Federal Aviation Administration June 2008 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

The FAA invites public comments about our intention to request the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to approve a current information collection. Information will be used to determine if licensees have complied with financial responsibility requirements (including maximum probable loss determination) as set forth in FAA regulations.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Boeing Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series airplanes. That AD currently requires reviewing airplane maintenance records, doing repetitive inspections for cracking of the yaw damper actuator portion of the upper and lower rudder power control modules (PCMs), replacing the PCMs if necessary, and reporting all airplane maintenance records review and inspection results to the manufacturer. This new AD limits the applicability, reduces the initial inspection threshold and repetitive interval, removes the reporting requirement, and requires installation of a secondary retention device for the yaw damper modulating piston. Installation of the secondary retention device terminates the repetitive inspection requirements. This AD results from additional reports of failure or cracking of the PCM manifold in the area of the yaw damper cavity endcap at intervals well below the initial inspection threshold of the existing AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded left rudder hardover in the event of cracking in the yaw damper actuator portion of the upper or lower rudder PCMs, and subsequent failure of the PCM manifold, which could result in increased pilot workload, and possible runway departure upon landing.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announces that it is reviewing a proposed noise compatibility program that was submitted for Marana Regional Airport under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 47501 et seq. (the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'') and 14 CFR Part 150 by the Town of Marana, Arizona. This program was submitted subsequent to a determination by FAA that associated noise exposure maps submitted under 14 CFR Part 150 for Marana Regional Airport were in compliance with applicable requirements, effective December 7, 2007 (72 FR 71475). The proposed noise compatibility program will be approved or disapproved on or before December 3, 2008.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series airplanes. This proposed AD would require installing an extension tube to the existing pump discharge port of the scavenge pump on the outboard side of the center fuel tank in the main fuel tank 2. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent a fire or explosion in the fuel tank and consequent loss of the airplane.

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain M7 Aerospace LP SA226 and SA227 series airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect electrical wires/components, hydraulic and bleed air tube assemblies at left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) inboard wing leading edge/battery box areas, LH/RH wing stations 51.167 to 81.174, and at all feed-through locations into the LH/RH inboard keelson. If chafing/ arcing is found, this AD requires you to reposition, repair, and/or replace all chafed electrical wires, components, and hydraulic and bleed air tube assemblies, as required. This AD also requires you to reposition the battery lead cables, cover four-gauge wires leaving the battery box with firesleeving and secure with clamps, and protect the battery power cable. This AD results from five reports of chafing between the bleed air tube and the electrical starter cables with one incident resulting in a fire. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct chafing/arcing of electrical wires, components, and bleed air lines. This condition could result in arcing of the exposed wires and burn a hole in the bleed air line or the nearby hydraulic line, and lead to a possible hydraulic fluid leak and fire in the engine nacelle compartment.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

We are revising an original NPRM for the products listed above. This action revises the original NPRM by expanding the scope. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The aim of * * * [Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88] is to require all holders of type certificates * * * to carry out a definition review against explosion hazards.

The FAA is correcting a previously published final rule entitled Performance and Handling Qualities Requirements for Rotorcraft. In that final rule, we inadvertently left two cited references unchanged. The intent of this action is to correct the error in the regulation to ensure the requirement is clear and accurate.

This action proposes to establish Class E airspace at Weiser Municipal Airport, Weiser, ID. Additional controlled airspace is necessary to accommodate aircraft using a new Area Navigation (RNAV) Global Positioning System (GPS) Standard Instrument Approach Procedure (SIAP) at Weiser Municipal Airport, Weiser, ID. The FAA is proposing this action to enhance the safety and management of aircraft operations at Weiser Municipal Airport, Weiser, ID.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. Model A109E, A109S, and A119 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the technical agent for Italy, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states in the MCAI:

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Lockheed Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G series airplanes. This proposed AD would require revising the FAA-approved maintenance program by incorporating new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. This proposed AD would also require the accomplishment of certain fuel system modifications, the initial inspections of certain repetitive fuel system limitations to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary. This proposed AD results from a design review of the fuel tank systems. We are proposing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Sandel Avionics Incorporated Model ST3400 TAWS/RMI units as described above. The existing AD currently requires installing a warning placard on the TAWS/RMI and revising the Limitations section of the airplane flight manual (AFM). The existing AD also requires installing upgraded software in the TAWS/RMI. This new AD allows installing later revisions of the software described in the existing AD. This AD results from a report that an in-flight bearing error occurred in a Model ST3400 TAWS/RMI configured to receive bearing information from a very high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) receiver interface via a composite video signal, due to a combination of input signal fault and software error. We are issuing this AD to prevent a bearing error, which could lead to an airplane departing from its scheduled flight path, which could result in a reduction in separation from, and a possible collision with, other aircraft or terrain.

This Rule establishes, amends, suspends, or revokes STANDARD Instrument Approach Procedures (SIAPs) and associated Takeoff Minimums and Obstacle Departure Procedures for operations at certain airports. These regulatory actions are needed because of the adoption of new or revised criteria, or because of changes occurring in the National Airspace System, such as the commissioning of new navigational facilities, adding new obstacles, or changing air traffic requirements. These changes are designed to provide safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace and to promote safe flight operations under instrument flight rules at the affected airports.

This action confirms the effective date and makes a correction to the direct final rule published in the Federal Register January 30, 2008, that establishes controlled airspace at Marienville, PA (73 FR 5431), Docket No. FAA-2007-0162. In the airspace description, the wrong name was used for the Airport. This action corrects that error.

This action confirms the effective date of a direct final rule published in the Federal Register on February 21, 2008 (FR 73 9445) Docket No. FAA-2008-0130 that modifies Class E Airspace at Wilkes- Barre, PA. Additionally, this action corrects a minor technical error in the publication of the coordinates for the Wyoming Valley Medical Center, Wilkes-Barre, PA and the Community Medical Center, Scranton, PA.

This action confirms the effective date of a direct final rule published in the Federal Register (73 FR 9186) that establishes Class E Airspace at Vinalhaven, ME to support a new Area Navigation (RNAV) Global Positioning System (GPS) Special Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) that has been developed for medical flight operations into the Mary Talbot Memorial Airfield.

This action withdraws the direct final rule published in the Federal Register March 21, 2008 establishing Class E Airspace at Lady Lake, FL (73 FR 15060), Docket No. FAA-2008-0072. This Direct final rule is being withdrawn in recognition of existing Class E Airspace at Lady Lake, FL that adequately supports the new Area Navigation (RNAV) Global Positioning System (GPS) Special Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) that has been developed for medical flight operations into the Village of Homewood Lady Lake Hospital.

The FAA invites public comments about our intention to request the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) approval of a new information collection. The Federal Register Notice with a 60-day comment period soliciting comments on the following collection of information was published on March 20, 2008, vol. 73, no. 55, page 15042. This project involves the random and representative sampling of Flight Attendants currently employed by U.S. air carriers.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires various repetitive inspections to detect cracks along the chemically milled steps of the fuselage skin or missing or loose fasteners in the area of the preventative modification or repairs, replacement of the time-limited repair with the permanent repair if applicable, and applicable corrective actions if necessary, which would end certain repetitive inspections. This AD results from a fatigue test that revealed numerous cracks in the upper skin panel at the chemically milled step above the lap joint. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such fatigue-related cracks, which could result in the crack tips continuing to turn and grow to the point where the skin bay flaps open, causing decompression of the airplane.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The assessment and lightning tests showed that certain fuel tube self-bonded couplings do not provide sufficient lightning current capability. The assessment also showed that single failure of the integral bonding wire of the self-bonded couplings could affect electrical bonding between the tubes. Insufficient electrical bonding between fuel tubes or insufficient current capability of fuel tube couplings, if not corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source[s] inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel tank explosion. * * *