Federal Aviation Administration January 2011 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

This action proposes to amend Class E airspace at Raton, NM. Additional controlled airspace is necessary to accommodate new Standard Instrument Approach Procedures (SIAP) at Raton Municipal Airport/Crews Field. The FAA is taking this action to enhance the safety and management of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations for SIAPs at the airport.

This action proposes to amend Class E airspace at Terre Haute, IN. Controlled airspace is necessary to accommodate new Standard Instrument Approach Procedures (SIAP) at Union Hospital Heliport. The FAA is taking this action to enhance the safety and management of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations at the heliport. This action also would change the name of Hulman Regional Airport and amend the geographic coordinates.

This action proposes to amend Class E airspace for the Indianapolis Executive Airport, Indianapolis, IN airspace area. Controlled airspace is necessary to accommodate new Standard Instrument Approach Procedures (SIAP) for the Clarian North Medical Center Heliport, Carmel, IN, and the Methodist Hospital of Indiana Heliport, Indianapolis, IN. The FAA is taking this action to enhance the safety and management of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations at the airport.

This action extends the comment period for an NPRM that was published on November 5, 2010. In that document, the FAA proposed to require each certificate holder operating under 14 CFR part 121 to develop and implement a safety management system (SMS) to improve its aviation related activities. Several trade and membership organizations representing various aviation industry segments have requested that the FAA extend the comment period closing date to allow time to adequately analyze the NPRM and prepare comments.

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-1, -1A, -1B, -7, -7A, -7B, -9, -9A, -11, -15, -15A, -17, -17A, -17R, and -17AR series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires revisions to the engine manufacturer's time limits section (TLS) to include enhanced inspection of selected critical life- limited parts at each piece-part opportunity. This AD modifies the TLS of the manufacturer's engine manual and an air carrier's approved continuous airworthiness maintenance program to incorporate additional inspection requirements and reduce the model applicability. This AD was prompted by PW developing, and the FAA approving, improved inspection procedures for the critical life-limited parts. The mandatory inspections are needed to identify those critical rotating parts with conditions which, if allowed to continue in service, could result in uncontained failures. We are issuing this AD to prevent critical life- limited rotating engine part failure, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.

These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 767- 300 series airplane. This airplane, as modified by TTF Aerospace, LLC, will have a novel or unusual design features associated with the pilot lower lobe crew rest module (CRM). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Pursuant to Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. App. 2), notice is hereby given of a teleconference of the Space Transportation Operations Working Group (STOWG) of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC). The teleconference will take place on Thursday, February 17, 2011, starting at 11 a.m. Eastern Standard Time. Individuals who plan to participate should contact Susan Lender, DFO, (the Contact Person listed below) by phone or e-mail for the teleconference call in number. The proposed agenda for this teleconference is to continue the discussion started during the October 6, 2010, working group meeting, and continued during the December 8, 2010, teleconference. This discussion will center on the orbital debris questions asked by the FAA; it will also include a look at responses to the Concept of Operation for Global Space Vehicle Debris Threat Management report. Interested members of the public may submit relevant written statements for the COMSTAC working group members to consider under the advisory process. Statements may concern the issues and agenda items mentioned above or additional issues that may be relevant for the U.S. commercial space transportation industry. Interested parties wishing to submit written statements should contact Susan Lender, DFO, (the Contact Person listed below) in writing (mail or e-mail) by February 11, 2011, so that the information can be made available to COMSTAC members for their review and consideration before the February 17, 2011, teleconference. Written statements should be supplied in the following formats: One hard copy with original signature or one electronic copy via e-mail. An agenda will be posted on the FAA Web site at https://www.faa.gov/ go/ast. Individuals who plan to participate and need special assistance should inform the Contact Person listed below in advance of the meeting.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD would require an inspection of the orientation of both sides of the coil cord connector keyways of the number 2 windows on the flight deck, re-clocking the connector keyways to 12 o'clock if necessary; and replacing the coil cord assemblies on both number 2 windows on the flight deck. This proposed AD was prompted by reports of arcing and smoke at the number 2 window in the flight deck. We are proposing this AD to prevent arcing, smoke, and fire in the flight deck, which could lead to injuries to or incapacitation of the flight crew.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracks in the fuselage skin and backup structure at the lower VHF antenna cutout at station 1197 + 99 between stringers 39 left and 39 right, and corrective actions if necessary. Certain repairs terminate certain inspection requirements. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking found in the section 46 fuselage lower skin around the periphery of the VHF antenna baseplate at station 1197 + 99. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracks in the fuselage skin and internal backup structure, which could result in rapid decompression of the airplane.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

This document requests public comment on the supplementary material provided by the applicant, Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport), in response to the FAA's requests for clarification of its application to impose and use a PFC at General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport, East Boston, Massachusetts. The FAA received additional documentation and information in support of Massport's PFC application, received April 15, 2010. The FAA is soliciting public comment on this supplementary material. Once received and following the FAA's review of any comments submitted pursuant to this notice, a Final Agency Decision is anticipated either approving or disapproving the application, in whole or in part, within 60 days of the date of this Notice. The ruling will be issued under the provisions of the 49 U.S.C. 40117 and 14 Code of Federal Regulations part 158 (14 CFR part 158).

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

This establishes, amends, suspends, or revokes Standard Instrument Approach Procedures (SIAPs) and associated Takeoff Minimums and Obstacle Departure Procedures for operations at certain airports. These regulatory actions are needed because of the adoption of new or revised criteria, or because of changes occurring in the National Airspace System, such as the commissioning of new navigational facilities, adding new obstacles, or changing air traffic requirements. These changes are designed to provide safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace and to promote safe flight operations under instrument flight rules at the affected airports.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD supersedes Emergency AD 2011-01-51, requires an immediate functional test of the fuselage drain holes, and requires sending a report of the results to the FAA. This AD also allows, with noted exceptions, for the return/ position of the airplane to a home base, hangar, maintenance facility, etc. This AD was prompted by reports of water accumulation in the belly of the fuselage that froze and caused the flight controls to jam. We are issuing this AD to prevent water or fluid from accumulating in the belly of the fuselage and freezing when the aircraft reaches and holds altitudes where the temperature is below the freezing point. This condition could cause the flight controls to jam with consequent loss of control.

The FAA is issuing this notice to advise the public of a meeting of RTCA Special Committee 224: Airport Security Access Control Systems.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This proposed AD would result in all airplanes having new relays with a ground fault interrupter (GFI) feature. This proposed AD would require, depending on airplane configuration, doing certain wiring changes, replacing the fuel pump power control relays for the main, center and auxiliary tanks, as applicable, with new relays having a GFI feature, performing certain bonding resistance measurements, and modifying relay module assemblies. The proposed AD also would require revising the maintenance program to incorporate Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) 28-AWL-23 (for Model 737-100, 737-200, and 737-200C series airplanes), and 28-AWL-22 (for Model 737-300, 737-400, and 737- 500 series airplanes). This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent damage to the fuel pumps caused by electrical arcing that could introduce an ignition source in the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

This final rule requires all certificate holders conducting operations under part 135 to include in their training programs crew resource management training for crewmembers, including pilots and flight attendants. This final rule is needed to ensure that crewmembers in part 135 operations receive training in the use of crew resource management principles, as appropriate for their operation. This final rule responds to National Transportation Safety Board recommendations, addresses a recommendation from the Part 125/135 Aviation Rulemaking Committee, and codifies current FAA guidance. The intended effect of this final rule is to reduce the frequency and severity of errors that are crew based, which will reduce the frequency of accidents and incidents within the scope of part 135 operations.

This notice contains a summary of a petition seeking relief from specified requirements of 14 CFR. The purpose of this notice is to improve the public's awareness of, and participation in, this aspect of FAA's regulatory activities. Neither publication of this notice nor the inclusion or omission of information in the summary is intended to affect the legal status of the petition or its final disposition.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This proposed AD would require repetitive inspections for hydraulic fluid contamination of the interior of the strut disconnect assembly; repetitive inspections for discrepancies of the interior of the strut disconnect assembly, if necessary; repetitive inspections of the exterior of the strut disconnect assembly for cracks, if necessary; and corrective action if necessary. This proposed AD also provides an optional terminating action for the inspections. This proposed AD results from reports of system disconnect boxes that have been contaminated with hydraulic fluid and, in one incident, led to subsequent cracking of titanium parts in the system disconnect assembly. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct hydraulic fluid contamination, which can cause cracking of titanium parts in the system disconnect assembly, resulting in compromise of the engine firewall. A cracked firewall can allow fire in the engine area to enter the strut and can lead to an uncontained engine strut fire if flammable fluid is present. Cracking of the disconnect box may also reduce the effectiveness of the fire extinguishing system in the engine compartment and could contribute to an uncontained engine fire. In addition, a cracked disconnect box can leak flammable fluids into the engine core, which can initiate an engine fire, and lead to one or both fire conditions discussed above.

This action proposes to establish Class E airspace at Kahului Airport, Kahului, HI. Controlled airspace is necessary to accommodate aircraft using the Instrument Landing System (ILS) standard instrument approach procedures at Kahului Airport, Kahului, HI. The FAA is proposing this action to enhance the safety and management of aircraft operations at the airport.

This action proposes to modify Class E airspace at Yellowstone Airport, West Yellowstone, MT, to accommodate aircraft using the Instrument Landing System (ILS) Localizer (LOC) standard instrument approach procedures at Yellowstone Airport, West Yellowstone, MT. The FAA is proposing this action to enhance the safety and management of aircraft operations at Yellowstone Airport.

This action changes the effective date for the establishment of Class E airspace at Port Clarence Coast Guard Station (CGS) Airport, Port Clarence, AK. The charting of this airspace has been delayed; therefore the effective date of the establishment of the Class E airspace area also must be delayed. A minor correction to a geographic coordinate also will be made.

The FAA proposes to supersede an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Model 757 airplanes. The existing AD currently requires inspecting certain power feeder wire bundles for damage, inspecting the support clamps for these wire bundles to determine whether the clamps are properly installed, and performing corrective actions if necessary. This proposed AD would require additional inspections for certain airplanes. This proposed AD results from a report that a power feeder wire bundle chafed against the number six auxiliary slat track, causing electrical wires in the bundle to arc, which damaged both the auxiliary slat track and power feeder wires. We are proposing this AD to prevent arcing that could be a possible ignition source for leaked flammable fluids, which could result in a fire. Arcing could also result in a loss of power from the generator connected to the power feeder wire bundle, and consequent loss of systems, which could reduce controllability of the airplane.

The FAA is correcting the regulation addressing the effective date of FAA determinations issued under 14 CFR part 77. The FAA amended this regulation by final rule published on July 21, 2010. The purpose of the final rule was to update the regulations governing objects that may affect the navigable airspace, to incorporate case law and legislative action, and to simplify the rule language. In one section of the regulations, we inadvertently state that the effective date of all determinations is 40 days from the date of issuance. However, only FAA determinations subject to the discretionary review process are effective 40 days from the date of issuance. All other FAA determinations are effective upon issuance. This document corrects that error.

This action removes and establishes high altitude Alaskan compulsory reporting points in the vicinity of the United States (U.S.) and Canadian border. Specifically, the FAA is removing BORAN and establishing the TOVAD reporting point.