Department of Transportation February 2010 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

FMCSA previously announced its decision to renew the exemptions from the vision requirement in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations for 10 individuals. FMCSA has statutory authority to exempt individuals from the vision requirement if the exemptions granted will not compromise safety. The Agency has concluded that granting these exemptions will provide a level of safety that will be equivalent to, or greater than, the level of safety maintained without the exemptions for these commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers.

FMCSA announces its decision to renew the exemptions from the vision requirement in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations for 5 individuals. FMCSA has statutory authority to exempt individuals from the vision requirement if the exemptions granted will not compromise safety. The Agency has concluded that granting these exemption renewals will provide a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater than, the level of safety maintained without the exemptions for these commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers.

FMCSA previously announced its decision to renew the exemptions from the vision requirement in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations for 27 individuals. FMCSA has statutory authority to exempt individuals from the vision requirement if the exemptions granted will not compromise safety. The Agency has concluded that granting these exemptions will provide a level of safety that will be equivalent to, or greater than, the level of safety maintained without the exemptions for these commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers.

FMCSA announces that Volvo Trucks North America (Volvo) has applied for an exemption from the Federal requirement for a driver of commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) to hold a commercial driver's license (CDL). Volvo requests that the exemption cover one Swedish field-test engineer who will test-drive CMVs for Volvo within the United States. The Volvo employee holds a valid Swedish CDL. Volvo states the exemption is needed to support a Volvo field test to meet future clean air standards, to test-drive Volvo prototype vehicles to verify results in ``real world'' environments, and, if necessary, to deliver the vehicles in the United States. Volvo believes the knowledge and skills tests and training program that Swedish drivers undergo to obtain a Swedish CDL ensures the exemption would provide a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater than, the level of safety obtained by complying with the U.S. requirements for a CDL.

This supplemental NPRM revises an earlier proposed airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from additional mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Engine in-flight shutdown incidents have been reported on Diamond Aircraft Industries DA 42 airplanes equipped with TAE 125 engines. The investigations showed that it was mainly the result of failure of the Proportional Pressure Reducing Valve (PPRV) (also known as Propeller Control Valve) due to high vibrations. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of engine in-flight shutdown, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aircraft. Since the release of European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2008-0145, the engine gearbox has been identified as the primary source of vibrations for the PPRV, and it has also been determined that failure of the electrical connection to the PPRV could have contributed to some power loss events or in-flight shutdowns. We are proposing this AD to prevent engine in-flight shutdown, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aircraft.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several occurrences of loss of the AC [alternating current] BUS 1 have been reported which led in some instances to the loss of the AC ESS [essential] BUS and DC [direct current] ESS BUS and connected systems. The affected systems include multiple flight deck Display Units (Primary Flight Display, Navigation Display and Upper Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring display). The loss of multiple display units, if not corrected expediently during a high workload period, potentially affects the capability of the flight crew and could contribute to a loss of situational awareness and consequent control of the aeroplane, which would constitute an unsafe condition.

In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), this notice announces that the Information Collection Requirements (ICRs) abstracted below have been forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and comment. The ICRs describes the nature of the information collection and their expected burden. The Federal Register notice with a 60-day comment period soliciting comments on the following collections of information was published on December 16, 2009 (74 FR 66722).

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Augustair, Inc. Models 2150, 2150A, and 2180 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the vertical stabilizer front spar for cracks and loose fasteners, repair any cracks and loose fasteners found, and reinforce the vertical stabilizer spar regardless if cracks are found. This AD results from six reports of airplanes with a cracked vertical stabilizer front spar. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the vertical stabilizer front spar, which could result in separation of the vertical stabilizer from the airplane. This failure could lead to loss of control.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers. That AD requires, for certain serial numbers (S/Ns) of McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers, initial and repetitive visual and dye penetrant inspections for cracks in the propeller hub, replacement of propellers with cracks that do not meet acceptable limits, and rework of propellers with cracks that meet acceptable limits. This AD requires, for all McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers, the same actions but at reduced compliance times. This AD also requires inspections of the bolt holes, reaming holes if necessary, and inspections of steel reinforcement plates and gaskets. This AD results from 16 reports received of propeller hubs found cracked since AD 2003-12-05 was issued. We are issuing this AD to prevent propeller separation due to hub fatigue cracking, which can result in loss of control of the airplane.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series airplanes. This proposed AD would require a detailed inspection of the entryway door movable ceiling panel for pin migration at either end of the hinge assembly and damage to the pin; a detailed inspection for correct crimp at both ends and damage to hinge stock; a detailed inspection of the ceiling area for any visible cosmetic and/or tie-rod chafing that could be caused by a migrated hinge pin; and a detailed inspection for wire damage and/or breakage; and other specified and corrective actions if necessary. This proposed AD results from reports of fault messages caused by improperly crimped hinge pins coming into contact with wires and causing damage. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct improperly crimped hinge pins, which could damage tie rods and wire bundles, causing shorts in many systems, including the spar fuel shut off valve, oxygen mask deployment, and burned wires, which could be an ignition source in a hidden area of the airplane.

The FAA amends digital flight data recorder regulations affecting certain air carriers and operators. This final rule prohibits the filtering of some original flight recorder sensor signals unless a certificate holder can show that the data can be accurately reconstructed. This final rule improves the integrity and quality of the data recorded on digital flight data recorders while giving aircraft designers and operators more flexibility in system design and operation where allowable.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. Models PA-32R-301T and PA-46-350P airplanes. This proposed AD would require you to replace any spot- welded V-band exhaust coupling with a riveted V-band exhaust coupling. This proposed AD results from reports that spot-welded V-band exhaust couplings are failing. We are proposing this AD to prevent failure of the V-band exhaust coupling, which could cause the exhaust pipe to detach from the turbocharger. This failure could result in release of high temperature gases inside the engine compartment and possibly cause an in-flight fire. An in-flight fire could lead to loss of control.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

This notice announces the availability of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the US-31 Holland to Grand Haven Project. This action is pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq, as amended and the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508). The FEIS identifies the Preferred Alternative which proposes improvements to US-31 from East Lakewood Boulevard north to Quincy Street, in Holland; and from south of Franklin Street north to north of Jackson Street in Grand Haven. The new M-231 route would be constructed west of 120th Avenue, from M-45 (Lake Michigan Drive) north to the I-96/M-104 interchange, including a new crossing of the Grand River; improvements to M-104, near I-96; new ramps at the I-96/M-231 interchange; and improvements to the I-96/112th Avenue interchange.

The FAA invites public comments about our intention to request the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) revision of a current information collection. The Federal Register Notice with a 60-day comment period soliciting comments on the following collection of information was published on October 16, 2009, vol. 74, no. 199, page 53316. FAR Part 157 requires that each person who intends to construct, deactivate, or change the status of an airport, runway, or taxiway must notify the FAA of such activity.

The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for RRC AE 3007A series turbofan engines. This proposed AD would require removing or performing initial and repetitive eddy current inspections (ECIs) or surface wave ultrasonic testing (SWUT) inspections on high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 wheels for cracks. This proposed AD also reduces the approved life limits of certain HPT stage 2 wheels. This proposed AD results from reports of cracked HPT stage 2 wheels. We are proposing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the HPT stage 2 wheel and damage to the airplane.

The FHWA, on behalf of Caltrans, is issuing this notice to announce actions taken by Caltrans and other Federal agencies, that are final within the meaning of 23 U.S.C. 139(l)(1). The actions relate to a proposed Physical Suicide Deterrent System on the Golden Gate Bridge on US Route 101 at the San Francisco/Marin County line, State of California. Those actions grant licenses, permits, and approvals for the project.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2500-A1, V2525-D5 and V2528-D5 turbofan engines and certain serial numbers (S/Ns) of IAE V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 turbofan engines. For certain S/Ns of V2500-A1, V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 series turbofan engines, this proposed AD would require initial and repetitive on-wing ultrasonic inspections (UIs) of the high-pressure compressor (HPC) stage 3 to 8 drum for cracks. As mandatory terminating action to the repetitive inspections, this proposed AD would require removal from service of the fully silver plated nuts attaching the HPC stage 3 to 8 drum to the HPC stage 9 to 12 drum, removal of silver residue from the HPC stage 3 to 8 drum, and fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) of the stage 3 to 8 drum within a specified time. For all other engines, this proposed AD would require removal from service of the fully silver plated nuts attaching the HPC stage 3 to 8 drum to the HPC stage 9 to 12 drum, removal of silver residue from the HPC stage 3 to 8 drum, and FPI of the HPC stage 3 to 8 drum at the next drum piece-part exposure. This proposed AD results from reports of 39 HPC stage 3 to 8 drums found cracked since March 2009. We are proposing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the HPC stage 3 to 8 drum, which could result in damage to the airplane.