Department of Transportation September 25, 2015 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

This action affirms the order published in the Federal Register on April 3, 2015, regarding the application of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 193, Federal Contract Tower SAFER- FCT Program and the Air Traffic Organization Engineers and Architects, Staff Support Specialist (Series 2186) and Flight Procedures Team (hereinafter ``Region X'') ATSAP-X Program. The Notice proposed that safety information provided to the FAA under the SAFER-FCT and ATSAP-X programs be designated by an FAA Order as protected from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 14 CFR part 193, Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information. The designation is intended to encourage persons to voluntarily provide information to the FAA under the SAFER-FCT and ATSAP-X, so the FAA can learn about and address aviation safety hazards and implement, as appropriate corrective measures for events or safety issues.

We are revising an earlier proposed airworthiness directive (AD) for The Boeing Company Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes, equipped with Rolls-Royce Model RB211-Trent 800 engines. The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposed to require repetitive inspections of the thrust reverser (T/R) structure and sealant, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The NPRM was prompted by reports of T/R events related to thermal damage of the T/R inner wall. This action revises the NPRM by proposing to add different repetitive inspections requirements for T/R halves with a thermal protective system installed. This action also revises the NPRM by proposing to require installation of serviceable T/R halves, which would terminate the repetitive inspections in this SNPRM. This SNPRM also proposes to revise the inspection or maintenance program by incorporating new airworthiness limitations. We are proposing this SNPRM to detect and correct a degraded T/R inner wall panel, which could lead to failure of the T/R and adjacent components and their consequent separation from the airplane, and which could result in a rejected takeoff (RTO) and cause asymmetric thrust and consequent loss of control of the airplane during reverse thrust operation. If a T/R inner wall overheats, separated components could cause structural damage to the airplane, damage to other airplanes, or possible injury to people on the ground. Since these actions impose an additional burden over that proposed in the NPRM, we are reopening the comment period to allow the public the chance to comment on these proposed changes.

This action makes a correction to the NPRM published in the Federal Register of August 27, 2015, proposing to establish Class E en route domestic airspace in the International Falls, MN area. Exclusionary reference to Canadian airspace was omitted from the regulatory text.

This action amends Class E Airspace at Mackall Army Airfield (AAF), NC, bringing current the regulatory text under the airspace designation for Mackall AAF, NC, by replacing the acronym ``NCB'' with ``NDB''. This is an administrative change to coincide with the FAA's aeronautical database.

We propose to supersede airworthiness directive (AD) 2014-07- 04R1 for certain Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters. AD 2014-07-04R1 currently requires repetitive inspections in the upper deck area for incorrectly installed clamps and chafing between the electrical wires and the hydraulic lines and replacing any unairworthy wires or hydraulic lines. Since we issued AD 2014-07-04R1, the manufacturer has developed an alteration that corrects the unsafe condition described in AD 2014-07-04R1. This proposed AD would require altering the wiring system in the upper deck area. These proposed actions are intended to prevent a fire in an area of the helicopter without extinguishing capability and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

In accordance with the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5117(c), PHMSA is publishing the following list of special permit applications that have been in process for 180 days or more. The reason(s) for delay and the expected completion date for action on each application is provided in association with each identified application.