Department of Transportation June 28, 2013 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

FMCSA announces the granting of an exemption of 55 member- companies of the American Pyrotechnics Association (APA) from FMCSA's regulation prohibiting drivers of commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) from driving after the 14th hour after coming on duty. The FMCSA renews the exemption for 45 APA member-companies and grants 10 additional carriers coverage by the exemption, which is applicable during the periods June 28-July 8, 2013, and June 28-July 8, 2014, inclusive. The requested renewal of the exemption for one motor carrier is being denied. Additionally, the APA advised FMCSA of the removal from the original renewal application of two companies that are no longer in business or no longer members of the APA. The original application was for 58 carriers; two were removed by APA and one denied by FMCSA, leaving 55 carriers being granted the exemption. Drivers who operate these CMVs in conjunction with staging fireworks shows celebrating Independence Day will be allowed to exclude off-duty and sleeper-berth time of any length from the calculation of the 14 hours. These drivers will continue to be subject to a prohibition from driving after accumulating 14 hours on duty, the 11-hour driving time limit, and the 60- and 70- hour limits. FMCSA believes that with the terms and conditions in place, APA-member motor carriers will maintain a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater than, the level of safety that would be obtained by complying with the regulation.

The FAA is issuing this notice to advise the public that a Written Re-Evaluation and Record of Decision (ROD) for an Environmental Impact Statement has been prepared for Theodore Francis Green Airport in Warwick, Rhode Island.

As authorized by 46 U.S.C. 12121, the Secretary of Transportation, as represented by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), is authorized to grant waivers of the U.S.-build requirement of the coastwise laws under certain circumstances. A request for such a waiver has been received by MARAD. The vessel, and a brief description of the proposed service, is listed below.

FRA issues this proposed rule in accordance with a statutory mandate that the Secretary of Transportation require certain major railroads to develop, and submit to the Secretary for approval, critical incident stress plans that provide for appropriate support services to be offered to their employees who are affected by a ``critical incident'' as defined by the Secretary. The NPRM proposes a definition of the term ``critical incident,'' the elements appropriate for the rail environment to be included in a railroad's critical incident stress plan, the type of employees to be covered by the plan, a requirement that a covered railroad submit its plan to FRA for approval, and a requirement that a railroad adopt and comply with its FRA-approved plan.

We are publishing a new airworthiness directive (AD) for various model helicopters with certain part-numbered and serial- numbered Goodrich externally-mounted hoists installed. This AD requires performing a cable conditioning lift and a load inspection test, deactivating or replacing any hoist that fails the load inspection test, and recording the results of the load inspection test. This AD is prompted by a report of a failure of the overload clutch resulting in an in-flight failure of a hoist containing a dummy load during a maintenance flight. These actions are intended to detect conditions that may result in failure of the hoist and injury to persons being lifted.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of chafing found on the main landing gear (MLG) yoke. The chafing was attributed to contact between the nacelle fire detection wires and the MLG yoke. This AD requires inspections of the nacelle fire detection wires and the MLG yoke for damage; replacing nacelle fire detection wires, if necessary; repairing the MLG yoke, if necessary; and installing brackets and associated hardware to secure the fire detection wires. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing between the nacelle fire detection wires and the MLG yoke. Chafing could lead to cracking and subsequent failure of the MLG yoke, which could adversely affect the safe landing of the airplane. In addition, chafing of the nacelle fire detection wires could cause them to fail and prevent the detection of a fire in the nacelle assembly.