Federal Aviation Administration February 19, 2014 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

These special conditions are issued for the Bombardier Inc. Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes. These airplanes will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These features are associated with the materials used to fabricate the fuselage, which may affect fire propagation during an in-flight fire. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, FAA invites public comments about our intention to request the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval to renew an information collection. The Federal Register Notice with a 60-day comment period soliciting comments on the following collection of information was published on December 12, 2013, vol. 78, no. 239, page 75670-75671. The Advanced Qualification Program uses data driven quality control processes for validating and maintaining the effectiveness of air carrier training program curriculum content.

We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2009-26-16 for certain The Boeing Company Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. AD 2009- 26-16 required inspecting to determine if wires touch the upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank, and marking the location, as necessary; inspecting all wire bundles above the center upper auxiliary fuel tank for splices and damage; inspecting for damage to the fuel vapor barrier seal and upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank; and performing corrective actions, as necessary. AD 2009-26-16 also required installing nonmetallic barrier/shield sleeving, new clamps, new attaching hardware, and a new extruded channel. This new AD requires inspections of additional center upper auxiliary fuel tank locations and corrective actions as necessary. This AD was prompted by reports that identified additional locations where inspections and corrective actions of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank are needed. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 series airplanes, and Model A340-200, - 300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by results from fuel system reviews conducted by the airplane manufacturer. This AD requires removing bulb-type maintenance lights; installing a drain mast on certain airplanes; and installing muffs on connecting bleed elements on certain airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and SA330J helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the crimping of the ball joint of the upper- and lower- end-fittings of the main servo-control and, depending on findings, replacing the main servo-control or repairing the ball joint. This AD was prompted by incidents of missing crimping on the ball joints of servo-control end-fittings. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of a main servo-control upper end fitting, and subsequent failure of the flight controls and loss of control of the helicopter.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Model 204B helicopters with a certain cable assembly installed. This AD requires inspecting the tail rotor (T/R) cable assembly for an incorrectly machined body. This AD is prompted by a report from Bell that a defective body on the cable prevents the barrel assembly from fully engaging in the body cavity. These actions are intended to prevent disengagement of the cable from the barrel, failure of the T/R pitch control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.