Department of Transportation July 10, 2008 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for PW models JT9D-7, -7A, -7AH, -7H, -7F, and -7J turbofan engines. This proposed AD would require initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the 2nd stage high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor and stator assembly. This proposed AD results from an uncontained failure of a 2nd stage HPT rotor disk that caused the engine to separate from the airplane. We are proposing this AD to prevent failure of the 2nd stage HPT rotor disk, which could result in uncontained engine failure, damage to the airplane, and the engine separating from the airplane.

As authorized by Public Law 105-383 and Public Law 107-295, the Secretary of Transportation, as represented by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), is authorized to grant waivers of the U.S.- build requirement of the coastwise laws under certain circumstances. A request for such a waiver has been received by MARAD. The vessel, and a brief description of the proposed service, is listed below. The complete application is given in DOT docket MARAD-2008-XXXX at https:// www.regulations.gov. Interested parties may comment on the effect this action may have on U.S. vessel builders or businesses in the U.S. that use U.S.-flag vessels. If MARAD determines, in accordance with Public Law 105-383 and MARAD's regulations at 46 CFR part 388 (68 FR 23084; April 30, 2003), that the issuance of the waiver will have an unduly adverse effect on a U.S.-vessel builder or a business that uses U.S.- flag vessels in that business, a waiver will not be granted. Comments should refer to the docket number of this notice and the vessel name in order for MARAD to properly consider the comments. Comments should also state the commenter's interest in the waiver application, and address the waiver criteria given in Sec. 388.4 of MARAD's regulations at 46 CFR part 388.

As authorized by Public Law 105-383 and Public Law 107-295, the Secretary of Transportation, as represented by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), is authorized to grant waivers of the U.S.- build requirement of the coastwise laws under certain circumstances. A request for such a waiver has been received by MARAD. The vessel, and a brief description of the proposed service, is listed below. The complete application is given in DOT docket MARAD-2008-0063 at https:// www.regulations.gov. Interested parties may comment on the effect this action may have on U.S. vessel builders or businesses in the U.S. that use U.S.-flag vessels. If MARAD determines, in accordance with Public Law 105-383 and MARAD's regulations at 46 CFR part 388 (68 FR 23084; April 30, 2003), that the issuance of the waiver will have an unduly adverse effect on a U.S.-vessel builder or a business that uses U.S.- flag vessels in that business, a waiver will not be granted. Comments should refer to the docket number of this notice and the vessel name in order for MARAD to properly consider the comments. Comments should also state the commenter's interest in the waiver application, and address the waiver criteria given in Sec. 388.4 of MARAD's regulations at 46 CFR part 388.

This notice announces Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval and extension until March 28, 2011 for an information collection request entitled ``Hazardous Materials Public Sector Training and Planning Grants,'' under OMB Control No. 2137-0586. This ICR was revised to implement a statutory provision authorizing PHMSA to request information from states concerning fees related to the transportation of hazardous materials. We are reserving these questions for use in a pilot project we are currently developing. In addition, this ICR was revised to include more detailed information from grantees to enable us to more accurately evaluate the effectiveness of the grant program in meeting emergency response planning and training needs. These questions are to be answered during the close-out procedures conducted and submitted at the end of the application cycle.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-4 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The aviation authority of Canada, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states in the MCAI: ``It has been determined that some helicopters have been fitted with a CRES steel fitting, part number (P/N) 407-030-750-103, and the installation of the tailboom attachment bolt does not meet the design criteria.'' We are issuing this AD to require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition that results from an improper installation of the tailboom attachment bolt in the upper left-hand tailboom attachment CRES steel fitting.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. Model AB 139 and AW 139 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Technical Agent for Italy, with which we have a bilateral agreement, which indicates that the Agusta AB 139's and AW 139's Fuselage Frame 5700 middle section is prone to fatigue damage. The actions are intended to detect cracks in the fuselage frame structure and to prevent structural failure in this area.

This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 222, 222B, 222U, 230 and 430 helicopters that requires rewiring and testing the fuel valve switch on each engine and testing the ignitor system. This amendment is prompted by an in-flight incident in which a fuel valve switch failed, causing the fuel valve to inadvertently close. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent interruption of the fuel supply caused by failure of the fuel switch, which could result in loss of engine power and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.