Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories; Supplier's Declaration of Conformity, 62327-62339 [E8-24826]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 203 / Monday, October 20, 2008 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration
[Docket No. OSHA–2008–0032]
Nationally Recognized Testing
Laboratories; Supplier’s Declaration of
Conformity
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Request for information.
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AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration requests
comment on a proposal submitted to
OSHA by the European Commission to
permit the use of a Supplier’s
Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) as an
alternative to the Nationally Recognized
Testing Laboratories (NRTLs) productapproval process.
DATES: You must submit information or
comments by the following dates:
• Hard copy: postmarked or sent by
January 20, 2009.
• Electronic transmission or
facsimile: sent by January 20, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods:
Electronically: You may submit
comments electronically at https://
www.regulations.gov, which is the
Federal eRulemaking Portal. Follow the
instructions online for making
electronic submissions.
Fax: If your submissions, including
attachments, are no longer than 10
pages, you may fax them to the OSHA
Docket Office at (202) 693–1648.
Mail, hand delivery, express mail, or
messenger or courier service: You must
submit three copies of your comments
to the OSHA Docket Office, Docket No.
OSHA–2008–0032, U.S. Department of
Labor, Room N–2625, 200 Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210.
Deliveries (hand, express mail,
messenger, and courier service) are
accepted during the Department of
Labor’s and Docket Office’s normal
business hours, 8:15 a.m.–4:45 p.m., e.t.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the Agency name and the OSHA
docket number (i.e. , OSHA–2008–
0032). Submissions, including any
personal information you provide, are
placed in the public docket without
change and may be made available
online at https://www.regulations.gov.
Docket: To read or download
submissions or other material in the
docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov
or the OSHA Docket Office at the
address above. All documents in the
docket are listed in the https://
www.regulations.gov index; however,
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some information (e.g. , copyrighted
material) is not publicly available to
read or download through the Web site.
All submissions, including copyrighted
material, are available for inspection
and copying at the OSHA Docket Office.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Press inquiries: Jennifer Ashley,
Director, OSHA Office of
Communications, Room N–3647, U.S.
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210;
telephone: (202) 693–1999. General and
technical information: MaryAnn
Garrahan, Director, Office of Technical
Programs and Coordination Activities,
NRTL Program, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, U.S. Department
of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue,
NW., Room N–3655, Washington, DC
20210; telephone: (202) 693–2110. Our
Web page includes information about
the NRTL Program (see https://
www.osha.gov and select ‘‘N’’ in the site
index).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
OSHA requests information and
comments on a proposal it received to
permit the use of a Supplier’s
Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) as an
alternative to the Nationally Recognized
Testing Laboratories (NRTLs) productapproval process. NRTLs are third-party
(i.e. , independent) laboratories that
have met OSHA’s requirements for
performing safety testing and
certification of electrical and other
products used in the workplace. NRTLs
test and certify these products to
determine whether they conform to
appropriate U.S. product-safety testing
standards. In contrast, an SDoC is a
written statement, produced by an
equipment manufacturer or supplier,
that a product meets or conforms to a
specified test standard or a set of
requirements. OSHA is aware of the
concept of manufacturer’s self-approval
and that it is allowed, for certain types
of products, in the U.S. (by certain
Federal agencies) and other countries.
Details on this use are covered later in
this RFI.
OSHA is taking this action in
response to a request from the European
Commission (EC) that OSHA allow an
SDoC system for certain electrical
products. SDoC is currently accepted for
certain electrical products in all
European Union (EU) countries. OSHA
issued a similar Request for Information
(RFI) in 2005 in response to a proposal
from an industry trade association for
OSHA to convert to an SDoC system for
IT-related products. At that time, OSHA
considered the responses from the 2005
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RFI to be insufficient to justify initiating
rulemaking for a change to an SDoC
system. Since then, OSHA has obtained
more information about SDoC, partially
through meetings with the EC, and this
information and the EC’s proposal raise
issues and topics that were not fully
explored in the 2005 RFI. The Agency
is currently interested in responses
specifically related to the issues and
topics raised in the EC proposal or
otherwise described in this present RFI.
OSHA will examine all responses
received from this RFI to determine
whether to initiate rulemaking or take
any other action with respect to SDoC.
OSHA requests comments from all
interested parties on any of the issues
raised in this RFI, or any other issues
the public feels is relevant for OSHA to
consider, and particularly seeks
comments that include specific detailed
scientific, technical, statistical, or
similar data and studies, of a credible
nature, supporting any claims made by
commenters. OSHA wants to emphasize
the importance of receiving such
evidentiary information.
The remainder of this notice is
divided into several sections. Section II
gives background information on
OSHA’s NRTL system for the approval
(also known as conformity assessment) 1
of electrical products. It also provides
background information on OSHA’s first
RFI on SDoC, and then describes events
leading to OSHA’s current RFI. It also
includes background information
regarding the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade. Next, section III discusses
requirements for OSHA rulemaking,
section IV summarizes key aspects of
the EC’s proposal related to SDoC,
section V discusses information that
OSHA has obtained to date on the
European Union’s (EU) SDoC system for
the approval of electrical products, and
section VI describes what OSHA has
found to date to be basic elements of an
SDoC system, discussing certain topics
and issues to provide a foundation for
the questions for which OSHA is
seeking specific information. Questions
for the public’s consideration are
included in the latter three sections.
1 While OSHA uses the term ‘‘approval’’ to
describe the type of testing or certification activities
performed by NRTLs, the international community
often uses a different term for such activities:
Conformity assessment. An international guide, ISO
Guide 2, defines ‘‘conformity assessment’’ as ‘‘any
activity concerned with determining directly or
indirectly that requirements are fulfilled.’’
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II. Background
A. OSHA Approval Requirements and
NRTL Program
Many of OSHA’s workplace standards
require that certain types of equipment
be approved by an NRTL. (In this RFI,
OSHA refers to these provisions as
‘‘NRTL approval requirements.’’) Most
of the requirements for NRTL approval
of equipment (also called ‘‘products’’
herein) used in the workplace are found
in the Agency’s General Industry
standards, 29 CFR part 1910. For
example, 29 CFR 1910.303(a) (read
together with the definitions of
‘‘approved’’ and ‘‘acceptable’’ in 29 CFR
1910.399) generally requires electric
equipment or products used in the
workplace to be approved by NRTLs. A
comprehensive list of NRTL approval
requirements and the categories of
products which must be approved can
be found on OSHA’s Web site at
www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/
index.html.
Since its inception, OSHA has
required that electric and other types of
equipment be approved by certain
qualified organizations as one measure
for ensuring the safety of this
equipment, thereby continuing the long
history in the U.S. of electric equipment
safety-testing being performed by thirdparty (i.e. , independent) organizations.
Adopting these requirements led
eventually to the establishment of the
NRTL Program, which ensures that
these organizations are qualified to
perform the product approvals.
OSHA’s NRTL Program recognition
process involves a thorough analysis of
an NRTL applicant’s policies and
procedures and a comprehensive on-site
review of the applicant’s testing and
certification facilities to ensure that the
applicant meets the requirements of 29
CFR 1910.7. OSHA’s staff also conducts
annual on-site audits to ensure that
existing NRTLs adequately perform
their testing and certification activities
and maintain the quality of those
operations.
OSHA imposes on the NRTLs several
requirements found in 29 CFR 1910.7.
Three of the requirements set forth the
definition for an organization’s testing
and certification capabilities. The
remaining requirement mandates an
organization’s complete independence
from any manufacturers, vendors, and
major users of equipment subject to the
requirements. This last requirement
ensures that organizations within the
program are third parties.2
2 NRTLs may be based in the U.S. or in other
countries. Currently, there are 15 NRTLs, of which
13 are established in the U.S. and two are foreignbased.
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NRTLs generally approve products for
a manufacturer before the products are
sold or shipped. The NRTL performs
two major functions in the productapproval process: Testing and
certification. For the first function, the
NRTL tests a representative unit or
prototype of the product to ensure that
it has appropriate safety features. For
this purpose, the NRTL may control and
accept testing performed by parties that
the NRTL has qualified. These parties
typically include independent testing
laboratories and even the product’s
manufacturer. The testing ensures that
the product conforms to the technical
requirements specified in test standards.
For the second function, the NRTL
certifies the product, not only by issuing
a certificate and authorizing use of its
certification mark, but more broadly
through listing and labeling, and followup inspection programs. The NRTL may
use a contractor under the NRTL’s
control to conduct the inspections.
Inspections must be done on a regular
basis at the product manufacturer’s
factories or assembling facilities to gain
assurance that all manufactured units of
the product are the same as the unit
initially tested and certified.
For more information about the
program, see the Web site
(www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/
index.html), as well as Ex. OSHA–2008–
0032–0004 of this docket and the
exhibits under Docket NRTL03–SDOC,
the latter pertaining to OSHA’s first RFI
on SDoC.
B. OSHA’s First Request for Information
on SDoC
OSHA previously published an RFI
on SDoC in response to a proposal from
an industry trade association, the
Information Technology Industry
Council (ITIC). It recommended a
change from the NRTL approval to an
SDoC system for ensuring the safety of
information technology equipment used
in the workplace. (Ex. 1, Docket
NRTL03–SDOC.) The proposal claimed
that SDoC would reduce products’ timeto-market delays and would not have a
detrimental effect on the safety of
affected products. It also claimed that
information-technology (IT) equipment
had a strong workplace safety record.
ITIC further suggested that all IT
equipment should be approved to meet
the technical requirements of the IEC
60950 test standard issued by the
International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC), a leading
organization in the development of
international test standards. ITIC
advocated the use of this test standard
by all countries. (Ex. 1A, Docket
NRTL03–SDOC.) OSHA noted that
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NRTLs already used UL 60950, the
corresponding U.S. harmonized version
of the IEC 60950 standard, for approving
IT equipment. The IEC 60950 standard
(or UL 60950 or other harmonized
versions) covers not only IT, but also a
number of other common products (e.g.,
printers, copiers, and telephones) and
specialized equipment (e.g.,
communications terminal equipment
and mail-sorting machines).
The proposal also included a study by
Industry Canada, an agency of the
Canadian government, which discussed
ways that agencies in various countries
use SDoCs for approvals of equipment.
(Ex. 1B, Docket NRTL03–SDOC.) The
study noted the importance in an SDoC
system of having a responsible
regulatory agency with audit and
enforcement authority after products are
sold. In contrast, under current OSHA
regulations, NRTLs must perform key
functions before products are sold. The
study identified only EU countries as
allowing use of SDoC for regulating the
safety of electric equipment. The study
noted the importance of each country’s
‘‘market surveillance authority to
monitor the products placed on the
market.’’ (Id., page 28.) As also noted,
with respect to EU’s enforcement
measures, ‘‘[m]any surveillance
authorities may use warnings,
administrative actions (such as
[product] modifications, recall, sales
ban, confiscation and publication) and,
ultimately, prosecution (fines and
imprisonment).’’ (Id., page 29.)
OSHA determined, however, that
ITIC’s proposal lacked information
needed to determine whether to initiate
rulemaking. To obtain more information
and give interested parties an
opportunity to comment on the ITIC
proposal, OSHA issued an RFI on
November 15, 2005 (70 FR 69355). The
RFI contained seven questions seeking
detailed information related to the
operation of an SDoC system, and seven
questions related to specific aspects of
the ITIC proposal. Twenty-six
comments were received in response to
the RFI. Commenters in favor (mainly
from three product industry
associations) claimed that SDoC would
reduce product time-to-market and that
SDoC systems have similar safety
records to OSHA’s NRTL Program.
Commenters opposed to the proposal
(mainly from product industry
associations, individuals, and NRTLs)
claimed that the competence of different
manufacturers varied widely, and that
there were no sufficient reasons for
OSHA to change its system. These latter
commenters claimed that safety would
suffer under an SDoC system. Some
commenters also stated that OSHA did
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not have the authority to implement an
SDoC system. Industry associations
opposed to the proposal included the
National Electrical Manufacturers
Association. Many commenters, both for
and against the proposal, stated that
adoption of SDoC would require OSHA,
at a minimum, to implement a
postmarket-surveillance system, which
would require monitoring products after
they reached the market, thereby
leading to potential enforcement actions
such as product bans or recalls.
In general, however, commenters did
not provide adequate data to support
their arguments. For example, parties on
both sides of the SDoC question offered
little in the way of adequate data to
support their positions. With regard to
the safety risk of the products, the data
or other information were not presented
in a manner to ensure validity or to
allow for analysis and evaluation. In
this regard, the American Council of
Independent Laboratories (ACIL)
reported results from a survey it
conducted, stating that ‘‘50% of IT and
Office Equipment products were noncompliant after first submittal to the
NRTL,’’ and that 50% of these
noncompliances were ‘‘major safety and
health related.’’ (Ex. 2–5, Docket
NRTL03–SDOC.) However, ACIL offered
no report summarizing all the results of
the survey or information about the
methodology of the survey, the response
rate, or the data upon which
respondents relied. Likewise,
Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
provided no details about how it
determined that ‘‘[a]pproximately 50%
of the IT equipment’’ submitted to it
‘‘initially fails to meet the applicable
safety requirements.’’ (Ex. 2–4–1, Id.)
Similarly unsupported were UL’s
statements that ‘‘[f]ield sampling in the
European Union suggests that up to
50% of the IT equipment on the market
in the European Union today does not
comply with applicable requirements’’
and that ‘‘[i]n 2004, electric appliances
accounted for 27 percent of RAPEXposted products and were determined to
present a serious risk to consumers’
health and safety.’’ (Ex. 2–4–1, Id.)
(RAPEX is formally called the
Community Rapid Information System.)
The Canadian Standards Association
referenced a German study which
purported to show that ‘‘certified
(’tested’) products appeared much less
often in accident and fault reports than
uncertified products,’’ but did not
provide the study for OSHA’s review or
a citation where it might be found. (Ex.
2–7–1, Id.)
Similar problems exist with the data
submitted by the proponents of SDoC.
ITIC calculated a defect rate of 0.2
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percent for ‘‘US computer products’’
between 1994 and 1999, but did not
provide the original sources of the data
from which this figure was calculated.
(Ex. 1, id.) It is also unclear why more
recent data were not used. In any event,
their approach did not account for a
significant confounding factor—that all
computer equipment operating from an
electric outlet and used in U.S.
workplaces is required to be NRTL
approved—so ITIC’s method did
nothing to measure the safety of
equipment sold or used only under an
SDoC system.
Other data submitted by ITIC address
this problem, in part. A graph in a
PowerPoint presentation prepared by
UNICE (now known as
‘‘BUSINESSEUROPE’’), and submitted
by ITIC, shows that in 2004, 27% of
RAPEX notifications of unsafe products
were for products manufactured in the
EU, compared with 2% for U.S.manufactured products. (Ex. 2–9–1, Id.)
Again, the underlying data are not
provided. However, taken at face value,
these statistics suggest that an NRTL
system may reduce the risk of unsafe
products. No firm conclusions may be
drawn, however, without more
information, such as the percentages
and types of U.S.-manufactured goods
and EU-manufactured goods sold in the
EU. Another UNICE graph showed a
relative decrease in electrocutions in
Germany compared to the U.S. between
1960 and 1989. (Ex. 2–9–1, Id.)
However, the source of the data does not
appear to be readily available in the
U.S., the actual numbers of
electrocutions per year and a
stratification by causes are not provided
in the graph, no reason is given why
more recent data were not obtained, and
it is unclear whether the data are
normalized for the two populations.
In summary, much of the information
submitted by commenters lacked the
supporting data and details requested in
the RFI. In addition, as the above
examples demonstrate, some comments
provided inadequate support for data,
figures, or claims, or provided little or
inadequate explanation. OSHA analyzed
all of the comments and concluded that
the information did not justify a
decision to initiate rulemaking to adopt
SDoC. Most importantly, OSHA found
that the information it received did not
provide reasonable assurance that
adopting SDoC would provide a high
degree of protection for the safety of
products used in the workplace.
Without such assurance, OSHA found
little justification to initiate a
rulemaking. Furthermore, OSHA
believed that implementation of SDoC
might require a change to OSHA’s
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legislative authority in addition to an
increase of appropriations. The change
in legislative authorization appeared
necessary because OSHA lacked
authority to adopt many of the
enforcement measures for electrical
safety noted earlier for the SDoC system
implemented by the EU, including
product recalls, bans, and confiscation,
among other measures. The Agency
could not justify such requests from
Congress based on the information
obtained through the RFI process.
In view of these findings, which
summarize only some of the key areas
of concern, OSHA decided to take no
further action on the proposal and
announced its decision in the Spring
2007 Semi-Annual Regulatory Agenda,
published on April 30, 2007 (see 72 FR
22870).
C. Events Leading to Second Request for
Information on SDoC
On April 30, 2007, President Bush
and his EU counterparts signed the
Framework for Advancing Transatlantic
Economic Integration Between the U.S.
and the EU (‘‘Framework Agreement’’ or
‘‘Agreement’’). (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–
0002.) This is a trade-related agreement
that has a number of objectives,
foremost of which is ‘‘removing barriers
to transatlantic commerce’’ (see section
II of the Agreement). The Agreement’s
Annex 1 lists a number of activities
affecting different U.S. and EU agencies
and sectors, including ‘‘initiating an
exchange on conformity-assessment
procedures for the safety of electrical
equipment.’’
The agreement established a
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC)
to monitor progress toward meeting the
goals of the Framework Agreement. As
stated in the Agreement, the TEC is ‘‘cochaired, on the U.S. side, by a U.S.
Cabinet-level official in the Executive
Office of the President and on the EU
side by a Member of the European
Commission, collaborating closely with
the EU Presidency.’’ Through the TEC,
in July 2007, the EC issued a brief
statement proposing that OSHA adopt
SDoC for all electric equipment,
claiming that this action would ‘‘reduce
unnecessary costs for transatlantic
trade.’’ (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0003.)
Working in part through the TEC, OSHA
and the EC arranged a meeting to
undertake the Annex 1 activity
regarding the exchange of information
on the conformity-assessment
procedures for the safety of electrical
equipment.
On October 11, 2007, representatives
of OSHA and two other offices within
the Department of Labor met with
representatives of the EC to conduct an
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exchange of information in furtherance
of the Annex 1 activity. A summary of
this meeting was produced that captures
key aspects of these systems. (Ex.
OSHA–2008–0032–0004.) The
participants considered the meeting to
be productive, but neither side was able
to ask all of its questions due to lack of
time.
At its first formal meeting, held on
November 9, 2007, the TEC issued a
joint statement requesting OSHA to
report, at the TEC’s next meeting, on
‘‘progress made to facilitate trade in
electrical products with respect to
conformity assessment procedures for
the safety of such products.’’ (Ex.
OSHA–2008–0032–0009.) In March
2008, the EC issued another statement
requesting the ‘‘[U.S.] Government to
allow the import and sale of any lowrisk electrical and electronic product on
the basis’’ of SDoC.3 (Ex. OSHA–2008–
0032–0005.) At the second formal TEC
meeting, held on May 13, 2008,
Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao stated
that OSHA would issue a second RFI on
SDoC. (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0006.)
Among other things, this RFI allows
OSHA to obtain a better understanding
regarding SDoC and, as noted earlier,
certain related topics and issues not
fully explored in the 2005 RFI. In June
2008, at the request of OSHA, the EC
submitted a formal rationale for its
request that OSHA adopt SDoC for
‘‘electrical and electronic products.’’
This rationale is discussed in section IV.
D. World Trade Organization’s
Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade
The U.S. and 152 other countries are
Members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and party to the
Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization which includes the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement) (see Ex. OSHA–
2008–0032–0007). The TBT Agreement
addresses technical regulations,
standards and conformity assessment
procedures for products or related
processes and production methods. In
terms of the TBT Agreement, OSHA’s
NRTL approval requirements are
considered conformity-assessment
procedures. The TBT Agreement states
Members’ desire to ensure that technical
regulations, standards, and conformity
assessment procedures do not create
unnecessary obstacles to trade while
recognizing that no Member should be
prevented from taking measures that are
3 OSHA does not regulate the ‘‘import and sale’’
of products, but its rules do affect whether certain
products may be used in the workplace, thus
affecting whether those products may be sold or
imported into the U.S.
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necessary inter alia to protect human
health or safety. Article 5 of the TBT
Agreement requires Members to ensure
that its central-level conformity
assessment procedures are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or
with the effect of creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade and
explains that ‘‘this means inter alia that
conformity assessment procedures shall
not be more strict or be applied more
strictly than is necessary to give the
importing Member adequate confidence
that products conform with the
applicable technical regulations or
standards, taking into account the risk
non-conformity would create.’’
Congress amended the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, as amended
(‘‘TAA’’; 19 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.) to
implement the TBT Agreement. In
particular, the TAA indicates that
Federal agencies may not ‘‘engage in
any standards-related activity that
creates unnecessary barriers of trade.’’
19 U.S.C. 2532. A standard is
‘‘necessary’’ in this context:
[I]f the demonstrable purpose of the
standards-related activity is to achieve a
legitimate domestic objective including, but
not limited to, the protection of legitimate
health or safety, essential security,
environmental, or consumer interests and if
such activity does not operate to exclude
imported products which fully meet the
objectives of such activity.
19 U.S.C. 2531(b).
The TAA also requires Federal
agencies to take international standards
into account in standards-related
activities, and to base their standards on
the international standards ‘‘if
appropriate.’’ 19 U.S.C. 2532(2)(A).
However, international standards are
not ‘‘appropriate’’ if they do not
adequately protect ‘‘human health or
safety, animal or plant life or health or
the environment.’’ 19 U.S.C. 2532(2)(B).
Likewise, the TAA provides that it may
not be construed ‘‘to limit the authority
of a Federal agency to determine the
level it considers appropriate of safety
or of protection of human, animal, or
plant life or health, the environment, or
consumers.’’ 19 U.S.C. 2531(a)(2).
OSHA’s NRTL Program and its thirdparty approval requirements apply to
certain equipment or products used in
the workplace, regardless of whether
they are manufactured within or outside
of the U.S. In addition, the NRTL
Program is open to both U.S. and
foreign-based organizations, which gives
them equal opportunity to become an
NRTL. OSHA’s requirements for
approval of electric equipment are
necessary measures for protecting
employees against electrical shock,
electrocution, burns, and fires, and,
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thus, to protect the safety of the
employees. The NRTL Program is
necessary to provide assurance that the
approvals are performed by qualified
organizations. As discussed later in this
notice, the EC views OSHA’s third-party
approval requirements and NRTL
Program as unnecessary obstacles to
trade. (See, for example, Ex. OSHA–
2008–0032–0005.) Although OSHA
disagrees with this view, it issues this
RFI to gather information bearing on the
question that an SDoC system, at least
for some categories of equipment, may
protect employees sufficiently to satisfy
the requirements of the OSH Act.
III. Requirements for OSHA
Rulemaking
The primary purpose of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act is
to assure, so far as possible, safe and
healthful working conditions for every
American employee. 29 U.S.C. 651(b).
To fulfill this purpose, Congress gave
the Secretary of Labor the authority to
promulgate, modify, or revoke
mandatory occupational safety and
health standards. 29 U.S.C. 655.4
The Act, the case law developed
under it, and OSHA regulations
establish a number of requirements that
the Agency must meet before exercising
this authority. Some of these
requirements are procedural. For
example, the Agency must support its
findings with substantial evidence in
the record developed through the
rulemaking proceedings, and explain
the basis for accepting or rejecting all
major suggestions for modification of a
proposed standard. See ‘‘Supplemental
Statement of Reasons’’ for the final rule
on Control of Hazardous Energy
Sources, 58 FR 16612 at 16615; see also
29 U.S.C. 655(b)(2), (b)(3), and (f). In
addition, when OSHA decides to change
a standard, it must provide a reasoned
basis for the change. International
Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665,
668–69 (DC Cir. 1994) (‘‘Lockout/Tagout
II’’)
4 In its comments submitted in response to the
previous RFI, ITIC argued that OSHA could adopt
an SDoC system through an interpretative rule
without notice and comment. (Ex. 4–19, pp. 10–12,
Docket NRTL03–SDOC.) OSHA disagrees with this
assertion. Current rules require NRTLs to be
‘‘completely independent of * * * manufacturers
or vendors of equipment or materials being tested.
* * *’’ 29 CFR 1910.7(b)(3). A change to this
requirement would constitute a legislative rule that
‘‘directly governs the conduct of [employers],
affecting individual rights and obligations,’’ Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 511 U.S. l, 127
S. Ct. 2339, 2350 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To guarantee that employers have an
opportunity to participate in the formulation of
these individual rights and obligations, OSHA must
follow the notice, comment, and hearing procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act and the OSH
Act.
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OSHA also is constrained by
substantive rulemaking requirements.
Accordingly, the OSH Act requires that
safety standards, like the NRTL
approval requirements, must ‘‘afford a
high degree of protection’’ to employees.
Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 669. Thus,
for OSHA to adopt an SDoC approval
standard and related program, it must
find, on the basis of substantial
evidence, that the SDoC system
provides this high degree of protection
to employees who use equipment that
would be covered by the standard. In
this regard, OSHA has been careful to
ensure that changes to its productconformity program maintain existing
levels of employee safety. See the final
rule on Safety Testing or Certification of
Certain Workplace Equipment and
Materials, 53 FR 12102 at 12103, April
12, 1988.
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IV. EC’s formal proposal for OSHA to
adopt SDoC
A. Overview of rationale
The EC’s proposal to OSHA
concerning the adoption of SDoC is
captured in its March 2008 statement
(Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0005) and
supplemented by its June 2008 rationale
(Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0008).5 The
March 2008 statement formally requests
that OSHA ‘‘review its conformity
assessment procedures in the area of
electrical and electronic products.’’ In
this statement, the EC also advocated
SDoC because it believes third-party
conformity assessment of ‘‘low-risk
electrical and electronic product[s]’’ in
the U.S. ‘‘imposes unnecessary
additional costs and market-entry
barriers on exporters of these goods.
* * *’’ The statement describes the
types of products the EC considers to be
outside the scope of ‘‘low-risk electrical
and electronic product[s],’’ such as
‘‘electrical equipment for use in an
explosive atmosphere, * * * for
radiology and medical purposes, * * *
[and] electricity meters, plugs, and
socket outlets for domestic use. * * *’’
The EC, therefore, maintains that such
products present a level of risk that
would make SDoC an inappropriate
means of conformity assessment, and
the EC requires the use of third-party
approvals in such cases.
In its rationale, the EC noted that it
has long experience with ‘‘conformity
assessment regimes’’ that do not require
manufacturers to obtain third-party
5 In August 2008, OSHA received a
complementary proposal, jointly submitted by three
industry associations, that provides a suggested
approach for implementing an OSHA SDoC system.
See section VI.G if you wish to comment on this
approach.
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certification. The EC stated that it made
‘‘an assessment of the risk to consumers,
workers, and the general interest’’ as to
whether certain ‘‘non-compliant
products [reaching] the market would
pose a danger.’’ The EC then concluded
that for these products ‘‘these risks are
at a level that they can be satisfactorily
managed’’ by requiring manufacturers to
demonstrate compliance and retain
proof of compliance for inspection by
public authorities. It also stated that
such rules, along with legal liabilities on
manufacturers, consumer-protection
legislation, and appropriate enforcement
measures would guarantee a high level
of safety for European consumers. The
EC further stated that it instituted its
approach in the area of electrical safety
through its ‘‘Low Voltage Directive,’’ for
products rated ‘‘between 50–1000 volts
AC and 75–2500 [sic] volts DC. * * *’’
(Note: the actual DC upper limit is 1500
volts.) We will provide some general
information about EC directives in the
next section of this notice.
The EC contends in its rationale that
OSHA’s third-party requirements cause
an ‘‘imbalance in market access * * *
[by manufacturers for] transatlantic
trade in electrical products,’’ and an
‘‘imbalance in market access for the
[EU] certification industry’’ because
they are subject to OSHA’s NRTL
approval requirement while U.S.
certifiers are not subject to any such
comparable EU requirement. The EC
also asserts that the requirements
increase the likelihood that countries
importing products from the U.S. and
the EU will establish their own form of
testing and approval. The EC further
contends that an OSHA change to SDoC
‘‘is justified by the fact that European
consumers and workers experience a
high if not higher level of electrical
safety as their counterparts in the US.’’
It attributes this effect in part to ‘‘the
high level of safety of electrical and
electronic devices.’’ Moreover, it
contends that ‘‘[s]tatistics furthermore
demonstrate that accidents can seldom
be attributed to products, but are
normally the result of ’live’ wires and
neglect. Where they can be attributed to
products, there are no indications that
in the EU there is a relationship
between non-compliance and incidents
[of accidents].’’ Finally the EC claims
that ‘‘market mechanisms [in the EU]
ensure that most electrical and
electronic products and especially high
technology products and high volume
products follow rigid quality controls
and have an excellent record of
compliance.’’
The EC’s rationale also suggests
several topics to cover in this RFI, and
OSHA is including the questions in
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section VI, below, to address these
topics.
B. OSHA Comments on EC’s Rationale
The key part of the EC’s rationale is
its conclusion that the safety risk
associated with noncompliant electrical
products can be satisfactorily managed
through SDoC. Indeed, this is a
threshold determination that OSHA
must make before it proposes an SDoC
approval standard or related program.
As discussed below, however, to date
the EC has failed to support this
conclusion with the evidence necessary
for OSHA to reasonably ensure that
SDoC would satisfy the standard-setting
requirements of the OSH Act. Such
support could include, for example, an
explanatory study or report that
adequately describes, quantifies, or
otherwise specifies the level or
characteristics of noncompliance, or the
characteristics of the electrical or other
safety risk involved. It is clear that the
EC would not permit SDoC for
particular equipment if it believes that
the safety risk of noncompliance is too
high. In fact, it justifies the use of SDoC
for low-voltage products on the grounds
that the safety risk of noncompliance is
low. (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0008, p. 1.)
However, it is unclear from the EC’s
proposal whether the EU determined
that the safety risk from noncompliance
was low before it implemented the
SDoC for low-voltage products, or
determined that the low level of risk
resulted through implementation of
SDoC. Also, it was unclear from the
proposal how the EU made this
determination. In addition, the EU
believes that this low level of
noncompliance and the resulting low
level of safety risk is maintained
because manufacturers are required to
retain ‘‘proof’’ of compliance and
because manufacturers are subject to
legal ‘‘liability, consumer protection
legislation and an appropriate
enforcement.’’ (Id.) The EC has not
provided evidence to support this
conclusion regarding the effectiveness
of an SDoC system, and a reliable means
of tracking the results of such a system
would help to provide the required
evidence. OSHA would need to review
this evidence before it could reach
similar conclusions.
The EC further contends that
European consumers and employees
‘‘experience an equally high, if not
higher level of electrical safety as their
counterparts in the U.S.’’ (Ex. OSHA–
2008–0032–0008, p. 2.) The EC
attributes this ‘‘higher level’’ in part to
‘‘the high level of safety of electrical and
electronic devices.’’ (Id.) The EC also
claims that ‘‘[s]tatistics furthermore
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demonstrate’’ that accidents involving
equipment are not attributable to ‘‘a
relationship between non-compliance
and incidents [of accidents].’’ (Id.) It
later notes that ‘‘most electrical and
electronic products and especially high
technology products * * * have an
excellent record of compliance.’’ (Id.) To
date, OSHA has received no data to
support any of these statements. OSHA
would need to receive such information
to determine whether to initiate
rulemaking on SDoC.
C. Questions
As noted above, the EC identified a
number of issues in its rationale and
suggested that the RFI include questions
addressing a number of topics. OSHA’s
comments above also serve as a basis for
other questions.
Questions Related to Details and Data
Supporting EC’s Rationale
IV.1. What information and evidence
is available to support the conclusion
that the risk of nonconforming products
posing a danger was, is, and will be low
under SDoC? If possible, describe,
quantify, and otherwise specify the level
or characteristics of noncompliance, and
the characteristics of the electrical or
other safety risk involved.
IV.2. What data, documentation, or
records exist to demonstrate adequately
that European consumers and
employees experience a level of
electrical safety at least as high as their
counterparts in the U.S.?
IV.3. What legal liability, consumerprotection legislation, and enforcement
programs exist in the EU to ensure that
its SDoC system has maintained and
will maintain the risk of danger posed
by noncompliant products at a low
level, or to ensure that the level of
noncompliant products will be low? Are
there similar protections in the U.S.?
IV.4. What data or documentation
exists to demonstrate adequately that
accidents in the EU involving electric
equipment are not attributable to
product noncompliance, and that most
electrical and electronic products,
especially high-technology products,
have an excellent record of compliance?
V. The EU’s SDoC System
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A. Background
On June 25, 2008, the EC submitted a
formal proposal to OSHA to issue a
second RFI on the adoption of an SDoC
system for certain ranges of products.
(Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0008.) The
proposal states that the RFI would
further the TEC’s goals of ‘‘promoting
transatlantic trade and regulatory
convergence.’’ It states that obligatory
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third-party certification of certain
products, such as is required by OSHA,
can create barriers to trade, and that
programs that create such barriers
should be justified by the additional
benefits they confer. In addition, the
proposal points out that the U.S. has
implemented SDoC systems for many
product categories other than electrical
products. The proposal claims that the
EC’s system is as effective as the U.S.’s
for protecting both consumer and
employee safety.
The proposal requests that the RFI
obtain information for an assessment of
the elements that would be necessary to
implement an SDoC system, and to
obtain data and information about what
classes of products such a system would
most appropriately regulate. At the time
of publication of this RFI, the EU’s
SDoC system is the only one of which
OSHA is aware that exists for the
conformity assessment of electricalproduct safety. In this section, we
review the information we have
obtained on this system as a basis for
later questions seeking a better
understanding of this system.
B. The EU’s SDoC system
The summary of the October 11, 2007,
information-exchange meeting between
OSHA and EC representatives (Ex.
OSHA–2008–0032–0003) provides
much of the information included in
this part. Research by OSHA staff also
provided information.
Products covered by the EC’s SDoC
system for electrical safety are
determined by the Low Voltage
Directive (LVD) (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–
0017), which was implemented in 1973
to promote the free movement of goods
across the EU. (The LVD does not apply
to goods intended for export to
countries outside the EU.) Such
directives constitute laws enacted by the
European Council and European
Parliament. These laws are generally
proposed by the EC. More information
on these institutions and their functions
is available at https://europa.eu/
index_en.htm . The LVD covers all
equipment between 50 and 1000 volts
AC and 75 and 1500 volts DC, except as
specifically excluded in its Annex II.
This annex lists, among other types of
equipment, ‘‘electrical equipment for
use in an explosive atmosphere, those
for radiology and medical purposes, and
those for goods and passenger lifts.’’ The
lower and upper limits of the LVD were
set to exclude electric equipment of the
telecommunication industry and
electric-power industries, respectively.
The EC’s proposal asserts that all
products covered under the LVD have
been demonstrated to be ‘‘low-risk,’’ and
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that electrocutions have become rare in
the EU since the LVD was implemented,
which the EC argues indicates the
effectiveness of the EC’s SDoC system.
In general, the conformity-assessment
approach used in the EU classifies
products according to eight categories,
with requirements ranging from the
least stringent (Module A) to the most
stringent (Module H). Module A,
covering only the lowest-risk products
and formally called ‘‘internal
production control,’’ is the only system
for which SDoC is permitted on its own,
i.e., without other and stronger
regulatory controls. (See Ex. OSHA–
2008–0032–0015 for an illustration of
the safety requirements for products
covered by each module.)
Enforcement under the LVD is
conducted through Member States’
postmarket surveillance. The EU
countries must enact their own national
laws to implement the LVD, and assign
at least one agency (called the
‘‘surveillance authority’’) to enforce
these laws. In the United Kingdom, for
example, this role is filled by
approximately 250 local government
agencies, whereas in other countries,
one agency or one part of an agency may
fill this role. The surveillance
authority’s inspections are a critical
aspect of its activities. Among the
countries, the kinds and number of
inspections vary depending on the
number of available inspectors, the
amount of available funding, and the
type and number of problems the EU
country is facing. In at least one
country, inspections are based primarily
on complaints and accidents, and in
other countries, inspections are based
primarily on a random selection of
products. Once a potential deficiency is
found, the manufacturer, if known, may
be required to submit to the authority a
report by an independent testing
organization (called a ‘‘notified body’’ in
the EU) demonstrating that the product
conforms to the applicable test standard.
For those products that do not conform,
the manufacturer must make a risk
assessment and propose corrective
actions. Ultimately, the country’s
surveillance authority makes a final
decision on risk, which, as noted in the
next section, can vary substantially
across countries. The authority then
decides what remedial action to take,
which may include product recall, ban,
quarantine, or confiscation; assessing
financial penalties; and, in more serious
cases, assessing criminal penalties. If
the authority cannot locate the
manufacturer or its authorized
representative, the authority may hold
the retailer (or other party placing the
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product in that country’s market)
responsible, and impose the remedial
action on that party.
For products posing immediate safety
risks, and affecting more than one
country, the EU has a rapid alert system
(RAPEX). This system is increasingly
used for communicating information
about noncompliant products. Another
notification system, the Information and
Communication System for Market
Surveillance (ICSMS), also has this
purpose, but it is not used by all
Member States. Technical files of
products covered under the directive
must be maintained by the manufacturer
for at least 10 years after the products
go on the market. Private-sector bodies
called ‘‘European Standardisation
Organisations’’ are responsible for
developing and maintaining the
technical safety specifications for the
products, similar to the role of the
American National Standards Institute
in the U.S. In addition, a product that
complies with the harmonized EU
versions of international test standards
is assumed to be in compliance with the
LVD. If challenged by the Member
States’ surveillance authority, a
manufacturer must prove it has
complied with the LVD either by
demonstrating compliance with
harmonized test standards or by other
means. In cases for which the
manufacturer cannot be found, the
burden passes to the importer, who can
be liable for penalties and applicable
fines. However, there is no requirement
that manufacturers or importers register
with any Member States, making it
difficult in some cases to identify the
responsible party.
While EU Member States cannot add
safety-related requirements to the LVD,
they can regulate nonsafety-related
public-interest requirements. The LVD,
like other directives, is binding upon
Member States, which are supposed to
implement it by transposing it into their
own national laws. If the Member States
do not implement or do not properly
implement the LVD or other productrelated directives through their own
legislation, they are nonetheless
obligated to accept products declared
compliant with the LVD unless the
products are found to be noncompliant.
Fines imposed on manufacturers or
importers for noncompliance with the
LVD are levied by individual Member
States, and may vary between different
Member States.
C. Effectiveness of the EU’s SDoC system
The EC has stated that its SDoC
system has provided European
consumers and employees with a high
level of safety. It argues that this level
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is the same or higher than that achieved
by the U.S. under its NRTL system.
However, the EC did not provide data,
in its submissions, to demonstrate its
position in a way that would support
rulemaking by OSHA. As noted by the
EC in its presentation at the October 11,
2007, meeting with OSHA, the lack of
harmonization in the EU of methods to
collect statistics on electrical accidents
hinders any comparison of statistics
between the U.S. and the EU, or even
among Member States within the EU.
OSHA has obtained information that
highlights different aspects of the EU’s
SDoC system, and provides a gauge of
its effectiveness. We are summarizing
this information solely to provide a
basis for some of our questions in this
RFI, and not to draw conclusions from
it.
First, we present the reports of the
results of two projects that were
undertaken by EU market-surveillance
authorities, then discuss a relevant
report issued by the staff of an office of
the EC, and finally describe some
aspects of the EU’s RAPEX and ICSMS
systems.
The Low Voltage Directive
Administrative Co-operation (LVD
AdCo) is ‘‘an independent Working
Group run and chaired by the Member
States. The Group is a forum for cooperation and exchange of information
between national market surveillance
authorities.’’ (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–
0010.) In 2006, LVD AdCo organized its
first cross-border market-surveillance
project, i.e. , a multi-country
cooperative and coordinated effort, by
the surveillance authorities from 15
Member States. In deciding which
products to target, the project report
notes that consideration was given to
the differences in ‘‘infrastructures and
funding * * * between member states,’’
and the need to ensure ‘‘that cost was
minimized and that the technical
requirements for the tests were within
the possibilities of all potential
participants.’’ (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–
0011, p. 5.) This approach highlights the
technical and financial limitations faced
by some Member States in performing
their surveillance functions.
The study targeted ‘‘portable
luminaries’’ (i.e. , portable lamps) partly
because they ‘‘are relatively cheap to
purchase,’’ thus making this project
feasible for ‘‘member states with small
[market-surveillance] budgets.’’ These
products were selected for study
because of the large number of problem
notifications found with these products
by Member States, as shown in a chart
depicting past ‘‘safeguard clauses and
RAPEX notifications.’’ (Ex. OSHA–
2008–0032–0011, p. 6.) For the project,
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a total of 226 luminaires were evaluated
for conformance to applicable
administrative and technical
requirements. Of this total, 38%
originated in the EU, 23% originated
from China, 10% originated from other
countries outside of the EU, and 29%
had no country of origin specified. The
project found that 72% (162) of the 226
luminaires failed one or more of the
technical requirements, with nearly half
(74) containing ‘‘serious’’ technical
hazards, and 23% (53) of the 226
luminaires had administrative
nonconformities (missing ‘‘CE’’ marks,
missing or incorrect technical files,
missing or incorrect declarations of
conformity, and other similar problems).
(Id., p. 17.) According to the report of
the project, sampling was not random.
Consequently, the results obtained ‘‘do
not give a dependable estimate of the
percentages [of] non-compliant
luminaires on the market.’’ (Id., p. 18.)
However, the report indicates that the
results of the project match the actual
experiences of several EU Member
States. A summary of the report states
the following:
Many companies appear to neglect
assuring conformity with the administrative
requirements in the Directive. Declarations of
conformity and technical files were often not
available or did not fit the luminaires
themselves. The LVD prescribes module A
for conformity assessment, which amounts to
self-certification by the manufacturer or
importer into the EU. The choice for module
A was made because of the relatively minor
hazards associated with electrical products.
However, the new and global approach is
based on the assumption that the actors
comply with the conformity assessment
procedures before CE-marking the product in
order to assure safe products on the markets.
For fragmented markets like the one for
luminaires, this assumption does not appear
to be valid, if the results of this and previous
national actions are indeed indicative. (Id.,
p. 19.)
The report lacks any analysis of the
underlying causes for the high rate of
nonconformities found. It recognizes
some difficulties in market surveillance
caused by differences between the
systems of EU Member States, noting:
Differences exist between the member
states in the grading of shortcomings: the
same violation of a specific requirement
leads to different assessment of the resulting
risk and as a consequence to different
interventions. Given the differences in legal
systems[,] differences in sanctions imposed
in the various member states for similar
violations cannot be avoided.
The report states further that
‘‘multinational companies operating in
the European union * * * will rightly
wonder why it is that the same violation
is considered a serious risk in one
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member state, while another member
state classifies it as a minor risk.’’ The
report suggests that in this area
‘‘harmonization is urgently needed.’’
(Id., p. 23.)
A similar project was conducted on
extension cords, and a summary of the
results was provided in a press release.
(Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0012.) The press
release indicated that 20 EU Member
States participated in the study, and 210
extension cords were tested. The results
show that only one in six cordextension sets fully complied with the
LVD and the General Product Safety
Directive (GPSD) requirements. (The
GPSD specifies requirements for general
consumer products used in the EU.)
Although the noncompliant samples
also included those products that
exhibited only administrative failures,
approximately 58% of the cordextension sets tested were considered
sufficiently unsafe by the authorities to
justify a sales ban or product recall.
OSHA also reviewed a document
prepared by the EC’s staff (Ex. OSHA–
2008–0032–0013), which provided
details about the EU’s marketsurveillance system and served as the
basis for associated legislation that the
EU was considering. This document
covers a wide range of issues in a
number of areas where the EU’s system
needed improvement.
Under ‘‘What are the Problems to
Tackle,’’ the report states, ‘‘Experience
with the implementation of [European]
Community legislation in the area of
free movement of goods has highlighted
certain weaknesses and shown that the
effectiveness of the system can still be
improved.’’ (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–
0013, p. 12.) The document also
declares that, ‘‘It is generally noted that
the enforcement of EU product
legislation is unsatisfactory and a
considerable number of non-compliant
(and potentially dangerous) products
reach the market. The share of noncompliant products can only be
estimated and the situation differs very
much from sector to sector and from
Member State to Member State.’’ (Id., p.
19.). This statement partially
corroborates the findings in the report
on luminaires, which indicated that the
high level of nonconformities results
from difficulties faced by Member States
in enforcing the LVD. Further, the staff
document notes, ‘‘Currently, market
surveillance does not operate effectively
throughout the Community. * * *’’ (Id.,
p. 20.) The document notes later, ‘‘In
practice market surveillance authorities
often experience difficulties in
identifying the person who has actually
manufactured and/or supplied the
products * * *’’ (Id., p. 23.) OSHA is
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aware that the legislation pertaining to
this staff document was passed and is
due to go into effect in 2010, although
OSHA has not obtained the details of
the measures adopted to address the
problems and recommendations in the
staff document.
The staff document states that the
number of noncompliant products in
the EU is unknown and the reporting
systems in the EU lack uniformity. The
EU’s RAPEX and ICSMS are notification
systems used by market-surveillance
authorities for enforcement purposes.
Formally called the Community Rapid
Information System, RAPEX is used for
a number of ‘‘non-food consumer
products.’’ It is not typically used for
products that are mainly for industrial
or commercial purposes. It also is not
used for notification of noncompliant
products when ‘‘the effects do not or
cannot go beyond the territory of a
Member State. * * *’’ (Ex. OSHA–
2008–0032–0021, p. 7.) As a result,
Member States may judge a number of
actions to be outside the scope of
RAPEX and, thus, not report them.
Therefore, RAPEX results may not give
an accurate estimate of problems
associated with certain products. For
example, the 2006 annual report for one
Member State authority showed that it
had 3,770 queries and complaints
related to electrical goods. (Ex. OSHA–
2008–0032–0022, p. 29.) The report
further states that about 200
investigations were carried out relating
to products that may pose a safety risk.
(Id., page 20.) The number of RAPEX
notifications for that country in 2006
was 14. (Ex., OSHA–2008–0032–0023,
p. 15.)
The following questions seek further
information and data regarding these
studies, as well as information and data
pertaining to the effectiveness of the
EC’s SDoC system.
V.1. The luminaire and cordextension projects identified substantial
noncompliance with the LVD and, if the
results are representative of the wider
array of products for which an SDoC is
acceptable, appear to be inconsistent
with the EC’s claim regarding the safety
of products evaluated under their SDoC
system. Is this a valid inference from
these studies? Do the data and study
methods have limitations that would
affect this inference?
V.2. What data and/or record systems
exist in each Member State to track the
effectiveness of their SDoC system?
V.3. Are other reports and documents
available that evaluate whether the
SDoC system implemented by each
Member State is effective or ineffective
in safeguarding product safety? What
are the strengths and weaknesses of the
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RAPEX, ICSMS, or other data or
reporting system used in the EU?
VI. Topics and Issues for Consideration
in a Possible Rulemaking
As part of this RFI, OSHA is seeking
information on the topics and associated
issues described below (with the
questions for each topic noted
parenthetically):
A. Product safety in an SDoC system
(VI.1 to VI.5).
B. Product risk and specifications
(VI.6 to VI.15).
C. Administration of an SDoC system
(VI.16 to VI.26).
D. Costs of an SDoC system (VI.27 to
VI.30).
E. Enforcement of an SDoC system
(VI.31 to VI.34).
F. Effects on trade (VI.35 to VI.37).
G. Implementation suggestions by
certain industries (VI.38).
In responding to the questions in this
section, please explain the reasons
supporting your views, and identify and
provide the relevant information on
which you rely, including data, studies,
articles, and other materials.
A. Product Safety in an SDoC System
A major purpose of this RFI is to
determine whether SDoC approval of
certain electrical products would
provide employees with a high level of
protection (see section III above).
OSHA’s current NRTL Program meets
this standard. NRTLs must first evaluate
and test a sample, and then perform
follow-up inspections of manufacturing
facilities to ensure that they continue to
make products that are safe to use.
These inspections are critical, and to
obtain an adequate level of assurance,
NRTLs may, if warranted, inspect 100%
of all products in a production batch for
this purpose. OSHA has a number of
policies that specify controls that
NRTLs must have in place to properly
accomplish pre-market evaluation.
OSHA then audits each NRTL to ensure
that they have instituted these controls
and that the controls are working
properly. NRTLs deficient in these areas
must make corrections or face
revocation of their recognition. These
measures provide the necessary
assurance that OSHA’s current system
provides a high level of protection to
employees.
One measure of the effectiveness of
OSHA’s current system is recalls issued
by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC). The OSHA NRTL
Program staff reviews these recalls, and
for those involving products that have
been certified by an NRTL, the staff has
not identified a recall that was due to
improper testing by an NRTL. In
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addition, the staff knows of no other
data showing that such testing caused
product-related injuries to employees.
OSHA sought information on SDoC
effectiveness during its first RFI on
SDoC, but did not receive data or a
rationale that demonstrated the
effectiveness of SDoC in assuring
product safety. Most of the respondents
to the specific questions suggested
instead that product safety under SDoC
needs to be assured through a proper
postmarket surveillance system,
including marketplace and factory
testing, and accreditation of laboratories
engaged in the testing, even if they are
affiliated with the manufacturer. Also,
in its rationale, the EC points to reliance
on liability laws and other protection
laws for assuring an effective SDoC.
OSHA now requests information or
data clearly demonstrating that product
approval of electric equipment through
SDoC is currently a highly protective
approach, as well as a description of the
measures currently in place or other
measures that would need to be adopted
to ensure that an SDoC system for
electrical products will be highly
protective to employees.
Postmarket surveillance would be a
new activity for OSHA. Adequate
administrative and enforcement
resources and procedures in this area,
based on the information obtained to
date, would need to be extensive, and
are critical in assuring product safety
under an SDoC system. Such a system
appears to include its infrastructure,
along with appropriate rules for
assuring SDoC effectiveness, and
penalties for breaking those rules.
As indicated by the summary of the
EU’s SDoC system in section V,
postmarket surveillance would require
that OSHA have the legal authority to:
establish rules requiring manufacturers
and other parties to take certain actions
related to issuing SDoCs; take
enforcement actions such as product
recalls, bans, quarantines, and
confiscations; and assess financial and
criminal penalties on product
manufacturers, importers, or their
representatives, and, perhaps, on
wholesalers and retailers for selling
nonconforming or dangerous products.
OSHA’s authority extends to the U.S.
workplace and, thus, its authority
regarding SDoC would presumably
apply only to products actually used or
intended to be used in the U.S.
workplace. Further, OSHA does not
have explicit authority to issue product
recalls and bans, or to quarantine or
confiscate nonconforming products, or
to assess the sort of criminal and
financial penalties described above. We
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further discuss the issue of authority,
below, in part E.
The following questions address
issues raised in this part.
VI.1. In determining whether to
undertake rulemaking for SDoC, what
specific measures and practices should
OSHA consider adopting or requiring to
provide assurance that product
approvals through SDoC will be highly
protective to employees? What are the
major elements or components needed
to assure SDoC effectiveness?
VI.2. Should OSHA rely upon other
measures outside its own authority to
ensure that product approvals through
SDoC will be effective? For example,
how should U.S. product-liability laws
and consumer-protection programs, as
suggested by the EC, be considered in
evaluating a conformity-assessment
scheme?
VI.3. In determining whether to adopt
SDoC, what systems should OSHA
consider establishing or using to track
the effectiveness of SDoC?
VI.4. Should the U.S. consider
entering into agreements with other
countries to permit them to enforce
SDoC requirements for products
originating outside of the U.S.? What
should be the minimum requirements
under such agreements?
VI.5. What safety objectives and
technical requirements should be met
by manufacturers and others parties
having obligations under an SDoC
system? What tests or risk assessments
should be conducted by manufacturers
or other involved parties?
B. Product Risk and Specifications
The EC has requested that OSHA
allow SDoC for certain electrical
products, but did not specify the type of
equipment or the criteria for defining
this equipment. As noted earlier, the
EC’s system allows SDoC for products
rated up to 1000 volts AC (1500 volts
DC). In its rationale, the EC suggests that
equipment should be eligible for SDoC
if it has a low risk of noncompliance
with the applicable test standard and
thus poses a low risk of danger. (Ex.
OSHA–2008–0032–0008, p. 1.)
However, the EC provides no
explanation for this concept, which
raises questions about its exact meaning.
It is unclear whether this equipment
was determined to have a low risk of
noncompliance because low risk was
demonstrated by: historical data
(including the reasons for
noncompliance); technical factors
inherent in the equipment or inherent in
the test standard; the manufacturers
performing the testing (i.e. , would they,
regardless of their qualifications or
actions, manufacture low-risk products);
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or other factors or analyses. Knowing
exactly how the EC made its
determination that equipment rated up
to 1000 volts AC (1500 volts DC) has a
low risk of noncompliance and resulting
low safety risk would be helpful to
OSHA, as would an explanation as to
why equipment must have such low risk
to be eligible for approval through
SDoC. As explained earlier in section
III, OSHA must ensure that equipment
is a low-risk hazard to employees.
Therefore, the method of conformity
assessment must ensure that the hazard
associated with equipment is low risk.
OSHA seeks information on the
factors that define low risk of
noncompliance and on methodologies
that could be used to determine whether
a category of electric equipment is likely
to have such a low risk. We seek
information on whether such an
analysis has been done, or how one
could be done. In this context, a
noncompliant product is one that fails
to meet the safety-critical elements of a
test standard and, thus, would
necessarily pose a danger to an
employee. Noncompliance with
nonsafety-critical elements is not at
issue.
Certain industry organizations have
argued that SDoC should be limited to
products that have ‘‘demonstrated an
excellent safety record’’ that support
their qualification as low risk ‘‘in the
workplace.’’ (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–
0019.) Although this assertion has been
made for information technology
products, OSHA has yet to receive the
historical data supporting and/or
adequately demonstrating the assertion
that the safety records of any type of
products justify SDoC. Also, it is
unclear whether this safety record is
due to low risk of nonconformity or an
inherently low risk of danger in the
equipment. If this claim is based upon
historical data of electrical products
used in the U.S., then it could be
attributable to a number of factors,
foremost of which could be the
prevalence of third-party testing in the
U.S. OSHA requests data that clearly
demonstrate the safety record of this
equipment, whether favorable or not, as
well as information that adequately
identifies the underlying reasons for this
claim.
OSHA also seeks information on
whether certain types of electric
equipment have an inherently low risk
of posing danger. In the first RFI, OSHA
asked whether SDoC should be limited
to ‘‘low voltage (for example, 50 volts or
less) IT equipment. * * *’’ (70 FR
69359, November 15, 2005.) No
comments were received addressing this
concept, which we again raise here.
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Specifically, we seek information on
whether certain products have features
that would inherently limit the risk of
hazard to an employee, which may be
the result of the requirements of the
product-safety test standards used to
evaluate the product. OSHA is aware
that some standards limit the available
voltage, current, and power (under
normal and abnormal operating
conditions) in some electrical products,
thereby lowering risk to employees and
others who may have access to this
equipment. In these cases, OSHA seeks
information on whether such products
would present a low risk of hazard
under the worst-case conditions of
noncompliance, and thus, whether an
SDoC may be an adequate tool for
ensuring the safety for such products.
In addition, OSHA seeks information
on the possibility of incorporating
aspects of other U.S. agencies’ SDoCtype systems into any system that OSHA
may eventually adopt. Conformity
assessment systems administered by the
Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) include tiered levels of
conformity assessment. The FCC
determines the conformity assessment
procedure required based on the
complexity of testing or the
telecommunication system or radiofrequency interference risks associated
with a nonconforming product. Such
tiered systems recognize that different
levels of conformity assessment are
necessary for different products or
standards based on the type of risks
posed by noncompliance. Depending on
the product or standard for which
conformity is being assessed, the FCC
may require evaluation and testing by
an accredited third-party testing
laboratory or by the FCC, or may permit
SDoC. The CPSC is another U.S. agency
that makes use of a conformity
assessment system similar to SDoC.
CPSC has used SDoC-type systems for
most products under its jurisdiction. In
August 2008, Congress approved the
Consumer Product Safety Improvement
Act (CPSIA); it mandates, among other
things, that manufacturers of any
children’s products certify that their
products under CPSC’s jurisdiction
meet federal requirements for consumerproduct safety based on testing by an
accredited independent third party. If
certain conditions are met, the Act
allows the CPSC to permit such testing
to be conducted by the manufacturer’s
‘‘firewalled’’ 6 laboratory. (Ex. OSHA–
6 According to the CPSIA, a firewalled laboratory
is one that is owned, managed, or controlled by a
manufacturer or private labeler but which may be
accredited as a third party testing laboratory if the
Commission makes certain findings that the
laboratory is protected from undue influence by the
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2008–0032–0018.) The following
questions pertain to the issues discussed
in this part.
VI.6. What data demonstrate that
products sold in the EU (i.e. , operating
at 1000V AC or 1500V DC or less) have
a low risk of nonconformance with
applicable standards? How is
conformance being determined by the
EC, and what requirements or criteria
are used to judge conformance?
VI.7. What data demonstrate that
products operating at these voltages,
current, and power levels present lowrisk electrical and fire hazards?
VI.8. In making a determination about
rulemaking, how should OSHA
determine which products to include
under a possible SDoC system? Should
OSHA consider a product’s risk of harm
or injury and the potential severity of
harm or injury, as well as its risk of
nonconformance with applicable
standards? Should OSHA consider
production processes (as the EU
suggests in their proposal)? What
methodology and factors should OSHA
consider in determining risk, and what
level of risk should OSHA consider
acceptable? What mechanism should
OSHA consider in evaluating this risk
on a continuing basis?
VI.9. In considering whether to adopt
SDoC, should OSHA consider only
voltage for defining low risk of
nonconformance, a low risk of hazard or
injury, both of these factors, or other
electrical variables?
VI.10. When considering voltage,
current, and power as parameters for
defining products which present a low
risk of nonconformance and a low risk
of injury or harm, should OSHA use
limits published in product-specific
standards (meaning that different
products may have different limits), or
should a single set of limits be
established for all products? If a single
set of limits should be established, what
value should the limits be and what
data are available to support the
assertion that these limits would not
present a risk of injury or harm to
employees?
VI.11. What other types of data related
to product risk should OSHA review
when considering whether or not to
adopt SDoC, and are these data readily
available?
VI.12. Should OSHA use the type of
manufacturer or industry, or a standard
industry classification, in defining the
appropriate parameters for products that
would be eligible for SDoC?
manufacturer or private labeler. In addition, certain
measures must be in place to report to the
Commission of any attempts by this party to hide
or exert undue influence over test results.
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VI.13. What justification exists for
establishing a single class of electrical
products for inclusion in an SDoC
system? What properties do such
electrical products have that distinguish
them from other products such as
ladders and fire doors that require thirdparty product certification?
VI.14. Should global test standards be
used as a basis for determining
conformity assessment of products (with
safeguards to adjust for specific U.S.
conditions) and, if so, how does this
approach differ from current conformity
assessment practices in the U.S.?
VI.15. Are there any aspects of other
U.S. agencies’ SDoC systems (e.g.,
CPSC’s ‘‘firewalling’’ authority to
designate a manufacturer’s lab as a
third-party laboratory) that may be
useful for OSHA to adopt in an SDoC
system for the safety of electrical
products used in the workplace? Are
there differences between OSHA and
these agencies that may impede or
prevent adopting aspects of their SDoC
system or creating a similar system?
C. Administration of an SDoC system
Information that OSHA has received
from the EC and the U.S. government,
industry associations, and other
concerned parties indicates that an
effective SDoC program requires an
extensive level of government oversight
of product manufacturers, importers,
and distributors, and that these entities
may number in the thousands.
Oversight may include postmarketsurveillance activities, product recall
authority, penalty assessment, a
complaint-handling system, and testing
and inspection of products after they are
in the market. A government oversight
program may also require developing
and overseeing a premarket registration
system for manufacturers and importers,
and distributors. The EU’s experience
shows a successful postmarketsurveillance program must have
sufficient resources in terms of number
of inspectors, expertise in the wide
variety of products to be regulated, and
the ability to perform the tests necessary
to ensure conformity. (See Ex. 1–B, pp.
20–25; Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0011, pp.
5 and 7.) OSHA’s existing budget, staff,
and facilities are not adequate for such
an effort.
OSHA’s current NRTL Program does
not include postmarket surveillance,
product-recall authority, penalty
assessment, postmarket testing and
inspection of products, or premarket
registration of products. OSHA’s
oversight of the program consists of
recognition and audits of NRTLs, of
which there are a limited number
(currently 15), and investigation of
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complaints. OSHA relies on the NRTLs
to exert controls over manufacturers
through private-sector mechanisms such
as conducting factory inspections and
postmarket surveillance. NRTLs
conduct premarket testing or rely on
other parties (including certain product
manufacturers) to conduct this testing if
the NRTL determines they are qualified.
Thus, OSHA believes it would need to
adopt fundamental changes to existing
requirements under an SDoC system. In
considering an SDoC system, OSHA
seeks comment on the following
questions that address how to
administer such a system.
VI.16. What administrative systems
are required to effectively run an SDoC
system? How much do they cost? How
would these systems interact with
OSHA’s existing operations? Could
OSHA expect to recoup any of the costs
of running an SDoC program?
VI.17. In determining whether to
undertake rulemaking for SDoC, should
OSHA consider accrediting third-party
organizations to conduct postmarket
testing or surveillance, and, if so, how?
What elements of OSHA’s current NRTL
Program could be used to implement the
accreditation process? Should current
NRTLs be automatically eligible for
conducting postmarket testing and
surveillance under an SDoC system?
VI.18. Should OSHA consider
requiring manufacturers and importers
to register their products in a central
database that identifies supplierapproved products? Should OSHA
require manufacturers to obtain
registration numbers, and require
products to bear these registration
numbers so that OSHA or its agents can
monitor supplier-certified equipment?
Should OSHA assess fees to pay for this
monitoring?
VI.19. What advantages or
disadvantages are there to requiring
manufacturers to establish an office in
the U.S. or requiring the party executing
the SDoC to be located in the U.S?
VI.20. Should OSHA consider
adopting SDoC as an alternative to its
current third-party approval
requirements, as a replacement for these
requirements, or as an extension of the
requirements? How can the two
programs be integrated or perform
complementary roles?
VI.21. What responsibilities should
importers or employers have to ensure
that the products they import have been
properly approved under an SDoC
system?
VI.22. What responsibilities should
employers have to ensure that the SDoCapproved products they use have
complete and accurate documentation
supporting conformance, and that the
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product supplier has appropriately
registered with OSHA or an
organization identified by OSHA?
VI.23. What records or reports should
OSHA require from manufacturers,
importers, and distributors to ensure
conformance with SDoC? Where should
these records and reports be
maintained? What access would OSHA
need to product and production
information, including foreign-produced
equipment? Should OSHA consider
assessing penalties for providing
inaccurate or incomplete information?
VI.24. What percentage of
manufacturers would continue to use
third-party certification systems like the
NRTL Program even if they were eligible
to use SDoC?
VI.25. For manufacturers that use
third-party testing for their SDoC,
should OSHA recognize the results of
tests performed by any accredited
testing laboratory regardless of location
without requiring explicit recognition
by OSHA? If so, how can OSHA ensure
that such laboratories are qualified to
perform the testing? What regulatory
measures should OSHA consider to
encourage the use of accredited tests
under an SDoC system?
VI.26. What obligations should
manufacturers and others have to ensure
that noncompliant products can be
traced (e.g., through marking and
labeling)?
D. Costs of an SDoC System
OSHA seeks information on the costs
to manufacturers associated with
administering the SDoC system
discussed in this RFI, as well as the cost
of OSHA’s NRTL Program and the EU’s
SDoC system. The EC raised the issue of
cost in its July 2007 statement (see Ex.
OSHA–2008–0032–0003) by claiming
that OSHA’s NRTL system costs EU
exporters 1.3 billion Euros annually.
The EC, however, did not provide the
basis for this estimate. OSHA does not
know the exact resources that would be
required to effectively operate an SDoC
system. The following discussion
illustrates the possible costs of
implementing such a system. OSHA has
obtained information showing that the
cost of postmarket surveillance for one
relatively small EU country is 2 million
Euros, which is $3 million at an
exchange rate of about $1.50 per Euro.
(Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0014.)
Extrapolating from this figure to the 50
U.S. states provides a rough draft
estimate of approximately $180 million
for implementing an SDoC system in the
U.S. An estimate of the marketsurveillance costs for a larger EU
country is 13 million Euros or about $20
million (Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0016).
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Extrapolating this figure to the 50 U.S.
states for an additional rough draft
estimate, implementing SDoC could cost
approximately $360 million.7 As noted
above, these estimates are simply
illustrative of possible costs, and OSHA
is using this extrapolation to
approximate the resources needed to
implement an SDoC system. The level of
these resources would depend on a
number of factors, such as the number
of manufacturers, importers, or other
parties that OSHA would need to
regulate; the number and type of
products that might enter the
workplace; and the sampling techniques
and other measures that OSHA would
include in an enforcement strategy.
OSHA also seeks information on who
should pay these costs, i.e., taxpayers
or, similar to the NRTL system,
manufacturers, importers, or
distributors through fees charged for the
service.
The NRTL Program currently has an
annual operating budget of
approximately $1 million, and a portion
of which may be reimbursed to the
government by the NRTLs. The cost to
manufacturers using NRTLs consists of
fees charged for initial testing of the
product sample, and then fees paid to
the NRTLs to cover factory inspection
costs and certification-mark licensing. It
is difficult to derive an accurate
estimate of the total costs to
manufacturers from total NRTL
revenues because NRTLs often perform
other non-NRTL work. Therefore, OSHA
seeks adequate and reliable information
on the total cost of its NRTL system to
manufacturers.
As noted in one of the EC project
reports described in section V of this
notice, inadequate budgets are a factor
driving the level of surveillance
performed by some EU countries under
their SDoC system. As also noted, the
EU has determined that the surveillance
and enforcement components of systems
in at least some Member States are
unsatisfactory. Consequently, current
figures from some EU countries may not
reflect the true cost of administering an
effective SDoC system. OSHA is
interested in obtaining adequate and
reliable information on these costs for
those EU countries that have a well7 The small EU country is Finland, which has a
population of approximately 5 million. Using the
$3 million postmarket surveillance cost results in
a cost of $0.60 per person. The U.S. population is
300 million, and multiplying this figure by $0.60
per person results in a total cost of $180 million.
The Netherlands, which is the larger EU country,
has a population of approximately 16.5 million,
resulting in a $1.20 cost per person. Thus, the
estimate of the cost in the U.S., based on the perperson cost in the Netherlands, would be $360
million.
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founded and effective postmarket
surveillance system. The following
questions solicit information on this
issue.
VI.27. Are there any available data
that show the annual cost to EU Member
States of administering their SDoC
systems (e.g., number of products
inspected, number of inspectors, cost of
inspections, costs of inspectors’ labor)?
If possible, provide any available costs
aggregated for the EU as a whole.
VI.28. Who should pay the operating
costs, and what means should OSHA
use to pay these costs? For example,
what are the potential advantages and
disadvantages of using appropriations,
registration fees assessed to
manufacturers, fines assessed against
nonconforming products, or other
methods to pay these costs?
VI.29. When comparing SDoC and
third-party certification (in particular,
OSHA’s NRTL Program), are initial
product-approval costs lower for one
system than for the other system? If so,
how much money is saved using the
less expensive system?
VI.30. When comparing SDoC and
third-party certification (in particular
OSHA’s NRTL Program), are ongoing
product-approval costs lower for one
system than for the other system? If so,
how much money is saved using the
less expensive system?
E. Enforcement of an SDoC System
SDoC systems raise a number of
issues concerning enforcement schemes
required by the OSH Act, including the
authority the OSH Act grants to OSHA
inspectors. The OSH Act currently
allows inspectors the right to inspect
‘‘any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area,
workplace or environment where work
is performed.’’ See 29 U.S.C. 657(a)(1).
By way of contrast, the National
Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA), which
operates a manufacturer-certification
program for motor vehicles, has
authority to inspect motor vehicles
wherever they are held for sale in
interstate commerce, as well as
locations where motor vehicle accidents
occur. 49 U.S.C. 30166(c)(3). Thus, the
NHTSA’s inspection authority appears
to have a broader geographical scope
than OSHA’s authority.
The OSH Act’s enforcement scheme
differs from that typically found in
SDoC regimes. Under the Act, OSHA
inspectors are authorized to: cite
employers for violations of the OSH Act,
including its associated standards and
regulations; propose an assessment of a
civil monetary penalty; and require
abatement of the violation within a
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reasonable time. 29 U.S.C. 658(a). If the
employer challenges the citation,
abatement is not required until the
Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission issues a final order on the
citation. 29 U.S.C. 659(b). However,
OSHA may apply to a U.S. District
Court for an order requiring an
employer to correct an ‘‘imminent
danger’’ pending the enforcement
action. 29 U.S.C. 662(a).
Compared to the scope of enforcement
action granted to OSHA under the OSH
Act, a wider range of enforcement tools
is usually available under an SDoC
system or to other U.S. government
agencies. For example, the EU’s General
Product Safety Directive allows the
responsible national authority (acting in
concert with other Member State
authorities and with the EC) to issue
product bans, withdrawals, and recalls
for ‘‘dangerous products’’ that pose a
‘‘serious risk.’’ See Directive 2001/95/EC
of 3 December 2001 on General Product
Safety, art. 8 & 11, 2002 O.J. (L11) 10–
12; Ex. OSHA–2008–0032–0020, pp. 10–
11. The EU also has established the
RAPEX and ICSMS systems that advise
the public of product-safety risks and
nonconformities. (Ex. OSHA–2008–
0032–0004, p. 11.) The NHTSA has
authority to require automobile
manufacturers to notify motor-vehicle
purchasers and dealers of defects and
nonconformity with motor-vehicle
safety standards, and require motorvehicle manufacturers to remedy defects
or noncompliance. 49 U.S.C. 30118. The
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety (NTMVS) Act also allows the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to seek an
injunction in U.S. District Court to
enjoin the sale of defective or
nonconforming motor vehicles and
equipment. 49 U.S.C. 30163(a). The FCC
allows a manufacturer to use, for certain
products, a declaration of conformity to
assure compliance with its
electromagnetic-compatibility
requirements, and the Federal
Communication Act gives the DOJ the
authority to seize equipment made,
possessed, or sold with the intent to
violate the FCC’s regulations. 47 U.S.C.
510.
If manufacturers are allowed to take a
major role in guaranteeing the safety of
their products through an SDoC system,
sufficient criminal penalties for
substantial violations may be necessary
to sustain public confidence in this
system. In this regard, a Canadian case
study notes that the SDoC systems it
analyzed usually had criminal penalties,
though these penalties were rarely
applied. (Ex. 1–B, p. 9, Docket NRTL03–
SDOC.) The OSH Act makes it a crime
punishable by a $10,000 fine and six-
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Sfmt 4703
months imprisonment, on the first
offense, for an ‘‘employer who willfully
violates’’ an OSHA standard when the
violation causes an employee’s death.
29 U.S.C. 666(e). The OSH Act imposes
the same penalties against ‘‘[w]hoever
knowingly makes any false statement,
representation, or certification’’ in
documents required to be maintained by
the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. 666(g). By
contrast, the NTMVS Act imposes up to
15 years imprisonment for making
misrepresentations with the intent to
mislead the Secretary of Transportation
when complying with certain reporting
requirements related to motor-vehicle
safety defects that have caused death or
serious bodily injury. 49 U.S.C.
30170(a).
OSHA is seeking public comment on
the following questions concerning
enforcement issues.
VI.31. Would OSHA’s current
authority grant inspectors performing
SDoC postmarket surveillance sufficient
geographic scope to conduct the
necessary inspections, or are there other
areas to which inspectors might need
access that are not covered by this
authority? Would OSHA inspectors
need explicit statutory authority to
impound or remove product samples for
testing under an effective SDoC
program?
VI.32. How should OSHA determine
the number of inspections to perform in
a given period and how should it target
these inspections? What strategies
should OSHA use to maximize the
effectiveness and minimize the
resources needed for such inspections?
VI.33. Is OSHA’s current enforcement
authority sufficient to support an
effective SDoC system in the U.S.? Does
OSHA need explicit statutory authority
to issue warnings, notifications of
defects or nonconformity, and/or
product recalls and bans? What
procedures should be available to OSHA
to enforce these remedies expeditiously
while avoiding inappropriate
enforcement action? Are other market
controls needed?
VI.34. Given the importance of
accurate manufacturer declarations to
an effective SDoC system, do the OSH
Act’s current criminal penalties, or any
other applicable Federal criminal
statutes, serve as a sufficient deterrent to
making false declarations?
F. Effects on Trade
One of the primary reasons that the
EC requested OSHA to consider SDoC is
the EC’s belief that the NRTL system is
an unnecessary barrier to trade.
Although OSHA considers the trade
impacts of its requirements when
developing them, it is interested in any
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information or analysis regarding the
effect of its NRTL approval
requirements or the NRTL Program on
trade.
OSHA believes that its current system
facilitates trade. The NRTL Program has
optional procedures in place to avoid
duplicating conformity-assessment of
products. These options permit the
NRTLs to accept test results from other
parties (including certain product
manufacturers) if the NRTL determines
that these parties are qualified. Through
these options, if an EU manufacturer has
the qualifications to do the testing or
uses testing performed by a qualified
test laboratory, the NRTL can rely on the
testing submitted by the manufacturer
and avoid retesting products. In Europe,
there are 250 laboratories or
manufacturers that provide testing to
NRTLs. In addition, NRTLs that are
members of the internationally
recognized International
Electrotechnical Commission
Certification Body (IEC–CB) system may
use testing performed by organizations
accredited under that scheme. The IEC–
CB system was established in large part
to facilitate trade (both export and
import) of electrical products. Under
this system, a manufacturer in one
country has its product tested by one of
its country’s member laboratories. This
laboratory issues a test report that the
manufacturer can submit to a member
laboratory in another country, which
will use the report to determine whether
to approve the manufacturer’s product
for export to that country.
These various options allow NRTLs to
rely on other qualified entities to
perform testing and certification. These
options can reduce the cost and time
required to obtain product approvals by
NRTLs, which in turn reduces the cost
and time to market for products. A
NRTL’s responsibility is to ensure the
accuracy of the data provided by these
qualified entities. NRTLs work closely
with qualified manufacturers, both large
and small, to avoid any unnecessary
delays and costs.
Through the following questions,
OSHA seeks information on how its
NRTL Program and the EU’s system of
conformity assessment hinders or
facilitates trade.
VI.35. In considering impacts on
trade, how should OSHA compare SDoC
and third-party certification (in
particular OSHA’s NRTL Program) to
determine if one system adds more
value to trade than the other system? If
such comparisons have been made,
what is the increase in value?
VI.36. When comparing SDoC and
third-party certification (in particular
OSHA’s NRTL Program), is there any
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:42 Oct 17, 2008
Jkt 217001
reduction in product time to market for
one system compared to other systems?
If so, how much time is saved? Does the
time saved vary by product? Is SDoC
faster than third-party certification for
some products and slower for others?
VI.37. Please provide specific
examples of how each system impacts
trade. Provide any data, if available, on
how each system may be a barrier or a
help to trade by affecting product time
to market, reduced profits, or other
effects.
G. Implementation Suggestions by
Certain Industries
In August 2008, OSHA received a
submission from three industry
associations advocating that OSHA
permit ‘‘safety approvals for a limited
scope of information and
communication technology products to
include the use of Supplier’s
Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) as an
option to (not a replacement for) thirdparty certification.’’ (Ex. OSHA–2008–
0032–0019.) This submission
compliments the EC’s proposal by
providing specific suggestions on how
OSHA should permit and implement
SDoC. While the focus of this RFI is the
EC’s proposal, OSHA seeks, through the
following question, comments on the
issues and approach outlined in this
industry submission.
VI.38. If OSHA were to implement
SDoC, should it follow the approach in
the industry submission, either partially
or completely? If partially, which
industry suggestions should OSHA
consider? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of the industry approach?
Would the industry approach affect
your response to any of the other
questions in this section, and, if yes,
how would your response differ? In
addition, please provide any comments
you want on issues raised by the
industry submission that are not
covered by the questions in this RFI.
VII. Responding to This RFI
OSHA welcomes information, data,
and comment on SDoC generally, and
the EC’s proposal specifically. OSHA
has provided a number of questions
above to provide a framework for the
public to respond to this RFI. However,
you can provide comment or
information on any aspect of the broad
areas mentioned above, and not limit
your answers to the specific questions
posed. In responding to the questions in
this RFI, please explain the reasons
supporting your views, and identify and
provide the relevant information on
which you rely, including data, studies,
articles, and other materials.
Respondents are encouraged to address
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62339
any aspect of the issue on which they
believe they can contribute. Please
identify any organization you represent
and your position with that
organization, and you may describe any
qualifications which you believe are
relevant to your comment. You are free
to provide any information that you
believe would be useful to OSHA,
including any data or supporting
documentation. However, as noted in
section I, OSHA particularly seeks
comments that include specific,
detailed, and credible scientific,
technical, statistical, and similar data
and studies that support claims made by
commenters.
OSHA will review all timely
comments and determine whether to
initiate rulemaking or take other action
with respect to SDoC, or to take no
further action.
VIII. Authority and Signature
This document was prepared under
the direction of Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, 200
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20210. This action is taken pursuant
to sections 4, 6, and 8 of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 657), Secretary of
Labor’s Order No. 5–2007 (72 FR
31159), and 29 CFR Part 1911.
Signed at Washington, DC, on October 14,
2008.
Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational
Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. E8–24826 Filed 10–17–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–26–P
MORRIS K. UDALL SCHOLARSHIP
AND EXCELLENCE IN NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
FOUNDATION, THE UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Agency Information Collection
Activities; Extension of Currently
Approved Information Collection;
Comment Request; U.S. Institute for
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Application for the National Roster of
Environmental Dispute Resolution and
Consensus Building Professionals
Morris K. Udall Scholarship
and Excellence in National
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Institute for Environmental Conflict
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ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: In compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act and
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 203 (Monday, October 20, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62327-62339]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-24826]
[[Page 62327]]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[Docket No. OSHA-2008-0032]
Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories; Supplier's
Declaration of Conformity
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Request for information.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration requests
comment on a proposal submitted to OSHA by the European Commission to
permit the use of a Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) as an
alternative to the Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTLs)
product-approval process.
DATES: You must submit information or comments by the following dates:
Hard copy: postmarked or sent by January 20, 2009.
Electronic transmission or facsimile: sent by January 20,
2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Electronically: You may submit comments electronically at https://
www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal eRulemaking Portal. Follow
the instructions online for making electronic submissions.
Fax: If your submissions, including attachments, are no longer than
10 pages, you may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at (202) 693-1648.
Mail, hand delivery, express mail, or messenger or courier service:
You must submit three copies of your comments to the OSHA Docket
Office, Docket No. OSHA-2008-0032, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-
2625, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210. Deliveries
(hand, express mail, messenger, and courier service) are accepted
during the Department of Labor's and Docket Office's normal business
hours, 8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m., e.t.
Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and the
OSHA docket number (i.e. , OSHA-2008-0032). Submissions, including any
personal information you provide, are placed in the public docket
without change and may be made available online at https://
www.regulations.gov.
Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the
docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at
the address above. All documents in the docket are listed in the http:/
/www.regulations.gov index; however, some information (e.g. ,
copyrighted material) is not publicly available to read or download
through the Web site. All submissions, including copyrighted material,
are available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Press inquiries: Jennifer Ashley,
Director, OSHA Office of Communications, Room N-3647, U.S. Department
of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210;
telephone: (202) 693-1999. General and technical information: MaryAnn
Garrahan, Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination
Activities, NRTL Program, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-2110. Our Web
page includes information about the NRTL Program (see https://
www.osha.gov and select ``N'' in the site index).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
OSHA requests information and comments on a proposal it received to
permit the use of a Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) as an
alternative to the Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTLs)
product-approval process. NRTLs are third-party (i.e. , independent)
laboratories that have met OSHA's requirements for performing safety
testing and certification of electrical and other products used in the
workplace. NRTLs test and certify these products to determine whether
they conform to appropriate U.S. product-safety testing standards. In
contrast, an SDoC is a written statement, produced by an equipment
manufacturer or supplier, that a product meets or conforms to a
specified test standard or a set of requirements. OSHA is aware of the
concept of manufacturer's self-approval and that it is allowed, for
certain types of products, in the U.S. (by certain Federal agencies)
and other countries. Details on this use are covered later in this RFI.
OSHA is taking this action in response to a request from the
European Commission (EC) that OSHA allow an SDoC system for certain
electrical products. SDoC is currently accepted for certain electrical
products in all European Union (EU) countries. OSHA issued a similar
Request for Information (RFI) in 2005 in response to a proposal from an
industry trade association for OSHA to convert to an SDoC system for
IT-related products. At that time, OSHA considered the responses from
the 2005 RFI to be insufficient to justify initiating rulemaking for a
change to an SDoC system. Since then, OSHA has obtained more
information about SDoC, partially through meetings with the EC, and
this information and the EC's proposal raise issues and topics that
were not fully explored in the 2005 RFI. The Agency is currently
interested in responses specifically related to the issues and topics
raised in the EC proposal or otherwise described in this present RFI.
OSHA will examine all responses received from this RFI to determine
whether to initiate rulemaking or take any other action with respect to
SDoC. OSHA requests comments from all interested parties on any of the
issues raised in this RFI, or any other issues the public feels is
relevant for OSHA to consider, and particularly seeks comments that
include specific detailed scientific, technical, statistical, or
similar data and studies, of a credible nature, supporting any claims
made by commenters. OSHA wants to emphasize the importance of receiving
such evidentiary information.
The remainder of this notice is divided into several sections.
Section II gives background information on OSHA's NRTL system for the
approval (also known as conformity assessment) \1\ of electrical
products. It also provides background information on OSHA's first RFI
on SDoC, and then describes events leading to OSHA's current RFI. It
also includes background information regarding the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Next,
section III discusses requirements for OSHA rulemaking, section IV
summarizes key aspects of the EC's proposal related to SDoC, section V
discusses information that OSHA has obtained to date on the European
Union's (EU) SDoC system for the approval of electrical products, and
section VI describes what OSHA has found to date to be basic elements
of an SDoC system, discussing certain topics and issues to provide a
foundation for the questions for which OSHA is seeking specific
information. Questions for the public's consideration are included in
the latter three sections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ While OSHA uses the term ``approval'' to describe the type
of testing or certification activities performed by NRTLs, the
international community often uses a different term for such
activities: Conformity assessment. An international guide, ISO Guide
2, defines ``conformity assessment'' as ``any activity concerned
with determining directly or indirectly that requirements are
fulfilled.''
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[[Page 62328]]
II. Background
A. OSHA Approval Requirements and NRTL Program
Many of OSHA's workplace standards require that certain types of
equipment be approved by an NRTL. (In this RFI, OSHA refers to these
provisions as ``NRTL approval requirements.'') Most of the requirements
for NRTL approval of equipment (also called ``products'' herein) used
in the workplace are found in the Agency's General Industry standards,
29 CFR part 1910. For example, 29 CFR 1910.303(a) (read together with
the definitions of ``approved'' and ``acceptable'' in 29 CFR 1910.399)
generally requires electric equipment or products used in the workplace
to be approved by NRTLs. A comprehensive list of NRTL approval
requirements and the categories of products which must be approved can
be found on OSHA's Web site at www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/.
Since its inception, OSHA has required that electric and other
types of equipment be approved by certain qualified organizations as
one measure for ensuring the safety of this equipment, thereby
continuing the long history in the U.S. of electric equipment safety-
testing being performed by third-party (i.e. , independent)
organizations. Adopting these requirements led eventually to the
establishment of the NRTL Program, which ensures that these
organizations are qualified to perform the product approvals.
OSHA's NRTL Program recognition process involves a thorough
analysis of an NRTL applicant's policies and procedures and a
comprehensive on-site review of the applicant's testing and
certification facilities to ensure that the applicant meets the
requirements of 29 CFR 1910.7. OSHA's staff also conducts annual on-
site audits to ensure that existing NRTLs adequately perform their
testing and certification activities and maintain the quality of those
operations.
OSHA imposes on the NRTLs several requirements found in 29 CFR
1910.7. Three of the requirements set forth the definition for an
organization's testing and certification capabilities. The remaining
requirement mandates an organization's complete independence from any
manufacturers, vendors, and major users of equipment subject to the
requirements. This last requirement ensures that organizations within
the program are third parties.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ NRTLs may be based in the U.S. or in other countries.
Currently, there are 15 NRTLs, of which 13 are established in the
U.S. and two are foreign-based.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRTLs generally approve products for a manufacturer before the
products are sold or shipped. The NRTL performs two major functions in
the product-approval process: Testing and certification. For the first
function, the NRTL tests a representative unit or prototype of the
product to ensure that it has appropriate safety features. For this
purpose, the NRTL may control and accept testing performed by parties
that the NRTL has qualified. These parties typically include
independent testing laboratories and even the product's manufacturer.
The testing ensures that the product conforms to the technical
requirements specified in test standards. For the second function, the
NRTL certifies the product, not only by issuing a certificate and
authorizing use of its certification mark, but more broadly through
listing and labeling, and follow-up inspection programs. The NRTL may
use a contractor under the NRTL's control to conduct the inspections.
Inspections must be done on a regular basis at the product
manufacturer's factories or assembling facilities to gain assurance
that all manufactured units of the product are the same as the unit
initially tested and certified.
For more information about the program, see the Web site
(www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/), as well as Ex. OSHA-2008-
0032-0004 of this docket and the exhibits under Docket NRTL03-SDOC, the
latter pertaining to OSHA's first RFI on SDoC.
B. OSHA's First Request for Information on SDoC
OSHA previously published an RFI on SDoC in response to a proposal
from an industry trade association, the Information Technology Industry
Council (ITIC). It recommended a change from the NRTL approval to an
SDoC system for ensuring the safety of information technology equipment
used in the workplace. (Ex. 1, Docket NRTL03-SDOC.) The proposal
claimed that SDoC would reduce products' time-to-market delays and
would not have a detrimental effect on the safety of affected products.
It also claimed that information-technology (IT) equipment had a strong
workplace safety record.
ITIC further suggested that all IT equipment should be approved to
meet the technical requirements of the IEC 60950 test standard issued
by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), a leading
organization in the development of international test standards. ITIC
advocated the use of this test standard by all countries. (Ex. 1A,
Docket NRTL03-SDOC.) OSHA noted that NRTLs already used UL 60950, the
corresponding U.S. harmonized version of the IEC 60950 standard, for
approving IT equipment. The IEC 60950 standard (or UL 60950 or other
harmonized versions) covers not only IT, but also a number of other
common products (e.g., printers, copiers, and telephones) and
specialized equipment (e.g., communications terminal equipment and
mail-sorting machines).
The proposal also included a study by Industry Canada, an agency of
the Canadian government, which discussed ways that agencies in various
countries use SDoCs for approvals of equipment. (Ex. 1B, Docket NRTL03-
SDOC.) The study noted the importance in an SDoC system of having a
responsible regulatory agency with audit and enforcement authority
after products are sold. In contrast, under current OSHA regulations,
NRTLs must perform key functions before products are sold. The study
identified only EU countries as allowing use of SDoC for regulating the
safety of electric equipment. The study noted the importance of each
country's ``market surveillance authority to monitor the products
placed on the market.'' (Id., page 28.) As also noted, with respect to
EU's enforcement measures, ``[m]any surveillance authorities may use
warnings, administrative actions (such as [product] modifications,
recall, sales ban, confiscation and publication) and, ultimately,
prosecution (fines and imprisonment).'' (Id., page 29.)
OSHA determined, however, that ITIC's proposal lacked information
needed to determine whether to initiate rulemaking. To obtain more
information and give interested parties an opportunity to comment on
the ITIC proposal, OSHA issued an RFI on November 15, 2005 (70 FR
69355). The RFI contained seven questions seeking detailed information
related to the operation of an SDoC system, and seven questions related
to specific aspects of the ITIC proposal. Twenty-six comments were
received in response to the RFI. Commenters in favor (mainly from three
product industry associations) claimed that SDoC would reduce product
time-to-market and that SDoC systems have similar safety records to
OSHA's NRTL Program. Commenters opposed to the proposal (mainly from
product industry associations, individuals, and NRTLs) claimed that the
competence of different manufacturers varied widely, and that there
were no sufficient reasons for OSHA to change its system. These latter
commenters claimed that safety would suffer under an SDoC system. Some
commenters also stated that OSHA did
[[Page 62329]]
not have the authority to implement an SDoC system. Industry
associations opposed to the proposal included the National Electrical
Manufacturers Association. Many commenters, both for and against the
proposal, stated that adoption of SDoC would require OSHA, at a
minimum, to implement a postmarket-surveillance system, which would
require monitoring products after they reached the market, thereby
leading to potential enforcement actions such as product bans or
recalls.
In general, however, commenters did not provide adequate data to
support their arguments. For example, parties on both sides of the SDoC
question offered little in the way of adequate data to support their
positions. With regard to the safety risk of the products, the data or
other information were not presented in a manner to ensure validity or
to allow for analysis and evaluation. In this regard, the American
Council of Independent Laboratories (ACIL) reported results from a
survey it conducted, stating that ``50% of IT and Office Equipment
products were non-compliant after first submittal to the NRTL,'' and
that 50% of these noncompliances were ``major safety and health
related.'' (Ex. 2-5, Docket NRTL03-SDOC.) However, ACIL offered no
report summarizing all the results of the survey or information about
the methodology of the survey, the response rate, or the data upon
which respondents relied. Likewise, Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
provided no details about how it determined that ``[a]pproximately 50%
of the IT equipment'' submitted to it ``initially fails to meet the
applicable safety requirements.'' (Ex. 2-4-1, Id.) Similarly
unsupported were UL's statements that ``[f]ield sampling in the
European Union suggests that up to 50% of the IT equipment on the
market in the European Union today does not comply with applicable
requirements'' and that ``[i]n 2004, electric appliances accounted for
27 percent of RAPEX-posted products and were determined to present a
serious risk to consumers' health and safety.'' (Ex. 2-4-1, Id.) (RAPEX
is formally called the Community Rapid Information System.) The
Canadian Standards Association referenced a German study which
purported to show that ``certified ('tested') products appeared much
less often in accident and fault reports than uncertified products,''
but did not provide the study for OSHA's review or a citation where it
might be found. (Ex. 2-7-1, Id.)
Similar problems exist with the data submitted by the proponents of
SDoC. ITIC calculated a defect rate of 0.2 percent for ``US computer
products'' between 1994 and 1999, but did not provide the original
sources of the data from which this figure was calculated. (Ex. 1, id.)
It is also unclear why more recent data were not used. In any event,
their approach did not account for a significant confounding factor--
that all computer equipment operating from an electric outlet and used
in U.S. workplaces is required to be NRTL approved--so ITIC's method
did nothing to measure the safety of equipment sold or used only under
an SDoC system.
Other data submitted by ITIC address this problem, in part. A graph
in a PowerPoint presentation prepared by UNICE (now known as
``BUSINESSEUROPE''), and submitted by ITIC, shows that in 2004, 27% of
RAPEX notifications of unsafe products were for products manufactured
in the EU, compared with 2% for U.S.-manufactured products. (Ex. 2-9-1,
Id.) Again, the underlying data are not provided. However, taken at
face value, these statistics suggest that an NRTL system may reduce the
risk of unsafe products. No firm conclusions may be drawn, however,
without more information, such as the percentages and types of U.S.-
manufactured goods and EU-manufactured goods sold in the EU. Another
UNICE graph showed a relative decrease in electrocutions in Germany
compared to the U.S. between 1960 and 1989. (Ex. 2-9-1, Id.) However,
the source of the data does not appear to be readily available in the
U.S., the actual numbers of electrocutions per year and a
stratification by causes are not provided in the graph, no reason is
given why more recent data were not obtained, and it is unclear whether
the data are normalized for the two populations.
In summary, much of the information submitted by commenters lacked
the supporting data and details requested in the RFI. In addition, as
the above examples demonstrate, some comments provided inadequate
support for data, figures, or claims, or provided little or inadequate
explanation. OSHA analyzed all of the comments and concluded that the
information did not justify a decision to initiate rulemaking to adopt
SDoC. Most importantly, OSHA found that the information it received did
not provide reasonable assurance that adopting SDoC would provide a
high degree of protection for the safety of products used in the
workplace. Without such assurance, OSHA found little justification to
initiate a rulemaking. Furthermore, OSHA believed that implementation
of SDoC might require a change to OSHA's legislative authority in
addition to an increase of appropriations. The change in legislative
authorization appeared necessary because OSHA lacked authority to adopt
many of the enforcement measures for electrical safety noted earlier
for the SDoC system implemented by the EU, including product recalls,
bans, and confiscation, among other measures. The Agency could not
justify such requests from Congress based on the information obtained
through the RFI process.
In view of these findings, which summarize only some of the key
areas of concern, OSHA decided to take no further action on the
proposal and announced its decision in the Spring 2007 Semi-Annual
Regulatory Agenda, published on April 30, 2007 (see 72 FR 22870).
C. Events Leading to Second Request for Information on SDoC
On April 30, 2007, President Bush and his EU counterparts signed
the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration Between
the U.S. and the EU (``Framework Agreement'' or ``Agreement''). (Ex.
OSHA-2008-0032-0002.) This is a trade-related agreement that has a
number of objectives, foremost of which is ``removing barriers to
transatlantic commerce'' (see section II of the Agreement). The
Agreement's Annex 1 lists a number of activities affecting different
U.S. and EU agencies and sectors, including ``initiating an exchange on
conformity-assessment procedures for the safety of electrical
equipment.''
The agreement established a Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) to
monitor progress toward meeting the goals of the Framework Agreement.
As stated in the Agreement, the TEC is ``co-chaired, on the U.S. side,
by a U.S. Cabinet-level official in the Executive Office of the
President and on the EU side by a Member of the European Commission,
collaborating closely with the EU Presidency.'' Through the TEC, in
July 2007, the EC issued a brief statement proposing that OSHA adopt
SDoC for all electric equipment, claiming that this action would
``reduce unnecessary costs for transatlantic trade.'' (Ex. OSHA-2008-
0032-0003.) Working in part through the TEC, OSHA and the EC arranged a
meeting to undertake the Annex 1 activity regarding the exchange of
information on the conformity-assessment procedures for the safety of
electrical equipment.
On October 11, 2007, representatives of OSHA and two other offices
within the Department of Labor met with representatives of the EC to
conduct an
[[Page 62330]]
exchange of information in furtherance of the Annex 1 activity. A
summary of this meeting was produced that captures key aspects of these
systems. (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0004.) The participants considered the
meeting to be productive, but neither side was able to ask all of its
questions due to lack of time.
At its first formal meeting, held on November 9, 2007, the TEC
issued a joint statement requesting OSHA to report, at the TEC's next
meeting, on ``progress made to facilitate trade in electrical products
with respect to conformity assessment procedures for the safety of such
products.'' (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0009.) In March 2008, the EC issued
another statement requesting the ``[U.S.] Government to allow the
import and sale of any low-risk electrical and electronic product on
the basis'' of SDoC.\3\ (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0005.) At the second formal
TEC meeting, held on May 13, 2008, Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao
stated that OSHA would issue a second RFI on SDoC. (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-
0006.) Among other things, this RFI allows OSHA to obtain a better
understanding regarding SDoC and, as noted earlier, certain related
topics and issues not fully explored in the 2005 RFI. In June 2008, at
the request of OSHA, the EC submitted a formal rationale for its
request that OSHA adopt SDoC for ``electrical and electronic
products.'' This rationale is discussed in section IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ OSHA does not regulate the ``import and sale'' of products,
but its rules do affect whether certain products may be used in the
workplace, thus affecting whether those products may be sold or
imported into the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. World Trade Organization's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
The U.S. and 152 other countries are Members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and party to the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization which includes the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT Agreement) (see Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0007). The TBT
Agreement addresses technical regulations, standards and conformity
assessment procedures for products or related processes and production
methods. In terms of the TBT Agreement, OSHA's NRTL approval
requirements are considered conformity-assessment procedures. The TBT
Agreement states Members' desire to ensure that technical regulations,
standards, and conformity assessment procedures do not create
unnecessary obstacles to trade while recognizing that no Member should
be prevented from taking measures that are necessary inter alia to
protect human health or safety. Article 5 of the TBT Agreement requires
Members to ensure that its central-level conformity assessment
procedures are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with
the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade and
explains that ``this means inter alia that conformity assessment
procedures shall not be more strict or be applied more strictly than is
necessary to give the importing Member adequate confidence that
products conform with the applicable technical regulations or
standards, taking into account the risk non-conformity would create.''
Congress amended the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, as amended
(``TAA''; 19 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.) to implement the TBT Agreement. In
particular, the TAA indicates that Federal agencies may not ``engage in
any standards-related activity that creates unnecessary barriers of
trade.'' 19 U.S.C. 2532. A standard is ``necessary'' in this context:
[I]f the demonstrable purpose of the standards-related activity
is to achieve a legitimate domestic objective including, but not
limited to, the protection of legitimate health or safety, essential
security, environmental, or consumer interests and if such activity
does not operate to exclude imported products which fully meet the
objectives of such activity.
19 U.S.C. 2531(b).
The TAA also requires Federal agencies to take international
standards into account in standards-related activities, and to base
their standards on the international standards ``if appropriate.'' 19
U.S.C. 2532(2)(A). However, international standards are not
``appropriate'' if they do not adequately protect ``human health or
safety, animal or plant life or health or the environment.'' 19 U.S.C.
2532(2)(B). Likewise, the TAA provides that it may not be construed
``to limit the authority of a Federal agency to determine the level it
considers appropriate of safety or of protection of human, animal, or
plant life or health, the environment, or consumers.'' 19 U.S.C.
2531(a)(2).
OSHA's NRTL Program and its third-party approval requirements apply
to certain equipment or products used in the workplace, regardless of
whether they are manufactured within or outside of the U.S. In
addition, the NRTL Program is open to both U.S. and foreign-based
organizations, which gives them equal opportunity to become an NRTL.
OSHA's requirements for approval of electric equipment are necessary
measures for protecting employees against electrical shock,
electrocution, burns, and fires, and, thus, to protect the safety of
the employees. The NRTL Program is necessary to provide assurance that
the approvals are performed by qualified organizations. As discussed
later in this notice, the EC views OSHA's third-party approval
requirements and NRTL Program as unnecessary obstacles to trade. (See,
for example, Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0005.) Although OSHA disagrees with
this view, it issues this RFI to gather information bearing on the
question that an SDoC system, at least for some categories of
equipment, may protect employees sufficiently to satisfy the
requirements of the OSH Act.
III. Requirements for OSHA Rulemaking
The primary purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Act is to
assure, so far as possible, safe and healthful working conditions for
every American employee. 29 U.S.C. 651(b). To fulfill this purpose,
Congress gave the Secretary of Labor the authority to promulgate,
modify, or revoke mandatory occupational safety and health standards.
29 U.S.C. 655.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In its comments submitted in response to the previous RFI,
ITIC argued that OSHA could adopt an SDoC system through an
interpretative rule without notice and comment. (Ex. 4-19, pp. 10-
12, Docket NRTL03-SDOC.) OSHA disagrees with this assertion. Current
rules require NRTLs to be ``completely independent of * * *
manufacturers or vendors of equipment or materials being tested. * *
*'' 29 CFR 1910.7(b)(3). A change to this requirement would
constitute a legislative rule that ``directly governs the conduct of
[employers], affecting individual rights and obligations,'' Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 511 U.S. --, 127 S. Ct. 2339,
2350 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). To guarantee that
employers have an opportunity to participate in the formulation of
these individual rights and obligations, OSHA must follow the
notice, comment, and hearing procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the OSH Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Act, the case law developed under it, and OSHA regulations
establish a number of requirements that the Agency must meet before
exercising this authority. Some of these requirements are procedural.
For example, the Agency must support its findings with substantial
evidence in the record developed through the rulemaking proceedings,
and explain the basis for accepting or rejecting all major suggestions
for modification of a proposed standard. See ``Supplemental Statement
of Reasons'' for the final rule on Control of Hazardous Energy Sources,
58 FR 16612 at 16615; see also 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(2), (b)(3), and (f). In
addition, when OSHA decides to change a standard, it must provide a
reasoned basis for the change. International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37
F.3d 665, 668-69 (DC Cir. 1994) (``Lockout/Tagout II'')
[[Page 62331]]
OSHA also is constrained by substantive rulemaking requirements.
Accordingly, the OSH Act requires that safety standards, like the NRTL
approval requirements, must ``afford a high degree of protection'' to
employees. Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 669. Thus, for OSHA to adopt
an SDoC approval standard and related program, it must find, on the
basis of substantial evidence, that the SDoC system provides this high
degree of protection to employees who use equipment that would be
covered by the standard. In this regard, OSHA has been careful to
ensure that changes to its product-conformity program maintain existing
levels of employee safety. See the final rule on Safety Testing or
Certification of Certain Workplace Equipment and Materials, 53 FR 12102
at 12103, April 12, 1988.
IV. EC's formal proposal for OSHA to adopt SDoC
A. Overview of rationale
The EC's proposal to OSHA concerning the adoption of SDoC is
captured in its March 2008 statement (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0005) and
supplemented by its June 2008 rationale (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0008).\5\
The March 2008 statement formally requests that OSHA ``review its
conformity assessment procedures in the area of electrical and
electronic products.'' In this statement, the EC also advocated SDoC
because it believes third-party conformity assessment of ``low-risk
electrical and electronic product[s]'' in the U.S. ``imposes
unnecessary additional costs and market-entry barriers on exporters of
these goods. * * *'' The statement describes the types of products the
EC considers to be outside the scope of ``low-risk electrical and
electronic product[s],'' such as ``electrical equipment for use in an
explosive atmosphere, * * * for radiology and medical purposes, * * *
[and] electricity meters, plugs, and socket outlets for domestic use. *
* *'' The EC, therefore, maintains that such products present a level
of risk that would make SDoC an inappropriate means of conformity
assessment, and the EC requires the use of third-party approvals in
such cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In August 2008, OSHA received a complementary proposal,
jointly submitted by three industry associations, that provides a
suggested approach for implementing an OSHA SDoC system. See section
VI.G if you wish to comment on this approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its rationale, the EC noted that it has long experience with
``conformity assessment regimes'' that do not require manufacturers to
obtain third-party certification. The EC stated that it made ``an
assessment of the risk to consumers, workers, and the general
interest'' as to whether certain ``non-compliant products [reaching]
the market would pose a danger.'' The EC then concluded that for these
products ``these risks are at a level that they can be satisfactorily
managed'' by requiring manufacturers to demonstrate compliance and
retain proof of compliance for inspection by public authorities. It
also stated that such rules, along with legal liabilities on
manufacturers, consumer-protection legislation, and appropriate
enforcement measures would guarantee a high level of safety for
European consumers. The EC further stated that it instituted its
approach in the area of electrical safety through its ``Low Voltage
Directive,'' for products rated ``between 50-1000 volts AC and 75-2500
[sic] volts DC. * * *'' (Note: the actual DC upper limit is 1500
volts.) We will provide some general information about EC directives in
the next section of this notice.
The EC contends in its rationale that OSHA's third-party
requirements cause an ``imbalance in market access * * * [by
manufacturers for] transatlantic trade in electrical products,'' and an
``imbalance in market access for the [EU] certification industry''
because they are subject to OSHA's NRTL approval requirement while U.S.
certifiers are not subject to any such comparable EU requirement. The
EC also asserts that the requirements increase the likelihood that
countries importing products from the U.S. and the EU will establish
their own form of testing and approval. The EC further contends that an
OSHA change to SDoC ``is justified by the fact that European consumers
and workers experience a high if not higher level of electrical safety
as their counterparts in the US.'' It attributes this effect in part to
``the high level of safety of electrical and electronic devices.''
Moreover, it contends that ``[s]tatistics furthermore demonstrate that
accidents can seldom be attributed to products, but are normally the
result of 'live' wires and neglect. Where they can be attributed to
products, there are no indications that in the EU there is a
relationship between non-compliance and incidents [of accidents].''
Finally the EC claims that ``market mechanisms [in the EU] ensure that
most electrical and electronic products and especially high technology
products and high volume products follow rigid quality controls and
have an excellent record of compliance.''
The EC's rationale also suggests several topics to cover in this
RFI, and OSHA is including the questions in section VI, below, to
address these topics.
B. OSHA Comments on EC's Rationale
The key part of the EC's rationale is its conclusion that the
safety risk associated with noncompliant electrical products can be
satisfactorily managed through SDoC. Indeed, this is a threshold
determination that OSHA must make before it proposes an SDoC approval
standard or related program. As discussed below, however, to date the
EC has failed to support this conclusion with the evidence necessary
for OSHA to reasonably ensure that SDoC would satisfy the standard-
setting requirements of the OSH Act. Such support could include, for
example, an explanatory study or report that adequately describes,
quantifies, or otherwise specifies the level or characteristics of
noncompliance, or the characteristics of the electrical or other safety
risk involved. It is clear that the EC would not permit SDoC for
particular equipment if it believes that the safety risk of
noncompliance is too high. In fact, it justifies the use of SDoC for
low-voltage products on the grounds that the safety risk of
noncompliance is low. (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0008, p. 1.) However, it is
unclear from the EC's proposal whether the EU determined that the
safety risk from noncompliance was low before it implemented the SDoC
for low-voltage products, or determined that the low level of risk
resulted through implementation of SDoC. Also, it was unclear from the
proposal how the EU made this determination. In addition, the EU
believes that this low level of noncompliance and the resulting low
level of safety risk is maintained because manufacturers are required
to retain ``proof'' of compliance and because manufacturers are subject
to legal ``liability, consumer protection legislation and an
appropriate enforcement.'' (Id.) The EC has not provided evidence to
support this conclusion regarding the effectiveness of an SDoC system,
and a reliable means of tracking the results of such a system would
help to provide the required evidence. OSHA would need to review this
evidence before it could reach similar conclusions.
The EC further contends that European consumers and employees
``experience an equally high, if not higher level of electrical safety
as their counterparts in the U.S.'' (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0008, p. 2.)
The EC attributes this ``higher level'' in part to ``the high level of
safety of electrical and electronic devices.'' (Id.) The EC also claims
that ``[s]tatistics furthermore
[[Page 62332]]
demonstrate'' that accidents involving equipment are not attributable
to ``a relationship between non-compliance and incidents [of
accidents].'' (Id.) It later notes that ``most electrical and
electronic products and especially high technology products * * * have
an excellent record of compliance.'' (Id.) To date, OSHA has received
no data to support any of these statements. OSHA would need to receive
such information to determine whether to initiate rulemaking on SDoC.
C. Questions
As noted above, the EC identified a number of issues in its
rationale and suggested that the RFI include questions addressing a
number of topics. OSHA's comments above also serve as a basis for other
questions.
Questions Related to Details and Data Supporting EC's Rationale
IV.1. What information and evidence is available to support the
conclusion that the risk of nonconforming products posing a danger was,
is, and will be low under SDoC? If possible, describe, quantify, and
otherwise specify the level or characteristics of noncompliance, and
the characteristics of the electrical or other safety risk involved.
IV.2. What data, documentation, or records exist to demonstrate
adequately that European consumers and employees experience a level of
electrical safety at least as high as their counterparts in the U.S.?
IV.3. What legal liability, consumer-protection legislation, and
enforcement programs exist in the EU to ensure that its SDoC system has
maintained and will maintain the risk of danger posed by noncompliant
products at a low level, or to ensure that the level of noncompliant
products will be low? Are there similar protections in the U.S.?
IV.4. What data or documentation exists to demonstrate adequately
that accidents in the EU involving electric equipment are not
attributable to product noncompliance, and that most electrical and
electronic products, especially high-technology products, have an
excellent record of compliance?
V. The EU's SDoC System
A. Background
On June 25, 2008, the EC submitted a formal proposal to OSHA to
issue a second RFI on the adoption of an SDoC system for certain ranges
of products. (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0008.) The proposal states that the
RFI would further the TEC's goals of ``promoting transatlantic trade
and regulatory convergence.'' It states that obligatory third-party
certification of certain products, such as is required by OSHA, can
create barriers to trade, and that programs that create such barriers
should be justified by the additional benefits they confer. In
addition, the proposal points out that the U.S. has implemented SDoC
systems for many product categories other than electrical products. The
proposal claims that the EC's system is as effective as the U.S.'s for
protecting both consumer and employee safety.
The proposal requests that the RFI obtain information for an
assessment of the elements that would be necessary to implement an SDoC
system, and to obtain data and information about what classes of
products such a system would most appropriately regulate. At the time
of publication of this RFI, the EU's SDoC system is the only one of
which OSHA is aware that exists for the conformity assessment of
electrical-product safety. In this section, we review the information
we have obtained on this system as a basis for later questions seeking
a better understanding of this system.
B. The EU's SDoC system
The summary of the October 11, 2007, information-exchange meeting
between OSHA and EC representatives (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0003) provides
much of the information included in this part. Research by OSHA staff
also provided information.
Products covered by the EC's SDoC system for electrical safety are
determined by the Low Voltage Directive (LVD) (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-
0017), which was implemented in 1973 to promote the free movement of
goods across the EU. (The LVD does not apply to goods intended for
export to countries outside the EU.) Such directives constitute laws
enacted by the European Council and European Parliament. These laws are
generally proposed by the EC. More information on these institutions
and their functions is available at https://europa.eu/index_en.htm .
The LVD covers all equipment between 50 and 1000 volts AC and 75 and
1500 volts DC, except as specifically excluded in its Annex II. This
annex lists, among other types of equipment, ``electrical equipment for
use in an explosive atmosphere, those for radiology and medical
purposes, and those for goods and passenger lifts.'' The lower and
upper limits of the LVD were set to exclude electric equipment of the
telecommunication industry and electric-power industries, respectively.
The EC's proposal asserts that all products covered under the LVD have
been demonstrated to be ``low-risk,'' and that electrocutions have
become rare in the EU since the LVD was implemented, which the EC
argues indicates the effectiveness of the EC's SDoC system. In general,
the conformity-assessment approach used in the EU classifies products
according to eight categories, with requirements ranging from the least
stringent (Module A) to the most stringent (Module H). Module A,
covering only the lowest-risk products and formally called ``internal
production control,'' is the only system for which SDoC is permitted on
its own, i.e., without other and stronger regulatory controls. (See Ex.
OSHA-2008-0032-0015 for an illustration of the safety requirements for
products covered by each module.)
Enforcement under the LVD is conducted through Member States'
postmarket surveillance. The EU countries must enact their own national
laws to implement the LVD, and assign at least one agency (called the
``surveillance authority'') to enforce these laws. In the United
Kingdom, for example, this role is filled by approximately 250 local
government agencies, whereas in other countries, one agency or one part
of an agency may fill this role. The surveillance authority's
inspections are a critical aspect of its activities. Among the
countries, the kinds and number of inspections vary depending on the
number of available inspectors, the amount of available funding, and
the type and number of problems the EU country is facing. In at least
one country, inspections are based primarily on complaints and
accidents, and in other countries, inspections are based primarily on a
random selection of products. Once a potential deficiency is found, the
manufacturer, if known, may be required to submit to the authority a
report by an independent testing organization (called a ``notified
body'' in the EU) demonstrating that the product conforms to the
applicable test standard. For those products that do not conform, the
manufacturer must make a risk assessment and propose corrective
actions. Ultimately, the country's surveillance authority makes a final
decision on risk, which, as noted in the next section, can vary
substantially across countries. The authority then decides what
remedial action to take, which may include product recall, ban,
quarantine, or confiscation; assessing financial penalties; and, in
more serious cases, assessing criminal penalties. If the authority
cannot locate the manufacturer or its authorized representative, the
authority may hold the retailer (or other party placing the
[[Page 62333]]
product in that country's market) responsible, and impose the remedial
action on that party.
For products posing immediate safety risks, and affecting more than
one country, the EU has a rapid alert system (RAPEX). This system is
increasingly used for communicating information about noncompliant
products. Another notification system, the Information and
Communication System for Market Surveillance (ICSMS), also has this
purpose, but it is not used by all Member States. Technical files of
products covered under the directive must be maintained by the
manufacturer for at least 10 years after the products go on the market.
Private-sector bodies called ``European Standardisation Organisations''
are responsible for developing and maintaining the technical safety
specifications for the products, similar to the role of the American
National Standards Institute in the U.S. In addition, a product that
complies with the harmonized EU versions of international test
standards is assumed to be in compliance with the LVD. If challenged by
the Member States' surveillance authority, a manufacturer must prove it
has complied with the LVD either by demonstrating compliance with
harmonized test standards or by other means. In cases for which the
manufacturer cannot be found, the burden passes to the importer, who
can be liable for penalties and applicable fines. However, there is no
requirement that manufacturers or importers register with any Member
States, making it difficult in some cases to identify the responsible
party.
While EU Member States cannot add safety-related requirements to
the LVD, they can regulate nonsafety-related public-interest
requirements. The LVD, like other directives, is binding upon Member
States, which are supposed to implement it by transposing it into their
own national laws. If the Member States do not implement or do not
properly implement the LVD or other product-related directives through
their own legislation, they are nonetheless obligated to accept
products declared compliant with the LVD unless the products are found
to be noncompliant. Fines imposed on manufacturers or importers for
noncompliance with the LVD are levied by individual Member States, and
may vary between different Member States.
C. Effectiveness of the EU's SDoC system
The EC has stated that its SDoC system has provided European
consumers and employees with a high level of safety. It argues that
this level is the same or higher than that achieved by the U.S. under
its NRTL system. However, the EC did not provide data, in its
submissions, to demonstrate its position in a way that would support
rulemaking by OSHA. As noted by the EC in its presentation at the
October 11, 2007, meeting with OSHA, the lack of harmonization in the
EU of methods to collect statistics on electrical accidents hinders any
comparison of statistics between the U.S. and the EU, or even among
Member States within the EU.
OSHA has obtained information that highlights different aspects of
the EU's SDoC system, and provides a gauge of its effectiveness. We are
summarizing this information solely to provide a basis for some of our
questions in this RFI, and not to draw conclusions from it.
First, we present the reports of the results of two projects that
were undertaken by EU market-surveillance authorities, then discuss a
relevant report issued by the staff of an office of the EC, and finally
describe some aspects of the EU's RAPEX and ICSMS systems.
The Low Voltage Directive Administrative Co-operation (LVD AdCo) is
``an independent Working Group run and chaired by the Member States.
The Group is a forum for co-operation and exchange of information
between national market surveillance authorities.'' (Ex. OSHA-2008-
0032-0010.) In 2006, LVD AdCo organized its first cross-border market-
surveillance project, i.e. , a multi-country cooperative and
coordinated effort, by the surveillance authorities from 15 Member
States. In deciding which products to target, the project report notes
that consideration was given to the differences in ``infrastructures
and funding * * * between member states,'' and the need to ensure
``that cost was minimized and that the technical requirements for the
tests were within the possibilities of all potential participants.''
(Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0011, p. 5.) This approach highlights the technical
and financial limitations faced by some Member States in performing
their surveillance functions.
The study targeted ``portable luminaries'' (i.e. , portable lamps)
partly because they ``are relatively cheap to purchase,'' thus making
this project feasible for ``member states with small [market-
surveillance] budgets.'' These products were selected for study because
of the large number of problem notifications found with these products
by Member States, as shown in a chart depicting past ``safeguard
clauses and RAPEX notifications.'' (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0011, p. 6.) For
the project, a total of 226 luminaires were evaluated for conformance
to applicable administrative and technical requirements. Of this total,
38% originated in the EU, 23% originated from China, 10% originated
from other countries outside of the EU, and 29% had no country of
origin specified. The project found that 72% (162) of the 226
luminaires failed one or more of the technical requirements, with
nearly half (74) containing ``serious'' technical hazards, and 23% (53)
of the 226 luminaires had administrative nonconformities (missing
``CE'' marks, missing or incorrect technical files, missing or
incorrect declarations of conformity, and other similar problems).
(Id., p. 17.) According to the report of the project, sampling was not
random. Consequently, the results obtained ``do not give a dependable
estimate of the percentages [of] non-compliant luminaires on the
market.'' (Id., p. 18.) However, the report indicates that the results
of the project match the actual experiences of several EU Member
States. A summary of the report states the following:
Many companies appear to neglect assuring conformity with the
administrative requirements in the Directive. Declarations of
conformity and technical files were often not available or did not
fit the luminaires themselves. The LVD prescribes module A for
conformity assessment, which amounts to self-certification by the
manufacturer or importer into the EU. The choice for module A was
made because of the relatively minor hazards associated with
electrical products. However, the new and global approach is based
on the assumption that the actors comply with the conformity
assessment procedures before CE-marking the product in order to
assure safe products on the markets. For fragmented markets like the
one for luminaires, this assumption does not appear to be valid, if
the results of this and previous national actions are indeed
indicative. (Id., p. 19.)
The report lacks any analysis of the underlying causes for the high
rate of nonconformities found. It recognizes some difficulties in
market surveillance caused by differences between the systems of EU
Member States, noting:
Differences exist between the member states in the grading of
shortcomings: the same violation of a specific requirement leads to
different assessment of the resulting risk and as a consequence to
different interventions. Given the differences in legal systems[,]
differences in sanctions imposed in the various member states for
similar violations cannot be avoided.
The report states further that ``multinational companies operating
in the European union * * * will rightly wonder why it is that the same
violation is considered a serious risk in one
[[Page 62334]]
member state, while another member state classifies it as a minor
risk.'' The report suggests that in this area ``harmonization is
urgently needed.'' (Id., p. 23.)
A similar project was conducted on extension cords, and a summary
of the results was provided in a press release. (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-
0012.) The press release indicated that 20 EU Member States
participated in the study, and 210 extension cords were tested. The
results show that only one in six cord-extension sets fully complied
with the LVD and the General Product Safety Directive (GPSD)
requirements. (The GPSD specifies requirements for general consumer
products used in the EU.) Although the noncompliant samples also
included those products that exhibited only administrative failures,
approximately 58% of the cord-extension sets tested were considered
sufficiently unsafe by the authorities to justify a sales ban or
product recall.
OSHA also reviewed a document prepared by the EC's staff (Ex. OSHA-
2008-0032-0013), which provided details about the EU's market-
surveillance system and served as the basis for associated legislation
that the EU was considering. This document covers a wide range of
issues in a number of areas where the EU's system needed improvement.
Under ``What are the Problems to Tackle,'' the report states,
``Experience with the implementation of [European] Community
legislation in the area of free movement of goods has highlighted
certain weaknesses and shown that the effectiveness of the system can
still be improved.'' (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0013, p. 12.) The document
also declares that, ``It is generally noted that the enforcement of EU
product legislation is unsatisfactory and a considerable number of non-
compliant (and potentially dangerous) products reach the market. The
share of non-compliant products can only be estimated and the situation
differs very much from sector to sector and from Member State to Member
State.'' (Id., p. 19.). This statement partially corroborates the
findings in the report on luminaires, which indicated that the high
level of nonconformities results from difficulties faced by Member
States in enforcing the LVD. Further, the staff document notes,
``Currently, market surveillance does not operate effectively
throughout the Community. * * *'' (Id., p. 20.) The document notes
later, ``In practice market surveillance authorities often experience
difficulties in identifying the person who has actually manufactured
and/or supplied the products * * *'' (Id., p. 23.) OSHA is aware that
the legislation pertaining to this staff document was passed and is due
to go into effect in 2010, although OSHA has not obtained the details
of the measures adopted to address the problems and recommendations in
the staff document.
The staff document states that the number of noncompliant products
in the EU is unknown and the reporting systems in the EU lack
uniformity. The EU's RAPEX and ICSMS are notification systems used by
market-surveillance authorities for enforcement purposes. Formally
called the Community Rapid Information System, RAPEX is used for a
number of ``non-food consumer products.'' It is not typically used for
products that are mainly for industrial or commercial purposes. It also
is not used for notification of noncompliant products when ``the
effects do not or cannot go beyond the territory of a Member State. * *
*'' (Ex. OSHA-2008-0032-0021, p. 7.) As a result, Member States may
judge a number of actions to be outside the scope of RAPEX and, thus,
not report them. Therefore, RAPEX results may not give an accurate
estimate of problems associated with certain products. For example, the
2006 annual report for one Member State authority showed that it had
3,770 queries and complaints related to electrical goods. (Ex. OSHA-
2008-0032-0022, p. 29.) The report further states that about 200
investigations were carried out relating to products that may pose a
safety risk. (Id., page 20.) The number of RAPEX notifications for that
country in 2006 was 14. (Ex., OSHA-2008-0032-0023, p. 15.)
The following questions seek further information and data regarding
these studies, as well as information and data pertaining to the
effectiveness of the EC's SDoC system.
V.1. The luminaire and cord-extension projects identified
substantial noncompliance with the LVD and, if the results are
representative of the wider array of products for which an SDoC is
acceptable, appear to be inconsistent with the EC's claim regarding the
safety of products evaluated under their SDoC system. Is this a valid
inference from these studies? Do the data and study methods have
limitations that would affect this inference?
V.2. What data and/or record systems exist in each Member State to
track the effectiveness of their SDoC system?
V.3. Are other reports and documents available that evaluate
whether the SDoC system implemented by each Member State is effective
or ineffective in safeguarding product safety? What are the strengths
and weaknesses of the RAPEX, ICSMS, or other data or reporting system
used in the EU?
VI. Topics and Issues for Consideration in a Possible Rulemaking
As part of this RFI, OSHA is seeking information on the topics and
associated issues described below (with the questions for each topic
noted parenthetically):
A. Product safety in an SDoC system (VI.1 to VI.5).
B. Product risk and specifications (VI.6 to VI.15).
C. Administration of an SDoC system (VI.16 to VI.26).
D. Costs of an SDoC system (VI.27 to VI.30).
E. Enforcement of an SDoC system (VI.31 to VI.34).
F. Effects on trade (VI.35 to VI.37).
G. Implementation suggestions by certain industries (VI.38).
In responding to the questions in this section, please explain the
reasons supporting your views, and identify and provide the relevant
information on which you rely, including data, studies, articles, and
other materials.
A. Product Safety in an SDoC System
A major purpose of this RFI is to determine whether SDoC approval
of certain electrical products would provide employees with a high
level of protection (see section III above). OSHA's current NRTL
Program meets this standard. NRTLs must first evaluate and test a
sample, and then perform follow-up inspections of manufacturing
facilities to ensure that they continue to make products that are safe
to use. These inspections are critical, and to obtain an adequate level
of assurance, NRTLs may, if warranted, inspect 100% of all products in
a production batch for this purpose. OSHA has a number of policies that
specify controls that NRTLs must have in place to properly accomplish
pre-market evaluation. OSHA then audits each NRTL to ensure that they
have instituted these controls and that the controls are working
properly. NRTLs deficient in these areas must make corrections or face
revocation of their recognition. These measures provide the necessary
assurance that OSHA's current system provides a high level of
protection to employees.
One measure of the effectiveness of OSHA's current system is
recalls issued by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). The
OSHA NRTL Program staff reviews these recalls, and for those involving
products that have been certified by an NRTL, the staff has not
identified a recall that was due to improper testing by an NRTL. In
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addition, the staff knows of no other data showing that such testing
caused product-related injuries to employees.
OSHA sought information on SDoC effectiveness during its first RFI
on SDoC, but did not receive data or a rationale that demonstrated the
effectiveness of SDoC in assuring product safety. Most of the
respondents to the specific questions suggested instead that product
safety under SDoC needs to be assured through a proper postmarket
surveillance system, including marketplace and factory testing, and
accreditation of laboratories engaged in the testing, even if they are
affiliated with the manufacturer. Also, in its rationale, the EC points
to reliance on liability laws and other protection laws for assuring an
effective SDoC.
OSHA now requests information or data clearly demonstrating that
product approval of electric equipment through SDoC is currently a
highly protective approach, as well as a description of the measures
currently in place or other measures that would need to be adopted to
ensure that an SDoC system for electrical products will be highly
protective to employees.
Postmarket surveillance would be a new activity for OSHA. Adequate
administrative and enforcement resources and procedures in this area,
based on the information obtained to date, would need to be extensive,
and are critical in assuring product safety under an SDoC system. Such
a system appears to include its infrastructure, along with appropriate
rules for assuring SDoC effectiveness, and penalties for breaking those
rules.
As indicated by the summary of the EU's SDoC system in section V,
postmarket surveillance would require that OSHA have the legal
authority to: establish rules requiring manufacturers and other parties
to take certain actions related to issuing SDoCs; take enforcement
actions such as product recalls, bans, quarantines, and confiscations;
and assess financial and criminal penalties on product manufacturers,
importers, or their representatives, and, perhaps, on wholesalers and
retailers for selling nonconforming or dangerous products. OSHA's
authority extends to the U.S. workplace and, thus, its authority
regarding SDoC would presumably apply only to products actually used or
intended to be used in the U.S. workplace. Further, OSHA does not have
explicit authority to issue product recalls and bans, or to quarantine
or confiscate nonconforming products, or to assess the sort of criminal
and financial penalties described above. We further discuss the issue
of authority, below, in part E.
The following questions address issues raised in this part.
VI.1. In determining whether to undertake rulemaking for SDoC, what
specific measures and practices should OSHA consider adopting or
requiring to provide assurance that product approvals through SDoC will
be highly protective to employees? What are the major elements or
components needed to assure SDoC effectiveness?
VI.2. Should OSHA rely upon other measures outside its own
authority to ensure that product approvals through SDoC will be
effective? For example, how should U.S. product-liability laws and
consumer-protection programs, as suggested by the EC, be considered in
evaluating a conformity-assessment scheme?
VI.3. In determining whether to adopt SDoC, what systems should
OSHA consider establishing or using to track the effectiveness of SDoC?
VI.4. S