Importation of Swine and Swine Products From the European Union, 17928-17940 [05-7013]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
• Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 67 (Friday, April 8, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 17928-17940]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-7013]


========================================================================
Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================


Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 67 / Friday, April 8, 2005 / Proposed 
Rules

[[Page 17928]]



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Parts 93, 94, and 98

[Docket No. 02-046-1]
RIN 0579-AB79


Importation of Swine and Swine Products From the European Union

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are proposing to amend the regulations for importing 
animals and animal products into the United States to apply a uniform 
set of importation requirements related to classical swine fever (CSF) 
to a region consisting of all of the 15 Member States of the European 
Union (EU) that comprised the EU as of April 30, 2004 (the EU-15) and 
prohibit for a specified period of time the importation of live swine 
and swine products from any area in the EU-15 that is identified by the 
veterinary authorities of the region as a restricted zone. We believe 
these changes are necessary to help prevent the introduction of CSF 
into the United States while increasing our responsiveness to changes 
in the CSF situation in the EU.

DATES: We will consider all comments that we receive on or before June 
7, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
     EDOCKET: Go to https://www.epa.gov/feddocket to submit or 
view public comments, access the index listing of the contents of the 
official public docket, and to access those documents in the public 
docket that are available electronically. Once you have entered 
EDOCKET, click on the ``View Open APHIS Dockets'' link to locate this 
document.
     Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery: Please send four copies 
of your comment (an original and three copies) to Docket No. 02-046-1, 
Regulatory Analysis and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station 3C71, 4700 
River Road Unit 118, Riverdale, MD 20737-1238. Please state that your 
comment refers to Docket No. 02-046-1.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for locating this 
docket and submitting comments.
    Reading Room: You may read any comments that we receive on this 
docket in our reading room. The reading room is located in room 1141 of 
the USDA South Building, 14th Street and Independence Avenue SW., 
Washington, DC. Normal reading room hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except holidays. To be sure someone is there to 
help you, please call (202) 690-2817 before coming.
    Other Information: You may view APHIS documents published in the 
Federal Register and related information on the Internet at https://
www.aphis.usda.gov/ppd/rad/webrepor.html.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Chip Wells, Senior Staff 
Veterinarian, Regionalization Evaluation Services Staff, National 
Center for Import and Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, 
Riverdale, MD 20737-1231; (301) 734-4356.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA or the Department) 
regulates the importation of animals and animal products into the 
United States to guard against the introduction of animal diseases not 
currently present or prevalent in this country. The regulations in 9 
CFR part 94 (referred to below as the regulations) prohibit or restrict 
the importation of specified animals and animal products to prevent the 
introduction into the United States of various animal diseases, 
including classical swine fever (CSF), rinderpest, foot-and-mouth 
disease, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, swine vesicular disease, and 
African swine fever.
    Sections 94.9 and 94.10 of the regulations state that CSF is known 
to exist in all regions of the world, except for those regions listed 
in Sec. Sec.  94.9(a) and 94.10(a). The importation of live swine and 
swine products from regions not recognized as free of CSF is restricted 
or prohibited. In addition, the importation of live swine and swine 
products from a region consisting of certain Member States and portions 
of Member States of the European Union (EU) is restricted with regard 
to CSF, even though that region is listed as free of the disease. The 
restrictions on imports from that region were established in a final 
rule published in the Federal Register on April 7, 2003 (68 FR 16922-
16941, Docket No. 98-090-5).
    We based our final rule primarily on two risk analyses conducted by 
APHIS.1 2 The risk analyses examined a region consisting of 
EU countries (Member States) that the European Commission (EC) asked us 
to recognize as free of CSF. (The EC is the EU institution responsible 
for representing the EU as a whole. It proposes legislation, policies, 
and programs of action and implements decisions of the EU Parliament 
and Council.) The Member States identified were Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain. Five other EU Member States--Denmark, Finland, the Republic 
of Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom--were already recognized by 
APHIS as being free of CSF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Biological Risk Analysis: Risk assessment and management 
options for imports of swine and swine products from the European 
Union--June 2, 1999.
    \2\ Risk Analysis for Importation of Classical Swine Fever Virus 
in Swine and Swine Products from the European Union--December 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The first risk analysis was made available to the public in 1999 at 
the time of publication in the Federal Register of the proposed rule 
(64 FR 34155-34168, Docket No. 98-090-1) upon which we based our April 
2003 final rule. The second risk analysis was released in 2002 for 
public comment (67 FR 22388-22389, Docket No. 98-090-2) and represented 
a revision and supplementation of the 1999 risk analysis. Data used in 
both risk analyses represented events that occurred during a CSF 
epidemic in Europe during 1997 and 1998. That outbreak is considered to 
be the most severe CSF epidemic ever experienced in Europe. Both risk 
analyses are available by calling or writing to the person listed in 
this

[[Page 17929]]

document under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. The analyses are also 
available on the Internet at https://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ncie/reg-
request.html. At the bottom of that Web site page, click on 
``Information previously submitted by Regions requesting export 
approval and supporting documentation.'' At the next screen, click on 
the triangle beside ``European Union/Not Specified/Classical Swine 
Fever,'' then click on the triangle beside ``Response by APHIS,'' which 
will reveal links to the risk analyses.
    The analyses took into account, among other things, the CSF history 
of the EU region consisting of the 10 Member States in the EC's 
request, the CSF history of countries adjacent to the region, the 
veterinary infrastructure and policies of the region, and the 
historical volumes of imports into the United States of breeding swine, 
swine semen, and pork and pork products from the region.
    Based on the analyses, we considered it necessary to establish 
certain mitigation measures for the importation of live swine, pork and 
pork products, and swine semen from the region. Although there were no 
CSF outbreaks in EU domestic swine within the defined region at the 
time, the risk analyses assumed that, because CSF was endemic in wild 
boar in several parts of the EU, it was likely CSF would continue to 
occur in domestic swine in the region. Further, the risk analyses 
considered the open borders among EU Member States. To address these 
situations, the final rule required that commodities from the region of 
the EU that was considered to be unaffected with CSF be segregated from 
those from CSF-affected regions of the EU and other CSF-affected 
regions, and that measures be taken to ensure that donor boars 
providing semen for export to the United States are truly free of CSF. 
These requirements are described below under the heading ``Importation 
Conditions Established in April 2003.''

Importation Conditions Established in April 2003

    Specifically, our April 2003 final rule required that the following 
conditions be met before the commodity in question could be imported 
into the United States (in the absence of any other diseases of swine 
that would otherwise prohibit importation):
     For pork and pork products: (1) The articles have not been 
commingled with pork or pork products derived from swine that have been 
in a region listed at the time as one in which CSF is known to exist; 
(2) the swine from which the pork or pork products were derived have 
not lived in a region listed at the time as one in which CSF is known 
to exist, and have not transited such a region unless moved directly 
through the region in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal 
determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination; and 
(3) the articles are accompanied by a certificate, issued by an 
official of the national government of the region of origin, stating 
that the above provisions have been met.
     For breeding swine: The swine (1) have never lived in a 
region listed at the time as one in which CSF is known to exist; (2) 
have never transited such a region unless moved directly through the 
region in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal determined to be 
intact upon arrival at the point of destination; and (3) have never 
been commingled with swine that have been in a region listed at the 
time as one in which CSF is known to exist. Additionally, no equipment 
or materials used in transporting the swine may have previously been 
used for transporting swine ineligible for export to the United States 
unless the equipment or materials first were cleaned and disinfected. 
Lastly, the swine have to be accompanied by a certificate, issued by a 
salaried veterinary officer of the national government of the country 
of origin, stating that the above provisions have been met.
     For swine semen: The donor boar meets the same conditions 
as those listed above for breeding swine. Additionally, the following 
conditions must be met: (1) The semen comes from a semen collection 
center approved for export by the veterinary services of the national 
government of the country of origin; (2) the donor boar is held in 
isolation for at least 30 days prior to entering the semen collection 
center, and, no more than 30 days prior to being held in isolation, is 
tested with negative results using a CSF test approved by the Office 
International des Epizooties (OIE) [also referred to as the World 
Organisation of Animal Health]; and (3) the donor boar is observed by 
the semen collection center veterinarian while at the center (including 
at least a 40-day holding period at the center following collection of 
the semen) and, along with all other swine at the center, exhibits no 
clinical signs of CSF.
    Under these conditions, we estimated that the risk of introducing 
CSF through imports from the defined region would be as follows:
     By importing breeding swine, most likely one incursion in 
an average of 33,670 years.
     By importing fresh pork, most likely one incursion in an 
average of 22,676 years.
     By importing swine semen, most likely one incursion in an 
average of 8,090 years.
    APHIS considered each of these risks to be low.
    We continue to consider the mitigation measures established in our 
April 2003 final rule to be necessary for the importation of breeding 
swine, pork and pork products, and swine semen from the EU region we 
recognized in that final rule, and to France and Spain, which were 
added to that region following publication of the April 2003 final rule 
in a final rule published on April 20, 2004 (69 FR 21042-21047, Docket 
No. 98-090-7). Under this proposed rule, those requirements would 
continue to apply.
    Additionally, we are proposing to apply the measures established in 
our April 2003 final rule to importations from five additional EU 
Member States whose exports to the United States are free of CSF-
related restrictions (Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom [consisting of England, Scotland, Wales, 
the Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland]), as well as to Luxembourg 
(which is currently listed as a region in which CSF exists, due to an 
outbreak of the disease following our June 1999 proposal) and all of 
Germany and Italy. Currently, only portions of Germany and Italy are 
recognized as free of CSF in our regulations. We would apply the same 
mitigation measures to each of the areas described above because we 
would recognize the combination of all of those areas of the EU as a 
single region of low-risk for CSF, discussed below. The region would be 
comprised of the 15 Member States comprising the EU as of April 30, 
2004, which we refer to as the European Union-15 (EU-15). We would add 
a definition of European Union-15 (EU-15) to Sec. Sec.  93.500, 94.0, 
and 98.30.
    We discuss below, under the heading ``Uniform Conditions for 
Imports from the EU-15,'' our proposed application of uniform import 
conditions to the EU-15 with regard to CSF. We then discuss the reasons 
we believe the EU-15 qualifies as a region of low-risk for CSF under 
the heading ``Basis for Recognition of an EU Region.''

Uniform Conditions for Imports From the EU-15

    As noted above, we are proposing to recognize a single region for 
CSF (the EU-15) that would consist of the following areas: (1) That 
region of the EU we now recognize as being free of

[[Page 17930]]

CSF but from which imports of swine and swine products are subject to 
specified restrictions; (2) Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (consisting of England, Scotland, Wales, 
the Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland); and (3) Luxembourg and all of 
Germany and Italy. Currently, only portions of Germany and Italy are 
recognized as free of CSF in our regulations.
    In our April 2003 final rule, we did not include Denmark, Finland, 
the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in the EU 
region we defined as free of classical swine fever but from which the 
importation of swine and swine products are subject to certain 
restrictions. Those five Member States had already been recognized in 
previous rulemakings as regions in which CSF is not known to exist and 
from which swine and swine products may be imported into the United 
States without restriction related to CSF. We continued to treat those 
Member States in the same way we had been treating them since the time 
we recognized them as free of CSF; that is, we did not apply to them 
the additional mitigation measures we were applying to the EU region we 
recognized in the April 2003 final rule.
    However, because we had recognized those five Member States as free 
of CSF before the EU was established, the evaluations we had conducted 
that supported such a classification of freedom did not take into 
account the opening of national borders within the EU and the 
possibility that the five CSF-free Member States would trade freely 
with EU Member States that we considered CSF-affected.
    As part of the EU, those five Member States carry out trade with 
the rest of the EU under what is essentially an open-border trading 
policy. There is no substantive difference between the way trade is 
carried out within the EU by those five Member States compared to the 
way it is carried out by other Member States. Because of these open-
border policies, we believe the CSF risk from the five member States 
must be considered the same as from the EU region we recognized as 
subject to additional mitigation measures in our April 2003 final rule, 
and the same importation conditions would be applied to both areas 
under this proposed rule.
    Additionally, we are proposing to apply those importation 
conditions to parts of the EU that we have not yet recognized as CSF-
free. In our April 2003 final rule, we excluded certain parts of the 
EU--in some cases entire Member States--from the region we recognized 
as CSF-free, either because those areas were not eligible for 
recognition as CSF-free at the time we published the proposal for our 
April 2003 final rule, or because they experienced an outbreak of CSF 
in domestic swine following publication of that proposed rule. Those 
areas included all of France and Spain--which have since been added to 
the region of the EU we consider free of CSF with restrictions--all of 
Luxembourg, and parts of Germany and Italy. In Germany, we excluded the 
following kreis: the Kreis Uckermark in the Land of Brandenburg; the 
Kreis Oldenberg, the Kreis Soltau-Fallingbostel, and the Kreis Vechta 
in the Land of Lower Saxony; the Kreis Heinsberg and the Kreis 
Warendorf in the Land of Northrhine-Westphalia; the Kreis Bernkastel-
Wittlich, the Kreis Bitburg-Pr[uuml]m, the Kreis Donnersbergkreis, the 
Kreis Rhein-Hunsr[uuml]che, the Kreis S[uuml]dliche Weinstrasse, and 
the Kreis Trier-Saarburg in the Land of Rhineland Palatinate; and the 
Kreis Altmarkkreis in the Land of Saxony-Anhalt. In Italy, we excluded 
the Regions of Emilia-Romagna, Piemonte, and Sardegna.
    Whether we excluded an entire Member State or a smaller 
administrative unit depended on whether we had identified in the June 
1999 proposed rule the administrative unit we would recognize as a 
region within a particular Member State in the event of a CSF outbreak. 
We had identified such administrative units for Germany and Italy (the 
``kreis'' in Germany and the ``region'' in Italy), but not for the 
other Member States of the EU.
    We are now proposing to apply the certification requirements 
established by our April 2003 final rule to all the areas in Italy and 
Germany listed above and to Luxembourg. In addition, we would require 
the EC to certify that commodities (breeding swine, swine semen, and 
fresh pork and pork products) are not exported from--and have not been 
commingled with swine from--restricted zones in the EU during the 
following time periods: (1) A period of 6 months after the last case of 
CSF in domestic swine in the restricted zone; or (2) until restrictions 
put in place by the EU because of CSF in wild boar in the restricted 
zone are released. We consider this action warranted because we 
consider the EU to be an homogeneous region of low CSF risk (although 
one in which CSF outbreaks may continue to occur) and because the EC 
has appropriate control measures in place to mitigate the risk of 
continuing outbreaks.
    We consider the EU to be homogeneous with regard to CSF despite the 
fact that we have treated certain kreis in Germany and Regions in Italy 
slightly differently from the rest of those countries during our 
rulemaking process. Our June 1999 proposed rule excluded three kreis in 
Germany and three Regions in Italy from consideration as part of the 
region recognized in our April 2003 final rule. Because these areas had 
experienced outbreaks within 6 months before collection of data for the 
1999 risk analysis, the model excluded consideration of exports from 
those areas. Exclusion of those areas was a policy decision based on 
the regionalization approach being used by APHIS at the time.
    However, the model used for the risk analysis was based on the 
assumption that outbreaks would continue to occur in the EU. Even with 
this assumption, the risk analysis concluded that the risk of exporting 
CSF from the EU in breeding swine, swine semen, and fresh pork was low. 
Outbreaks did, in fact, occur in some German kreis other than the three 
excluded from the June 1999 proposed rule--as well as in France, Spain, 
and Luxembourg, which were subject to the June 1999 proposed rule--and 
to provide the public an opportunity to comment upon the outbreaks, we 
did not include those kreis and Member States in our April 2003 final 
rule. However, we consider the CSF risk posed by commodities from the 
German kreis and Italian Regions that were excluded from the proposed 
rule, as well as from those areas and Member States that had outbreaks 
subsequent to the proposed rule, to be equivalent to the CSF risk from 
the other EU-15 Member States (as discussed above, in April 2004 we 
added France and Spain to the EU region we recognized in April 2003). 
We consider the risk from the EU-15 as a whole to be within the 
parameters of the risk analysis, and believe the risk from continuing 
CSF outbreaks in any part of the EU-15 would be adequately mitigated by 
the control mechanisms implemented in the EU.
    Thus, we are proposing to apply the same import conditions for 
swine and swine products with regard to CSF to a region consisting of 
all of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The conditions for pork, pork 
products, and live swine would be set forth in Sec.  94.24. The 
conditions for swine semen would be set forth in Sec.  98.38.

[[Page 17931]]

The EU-15 as a Region of Low Risk for CSF

    In evaluating the CSF risk from imports of breeding swine, swine 
semen, and swine products from the EU-15, we took into consideration 
the following characteristics of that region:
     The region contains a known source of CSF risk (e.g., 
infected wild boar) that may spread the disease virus to EU domestic 
swine, resulting in continuing outbreaks of CSF in the region, but 
veterinary officials in the region have established risk mitigation 
measures adequate to prevent widespread exposure and establishment of 
the disease;
     Specific mitigation measures in place include 
surveillance, epidemiological investigations, diagnostic capability, 
and emergency response capacity that are sufficient to identify the 
disease, establish appropriate control zones, and implement all 
measures necessary to effectively limit the spread of CSF from the 
region; and
     Veterinary officials maintain contingency plans defining 
proactive approaches to CSF control: The veterinary officials have 
sufficient legal powers, a detailed chain-of-command, and appropriate 
resources, including emergency funds, laboratory staff, equipment and 
infrastructure, to carry out a rapid and effective eradication 
campaign; there is an instruction manual detailing all procedures, 
instructions, and measures, including emergency vaccination plans if 
deemed necessary, to be implemented in the event of a CSF outbreak; and 
appropriate staff regularly receive training and conduct drills in CSF 
diagnosis, control measures, and communication techniques.
    Included in the EC request to APHIS that resulted in our April 7, 
2003, final rule was a request that was made in the context of the 
Veterinary Equivalence Agreement (VEA) between the United States and 
the EU, which was enacted in 1998. (The stated objective of the VEA is 
to facilitate trade in live animals and animal products between the EU 
and the United States by establishing a mechanism for the recognition 
of equivalence of sanitary measures, consistent with the protection of 
public and animal health, and improve communication and cooperation on 
sanitary issues.) The EC requested that APHIS adopt the EC approach to 
regionalization for CSF. This would require APHIS to establish a new 
approach to dealing with outbreaks of CSF in the EU-15. As a result of 
our review of the information provided, we are proposing to establish a 
new approach that will adopt many elements of the EC approach to 
dealing with outbreaks of CSF in the EU-15. Rather than responding to 
outbreaks through rulemakings specific to each outbreak, we are 
proposing in this document to establish actions that we would take in 
the event of a CSF outbreak in the region. Our proposal and the way in 
which it differs from current practice is explained below. While the 
approach we are proposing would, in this case, apply specifically to 
the EU-15, we would accept requests and supporting information from 
other regions interested in being considered for a similar approach.
    Currently, Sec.  92.3 of the regulations provides that whenever the 
EC establishes a quarantine for a disease in the EU in a region APHIS 
recognizes as one in which the disease is not known to exist and the EC 
imposes prohibitions or other restrictions on the movement of animals 
or animal products from the quarantined area in the EU, such animals 
and animal products are prohibited importation into the United States. 
Additionally, APHIS published a final rule on May 4, 2004 (69 FR 25817-
25820, Docket No. 02-001-2) that established procedures to follow when 
a region that we recognize as free of an animal disease experiences an 
outbreak of that disease. If a region of the world that is considered 
free of CSF experiences an outbreak of CSF, APHIS will prohibit or 
restrict immediately the importation of live swine, fresh pork and pork 
products, and swine semen from that region into the United States. We 
then may publish an interim rule in the Federal Register as soon as 
possible that removes that region from the lists in Sec. Sec.  94.9 and 
94.10 of the regulations of regions in which CSF does not exist and 
that prohibits or restricts, by regulation, the importation of live 
swine, fresh pork and pork products, and swine semen. We accept public 
comment on the interim rule for a specified period of time. If the 
outbreak is eliminated in the region in question and a sufficient 
amount of time passes (generally defined as consistent with OIE 
recommendations) to ensure that the disease has been eradicated, we 
evaluate the risk of resuming imports from the region. If we believe 
the results of the risk evaluation support reinstatement of the 
region's previous CSF-free status and resumption of the importation of 
the prohibited swine and swine products into the United States, we make 
the evaluation available to the public and solicit public comment on 
it. If, after considering the public comments, we still consider it 
warranted to reinstate the region's CSF-free status, we publish a final 
rule in the Federal Register listing the region as free of CSF, and we 
allow importations of swine and swine products to resume.
    We are proposing in this document that, whenever an outbreak of CSF 
occurs in the EU-15 and the competent veterinary authority of the EU-15 
Member State establishes a quarantined area for CSF (also referred to 
in this document as a ``restricted zone''), swine and swine products 
will be prohibited importation into the United States from that zone. 
No action would be required by APHIS; the prohibition would take effect 
immediately. Swine and swine products would not be allowed importation 
from the region unless they are accompanied by certification by an 
official of the competent veterinary authority of the EU-15 Member 
State that the prohibitions set forth in this proposed rule regarding 
restricted zones (discussed below) have been met.
    In the case of an outbreak of CSF in EU domestic swine, the 
importation prohibitions would remain in effect for 6 months following 
the depopulation of swine and the cleaning and disinfection of the last 
infected premises in the restricted zone, even if the competent 
veterinary authority of the EU-15 Member State removes its designation 
of the area as a restricted zone before 6 months have elapsed. In the 
case of a restricted zone established because of the detection of CSF 
in wild boar, the importation prohibitions would remain in place until 
the competent veterinary authority of the EU-15 Member State removes 
its designation of the area as a restricted zone. (The issue of wild 
boar is discussed further in this document under the heading ``Wild 
Boar.'') The lifting of the prohibitions on imports into the United 
States from a restricted zone would take effect at the times described 
above. No action by APHIS would be required. However, APHIS would 
reserve the right to make site visits and review documentation related 
to the outbreak and eradication activities. In considering the CSF risk 
in the EU-15, we evaluated both the ability of officials in that region 
to ensure that such restricted zones would be effectively established 
and maintained and the ability of the officials to ensure that 
prohibitions on the importation into the United States of swine and 
swine products from the restricted zones would be effectively enforced.
    In Sec. Sec.  94.0 and 98.30, we would define restricted zone for 
classical swine fever to mean an area, delineated by the relevant 
competent veterinary authorities of the region in which the

[[Page 17932]]

area is located, that surrounds and includes the location of an 
outbreak of CSF in domestic swine or detection of the disease in wild 
boar, and from which the movement of domestic swine is prohibited. We 
are not proposing to specify how far from an outbreak a restricted zone 
must extend because factors such as geographic boundaries could 
influence the necessary distance. However, we did evaluate the policies 
of the EC for establishing restricted zones when considering whether to 
consider the EU-15 as a region of low-risk for CSF. This is discussed 
in more detail below under ``EU Animal Health Controls.''
    We believe this new approach is warranted for the EU-15 because 
that region has demonstrated the capability to effectively prevent the 
spread of CSF from areas where outbreaks occur. Plus, as a 
precautionary measure, imports of swine and swine products from the EU-
15 into the United States will be restricted to address the recognized 
probability of these outbreaks occurring from time to time.
    Because we are proposing to recognize the EU-15 as a single region 
that poses a low risk for CSF, we would remove from Sec. Sec.  94.9(a) 
and 94.10(a) of the regulations the EU-15 Member States currently 
listed as regions in which CSF is not known to exist. The EU-15 would 
be included in proposed Sec. Sec.  94.9(b) and 94.10(b) as a single 
region of low-risk for CSF.

Basis for Consideration of the EU-15 as a Region of Low-Risk for CSF

    We believe that consideration of the EU-15 as a single low-risk 
region for CSF is warranted based on the risk analyses described above, 
upon which we based on our April 2003 final rule, and on our knowledge 
of the veterinary infrastructure and legislation in the EU. These 
considerations are discussed in detail in an APHIS document titled 
``APHIS Risk Considerations on Importation of Classical Swine Fever 
(CSF) Virus in Breeding Swine, Swine Semen, and Fresh Pork from a 
European Union Region of Fifteen Member States.'' The document can be 
obtained by calling or writing to the person listed in this document 
under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. It is also available on the 
Internet at https://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ncie/reg-request.html. At the 
bottom of that Web site page, click on ``Information previously 
submitted by Regions requesting export approval and supporting 
documentation.'' At the next screen, click on the triangle beside 
``European Union/Not Specified/Classical Swine Fever,'' then click on 
the triangle beside ``Response by APHIS,'' which will reveal a link to 
the document.
    The estimates of risk in the analyses we conducted regarding CSF in 
the EU-15 suggest that the EU's control mechanisms, combined with the 
risk mitigation measures we established in the April 2003 final rule, 
are sufficiently effective to mitigate the risk of introducing the CSF 
virus to the United States via exports of the swine and swine products 
that would be eligible for importation into the United States under 
this rule.
    The risk estimated in the risk analyses regarding the EU that we 
conducted in 1999 and 2000 was based on quantitative data reflecting 
the effects of EU regulations that were in place during a severe CSF 
outbreak in 1997 and 1998 that occurred extensively in the Netherlands 
and that spread to other EU Member States. Although the outbreak was 
considered the most severe the EU ever experienced and CSF did spread 
during that outbreak, our quantitative estimates of risk showed that 
the risk to the United States of CSF introduction due to that most 
severe outbreak was low. Since that outbreak, the EU has implemented 
measures to strengthen its response to a CSF outbreak. Therefore, with 
the continued application of EU regulations, any risk from future CSF 
outbreaks in the EU-15 is expected to also be low, unless an outbreak 
occurs that is more severe than the one in 1997-1998--i.e., that poses 
a risk greater than that evaluated in the analysis. In the event of a 
more severe outbreak or any other circumstance the Administrator 
considers to pose a risk (such as evidence of unreported CSF outbreaks 
or significant deterioration of veterinary infrastructure or control in 
the region), the APHIS Administrator would reserve the right to take 
whatever action is necessary to ensure that CSF is not introduced into 
the United States.

EU Animal Health Controls

    In general, our proposed classification of the EU-15 as a region of 
low risk for CSF is based on continued adherence in the Member States 
to EU animal health controls, some of which are described below, as 
well as on the measures we established in our April 2003 final rule. 
However, in one way, we believe it is necessary to require a measure 
that exceeds the EU controls. This measure has to do with the length of 
time the prohibition on the importation into the United States of swine 
and swine products from a restricted zone is maintained. We discuss 
this measure at greater length below, under the heading ``Prohibition 
of Importations from a Restricted Zone.''
    Animal health regulations imposed in the EU are harmonized and 
binding upon all Member States. Requirements include compulsory 
notification of OIE List A diseases, including CSF, and laboratory 
testing for CSF on all sick swine if CSF is suspected. Member States 
are required to have CSF contingency plans and, if applicable, 
eradication plans for CSF in wild boar populations.
    Swine are moved freely among EU Member States and within Member 
States. Swine born in one Member State are routinely fattened or 
slaughtered in another. Animals moving between Member States are 
required to be accompanied by an official health certificate issued by 
an official veterinarian appointed by the competent veterinary 
authority of the Member State. Prior notification of the movement is 
reported electronically through an electronic network linking 
authorities of the EC and Member States.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ TRACES (Trade Control and Export System) is replacing ANIMO 
by the end of 2004 as the computerized system mandated by EU law to 
track animal and animal product movement between Member States, as 
well as to track imports from non-EU countries into the EU. Data are 
entered by local veterinary authorities in each Member State and are 
shared over a network with the rest of the EU. The system is 
administered by a private contractor under the oversight of the EC 
and the EU Court of Auditors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Farm registration is mandatory, and each holding is assigned a 
unique identification number by the competent veterinary authority of 
the Member State. Animal identification is compulsory. Breeding swine 
must be identified with a unique identification number (either by ear 
tag or tattoo), and fattening swine must be identified by the holding 
registration number. This information is maintained by each Member 
State.
    If CSF is detected anywhere in the EU, control mechanisms are 
activated in accordance with EU legislation. When CSF is suspected on a 
swine holding, a clinical investigation is conducted by the competent 
veterinary authority of the Member State to confirm or rule out the 
disease, and an epidemiological investigation is carried out. Movement 
of swine from the holding under suspicion is prohibited, and 
biosecurity measures are implemented to prevent spread of the disease.
    If CSF is confirmed, all swine on the holding containing infected 
swine must be depopulated, and the carcasses must be disposed of after 
being treated to inactivate the CSF virus under official supervision. 
Two types of zones are

[[Page 17933]]

established around an outbreak of CSF in EU domestic swine--
``protection zones'' and ``surveillance zones.'' The protection zone 
extends at least 3 kilometers from the outbreak. The surveillance zone 
extends at least 10 kilometers from the outbreak. For the purpose of 
our regulations, we would consider the combination of an EU protection 
zone and surveillance zone to constitute a restricted zone. When 
establishing zones, the competent veterinary authority of the Member 
State is required by EU legislation to take into account the following:
     The results of the epidemiological investigation;
     The geographical situation, particularly natural or 
artificial boundaries;
     The location and proximity of holdings;
     Patterns of movements and trade in swine and the 
availability of slaughterhouses;
     The facilities and personnel available to control any 
movement of swine within the zones, in particular if the swine to be 
killed need to be moved away from their holding of origin.
    Veterinary authorities are required to take all necessary measures, 
including posting signs and alerting the media, to inform the public of 
the imposed restrictions and must use appropriate measures to enforce 
the restrictions. Veterinary authorities of Member States collaborate 
in establishing zones that overlap their borders.
    In accordance with EU regulations, premises located within the 
protection zone are prohibited by the Member State from moving swine 
out of that zone for at least 30 days following the depopulation of 
swine and the cleaning and disinfection of the last premises in the 
zone infected with CSF. Premises within the surveillance zone are 
prohibited by the Member State from moving swine out of that zone for 
at least 20 days following the depopulation of swine and the cleaning 
and disinfection of the last premises in the protected zone infected 
with CSF. A census is conducted of all swine in both the protection and 
surveillance zones. Clinical examinations are conducted of all swine 
within the protection zone.
    An epidemiological inquiry is made into the origin of the virus in 
the infected swine, and contacts are identified for traceback and 
traceforward investigations. Isolates of the virus are genetically 
typed by the EU Reference Laboratory in Hanover, Germany.
    Under official supervision of the competent veterinary authority of 
the Member State, meat of swine slaughtered during the period between 
the probable introduction of disease and the implementation of control 
measures is traced and processed in such a way as to destroy or 
inactivate the CSF virus. Likewise, swine genetic products collected 
during this time are traced and destroyed under official supervision in 
such a way as to avoid the risk of spread of the CSF virus.
    After the depopulation of swine, the buildings, equipment, 
vehicles, and other articles that may have been contaminated with the 
CSF virus must be cleaned and disinfected under official supervision 
using approved disinfectants.
    Swine may not be reintroduced onto a holding that contained 
infected swine until at least 30 days after the required cleaning and 
disinfection. Any swine reintroduced onto the holding must be monitored 
to make sure that none develop antibodies to CSF.
    The EU does not vaccinate domestic swine for CSF. However, with EC 
approval, emergency vaccination may be used in cases where CSF has been 
confirmed and epidemiological data suggest that the disease threatens 
to spread.
    Whenever CSF is detected in a wild boar, the competent veterinary 
authority of the Member State, in consultation with an expert panel of 
veterinarians, hunters, wildlife biologists, and epidemiologists, 
defines the infected area, implements appropriate measures to reduce 
the spread of the disease, develops and submits for EC approval an 
eradication plan, and audit the effectiveness of measures adopted to 
eradicate CSF from the infected area. These measures require that all 
holdings of domestic swine in the infected area be placed under 
official surveillance, an official census of swine be conducted, swine 
movement be restricted, biosecurity measures be implemented, and 
testing for CSF be conducted on all sick or dead swine. Further, all 
wild boar shot or found dead must be examined and tested for CSF by an 
official veterinarian designated by the competent veterinary authority 
of the Member State. In addition, the measures taken may include 
suspension of hunting and a ban on feeding wild boar. The veterinary 
authority must also ensure that the CSF isolate is genetically typed. 
Adjacent Member States collaborate in establishing control measures in 
cases where the infected wild boar are found close to common borders.
    As part of an approved eradication plan, emergency vaccination of 
wild boar may be conducted in situations where CSF has been confirmed 
and epidemiological data suggest that the disease threatens to spread. 
The vaccination area must be part of the defined infected area, and 
appropriate measures must be taken to prevent spread of the vaccine 
virus to domestic swine. Currently, there is an ongoing emergency 
vaccination program for wild boar in infected areas within Germany and 
Luxembourg.

Requirement in Addition to EU Controls

    As we stated above, we believe it is necessary to require a CSF 
control measure in the EU-15 that exceeds EU controls and the 
conditions imposed by our April 2003 final rule. This measure is the 
length of time the prohibitions on the exportation of swine and swine 
products to the United States are maintained. We discuss this measure 
below.

Prohibition of Importations From a Restricted Zone

    Current EU regulations allow CSF restrictions in a protection zone 
(that area extending at least 3 kilometers from an infected holding of 
domestic swine) to be removed 30 days after completion of preliminary 
cleaning and disinfection measures on the infected holding. 
Restrictions in a surveillance zone must stay in place at least 20 days 
after such cleaning and disinfection. Restrictions are removed only 
after clinical examinations and serology indicate that any swine 
remaining in the area are free of CSF. Presumably, after restrictions 
are released, swine from the area could be moved throughout the EU.
    We are concerned by observations of recurrence of CSF in certain 
areas shortly after such restrictions have been removed by the EU and 
swine movement from the areas has commenced. For example, in December 
2001, an outbreak was confirmed in Osoma, Spain, 22 days after release 
of movement restrictions by the EU. In another case, an outbreak in 
Luxembourg in August 2002 was epidemiologically linked to an outbreak 
that occurred in June 2002, and occurred 27 days after release of 
movement restrictions by the EU. During the 1997-1998 epidemic, 
veterinary authorities in the EU usually found it necessary to maintain 
movement restrictions for more than 30 days following an outbreak. 
These observations suggest that restricting movement for only 30 days 
may be insufficient to ensure that the region remains unaffected.
    Further, as discussed below, we believe that OIE standards support 
restriction of movement for more than 30 days. As discussed above, we 
are

[[Page 17934]]

proposing to consider the EU-15 as a region of low risk for CSF, rather 
than as a region in which CSF is not known to exist. The OIE standard 
that would be relevant to such a region is the standard for a country 
or zone free of CSF in domestic swine but with infection in the wild 
swine population.\4\ In such situations, OIE recommends that, where a 
stamping out policy without vaccination has been implemented for CSF 
control, recognition of the region as CSF-free may be acquired 6 months 
after the last outbreak in domestic swine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code-2003, Part 2, Chapter 
2.1.13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are in agreement with the OIE recommendation that restrictions 
on the movement of swine and swine products from a CSF quarantined area 
be maintained for 6 months, and consider it consistent with our 
proposed consideration of the EU-15 as a region that poses a low risk 
of CSF. Further, maintenance of such restrictions for 6 months is 
consistent with our stated intent in our December 2000 risk analysis to 
accept exports only from regions that have not experienced a CSF 
outbreak within the previous 6 months.\5\ This is why we are proposing 
to provide that our prohibition on the importation of swine and swine 
products from a restricted zone established because of an outbreak of 
CSF in domestic swine remain in place for at least 6 months following 
the depopulation of swine and the cleaning and disinfection of the last 
infected premises in the zone. As noted above, the prohibition of the 
importation of swine and swine products from a restricted zone 
established because of the detection of CSF in wild boar would remain 
in place until the restricted zone status of the area is removed by the 
competent veterinary authority of the EU-15 Member State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Risk Analysis for Importation of Classical Swine Fever Virus 
in Swine and Swine Products from the European Union--December 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wild Boar

    Under our current regulations, we do not remove a region from the 
lists in Sec. Sec.  94.9(a) and 94.10(a) of regions considered free of 
CSF if the disease is detected in wild boar in the region but not in 
domestic swine. This approach is consistent with APHIS domestic 
regulations, which do not regulate wild boar in the United States for 
swine diseases. However, under this proposed rule, we would prohibit 
importations of swine and swine products from areas in the EU-15 placed 
under quarantine by the competent veterinary authority of an EU-15 
Member State because of the detection of CSF in wild boar, even if CSF 
has not been detected in domestic swine in the area. Although the 
estimates of CSF risk from the region identified in our 1999 and 2000 
risk analyses were based on data related only to outbreaks and control 
measures in EU domestic swine (i.e., data from wild boar outbreaks were 
not included), we recognize that EU control measures implemented in 
response to outbreaks in wild boar had a mitigating effect on the 
spread of CSF in domestic swine. Therefore, we believe that EU control 
measures for CSF in wild boar are a critical component of the overall 
EU controls for CSF. Data indicate that wild boar continue to be a 
potential source of infection in domestic swine. For example, infected 
wild boar are the suspected source of virus linked to an August 2003 
outbreak in Luxembourg, an April 2002 outbreak in France, and multiple 
outbreaks in Germany. The EU recognizes the risk to its domestic swine 
population because of the endemic CSF infection in wild boar and has 
implemented eradication plans and contingency measures to deal with 
this problem. To protect domestic swine herds throughout the region, 
the EC has placed restrictions on movement of domestic swine from 
infected wild boar areas. It is likely that the EU restrictions on 
regions containing infected wild boar contribute significantly to the 
effectiveness of EU control measures.

Certificate for Swine

    Section 93.505 of the regulations requires that, except for swine 
from Canada, all swine intended for importation into the United States 
be accompanied by official certification regarding the health status of 
the swine and the disease status of the region of origin. Paragraph (a) 
of Sec.  93.505 requires that the certificate accompanying the swine 
show that the entire region of origin of the swine is free of CSF. In 
accordance with our proposed action to allow the importation of 
breeding swine from the EU-15, we are proposing to change the language 
in Sec.  93.505 accordingly, to allow for the importation of live swine 
from the EU-15.

Application of this Approach to Other Regions

    Section 92.2 of the regulations defines the type of information 
that must be included with the request of a country or countries to 
APHIS for recognition of the animal health status of a region. 
Evaluation of this information would constitute the first step in 
consideration of a new regulatory approach for the region. As part of 
its consideration, APHIS would determine whether it might be 
appropriate to revise its approach dealing with outbreaks in the region 
that made the request. The results of these considerations will be 
reflected in regulatory changes made through rulemaking. Aspects of the 
rulemaking process are discussed in Sec.  92.2.

Authorized Inspectors

    Currently, there is a requirement in Sec.  94.24(c) that 
certificates required under Sec.  94.24 be presented by the importer of 
swine and swine products to the appropriate Customs and Border 
Protection officer at the port of arrival. We are proposing to require 
instead that the certificates be presented to an authorized inspector, 
which is defined in Sec.  94.0 as any individual authorized by the 
Administrator of APHIS or the Commissioner of Customs and Border 
Protection, Department of Homeland Security, to enforce the 
regulations. This change would reflect the fact that, for some imports, 
it is an APHIS employee who accepts the certificate at the port of 
arrival.

Executive Order 12866 and Regulatory Flexibility Act

    This proposed rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12866. 
The rule has been determined to be significant for the purposes of 
Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, has been reviewed by the Office 
of Management and Budget.
    Under the Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.) the 
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to promulgate regulations to 
prevent the introduction into the United States or dissemination of any 
pest or disease of livestock. Under this authority, APHIS is proposing 
to establish provisions for imports of swine and swine products from 
the EU-15 under conditions we believe will guard against the 
introduction of CSF into the United States from that region.
    Below is the economic analysis for the changes proposed in this 
document. The economic analysis provides a cost-benefit analysis as 
required by Executive Order 12866 and an analysis of the potential 
economic effects on small entities as required by the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act.
    We do not have enough data for a comprehensive analysis of the 
economic effects of this proposed rule on small entities. Therefore, in 
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603, we have performed an initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis for this proposed rule. We are inviting comments 
about this proposed rule as it relates to small entities. In 
particular, we are interested in determining the number and kind of 
small entities who

[[Page 17935]]

may incur benefits or costs from implementation of this proposed rule 
and the economic impact of those benefits or costs.
    CSF is a highly contagious and fatal disease of swine. It was 
eradicated from the United States in 1976 after a 16-year effort, at a 
cost to USDA and individual States of about $140 million ($455 million 
in 2003 dollars). The potential for reintroduction of CSF into the 
United States remains a major concern, not only because of production 
losses and eradication costs, but also because of the adverse effects 
reintroduction would have on U.S. swine and pork exports.
    APHIS determines, based on disease risk evaluations, whether 
animals and animal products may be exported from foreign regions to the 
United States. If a region recognized by APHIS as free of a specific 
animal disease experiences an outbreak, generally an interim rule is 
issued prohibiting or restricting potentially infected imports. Once 
the outbreak has been eliminated, and a period of time has elapsed 
sufficient to allow the animal disease situation in the region to 
stabilize, the region's previous disease-free status may be restored. 
APHIS personnel conduct a site visit and reevaluate the risk by 
conducting a risk analysis. If, based on the analysis, APHIS believes 
it is appropriate to once again consider the region free of the 
disease, APHIS publishes a notice in the Federal Register soliciting 
public comments on the analysis. Any comments received are reviewed and 
each issue raised by commenters is considered. If, after review of the 
comments, APHIS continues to consider it appropriate to once again 
recognize the region free of the disease, a final rule is published in 
the Federal Register giving notice of such recognition.
    We believe this proposed rule would enable APHIS to respond more 
quickly to changes in CSF conditions within the EU-15, while 
maintaining the Agency's sanitary standards. The proposed rule would 
change the procedure by which imports of swine, pork and pork products, 
and swine semen would be allowed to resume following the elimination of 
a CSF outbreak in the EU-15. Separate rulemaking would no longer be 
required each time an area within the region experiences a CSF outbreak 
and the disease is subsequently eliminated. Rather, APHIS would 
recognize quarantine decisions made by the competent veterinary 
authority of an EU-15 Member State and prohibit the importation of 
swine and swine products from restricted zones in the EU-15 established 
by the competent veterinary authority of an EU-15 Member State. As an 
additional safeguard, imports of swine, fresh pork and pork products, 
and swine semen into the United States from the restricted zone would 
be prohibited for a period of 6 months following the depopulation of 
swine and the cleaning and disinfection of the last infected premises 
in the zone. Restrictions and prohibitions we would establish because 
of the detection of CSF in wild boar would remain in place until the 
restricted zone status of the area is removed by a competent veterinary 
authority of the EU-15 Member State.
    An alternative to the proposed rule would be to not change the 
regulations--i.e., to continue to initiate rulemaking whenever the CSF 
situation within the EU-15 changes. Continuing with the current 
procedures would not achieve the Agency objective of improving the 
Agency's responsiveness to CSF situation changes while maintaining 
adequate disease prevention measures. A second alternative would be to 
consider the EU-15 as a single region of low risk for CSF, but not 
require that at least 6 months elapse after eradication of a disease 
outbreak in the region before the importation of swine and swine 
products into the United States could resume. This alternative would 
forfeit the additional sanitary assurance that the 6-month period is 
intended to provide to the U.S. swine industry that the reestablished 
imports would be CSF-free. We believe that this proposed rule would be 
preferable in allowing resumption of imports in a timelier manner, 
while ensuring that sanitary standards are maintained. As noted above, 
we invite public comment on this proposed rule, including comment on 
how the proposed rule could be modified to reduce expected costs or 
burdens for small entities consistent with its objectives. Any comment 
suggesting changes to the proposed criteria should be supported by an 
explanation of why the changes should be made.

Expected Effects of the Proposed Rule

    This proposed rule could affect U.S. imports of swine, pork and 
pork products, and swine semen from the EU-15 in several ways. One of 
the effects would be potential additional restrictions on the 
importation of swine semen from certain EU-15 Member States. 
Additionally, the regulatory process used to establish import 
restrictions for areas affected by CSF, and to remove those 
restrictions when the disease is eliminated, would be simplified and 
made timelier. We believe the proposed rule would also result in more 
efficient use of APHIS resources. These areas of potential effects are 
discussed in turn.

Change in Swine Semen Requirements

    The EU-15 consists of the following Member States: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom. APHIS considered five of the Member States--
Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom--to be free of CSF even before publication of our April 2003 
final rule. In that final rule, we recognized--with the exception of 
specified regions in Germany and Italy--the countries of Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal as a 
single region in which CSF is not known to exist. That final rule also 
set forth conditions under which breeding swine, pork and pork 
products, and swine semen could be imported into the United States from 
that region.
    The remaining three Member States-France, Luxembourg, and Spain-as 
well as specified regions in Germany and in Italy, were not included in 
the region recognized by the final rule because of outbreaks of CSF 
either before or after publication of the June 1999 proposed rule on 
which the April 2003 final rule was based. However, as discussed above, 
we published a final rule in the Federal Register in April 2004 that 
recognized France and Spain as part of the CSF-free region we had 
established in our April 2003 final rule.
    This proposed rule would consider the EU-15 to be a single region 
of low-risk for CSF. Therefore, that region would include the seven 
Member States we recognized in whole or in part as CSF-free in the 
April 2003 final rule (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal), the five Member States we already 
considered CSF-free before the April 2003 final rule (Denmark, Finland, 
the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), the two 
Member States we recognized as CSF-free in our April 2004 final rule 
(France and Spain), and Luxembourg. Under the provisions of this 
proposed rule, each of the 15 Member States would be subject to the 
import conditions set forth in the April 2003 final rule and to the 
restrictions added in this document concerning waiting periods before 
release of restrictions on zones where outbreaks have occurred. In 
considering the effects of these changes, the key questions are: (1) In 
what ways do the current import requirements for

[[Page 17936]]

Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom differ from the import requirements set forth in this proposed 
rule; and (2) what effects would result for those five Member States 
due to the changes in requirements for export to the United States?
    This proposed rule prescribes conditions for the importation of 
breeding swine, swine semen, and pork and pork products from areas 
classified as low risk for CSF. Movement restrictions require that 
there be no commingling of commodities intended for export to the 
United States (or of the donor boars of swine semen intended for export 
to the United States) with like commodities from areas where CSF is 
known to exist. Movement of commodities intended for export to the 
United States through areas where CSF is known to exist is permitted 
only by sealed means of conveyance. Sanitary certification that these 
provisions have been met is required.
    Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom are already complying with the proposed conditions for pork, 
pork products, and breeding swine, and, in fact, were meeting these 
conditions before our April 2003 final rule. However, with respect to 
swine semen, the proposal would require that before the semen is 
exported to the United States, the donor boar must be held at the semen 
collection center for at least 40 days following semen collection, to 
ensure that the boar does not exhibit any clinical signs of CSF. This 
would be a new risk mitigation measure for swine semen exported to the 
United States from these five Member States.
    Three of the five Member States, Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom, have histories of swine semen exports to the 
United States. From 1994 through 2002, the United States imported an 
average of 2,474 straws of swine semen annually. The average yearly 
share of U.S. swine semen imports supplied by the three Member States 
over the 9-year period was about 26 percent. The United Kingdom was the 
major source among the three Member States, supplying all of the three 
Member States' swine semen exports to the United States in 5 of the 9 
years.
    Reportedly, donor boars are largely resident at swine collection 
centers, so costs associated with the animals' maintenance would be 
affected little by the 40-day holding period. A potential issue is 
whether storage for 40 days before exportation would affect the quality 
of the collected semen and therefore affect import demand. APHIS 
welcomes information on this issue that may help in evaluating the 
effect on swine semen importers.

More Timely Reestablishment of CSF-Free Status

    The proposed procedure for reestablishing CSF-free status for an 
area that has been under quarantine is expected to require less time 
than current procedures, notwithstanding the 6-month restriction 
following the last case of CSF and completion of disinfection measures. 
More timely recognition of an area's CSF-free status would allow 
imports of swine and swine products from the area to resume sooner than 
at present. The effect of this procedural change would depend on the 
difference in time required by the two regulatory approaches, and the 
additional swine, swine meat, and swine genetics that would be imported 
because of more timely recognition of an area's reestablished CSF-free 
status.
    APHIS published a final rule on May 4, 2004 (69 FR 25817-25820, 
Docket No. 02-001-2) that codifies the procedures APHIS follows when a 
region free of a particular disease has an outbreak and APHIS responds 
to that outbreak by publishing an interim rule prohibiting or 
restricting imports from that region. APHIS will reassess the disease 
situation in that region, and, before taking any action to relieve or 
finalize prohibitions or restrictions imposed by the interim rule, will 
make information regarding its reassessment of the region's disease 
status available to the public for comment. Based on that reassessment, 
including comments received regarding the reassessment information, 
APHIS will either publish a final rule reinstating the disease-free 
status of the area, or a portion of the area covered by the interim 
rule; publish an affirmation of the interim rule that imposed 
prohibitions or restrictions on imports of animals and animal products 
from