Changes to the Application Requirements for Authorization To Operate in Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum Airspace
This action revises the FAA's requirements for an application to operate in Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) airspace and eliminates the burden and expense of developing, processing, and approving RVSM maintenance programs. As a result of this revision, an applicant to operate in RVSM airspace will no longer be required to develop and submit an RVSM maintenance program solely for the purpose of obtaining an RVSM authorization. Because of other, independent FAA airworthiness regulations, all aircraft operators remain required to maintain RVSM equipment in an airworthy condition.
Changing the Collective Risk Limits for Launches and Reentries and Clarifying the Risk Limit Used To Establish Hazard Areas for Ships and Aircraft
The FAA is amending its regulations concerning the collective risk limits for commercial launches and reentries. These changes include: Separating the risk limits for commercial launches and reentries; aggregating the risk posed by impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure; limiting the aggregate risk for these three hazards to 1 x 10-4; reducing the number of significant digits used in launch and reentry risk analysis; and various non-substantive clarifying revisions. These changes update FAA regulations to reflect the United States Government's greater experience with commercial launch and reentry and to align more closely the FAA's risk standards with those of other United States Federal agencies, while continuing to protect public safety.
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
We propose to supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011-26- 03, which applies to certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. AD 2011-26-03 currently requires installing Teflon sleeving under the clamps of certain wire bundles routed along the fuel tank boundary structure, and cap sealing certain penetrating fasteners of the main and center fuel tanks. AD 2011-26-03 resulted from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. Since we issued AD 2011-26-03, we have received a report indicating that additional airplanes are affected by the identified unsafe condition. This proposed AD would add airplanes to the applicability. This AD would also add, for certain airplanes, detailed inspections of certain wire bundle clamps, certain Teflon sleeves, and certain fasteners; corrective actions if necessary; and installation of Teflon sleeves under certain wire bundle clamps. We are proposing this AD to prevent electrical arcing on the fuel tank boundary structure or inside the fuel tanks, which could result in a fire or explosion.