Federal Aviation Administration June 22, 2006 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

Airworthiness Directives; MD Helicopters, Inc., Model 600N Helicopters
Document Number: E6-9846
Type: Proposed Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
The FAA withdraws a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposing a new Airworthiness Directive (AD) for MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) Model 600N helicopters. The NPRM proposed adding six more inspection holes in the aft fuselage skin panels and inspecting the upper and lower tailboom attachment fittings, the upper longerons, and the angles and nutplates for cracks. Also, the NPRM proposed a terminating action of modifying the fuselage aft section to strengthen the tailboom attachments and longerons. Since issuing the NPRM, we have received a report of an in-flight separation of the tailboom in the inspection area. Based on that accident and due to the critical unsafe condition, we issued a final rule; request for comments that addressed the actions proposed in the NPRM. Accordingly, we withdraw the proposed AD.
Airworthiness Directives; Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 Airplanes
Document Number: E6-9845
Type: Proposed Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an airworthiness authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address an unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
Airworthiness Directives; Arrow Falcon Exporters, Inc. (Previously Utah State University); Firefly Aviation Helicopter Services (Previously Erickson Air-Crane Co.); California Department of Forestry; Garlick Helicopters, Inc.; Global Helicopter Technology, Inc.; Hagglund Helicopters, LLC (Previously Western International Aviation, Inc.); International Helicopters, Inc.; Precision Helicopters, LLC; Robinson Air Crane, Inc.; San Joaquin Helicopters (Previously Hawkins and Powers Aviation, Inc.); S.M.&T. Aircraft (Previously US Helicopters, Inc., UNC Helicopter, Inc., Southern Aero Corporation, and Wilco Aviation); Smith Helicopters; Southern Helicopter, Inc.; Southwest Florida Aviation International, Inc. (Previously Jamie R. Hill and Southwest Florida Aviation); Tamarack Helicopters, Inc. (Previously Ranger Helicopter Services, Inc.); US Helicopter, Inc. (Previously UNC Helicopter, Inc.); West Coast Fabrication; and Williams Helicopter Corporation (Previously Scott Paper Co.) Model HH-1K, TH-1F, TH-1L, UH-1A,
Document Number: 06-5600
Type: Proposed Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
This document proposes adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified restricted category type-certificated helicopters. The AD would require a review of the helicopter records to determine the Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code of the tail rotor (T/R) slider. If the T/R slider is FAA approved or has a certain legible CAGE code, this AD would require no further action. If you cannot determine whether the T/R slider is FAA approved and it has no stamped CAGE code, an illegible stamped CAGE code, or an affected CAGE code, the AD would also require, before further flight and at specified intervals, magnaflux inspecting the T/R slider for a crack. If a crack is found, the AD would require, before further flight, replacing the T/ R slider with an airworthy T/R slider. The AD would also require replacing the T/R slider with an airworthy T/R slider on or before accumulating 1,000 hours time-in-service (TIS) or on or before 12 months, whichever occurs first. This proposal is prompted by two accidents attributed to sub-standard T/R sliders that failed during flight. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent failure of a T/R slider, loss of T/R control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
Airworthiness Directives; Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Model 206L Series Helicopters
Document Number: 06-5599
Type: Proposed Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
This document proposes adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206L series helicopters. This proposal would require inspecting the fuel low-level detector switch unit (switch unit) to determine if it is a certain serial-numbered switch unit that may fail to indicate a low fuel condition. If the serial number is missing or unreadable, the mounting flange of the switch unit is not colored red or the purchase date is within a certain range or cannot be determined, this proposal would require an operational test. The AD would also require replacing before further flight each affected switch unit with an airworthy switch unit that is not listed in the applicability of the AD. This proposal is prompted by the manufacturer's discovery that eight switch units may have a manufacturing flaw that could cause them to hang in the high position and fail to indicate a low fuel condition. The actions specified by this proposed AD are intended to prevent failure of the switch unit to indicate a low fuel condition that could lead to fuel exhaustion and a subsequent forced landing.
Airworthiness Directives; Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Models PC-6, PC-6-H1, PC-6-H2, PC-6/350, PC-6/350-H1, PC-6/350-H2, PC-6/A, PC-6/A-H1, PC-6/A-H2, PC-6/B-H2, PC-6/B1-H2, PC-6/B2-H2, PC-6/B2-H4, PC-6/C-H2, and PC-6/C1-H2 Airplanes
Document Number: 06-5587
Type: Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) that supersedes AD 2002-21-08, which applies to certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd (Pilatus) Model PC-6 airplanes. AD 2002-21-08 currently requires you to inspect the aileron assembly for correct configuration and modify as necessary. Since we issued AD 2002-21-08, the FAA determined the action should also apply to all the models of the PC-6 airplanes listed in the type certificate data sheet of Type Certificate (TC) No. 7A15 that were produced in the United States through a licensing agreement between Pilatus and Fairchild Republic Company (also identified as Fairchild Industries, Fairchild Heli Porter, or Fairchild-Hiller Corporation). In addition, the intent of the applicability of AD 2002-21-08 was to apply to all the affected serial numbers of the airplane models listed in TC No. 7A15. This AD retains all the actions of AD 2002-21-08, adds those Fairchild Republic Company airplanes to the applicability of this AD, and lists the individual specific airplane models. We are issuing this AD to correct improper aileron assembly configuration, which could result in failure of the aileron mass balance weight. Such failure could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737 Airplanes
Document Number: 06-5585
Type: Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737 airplanes. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual to advise the flightcrew of improved procedures for pre- flight setup of the cabin pressurization system, as well as improved procedures for interpreting and responding to the cabin altitude/ configuration warning horn. This AD results from reports that airplanes have failed to pressurize, and that the flightcrews failed to react properly to the cabin altitude warning horn. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the airplane to pressurize and subsequent failure of the flightcrew to recognize and react to a valid cabin altitude warning horn, which could result in incapacitation of the flightcrew due to hypoxia (lack of oxygen in body) and consequent loss of airplane control.
Airworthiness Directives; Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Models PC-6, PC-6-H1, PC-6-H2, PC-6/350, PC-6/350-H1, PC-6/350-H2, PC-6/A, PC-6/A-H1, PC-6/A-H2, PC-6/B-H2, PC-6/B1-H2, PC-6/B2-H2, PC-6/B2-H4, PC-6/C-H2, and PC-6/C1-H2 Airplanes
Document Number: 06-5583
Type: Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) that supersedes AD 98-12-01, which applies to certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd (Pilatus) Models PC-6, PC-6/A, PC-6/B, and PC-6/C series airplanes equipped with turbo-prop engines. Since we issued AD 98-12-01, the FAA determined the action should also apply to all the models of the PC-6 airplanes listed in the type certificate data sheet of Type Certificate (TC) No. 7A15 that were produced in the United States through a licensing agreement between Pilatus and Fairchild Republic Company (also identified as Fairchild Industries, Fairchild Heli Porter, or Fairchild-Hiller Corporation). In addition, the intent of the applicability of AD 98-12-01 was to apply to all the affected serial numbers of the airplane models listed in TC No. 7A15. This AD retains all the actions of AD 98-12-01, adds those Fairchild Republic Company airplanes to the applicability of this AD, and lists the individual specific airplane models. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine fuel starvation during maximum climb and descent caused by poor fuel tank venting with low fuel levels, which could result in a loss of engine power during critical phases of flight.
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and MD-11F Airplanes
Document Number: 06-5550
Type: Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. That AD currently requires replacement of the upper and lower reading lights in the forward crew rest area with a redesigned light fixture. This new AD adds airplanes to the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from a report of the old reading lights being inadvertently sent to an additional ten airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent a possible flammable condition, which could result in smoke and fire in the forward crew rest area.
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and 747-400D Series Airplanes
Document Number: 06-5549
Type: Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and 747-400D series airplanes. This AD requires replacing specified tie rods of the center overhead stowage bins. This AD results from manufacturer analysis of the overhead storage bin support structure that demonstrated that the capability of certain existing tie rods does not meet emergency landing load requirements. We are issuing this AD to prevent detachment of the center overhead stowage bins during an extreme forward load event, which could cause injury to passengers and hinder emergency evacuation procedures.
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, and A340-300 Series Airplanes; and Model A340-541 and A340-642 Airplanes
Document Number: 06-5548
Type: Rule
Date: 2006-06-22
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, and A340-300 series airplanes; and Model A340-541 and A340-642 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection for anti-fretting material contamination of the Halon filters and plumbing parts of the flow metering system (FMS) and flow metering compact unit (FMCU) in the lower deck cargo compartment (LDCC) and bulk crew rest compartment (BCRC), as applicable; other specified actions; and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report that the FMS and FMCU of the fire extinguishing system may be blocked by anti-fretting material contamination. We are issuing this AD to prevent such anti-fretting material contamination, which could reduce the effectiveness of the fire extinguisher system to discharge fire extinguishing agents and to lower the concentration of Halon gas in the LDCC or BCRC in a timely manner. An ineffective fire extinguisher system in the event of a fire could result in an uncontrollable fire in the LDCC or BCRC.