Federal Aviation Administration August 19, 2014 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

The FAA is issuing this notice to advise the public of the Seventy Nineth meeting of RTCA Special Committee 147, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems Airborne Equipment.

This notice contains a summary of a petition seeking relief from specified requirements of 14 CFR. The purpose of this notice is to improve the public's awareness of, and participation in, this aspect of FAA's regulatory activities. Neither publication of this notice nor the inclusion or omission of information in the summary is intended to affect the legal status of the petition or its final disposition.

These special conditions are issued for the modification of the Robinson Helicopter Company Model R66 helicopter. This model helicopter will have a novel or unusual design feature after installation of the HeliSAS helicopter autopilot/stabilization augmentation system (AP/SAS) that has potential failure conditions with more severe adverse consequences than those envisioned by the existing applicable airworthiness regulations. These special conditions contain the added safety standards the Administrator considers necessary to ensure the failures and their effects are sufficiently analyzed and contained.

We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011-15-09 for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400, -401, and -402 airplanes. AD 2011-15-09 required repetitive inspections for proper operation of the main landing gear (MLG) alternate extension system (AES), and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires, for certain airplanes, new repetitive inspections for proper operation of the MLG AES, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD also requires eventually replacing the MLG AES cam mechanism assembly with a new assembly, which terminates the repetitive inspections for those airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that, for certain airplanes not affected by AD 2011-15-09, a different MLG AES cam mechanism assembly was installed, resulting in input lever fractures and inability to open the MLG door; those assemblies could be subject to the same unsafe condition in AD 2011-15-09. We are issuing this AD to prevent improper operation of the cam mechanism or rupture of the door release cable, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports in which a single, undetected, erroneous radio altimeter output caused the autothrottle to enter landing flare retard mode prematurely on approach. This AD requires removing certain autothrottle computers and installing a new or reworked autothrottle computer. We are issuing this AD to prevent a single, undetected, erroneous radio altimeter output from causing premature autothrottle landing flare retard and subsequent loss of automatic speed control, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of smoke or flames in the passenger cabin of various transport category airplanes related to the wiring for the passenger cabin in-flight entertainment (IFE) system, cabin lighting, and passenger seats. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, doing an inspection of the electrical power control panel for a certain part number, and corrective action if necessary; and, for certain other airplanes, installing a new electrical power control panel, and making changes to the wiring and certain electrical load management system (ELMS) panels. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to the IFE systems and other non- essential electrical systems through one or two switches in the flight deck in the event of smoke or flames. In the event of smoke or flames in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin, the flightcrew's inability to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non- essential electrical systems could result in the inability to control smoke or flames in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin during a non-normal or emergency situation, and consequent loss of control of the airplane.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 707 airplanes, Model 720 and 720B series airplanes, Model 727 airplanes, and Model 737-100, -200, and -200C series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a fire that originated near the first officer's area and caused extensive damage to the flight deck on a different airplane model. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low- pressure oxygen hoses in the flight compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from inadvertently passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the low-pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, leading to an oxygen-fed fire and/or smoke in the flight deck.