Federal Aviation Administration July 6, 2005 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

Pursuant to FAA's rulemaking provisions governing the application, processing, and disposition of petitions for exemption part 11 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), this notice contains a summary of certain petitions seeking relief from specified requirements of 14 CFR. The purpose of this notice is to improve the public's awareness of, and participation in, this aspect of FAA's regulatory activities. Neither publication of this notice nor the inclusion or omission of information in the summary is intended to affect the legal status of any petition or its final disposition.

In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the FAA invites public comment on one public information collection which will be submitted to OMB for review and approval.

This document proposes adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell) Model 47D1, 47G, 47G-2, 47G-2A, 47G-2A-1, 47G-3, 47G-3B, 47G-3B-1, 47G-3B-2, 47G-3B-2A, 47G-4, 47G-4A, 47G-5, 47G-5A and Coastal Helicopters, Inc. Model OH-13H (Tomcat Mark 5A, 6B, 6C) helicopters that have a certain scissors assembly or weld assembly scissors bracket installed. The AD would require, within 60 days, determining and recording the total hours time-in-service (TIS) for each Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA)-produced scissors assembly and weld assembly scissors bracket and would establish a life limit for each affected part. This proposal is prompted by the need to establish a life limit on scissors assemblies and weld assembly scissors brackets produced under PMA No. PQ808SW or installed per Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. SH2772SW. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to establish a life limit to prevent using a scissors assembly or weld assembly scissors bracket past its life limit, which could result in failure of the part and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires applying an anti-static conductive coating to the fuel access and thermal anti-icing blowout doors at the location of the bonding fasteners on the leading edge of the wings, and performing a resistance test on the new coating to ensure correct ground path resistance. This AD is prompted by a report that an anti-static coating was not applied correctly on doors located within a flammable fluid leakage zone. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncontrollable fire in the leading edge of the wing, which could damage critical wing structures and cause a fuel tank explosion.

The FAA is revising an earlier proposed airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757 airplanes. The original NPRM would have required inspections of certain wire bundles in the left and right engine-to-wing aft fairings for discrepancies, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The original NPRM was prompted by a report indicating that a circuit breaker for the fuel shutoff valve tripped due to a wire that chafed against the structure in the flammable leakage zone of the aft fairing, causing a short circuit. This action revises the original NPRM by adding a new requirement for installing back-to-back p-clamps between the wire and hydraulic supply tube at the aft end of the right-hand strut only; and associated re-routing of the wire bundles, if necessary; and adding airplanes to the applicability. This action also clarifies the applicability specified in the original NPRM. We are proposing this supplemental NPRM to prevent chafing between the wire bundle and the structure of the aft fairing, which could result in electrical arcing and subsequent ignition of flammable vapors and possible uncontrollable fire.

This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-145 and EMB-135 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the engine-driven hydraulic pump. This action is necessary to prevent engine oil leakage at the coupling seal between the hydraulic pump and the engine gearbox from causing low engine oil levels, which could lead to in-flight engine shutdown and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.