Department of Transportation September 14, 2005 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

This is to notify the public that PHMSA is investigating the unauthorized marking of high- and low-pressure compressed gas cylinders, including fire extinguishers, oxygen cylinders, and self- contained breathing apparatus, by All-Out Fire Equipment Co., Inc. The company is located at 385 High Street, Holbrook, NY. On June 15, 2004, two inspectors from the Office of Hazardous Materials Enforcement (OHMEEastern Region) conducted a compliance inspection of All-Out Fire Equipment Co., Inc. During the inspection, PHMSA obtained evidence that All-Out Fire Equipment Co., Inc. had marked, certified, and returned to service an undetermined number of cylinders as being properly tested in accordance with the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR), without conducting the required hydrostatic testing of those cylinders. All-Out Fire Equipment Co., Inc.'s retest records revealed that, from November 2003 through June 2004, All-Out Fire Equipment Co., Inc. had returned to service hundreds of cylinders without hydrostatically testing them. In addition, PHMSA found no records of hydrostatic testing for cylinders All-Out Fire Equipment Co., Inc. had requalified prior to November 2003. This and other evidence obtained by PHMSA indicates that All-Out Fire Equipment Co., Inc. also failed to perform required hydrostatic testing on cylinders it requalified prior to November 2003. Hydrostatic retesting and visual inspection, conducted as prescribed in the HMR, are used to verify the structural integrity of a cylinder. If the hydrostatic retesting and visual inspection are not performed in accordance with the HMR, a cylinder with compromised structural integrity may be returned to service when it should have been condemned in the first place. Extensive property damage, serious personal injury, or death could result from rupture of a cylinder. Cylinders that have not been retested in accordance with the HMR may not be charged or filled with compressed gas or other hazardous material.

In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this notice announces that the Information Collection Requirement (ICR) abstracted below has been forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and comment. The ICR describes the nature of the information collection and its expected burden. The Federal Register notice with a 60-day comment period soliciting comments on the following collection of information was published on July 6, 2005.

In accordance with the procedures governing the application for, and the processing of, exemptions from the Department of Transportation's Hazardous Material Regulations (49 CFR part 107, subpart B), notice is hereby given that the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety has received the application described herein. This notice is abbreviated to expedite docketing and public notice. Because the sections affected, modes of transportation, and the nature of application have been shown in earlier Federal Register publications, they are not repeated here. Requests of modifications of exemptions (e.g. to provide for additional hazardous materials, packaging design changes, additional mode of transportation, etc.) are described in footnotes to the application number. Application numbers with the suffix ``M'' denote a modification request. Applications have been separated from the new application for exemption to facilitate processing.

The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus transport category airplanes. This proposed AD would require replacing the existing cabin altitude indicator in the cabin pressure control panel with a new, improved cabin altitude indicator. This proposed AD is prompted by a report of injuries occurring on in- service airplanes when crewmembers forcibly initiated opening of passenger/crew doors against residual pressure causing the doors to rapidly open. We are proposing this AD to prevent injury to crewmembers, and subsequent damage to the airplane caused by rapid opening of the door.

The FAA proposes to supersede an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Sabreliner Model NA-265-40, NA- 265-50, NA-265-60, NA-265-70, and NA-265-80 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires repetitive inspections for discrepancies in the front and rear spars of the wing in the area of the wing center section, and in the lugs on the rear spar and wing trailing edge panel rib, and corrective actions if necessary. This proposed AD would expand the applicability of the existing AD and require new repetitive inspections for fuel leaks of the front and rear spars of the wing, and for discrepancies in the front and rear spars of the wing in the area of the wing center section, and in the lugs on the rear spar and wing trailing edge panel rib. This proposed AD would also require related investigative and corrective actions, if necessary. This proposed AD results from reports of cracking in the upper and lower flanges of the front and rear spars of the wing near the wing center section, and in the lugs on the rear spar. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct cracking or other discrepancies in these areas, which could result in structural failure of the wing.

The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Burkhardt Grob Luft-Und Raumfahrt GmbH & CO KG (Grob) Model G103 TWIN ASTIR sailplanes. This proposed AD would require you to replace the elevator lever, part number (P/N) 103-3521, with a part of improved design, P/N 103-3523. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this proposed AD to prevent cracks in the elevator lever, which could cause the elevator lever to fail. This failure could result in loss of control of the sailplane.

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Aerospatiale Model ATR42-500 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting for correct installation of the fastener that attaches the ground braids on the elevator, modifying the forward bonded assembly of the elevator control rod, and corrective action if necessary. This AD results from a functional test of the elevator trim tab control rod of the leading edge, which showed that, in a full-up elevator condition with the tab fully down, interference could occur between the tab control rod and the forward edge of the lower skin of the elevator. We are issuing this AD to prevent discrepancies between the elevator trim tab control rod and the forward edge of the lower skin of the elevator, which could result in reduced control of the elevator and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all EMBRAER Model ERJ 170 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the hydraulic pressure tubes at the outlet of the engine-driven hydraulic pumps to determine the part and serial numbers; and replacing hydraulic pressure tubes having certain serial numbers with new hydraulic pressure tubes. This AD results from failure of a hydraulic system due to leakage of hydraulic fluid from a crack in the pipe coming from the pressure side of the engine-driven pump. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking of the hydraulic pressure pipes, which could result in failure of hydraulic system 1 or 2 or both, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires modification of the splice plate assemblies installed under the floor panels at the forward and aft edges of the cabin aisle. This AD results from reports of cracking of the aluminum splice plates under the floor panels in the cabin aisle. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of the capability of the cabin floor and seat track structure to support the airplane interior inertia loads under emergency landing conditions. Loss of this support could lead to galley or seat separation from attached restraints, which could result in blocking of the emergency exits and consequent injury to passengers and crew.