Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Automatic Emergency Braking Systems for Light Vehicles, 93199-93220 [2024-27349]
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 26, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
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§ 102–117.295
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act
[Docket No. NHTSA–2023–0021]
II. Discussion of the Final Rule
This final rule will not have a
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final rule is also exempt from the
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RIN 2127–AM37
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SUMMARY:
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This final rule removes gender-based
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replaces them with more inclusive
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B. Expected Cost Impact to the Public
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The Paperwork Reduction Act does
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the collection of information from
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List of Subjects in 41 CFR Part 102–117
Freight, Government property
management, Moving of household
goods, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Transportation.
Robin Carnahan,
Administrator of General Services.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, GSA amends 41 CFR part
102–117 as set forth below:
PART 102–117—TRANSPORTATION
MANAGEMENT
1. The authority citation for 41 CFR
part 102–117 continues to read as
follows:
■
Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3726; 40 U.S.C.
121(c); 40 U.S.C. 501, et seq.; 46 U.S.C.
55305; 49 U.S.C. 40118.
2. Revise the section heading for
§ 102–117.240 to read as follows:
■
§ 102–117.240 What is my agency’s
financial responsibility to an employee who
chooses to move all or part of their HHG
under the commuted rate system?
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93199
[Amended]
3. Amend § 102–117.295 by, in
paragraph (b), removing the words ‘‘his/
her’’ from the second sentence.
■
[FR Doc. 2024–27565 Filed 11–25–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 571
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Automatic Emergency
Braking Systems for Light Vehicles
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions
for reconsideration.
AGENCY:
This document grants parts of
petitions for reconsideration of a May 9,
2024, final rule that adopted Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)
No. 127, ‘‘Automatic Emergency Braking
for Light Vehicles,’’ which requires
automatic emergency braking (AEB),
pedestrian automatic emergency braking
(PAEB), and forward collision warning
(FCW) systems on all new light vehicles.
This final rule clarifies requirements
applicable to FCW visual signals and
audio signals, corrects an error in the
test scenario for obstructed pedestrian
crossing the road, and removes
superfluous language from the
performance test requirement for lead
vehicle AEB. This notice denies other
requests in the petitions. This document
also denies a petition for
reconsideration, which is treated as a
petition for rulemaking because it was
received more than 45 days after
publication of the rule.
DATES:
Effective: January 27, 2025.
Compliance date: Compliance with
FMVSS No. 127 and related regulations,
as amended in this rule, is required for
all vehicles by September 1, 2029.
However, vehicles produced by smallvolume manufacturers, final-stage
manufacturers, and alterers must be
equipped with a compliant AEB system
by September 1, 2030.
Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions
for reconsideration of this final action
must be received not later than January
10, 2025.
ADDRESSES: Correspondence related to
this rule, including petitions for
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reconsideration and comments, should
refer to the docket number set forth
above (NHTSA–2023–0021) and be
submitted to the Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical issues: Mr. Markus Price,
Office of Crash Avoidance Standards,
Telephone: (202) 366–1810, Facsimile:
(202) 366–7002. For legal issues: Mr. Eli
Wachtel, Office of the Chief Counsel,
Telephone: (202) 366–2992, Facsimile:
(202) 366–3820. The mailing address for
these officials is: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background and Executive Summary
II. Petitions for Reconsideration Received by
NHTSA and Analysis
A. No Contact
B. Multiple Trials
C. Equipment Requirement
D. Unlimited Preconditioning and Test
Runs
E. Malfunction Indicator Lamp
F. Deactivation
G. Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test
Correction
H. FCW Auditory Signal
I. FCW Visual Signal
J. Cost Estimates
K. Brake Pedal Robot
L. Manual Transmission
M. Small-Volume Manufacturers
III. Petition for Rulemaking Received by
NHTSA and Analysis
A. Include V2X
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
V. Regulatory Text
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I. Background and Executive Summary
In November 2021, the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law (BIL), enacted as the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
(Pub. L. 117–58), was signed into law.
BIL directed the Secretary of
Transportation to promulgate a rule to
establish minimum performance
standards with respect to crash
avoidance technology and to require
that all passenger motor vehicles
manufactured for sale in the United
States be equipped with forward
collision warning (FCW) and automatic
emergency braking (AEB) systems that
alert the driver if a collision is imminent
and automatically apply the brakes if
the driver fails to do so.
In accordance with BIL, NHTSA
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) (88 FR 38632) in June 2023,
followed by a final rule (89 FR 39686)
in May 2024, establishing FMVSS No.
127, ‘‘Automatic Emergency Braking
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Systems for Light Vehicles.’’ This
FMVSS requires AEB, including
pedestrian AEB (PAEB), systems on
light vehicles. In addition to the
mandate in BIL, the final rule was also
issued under the authority of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act). Under
49 U.S.C. chapter 301, the Secretary of
Transportation is responsible for
prescribing motor vehicle safety
standards that are practicable, meet the
need for motor vehicle safety, and are
stated in objective terms. The
responsibility for promulgation of
FMVSSs is delegated to NHTSA.
The final rule includes four
requirements for AEB systems for both
lead vehicles and pedestrians. First,
there is an equipment requirement that
vehicles have an FCW system that
provides an auditory and visual signal
to the driver of an impending collision
with a lead vehicle or a pedestrian. The
system must operate at any forward
speed greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph)
and less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) for
a warning involving a lead vehicle, at
any forward speed greater than 10 km/
h (6.2 mph) and less than 73 km/h (45.3
mph) for a warning involving a
pedestrian. Similarly, the final rule
includes an equipment requirement that
light vehicles have an AEB system that
applies the brakes automatically when a
collision with a lead vehicle or
pedestrian is imminent. The system
must operate at any forward speed that
is greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and
less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) for AEB
involving a lead vehicle, and at any
forward speed greater than 10 km/h (6.2
mph) and less than 73 km/h (45.3 mph)
for PAEB.
Second, the AEB system is required to
prevent the vehicle from colliding with
the lead vehicle or pedestrian test
devices when tested according to the
standard’s test procedures. These track
test procedures have defined
parameters, including travel speeds up
to 100 km/h (62.2 mph), that ensure that
AEB systems prevent crashes in a
controlled testing environment.
Third, the final rule includes two
false activation tests.
Finally, the final rule requires that a
vehicle must detect AEB system
malfunctions, including performance
degradation caused solely by sensor
obstructions, and notify the driver of
any malfunction that causes the AEB
system not to meet the minimum
proposed performance requirements. If
the system detects a malfunction, or if
the system adjusts its performance such
that it will not meet the requirements of
the finalized standard, the system must
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provide the vehicle operator with a
telltale notification.
The final rule applies to vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2029. An additional year is provided for
small-volume manufacturers.
Petitions for Reconsideration Received
NHTSA regulations allow any
interested person to petition the
Administrator for reconsideration of a
rule. Under NHTSA’s regulations,
petitions for reconsideration must
provide an explanation why compliance
with the rule is not practicable, is
unreasonable, or is not in the public
interest. Additionally, petitions must be
received within 45 days of the
publication of the final rule. Untimely
petitions for reconsideration are
considered to be petitions for
rulemaking. The Administrator may
consolidate petitions relating to the
same rule.1
NHTSA received petitions for
reconsideration from the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation (the Alliance),2
Toyota Motor North America (Toyota),3
Volkswagen Group of America
(Volkswagen),4 and Scuderia Cameron
Glickenhaus, LLC (Glickenhaus).5
NHTSA also received a letter from
Hyundai Motor Group (Hyundai), styled
as a ‘‘supplemental comment,’’ that
provides its perspective on FMVSS No.
127, which we have considered in this
response to the petitions for
reconsideration.6 NHTSA also received
a petition from Autotalks that NHTSA is
treating as a petition for rulemaking
because it was received more than 45
days after publication of the final rule.7
The petitions requested a variety of
amendments to FMVSS No. 127. These,
and NHTSA’s reasoning and response to
each petitioned-for item, are
summarized below and discussed in
detail in the respective sections of the
preamble of this notice.
Summary of Responses to the Petitions
for Reconsideration
In response to these petitions, NHTSA
is granting in part and denying in part.
The changes made to FMVSS No. 127
are summarized as follows.
1 49
CFR 553.35, 553.37.
for Automotive Innovation, Docket No.
NHTSA–2023–0021–1071.
3 Toyota Motor North America, Docket No.
NHTSA–2023–0021–1074.
4 Volkswagen Group of America, Docket No.
NHTSA–2023–0021–1073.
5 Scuderia Cameron Glickenhaus, Docket No.
NHTSA–2023–0021–1078.
6 Hyundai Motor Group, Docket No. NHTSA–
2023–0021–1072.
7 Autotalks, Docket No. NHTSA–2023–0021–
1075.
2 Alliance
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• FMVSS No. 127 contains an
equipment requirement that AEB
systems activate the service brakes
when a collision is imminent and that
they operate under certain conditions. It
also contains a performance test
requirement for lead vehicle AEB that
contains similar language. Petitioners
requested definitions for the terms
‘‘operate’’ and ‘‘imminent.’’ NHTSA is
amending the language in the
performance test requirement to remove
refence to ‘‘imminent’’ from the
performance test requirement for lead
vehicle AEB, to clarify that the
performance test does not evaluate AEB
activation timing. NHTSA is not
providing a definition for ‘‘operate’’
because the definition of ‘‘automatic
emergency braking system’’ in the final
rule sufficiently describes how an AEB
system operates. NHTSA is not
providing a definition for ‘‘imminent’’
because the term is used consistent with
its plain meaning.
• FMVSS No. 127 contains a test
scenario that, when tested with very
narrow vehicles at the extreme of the
tolerances allowed by the test condition,
resulted in a stringency beyond that
intended by NHTSA. This final rule
amends the test scenario to ensure the
correct level of stringency.
• FMVSS No. 127 contains
specifications for the FCW visual signal
location. Petitioners requested
additional clarity. This final rule
amends the regulatory text to clarify
these specifications.
• FMVSS No. 127 contains
requirements for the FCW audio signal,
including that in-vehicle audio must be
suppressed when the FCW auditory
signal is presented. Petitioners
expressed several concerns about the
clarity and objectivity of these
requirements as well as test conditions.
This final rule clarifies these
requirements by stating the location of
the microphone, additional vehicle
conditions under which testing will
occur, and amending the definitions to
simplify the requirement for
suppression.
This rule also denies the petitions
with regards to several other requested
amendments. These are as follows. For
the items for which petitioners restate
arguments made during the comment
period for FMVSS No. 127, the reasons
given for denial are the same as those
stated in the final rule.
• The performance requirement for
both lead vehicle and pedestrian AEB
testing is collision avoidance (referred
to throughout the final rule and this
document as ‘‘no contact’’). Petitioners
requested relaxation of this requirement
to allow contact at low speeds,
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specifically requesting 10 km/h (6.2
mph). NHTSA is rejecting this request
because the no contact requirement is
practicable and meets the need for
safety.
• Petitioners requested that multiple
test runs be allowed to achieve the no
contact performance requirement (for
example, that vehicles must pass on 5
out of 7 test runs) to account for
variability. Petitioners noted that
FMVSS No. 135, which regulates light
vehicle brake systems, allows multiple
test runs to meet some of the
performance requirements. NHTSA is
rejecting this request because FMVSS
No. 127 testing is distinct from FMVSS
No. 135 testing such that not allowing
multiple test runs in FMVSS No. 127 is
practicable and meets the need for
safety.
• FMVSS No. 127 test scenarios state
that the vehicle can be driven for any
amount of time. Additionally, it does
not place a cap on the number of tests
that could be run on any given subject
vehicle. Petitioners expressed concern
that this standard would allow
excessive driving or testing of vehicles
to wear out components such that they
can no longer meet the performance
required by the standard. NHTSA finds
further specification is unnecessary
because the test does not evaluate the
endurance or durability of wear parts
and will not be used in such a manner.
• FMVSS No. 127 requires that
vehicles illuminate a malfunction
identification lamp (MIL) upon
detection of a malfunction or if the AEB
system adjusts its performance such that
it is below the performance required by
the standard. Petitioners requested
additional specificity regarding the
terminology in this requirement as well
as a test procedure. NHTSA is rejecting
this request because the requirement
meets the Safety Act as written.
• FMVSS No. 127 does not permit
installation of a manual control with the
sole purpose of deactivating the AEB
system. It does contain a provision
allowing automatic deactivation in
certain situations. Petitioners requested
permission to install a manual
deactivation control, as well as
modifications to the automatic
deactivation provision. NHTSA is
rejecting this request because the final
rule already addresses petitioners’
concerns.
• Petitioners stated that NHTSA did
not fully consider costs associated with
compliance. No change is needed in
response to this request because the
final rule fully considered the costs
associated with compliance.
• Volkswagen requested additional
specifications for the brake pedal robot
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used in testing with manual brake
application. NHTSA is rejecting this
request for the reasons stated in the May
9, 2024 final rule.
• Petitioner Glickenhaus requested
the AEB requirements not be applicable
to vehicles with manual transmission.
NHTSA is rejecting this request because
vehicles equipped with manual
transmissions and AEB are widely
available.
• Petitioner Glickenhaus requested
additional flexibility for very small
volume manufacturers. NHTSA is
rejecting this request because AEB
systems are available for purchase and,
in the case that a manufacturer is unable
to acquire systems, the exemption
processes in the Safety Act may provide
relief.
II. Petitions for Reconsideration
Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. No Contact
The final rule requires that, when
tested according to the procedures
therein, the subject vehicle not collide
with the test device (vehicle test device
or pedestrian mannequin). The test data,
discussed at length in the final rule,
demonstrates that this requirement is
practicable. A tested vehicle was able to
meet the performance requirements in
the final rule and recent NHTSA testing
revealed significant improvement
throughout much of the fleet in a
relatively short time. These facts show
that compliance by 2029 is practicable.
In the final rule we also emphasized
that practicability must be viewed from
the perspective that under the Safety
Act, NHTSA has the authority to issue
standards that are technology-forcing.8
That is, NHTSA is empowered under
the Safety Act to issue safety standards
that ‘‘impel automobile manufacturers
to develop and apply new technology to
the task of improving the safety design
of automobiles as readily as possible’’
such that they ‘‘require improvements
in existing technology or which require
the development of new technology,
and is not limited to issuing standards
based solely on devices already fully
developed.’’ 9 NHTSA acknowledged
that the final rule is technology-forcing,
but emphasized that the standard is
practicable and no single current
vehicle must meet every requirement for
an FMVSS to be considered practicable
under the Safety Act.
Petitioners requested reconsideration
on two broad grounds: first that the nocontact requirement is not practicable,
8 Chrysler Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 F.2d 659
(6th Cir. 1972) (Chrysler).
9 Id. at 671, 673.
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and second that it does not meet the
need for safety.
1. Practicability and Test Data
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a. PAEB and AEB Test Data
The Alliance stated that NHTSA has
not demonstrated that the no contact
requirement is practicable for the fleet.
Other than the simulation data for the
obstructed pedestrian crossing road
scenario, the Alliance did not present
any new data or analysis regarding the
practicability of requiring collision
avoidance in AEB compliance testing
that the agency had not previously
considered.10 The Alliance noted that
the final rule states that NHTSA agrees
with the IIHS’s comment to the NPRM
that some current AEB systems are
already completely avoiding collisions
under the proposed AEB testing. The
Alliance added, however, that IIHS did
not test any vehicles at speeds faster
than 70 km/h (43.5 mph), and only three
out of the six tested vehicles could
avoid the lead vehicle target in all of the
test runs. It also stated that NHTSA
conceded that no vehicle in its 2020
AEB research was able to meet all the
performance requirements of the final
rule for lead vehicle and PAEB systems.
It also pointed out that for lead vehicle
AEB systems, NHTSA’s MY 2023
research showed that only one vehicle
could avoid contact in each test speed
and scenario, but even that vehicle did
not avoid contact on every test run at
the most stringent condition. The
Alliance argued that a single vehicle’s
ability to meet the required tests some
of the time does not support NHTSA’s
conclusion that the no-contact
requirement is practicable. The Alliance
also stated that the vehicles used in
NHTSA’s 2023 testing don’t support the
final rule because those vehicles were
designed only to meet the performance
levels stated in the 2016 voluntary
commitment.11
The Alliance stated the agency’s
analysis of test data demonstrate
variation in performance that was not
accounted for in the final rule. The
Alliance stated that the final rule did
not consider whether variability
10 The obstructed pedestrian crossing road
scenario is discussed in detail in Section II.G,
‘‘Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test Correction,’’
of this notice.
11 In March 2016, NHTSA and the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) announced a
commitment by 20 manufacturers representing
more than 99 percent of the U.S. light vehicle
market to include low-speed AEB as a standard
feature on nearly all new light vehicles not later
than September 1, 2022. As part of this voluntary
commitment, manufacturers are including both
FCW and a crash imminent braking (CIB) system
that reduces a vehicle’s speed in certain rear-end
crash-imminent test conditions.
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between vehicles or testing locations
would make compliance more
challenging by dictating the design
margin that manufacturers need to meet
to comply with the requirement. The
Alliance reasoned that NHTSA’s
evaluation (in the FRIA) of the
variability in time-to-collision (TTC) at
brake activation demonstrates that this
variability is meaningful and
demonstrates variation in performance.
The Alliance noted that NHTSA
research that was conducted with three
vehicles at the speed range from 16 km/
h (9.9 mph) to 40 km/h (24.9 mph)
showed a variation of at least 0.15
seconds in TTC at brake activation.
Agency Analysis
The test data demonstrates that the
rule is practicable. In its petition, the
Alliance acknowledged that NHTSA
had considered all available information
and test results from the agency’s
research and studies conducted by
stakeholders such as IIHS. It also
acknowledged that a tested vehicle was
able to meet the performance
requirements, despite not being
designed to meet the requirements of
the final rule. Additionally, the vehicle
that was able to meet the requirements
had a sales price below the market
average, indicating that the
requirements could be met without
expensive new technologies.
NHTSA’s recent testing also marked
significant progress compared to its
earlier research from 2020. The positive
trend in AEB technology was further
supported by IIHS, which highlighted
substantial improvements between the
2023 and 2024 model years in the
stationary lead vehicle test at 70 km/h
(43.5 mph).12 Notably, the percentage of
vehicles avoiding the target in all test
runs increased from 10 percent to 56
percent. These data all show that
meeting the requirements of this rule by
September 2029 is practicable.13
Additionally, the Alliance’s framing
of vehicle and test location variability
and our FRIA estimates is
unconvincing. Variability between
vehicles in the same model line and
year (vehicle-to-vehicle variability) is
determined by the manufacturer, subject
to the requirement that every vehicle it
sells meet the minimum safety
performance. NHTSA has no reason to
believe that the vehicles we tested had
superior performance to other vehicles
12 NHTSA–2023–0021–1076.
13 Additionally, in the final rule we emphasized
several other reasons that inform the practicability
of selecting a no contact requirement over a
requirement that allows contacts, such as testing
repeatability and costs associated with replacing or
repairing test vehicles and test devices.
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in the same model line and year. Also,
vehicle-to-vehicle variability is a
consideration for all FMVSS, and the
Alliance provided no information to
indicate that there is an issue unique to
AEB. Additionally, variation in brake
activation timing between
manufacturers is contemplated by the
structure of the rule. The final rule does
not dictate brake activation timing,
brake force, or any other aspects of AEB
performance other than that the subject
vehicle not make contact with the test
device.
Regarding variability across test
locations, FMVSS No. 127 specifies all
the needed conditions to inform
manufacturers of how we will test.
These conditions were proposed in the
NPRM, and commenters did not raise
conditions that were not included that
would affect test outcomes. Finally, the
variability analysis in the FRIA is our
attempt to connect the idealized test
conditions to the real world when
conducting benefits analyses. NHTSA
understands that in the real world there
will be variability that cannot be tested
in an efficient way through an FMVSS,
which informs our benefits calculations.
However, such analysis should not be
used to determine the types of results
achievable in an idealized testing
environment. For these reasons, NHTSA
will not grant reconsideration.
b. FMVSS No. 135 Test Data
The Alliance stated that the final rule
improperly relied on the agency’s
evaluation of FMVSS No. 135 test
results, which showed that braking
performance of nearly all tested vehicles
was much better than what the FMVSS
requires. The Alliance stated that the
evaluation reflects that manufacturers
build compliance margins into their
design for FMVSS compliance and does
not support the agency’s conclusion that
the no-contact requirement is
practicable. Furthermore, the Alliance
stated that test results from FMVSS No.
135 testing are not comparable to AEB
performance because the final rule
requires performance from both the
service brakes and a perception system,
whereas FMVSS No. 135 evaluates only
service brake performance. Also, the
Alliance stated that the maneuvers in
FMVSS No. 135 tests are conducted
with a human driver putting muscular
effort into the brake pedal. In contrast,
there is no human input when testing
the AEB system.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA’s use of FMVSS No. 135 test
results was justified. As an initial
matter, those results were not the
primary results upon which the agency
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determined that the requirements are
practicable. They were used largely to
show that the braking performance
needed to meet the requirements in the
final rule is present in the current fleet
without the need for changes, especially
with regard to heavier vehicles for
which there were limitations on
available test data. The results indicated
that the brake performance of most
vehicles surpasses the performance
requirements set by FMVSS No. 135.
While the results of these tests might
not show exactly how the braking
systems will perform under automatic
actuation that does not involve human
muscular inputs, they do demonstrate
that braking performance is more than
sufficient to permit compliance with the
final rule. Indeed, we do not need to
rely on FMVSS No. 135 test data to
demonstrate actuation performance
because AEB systems currently on the
road and tested by NHTSA actuate the
service brakes without human driver
inputs and demonstrate the performance
needed to meet FMVSS No. 127.
Therefore, we disagree with the
Alliance’s contention that the final rule
misused the FMVSS No. 135 test results.
c. Test Speeds and Headway
Toyota, Volkswagen, and the Alliance
expressed concern regarding the
practicability of high maximum test
speeds and no contact. The Alliance
stated that NHTSA’s data illustrate the
difficulties in complying with the
decelerating lead vehicle test with both
the lead and subject vehicles traveling at
50 mph (80 km/h) at any headway
between 12 and 40 meters (S7.5.1(a),
S7.5.2(b)(2), S7.5.3(a) and S7.5.3(d) of
the final rule). To address this issue, the
Alliance petitioned NHTSA to consider
reducing the maximum test speed for
the AEB and PAEB requirements and
adjust the headway requirements. The
Alliance claimed that the 2023
additional AEB research in the final rule
evaluated only the test condition with a
12-meter headway and did not provide
any test data to support the lead vehicle
decelerating test with headways greater
than 12 meters.
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Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not reducing the maximum
test speeds or adjusting the headway
requirements for the test scenarios.
Petitioners’ requests for test speed
reduction were addressed in the final
rule, and headways above 12 meters are
practicable.
Regarding test speeds, NHTSA’s 2023
research showed multiple vehicles
avoided contact on most tests regardless
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of scenario and test speed.14 Further,
one vehicle avoided contact on all lead
vehicle AEB and PAEB tests except on
three of the five lead vehicle
decelerating tests, where it impacted the
lead vehicle at approximately 5 km/h or
less. 15 That vehicles not designed to
meet the standard are already capable of
doing so demonstrates that the
performance test requirements are
practicable.
Regarding headway for the lead
vehicle decelerating test, the headway
ranges selected are consistent with those
used by Euro NCAP and NHTSA
incorporated the test ranges for speed
and headways to ensure AEB system
robustness under a range of situations.
NHTSA tested 2022 model year vehicles
with headways of 40 m with and
without manual brake application at 50
km/h and 80 km/h, and with a lead
vehicle deceleration of 0.4 g and 0.5 g.16
During that testing, multiple vehicles
avoided contact in almost all lead
vehicle decelerating test scenarios and
one vehicle avoided contact in all
scenarios. Additionally, the shorter
headway tests are generally more
stringent than tests with larger
headways. In our 2023 testing, one
vehicle tested by NHTSA avoided
contact in the 80 km/h lead vehicle
deceleration test in all trials with a 12
m headway, and another vehicle
avoided contact on 2 out of 5 runs,17
suggesting that avoiding contact under
less stringent test conditions is
practicable. Based on our test data, the
requirements are practicable and will
not be adjusted.
2. Meet the Need for Safety
Petitioners requested reconsideration
of the no contact requirement, stating
that it could lead to unintended
consequences such as increased false
positives and a rise in rear-end
collisions. A false positive describes
AEB system brake applications in
circumstances where there is no crashimminent situation, such as braking in
the absence of a true obstacle.
14 NHTSA’s 2023 Light Vehicle Automatic
Emergency Braking Research Test Summary, Docket
No. NHTSA–2023–0021–1066; NHTSA’s 2023 Light
Vehicle Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking
Research Test Summary, Docket No. NHTSA–2023–
0021–1068.
15 The low impact speeds on the system that did
not avoid contact on all trials suggests that slight
tuning of that AEB to the requirements of FMVSS
No. 127 is needed to meet the standard.
16 NHTSA’s 2022 Light Vehicle Automatic
Emergency Braking Research Test Summary, Docket
No. NHTSA–2023–0021–0005.
17 NHTSA’s 2023 Light Vehicle Automatic
Emergency Braking Research Test Summary, Docket
No. NHTSA–2023–0021–1066.
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a. Sufficiency of Analysis of False
Positives
The Alliance stated that NHTSA has
not adequately considered whether
meeting the no-contact performance
requirement will generate false positives
and that NHTSA ‘‘should have
attempted to quantify this risk’’ and
assessed why those disbenefits are
reasonable to accept. The Alliance
suggested that a false positive in
FMVSS-compliant AEB vehicles could
induce rear-end collisions with vehicles
that are not equipped with rulecompliant AEB systems. The Alliance’s
petition included simulation data
indicating that a vehicle complying with
the final rule must respond within 0.35
seconds to avoid contact in one of the
obstructed pedestrian crossing
situations, which it argues is beyond the
reaction ability of human drivers that
may be behind these vehicles. It claimed
that this discrepancy will likely result
in a rear-end crash. Furthermore,
according to the Alliance, increases in
relative speed may heighten the
likelihood of false positives due to the
need for earlier prediction and
intervention. The Alliance stated that
NHTSA acknowledged that false
positives could generate problems with
public acceptance of AEB technology. It
also stated that NHTSA dismissed this
concern in the final rule without
demonstrating that the final rule’s
requirements will not significantly
impact the rate of false positives, and
without understanding that the final
rule demands effectively different
systems from those currently installed
in vehicles. The Alliance did not
suggest any specific alternative.
Toyota claimed that the requirements
in the final rule will likely lead to an
increase in false positives and can create
driving behavior that neither the driver
of the subject vehicle nor the drivers of
surrounding vehicles will find natural
or predictable, resulting in safety
disbenefits. It stated that due to high
maximum testable speeds, AEB will
need to activate earlier to avoid a
collision, and while a system can be
designed to better account for curves in
the road or parked cars, systems cannot
be designed to predict what drivers in
lead vehicles intend to do. Regarding
PAEB, Volkswagen claimed that because
pedestrians may change their travel path
to avoid a collision themselves, AEB
activations that initiate early to avoid a
potential collision will result in rear end
collisions with the stopping vehicle.
Agency Response
Petitioners’ statements were largely
speculative. In support of these
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arguments, they did not present any
new data or analysis beyond what the
agency had already considered.18
Petitioners have failed to provide data
demonstrating the likelihood of an
increase in false positives or the
magnitude of the increase, nor is
NHTSA aware of any source of such
data.
Under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) and the Safety Act, NHTSA’s
obligation is not to eliminate
uncertainty. Courts have repeatedly
emphasized that the agency’s job is to
acknowledge uncertainty, explain the
available evidence, and offer a ‘‘rational
connection between the facts found and
the choice made.’’ 19 In coming to its
determination, NHTSA dealt with each
of the principal uncertainties and
resolved them to the degree possible. In
some cases, the requisite decisions were
necessarily based on imperfect data and
were inherently judgmental or
predictive in part. The obligation to
make such decisions and resolve such
uncertainties is an integral part of
NHTSA’s mandate under the Safety Act
and the APA. Our determination under
the Safety Act, which was based on
several factors including the available
test data, was that collision avoidance
was practicable and that any risk of
increased false positives and rear
collisions did not outweigh the benefits
of the rule. Therefore, considering the
data available and applying our expert
judgment about the unquantifiable
aspects of the rule, we selected the
option that best meets the need for
safety.
NHTSA acknowledged the
uncertainties and explained our
reasoning throughout the rulemaking
effort. In the FRIA, we noted that there
is insufficient data to quantify the
frequency and dynamics of false
positive scenarios.20 We explained that
the analysis had limitations regarding
crash scenarios and parameters beyond
those reflected in testing. We recognized
from our testing that performance is
18 Petitioner’s simulation data provided regarding
the obstructed pedestrian crossing test is discussed
in Section G.
19 In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 51–52 (1983), the Court recognized that
‘‘[i]t is not infrequent that the available data does
not settle a regulatory issue and the agency must
then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts
and probabilities on the record to a policy
conclusion. Recognizing that policymaking in a
complex society must account for uncertainty,
however, does not imply that it is sufficient for an
agency to merely recite the terms ‘substantial
uncertainty’ as a justification for its actions.’’ See
also Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251,
1261–62 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
20 Light Vehicle AEB FRIA, Docket No. NHTSA–
2023–0021–1069, at 252 (FRIA).
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variable and false positives do occur on
current systems. However, this
uncertainty, on its own, does not
demonstrate that false positives would
become more frequent under the final
rule.
We also explained that it is not
possible to anticipate an exhaustive list
of other possible real-world scenarios
that systems would face and continually
repeat testing to establish a robust
estimate of the frequency of false
positive occurrence. Based on this
reasoning and test results, the analysis
in the FRIA considered false positive
rates to be the same under the final rule
as they are in the current fleet. These
false positives are therefore included in
the analysis, but do not contribute to
costs or benefits in the rule. The FRIA
acknowledged that removing that
assumption would reduce the
magnitude of the estimated safety
impacts. However, as the estimated
benefits from the final rule are 17 to 21
times greater than the costs, it is
unlikely that disbenefits from
incremental false positives resulting in
an increase in rear-end crashes would
render the rule not cost-beneficial.
Despite these limitations, we
nonetheless considered the problem
qualitatively and addressed it to the
extent possible. We emphasized that
because market penetration of AEB is
very high, incremental disbenefits
resulting from all applicable vehicles
having rule-compliant lead vehicle AEB
would be insignificant.21 We also
emphasized our belief that false
positives would not occur in welldesigned AEB systems, especially with
the integration of supplemental
technologies. These technologies can
include providing sufficient redundancy
or continuously receiving and updating
information regarding a vehicle or
pedestrian as the vehicle approaches.
Additionally, we did not simply
disregard risks of false activations due
to the speculative nature of the risks.
We incorporated two false positive
testing scenarios to establish a
minimum level of system functionality
in avoiding such events. We noted that,
while certainly not comprehensive, we
selected these scenarios because we
believe they represent the most common
scenarios systems will encounter and
21 FRIA at 252. Petitioners argue that this analysis
is unconvincing because of the timeline of fleet
turnover. However, the moment of 100 percent fleet
adoption is not the only relevant timeline. Table
218 in the FRIA shows cumulative exposure by
year. By year 6, we anticipate that 50 percent of the
fleet will have rule-compliant AEB such that
concerns about additional rear-ends derived from
false activations will be significantly abated.
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they address known engineering
challenges for existing AEB systems.22
Furthermore, we also emphasized
many possible benefits from the rule
that the analysis also could not quantify.
These include safety benefits associated
with crash scenarios and parameters
outside of those reflected in agency
testing, safety benefits from avoiding
secondary crashes, safety benefits from
preventing or mitigating crashes with
other vulnerable road users or animals,
and property damage and traffic
congestion avoided.23
In contrast, the petitioners simply
asserted speculative disbenefits based
on theoretical scenarios. The Alliance,
for example, presented simulation data
to support the possibility of rear-end
collisions that could occur if a vehicle
has a false positive with a human driver
behind it, but it did not provide any
evidence that the false positive events
themselves would occur in greater
frequency or severity under the final
rule compared to no requirement or an
alternative requirement.24 Additionally,
Volkswagen asserts that ‘‘no contact’’
‘‘will undoubtably lead to higher false
positive rates’’ in scenarios in which a
pedestrian changes their travel path
following the onset of braking, and
Toyota made a similar claim with
regards to lead vehicle AEB.25 When
considering the balance of costs and
benefits, petitioners seek to place greater
weight on speculative and
unquantifiable disbenefits without
considering the added benefits which
may also be obtained. These assertions
are insufficient to demonstrate that the
speculative disbenefits outweigh the
benefits of a no contact requirement.
Without sufficient information to fully
quantify either, it is not unreasonable
for NHTSA, in its expert judgment and
in consideration of the Safety Act’s
22 89
FR 39686, at 39732; FRIA at 47.
at 47.
24 We also disagree with the petitioners’
conclusions about these hypothetical scenarios. If
the driver of the following vehicle maintains the
safe distance required by law, a collision with the
rule-compliant subject vehicle would not occur.
Additionally, as we noted in the final rule, if an
AEB activation of the subject vehicle leads to a
collision with the following vehicle in a true
positive situation, we believe that the AEB
activation effectively reduces the likelihood of
multiple collisions in a single crash. The AEB
system would prevent the subject vehicle from
colliding with an obstacle—whether another
vehicle or a pedestrian—in its path.
25 Nothing in the final rule prevents systems from
relaxing braking once an imminent collision is no
longer present or from designing AEB systems with
algorithms that suppress AEB activations in certain
circumstances such as after a substantial steering
input or the application of additional throttle.
However, when tested according to the procedures
specified in the rule, the system must operate to
avoid a collision.
23 FRIA
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focus on safety, to select the option that
maximizes possible safety benefits.
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b. Defect Authority
The Alliance stated that it is
insufficient for NHTSA to address false
positives through the agency’s safety
defect authority. The Alliance stated
that false positives are an unwanted side
effect, similar to an issue experienced
with early higher-powered airbag
technology, which NHTSA needs to
address through rulemaking to amend
the performance requirements rather
than through recalls. The Alliance
argued that after the new FMVSS, ‘‘[i]t
is not sufficient, or fair,’’ to continue to
‘‘address ‘false positives’ through
[NHTSA’s] safety defect authority.’’ This
argument primarily stemmed from the
Alliance’s claim that, due to current
limitations in AEB technology,
increasing the sensitivity of an AEB
system to meet the performance
requirements of the new FMVSS would
increase the likelihood that the AEB
system would also erroneously detect
obstacles where none exist.
Agency Analysis
The Alliance’s arguments do not
support reconsideration of the final rule
for several reasons.
First, the variability of false positive
scenarios lends itself to the more
individualized review of real-world
operation that the defects process
allows. As we noted, the final rule
included two false activation test
scenarios, but these are not
comprehensive for eliminating
susceptibility to false activations.26 The
best forum for such an individualized
review is NHTSA’s defects authority,
which can accommodate investigations
that consider the reasonableness of the
potential safety risks in light of all of the
facts and circumstances. In contrast, an
FMVSS sets a static performance
requirement for all systems. Therefore,
the defects authority is an appropriate
avenue for addressing false positive
events.
Second, there is an established
precedent of both NHTSA and
manufacturers addressing false positive
AEB events through safety recalls. In the
past, vehicle manufacturers have filed
recalls based on the safety risk that, for
example, has been described as ‘‘[i]f the
AEB system unexpectedly activates
while driving, the risk of a rear-end
collision from a following vehicle may
increase.’’ 27 Likewise, NHTSA has
26 89
FR 39686, at 39732.
e.g., Tesla, Part 573 Safety Recall Report,
No. 21V–846, Unexpected Activation of Automatic
Emergency Brake, available at https://static.
nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2021/RCLRPT-21V846-7836.PDF.
27 See,
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undertaken multiple defect
investigations of potential safety risks
arising from false activations of AEB
systems.28 The public has similarly
raised concerns about the safety risks
associated with AEB false activations,
requesting NHTSA apply its safety
defect authority to the issue.29 This
established practice demonstrates that
using the defects authority to address
false positives has been effective and
workable, and the Alliance does not
explain why it will not continue to be
under the final rule.
Third, the Alliance’s petition suggests
that current technical limits in AEB
equipment, such as sensor range or
definition, would make it unfair for
NHTSA to act on safety risks that were
a byproduct of manufacturer efforts to
meet the performance requirements of
the new FMVSS. However, in striving to
protect the public, the Safety Act
requires manufacturers to remedy all
unreasonable safety risks in their
vehicles, regardless of the reason for
their origin. A manufacturer’s good
intention is not a defense to a recall.30
Fourth, the false positive risks that
petitioners raise are speculative. No
petitioner or commenter has identified
an aspect of the new FMVSS that will
cause future defects related to false
positives. At most, the Alliance has
identified challenges with existing AEB
technology that could lead some
manufacturers to inadvertently be
imprecise or overinclusive when
calibrating the sensitivity of their AEB
systems to meet the new FMVSS. The
Alliance has not suggested that these
errors in implementation would be
impossible to eliminate or mitigate once
they became apparent.
Finally, the Alliance’s example of
early, ‘‘high-powered’’ air bags is an
28 See, e.g., NHTSA, Opening Resume:
Engineering Analysis EA 24–002, Inadvertent
Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https://
static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-EA2400211766P1.pdf; NHTSA, Opening Resume:
Preliminary Evaluation PE 24–008, Inadvertent
Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https://
static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-PE2400810868.pdf; NHTSA, Opening Resume: Preliminary
Evaluation 24–013, Inadvertent Automatic
Emergency Braking, available at https://static.
nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-PE24013-12241.pdf;
NHTSA, Opening Resume: Preliminary Evaluation
23–017, Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking,
available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2023/
INOA-PE23017-10785.pdf.
29 See, e.g., NHTSA, Opening Resume: DP 19–
001, Defect Petition for False Automatic Emergency
Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/
inv/2019/INOA-DP19001-5499.PDF. NHTSA also
often receives customer complaints regarding the
issue through Vehicle Owner Questionnaire
submissions.
30 See 49 U.S.C. 30116 et seq.; 49 U.S.C. 30102;
see also 49 U.S.C. 30118 (establishing that general
recall notification responsibilities apply to all
defects and is not based on design intent).
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inapt analogy. Early versions of air bags
deployed with a fixed amount of force
that posed a risk of injury to occupants.
These risks were not an occasional
byproduct of those air bags but were
inherent to the forces generated when
those air bags deployed as quickly as
needed to meet the performance
requirements of the original air bag
FMVSS. As air bag technology
improved, air bags became capable of
modulating the force of their
deployment to limit the injurious
potential of their inflation. When
updating the FMVSS to require
advanced air bags, NHTSA noted that
‘‘the fact that we are requiring
manufacturers to provide improved air
bags in new vehicles does not mean that
earlier vehicles that do not meet the
new requirements have a safety-related
defect.’’ 31 By contrast, an AEB false
positive (such as braking in the absence
of a true obstacle) is not a behavior
required by the final rule. Rather, it is
at most an accidental engineering failure
from trying to design an AEB system
with sufficient sensitivity to meet the
performance standard. In fact, AEB false
positives are more like the safety defects
posed by air bag inflator ruptures. These
occur when, in an effort to design air
bag systems capable of meeting the
intense inflation demands of the
FMVSS, engineering failures cause
ruptures which project debris. In the
same way, even assuming the Alliance
is correct that the performance demands
of the final rule may sometimes result
in faulty AEB system designs that are
susceptible to false positives, those false
positives are a failure in the
implementation of the AEB system, not
an inherent performance characteristic
of the standard.
For these reasons, no reconsideration
is needed on this issue.
c. Comparison to a Standard That
Allows Low-Speed Contact
To address false positive risks and
practicability concerns, Volkswagen and
Toyota petitioned for the consideration
of allowing a low-speed contact, such as
up to 10 km/h (6.2 mph).32 They present
two justifications. First, they make a
novel assertion, not raised during the
NPRM comment period, that NHTSA
implicitly accepts contacts under 10
km/h because the final rule does not
31 65 FR 30680, 30705 (May 12, 2000). The same
approach is true for FMVSS No. 127: the fact that
vehicles manufactured before the new FMVSS takes
affect may have AEB systems that do not meet the
new standards (or perhaps do not have AEB at all)
does not mean those earlier vehicles have safetyrelated defects simply because they do not meet the
new standards.
32 Hyundai also discussed this issue in its letter.
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require AEB systems to operate at
speeds 10 km/h and below. Second,
Toyota claims that NHTSA’s analysis
did not establish how no contact meets
the need for safety in comparison to
low-speed contact alternatives.33
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Agency Analysis
Petitioners’ arguments do not support
reconsideration of the final rule. As an
initial matter, NHTSA’s analysis fully
considered this issue and the relevant
alternatives in the rulemaking. In the
NPRM, we sought comment on
alternatives to the no contact
requirement, specifically regarding
allowing low-speed contact in on-track
testing for both PAEB and lead vehicle.
We received extensive comment both in
support of and against allowing contact
at low speeds. In the final rule, the
agency disagreed that a low-speed
approach fully resolved the safety
problem, emphasizing that no contact
provides maximum safety benefits and
aligns with the Safety Act. We reiterated
that striking a person with a vehicle is
unacceptable at any speed under any
conditions, and the analysis in our FRIA
supports that conclusion. We believe
the data and analysis in the final rule
and the FRIA demonstrate the safety
basis upon which ‘‘no contact’’ was
selected over low-speed alternatives.
Therefore, we are not amending the
final rule on these bases. However, as
petitioners have presented a new
framing of the argument regarding the
10 km/h (6.2 mph) activation threshold,
we take this opportunity to highlight the
data and analysis that supports the final
rule to respond to the points raised by
petitioners.
Petitioners present a false equivalency
between the activation threshold and
contact speeds. Activation of an AEB
system while moving below 10 km/h is
a different scenario from continuing to
move at up to 10 km/h after an
activation has already occurred. The
impact speed is part of the in-operation
performance of the system. That is, once
an AEB system detects an imminent
collision with a vehicle or pedestrian,
we anticipate that the systems will
remain active as long as the imminent
collision risk persists. The AEB
minimum activation speed, on the other
hand, is selected as a design
specification. Petitioners attempted to
conflate these circumstances, which is
unpersuasive.
33 Hyundai, in its letter, argued that a 10 km/h
minimum allowable collision speed would preserve
the safety benefits of the rule because contacts
under that speed are unlikely to result in serious
injuries or fatalities. One comment discussed in the
final rule stated similarly. 89 FR 39686, 39272.
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Additionally, the activation threshold
exists to ensure practicability, not
because no safety concerns exist below
that speed.34 When discussing PAEB
testing in the NPRM, for example, we
noted that the lower bound was chosen
based on a tentative conclusion,
corroborated by our 2020 testing and
testing on vehicles from model years
2021 and 2022, that PAEB systems may
not offer consistent performance at
speeds below 16 km/h (9.9 mph) and
that 10 km/h (6.2 mph) is consistent
with Euro NCAP’s testing lower bound.
In addition to those stated in prior
notices, there are several other reasons
for the practicability concerns that
justify a distinction between 10 km/h as
an activation threshold and as a
maximum contact speed in testing.
First, at speeds below 10 km/h, the
driver has more time to re-engage and
apply the brakes to avoid the collision
without AEB intervention. Second, AEB
systems can have difficulty operating in
very tight spaces and at low speeds such
as in crowded parking garages, where
manoeuvres at low speed may need to
occur in crash-imminent scenarios.
Third, certain vehicles to which the
regulation applies may need to push
objects while operating at low speeds.
Finally, our testing and data collection
showed both that no systems operated at
speeds under 5 km/h (3.1 mph), and
that some vehicles that performed well
in high-speed testing did not operate
under 10 km/h (6.2 mph).35 These data
suggest design challenges specific to
low-speed operation. NHTSA
considered these factors and determined
that it was practicable to require only
that systems operate above 10 km/h.
Therefore, the activation threshold and
whether to allow an impact speed have
distinct considerations that justify
different approaches.
Furthermore, no contact better meets
the need for safety in comparison to a
regulation that allows low-speed
contact. The data and analysis in the
FRIA show that allowing for contact, at
any speed, results in less safety benefits
than are achieved by the final rule. In
analyzing the capabilities of AEB
technology, at least one vehicle tested
was able to meet the no contact
requirement in each scenario. Therefore,
the benefits in the FRIA represent the
34 We have been consistent in our belief that
collisions under 10 km/h present a safety risk. In
the NPRM, we noted that ‘‘not requiring PAEB to
be active below 10 km/h (6.2 mph) should not be
construed to preclude making the AEB system
active, if possible, at speeds below 10 km/h (6.2
mph). In fact, the agency anticipates that
manufacturers will make the system available at the
lowest practicable speed.’’ 88 FR 38632, at 38667.
35 NHTSA–2023–0021–0005, Table 3.
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level of safety associated with the best
performer.36 The injury risk curves in
the FRIA represent the likelihood of
injury based on impact speed. In
general, the likelihood of injury, and
more severe injuries or fatalities,
increases with respect to contact speed.
And, although there are limits to the
precision of the conclusion that can be
drawn due to data limitations, the injury
risk curves show that allowing for
contact at any speed results in less
safety benefits than are achieved by the
best performer. NHTSA’s analysis
therefore fully considered this issue.
The PAEB data clearly show that a
low-speed contact alternative would
achieve substantially less safety than no
contact.37 Even at the lowest impact
speeds of 0–5 mph, there is a 75 percent
chance of minor injury, 4 percent
chance of a moderate severity injury,
and a 1 percent chance serious injury or
worse. Furthermore, at even the next
impact speed group, there is a non-zero
probability of a fatality.38 NHTSA
considered these risks in deciding that
no contact in PAEB testing meets the
need for safety.
By applying these percentages to the
PAEB data across the injury severity
categories in the estimated benefits of
the final rule, we find significant
benefits to a no contact standard.39
36 This ties the benefits calculations directly to a
vehicle’s observed test performance. In contrast,
fully calculating the benefits of a standard that
allowed contact would require adjusting the best
performer away from the test data. This would
involve assumptions about best performance under
the rule that are not tied to observed performance
and reduce the accuracy of the benefits
calculations.
37 Injury risk data used in this paragraph is
presented in the FRIA, Table 131. The table and this
data are rounded to the nearest hundredth. The true
figures are as follows: at a maximum contact speed
of 5 mph, approximately 0.4 percent of collisions
would result in fatality, 75 percent would result in
minor injury, 4 percent in moderate injury, and 0.7
percent in serious injury. These descriptions
correspond to the maximum abbreviated injury
scale (MAIS) categories, described on pages 238–
239 of the FRIA. Minor injuries can include nonsuperficial injuries, including those with long term
effects such as whiplash, and moderate injuries
include a fractured sternum.
38 Petitioners suggested allowing contact at up to
10 km/h, which would correspond to a roughly 6
mph impact speed. The data in the FRIA is
organized by miles-per-hour, so for this response
we discussed injuries in the impact speed range
closest to but below this figure, which is 0–5 mph.
39 Although this discussion is new analysis in
response to the petitions for reconsideration, we
note that this analysis uses only data already in the
FRIA and uses no proprietary statistical methods.
In the FRIA, PAEB is considered in crossing path
and along path scenarios. For along path scenarios,
we assume that all pedestrian impacts would be
avoided under a no contact requirement, so
allowing contact would distribute those incidents
that would have been avoided across each injury
severity category by the percentage of injuries
associated with each severity at the selected contact
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Allowing contact at low speeds would
lead to 2,192 additional minor injuries,
31 moderate injuries, 3 serious injuries,
and 1 fatality annually. Monetized, this
change results in $179.1 million
comprehensive economic benefits lost,
or 4.9 percent of the PAEB benefits
generated by the final rule.40 This is a
sizable impact, and one that NHTSA
considers meaningful. Indeed, $179.1
million of comprehensive economic
benefits is larger than those of many
entire safety rules we issue.
For lead vehicle AEB, the low-speed
injury data in the FRIA has more
limitations than that for PAEB. The
relatively small number of severe
injuries that occur in rear-end collisions
at low speeds compared to those that
occur in high speed collisions causes
implausible analytical results that limit
the precision of the conclusions that can
be drawn about the exact level of safety
benefit obtained at low impact speeds.
Nonetheless, the available data
demonstrate that benefits would be lost
with a contact standard and the general
magnitude of those lost benefits.
The injury data in the FRIA show that
allowing contact at any speed reduces
the safety benefits.41 At a relative
contact speed of 10 mph (the difference
between striking vehicle speed and
struck vehicle speed), the probability of
minor injury increases to 21.9 percent,
moderate injuries to 0.9 percent, serious
injuries to 0.7 percent, and even 0.1
percent chance of a fatality. In fact, even
at a relative contact speed of just 1 mph
(contact at 2 mph), there is a 3.5 percent
chance of minor injury and a 0.4 percent
chance each of moderate and serious
injuries. The FRIA contains an example
calculation to show how these figures
are derived and factor into NHTSA’s
benefits analysis.42
The data and analysis in the FRIA
show that while low-speed collisions
speed. For crossing path scenarios, even under a no
contact requirement there are situations in which
pedestrians enter the path of the vehicle with
insufficient time for detection and braking to avoid
the collision. Therefore, the expected effect of
allowing contact should account for a reduced
number of both avoided and mitigated injuries.
40 Performing the same analysis as used in this
paragraph on contacts up to 10 mph yields
additional lost benefits of only 0.7 percent. This
result suggests that most of the safety benefits lost
from a low-speed contact option are lost in the
contact allowance.
41 FRIA, Table 108.
42 FRIA at 761 (the example begins on p. 763).
Note that it appears some of the values in FRIA
Table 317, which summarizes input parameters,
appear to be incorrect. Table 317 stated that the
TTC Duration(s) were 2.01 for each FCW scenario.
The correct values are as follows: Status quo (SQ)
Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS) of 2.01, SQ Lead
Vehicle Moving (LVM) of 2.09, SQ Lead Vehicle
Decelerating (LVD) of 2.14, Best performer (BP) LVS
of 2.06, BP LVM of 2.12, and BP LVD of 2.23.
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are less likely to result in severe or fatal
injuries, reducing the number of injuries
that are less severe can carry large safety
benefits due to the large volume of those
injuries. As the final rule states,
between 2016 and 2019, there were an
average of 1.75 million rear-end crashes
annually (and nearly 55,000 frontal
crashes with a pedestrian). Even small
changes in injury risk can have sizable
impacts across that volume of
collisions.43 Additionally, even injuries
classified as less severe in the data
cause serious harm, and these injuries,
such as whiplash, can carry long-term
effects. In the final rule, the agency
concluded that although the data is
limited, it plainly indicates that a no
contact standard achieves greater safety
benefits than a standard that allows
contact.
In contrast to the data collection and
analyses done by NHTSA, petitioners
suggest that NHTSA should prioritize
speculative disbenefits from false
positives over the demonstrable safety
benefits that a no contact requirement
achieves. Petitioners did not provide
any new information or data that was
not already considered by the agency
during the development of the final rule
in response to public comments
suggesting that a low-speed alternative
would better meet the need for safety.
Nor did they provide, at any stage in the
rulemaking, compelling information
regarding the increase in false positives
that they fear or evidence that a no
contact requirement will result in such
an increase while allowing a 10 km/h
(6.2 mph) contact speed would not.
Although we recognized that there are
unquantifiable aspects, NHTSA was
well within its responsibilities to
consider this risk but to weight more
heavily the demonstrable safety benefits
achievable by a no contact requirement.
The Safety Act entrusts NHTSA with
this responsibility and to exercise its
judgment, and we did so. Therefore, no
reconsideration is necessary, and we
deny the request for reconsideration to
allow low-speed contact.
B. Multiple Trials
The final rule requires that the test
vehicle meet the performance test
requirements in any test run and does
not allow multiple test runs in which
the vehicle is only required to meet the
required performance in a percentage of
the runs. Petitioners requested that the
43 FRIA, Tables 225 and 251. Note that these crash
estimates were not used to estimate benefits. The
target population used to estimate benefits for lead
vehicle AEB and PAEB included several filters to
best reflect the real-world crashes that
corresponded with the test scenarios and
conditions.
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standard be amended to incorporate
multiple test runs to allow a vehicle to
meet the performance requirement in
some but not all runs, and provided
several reasons discussed below.
1. Comparison to FMVSS No. 135 and
Forms of Variability
Petitioners argued that the final rule
did not account for the variabilities in
testing. They requested FMVSS No. 127
be amended to be similar to FMVSS No.
135, which allows for compliance to be
determined based on multiple test runs.
Petitioners suggested several variations,
including passing 5 out of 7 runs (which
is similar to NCAP), passing 3 out of 5
runs, and a requirement that if the
vehicle fails the first run it must pass
three subsequent runs.44
The Alliance stated that existing
braking standards, specifically FMVSS
No. 135, acknowledge the inherent
variability in vehicle braking systems
that make it unreasonable to evaluate
performance based on a single test run.
The Alliance suggested that since AEB
is a braking system, it has these
variations, which raise practicability
concerns when a test requirement does
not allow for multiple test trials. These
variations derive from both foundational
braking mechanisms and additional
variability from sensing and perception
responses. Therefore, the Alliance
argued that NHTSA failed to recognize
that FMVSS No. 127 deviates from its
established practice of permitting
multiple test runs for braking standards.
Moreover, it claims that NHTSA did not
provide any explanation in the final rule
for departing from this longstanding
precedent.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA received comment on and
fully considered the issue of multiple
trials during the rulemaking. The
arguments raised in the petitions do not
justify allowing multiple test trials.
That multiple test runs are used in
FMVSS No. 135 does not mean that
multiple test runs are necessary for
FMSS No. 127. There is a critical
difference between FMVSS No. 135 and
FMVSS No. 127 that justifies a different
approach.45 The purpose of FMVSS No.
44 The Alliance also noted that, if NHTSA
provides sufficient relief regarding the no contact
requirement, then this relief may not be necessary.
45 Not all the tests in FMVSS No. 135 use
multiple trials. Those that do include: S7.5. Cold
effectiveness; S7.6. High speed effectiveness, S7.7.
Stops with Engine Off, S7.8. Antilock functional
failure, S7.9. Variable brake proportioning system
functional failure, and S7.11. Brake power unit or
brake power assist unit inoperative (System
depleted). These afford up to six test runs to achieve
the required performance.
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135 is to ensure safe braking
performance, and its testing is designed
to test braking performance of the
vehicle.46 It uses multiple test runs to
account for the variability in the ability
of the human test driver to maximize
the braking capabilities of the vehicle.
The agency published the first NPRM
for what would become FMVSS No. 135
in 1985. In that NPRM, the agency
stated that ‘‘[t]he purpose of specifying
multiple stops is to enable test drivers
to achieve a vehicle’s best
performance.’’ 47 That preamble further
stated that it normally took test drivers
three or four stops to achieve the best
possible braking performance. NHTSA
has also rejected incorporation of
multiple test runs into the standard for
the ‘‘hot stop’’ test because NHTSA
found in its testing that the human test
drivers were capable of achieving the
needed performance for the test, and the
test needed to occur while the brakes
were at temperature.48 Additionally, in
FMVSS No. 126, an example of a
standard where NHTSA found a single
test run to be sufficient, the sine-withdwell test provides for only one test run
at each steering-wheel amplitude and
rotation direction combination. Further,
in the final rule establishing FMVSS No.
136, ‘‘Electronic stability control
systems for heavy vehicles,’’ NHTSA
stated that FMVSS No. 136 allows
multiple attempts to maintain the lane
for J-turn testing to ensure that the ESC
system activates before the vehicle
becomes unstable instead of imposing a
requirement that it activate prior to
instability to ‘‘account for driver
variability and possible driver error in
conducting the manoeuvre. Absent
driver error, we do not expect any
vehicle equipped with currentgeneration ESC systems to leave the lane
during any J-turn test.’’ 49 These
examples make clear that a standard
that permits multiple test trials is
justified where testing may be affected
by variability in a human test driver’s
ability to apply a full brake application.
It may be the case that, because it allows
multiple test trials to accommodate
human test drivers, FMVSS No. 135
accommodates the other forms of test
variability cited by petitioners.
However, this result is an ancillary
effect of the standard’s design, not its
purpose.
In contrast to FMVSS No. 135, the test
procedures in FMVSS No. 127 test the
AEB system and do not use human test
drivers to actuate the brakes. Even for
46 49
CFR 571.135, S2.
FR 19751.
48 60 FR 6431.
49 80 FR 36050.
47 50
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tests that include manual brake
application, the test procedure specifies
use of a braking robot and the
performance specifications on how the
brake must be actuated for the test. No
variability from human operation
contributes to test outcomes in FMVSS
No. 127.
Indeed, the Alliance, in attempting to
argue that FMVSS No. 135 test results
are not informative of AEB system
performance, acknowledged this
distinction is meaningful. It claimed
that test conditions in FMVSS No.’s 135
and 127 ‘‘are fundamentally different
such that FMVSS No. 135 results are not
indicative of AEB performance’’ because
tests conducted under FMVSS No. 135
are ‘‘conducted with a human driver
putting muscular effort into the brake
pedal.’’ 50 This distinction justifies
NHTSA’s decision not to use multiple
test runs.
a. Specific Forms of Variability Raised
by Petitioners
Petitioners cited several forms of
variability that they argue justify
multiple test runs or render the standard
impracticably stringent. The Alliance,
for example, cited wear and tear of
pedestrian test dummies, design of
pedestrian test dummies, and headlamp
aim as aspects specific to AEB system
performance that can impact testing. It
also emphasized track conditions that
contribute to stopping distance
variability, such as the age and
degradation of the asphalt since it was
last resurfaced, the type of aggregate
used on the test track, and other
variables. The Alliance also noted that
compliance tests are conducted at any
number of test tracks throughout the
United States, which the Alliance
claimed further amplifies variability of
the test by contributing their own
unique characteristics. It also noted
ambient environmental effects such as
cloud cover (or intermittent cloud
cover), dust, debris, pollen effects,
recent rainfall, and noise factors. It also
stated that the road surface friction
decreases as the road surface
temperature increases, and provided a
figure that shows road surface friction
around 0.98 at a temperature of 2
degrees C and decreasing to around 0.92
at 50 degrees C, and that these
variations in ambient conditions can
translate into about 8–10 feet (2.5–3m)
or more variation in absolute stopping
50 In making this argument, the Alliance is
suggesting that NHTSA cannot rely on FMVSS No.
135 tests to show the practicability of the no contact
requirement because these tests will have superior
braking performance to FMVSS No. 127 tests due
to added muscular effort from the driver. This claim
is discussed in the ‘‘no contact’’ section, above.
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distance on a given test surface. It also
raised vehicle conditions, such as tire
burnish, brake burnish, brake wear and
brake bleed, which amplify these
environmental effects. The Alliance
stated that these factors (ambient
conditions, vehicle conditions, and
track conditions) support the reason
why FMVSS No. 135 accommodates
outcome variability by using multiple
trials, justify using multiple trials, or
justify a change in the no contact
requirement.
The Alliance stated that NHTSA’s
data demonstrate the challenges of
avoiding contact in every test that result
from their cited variability. The Alliance
emphasized that no test scenario
showed that all tested vehicles could
meet the performance requirements for
lead vehicle AEB on every test run.
Starting at 64 km/h (40 mph), fewer
than half of the tested vehicle met the
performance requirements in all the test
trials. The Alliance further stated that,
while the research conducted tests only
up to 72 km/h (45 mph), at which only
two models avoided contact, the
standard requires compliance with lead
vehicle AEB test at speeds up to 100
km/h (62 mph) without demonstrating
the feasibility and practicability at those
higher speeds. It also referenced PAEB
testing, for which at the lowest tested
speed (16 km/h (9.9 mph)), vehicles
failed in over 25 percent of the test runs.
At speeds of 65 km/h (40.4 mph) in dark
conditions, the Alliance stated that no
tested vehicle could comply with the
requirements 100 percent of the time.
The Alliance reasoned, therefore, that
NHTSA’s test data indicates that most
vehicles do not meet the standard’s
requirements, and the agency has not
provided any analysis demonstrating
why these data or other information
prove the practicability of avoiding
contact on every test run.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA disagrees that the types of
variability raised by petitioners make
the rule impracticable or justify
multiple test runs.
First, several of these types of
variability would not be resolved if
FMVSS No. 127 allowed multiple test
runs. For example, test track conditions,
headlamp aim, and the differences
between the pedestrian test device and
real pedestrians, which do contribute to
variability in AEB system performance,
do not contribute to variability in
performance across multiple test runs in
the same place with the same test
devices. The test track is relatively
consistent across runs. Differences in
the pedestrian test device and a real
pedestrian may contribute to variable
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performance between the real world and
the test track, but it does not contribute
to variability across multiple runs with
the same test device. Therefore,
allowing multiple runs would not
resolve these concerns.
Additionally, other variabilities raised
by petitioners are resolved by other
aspects of the FMVSS. The test
conditions, including temperature
range, are generally consistent with
those of existing FMVSSs, such as
FMVSS No. 135, which have proven
effective over time in resolving many
issues raised by petitioners, such as
concerns with thermal effects on the
surface friction of the test track.
Additionally, the test procedures state
that headlamps will be aimed per
manufacturers’ instructions and that
testing will not occur during periods of
precipitation or when visibility is
affected by fog, smoke, ash, or
particulates, which resolves many
concerns regarding AEB system
performance variability.51 The
Alliance’s concerns about the test
dummies are also unfounded. Dummy
wear and tear will not contribute to test
performance variability because the test
procedures specify the conditions for
the test devices used.
The Alliance’s discussion regarding
vehicle and test track variability is not
persuasive because it relies on studies
conducted with test vehicles not
specifically designed to meet the
requirements of the final rule. We
anticipate the variability between
vehicles designed to comply with an
FMVSS will be relatively small and will
depend on the compliance margins set
by manufacturers according to their risk
acceptance strategies.
Regarding petitioners’ claims that the
current state of AEB technology means
that multiple test runs are necessary for
the standard to be practicable, we note
that in the agency’s 2023 research one
tested vehicle was able to avoid contact
on most runs, which marked significant
progress compared to the 2020 testing.
This and other improvements in AEB
technology over time support the
conclusions made in the final rule that
these requirements are practicable
within the allowed lead time. Under the
Safety Act, the agency is empowered to
issue safety standards that require
advancements in existing technology or
require development of new
technology.52 Given the developmental
trajectory, the agency does not find
51 The Alliance also petitioned for more
specificity regarding ‘‘visibility’’ in the test
condition. We provided a thorough discussion of
this requirement and the reasons for not providing
additional specificity in the NPRM and final rule.
52 Chrysler, supra footnote 9.
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arguments based around the
performance of existing AEB systems to
be a persuasive argument for multiple
trials.
b. System Maturity
The Alliance stated that the final rule
claimed that multiple trials are not
necessary for mature systems. It argued
that NHTSA incorrectly assumed that
AEB technologies are mature, in part
because AEB systems introduced under
the 2016 voluntary commitment were
not designed to meet the performance
requirements of the final rule. The
Alliance also referenced the FRIA—
which stated that because many AEB
systems do not meet the rule’s
requirements there will be significant
benefits to the new rule-compliant AEB
systems—to argue that the agency
cannot consider an existing AEB system
installed under the 2016 commitment to
be mature while simultaneously
claiming significant benefits from the
new systems required by the final rule.
The Alliance also stated that rulecompliant AEB systems should be
considered new or in development. It
concluded that therefore these systems
are not mature and should be allowed
to demonstrate compliance through
multiple test trials.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded by the
Alliance’s reframing of the issue. The
fact that a current system can meet the
requirements of the standard shows that
the technology is mature—vehicles on
the road today have the requisite
technology to comply with the rule. The
benefits estimates assess the
improvements in outcomes generated
when the entire fleet becomes compliant
in comparison to the status quo
baseline. As we explained in the FRIA,
the status quo baseline is the average
performance of the vehicles included in
NHTSA’s testing. Therefore, the benefits
claimed are representative of mature
systems being required throughout the
fleet.
Therefore, no reconsideration is
needed. NHTSA denies the petitions for
reconsideration regarding multiple trials
and will not adjust the final rule to
incorporate multiple test trials.
C. Equipment Requirement
The final rule includes an equipment
requirement that light vehicles have an
AEB system that applies the brakes
automatically at any forward speed that
is greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and
less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) when a
collision with a lead vehicle is
imminent, and at any forward speed
greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less
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than 73 km/h (45.3 mph) when a
collision with a pedestrian is imminent.
It also includes a performance test
requirement that, when tested according
to the procedures in the rule, the subject
vehicle provides a forward collision
warning and subsequently applies the
service brakes automatically when a
collision with a lead vehicle is
imminent such that the subject vehicle
does not collide with the lead vehicle.
The Alliance stated that the final rule
lacks objectivity because NHTSA has
not established performance
requirements for the equipment
required by final rule. It notes that while
the rule requires the lead vehicle AEB
and PAEB systems to operate at speeds
up to 145 km/h (90.1 mph) and 73 km/
h (45.3 mph) respectively, it does not
define the term ‘‘operate,’’ Additionally,
the Alliance argues, although the
preamble to the final rule indicated that
the systems would apply brakes when a
collision is imminent, NHTSA did not
define an imminent crash. To address
these concerns, the Alliance requested a
supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking (SNPRM) proposing
objective performance requirements,
including specifying what it means to
‘‘operate’’ the equipment and defining
when a crash is ‘‘imminent.’’
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not incorporating
definitions for ‘‘operate’’ or ‘‘imminent’’
and is not incorporating a test
procedure. However, NHTSA is making
one clarifying edit to remove reference
to ‘‘imminent’’ in the performance test
requirement for lead vehicle AEB.
NHTSA does not believe that it is
necessary to provide a definition of or
test procedures for the term ‘‘operate’’ in
the regulatory text because the final
rule’s definition of AEB clarifies how an
AEB system operates. FMVSS No. 127
defines ‘‘Automatic Emergency
Braking’’ as ‘‘a system that detects an
imminent collision with vehicles,
objects, and road users in or near the
path of a vehicle and automatically
controls the vehicle’s service brakes to
avoid or mitigate the collision.’’ The
definition of FCW provides similar
clarity regarding FCW operation.
Additionally, the requirement that these
systems ‘‘operate’’ is explicitly tied to
the test conditions in S6, Test
Conditions, of FMVSS No. 127. In
considering the meaning of ‘‘operate’’ in
the context of the performance
requirements applicable to AEB
systems, the final rule provides
sufficient clarity that manufacturers can
certify with reasonable care that their
systems ‘‘operate’’ in the circumstances
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required by the final rule. Therefore, no
definition is needed.
Regarding the definition of
‘‘imminent’’ as used in the equipment
requirements, no regulatory definition is
needed. Certainly, not all of the terms in
a regulation must be explicitly defined.
Here, the term ‘‘imminent’’ comes from
the regulatory mandate in BIL.53 In BIL,
Congress chose not to define the term,
and we interpret this provision of BIL to
use the plain meaning of the word
‘‘imminent.’’ 54 Manufacturers may refer
to the plain meaning when certifying
their vehicles to the equipment
requirements.55 Additionally, the term
is sufficiently clear in context, and its
meaning is discernable from close
review of the performance requirements
and test procedures in the rule, such as
the set of testable ranges specified.
However, we are making a clarifying
change to the performance test
requirement. In its petition, the Alliance
appears to conflate equipment
requirements and performance
requirements. The final rule and NPRM
distinguished between them and
explained how the equipment
requirement supplements the
performance requirement.56 The
equipment requirement, explicitly
mandated in BIL, does not have an
associated performance test and
compliance with it is not evaluated
based on performance testing. On the
other hand, compliance with the
performance requirements is evaluated
through the performance testing laid out
in the final rule. Critically, these tests
do not evaluate the activation timing of
the AEB or FCW systems (other than
that FCW should not activate after AEB).
Rather, the performance criterion is
53 49
U.S.C. 30129 note.
defines ‘‘imminent’’ as ‘‘ready
to take place; happening soon.’’ https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
imminent?utm_campaign=sd&utm_
medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (accessed on 8/
28/24). For an analogous determination, see 81 FR
85478, Vehicle Defect Reporting Requirements. In
this NPRM, we specified a location that is
‘‘accessible’’ for an information label pursuant to
the section 31306 of the Moving Ahead for Progress
in the 21st Century Act. We noted that while the
statute did not explicitly require us or the
manufacturer to determine the location, selecting a
standardized location would best serve the purpose
of the statute by facilitating repeated consumer
access to the information. We also referenced the
dictionary definition of the term ‘‘accessible.’’
55 See, e.g., Ard v. O’Malley, 110 F.4th 613, 617
(4th Cir. 2024).
56 88 FR at 36832, at 38655; see also 72 FR 17235,
17299 (Apr. 6, 2007) (discussing the understeer
requirement in FMVSS No. 126). The NPRM also
explained how we might approach information
gathering and enforcement of this requirement. The
final rule also discussed NHTSA’s authorities
regarding equipment requirements in response to
comment regarding activation speed. 89 FR 39686,
39712–14.
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contact with the test device (for AEB)
and whether FCW activated. We
therefore left to manufacturers the
discretion to determine when to apply
the brakes and provide the FCW, so long
as their determination is not clearly
erroneous.
To resolve any confusion, we are
amending the performance test
requirement for lead vehicle AEB in
S5.1.3 to remove the phrase ‘‘when a
collision with a lead vehicle is
imminent.’’ The purpose of this change
is to clarify the distinction between the
performance requirements and
equipment requirements in FMVSS No.
127 and does not substantively alter the
requirements as described in the
preamble. In fact, because NHTSA’s
testing will not evaluate AEB and FCW
timing, and the test scenarios
themselves create crash-imminent
scenarios, this language was superfluous
in the performance test requirement.
This change also aligns the text of S5.1.3
with the performance test criteria for
PAEB (S5.2.3), which does not contain
that phrase. Although the preamble of
the final rule explained this approach,
the change discussed here makes it clear
in the regulatory text. Finally, following
the change, the term ‘‘imminent’’ only
remains in the equipment requirement.
Therefore, no performance test
procedure is needed to evaluate
compliance.
Therefore, we are amending FMVSS
No. 127 to resolve confusion in the
requirements. However, we are denying
the petitions for reconsideration
regarding issuing an SNPRM to establish
a test procedure for equipment
requirements or providing a definition
for ‘‘operate’’ and ‘‘imminent.’’
D. Unlimited Preconditioning and Test
Runs
The final rule does not explicitly
place a limit on the amount of pretest
driving a vehicle may undergo and it
does not place a maximum limit on the
number of test runs a vehicle may be
put through.57
The Alliance requested
reconsideration, arguing that unlimited
pretest driving of a subject vehicle is
inconsistent with repeatable, objective
test procedures. It also argued that the
agency could accrue thousands of miles
on the test vehicle, degrading the tires
and other wear components, before
running the compliance test. Petitioners
expressed concern that manufacturers
would have no way to predict what the
57 Specifically, test procedures state that prior to
the test the subject vehicle is driven at any speed,
in any direction, on any road surface, for any
amount of time.
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agency’s pretest driving scenarios will
do to the subject vehicle, making it
impossible to certify compliance.
Similarly, it stated that, under the test
procedures as written, a vehicle can be
tested unlimited times until one failed
test trial occurs, in which case the
vehicle would be non-compliant.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not granting
reconsideration on this issue for two
reasons. First, the purpose of FMVSS
No. 127 testing is not to be an
endurance or durability test, but a test
of as-new hardware. This purpose is
apparent in the structure of the rule
compared with several other FMVSSs.
When there are endurance and/or wear
requirements in the FMVSSs, these
requirements are apparent (i.e., they are
titled ‘‘durability’’ or ‘‘endurance’’ tests)
or are specifically written to indicate
minimum required durability limits.58
For example, FMVSS No. 106 contains
a water absorption and whip resistance
requirement, which identifies both the
length of time the hose sample will be
submerged under water, and how long
the hose sample will be flexed.59 There
are numerous other examples in FMVSS
No. 106 and other FMVSSs of this style
of endurance testing that establishes a
minimum durability performance.
FMVSS No. 127 contains no such
provisions. It was not written to, and is
not intended to, set endurance or wear
limits on the base equipment making up
the AEB system. Instead, FMVSS No.
127 is intended to ensure a minimum
level of performance of AEB systems.
The only expected wear on the
components is what is necessary for
establishing a repeatable test, which is
specified in the test procedures (i.e.,
brake burnishing). In the event that wear
and tear result in an apparent noncompliance during agency testing, the
agency would not consider these tests
valid. The Agency has demonstrated,
through decades of testing, the
competency to determine if wear is the
source of an apparent non-compliance,
be it by conducting additional testing,
disassembly and visual inspection, and
other similar methods. Finally, any
specific limits on preconditioning
driving time or test runs would be
58 See, e.g., FMVSS No. 108, S14.9.3.6, Turn
signal flasher durability test; FMVSS No. 111,
S5.5.7, Durability and S14.3, Durability test
procedures; FMVSS No. 139, S6.3 Tire Endurance;
and FMVSS No. 209, S4.2(d) and S5.1(d), which
establish a test for the resistance of seat belt
webbing to abrasion.
59 S5.3.7, Water absorption and whip resistance
(‘‘A hydraulic brake hose assembly, after immersion
in water for 70 hours (S6.5), shall not rupture when
run continuously on a flexing machine for 35 hours
(S6.3).’’).
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arbitrary. Therefore, given that that
FMVSS No. 127 does not establish an
endurance or durability test, NHTSA
determined it is not necessary to specify
such limits.
Second, manufacturers
misunderstand the purpose of the
pretest conditioning language. The
initial conditions contained in S6, S7,
S8, and S9, are written to prevent
designing the AEB system to sense
specific pre-conditions of the test. They
are not intended to enable the agency to
conduct durability testing. For instance,
petitioners expressed concern that the
standard states that the agency will
drive the vehicle in any direction for
any amount of time prior to the start of
the test. However, additional conditions
listed in S6 state that consumable fluids
(including fuel), or battery charge for
electric vehicles, will be between 5 and
100 percent. Additionally, the
initialization conditions state that the
vehicle will be driven at a speed of 10
km/h or higher for at least one minute
prior to testing and subsequently the
starting system is not cycled off prior to
testing. Because the starting system is
cycled off during fuelling, these
conditions provide a practical and
realistic limit on the amount of time the
agency can drive the vehicle during
preconditioning prior to any single test.
Therefore, petitioners’ concerns
regarding ‘‘unlimited pretest driving’’
are misplaced.
As such, reconsideration is
unnecessary to resolve petitioners’
concerns. Therefore, NHTSA declines to
amend the final rule on this issue.
E. Malfunction Indicator Lamp
The final rule requires that vehicles
must detect AEB system malfunctions
and notify the driver of any malfunction
that causes the AEB system not to meet
the minimum proposed performance
requirements.
The Alliance and Volkswagen stated
that the requirement that the
malfunction indicator lamp (MIL)
illuminate under all malfunction
conditions, including sensor
degradation, and under all possible
conditions of ‘‘adjustments in
performance’’ lacks objectivity and
practicability. The Alliance petitioned
NHTSA to issue an SNPRM that would
define each malfunction requiring MIL
illumination and include an associated
test procedure. It did not provide any
additional data or analysis beyond what
has already been considered in
comments to the NPRM.
The Alliance noted that while the
requirement for activating a MIL in the
event of a malfunction in an AEB
system is consistent with other
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FMVSSs, the final rule neither explicitly
defines malfunction nor provides the
associated test procedures. Several
petitioners requested an objective
definition of ‘‘malfunction.’’ The
Alliance pointed out that FMVSS No.
135 specifies conditions for MIL
activation, and FMVSS No. 138
provides malfunction conditions and
test procedure for the tire pressure
monitoring system. In contrast, it stated,
‘‘malfunction’’ in FMVSS No. 127 is not
defined and could include sensor
degradation, which exceeds typical MIL
illumination requirements in the
FMVSSs. It stated that without a clear
definition, manufacturers may
determine a malfunction at their
discretion and adjust AEB performance
to any performance level, including
complete deactivation, that does not
meet the requirements of the final rule.
The Alliance stated that if its
interpretation is correct, the standard
should clearly specify the allowance to
adjust AEB systems, including complete
deactivation, during a defined
malfunction state.
Additionally, the Alliance stated that
NHTSA did not establish an objective
test procedure for automatically
detecting system changes that may affect
AEB performance. The Alliance stated
that the requirement to detect vehicle
owner’s modifications that could render
the AEB system non-compliant is
boundless and lacks specific, objective
performance criteria and test
procedures, unlike other FMVSSs. For
example, FMVSS No. 138 provides
specific test procedures where the MIL
must illuminate when an incompatible
tire is installed. In contrast, the final
rule does not limit or specify the types
of owner modifications that may trigger
MIL illumination, making it
unreasonable to expect manufacturers to
anticipate and develop detection
strategies for every possible
modification scenario. It stated that, as
a result, the MIL requirement is not
objective.
Toyota petitioned for reconsideration
of MIL requirements and incorporated
the Alliance’s petition into its own.
Additionally, Toyota provided a
description of its understanding of the
malfunction requirements. It read the
requirements to allow discretion to the
manufacturer to design a malfunction
detection feature—including what
elements to monitor and what is
considered a malfunction. It also stated
that if a malfunction is identified, the
standard permits the manufacturer, at
its discretion, to adjust the performance
of the vehicle such that it will not meet
the requirements specified in
paragraphs S5.1, S5.2, or S5.3, including
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completely deactivating the AEB
system, and illuminate the telltale. It
said it understood the agency’s intent to
be that manufacturers must design
vehicles with a malfunction detection
feature, and that the vehicle must
display a telltale when a malfunction is
detected and allow the vehicle to adjust
the performance of the AEB system or
deactivate it in response to
malfunctions.
Toyota agreed with NHTSA that
malfunctions should be detected based
on the system design. Toyota argued
that if the AEB system cannot be
deactivated in cases of performance
degradation, such as from sensor
misalignment, it could result in falsepositive activations potentially creating
safety disbenefits. However, it
nonetheless argued that the malfunction
detection requirements are unclear and
requested reconsideration. It noted that
NHTSA had rejected suggested language
from Bosch regarding malfunction
detection on the basis that it was not
workable for an FMVSS and lacked
objectivity.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA will not adjust the
malfunction detection requirements.
NHTSA considered comments on
malfunction detection in the final rule.
Petitioners broadly expressed confusion
about the term ‘‘malfunction’’ and about
what conditions the indicator lamp
must illuminate. However, Toyota, in its
petition, correctly summarized the
requirements, indicating that it
understood the requirement as written.
Nonetheless, we respond to certain
issues raised in the petitions to clarify
our intent.
Toyota is correct that, when a
malfunction is detected, the system is
permitted to reduce functionality and it
must show the telltale. The intent
behind the requirement is for systems to
self-diagnose issues that cause them to
perform at a level below that required
by the FMVSS, adjust performance as
the system determines is appropriate,
and alert the operator. In contrast to
how petitioners describe the
requirement, the standard does not
require AEB systems to detect all
possible conditions (or owner
modifications) that could reduce
functionality. Rather it requires the
system to be able to make detections
regarding malfunctions and conditions
that cause performance degradations,
allows the system to adjust performance
if it makes such a detection, and
requires the system to alert the operator
if such an adjustment is made.
As is customary with NHTSA’s
standards, the laboratory compliance
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test procedures will specify how
NHTSA intends to run its compliance
test regarding illumination of a
malfunction telltale. However, NHTSA
is not specifying these in the regulation.
The conditions under which the
malfunction lamp are required to
illuminate are sufficiently defined in the
FMVSS, which is enough information
for manufacturers to certify to the
requirement. Although NHTSA is also
not specifying in the regulatory text how
an internal malfunction is generated,
test procedures for MIL requirements
typically involve creating an obvious
failure condition, such as disconnecting
the power source to the system, and
determining if the MIL illuminates.
NHTSA will not specify instances of
‘‘malfunction.’’ NHTSA received and
fully considered comment on this issue.
The range of possible malfunctions is
sufficiently broad that such an approach
would be unlikely to meet the need for
safety because it would omit many
possible malfunctions from the MIL
requirement. As Toyota stated, what
constitutes a malfunction is specific to
the design of each AEB system, and
manufacturers are best positioned to
determine when a circumstance exists
that causes performance to be impeded.
Furthermore, petitioners are incorrect
when they state that the MIL
requirement is not objective or
practicable because the term
‘‘malfunction’’ is not given a regulatory
definition. The MIL requirement in
FMVSS No. 127 is stated in objective
terms. It ties the requirement to
illuminate the MIL upon performance
adjustment to the performance
requirements for AEB systems. These
performance requirements are stated in
objective terms. The MIL requirement is
therefore also stated in objective terms.
Finally, the Alliance attempts to
reference the MIL requirement in
FMVSS No. 138 as a contrasting
example of a MIL requirement that is
objective. However, FMVSS No. 138,
like FMVSS No. 127, does not provide
an explicit definition of ‘‘malfunction,’’
instead applying the performance
requirement ‘‘to a malfunction that
affects the generation or transmission of
control or response signals.’’ 60 The
approach undertaken in FMVSS No. 127
is analogous: it specifies the AEB system
performance requirements, stated in
objective terms, as the relevant
comparison. Therefore, no
reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is
denying the petitions for
reconsideration on this issue and is not
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changing the MIL requirements from
those stated in FMVSS No. 127.
F. Deactivation
The final rule includes an explicit
prohibition against manufacturers
installing a control designed for the sole
purpose of deactivation of the AEB
system, except in certain cases relating
to law enforcement. The final rule does,
however, allow for controls that have
the ancillary effect of deactivating the
AEB system, such as during low-range
four-wheel drive configurations, when
the driver selects ‘‘tow mode,’’ or when
another vehicle system is activated that
will have a negative ancillary impact on
AEB operation. It also allows for
automatic deactivation in the
malfunction circumstances described in
the previous section.
1. Manual Deactivation
The Alliance and Volkswagen
petitioned NHTSA to allow manual
deactivation of the AEB system.
Petitioners pointed out scenarios in
which they state that AEB operation can
be inappropriate or potentially
hazardous. These include racetrack
usage, off-road driving that requires
manoeuvring around obstacles, off-road
driving without low range or gear
options, road infrastructure causing
false positives, support vehicles for
cycling races, and similar situations or
dynamic driving events involving
interactions with other vehicles. The
Alliance also raised several scenarios
where vehicles are used on public roads
but under non-normal conditions, such
as during parades, car shows, or sport
events where vehicles are operated in
close proximity to pedestrians and other
vehicles. Petitioners stated that the
automatic deactivation provision is
inadequate to address these scenarios.
The Alliance noted that, since AEB
systems might not automatically
differentiate between tracks or parking
lots and public roads, they could
potentially intervene during dynamic
driving manoeuvres, disrupting the
driver and posing a risk to nearby
vehicles. Moreover, the Alliance noted
concerns about the ‘‘automatic
deactivation only’’ approach for
installed equipment, using snowplows
as an example, stating that the final rule
does not cover all potentially unsafe
scenarios. For instance, installing
equipment like a roof-mounted kayak,
canoe, or ski rack with parts
overhanging the front windshield could
cause sensors to detect shapes that
might not lead to a malfunction but
could inadvertently trigger AEB
operation. Thus, it requested that
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drivers have the ability to disable AEB
systems to resolve these circumstances.
The Alliance also requested
expansion of the language in S5.4.3 of
the final rule, which applies only to
vehicles operating in a low-range fourwheel drive configuration, to include
certain modern vehicle configurations,
like those with all-wheel drive system
without a transfer case or electrical
vehicles using only electric motors or a
combination of combustion-driven axles
and electric motors, which may not
have a low-range system but are still
capable of off-road operations. Thus, the
Alliance argued, NHTSA should
broaden the applicability of S5.4.3 to
include vehicles operating in any offroad mode or mode designated to the
driver as appropriate for low-speed offroad operations.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA will not adjust the
requirements regarding deactivation.
NHTSA received and considered
comments on automatic and manual
deactivation of AEB systems. After
consideration of those comments,
NHTSA determined that allowing
automatic deactivation pursuant to the
circumstances in S5.4.2.2 would be
practicable and most effectively meet
the need for safety because it allows for
controls that have the ancillary effect of
deactivating the AEB while preventing
installation of a control with the sole
purpose of enabling driver disablement
of AEB systems. NHTSA believes that
the current regulatory text, which
allows AEB deactivation ‘‘when another
vehicle system is activated that will
have a negative ancillary impact on AEB
operation,’’ is sufficiently broad to
encompass the vehicle types that the
Alliance raises. Furthermore, the
purpose of S5.4.3 is to exempt vehicles
that have four-wheel drive modes,
selected by mechanical controls that
cannot be automatically reset
electrically, from the requirement that
any AEB deactivation be reset by the
ignition cycle. For other vehicles (such
as those with all-wheel drive), the
agency expects that AEB will reactivate
when the vehicle is in a drive mode that
allows for AEB activation, and when the
vehicle’s ignition/power is cycled on/
off.
Petitioners’ stated concerns about
operation of vehicles with no manual
AEB deactivation in unusual
circumstances do not justify
reconsideration. As we discussed in the
final rule regarding front-mounted
equipment, a well-designed AEB system
will be able to detect and automatically
deactivate to accommodate roofmounted equipment such as kayaks or
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ski racks that may overhang the front
windshield. We are also unpersuaded
by requests that the final rule allow
manual deactivation to account for
various racing or track scenarios. The
allowance in S5.4.2.2 provides relief for
some of these vehicles. Additionally,
our requirements apply to motor
vehicles, which the Safety Act defines
as a vehicle ‘‘manufactured primarily
for use on public streets, roads, and
highways.’’ 61 Therefore, if a
manufacturer chooses to produce a
racing vehicle designed for use on
public roads it must meet the minimum
safety requirements. The fact that it may
be used in a racing environment does
not in and of itself justify a manual
deactivation feature. Manufacturers may
design racing vehicles not for use on
public roads that do not meet the
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2. UNECE Regulation No. 152
Volkswagen and the Alliance
requested reconsideration of the
agency’s decision to disallow a manual
deactivation feature based on data
submitted by Volkswagen. Petitioners
stated that data collected in Europe
showed that, among a fleet of over
30,000 UNECE Regulation No. 152
compliant vehicles which collectively
took more than 12 million trips, only 0.2
percent of the vehicles deactivated their
AEB systems more than 10 times.
According to petitioners, this data
indicates that less than 0.005 percent of
all trips involved AEB deactivation and
that while drivers did use the manual
deactivation feature, they did so very
rarely. Thus, they argued that allowing
the manual deactivation feature, with
appropriate multi-step procedures to
prevent inadvertent deactivation, would
not significantly diminish the overall
benefits of AEB systems.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded that the data
provided by Volkswagen demonstrates
that NHTSA should adopt the approach
taken by UNECE Regulation No. 152.
Generally, the driving environment
(road and lane design, etc.) and driver
habits in the United States differ
substantially from those in Europe, and
there is also significant variation within
European nations. These differences
may result in differences in how drivers
interact with AEB technology. The
petitioners did not present evidence that
data from the European market
accurately represents driver behaviour
in the U.S. market. In view of the safety
concerns expressed in the final rule and
by commenters, harmonization alone is
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an insufficient justification for allowing
a control to deactivate the AEB system.
As a result, we will not adopt the
UNECE Regulation No. 152 approach.
Therefore, no reconsideration is
necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petitions for reconsideration regarding
amending the automatic deactivation
provision or the restriction on installing
a manual deactivation control.
G. Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test
Correction
The final rule contains a test scenario
in which an obstructed pedestrian
enters the path of the vehicle from the
right.
In its petition for reconsideration, the
Alliance argued this performance test
requirement demonstrates that the final
rule is impracticable. The Alliance
asked NHTSA to reduce the maximum
test speed and align the headways more
closely with the results of NHTSA’s
testing.
The Alliance provided a case study of
a narrow vehicle avoiding contact with
the test mannequin using the boundary
conditions specified in the rule and
realistic vehicle stopping dynamics (a
peak braking acceleration of 0.9 g and
an initial braking rate of 3 g/s). The
Alliance stated in its analysis that, when
using nominal tolerances on the
location of the vehicle test device
relative to the subject vehicle
positioning, the vehicle with a width of
1570 mm (61.8 in) had approximately
0.35 seconds to identify the crossing
pedestrian and begin braking. However,
in its analysis, when that same subject
vehicle was at the maximum distance
away from the intended travel path, and
the vehicle test device was located as
close to the side of the subject vehicle,
only 0.15 seconds were available to
react to the crossing mannequin. The
Alliance stated that a response time of
0.15 seconds is beyond the capabilities
of any AEB system and is not
practicable.
Agency Analysis
Agency calculations confirmed the
issue raised by the Alliance regarding
the perception time in obstructed
pedestrian testing at the maximum
allowable test tolerances. However, the
agency does not agree that this finding
is an indication of the standard’s
fundamental impracticability.
Therefore, NHTSA is amending the
requirement to align with the intent of
the scenario to ensure that the specified
tolerances do not result in an
unintentionally stringent test.
The final rule specified that subject
vehicles would nominally be a meter
away from the side of the vehicle test
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device when performing obstructed
pedestrian testing. As the Alliance
highlighted, the tolerance of the subject
vehicle relative to the intended travel
path (+/- 0.15 m), and the tolerance of
the vehicle test device relative to the
side of the subject vehicle (+/- 0.1 m)
could add up such that the minimum
distance could be 0.75 m instead of the
intended 1 m. The reduction of the
intended distance between the vehicle
and the pedestrian mannequin by 25
percent has a significant impact on how
much time the system has to determine
whether to initiate braking.
Additionally, as the Alliance
highlighted, because we were primarily
determining the vehicle test device
location relative to the side of the
subject vehicle, the narrower the
vehicle, the less time that vehicle has to
perceive the obstructed pedestrian and
decide to begin braking. For narrower
vehicles, this scenario renders the test
more stringent than NHTSA intended.
To address the issue, the agency is
adjusting how the tolerances are defined
in S8.3.3, so that at most, the vehicle
test device is not less than 1.0 m away
from the 0 percent overlap point (the
right side of the vehicle). For vehicles
up to 2.05 m (79.5 in) wide, which is a
majority of passenger cars, the left side
of the vehicle test device will be no less
than 2.2 m away from the intended
travel path. This standard places the left
side of the vehicle test device at least
1.15 m away from the right side of the
subject vehicle, which accounts for the
+/- 0.15 m lateral tolerance of the
subject vehicle relative to the intended
travel path prior to braking. To make
sure testing is consistent, and to make
sure that testing stringency does not
increase for vehicles wider than 2.05 m
(79.5 in), the left side of the vehicle test
device will be no less than 1.15 m away
from the subject vehicle.
Therefore, NHTSA is amending the
specifications for the obstructed
pedestrian crossing test.
H. FCW Auditory Signal
1. FCW Auditory Signal Requirements
The final rule requires the FCW
auditory signal to have a high
fundamental frequency of at least 800
Hz, a tempo in the range of 6–12 pulses
per second, and a duty cycle in the
range of 0.25–0.95, and a minimum
intensity of 15–30 dB above the masked
threshold.
The Alliance stated that the
requirements related to the auditory
signal lack specificity and were
therefore not objective. The Alliance
stated that the threshold sound level
largely depends on the ambient noise at
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a given moment in time and conditions
such as vehicle speed and engine, tire/
road, and wind noise. It concluded that
for the requirement to be objective,
NHTSA must clearly define several key
characteristics, including the test
conditions under which both the
ambient noise and the masked threshold
are measured as well as the
methodology to measure and compute
the sound level of the FCW warning and
the noise separation amount (i.e., 5 dB).
The Alliance also stated that there may
need to be exceptions for high ambient
noise conditions, such as convertibles
with an open top.
Volkswagen similarly commented that
additional information relating to
compliance testing is needed such as
details of the means and conditions for
measuring the reference noise level to
which the regulation will compare the
FCW auditory signal and inquired
whether the vehicle’s windows would
be open and/or HVAC system would be
active during the testing. The Alliance,
as part of its comments regarding the
audio suppression requirement (the
remainder of which are discussed in the
next subsection), also requested
additional conditions regarding the
‘‘masked threshold’’ and how it will be
assessed. Volkswagen also questioned
the meaning of ‘‘quietest level’’ in the
masked threshold definition and how to
measure it. It further asked whether
masked threshold would be determined
based on a person with normal hearing
or impaired hearing.
Agency Analysis
In response to petitions, NHTSA is
incorporating additional description of
the conditions in which the FCW
auditory requirements must be met,
detailing the location of the sound
measurement device, and replacing
‘‘masked threshold’’ with ‘‘average noise
level inside the vehicle.’’ We are
incorporating them to ensure clarity and
to facilitate compliance.
We are adding several specifications
to the FCW auditory requirement. First,
that the auditory signal requirements
must be met at the highest SV test speed
(which is 100 km/h). Second, we are
specifying that the audio requirements
are met with all vehicle openings
closed. This language is intended to
clarify for certifying entities that during
the test, openings such as the windows,
doors, hood, rear hatch, and trunk will
be closed, as will convertible tops.
Third, the provision now states that all
subject vehicle sound-producing
systems or functions are set to off, other
than those necessary for performing
testing under the rule. This language is
intended to describe systems such as the
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HVAC, windshield wipers, and turn
signals, which produce noise that may
impact measurement of sound inside
the vehicle, but which are not necessary
for testing. These additions provide
significant clarity regarding the
conditions under which the signal will
be measured. The FMVSS already states
that FCW must operate under the
conditions in S6, which includes items
that may impact the in-vehicle sound
environment, such as the environmental
conditions, road conditions, subject
vehicle conditions, and equipment.
Therefore, those conditions will not be
further specified.
NHTSA is also incorporating the
intended sound measurement location,
adjacent to a 50th percentile male
driver’s right ear tragion point. This
point is identified in the anthropometric
data from a NHTSA-sponsored study of
the dimensions of 50th percentile male
drivers seated with a 25-degree seatback
angle (‘‘Anthropometry of Motor
Vehicle Occupants’’).62 The tragion is an
anthropometric point situated in the
notch just above the tragus of the ear
and is located 614 mm vertically above
the H point (hip location of a driver in
the driver seating position), 185 mm aft
of the H point, and 83 mm to the right
of the H point.
We are also simplifying the baseline
sound level against which the FCW
auditory signal intensity is compared by
replacing the term ‘‘masked threshold’’
with ‘‘average noise level inside the
vehicle.’’ We are also incorporating a
description of how that level will be
determined: by measuring the noise
level inside the vehicle over a 5-second
period under the conditions described
above. This change resolves items raised
by petitioners regarding defining
additional aspects of the ‘‘masked
threshold’’ as well as Volkswagen’s
petition regarding the hearing ability of
the reference driver by simplifying the
measurement to focus solely on the
noise level inside the vehicle.
Therefore, NHTSA is incorporating
these three changes to clarify the
requirements applicable to the FCW
auditory warning.
2. In-Vehicle Audio Suppression
Requirement
The final rule required that in-vehicle
audio that is not related to a safety
purpose or safety system (i.e.,
entertainment and other audio content
not related to or essential for safe
performance of the driving task) must be
muted, or reduced in volume to within
62 This report is the same as the one used as a
basis for eye midpoint location set in FMVSS No.
111.
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5 dB of the masked threshold during
presentation of the FCW auditory signal.
The Alliance requested
reconsideration of the requirement. The
Alliance and Volkswagen stated that the
requirement lacked objectivity and a
corresponding test procedure. The
Alliance requested that NHTSA
eliminate the requirement or issue an
SNPRM proposing to define the audio
sources that must be suppressed and
‘‘safety purpose or safety system’’
sounds that are not required to be
suppressed. It also asked NHTSA to
propose performance requirements
defining the threshold for when the
audio suppression must begin, with an
associated test procedure. Finally, the
Alliance argued that NHTSA did not
adequately consider consumer
satisfaction concerns with the
suppression requirement and that
consumers may be unaccustomed to it,
believing their audio is not working or
seeking to disable the audio suppression
feature.
a. Types of Sounds that Must be
Suppressed
The Alliance stated that the phrase
‘‘not related to a safety purpose or a
safety system’’ contains undefined terms
that are not explained except with a
parenthetical reference to
entertainment. The Alliance, in its
petition, noted that audio suppression
systems cannot distinguish between
certain content that may or may not
have a safety purpose: for example, a
radio broadcast of a talk show host
versus a radio broadcast of an
emergency weather alert. It noted that
the language may result in suppression
of broadcasts of FEMA’s Integrated
Public Alert and Warning System,
which the Alliance noted was
established by Executive Order 13407 to
ensure that the public has access to
critical alerts about weather and other
emergencies. Petitioners also requested
that NHTSA provide definitions
indicating which audio sources must be
suppressed and which do not. The
Alliance mentioned examples for which
it was not sure whether the suppression
requirement would apply, such as the
HVAC, defroster, seat belt reminder
alarms, intelligent speeding assist
indicators, and road departure alerts.
Agency Analysis
In response to this petition, NHTSA is
amending the language to clarify that
the requirement is to suppress audio not
related to a crash avoidance warning.
The intent of the requirement was to
ensure that auditory signals unrelated to
the vehicle’s crash avoidance response
in an imminent crash avoidance
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scenario would not interfere with the
driver’s perception of the FCW and
thereby hinder their opportunity to
intervene and avoid a crash. Given that
petitioners’ concerns appear to be
regarding vagueness, NHTSA is
clarifying the requirement to reference a
more specific set of audio signals that
should not be suppressed: in-vehicle
audio that is ‘‘not related to a crash
avoidance system warning.’’ 63 NHTSA
is also removing the explanatory
parenthetical associated with ‘‘safety
purpose or safety system,’’ as it is no
longer applicable. This change also
resolves concerns with systems being
able to distinguish between regular and
emergency broadcasts, because
emergency broadcasts are not related to
a crash avoidance system warning and
would therefore need to be suppressed.
Regarding the Alliance’s question
whether a vehicle’s HVAC system and
window defrosting system should be
considered in-vehicle audio, they
should not. In-vehicle audio is to be
understood to refer to auditory signals
and content produced or transmitted by
the vehicle for the purpose of
communicating information,
entertainment, or other purpose not
related to or essential for safe
performance of the driving task.
Although the regulation does not define
‘‘audio,’’ NHTSA’s understanding of the
term is consistent with its plain
meaning. For example, Webster’s
dictionary defines the noun, ‘‘audio,’’ to
refer to ‘‘an audio signal.’’ 64 Cambridge
Dictionary defines the noun ‘‘audio’’ to
mean ‘‘a sound recording, or recorded
sound.’’ 65 These definitions suggest
‘‘audio’’ to refer to purposeful sounds
emitted to communicate or provide
some form of information (including
entertainment). Noise stemming from
the operation of HVAC systems or
windshield defrosters would not be
considered ‘‘in-vehicle audio.’’ On the
other hand, auditory navigation
instructions are considered audio and
are subject to the suppression prevision.
Therefore, the regulation is clear as
written.
63 The examples used by the petitioners,
including ‘‘seat belt reminder alarms,’’ ‘‘intelligent
speeding assist indicators,’’ and ‘‘road departure
alerts,’’ should be evaluated by the manufacturer
based on their propensity to assist a driver in
avoiding a crash. While NHTSA could have chosen
to state that, for example, audio from systems other
than ‘‘Advanced Driving Assistance Systems
(ADAS)’’ should be muted, the term ‘‘ADAS’’ has
only been in use for approximately a decade and
may describe a broader array of alerts than is
appropriate.
64 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
audio (accessed 7/29/2024).
65 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/
english/audio (accessed 7/29/2024).
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The arguments regarding consumer
acceptance are not persuasive. An FCW
alert is only required in a crashimminent scenario, and the muting of
in-vehicle audio would be accompanied
by the FCW audio signal. In such a
crash-imminent scenario, it is not
evident that the muting of in-vehicle
audio would be of any concern to a
driver.
Additionally, in responding to this
petition, NHTSA examined 15 model
year 2016–2024 light vehicle models
from 12 manufacturers to determine
whether in-vehicle audio muting during
FCW presentation was employed. Of 15
models examined, 11 models from 10
manufacturers were found to mute invehicle audio during FCW presentation.
A twelfth vehicle (2022 Hyundai
Tucson) reduced the volume of invehicle audio during FCW presentation.
Three models did not appear to mute or
reduce the volume of in-vehicle audio
during FCW presentation (2022 Honda
Odyssey, 2023 Nissan Pathfinder, and
2022 Subaru Outback). Aside from invehicle audio suppression during FCW,
in-vehicle audio suppression under
other circumstances is already present
vehicles today as well. For example,
some current vehicles mute in-vehicle
audio while the vehicle’s transmission
is in reverse gear. Audio sources in the
vehicle can also be muted by apps on a
phone connected to the vehicle, such as
the Ring app (camera motion
notifications will mute vehicle audio
sources) and the Waze navigation app,
which mutes vehicle audio sources
while audio route instructions and other
app-based verbal information is
provided. Given the ubiquity of
suppression of in-vehicle audio during
FCW presentation, as well as other
vehicle features and phone apps that
suppress the vehicle’s entertainment
system and other in-vehicle audio, the
petitioner’s contention that customers
will find the required audio suppression
during FCW presentation to be
unfamiliar and cause dissatisfaction is
not compelling.
b. FCW Presentation and Suppression
Timing
The Alliance stated that the
suppression requirement is not objective
because it lacks a definition of
‘‘presentation,’’ and information
regarding when the FCW must present
or when suppression of in-vehicle audio
must occur (such as whether it must
occur immediately upon FCW
presentation or within a specified
period of time). It noted that NCAP,
IIHS, and European procedures all
contain a TTC value for when the FCW
must present. Volkswagen and the
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Alliance also petitioned regarding the
lack of an objective test methodology for
the suppression requirement.
Agency Analysis
Petitioners’ arguments do not justify
reconsideration on this issue. NHTSA is
not incorporating a specified timing at
which the FCW signal’s onset must
occur, a definition of ‘‘presentation,’’ or
a regulatory test procedure for
evaluating the suppression requirement.
FCW is required without an associated
timing requirement because there is no
regulatory safety need to require FCW at
for any particular amount of time prior
to automatic braking. Therefore, the
FMVSS gives manufacturers flexibility
in determining the timing of the FCW
presentation for their vehicles.
NHTSA will also not provide a
definition of ‘‘presentation’’ because the
plain meaning of the term and its use in
context is not vague or unclear.66 The
term is used only once in the regulatory
text to describe the suppression
requirement. Additionally, ‘‘FCW
onset’’ is defined as the first moment in
time when a forward collision warning
is provided. In understanding the
meaning of ‘‘presentation,’’
manufacturers may consider viewing
‘‘FCW onset’’ as the moment at which
‘‘presentation’’ begins, and that
‘‘presentation’’ encompasses the entire
time that the audible signal is active.
Additionally, given the short,
approximately 1–2 second duration of
most FCW auditory signals, any delay in
suppressing other audio content could
hinder the driver’s ability to perceive
the warning. As such, onset of the
muting of in-vehicle audio should be
simultaneous with the onset of the FCW
auditory signal. There is no reason to
believe, and petitioners did not suggest,
that AEB systems are incapable of
sending concurrent commands to
initiate both FCW presentation and
muting of in-vehicle audio or that
response times for sending commands
to initiate the FCW and the suppression
would be different. Therefore, NHTSA
does not expect substantial delay in
suppression.
Regarding a test procedure, the
changes in this rule resolve many of the
questions petitioners had regarding
vehicle state and sound measurement
such that manufacturers have clear
guidance on the suppression
requirement. Therefore, no additional
test procedure will be added. However,
66 For example, Cambridge Dictionary defines
‘‘presentation’’ as a noun meaning ‘‘the act of giving
or showing something, or the way in which
something is given or shown.’’ https://dictionary.
cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/presentation
(accessed 7/31/2024).
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for clarity below we describe
straightforward and readily apparent
steps we expect to take in evaluating the
requirement.
NHTSA anticipates recording and
evaluating audio data during the
performance of the test scenario
including the activation of FCW, and
manufacturers may reasonably certify to
the suppression requirement by using
any of the required test scenarios while
audio content subject to the muting
requirement is playing (e.g., music). The
first opportunity to measure the muted
or reduced audio level would be during
the period after the first FCW auditory
signal pulse and before the start of the
second pulse. Sound level would be
recorded beginning some time before
the onset of FCW and through the end
of FCW presentation. Recorded audio
data would be analyzed to extract sound
level (in dB) values during the FCW
pulse and the period between the first
and second FCW auditory signal pulse.
The sound level between pulses would
be analyzed to demonstrate that the
sound level had been reduced to the
required level of within 5 dB of the
average noise level inside the vehicle.
For these reasons, no reconsideration
is needed on this issue.
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I. FCW Visual Signal
The final rule states that the FCW
visual signal must be located within an
ellipse that extends 18 degrees vertically
and 10 degrees horizontally of the driver
forward line of sight based on the
forward-looking eye midpoint (Mf) as
described in S14.1.5. of FMVSS No. 111.
It also requires that the signal include
the crash pictorial symbol in SAE J2400
and that the visual signal be red and
steady burning.
Both the Alliance and Volkswagen
stated that the requirements are
insufficient to be objective or for
evaluating compliance and requested
several revisions to the rule. The
Alliance requested that NHTSA issue an
SNPRM to propose performance
requirements and test procedures.
In response to the petitions, NHTSA
has determined that reconsideration is
warranted on some of the items and is
making changes to the regulatory text to
ensure clarity in the requirements.
However, comment was sought on these
issues in the NPRM, and NHTSA has
determined that no additional
opportunity for comment is necessary,
as explained in section IV. Rulemaking
Analyses and Notices.67 Therefore,
67 Pursuant to 49 CFR 553.37, and in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. 553, the Administrator has the
discretion to make a final decision or seek further
comment when reconsidering a rule.
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NHTSA will not issue an SNPRM, and
is finalizing the changes herein.
1. FCW Visual Signal Size
In its petition, the Alliance stated that
the FCW visual signal requirements do
not define the size of the FCW symbol.
NHTSA is not incorporating a size
requirement for the FCW visual signal
because there is no need for such a
requirement. Not specifying a minimum
or maximum FCW visual signal size
provides manufacturers some flexibility
in how the symbol is implemented for
their system.
2. Dimensions of the FCW Visual Signal
Location Elliptical Area
Volkswagen requested clarification of
the regulatory language regarding the
required location of the FCW visual
signal. Volkswagen noted that
S5.1.1(b)(1) of the regulation states that
‘‘[t]he visual signal must be located
within an ellipse that extends 18
degrees vertically . . . of the driver
forward line of sight,’’ but that it is not
clear whether this language means ± 18
degrees or ± 9 degrees from the driver’s
line of sight.
NHTSA grants reconsideration on this
issue and is amending the regulation to
provide clarity. The regulatory language
was intended to specify an elliptical
cone extending ±18 degrees vertically
and ±10 degrees horizontally from the
driver’s line of sight. Therefore, a plusminus sign will be added.
3. Clarify Whether the FCW Visual
Signal Needs To Be Fully Within the
Ellipse
Volkswagen stated that the
requirements were unclear as to
whether the entire FCW visual icon or
only a portion of it must be located
within the bounds of the elliptical cone.
Reconsideration is justified on this
issue. NHTSA intended the regulation
to require that the required FCW symbol
must be presented fully within the
defined elliptical area and is updating
the regulatory text to reflect this intent.
NHTSA is incorporating the word
‘‘symbol’’ after ‘‘visual signal’’ in the
S5.1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the symbol is
what must be located within the
specified area. If a manufacturer chooses
to provide any additional visual
warning components (e.g., illuminating
the perimeter of the instrument panel,
or surrounding the symbol with an
illuminated, color-shaded shape), the
additional components are not required
to be located within the specified
elliptical area.
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4. Reference to FMVSS No. 111
The Alliance and Volkswagen stated
that S5.1.1(b) of the final rule requires
the visual signal to be located in an
ellipse formed around the forwardlooking eye midpoint of the driver ‘‘as
described in S14.1.5 of FMVSS No. 111’’
but does not specify the driver seat
position and seat back angle or the
steering wheel adjustment like FMVSS
No. 111 does.
Reconsideration is justified on this
issue. Although explicitly stating these
details is not essential because to
accurately locate the driver eye
midpoint ‘‘test reference point’’ as
defined in FMVSS No. 111 S14.1.5 it is
necessary to follow the ‘‘Driver Seat
Positioning’’ specifications in S14.1.2.5,
NHTSA is changing the regulatory text
for clarity to refer to S14 of FMVSS No.
111 instead of only S14.1.5. This change
incorporates the relevant information
from FMVSS No. 111.
J. Cost Estimates
The Alliance argued that the agency
did not adequately consider the costs of
the requirements, including
consideration of the disbenefits that
might be induced by the new standard.
It requested that NHTSA revise its cost
assessment to consider more realistic
assessments of the hardware additions
and other changes that will be required
by the final rule, as well as identify and
quantify the disbenefits in terms of
increased rear-end collisions and other
crashes that will be induced by the final
rule, at least for several more years. In
its petition, the Alliance argued that the
conclusions in the FRIA are not based
on the rulemaking record or on the facts
in the market and led NHTSA to
substantially underestimate the costs of
compliance with the new standard.
Based on a survey of its members, the
Alliance stated that the additional costs
to make current systems compliant
range from $200 per vehicle on the low
end to $4,200 per vehicle on the high
end. The Alliance also claimed that
NHTSA mischaracterized a meeting
NHTSA had with Robert Bosch LLC
(Bosch) regarding the percentage of
vehicles in the fleet that may need
hardware improvements.
Volkswagen stated the cost analysis as
reported in the FRIA does not represent
the true cost of the final rule. For
example, Volkswagen argued, the
requirements of the final rule cannot be
reasonably met with existing vacuum
brake systems, and the PAEB
requirements under conditions of
darkness may necessitate infrared
cameras. It stated that NHTSA did not
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account for the costs for additional
hardware in its analysis.
Agency Analysis
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The Alliance and Volkswagen’s
claims that the final rule did not
adequately consider costs in
improvements in AEB technology are
mistaken. The Alliance’s cost estimates
are not correct estimates of the cost of
compliance with the final rule because
they include the cost of including headup display (HUD) and lidar, neither of
which are required to meet the
requirements and account for a large
portion of that higher estimate.
Additionally, the final rule fully
considered the cost concerns raised by
petitioners. NHTSA sought and received
comment regarding hardware costs.
Comments did not indicate the
incremental cost associated with
additional hardware commenters
believed was necessary to achieve the
requirements or the percentage of new
light vehicles that they believe would
require additional hardware.
Nevertheless, the cost analysis in the
FRIA accounted for a small number of
new light vehicles that may need
additional hardware for their existing
AEB systems, such as an additional
camera or radar, by including the
incremental cost of adding radar to five
percent of new light vehicles.68 The
Alliance disputed the 5 percent figure,
noting that the information NHTSA
received from Bosch suggests larger
improvements are needed, and NHTSA
received a letter from Bosch clarifying
the figure.69 NHTSA appreciates
Bosch’s clarification. However, even if
NHTSA accepts for the sake of argument
that the incremental cost estimate
undercounts that percentage of new
light vehicles that need additional
improvements in computing power or
sensing technologies, NHTSA’s analysis
fully considered these costs because the
FRIA also included a sensitivity
analysis.70 The sensitivity analysis
68 One possible result of this assumption is that
the cost analysis may in fact overestimate those
incremental hardware costs because some vehicle
manufacturers may add an additional camera at a
lower cost than radar.
69 Docket No. NHTSA–2023–0021–1077. The
letter states that the 5 percent figure ‘‘is a significant
misunderstanding and/or mischaracterization of the
information provided by Bosch’’ and that Bosch
was describing only a rough estimate of the share
of Bosch-supplied AEB systems in the U.S. market
that are mono-camera. Bosch also emphasized, both
in the presentation given to NHTSA and in its
comments on the NPRM, that certain models may
require significant hardware updates such as
improved sensors as well as computing power and/
or improved brake systems.
70 The sensitivity analysis in the FRIA for
hardware considered the case in which 10, 20, or
50 percent of new light vehicles would need either
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found that even in the case that 50
percent of new light vehicles would
need to add radar to their current
hardware and all new light vehicles
needed a software upgrade, the final
rule would remain highly net beneficial.
The FRIA also includes a breakeven
analysis that estimates the per-vehicle
cost at which net benefits would be
zero. Therefore, NHTSA’s cost and
benefits estimates for AEB system
hardware and software were sufficient
to support the final rule.
NHTSA’s analysis also considered
comments and the available data
regarding whether the final rule would
necessitate improvements in vehicles’
foundational braking system and found
that it would not. The agency found that
vehicles subject to the final rule would
already be equipped with brakes that
give them the braking capabilities to
meet the performance requirements
specified in the final rule.71 The FRIA
discussed a summary of the braking test
results from FMVSS No. 135 testing.72
In all cases, vehicles covered by the
final rule exceed the minimum
requirements of the braking standards.
The results further indicate that baseline
vehicles already have the braking
capabilities necessary to meet the
minimum requirements for AEB.
Additionally, NHTSA believes that the
most cost-effective way (lowest cost
option) for manufacturers to meet the
requirements of FMVSS No. 127 is
through tunning and calibration of the
AEB systems rather than through
increased braking capacity or additional
brake hardware such as electrohydraulic brake actuators. As NHTSA’s
analysis focuses on the lowest cost
option that is estimated to be capable of
meeting the final rule and the lowest
cost option does not necessitate
increased braking capacity, the costs
incurred by increasing the foundational
braking system were not considered.
That being said, the agency provides
flexibility in how manufacturers
construct their AEB systems to meet the
requirements and they may well choose
to include brakes with increased
capabilities. At any rate, the breakeven
and sensitivity analyses demonstrate
that even with significant per-vehicle
hardware costs beyond those estimated
in the FRIA, the final rule would remain
cost-beneficial.
Lastly, petitioners simultaneously
claim that the final rule is impracticable
an additional camera or radar to meet the
requirements.
71 FRIA at 40.
72 FRIA, Table 267. The Alliance’s stated
concerns with the relevance of this test data are
discussed in Section II.A.1.b ‘‘FMVSS No. 135 Test
Data’’ of this notice.
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but also that the requirements can only
be met if certain hardware
improvements are made. Given that the
final rule would be economically
practicable even with sizable increases
in compliance costs, these statements
are contradictory. Indeed, petitioners’
claims regarding cost support the notion
that the final rule is practicable by
acknowledging the availability of
technologies that can enable vehicles to
meet the requirements.
Therefore, no reconsideration is
necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petitions for reconsideration regarding
NHTSA’s cost estimates.
K. Brake Pedal Robot
The final rule specified how the brake
pedal force is applied during testing
conducted with manual brake
application. It left to the manufacturer
the discretion to select the braking
method that NHTSA will use when
NHTSA tests the manufacturer’s
vehicles.
Volkswagen requested
reconsideration of the decision not to
provide specifications for the brake
pedal robot used in the manual braking
tests. It stated that differences in test
equipment between the agency’s test
contractors and the vehicle
manufacturer could lead to
inconsistencies in performance.
NHTSA received comments on this
issue (including from Volkswagen) and
responded to them in the final rule.
NHTSA clarified that the rule does not
require use of a specified braking robot.
The final rule specifies the brake pedal
force application during testing, leaving
it to the manufacturer’s discretion to
select the braking method for NHTSA’s
testing of its vehicles. The specification
is sufficient to ensure test repeatability,
especially given manufacturers’ lengthy
experience with braking robots in AEB
testing. Since the petitioner did not
present any new information that would
warrant reconsidering the agency’s prior
conclusion, no reconsideration is
necessary, and we are denying the
petition for reconsideration regarding
the brake pedal robot specifications.
L. Manual Transmission
Glickenhaus petitioned NHTSA to
reconsider and amend the standard to
only require FCW (i.e., not AEB) for
vehicles with manual transmission.
Glickenhaus stated that substantial
slowing or stopping from highway
speeds in a vehicle with a manual
transmission will stall the vehicle
without manually shifting or engaging
the clutch. It stated that sudden
unnecessary braking caused by the final
rule will cause a vehicle with a manual
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transmission to stall, thereby reducing
the functionality of the brakes. A stalled
vehicle, Glickenhaus stated, can create
an unreasonable risk if the vehicle is on
the highway and cannot move out of the
way. Further, Glickenhaus stated that
NHTSA’s existing standards have a
precedent of differentiating
requirements and testing procedures for
manual transmissions from those for
automatic transmissions where the
technology requires. Glickenhaus
provided examples of those standards
and what it stated are the relevant
sections. Additionally, Glickenhaus
stated that one FMVSS testing facility it
works with confirmed that whenever it
runs AEB tests on any vehicle with an
automatic transmission,73 the vehicle
always stalls. Glickenhaus also stated
that its manual gearbox supplier
confirmed that will always be the case,
and that this stalling could damage the
drivetrain. Glickenhaus further stated
that NHTSA recognizes that vehicle
stalling, especially when unexpected at
highway speeds, is a ‘‘substantial’’
hazard. Glickenhaus also stated that
drivers using manual transmissions are
more likely to be paying closer attention
to the road than drivers of vehicles with
cruise control, or any level of ‘‘self
driving’’ vehicle functionality.
Glickenhaus’s petition stated that
requiring only FCW for manual
transmissions could increase safety by
warning drivers while allowing them to
place the vehicle into neutral or press
the clutch to avoid stalling while
braking.
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Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded that the
technical limitations of AEB with
manual transmission vehicles justifies
excluding them from the AEB
requirement. Our review of the fleet
shows that AEB technology already
exists for manual transmissions.
Therefore, no reconsideration is needed.
There are many light vehicles sold in
the US which still offer manual
transmission as an option or standard.74
Several vehicles equipped with manual
transmissions, such as the 2024 Honda
Civic Type R,75 2024 Ford Bronco 76 and
73 In its petition, Petitioner may have intended to
state ‘‘manual’’ instead of ‘‘automatic’’ here.
Regardless, our response to the petitioned-for
request is the same.
74 https://www.caranddriver.com/features/
g20734564/manual-transmission-cars/ (accessed
August 26, 2024); https://www.caranddriver.com/
features/g15379070/manual-transmission-suv/
(accessed August 26, 2024).
75 https://automobiles.honda.com/civic-type-r#
(accessed August 26, 2024).
76 https://www.ford.com/suvs/bronco/comparemodels/?gnav=footer-shop (accessed August 26,
2024).
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2024 Nissan Z,77 also come with AEB
and PAEB as a standard feature. Due to
the wide availability of technology from
various suppliers with AEB and manual
transmissions, NHTSA is not persuaded
that only manual application of the
clutch can prevent a stall.
NHTSA is also unpersuaded that
drivers of manual transmission vehicles
are more engaged such that excluding
them from the AEB requirement would
be justified. As noted in the final rule,
the timing of AEB and PAEB events do
not always allow sufficient time for the
driver to react and apply the brakes
when a FCW is presented, regardless of
the level of driver engagement.
Therefore, no reconsideration is
necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petition for reconsideration regarding
requiring only FCW for vehicles with a
manual transmission.
M. Small-Volume Manufacturers
The final rule did not alter
requirements for small-volume
manufacturers but allowed an
additional year for compliance for
small-volume manufacturers.
Glickenhaus, which produces around
30 vehicles annually subject to the final
rule, petitioned for reconsideration of
the requirements for small-volume
manufacturers, stating that the standard
would cause substantial financial
hardship. Glickenhaus stated it had
contacted Tier 1 suppliers about AEB
systems and was informed that the
hardware for these systems is typically
developed by larger manufacturers, and
there is not a baseline set of hardware
and software available for Glickenhaus
to develop an AEB system for its very
low volume vehicles. It noted that
developing AEB hardware takes years,
and the software calibration requires
millions of miles of driving.
Glickenhaus claims it cannot produce
enough cars and drive them long
enough to gather the necessary data to
create compliant hardware and software
for its very low volume vehicles.
Therefore, according to Glickenhaus,
unless Tier 1 suppliers develop starting
packages for small-volume
manufacturers, it would be impossible
to develop a rule compliant AEB system
within the lead time provided.
Glickenhaus further emphasized the
challenges of software development,
vehicle testing, and calibration miles,
which it considers nearly impossible to
achieve within the given timeframe,
even with an additional year. It argued
out that some manufacturers have spent
77 https://www.nissanusa.com/vehicles/sportscars/nissan-z/specs-trims.html, accessed August 26,
2024.
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over 20 years developing and testing
AEB systems, and that the costs of
developing software and hardware for a
driving automation system, including
AEB functions, can exceed $ 10 billion
annually—figures that the petitioner
cannot manage.
Agency Analysis
The agency initially proposed that the
requirements would not apply to smallvolume manufacturers until one year
after the compliance date set for other
manufacturers. NHTSA received more
than 1,000 comments on the NPRM,
including input from sensor developers
that indicated that the technologies
required to meet the standard are
already available.78 In the final rule, the
agency provided additional lead time
for all manufacturers and continued to
provide small-volume manufacturers an
additional year beyond other
manufacturers. Given the comments we
received and the availability of these
systems, we expect that small-volume
manufacturers will be able to source
rule-compliant AEB systems for their
vehicles from existing technologies
without incurring undue expenses in
research and development.79
However, we acknowledge that there
could be specific situations in which it
may be particularly challenging for
small-volume manufacturers to source
systems. Without additional technical
information regarding why Tier 1
suppliers could not provide AEB
systems to the petitioner, we cannot
provide further analysis regarding their
circumstances. However, if the
petitioner believes that the standard will
cause substantial financial hardship and
it has attempted to comply with the
standard in good faith, it may be able to
seek a temporary exemption pursuant to
49 U.S.C. 30113 and 49 CFR part 555,
subject to a determination that an
exemption is consistent with the public
interest.
Therefore, no reconsideration is
necessary. NHTSA is denying
Glickenhaus’s petition for
reconsideration of the requirements for
small-volume manufacturers.
III. Petition for Rulemaking Received
by NHTSA and Analysis
A. Include V2X
In addition to the petitions for
reconsideration discussed above,
NHTSA also received a petition from
Autotalks on June 26, 2024. Pursuant to
49 CFR 553.35, petitions for
reconsideration must be received ‘‘not
later than 45 days after publication of
78 89
79 Id.
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at 39726–27, 39729, 39737.
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the rule in the Federal Register.’’
Additionally, the regulation states that
‘‘[p]etitions filed after that time will be
considered as petitions filed under Part
552 of this chapter.’’ 80 Part 552 governs
petitions for rulemaking. Although
Autotalks’s petition requested revision
of the final rule, given that Autotalks’s
petition was received by NHTSA more
than 45 days after publication of the
final rule, NHTSA will treat that
petition as a petition for rulemaking.
Pursuant to Part 552, when deciding
on a petition for rulemaking the agency
conducts a technical review of the
petition, which may consist of an
analysis of the material submitted,
together with information already in
possession of the agency. In deciding
whether to grant or deny a petition, the
agency considers this technical review
as well as appropriate factors, which
include, among others, allocation of
agency resources and agency priorities.
In its petition, Autotalks requests
incorporating a V2X transmitter to the
lead vehicle and activating it during the
lead deceleration test with a 12-meter
gap (Table 1 to S7.1). Autotalks argues
that this requirement will allow the
tested vehicle to use V2X to
complement its sensors. Autotalks
provides technical information
regarding the capabilities and
availability of V2X technology.
1. NHTSA’s Consideration of the
Petition and Decision
NHTSA has conducted an analysis of
Autotalks’s petition and, after careful
consideration, has decided to deny the
petition and will not initiate rulemaking
proposing to require the installation and
use of a V2X transmitter in lead vehicle
deceleration AEB testing with 12-meter
headway, for the reason stated below.
In November 2023, NHTSA withdrew
a proposed rule which had proposed to
establish a new FMVSS mandating V2V
(vehicle-to-vehicle) communication
technology in all new light vehicles.81
After reviewing comments on the
NPRM, NHTSA determined that,
although V2V and V2X technologies
may improve safety and offer innovative
services to consumers, significant
analysis would be needed before
determining whether a new V2V
standard is appropriate, and, if so, what
that standard would encompass.
NHTSA’s position has not changed
since then and Autotalks has not
provided information to change that
position. Therefore, NHTSA will not
initiate a rulemaking to require V2X
technologies in AEB systems as a result
80 49
81 88
CFR 553.35(a).
FR 80685.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:25 Nov 25, 2024
Jkt 265001
of this petition. As we stated in the
November 2023 withdrawal notice,
NHTSA will continue to monitor the
development of this technology for
possible future vehicle safety
applications.
2. Conclusion
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 30162
and 49 CFR part 552, the petition for
rulemaking from Autotalks is denied.
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
This rule is a non-significant rule for
purposes of Executive Order (E.O.)
12886, as supplemented by E.O. 13563
and amended by E.O. 14094, and will
not impose any significant costs or have
impacts beyond those analyzed in the
final rule published on May 9, 2024.82
DOT has determined that the regulatory
analyses conducted for the May 9, 2024
final rule remain applicable to this
action. DOT makes these statements on
the basis that this final rule makes
technical or clarifying changes to
FMVSS No. 127 as established in the
May 9, 2024 final rule. In addition, this
final rule is not expected to impact the
estimated costs and benefits detailed in
the final regulatory impact analysis
included in the docket listed in
beginning of the final rule published on
May 9, 2024.
NHTSA finds it has good cause to
make these changes without notice and
comment pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5
U.S.C. 551, et seq.). Section 553(b)(B) of
the APA provides that, when an agency
for good cause finds that notice and
public procedure are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest, the agency may issue a rule
without providing notice and an
opportunity for public comment. The
May 2024 final rule is the product of an
extensive administrative record with
opportunity for public comment on the
issues discussed in this final rule. The
changes in this final rule are made in
response to petitions for reconsideration
submitted to NHTSA in response to and
docketed in the record of the May 2024
final rule in accordance with 49 CFR
553.35 and 49 CFR 553.37.83 In
response to those petitions, NHTSA
makes only clarifying changes to the
May 2024 final rule to align the
regulatory text with the explanatory
82 89
FR 39686.
regulations grant to the Administrator
the authority, consistent with 5 U.S.C. 553b(B), to
issue a final decision in response to petitions for
reconsideration without further proceedings or with
opportunity for further comment as the
Administrator deems appropriate.
83 These
PO 00000
Frm 00073
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
93219
material in the preamble of that final
rule.
Specifically, NHTSA removes the
term ‘‘imminent’’ from the performance
test requirement. This change resolves a
point of confusion expressed by
petitioners and aligns the regulatory text
with the intent of the May 2024 rule as
expressed in the preamble by clarifying
that the performance test does not
evaluate AEB activation timing. NHTSA
also amends a test scenario in FMVSS
No. 127 highlighted by petitioners that,
when tested with very narrow vehicles
at the extreme of the tolerances allowed
by the test condition, resulted in a
stringency beyond that intended by
NHTSA. NHTSA makes that
amendment to ensure the correct level
of stringency. Petitioners also requested
clarification of the specifications in
FMVSS No. 127 for the FCW visual
signal location. NHTSA amends the
regulatory text to clarify these
specifications. Petitioners also
expressed concerns about the clarity
and objectivity of the requirements and
test conditions in FMVSS No. 127 for
the FCW audio signal. NHTSA clarifies
these requirements by stating the
location of the microphone and
additional vehicle conditions under
which testing will occur, as well as
amending the definitions to simplify the
requirement for suppression.
Given the above, NHTSA finds that
additional comment on the changes
herein made in response to petitions for
reconsideration of the May 2024 final
rule is unnecessary.
Congressional Review Act
The Congressional Review Act, 5
U.S.C. 801 et. seq., as added by the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides
that before a rule may take effect, the
agency promulgating the rule must
submit a rule report, which includes a
copy of the rule, to each House of the
Congress and to the Comptroller General
of the United States. NHTSA will
submit a report containing this rule and
other required information to the U.S.
Senate, the U.S. House of
Representatives, and the Comptroller
General of the United States prior to
publication of the rule in the Federal
Register. This rule does not meet the
criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be
considered a major rule.
V. Regulatory Text
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571
Motor vehicles, Motor vehicle safety,
Rubber and rubber products.
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 26, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
In consideration of the foregoing,
NHTSA is amending 49 CFR part 571 as
set forth below.
PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR
VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
1. The authority citation for part 571
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30117 and 30166; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.95.
2. Section 571.127 is amended by:
a. Removing the definition of ‘‘masked
threshold’’ from S4;
■ b. Revising S5.1.1(a)(3) and (4),
S5.1.1(b)(2), S5.1.3. and S8.3.3(g).
The revisions read as follows:
■
■
§ 571.127 Standard No. 127; Automatic
emergency braking systems for light
vehicles.
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with RULES1
*
*
*
*
*
S5.1.1. * * *
(a) * * *
(3) The auditory signal as measured
adjacent to a 50th percentile male
driver’s right ear (tragion) must have an
intensity of 15–30 dB above the average
noise level inside the vehicle when
measured over a 5-second period under
the range of test conditions specified in
S6, at 100 km/h, with all vehicle
openings closed, and all subject vehicle
audio and sound-producing systems or
functions that are not necessary for
performing tests pursuant to the
conditions in S6 and the procedures in
S7, S8, S9 of this standard set to off.
(4) In-vehicle audio that is not related
to a crash avoidance system warning
must be muted, or reduced in volume
during presentation of the FCW auditory
signal to within 5 dB of the average
noise level inside the vehicle (as
measured in S5.1.1(a)(3)), for the
duration of the first between-pulse
period of the FCW auditory signal under
the range of test conditions specified in
S6, at 100 km/h, with all vehicle
openings closed, and all subject vehicle
audio and sound-producing systems or
functions that are not necessary for
performing tests pursuant to the
conditions in S6 and the procedures in
S7, S8, S9 of this standard set to off.
(b) * * *
(1) The visual signal symbol must be
located within an ellipse that extends
±18 degrees vertically and ±10 degrees
horizontally of the driver forward line of
sight based on the forward-looking eye
midpoint (Mf) as described in S14 of 49
CFR 571.111.
*
*
*
*
*
S5.1.3. Performance test requirements.
The vehicle must provide a forward
collision warning and subsequently
apply the service brakes automatically
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:25 Nov 25, 2024
Jkt 265001
such that the subject vehicle does not
collide with the lead vehicle when
tested using the procedures in S7 under
the conditions specified in S6. The
forward collision warning is not
required if adaptive cruise control is
engaged.
*
*
*
*
*
S8.3.3. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
(g) Two vehicle test devices are
secured in stationary positions parallel
to the intended travel path. The two
vehicle test devices face the same
direction as the intended travel path.
One vehicle test device is directly
behind the other separated by 1.0 ± 0.1
m. The frontmost plane of the vehicle
test device furthermost from the subject
vehicle is located 1.0 ± 0.1 m from the
parallel contact plane (to the subject
vehicle’s frontmost plane) on the
pedestrian test mannequin. The left side
of each vehicle test device is no less
than 2.2 m to the right of the vertical
plane through the intended travel path.
The left side of each vehicle test device
is no less than 1.15 m to the right of the
vertical plane parallel to the plane
through the intended travel path tangent
to the 0 percent overlap point.
*
*
*
*
*
Issued in Washington, DC, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.95 and 49 CFR Part
501.
Jack Danielson,
Executive Director.
[FR Doc. 2024–27349 Filed 11–25–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
50 CFR Part 622
[Docket No. 211217–0261; RTID 0648–
XE473]
Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of
Mexico; 2024 Commercial and
Recreational Accountability Measure
and Closures for Gulf of Mexico Lane
Snapper
National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Commerce.
ACTION: Temporary rule; closure.
AGENCY:
NMFS implements an
accountability measure (AM) for the
lane snapper commercial and
recreational sectors in the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) of the Gulf of
Mexico (Gulf) for the 2024 fishing year
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00074
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
through this temporary rule. NMFS
projects that the 2024 stock annual
catch limit (ACL) for Gulf lane snapper
has been reached. Therefore, NMFS
closes the commercial and recreational
sectors for Gulf lane snapper on
November 26, 2024, and they will
remain closed through December 31,
2024. These closures are necessary to
protect the Gulf lane snapper resource.
DATES: This temporary rule is effective
from 12:01 a.m., local time, on
November 26, 2024, through December
31, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Frank Helies, NMFS Southeast Regional
Office, 727–824–5305, Frank.Helies@
noaa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NMFS
manages the Gulf reef fish fishery,
which includes lane snapper, under the
Fishery Management Plan for the Reef
Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico
(FMP). The FMP was prepared by the
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council (Council), approved by the
Secretary of Commerce, and is
implemented by NMFS under the
authority of the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) through
regulations at 50 CFR part 622. All lane
snapper weights discussed in this
temporary rule are in round weight.
The current stock ACL for Gulf lane
snapper was implemented on October
18, 2024, and is 1,088,873 lb (493,904
kg) (50 CFR 622.41(k)) (89 FR 76438,
September 18, 2024). As specified in 50
CFR 622.41(k), if the sum of the
commercial and recreational landings
reaches or is projected to reach the stock
ACL, NMFS will close the commercial
and recreational sectors for the
remainder of the fishing year. Based on
latest landings estimates, which were
available in October 2024, NMFS has
determined that the stock ACL for Gulf
lane snapper has been reached.
Accordingly, this temporary rule closes
the commercial and recreational sectors
for Gulf lane snapper effective at 12:01
a.m., local time, on November 26, 2024,
and both sectors will remain closed
through the end of the current fishing
year on December 31, 2024.
During the commercial and
recreational closures, all harvest or
possession in or from the Gulf EEZ of
lane snapper is prohibited. The
prohibition on possession of Gulf lane
snapper also applies in Gulf state waters
for a vessel issued a valid Federal
charter vessel/headboat permit for Gulf
reef fish. During the closures, the
operator of a vessel with a valid
commercial vessel permit for Gulf reef
fish having lane snapper on board must
E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 228 (Tuesday, November 26, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 93199-93220]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-27349]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 571
[Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021]
RIN 2127-AM37
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Automatic Emergency
Braking Systems for Light Vehicles
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions for reconsideration.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This document grants parts of petitions for reconsideration of
a May 9, 2024, final rule that adopted Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 127, ``Automatic Emergency Braking for Light
Vehicles,'' which requires automatic emergency braking (AEB),
pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB), and forward collision
warning (FCW) systems on all new light vehicles. This final rule
clarifies requirements applicable to FCW visual signals and audio
signals, corrects an error in the test scenario for obstructed
pedestrian crossing the road, and removes superfluous language from the
performance test requirement for lead vehicle AEB. This notice denies
other requests in the petitions. This document also denies a petition
for reconsideration, which is treated as a petition for rulemaking
because it was received more than 45 days after publication of the
rule.
DATES:
Effective: January 27, 2025.
Compliance date: Compliance with FMVSS No. 127 and related
regulations, as amended in this rule, is required for all vehicles by
September 1, 2029. However, vehicles produced by small-volume
manufacturers, final-stage manufacturers, and alterers must be equipped
with a compliant AEB system by September 1, 2030.
Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions for reconsideration of
this final action must be received not later than January 10, 2025.
ADDRESSES: Correspondence related to this rule, including petitions for
[[Page 93200]]
reconsideration and comments, should refer to the docket number set
forth above (NHTSA-2023-0021) and be submitted to the Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE, Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues: Mr. Markus
Price, Office of Crash Avoidance Standards, Telephone: (202) 366-1810,
Facsimile: (202) 366-7002. For legal issues: Mr. Eli Wachtel, Office of
the Chief Counsel, Telephone: (202) 366-2992, Facsimile: (202) 366-
3820. The mailing address for these officials is: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington,
DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background and Executive Summary
II. Petitions for Reconsideration Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. No Contact
B. Multiple Trials
C. Equipment Requirement
D. Unlimited Preconditioning and Test Runs
E. Malfunction Indicator Lamp
F. Deactivation
G. Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test Correction
H. FCW Auditory Signal
I. FCW Visual Signal
J. Cost Estimates
K. Brake Pedal Robot
L. Manual Transmission
M. Small-Volume Manufacturers
III. Petition for Rulemaking Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. Include V2X
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
V. Regulatory Text
I. Background and Executive Summary
In November 2021, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), enacted
as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Pub. L. 117-58), was
signed into law. BIL directed the Secretary of Transportation to
promulgate a rule to establish minimum performance standards with
respect to crash avoidance technology and to require that all passenger
motor vehicles manufactured for sale in the United States be equipped
with forward collision warning (FCW) and automatic emergency braking
(AEB) systems that alert the driver if a collision is imminent and
automatically apply the brakes if the driver fails to do so.
In accordance with BIL, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) (88 FR 38632) in June 2023, followed by a final rule
(89 FR 39686) in May 2024, establishing FMVSS No. 127, ``Automatic
Emergency Braking Systems for Light Vehicles.'' This FMVSS requires
AEB, including pedestrian AEB (PAEB), systems on light vehicles. In
addition to the mandate in BIL, the final rule was also issued under
the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 (Safety Act). Under 49 U.S.C. chapter 301, the Secretary of
Transportation is responsible for prescribing motor vehicle safety
standards that are practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety,
and are stated in objective terms. The responsibility for promulgation
of FMVSSs is delegated to NHTSA.
The final rule includes four requirements for AEB systems for both
lead vehicles and pedestrians. First, there is an equipment requirement
that vehicles have an FCW system that provides an auditory and visual
signal to the driver of an impending collision with a lead vehicle or a
pedestrian. The system must operate at any forward speed greater than
10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) for a warning
involving a lead vehicle, at any forward speed greater than 10 km/h
(6.2 mph) and less than 73 km/h (45.3 mph) for a warning involving a
pedestrian. Similarly, the final rule includes an equipment requirement
that light vehicles have an AEB system that applies the brakes
automatically when a collision with a lead vehicle or pedestrian is
imminent. The system must operate at any forward speed that is greater
than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) for AEB
involving a lead vehicle, and at any forward speed greater than 10 km/h
(6.2 mph) and less than 73 km/h (45.3 mph) for PAEB.
Second, the AEB system is required to prevent the vehicle from
colliding with the lead vehicle or pedestrian test devices when tested
according to the standard's test procedures. These track test
procedures have defined parameters, including travel speeds up to 100
km/h (62.2 mph), that ensure that AEB systems prevent crashes in a
controlled testing environment.
Third, the final rule includes two false activation tests.
Finally, the final rule requires that a vehicle must detect AEB
system malfunctions, including performance degradation caused solely by
sensor obstructions, and notify the driver of any malfunction that
causes the AEB system not to meet the minimum proposed performance
requirements. If the system detects a malfunction, or if the system
adjusts its performance such that it will not meet the requirements of
the finalized standard, the system must provide the vehicle operator
with a telltale notification.
The final rule applies to vehicles manufactured on or after
September 1, 2029. An additional year is provided for small-volume
manufacturers.
Petitions for Reconsideration Received
NHTSA regulations allow any interested person to petition the
Administrator for reconsideration of a rule. Under NHTSA's regulations,
petitions for reconsideration must provide an explanation why
compliance with the rule is not practicable, is unreasonable, or is not
in the public interest. Additionally, petitions must be received within
45 days of the publication of the final rule. Untimely petitions for
reconsideration are considered to be petitions for rulemaking. The
Administrator may consolidate petitions relating to the same rule.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 49 CFR 553.35, 553.37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA received petitions for reconsideration from the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation (the Alliance),\2\ Toyota Motor North America
(Toyota),\3\ Volkswagen Group of America (Volkswagen),\4\ and Scuderia
Cameron Glickenhaus, LLC (Glickenhaus).\5\ NHTSA also received a letter
from Hyundai Motor Group (Hyundai), styled as a ``supplemental
comment,'' that provides its perspective on FMVSS No. 127, which we
have considered in this response to the petitions for
reconsideration.\6\ NHTSA also received a petition from Autotalks that
NHTSA is treating as a petition for rulemaking because it was received
more than 45 days after publication of the final rule.\7\ The petitions
requested a variety of amendments to FMVSS No. 127. These, and NHTSA's
reasoning and response to each petitioned-for item, are summarized
below and discussed in detail in the respective sections of the
preamble of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-
0021-1071.
\3\ Toyota Motor North America, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1074.
\4\ Volkswagen Group of America, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-
1073.
\5\ Scuderia Cameron Glickenhaus, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-
1078.
\6\ Hyundai Motor Group, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1072.
\7\ Autotalks, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1075.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of Responses to the Petitions for Reconsideration
In response to these petitions, NHTSA is granting in part and
denying in part. The changes made to FMVSS No. 127 are summarized as
follows.
[[Page 93201]]
FMVSS No. 127 contains an equipment requirement that AEB
systems activate the service brakes when a collision is imminent and
that they operate under certain conditions. It also contains a
performance test requirement for lead vehicle AEB that contains similar
language. Petitioners requested definitions for the terms ``operate''
and ``imminent.'' NHTSA is amending the language in the performance
test requirement to remove refence to ``imminent'' from the performance
test requirement for lead vehicle AEB, to clarify that the performance
test does not evaluate AEB activation timing. NHTSA is not providing a
definition for ``operate'' because the definition of ``automatic
emergency braking system'' in the final rule sufficiently describes how
an AEB system operates. NHTSA is not providing a definition for
``imminent'' because the term is used consistent with its plain
meaning.
FMVSS No. 127 contains a test scenario that, when tested
with very narrow vehicles at the extreme of the tolerances allowed by
the test condition, resulted in a stringency beyond that intended by
NHTSA. This final rule amends the test scenario to ensure the correct
level of stringency.
FMVSS No. 127 contains specifications for the FCW visual
signal location. Petitioners requested additional clarity. This final
rule amends the regulatory text to clarify these specifications.
FMVSS No. 127 contains requirements for the FCW audio
signal, including that in-vehicle audio must be suppressed when the FCW
auditory signal is presented. Petitioners expressed several concerns
about the clarity and objectivity of these requirements as well as test
conditions. This final rule clarifies these requirements by stating the
location of the microphone, additional vehicle conditions under which
testing will occur, and amending the definitions to simplify the
requirement for suppression.
This rule also denies the petitions with regards to several other
requested amendments. These are as follows. For the items for which
petitioners restate arguments made during the comment period for FMVSS
No. 127, the reasons given for denial are the same as those stated in
the final rule.
The performance requirement for both lead vehicle and
pedestrian AEB testing is collision avoidance (referred to throughout
the final rule and this document as ``no contact''). Petitioners
requested relaxation of this requirement to allow contact at low
speeds, specifically requesting 10 km/h (6.2 mph). NHTSA is rejecting
this request because the no contact requirement is practicable and
meets the need for safety.
Petitioners requested that multiple test runs be allowed
to achieve the no contact performance requirement (for example, that
vehicles must pass on 5 out of 7 test runs) to account for variability.
Petitioners noted that FMVSS No. 135, which regulates light vehicle
brake systems, allows multiple test runs to meet some of the
performance requirements. NHTSA is rejecting this request because FMVSS
No. 127 testing is distinct from FMVSS No. 135 testing such that not
allowing multiple test runs in FMVSS No. 127 is practicable and meets
the need for safety.
FMVSS No. 127 test scenarios state that the vehicle can be
driven for any amount of time. Additionally, it does not place a cap on
the number of tests that could be run on any given subject vehicle.
Petitioners expressed concern that this standard would allow excessive
driving or testing of vehicles to wear out components such that they
can no longer meet the performance required by the standard. NHTSA
finds further specification is unnecessary because the test does not
evaluate the endurance or durability of wear parts and will not be used
in such a manner.
FMVSS No. 127 requires that vehicles illuminate a
malfunction identification lamp (MIL) upon detection of a malfunction
or if the AEB system adjusts its performance such that it is below the
performance required by the standard. Petitioners requested additional
specificity regarding the terminology in this requirement as well as a
test procedure. NHTSA is rejecting this request because the requirement
meets the Safety Act as written.
FMVSS No. 127 does not permit installation of a manual
control with the sole purpose of deactivating the AEB system. It does
contain a provision allowing automatic deactivation in certain
situations. Petitioners requested permission to install a manual
deactivation control, as well as modifications to the automatic
deactivation provision. NHTSA is rejecting this request because the
final rule already addresses petitioners' concerns.
Petitioners stated that NHTSA did not fully consider costs
associated with compliance. No change is needed in response to this
request because the final rule fully considered the costs associated
with compliance.
Volkswagen requested additional specifications for the
brake pedal robot used in testing with manual brake application. NHTSA
is rejecting this request for the reasons stated in the May 9, 2024
final rule.
Petitioner Glickenhaus requested the AEB requirements not
be applicable to vehicles with manual transmission. NHTSA is rejecting
this request because vehicles equipped with manual transmissions and
AEB are widely available.
Petitioner Glickenhaus requested additional flexibility
for very small volume manufacturers. NHTSA is rejecting this request
because AEB systems are available for purchase and, in the case that a
manufacturer is unable to acquire systems, the exemption processes in
the Safety Act may provide relief.
II. Petitions for Reconsideration Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. No Contact
The final rule requires that, when tested according to the
procedures therein, the subject vehicle not collide with the test
device (vehicle test device or pedestrian mannequin). The test data,
discussed at length in the final rule, demonstrates that this
requirement is practicable. A tested vehicle was able to meet the
performance requirements in the final rule and recent NHTSA testing
revealed significant improvement throughout much of the fleet in a
relatively short time. These facts show that compliance by 2029 is
practicable.
In the final rule we also emphasized that practicability must be
viewed from the perspective that under the Safety Act, NHTSA has the
authority to issue standards that are technology-forcing.\8\ That is,
NHTSA is empowered under the Safety Act to issue safety standards that
``impel automobile manufacturers to develop and apply new technology to
the task of improving the safety design of automobiles as readily as
possible'' such that they ``require improvements in existing technology
or which require the development of new technology, and is not limited
to issuing standards based solely on devices already fully developed.''
\9\ NHTSA acknowledged that the final rule is technology-forcing, but
emphasized that the standard is practicable and no single current
vehicle must meet every requirement for an FMVSS to be considered
practicable under the Safety Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir.
1972) (Chrysler).
\9\ Id. at 671, 673.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petitioners requested reconsideration on two broad grounds: first
that the no-contact requirement is not practicable,
[[Page 93202]]
and second that it does not meet the need for safety.
1. Practicability and Test Data
a. PAEB and AEB Test Data
The Alliance stated that NHTSA has not demonstrated that the no
contact requirement is practicable for the fleet. Other than the
simulation data for the obstructed pedestrian crossing road scenario,
the Alliance did not present any new data or analysis regarding the
practicability of requiring collision avoidance in AEB compliance
testing that the agency had not previously considered.\10\ The Alliance
noted that the final rule states that NHTSA agrees with the IIHS's
comment to the NPRM that some current AEB systems are already
completely avoiding collisions under the proposed AEB testing. The
Alliance added, however, that IIHS did not test any vehicles at speeds
faster than 70 km/h (43.5 mph), and only three out of the six tested
vehicles could avoid the lead vehicle target in all of the test runs.
It also stated that NHTSA conceded that no vehicle in its 2020 AEB
research was able to meet all the performance requirements of the final
rule for lead vehicle and PAEB systems. It also pointed out that for
lead vehicle AEB systems, NHTSA's MY 2023 research showed that only one
vehicle could avoid contact in each test speed and scenario, but even
that vehicle did not avoid contact on every test run at the most
stringent condition. The Alliance argued that a single vehicle's
ability to meet the required tests some of the time does not support
NHTSA's conclusion that the no-contact requirement is practicable. The
Alliance also stated that the vehicles used in NHTSA's 2023 testing
don't support the final rule because those vehicles were designed only
to meet the performance levels stated in the 2016 voluntary
commitment.\11\
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\10\ The obstructed pedestrian crossing road scenario is
discussed in detail in Section II.G, ``Obstructed Pedestrian
Crossing Test Correction,'' of this notice.
\11\ In March 2016, NHTSA and the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety (IIHS) announced a commitment by 20 manufacturers
representing more than 99 percent of the U.S. light vehicle market
to include low-speed AEB as a standard feature on nearly all new
light vehicles not later than September 1, 2022. As part of this
voluntary commitment, manufacturers are including both FCW and a
crash imminent braking (CIB) system that reduces a vehicle's speed
in certain rear-end crash-imminent test conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Alliance stated the agency's analysis of test data demonstrate
variation in performance that was not accounted for in the final rule.
The Alliance stated that the final rule did not consider whether
variability between vehicles or testing locations would make compliance
more challenging by dictating the design margin that manufacturers need
to meet to comply with the requirement. The Alliance reasoned that
NHTSA's evaluation (in the FRIA) of the variability in time-to-
collision (TTC) at brake activation demonstrates that this variability
is meaningful and demonstrates variation in performance. The Alliance
noted that NHTSA research that was conducted with three vehicles at the
speed range from 16 km/h (9.9 mph) to 40 km/h (24.9 mph) showed a
variation of at least 0.15 seconds in TTC at brake activation.
Agency Analysis
The test data demonstrates that the rule is practicable. In its
petition, the Alliance acknowledged that NHTSA had considered all
available information and test results from the agency's research and
studies conducted by stakeholders such as IIHS. It also acknowledged
that a tested vehicle was able to meet the performance requirements,
despite not being designed to meet the requirements of the final rule.
Additionally, the vehicle that was able to meet the requirements had a
sales price below the market average, indicating that the requirements
could be met without expensive new technologies.
NHTSA's recent testing also marked significant progress compared to
its earlier research from 2020. The positive trend in AEB technology
was further supported by IIHS, which highlighted substantial
improvements between the 2023 and 2024 model years in the stationary
lead vehicle test at 70 km/h (43.5 mph).\12\ Notably, the percentage of
vehicles avoiding the target in all test runs increased from 10 percent
to 56 percent. These data all show that meeting the requirements of
this rule by September 2029 is practicable.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ NHTSA-2023-0021-1076.
\13\ Additionally, in the final rule we emphasized several other
reasons that inform the practicability of selecting a no contact
requirement over a requirement that allows contacts, such as testing
repeatability and costs associated with replacing or repairing test
vehicles and test devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the Alliance's framing of vehicle and test location
variability and our FRIA estimates is unconvincing. Variability between
vehicles in the same model line and year (vehicle-to-vehicle
variability) is determined by the manufacturer, subject to the
requirement that every vehicle it sells meet the minimum safety
performance. NHTSA has no reason to believe that the vehicles we tested
had superior performance to other vehicles in the same model line and
year. Also, vehicle-to-vehicle variability is a consideration for all
FMVSS, and the Alliance provided no information to indicate that there
is an issue unique to AEB. Additionally, variation in brake activation
timing between manufacturers is contemplated by the structure of the
rule. The final rule does not dictate brake activation timing, brake
force, or any other aspects of AEB performance other than that the
subject vehicle not make contact with the test device.
Regarding variability across test locations, FMVSS No. 127
specifies all the needed conditions to inform manufacturers of how we
will test. These conditions were proposed in the NPRM, and commenters
did not raise conditions that were not included that would affect test
outcomes. Finally, the variability analysis in the FRIA is our attempt
to connect the idealized test conditions to the real world when
conducting benefits analyses. NHTSA understands that in the real world
there will be variability that cannot be tested in an efficient way
through an FMVSS, which informs our benefits calculations. However,
such analysis should not be used to determine the types of results
achievable in an idealized testing environment. For these reasons,
NHTSA will not grant reconsideration.
b. FMVSS No. 135 Test Data
The Alliance stated that the final rule improperly relied on the
agency's evaluation of FMVSS No. 135 test results, which showed that
braking performance of nearly all tested vehicles was much better than
what the FMVSS requires. The Alliance stated that the evaluation
reflects that manufacturers build compliance margins into their design
for FMVSS compliance and does not support the agency's conclusion that
the no-contact requirement is practicable. Furthermore, the Alliance
stated that test results from FMVSS No. 135 testing are not comparable
to AEB performance because the final rule requires performance from
both the service brakes and a perception system, whereas FMVSS No. 135
evaluates only service brake performance. Also, the Alliance stated
that the maneuvers in FMVSS No. 135 tests are conducted with a human
driver putting muscular effort into the brake pedal. In contrast, there
is no human input when testing the AEB system.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA's use of FMVSS No. 135 test results was justified. As an
initial matter, those results were not the primary results upon which
the agency
[[Page 93203]]
determined that the requirements are practicable. They were used
largely to show that the braking performance needed to meet the
requirements in the final rule is present in the current fleet without
the need for changes, especially with regard to heavier vehicles for
which there were limitations on available test data. The results
indicated that the brake performance of most vehicles surpasses the
performance requirements set by FMVSS No. 135. While the results of
these tests might not show exactly how the braking systems will perform
under automatic actuation that does not involve human muscular inputs,
they do demonstrate that braking performance is more than sufficient to
permit compliance with the final rule. Indeed, we do not need to rely
on FMVSS No. 135 test data to demonstrate actuation performance because
AEB systems currently on the road and tested by NHTSA actuate the
service brakes without human driver inputs and demonstrate the
performance needed to meet FMVSS No. 127. Therefore, we disagree with
the Alliance's contention that the final rule misused the FMVSS No. 135
test results.
c. Test Speeds and Headway
Toyota, Volkswagen, and the Alliance expressed concern regarding
the practicability of high maximum test speeds and no contact. The
Alliance stated that NHTSA's data illustrate the difficulties in
complying with the decelerating lead vehicle test with both the lead
and subject vehicles traveling at 50 mph (80 km/h) at any headway
between 12 and 40 meters (S7.5.1(a), S7.5.2(b)(2), S7.5.3(a) and
S7.5.3(d) of the final rule). To address this issue, the Alliance
petitioned NHTSA to consider reducing the maximum test speed for the
AEB and PAEB requirements and adjust the headway requirements. The
Alliance claimed that the 2023 additional AEB research in the final
rule evaluated only the test condition with a 12-meter headway and did
not provide any test data to support the lead vehicle decelerating test
with headways greater than 12 meters.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not reducing the maximum test speeds or adjusting the
headway requirements for the test scenarios. Petitioners' requests for
test speed reduction were addressed in the final rule, and headways
above 12 meters are practicable.
Regarding test speeds, NHTSA's 2023 research showed multiple
vehicles avoided contact on most tests regardless of scenario and test
speed.\14\ Further, one vehicle avoided contact on all lead vehicle AEB
and PAEB tests except on three of the five lead vehicle decelerating
tests, where it impacted the lead vehicle at approximately 5 km/h or
less. \15\ That vehicles not designed to meet the standard are already
capable of doing so demonstrates that the performance test requirements
are practicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ NHTSA's 2023 Light Vehicle Automatic Emergency Braking
Research Test Summary, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1066; NHTSA's 2023
Light Vehicle Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking Research Test
Summary, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1068.
\15\ The low impact speeds on the system that did not avoid
contact on all trials suggests that slight tuning of that AEB to the
requirements of FMVSS No. 127 is needed to meet the standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding headway for the lead vehicle decelerating test, the
headway ranges selected are consistent with those used by Euro NCAP and
NHTSA incorporated the test ranges for speed and headways to ensure AEB
system robustness under a range of situations. NHTSA tested 2022 model
year vehicles with headways of 40 m with and without manual brake
application at 50 km/h and 80 km/h, and with a lead vehicle
deceleration of 0.4 g and 0.5 g.\16\ During that testing, multiple
vehicles avoided contact in almost all lead vehicle decelerating test
scenarios and one vehicle avoided contact in all scenarios.
Additionally, the shorter headway tests are generally more stringent
than tests with larger headways. In our 2023 testing, one vehicle
tested by NHTSA avoided contact in the 80 km/h lead vehicle
deceleration test in all trials with a 12 m headway, and another
vehicle avoided contact on 2 out of 5 runs,\17\ suggesting that
avoiding contact under less stringent test conditions is practicable.
Based on our test data, the requirements are practicable and will not
be adjusted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ NHTSA's 2022 Light Vehicle Automatic Emergency Braking
Research Test Summary, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-0005.
\17\ NHTSA's 2023 Light Vehicle Automatic Emergency Braking
Research Test Summary, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1066.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Meet the Need for Safety
Petitioners requested reconsideration of the no contact
requirement, stating that it could lead to unintended consequences such
as increased false positives and a rise in rear-end collisions. A false
positive describes AEB system brake applications in circumstances where
there is no crash-imminent situation, such as braking in the absence of
a true obstacle.
a. Sufficiency of Analysis of False Positives
The Alliance stated that NHTSA has not adequately considered
whether meeting the no-contact performance requirement will generate
false positives and that NHTSA ``should have attempted to quantify this
risk'' and assessed why those disbenefits are reasonable to accept. The
Alliance suggested that a false positive in FMVSS-compliant AEB
vehicles could induce rear-end collisions with vehicles that are not
equipped with rule-compliant AEB systems. The Alliance's petition
included simulation data indicating that a vehicle complying with the
final rule must respond within 0.35 seconds to avoid contact in one of
the obstructed pedestrian crossing situations, which it argues is
beyond the reaction ability of human drivers that may be behind these
vehicles. It claimed that this discrepancy will likely result in a
rear-end crash. Furthermore, according to the Alliance, increases in
relative speed may heighten the likelihood of false positives due to
the need for earlier prediction and intervention. The Alliance stated
that NHTSA acknowledged that false positives could generate problems
with public acceptance of AEB technology. It also stated that NHTSA
dismissed this concern in the final rule without demonstrating that the
final rule's requirements will not significantly impact the rate of
false positives, and without understanding that the final rule demands
effectively different systems from those currently installed in
vehicles. The Alliance did not suggest any specific alternative.
Toyota claimed that the requirements in the final rule will likely
lead to an increase in false positives and can create driving behavior
that neither the driver of the subject vehicle nor the drivers of
surrounding vehicles will find natural or predictable, resulting in
safety disbenefits. It stated that due to high maximum testable speeds,
AEB will need to activate earlier to avoid a collision, and while a
system can be designed to better account for curves in the road or
parked cars, systems cannot be designed to predict what drivers in lead
vehicles intend to do. Regarding PAEB, Volkswagen claimed that because
pedestrians may change their travel path to avoid a collision
themselves, AEB activations that initiate early to avoid a potential
collision will result in rear end collisions with the stopping vehicle.
Agency Response
Petitioners' statements were largely speculative. In support of
these
[[Page 93204]]
arguments, they did not present any new data or analysis beyond what
the agency had already considered.\18\ Petitioners have failed to
provide data demonstrating the likelihood of an increase in false
positives or the magnitude of the increase, nor is NHTSA aware of any
source of such data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Petitioner's simulation data provided regarding the
obstructed pedestrian crossing test is discussed in Section G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Safety Act,
NHTSA's obligation is not to eliminate uncertainty. Courts have
repeatedly emphasized that the agency's job is to acknowledge
uncertainty, explain the available evidence, and offer a ``rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'' \19\ In
coming to its determination, NHTSA dealt with each of the principal
uncertainties and resolved them to the degree possible. In some cases,
the requisite decisions were necessarily based on imperfect data and
were inherently judgmental or predictive in part. The obligation to
make such decisions and resolve such uncertainties is an integral part
of NHTSA's mandate under the Safety Act and the APA. Our determination
under the Safety Act, which was based on several factors including the
available test data, was that collision avoidance was practicable and
that any risk of increased false positives and rear collisions did not
outweigh the benefits of the rule. Therefore, considering the data
available and applying our expert judgment about the unquantifiable
aspects of the rule, we selected the option that best meets the need
for safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51-52 (1983), the
Court recognized that ``[i]t is not infrequent that the available
data does not settle a regulatory issue and the agency must then
exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on
the record to a policy conclusion. Recognizing that policymaking in
a complex society must account for uncertainty, however, does not
imply that it is sufficient for an agency to merely recite the terms
`substantial uncertainty' as a justification for its actions.'' See
also Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251, 1261-62 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA acknowledged the uncertainties and explained our reasoning
throughout the rulemaking effort. In the FRIA, we noted that there is
insufficient data to quantify the frequency and dynamics of false
positive scenarios.\20\ We explained that the analysis had limitations
regarding crash scenarios and parameters beyond those reflected in
testing. We recognized from our testing that performance is variable
and false positives do occur on current systems. However, this
uncertainty, on its own, does not demonstrate that false positives
would become more frequent under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Light Vehicle AEB FRIA, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1069, at
252 (FRIA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also explained that it is not possible to anticipate an
exhaustive list of other possible real-world scenarios that systems
would face and continually repeat testing to establish a robust
estimate of the frequency of false positive occurrence. Based on this
reasoning and test results, the analysis in the FRIA considered false
positive rates to be the same under the final rule as they are in the
current fleet. These false positives are therefore included in the
analysis, but do not contribute to costs or benefits in the rule. The
FRIA acknowledged that removing that assumption would reduce the
magnitude of the estimated safety impacts. However, as the estimated
benefits from the final rule are 17 to 21 times greater than the costs,
it is unlikely that disbenefits from incremental false positives
resulting in an increase in rear-end crashes would render the rule not
cost-beneficial.
Despite these limitations, we nonetheless considered the problem
qualitatively and addressed it to the extent possible. We emphasized
that because market penetration of AEB is very high, incremental
disbenefits resulting from all applicable vehicles having rule-
compliant lead vehicle AEB would be insignificant.\21\ We also
emphasized our belief that false positives would not occur in well-
designed AEB systems, especially with the integration of supplemental
technologies. These technologies can include providing sufficient
redundancy or continuously receiving and updating information regarding
a vehicle or pedestrian as the vehicle approaches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ FRIA at 252. Petitioners argue that this analysis is
unconvincing because of the timeline of fleet turnover. However, the
moment of 100 percent fleet adoption is not the only relevant
timeline. Table 218 in the FRIA shows cumulative exposure by year.
By year 6, we anticipate that 50 percent of the fleet will have
rule-compliant AEB such that concerns about additional rear-ends
derived from false activations will be significantly abated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, we did not simply disregard risks of false
activations due to the speculative nature of the risks. We incorporated
two false positive testing scenarios to establish a minimum level of
system functionality in avoiding such events. We noted that, while
certainly not comprehensive, we selected these scenarios because we
believe they represent the most common scenarios systems will encounter
and they address known engineering challenges for existing AEB
systems.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ 89 FR 39686, at 39732; FRIA at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, we also emphasized many possible benefits from the
rule that the analysis also could not quantify. These include safety
benefits associated with crash scenarios and parameters outside of
those reflected in agency testing, safety benefits from avoiding
secondary crashes, safety benefits from preventing or mitigating
crashes with other vulnerable road users or animals, and property
damage and traffic congestion avoided.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ FRIA at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, the petitioners simply asserted speculative
disbenefits based on theoretical scenarios. The Alliance, for example,
presented simulation data to support the possibility of rear-end
collisions that could occur if a vehicle has a false positive with a
human driver behind it, but it did not provide any evidence that the
false positive events themselves would occur in greater frequency or
severity under the final rule compared to no requirement or an
alternative requirement.\24\ Additionally, Volkswagen asserts that ``no
contact'' ``will undoubtably lead to higher false positive rates'' in
scenarios in which a pedestrian changes their travel path following the
onset of braking, and Toyota made a similar claim with regards to lead
vehicle AEB.\25\ When considering the balance of costs and benefits,
petitioners seek to place greater weight on speculative and
unquantifiable disbenefits without considering the added benefits which
may also be obtained. These assertions are insufficient to demonstrate
that the speculative disbenefits outweigh the benefits of a no contact
requirement. Without sufficient information to fully quantify either,
it is not unreasonable for NHTSA, in its expert judgment and in
consideration of the Safety Act's
[[Page 93205]]
focus on safety, to select the option that maximizes possible safety
benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ We also disagree with the petitioners' conclusions about
these hypothetical scenarios. If the driver of the following vehicle
maintains the safe distance required by law, a collision with the
rule-compliant subject vehicle would not occur. Additionally, as we
noted in the final rule, if an AEB activation of the subject vehicle
leads to a collision with the following vehicle in a true positive
situation, we believe that the AEB activation effectively reduces
the likelihood of multiple collisions in a single crash. The AEB
system would prevent the subject vehicle from colliding with an
obstacle--whether another vehicle or a pedestrian--in its path.
\25\ Nothing in the final rule prevents systems from relaxing
braking once an imminent collision is no longer present or from
designing AEB systems with algorithms that suppress AEB activations
in certain circumstances such as after a substantial steering input
or the application of additional throttle. However, when tested
according to the procedures specified in the rule, the system must
operate to avoid a collision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Defect Authority
The Alliance stated that it is insufficient for NHTSA to address
false positives through the agency's safety defect authority. The
Alliance stated that false positives are an unwanted side effect,
similar to an issue experienced with early higher-powered airbag
technology, which NHTSA needs to address through rulemaking to amend
the performance requirements rather than through recalls. The Alliance
argued that after the new FMVSS, ``[i]t is not sufficient, or fair,''
to continue to ``address `false positives' through [NHTSA's] safety
defect authority.'' This argument primarily stemmed from the Alliance's
claim that, due to current limitations in AEB technology, increasing
the sensitivity of an AEB system to meet the performance requirements
of the new FMVSS would increase the likelihood that the AEB system
would also erroneously detect obstacles where none exist.
Agency Analysis
The Alliance's arguments do not support reconsideration of the
final rule for several reasons.
First, the variability of false positive scenarios lends itself to
the more individualized review of real-world operation that the defects
process allows. As we noted, the final rule included two false
activation test scenarios, but these are not comprehensive for
eliminating susceptibility to false activations.\26\ The best forum for
such an individualized review is NHTSA's defects authority, which can
accommodate investigations that consider the reasonableness of the
potential safety risks in light of all of the facts and circumstances.
In contrast, an FMVSS sets a static performance requirement for all
systems. Therefore, the defects authority is an appropriate avenue for
addressing false positive events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ 89 FR 39686, at 39732.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, there is an established precedent of both NHTSA and
manufacturers addressing false positive AEB events through safety
recalls. In the past, vehicle manufacturers have filed recalls based on
the safety risk that, for example, has been described as ``[i]f the AEB
system unexpectedly activates while driving, the risk of a rear-end
collision from a following vehicle may increase.'' \27\ Likewise, NHTSA
has undertaken multiple defect investigations of potential safety risks
arising from false activations of AEB systems.\28\ The public has
similarly raised concerns about the safety risks associated with AEB
false activations, requesting NHTSA apply its safety defect authority
to the issue.\29\ This established practice demonstrates that using the
defects authority to address false positives has been effective and
workable, and the Alliance does not explain why it will not continue to
be under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See, e.g., Tesla, Part 573 Safety Recall Report, No. 21V-
846, Unexpected Activation of Automatic Emergency Brake, available
at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2021/RCLRPT-21V846-7836.PDF.
\28\ See, e.g., NHTSA, Opening Resume: Engineering Analysis EA
24-002, Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking, available at
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-EA24002-11766P1.pdf;
NHTSA, Opening Resume: Preliminary Evaluation PE 24-008, Inadvertent
Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-PE24008-10868.pdf; NHTSA, Opening Resume:
Preliminary Evaluation 24-013, Inadvertent Automatic Emergency
Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-PE24013-12241.pdf; NHTSA, Opening Resume: Preliminary Evaluation 23-
017, Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2023/INOA-PE23017-10785.pdf.
\29\ See, e.g., NHTSA, Opening Resume: DP 19-001, Defect
Petition for False Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2019/INOA-DP19001-5499.PDF. NHTSA also
often receives customer complaints regarding the issue through
Vehicle Owner Questionnaire submissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, the Alliance's petition suggests that current technical
limits in AEB equipment, such as sensor range or definition, would make
it unfair for NHTSA to act on safety risks that were a byproduct of
manufacturer efforts to meet the performance requirements of the new
FMVSS. However, in striving to protect the public, the Safety Act
requires manufacturers to remedy all unreasonable safety risks in their
vehicles, regardless of the reason for their origin. A manufacturer's
good intention is not a defense to a recall.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See 49 U.S.C. 30116 et seq.; 49 U.S.C. 30102; see also 49
U.S.C. 30118 (establishing that general recall notification
responsibilities apply to all defects and is not based on design
intent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, the false positive risks that petitioners raise are
speculative. No petitioner or commenter has identified an aspect of the
new FMVSS that will cause future defects related to false positives. At
most, the Alliance has identified challenges with existing AEB
technology that could lead some manufacturers to inadvertently be
imprecise or overinclusive when calibrating the sensitivity of their
AEB systems to meet the new FMVSS. The Alliance has not suggested that
these errors in implementation would be impossible to eliminate or
mitigate once they became apparent.
Finally, the Alliance's example of early, ``high-powered'' air bags
is an inapt analogy. Early versions of air bags deployed with a fixed
amount of force that posed a risk of injury to occupants. These risks
were not an occasional byproduct of those air bags but were inherent to
the forces generated when those air bags deployed as quickly as needed
to meet the performance requirements of the original air bag FMVSS. As
air bag technology improved, air bags became capable of modulating the
force of their deployment to limit the injurious potential of their
inflation. When updating the FMVSS to require advanced air bags, NHTSA
noted that ``the fact that we are requiring manufacturers to provide
improved air bags in new vehicles does not mean that earlier vehicles
that do not meet the new requirements have a safety-related defect.''
\31\ By contrast, an AEB false positive (such as braking in the absence
of a true obstacle) is not a behavior required by the final rule.
Rather, it is at most an accidental engineering failure from trying to
design an AEB system with sufficient sensitivity to meet the
performance standard. In fact, AEB false positives are more like the
safety defects posed by air bag inflator ruptures. These occur when, in
an effort to design air bag systems capable of meeting the intense
inflation demands of the FMVSS, engineering failures cause ruptures
which project debris. In the same way, even assuming the Alliance is
correct that the performance demands of the final rule may sometimes
result in faulty AEB system designs that are susceptible to false
positives, those false positives are a failure in the implementation of
the AEB system, not an inherent performance characteristic of the
standard.
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\31\ 65 FR 30680, 30705 (May 12, 2000). The same approach is
true for FMVSS No. 127: the fact that vehicles manufactured before
the new FMVSS takes affect may have AEB systems that do not meet the
new standards (or perhaps do not have AEB at all) does not mean
those earlier vehicles have safety-related defects simply because
they do not meet the new standards.
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For these reasons, no reconsideration is needed on this issue.
c. Comparison to a Standard That Allows Low-Speed Contact
To address false positive risks and practicability concerns,
Volkswagen and Toyota petitioned for the consideration of allowing a
low-speed contact, such as up to 10 km/h (6.2 mph).\32\ They present
two justifications. First, they make a novel assertion, not raised
during the NPRM comment period, that NHTSA implicitly accepts contacts
under 10 km/h because the final rule does not
[[Page 93206]]
require AEB systems to operate at speeds 10 km/h and below. Second,
Toyota claims that NHTSA's analysis did not establish how no contact
meets the need for safety in comparison to low-speed contact
alternatives.\33\
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\32\ Hyundai also discussed this issue in its letter.
\33\ Hyundai, in its letter, argued that a 10 km/h minimum
allowable collision speed would preserve the safety benefits of the
rule because contacts under that speed are unlikely to result in
serious injuries or fatalities. One comment discussed in the final
rule stated similarly. 89 FR 39686, 39272.
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Agency Analysis
Petitioners' arguments do not support reconsideration of the final
rule. As an initial matter, NHTSA's analysis fully considered this
issue and the relevant alternatives in the rulemaking. In the NPRM, we
sought comment on alternatives to the no contact requirement,
specifically regarding allowing low-speed contact in on-track testing
for both PAEB and lead vehicle. We received extensive comment both in
support of and against allowing contact at low speeds. In the final
rule, the agency disagreed that a low-speed approach fully resolved the
safety problem, emphasizing that no contact provides maximum safety
benefits and aligns with the Safety Act. We reiterated that striking a
person with a vehicle is unacceptable at any speed under any
conditions, and the analysis in our FRIA supports that conclusion. We
believe the data and analysis in the final rule and the FRIA
demonstrate the safety basis upon which ``no contact'' was selected
over low-speed alternatives. Therefore, we are not amending the final
rule on these bases. However, as petitioners have presented a new
framing of the argument regarding the 10 km/h (6.2 mph) activation
threshold, we take this opportunity to highlight the data and analysis
that supports the final rule to respond to the points raised by
petitioners.
Petitioners present a false equivalency between the activation
threshold and contact speeds. Activation of an AEB system while moving
below 10 km/h is a different scenario from continuing to move at up to
10 km/h after an activation has already occurred. The impact speed is
part of the in-operation performance of the system. That is, once an
AEB system detects an imminent collision with a vehicle or pedestrian,
we anticipate that the systems will remain active as long as the
imminent collision risk persists. The AEB minimum activation speed, on
the other hand, is selected as a design specification. Petitioners
attempted to conflate these circumstances, which is unpersuasive.
Additionally, the activation threshold exists to ensure
practicability, not because no safety concerns exist below that
speed.\34\ When discussing PAEB testing in the NPRM, for example, we
noted that the lower bound was chosen based on a tentative conclusion,
corroborated by our 2020 testing and testing on vehicles from model
years 2021 and 2022, that PAEB systems may not offer consistent
performance at speeds below 16 km/h (9.9 mph) and that 10 km/h (6.2
mph) is consistent with Euro NCAP's testing lower bound.
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\34\ We have been consistent in our belief that collisions under
10 km/h present a safety risk. In the NPRM, we noted that ``not
requiring PAEB to be active below 10 km/h (6.2 mph) should not be
construed to preclude making the AEB system active, if possible, at
speeds below 10 km/h (6.2 mph). In fact, the agency anticipates that
manufacturers will make the system available at the lowest
practicable speed.'' 88 FR 38632, at 38667.
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In addition to those stated in prior notices, there are several
other reasons for the practicability concerns that justify a
distinction between 10 km/h as an activation threshold and as a maximum
contact speed in testing. First, at speeds below 10 km/h, the driver
has more time to re-engage and apply the brakes to avoid the collision
without AEB intervention. Second, AEB systems can have difficulty
operating in very tight spaces and at low speeds such as in crowded
parking garages, where manoeuvres at low speed may need to occur in
crash-imminent scenarios. Third, certain vehicles to which the
regulation applies may need to push objects while operating at low
speeds. Finally, our testing and data collection showed both that no
systems operated at speeds under 5 km/h (3.1 mph), and that some
vehicles that performed well in high-speed testing did not operate
under 10 km/h (6.2 mph).\35\ These data suggest design challenges
specific to low-speed operation. NHTSA considered these factors and
determined that it was practicable to require only that systems operate
above 10 km/h. Therefore, the activation threshold and whether to allow
an impact speed have distinct considerations that justify different
approaches.
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\35\ NHTSA-2023-0021-0005, Table 3.
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Furthermore, no contact better meets the need for safety in
comparison to a regulation that allows low-speed contact. The data and
analysis in the FRIA show that allowing for contact, at any speed,
results in less safety benefits than are achieved by the final rule. In
analyzing the capabilities of AEB technology, at least one vehicle
tested was able to meet the no contact requirement in each scenario.
Therefore, the benefits in the FRIA represent the level of safety
associated with the best performer.\36\ The injury risk curves in the
FRIA represent the likelihood of injury based on impact speed. In
general, the likelihood of injury, and more severe injuries or
fatalities, increases with respect to contact speed. And, although
there are limits to the precision of the conclusion that can be drawn
due to data limitations, the injury risk curves show that allowing for
contact at any speed results in less safety benefits than are achieved
by the best performer. NHTSA's analysis therefore fully considered this
issue.
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\36\ This ties the benefits calculations directly to a vehicle's
observed test performance. In contrast, fully calculating the
benefits of a standard that allowed contact would require adjusting
the best performer away from the test data. This would involve
assumptions about best performance under the rule that are not tied
to observed performance and reduce the accuracy of the benefits
calculations.
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The PAEB data clearly show that a low-speed contact alternative
would achieve substantially less safety than no contact.\37\ Even at
the lowest impact speeds of 0-5 mph, there is a 75 percent chance of
minor injury, 4 percent chance of a moderate severity injury, and a 1
percent chance serious injury or worse. Furthermore, at even the next
impact speed group, there is a non-zero probability of a fatality.\38\
NHTSA considered these risks in deciding that no contact in PAEB
testing meets the need for safety.
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\37\ Injury risk data used in this paragraph is presented in the
FRIA, Table 131. The table and this data are rounded to the nearest
hundredth. The true figures are as follows: at a maximum contact
speed of 5 mph, approximately 0.4 percent of collisions would result
in fatality, 75 percent would result in minor injury, 4 percent in
moderate injury, and 0.7 percent in serious injury. These
descriptions correspond to the maximum abbreviated injury scale
(MAIS) categories, described on pages 238-239 of the FRIA. Minor
injuries can include non-superficial injuries, including those with
long term effects such as whiplash, and moderate injuries include a
fractured sternum.
\38\ Petitioners suggested allowing contact at up to 10 km/h,
which would correspond to a roughly 6 mph impact speed. The data in
the FRIA is organized by miles-per-hour, so for this response we
discussed injuries in the impact speed range closest to but below
this figure, which is 0-5 mph.
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By applying these percentages to the PAEB data across the injury
severity categories in the estimated benefits of the final rule, we
find significant benefits to a no contact standard.\39\
[[Page 93207]]
Allowing contact at low speeds would lead to 2,192 additional minor
injuries, 31 moderate injuries, 3 serious injuries, and 1 fatality
annually. Monetized, this change results in $179.1 million
comprehensive economic benefits lost, or 4.9 percent of the PAEB
benefits generated by the final rule.\40\ This is a sizable impact, and
one that NHTSA considers meaningful. Indeed, $179.1 million of
comprehensive economic benefits is larger than those of many entire
safety rules we issue.
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\39\ Although this discussion is new analysis in response to the
petitions for reconsideration, we note that this analysis uses only
data already in the FRIA and uses no proprietary statistical
methods. In the FRIA, PAEB is considered in crossing path and along
path scenarios. For along path scenarios, we assume that all
pedestrian impacts would be avoided under a no contact requirement,
so allowing contact would distribute those incidents that would have
been avoided across each injury severity category by the percentage
of injuries associated with each severity at the selected contact
speed. For crossing path scenarios, even under a no contact
requirement there are situations in which pedestrians enter the path
of the vehicle with insufficient time for detection and braking to
avoid the collision. Therefore, the expected effect of allowing
contact should account for a reduced number of both avoided and
mitigated injuries.
\40\ Performing the same analysis as used in this paragraph on
contacts up to 10 mph yields additional lost benefits of only 0.7
percent. This result suggests that most of the safety benefits lost
from a low-speed contact option are lost in the contact allowance.
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For lead vehicle AEB, the low-speed injury data in the FRIA has
more limitations than that for PAEB. The relatively small number of
severe injuries that occur in rear-end collisions at low speeds
compared to those that occur in high speed collisions causes
implausible analytical results that limit the precision of the
conclusions that can be drawn about the exact level of safety benefit
obtained at low impact speeds. Nonetheless, the available data
demonstrate that benefits would be lost with a contact standard and the
general magnitude of those lost benefits.
The injury data in the FRIA show that allowing contact at any speed
reduces the safety benefits.\41\ At a relative contact speed of 10 mph
(the difference between striking vehicle speed and struck vehicle
speed), the probability of minor injury increases to 21.9 percent,
moderate injuries to 0.9 percent, serious injuries to 0.7 percent, and
even 0.1 percent chance of a fatality. In fact, even at a relative
contact speed of just 1 mph (contact at 2 mph), there is a 3.5 percent
chance of minor injury and a 0.4 percent chance each of moderate and
serious injuries. The FRIA contains an example calculation to show how
these figures are derived and factor into NHTSA's benefits
analysis.\42\
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\41\ FRIA, Table 108.
\42\ FRIA at 761 (the example begins on p. 763). Note that it
appears some of the values in FRIA Table 317, which summarizes input
parameters, appear to be incorrect. Table 317 stated that the TTC
Duration(s) were 2.01 for each FCW scenario. The correct values are
as follows: Status quo (SQ) Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS) of 2.01, SQ
Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM) of 2.09, SQ Lead Vehicle Decelerating
(LVD) of 2.14, Best performer (BP) LVS of 2.06, BP LVM of 2.12, and
BP LVD of 2.23.
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The data and analysis in the FRIA show that while low-speed
collisions are less likely to result in severe or fatal injuries,
reducing the number of injuries that are less severe can carry large
safety benefits due to the large volume of those injuries. As the final
rule states, between 2016 and 2019, there were an average of 1.75
million rear-end crashes annually (and nearly 55,000 frontal crashes
with a pedestrian). Even small changes in injury risk can have sizable
impacts across that volume of collisions.\43\ Additionally, even
injuries classified as less severe in the data cause serious harm, and
these injuries, such as whiplash, can carry long-term effects. In the
final rule, the agency concluded that although the data is limited, it
plainly indicates that a no contact standard achieves greater safety
benefits than a standard that allows contact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ FRIA, Tables 225 and 251. Note that these crash estimates
were not used to estimate benefits. The target population used to
estimate benefits for lead vehicle AEB and PAEB included several
filters to best reflect the real-world crashes that corresponded
with the test scenarios and conditions.
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In contrast to the data collection and analyses done by NHTSA,
petitioners suggest that NHTSA should prioritize speculative
disbenefits from false positives over the demonstrable safety benefits
that a no contact requirement achieves. Petitioners did not provide any
new information or data that was not already considered by the agency
during the development of the final rule in response to public comments
suggesting that a low-speed alternative would better meet the need for
safety. Nor did they provide, at any stage in the rulemaking,
compelling information regarding the increase in false positives that
they fear or evidence that a no contact requirement will result in such
an increase while allowing a 10 km/h (6.2 mph) contact speed would not.
Although we recognized that there are unquantifiable aspects, NHTSA was
well within its responsibilities to consider this risk but to weight
more heavily the demonstrable safety benefits achievable by a no
contact requirement. The Safety Act entrusts NHTSA with this
responsibility and to exercise its judgment, and we did so. Therefore,
no reconsideration is necessary, and we deny the request for
reconsideration to allow low-speed contact.
B. Multiple Trials
The final rule requires that the test vehicle meet the performance
test requirements in any test run and does not allow multiple test runs
in which the vehicle is only required to meet the required performance
in a percentage of the runs. Petitioners requested that the standard be
amended to incorporate multiple test runs to allow a vehicle to meet
the performance requirement in some but not all runs, and provided
several reasons discussed below.
1. Comparison to FMVSS No. 135 and Forms of Variability
Petitioners argued that the final rule did not account for the
variabilities in testing. They requested FMVSS No. 127 be amended to be
similar to FMVSS No. 135, which allows for compliance to be determined
based on multiple test runs. Petitioners suggested several variations,
including passing 5 out of 7 runs (which is similar to NCAP), passing 3
out of 5 runs, and a requirement that if the vehicle fails the first
run it must pass three subsequent runs.\44\
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\44\ The Alliance also noted that, if NHTSA provides sufficient
relief regarding the no contact requirement, then this relief may
not be necessary.
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The Alliance stated that existing braking standards, specifically
FMVSS No. 135, acknowledge the inherent variability in vehicle braking
systems that make it unreasonable to evaluate performance based on a
single test run. The Alliance suggested that since AEB is a braking
system, it has these variations, which raise practicability concerns
when a test requirement does not allow for multiple test trials. These
variations derive from both foundational braking mechanisms and
additional variability from sensing and perception responses.
Therefore, the Alliance argued that NHTSA failed to recognize that
FMVSS No. 127 deviates from its established practice of permitting
multiple test runs for braking standards. Moreover, it claims that
NHTSA did not provide any explanation in the final rule for departing
from this longstanding precedent.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA received comment on and fully considered the issue of
multiple trials during the rulemaking. The arguments raised in the
petitions do not justify allowing multiple test trials.
That multiple test runs are used in FMVSS No. 135 does not mean
that multiple test runs are necessary for FMSS No. 127. There is a
critical difference between FMVSS No. 135 and FMVSS No. 127 that
justifies a different approach.\45\ The purpose of FMVSS No.
[[Page 93208]]
135 is to ensure safe braking performance, and its testing is designed
to test braking performance of the vehicle.\46\ It uses multiple test
runs to account for the variability in the ability of the human test
driver to maximize the braking capabilities of the vehicle. The agency
published the first NPRM for what would become FMVSS No. 135 in 1985.
In that NPRM, the agency stated that ``[t]he purpose of specifying
multiple stops is to enable test drivers to achieve a vehicle's best
performance.'' \47\ That preamble further stated that it normally took
test drivers three or four stops to achieve the best possible braking
performance. NHTSA has also rejected incorporation of multiple test
runs into the standard for the ``hot stop'' test because NHTSA found in
its testing that the human test drivers were capable of achieving the
needed performance for the test, and the test needed to occur while the
brakes were at temperature.\48\ Additionally, in FMVSS No. 126, an
example of a standard where NHTSA found a single test run to be
sufficient, the sine-with-dwell test provides for only one test run at
each steering-wheel amplitude and rotation direction combination.
Further, in the final rule establishing FMVSS No. 136, ``Electronic
stability control systems for heavy vehicles,'' NHTSA stated that FMVSS
No. 136 allows multiple attempts to maintain the lane for J-turn
testing to ensure that the ESC system activates before the vehicle
becomes unstable instead of imposing a requirement that it activate
prior to instability to ``account for driver variability and possible
driver error in conducting the manoeuvre. Absent driver error, we do
not expect any vehicle equipped with current-generation ESC systems to
leave the lane during any J-turn test.'' \49\ These examples make clear
that a standard that permits multiple test trials is justified where
testing may be affected by variability in a human test driver's ability
to apply a full brake application. It may be the case that, because it
allows multiple test trials to accommodate human test drivers, FMVSS
No. 135 accommodates the other forms of test variability cited by
petitioners. However, this result is an ancillary effect of the
standard's design, not its purpose.
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\45\ Not all the tests in FMVSS No. 135 use multiple trials.
Those that do include: S7.5. Cold effectiveness; S7.6. High speed
effectiveness, S7.7. Stops with Engine Off, S7.8. Antilock
functional failure, S7.9. Variable brake proportioning system
functional failure, and S7.11. Brake power unit or brake power
assist unit inoperative (System depleted). These afford up to six
test runs to achieve the required performance.
\46\ 49 CFR 571.135, S2.
\47\ 50 FR 19751.
\48\ 60 FR 6431.
\49\ 80 FR 36050.
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In contrast to FMVSS No. 135, the test procedures in FMVSS No. 127
test the AEB system and do not use human test drivers to actuate the
brakes. Even for tests that include manual brake application, the test
procedure specifies use of a braking robot and the performance
specifications on how the brake must be actuated for the test. No
variability from human operation contributes to test outcomes in FMVSS
No. 127.
Indeed, the Alliance, in attempting to argue that FMVSS No. 135
test results are not informative of AEB system performance,
acknowledged this distinction is meaningful. It claimed that test
conditions in FMVSS No.'s 135 and 127 ``are fundamentally different
such that FMVSS No. 135 results are not indicative of AEB performance''
because tests conducted under FMVSS No. 135 are ``conducted with a
human driver putting muscular effort into the brake pedal.'' \50\ This
distinction justifies NHTSA's decision not to use multiple test runs.
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\50\ In making this argument, the Alliance is suggesting that
NHTSA cannot rely on FMVSS No. 135 tests to show the practicability
of the no contact requirement because these tests will have superior
braking performance to FMVSS No. 127 tests due to added muscular
effort from the driver. This claim is discussed in the ``no
contact'' section, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Specific Forms of Variability Raised by Petitioners
Petitioners cited several forms of variability that they argue
justify multiple test runs or render the standard impracticably
stringent. The Alliance, for example, cited wear and tear of pedestrian
test dummies, design of pedestrian test dummies, and headlamp aim as
aspects specific to AEB system performance that can impact testing. It
also emphasized track conditions that contribute to stopping distance
variability, such as the age and degradation of the asphalt since it
was last resurfaced, the type of aggregate used on the test track, and
other variables. The Alliance also noted that compliance tests are
conducted at any number of test tracks throughout the United States,
which the Alliance claimed further amplifies variability of the test by
contributing their own unique characteristics. It also noted ambient
environmental effects such as cloud cover (or intermittent cloud
cover), dust, debris, pollen effects, recent rainfall, and noise
factors. It also stated that the road surface friction decreases as the
road surface temperature increases, and provided a figure that shows
road surface friction around 0.98 at a temperature of 2 degrees C and
decreasing to around 0.92 at 50 degrees C, and that these variations in
ambient conditions can translate into about 8-10 feet (2.5-3m) or more
variation in absolute stopping distance on a given test surface. It
also raised vehicle conditions, such as tire burnish, brake burnish,
brake wear and brake bleed, which amplify these environmental effects.
The Alliance stated that these factors (ambient conditions, vehicle
conditions, and track conditions) support the reason why FMVSS No. 135
accommodates outcome variability by using multiple trials, justify
using multiple trials, or justify a change in the no contact
requirement.
The Alliance stated that NHTSA's data demonstrate the challenges of
avoiding contact in every test that result from their cited
variability. The Alliance emphasized that no test scenario showed that
all tested vehicles could meet the performance requirements for lead
vehicle AEB on every test run. Starting at 64 km/h (40 mph), fewer than
half of the tested vehicle met the performance requirements in all the
test trials. The Alliance further stated that, while the research
conducted tests only up to 72 km/h (45 mph), at which only two models
avoided contact, the standard requires compliance with lead vehicle AEB
test at speeds up to 100 km/h (62 mph) without demonstrating the
feasibility and practicability at those higher speeds. It also
referenced PAEB testing, for which at the lowest tested speed (16 km/h
(9.9 mph)), vehicles failed in over 25 percent of the test runs. At
speeds of 65 km/h (40.4 mph) in dark conditions, the Alliance stated
that no tested vehicle could comply with the requirements 100 percent
of the time. The Alliance reasoned, therefore, that NHTSA's test data
indicates that most vehicles do not meet the standard's requirements,
and the agency has not provided any analysis demonstrating why these
data or other information prove the practicability of avoiding contact
on every test run.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA disagrees that the types of variability raised by petitioners
make the rule impracticable or justify multiple test runs.
First, several of these types of variability would not be resolved
if FMVSS No. 127 allowed multiple test runs. For example, test track
conditions, headlamp aim, and the differences between the pedestrian
test device and real pedestrians, which do contribute to variability in
AEB system performance, do not contribute to variability in performance
across multiple test runs in the same place with the same test devices.
The test track is relatively consistent across runs. Differences in the
pedestrian test device and a real pedestrian may contribute to variable
[[Page 93209]]
performance between the real world and the test track, but it does not
contribute to variability across multiple runs with the same test
device. Therefore, allowing multiple runs would not resolve these
concerns.
Additionally, other variabilities raised by petitioners are
resolved by other aspects of the FMVSS. The test conditions, including
temperature range, are generally consistent with those of existing
FMVSSs, such as FMVSS No. 135, which have proven effective over time in
resolving many issues raised by petitioners, such as concerns with
thermal effects on the surface friction of the test track.
Additionally, the test procedures state that headlamps will be aimed
per manufacturers' instructions and that testing will not occur during
periods of precipitation or when visibility is affected by fog, smoke,
ash, or particulates, which resolves many concerns regarding AEB system
performance variability.\51\ The Alliance's concerns about the test
dummies are also unfounded. Dummy wear and tear will not contribute to
test performance variability because the test procedures specify the
conditions for the test devices used.
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\51\ The Alliance also petitioned for more specificity regarding
``visibility'' in the test condition. We provided a thorough
discussion of this requirement and the reasons for not providing
additional specificity in the NPRM and final rule.
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The Alliance's discussion regarding vehicle and test track
variability is not persuasive because it relies on studies conducted
with test vehicles not specifically designed to meet the requirements
of the final rule. We anticipate the variability between vehicles
designed to comply with an FMVSS will be relatively small and will
depend on the compliance margins set by manufacturers according to
their risk acceptance strategies.
Regarding petitioners' claims that the current state of AEB
technology means that multiple test runs are necessary for the standard
to be practicable, we note that in the agency's 2023 research one
tested vehicle was able to avoid contact on most runs, which marked
significant progress compared to the 2020 testing. This and other
improvements in AEB technology over time support the conclusions made
in the final rule that these requirements are practicable within the
allowed lead time. Under the Safety Act, the agency is empowered to
issue safety standards that require advancements in existing technology
or require development of new technology.\52\ Given the developmental
trajectory, the agency does not find arguments based around the
performance of existing AEB systems to be a persuasive argument for
multiple trials.
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\52\ Chrysler, supra footnote 9.
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b. System Maturity
The Alliance stated that the final rule claimed that multiple
trials are not necessary for mature systems. It argued that NHTSA
incorrectly assumed that AEB technologies are mature, in part because
AEB systems introduced under the 2016 voluntary commitment were not
designed to meet the performance requirements of the final rule. The
Alliance also referenced the FRIA--which stated that because many AEB
systems do not meet the rule's requirements there will be significant
benefits to the new rule-compliant AEB systems--to argue that the
agency cannot consider an existing AEB system installed under the 2016
commitment to be mature while simultaneously claiming significant
benefits from the new systems required by the final rule. The Alliance
also stated that rule-compliant AEB systems should be considered new or
in development. It concluded that therefore these systems are not
mature and should be allowed to demonstrate compliance through multiple
test trials.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded by the Alliance's reframing of the issue. The
fact that a current system can meet the requirements of the standard
shows that the technology is mature--vehicles on the road today have
the requisite technology to comply with the rule. The benefits
estimates assess the improvements in outcomes generated when the entire
fleet becomes compliant in comparison to the status quo baseline. As we
explained in the FRIA, the status quo baseline is the average
performance of the vehicles included in NHTSA's testing. Therefore, the
benefits claimed are representative of mature systems being required
throughout the fleet.
Therefore, no reconsideration is needed. NHTSA denies the petitions
for reconsideration regarding multiple trials and will not adjust the
final rule to incorporate multiple test trials.
C. Equipment Requirement
The final rule includes an equipment requirement that light
vehicles have an AEB system that applies the brakes automatically at
any forward speed that is greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less than
145 km/h (90.1 mph) when a collision with a lead vehicle is imminent,
and at any forward speed greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less than
73 km/h (45.3 mph) when a collision with a pedestrian is imminent. It
also includes a performance test requirement that, when tested
according to the procedures in the rule, the subject vehicle provides a
forward collision warning and subsequently applies the service brakes
automatically when a collision with a lead vehicle is imminent such
that the subject vehicle does not collide with the lead vehicle.
The Alliance stated that the final rule lacks objectivity because
NHTSA has not established performance requirements for the equipment
required by final rule. It notes that while the rule requires the lead
vehicle AEB and PAEB systems to operate at speeds up to 145 km/h (90.1
mph) and 73 km/h (45.3 mph) respectively, it does not define the term
``operate,'' Additionally, the Alliance argues, although the preamble
to the final rule indicated that the systems would apply brakes when a
collision is imminent, NHTSA did not define an imminent crash. To
address these concerns, the Alliance requested a supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) proposing objective performance
requirements, including specifying what it means to ``operate'' the
equipment and defining when a crash is ``imminent.''
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not incorporating definitions for ``operate'' or
``imminent'' and is not incorporating a test procedure. However, NHTSA
is making one clarifying edit to remove reference to ``imminent'' in
the performance test requirement for lead vehicle AEB.
NHTSA does not believe that it is necessary to provide a definition
of or test procedures for the term ``operate'' in the regulatory text
because the final rule's definition of AEB clarifies how an AEB system
operates. FMVSS No. 127 defines ``Automatic Emergency Braking'' as ``a
system that detects an imminent collision with vehicles, objects, and
road users in or near the path of a vehicle and automatically controls
the vehicle's service brakes to avoid or mitigate the collision.'' The
definition of FCW provides similar clarity regarding FCW operation.
Additionally, the requirement that these systems ``operate'' is
explicitly tied to the test conditions in S6, Test Conditions, of FMVSS
No. 127. In considering the meaning of ``operate'' in the context of
the performance requirements applicable to AEB systems, the final rule
provides sufficient clarity that manufacturers can certify with
reasonable care that their systems ``operate'' in the circumstances
[[Page 93210]]
required by the final rule. Therefore, no definition is needed.
Regarding the definition of ``imminent'' as used in the equipment
requirements, no regulatory definition is needed. Certainly, not all of
the terms in a regulation must be explicitly defined. Here, the term
``imminent'' comes from the regulatory mandate in BIL.\53\ In BIL,
Congress chose not to define the term, and we interpret this provision
of BIL to use the plain meaning of the word ``imminent.'' \54\
Manufacturers may refer to the plain meaning when certifying their
vehicles to the equipment requirements.\55\ Additionally, the term is
sufficiently clear in context, and its meaning is discernable from
close review of the performance requirements and test procedures in the
rule, such as the set of testable ranges specified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ 49 U.S.C. 30129 note.
\54\ Miriam-Webster defines ``imminent'' as ``ready to take
place; happening soon.'' https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imminent?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (accessed
on 8/28/24). For an analogous determination, see 81 FR 85478,
Vehicle Defect Reporting Requirements. In this NPRM, we specified a
location that is ``accessible'' for an information label pursuant to
the section 31306 of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st
Century Act. We noted that while the statute did not explicitly
require us or the manufacturer to determine the location, selecting
a standardized location would best serve the purpose of the statute
by facilitating repeated consumer access to the information. We also
referenced the dictionary definition of the term ``accessible.''
\55\ See, e.g., Ard v. O'Malley, 110 F.4th 613, 617 (4th Cir.
2024).
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However, we are making a clarifying change to the performance test
requirement. In its petition, the Alliance appears to conflate
equipment requirements and performance requirements. The final rule and
NPRM distinguished between them and explained how the equipment
requirement supplements the performance requirement.\56\ The equipment
requirement, explicitly mandated in BIL, does not have an associated
performance test and compliance with it is not evaluated based on
performance testing. On the other hand, compliance with the performance
requirements is evaluated through the performance testing laid out in
the final rule. Critically, these tests do not evaluate the activation
timing of the AEB or FCW systems (other than that FCW should not
activate after AEB). Rather, the performance criterion is contact with
the test device (for AEB) and whether FCW activated. We therefore left
to manufacturers the discretion to determine when to apply the brakes
and provide the FCW, so long as their determination is not clearly
erroneous.
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\56\ 88 FR at 36832, at 38655; see also 72 FR 17235, 17299 (Apr.
6, 2007) (discussing the understeer requirement in FMVSS No. 126).
The NPRM also explained how we might approach information gathering
and enforcement of this requirement. The final rule also discussed
NHTSA's authorities regarding equipment requirements in response to
comment regarding activation speed. 89 FR 39686, 39712-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To resolve any confusion, we are amending the performance test
requirement for lead vehicle AEB in S5.1.3 to remove the phrase ``when
a collision with a lead vehicle is imminent.'' The purpose of this
change is to clarify the distinction between the performance
requirements and equipment requirements in FMVSS No. 127 and does not
substantively alter the requirements as described in the preamble. In
fact, because NHTSA's testing will not evaluate AEB and FCW timing, and
the test scenarios themselves create crash-imminent scenarios, this
language was superfluous in the performance test requirement. This
change also aligns the text of S5.1.3 with the performance test
criteria for PAEB (S5.2.3), which does not contain that phrase.
Although the preamble of the final rule explained this approach, the
change discussed here makes it clear in the regulatory text. Finally,
following the change, the term ``imminent'' only remains in the
equipment requirement. Therefore, no performance test procedure is
needed to evaluate compliance.
Therefore, we are amending FMVSS No. 127 to resolve confusion in
the requirements. However, we are denying the petitions for
reconsideration regarding issuing an SNPRM to establish a test
procedure for equipment requirements or providing a definition for
``operate'' and ``imminent.''
D. Unlimited Preconditioning and Test Runs
The final rule does not explicitly place a limit on the amount of
pretest driving a vehicle may undergo and it does not place a maximum
limit on the number of test runs a vehicle may be put through.\57\
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\57\ Specifically, test procedures state that prior to the test
the subject vehicle is driven at any speed, in any direction, on any
road surface, for any amount of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Alliance requested reconsideration, arguing that unlimited
pretest driving of a subject vehicle is inconsistent with repeatable,
objective test procedures. It also argued that the agency could accrue
thousands of miles on the test vehicle, degrading the tires and other
wear components, before running the compliance test. Petitioners
expressed concern that manufacturers would have no way to predict what
the agency's pretest driving scenarios will do to the subject vehicle,
making it impossible to certify compliance. Similarly, it stated that,
under the test procedures as written, a vehicle can be tested unlimited
times until one failed test trial occurs, in which case the vehicle
would be non-compliant.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not granting reconsideration on this issue for two
reasons. First, the purpose of FMVSS No. 127 testing is not to be an
endurance or durability test, but a test of as-new hardware. This
purpose is apparent in the structure of the rule compared with several
other FMVSSs. When there are endurance and/or wear requirements in the
FMVSSs, these requirements are apparent (i.e., they are titled
``durability'' or ``endurance'' tests) or are specifically written to
indicate minimum required durability limits.\58\ For example, FMVSS No.
106 contains a water absorption and whip resistance requirement, which
identifies both the length of time the hose sample will be submerged
under water, and how long the hose sample will be flexed.\59\ There are
numerous other examples in FMVSS No. 106 and other FMVSSs of this style
of endurance testing that establishes a minimum durability performance.
FMVSS No. 127 contains no such provisions. It was not written to, and
is not intended to, set endurance or wear limits on the base equipment
making up the AEB system. Instead, FMVSS No. 127 is intended to ensure
a minimum level of performance of AEB systems. The only expected wear
on the components is what is necessary for establishing a repeatable
test, which is specified in the test procedures (i.e., brake
burnishing). In the event that wear and tear result in an apparent non-
compliance during agency testing, the agency would not consider these
tests valid. The Agency has demonstrated, through decades of testing,
the competency to determine if wear is the source of an apparent non-
compliance, be it by conducting additional testing, disassembly and
visual inspection, and other similar methods. Finally, any specific
limits on preconditioning driving time or test runs would be
[[Page 93211]]
arbitrary. Therefore, given that that FMVSS No. 127 does not establish
an endurance or durability test, NHTSA determined it is not necessary
to specify such limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ See, e.g., FMVSS No. 108, S14.9.3.6, Turn signal flasher
durability test; FMVSS No. 111, S5.5.7, Durability and S14.3,
Durability test procedures; FMVSS No. 139, S6.3 Tire Endurance; and
FMVSS No. 209, S4.2(d) and S5.1(d), which establish a test for the
resistance of seat belt webbing to abrasion.
\59\ S5.3.7, Water absorption and whip resistance (``A hydraulic
brake hose assembly, after immersion in water for 70 hours (S6.5),
shall not rupture when run continuously on a flexing machine for 35
hours (S6.3).'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, manufacturers misunderstand the purpose of the pretest
conditioning language. The initial conditions contained in S6, S7, S8,
and S9, are written to prevent designing the AEB system to sense
specific pre-conditions of the test. They are not intended to enable
the agency to conduct durability testing. For instance, petitioners
expressed concern that the standard states that the agency will drive
the vehicle in any direction for any amount of time prior to the start
of the test. However, additional conditions listed in S6 state that
consumable fluids (including fuel), or battery charge for electric
vehicles, will be between 5 and 100 percent. Additionally, the
initialization conditions state that the vehicle will be driven at a
speed of 10 km/h or higher for at least one minute prior to testing and
subsequently the starting system is not cycled off prior to testing.
Because the starting system is cycled off during fuelling, these
conditions provide a practical and realistic limit on the amount of
time the agency can drive the vehicle during preconditioning prior to
any single test. Therefore, petitioners' concerns regarding ``unlimited
pretest driving'' are misplaced.
As such, reconsideration is unnecessary to resolve petitioners'
concerns. Therefore, NHTSA declines to amend the final rule on this
issue.
E. Malfunction Indicator Lamp
The final rule requires that vehicles must detect AEB system
malfunctions and notify the driver of any malfunction that causes the
AEB system not to meet the minimum proposed performance requirements.
The Alliance and Volkswagen stated that the requirement that the
malfunction indicator lamp (MIL) illuminate under all malfunction
conditions, including sensor degradation, and under all possible
conditions of ``adjustments in performance'' lacks objectivity and
practicability. The Alliance petitioned NHTSA to issue an SNPRM that
would define each malfunction requiring MIL illumination and include an
associated test procedure. It did not provide any additional data or
analysis beyond what has already been considered in comments to the
NPRM.
The Alliance noted that while the requirement for activating a MIL
in the event of a malfunction in an AEB system is consistent with other
FMVSSs, the final rule neither explicitly defines malfunction nor
provides the associated test procedures. Several petitioners requested
an objective definition of ``malfunction.'' The Alliance pointed out
that FMVSS No. 135 specifies conditions for MIL activation, and FMVSS
No. 138 provides malfunction conditions and test procedure for the tire
pressure monitoring system. In contrast, it stated, ``malfunction'' in
FMVSS No. 127 is not defined and could include sensor degradation,
which exceeds typical MIL illumination requirements in the FMVSSs. It
stated that without a clear definition, manufacturers may determine a
malfunction at their discretion and adjust AEB performance to any
performance level, including complete deactivation, that does not meet
the requirements of the final rule. The Alliance stated that if its
interpretation is correct, the standard should clearly specify the
allowance to adjust AEB systems, including complete deactivation,
during a defined malfunction state.
Additionally, the Alliance stated that NHTSA did not establish an
objective test procedure for automatically detecting system changes
that may affect AEB performance. The Alliance stated that the
requirement to detect vehicle owner's modifications that could render
the AEB system non-compliant is boundless and lacks specific, objective
performance criteria and test procedures, unlike other FMVSSs. For
example, FMVSS No. 138 provides specific test procedures where the MIL
must illuminate when an incompatible tire is installed. In contrast,
the final rule does not limit or specify the types of owner
modifications that may trigger MIL illumination, making it unreasonable
to expect manufacturers to anticipate and develop detection strategies
for every possible modification scenario. It stated that, as a result,
the MIL requirement is not objective.
Toyota petitioned for reconsideration of MIL requirements and
incorporated the Alliance's petition into its own. Additionally, Toyota
provided a description of its understanding of the malfunction
requirements. It read the requirements to allow discretion to the
manufacturer to design a malfunction detection feature--including what
elements to monitor and what is considered a malfunction. It also
stated that if a malfunction is identified, the standard permits the
manufacturer, at its discretion, to adjust the performance of the
vehicle such that it will not meet the requirements specified in
paragraphs S5.1, S5.2, or S5.3, including completely deactivating the
AEB system, and illuminate the telltale. It said it understood the
agency's intent to be that manufacturers must design vehicles with a
malfunction detection feature, and that the vehicle must display a
telltale when a malfunction is detected and allow the vehicle to adjust
the performance of the AEB system or deactivate it in response to
malfunctions.
Toyota agreed with NHTSA that malfunctions should be detected based
on the system design. Toyota argued that if the AEB system cannot be
deactivated in cases of performance degradation, such as from sensor
misalignment, it could result in false-positive activations potentially
creating safety disbenefits. However, it nonetheless argued that the
malfunction detection requirements are unclear and requested
reconsideration. It noted that NHTSA had rejected suggested language
from Bosch regarding malfunction detection on the basis that it was not
workable for an FMVSS and lacked objectivity.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA will not adjust the malfunction detection requirements. NHTSA
considered comments on malfunction detection in the final rule.
Petitioners broadly expressed confusion about the term ``malfunction''
and about what conditions the indicator lamp must illuminate. However,
Toyota, in its petition, correctly summarized the requirements,
indicating that it understood the requirement as written. Nonetheless,
we respond to certain issues raised in the petitions to clarify our
intent.
Toyota is correct that, when a malfunction is detected, the system
is permitted to reduce functionality and it must show the telltale. The
intent behind the requirement is for systems to self-diagnose issues
that cause them to perform at a level below that required by the FMVSS,
adjust performance as the system determines is appropriate, and alert
the operator. In contrast to how petitioners describe the requirement,
the standard does not require AEB systems to detect all possible
conditions (or owner modifications) that could reduce functionality.
Rather it requires the system to be able to make detections regarding
malfunctions and conditions that cause performance degradations, allows
the system to adjust performance if it makes such a detection, and
requires the system to alert the operator if such an adjustment is
made.
As is customary with NHTSA's standards, the laboratory compliance
[[Page 93212]]
test procedures will specify how NHTSA intends to run its compliance
test regarding illumination of a malfunction telltale. However, NHTSA
is not specifying these in the regulation. The conditions under which
the malfunction lamp are required to illuminate are sufficiently
defined in the FMVSS, which is enough information for manufacturers to
certify to the requirement. Although NHTSA is also not specifying in
the regulatory text how an internal malfunction is generated, test
procedures for MIL requirements typically involve creating an obvious
failure condition, such as disconnecting the power source to the
system, and determining if the MIL illuminates.
NHTSA will not specify instances of ``malfunction.'' NHTSA received
and fully considered comment on this issue. The range of possible
malfunctions is sufficiently broad that such an approach would be
unlikely to meet the need for safety because it would omit many
possible malfunctions from the MIL requirement. As Toyota stated, what
constitutes a malfunction is specific to the design of each AEB system,
and manufacturers are best positioned to determine when a circumstance
exists that causes performance to be impeded.
Furthermore, petitioners are incorrect when they state that the MIL
requirement is not objective or practicable because the term
``malfunction'' is not given a regulatory definition. The MIL
requirement in FMVSS No. 127 is stated in objective terms. It ties the
requirement to illuminate the MIL upon performance adjustment to the
performance requirements for AEB systems. These performance
requirements are stated in objective terms. The MIL requirement is
therefore also stated in objective terms.
Finally, the Alliance attempts to reference the MIL requirement in
FMVSS No. 138 as a contrasting example of a MIL requirement that is
objective. However, FMVSS No. 138, like FMVSS No. 127, does not provide
an explicit definition of ``malfunction,'' instead applying the
performance requirement ``to a malfunction that affects the generation
or transmission of control or response signals.'' \60\ The approach
undertaken in FMVSS No. 127 is analogous: it specifies the AEB system
performance requirements, stated in objective terms, as the relevant
comparison. Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is
denying the petitions for reconsideration on this issue and is not
changing the MIL requirements from those stated in FMVSS No. 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ 49 CFR 571.138.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Deactivation
The final rule includes an explicit prohibition against
manufacturers installing a control designed for the sole purpose of
deactivation of the AEB system, except in certain cases relating to law
enforcement. The final rule does, however, allow for controls that have
the ancillary effect of deactivating the AEB system, such as during
low-range four-wheel drive configurations, when the driver selects
``tow mode,'' or when another vehicle system is activated that will
have a negative ancillary impact on AEB operation. It also allows for
automatic deactivation in the malfunction circumstances described in
the previous section.
1. Manual Deactivation
The Alliance and Volkswagen petitioned NHTSA to allow manual
deactivation of the AEB system. Petitioners pointed out scenarios in
which they state that AEB operation can be inappropriate or potentially
hazardous. These include racetrack usage, off-road driving that
requires manoeuvring around obstacles, off-road driving without low
range or gear options, road infrastructure causing false positives,
support vehicles for cycling races, and similar situations or dynamic
driving events involving interactions with other vehicles. The Alliance
also raised several scenarios where vehicles are used on public roads
but under non-normal conditions, such as during parades, car shows, or
sport events where vehicles are operated in close proximity to
pedestrians and other vehicles. Petitioners stated that the automatic
deactivation provision is inadequate to address these scenarios. The
Alliance noted that, since AEB systems might not automatically
differentiate between tracks or parking lots and public roads, they
could potentially intervene during dynamic driving manoeuvres,
disrupting the driver and posing a risk to nearby vehicles. Moreover,
the Alliance noted concerns about the ``automatic deactivation only''
approach for installed equipment, using snowplows as an example,
stating that the final rule does not cover all potentially unsafe
scenarios. For instance, installing equipment like a roof-mounted
kayak, canoe, or ski rack with parts overhanging the front windshield
could cause sensors to detect shapes that might not lead to a
malfunction but could inadvertently trigger AEB operation. Thus, it
requested that drivers have the ability to disable AEB systems to
resolve these circumstances.
The Alliance also requested expansion of the language in S5.4.3 of
the final rule, which applies only to vehicles operating in a low-range
four-wheel drive configuration, to include certain modern vehicle
configurations, like those with all-wheel drive system without a
transfer case or electrical vehicles using only electric motors or a
combination of combustion-driven axles and electric motors, which may
not have a low-range system but are still capable of off-road
operations. Thus, the Alliance argued, NHTSA should broaden the
applicability of S5.4.3 to include vehicles operating in any off-road
mode or mode designated to the driver as appropriate for low-speed off-
road operations.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA will not adjust the requirements regarding deactivation.
NHTSA received and considered comments on automatic and manual
deactivation of AEB systems. After consideration of those comments,
NHTSA determined that allowing automatic deactivation pursuant to the
circumstances in S5.4.2.2 would be practicable and most effectively
meet the need for safety because it allows for controls that have the
ancillary effect of deactivating the AEB while preventing installation
of a control with the sole purpose of enabling driver disablement of
AEB systems. NHTSA believes that the current regulatory text, which
allows AEB deactivation ``when another vehicle system is activated that
will have a negative ancillary impact on AEB operation,'' is
sufficiently broad to encompass the vehicle types that the Alliance
raises. Furthermore, the purpose of S5.4.3 is to exempt vehicles that
have four-wheel drive modes, selected by mechanical controls that
cannot be automatically reset electrically, from the requirement that
any AEB deactivation be reset by the ignition cycle. For other vehicles
(such as those with all-wheel drive), the agency expects that AEB will
reactivate when the vehicle is in a drive mode that allows for AEB
activation, and when the vehicle's ignition/power is cycled on/off.
Petitioners' stated concerns about operation of vehicles with no
manual AEB deactivation in unusual circumstances do not justify
reconsideration. As we discussed in the final rule regarding front-
mounted equipment, a well-designed AEB system will be able to detect
and automatically deactivate to accommodate roof-mounted equipment such
as kayaks or
[[Page 93213]]
ski racks that may overhang the front windshield. We are also
unpersuaded by requests that the final rule allow manual deactivation
to account for various racing or track scenarios. The allowance in
S5.4.2.2 provides relief for some of these vehicles. Additionally, our
requirements apply to motor vehicles, which the Safety Act defines as a
vehicle ``manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and
highways.'' \61\ Therefore, if a manufacturer chooses to produce a
racing vehicle designed for use on public roads it must meet the
minimum safety requirements. The fact that it may be used in a racing
environment does not in and of itself justify a manual deactivation
feature. Manufacturers may design racing vehicles not for use on public
roads that do not meet the FMVSS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ 49 U.S.C. 30102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. UNECE Regulation No. 152
Volkswagen and the Alliance requested reconsideration of the
agency's decision to disallow a manual deactivation feature based on
data submitted by Volkswagen. Petitioners stated that data collected in
Europe showed that, among a fleet of over 30,000 UNECE Regulation No.
152 compliant vehicles which collectively took more than 12 million
trips, only 0.2 percent of the vehicles deactivated their AEB systems
more than 10 times. According to petitioners, this data indicates that
less than 0.005 percent of all trips involved AEB deactivation and that
while drivers did use the manual deactivation feature, they did so very
rarely. Thus, they argued that allowing the manual deactivation
feature, with appropriate multi-step procedures to prevent inadvertent
deactivation, would not significantly diminish the overall benefits of
AEB systems.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded that the data provided by Volkswagen
demonstrates that NHTSA should adopt the approach taken by UNECE
Regulation No. 152. Generally, the driving environment (road and lane
design, etc.) and driver habits in the United States differ
substantially from those in Europe, and there is also significant
variation within European nations. These differences may result in
differences in how drivers interact with AEB technology. The
petitioners did not present evidence that data from the European market
accurately represents driver behaviour in the U.S. market. In view of
the safety concerns expressed in the final rule and by commenters,
harmonization alone is an insufficient justification for allowing a
control to deactivate the AEB system. As a result, we will not adopt
the UNECE Regulation No. 152 approach.
Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petitions for reconsideration regarding amending the automatic
deactivation provision or the restriction on installing a manual
deactivation control.
G. Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test Correction
The final rule contains a test scenario in which an obstructed
pedestrian enters the path of the vehicle from the right.
In its petition for reconsideration, the Alliance argued this
performance test requirement demonstrates that the final rule is
impracticable. The Alliance asked NHTSA to reduce the maximum test
speed and align the headways more closely with the results of NHTSA's
testing.
The Alliance provided a case study of a narrow vehicle avoiding
contact with the test mannequin using the boundary conditions specified
in the rule and realistic vehicle stopping dynamics (a peak braking
acceleration of 0.9 g and an initial braking rate of 3 g/s). The
Alliance stated in its analysis that, when using nominal tolerances on
the location of the vehicle test device relative to the subject vehicle
positioning, the vehicle with a width of 1570 mm (61.8 in) had
approximately 0.35 seconds to identify the crossing pedestrian and
begin braking. However, in its analysis, when that same subject vehicle
was at the maximum distance away from the intended travel path, and the
vehicle test device was located as close to the side of the subject
vehicle, only 0.15 seconds were available to react to the crossing
mannequin. The Alliance stated that a response time of 0.15 seconds is
beyond the capabilities of any AEB system and is not practicable.
Agency Analysis
Agency calculations confirmed the issue raised by the Alliance
regarding the perception time in obstructed pedestrian testing at the
maximum allowable test tolerances. However, the agency does not agree
that this finding is an indication of the standard's fundamental
impracticability. Therefore, NHTSA is amending the requirement to align
with the intent of the scenario to ensure that the specified tolerances
do not result in an unintentionally stringent test.
The final rule specified that subject vehicles would nominally be a
meter away from the side of the vehicle test device when performing
obstructed pedestrian testing. As the Alliance highlighted, the
tolerance of the subject vehicle relative to the intended travel path
(+/- 0.15 m), and the tolerance of the vehicle test device relative to
the side of the subject vehicle (+/- 0.1 m) could add up such that the
minimum distance could be 0.75 m instead of the intended 1 m. The
reduction of the intended distance between the vehicle and the
pedestrian mannequin by 25 percent has a significant impact on how much
time the system has to determine whether to initiate braking.
Additionally, as the Alliance highlighted, because we were primarily
determining the vehicle test device location relative to the side of
the subject vehicle, the narrower the vehicle, the less time that
vehicle has to perceive the obstructed pedestrian and decide to begin
braking. For narrower vehicles, this scenario renders the test more
stringent than NHTSA intended.
To address the issue, the agency is adjusting how the tolerances
are defined in S8.3.3, so that at most, the vehicle test device is not
less than 1.0 m away from the 0 percent overlap point (the right side
of the vehicle). For vehicles up to 2.05 m (79.5 in) wide, which is a
majority of passenger cars, the left side of the vehicle test device
will be no less than 2.2 m away from the intended travel path. This
standard places the left side of the vehicle test device at least 1.15
m away from the right side of the subject vehicle, which accounts for
the +/- 0.15 m lateral tolerance of the subject vehicle relative to the
intended travel path prior to braking. To make sure testing is
consistent, and to make sure that testing stringency does not increase
for vehicles wider than 2.05 m (79.5 in), the left side of the vehicle
test device will be no less than 1.15 m away from the subject vehicle.
Therefore, NHTSA is amending the specifications for the obstructed
pedestrian crossing test.
H. FCW Auditory Signal
1. FCW Auditory Signal Requirements
The final rule requires the FCW auditory signal to have a high
fundamental frequency of at least 800 Hz, a tempo in the range of 6-12
pulses per second, and a duty cycle in the range of 0.25-0.95, and a
minimum intensity of 15-30 dB above the masked threshold.
The Alliance stated that the requirements related to the auditory
signal lack specificity and were therefore not objective. The Alliance
stated that the threshold sound level largely depends on the ambient
noise at
[[Page 93214]]
a given moment in time and conditions such as vehicle speed and engine,
tire/road, and wind noise. It concluded that for the requirement to be
objective, NHTSA must clearly define several key characteristics,
including the test conditions under which both the ambient noise and
the masked threshold are measured as well as the methodology to measure
and compute the sound level of the FCW warning and the noise separation
amount (i.e., 5 dB). The Alliance also stated that there may need to be
exceptions for high ambient noise conditions, such as convertibles with
an open top.
Volkswagen similarly commented that additional information relating
to compliance testing is needed such as details of the means and
conditions for measuring the reference noise level to which the
regulation will compare the FCW auditory signal and inquired whether
the vehicle's windows would be open and/or HVAC system would be active
during the testing. The Alliance, as part of its comments regarding the
audio suppression requirement (the remainder of which are discussed in
the next subsection), also requested additional conditions regarding
the ``masked threshold'' and how it will be assessed. Volkswagen also
questioned the meaning of ``quietest level'' in the masked threshold
definition and how to measure it. It further asked whether masked
threshold would be determined based on a person with normal hearing or
impaired hearing.
Agency Analysis
In response to petitions, NHTSA is incorporating additional
description of the conditions in which the FCW auditory requirements
must be met, detailing the location of the sound measurement device,
and replacing ``masked threshold'' with ``average noise level inside
the vehicle.'' We are incorporating them to ensure clarity and to
facilitate compliance.
We are adding several specifications to the FCW auditory
requirement. First, that the auditory signal requirements must be met
at the highest SV test speed (which is 100 km/h). Second, we are
specifying that the audio requirements are met with all vehicle
openings closed. This language is intended to clarify for certifying
entities that during the test, openings such as the windows, doors,
hood, rear hatch, and trunk will be closed, as will convertible tops.
Third, the provision now states that all subject vehicle sound-
producing systems or functions are set to off, other than those
necessary for performing testing under the rule. This language is
intended to describe systems such as the HVAC, windshield wipers, and
turn signals, which produce noise that may impact measurement of sound
inside the vehicle, but which are not necessary for testing. These
additions provide significant clarity regarding the conditions under
which the signal will be measured. The FMVSS already states that FCW
must operate under the conditions in S6, which includes items that may
impact the in-vehicle sound environment, such as the environmental
conditions, road conditions, subject vehicle conditions, and equipment.
Therefore, those conditions will not be further specified.
NHTSA is also incorporating the intended sound measurement
location, adjacent to a 50th percentile male driver's right ear tragion
point. This point is identified in the anthropometric data from a
NHTSA-sponsored study of the dimensions of 50th percentile male drivers
seated with a 25-degree seatback angle (``Anthropometry of Motor
Vehicle Occupants'').\62\ The tragion is an anthropometric point
situated in the notch just above the tragus of the ear and is located
614 mm vertically above the H point (hip location of a driver in the
driver seating position), 185 mm aft of the H point, and 83 mm to the
right of the H point.
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\62\ This report is the same as the one used as a basis for eye
midpoint location set in FMVSS No. 111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are also simplifying the baseline sound level against which the
FCW auditory signal intensity is compared by replacing the term
``masked threshold'' with ``average noise level inside the vehicle.''
We are also incorporating a description of how that level will be
determined: by measuring the noise level inside the vehicle over a 5-
second period under the conditions described above. This change
resolves items raised by petitioners regarding defining additional
aspects of the ``masked threshold'' as well as Volkswagen's petition
regarding the hearing ability of the reference driver by simplifying
the measurement to focus solely on the noise level inside the vehicle.
Therefore, NHTSA is incorporating these three changes to clarify
the requirements applicable to the FCW auditory warning.
2. In-Vehicle Audio Suppression Requirement
The final rule required that in-vehicle audio that is not related
to a safety purpose or safety system (i.e., entertainment and other
audio content not related to or essential for safe performance of the
driving task) must be muted, or reduced in volume to within 5 dB of the
masked threshold during presentation of the FCW auditory signal.
The Alliance requested reconsideration of the requirement. The
Alliance and Volkswagen stated that the requirement lacked objectivity
and a corresponding test procedure. The Alliance requested that NHTSA
eliminate the requirement or issue an SNPRM proposing to define the
audio sources that must be suppressed and ``safety purpose or safety
system'' sounds that are not required to be suppressed. It also asked
NHTSA to propose performance requirements defining the threshold for
when the audio suppression must begin, with an associated test
procedure. Finally, the Alliance argued that NHTSA did not adequately
consider consumer satisfaction concerns with the suppression
requirement and that consumers may be unaccustomed to it, believing
their audio is not working or seeking to disable the audio suppression
feature.
a. Types of Sounds that Must be Suppressed
The Alliance stated that the phrase ``not related to a safety
purpose or a safety system'' contains undefined terms that are not
explained except with a parenthetical reference to entertainment. The
Alliance, in its petition, noted that audio suppression systems cannot
distinguish between certain content that may or may not have a safety
purpose: for example, a radio broadcast of a talk show host versus a
radio broadcast of an emergency weather alert. It noted that the
language may result in suppression of broadcasts of FEMA's Integrated
Public Alert and Warning System, which the Alliance noted was
established by Executive Order 13407 to ensure that the public has
access to critical alerts about weather and other emergencies.
Petitioners also requested that NHTSA provide definitions indicating
which audio sources must be suppressed and which do not. The Alliance
mentioned examples for which it was not sure whether the suppression
requirement would apply, such as the HVAC, defroster, seat belt
reminder alarms, intelligent speeding assist indicators, and road
departure alerts.
Agency Analysis
In response to this petition, NHTSA is amending the language to
clarify that the requirement is to suppress audio not related to a
crash avoidance warning. The intent of the requirement was to ensure
that auditory signals unrelated to the vehicle's crash avoidance
response in an imminent crash avoidance
[[Page 93215]]
scenario would not interfere with the driver's perception of the FCW
and thereby hinder their opportunity to intervene and avoid a crash.
Given that petitioners' concerns appear to be regarding vagueness,
NHTSA is clarifying the requirement to reference a more specific set of
audio signals that should not be suppressed: in-vehicle audio that is
``not related to a crash avoidance system warning.'' \63\ NHTSA is also
removing the explanatory parenthetical associated with ``safety purpose
or safety system,'' as it is no longer applicable. This change also
resolves concerns with systems being able to distinguish between
regular and emergency broadcasts, because emergency broadcasts are not
related to a crash avoidance system warning and would therefore need to
be suppressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ The examples used by the petitioners, including ``seat belt
reminder alarms,'' ``intelligent speeding assist indicators,'' and
``road departure alerts,'' should be evaluated by the manufacturer
based on their propensity to assist a driver in avoiding a crash.
While NHTSA could have chosen to state that, for example, audio from
systems other than ``Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS)''
should be muted, the term ``ADAS'' has only been in use for
approximately a decade and may describe a broader array of alerts
than is appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the Alliance's question whether a vehicle's HVAC system
and window defrosting system should be considered in-vehicle audio,
they should not. In-vehicle audio is to be understood to refer to
auditory signals and content produced or transmitted by the vehicle for
the purpose of communicating information, entertainment, or other
purpose not related to or essential for safe performance of the driving
task. Although the regulation does not define ``audio,'' NHTSA's
understanding of the term is consistent with its plain meaning. For
example, Webster's dictionary defines the noun, ``audio,'' to refer to
``an audio signal.'' \64\ Cambridge Dictionary defines the noun
``audio'' to mean ``a sound recording, or recorded sound.'' \65\ These
definitions suggest ``audio'' to refer to purposeful sounds emitted to
communicate or provide some form of information (including
entertainment). Noise stemming from the operation of HVAC systems or
windshield defrosters would not be considered ``in-vehicle audio.'' On
the other hand, auditory navigation instructions are considered audio
and are subject to the suppression prevision. Therefore, the regulation
is clear as written.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/audio (accessed
7/29/2024).
\65\ https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/audio
(accessed 7/29/2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The arguments regarding consumer acceptance are not persuasive. An
FCW alert is only required in a crash-imminent scenario, and the muting
of in-vehicle audio would be accompanied by the FCW audio signal. In
such a crash-imminent scenario, it is not evident that the muting of
in-vehicle audio would be of any concern to a driver.
Additionally, in responding to this petition, NHTSA examined 15
model year 2016-2024 light vehicle models from 12 manufacturers to
determine whether in-vehicle audio muting during FCW presentation was
employed. Of 15 models examined, 11 models from 10 manufacturers were
found to mute in-vehicle audio during FCW presentation. A twelfth
vehicle (2022 Hyundai Tucson) reduced the volume of in-vehicle audio
during FCW presentation. Three models did not appear to mute or reduce
the volume of in-vehicle audio during FCW presentation (2022 Honda
Odyssey, 2023 Nissan Pathfinder, and 2022 Subaru Outback). Aside from
in-vehicle audio suppression during FCW, in-vehicle audio suppression
under other circumstances is already present vehicles today as well.
For example, some current vehicles mute in-vehicle audio while the
vehicle's transmission is in reverse gear. Audio sources in the vehicle
can also be muted by apps on a phone connected to the vehicle, such as
the Ring app (camera motion notifications will mute vehicle audio
sources) and the Waze navigation app, which mutes vehicle audio sources
while audio route instructions and other app-based verbal information
is provided. Given the ubiquity of suppression of in-vehicle audio
during FCW presentation, as well as other vehicle features and phone
apps that suppress the vehicle's entertainment system and other in-
vehicle audio, the petitioner's contention that customers will find the
required audio suppression during FCW presentation to be unfamiliar and
cause dissatisfaction is not compelling.
b. FCW Presentation and Suppression Timing
The Alliance stated that the suppression requirement is not
objective because it lacks a definition of ``presentation,'' and
information regarding when the FCW must present or when suppression of
in-vehicle audio must occur (such as whether it must occur immediately
upon FCW presentation or within a specified period of time). It noted
that NCAP, IIHS, and European procedures all contain a TTC value for
when the FCW must present. Volkswagen and the Alliance also petitioned
regarding the lack of an objective test methodology for the suppression
requirement.
Agency Analysis
Petitioners' arguments do not justify reconsideration on this
issue. NHTSA is not incorporating a specified timing at which the FCW
signal's onset must occur, a definition of ``presentation,'' or a
regulatory test procedure for evaluating the suppression requirement.
FCW is required without an associated timing requirement because there
is no regulatory safety need to require FCW at for any particular
amount of time prior to automatic braking. Therefore, the FMVSS gives
manufacturers flexibility in determining the timing of the FCW
presentation for their vehicles.
NHTSA will also not provide a definition of ``presentation''
because the plain meaning of the term and its use in context is not
vague or unclear.\66\ The term is used only once in the regulatory text
to describe the suppression requirement. Additionally, ``FCW onset'' is
defined as the first moment in time when a forward collision warning is
provided. In understanding the meaning of ``presentation,''
manufacturers may consider viewing ``FCW onset'' as the moment at which
``presentation'' begins, and that ``presentation'' encompasses the
entire time that the audible signal is active. Additionally, given the
short, approximately 1-2 second duration of most FCW auditory signals,
any delay in suppressing other audio content could hinder the driver's
ability to perceive the warning. As such, onset of the muting of in-
vehicle audio should be simultaneous with the onset of the FCW auditory
signal. There is no reason to believe, and petitioners did not suggest,
that AEB systems are incapable of sending concurrent commands to
initiate both FCW presentation and muting of in-vehicle audio or that
response times for sending commands to initiate the FCW and the
suppression would be different. Therefore, NHTSA does not expect
substantial delay in suppression.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ For example, Cambridge Dictionary defines ``presentation''
as a noun meaning ``the act of giving or showing something, or the
way in which something is given or shown.'' https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/presentation
(accessed 7/31/2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding a test procedure, the changes in this rule resolve many
of the questions petitioners had regarding vehicle state and sound
measurement such that manufacturers have clear guidance on the
suppression requirement. Therefore, no additional test procedure will
be added. However,
[[Page 93216]]
for clarity below we describe straightforward and readily apparent
steps we expect to take in evaluating the requirement.
NHTSA anticipates recording and evaluating audio data during the
performance of the test scenario including the activation of FCW, and
manufacturers may reasonably certify to the suppression requirement by
using any of the required test scenarios while audio content subject to
the muting requirement is playing (e.g., music). The first opportunity
to measure the muted or reduced audio level would be during the period
after the first FCW auditory signal pulse and before the start of the
second pulse. Sound level would be recorded beginning some time before
the onset of FCW and through the end of FCW presentation. Recorded
audio data would be analyzed to extract sound level (in dB) values
during the FCW pulse and the period between the first and second FCW
auditory signal pulse. The sound level between pulses would be analyzed
to demonstrate that the sound level had been reduced to the required
level of within 5 dB of the average noise level inside the vehicle.
For these reasons, no reconsideration is needed on this issue.
I. FCW Visual Signal
The final rule states that the FCW visual signal must be located
within an ellipse that extends 18 degrees vertically and 10 degrees
horizontally of the driver forward line of sight based on the forward-
looking eye midpoint (Mf) as described in S14.1.5. of FMVSS No. 111. It
also requires that the signal include the crash pictorial symbol in SAE
J2400 and that the visual signal be red and steady burning.
Both the Alliance and Volkswagen stated that the requirements are
insufficient to be objective or for evaluating compliance and requested
several revisions to the rule. The Alliance requested that NHTSA issue
an SNPRM to propose performance requirements and test procedures.
In response to the petitions, NHTSA has determined that
reconsideration is warranted on some of the items and is making changes
to the regulatory text to ensure clarity in the requirements. However,
comment was sought on these issues in the NPRM, and NHTSA has
determined that no additional opportunity for comment is necessary, as
explained in section IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices.\67\
Therefore, NHTSA will not issue an SNPRM, and is finalizing the changes
herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Pursuant to 49 CFR 553.37, and in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
553, the Administrator has the discretion to make a final decision
or seek further comment when reconsidering a rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. FCW Visual Signal Size
In its petition, the Alliance stated that the FCW visual signal
requirements do not define the size of the FCW symbol.
NHTSA is not incorporating a size requirement for the FCW visual
signal because there is no need for such a requirement. Not specifying
a minimum or maximum FCW visual signal size provides manufacturers some
flexibility in how the symbol is implemented for their system.
2. Dimensions of the FCW Visual Signal Location Elliptical Area
Volkswagen requested clarification of the regulatory language
regarding the required location of the FCW visual signal. Volkswagen
noted that S5.1.1(b)(1) of the regulation states that ``[t]he visual
signal must be located within an ellipse that extends 18 degrees
vertically . . . of the driver forward line of sight,'' but that it is
not clear whether this language means 18 degrees or 9 degrees from the driver's line of sight.
NHTSA grants reconsideration on this issue and is amending the
regulation to provide clarity. The regulatory language was intended to
specify an elliptical cone extending 18 degrees vertically
and 10 degrees horizontally from the driver's line of
sight. Therefore, a plus-minus sign will be added.
3. Clarify Whether the FCW Visual Signal Needs To Be Fully Within the
Ellipse
Volkswagen stated that the requirements were unclear as to whether
the entire FCW visual icon or only a portion of it must be located
within the bounds of the elliptical cone.
Reconsideration is justified on this issue. NHTSA intended the
regulation to require that the required FCW symbol must be presented
fully within the defined elliptical area and is updating the regulatory
text to reflect this intent. NHTSA is incorporating the word ``symbol''
after ``visual signal'' in the S5.1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the symbol
is what must be located within the specified area. If a manufacturer
chooses to provide any additional visual warning components (e.g.,
illuminating the perimeter of the instrument panel, or surrounding the
symbol with an illuminated, color-shaded shape), the additional
components are not required to be located within the specified
elliptical area.
4. Reference to FMVSS No. 111
The Alliance and Volkswagen stated that S5.1.1(b) of the final rule
requires the visual signal to be located in an ellipse formed around
the forward-looking eye midpoint of the driver ``as described in
S14.1.5 of FMVSS No. 111'' but does not specify the driver seat
position and seat back angle or the steering wheel adjustment like
FMVSS No. 111 does.
Reconsideration is justified on this issue. Although explicitly
stating these details is not essential because to accurately locate the
driver eye midpoint ``test reference point'' as defined in FMVSS No.
111 S14.1.5 it is necessary to follow the ``Driver Seat Positioning''
specifications in S14.1.2.5, NHTSA is changing the regulatory text for
clarity to refer to S14 of FMVSS No. 111 instead of only S14.1.5. This
change incorporates the relevant information from FMVSS No. 111.
J. Cost Estimates
The Alliance argued that the agency did not adequately consider the
costs of the requirements, including consideration of the disbenefits
that might be induced by the new standard. It requested that NHTSA
revise its cost assessment to consider more realistic assessments of
the hardware additions and other changes that will be required by the
final rule, as well as identify and quantify the disbenefits in terms
of increased rear-end collisions and other crashes that will be induced
by the final rule, at least for several more years. In its petition,
the Alliance argued that the conclusions in the FRIA are not based on
the rulemaking record or on the facts in the market and led NHTSA to
substantially underestimate the costs of compliance with the new
standard. Based on a survey of its members, the Alliance stated that
the additional costs to make current systems compliant range from $200
per vehicle on the low end to $4,200 per vehicle on the high end. The
Alliance also claimed that NHTSA mischaracterized a meeting NHTSA had
with Robert Bosch LLC (Bosch) regarding the percentage of vehicles in
the fleet that may need hardware improvements.
Volkswagen stated the cost analysis as reported in the FRIA does
not represent the true cost of the final rule. For example, Volkswagen
argued, the requirements of the final rule cannot be reasonably met
with existing vacuum brake systems, and the PAEB requirements under
conditions of darkness may necessitate infrared cameras. It stated that
NHTSA did not
[[Page 93217]]
account for the costs for additional hardware in its analysis.
Agency Analysis
The Alliance and Volkswagen's claims that the final rule did not
adequately consider costs in improvements in AEB technology are
mistaken. The Alliance's cost estimates are not correct estimates of
the cost of compliance with the final rule because they include the
cost of including head-up display (HUD) and lidar, neither of which are
required to meet the requirements and account for a large portion of
that higher estimate.
Additionally, the final rule fully considered the cost concerns
raised by petitioners. NHTSA sought and received comment regarding
hardware costs. Comments did not indicate the incremental cost
associated with additional hardware commenters believed was necessary
to achieve the requirements or the percentage of new light vehicles
that they believe would require additional hardware. Nevertheless, the
cost analysis in the FRIA accounted for a small number of new light
vehicles that may need additional hardware for their existing AEB
systems, such as an additional camera or radar, by including the
incremental cost of adding radar to five percent of new light
vehicles.\68\ The Alliance disputed the 5 percent figure, noting that
the information NHTSA received from Bosch suggests larger improvements
are needed, and NHTSA received a letter from Bosch clarifying the
figure.\69\ NHTSA appreciates Bosch's clarification. However, even if
NHTSA accepts for the sake of argument that the incremental cost
estimate undercounts that percentage of new light vehicles that need
additional improvements in computing power or sensing technologies,
NHTSA's analysis fully considered these costs because the FRIA also
included a sensitivity analysis.\70\ The sensitivity analysis found
that even in the case that 50 percent of new light vehicles would need
to add radar to their current hardware and all new light vehicles
needed a software upgrade, the final rule would remain highly net
beneficial. The FRIA also includes a breakeven analysis that estimates
the per-vehicle cost at which net benefits would be zero. Therefore,
NHTSA's cost and benefits estimates for AEB system hardware and
software were sufficient to support the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ One possible result of this assumption is that the cost
analysis may in fact overestimate those incremental hardware costs
because some vehicle manufacturers may add an additional camera at a
lower cost than radar.
\69\ Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1077. The letter states that the
5 percent figure ``is a significant misunderstanding and/or
mischaracterization of the information provided by Bosch'' and that
Bosch was describing only a rough estimate of the share of Bosch-
supplied AEB systems in the U.S. market that are mono-camera. Bosch
also emphasized, both in the presentation given to NHTSA and in its
comments on the NPRM, that certain models may require significant
hardware updates such as improved sensors as well as computing power
and/or improved brake systems.
\70\ The sensitivity analysis in the FRIA for hardware
considered the case in which 10, 20, or 50 percent of new light
vehicles would need either an additional camera or radar to meet the
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA's analysis also considered comments and the available data
regarding whether the final rule would necessitate improvements in
vehicles' foundational braking system and found that it would not. The
agency found that vehicles subject to the final rule would already be
equipped with brakes that give them the braking capabilities to meet
the performance requirements specified in the final rule.\71\ The FRIA
discussed a summary of the braking test results from FMVSS No. 135
testing.\72\ In all cases, vehicles covered by the final rule exceed
the minimum requirements of the braking standards. The results further
indicate that baseline vehicles already have the braking capabilities
necessary to meet the minimum requirements for AEB. Additionally, NHTSA
believes that the most cost-effective way (lowest cost option) for
manufacturers to meet the requirements of FMVSS No. 127 is through
tunning and calibration of the AEB systems rather than through
increased braking capacity or additional brake hardware such as
electro-hydraulic brake actuators. As NHTSA's analysis focuses on the
lowest cost option that is estimated to be capable of meeting the final
rule and the lowest cost option does not necessitate increased braking
capacity, the costs incurred by increasing the foundational braking
system were not considered. That being said, the agency provides
flexibility in how manufacturers construct their AEB systems to meet
the requirements and they may well choose to include brakes with
increased capabilities. At any rate, the breakeven and sensitivity
analyses demonstrate that even with significant per-vehicle hardware
costs beyond those estimated in the FRIA, the final rule would remain
cost-beneficial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ FRIA at 40.
\72\ FRIA, Table 267. The Alliance's stated concerns with the
relevance of this test data are discussed in Section II.A.1.b
``FMVSS No. 135 Test Data'' of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lastly, petitioners simultaneously claim that the final rule is
impracticable but also that the requirements can only be met if certain
hardware improvements are made. Given that the final rule would be
economically practicable even with sizable increases in compliance
costs, these statements are contradictory. Indeed, petitioners' claims
regarding cost support the notion that the final rule is practicable by
acknowledging the availability of technologies that can enable vehicles
to meet the requirements.
Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petitions for reconsideration regarding NHTSA's cost estimates.
K. Brake Pedal Robot
The final rule specified how the brake pedal force is applied
during testing conducted with manual brake application. It left to the
manufacturer the discretion to select the braking method that NHTSA
will use when NHTSA tests the manufacturer's vehicles.
Volkswagen requested reconsideration of the decision not to provide
specifications for the brake pedal robot used in the manual braking
tests. It stated that differences in test equipment between the
agency's test contractors and the vehicle manufacturer could lead to
inconsistencies in performance.
NHTSA received comments on this issue (including from Volkswagen)
and responded to them in the final rule. NHTSA clarified that the rule
does not require use of a specified braking robot. The final rule
specifies the brake pedal force application during testing, leaving it
to the manufacturer's discretion to select the braking method for
NHTSA's testing of its vehicles. The specification is sufficient to
ensure test repeatability, especially given manufacturers' lengthy
experience with braking robots in AEB testing. Since the petitioner did
not present any new information that would warrant reconsidering the
agency's prior conclusion, no reconsideration is necessary, and we are
denying the petition for reconsideration regarding the brake pedal
robot specifications.
L. Manual Transmission
Glickenhaus petitioned NHTSA to reconsider and amend the standard
to only require FCW (i.e., not AEB) for vehicles with manual
transmission. Glickenhaus stated that substantial slowing or stopping
from highway speeds in a vehicle with a manual transmission will stall
the vehicle without manually shifting or engaging the clutch. It stated
that sudden unnecessary braking caused by the final rule will cause a
vehicle with a manual
[[Page 93218]]
transmission to stall, thereby reducing the functionality of the
brakes. A stalled vehicle, Glickenhaus stated, can create an
unreasonable risk if the vehicle is on the highway and cannot move out
of the way. Further, Glickenhaus stated that NHTSA's existing standards
have a precedent of differentiating requirements and testing procedures
for manual transmissions from those for automatic transmissions where
the technology requires. Glickenhaus provided examples of those
standards and what it stated are the relevant sections. Additionally,
Glickenhaus stated that one FMVSS testing facility it works with
confirmed that whenever it runs AEB tests on any vehicle with an
automatic transmission,\73\ the vehicle always stalls. Glickenhaus also
stated that its manual gearbox supplier confirmed that will always be
the case, and that this stalling could damage the drivetrain.
Glickenhaus further stated that NHTSA recognizes that vehicle stalling,
especially when unexpected at highway speeds, is a ``substantial''
hazard. Glickenhaus also stated that drivers using manual transmissions
are more likely to be paying closer attention to the road than drivers
of vehicles with cruise control, or any level of ``self driving''
vehicle functionality. Glickenhaus's petition stated that requiring
only FCW for manual transmissions could increase safety by warning
drivers while allowing them to place the vehicle into neutral or press
the clutch to avoid stalling while braking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ In its petition, Petitioner may have intended to state
``manual'' instead of ``automatic'' here. Regardless, our response
to the petitioned-for request is the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded that the technical limitations of AEB with
manual transmission vehicles justifies excluding them from the AEB
requirement. Our review of the fleet shows that AEB technology already
exists for manual transmissions. Therefore, no reconsideration is
needed.
There are many light vehicles sold in the US which still offer
manual transmission as an option or standard.\74\ Several vehicles
equipped with manual transmissions, such as the 2024 Honda Civic Type
R,\75\ 2024 Ford Bronco \76\ and 2024 Nissan Z,\77\ also come with AEB
and PAEB as a standard feature. Due to the wide availability of
technology from various suppliers with AEB and manual transmissions,
NHTSA is not persuaded that only manual application of the clutch can
prevent a stall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g20734564/manual-transmission-cars/ (accessed August 26, 2024); https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g15379070/manual-transmission-suv/
(accessed August 26, 2024).
\75\ https://automobiles.honda.com/civic-type-r# (accessed
August 26, 2024).
\76\ https://www.ford.com/suvs/bronco/compare-models/?gnav=footer-shop (accessed August 26, 2024).
\77\ https://www.nissanusa.com/vehicles/sports-cars/nissan-z/specs-trims.html, accessed August 26, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA is also unpersuaded that drivers of manual transmission
vehicles are more engaged such that excluding them from the AEB
requirement would be justified. As noted in the final rule, the timing
of AEB and PAEB events do not always allow sufficient time for the
driver to react and apply the brakes when a FCW is presented,
regardless of the level of driver engagement.
Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petition for reconsideration regarding requiring only FCW for vehicles
with a manual transmission.
M. Small-Volume Manufacturers
The final rule did not alter requirements for small-volume
manufacturers but allowed an additional year for compliance for small-
volume manufacturers.
Glickenhaus, which produces around 30 vehicles annually subject to
the final rule, petitioned for reconsideration of the requirements for
small-volume manufacturers, stating that the standard would cause
substantial financial hardship. Glickenhaus stated it had contacted
Tier 1 suppliers about AEB systems and was informed that the hardware
for these systems is typically developed by larger manufacturers, and
there is not a baseline set of hardware and software available for
Glickenhaus to develop an AEB system for its very low volume vehicles.
It noted that developing AEB hardware takes years, and the software
calibration requires millions of miles of driving. Glickenhaus claims
it cannot produce enough cars and drive them long enough to gather the
necessary data to create compliant hardware and software for its very
low volume vehicles. Therefore, according to Glickenhaus, unless Tier 1
suppliers develop starting packages for small-volume manufacturers, it
would be impossible to develop a rule compliant AEB system within the
lead time provided.
Glickenhaus further emphasized the challenges of software
development, vehicle testing, and calibration miles, which it considers
nearly impossible to achieve within the given timeframe, even with an
additional year. It argued out that some manufacturers have spent over
20 years developing and testing AEB systems, and that the costs of
developing software and hardware for a driving automation system,
including AEB functions, can exceed $ 10 billion annually--figures that
the petitioner cannot manage.
Agency Analysis
The agency initially proposed that the requirements would not apply
to small-volume manufacturers until one year after the compliance date
set for other manufacturers. NHTSA received more than 1,000 comments on
the NPRM, including input from sensor developers that indicated that
the technologies required to meet the standard are already
available.\78\ In the final rule, the agency provided additional lead
time for all manufacturers and continued to provide small-volume
manufacturers an additional year beyond other manufacturers. Given the
comments we received and the availability of these systems, we expect
that small-volume manufacturers will be able to source rule-compliant
AEB systems for their vehicles from existing technologies without
incurring undue expenses in research and development.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ 89 FR 39686, 39727.
\79\ Id. at 39726-27, 39729, 39737.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, we acknowledge that there could be specific situations in
which it may be particularly challenging for small-volume manufacturers
to source systems. Without additional technical information regarding
why Tier 1 suppliers could not provide AEB systems to the petitioner,
we cannot provide further analysis regarding their circumstances.
However, if the petitioner believes that the standard will cause
substantial financial hardship and it has attempted to comply with the
standard in good faith, it may be able to seek a temporary exemption
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30113 and 49 CFR part 555, subject to a
determination that an exemption is consistent with the public interest.
Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is denying
Glickenhaus's petition for reconsideration of the requirements for
small-volume manufacturers.
III. Petition for Rulemaking Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. Include V2X
In addition to the petitions for reconsideration discussed above,
NHTSA also received a petition from Autotalks on June 26, 2024.
Pursuant to 49 CFR 553.35, petitions for reconsideration must be
received ``not later than 45 days after publication of
[[Page 93219]]
the rule in the Federal Register.'' Additionally, the regulation states
that ``[p]etitions filed after that time will be considered as
petitions filed under Part 552 of this chapter.'' \80\ Part 552 governs
petitions for rulemaking. Although Autotalks's petition requested
revision of the final rule, given that Autotalks's petition was
received by NHTSA more than 45 days after publication of the final
rule, NHTSA will treat that petition as a petition for rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ 49 CFR 553.35(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Part 552, when deciding on a petition for rulemaking
the agency conducts a technical review of the petition, which may
consist of an analysis of the material submitted, together with
information already in possession of the agency. In deciding whether to
grant or deny a petition, the agency considers this technical review as
well as appropriate factors, which include, among others, allocation of
agency resources and agency priorities.
In its petition, Autotalks requests incorporating a V2X transmitter
to the lead vehicle and activating it during the lead deceleration test
with a 12-meter gap (Table 1 to S7.1). Autotalks argues that this
requirement will allow the tested vehicle to use V2X to complement its
sensors. Autotalks provides technical information regarding the
capabilities and availability of V2X technology.
1. NHTSA's Consideration of the Petition and Decision
NHTSA has conducted an analysis of Autotalks's petition and, after
careful consideration, has decided to deny the petition and will not
initiate rulemaking proposing to require the installation and use of a
V2X transmitter in lead vehicle deceleration AEB testing with 12-meter
headway, for the reason stated below.
In November 2023, NHTSA withdrew a proposed rule which had proposed
to establish a new FMVSS mandating V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle)
communication technology in all new light vehicles.\81\ After reviewing
comments on the NPRM, NHTSA determined that, although V2V and V2X
technologies may improve safety and offer innovative services to
consumers, significant analysis would be needed before determining
whether a new V2V standard is appropriate, and, if so, what that
standard would encompass. NHTSA's position has not changed since then
and Autotalks has not provided information to change that position.
Therefore, NHTSA will not initiate a rulemaking to require V2X
technologies in AEB systems as a result of this petition. As we stated
in the November 2023 withdrawal notice, NHTSA will continue to monitor
the development of this technology for possible future vehicle safety
applications.
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\81\ 88 FR 80685.
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2. Conclusion
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 30162 and 49 CFR part 552, the
petition for rulemaking from Autotalks is denied.
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
This rule is a non-significant rule for purposes of Executive Order
(E.O.) 12886, as supplemented by E.O. 13563 and amended by E.O. 14094,
and will not impose any significant costs or have impacts beyond those
analyzed in the final rule published on May 9, 2024.\82\ DOT has
determined that the regulatory analyses conducted for the May 9, 2024
final rule remain applicable to this action. DOT makes these statements
on the basis that this final rule makes technical or clarifying changes
to FMVSS No. 127 as established in the May 9, 2024 final rule. In
addition, this final rule is not expected to impact the estimated costs
and benefits detailed in the final regulatory impact analysis included
in the docket listed in beginning of the final rule published on May 9,
2024.
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\82\ 89 FR 39686.
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NHTSA finds it has good cause to make these changes without notice
and comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 U.S.C.
551, et seq.). Section 553(b)(B) of the APA provides that, when an
agency for good cause finds that notice and public procedure are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest, the
agency may issue a rule without providing notice and an opportunity for
public comment. The May 2024 final rule is the product of an extensive
administrative record with opportunity for public comment on the issues
discussed in this final rule. The changes in this final rule are made
in response to petitions for reconsideration submitted to NHTSA in
response to and docketed in the record of the May 2024 final rule in
accordance with 49 CFR 553.35 and 49 CFR 553.37.\83\ In response to
those petitions, NHTSA makes only clarifying changes to the May 2024
final rule to align the regulatory text with the explanatory material
in the preamble of that final rule.
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\83\ These regulations grant to the Administrator the authority,
consistent with 5 U.S.C. 553b(B), to issue a final decision in
response to petitions for reconsideration without further
proceedings or with opportunity for further comment as the
Administrator deems appropriate.
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Specifically, NHTSA removes the term ``imminent'' from the
performance test requirement. This change resolves a point of confusion
expressed by petitioners and aligns the regulatory text with the intent
of the May 2024 rule as expressed in the preamble by clarifying that
the performance test does not evaluate AEB activation timing. NHTSA
also amends a test scenario in FMVSS No. 127 highlighted by petitioners
that, when tested with very narrow vehicles at the extreme of the
tolerances allowed by the test condition, resulted in a stringency
beyond that intended by NHTSA. NHTSA makes that amendment to ensure the
correct level of stringency. Petitioners also requested clarification
of the specifications in FMVSS No. 127 for the FCW visual signal
location. NHTSA amends the regulatory text to clarify these
specifications. Petitioners also expressed concerns about the clarity
and objectivity of the requirements and test conditions in FMVSS No.
127 for the FCW audio signal. NHTSA clarifies these requirements by
stating the location of the microphone and additional vehicle
conditions under which testing will occur, as well as amending the
definitions to simplify the requirement for suppression.
Given the above, NHTSA finds that additional comment on the changes
herein made in response to petitions for reconsideration of the May
2024 final rule is unnecessary.
Congressional Review Act
The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et. seq., as added by
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,
generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency
promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy
of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller
General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing
this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S.
House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United
States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register. This
rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a
major rule.
V. Regulatory Text
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571
Motor vehicles, Motor vehicle safety, Rubber and rubber products.
[[Page 93220]]
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA is amending 49 CFR part
571 as set forth below.
PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
0
1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117 and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95.
0
2. Section 571.127 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the definition of ``masked threshold'' from S4;
0
b. Revising S5.1.1(a)(3) and (4), S5.1.1(b)(2), S5.1.3. and S8.3.3(g).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 571.127 Standard No. 127; Automatic emergency braking systems
for light vehicles.
* * * * *
S5.1.1. * * *
(a) * * *
(3) The auditory signal as measured adjacent to a 50th percentile
male driver's right ear (tragion) must have an intensity of 15-30 dB
above the average noise level inside the vehicle when measured over a
5-second period under the range of test conditions specified in S6, at
100 km/h, with all vehicle openings closed, and all subject vehicle
audio and sound-producing systems or functions that are not necessary
for performing tests pursuant to the conditions in S6 and the
procedures in S7, S8, S9 of this standard set to off.
(4) In-vehicle audio that is not related to a crash avoidance
system warning must be muted, or reduced in volume during presentation
of the FCW auditory signal to within 5 dB of the average noise level
inside the vehicle (as measured in S5.1.1(a)(3)), for the duration of
the first between-pulse period of the FCW auditory signal under the
range of test conditions specified in S6, at 100 km/h, with all vehicle
openings closed, and all subject vehicle audio and sound-producing
systems or functions that are not necessary for performing tests
pursuant to the conditions in S6 and the procedures in S7, S8, S9 of
this standard set to off.
(b) * * *
(1) The visual signal symbol must be located within an ellipse that
extends 18 degrees vertically and 10 degrees
horizontally of the driver forward line of sight based on the forward-
looking eye midpoint (Mf) as described in S14 of 49 CFR
571.111.
* * * * *
S5.1.3. Performance test requirements. The vehicle must provide a
forward collision warning and subsequently apply the service brakes
automatically such that the subject vehicle does not collide with the
lead vehicle when tested using the procedures in S7 under the
conditions specified in S6. The forward collision warning is not
required if adaptive cruise control is engaged.
* * * * *
S8.3.3. * * *
* * * * *
(g) Two vehicle test devices are secured in stationary positions
parallel to the intended travel path. The two vehicle test devices face
the same direction as the intended travel path. One vehicle test device
is directly behind the other separated by 1.0 0.1 m. The
frontmost plane of the vehicle test device furthermost from the subject
vehicle is located 1.0 0.1 m from the parallel contact
plane (to the subject vehicle's frontmost plane) on the pedestrian test
mannequin. The left side of each vehicle test device is no less than
2.2 m to the right of the vertical plane through the intended travel
path. The left side of each vehicle test device is no less than 1.15 m
to the right of the vertical plane parallel to the plane through the
intended travel path tangent to the 0 percent overlap point.
* * * * *
Issued in Washington, DC, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.95 and 49 CFR Part 501.
Jack Danielson,
Executive Director.
[FR Doc. 2024-27349 Filed 11-25-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
