Baby Trend, Inc., Denial of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 12433-12436 [2023-03926]
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2023 / Notices
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA–2022–0074; Notice 2]
Baby Trend, Inc., Denial of Petition for
Decision of Inconsequential
Noncompliance
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Denial of petition.
AGENCY:
Baby Trend, Inc., (BT), has
determined that certain BT Hybrid 3-in1 Combination Booster Seat child
restraint systems (CRSs) do not fully
comply with Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems. BT filed an original
noncompliance report dated July 6,
2022. BT subsequently petitioned
NHTSA on August 1, 2022, for a
decision that the subject noncompliance
is inconsequential as it relates to motor
vehicle safety. This document
announces the denial of BT’s petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kelley Adams-Campos, Safety
Compliance Engineer, NHTSA, Office of
Vehicle Safety Compliance,
kelley.adamscampos@dot.gov, (202)
366–7479.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Overview
BT determined that certain BT Hybrid
3-in-1 Combination Booster Seat CRSs
do not fully comply with paragraph
S5.4.1.2(a) of FMVSS No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems (49 CFR 571.213).
BT filed an original noncompliance
report dated July 6, 2022, pursuant to 49
CFR part 573, Defect and
Noncompliance Responsibility and
Reports. BT petitioned NHTSA on
August 1, 2022, for an exemption from
the notification and remedy
requirements of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301
on the basis that this noncompliance is
inconsequential as it relates to motor
vehicle safety, pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
30118(d) and 30120(h) and 49 CFR part
556, Exemption for Inconsequential
Defect or Noncompliance.
Notice of receipt of BT’s petition was
published with a 30-day public
comment period, on September 9, 2022,
in the Federal Register (87 FR 55465).
No comments were received. To view
the petition and all supporting
documents log onto the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS) website at
https://www.regulations.gov/. Then
follow the online search instructions to
locate docket number ‘‘NHTSA–2022–
0074.’’
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2023 / Notices
II. Child Restraint Systems Involved
Approximately 101,361 BT Hybrid 3in-1 Combination Booster Seat CRSs,
manufactured from December 6, 2021,
to June 6, 2022,1 are potentially
involved:
III. Noncompliance
BT explains that the lower anchor
webbing in the subject CRSs failed the
minimum required breaking 2 strength
when tested in accordance with S5.1 of
FMVSS No. 209, referenced in FMVSS
No. 213 S5.4.1.2(a). Specifically, the
breaking strength of the lower anchor
webbing of the Lower Anchors and
Tethers for CHildren (LATCH 3) system
in the subject CRSs was 13,926 Newtons
(N), 13,940 N, and 14,087 N when tested
by NHTSA.
IV. Rule Requirements
Paragraph S5.4.1.2(a) of FMVSS No.
213 includes the requirements relevant
to this petition. The webbing of belts
provided with a child restraint system
and used to attach the system to the
vehicle must have a minimum breaking
strength for new webbing of not less
than 15,000 N, including the tether and
lower anchorages of a child restraint
anchorage system, when tested in
accordance with S5.1 of FMVSS No.
209. ‘‘New webbing’’ means webbing
that has not been exposed to abrasion,
light or micro-organisms as specified
elsewhere in FMVSS No. 213.
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V. Summary of BT’s Petition
The following views and arguments
presented in this section, ‘‘V. Summary
of BT’s Petition,’’ are the views and
arguments provided by BT. They do not
reflect the views of the Agency. BT
describes the subject noncompliance
and contends that the noncompliance is
inconsequential as it relates to motor
vehicle safety.
Upon receiving an information
request from NHTSA on June 6, 2022,
regarding the subject noncompliance,
BT states that production and
distribution of the subject CRSs were
halted, and BT began an investigation.
BT states that, as part of its
investigation, it conducted dynamic
sled testing, webbing testing and
examined internal processes to
determine the root cause of the
noncompliance. As a result of its
1 As
reported in BT’s July 6, 2022, Part 573
submission.
2 In its petition, BT refers to breaking as tensile.
3 ‘‘LATCH’’ refers to the child restraint anchorage
system that FMVSS 225, ‘‘Child restraint anchorage
systems,’’ requires to be installed in motor vehicles.
Industry and advocates have developed the term
‘‘LATCH’’ to refer to Standard 225’s child restraint
anchorage system.
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investigation, BT found that the wrong
webbing, with a failure threshold
characterized as marginally below the
breaking strength required in FMVSS
No. 213 S5.4.1.2(a), was installed in a
portion of the subject CRSs, but BT
believes, through its analysis of existing
and new test data, that the subject
noncompliance is inconsequential to
motor vehicle safety.
BT claims that FMVSS No. 213
dynamic sled testing ensures the
structural integrity of the subject CRSs
and that this is supported by NHTSA’s
November 2, 2020, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking 4 (NPRM) regarding FMVSS
No. 213, where the Agency determined
that no change in the severity of the
FMVSS No. 213 crash pulse was
warranted. In its petition, BT questions
‘‘the utility of considering the webbing
strength tests in isolation rather than the
integrity of the LATCH system as
required under FMVSS 213.’’ BT
believes the webbing strength tests
specified in FMVSS No. 213 have utility
in safety ‘‘only in the context of
maintaining strength of the webbing
with wear and tear of the child restraint
following years of use’’ and asserts that
the unabraded webbing strength test is
not necessary to ensure the structural
integrity of a CRS.
BT states that in addition to the
dynamic sled testing required by
FMVSS No. 213, it conducts dynamic
sled testing, through Consumer’s Union
(CU), on child restraints produced by
each of its factories. BT contends that if
NHTSA previously found the dynamic
sled testing at 48 kph to be sufficient to
ensure the structural integrity of a CRS,
BT’s additional CU testing is also
similarly sufficient.
The CU dynamic testing, as BT
explains, has important differences from
that required by FMVSS No. 213. First,
the test is conducted at 56 kph whereas
the FMVSS No. 213 test is conducted at
48 kph. Second, the bench used is
derived from a vehicle seat, providing
‘‘a boundary condition for LATCH
attachment and seat cushion-to-CRS
interaction.’’ Finally, the CU test
protocol includes a structure to
represent the seat in front of the CRS
seat position, which, BT claims,
provides a ‘‘clear tell-tale’’ of failure in
any way of the LATCH lower anchor
belt in adequately restraining the CRS
and its occupant.
BT also claims that the minimum
LATCH lower anchor webbing strength
requirements of FMVSS No. 213 are
unrealistic, based on dynamic crash
4 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child
Restraint Systems, Incorporation by Reference; 85
FR 69388 (November 2, 2020.)
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testing it conducted on the Hybrid 3-in1 CRSs using the same incorrect
webbing used on the noncompliant
CRSs that are the subject of its petition,
and without attaching the CRS’ tether to
the tether anchor. This testing, as BT
explains, was conducted on the test
bench proposed by NHTSA in the 2020
FMVSS No. 213 NPRM.5 Other test
apparatus and conditions used in its
testing were those either specified in
FMVSS No. 213, and/or the current
NPRM, or ‘‘widely accepted’’ as due
care tests. For the tests BT conducted in
the frontal direction, sled test speeds
ranging from 57.1 kph to 63.9 kph were
used. See the Table 6 in BT’s petition for
the parameters used in its testing. BT
states that it is confident that its frontal
sled testing conducted at ‘‘64 kph . . .
encompasses all crashes including the
most severe crashes’’ and that ‘‘at no
time and in no test did the LATCH
Lower Anchor webbing or belt system
fail to perform its intended purpose of
restraining the CRS.’’ BT also found
‘‘that at no time during any of these tests
did the LATCH Lower Anchor webbing
load exceed 5,000 Newtons and, more
importantly, come even close to the
15,000 Newton minimum threshold’’
required by FMVSS No. 213.
In its petition, BT shares a graphic 7 to
illustrate its beliefs for the minimum
strength of various components in the
LATCH system and points to examples
where, ‘‘in the rare instances of failures
of the LATCH system, the failures
occurred in . . . the LATCH lower
anchor on the vehicle.’’ Thus, BT
contends that the webbing is not the
weak link in the LATCH lower anchor
system, and that ‘‘any deficiencies with
the strength of the LATCH Lower
Anchor webbing would have been
revealed in the dynamic sled tests of
FMVSS 213.’’
BT states that there is no evidence of
webbing failure in any CRS in the real
world, that it has never received a
complaint, nor has any knowledge, of a
webbing failure on any of its products
in the real world.
BT concludes by stating its belief that
the subject noncompliance is
inconsequential as it relates to motor
vehicle safety and its petition.
VI. NHTSA’s Analysis
The burden of establishing the
inconsequentiality of a failure to comply
with a performance requirement in an
FMVSS is substantial and difficult to
meet. Accordingly, the Agency has not
5 Id.
6 Section
7 Section
E:\FR\FM\27FEN1.SGM
3 of BT’s petition.
5 of BT’s petition.
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found many such noncompliances
inconsequential.8
In determining inconsequentiality of a
noncompliance, NHTSA focuses on the
safety risk to individuals who
experience the type of event against
which a recall would otherwise
protect.9 In general, NHTSA does not
consider the absence of complaints or
injuries when determining if a
noncompliance is inconsequential to
safety. The absence of complaints does
not mean vehicle occupants have not
experienced a safety issue, nor does it
mean that there will not be safety issues
in the future.10
BT makes several claims and
assertions in support of its petition,
including its claim that the wrong
webbing installed in the subject CRSs
had a breaking strength ‘‘marginally’’
below that required by FMVSS No. 213.
NHTSA does not agree, based on its
own compliance test results, that the
breaking strength values were marginal.
Next, BT claims it to be ‘‘NHTSA’s
current and well-justified position’’ that
the dynamic sled testing contained in
FMVSS No. 213 ensures the structural
integrity of the ‘‘CRS system, including
the LATCH lower anchor webbing in an
unabraded condition.’’ BT furthers this
claim, opining that the Agency should
also conclude that BT’s CU testing it
conducts ‘‘is similarly sufficient to
ensure structural integrity of a CRS’’
based on ‘‘important differences’’ from
FMVSS No. 213, i.e., a test speed of 56
kph and a test bench derived from a
vehicle seat. NHTSA does not find these
claims to be relevant or persuasive. It
appears that BT is misapplying the
conclusion the Agency made in the
2020 FMVSS No. 213 NPRM (supra),
8 Cf. Gen. Motors Corporation; Ruling on Petition
for Determination of Inconsequential
Noncompliance, 69 FR 19897, 19899 (Apr. 14,
2004) (citing prior cases where noncompliance was
expected to be imperceptible, or nearly so, to
vehicle occupants or approaching drivers).
9 See Gen. Motors, LLC; Grant of Petition for
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR
35355 (June 12, 2013) (finding noncompliance had
no effect on occupant safety because it had no effect
on the proper operation of the occupant
classification system and the correct deployment of
an air bag); Osram Sylvania Prods. Inc.; Grant of
Petition for Decision of Inconsequential
Noncompliance, 78 FR 46000 (July 30, 2013)
(finding occupant using noncompliant light source
would not be exposed to significantly greater risk
than occupant using similar compliant light
source).
10 See Morgan 3 Wheeler Limited; Denial of
Petition for Decision of Inconsequential
Noncompliance, 81 FR 21663, 21666 (Apr. 12,
2016); see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
565 F.2d 754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding defect
poses an unreasonable risk when it ‘‘results in
hazards as potentially dangerous as sudden engine
fire, and where there is no dispute that at least some
such hazards, in this case fires, can definitely be
expected to occur in the future’’).
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i.e., that there was no safety need to
increase the sled acceleration pulse for
the dynamic systems test in S6.1 of
FMVSS No. 213. This conclusion was
specific to the child restraint system
dynamic test. This test is not the only
performance test in FMVSS No. 213 and
does not address the same conditions,
nor serve the same purpose, as the
webbing breaking strength test. NHTSA
has multiple tests because a single test
does not address the range of safety
concerns with child restraints. The
breaking strength requirements ensure
that the performance of the webbing
over the lifetime of a child restraint
system is sufficient to provide the
necessary protection, even after wear
and tear that webbing can experience
during the course of normal use.
BT asserts that the unabraded
webbing strength test is not necessary to
ensure the structural integrity of a CRS,
and that the minimum LATCH lower
anchor webbing strength requirements
of FMVSS No. 213 are unrealistic. BT
bases this assertion on dynamic crash
testing it conducted on the Hybrid 3-in1 CRSs using the same incorrect
webbing used on the noncompliant
CRSs subject of its petition. According
to its petition, tests were conducted at
63.9 kph without attaching the tether to
its corresponding anchor, asserting that
under this condition ‘‘the entire
restraining load was borne by the
LATCH webbing.’’
BT also states, ‘‘at no time and in no
test did the LATCH Lower Anchor
webbing or belt system fail to perform
its intended purpose of restraining the
CRS’’ and that the loads on the subject
webbing during any of the foregoing
tests did not exceed 5,000 N. This
argument challenges the stringency of
the requirement in the standard, to
which a petition for rulemaking, not an
inconsequentiality petition, is the
appropriate means.11 Moreover, even if
these foregoing arguments were
relevant, NHTSA does not find them
availing. As explained in NHTSA’s 2006
Final Rule 12 adopting the new webbing
breaking strength requirements,
Standard 213’s minimum requirements
are not intended to only ensure that
CRSs in new condition are safe, but also
safe in the cases of foreseeable wear,
such as in the breaking strength
requirement to which this population of
CRSs failed to comply. Requirements at
the component level increase the
likelihood that components, like
webbing, maintain their integrity for the
11 See Dorel Juvenile Group; Denial of Appeal of
Decision on Inconsequential Noncompliance, 75 FR
510, January 5, 2010.
12 71 FR 32855 (June 7, 2006).
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12435
lifetime of the child restraint. Such
comparable assurances are not provided
by the dynamic system test in Standard
213, added in December 1979.13 In
2002, the Agency found it inappropriate
that minimum breaking strength
requirements for new webbing in child
restraint systems were absent from
FMVSS No. 213 14 and the 2005–2006
rulemaking ensued. This established
NHTSA’s long-standing position that
webbing strength requirements are
necessary for safety and, consistent with
how we addressed past similar
arguments 15 by CRS manufacturers who
submitted webbing load force data
generated in dynamic testing to
demonstrate apparent safety margins in
comparison to webbing breaking
strength test results, BT has not
compelled NHTSA to consider
otherwise.
NHTSA is also not persuaded by BT’s
argument, as its petition further goes on
in Section 5, that ‘‘any deficiencies with
the strength of the LATCH Lower
Anchor webbing would have been
revealed in the dynamic sled tests of
FMVSS 213.’’ As explained above,
FMVSS No. 213 has multiple
performance tests serving different
purposes. It is not proper to apply or
substitute the outcome from one test for
another; to be compliant with FMVSS
No. 213 all applicable requirements
must be satisfied.16 Thus, BT has not
met its burden of persuasion.
Finally, neither BT’s claim that there
is no evidence of any CRS webbing
failures, including on any of its
products, in the real world, nor BT’s
lack of complaints are persuasive to the
Agency. Notwithstanding that BT did
not provide any evidence to support
these claims, as stated at this notice’s
onset NHTSA does not consider the
absence of complaints or injuries when
determining if a noncompliance is
inconsequential to safety.
VII. NHTSA’s Decision
In consideration of the foregoing,
NHTSA has decided that BT has not met
its burden of persuasion that the subject
FMVSS No. 213 noncompliance is
inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.
13 44
FR 72131 (December 13, 1979).
Company, Inc., Grant of Application
for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 67
FR 21798 (May 1, 2002).
15 Combi USA, Inc., 78 FR 71028 (Nov. 27, 2013),
Combi USA, Inc., 86 FR 47723 (Aug. 26, 2021).
16 BT asserts that the noncompliance of the BT
Hybrid 3-in-1 would have been ‘‘revealed’’ in the
Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance’s (OVSC)
compliance program’s dynamic testing. NHTSA
notes that the Agency’s dynamic testing of BT’s
Hybrid 3-in1 did not result in LATCH lower anchor
webbing failures. See https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/
ctr/9999/TRTR-647891-2022-001.pdf.
14 Evenflo
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2023 / Notices
Accordingly, BT’s petition is hereby
denied, and BT is consequently
obligated to provide notification of and
free remedy for that noncompliance
under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.
(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120:
delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.95 and
501.8)
Anne L. Collins,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023–03926 Filed 2–24–23; 8:45 am]
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Office of Foreign Assets Control
Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions
Office of Foreign Assets
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ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Department of the
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of one or more persons that have been
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based on OFAC’s determination that one
or more applicable legal criteria were
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persons are generally prohibited from
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Notice of OFAC Actions
On February 22, 2023, OFAC
determined that the property and
interests in property subject to U.S.
jurisdiction of the following persons are
blocked under the relevant sanctions
authority listed below.
Individuals
1. ARREDONDO BELTRAN, Jose Santana,
Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 27 Jun 1977;
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20:06 Feb 24, 2023
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POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico;
Gender Male; C.U.R.P.
AEBS770627HSLRLN05 (Mexico)
(individual) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of
Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021,
‘‘Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons
Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade,’’ 86
FR 71549 (December 17, 2021) (E.O. 14059)
for having engaged in, or attempted to engage
in, activities or transactions that have
materially contributed to, or pose a
significant risk of materially contributing to,
the international proliferation of illicit drugs
or their means of production.
2. FLORES MADRID, Luis Gerardo,
Mexico; DOB 09 Mar 1988; POB Sinaloa,
Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male;
C.U.R.P. FOML880309HSLLDS09 (Mexico)
(individual) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of
E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or
attempted to engage in, activities or
transactions that have materially contributed
to, or pose a significant risk of materially
contributing to, the international
proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of
production.
3. MACHADO TORRES, Ernesto, Mexico;
DOB 15 Apr 1984; POB Sinaloa, Mexico;
nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P.
MATE840415HSLCRR00 (Mexico)
(individual) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of
E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or
attempted to engage in, activities or
transactions that have materially contributed
to, or pose a significant risk of materially
contributing to, the international
proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of
production.
4. ZAMUDIO LERMA, Ludim, Boulevard
Doctor Mora 1776, Colonia La Campina,
Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 19 Apr 1972;
POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico;
Gender Male; C.U.R.P.
ZALL720419HSLMRD06 (Mexico)
(individual) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of
E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or
attempted to engage in, activities or
transactions that have materially contributed
to, or pose a significant risk of materially
contributing to, the international
proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of
production.
5. ZAMUDIO IBARRA, Ludim, Calle Diego
Rivera 374, Interior 3, Colonia Privada Los
Cisnes, Desarrollo Urbano Tres Rios,
Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 03 Sep 1991;
POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico;
Gender Male; C.U.R.P.
ZAIL910903HSLMBD06 (Mexico)
(individual) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of
E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or
attempted to engage in, activities or
transactions that have materially contributed
to, or pose a significant risk of materially
contributing to, the international
proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of
production.
6. ZAMUDIO LERMA, Luis Alfonso, Calle
Frida Kahlo 2464, Fraccionamiento
Residencial Los Cisnes, Culiacan, Sinaloa,
Mexico; Calle Diego Valadez 1321, Col.
PO 00000
Frm 00130
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Chapultepec, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico;
DOB 09 Apr 1965; POB Sinaloa, Mexico;
nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P.
ZALL650409HSLMRS03 (Mexico)
(individual) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of
E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or
attempted to engage in, activities or
transactions that have materially contributed
to, or pose a significant risk of materially
contributing to, the international
proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of
production.
Entities
1. ACEROS Y REFACCIONES DEL
HUMAYA, S.A. DE C.V., Boulevard Doctor
Enrique Cabrera 2000, Culiacan, Sinaloa,
Mexico; Organization Established Date 21
Sep 2006; Folio Mercantil No. 41204
(Mexico) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of
E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or
attempted to engage in, activities or
transactions that have materially contributed
to, or pose a significant risk of materially
contributing to, the international
proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of
production.
2. FARMACIA LUDIM, Boulevard Doctor
Enrique Cabrera, Tres Rios, Culiacan,
Sinaloa, Mexico; Organization Type: Retail
sale of pharmaceutical and medical goods,
cosmetic and toilet articles in specialized
stores [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of
E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or
attempted to engage in, activities or
transactions that have materially contributed
to, or pose a significant risk of materially
contributing to, the international
proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of
production.
3. GRUPO ZAIT, S.A. DE C.V., Culiacan,
Sinaloa, Mexico; Organization Established
Date 22 Jul 2013; Folio Mercantil No. 82722
(Mexico) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of
E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or
directed by, or to have acted or purported to
act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly,
Luis Alfonso ZAMUDIO LERMA, a person
blocked pursuant to E.O. 14059.
4. INMOBILIARIA DEL RIO HUMAYA,
S.A. DE C.V., Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico;
Organization Established Date 20 Aug 2003;
Folio Mercantil No. 73228 (Mexico)
[ILLICIT–DRUGS–EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of
E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or
directed by, or to have acted or purported to
act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly,
Ludim ZAMUDIO LERMA, a person blocked
pursuant to E.O. 14059.
5. OPERADORA DEL HUMAYA, S.A. DE
C.V., Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; Organization
Established Date 16 Oct 2003; R.F.C.
OHU0310161G2 (Mexico); Folio Mercantil
No. 73385 (Mexico) [ILLICIT–DRUGS–
EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of
E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or
directed by, or to have acted or purported to
act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly,
Ludim ZAMUDIO LERMA and Ludim
ZAMUDIO IBARRA, persons blocked
pursuant to E.O. 14059.
E:\FR\FM\27FEN1.SGM
27FEN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 38 (Monday, February 27, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12433-12436]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-03926]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2022-0074; Notice 2]
Baby Trend, Inc., Denial of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Denial of petition.
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SUMMARY: Baby Trend, Inc., (BT), has determined that certain BT Hybrid
3-in-1 Combination Booster Seat child restraint systems (CRSs) do not
fully comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No.
213, Child Restraint Systems. BT filed an original noncompliance report
dated July 6, 2022. BT subsequently petitioned NHTSA on August 1, 2022,
for a decision that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential as it
relates to motor vehicle safety. This document announces the denial of
BT's petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kelley Adams-Campos, Safety Compliance
Engineer, NHTSA, Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance,
[email protected], (202) 366-7479.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Overview
BT determined that certain BT Hybrid 3-in-1 Combination Booster
Seat CRSs do not fully comply with paragraph S5.4.1.2(a) of FMVSS No.
213, Child Restraint Systems (49 CFR 571.213).
BT filed an original noncompliance report dated July 6, 2022,
pursuant to 49 CFR part 573, Defect and Noncompliance Responsibility
and Reports. BT petitioned NHTSA on August 1, 2022, for an exemption
from the notification and remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301
on the basis that this noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates
to motor vehicle safety, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h)
and 49 CFR part 556, Exemption for Inconsequential Defect or
Noncompliance.
Notice of receipt of BT's petition was published with a 30-day
public comment period, on September 9, 2022, in the Federal Register
(87 FR 55465). No comments were received. To view the petition and all
supporting documents log onto the Federal Docket Management System
(FDMS) website at https://www.regulations.gov/. Then follow the online
search instructions to locate docket number ``NHTSA-2022-0074.''
[[Page 12434]]
II. Child Restraint Systems Involved
Approximately 101,361 BT Hybrid 3-in-1 Combination Booster Seat
CRSs, manufactured from December 6, 2021, to June 6, 2022,\1\ are
potentially involved:
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\1\ As reported in BT's July 6, 2022, Part 573 submission.
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III. Noncompliance
BT explains that the lower anchor webbing in the subject CRSs
failed the minimum required breaking \2\ strength when tested in
accordance with S5.1 of FMVSS No. 209, referenced in FMVSS No. 213
S5.4.1.2(a). Specifically, the breaking strength of the lower anchor
webbing of the Lower Anchors and Tethers for CHildren (LATCH \3\)
system in the subject CRSs was 13,926 Newtons (N), 13,940 N, and 14,087
N when tested by NHTSA.
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\2\ In its petition, BT refers to breaking as tensile.
\3\ ``LATCH'' refers to the child restraint anchorage system
that FMVSS 225, ``Child restraint anchorage systems,'' requires to
be installed in motor vehicles. Industry and advocates have
developed the term ``LATCH'' to refer to Standard 225's child
restraint anchorage system.
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IV. Rule Requirements
Paragraph S5.4.1.2(a) of FMVSS No. 213 includes the requirements
relevant to this petition. The webbing of belts provided with a child
restraint system and used to attach the system to the vehicle must have
a minimum breaking strength for new webbing of not less than 15,000 N,
including the tether and lower anchorages of a child restraint
anchorage system, when tested in accordance with S5.1 of FMVSS No. 209.
``New webbing'' means webbing that has not been exposed to abrasion,
light or micro-organisms as specified elsewhere in FMVSS No. 213.
V. Summary of BT's Petition
The following views and arguments presented in this section, ``V.
Summary of BT's Petition,'' are the views and arguments provided by BT.
They do not reflect the views of the Agency. BT describes the subject
noncompliance and contends that the noncompliance is inconsequential as
it relates to motor vehicle safety.
Upon receiving an information request from NHTSA on June 6, 2022,
regarding the subject noncompliance, BT states that production and
distribution of the subject CRSs were halted, and BT began an
investigation. BT states that, as part of its investigation, it
conducted dynamic sled testing, webbing testing and examined internal
processes to determine the root cause of the noncompliance. As a result
of its investigation, BT found that the wrong webbing, with a failure
threshold characterized as marginally below the breaking strength
required in FMVSS No. 213 S5.4.1.2(a), was installed in a portion of
the subject CRSs, but BT believes, through its analysis of existing and
new test data, that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to
motor vehicle safety.
BT claims that FMVSS No. 213 dynamic sled testing ensures the
structural integrity of the subject CRSs and that this is supported by
NHTSA's November 2, 2020, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking \4\ (NPRM)
regarding FMVSS No. 213, where the Agency determined that no change in
the severity of the FMVSS No. 213 crash pulse was warranted. In its
petition, BT questions ``the utility of considering the webbing
strength tests in isolation rather than the integrity of the LATCH
system as required under FMVSS 213.'' BT believes the webbing strength
tests specified in FMVSS No. 213 have utility in safety ``only in the
context of maintaining strength of the webbing with wear and tear of
the child restraint following years of use'' and asserts that the
unabraded webbing strength test is not necessary to ensure the
structural integrity of a CRS.
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\4\ Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint
Systems, Incorporation by Reference; 85 FR 69388 (November 2, 2020.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BT states that in addition to the dynamic sled testing required by
FMVSS No. 213, it conducts dynamic sled testing, through Consumer's
Union (CU), on child restraints produced by each of its factories. BT
contends that if NHTSA previously found the dynamic sled testing at 48
kph to be sufficient to ensure the structural integrity of a CRS, BT's
additional CU testing is also similarly sufficient.
The CU dynamic testing, as BT explains, has important differences
from that required by FMVSS No. 213. First, the test is conducted at 56
kph whereas the FMVSS No. 213 test is conducted at 48 kph. Second, the
bench used is derived from a vehicle seat, providing ``a boundary
condition for LATCH attachment and seat cushion-to-CRS interaction.''
Finally, the CU test protocol includes a structure to represent the
seat in front of the CRS seat position, which, BT claims, provides a
``clear tell-tale'' of failure in any way of the LATCH lower anchor
belt in adequately restraining the CRS and its occupant.
BT also claims that the minimum LATCH lower anchor webbing strength
requirements of FMVSS No. 213 are unrealistic, based on dynamic crash
testing it conducted on the Hybrid 3-in-1 CRSs using the same incorrect
webbing used on the noncompliant CRSs that are the subject of its
petition, and without attaching the CRS' tether to the tether anchor.
This testing, as BT explains, was conducted on the test bench proposed
by NHTSA in the 2020 FMVSS No. 213 NPRM.\5\ Other test apparatus and
conditions used in its testing were those either specified in FMVSS No.
213, and/or the current NPRM, or ``widely accepted'' as due care tests.
For the tests BT conducted in the frontal direction, sled test speeds
ranging from 57.1 kph to 63.9 kph were used. See the Table \6\ in BT's
petition for the parameters used in its testing. BT states that it is
confident that its frontal sled testing conducted at ``64 kph . . .
encompasses all crashes including the most severe crashes'' and that
``at no time and in no test did the LATCH Lower Anchor webbing or belt
system fail to perform its intended purpose of restraining the CRS.''
BT also found ``that at no time during any of these tests did the LATCH
Lower Anchor webbing load exceed 5,000 Newtons and, more importantly,
come even close to the 15,000 Newton minimum threshold'' required by
FMVSS No. 213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Id.
\6\ Section 3 of BT's petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its petition, BT shares a graphic \7\ to illustrate its beliefs
for the minimum strength of various components in the LATCH system and
points to examples where, ``in the rare instances of failures of the
LATCH system, the failures occurred in . . . the LATCH lower anchor on
the vehicle.'' Thus, BT contends that the webbing is not the weak link
in the LATCH lower anchor system, and that ``any deficiencies with the
strength of the LATCH Lower Anchor webbing would have been revealed in
the dynamic sled tests of FMVSS 213.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Section 5 of BT's petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BT states that there is no evidence of webbing failure in any CRS
in the real world, that it has never received a complaint, nor has any
knowledge, of a webbing failure on any of its products in the real
world.
BT concludes by stating its belief that the subject noncompliance
is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety and its
petition.
VI. NHTSA's Analysis
The burden of establishing the inconsequentiality of a failure to
comply with a performance requirement in an FMVSS is substantial and
difficult to meet. Accordingly, the Agency has not
[[Page 12435]]
found many such noncompliances inconsequential.\8\
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\8\ Cf. Gen. Motors Corporation; Ruling on Petition for
Determination of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 69 FR 19897, 19899
(Apr. 14, 2004) (citing prior cases where noncompliance was expected
to be imperceptible, or nearly so, to vehicle occupants or
approaching drivers).
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In determining inconsequentiality of a noncompliance, NHTSA focuses
on the safety risk to individuals who experience the type of event
against which a recall would otherwise protect.\9\ In general, NHTSA
does not consider the absence of complaints or injuries when
determining if a noncompliance is inconsequential to safety. The
absence of complaints does not mean vehicle occupants have not
experienced a safety issue, nor does it mean that there will not be
safety issues in the future.\10\
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\9\ See Gen. Motors, LLC; Grant of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 35355 (June 12, 2013) (finding
noncompliance had no effect on occupant safety because it had no
effect on the proper operation of the occupant classification system
and the correct deployment of an air bag); Osram Sylvania Prods.
Inc.; Grant of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential
Noncompliance, 78 FR 46000 (July 30, 2013) (finding occupant using
noncompliant light source would not be exposed to significantly
greater risk than occupant using similar compliant light source).
\10\ See Morgan 3 Wheeler Limited; Denial of Petition for
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 81 FR 21663, 21666 (Apr.
12, 2016); see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 565 F.2d
754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding defect poses an unreasonable risk
when it ``results in hazards as potentially dangerous as sudden
engine fire, and where there is no dispute that at least some such
hazards, in this case fires, can definitely be expected to occur in
the future'').
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BT makes several claims and assertions in support of its petition,
including its claim that the wrong webbing installed in the subject
CRSs had a breaking strength ``marginally'' below that required by
FMVSS No. 213. NHTSA does not agree, based on its own compliance test
results, that the breaking strength values were marginal. Next, BT
claims it to be ``NHTSA's current and well-justified position'' that
the dynamic sled testing contained in FMVSS No. 213 ensures the
structural integrity of the ``CRS system, including the LATCH lower
anchor webbing in an unabraded condition.'' BT furthers this claim,
opining that the Agency should also conclude that BT's CU testing it
conducts ``is similarly sufficient to ensure structural integrity of a
CRS'' based on ``important differences'' from FMVSS No. 213, i.e., a
test speed of 56 kph and a test bench derived from a vehicle seat.
NHTSA does not find these claims to be relevant or persuasive. It
appears that BT is misapplying the conclusion the Agency made in the
2020 FMVSS No. 213 NPRM (supra), i.e., that there was no safety need to
increase the sled acceleration pulse for the dynamic systems test in
S6.1 of FMVSS No. 213. This conclusion was specific to the child
restraint system dynamic test. This test is not the only performance
test in FMVSS No. 213 and does not address the same conditions, nor
serve the same purpose, as the webbing breaking strength test. NHTSA
has multiple tests because a single test does not address the range of
safety concerns with child restraints. The breaking strength
requirements ensure that the performance of the webbing over the
lifetime of a child restraint system is sufficient to provide the
necessary protection, even after wear and tear that webbing can
experience during the course of normal use.
BT asserts that the unabraded webbing strength test is not
necessary to ensure the structural integrity of a CRS, and that the
minimum LATCH lower anchor webbing strength requirements of FMVSS No.
213 are unrealistic. BT bases this assertion on dynamic crash testing
it conducted on the Hybrid 3-in-1 CRSs using the same incorrect webbing
used on the noncompliant CRSs subject of its petition. According to its
petition, tests were conducted at 63.9 kph without attaching the tether
to its corresponding anchor, asserting that under this condition ``the
entire restraining load was borne by the LATCH webbing.''
BT also states, ``at no time and in no test did the LATCH Lower
Anchor webbing or belt system fail to perform its intended purpose of
restraining the CRS'' and that the loads on the subject webbing during
any of the foregoing tests did not exceed 5,000 N. This argument
challenges the stringency of the requirement in the standard, to which
a petition for rulemaking, not an inconsequentiality petition, is the
appropriate means.\11\ Moreover, even if these foregoing arguments were
relevant, NHTSA does not find them availing. As explained in NHTSA's
2006 Final Rule \12\ adopting the new webbing breaking strength
requirements, Standard 213's minimum requirements are not intended to
only ensure that CRSs in new condition are safe, but also safe in the
cases of foreseeable wear, such as in the breaking strength requirement
to which this population of CRSs failed to comply. Requirements at the
component level increase the likelihood that components, like webbing,
maintain their integrity for the lifetime of the child restraint. Such
comparable assurances are not provided by the dynamic system test in
Standard 213, added in December 1979.\13\ In 2002, the Agency found it
inappropriate that minimum breaking strength requirements for new
webbing in child restraint systems were absent from FMVSS No. 213 \14\
and the 2005-2006 rulemaking ensued. This established NHTSA's long-
standing position that webbing strength requirements are necessary for
safety and, consistent with how we addressed past similar arguments
\15\ by CRS manufacturers who submitted webbing load force data
generated in dynamic testing to demonstrate apparent safety margins in
comparison to webbing breaking strength test results, BT has not
compelled NHTSA to consider otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See Dorel Juvenile Group; Denial of Appeal of Decision on
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 75 FR 510, January 5, 2010.
\12\ 71 FR 32855 (June 7, 2006).
\13\ 44 FR 72131 (December 13, 1979).
\14\ Evenflo Company, Inc., Grant of Application for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 67 FR 21798 (May 1, 2002).
\15\ Combi USA, Inc., 78 FR 71028 (Nov. 27, 2013), Combi USA,
Inc., 86 FR 47723 (Aug. 26, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA is also not persuaded by BT's argument, as its petition
further goes on in Section 5, that ``any deficiencies with the strength
of the LATCH Lower Anchor webbing would have been revealed in the
dynamic sled tests of FMVSS 213.'' As explained above, FMVSS No. 213
has multiple performance tests serving different purposes. It is not
proper to apply or substitute the outcome from one test for another; to
be compliant with FMVSS No. 213 all applicable requirements must be
satisfied.\16\ Thus, BT has not met its burden of persuasion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ BT asserts that the noncompliance of the BT Hybrid 3-in-1
would have been ``revealed'' in the Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance's (OVSC) compliance program's dynamic testing. NHTSA
notes that the Agency's dynamic testing of BT's Hybrid 3-in1 did not
result in LATCH lower anchor webbing failures. See https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/ctr/9999/TRTR-647891-2022-001.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, neither BT's claim that there is no evidence of any CRS
webbing failures, including on any of its products, in the real world,
nor BT's lack of complaints are persuasive to the Agency.
Notwithstanding that BT did not provide any evidence to support these
claims, as stated at this notice's onset NHTSA does not consider the
absence of complaints or injuries when determining if a noncompliance
is inconsequential to safety.
VII. NHTSA's Decision
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that BT has
not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 213
noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.
[[Page 12436]]
Accordingly, BT's petition is hereby denied, and BT is consequently
obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that
noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.
(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120: delegations of authority at 49
CFR 1.95 and 501.8)
Anne L. Collins,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023-03926 Filed 2-24-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
