Summary of Commission Practice Relating to Administrative Protective Orders, 69331-69338 [2022-25108]
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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 222 / Friday, November 18, 2022 / Notices
comment. BOEM makes all comments,
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your submission is subject to the
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or such court order, your information
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their entirety.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 4231 et seq.
(NEPA, as amended) and 40 CFR 1506.6.
Dated: November 11, 2022.
Karen Baker,
Chief, Office of Renewable Energy Programs,
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
[FR Doc. 2022–25034 Filed 11–17–22; 8:45 am]
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BILLING CODE 4340–98–P
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
[Investigation Nos. 701–TA–671–672 and
731–TA–1571–1573 (Final)]
Oil Country Tubular Goods From
Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and South
Korea
Determinations
On the basis of the record 1 developed
in the subject investigations, the United
States International Trade Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) determines, pursuant
to the Tariff Act of 1930 (‘‘the Act’’),
that an industry in the United States is
materially injured by reason of imports
of oil country tubular goods from
Argentina and Mexico provided for in
subheadings 7304.29, 7305.20, and
7306.29 of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States, that have
been found by the U.S. Department of
Commerce (‘‘Commerce’’) to be sold in
the United States at less than fair value
(‘‘LTFV’’); by reason of imports of oil
country tubular goods from Russia that
have been found by Commerce to be
sold in the United States at LTFV and
subsidized by the government of Russia;
and by reason of imports of oil country
tubular goods from South Korea that
have been found by Commerce to be
subsidized by the government of South
Korea.2 3
Background
The Commission instituted these
investigations effective October 6, 2021,
following receipt of petitions filed with
the Commission and Commerce by
Borusan Mannesmann Pipe U.S., Inc.,
Baytown, Texas; PTC Liberty Tubulars
LLC, Liberty, Texas; U.S. Steel Tubular
Products, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Welded Tube USA, Inc., Lackawanna,
New York; and the United States Steel,
Paper and Forestry, Rubber,
Manufacturing, Energy, Allied
Industrial and Service Workers
International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The final
phase of the investigations was
scheduled by the Commission following
notification of a preliminary
determination by Commerce that
imports of oil country tubular goods
from Russia were subsidized within the
1 The record is defined in § 207.2(f) of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (19
CFR 207.2(f)).
2 87 FR 59041, 59045, 59047, 59054, and 59056
(September 29, 2022).
3 The Commission also finds that imports subject
to Commerce’s affirmative critical circumstances
determinations are not likely to undermine
seriously the remedial effect of the antidumping
duty orders on oil country tubular goods from
Mexico and Russia.
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69331
meaning of section 703(b) of the Act (19
U.S.C. 1671b(b)) and preliminary
determinations by Commerce that
imports of oil country tubular goods
from Argentina, Mexico, and Russia
were sold at LTFV within the meaning
of 733(b) of the Act (19 U.S.C.
1673b(b)).4 Notice of the scheduling of
the final phase of the Commission’s
investigations and of a public hearing to
be held in connection therewith was
given by posting copies of the notice in
the Office of the Secretary, U.S.
International Trade Commission,
Washington, DC, and by publishing the
notice in the Federal Register on June
9, 2022 (87 FR 35246). The Commission
conducted its hearing on September 22,
2022. All persons who requested the
opportunity were permitted to
participate.
The Commission made these
determinations pursuant to §§ 705(b)
and 735(b) of the Act (19 U.S.C.
1671d(b) and 19 U.S.C. 1673d(b)). It
completed and filed its determinations
in these investigations on November 14,
2022. The views of the Commission are
contained in USITC Publication 5381
(November 2022), entitled Oil Country
Tubular Goods from Argentina, Mexico,
Russia, and South Korea: Investigation
Nos. 701–TA–671–672 and 731–TA–
1571–1573 (Final).
By order of the Commission.
Issued: November 14, 2022.
Jessica Mullan,
Attorney Advisor.
[FR Doc. 2022–25109 Filed 11–17–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
Summary of Commission Practice
Relating to Administrative Protective
Orders
International Trade
Commission.
ACTION: Summary of commission
practice relating to administrative
protective orders.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: Since February 1991, the U.S.
International Trade Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) has published in the
Federal Register reports on the status of
its practice with respect to breaches of
4 87 FR 28801, 28804, and 28808 (May 11, 2022)
(antidumping duty preliminary determinations) and
87 FR 14249 (March 14, 2022) (countervailing duty
preliminary determination for Russia). Commerce
preliminarily determined that countervailable
subsidies were not being provided to producers and
exporters of oil country tubular goods from South
Korea. 87 FR 14248 (March 14, 2022)
(countervailing duty preliminary determination for
South Korea).
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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 222 / Friday, November 18, 2022 / Notices
its administrative protective orders
(‘‘APOs’’) under the Tariff Act of 1930
in response to a direction contained in
the Conference Report to the Customs
and Trade Act of 1990. Over time, the
Commission has added to its report
discussions of APO breaches in
Commission proceedings other than
under title VII and violations of the
Commission’s rules, including the rule
on bracketing business proprietary
information (the ‘‘24-hour rule’’). This
notice provides a summary of APO
breach investigations completed during
fiscal year 2022. This summary
addresses APO breach investigations
related to proceedings under both title
VII and section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930. The Commission intends for this
summary to inform representatives of
parties to Commission proceedings of
the specific types of APO breaches
before the Commission and the
corresponding types of actions that the
Commission has taken.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Caitlin Stephens, Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. International Trade
Commission, telephone (202) 205–2076.
Hearing-impaired individuals may
obtain information on this matter by
contacting the Commission’s TDD
terminal at (202) 205–1810. General
information concerning the Commission
is available on its website at https://
www.usitc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Statutory
authorities for Commission
investigations provide for the release of
business proprietary information
(‘‘BPI’’) or confidential business
information (‘‘CBI’’) to certain
authorized representatives in
accordance with requirements set forth
in the Commission’s Rules of Practice
and Procedure. Such statutory and
regulatory authorities include: 19 U.S.C.
1677f; 19 CFR 207.7; 19 U.S.C. 1337(n);
19 CFR 210.5, 210.34; 19 U.S.C. 2252(i);
19 CFR 206.17; 19 U.S.C. 4572(f); 19
CFR 208.22; 19 U.S.C. 1516a(g)(7)(A);
and 19 CFR 207.100—207.120. The
discussion below describes APO breach
investigations that the Commission
completed during fiscal year 2022,
including descriptions of actions taken
in response to any breaches.
Since 1991, the Commission has
published annually a summary of its
actions in response to violations of
Commission APOs and rule violations.
See 86 FR 71916 (Dec. 20, 2021); 85 FR
7589 (Feb. 10, 2020); 83 FR 42140 (Aug.
20, 2018); 83 FR 17843 (Apr. 24, 2018);
82 FR 29322 (June 28, 2017); 81 FR
17200 (Mar. 28, 2016); 80 FR 1664 (Jan.
13, 2015); 78 FR 79481 (Dec. 30, 2013);
77 FR 76518 (Dec. 28, 2012); 76 FR
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78945 (Dec. 20, 2011); 75 FR 66127 (Oct.
27, 2010); 74 FR 54071 (Oct. 21, 2009);
73 FR 51843 (Sept. 5, 2008); 72 FR
50119 (Aug. 30, 2007); 71 FR 39355
(July 12, 2006); 70 FR 42382 (July 22,
2005); 69 FR 29972 (May 26, 2004); 68
FR 28256 (May 23, 2003); 67 FR 39425
(June 7, 2002); 66 FR 27685 (May 18,
2001); 65 FR 30434 (May 11, 2000); 64
FR 23355 (Apr. 30, 1999); 63 FR 25064
(May 6, 1998); 62 FR 13164 (Mar. 19,
1997); 61 FR 21203 (May 9, 1996); 60 FR
24880 (May 10, 1995); 59 FR 16834
(Apr. 8, 1994); 58 FR 21991 (Apr. 26,
1993); 57 FR 12335 (Apr. 9, 1992); and
56 FR 4846 (Feb. 6, 1991). This report
does not provide an exhaustive list of
conduct that will be deemed to be a
breach of the Commission’s APOs. The
Commission considers APO breach
investigations on a case-by-case basis.
As part of the Commission’s efforts to
educate practitioners about the
Commission’s current APO practice, the
Secretary to the Commission
(‘‘Secretary’’) issued in January 2022 a
sixth edition of An Introduction to
Administrative Protective Order Practice
in Import Injury Investigations (Pub. No.
5280). This document is available on the
Commission’s website at https://
www.usitc.gov.
I. In General
A. Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Investigations
The current APO application form for
antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations, which the Commission
revised in May 2020, requires an APO
applicant to agree to:
(1) Not divulge any of the BPI
disclosed under this APO or otherwise
obtained in this investigation and not
otherwise available to him or her, to any
person other than—
(i) Personnel of the Commission
concerned with the investigation,
(ii) The person or agency from whom
the BPI was obtained,
(iii) A person whose application for
disclosure of BPI under this APO has
been granted by the Secretary, and
(iv) Other persons, such as paralegals
and clerical staff, who (a) are employed
or supervised by and under the
direction and control of the authorized
applicant or another authorized
applicant in the same firm whose
application has been granted; (b) have a
need thereof in connection with the
investigation; (c) are not involved in
competitive decision making for an
interested party which is a party to the
investigation; and (d) have signed the
acknowledgment for clerical personnel
in the form attached hereto (the
authorized applicant shall also sign
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such acknowledgment and will be
deemed responsible for such persons’
compliance with this APO);
(2) Use such BPI solely for the
purposes of the above-captioned
Commission investigation or for U.S.
judicial or review pursuant to the North
American Free Trade Agreement the
determination resulting from such
investigation of such Commission
investigation;
(3) Not consult with any person not
described in paragraph (1) concerning
BPI disclosed under this APO or
otherwise obtained in this investigation
without first having received the written
consent of the Secretary and the party
or the representative of the party from
whom such BPI was obtained;
(4) Whenever materials (e.g.,
documents, computer disks or similar
media) containing such BPI are not
being used, store such material in a
locked file cabinet, vault, safe, or other
suitable container (N.B.: [S]torage of BPI
on so-called hard disk computer media
or similar media is to be avoided,
because mere erasure of data from such
media may not irrecoverably destroy the
BPI and may result in violation of
paragraph C of this APO);
(5) Serve all materials containing BPI
disclosed under this APO as directed by
the Secretary and pursuant to section
207.7(f) of the Commission’s rules;
(6) Transmit each document
containing BPI disclosed under this
APO:
(i) With a cover sheet identifying the
document as containing BPI,
(ii) With all BPI enclosed in brackets
and each page warning that the
document contains BPI,
(iii) If the document is to be filed by
a deadline, with each page marked
‘‘Bracketing of BPI not final for one
business day after date of filing,’’ and
(iv) Within two envelopes, the inner
one sealed and marked ‘‘Business
Proprietary Information—To be opened
only by [name of recipient]’’, and the
outer one sealed and not marked as
containing BPI;
(7) Comply with the provision of this
APO and section 207.7 of the
Commission’s rules
(i) Make true and accurate
representations in the authorized
applicant’s application and promptly
notify the Secretary of any changes that
occur after the submission of the
application and that affect the
representations made in the application
(e.g.[,] change in personnel assigned to
the investigation),
(ii) Report promptly and confirm in
writing to the Secretary any possible
breach of this APO, and
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(iii) Acknowledge that breach of this
APO may subject the authorized
applicant and other persons to such
sanctions or other actions as the
Commission deems appropriate,
including the administrative sanctions
and actions set out in this APO.
The APO form for antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations also
provides for the return or destruction of
the BPI obtained under the APO on the
order of the Secretary, at the conclusion
of the investigation, or at the completion
of Judicial Review. The BPI disclosed to
an authorized applicant under an APO
during the preliminary phase of the
investigation generally may remain in
the applicant’s possession during the
final phase of the investigation.
The APO further provides that breach
of an APO may subject an applicant to:
(1) Disbarment from practice in any
capacity before the Commission along
with such person’s partners, associates,
employer, and employees, for up to
seven years following publication of a
determination that the order has been
breached;
(2) Referral to the United States
Attorney;
(3) In the case of an attorney,
accountant, or other professional,
referral to the ethics panel of the
appropriate professional association;
(4) Such other administrative
sanctions as the Commission determines
to be appropriate, including public
release of, or striking from the record
any information or briefs submitted by,
or on behalf of, such person or the party
he represents; denial of further access to
business proprietary information in the
current or any future investigations
before the Commission, and issuance of
a public or private letter of reprimand;
and
(5) Such other actions, including but
not limited to, a warning letter, as the
Commission determines to be
appropriate.
APOs issued in cross-border long-haul
trucking (‘‘LHT’’) investigations,
conducted under the United StatesMexico-Canada Agreement (‘‘USMCA’’)
Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. 4571–
4574 (19 U.S.C. 4501 note), and
safeguard investigations, conducted
under the statutory authorities listed in
19 CFR 206.1 and 206.31, contain
similar (though not identical)
provisions.
B. Section 337 Investigations
APOs in section 337 investigations
differ from those in title VII
investigations: There is no set form like
the title VII APO application, and
provisions of individual APOs may
differ depending on the investigation
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and the presiding administrative law
judge. However, in practice, the
provisions are often similar in scope
and applied quite similarly. Any person
seeking access to CBI during a section
337 investigation (including outside
counsel for parties to the investigation,
secretarial and support personnel
assisting such counsel, and technical
experts and their staff who are
employed for the purposes of the
investigation) is required to read the
APO, file a letter with the Secretary
indicating agreement to be bound by the
terms of the APO, agree not to reveal
CBI to anyone other than another person
permitted access by the APO, and agree
to utilize the CBI solely for the purposes
of that investigation.
In general, an APO in a section 337
investigation will define what kind of
information is CBI and direct how CBI
is to be designated and protected. The
APO will state which persons may have
access to CBI and which of those
persons must sign onto the APO. The
APO will provide instructions on how
CBI is to be maintained and protected
by labeling documents and filing
transcripts under seal. It will provide
protections for the suppliers of CBI by
notifying them of a Freedom of
Information Act request for the CBI and
providing a procedure for the supplier
to seek to prevent the release of the
information. There are provisions for
disputing the designation of CBI and a
procedure for resolving such disputes.
Under the APO, suppliers of CBI are
given the opportunity to object to the
release of the CBI to a proposed expert.
The APO requires a person who
discloses CBI, other than in a manner
authorized by the APO, to provide all
pertinent facts to the supplier of the CBI
and to the administrative law judge and
to make every effort to prevent further
disclosure. Under Commission practice,
if the underlying investigation is before
the Commission at the time of the
alleged breach or if the underlying
investigation has been terminated, a
person who discloses CBI, other than in
a manner authorized by the APO,
should report the disclosure to the
Secretary. See 19 CFR 210.25, 210.34(c).
Upon final termination of an
investigation, the APO requires all
signatories to the APO to either return
to the suppliers or, with the written
consent of the CBI supplier, destroy the
originals and all copies of the CBI
obtained during the investigation.
The Commission’s regulations
provide for the imposition of certain
sanctions if a person subject to the APO
violates its restrictions. The
Commission keeps the names of the
persons being investigated for violating
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69333
an APO confidential unless the sanction
imposed is a public letter of reprimand.
19 CFR 210.34(c)(1). The possible
sanctions are:
(1) An official reprimand by the
Commission.
(2) Disqualification from or limitation
of further participation in a pending
investigation.
(3) Temporary or permanent
disqualification from practicing in any
capacity before the Commission
pursuant to 19 CFR 201.15(a).
(4) Referral of the facts underlying the
violation to the appropriate licensing
authority in the jurisdiction in which
the individual is licensed to practice.
(5) Making adverse inferences and
rulings against a party involved in the
violation of the APO or such other
action that may be appropriate. 19 CFR
210.34(c)(3).
Commission employees are not
signatories to the Commission’s APOs
and do not obtain access to BPI or CBI
through APO procedures. Consequently,
they are not subject to the requirements
of the APO with respect to the handling
of BPI and CBI. However, Commission
employees are subject to strict statutory
and regulatory constraints concerning
BPI and CBI, and they face potentially
severe penalties for noncompliance. See
18 U.S.C. 1905; title 5, U.S. Code; and
Commission personnel policies
implementing the statutes. Although the
Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) limits the
Commission’s authority to disclose any
personnel action against agency
employees, this should not lead the
public to conclude that no such actions
have been taken.
II. Investigations of Alleged APO
Breaches
The Commission conducts APO
breach investigations for potential
breaches that occur in title VII,
safeguard, and LHT investigations, as
well as potential breaches in section 337
investigations that are before the
Commission or have been terminated.1
Administrative law judges handle
potential APO breaches in section 337
investigations when the breach occurred
and is discovered while the underlying
investigation is before the
administrative law judge. The
Commission may review any decision
that the administrative law judge makes
1 Procedures for investigations to determine
whether a prohibited act, such as a breach, has
occurred and for imposing sanctions for violation
of the provisions of a protective order issued during
a North American Free Trade Agreement or USMCA
panel or committee proceedings are set out in 19
CFR 207.100–207.120. The Commission’s Office of
Unfair Import Investigations conducts those
investigations initially.
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on sanctions in accordance with
Commission regulations. See 19 CFR
210.25, 210.34(c).
For Commission APO breach
investigations, upon finding evidence of
an APO breach or receiving information
that there is reason to believe that one
has occurred, the Secretary notifies
relevant Commission offices that the
Secretary has opened an APO breach
file and the Commission has
commenced an APO breach
investigation. The Commission then
notifies the alleged breaching parties of
the alleged breach and provides them
with the voluntary option to proceed
under a one- or two-step investigatory
process. Under the two-step process,
which was the Commission’s historic
practice, the Commission determines
first whether a breach has occurred and,
if so, who is responsible for it. This is
done after the alleged breaching parties
have been provided an opportunity to
present their views on the matter. The
breach investigation may conclude after
this first step if: (1) the Commission
determines that no breach occurred and
issues a letter so stating; or (2) the
Commission finds that a breach
occurred, but concludes that no further
action is warranted and issues a
warning letter. If the Commission
determines that a breach occurred that
warrants further action, the Commission
will then determine what sanction, if
any, to impose. Before making this
determination, the Commission
provides the breaching parties with an
opportunity to present their views on
the appropriate sanction and any
mitigating circumstances. The
Commission can decide as part of either
the first or second step to issue a
warning letter. A warning letter is not a
sanction, but the Commission will
consider a warning letter as part of a
subsequent APO breach investigation.
The Commission recognizes that the
two-step process can result in
duplicative work for the alleged
breaching party and Commission staff in
some APO breach investigations. For
example, parties who self-report their
own breach often address mitigating
circumstances and sanctions in their
initial response to the Commission’s
letter of inquiry on the breach. But,
under the Commission’s two-step
process, they must await a Commission
decision on breach and then submit
again their views on mitigating
circumstances and sanctions. To
streamline this process and accelerate
processing times, the Commission offers
alleged breaching parties the option to
voluntarily elect a one-step APO breach
investigation process. Under this
process, the Commission will determine
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simultaneously whether a breach
occurred and, if so, the appropriate
sanction to impose, if any. Under either
process, the alleged breaching party has
the opportunity to submit affidavits
reciting the facts concerning the alleged
breach and mitigating factors pertaining
to the appropriate response if a breach
is found.
Sanctions for APO violations serve
three basic interests: (a) preserving the
confidence of submitters of BPI/CBI that
the Commission is a reliable protector of
BPI/CBI; (b) disciplining breachers; and
(c) deterring future violations. As the
Conference Report to the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
observed: ‘‘[T]he effective enforcement
of limited disclosure under [APO]
depends in part on the extent to which
private parties have confidence that
there are effective sanctions against
violation.’’ H.R. Conf. Rep. 100–576, at
623 (1988).
The Commission has worked to
develop consistent jurisprudence, not
only in determining whether a breach
has occurred, but also in selecting an
appropriate response. In determining
the appropriate response, the
Commission generally considers
mitigating factors such as the
unintentional nature of the breach, the
lack of prior breaches committed by the
breaching party, the corrective measures
taken by the breaching party, and the
promptness with which the breaching
party reported the violation to the
Commission. The Commission also
considers aggravating circumstances,
especially whether persons not
authorized under the APO had access to
and viewed the BPI/CBI. The
Commission considers whether there
have been prior breaches by the same
person or persons in other
investigations and whether there have
been multiple breaches by the same
person or persons in the same
investigation.
The Commission’s rules permit an
economist or consultant to obtain access
to BPI/CBI under the APO in a title VII,
safeguard, or LHT investigation if the
economist or consultant is under the
direction and control of an attorney
under the APO, or if the economist or
consultant appears regularly before the
Commission and represents an
interested party who is a party to the
investigation. See 19 CFR
207.7(a)(3)(i)(B) and (C); 19 CFR
206.17(a)(3)(i)(B) and (C); and 19 CFR
208.22(a)(3)(i)(B) and (C). Economists
and consultants who obtain access to
BPI/CBI under the APO under the
direction and control of an attorney
nonetheless remain individually
responsible for complying with the
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APO. In appropriate circumstances, for
example, an economist under the
direction and control of an attorney may
be held responsible for a breach of the
APO by failing to redact APO
information from a document that is
subsequently filed with the Commission
and served as a public document, or for
retaining BPI/CBI without consent of the
submitter after the termination of an
investigation. This is so even though the
Commission may also hold the attorney
exercising direction or control over the
economist or consultant responsible for
the APO breach. In section 337
investigations, technical experts and
their staff who are employed for the
purposes of the investigation are
required to sign onto the APO and agree
to comply with its provisions.
The records of Commission
investigations of alleged APO breaches
in antidumping and countervailing duty
cases, section 337 investigations,
safeguard investigations, and LHT
investigations are not publicly available
and are exempt from disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. 552. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. 1677f(g);
19 U.S.C. 1333(h); 19 CFR 210.34(c).
The two types of breaches most
frequently investigated by the
Commission involve: (1) the APO’s
prohibition on the dissemination or
exposure of BPI or CBI to unauthorized
persons; and (2) the APO’s requirement
that the materials received under the
APO be returned or destroyed and that
a certificate be filed with the
Commission indicating what actions
were taken after the termination of the
investigation or any subsequent appeals
of the Commission’s determination. The
dissemination of BPI/CBI usually occurs
as the result of failure to delete BPI/CBI
from public versions of documents filed
with the Commission or transmission of
proprietary versions of documents to
unauthorized recipients. Other breaches
have included the failure to bracket
properly BPI/CBI in proprietary
documents filed with the Commission,
the failure to report immediately known
or suspected violations of an APO, and
the failure to adequately supervise nonlawyers in the handling of BPI/CBI.
Occasionally, the Commission
conducts APO breach investigations that
involve members of a law firm or
consultants working with a firm who
were granted access to APO materials by
the firm although they were not APO
signatories. In many of these cases, the
firm and the person using the BPI/CBI
mistakenly believed an APO application
had been filed for that person. The
Commission has determined in all of
these cases that the person who was a
non-signatory, and therefore did not
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agree to be bound by the APO, could not
be found to have breached the APO.
However, under Commission rule
201.15 (19 CFR 201.15), the Commission
may take action against these persons
for good cause shown. In all cases in
which the Commission has taken such
action, it decided that the non-signatory
appeared regularly before the
Commission, was aware of the
requirements and limitations related to
APO access, and should have verified
their APO status before obtaining access
to and using the BPI/CBI. The
Commission notes that section 201.15
may also be available to issue sanctions
to attorneys or agents in different factual
circumstances in which they did not
technically breach the APO, but their
action or inaction did not demonstrate
diligent care of the APO materials, even
though they appeared regularly before
the Commission and were aware of the
importance that the Commission places
on the proper care of APO materials.
The Commission has held routinely
that the disclosure of BPI/CBI through
recoverable metadata or hidden text
constitutes a breach of the APO even
when the BPI/CBI is not immediately
visible without further manipulation of
the document. In such cases, breaching
parties have transmitted documents that
appear to be public documents in which
the parties have removed or redacted all
BPI/CBI. However, further inspection of
the document reveals that confidential
information is actually retrievable by
manipulating codes in software or
through the recovery of hidden text or
metadata. In such instances, the
Commission has found that the
electronic transmission of a public
document with BPI/CBI in a recoverable
form was a breach of the APO.
The Commission has cautioned
counsel to ensure that each authorized
applicant files with the Commission
within 60 days of the completion of an
import injury investigation or at the
conclusion of judicial or binational
review of the Commission’s
determination, a certificate stating that,
to the signatory’s knowledge and belief,
all copies of BPI/CBI have been returned
or destroyed, and no copies of such
materials have been made available to
any person to whom disclosure was not
specifically authorized. This
requirement applies to each attorney,
consultant, or expert in a firm who has
access to BPI/CBI. One firm-wide
certificate is insufficient.
Attorneys who are signatories to the
APO in a section 337 investigation
should inform the administrative law
judge and the Secretary if there are any
changes to the information that was
provided in the application for access to
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the CBI. This is similar to the
requirement to update an applicant’s
information in title VII investigations.
In addition, attorneys who are
signatories to the APO in a section 337
investigation should send a notice to the
Commission if they stop participating in
the investigation or the subsequent
appeal of the Commission’s
determination. The notice should
inform the Commission about the
disposition of CBI obtained under the
APO that was in their possession, or the
Commission could hold them
responsible for any failure of their
former firm to return or destroy the CBI
in an appropriate manner.
III. Specific APO Breach Investigations
Case 1. The Commission determined
that a partner at a law firm breached the
APO issued in a title VII investigation
when the partner supervised the
drafting, revision, and review of a
publicly filed document that contained
BPI.
Three attorneys, including the
partner, were responsible for drafting
the document at issue. Despite the
firm’s instructions to place brackets
around any BPI that an attorney added
to the draft, one of the non-partner
attorneys inadvertently failed to include
brackets around a quote in a footnote.
The partner completed two full reviews
of the document before its filing, but the
partner failed to identify the
unbracketed BPI in the footnote. The
law firm filed the document on the
Commission’s Electronic Document
Information System (EDIS), and it also
served the document on all parties on
the public service list. The Commission
first became aware of this breach
through Commission staff, who
discovered the exposed BPI and notified
the Secretary. The Office of the
Secretary notified the partner of the
breach, and the law firm filed a
corrected version of the public
document later that day.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered mitigating factors, including
that: (1) the breach was inadvertent and
unintentional; (2) the law firm took
prompt corrective actions to mitigate the
effect of the breach by correcting its
filing, notifying the recipients of the
document’s error and of its substitute
filing, and obtaining the recipient’s
confirmation of the document’s
destruction; and (3) the partner had not
previously breached an APO in the twoyear period preceding the date of the
breach. The Commission also
considered the following aggravating
factors: (1) the Commission was the first
to discover and flag the breach; and (2)
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unauthorized individuals accessed and
presumably viewed the CBI.
The Commission issued a private
letter of reprimand to the partner after
finding that the partner was ultimately
responsible for the failure to redact BPI
from the public document.
Case 2. The Commission determined
that an expert breached the APO issued
in a section 337 investigation by
submitting expert reports containing
CBI in several unrelated actions pending
before a federal district court.
The expert drafted and filed before a
federal district court six expert reports
that contained a sentence from the
confidential version of an
administrative law judge’s initial
determination. Two months later,
counsel for one of the parties involved
in the underlying section 337
investigation, and in the federal district
court action, notified the expert that the
quoted sentence did not appear in the
public version of the initial
determination. The expert took
immediate steps to replace the page that
contained the CBI, but the expert did
not notify the Commission until about a
month after the breach’s discovery. The
expert acknowledged the failure to
follow firm procedures, which would
have required comparison of the draft
expert report with the public version of
the initial determination.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered the following mitigating
factors: (1) the breach was inadvertent
and unintentional; (2) the expert selfreported the breach to the Commission;
and (3) the expert had not previously
breached an APO in the two-year period
preceding the breach. The Commission
also considered the following
aggravating factors: (1) the expert did
not discover the breach; (2) the breach
resulted in exposure of CBI to
unauthorized individuals; (3) there was
a delay of two months between the
discovery of the breach and the
mitigation of the breach; (4) the expert
waited more than one month to report
the breach to the Commission; and (5)
the expert failed to handle CBI with due
diligence and care, and the expert did
not follow firm procedures for
protecting CBI.
The Commission issued a private
letter of reprimand to the expert.
Case 3. The Commission determined
that a supervisory attorney at a law firm
breached an APO in a title VII
investigation when a legal support staff
member under the attorney’s
supervision inadvertently attached a
confidential brief from one investigation
to a public brief in another investigation
and publicly filed both briefs as one
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document with the Department of
Commerce (Commerce). The
Commission also determined that the
supervisory attorney breached the APO
a second time by providing BPI to that
legal support staff member before the
staff member had signed an APO
acknowledgment for clerical personnel.
After filing the document in
Commerce’s IA ACCESS website, the
legal support staff member served the
document on the parties listed on the
public brief’s service list. None of the
served parties were on the APO service
list for the confidential brief. Three days
later, the law firm received notification
from one of the parties on the public
brief’s service list that the document
contained BPI from an unrelated
investigation. Upon review of the
document, the law firm discovered that
the legal support staff member who had
filed and served the document had
included a copy of a confidential brief
from another title VII investigation. The
law firm immediately contacted
Commerce to request removal of the
document from the IA ACCESS website.
Commerce indicated to the law firm that
multiple individuals had accessed the
document while it was posted publicly
to that website. The law firm also
contacted the parties on the public
service list to ask that they destroy any
copies.
The law firm immediately notified the
Commission of the breach after learning
of it. In its correspondence to the
Commission, the firm indicated that the
breach occurred because of the legal
support staff member’s failure to follow
firm procedures in handling and storing
the confidential brief. The firm also
indicated that the supervisory attorney
had supervised the preparation of the
confidential brief and had been aware of
staff’s inconsistent adherence to the
firm’s BPI procedures. In addition, over
the course of the APO breach
investigation, the Commission
discovered that the supervisory attorney
had provided BPI to the legal support
staff member without first having the
staff member sign an APO
acknowledgment for clerical personnel.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered mitigating factors, including
that: (1) the breach was inadvertent and
unintentional; (2) the law firm took
prompt action to remedy the breach and
prevent further dissemination of BPI; (3)
the law firm promptly self-reported the
breach to the Commission; (4) the law
firm implemented new procedures to
prevent similar breaches in the future;
and (5) the supervisory attorney had not
previously breached an APO in the twoyear period preceding the date of the
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breach. The Commission also
considered the following aggravating
factors: (1) unauthorized individuals
had access to and viewed the BPI; (2)
the law firm violated the APO in two
different ways; (3) the law firm did not
discover either breach; and (4) the
supervisory attorney and legal support
staff failed to follow the law firm’s
procedures for protecting BPI.
The Commission also considered
whether to find in breach of the APO a
second attorney who supervised the
preparation of the public brief, and it
determined not to do so. The second
attorney was an APO signatory in both
relevant investigations, but the second
attorney had not supervised the
preparation of the confidential brief.
Further, the second attorney had
reviewed the public brief before the
legal support staff member had attached
the confidential version to it. The
Commission determined that the second
attorney would have had no reason to
suspect that the legal support staff
member would attach BPI materials to
the public brief after the final review
and approval of the brief.
The Commission issued a private
letter of reprimand to the supervisory
attorney. The Commission did not take
any further action against the legal
support staff member whose actions
contributed to the breach because the
staff member had since passed away.
Case 4. The Commission determined
that two attorneys at a law firm
breached an APO in a title VII
investigation when they reviewed, filed
in EDIS, and served a public version of
a brief that contained unredacted BPI
belonging to a third party.
The attorneys served the brief on the
parties to the public service list in the
investigation, which included
individuals who were not authorized
under the APO to view BPI, and the
brief was publicly posted to EDIS,
where at least one unauthorized
individual accessed it. In addition, one
of the attorneys forwarded copies of the
brief to the firm’s clients. Two days after
filing and serving the brief, the two
attorneys received notification from
another party to the investigation (after
Commission business hours) that the
brief contained BPI. The two attorneys
immediately reviewed the brief, and
they discovered that they had bracketed,
but failed to remove, the BPI at issue.
That same day, the two attorneys
contacted their clients and the parties
on the public service list to request that
they destroy the brief and contact
anyone else to whom they may have
forwarded the brief. The next day, the
two attorneys notified the Commission
of the breach and requested that the
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Secretary remove the document from
public view on EDIS. Over the course of
the investigation, the two attorneys
confirmed to the Commission that they
had received responses (and
confirmations of destruction) from all
but two individual recipients of the
brief. Those two individuals never
acknowledged the attorneys’ emails nor
confirmed destruction of the brief.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered mitigating factors, including
that: (1) the breach was inadvertent and
unintentional; (2) the law firm promptly
self-reported the breach to the
Commission; (3) the law firm took
prompt action to remedy the breach and
prevent further dissemination of BPI; (4)
the law firm implemented new
procedures to prevent similar breaches
in the future; and (5) neither attorney
had previously breach an APO in the
two-year period preceding the date of
the breach. The Commission also
considered the following aggravating
factors: (1) unauthorized individuals
had access to and presumably viewed
the BPI; and (2) the law firm did not
discover its own breach.
The Commission determined to issue
private letters of reprimand to both
attorneys.
Case 5. The Commission determined
that an attorney and a paralegal at a law
firm breached the APO in a title VII
investigation when an economist at the
firm accessed BPI materials that the law
firm had received under the APO before
the Secretary had approved the
economist’s APO application.
The attorney, who was lead counsel
for the investigation, did not confirm
that the Secretary had approved the
economist’s APO application before
instructing the economist to access the
BPI materials. The economist also failed
to confirm that the Secretary had
approved the APO application before
accessing the BPI materials. The
paralegal, who had set up the folder
containing the BPI materials in the law
firm’s system, had failed to restrict
access to the folder (in accordance with
the firm’s procedures) to only
authorized individuals whose APO
applications had been approved. Upon
discovery that the Secretary had not yet
approved the economist’s APO
application, the attorney immediately
notified the Commission of the breach
and restricted access to the folder
containing the BPI materials to
approved APO applicants. However, the
economist had access to and viewed on
several occasions the BPI at issue for
approximately two weeks before
authorized to do so. The law firm
confirmed that the economist was the
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only unauthorized individual to access
the BPI materials.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered mitigating factors, including
that: (1) the breach was inadvertent and
unintentional; (2) the law firm took
prompt action to remedy the breach and
prevent further dissemination of BPI; (3)
the firm immediately self-reported the
breach to the Commission; (4) the law
firm implemented new procedures to
prevent similar breaches in the future;
(5) the economist, who was later added
to the APO, acted at all times as if
bound by the APO, and thus no other
unauthorized individuals viewed the
BPI materials; and (6) the attorney and
the paralegal had not previously
breached an APO in the two-year period
preceding the date of the breach. The
Commission also considered the
following aggravating factors: (1) the
economist was not an authorized APO
signatory at the time of the initial access
and viewing of the BPI; and (2) the
attorney, the paralegal, and the
economist failed to follow the law firm’s
procedures for protecting BPI.
The Commission determined to issue
warning letters to the attorney and the
paralegal. The Commission also found
that good cause existed to issue a
warning letter to the economist under
19 CFR 201.15(a). Though the economist
was not a signatory to the APO at the
time of the inappropriate access to the
BPI, the economist was, or should have
been, aware of the requirements and
limitations related to APO access. The
economist’s failure to verify that the
Commission had accepted the APO
application before using the BPI
materials demonstrated a disregard for
the Commission’s rules protecting the
confidentiality of the information that is
provided under the APO.
Case 6. The Commission determined
that 18 attorneys from one law firm
breached the APO issued in a section
337 investigation when the law firm
filed in EDIS a public version of a
document that contained unredacted
CBI in a footnote.
Two supervisory attorneys oversaw
the redaction and filing of the public
version of the document and 16
attorneys contributed to its review and
redaction. Each attorney had the
opportunity to discover the presence of
the unredacted CBI in the footnote of
the document during their respective
review, but none did. The firm filed the
document in EDIS and served it on the
parties. One day later, one of the firm’s
attorneys, who had an opportunity to
review the document before its filing,
discovered that the footnote in question
contained unredacted CBI. The firm
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notified the Commission that same day,
after the document had been publicly
posted to EDIS, and the firm filed a
replacement document about a week
later.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered the following mitigating
factors: (1) the breach was inadvertent
and unintentional; (2) the law firm took
prompt action to remedy the breach and
prevent further dissemination of CBI; (3)
the law firm immediately self-reported
the breach to the Commission; and (4)
the law firm implemented new
procedures to prevent similar breaches
in the future. The Commission also
considered the aggravating factor that
unauthorized persons had access to and
presumably viewed CBI.
The Commission issued warning
letters to 16 attorneys whose actions
contributed to the breach. The
Commission also issued private letters
of reprimand to the two supervisory
attorneys who bore ultimate
responsibility for overseeing the
redaction and filing of the document at
issue.
Case 7. The Commission determined
that a supervisory attorney and an
associate attorney breached the APO
issued in a section 337 investigation
when they exposed CBI from the
investigation to their client.
The associate attorney, in reporting
the work that the attorney had
performed for the underlying
investigation, noted details of that work
in an internal electronic time entry
system. The details included references
to company names that one of the
parties to the investigation considered
to be CBI. The firm incorporated the
associate attorney’s entries from the
time entry system into a billing invoice
that it sent to its client. The supervisory
attorney personally reviewed the billing
invoice at issue and approved it for
transmittal to the firm’s client. Upon
receipt of the billing invoice, the client
contacted the firm to inquire about the
entries that contained CBI, which
caused the firm to discover its own
breach. The firm requested that its client
return the original invoice, and the
client immediately did so. The firm
notified the party whose CBI was
exposed, and after conducting an
internal investigation, the firm notified
the Commission about two months later.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered the following mitigating
factors: (1) the breach was inadvertent
and unintentional; (2) the law firm selfreported the breach to the Commission;
(3) the law firm took prompt action to
remedy the breach and prevent further
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dissemination of CBI; (4) the attorneys
had not previously breached an APO in
the two-year period preceding the date
of the breach; and (5) the law firm
implemented new measures to prevent
future similar breaches in the future.
The Commission also considered the
following aggravating factors: (1)
unauthorized persons had access to and
viewed CBI; and (2) the law firm waited
nearly two months to notify the
Commission of the breach.
The Commission issued a warning
letter to the associate attorney whose
actions contributed to, but did not
directly cause, the breach. It issued a
private letter of reprimand to the
supervisory attorney.
Case 8. The Commission determined
that 16 attorneys from one law firm
breached the APO issued in a section
337 investigation when the law firm
filed in EDIS 79 public demonstrative
exhibits that contained unredacted CBI.
Fifteen attorneys were part of a team
that was responsible for preparing and
filing demonstrative exhibits following a
hearing in the investigation. One senior
attorney was responsible for supervising
the team’s effort. The breach occurred
because when, in preparing the
demonstrative exhibits for filing, the
team failed to follow an instruction to
place a ‘‘-C’’ designation after the
exhibit number where the exhibits
contained CBI. Because the team did not
include the ‘‘-C’’ designation on the
exhibits in question, the legal support
staff who filed the exhibits in EDIS
assumed that they were public and filed
them on the public record. Over a year
later, the law firm learned that opposing
counsel in unrelated federal court
litigation accessed the exhibits through
EDIS. The law firm promptly notified
the Commission and the affected parties
whose CBI had been exposed, and the
firm spent over 1,000 hours in its efforts
to remediate the breach. Following the
breach’s discovery, the law firm
changed its protocols for protecting CBI
in section 337 investigations.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered the following mitigating
factors: (1) the breach was inadvertent
and unintentional; (2) the law firm
discovered its own breach and promptly
self-reported it to the Commission; (3)
the law firm took prompt action to
investigate and remedy the breach; (4)
the attorneys had not previously
breached an APO in the preceding two
years; and (5) the law firm implemented
new measures to prevent future similar
breaches. The Commission also
considered the following aggravating
factors: (1) unauthorized persons had
access to and viewed CBI; and (2) the
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delay in the discovery of the breach left
CBI publicly exposed for a period of
about 15 months.
The Commission issued a private
letter of reprimand to the supervisor of
the team responsible for the preparation
and filing of the exhibits at issue after
finding that the attorney’s supervision
was inadequate and failed to secure the
confidential treatment of the CBI in
those exhibits. The Commission issued
warning letters to 14 attorneys on the
team who contributed to the preparation
and filing of the exhibits. The
Commission also issued a warning letter
to one attorney who did not directly
participate in the preparation and filing
of the exhibits but permitted legal
support staff to use, without
supervision, the attorney’s credentials to
file the exhibits.
Case 9. The Commission found that
an associate attorney breached the APO
issued in a section 337 investigation
when the attorney’s actions exposed CBI
obtained under the APO to the
attorney’s client.
The breach occurred when the
attorney arranged for the client to access
firm files stored on an electronic server
by a discovery vendor. The attorney
instructed the vendor to provide the
client with limited access to certain file
locations that stored only public files.
However, the attorney did not verify
that the vendor had followed the
attorney’s instructions before granting
the client access to the firm’s files. The
vendor mistakenly granted the client
unlimited access, and, as a result, the
client inadvertently accessed 14 files
containing CBI obtained under the APO.
In accordance with the predetermined
arrangement, the vendor terminated that
client’s unlimited access one day later.
However, the attorney did not discover
the breach until about 14 months later.
The attorney reported the breach to the
Commission a few days after making the
discovery.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered the following mitigating
factors: (1) the breach was inadvertent
and unintentional; (2) the law firm
discovered its own breach; (3) the law
firm took prompt action to investigate
and remedy the breach; (4) the attorney
had not previously breached an APO in
the two-year period preceding the date
of the breach; and (5) the law firm selfreported its own breach to the
Commission. The Commission also
considered the following aggravating
factors: (1) unauthorized persons had
access to and viewed CBI; and (2) the
law firm did not discover its own breach
until about 14 months after it occurred.
However, the Commission noted that
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because the client’s access to the CBIcontaining files was limited to one day,
the CBI was not exposed to
unauthorized individuals during those
14 months.
The Commission issued a private
letter of reprimand to the associate
attorney and found that, in the context
of this matter, the attorney was
obligated to take additional steps to
ensure that the client was unable to
access the files containing CBI.
Case 10. The Commission determined
that an attorney and a paralegal at a law
firm breached the APO in a title VII
investigation when they publicly filed
in EDIS a brief with BPI in recoverable
hidden text.
While multiple attorneys reviewed
the public version of the brief, the
attorney and the paralegal were the only
individuals who prepared and reviewed
the final .pdf version of the document.
Under firm procedures, the paralegal
prepared the public version of the
document by changing bracketed BPI to
white font, converting the document
from Microsoft Word to a .pdf file
format, and then removing hidden
information from the final .pdf file.
Following the paralegal’s preparation of
the final document, the attorney
reviewed the .pdf version of the
document to ensure that all BPI had
been removed from the file. The
paralegal then publicly filed the
document to EDIS. That same day,
while preparing the document for
service, another paralegal at the same
firm noticed that the document
contained BPI in recoverable hidden
text. The attorney immediately notified
the Commission of the breach and
requested that the document be
removed from public viewing. However,
unauthorized individuals accessed and
presumably viewed the brief while it
was posted publicly to EDIS.
In determining whether to issue a
sanction for the breach, the Commission
considered mitigating factors, including
that: (1) the breach was inadvertent and
unintentional; (2) the law firm
discovered its own breach; (3) the law
firm took prompt action to remedy the
breach and prevent further
dissemination of BPI; (4) the law firm
immediately self-reported the breach to
the Commission; (5) the law firm
implemented new procedures to prevent
similar breaches in the future; and (6)
neither the attorney nor the paralegal
had previously breached an APO in the
two-year period preceding the date of
the breach. The Commission also
considered the aggravating factor that
unauthorized persons had access to and
presumably viewed BPI.
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The Commission determined to issue
private letters of reprimand to both the
attorney and the paralegal. The
Commission also considered whether to
find in breach other attorneys and legal
support staff who reviewed the public
version of the brief and approved the
bracketing. However, the Commission
declined to do so, determining that this
breach occurred not because of
bracketing issues, but because of a
failure to remove properly bracketed BPI
from the final .pdf file.
By order of the Commission.
Issued: November 14, 2022.
Jessica Mullan,
Attorney Advisor.
[FR Doc. 2022–25108 Filed 11–17–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
[Investigation Nos. 731–TA–1064 and 1066–
1068 (Third Review)]
Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From
China, India, Thailand, and Vietnam;
Scheduling of Full Five-Year Reviews
United States International
Trade Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Commission hereby gives
notice of the scheduling of full reviews
pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930 (‘‘the
Act’’) to determine whether revocation
of the antidumping duty orders on
frozen warmwater shrimp from China,
India, Thailand, and Vietnam would be
likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of material injury within a
reasonably foreseeable time. The
Commission has determined to exercise
its authority to extend the review period
by up to 90 days.
DATES: November 14, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Tyler Berard (202–205–3354) or Keysha
Martinez (202–205–2136), Office of
Investigations, U.S. International Trade
Commission, 500 E Street SW,
Washington, DC 20436. Hearingimpaired persons can obtain
information on this matter by contacting
the Commission’s TDD terminal on 202–
205–1810. Persons with mobility
impairments who will need special
assistance in gaining access to the
Commission should contact the Office
of the Secretary at 202–205–2000.
General information concerning the
Commission may also be obtained by
accessing its internet server (https://
www.usitc.gov). The public record for
these reviews may be viewed on the
E:\FR\FM\18NON1.SGM
18NON1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 222 (Friday, November 18, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69331-69338]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-25108]
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
Summary of Commission Practice Relating to Administrative
Protective Orders
AGENCY: International Trade Commission.
ACTION: Summary of commission practice relating to administrative
protective orders.
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SUMMARY: Since February 1991, the U.S. International Trade Commission
(``Commission'') has published in the Federal Register reports on the
status of its practice with respect to breaches of
[[Page 69332]]
its administrative protective orders (``APOs'') under the Tariff Act of
1930 in response to a direction contained in the Conference Report to
the Customs and Trade Act of 1990. Over time, the Commission has added
to its report discussions of APO breaches in Commission proceedings
other than under title VII and violations of the Commission's rules,
including the rule on bracketing business proprietary information (the
``24-hour rule''). This notice provides a summary of APO breach
investigations completed during fiscal year 2022. This summary
addresses APO breach investigations related to proceedings under both
title VII and section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The Commission
intends for this summary to inform representatives of parties to
Commission proceedings of the specific types of APO breaches before the
Commission and the corresponding types of actions that the Commission
has taken.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Caitlin Stephens, Office of the
General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission, telephone (202)
205-2076. Hearing-impaired individuals may obtain information on this
matter by contacting the Commission's TDD terminal at (202) 205-1810.
General information concerning the Commission is available on its
website at https://www.usitc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Statutory authorities for Commission
investigations provide for the release of business proprietary
information (``BPI'') or confidential business information (``CBI'') to
certain authorized representatives in accordance with requirements set
forth in the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. Such
statutory and regulatory authorities include: 19 U.S.C. 1677f; 19 CFR
207.7; 19 U.S.C. 1337(n); 19 CFR 210.5, 210.34; 19 U.S.C. 2252(i); 19
CFR 206.17; 19 U.S.C. 4572(f); 19 CFR 208.22; 19 U.S.C. 1516a(g)(7)(A);
and 19 CFR 207.100--207.120. The discussion below describes APO breach
investigations that the Commission completed during fiscal year 2022,
including descriptions of actions taken in response to any breaches.
Since 1991, the Commission has published annually a summary of its
actions in response to violations of Commission APOs and rule
violations. See 86 FR 71916 (Dec. 20, 2021); 85 FR 7589 (Feb. 10,
2020); 83 FR 42140 (Aug. 20, 2018); 83 FR 17843 (Apr. 24, 2018); 82 FR
29322 (June 28, 2017); 81 FR 17200 (Mar. 28, 2016); 80 FR 1664 (Jan.
13, 2015); 78 FR 79481 (Dec. 30, 2013); 77 FR 76518 (Dec. 28, 2012); 76
FR 78945 (Dec. 20, 2011); 75 FR 66127 (Oct. 27, 2010); 74 FR 54071
(Oct. 21, 2009); 73 FR 51843 (Sept. 5, 2008); 72 FR 50119 (Aug. 30,
2007); 71 FR 39355 (July 12, 2006); 70 FR 42382 (July 22, 2005); 69 FR
29972 (May 26, 2004); 68 FR 28256 (May 23, 2003); 67 FR 39425 (June 7,
2002); 66 FR 27685 (May 18, 2001); 65 FR 30434 (May 11, 2000); 64 FR
23355 (Apr. 30, 1999); 63 FR 25064 (May 6, 1998); 62 FR 13164 (Mar. 19,
1997); 61 FR 21203 (May 9, 1996); 60 FR 24880 (May 10, 1995); 59 FR
16834 (Apr. 8, 1994); 58 FR 21991 (Apr. 26, 1993); 57 FR 12335 (Apr. 9,
1992); and 56 FR 4846 (Feb. 6, 1991). This report does not provide an
exhaustive list of conduct that will be deemed to be a breach of the
Commission's APOs. The Commission considers APO breach investigations
on a case-by-case basis.
As part of the Commission's efforts to educate practitioners about
the Commission's current APO practice, the Secretary to the Commission
(``Secretary'') issued in January 2022 a sixth edition of An
Introduction to Administrative Protective Order Practice in Import
Injury Investigations (Pub. No. 5280). This document is available on
the Commission's website at https://www.usitc.gov.
I. In General
A. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations
The current APO application form for antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations, which the Commission revised in May 2020, requires
an APO applicant to agree to:
(1) Not divulge any of the BPI disclosed under this APO or
otherwise obtained in this investigation and not otherwise available to
him or her, to any person other than--
(i) Personnel of the Commission concerned with the investigation,
(ii) The person or agency from whom the BPI was obtained,
(iii) A person whose application for disclosure of BPI under this
APO has been granted by the Secretary, and
(iv) Other persons, such as paralegals and clerical staff, who (a)
are employed or supervised by and under the direction and control of
the authorized applicant or another authorized applicant in the same
firm whose application has been granted; (b) have a need thereof in
connection with the investigation; (c) are not involved in competitive
decision making for an interested party which is a party to the
investigation; and (d) have signed the acknowledgment for clerical
personnel in the form attached hereto (the authorized applicant shall
also sign such acknowledgment and will be deemed responsible for such
persons' compliance with this APO);
(2) Use such BPI solely for the purposes of the above-captioned
Commission investigation or for U.S. judicial or review pursuant to the
North American Free Trade Agreement the determination resulting from
such investigation of such Commission investigation;
(3) Not consult with any person not described in paragraph (1)
concerning BPI disclosed under this APO or otherwise obtained in this
investigation without first having received the written consent of the
Secretary and the party or the representative of the party from whom
such BPI was obtained;
(4) Whenever materials (e.g., documents, computer disks or similar
media) containing such BPI are not being used, store such material in a
locked file cabinet, vault, safe, or other suitable container (N.B.:
[S]torage of BPI on so-called hard disk computer media or similar media
is to be avoided, because mere erasure of data from such media may not
irrecoverably destroy the BPI and may result in violation of paragraph
C of this APO);
(5) Serve all materials containing BPI disclosed under this APO as
directed by the Secretary and pursuant to section 207.7(f) of the
Commission's rules;
(6) Transmit each document containing BPI disclosed under this APO:
(i) With a cover sheet identifying the document as containing BPI,
(ii) With all BPI enclosed in brackets and each page warning that
the document contains BPI,
(iii) If the document is to be filed by a deadline, with each page
marked ``Bracketing of BPI not final for one business day after date of
filing,'' and
(iv) Within two envelopes, the inner one sealed and marked
``Business Proprietary Information--To be opened only by [name of
recipient]'', and the outer one sealed and not marked as containing
BPI;
(7) Comply with the provision of this APO and section 207.7 of the
Commission's rules
(i) Make true and accurate representations in the authorized
applicant's application and promptly notify the Secretary of any
changes that occur after the submission of the application and that
affect the representations made in the application (e.g.[,] change in
personnel assigned to the investigation),
(ii) Report promptly and confirm in writing to the Secretary any
possible breach of this APO, and
[[Page 69333]]
(iii) Acknowledge that breach of this APO may subject the
authorized applicant and other persons to such sanctions or other
actions as the Commission deems appropriate, including the
administrative sanctions and actions set out in this APO.
The APO form for antidumping and countervailing duty investigations
also provides for the return or destruction of the BPI obtained under
the APO on the order of the Secretary, at the conclusion of the
investigation, or at the completion of Judicial Review. The BPI
disclosed to an authorized applicant under an APO during the
preliminary phase of the investigation generally may remain in the
applicant's possession during the final phase of the investigation.
The APO further provides that breach of an APO may subject an
applicant to:
(1) Disbarment from practice in any capacity before the Commission
along with such person's partners, associates, employer, and employees,
for up to seven years following publication of a determination that the
order has been breached;
(2) Referral to the United States Attorney;
(3) In the case of an attorney, accountant, or other professional,
referral to the ethics panel of the appropriate professional
association;
(4) Such other administrative sanctions as the Commission
determines to be appropriate, including public release of, or striking
from the record any information or briefs submitted by, or on behalf
of, such person or the party he represents; denial of further access to
business proprietary information in the current or any future
investigations before the Commission, and issuance of a public or
private letter of reprimand; and
(5) Such other actions, including but not limited to, a warning
letter, as the Commission determines to be appropriate.
APOs issued in cross-border long-haul trucking (``LHT'')
investigations, conducted under the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (``USMCA'') Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. 4571-4574 (19
U.S.C. 4501 note), and safeguard investigations, conducted under the
statutory authorities listed in 19 CFR 206.1 and 206.31, contain
similar (though not identical) provisions.
B. Section 337 Investigations
APOs in section 337 investigations differ from those in title VII
investigations: There is no set form like the title VII APO
application, and provisions of individual APOs may differ depending on
the investigation and the presiding administrative law judge. However,
in practice, the provisions are often similar in scope and applied
quite similarly. Any person seeking access to CBI during a section 337
investigation (including outside counsel for parties to the
investigation, secretarial and support personnel assisting such
counsel, and technical experts and their staff who are employed for the
purposes of the investigation) is required to read the APO, file a
letter with the Secretary indicating agreement to be bound by the terms
of the APO, agree not to reveal CBI to anyone other than another person
permitted access by the APO, and agree to utilize the CBI solely for
the purposes of that investigation.
In general, an APO in a section 337 investigation will define what
kind of information is CBI and direct how CBI is to be designated and
protected. The APO will state which persons may have access to CBI and
which of those persons must sign onto the APO. The APO will provide
instructions on how CBI is to be maintained and protected by labeling
documents and filing transcripts under seal. It will provide
protections for the suppliers of CBI by notifying them of a Freedom of
Information Act request for the CBI and providing a procedure for the
supplier to seek to prevent the release of the information. There are
provisions for disputing the designation of CBI and a procedure for
resolving such disputes. Under the APO, suppliers of CBI are given the
opportunity to object to the release of the CBI to a proposed expert.
The APO requires a person who discloses CBI, other than in a manner
authorized by the APO, to provide all pertinent facts to the supplier
of the CBI and to the administrative law judge and to make every effort
to prevent further disclosure. Under Commission practice, if the
underlying investigation is before the Commission at the time of the
alleged breach or if the underlying investigation has been terminated,
a person who discloses CBI, other than in a manner authorized by the
APO, should report the disclosure to the Secretary. See 19 CFR 210.25,
210.34(c). Upon final termination of an investigation, the APO requires
all signatories to the APO to either return to the suppliers or, with
the written consent of the CBI supplier, destroy the originals and all
copies of the CBI obtained during the investigation.
The Commission's regulations provide for the imposition of certain
sanctions if a person subject to the APO violates its restrictions. The
Commission keeps the names of the persons being investigated for
violating an APO confidential unless the sanction imposed is a public
letter of reprimand. 19 CFR 210.34(c)(1). The possible sanctions are:
(1) An official reprimand by the Commission.
(2) Disqualification from or limitation of further participation in
a pending investigation.
(3) Temporary or permanent disqualification from practicing in any
capacity before the Commission pursuant to 19 CFR 201.15(a).
(4) Referral of the facts underlying the violation to the
appropriate licensing authority in the jurisdiction in which the
individual is licensed to practice.
(5) Making adverse inferences and rulings against a party involved
in the violation of the APO or such other action that may be
appropriate. 19 CFR 210.34(c)(3).
Commission employees are not signatories to the Commission's APOs
and do not obtain access to BPI or CBI through APO procedures.
Consequently, they are not subject to the requirements of the APO with
respect to the handling of BPI and CBI. However, Commission employees
are subject to strict statutory and regulatory constraints concerning
BPI and CBI, and they face potentially severe penalties for
noncompliance. See 18 U.S.C. 1905; title 5, U.S. Code; and Commission
personnel policies implementing the statutes. Although the Privacy Act
(5 U.S.C. 552a) limits the Commission's authority to disclose any
personnel action against agency employees, this should not lead the
public to conclude that no such actions have been taken.
II. Investigations of Alleged APO Breaches
The Commission conducts APO breach investigations for potential
breaches that occur in title VII, safeguard, and LHT investigations, as
well as potential breaches in section 337 investigations that are
before the Commission or have been terminated.\1\ Administrative law
judges handle potential APO breaches in section 337 investigations when
the breach occurred and is discovered while the underlying
investigation is before the administrative law judge. The Commission
may review any decision that the administrative law judge makes
[[Page 69334]]
on sanctions in accordance with Commission regulations. See 19 CFR
210.25, 210.34(c).
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\1\ Procedures for investigations to determine whether a
prohibited act, such as a breach, has occurred and for imposing
sanctions for violation of the provisions of a protective order
issued during a North American Free Trade Agreement or USMCA panel
or committee proceedings are set out in 19 CFR 207.100-207.120. The
Commission's Office of Unfair Import Investigations conducts those
investigations initially.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Commission APO breach investigations, upon finding evidence of
an APO breach or receiving information that there is reason to believe
that one has occurred, the Secretary notifies relevant Commission
offices that the Secretary has opened an APO breach file and the
Commission has commenced an APO breach investigation. The Commission
then notifies the alleged breaching parties of the alleged breach and
provides them with the voluntary option to proceed under a one- or two-
step investigatory process. Under the two-step process, which was the
Commission's historic practice, the Commission determines first whether
a breach has occurred and, if so, who is responsible for it. This is
done after the alleged breaching parties have been provided an
opportunity to present their views on the matter. The breach
investigation may conclude after this first step if: (1) the Commission
determines that no breach occurred and issues a letter so stating; or
(2) the Commission finds that a breach occurred, but concludes that no
further action is warranted and issues a warning letter. If the
Commission determines that a breach occurred that warrants further
action, the Commission will then determine what sanction, if any, to
impose. Before making this determination, the Commission provides the
breaching parties with an opportunity to present their views on the
appropriate sanction and any mitigating circumstances. The Commission
can decide as part of either the first or second step to issue a
warning letter. A warning letter is not a sanction, but the Commission
will consider a warning letter as part of a subsequent APO breach
investigation.
The Commission recognizes that the two-step process can result in
duplicative work for the alleged breaching party and Commission staff
in some APO breach investigations. For example, parties who self-report
their own breach often address mitigating circumstances and sanctions
in their initial response to the Commission's letter of inquiry on the
breach. But, under the Commission's two-step process, they must await a
Commission decision on breach and then submit again their views on
mitigating circumstances and sanctions. To streamline this process and
accelerate processing times, the Commission offers alleged breaching
parties the option to voluntarily elect a one-step APO breach
investigation process. Under this process, the Commission will
determine simultaneously whether a breach occurred and, if so, the
appropriate sanction to impose, if any. Under either process, the
alleged breaching party has the opportunity to submit affidavits
reciting the facts concerning the alleged breach and mitigating factors
pertaining to the appropriate response if a breach is found.
Sanctions for APO violations serve three basic interests: (a)
preserving the confidence of submitters of BPI/CBI that the Commission
is a reliable protector of BPI/CBI; (b) disciplining breachers; and (c)
deterring future violations. As the Conference Report to the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 observed: ``[T]he effective
enforcement of limited disclosure under [APO] depends in part on the
extent to which private parties have confidence that there are
effective sanctions against violation.'' H.R. Conf. Rep. 100-576, at
623 (1988).
The Commission has worked to develop consistent jurisprudence, not
only in determining whether a breach has occurred, but also in
selecting an appropriate response. In determining the appropriate
response, the Commission generally considers mitigating factors such as
the unintentional nature of the breach, the lack of prior breaches
committed by the breaching party, the corrective measures taken by the
breaching party, and the promptness with which the breaching party
reported the violation to the Commission. The Commission also considers
aggravating circumstances, especially whether persons not authorized
under the APO had access to and viewed the BPI/CBI. The Commission
considers whether there have been prior breaches by the same person or
persons in other investigations and whether there have been multiple
breaches by the same person or persons in the same investigation.
The Commission's rules permit an economist or consultant to obtain
access to BPI/CBI under the APO in a title VII, safeguard, or LHT
investigation if the economist or consultant is under the direction and
control of an attorney under the APO, or if the economist or consultant
appears regularly before the Commission and represents an interested
party who is a party to the investigation. See 19 CFR 207.7(a)(3)(i)(B)
and (C); 19 CFR 206.17(a)(3)(i)(B) and (C); and 19 CFR
208.22(a)(3)(i)(B) and (C). Economists and consultants who obtain
access to BPI/CBI under the APO under the direction and control of an
attorney nonetheless remain individually responsible for complying with
the APO. In appropriate circumstances, for example, an economist under
the direction and control of an attorney may be held responsible for a
breach of the APO by failing to redact APO information from a document
that is subsequently filed with the Commission and served as a public
document, or for retaining BPI/CBI without consent of the submitter
after the termination of an investigation. This is so even though the
Commission may also hold the attorney exercising direction or control
over the economist or consultant responsible for the APO breach. In
section 337 investigations, technical experts and their staff who are
employed for the purposes of the investigation are required to sign
onto the APO and agree to comply with its provisions.
The records of Commission investigations of alleged APO breaches in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases, section 337 investigations,
safeguard investigations, and LHT investigations are not publicly
available and are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. 1677f(g); 19 U.S.C.
1333(h); 19 CFR 210.34(c).
The two types of breaches most frequently investigated by the
Commission involve: (1) the APO's prohibition on the dissemination or
exposure of BPI or CBI to unauthorized persons; and (2) the APO's
requirement that the materials received under the APO be returned or
destroyed and that a certificate be filed with the Commission
indicating what actions were taken after the termination of the
investigation or any subsequent appeals of the Commission's
determination. The dissemination of BPI/CBI usually occurs as the
result of failure to delete BPI/CBI from public versions of documents
filed with the Commission or transmission of proprietary versions of
documents to unauthorized recipients. Other breaches have included the
failure to bracket properly BPI/CBI in proprietary documents filed with
the Commission, the failure to report immediately known or suspected
violations of an APO, and the failure to adequately supervise non-
lawyers in the handling of BPI/CBI.
Occasionally, the Commission conducts APO breach investigations
that involve members of a law firm or consultants working with a firm
who were granted access to APO materials by the firm although they were
not APO signatories. In many of these cases, the firm and the person
using the BPI/CBI mistakenly believed an APO application had been filed
for that person. The Commission has determined in all of these cases
that the person who was a non-signatory, and therefore did not
[[Page 69335]]
agree to be bound by the APO, could not be found to have breached the
APO. However, under Commission rule 201.15 (19 CFR 201.15), the
Commission may take action against these persons for good cause shown.
In all cases in which the Commission has taken such action, it decided
that the non-signatory appeared regularly before the Commission, was
aware of the requirements and limitations related to APO access, and
should have verified their APO status before obtaining access to and
using the BPI/CBI. The Commission notes that section 201.15 may also be
available to issue sanctions to attorneys or agents in different
factual circumstances in which they did not technically breach the APO,
but their action or inaction did not demonstrate diligent care of the
APO materials, even though they appeared regularly before the
Commission and were aware of the importance that the Commission places
on the proper care of APO materials.
The Commission has held routinely that the disclosure of BPI/CBI
through recoverable metadata or hidden text constitutes a breach of the
APO even when the BPI/CBI is not immediately visible without further
manipulation of the document. In such cases, breaching parties have
transmitted documents that appear to be public documents in which the
parties have removed or redacted all BPI/CBI. However, further
inspection of the document reveals that confidential information is
actually retrievable by manipulating codes in software or through the
recovery of hidden text or metadata. In such instances, the Commission
has found that the electronic transmission of a public document with
BPI/CBI in a recoverable form was a breach of the APO.
The Commission has cautioned counsel to ensure that each authorized
applicant files with the Commission within 60 days of the completion of
an import injury investigation or at the conclusion of judicial or
binational review of the Commission's determination, a certificate
stating that, to the signatory's knowledge and belief, all copies of
BPI/CBI have been returned or destroyed, and no copies of such
materials have been made available to any person to whom disclosure was
not specifically authorized. This requirement applies to each attorney,
consultant, or expert in a firm who has access to BPI/CBI. One firm-
wide certificate is insufficient.
Attorneys who are signatories to the APO in a section 337
investigation should inform the administrative law judge and the
Secretary if there are any changes to the information that was provided
in the application for access to the CBI. This is similar to the
requirement to update an applicant's information in title VII
investigations.
In addition, attorneys who are signatories to the APO in a section
337 investigation should send a notice to the Commission if they stop
participating in the investigation or the subsequent appeal of the
Commission's determination. The notice should inform the Commission
about the disposition of CBI obtained under the APO that was in their
possession, or the Commission could hold them responsible for any
failure of their former firm to return or destroy the CBI in an
appropriate manner.
III. Specific APO Breach Investigations
Case 1. The Commission determined that a partner at a law firm
breached the APO issued in a title VII investigation when the partner
supervised the drafting, revision, and review of a publicly filed
document that contained BPI.
Three attorneys, including the partner, were responsible for
drafting the document at issue. Despite the firm's instructions to
place brackets around any BPI that an attorney added to the draft, one
of the non-partner attorneys inadvertently failed to include brackets
around a quote in a footnote. The partner completed two full reviews of
the document before its filing, but the partner failed to identify the
unbracketed BPI in the footnote. The law firm filed the document on the
Commission's Electronic Document Information System (EDIS), and it also
served the document on all parties on the public service list. The
Commission first became aware of this breach through Commission staff,
who discovered the exposed BPI and notified the Secretary. The Office
of the Secretary notified the partner of the breach, and the law firm
filed a corrected version of the public document later that day.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered mitigating factors, including that: (1) the
breach was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm took prompt
corrective actions to mitigate the effect of the breach by correcting
its filing, notifying the recipients of the document's error and of its
substitute filing, and obtaining the recipient's confirmation of the
document's destruction; and (3) the partner had not previously breached
an APO in the two-year period preceding the date of the breach. The
Commission also considered the following aggravating factors: (1) the
Commission was the first to discover and flag the breach; and (2)
unauthorized individuals accessed and presumably viewed the CBI.
The Commission issued a private letter of reprimand to the partner
after finding that the partner was ultimately responsible for the
failure to redact BPI from the public document.
Case 2. The Commission determined that an expert breached the APO
issued in a section 337 investigation by submitting expert reports
containing CBI in several unrelated actions pending before a federal
district court.
The expert drafted and filed before a federal district court six
expert reports that contained a sentence from the confidential version
of an administrative law judge's initial determination. Two months
later, counsel for one of the parties involved in the underlying
section 337 investigation, and in the federal district court action,
notified the expert that the quoted sentence did not appear in the
public version of the initial determination. The expert took immediate
steps to replace the page that contained the CBI, but the expert did
not notify the Commission until about a month after the breach's
discovery. The expert acknowledged the failure to follow firm
procedures, which would have required comparison of the draft expert
report with the public version of the initial determination.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered the following mitigating factors: (1) the breach
was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the expert self-reported the
breach to the Commission; and (3) the expert had not previously
breached an APO in the two-year period preceding the breach. The
Commission also considered the following aggravating factors: (1) the
expert did not discover the breach; (2) the breach resulted in exposure
of CBI to unauthorized individuals; (3) there was a delay of two months
between the discovery of the breach and the mitigation of the breach;
(4) the expert waited more than one month to report the breach to the
Commission; and (5) the expert failed to handle CBI with due diligence
and care, and the expert did not follow firm procedures for protecting
CBI.
The Commission issued a private letter of reprimand to the expert.
Case 3. The Commission determined that a supervisory attorney at a
law firm breached an APO in a title VII investigation when a legal
support staff member under the attorney's supervision inadvertently
attached a confidential brief from one investigation to a public brief
in another investigation and publicly filed both briefs as one
[[Page 69336]]
document with the Department of Commerce (Commerce). The Commission
also determined that the supervisory attorney breached the APO a second
time by providing BPI to that legal support staff member before the
staff member had signed an APO acknowledgment for clerical personnel.
After filing the document in Commerce's IA ACCESS website, the
legal support staff member served the document on the parties listed on
the public brief's service list. None of the served parties were on the
APO service list for the confidential brief. Three days later, the law
firm received notification from one of the parties on the public
brief's service list that the document contained BPI from an unrelated
investigation. Upon review of the document, the law firm discovered
that the legal support staff member who had filed and served the
document had included a copy of a confidential brief from another title
VII investigation. The law firm immediately contacted Commerce to
request removal of the document from the IA ACCESS website. Commerce
indicated to the law firm that multiple individuals had accessed the
document while it was posted publicly to that website. The law firm
also contacted the parties on the public service list to ask that they
destroy any copies.
The law firm immediately notified the Commission of the breach
after learning of it. In its correspondence to the Commission, the firm
indicated that the breach occurred because of the legal support staff
member's failure to follow firm procedures in handling and storing the
confidential brief. The firm also indicated that the supervisory
attorney had supervised the preparation of the confidential brief and
had been aware of staff's inconsistent adherence to the firm's BPI
procedures. In addition, over the course of the APO breach
investigation, the Commission discovered that the supervisory attorney
had provided BPI to the legal support staff member without first having
the staff member sign an APO acknowledgment for clerical personnel.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered mitigating factors, including that: (1) the
breach was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm took prompt
action to remedy the breach and prevent further dissemination of BPI;
(3) the law firm promptly self-reported the breach to the Commission;
(4) the law firm implemented new procedures to prevent similar breaches
in the future; and (5) the supervisory attorney had not previously
breached an APO in the two-year period preceding the date of the
breach. The Commission also considered the following aggravating
factors: (1) unauthorized individuals had access to and viewed the BPI;
(2) the law firm violated the APO in two different ways; (3) the law
firm did not discover either breach; and (4) the supervisory attorney
and legal support staff failed to follow the law firm's procedures for
protecting BPI.
The Commission also considered whether to find in breach of the APO
a second attorney who supervised the preparation of the public brief,
and it determined not to do so. The second attorney was an APO
signatory in both relevant investigations, but the second attorney had
not supervised the preparation of the confidential brief. Further, the
second attorney had reviewed the public brief before the legal support
staff member had attached the confidential version to it. The
Commission determined that the second attorney would have had no reason
to suspect that the legal support staff member would attach BPI
materials to the public brief after the final review and approval of
the brief.
The Commission issued a private letter of reprimand to the
supervisory attorney. The Commission did not take any further action
against the legal support staff member whose actions contributed to the
breach because the staff member had since passed away.
Case 4. The Commission determined that two attorneys at a law firm
breached an APO in a title VII investigation when they reviewed, filed
in EDIS, and served a public version of a brief that contained
unredacted BPI belonging to a third party.
The attorneys served the brief on the parties to the public service
list in the investigation, which included individuals who were not
authorized under the APO to view BPI, and the brief was publicly posted
to EDIS, where at least one unauthorized individual accessed it. In
addition, one of the attorneys forwarded copies of the brief to the
firm's clients. Two days after filing and serving the brief, the two
attorneys received notification from another party to the investigation
(after Commission business hours) that the brief contained BPI. The two
attorneys immediately reviewed the brief, and they discovered that they
had bracketed, but failed to remove, the BPI at issue. That same day,
the two attorneys contacted their clients and the parties on the public
service list to request that they destroy the brief and contact anyone
else to whom they may have forwarded the brief. The next day, the two
attorneys notified the Commission of the breach and requested that the
Secretary remove the document from public view on EDIS. Over the course
of the investigation, the two attorneys confirmed to the Commission
that they had received responses (and confirmations of destruction)
from all but two individual recipients of the brief. Those two
individuals never acknowledged the attorneys' emails nor confirmed
destruction of the brief.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered mitigating factors, including that: (1) the
breach was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm promptly
self-reported the breach to the Commission; (3) the law firm took
prompt action to remedy the breach and prevent further dissemination of
BPI; (4) the law firm implemented new procedures to prevent similar
breaches in the future; and (5) neither attorney had previously breach
an APO in the two-year period preceding the date of the breach. The
Commission also considered the following aggravating factors: (1)
unauthorized individuals had access to and presumably viewed the BPI;
and (2) the law firm did not discover its own breach.
The Commission determined to issue private letters of reprimand to
both attorneys.
Case 5. The Commission determined that an attorney and a paralegal
at a law firm breached the APO in a title VII investigation when an
economist at the firm accessed BPI materials that the law firm had
received under the APO before the Secretary had approved the
economist's APO application.
The attorney, who was lead counsel for the investigation, did not
confirm that the Secretary had approved the economist's APO application
before instructing the economist to access the BPI materials. The
economist also failed to confirm that the Secretary had approved the
APO application before accessing the BPI materials. The paralegal, who
had set up the folder containing the BPI materials in the law firm's
system, had failed to restrict access to the folder (in accordance with
the firm's procedures) to only authorized individuals whose APO
applications had been approved. Upon discovery that the Secretary had
not yet approved the economist's APO application, the attorney
immediately notified the Commission of the breach and restricted access
to the folder containing the BPI materials to approved APO applicants.
However, the economist had access to and viewed on several occasions
the BPI at issue for approximately two weeks before authorized to do
so. The law firm confirmed that the economist was the
[[Page 69337]]
only unauthorized individual to access the BPI materials.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered mitigating factors, including that: (1) the
breach was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm took prompt
action to remedy the breach and prevent further dissemination of BPI;
(3) the firm immediately self-reported the breach to the Commission;
(4) the law firm implemented new procedures to prevent similar breaches
in the future; (5) the economist, who was later added to the APO, acted
at all times as if bound by the APO, and thus no other unauthorized
individuals viewed the BPI materials; and (6) the attorney and the
paralegal had not previously breached an APO in the two-year period
preceding the date of the breach. The Commission also considered the
following aggravating factors: (1) the economist was not an authorized
APO signatory at the time of the initial access and viewing of the BPI;
and (2) the attorney, the paralegal, and the economist failed to follow
the law firm's procedures for protecting BPI.
The Commission determined to issue warning letters to the attorney
and the paralegal. The Commission also found that good cause existed to
issue a warning letter to the economist under 19 CFR 201.15(a). Though
the economist was not a signatory to the APO at the time of the
inappropriate access to the BPI, the economist was, or should have
been, aware of the requirements and limitations related to APO access.
The economist's failure to verify that the Commission had accepted the
APO application before using the BPI materials demonstrated a disregard
for the Commission's rules protecting the confidentiality of the
information that is provided under the APO.
Case 6. The Commission determined that 18 attorneys from one law
firm breached the APO issued in a section 337 investigation when the
law firm filed in EDIS a public version of a document that contained
unredacted CBI in a footnote.
Two supervisory attorneys oversaw the redaction and filing of the
public version of the document and 16 attorneys contributed to its
review and redaction. Each attorney had the opportunity to discover the
presence of the unredacted CBI in the footnote of the document during
their respective review, but none did. The firm filed the document in
EDIS and served it on the parties. One day later, one of the firm's
attorneys, who had an opportunity to review the document before its
filing, discovered that the footnote in question contained unredacted
CBI. The firm notified the Commission that same day, after the document
had been publicly posted to EDIS, and the firm filed a replacement
document about a week later.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered the following mitigating factors: (1) the breach
was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm took prompt action
to remedy the breach and prevent further dissemination of CBI; (3) the
law firm immediately self-reported the breach to the Commission; and
(4) the law firm implemented new procedures to prevent similar breaches
in the future. The Commission also considered the aggravating factor
that unauthorized persons had access to and presumably viewed CBI.
The Commission issued warning letters to 16 attorneys whose actions
contributed to the breach. The Commission also issued private letters
of reprimand to the two supervisory attorneys who bore ultimate
responsibility for overseeing the redaction and filing of the document
at issue.
Case 7. The Commission determined that a supervisory attorney and
an associate attorney breached the APO issued in a section 337
investigation when they exposed CBI from the investigation to their
client.
The associate attorney, in reporting the work that the attorney had
performed for the underlying investigation, noted details of that work
in an internal electronic time entry system. The details included
references to company names that one of the parties to the
investigation considered to be CBI. The firm incorporated the associate
attorney's entries from the time entry system into a billing invoice
that it sent to its client. The supervisory attorney personally
reviewed the billing invoice at issue and approved it for transmittal
to the firm's client. Upon receipt of the billing invoice, the client
contacted the firm to inquire about the entries that contained CBI,
which caused the firm to discover its own breach. The firm requested
that its client return the original invoice, and the client immediately
did so. The firm notified the party whose CBI was exposed, and after
conducting an internal investigation, the firm notified the Commission
about two months later.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered the following mitigating factors: (1) the breach
was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm self-reported the
breach to the Commission; (3) the law firm took prompt action to remedy
the breach and prevent further dissemination of CBI; (4) the attorneys
had not previously breached an APO in the two-year period preceding the
date of the breach; and (5) the law firm implemented new measures to
prevent future similar breaches in the future. The Commission also
considered the following aggravating factors: (1) unauthorized persons
had access to and viewed CBI; and (2) the law firm waited nearly two
months to notify the Commission of the breach.
The Commission issued a warning letter to the associate attorney
whose actions contributed to, but did not directly cause, the breach.
It issued a private letter of reprimand to the supervisory attorney.
Case 8. The Commission determined that 16 attorneys from one law
firm breached the APO issued in a section 337 investigation when the
law firm filed in EDIS 79 public demonstrative exhibits that contained
unredacted CBI.
Fifteen attorneys were part of a team that was responsible for
preparing and filing demonstrative exhibits following a hearing in the
investigation. One senior attorney was responsible for supervising the
team's effort. The breach occurred because when, in preparing the
demonstrative exhibits for filing, the team failed to follow an
instruction to place a ``-C'' designation after the exhibit number
where the exhibits contained CBI. Because the team did not include the
``-C'' designation on the exhibits in question, the legal support staff
who filed the exhibits in EDIS assumed that they were public and filed
them on the public record. Over a year later, the law firm learned that
opposing counsel in unrelated federal court litigation accessed the
exhibits through EDIS. The law firm promptly notified the Commission
and the affected parties whose CBI had been exposed, and the firm spent
over 1,000 hours in its efforts to remediate the breach. Following the
breach's discovery, the law firm changed its protocols for protecting
CBI in section 337 investigations.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered the following mitigating factors: (1) the breach
was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm discovered its own
breach and promptly self-reported it to the Commission; (3) the law
firm took prompt action to investigate and remedy the breach; (4) the
attorneys had not previously breached an APO in the preceding two
years; and (5) the law firm implemented new measures to prevent future
similar breaches. The Commission also considered the following
aggravating factors: (1) unauthorized persons had access to and viewed
CBI; and (2) the
[[Page 69338]]
delay in the discovery of the breach left CBI publicly exposed for a
period of about 15 months.
The Commission issued a private letter of reprimand to the
supervisor of the team responsible for the preparation and filing of
the exhibits at issue after finding that the attorney's supervision was
inadequate and failed to secure the confidential treatment of the CBI
in those exhibits. The Commission issued warning letters to 14
attorneys on the team who contributed to the preparation and filing of
the exhibits. The Commission also issued a warning letter to one
attorney who did not directly participate in the preparation and filing
of the exhibits but permitted legal support staff to use, without
supervision, the attorney's credentials to file the exhibits.
Case 9. The Commission found that an associate attorney breached
the APO issued in a section 337 investigation when the attorney's
actions exposed CBI obtained under the APO to the attorney's client.
The breach occurred when the attorney arranged for the client to
access firm files stored on an electronic server by a discovery vendor.
The attorney instructed the vendor to provide the client with limited
access to certain file locations that stored only public files.
However, the attorney did not verify that the vendor had followed the
attorney's instructions before granting the client access to the firm's
files. The vendor mistakenly granted the client unlimited access, and,
as a result, the client inadvertently accessed 14 files containing CBI
obtained under the APO. In accordance with the predetermined
arrangement, the vendor terminated that client's unlimited access one
day later. However, the attorney did not discover the breach until
about 14 months later. The attorney reported the breach to the
Commission a few days after making the discovery.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered the following mitigating factors: (1) the breach
was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm discovered its own
breach; (3) the law firm took prompt action to investigate and remedy
the breach; (4) the attorney had not previously breached an APO in the
two-year period preceding the date of the breach; and (5) the law firm
self-reported its own breach to the Commission. The Commission also
considered the following aggravating factors: (1) unauthorized persons
had access to and viewed CBI; and (2) the law firm did not discover its
own breach until about 14 months after it occurred. However, the
Commission noted that because the client's access to the CBI-containing
files was limited to one day, the CBI was not exposed to unauthorized
individuals during those 14 months.
The Commission issued a private letter of reprimand to the
associate attorney and found that, in the context of this matter, the
attorney was obligated to take additional steps to ensure that the
client was unable to access the files containing CBI.
Case 10. The Commission determined that an attorney and a paralegal
at a law firm breached the APO in a title VII investigation when they
publicly filed in EDIS a brief with BPI in recoverable hidden text.
While multiple attorneys reviewed the public version of the brief,
the attorney and the paralegal were the only individuals who prepared
and reviewed the final .pdf version of the document. Under firm
procedures, the paralegal prepared the public version of the document
by changing bracketed BPI to white font, converting the document from
Microsoft Word to a .pdf file format, and then removing hidden
information from the final .pdf file. Following the paralegal's
preparation of the final document, the attorney reviewed the .pdf
version of the document to ensure that all BPI had been removed from
the file. The paralegal then publicly filed the document to EDIS. That
same day, while preparing the document for service, another paralegal
at the same firm noticed that the document contained BPI in recoverable
hidden text. The attorney immediately notified the Commission of the
breach and requested that the document be removed from public viewing.
However, unauthorized individuals accessed and presumably viewed the
brief while it was posted publicly to EDIS.
In determining whether to issue a sanction for the breach, the
Commission considered mitigating factors, including that: (1) the
breach was inadvertent and unintentional; (2) the law firm discovered
its own breach; (3) the law firm took prompt action to remedy the
breach and prevent further dissemination of BPI; (4) the law firm
immediately self-reported the breach to the Commission; (5) the law
firm implemented new procedures to prevent similar breaches in the
future; and (6) neither the attorney nor the paralegal had previously
breached an APO in the two-year period preceding the date of the
breach. The Commission also considered the aggravating factor that
unauthorized persons had access to and presumably viewed BPI.
The Commission determined to issue private letters of reprimand to
both the attorney and the paralegal. The Commission also considered
whether to find in breach other attorneys and legal support staff who
reviewed the public version of the brief and approved the bracketing.
However, the Commission declined to do so, determining that this breach
occurred not because of bracketing issues, but because of a failure to
remove properly bracketed BPI from the final .pdf file.
By order of the Commission.
Issued: November 14, 2022.
Jessica Mullan,
Attorney Advisor.
[FR Doc. 2022-25108 Filed 11-17-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020-02-P