Self-Regulatory Organizations; MIAX PEARL, LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend the MIAX PEARL Options Fee Schedule To Remove Certain Credits and Increase Trading Permit Fees, 48702-48715 [2022-17096]
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48702
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 153 / Wednesday, August 10, 2022 / Notices
Agreements in the Mail Classification
Schedule’s Competitive Products List.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
DATES:
Date of required notice: August
10, 2022.
[Release No. 34–95419; File No. SR–
PEARL–2022–30]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Self-Regulatory Organizations; MIAX
PEARL, LLC; Notice of Filing and
Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed
Rule Change To Amend the MIAX
PEARL Options Fee Schedule To
Remove Certain Credits and Increase
Trading Permit Fees
Sean Robinson, 202–268–8405.
The
United States Postal Service® hereby
gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C.
3642 and 3632(b)(3), on August 1, 2022,
it filed with the Postal Regulatory
Commission a USPS Request To Add
Priority Mail Contract 753 to
Competitive Product List. Documents
are available at www.prc.gov, Docket
Nos. MC2022–93, CP2022–97.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Sarah Sullivan,
Attorney, Ethics and Legal Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2022–17172 Filed 8–9–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7710–12–P
POSTAL SERVICE
Product Change—Priority Mail
Negotiated Service Agreement
AGENCY:
ACTION:
Postal ServiceTM.
Notice.
The Postal Service gives
notice of filing a request with the Postal
Regulatory Commission to add a
domestic shipping services contract to
the list of Negotiated Service
Agreements in the Mail Classification
Schedule’s Competitive Products List.
SUMMARY:
Date of required notice: August
10, 2022.
DATES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Sean Robinson, 202–268–8405.
The
United States Postal Service® hereby
gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C.
3642 and 3632(b)(3), on August 5, 2022,
it filed with the Postal Regulatory
Commission a USPS Request to Add
Priority Mail Contract 754 to
Competitive Product List. Documents
are available at www.prc.gov, Docket
Nos. MC2022–94, CP2022–98.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Sarah Sullivan,
Attorney, Ethics and Legal Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2022–17173 Filed 8–9–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7710–12–P
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August 4, 2022.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on July 26,
2022, MIAX PEARL, LLC (‘‘MIAX Pearl’’
or ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) a proposed rule change
as described in Items I, II, and III, below,
which Items have been prepared by the
Exchange. The Commission is
publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change
from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange is filing a proposal to
amend the MIAX Pearl Options Fee
Schedule (the ‘‘Fee Schedule’’) to
amend its monthly Trading Permit 3 fees
for Members 4 and no longer provide
two monthly credits associated with
Trading Permit and non-transaction
fees.
The text of the proposed rule change
is available on the Exchange’s website at
https://www.miaxoptions.com/rulefilings/pearl at MIAX Pearl’s principal
office, and at the Commission’s Public
Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
1 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
3 The term ‘‘Trading Permit’’ means a permit
issued by the Exchange that confers the ability to
transact on the Exchange. See Exchange Rule 100.
4 The term ‘‘Member’’ means an individual or
organization that is registered with the Exchange
pursuant to Chapter II of Exchange Rules for
purposes of trading on the Exchange as an
‘‘Electronic Exchange Member’’ or ‘‘Market Maker.’’
Members are deemed ‘‘members’’ under the
Exchange Act. See Exchange Rule 100 and the
Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule.
2 17
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statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange commenced operations
in February 2017 5 and adopted its
initial fee schedule that waived fees for
Trading Permits to trade on the
Exchange.6 Although the fee was
waived, an initial fee structure was put
in place in communicate our intent to
charge a fee in the future. As a new
exchange entrant, the Exchange chose to
offer Trading Permits free of charge to
encourage market participants to trade
on the Exchange and experience, among
things, the quality of the Exchange’s
technology and trading functionality.
This practice is not uncommon. Newlyopened exchanges often do not charge
fees or charge lower fees for certain
services such as memberships to attract
order flow to an exchange, and later
amend their fees to reflect the true value
of those services, absorbing all costs to
provide those services in the meantime.
Allowing new exchange entrants time to
build and sustain market share through
various pricing incentives before
increasing non-transaction fees
encourages market entry and promotes
competition. It also enables these new
exchanges to mature their markets and
allow market participants to trade on
the new exchanges without fees serving
as a potential barrier to attracting
memberships and order flow.7
5 See MIAX PEARL Successfully Launches
Trading Operations, dated February 6, 2017,
available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/sites/
default/files/alert-files/MIAX_Press_Release_
02062017.pdf.
6 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80061
(February 17, 2017), 82 FR 11676 (February 24,
2017) (SR–PEARL–2017–10).
7 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94894
(May 11, 2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR–
BOX–2022–17) (stating, ‘‘[t]he Exchange established
this lower (when compared to other options
exchanges in the industry) Participant Fee in order
to encourage market participants to become
Participants of BOX. . .’’). See also Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 90076 (October 2, 2020),
85 FR 63620 (October 8, 2020) (SR–MEMX–2020–
10) (‘‘MEMX Membership Fee Proposal’’)
(proposing to adopt the initial fee schedule and
stating that ‘‘[u]nder the initial proposed Fee
Schedule, the Exchange proposes to make clear that
it does not charge any fees for membership, market
data products, physical connectivity or application
sessions.’’). MEMX has seen its market share
increase and recently proposed to adopt a
membership fee and fees for connectivity. See
Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 93927
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Later in 2018, as the Exchange’s
market share increased,8 it adopted a
nominal fee for Trading Permits along
with a tiered-volume based fee credit,
known as the Trading Permit Fee Credit,
and a Monthly Volume Credit.9 The
Exchange has not amended its Trading
Permit fees since the fees were first
adopted in 2018. The Exchange
established the Trading Permit Fee
Credit to continue to attract order flow
and increase membership by lowering
the costs for Members that connect via
the MEO Interface 10 and FIX
Interface.11
The lower Trading Permit Fees,
Trading Permit Fee Credit and Monthly
Volume Credit have served their
purpose of incentivizing market
participants to trade on the Exchange as
the Exchange’s market share continues
to grow and increase since the fee and
credits were established.12 Therefore,
the Exchange now proposes to amend
the monthly Trading Permit fees for
Members and to no longer provide two
monthly credits associated with Trading
Permit and non-transaction fees. The
proposed changes are designed to
update the Exchange’s Trading Permit
fees to reflect their current value based
on the Exchange’s market share and
ability to deliver value to its customers
through improved liquidity, enhanced
functionality, and resilient trading
technology, rather than their value
when MIAX Pearl was a new options
exchange entrant seeking to establish
itself in a highly competitive space over
five years ago. The Exchange reviewed
similar fees charged by other options
(January 7, 2022), 87 FR 2191 (January 13, 2022)
(SR–MEMX–2021–19) (proposing to adopt
membership fees); and 95299 (July 15, 2022), 87 FR
43563 (July 21, 2022) (SR–MEMX–2022–17)
(proposing to adopt fees for connectivity). See also,
e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 88211
(February 14, 2020), 85 FR 9847 (February 20, 2020)
(SR–NYSENAT–2020–05), available at https://
www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nysenational/rulefilings/filings/2020/SR-NYSENat-202005.pdf (initiating market data fees for the NYSE
National exchange after initially setting such fees at
zero).
8 The Exchange experienced a monthly average
trading volume of 3.94% for the month of March
2018. See Market at a Glance, available at
www.miaxoptions.com (last visited (June 22, 2022).
9 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82867
(March 13, 2018), 83 FR 12044 (March 19, 2018)
(SR–PEARL–2018–07).
10 ‘‘MEO Interface’’ or ‘‘MEO’’ means a binary
order interface for certain order types as set forth
in Rule 516 into the MIAX Pearl System. See the
Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule and
Exchange Rule 100.
11 ‘‘FIX Interface’’ means the Financial
Information Exchange interface for certain order
types as set forth in Exchange Rule 516. See the
Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule and
Exchange Rule 100.
12 The Exchange experienced a monthly average
trading volume of 4.92% for the month of June
2022. See Market at a Glance, supra note 8.
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exchanges when considering the
proposed fee levels as well as the
impact on current Members and
whether the proposed fee levels would
continue to enable the Exchange to
attract new Members and retain existing
Members. The Exchange notes that it
also socialized the proposed fee
increases with current Members prior to
first implementing the changes. During
this process, the Exchange decided on
price levels that it believes would aid
and improve its competitive footing and
some Members informed the Exchange
that they anticipated a potential
increase due to the lower rates the
Exchange historically charged and the
resiliency and performance of its trading
platform. Each of these changes are
described below.
Background
A Trading Permit confers the right to
transact on the Exchange 13 and are
available to all Members. The Exchange
notes that requiring a Trading Permit to
trade on the Exchange and charging a
monthly fee for such is comparable to
other monthly membership
requirements and associated fees
charged by other exchanges and is
described further below. Trading
Permits, like membership fees, grant
access and allow Members to be active
on the Exchange, thus providing the
ability to submit orders and trade on the
Exchange, in the manner consistent
with the membership type. Without a
Trading Permit, or ‘‘membership’’ as
referred to by other exchanges, a
Member cannot directly trade on the
Exchange. Therefore, a Trading Permit
is a means to directly access the
Exchange, which offers meaningful
value. The Exchange has not amended
its Trading Permit fees since the fees
were first adopted in 2018.14
Removal of Monthly Trading Permit Fee
Credits
Monthly Volume Credit
The Exchange proposes to amend the
Definitions section of the Fee Schedule
to delete the definition and remove the
credits applicable to the Monthly
Volume Credit for Members. The
Exchange established the Monthly
Volume Credit in 2018 15 to encourage
Members to send increased Priority
Customer 16 order flow to the Exchange,
13 See
Exchange Rule 200(a).
supra note 9.
15 See Market at a Glance, supra note 8.
16 The term ‘‘Priority Customer’’ means a person
or entity that (i) is not a broker or dealer in
securities, and (ii) does not place more than 390
orders in listed options per day on average during
a calendar month for its own beneficial accounts(s).
The number of orders shall be counted in
14 See
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which the Exchange applied as a metric
to the assessment of non-transaction
fees for that Member. Prior to and
during periods when this proposal was
not in effect, the Exchange applied a
different Monthly Volume Credit
depending on whether the Member
connects to the Exchange via the FIX or
MEO Interface. Prior to and during
periods when this proposal was not in
effect, the Exchange assessed the
Monthly Volume Credit to each Member
that has executed Priority Customer
volume along with that of its affiliates,17
not including Excluded Contracts,18 of
at least 0.30% of MIAX Pearl-listed
Total Consolidated Volume (‘‘TCV’’),19
as set forth in the following table:
accordance with Interpretation and Policy .01 of
Exchange Rule 100. See the Definitions Section of
the Fee Schedule and Exchange Rule 100, including
Interpretation and Policy .01.
17 ‘‘Affiliate’’ means (i) an affiliate of a Member
of at least 75% common ownership between the
firms as reflected on each firm’s Form BD, Schedule
A, or (ii) the Appointed Market Maker of an
Appointed EEM (or, conversely, the Appointed
EEM of an Appointed Market Maker). An
‘‘Appointed Market Maker’’ is a MIAX Pearl Market
Maker (who does not otherwise have a corporate
affiliation based upon common ownership with an
EEM) that has been appointed by an EEM and an
‘‘Appointed EEM’’ is an EEM (who does not
otherwise have a corporate affiliation based upon
common ownership with a MIAX Pearl Market
Maker) that has been appointed by a MIAX Pearl
Market Maker, pursuant to the following process. A
MIAX Pearl Market Maker appoints an EEM and an
EEM appoints a MIAX Pearl Market Maker, for the
purposes of the Fee Schedule, by each completing
and sending an executed Volume Aggregation
Request Form by email to membership@
miaxoptions.com no later than 2 business days
prior to the first business day of the month in which
the designation is to become effective. Transmittal
of a validly completed and executed form to the
Exchange along with the Exchange’s
acknowledgement of the effective designation to
each of the Market Maker and EEM will be viewed
as acceptance of the appointment. The Exchange
will only recognize one designation per Member. A
Member may make a designation not more than
once every 12 months (from the date of its most
recent designation), which designation shall remain
in effect unless or until the Exchange receives
written notice submitted 2 business days prior to
the first business day of the month from either
Member indicating that the appointment has been
terminated. Designations will become operative on
the first business day of the effective month and
may not be terminated prior to the end of the
month. Execution data and reports will be provided
to both parties. See the Definitions Section of the
Fee Schedule.
18 ‘‘Excluded Contracts’’ means any contracts
routed to an away market for execution. See the
Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule.
19 ‘‘TCV’’ means total consolidated volume
calculated as the total national volume in those
classes listed on MIAX Pearl for the month for
which the fees apply, excluding consolidated
volume executed during the period of time in
which the Exchange experiences an Exchange
System Disruption (solely in the option classes of
the affected Matching Engine). See the Definitions
Section of the Fee Schedule.
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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 153 / Wednesday, August 10, 2022 / Notices
Monthly
volume
credit
Type of member connection
Member that connects via the FIX
Interface ....................................
Member that connects via the
MEO Interface ...........................
$250
1,000
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If a Member connects via both the
MEO Interface and FIX Interface and
qualifies for the Monthly Volume Credit
based upon its Priority Customer
volume, the greater Monthly Volume
Credit shall apply to such Member.
Prior to and during periods when this
proposal was not in effect, the Monthly
Volume Credit was a single, once-permonth credit towards the aggregate
monthly total of non-transaction fees
assessable to a Member.
The Exchange proposes an
amendment to the Definitions section of
the Fee Schedule to delete the definition
and remove the Monthly Volume Credit.
The Exchange established the Monthly
Volume Credit when it first launched
operations to encourage members to
increase their order flow by providing a
credit to those that exceeded a volume
threshold. The Exchange believes that
the Exchange’s existing Priority
Customer rebates and fees will continue
to allow the Exchange to remain highly
competitive and continue to attract
order flow and maintain market share
even without the Monthly Volume
Credit.
Trading Permit Fee Credit
The Exchange proposes to amend
Section (3)(b) of the Fee Schedule to
remove the Trading Permit fee credit
that is denoted in footnote ‘‘*’’ below
the Trading Permit fee table. Prior to
and during periods when this proposal
was not in effect, the Trading Permit fee
credit was applicable to Members that
connected via both the MEO and FIX
Interfaces. Members who connect via
both the MEO and FIX Interfaces are
assessed the rates for both types of
Trading Permits, but these Members
received a $100 monthly credit towards
the Trading Permit fees applicable to the
MEO Interface prior to and during
periods when this proposal was not in
effect. The Exchange proposes to
remove the Trading Permit fee credit
and delete footnote ‘‘*’’ from Section
(3)(b) of the Fee Schedule.
The Exchange established the Trading
Permit fee credit when it first launched
operations to attract order flow and
increase membership by lowering the
costs for Members that connect via the
MEO Interface and FIX Interface. The
Trading Permit fee credit has achieved
its purpose and the Exchange now
believes that it is appropriate to remove
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this credit in light of the current
operating conditions and membership
population on the Exchange.
Amendments to Monthly Trading
Permit Fees
The Exchange proposes to amend the
Fee Schedule to amend the fees for
Trading Permits. As a self-regulatory
organization, the Exchange’s
membership department reviews
applicants to ensure that each
application complies with Exchange
Rule 200 as well as other requirements
for membership.20 Applicants must
meet the Exchange’s qualification
criteria prior to approval. The new
member review includes, but is not
limited to, the registration and
qualification of associated persons,
financial health of the proposed
member, the validity of the required
clearing relationship, and the history of
disciplinary matters. Approved new
Members are required to comply with
Exchange’s By-Laws and Rules and are
subject to regulation by the Exchange.
The Exchange also has ongoing
regulatory responsibilities over its
Members.
The Exchange believes that there are
many factors that may cause a market
participant to decide to become a
member of a particular exchange.
Among various factors, the Exchange
believes market participants consider:
(i) an exchange’s available liquidity in
options series; (ii) trading functionality,
latency, reliability, throughout, access to
liquidity, and determinism offered on a
particular market; (iii) product offerings;
(iv) customer service on an exchange;
and (v) transactional pricing. The
Exchange believes that the decision to
become a member of an exchange,
particularly as a registered market
maker, is a complex one that is not
solely based on non-transactional costs
assessed by an exchange. Market
participants weigh the tradeoff between
where they choose to deploy liquidity
versus where trading opportunities
exist. Of course, the cost of membership
may factor into a decision to become a
member of a certain exchange, but the
Exchange believes it is by no means the
only factor when comparing exchanges.
The Exchange assesses Trading Permit
fees based upon the monthly total
volume executed by the Member and its
Affiliates on the Exchange across all
origin types, not including Excluded
Contracts, as compared to the total TCV
in all MIAX Pearl-listed options. The
Exchange adopted a tier-based fee
20 The Exchange’s Membership Department must
ensure, among other things, that an applicant is not
statutorily disqualified.
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structure based upon the volume-based
tiers detailed in the definition of ‘‘NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based
Tiers’’ 21 in the Definitions section of the
Fee Schedule. The Exchange also
assesses Trading Permit fees based upon
the type of interface used by the
Member to connect to the Exchange—
the FIX Interface and/or the MEO
Interface.
The Exchange has two types of
Members, Electronic Exchange
Members 22 (‘‘EEMs’’) and Market
Makers.23 The Exchange currently
charges monthly fees for Trading
Permits pursuant to Exchange Rule
200(f), which varies based on the
interface used by the Member and the
Member’s monthly trading volumes.
The Exchange provides two interfaces to
access the MIAX Pearl System,24 the FIX
Interface and MEO Interface, and all
Members are able to use either interface
based on their business models and
needs. The FIX Interface is the industrywide uniform message format and
provides lower bandwidth, less
capacity, and fewer Exchange resources.
EEMs, who are primarily order flow
providers, are the only users of the FIX
Interface.25 No Market Maker uses the
FIX Interface. Meanwhile, the MEO
Interface is the more robust interface
offering lower latency and higher
throughput. Market Makers only use the
MEO Interface.
Today, seven (7) Members that are
registered solely as EEMs elect to utilize
the MEO Interface. Based on their own
business decisions and needs, some
EEMs may elect to utilize the MEO
Interface today due to its lower latency
21 See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule
for the monthly volume thresholds associated with
each Tier.
22 The term ‘‘Electronic Exchange Member’’ or
‘‘EEM’’ means the holder of a Trading Permit who
is a Member representing as agent Public Customer
Orders or Non-Customer Orders on the Exchange
and those non-Market Maker Members conducting
proprietary trading. Electronic Exchange Members
are deemed ‘‘members’’ under the Exchange Act.
See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule and
Exchange Rule 100.
23 The term ‘‘Market Maker’’ or ‘‘MM’’ means a
Member registered with the Exchange for the
purpose of making markets in options contracts
traded on the Exchange and that is vested with the
rights and responsibilities specified in Chapter VI
of the Exchange Rules. See the Definitions Section
of the Fee Schedule and Exchange Rule 100.
24 The term ‘‘System’’ means the automated
trading system used by the Exchange for the trading
of securities. See Exchange Rule 100.
25 The Exchange does not propose to amend the
fees for EEM Clearing Firms, which is set at $250
per month and not based on the amount of volume
conducted on the Exchange. The term ‘‘EEM
Clearing Firm’’ means an EEM that solely clears
transactions on the Exchange and does not connect
to the Exchange via either the FIX Interface or MEO
Interface. See the Definitions Section of the Fee
Schedule.
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and higher throughput. Also, six (6)
Members are registered as both an EEM
and Market Maker. These Members may
choose to utilize only the MEO Interface
for acting as either EEM or Market
Maker, not only based on their own
business needs, but also as a means to
streamline and simplify their
architecture between them and the
Exchange. Each of these Members are
able to utilize the FIX Interface for their
EEM activities and avail themselves to
the lower rates if they believe the FIX
Interface is aligned with their business
needs.
Market Makers only use the MEO
Interface because it provides
functionality that is designed to assist
Market Makers in satisfying their market
making obligations. The Exchange offers
three time-in-force modifiers: 26 Day
Limit (‘‘Day’’), Immediate-Or-Cancel
(‘‘IOC’’), and Good ‘Til Cancelled
(‘‘GTC’’).27 While all order types are
available for use on either interface,
only the time-in-force modifiers of IOC
and Day are available on the MEO
Interface.28 Market Makers utilize the
time-in-force of Day on orders to be
posted on the MIAX Pearl Options
Book 29 and to meet Market Makers’
continuous quoting obligations under
Exchange Rule 605(d).30 Other Market
Makers that primarily remove liquidity
tend to be more latency sensitive and
utilize the time-in-force of IOC on
orders when looking to remove liquidity
from the MIAX Pearl Options Book. The
MEO Interface allows the submission of
Cancel-Replacement orders,31 which
allow for the immediate cancellation of
26 See MIAX Pearl Options Exchange User
Manual, Section 6, Order Types, available at
https://www.miaxoptions.com/exchangefunctionality/pearl (last visited June 30, 2022).
27 See, e.g., Exchange Rule 516.
28 See preamble to Exchange Rule 516 (noting that
not all order types and modifiers are available for
use on each of the MEO Interface and the FIX
Interface). See also Section 4.1.1.2 of the MEO
Interface Specification, available at https://
www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/pagefiles/MIAX_Express_Orders_MEO_v2.0.pdf
(indicating that the time-in-force instructions of IOC
and Day are available on the MEO interface).
29 The term ‘‘Book’’ means the electronic book of
buy and sell orders and quotes maintained by the
System. See Exchange Rule 100.
30 Only the time-in-force modifiers of IOC and
Day are available on the MEO Interface. See
Exchange Rule 516 (noting that not all order types
and modifiers are available for use on each of the
MEO Interface and the FIX Interface). See also
MIAX Pearl Options Exchange MEO Interface
Specification, Section 4.1.1.2, available at https://
www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/pagefiles/MIAX_Express_Orders_MEO_v2.0.pdf
(indicating that the time-in-force instructions of IOC
and Day are available on the MEO interface).
31 See MIAX Pearl Options Exchange User
Manual, Section 6, Interfaces and Liquidity Types,
available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/
exchange-functionality/pearl (last visited May 16,
2022).
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17:26 Aug 09, 2022
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a previously received order and the
replacement of that order with a new
order with new terms and conditions.32
Cancel-Replacement orders are
primarily used by Market Makers as part
of their continuous quoting obligations.
Market Makers only use the MEO
Interface due to its lower latency, higher
throughput, available time-in-force
instructions and order types that assist
them in satisfying their market making
obligations. Market Makers do not use
the FIX Interface due to the
unavailability of the above
functionality. While EEMs primarily use
the FIX Interface, certain EEMs chose to
use the MEO interface due to its
enhanced functionality and based on
their own business models.
Current Trading Permit Fees. Prior to
and during periods when this proposal
was not in effect, each Member who
connected to the System via the FIX
Interface was assessed the following
monthly Trading Permit fees:
(i) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 1 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
or volume up to 0.30%, $250;
(ii) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 2 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
or volume above 0.30% up to 0.60%,
$350; and
(iii) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 3 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
or volume above 0.60%, $450.
Each Member who connected to the
System via the MEO Interface was
assessed the following monthly Trading
Permit fees:
(i) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 1 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
or volume up to 0.30%, $300;
(ii) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 2 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
or volume above 0.30% up to 0.60%,
$400; and
(iii) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 3 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
or volume above 0.60%, $500.
Proposed Trading Permit Fees. The
pull on Exchange resources associated
with providing ongoing Member
support, onboarding/off boarding
technology requests, monitoring,
reporting, and the surveillance and
retention of increased message traffic
due to increased trading volumes
continue to increase since Trading
Permit fees were first adopted in 2018.33
The Exchange proposes to amend its
32 See
33 See
PO 00000
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supra note 9.
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Trading Permit fees as follows. Each
Member who connects to the System via
the FIX Interface will be assessed the
following monthly Trading Permit fees:
(i) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 1 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
$500;
(ii) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 2 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
$1,000; and
(iii) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 3 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
$1,500.
Each Member who connects to the
System via the MEO Interface will be
assessed the following monthly Trading
Permit fees:
(i) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 1 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
$2,500;
(ii) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 2 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
$4,000; and
(iii) if its volume falls within the
parameters of Tier 3 of the NonTransaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers,
$6,000.
As discussed above, both the MEO
Interface and FIX Interface are available
to all Members and each Member may
choose which interface to utilize based
on their own business needs. The MEO
Interface is primarily used by Market
Makers due to its robustness, lower
latency, and higher throughput 34 and,
as discussed below, utilizes greater
Exchange resources due to the increased
volume of message traffic that travels
through the MEO interface. Trading
Permit fees for Members who connect
through the MEO Interface are,
therefore, higher than the Trading
Permit fees for Members who connect
through the FIX Interface. The FIX
Interface provides lower capacity and
bandwidth and, therefore, utilizes less
Exchange resources. The FIX Interface is
primarily used by order flow providers
who tend to be less latency sensitive
and submit less orders and messages
than Market Makers.
The Exchange has not amended its
Trading Permit fees since the fees were
first adopted in 2018.35 The Exchange
notes that its affiliates, Miami
International Securities Exchange, LLC
(‘‘MIAX’’) and MIAX Emerald, LLC
(‘‘MIAX Emerald’’), charge EEMs a
similar, fixed flat trading permit fee of
34 Certain EEMs also choose to use the MEO
interface due to its enhanced functionality and
based on their own business models.
35 Id.
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$1,500,36 which equals the top tier
proposed herein for users of the FIX
Interface and also entirely consists of
EEMs. MIAX and MIAX Emerald also
charge tiered trading permit fees to
Market Makers as the Exchange
proposes herein for users of the MEO
Interface, which also primarily consists
of Market Makers. However, the
Exchange’s proposed fees for users of
the MEO Interface range from $2,500 to
$6,000 while the fees on MIAX and
MIAX Emerald range from $7,000 to
$22,000. The Exchange also proposes to
base its pricing on trading volume while
MIAX and MIAX Emerald base their
trading permit fees on number of
options classes assigned to the Market
Maker or the percentage of volume in
option classes.37 This is due to the
difference in options assignments
between the Exchange, and MIAX and
MIAX Emerald. On MIAX and MIAX
Emerald, Market Makers are assigned by
options class, and are required to quote
nearly all options in the class. On the
Exchange, Market Makers are assigned
by series, not class, and, therefore,
trading volume is the more equitable
and metric by which to gauge their use
of the Exchange systems and related
Trading Permit Fee.
As illustrated by the table below, the
Exchange notes that the proposed fees
for the Exchange’s Trading Permits are
Exchange
Monthly membership/trading permit fee
MIAX Pearl Options (as proposed)
BOX Options
(‘‘BOX’’) 38.
Exchange
LLC
NYSE Arca, Inc. (‘‘NYSE Arca’’) 39
NYSE American,
American’’) 40.
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Nasdaq PHLX
PHLX’’) 41.
LLC
LLC
(‘‘NYSE
(‘‘Nasdaq
Nasdaq ISE LLC (‘‘Nasdaq ISE’’) 42
Trading Permit access via FIX Interface:
Tier 1: $500.
Tier 2: $1,000.
Tier 3: $1,500.
Trading Permit access via MEO Interface:
Tier 1: $2,500.
Tier 2: $4,000.
Tier 3: $6,000.
Participant Fee: $1,500.
Electronic Market Maker Trading Permit Fees:
Tier 1 (up to and including 10 classes): $4,000.
Tier 2 (up to and including 40 classes): $6,000.
Tier 3 (up to and including 100 classes): $8,000.
Tier 1 (over 100 classes): $10,000.
Options Trading Permits:
Office and Clearing Firms: $1,000.
Market Makers: 1st OTP—$8,000 for up to 60 plus the bottom 45% of option issues.
2nd OTP—Additional $6,000 for up to 150 plus the bottom 45% of option issues.
3rd OTP—Additional $5,000 for up to 500 plus the bottom 45% of option issues.
4th OTP—Additional $4,000 for up to 1,100 plus the bottom 45% of option issues.
5th OTP—Additional $3,000 for all option issues.
6th–9th OTP—Additional $2,000.
10th or more OTPs—$500 for all options issues.
ATP Trading Permits:
Clearing Member: $1,000.
Order Flow Provider: $1,000.
Market Makers: $8,000 for up to 60 plus the bottom 45% of option issues.
Additional $6,000 for up to 150 plus the bottom 45% of option issues.
Additional $5,000 for up to 500 plus the bottom 45% of option issues.
Additional $4,000 for up to 1,100 plus the bottom 45% of option issues.
Additional $3,000 for all option issues.
Additional $2,000 for 6th to 9th ATPs (plus additional fee for premium products).
Streaming Quote Trader (‘‘SQT’’) permit fees:
Tier 1 (up to 200 option classes): $0.00.
Tier 2 (up to 400 option classes): $2,200.
Tier 3 (up to 600 option classes): $3,200.
Tier 4 (up to 800 option classes): $4,200.
Tier 5 (up to 1,000 option classes): $5,200.
Tier 6 (up to 1,200 option classes): $6,200.
Tier 7 (all option classes): $7,200.
Remote Market Maker Organization (‘‘RMMO’’) permit fees:
Tier 1 (less than 100 option classes): $5,000.
Tier 2 (more than 100 and less than 999 option classes): $8,000.
Tier 3 (1,000 or more option classes): $11,000.
Access Fees:
36 See the MIAX Fee Schedule, Section 3)b) and
MIAX Emerald Fee Schedule, Section 3)b),
available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/fees (last
visited June 30, 2022).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
in line with, or cheaper than, the similar
trading permit and membership fees
charged by other options exchanges.
The below table also illustrates how the
Exchange has historically undercharged
for membership via Trading Permits as
compared to other options exchanges.
The Exchange believes other exchanges’
membership and trading permit fees are
useful examples of alternative
approaches to providing and charging
for membership and provides the below
table for comparison purposes only to
show how the Exchange’s proposed fees
compare to fees currently charged by
other options exchanges for similar
membership.
17:26 Aug 09, 2022
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37 Both MIAX and MIAX Emerald charge Market
Makers a monthly fee of $7,000 for up to 10 classes
or up to 20% of classes assigned by volume,
$12,000 for up to 40 classes or up to 35% of classes
assigned by volume, $17,000 for up to 100 classes
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or up to 50% of classes assigned by volume, or
$22,000 for over 100 classes or over 50% of classes
assigned by volume up to all classes listed on MIAX
or MIAX Emerald, as applicable. Id.
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Exchange
Monthly membership/trading permit fee
Cboe Exchange, Inc. (‘‘Cboe’’) 43 ...
Cboe C2 Exchange, Inc. (‘‘Cboe
C2’’) 44.
Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (‘‘Cboe
BZX Optis’’) 45.
Electronic Access Members (‘‘EAMs’’): $500.
Primary Market Maker: $5,000 per membership.
Competitive Market Maker: $2,500 per membership.
Electronic Trading Permit Fees:
Market Maker: $5,000.
Electronic Access Permit: $3,000.
Clearing TPH Permit: $2,000.
Access Permit Fees for Market Makers: $5,000.
Electronic Access Permits: $1,000.
$500 where member has an ADV < 5,000 contracts traded. 46
$1,000 where member has an ADV ≥ 5,000 contracts traded.
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Implementation and Procedural History
The proposed rule change will be
immediately effective. The Exchange
initially filed this proposal on July 1,
2021, with the proposed fees being
38 See BOX fee schedule, Section 1, available at
https://boxexchange.com/assets/BOX-FeeSchedule-as-of-June-1-2022-1.pdf (last visited June
29, 2022). BOX’s Participant Fee is the analog to the
Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for Members who
use the FIX interface. BOX’s Electronic Market
Maker Trading Permit fee is the analog for the
Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for Members who
use the MEO interface. BOX had an average daily
market share of 6.26% as of June 30, 2022. See
Market at a Glance, supra note 8.
39 See NYSE Arca Options Fees and Charges, OTP
Trading Participant Rights, p.1, available at https://
www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/arcaoptions/NYSE_Arca_Options_Fee_Schedule.pdf
(last visited July 12, 2022). NYSE Arca recently
increased this Options Trading Permit Fees
approximately 45%. See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 95142 (June 23, 2022), 87 FR 38786
(June 29, 2022) (SR–NYSEArca–2022–36). Under
the new fee structure, it effectively costs a Market
Maker $26,000 per month to trade all options issues
on NYSE Arca. NYSE Arca’s Options Trading
Permit fee is the analog to the Exchange’s Trading
Permit fee for Members who use the FIX interface.
NYSE Arca’s Options Trading Permit fee for Market
Makers is the analog for the Exchange’s Trading
Permit fee for Members who use the MEO interface.
40 See NYSE American Options Fee Schedule,
Section III, Monthly Trading Permit, Rights, Floor
Access and Premium Product Fees, p. 23–24,
available at https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/
nyse/markets/american-options/NYSE_American_
Options_Fee_Schedule.pdf (last visited May 16,
2022). Under this fee structure, it effectively costs
a Market Maker $26,000 per month to trade all
options issues on NYSE American. NYSE
American’s ATP Trading Permit fee for Clearing
Members and Order Flow Providers is the analog
for the Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for Members
that use the FIX interface. NYSE American’s ATP
Trading Permit fee for Market Makers is the analog
for the Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for Members
that use the MEO interface.
41 See Nasdaq PHLX Options 7 Pricing Schedule,
Section 8. Membership Fees, available at https://
listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/phlx/rules/
Phlx%20Options%207 (last visited May 16, 2022).
Nasdaq PHLX Options’ SQT and RMMO fees is the
analog to the Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for
Members that use the MEO Interface.
42 See Nasdaq ISE Options 7 Pricing Schedule,
Section 8.A. Access Services, available at https://
listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/ise/rules/
ISE%20Options%207 (last visited May 16, 2022).
Nasdaq ISE Options’ EAM Access Fee is the analog
to the Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for Members
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17:26 Aug 09, 2022
48707
Jkt 256001
immediately effective.47 Between
August 2021 and February 2022, the
Exchange withdrew and refiled the
proposed rule change, each time to
meaningfully attempt to provide
additional justification for the proposed
fee changes, provide enhanced details
regarding the Exchange’s cost
methodology, and address questions
contained in the Commission’s
that use the FIX Interface. Nasdaq ISE Options’
Primary and Competitive Market Maker Access Fees
are the analog to the Exchange’s Trading Permit fee
for Members that use the MEO Interface.
43 See Cboe Fee Schedule, Electronic Trading
Permit Fees, available at https://cdn.cboe.com/
resources/membership/Cboe_FeeSchedule.pdf (last
visited June 30, 2022). Cboe’s Electronic Access
Permit fee and Clearing TPH fee are the analog to
the Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for Members that
use the FIX Interface. Cboe’s Market Maker Permit
fee is the analog to the Exchange’s Trading Permit
fee for Members that use the MEO Interface.
44 See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Access Fees,
available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/
membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/ (last visited June
30, 2022). C2’s Market Maker Access Permit fee is
the analog to the Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for
Members that use the MEO Interface. C2’s
Electronic Access Permit fee is the analog to the
Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for Members that use
the FIX Interface.
45 See ‘‘Membership Fees’’ section of the Cboe
BZX Options Fee Schedule, available at https://
www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_
schedule/bzx (last visited June 30, 2022). The
Exchange understands Cboe BZX Options charges
the same Membership Fee to all of its Options
Members.
46 Under the Exchange’s tiered structure, a
Member may trade approximately 106,000 more
contracts on the Exchange than on Cboe BZX
Options and continue to qualify for the Exchange’s
lowest tier. For example, a Member would qualify
for Tier 1 of the Exchange’s tiered pricing structure
where that Member’s total volume as a percentage
of TCV is between 0.00% and 0.30%. Assuming an
average of 37 million contracts are traded each day
during a month, that Member would qualify for Tier
1 where that Member traded less than 111,000
contracts that day and be charged $500, the same
fee as Cboe BZX Options, where that Member
connects via the FIX Interface. On Cboe BZX
Options, the Exchange understands that same
member would no longer qualify for their lowest
tier when their ADV equals or exceeds 5,000
contracts and be charged a fee of $1,000 for that
month.
47 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92366
(July 9, 2021), 86 FR 37379 (SR–PEARL–2021–32).
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suspension orders.48 The Commission
received one comment letter on the
filings.49 The Commission again
suspended the proposed fees on
February 18, 2022.50 The Commission
received one comment letter on that
filing.51 The Exchange then provided
Trading Permits at the lower rates for
the month of March 2022 and absorbed
all associated costs with the lower rates.
On March 30, 2022, the Exchange
withdrew the proposed rule change that
was previously suspended by the
Commission on February 18, 2022. After
providing Trading Permits at the lower
rates for the month of March 2022, on
March 30, 2022, the Exchange submitted
a revised proposal for effectiveness
beginning April 1, 2022.52 This revised
proposal argued that the proposed fees
were constrained by competition based
on a similar filing for permit/
membership fees by MEMX LLC
(‘‘MEMX’’).53 The Commission received
one comment letter on that filing.54 The
Exchange withdrew this revised
proposal and submitted a further
revised filing providing additional
support for its competition based
48 See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos.
92797 (August 27, 2021), 86 FR 49399 (September
2, 2021) (SR–PEARL–2021–32) (‘‘Suspension Order
1’’); 93555 (November 10, 2021), 86 FR 64254
(November 17, 2021) (SR–PEARL–2021–54); 93895
(January 4, 2022), 87 FR 1217 (January 10, 2022)
(SR–PEARL–2021–59).
49 See Letter from Richard J. McDonald,
Susquehanna International Group, LLC (‘‘SIG’’), to
Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated
September 28, 2021 (‘‘SIG Letter 1’’).
50 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94287
(February 18, 2022), 87 FR 10837 (February 25,
2022) (SR–PEARL–2022–05) (‘‘Suspension Order
2’’).
51 See Letter from Richard J. McDonald, SIG, to
Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated
March 15, 2022 (‘‘SIG Letter 2’’).
52 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94696
(April 12, 2022), 87 FR 22987 (April 18, 2022) (SR–
PEARL–2022–09).
53 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 93927
(January 7, 2022), 87 FR 2191 (January 13, 2022)
(SR–MEMX–2021–19) (proposal to adopt monthly
membership fees).
54 See Letter from Brian Sopinsky, SIG, to Vanessa
Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated May 9,
2022 (‘‘SIG Letter 3’’).
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justification on May 17, 2022.55 In
response to feedback from Commission
Staff, the Exchange then withdrew that
revised proposal and submitted a
further revised proposal to provide
additional support for the proposed fee
change and to enhance its competition
based justification on July 12, 2022.56
Again, in response to feedback from
Commission Staff, the Exchange
withdrew that revised proposal and
submitted this further revised proposal
to provide additional support for the
proposed fee change and to enhance its
competition based justification on July
26, 2022.
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2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that its
proposal to amend its Fee Schedule is
consistent with Section 6(b) of the Act 57
in general, and furthers the objectives of
Section 6(b)(4) of the Act 58 in
particular, in that it is an equitable
allocation of reasonable dues, fees and
other charges among its members and
issuers and other persons using its
facilities. The Exchange also believes
the proposal furthers the objectives of
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act in that it is
designed to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to remove
impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market
and a national market system, and, in
general to protect investors and the
public interest and is not designed to
permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers and dealers.
The proposed changes to the Fee
Schedule are reasonable in several
respects. As a threshold matter, the
Exchange is subject to significant
competitive forces in the market for
order flow, which constrains its pricing
determinations. The fact that the market
for order flow is competitive has long
been recognized by the courts. In
NetCoalition v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, the D.C. Circuit stated,
‘‘[n]o one disputes that competition for
order flow is ‘fierce.’ . . . As the SEC
explained, ‘[i]n the U.S. national market
system, buyers and sellers of securities,
and the broker-dealers that act as their
order-routing agents, have a wide range
of choices of where to route orders for
execution’; [and] ‘no exchange can
afford to take its market share
percentages for granted’ because ‘no
exchange possesses a monopoly,
regulatory or otherwise, in the execution
55 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94993
(May 26, 2022), 87 FR 33518 (June 2, 2022) (SR–
PEARL–2022–23).
56 See SR–PEARL–2022–28.
57 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
58 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
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of order flow from broker dealers’
. . . .’’ 59
The Commission and the courts have
repeatedly expressed their preference
for competition over regulatory
intervention to determine prices,
products, and services in the securities
markets. In Regulation NMS, while
adopting a series of steps to improve the
current market model, the Commission
highlighted the importance of market
forces in determining prices and SRO
revenues, and also recognized that
current regulation of the market system
‘‘has been remarkably successful in
promoting market competition in its
broader forms that are most important to
investors and listed companies.’’ 60
Congress directed the Commission to
‘‘rely ‘on competition, whenever
possible, in meeting its regulatory
responsibilities for overseeing the SROs
and the national market system.’ ’’ 61 As
a result, the Commission has
historically relied on competitive forces
to determine whether a fee proposal is
equitable, fair, reasonable, and not
unreasonably or unfairly discriminatory.
‘‘If competitive forces are operative, the
self-interest of the exchanges themselves
will work powerfully to constrain
unreasonable or unfair behavior.’’ 62
Accordingly, ‘‘the existence of
significant competition provides a
substantial basis for finding that the
terms of an exchange’s fee proposal are
equitable, fair, reasonable, and not
unreasonably or unfairly
discriminatory.’’ 63
In its 2019 guidance on fee proposals,
Commission staff indicated that they
would look at factors beyond the
competitive environment, such as cost,
only if a ‘‘proposal lacks persuasive
evidence that the proposed fee is
constrained by significant competitive
forces.’’ 64 The Commission staff further
indicated in its 2019 guidance that an
exchange can demonstrate competitive
forces exist by showing that
59 See NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 539 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (quoting Securities Exchange Act Release No.
59039 (December 2, 2008), 73 FR 74770, 74782–83
(December 9, 2008) (SR–NYSEArca–2006–21)).
60 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808
(June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496, 37499 (June 29, 2005)
(‘‘Regulation NMS Adopting Release’’).
61 See NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 534–35; see also
H.R. Rep. No. 94–229 at 92 (1975) (‘‘[I]t is the intent
of the conferees that the national market system
evolve through the interplay of competitive forces
as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed.’’).
62 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039
(December 2, 2008), 73 FR 74,770 (December 9,
2008) (SR–NYSEArca–2006–21).
63 Id.
64 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
‘‘Staff Guidance on SRO Rule filings Relating to
Fees,’’ (May 21, 2019), available at https://
www.sec.gov/tm/staff-guidance-sro-rule-filings-fees.
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‘‘substantially similar but not identical’’
substitutable products or services exist
and that ‘‘elasticity of demand’’ may be
evidence that competitive forces exist.65
The Exchange believes that there are
many factors that may cause a market
participant to decide to become a
member of a particular exchange
including: (i) an exchange’s available
liquidity in options series; (ii) trading
functionality offered on a particular
market; (iii) product offerings; (iv)
customer service on an exchange; and
(v) transactional pricing. As discussed
above, the Exchange believes that the
decision to become a member of an
exchange, particularly as a registered
market maker, is a complex one that is
not solely based on non-transactional
costs assessed by an exchange. Market
participants weigh the tradeoff between
where they choose to deploy liquidity
versus where trading opportunities
exist. Of course, the cost of membership,
ports and market data may factor into a
decision to become a member of a
certain exchange, but the Exchange
believes it is by no means the only
factor when comparing exchanges. In
general, there are a number of factors
that market participants may consider
when deciding to become a member of
the Exchange or any other options
exchange.
Market Makers
Market makers play an important role
on options exchanges as they provide
liquidity. In options markets, registered
market makers are assigned options
series 66 and are required to quote in
those options series for a specified time
period during the day.67 Typically, a
lead or primary market maker 68 will be
required to quote for a longer period of
time during the day as compared to
other market makers registered on an
exchange.69 Additionally, market
makers are typically required to quote
within a certain width on options
markets.70 Greater liquidity on options
65 Id.
66 See Exchange Rule 602, Phlx, ISE, Nasdaq
GEMX, Inc. (‘‘GEMX’’), Nasdaq MRX, Inc. (‘‘MRX’’),
Nasdaq BX, Inc. (‘‘BX’’) and Nasdaq Options Market
(‘‘NOM’’) Options 2, Section 3; Cboe Rule 5.50;
BOX Exchange LLC (‘‘BOX’’) Rule 8030; MIAX Rule
602; and NYSE Arca Rule 6.35–O.
67 See Exchange Rule 604, ISE, GEMX and MRX,
Phlx, BX and NOM Options 2, Section 5; Cboe Rule
5.52; BOX Rule 8050; MIAX Rule 604; and NYSE
Arca Rule 6.37A–O.
68 Options markets refer to the primary market
maker on an exchange in several ways.
69 See Exchange Rule 604, BX Options 2, Section
4; ISE, GEMX and MRX, and Phlx Options 2,
Section 5; BOX Rule 8055; MIAX Rule 604; and
NYSE Arca Rule 6.37A–O.
70 See BX Options 2, Section 4; ISE, GEMX and
MRX, Phlx and NOM Options 2, Section 5; and
Cboe Rule 5.52; BOX Rule 8040.
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markets benefits all market participants
by providing more trading opportunities
and attracting greater participation by
market makers. An increase in the
activity of market makers in turn
facilitates tighter spreads. Market
participants are attracted to options
markets that have ample liquidity and
tighter spreads in options series.
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Trading Functionality
An exchange’s trading functionality
attracts market participants who may
elect, for example, to submit an order
into a price improving auction,71 enter
a complex order,72 or utilize a particular
order type.73 Different options
exchanges offer different trading
functionality to their members. For
example, with respect to priority and
allocation of an order book, some
options exchanges have price/time
allocation,74 some have a size pro-rata
allocation,75 while other exchanges offer
both allocation models.76 The allocation
methodology on a particular options
exchange’s order book may attract
certain market participants. Also, the
manner in which some options markets
structure their solicitation auction,77 or
opening process,78 may be attractive to
certain market participants. Finally,
some exchanges have trading floors 79
which may accommodate trading for
certain market participants or trading
firms.80
71 See ISE, GEMX, MRX, Phlx and BX Options 3,
Section 13; MIAX Rule 515A; Cboe Rule 5.37; and
BOX Rules 7150 and 7245. The Exchange does not
currently offer a price improving auction.
72 See Phlx and ISE Options 3, Section 14; MIAX
Rule 518; Cboe Rule 5.33; BOX Rule 7240; and
NYSE Arca Rule 6.91–O. The Exchange does not
currently offer complex order functionality.
73 See Exchange Rule 516, ISE, GEMX, MRX,
Phlx, BX and NOM Options 3, Section 7; MIAX
Rule 516; Cboe Rule 5.6; BOX Rule 7110; and NYSE
Arca Rule 6.62–O.
74 See Exchange Rule 514, Cboe Rule 5.85; BOX
Rule 7130; and NYSE Arca Rule 6.76–O.
75 See Phlx, ISE, GEMX and MRX Options 3,
Section 10; and BOX Rule 7135.
76 See BX Options 3, Section 10. While BX’s rule
permits both price/time and size pro-rata allocation,
all symbols on BX are currently designated as Price/
Time. See also BOX Rules 7130 and 7135. MIAX’s
rule permits both Price-Time and Pro-Rata
allocation. See also MIAX Rule 514.
77 See ISE, GEMX and MRX Options 3, Section
11; NYSE American Rules 971.1NY and 971.2NY;
and Cboe Rule 5.39.
78 See Exchange Rule 503, ISE, GEMX, MRX,
Phlx, BX and NOM Options 3, Section 8; Cboe Rule
5.31, MIAX Rule 503, BOX Rule 7070, and NYSE
Arca Rule 6.64–O.
79 Today, Phlx, Cboe, BOX, NYSE Arca, and
NYSE American LLC have a trading floor. Trading
floors require an on-floor presence to execute
options transactions.
80 There are certain features of open outcry
trading that are difficult to replicate in an electronic
trading environment. The Exchange has observed,
and understands from various market participants,
that they have had difficulty executing certain
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Product Offerings
Introducing new and innovative
products to the marketplace designed to
meet customer demands may attract
market participants to a particular
options venue. New products in the
options industry may allow market
participants greater trading and hedging
opportunities, as well as new avenues to
manage risks. The listing of new options
products enhances competition among
market participants by providing
investors with additional investment
vehicles, as well as competitive
alternatives, to existing investment
products. An exchange’s proprietary
product offering may attract order flow
to a particular exchange to trade a
particular options product.81
Transaction Pricing
The pricing available on a particular
exchange may impact a market
participant’s decision to submit order
flow to a particular options venue. The
options industry is competitive. Clear
substitutes to the Exchange exist in the
market for options security transaction
services; the Exchange is only one of
sixteen options exchanges to which
market participants may direct their
order flow and memberships. Within
this environment, market participants
can freely, and often do, shift their order
flow and memberships among the
Exchange and competing venues in
response to changes in their respective
pricing schedules.
*
*
*
*
*
The Exchange believes the fees in this
case are reasonable and constrained by
competitive forces. Evidence is set forth
below showing that substitutable
products and elasticity of demand exist
when it comes to purchasing a Trading
Permit or membership on an exchange.
Trading Permit Fee Increase
Trading Permit and Similar Membership
Fees Are Constrained by Competition
The Exchange’s Trading Permit Fees
are subject to significant competitive
forces as evidenced by available
substitutes and elasticity of demand. As
discussed above, the Exchange believes
that there are many factors that may
cause a market participant to decide to
become a member of a particular
exchange including: (i) an exchange’s
available liquidity in options series; (ii)
orders, such as larger orders and high-risk and
complicated strategies, in an all-electronic trading
configuration without the element of human
interaction to negotiate pricing for these orders.
81 See, e.g., options on the Nasdaq-100 Index®
available on ISE, GEMX and Phlx and Cboe’s
Market Volatility Index®. Currently, the Exchange
does not list any proprietary products.
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48709
trading functionality, latency,
reliability, throughout, access to
liquidity, and determinism offered on a
particular market; (iii) product offerings;
(iv) customer service on an exchange;
and (v) transactional pricing. The
Exchange believes that the decision to
become a member of an exchange is a
complex one that is not solely based on
non-transactional costs assessed by an
exchange.
The Exchange believes that there is
value in being a Member of the
Exchange and retaining that
Membership as the Exchange’s market
share has grown. Exchanges compete
with each other for memberships and
must consider this competitive dynamic
when setting fees for memberships, such
as Trading Permits. In this case, the
proposed Trading Permit fees are
reasonable and constrained by
competition because, as illustrated by
the above table, they are in the range of
similar types of membership fees
charged to analogous categories of
market participants by other exchanges,
including those with similar market
share.82 The proposed monthly Trading
Permit fees are also lower than or
comparable to the membership and
trading permit fees imposed by several
other national securities exchanges that
charge such fees.83 Should the Exchange
seek to adopt Trading Permit Fees that
are higher than that of other exchanges,
it would risk losing Members and
having them potentially connect to the
Exchange via other means. Becoming a
member of the exchange does not ‘‘lock’’
a potential member into a market or
diminish the overall competition for
exchange services. The decision to
become a member of an exchange is
made at the beginning of the
relationship, and is no less subject to
competition than trading fees or market
data.
Availability of Substitutes. The
Commission staff indicated in its 2019
guidance that an exchange can
demonstrate competitive forces exist by
showing that ‘‘substantially similar but
not identical’’ substitutable products or
services exist.84 That is clearly the case
here. No broker-dealer is required to
become a Member of the Exchange.
Instead, many market participants
waited for the Exchange to grow to a
certain percentage of market share
before they decided to become an
Exchange Member. In addition, many
market participants still have not joined
the Exchange despite the Exchange’s
growth in recent years to consistently be
82 See
supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text.
id.
84 See supra note 64.
83 See
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approximately 4–5% of the overall
equity options market share. To
illustrate, the Exchange currently has 41
Members.85 However, based on publicly
available information regarding a
sample of the Exchange’s competitors,
NYSE American Options has 75
members, NYSE Arca Options has 71
members, and Cboe has 94 members.86
Accordingly, the vigorous competition
among national securities exchanges
provides many alternatives for firms to
voluntarily decide whether membership
to the Exchange is appropriate and
worthwhile, and no broker-dealer is
required to become a member of the
Exchange. Specifically, neither the
trade-through requirements under
Regulation NMS nor broker-dealers’ best
execution obligations require a brokerdealer to become a member of every
exchange.
The Exchange acknowledges that
competitive forces may compel certain
broker-dealers to be members of all
equity options exchanges based on their
business models. These broker-dealers
may engage in latency sensitive trading
strategies that benefit from being a
member and connecting directly to an
exchange based on the business model
they choose to employ. Competitive
forces that may drive certain brokerdealers to become members of each
exchange based on their business
models is not unique to the options
market. This dynamic also exists in
equities and acknowledged by MEMX
and considered by the Commission in a
recent MEMX proposal to adopt a
monthly membership fee.87 However,
the Exchange believes that the proposed
fees are reasonable, equitably allocated
and not unfairly discriminatory, even
for a broker-dealer that deems it
necessary to join the Exchange for
business purposes, as those business
reasons should presumably result in
revenue capable of covering the
proposed fees, just as one may do when
considering whether to become an
member of an equity exchange.
Other broker-dealers may not find a
need in becoming a member of all or
some exchanges. There is no
85 See MIAX Pearl Options Exchange Member
Directory, available at https://
www.miaxoptions.com/exchange-members/pearl.
86 See NYSE American Options Membership
Directory, available at https://www.nyse.com/
markets/american-options/membership (last visited
March 9, 2022); NYSE Arca Options Membership
Directory, available at https://www.nyse.com/
markets/arca-options/membership (last visited
March 9, 2022); Cboe Members and Sponsored
Participants, Form 1 Amendment dated February
17, 2022, Exhibit M, available at https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/2200/
22000797.pdf (last visited March 9, 2022).
87 See MEMX Membership Fee Proposal, supra
note 7.
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requirement, regulatory or otherwise,
that any broker-dealer connect to and
access any (or all of) the available
options exchanges. One other exchange
recently noted in a proposal to amend
their own trading permit fees that of the
62 market making firms that are
registered as Market Makers across
Cboe, MIAX, and BOX, 42 firms access
only one of the three exchanges.88
Further, the Exchange and its affiliates,
MIAX and MIAX Emerald, have a total
of 47 members. Of those 47 total
members, 35 are members of all three
exchanges, four are members of only
two (2) exchanges, and eight (8) are
members of only one exchange. Of those
that are Market Makers today on the
Exchange, two (2) are not registered as
Market Makers on MIAX and one (1) is
not registered as a Market Maker on
MIAX Emerald. Broken down even
further, of those Market Makers that use
the MEO Interface and reached the
Exchange’s top tier for the Trading
Permit fee for June 2022, one (1) Market
Maker was only a Member of the
Exchange and not its two affiliates,
MIAX and MIAX Emerald. The above
data evidences that a Market Maker
need not be a Member of all options
exchanges, let alone the Exchange and
its two affiliates, and market makers
elect to do so based on their own
business decisions and need to directly
access each exchange’s liquidity pool.
The Exchange also is not aware of any
reason why a Market Maker could not
cease being a permit holder in response
to price increases that it deems
unreasonable from its own business
perspective. The Exchange does not
assess any termination fee for a Member
to drop its Trading Permit, nor is the
Exchange aware of any other costs that
would be incurred by a Market Maker to
do so. Further, a broker-dealer may
employ a business model that is not
latency sensitive, such as one that only
enters resting liquidity and, therefore,
may not find interest in exchange
membership. Exchange membership
may also not be useful for order routing
firms that seek to route orders to an
exchange through another means,
described below, solely as part of their
best execution obligations or to comply
with the trade-through requirements
88 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94894
(May 11, 2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR–
BOX–2022–17) (Notice of Filing and Immediate
Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change to Amend
the Fee Schedule on the BOX Options Market LLC
Facility To Adopt Electronic Market Maker Trading
Permit Fees). The Exchange believes that BOX’s
observation demonstrates that market making firms
can, and do, select which exchanges they wish to
access, and, accordingly, options exchanges must
take competitive considerations into account when
setting fees for such access.
PO 00000
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under Chapter XIV of the Exchange’s
Rules. Such broker-dealers may utilize
various existing substitutes to access an
exchange. For example, in lieu of
becoming a member at each options
exchange, a market participant may join
one exchange and elect to have their
orders routed in the event that a better
price is available on an away market,
including the Exchange. Nothing in the
Order Protection Rule requires a firm to
become a Member at the Exchange, or
any other options exchange.89 Further,
if the Exchange is not at the NBBO, the
Exchange will route an order to an away
market that is at the NBBO to prevent
a trade-through and also ensure that the
order was executed at a superior price.90
Some other broker-dealers may not
deem it necessary to be a Member of the
Exchange and may elect to access the
Exchange through other means. As a
substitute for joining an exchange, a
third-party may be utilized to execute
an order on an exchange. For example,
a third-party broker-dealer Member of
the Exchange may be utilized by a retail
investor to submit orders into an
exchange. An institutional investor may
utilize a broker-dealer, a service
bureau,91 or request sponsored access 92
through a member of an exchange in
order to submit an order directly to an
options exchange.93 A market
participant may either pay the costs
associated with becoming a member of
an exchange or, in the alternative, a
market participant may elect to pay
commissions to a broker-dealer, pay fees
to a service bureau to submit trades, or
pay a member to sponsor the market
participant in order to submit trades
directly to an exchange.94 Market
89 See Options Order Protection and Locked/
Crossed Market Plan (August 14, 2009), available at
https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/7fc629d9-4e544b99-9f11-c0e4db1a2266/options_order_protection_
plan.pdf.
90 Exchange Members may elect to not route their
orders by marking an order as ‘‘do-not-route.’’ In
this case, the order would not be routed.
91 Service bureaus provide access to market
participants to submit and execute orders on an
exchange. On the Exchange, a Service Bureau may
be a Member. Some Members utilize a Service
Bureau for connectivity and that Service Bureau
may not be a Member. Some market participants
utilize a Service Bureau who is a Member to submit
orders.
92 Sponsored Access is an arrangement whereby
a member permits its customers to enter orders into
an exchange’s system that bypass the member’s
trading system and are routed directly to the
Exchange, including routing through a service
bureau or other third-party technology provider.
93 This may include utilizing a Floor Broker and
submitting the trade to one of the five options
trading floors.
94 The Exchange notes that it does not have
insight into the economics of such a relationship
where a broker-dealer utilizes another entity to
access the Exchanges. It is presumed that a thirdparty that provides access to an exchange does so
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participants may elect any of the above
substitute models and weigh the varying
costs when determining how to submit
trades to an exchange. Depending on the
number of orders to be submitted,
technology, ability to control
submission of orders, and projected
revenues, a market participant may
determine one model is more cost
efficient as compared to the alternatives.
The above examples clearly demonstrate
competitive forces exist by the
availability of ‘‘substantially similar but
not identical’’ substitutable products or
services to becoming a Member of the
Exchange. Also, based on the disparity
in amount of memberships among
exchanges detailed above, numerous
market participants take advantage of
these substitutes to send order flow to
the Exchange in lieu of becoming a
Member.
Elasticity of Demand. The Exchange
notes it is not aware of any reason why
Members could not simply drop their
access to an exchange (or not initially
access an exchange) if an exchange were
to establish prices for its nontransaction fees that, in the
determination of such Member, did not
make business or economic sense for
such Member to access such exchange.
The Exchange again notes that Members
are not required by rule, regulation, or
competitive forces to be a Member on
the Exchange.
Elasticity of demand for Exchange
Membership exists when it comes to
purchasing a Trading Permit and, as
evidenced by the below data, Members
have terminated their memberships
since the proposed fees were first in
effect. First, and most notably, the
Exchange has not seen an increase in
memberships since it first adopted the
proposed fee increase. In fact, three
Members terminated their memberships
in the time since the proposed fee
increase first went into effect. In June
2021, the month immediately preceding
the initial implementation of this
proposed fee change, the Exchange had
20 users of the MEO Interface and 28
users of the FIX Interface. These
numbers remained stagnant until
August 2021, where one Member that
utilized the MEO Interface ceased
utilizing the MEO Interface and again in
December 2021 where one Member that
utilized the FIX Interface ceased
utilizing the FIX Interface. These
numbers again remained stagnant until
on behalf of multiple broker-dealers and provides
access to multiple exchanges. It is also presumed
that any increased volume that might cause such
third party to achieve a higher Trading Permit
pricing tier maybe offset through achieving a higher
rebate on the Exchange or other economic
arrangement between the parties.
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March 2022, where another Member
that utilized the FIX Interface ceased
utilizing the FIX Interface. This resulted
in 19 users of the MEO Interface and 26
users of the FIX Interface. Further, other
exchanges have also experienced
termination of memberships if their
members deem permit or membership
fees to be unreasonable or excessive. For
example, the Exchange notes that a BOX
participant modified its access to BOX
in connection with the implementation
of a proposed change to BOX’s permit
fees.95 The absence of new memberships
coupled with the termination of two
memberships on the Exchange, as well
as similar membership changes on
another options exchange in relation to
a trading permit fee increase, clearly
shows that elasticity of demand exists.
Also, the Exchange has not
experienced any Member decreasing
their trading activity on the Exchange in
order to move to a lower tier and be
charged the corresponding lower fee. In
fact, between June 2021 and July 2021,
one Member that utilizes the MEO
Interface moved up from Tier 1 to Tier
3 due to increasing their trading volume
on the Exchange. This occurred again
between January 2022 and February
2022, where another Member that
utilizes the MEO Interface moved up
from Tier 1 to Tier 2 also due to
increasing their trading volume on the
Exchange.
The Exchange has not experienced a
net decrease in Members due to the fee
increase, because the Exchange believes
numerous considerations are taken into
account when deciding to be a member
of an exchange, including, but not
limited to: (i) an exchange’s available
liquidity in options series; (ii) trading
functionality, latency, reliability,
throughout, access to liquidity, and
determinism offered on a particular
market; (iii) product offerings; (iv)
customer service on an exchange; and
(v) transactional pricing when
socializing the change. Fees are not the
sole consideration. As stated above, the
Exchange socialized the proposed fee
increase with Members prior to first
implementing the change. During that
process, some Members stated that they
95 According to BOX, a Market Maker on BOX
terminated its status as a Market Maker in response
to BOX’s proposed modification of Market Maker
trading permit fees. See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 94894 (May 11, 2022), 87 FR 29987
(May 17, 2022) (SR–BOX–2022–17). BOX noted,
and the Exchange agrees, that this Market Maker’s
decision demonstrates that Market Makers can, and
do, alter their membership status if they deem
permit fees at an exchange to be unsuitable for their
business needs, thus demonstrating the competitive
environment for Market Maker permit fees and the
constraints on options exchanges when setting
Market Maker permit fees.
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48711
anticipated a potential increase due to
the lower rates the Exchange historically
charged.
The Proposed Fees Are Reasonable and
Constrained by Similar Fees Charged by
Other Options Exchanges
The proposed fees for the Exchange’s
Trading Permits are in line with, or
cheaper than, the similar trading permit
and membership fees charged by other
options exchanges with similar market
share. The Exchange believes other
exchanges’ membership and trading
permit fees, even those of its affiliates,
are useful examples of alternative
approaches to charging for memberships
and how such fees are constrained by
like fees charged by other exchanges.
Again, the Exchange has not amended
its Trading Permit fees since the fees
were first adopted in 2018.96 As
described above, the Exchange’s
proposed fee increase results in fees that
remain lower than those of its affiliates,
MIAX and MIAX Emerald. First, MIAX
and MIAX Emerald charge EEMs a
similar, fixed flat trading permit fee of
$1,500,97 which equals the top tier
proposed herein for users of the FIX
Interface and also primarily consists of
EEMs. Members that do not qualify for
the top tier on the Exchange would pay
a lower Trading Permit Fee than they
would on MIAX or MIAX Emerald. Like
the Exchange currently employs for
MEO Interface, which is primarily used
by Market Makers, MIAX and MIAX
Emerald charge tiered trading permit
fees to Market Makers. However, the
Exchange’s proposed fees for users of
the MEO Interface are lower and range
from $2,500 to $6,000, while the
Trading Permit fees on MIAX and MIAX
Emerald range from $7,000 to $22,000.
The below discussion illustrates how
the Exchange has historically
undercharged for access via Trading
Permits as compared to other options
exchanges. As discussed further above,
the Exchange chose to charge less than
other options exchanges to attract
memberships and order flow as a new
options exchange entrant. The Exchange
now seeks to increase its Trading Permit
Fees due to the maturity of its market
while keeping in mind the competitive
constraints based on similar fees by
other options exchanges.
The proposed Trading Permit Fees
compare favorably with those of other
options exchanges. The Exchange
proposes to charge users of the FIX
Interface monthly fees ranging from
96 See
supra note 9.
the MIAX Fee Schedule, Section (3)(b) and
MIAX Emerald Fee Schedule, Section (3)(b),
available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/fees (last
visited June 30, 2022).
97 See
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$500 to $1,500 based on trading volume.
Users of the FIX Interface are primarily
EEMs, which generally consist of order
flow providers. Cboe charges monthly
electronic trading permit fees based on
the category of participant, such as
$3,000 for Electronic Access Permit
holders and $2,000 for Clearing TPH
Permit holders (the Exchange notes that
it only charges $250 per month for EEM
Clearing Firms). Cboe’s Electronic
Access Permit fee is the analog to the
Exchange’s Trading Permit fee for
Members that use the FIX Interface and
is higher than the Exchange’s proposed
highest tier.
The Exchange’s proposed monthly
Trading Permit Fees for users of the
MEO Interface, which are primarily
Market Makers, range from $2,500 to
$6,000 based on trading volume. Basing
such fees on trading volume is
analogous to other options exchanges
that base their similar fees charged to
Market Makers based on the number of
options classes assigned. For example,
NYSE Arca charges Market Makers a
base fee of $8,000 and charges
additional fees ranging from $500 to
$6,000 on top of the base fee and
depending on the options issues
assigned, could result in monthly
options trading permit fees ranging from
$8,000 to $26,000 (or higher), which is
higher than the Exchange’s highest
proposed tier of $6,000. NYSE American
charges electronic Market Makers a base
fee of $8,000 and charges additional fees
ranging from $500 to $6,000 on top of
the base fee and depending on the
options issues assigned, which could
result in monthly options trading permit
fees ranging from $8,000 to $26,000 (or
higher), also higher than the Exchange’s
highest proposed tier of $6,000.
The proposed Trading Permit Fee also
compares favorably with those of other
options exchanges with similar market
share. Under the Exchange’s tiered
structure, a Member may trade
approximately 106,000 more ADV
contracts on the Exchange than on Cboe
BZX Options 98 and continue to qualify
for the Exchange’s lowest Tier. For
example, a Member would qualify for
Tier 1 of the Exchange’s tiered pricing
structure where that Member’s total
volume as a percentage of TCV is
between 0.00% and 0.30%. Assuming
an average of 37 million contracts are
traded each day during a month that
Member would qualify for Tier 1 where
that Member traded less than an ADV of
111,000 contracts and be charged $500
98 Cboe BZX Options had an average daily market
share of 7.95% as of June 23, 2022. See ‘‘Market at
a Glance’’, available at https://
www.miaxoptions.com/ (last visited June 23, 2022).
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for the month, the same fee as Cboe BZX
Options, where that Member connects
via FIX.99 On Cboe BZX Options, the
Exchange understands that same
member would no longer qualify for
their lowest tier when their ADV equals
or exceeds 5,000 contracts and be
charged a fee of $1,000 for that
month.100
Like the Exchange, BOX also employs
a tier pricing structure for market maker
trading permit fees charging $4,000 to
$10,000 per month based on options
classes traded.101 BOX’s pricing
structure is the analog for the
Exchange’s Trading Permit Fees for
users of the MEO Interface as that
interface is primarily used by Market
Makers. BOX’s lowest tier only equals
the Exchange’s second tier for the MEO
interface and its third and fourth tier
exceed the Exchange’s highest tier.
The Proposed Fees Are Equitable and
Not Unfairly Discriminatory
The Exchange believes that the
proposed monthly Trading Permit fees
are not unfairly discriminatory because
they would be assessed equally across
all Members or firms that seek to
become Members. The Exchange first
adopted its tiered pricing structure in
2018 and has not amended the volume
requirement since, nor does it propose
to do so herein. Nonetheless, the
Exchange continues to believe the tiered
pricing structure remains not unfairly
discriminatory because it is based on
the amount of trading a Member
conducts on the Exchange, related use
of Exchange services, and the value of
the Exchange’s technology offering. In
other words, the more a firm uses the
Exchange’s system, the more that firm
will pay than others that use the system
less. The proposed fees also remain not
unfairly discriminatory because they
continue to be based on the type of
interface utilized and the value drawn
from the use of that interface.
The tiered pricing structure remains
not unfairly discriminatory because it is
based on the amount of trading a
Member conducts on the Exchange,
related use of Exchange services, and
99 See ‘‘Membership Fees’’ section of the Cboe
BZX Options Fee Schedule, available at https://
www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_
schedule/bzx (last visited April 13, 2022). The
Exchange understands Cboe BZX Options charges
the same Membership Fee to all of its Options
Members.
100 The Exchange proposes to also charge a fee of
$1,000 per month to Members that qualify for Tier
2, the same as BZX’s highest tier. The Exchange
acknowledges that the Exchange’s Trading Permit
fee would be higher than BZX where a Member
qualifies for Tier 3.
101 See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
94894 (May 11, 2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022)
(SR–BOX–2022–17).
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the value of the Exchange’s technology
offering. The Exchange offers a premium
System network, connectivity, and a
highly deterministic trading
environment, the cost of which per tier
is in relation to the value it provides.
The Exchange is recognized as a leader
in network monitoring, determinism,
risk protections, and network stability.
For example, the Exchange experiences
approximately a 95% determinism rate,
system throughput of approximately
10.8 million quotes per second and
average round trip latency rate of
approximately 30.76 microseconds for a
single quote. The Exchange provides a
highly resilient trading platform that
experienced 99.9999% of uptime since
its inception over 5 years ago. The
Exchange provides extreme performance
and radical scalability designed to
match the unique needs of trading
differing asset class/market model
combinations.
Again, Exchange systems offer two
customer interfaces, FIX Interface
gateway for orders, and ultra-low
latency MEO Interface and data feeds
with best-in-class wire order
determinism. The Exchange also offers
automated continuous testing to ensure
high reliability, advanced monitoring
and systems security, and employs a
software architecture that results in
minimizing the demands on power,
space, and cooling while allowing for
rapid scalability, resiliency and fault
isolation. The Exchange also provides
latency equalized cross-connects in the
primary data center ensures fair and
cost efficient access to the Exchange’s
Systems.
The tiered pricing structure represent
the value of the Exchange’s industry
leading technology platform and is
based on how frequently a Member
trades on the Exchange. The more use,
the more value a Member is extolling
from the Exchange. The Exchange
believes that a Member that qualifies for
the first tier should not be charged the
same as a Member that qualifies for the
highest tier because the Member that
qualifies for the first tier uses the
Exchange less than the Member that
qualifies for the highest tier. Members
that qualify for the lowest tier tend to
connect to the Exchange as part of their
best execution obligations and generally
tend to send the least amount of orders
and messages over those connections.102
102 An EEM may satisfy its best execution
obligations by using the FIX Interface, limiting their
costs. Those EEMs that choose to use the MEO
Interface do so for reasons other than best
execution, such as the enhanced functionality
provided by the MEO Interface, and the proposed
fees would not serve as a barrier to satisfying best
execution.
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Those Members generally send fewer
orders and messages to the Exchange
resulting in less use of the Exchange
resources. Therefore, the Trading Permit
fees for those Members should rightfully
be lower than others that trade on the
Exchange for other reasons, such as a
low-latency trading strategies that
requires sending more orders and
messages which, therefore, utilize a
greater amount or Exchange resources
and extoll great value from their use of
the Exchange’s industry leading
technology offering.
Next, the existing tiered pricing
structure remains not unfairly
discriminatory because it continues to
be based on the type of interface utilized
and the value drawn from the use of that
interface. As discussed above, both the
MEO Interface and FIX Interface
continue to be available to all Members
and each Member may choose which
interface to utilize based on their own
business needs. The FIX Interface is the
industry-wide uniform message format
and provides lower bandwidth, less
capacity, and fewer Exchange resources.
EEMs, who are primarily order flow
providers, are the primary users of the
FIX Interface. Meanwhile, the MEO
Interface is the more robust interface
offering lower latency and higher
throughput. Market Makers primarily
use the MEO Interface due to its
functionality, robustness, lower latency,
and higher throughput and utilizes
greater Exchange resources due to the
increased volume of message traffic that
travel through the MEO Interface.
As stated above, the Exchange offers
three time-in-force modifiers: Day, IOC,
and GTC. While all order types are
available for use on either interface,
only the time-in-force modifiers of IOC
and Day are available on the MEO
Interface. Market Makers utilize the
time-in-force of Day on orders to be
posted on the MIAX Pearl Options Book
and to meet Market Makers’ continuous
quoting obligations under Exchange
Rule 605(d). Other Market Makers, and
certain EEMs, that primarily remove
liquidity tend to be more latency
sensitive and utilize the time-in-force of
IOC on orders when looking to remove
liquidity from the MIAX Pearl Options
Book. The MEO Interface allows the
submission of Cancel-Replacement
orders, which allow for the immediate
cancellation of a previously received
order and the replacement of that order
with a new order with new terms and
conditions. Cancel-Replacement orders
are primarily used by Market Makers as
part of their continuous quoting
obligations. Market Makers, and certain
EEMs, are the primary users of the MEO
Interface due to its lower latency, higher
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throughput, available time-in-force
instructions and order types that assist
them in satisfying their market making
obligations. The Exchange also offers its
Aggregate Risk Manager (‘‘ARM’’) over
the MEO Interface and it is available to
both EEMs and Market Makers.103
The FIX Interface provides lower
capacity and bandwidth and, therefore,
utilizes less Exchange resources. The
FIX Interface is primarily used by EEMs,
who tend to be less latency sensitive
and submit less orders and messages
than Market Makers. The FIX Interface
provides EEMs all the functionality
necessary for them to satisfy their best
execution obligations. However, EEMs
may choose to use the MEO Interface
due to its lower latency, higher
throughput, available functionality
based on their business needs if they
choose.
The Exchange notes that while Market
Maker users of the MEO Interface
continue to account for a vast majority
of the increased System usage placed on
the Exchange, Market Makers continue
to be valuable market participants on
the exchanges as the options market is
a quote driven industry. The Exchange
recognizes the value that Market Makers
bring to the Exchange. The Exchange
proposes higher, separate fees for users
of the MEO Interface that are more
aligned with the costs and resources
that Market Makers continue to place on
the Exchange and its systems.
The Exchange notes that Market
Makers are the predominant users of the
MEO Interface and consume the most
bandwidth and resources of the
network, transact the vast majority of
the volume on the Exchange, and
require the high touch network support
services provided by the Exchange and
its staff. The Exchange notes that users
of the FIX Interface, i.e., non-Market
Makers, take up significantly less
Exchange resources as discussed further
below. Further, the Exchange notes that
MEO users account for greater than 99%
of message traffic over the network,
while FIX users account for less than
1% of message traffic over the network.
In the Exchange’s experience, most
Exchange Members do not have a
business need for the high performance
network solutions, like MEO, required
by Market Makers and certain EEMs.
Over the period from March 2022
through May 2022, the Exchange
processed 1.3 billion messages via the
FIX Interface (0.33% of total messages
received). Over that same time period,
the Exchange processed 386.1 billion
messages (99.67% of total messages
received) over the MEO Interface. This
marked difference between the number
of FIX and MEO messages processed,
when mapped to servers, software,
storage, and networking results in a
much higher allocation of total
resources to support the MEO Interface.
For one, the Exchange expends greater
resources to maintain the resilience of
the MEO Interface to ensure its ongoing
operation in accordance with Regulation
SCI. Another, the Exchange must
expand its storage capacity to retain
these increased messages in compliance
with its record keeping obligations. The
Exchange must also expend additional
resources to surveil and ensure proper
regulatory oversight of this increased
message traffic. These pulls on
Exchange resources have only increased
since it first adopted the Trading Permit
fee in March of 2018 104 when the
Exchange’s trading volume for that
month averaged 3.94%.105 Today, the
Exchange’s average daily trading
volume for June 2022 is 4.92%.106 This
additional volume increases the pull on
Exchange resources necessary to surveil
and regulate its market while also
procuring additional capacity to store
and monitor those messages in
compliance with its record keeping
obligations under the Exchange Act.
Users of the MEO Interface, therefore,
receive greater value than Users of the
FIX Interface due to its higher
throughput, lower latency, and available
functionality. As the above data shows,
the Exchange also expends much more
resources to support the MEO Interface
than it does to support the FIX Interface.
The existing tiered pricing structure is
designed to account for these facts.
Trading Permit fees for Members who
connect through the MEO Interface are,
therefore, higher than the Trading
Permit fees for Members who connect
through the FIX Interface. The tiered
pricing structure also accounts for the
corresponding use of the MEO and FIX
Interfaces and charges more for those
that use either interface more in terms
of trading volume and proportionate
pull on Exchange resources. Therefore,
the proposed monthly Trading Permit
fees are not unfairly discriminatory
because they would be assessed equally
across all Members based on the type of
interface and related usage of Exchange
resources.
The tiered pricing structure has been
in place since 2018 107 and similar
104 See
103 See
Exchange Rules 517(A) (Aggregated Risk
Manager for EEMs) and 517B (Aggregate Risk
Manager for Market Makers).
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105 See
supra note 9.
Market at a Glance, supra note 8.
106 Id.
107 See
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supra note 9.
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membership pricing structures utilized
by other options exchanges assess
permit fees at different rates, based
upon a member’s participation on that
exchange,108 and, as such, this concept
is not new or novel. The Exchange also
notes the some options exchanges
employ a tiered pricing structure for
membership fees based on options
assigned or traded while the Exchange
employs a tier pricing structure based
on trading volume. The Exchange
believes both are analogous and lead to
the same result. Also see the BZX
example explained above.
The proposed fees are equitable and
not unfairly discriminatory as the fees
apply equally to all Members. As such,
all similarly situated Members, with the
same trading volume, will be subject to
the same Trading Permit fee. The
Exchange also believes that assessing
lower fees to Members with less trading
volume is reasonable and appropriate as
it will allow the Exchange to retain and
attract smaller-scale Members, which
are an integral component of the options
industry marketplace. Since these
smaller Members utilize less bandwidth
and capacity on the Exchange’s network
due to the lower trading volume, the
Exchange believes it is reasonable and
appropriate to offer Members a lower
fee. Furthermore, the Exchange tiered
pricing is beneficial and valued by
smaller Market Makers who provide
liquidity in less liquid options classes.
The Exchange fears that without its
tiered pricing structure, smaller Market
Makers would discontinue their
membership and cease providing much
needed liquidity in less liquid options
classes to the detriment of all market
participants. The Exchange must,
therefore, consider Members’ ability to
discontinue their memberships when
108 See e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
94894 (May 11, 2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022)
(SR–BOX–2022–17). NYSE Arca Options Fees and
Charges, p.1 (assessing market makers $6,000 for up
to 175 option issues, an additional $5,000 for up to
350 option issues, an additional $4,000 for up to
1,000 option issues, an additional $3,000 for all
option issues on the exchange, and an additional
$1,000 for the fifth trading permit and for each
trading permit thereafter); NYSE American Options
Fee Schedule, p. 23 (assessing market makers
$8,000 for up to 60 plus the bottom 45% of option
issues, an additional $6,000 for up to 150 plus the
bottom 45% of option issues, an additional $5,000
for up to 500 plus the bottom 45% of option issues,
and additional $4,000 for up to 1,100 plus the
bottom 45% of option issues, an additional $3,000
for all issues traded on the exchange, and an
additional $2,000 for 6th to 9th ATPs; plus an
addition fee for premium products). See also BZX
Options assesses the Participant Fee, which is a
membership fee, according to a member’s ADV. See
Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee Schedule under
‘‘Membership Fees’’. The Participant Fee is $500 if
the member ADV is less than 5000 contracts and
$1,000 if the member ADV is equal to or greater
than 5,000 contracts.
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17:26 Aug 09, 2022
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considering any potential changes to its
tiered volume requirements and that
Members’ ability to transition to another
exchange they view offers more
attractive volume thresholds and
pricing. The proposed fees, therefore,
represent the equitable allocation of
reasonable dues, fees and other charges
because the fees are generally lower
than other exchanges and the proposed
tiered fees are similar to other tiered
pricing structures on other options
exchanges.109
Removal of Monthly Volume Credit and
Trading Permit Fee Credit
The Exchange believes its proposal to
remove the Monthly Volume Credit is
reasonable, equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because all market
participants will no longer be offered
the ability to achieve the extra credits
associated with the Monthly Volume
Credit for submitting Priority Customer
volume to the Exchange and access to
the Exchange is offered on terms that are
not unfairly discriminatory. The
Exchange believes it is equitable and not
unfairly discriminatory to remove the
Monthly Volume Credit from the Fee
Schedule for business and competitive
reasons. The Exchange established the
Monthly Volume Credit when it first
launched operations to encourage
Members to increase their order flow by
providing a credit to those that
exceeded a volume threshold. The
Exchange believes that the Exchange’s
existing Priority Customer rebates and
fees will continue to allow the Exchange
to remain highly competitive and
continue to attract order flow and
maintain market share even without the
Monthly Volume Credit.110
The Exchange believes its proposal to
remove the Trading Permit fee credit for
Members that connect via both the MEO
Interface and FIX Interface is
reasonable, equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because all market
participants will no longer be offered
the ability to receive the credit and
access to the Exchange is offered on
terms that are not unfairly
discriminatory. The Exchange believes
it is equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory to remove the Trading
Permit fee credit for business and
competitive reasons. The Exchange
established the Trading Permit fee credit
to lower the costs for Members that
connect via the MEO Interface and/or
FIX Interface as a means to attract order
109 The Exchange does not charge a separate fee
to Market Makers for options assignments.
110 See the Exchange’s Fee Schedule available at
https://www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/
fee_schedule-files/MIAX_Pearl_Options_Fee_
Schedule_07122022.pdf.
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flow and memberships after the
Exchange first launched operations. The
Exchange now believes that it is
appropriate to remove this credit in
light of the current operating conditions
and membership on the Exchange.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
In accordance with Section 6(b)(8) of
the Act, 111 the Exchange believes that
the proposed rule change would not
impose any burden on intermarket or
intramarket competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act.
Intra-Market Competition
The Exchange believes the removal of
the Monthly Volume Credit and Trading
Permit fee credit will not place certain
market participants at a relative
disadvantage to other market
participants because, in order to attract
order flow when the Exchange first
launched operations, the Exchange
established these credits to lower the
initial fixed cost for Members. The
Exchange now believes that it is
appropriate to remove this credit in
light of the current operating conditions,
including the Exchange’s overall
membership and the current type and
amount of volume executed on the
Exchange. The Exchange believes that
the Exchange’s rebates and fees will still
allow the Exchange to remain highly
competitive such that the Exchange
should continue to attract order flow
and maintain market share.
As described above, the Exchange’s
proposed Trading Permit fees are lower
than or similar to the cost of
membership and trading permits on
other exchanges,112 and therefore, may
stimulate intramarket competition by
attracting additional firms to become
Members on the Exchange or at least
should not deter interested participants
from joining the Exchange. In addition,
membership and trading permit fees are
subject to competition from other
exchanges. Accordingly, if the changes
proposed herein are unattractive to
market participants, it is likely the
Exchange will see a decline in
membership as a result. As stated above,
the number of FIX and MEO Interface
users remained stagnant until August
2021, where one Member that utilized
the MEO Interface ceased utilizing that
interface and again in December 2021,
where one Member that utilized the FIX
Interface ceased utilizing that interface.
The Exchange also does not believe
charging different fees for MEO and FIX
111 15
U.S.C. 78f(8).
supra notes 38–46.
112 See
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Interface users and basing the amount of
such fees on trading volume would
impose any burden on intermarket or
intramarket competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act. As discussed
above, the FIX Interface is the uniform
industry message protocol used by most
exchanges and provides lower
throughput and bandwidth than the
MEO Interface. Users are free to use
either interface based on their business
need and the pricing structure is aligned
with the interface used, its pull on
Exchange resources, and the Member’s
monthly trading volume. The tiered
pricing structure is based on the type of
interface and trading volume in place on
the Exchange today and the Exchange
does not propose to amend the volume
requirements associated with each Tier.
Rather, it is simply seeking to amend
the associated fees. Basing such fees on
trading volume would may also
stimulate intramarket competition
because it is analogous to other
exchanges that base like fees on options
classes traded or assigned. A Member
may cease being a Member if they
believe the tiered structure is not
appropriate or that another exchange
presents a better value. Likewise, a
market participant that is not already a
Member may cease membership on
another exchange or become a Member
of MIAX Pearl where they deem the
Exchange’s Trading Permit fee to be a
better value based on its trading activity
and business needs.
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Inter-Market Competition
The Exchange operates in a highly
competitive market in which market
participants can readily favor one of the
15 competing options venues if they
deem fee levels at a particular venue to
be excessive. Based on publiclyavailable information, and excluding
index-based options, no single exchange
has more than approximately 16%
market share. Therefore, no exchange
possesses significant pricing power
regarding memberships or in the
execution of multiply-listed equity and
ETF options order flow. Over the course
of 2021 and 2022, the Exchange’s
market share has fluctuated between
approximately 3–6% of the U.S. equity
options industry.113 The Exchange is
not aware of any evidence that a market
share of approximately 3–6% provides
the Exchange with anti-competitive
pricing power when it comes to
competition for memberships. The
Exchange believes that the ever-shifting
market share among exchanges from
113 See
supra note 8.
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month to month demonstrates that
market participants can discontinue
memberships in response to fee
changes. In such an environment, the
Exchange must continually adjust its
fees to remain competitive with other
exchanges and to attract and retain
memberships on the Exchange.
Electronic Comments
The proposed fee change will not
impact intermarket competition because
it will apply to all Members equally.
Also, Members are free to use either the
FIX or MEO Interface and may choose
the interface that better meets their
business needs based on their trading
models and behavior. The Exchange
operates in a highly competitive market
in which market participants can
determine whether or not to join the
Exchange based on the value received
compared to the cost of joining and
maintaining membership on the
Exchange.
Paper Comments
C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange responded to comment
letters in a prior proposal.114
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act,115 and Rule
19b–4(f)(2) 116 thereunder. At any time
within 60 days of the filing of the
proposed rule change, the Commission
summarily may temporarily suspend
such rule change if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall
institute proceedings to determine
whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
48715
• Use the Commission’s internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
PEARL–2022–30 on the subject line.
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–PEARL–2022–30. This file
number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
internet website (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change.
Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from
comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish
to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR–PEARL–2022–30 and
should be submitted on or before
August 31, 2022.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.117
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022–17096 Filed 8–9–22; 8:45 am]
114 See
supra note 55.
115 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
116 17 CFR 240.19b–4(f)(2).
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BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
117 17
E:\FR\FM\10AUN1.SGM
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 153 (Wednesday, August 10, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48702-48715]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-17096]
=======================================================================
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-95419; File No. SR-PEARL-2022-30]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; MIAX PEARL, LLC; Notice of Filing
and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend the MIAX
PEARL Options Fee Schedule To Remove Certain Credits and Increase
Trading Permit Fees
August 4, 2022.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on July 26, 2022, MIAX PEARL, LLC (``MIAX Pearl'' or ``Exchange'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') a
proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III, below, which
Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing
this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from
interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange is filing a proposal to amend the MIAX Pearl Options
Fee Schedule (the ``Fee Schedule'') to amend its monthly Trading Permit
\3\ fees for Members \4\ and no longer provide two monthly credits
associated with Trading Permit and non-transaction fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The term ``Trading Permit'' means a permit issued by the
Exchange that confers the ability to transact on the Exchange. See
Exchange Rule 100.
\4\ The term ``Member'' means an individual or organization that
is registered with the Exchange pursuant to Chapter II of Exchange
Rules for purposes of trading on the Exchange as an ``Electronic
Exchange Member'' or ``Market Maker.'' Members are deemed
``members'' under the Exchange Act. See Exchange Rule 100 and the
Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's
website at https://www.miaxoptions.com/rule-filings/pearl at MIAX
Pearl's principal office, and at the Commission's Public Reference
Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange commenced operations in February 2017 \5\ and adopted
its initial fee schedule that waived fees for Trading Permits to trade
on the Exchange.\6\ Although the fee was waived, an initial fee
structure was put in place in communicate our intent to charge a fee in
the future. As a new exchange entrant, the Exchange chose to offer
Trading Permits free of charge to encourage market participants to
trade on the Exchange and experience, among things, the quality of the
Exchange's technology and trading functionality. This practice is not
uncommon. Newly-opened exchanges often do not charge fees or charge
lower fees for certain services such as memberships to attract order
flow to an exchange, and later amend their fees to reflect the true
value of those services, absorbing all costs to provide those services
in the meantime. Allowing new exchange entrants time to build and
sustain market share through various pricing incentives before
increasing non-transaction fees encourages market entry and promotes
competition. It also enables these new exchanges to mature their
markets and allow market participants to trade on the new exchanges
without fees serving as a potential barrier to attracting memberships
and order flow.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See MIAX PEARL Successfully Launches Trading Operations,
dated February 6, 2017, available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/alert-files/MIAX_Press_Release_02062017.pdf.
\6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80061 (February 17,
2017), 82 FR 11676 (February 24, 2017) (SR-PEARL-2017-10).
\7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94894 (May 11,
2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR-BOX-2022-17) (stating, ``[t]he
Exchange established this lower (when compared to other options
exchanges in the industry) Participant Fee in order to encourage
market participants to become Participants of BOX. . .''). See also
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90076 (October 2, 2020), 85 FR
63620 (October 8, 2020) (SR-MEMX-2020-10) (``MEMX Membership Fee
Proposal'') (proposing to adopt the initial fee schedule and stating
that ``[u]nder the initial proposed Fee Schedule, the Exchange
proposes to make clear that it does not charge any fees for
membership, market data products, physical connectivity or
application sessions.''). MEMX has seen its market share increase
and recently proposed to adopt a membership fee and fees for
connectivity. See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 93927
(January 7, 2022), 87 FR 2191 (January 13, 2022) (SR-MEMX-2021-19)
(proposing to adopt membership fees); and 95299 (July 15, 2022), 87
FR 43563 (July 21, 2022) (SR-MEMX-2022-17) (proposing to adopt fees
for connectivity). See also, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 88211 (February 14, 2020), 85 FR 9847 (February 20, 2020) (SR-
NYSENAT-2020-05), available at https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse-national/rulefilings/filings/2020/SR-NYSENat-2020-05.pdf (initiating market data fees for the NYSE National exchange
after initially setting such fees at zero).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 48703]]
Later in 2018, as the Exchange's market share increased,\8\ it
adopted a nominal fee for Trading Permits along with a tiered-volume
based fee credit, known as the Trading Permit Fee Credit, and a Monthly
Volume Credit.\9\ The Exchange has not amended its Trading Permit fees
since the fees were first adopted in 2018. The Exchange established the
Trading Permit Fee Credit to continue to attract order flow and
increase membership by lowering the costs for Members that connect via
the MEO Interface \10\ and FIX Interface.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The Exchange experienced a monthly average trading volume of
3.94% for the month of March 2018. See Market at a Glance, available
at www.miaxoptions.com (last visited (June 22, 2022).
\9\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82867 (March 13,
2018), 83 FR 12044 (March 19, 2018) (SR-PEARL-2018-07).
\10\ ``MEO Interface'' or ``MEO'' means a binary order interface
for certain order types as set forth in Rule 516 into the MIAX Pearl
System. See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule and Exchange
Rule 100.
\11\ ``FIX Interface'' means the Financial Information Exchange
interface for certain order types as set forth in Exchange Rule 516.
See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule and Exchange Rule
100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lower Trading Permit Fees, Trading Permit Fee Credit and
Monthly Volume Credit have served their purpose of incentivizing market
participants to trade on the Exchange as the Exchange's market share
continues to grow and increase since the fee and credits were
established.\12\ Therefore, the Exchange now proposes to amend the
monthly Trading Permit fees for Members and to no longer provide two
monthly credits associated with Trading Permit and non-transaction
fees. The proposed changes are designed to update the Exchange's
Trading Permit fees to reflect their current value based on the
Exchange's market share and ability to deliver value to its customers
through improved liquidity, enhanced functionality, and resilient
trading technology, rather than their value when MIAX Pearl was a new
options exchange entrant seeking to establish itself in a highly
competitive space over five years ago. The Exchange reviewed similar
fees charged by other options exchanges when considering the proposed
fee levels as well as the impact on current Members and whether the
proposed fee levels would continue to enable the Exchange to attract
new Members and retain existing Members. The Exchange notes that it
also socialized the proposed fee increases with current Members prior
to first implementing the changes. During this process, the Exchange
decided on price levels that it believes would aid and improve its
competitive footing and some Members informed the Exchange that they
anticipated a potential increase due to the lower rates the Exchange
historically charged and the resiliency and performance of its trading
platform. Each of these changes are described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The Exchange experienced a monthly average trading volume
of 4.92% for the month of June 2022. See Market at a Glance, supra
note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
A Trading Permit confers the right to transact on the Exchange \13\
and are available to all Members. The Exchange notes that requiring a
Trading Permit to trade on the Exchange and charging a monthly fee for
such is comparable to other monthly membership requirements and
associated fees charged by other exchanges and is described further
below. Trading Permits, like membership fees, grant access and allow
Members to be active on the Exchange, thus providing the ability to
submit orders and trade on the Exchange, in the manner consistent with
the membership type. Without a Trading Permit, or ``membership'' as
referred to by other exchanges, a Member cannot directly trade on the
Exchange. Therefore, a Trading Permit is a means to directly access the
Exchange, which offers meaningful value. The Exchange has not amended
its Trading Permit fees since the fees were first adopted in 2018.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Exchange Rule 200(a).
\14\ See supra note 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Removal of Monthly Trading Permit Fee Credits
Monthly Volume Credit
The Exchange proposes to amend the Definitions section of the Fee
Schedule to delete the definition and remove the credits applicable to
the Monthly Volume Credit for Members. The Exchange established the
Monthly Volume Credit in 2018 \15\ to encourage Members to send
increased Priority Customer \16\ order flow to the Exchange, which the
Exchange applied as a metric to the assessment of non-transaction fees
for that Member. Prior to and during periods when this proposal was not
in effect, the Exchange applied a different Monthly Volume Credit
depending on whether the Member connects to the Exchange via the FIX or
MEO Interface. Prior to and during periods when this proposal was not
in effect, the Exchange assessed the Monthly Volume Credit to each
Member that has executed Priority Customer volume along with that of
its affiliates,\17\ not including Excluded Contracts,\18\ of at least
0.30% of MIAX Pearl-listed Total Consolidated Volume (``TCV''),\19\ as
set forth in the following table:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Market at a Glance, supra note 8.
\16\ The term ``Priority Customer'' means a person or entity
that (i) is not a broker or dealer in securities, and (ii) does not
place more than 390 orders in listed options per day on average
during a calendar month for its own beneficial accounts(s). The
number of orders shall be counted in accordance with Interpretation
and Policy .01 of Exchange Rule 100. See the Definitions Section of
the Fee Schedule and Exchange Rule 100, including Interpretation and
Policy .01.
\17\ ``Affiliate'' means (i) an affiliate of a Member of at
least 75% common ownership between the firms as reflected on each
firm's Form BD, Schedule A, or (ii) the Appointed Market Maker of an
Appointed EEM (or, conversely, the Appointed EEM of an Appointed
Market Maker). An ``Appointed Market Maker'' is a MIAX Pearl Market
Maker (who does not otherwise have a corporate affiliation based
upon common ownership with an EEM) that has been appointed by an EEM
and an ``Appointed EEM'' is an EEM (who does not otherwise have a
corporate affiliation based upon common ownership with a MIAX Pearl
Market Maker) that has been appointed by a MIAX Pearl Market Maker,
pursuant to the following process. A MIAX Pearl Market Maker
appoints an EEM and an EEM appoints a MIAX Pearl Market Maker, for
the purposes of the Fee Schedule, by each completing and sending an
executed Volume Aggregation Request Form by email to
[email protected] no later than 2 business days prior to
the first business day of the month in which the designation is to
become effective. Transmittal of a validly completed and executed
form to the Exchange along with the Exchange's acknowledgement of
the effective designation to each of the Market Maker and EEM will
be viewed as acceptance of the appointment. The Exchange will only
recognize one designation per Member. A Member may make a
designation not more than once every 12 months (from the date of its
most recent designation), which designation shall remain in effect
unless or until the Exchange receives written notice submitted 2
business days prior to the first business day of the month from
either Member indicating that the appointment has been terminated.
Designations will become operative on the first business day of the
effective month and may not be terminated prior to the end of the
month. Execution data and reports will be provided to both parties.
See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule.
\18\ ``Excluded Contracts'' means any contracts routed to an
away market for execution. See the Definitions Section of the Fee
Schedule.
\19\ ``TCV'' means total consolidated volume calculated as the
total national volume in those classes listed on MIAX Pearl for the
month for which the fees apply, excluding consolidated volume
executed during the period of time in which the Exchange experiences
an Exchange System Disruption (solely in the option classes of the
affected Matching Engine). See the Definitions Section of the Fee
Schedule.
[[Page 48704]]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly
Type of member connection volume
credit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Member that connects via the FIX Interface................... $250
Member that connects via the MEO Interface................... 1,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
If a Member connects via both the MEO Interface and FIX Interface
and qualifies for the Monthly Volume Credit based upon its Priority
Customer volume, the greater Monthly Volume Credit shall apply to such
Member. Prior to and during periods when this proposal was not in
effect, the Monthly Volume Credit was a single, once-per-month credit
towards the aggregate monthly total of non-transaction fees assessable
to a Member.
The Exchange proposes an amendment to the Definitions section of
the Fee Schedule to delete the definition and remove the Monthly Volume
Credit. The Exchange established the Monthly Volume Credit when it
first launched operations to encourage members to increase their order
flow by providing a credit to those that exceeded a volume threshold.
The Exchange believes that the Exchange's existing Priority Customer
rebates and fees will continue to allow the Exchange to remain highly
competitive and continue to attract order flow and maintain market
share even without the Monthly Volume Credit.
Trading Permit Fee Credit
The Exchange proposes to amend Section (3)(b) of the Fee Schedule
to remove the Trading Permit fee credit that is denoted in footnote
``*'' below the Trading Permit fee table. Prior to and during periods
when this proposal was not in effect, the Trading Permit fee credit was
applicable to Members that connected via both the MEO and FIX
Interfaces. Members who connect via both the MEO and FIX Interfaces are
assessed the rates for both types of Trading Permits, but these Members
received a $100 monthly credit towards the Trading Permit fees
applicable to the MEO Interface prior to and during periods when this
proposal was not in effect. The Exchange proposes to remove the Trading
Permit fee credit and delete footnote ``*'' from Section (3)(b) of the
Fee Schedule.
The Exchange established the Trading Permit fee credit when it
first launched operations to attract order flow and increase membership
by lowering the costs for Members that connect via the MEO Interface
and FIX Interface. The Trading Permit fee credit has achieved its
purpose and the Exchange now believes that it is appropriate to remove
this credit in light of the current operating conditions and membership
population on the Exchange.
Amendments to Monthly Trading Permit Fees
The Exchange proposes to amend the Fee Schedule to amend the fees
for Trading Permits. As a self-regulatory organization, the Exchange's
membership department reviews applicants to ensure that each
application complies with Exchange Rule 200 as well as other
requirements for membership.\20\ Applicants must meet the Exchange's
qualification criteria prior to approval. The new member review
includes, but is not limited to, the registration and qualification of
associated persons, financial health of the proposed member, the
validity of the required clearing relationship, and the history of
disciplinary matters. Approved new Members are required to comply with
Exchange's By-Laws and Rules and are subject to regulation by the
Exchange. The Exchange also has ongoing regulatory responsibilities
over its Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The Exchange's Membership Department must ensure, among
other things, that an applicant is not statutorily disqualified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes that there are many factors that may cause a
market participant to decide to become a member of a particular
exchange. Among various factors, the Exchange believes market
participants consider: (i) an exchange's available liquidity in options
series; (ii) trading functionality, latency, reliability, throughout,
access to liquidity, and determinism offered on a particular market;
(iii) product offerings; (iv) customer service on an exchange; and (v)
transactional pricing. The Exchange believes that the decision to
become a member of an exchange, particularly as a registered market
maker, is a complex one that is not solely based on non-transactional
costs assessed by an exchange. Market participants weigh the tradeoff
between where they choose to deploy liquidity versus where trading
opportunities exist. Of course, the cost of membership may factor into
a decision to become a member of a certain exchange, but the Exchange
believes it is by no means the only factor when comparing exchanges.
The Exchange assesses Trading Permit fees based upon the monthly
total volume executed by the Member and its Affiliates on the Exchange
across all origin types, not including Excluded Contracts, as compared
to the total TCV in all MIAX Pearl-listed options. The Exchange adopted
a tier-based fee structure based upon the volume-based tiers detailed
in the definition of ``Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers'' \21\
in the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule. The Exchange also
assesses Trading Permit fees based upon the type of interface used by
the Member to connect to the Exchange--the FIX Interface and/or the MEO
Interface.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule for the
monthly volume thresholds associated with each Tier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange has two types of Members, Electronic Exchange Members
\22\ (``EEMs'') and Market Makers.\23\ The Exchange currently charges
monthly fees for Trading Permits pursuant to Exchange Rule 200(f),
which varies based on the interface used by the Member and the Member's
monthly trading volumes. The Exchange provides two interfaces to access
the MIAX Pearl System,\24\ the FIX Interface and MEO Interface, and all
Members are able to use either interface based on their business models
and needs. The FIX Interface is the industry-wide uniform message
format and provides lower bandwidth, less capacity, and fewer Exchange
resources. EEMs, who are primarily order flow providers, are the only
users of the FIX Interface.\25\ No Market Maker uses the FIX Interface.
Meanwhile, the MEO Interface is the more robust interface offering
lower latency and higher throughput. Market Makers only use the MEO
Interface.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The term ``Electronic Exchange Member'' or ``EEM'' means
the holder of a Trading Permit who is a Member representing as agent
Public Customer Orders or Non-Customer Orders on the Exchange and
those non-Market Maker Members conducting proprietary trading.
Electronic Exchange Members are deemed ``members'' under the
Exchange Act. See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule and
Exchange Rule 100.
\23\ The term ``Market Maker'' or ``MM'' means a Member
registered with the Exchange for the purpose of making markets in
options contracts traded on the Exchange and that is vested with the
rights and responsibilities specified in Chapter VI of the Exchange
Rules. See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule and Exchange
Rule 100.
\24\ The term ``System'' means the automated trading system used
by the Exchange for the trading of securities. See Exchange Rule
100.
\25\ The Exchange does not propose to amend the fees for EEM
Clearing Firms, which is set at $250 per month and not based on the
amount of volume conducted on the Exchange. The term ``EEM Clearing
Firm'' means an EEM that solely clears transactions on the Exchange
and does not connect to the Exchange via either the FIX Interface or
MEO Interface. See the Definitions Section of the Fee Schedule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, seven (7) Members that are registered solely as EEMs elect
to utilize the MEO Interface. Based on their own business decisions and
needs, some EEMs may elect to utilize the MEO Interface today due to
its lower latency
[[Page 48705]]
and higher throughput. Also, six (6) Members are registered as both an
EEM and Market Maker. These Members may choose to utilize only the MEO
Interface for acting as either EEM or Market Maker, not only based on
their own business needs, but also as a means to streamline and
simplify their architecture between them and the Exchange. Each of
these Members are able to utilize the FIX Interface for their EEM
activities and avail themselves to the lower rates if they believe the
FIX Interface is aligned with their business needs.
Market Makers only use the MEO Interface because it provides
functionality that is designed to assist Market Makers in satisfying
their market making obligations. The Exchange offers three time-in-
force modifiers: \26\ Day Limit (``Day''), Immediate-Or-Cancel
(``IOC''), and Good `Til Cancelled (``GTC'').\27\ While all order types
are available for use on either interface, only the time-in-force
modifiers of IOC and Day are available on the MEO Interface.\28\ Market
Makers utilize the time-in-force of Day on orders to be posted on the
MIAX Pearl Options Book \29\ and to meet Market Makers' continuous
quoting obligations under Exchange Rule 605(d).\30\ Other Market Makers
that primarily remove liquidity tend to be more latency sensitive and
utilize the time-in-force of IOC on orders when looking to remove
liquidity from the MIAX Pearl Options Book. The MEO Interface allows
the submission of Cancel-Replacement orders,\31\ which allow for the
immediate cancellation of a previously received order and the
replacement of that order with a new order with new terms and
conditions.\32\ Cancel-Replacement orders are primarily used by Market
Makers as part of their continuous quoting obligations. Market Makers
only use the MEO Interface due to its lower latency, higher throughput,
available time-in-force instructions and order types that assist them
in satisfying their market making obligations. Market Makers do not use
the FIX Interface due to the unavailability of the above functionality.
While EEMs primarily use the FIX Interface, certain EEMs chose to use
the MEO interface due to its enhanced functionality and based on their
own business models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See MIAX Pearl Options Exchange User Manual, Section 6,
Order Types, available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/exchange-functionality/pearl (last visited June 30, 2022).
\27\ See, e.g., Exchange Rule 516.
\28\ See preamble to Exchange Rule 516 (noting that not all
order types and modifiers are available for use on each of the MEO
Interface and the FIX Interface). See also Section 4.1.1.2 of the
MEO Interface Specification, available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/page-files/MIAX_Express_Orders_MEO_v2.0.pdf (indicating that the time-in-force
instructions of IOC and Day are available on the MEO interface).
\29\ The term ``Book'' means the electronic book of buy and sell
orders and quotes maintained by the System. See Exchange Rule 100.
\30\ Only the time-in-force modifiers of IOC and Day are
available on the MEO Interface. See Exchange Rule 516 (noting that
not all order types and modifiers are available for use on each of
the MEO Interface and the FIX Interface). See also MIAX Pearl
Options Exchange MEO Interface Specification, Section 4.1.1.2,
available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/page-files/MIAX_Express_Orders_MEO_v2.0.pdf (indicating that the time-in-
force instructions of IOC and Day are available on the MEO
interface).
\31\ See MIAX Pearl Options Exchange User Manual, Section 6,
Interfaces and Liquidity Types, available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/exchange-functionality/pearl (last visited May
16, 2022).
\32\ See Exchange Rule 516(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Trading Permit Fees. Prior to and during periods when this
proposal was not in effect, each Member who connected to the System via
the FIX Interface was assessed the following monthly Trading Permit
fees:
(i) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 1 of the Non-
Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, or volume up to 0.30%, $250;
(ii) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 2 of the
Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, or volume above 0.30% up to
0.60%, $350; and
(iii) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 3 of the
Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, or volume above 0.60%, $450.
Each Member who connected to the System via the MEO Interface was
assessed the following monthly Trading Permit fees:
(i) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 1 of the Non-
Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, or volume up to 0.30%, $300;
(ii) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 2 of the
Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, or volume above 0.30% up to
0.60%, $400; and
(iii) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 3 of the
Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, or volume above 0.60%, $500.
Proposed Trading Permit Fees. The pull on Exchange resources
associated with providing ongoing Member support, onboarding/off
boarding technology requests, monitoring, reporting, and the
surveillance and retention of increased message traffic due to
increased trading volumes continue to increase since Trading Permit
fees were first adopted in 2018.\33\ The Exchange proposes to amend its
Trading Permit fees as follows. Each Member who connects to the System
via the FIX Interface will be assessed the following monthly Trading
Permit fees:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See supra note 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 1 of the Non-
Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, $500;
(ii) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 2 of the
Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, $1,000; and
(iii) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 3 of the
Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, $1,500.
Each Member who connects to the System via the MEO Interface will
be assessed the following monthly Trading Permit fees:
(i) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 1 of the Non-
Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, $2,500;
(ii) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 2 of the
Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, $4,000; and
(iii) if its volume falls within the parameters of Tier 3 of the
Non-Transaction Fees Volume-Based Tiers, $6,000.
As discussed above, both the MEO Interface and FIX Interface are
available to all Members and each Member may choose which interface to
utilize based on their own business needs. The MEO Interface is
primarily used by Market Makers due to its robustness, lower latency,
and higher throughput \34\ and, as discussed below, utilizes greater
Exchange resources due to the increased volume of message traffic that
travels through the MEO interface. Trading Permit fees for Members who
connect through the MEO Interface are, therefore, higher than the
Trading Permit fees for Members who connect through the FIX Interface.
The FIX Interface provides lower capacity and bandwidth and, therefore,
utilizes less Exchange resources. The FIX Interface is primarily used
by order flow providers who tend to be less latency sensitive and
submit less orders and messages than Market Makers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Certain EEMs also choose to use the MEO interface due to
its enhanced functionality and based on their own business models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange has not amended its Trading Permit fees since the fees
were first adopted in 2018.\35\ The Exchange notes that its affiliates,
Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC (``MIAX'') and MIAX
Emerald, LLC (``MIAX Emerald''), charge EEMs a similar, fixed flat
trading permit fee of
[[Page 48706]]
$1,500,\36\ which equals the top tier proposed herein for users of the
FIX Interface and also entirely consists of EEMs. MIAX and MIAX Emerald
also charge tiered trading permit fees to Market Makers as the Exchange
proposes herein for users of the MEO Interface, which also primarily
consists of Market Makers. However, the Exchange's proposed fees for
users of the MEO Interface range from $2,500 to $6,000 while the fees
on MIAX and MIAX Emerald range from $7,000 to $22,000. The Exchange
also proposes to base its pricing on trading volume while MIAX and MIAX
Emerald base their trading permit fees on number of options classes
assigned to the Market Maker or the percentage of volume in option
classes.\37\ This is due to the difference in options assignments
between the Exchange, and MIAX and MIAX Emerald. On MIAX and MIAX
Emerald, Market Makers are assigned by options class, and are required
to quote nearly all options in the class. On the Exchange, Market
Makers are assigned by series, not class, and, therefore, trading
volume is the more equitable and metric by which to gauge their use of
the Exchange systems and related Trading Permit Fee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Id.
\36\ See the MIAX Fee Schedule, Section 3)b) and MIAX Emerald
Fee Schedule, Section 3)b), available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/fees (last visited June 30, 2022).
\37\ Both MIAX and MIAX Emerald charge Market Makers a monthly
fee of $7,000 for up to 10 classes or up to 20% of classes assigned
by volume, $12,000 for up to 40 classes or up to 35% of classes
assigned by volume, $17,000 for up to 100 classes or up to 50% of
classes assigned by volume, or $22,000 for over 100 classes or over
50% of classes assigned by volume up to all classes listed on MIAX
or MIAX Emerald, as applicable. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As illustrated by the table below, the Exchange notes that the
proposed fees for the Exchange's Trading Permits are in line with, or
cheaper than, the similar trading permit and membership fees charged by
other options exchanges. The below table also illustrates how the
Exchange has historically undercharged for membership via Trading
Permits as compared to other options exchanges. The Exchange believes
other exchanges' membership and trading permit fees are useful examples
of alternative approaches to providing and charging for membership and
provides the below table for comparison purposes only to show how the
Exchange's proposed fees compare to fees currently charged by other
options exchanges for similar membership.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly membership/trading permit
Exchange fee
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Pearl Options (as proposed).. Trading Permit access via FIX
Interface:
Tier 1: $500.
Tier 2: $1,000.
Tier 3: $1,500.
Trading Permit access via MEO
Interface:
Tier 1: $2,500.
Tier 2: $4,000.
Tier 3: $6,000.
BOX Options Exchange LLC (``BOX'') Participant Fee: $1,500.
\38\.
Electronic Market Maker Trading
Permit Fees:
Tier 1 (up to and including 10
classes): $4,000.
Tier 2 (up to and including 40
classes): $6,000.
Tier 3 (up to and including 100
classes): $8,000.
Tier 1 (over 100 classes): $10,000.
NYSE Arca, Inc. (``NYSE Arca'') Options Trading Permits:
\39\.
Office and Clearing Firms: $1,000.
Market Makers: 1st OTP--$8,000 for
up to 60 plus the bottom 45% of
option issues.
2nd OTP--Additional $6,000 for up to
150 plus the bottom 45% of option
issues.
3rd OTP--Additional $5,000 for up to
500 plus the bottom 45% of option
issues.
4th OTP--Additional $4,000 for up to
1,100 plus the bottom 45% of option
issues.
5th OTP--Additional $3,000 for all
option issues.
6th-9th OTP--Additional $2,000.
10th or more OTPs--$500 for all
options issues.
NYSE American, LLC (``NYSE ATP Trading Permits:
American'') \40\.
Clearing Member: $1,000.
Order Flow Provider: $1,000.
Market Makers: $8,000 for up to 60
plus the bottom 45% of option
issues.
Additional $6,000 for up to 150 plus
the bottom 45% of option issues.
Additional $5,000 for up to 500 plus
the bottom 45% of option issues.
Additional $4,000 for up to 1,100
plus the bottom 45% of option
issues.
Additional $3,000 for all option
issues.
Additional $2,000 for 6th to 9th
ATPs (plus additional fee for
premium products).
Nasdaq PHLX LLC (``Nasdaq PHLX'') Streaming Quote Trader (``SQT'')
\41\. permit fees:
Tier 1 (up to 200 option classes):
$0.00.
Tier 2 (up to 400 option classes):
$2,200.
Tier 3 (up to 600 option classes):
$3,200.
Tier 4 (up to 800 option classes):
$4,200.
Tier 5 (up to 1,000 option classes):
$5,200.
Tier 6 (up to 1,200 option classes):
$6,200.
Tier 7 (all option classes): $7,200.
Remote Market Maker Organization
(``RMMO'') permit fees:
Tier 1 (less than 100 option
classes): $5,000.
Tier 2 (more than 100 and less than
999 option classes): $8,000.
Tier 3 (1,000 or more option
classes): $11,000.
Nasdaq ISE LLC (``Nasdaq ISE'') Access Fees:
\42\.
[[Page 48707]]
Electronic Access Members
(``EAMs''): $500.
Primary Market Maker: $5,000 per
membership.
Competitive Market Maker: $2,500 per
membership.
Cboe Exchange, Inc. (``Cboe'') Electronic Trading Permit Fees:
\43\.
Market Maker: $5,000.
Electronic Access Permit: $3,000.
Clearing TPH Permit: $2,000.
Cboe C2 Exchange, Inc. (``Cboe Access Permit Fees for Market
C2'') \44\. Makers: $5,000.
Electronic Access Permits: $1,000.
Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (``Cboe $500 where member has an ADV < 5,000
BZX Optis'') \45\. contracts traded. \46\
$1,000 where member has an ADV >=
5,000 contracts traded.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementation and Procedural History
The proposed rule change will be immediately effective. The
Exchange initially filed this proposal on July 1, 2021, with the
proposed fees being immediately effective.\47\ Between August 2021 and
February 2022, the Exchange withdrew and refiled the proposed rule
change, each time to meaningfully attempt to provide additional
justification for the proposed fee changes, provide enhanced details
regarding the Exchange's cost methodology, and address questions
contained in the Commission's suspension orders.\48\ The Commission
received one comment letter on the filings.\49\ The Commission again
suspended the proposed fees on February 18, 2022.\50\ The Commission
received one comment letter on that filing.\51\ The Exchange then
provided Trading Permits at the lower rates for the month of March 2022
and absorbed all associated costs with the lower rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ See BOX fee schedule, Section 1, available at https://boxexchange.com/assets/BOX-Fee-Schedule-as-of-June-1-2022-1.pdf
(last visited June 29, 2022). BOX's Participant Fee is the analog to
the Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members who use the FIX
interface. BOX's Electronic Market Maker Trading Permit fee is the
analog for the Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members who use the
MEO interface. BOX had an average daily market share of 6.26% as of
June 30, 2022. See Market at a Glance, supra note 8.
\39\ See NYSE Arca Options Fees and Charges, OTP Trading
Participant Rights, p.1, available at https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/arca-options/NYSE_Arca_Options_Fee_Schedule.pdf (last visited July 12, 2022).
NYSE Arca recently increased this Options Trading Permit Fees
approximately 45%. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 95142
(June 23, 2022), 87 FR 38786 (June 29, 2022) (SR-NYSEArca-2022-36).
Under the new fee structure, it effectively costs a Market Maker
$26,000 per month to trade all options issues on NYSE Arca. NYSE
Arca's Options Trading Permit fee is the analog to the Exchange's
Trading Permit fee for Members who use the FIX interface. NYSE
Arca's Options Trading Permit fee for Market Makers is the analog
for the Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members who use the MEO
interface.
\40\ See NYSE American Options Fee Schedule, Section III,
Monthly Trading Permit, Rights, Floor Access and Premium Product
Fees, p. 23-24, available at https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/american-options/NYSE_American_Options_Fee_Schedule.pdf
(last visited May 16, 2022). Under this fee structure, it
effectively costs a Market Maker $26,000 per month to trade all
options issues on NYSE American. NYSE American's ATP Trading Permit
fee for Clearing Members and Order Flow Providers is the analog for
the Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members that use the FIX
interface. NYSE American's ATP Trading Permit fee for Market Makers
is the analog for the Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members that
use the MEO interface.
\41\ See Nasdaq PHLX Options 7 Pricing Schedule, Section 8.
Membership Fees, available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/phlx/rules/Phlx%20Options%207 (last visited May 16, 2022).
Nasdaq PHLX Options' SQT and RMMO fees is the analog to the
Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members that use the MEO
Interface.
\42\ See Nasdaq ISE Options 7 Pricing Schedule, Section 8.A.
Access Services, available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/ise/rules/ISE%20Options%207 (last visited May 16, 2022).
Nasdaq ISE Options' EAM Access Fee is the analog to the Exchange's
Trading Permit fee for Members that use the FIX Interface. Nasdaq
ISE Options' Primary and Competitive Market Maker Access Fees are
the analog to the Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members that use
the MEO Interface.
\43\ See Cboe Fee Schedule, Electronic Trading Permit Fees,
available at https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/membership/Cboe_FeeSchedule.pdf (last visited June 30, 2022). Cboe's Electronic
Access Permit fee and Clearing TPH fee are the analog to the
Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members that use the FIX
Interface. Cboe's Market Maker Permit fee is the analog to the
Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members that use the MEO
Interface.
\44\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Access Fees, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/ (last visited
June 30, 2022). C2's Market Maker Access Permit fee is the analog to
the Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members that use the MEO
Interface. C2's Electronic Access Permit fee is the analog to the
Exchange's Trading Permit fee for Members that use the FIX
Interface.
\45\ See ``Membership Fees'' section of the Cboe BZX Options Fee
Schedule, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/bzx (last visited June 30, 2022). The Exchange
understands Cboe BZX Options charges the same Membership Fee to all
of its Options Members.
\46\ Under the Exchange's tiered structure, a Member may trade
approximately 106,000 more contracts on the Exchange than on Cboe
BZX Options and continue to qualify for the Exchange's lowest tier.
For example, a Member would qualify for Tier 1 of the Exchange's
tiered pricing structure where that Member's total volume as a
percentage of TCV is between 0.00% and 0.30%. Assuming an average of
37 million contracts are traded each day during a month, that Member
would qualify for Tier 1 where that Member traded less than 111,000
contracts that day and be charged $500, the same fee as Cboe BZX
Options, where that Member connects via the FIX Interface. On Cboe
BZX Options, the Exchange understands that same member would no
longer qualify for their lowest tier when their ADV equals or
exceeds 5,000 contracts and be charged a fee of $1,000 for that
month.
\47\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92366 (July 9,
2021), 86 FR 37379 (SR-PEARL-2021-32).
\48\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 92797 (August 27,
2021), 86 FR 49399 (September 2, 2021) (SR-PEARL-2021-32)
(``Suspension Order 1''); 93555 (November 10, 2021), 86 FR 64254
(November 17, 2021) (SR-PEARL-2021-54); 93895 (January 4, 2022), 87
FR 1217 (January 10, 2022) (SR-PEARL-2021-59).
\49\ See Letter from Richard J. McDonald, Susquehanna
International Group, LLC (``SIG''), to Vanessa Countryman,
Secretary, Commission, dated September 28, 2021 (``SIG Letter 1'').
\50\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94287 (February 18,
2022), 87 FR 10837 (February 25, 2022) (SR-PEARL-2022-05)
(``Suspension Order 2'').
\51\ See Letter from Richard J. McDonald, SIG, to Vanessa
Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated March 15, 2022 (``SIG
Letter 2'').
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On March 30, 2022, the Exchange withdrew the proposed rule change
that was previously suspended by the Commission on February 18, 2022.
After providing Trading Permits at the lower rates for the month of
March 2022, on March 30, 2022, the Exchange submitted a revised
proposal for effectiveness beginning April 1, 2022.\52\ This revised
proposal argued that the proposed fees were constrained by competition
based on a similar filing for permit/membership fees by MEMX LLC
(``MEMX'').\53\ The Commission received one comment letter on that
filing.\54\ The Exchange withdrew this revised proposal and submitted a
further revised filing providing additional support for its competition
based
[[Page 48708]]
justification on May 17, 2022.\55\ In response to feedback from
Commission Staff, the Exchange then withdrew that revised proposal and
submitted a further revised proposal to provide additional support for
the proposed fee change and to enhance its competition based
justification on July 12, 2022.\56\ Again, in response to feedback from
Commission Staff, the Exchange withdrew that revised proposal and
submitted this further revised proposal to provide additional support
for the proposed fee change and to enhance its competition based
justification on July 26, 2022.
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\52\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94696 (April 12,
2022), 87 FR 22987 (April 18, 2022) (SR-PEARL-2022-09).
\53\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 93927 (January 7,
2022), 87 FR 2191 (January 13, 2022) (SR-MEMX-2021-19) (proposal to
adopt monthly membership fees).
\54\ See Letter from Brian Sopinsky, SIG, to Vanessa Countryman,
Secretary, Commission, dated May 9, 2022 (``SIG Letter 3'').
\55\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94993 (May 26,
2022), 87 FR 33518 (June 2, 2022) (SR-PEARL-2022-23).
\56\ See SR-PEARL-2022-28.
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2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that its proposal to amend its Fee Schedule
is consistent with Section 6(b) of the Act \57\ in general, and
furthers the objectives of Section 6(b)(4) of the Act \58\ in
particular, in that it is an equitable allocation of reasonable dues,
fees and other charges among its members and issuers and other persons
using its facilities. The Exchange also believes the proposal furthers
the objectives of Section 6(b)(5) of the Act in that it is designed to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to remove impediments
to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national
market system, and, in general to protect investors and the public
interest and is not designed to permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers and dealers.
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\57\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\58\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed changes to the Fee Schedule are reasonable in several
respects. As a threshold matter, the Exchange is subject to significant
competitive forces in the market for order flow, which constrains its
pricing determinations. The fact that the market for order flow is
competitive has long been recognized by the courts. In NetCoalition v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, the D.C. Circuit stated, ``[n]o one
disputes that competition for order flow is `fierce.' . . . As the SEC
explained, `[i]n the U.S. national market system, buyers and sellers of
securities, and the broker-dealers that act as their order-routing
agents, have a wide range of choices of where to route orders for
execution'; [and] `no exchange can afford to take its market share
percentages for granted' because `no exchange possesses a monopoly,
regulatory or otherwise, in the execution of order flow from broker
dealers' . . . .'' \59\
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\59\ See NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 539 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (December 2, 2008), 73 FR
74770, 74782-83 (December 9, 2008) (SR-NYSEArca-2006-21)).
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The Commission and the courts have repeatedly expressed their
preference for competition over regulatory intervention to determine
prices, products, and services in the securities markets. In Regulation
NMS, while adopting a series of steps to improve the current market
model, the Commission highlighted the importance of market forces in
determining prices and SRO revenues, and also recognized that current
regulation of the market system ``has been remarkably successful in
promoting market competition in its broader forms that are most
important to investors and listed companies.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9,
2005), 70 FR 37496, 37499 (June 29, 2005) (``Regulation NMS Adopting
Release'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress directed the Commission to ``rely `on competition,
whenever possible, in meeting its regulatory responsibilities for
overseeing the SROs and the national market system.' '' \61\ As a
result, the Commission has historically relied on competitive forces to
determine whether a fee proposal is equitable, fair, reasonable, and
not unreasonably or unfairly discriminatory. ``If competitive forces
are operative, the self-interest of the exchanges themselves will work
powerfully to constrain unreasonable or unfair behavior.'' \62\
Accordingly, ``the existence of significant competition provides a
substantial basis for finding that the terms of an exchange's fee
proposal are equitable, fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably or
unfairly discriminatory.'' \63\
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\61\ See NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 534-35; see also H.R. Rep.
No. 94-229 at 92 (1975) (``[I]t is the intent of the conferees that
the national market system evolve through the interplay of
competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed.'').
\62\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (December 2,
2008), 73 FR 74,770 (December 9, 2008) (SR-NYSEArca-2006-21).
\63\ Id.
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In its 2019 guidance on fee proposals, Commission staff indicated
that they would look at factors beyond the competitive environment,
such as cost, only if a ``proposal lacks persuasive evidence that the
proposed fee is constrained by significant competitive forces.'' \64\
The Commission staff further indicated in its 2019 guidance that an
exchange can demonstrate competitive forces exist by showing that
``substantially similar but not identical'' substitutable products or
services exist and that ``elasticity of demand'' may be evidence that
competitive forces exist.\65\
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\64\ See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, ``Staff
Guidance on SRO Rule filings Relating to Fees,'' (May 21, 2019),
available at https://www.sec.gov/tm/staff-guidance-sro-rule-filings-fees.
\65\ Id.
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The Exchange believes that there are many factors that may cause a
market participant to decide to become a member of a particular
exchange including: (i) an exchange's available liquidity in options
series; (ii) trading functionality offered on a particular market;
(iii) product offerings; (iv) customer service on an exchange; and (v)
transactional pricing. As discussed above, the Exchange believes that
the decision to become a member of an exchange, particularly as a
registered market maker, is a complex one that is not solely based on
non-transactional costs assessed by an exchange. Market participants
weigh the tradeoff between where they choose to deploy liquidity versus
where trading opportunities exist. Of course, the cost of membership,
ports and market data may factor into a decision to become a member of
a certain exchange, but the Exchange believes it is by no means the
only factor when comparing exchanges. In general, there are a number of
factors that market participants may consider when deciding to become a
member of the Exchange or any other options exchange.
Market Makers
Market makers play an important role on options exchanges as they
provide liquidity. In options markets, registered market makers are
assigned options series \66\ and are required to quote in those options
series for a specified time period during the day.\67\ Typically, a
lead or primary market maker \68\ will be required to quote for a
longer period of time during the day as compared to other market makers
registered on an exchange.\69\ Additionally, market makers are
typically required to quote within a certain width on options
markets.\70\ Greater liquidity on options
[[Page 48709]]
markets benefits all market participants by providing more trading
opportunities and attracting greater participation by market makers. An
increase in the activity of market makers in turn facilitates tighter
spreads. Market participants are attracted to options markets that have
ample liquidity and tighter spreads in options series.
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\66\ See Exchange Rule 602, Phlx, ISE, Nasdaq GEMX, Inc.
(``GEMX''), Nasdaq MRX, Inc. (``MRX''), Nasdaq BX, Inc. (``BX'') and
Nasdaq Options Market (``NOM'') Options 2, Section 3; Cboe Rule
5.50; BOX Exchange LLC (``BOX'') Rule 8030; MIAX Rule 602; and NYSE
Arca Rule 6.35-O.
\67\ See Exchange Rule 604, ISE, GEMX and MRX, Phlx, BX and NOM
Options 2, Section 5; Cboe Rule 5.52; BOX Rule 8050; MIAX Rule 604;
and NYSE Arca Rule 6.37A-O.
\68\ Options markets refer to the primary market maker on an
exchange in several ways.
\69\ See Exchange Rule 604, BX Options 2, Section 4; ISE, GEMX
and MRX, and Phlx Options 2, Section 5; BOX Rule 8055; MIAX Rule
604; and NYSE Arca Rule 6.37A-O.
\70\ See BX Options 2, Section 4; ISE, GEMX and MRX, Phlx and
NOM Options 2, Section 5; and Cboe Rule 5.52; BOX Rule 8040.
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Trading Functionality
An exchange's trading functionality attracts market participants
who may elect, for example, to submit an order into a price improving
auction,\71\ enter a complex order,\72\ or utilize a particular order
type.\73\ Different options exchanges offer different trading
functionality to their members. For example, with respect to priority
and allocation of an order book, some options exchanges have price/time
allocation,\74\ some have a size pro-rata allocation,\75\ while other
exchanges offer both allocation models.\76\ The allocation methodology
on a particular options exchange's order book may attract certain
market participants. Also, the manner in which some options markets
structure their solicitation auction,\77\ or opening process,\78\ may
be attractive to certain market participants. Finally, some exchanges
have trading floors \79\ which may accommodate trading for certain
market participants or trading firms.\80\
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\71\ See ISE, GEMX, MRX, Phlx and BX Options 3, Section 13; MIAX
Rule 515A; Cboe Rule 5.37; and BOX Rules 7150 and 7245. The Exchange
does not currently offer a price improving auction.
\72\ See Phlx and ISE Options 3, Section 14; MIAX Rule 518; Cboe
Rule 5.33; BOX Rule 7240; and NYSE Arca Rule 6.91-O. The Exchange
does not currently offer complex order functionality.
\73\ See Exchange Rule 516, ISE, GEMX, MRX, Phlx, BX and NOM
Options 3, Section 7; MIAX Rule 516; Cboe Rule 5.6; BOX Rule 7110;
and NYSE Arca Rule 6.62-O.
\74\ See Exchange Rule 514, Cboe Rule 5.85; BOX Rule 7130; and
NYSE Arca Rule 6.76-O.
\75\ See Phlx, ISE, GEMX and MRX Options 3, Section 10; and BOX
Rule 7135.
\76\ See BX Options 3, Section 10. While BX's rule permits both
price/time and size pro-rata allocation, all symbols on BX are
currently designated as Price/Time. See also BOX Rules 7130 and
7135. MIAX's rule permits both Price-Time and Pro-Rata allocation.
See also MIAX Rule 514.
\77\ See ISE, GEMX and MRX Options 3, Section 11; NYSE American
Rules 971.1NY and 971.2NY; and Cboe Rule 5.39.
\78\ See Exchange Rule 503, ISE, GEMX, MRX, Phlx, BX and NOM
Options 3, Section 8; Cboe Rule 5.31, MIAX Rule 503, BOX Rule 7070,
and NYSE Arca Rule 6.64-O.
\79\ Today, Phlx, Cboe, BOX, NYSE Arca, and NYSE American LLC
have a trading floor. Trading floors require an on-floor presence to
execute options transactions.
\80\ There are certain features of open outcry trading that are
difficult to replicate in an electronic trading environment. The
Exchange has observed, and understands from various market
participants, that they have had difficulty executing certain
orders, such as larger orders and high-risk and complicated
strategies, in an all-electronic trading configuration without the
element of human interaction to negotiate pricing for these orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Product Offerings
Introducing new and innovative products to the marketplace designed
to meet customer demands may attract market participants to a
particular options venue. New products in the options industry may
allow market participants greater trading and hedging opportunities, as
well as new avenues to manage risks. The listing of new options
products enhances competition among market participants by providing
investors with additional investment vehicles, as well as competitive
alternatives, to existing investment products. An exchange's
proprietary product offering may attract order flow to a particular
exchange to trade a particular options product.\81\
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\81\ See, e.g., options on the Nasdaq-100 Index[supreg]
available on ISE, GEMX and Phlx and Cboe's Market Volatility
Index[supreg]. Currently, the Exchange does not list any proprietary
products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transaction Pricing
The pricing available on a particular exchange may impact a market
participant's decision to submit order flow to a particular options
venue. The options industry is competitive. Clear substitutes to the
Exchange exist in the market for options security transaction services;
the Exchange is only one of sixteen options exchanges to which market
participants may direct their order flow and memberships. Within this
environment, market participants can freely, and often do, shift their
order flow and memberships among the Exchange and competing venues in
response to changes in their respective pricing schedules.
* * * * *
The Exchange believes the fees in this case are reasonable and
constrained by competitive forces. Evidence is set forth below showing
that substitutable products and elasticity of demand exist when it
comes to purchasing a Trading Permit or membership on an exchange.
Trading Permit Fee Increase
Trading Permit and Similar Membership Fees Are Constrained by
Competition
The Exchange's Trading Permit Fees are subject to significant
competitive forces as evidenced by available substitutes and elasticity
of demand. As discussed above, the Exchange believes that there are
many factors that may cause a market participant to decide to become a
member of a particular exchange including: (i) an exchange's available
liquidity in options series; (ii) trading functionality, latency,
reliability, throughout, access to liquidity, and determinism offered
on a particular market; (iii) product offerings; (iv) customer service
on an exchange; and (v) transactional pricing. The Exchange believes
that the decision to become a member of an exchange is a complex one
that is not solely based on non-transactional costs assessed by an
exchange.
The Exchange believes that there is value in being a Member of the
Exchange and retaining that Membership as the Exchange's market share
has grown. Exchanges compete with each other for memberships and must
consider this competitive dynamic when setting fees for memberships,
such as Trading Permits. In this case, the proposed Trading Permit fees
are reasonable and constrained by competition because, as illustrated
by the above table, they are in the range of similar types of
membership fees charged to analogous categories of market participants
by other exchanges, including those with similar market share.\82\ The
proposed monthly Trading Permit fees are also lower than or comparable
to the membership and trading permit fees imposed by several other
national securities exchanges that charge such fees.\83\ Should the
Exchange seek to adopt Trading Permit Fees that are higher than that of
other exchanges, it would risk losing Members and having them
potentially connect to the Exchange via other means. Becoming a member
of the exchange does not ``lock'' a potential member into a market or
diminish the overall competition for exchange services. The decision to
become a member of an exchange is made at the beginning of the
relationship, and is no less subject to competition than trading fees
or market data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
\83\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Availability of Substitutes. The Commission staff indicated in its
2019 guidance that an exchange can demonstrate competitive forces exist
by showing that ``substantially similar but not identical''
substitutable products or services exist.\84\ That is clearly the case
here. No broker-dealer is required to become a Member of the Exchange.
Instead, many market participants waited for the Exchange to grow to a
certain percentage of market share before they decided to become an
Exchange Member. In addition, many market participants still have not
joined the Exchange despite the Exchange's growth in recent years to
consistently be
[[Page 48710]]
approximately 4-5% of the overall equity options market share. To
illustrate, the Exchange currently has 41 Members.\85\ However, based
on publicly available information regarding a sample of the Exchange's
competitors, NYSE American Options has 75 members, NYSE Arca Options
has 71 members, and Cboe has 94 members.\86\ Accordingly, the vigorous
competition among national securities exchanges provides many
alternatives for firms to voluntarily decide whether membership to the
Exchange is appropriate and worthwhile, and no broker-dealer is
required to become a member of the Exchange. Specifically, neither the
trade-through requirements under Regulation NMS nor broker-dealers'
best execution obligations require a broker-dealer to become a member
of every exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ See supra note 64.
\85\ See MIAX Pearl Options Exchange Member Directory, available
at https://www.miaxoptions.com/exchange-members/pearl.
\86\ See NYSE American Options Membership Directory, available
at https://www.nyse.com/markets/american-options/membership (last
visited March 9, 2022); NYSE Arca Options Membership Directory,
available at https://www.nyse.com/markets/arca-options/membership
(last visited March 9, 2022); Cboe Members and Sponsored
Participants, Form 1 Amendment dated February 17, 2022, Exhibit M,
available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/2200/22000797.pdf (last visited March 9, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange acknowledges that competitive forces may compel
certain broker-dealers to be members of all equity options exchanges
based on their business models. These broker-dealers may engage in
latency sensitive trading strategies that benefit from being a member
and connecting directly to an exchange based on the business model they
choose to employ. Competitive forces that may drive certain broker-
dealers to become members of each exchange based on their business
models is not unique to the options market. This dynamic also exists in
equities and acknowledged by MEMX and considered by the Commission in a
recent MEMX proposal to adopt a monthly membership fee.\87\ However,
the Exchange believes that the proposed fees are reasonable, equitably
allocated and not unfairly discriminatory, even for a broker-dealer
that deems it necessary to join the Exchange for business purposes, as
those business reasons should presumably result in revenue capable of
covering the proposed fees, just as one may do when considering whether
to become an member of an equity exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ See MEMX Membership Fee Proposal, supra note 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other broker-dealers may not find a need in becoming a member of
all or some exchanges. There is no requirement, regulatory or
otherwise, that any broker-dealer connect to and access any (or all of)
the available options exchanges. One other exchange recently noted in a
proposal to amend their own trading permit fees that of the 62 market
making firms that are registered as Market Makers across Cboe, MIAX,
and BOX, 42 firms access only one of the three exchanges.\88\ Further,
the Exchange and its affiliates, MIAX and MIAX Emerald, have a total of
47 members. Of those 47 total members, 35 are members of all three
exchanges, four are members of only two (2) exchanges, and eight (8)
are members of only one exchange. Of those that are Market Makers today
on the Exchange, two (2) are not registered as Market Makers on MIAX
and one (1) is not registered as a Market Maker on MIAX Emerald. Broken
down even further, of those Market Makers that use the MEO Interface
and reached the Exchange's top tier for the Trading Permit fee for June
2022, one (1) Market Maker was only a Member of the Exchange and not
its two affiliates, MIAX and MIAX Emerald. The above data evidences
that a Market Maker need not be a Member of all options exchanges, let
alone the Exchange and its two affiliates, and market makers elect to
do so based on their own business decisions and need to directly access
each exchange's liquidity pool.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94894 (May 11,
2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR-BOX-2022-17) (Notice of Filing
and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change to Amend the
Fee Schedule on the BOX Options Market LLC Facility To Adopt
Electronic Market Maker Trading Permit Fees). The Exchange believes
that BOX's observation demonstrates that market making firms can,
and do, select which exchanges they wish to access, and,
accordingly, options exchanges must take competitive considerations
into account when setting fees for such access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange also is not aware of any reason why a Market Maker
could not cease being a permit holder in response to price increases
that it deems unreasonable from its own business perspective. The
Exchange does not assess any termination fee for a Member to drop its
Trading Permit, nor is the Exchange aware of any other costs that would
be incurred by a Market Maker to do so. Further, a broker-dealer may
employ a business model that is not latency sensitive, such as one that
only enters resting liquidity and, therefore, may not find interest in
exchange membership. Exchange membership may also not be useful for
order routing firms that seek to route orders to an exchange through
another means, described below, solely as part of their best execution
obligations or to comply with the trade-through requirements under
Chapter XIV of the Exchange's Rules. Such broker-dealers may utilize
various existing substitutes to access an exchange. For example, in
lieu of becoming a member at each options exchange, a market
participant may join one exchange and elect to have their orders routed
in the event that a better price is available on an away market,
including the Exchange. Nothing in the Order Protection Rule requires a
firm to become a Member at the Exchange, or any other options
exchange.\89\ Further, if the Exchange is not at the NBBO, the Exchange
will route an order to an away market that is at the NBBO to prevent a
trade-through and also ensure that the order was executed at a superior
price.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ See Options Order Protection and Locked/Crossed Market Plan
(August 14, 2009), available at https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/7fc629d9-4e54-4b99-9f11-c0e4db1a2266/options_order_protection_plan.pdf.
\90\ Exchange Members may elect to not route their orders by
marking an order as ``do-not-route.'' In this case, the order would
not be routed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some other broker-dealers may not deem it necessary to be a Member
of the Exchange and may elect to access the Exchange through other
means. As a substitute for joining an exchange, a third-party may be
utilized to execute an order on an exchange. For example, a third-party
broker-dealer Member of the Exchange may be utilized by a retail
investor to submit orders into an exchange. An institutional investor
may utilize a broker-dealer, a service bureau,\91\ or request sponsored
access \92\ through a member of an exchange in order to submit an order
directly to an options exchange.\93\ A market participant may either
pay the costs associated with becoming a member of an exchange or, in
the alternative, a market participant may elect to pay commissions to a
broker-dealer, pay fees to a service bureau to submit trades, or pay a
member to sponsor the market participant in order to submit trades
directly to an exchange.\94\ Market
[[Page 48711]]
participants may elect any of the above substitute models and weigh the
varying costs when determining how to submit trades to an exchange.
Depending on the number of orders to be submitted, technology, ability
to control submission of orders, and projected revenues, a market
participant may determine one model is more cost efficient as compared
to the alternatives. The above examples clearly demonstrate competitive
forces exist by the availability of ``substantially similar but not
identical'' substitutable products or services to becoming a Member of
the Exchange. Also, based on the disparity in amount of memberships
among exchanges detailed above, numerous market participants take
advantage of these substitutes to send order flow to the Exchange in
lieu of becoming a Member.
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\91\ Service bureaus provide access to market participants to
submit and execute orders on an exchange. On the Exchange, a Service
Bureau may be a Member. Some Members utilize a Service Bureau for
connectivity and that Service Bureau may not be a Member. Some
market participants utilize a Service Bureau who is a Member to
submit orders.
\92\ Sponsored Access is an arrangement whereby a member permits
its customers to enter orders into an exchange's system that bypass
the member's trading system and are routed directly to the Exchange,
including routing through a service bureau or other third-party
technology provider.
\93\ This may include utilizing a Floor Broker and submitting
the trade to one of the five options trading floors.
\94\ The Exchange notes that it does not have insight into the
economics of such a relationship where a broker-dealer utilizes
another entity to access the Exchanges. It is presumed that a third-
party that provides access to an exchange does so on behalf of
multiple broker-dealers and provides access to multiple exchanges.
It is also presumed that any increased volume that might cause such
third party to achieve a higher Trading Permit pricing tier maybe
offset through achieving a higher rebate on the Exchange or other
economic arrangement between the parties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elasticity of Demand. The Exchange notes it is not aware of any
reason why Members could not simply drop their access to an exchange
(or not initially access an exchange) if an exchange were to establish
prices for its non-transaction fees that, in the determination of such
Member, did not make business or economic sense for such Member to
access such exchange. The Exchange again notes that Members are not
required by rule, regulation, or competitive forces to be a Member on
the Exchange.
Elasticity of demand for Exchange Membership exists when it comes
to purchasing a Trading Permit and, as evidenced by the below data,
Members have terminated their memberships since the proposed fees were
first in effect. First, and most notably, the Exchange has not seen an
increase in memberships since it first adopted the proposed fee
increase. In fact, three Members terminated their memberships in the
time since the proposed fee increase first went into effect. In June
2021, the month immediately preceding the initial implementation of
this proposed fee change, the Exchange had 20 users of the MEO
Interface and 28 users of the FIX Interface. These numbers remained
stagnant until August 2021, where one Member that utilized the MEO
Interface ceased utilizing the MEO Interface and again in December 2021
where one Member that utilized the FIX Interface ceased utilizing the
FIX Interface. These numbers again remained stagnant until March 2022,
where another Member that utilized the FIX Interface ceased utilizing
the FIX Interface. This resulted in 19 users of the MEO Interface and
26 users of the FIX Interface. Further, other exchanges have also
experienced termination of memberships if their members deem permit or
membership fees to be unreasonable or excessive. For example, the
Exchange notes that a BOX participant modified its access to BOX in
connection with the implementation of a proposed change to BOX's permit
fees.\95\ The absence of new memberships coupled with the termination
of two memberships on the Exchange, as well as similar membership
changes on another options exchange in relation to a trading permit fee
increase, clearly shows that elasticity of demand exists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ According to BOX, a Market Maker on BOX terminated its
status as a Market Maker in response to BOX's proposed modification
of Market Maker trading permit fees. See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 94894 (May 11, 2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR-
BOX-2022-17). BOX noted, and the Exchange agrees, that this Market
Maker's decision demonstrates that Market Makers can, and do, alter
their membership status if they deem permit fees at an exchange to
be unsuitable for their business needs, thus demonstrating the
competitive environment for Market Maker permit fees and the
constraints on options exchanges when setting Market Maker permit
fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also, the Exchange has not experienced any Member decreasing their
trading activity on the Exchange in order to move to a lower tier and
be charged the corresponding lower fee. In fact, between June 2021 and
July 2021, one Member that utilizes the MEO Interface moved up from
Tier 1 to Tier 3 due to increasing their trading volume on the
Exchange. This occurred again between January 2022 and February 2022,
where another Member that utilizes the MEO Interface moved up from Tier
1 to Tier 2 also due to increasing their trading volume on the
Exchange.
The Exchange has not experienced a net decrease in Members due to
the fee increase, because the Exchange believes numerous considerations
are taken into account when deciding to be a member of an exchange,
including, but not limited to: (i) an exchange's available liquidity in
options series; (ii) trading functionality, latency, reliability,
throughout, access to liquidity, and determinism offered on a
particular market; (iii) product offerings; (iv) customer service on an
exchange; and (v) transactional pricing when socializing the change.
Fees are not the sole consideration. As stated above, the Exchange
socialized the proposed fee increase with Members prior to first
implementing the change. During that process, some Members stated that
they anticipated a potential increase due to the lower rates the
Exchange historically charged.
The Proposed Fees Are Reasonable and Constrained by Similar Fees
Charged by Other Options Exchanges
The proposed fees for the Exchange's Trading Permits are in line
with, or cheaper than, the similar trading permit and membership fees
charged by other options exchanges with similar market share. The
Exchange believes other exchanges' membership and trading permit fees,
even those of its affiliates, are useful examples of alternative
approaches to charging for memberships and how such fees are
constrained by like fees charged by other exchanges.
Again, the Exchange has not amended its Trading Permit fees since
the fees were first adopted in 2018.\96\ As described above, the
Exchange's proposed fee increase results in fees that remain lower than
those of its affiliates, MIAX and MIAX Emerald. First, MIAX and MIAX
Emerald charge EEMs a similar, fixed flat trading permit fee of
$1,500,\97\ which equals the top tier proposed herein for users of the
FIX Interface and also primarily consists of EEMs. Members that do not
qualify for the top tier on the Exchange would pay a lower Trading
Permit Fee than they would on MIAX or MIAX Emerald. Like the Exchange
currently employs for MEO Interface, which is primarily used by Market
Makers, MIAX and MIAX Emerald charge tiered trading permit fees to
Market Makers. However, the Exchange's proposed fees for users of the
MEO Interface are lower and range from $2,500 to $6,000, while the
Trading Permit fees on MIAX and MIAX Emerald range from $7,000 to
$22,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ See supra note 9.
\97\ See the MIAX Fee Schedule, Section (3)(b) and MIAX Emerald
Fee Schedule, Section (3)(b), available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/fees (last visited June 30, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The below discussion illustrates how the Exchange has historically
undercharged for access via Trading Permits as compared to other
options exchanges. As discussed further above, the Exchange chose to
charge less than other options exchanges to attract memberships and
order flow as a new options exchange entrant. The Exchange now seeks to
increase its Trading Permit Fees due to the maturity of its market
while keeping in mind the competitive constraints based on similar fees
by other options exchanges.
The proposed Trading Permit Fees compare favorably with those of
other options exchanges. The Exchange proposes to charge users of the
FIX Interface monthly fees ranging from
[[Page 48712]]
$500 to $1,500 based on trading volume. Users of the FIX Interface are
primarily EEMs, which generally consist of order flow providers. Cboe
charges monthly electronic trading permit fees based on the category of
participant, such as $3,000 for Electronic Access Permit holders and
$2,000 for Clearing TPH Permit holders (the Exchange notes that it only
charges $250 per month for EEM Clearing Firms). Cboe's Electronic
Access Permit fee is the analog to the Exchange's Trading Permit fee
for Members that use the FIX Interface and is higher than the
Exchange's proposed highest tier.
The Exchange's proposed monthly Trading Permit Fees for users of
the MEO Interface, which are primarily Market Makers, range from $2,500
to $6,000 based on trading volume. Basing such fees on trading volume
is analogous to other options exchanges that base their similar fees
charged to Market Makers based on the number of options classes
assigned. For example, NYSE Arca charges Market Makers a base fee of
$8,000 and charges additional fees ranging from $500 to $6,000 on top
of the base fee and depending on the options issues assigned, could
result in monthly options trading permit fees ranging from $8,000 to
$26,000 (or higher), which is higher than the Exchange's highest
proposed tier of $6,000. NYSE American charges electronic Market Makers
a base fee of $8,000 and charges additional fees ranging from $500 to
$6,000 on top of the base fee and depending on the options issues
assigned, which could result in monthly options trading permit fees
ranging from $8,000 to $26,000 (or higher), also higher than the
Exchange's highest proposed tier of $6,000.
The proposed Trading Permit Fee also compares favorably with those
of other options exchanges with similar market share. Under the
Exchange's tiered structure, a Member may trade approximately 106,000
more ADV contracts on the Exchange than on Cboe BZX Options \98\ and
continue to qualify for the Exchange's lowest Tier. For example, a
Member would qualify for Tier 1 of the Exchange's tiered pricing
structure where that Member's total volume as a percentage of TCV is
between 0.00% and 0.30%. Assuming an average of 37 million contracts
are traded each day during a month that Member would qualify for Tier 1
where that Member traded less than an ADV of 111,000 contracts and be
charged $500 for the month, the same fee as Cboe BZX Options, where
that Member connects via FIX.\99\ On Cboe BZX Options, the Exchange
understands that same member would no longer qualify for their lowest
tier when their ADV equals or exceeds 5,000 contracts and be charged a
fee of $1,000 for that month.\100\
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\98\ Cboe BZX Options had an average daily market share of 7.95%
as of June 23, 2022. See ``Market at a Glance'', available at
https://www.miaxoptions.com/ (last visited June 23, 2022).
\99\ See ``Membership Fees'' section of the Cboe BZX Options Fee
Schedule, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/bzx (last visited April 13, 2022). The Exchange
understands Cboe BZX Options charges the same Membership Fee to all
of its Options Members.
\100\ The Exchange proposes to also charge a fee of $1,000 per
month to Members that qualify for Tier 2, the same as BZX's highest
tier. The Exchange acknowledges that the Exchange's Trading Permit
fee would be higher than BZX where a Member qualifies for Tier 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like the Exchange, BOX also employs a tier pricing structure for
market maker trading permit fees charging $4,000 to $10,000 per month
based on options classes traded.\101\ BOX's pricing structure is the
analog for the Exchange's Trading Permit Fees for users of the MEO
Interface as that interface is primarily used by Market Makers. BOX's
lowest tier only equals the Exchange's second tier for the MEO
interface and its third and fourth tier exceed the Exchange's highest
tier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94894 (May 11,
2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR-BOX-2022-17).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Proposed Fees Are Equitable and Not Unfairly Discriminatory
The Exchange believes that the proposed monthly Trading Permit fees
are not unfairly discriminatory because they would be assessed equally
across all Members or firms that seek to become Members. The Exchange
first adopted its tiered pricing structure in 2018 and has not amended
the volume requirement since, nor does it propose to do so herein.
Nonetheless, the Exchange continues to believe the tiered pricing
structure remains not unfairly discriminatory because it is based on
the amount of trading a Member conducts on the Exchange, related use of
Exchange services, and the value of the Exchange's technology offering.
In other words, the more a firm uses the Exchange's system, the more
that firm will pay than others that use the system less. The proposed
fees also remain not unfairly discriminatory because they continue to
be based on the type of interface utilized and the value drawn from the
use of that interface.
The tiered pricing structure remains not unfairly discriminatory
because it is based on the amount of trading a Member conducts on the
Exchange, related use of Exchange services, and the value of the
Exchange's technology offering. The Exchange offers a premium System
network, connectivity, and a highly deterministic trading environment,
the cost of which per tier is in relation to the value it provides. The
Exchange is recognized as a leader in network monitoring, determinism,
risk protections, and network stability. For example, the Exchange
experiences approximately a 95% determinism rate, system throughput of
approximately 10.8 million quotes per second and average round trip
latency rate of approximately 30.76 microseconds for a single quote.
The Exchange provides a highly resilient trading platform that
experienced 99.9999% of uptime since its inception over 5 years ago.
The Exchange provides extreme performance and radical scalability
designed to match the unique needs of trading differing asset class/
market model combinations.
Again, Exchange systems offer two customer interfaces, FIX
Interface gateway for orders, and ultra-low latency MEO Interface and
data feeds with best-in-class wire order determinism. The Exchange also
offers automated continuous testing to ensure high reliability,
advanced monitoring and systems security, and employs a software
architecture that results in minimizing the demands on power, space,
and cooling while allowing for rapid scalability, resiliency and fault
isolation. The Exchange also provides latency equalized cross-connects
in the primary data center ensures fair and cost efficient access to
the Exchange's Systems.
The tiered pricing structure represent the value of the Exchange's
industry leading technology platform and is based on how frequently a
Member trades on the Exchange. The more use, the more value a Member is
extolling from the Exchange. The Exchange believes that a Member that
qualifies for the first tier should not be charged the same as a Member
that qualifies for the highest tier because the Member that qualifies
for the first tier uses the Exchange less than the Member that
qualifies for the highest tier. Members that qualify for the lowest
tier tend to connect to the Exchange as part of their best execution
obligations and generally tend to send the least amount of orders and
messages over those connections.\102\
[[Page 48713]]
Those Members generally send fewer orders and messages to the Exchange
resulting in less use of the Exchange resources. Therefore, the Trading
Permit fees for those Members should rightfully be lower than others
that trade on the Exchange for other reasons, such as a low-latency
trading strategies that requires sending more orders and messages
which, therefore, utilize a greater amount or Exchange resources and
extoll great value from their use of the Exchange's industry leading
technology offering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ An EEM may satisfy its best execution obligations by using
the FIX Interface, limiting their costs. Those EEMs that choose to
use the MEO Interface do so for reasons other than best execution,
such as the enhanced functionality provided by the MEO Interface,
and the proposed fees would not serve as a barrier to satisfying
best execution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next, the existing tiered pricing structure remains not unfairly
discriminatory because it continues to be based on the type of
interface utilized and the value drawn from the use of that interface.
As discussed above, both the MEO Interface and FIX Interface continue
to be available to all Members and each Member may choose which
interface to utilize based on their own business needs. The FIX
Interface is the industry-wide uniform message format and provides
lower bandwidth, less capacity, and fewer Exchange resources. EEMs, who
are primarily order flow providers, are the primary users of the FIX
Interface. Meanwhile, the MEO Interface is the more robust interface
offering lower latency and higher throughput. Market Makers primarily
use the MEO Interface due to its functionality, robustness, lower
latency, and higher throughput and utilizes greater Exchange resources
due to the increased volume of message traffic that travel through the
MEO Interface.
As stated above, the Exchange offers three time-in-force modifiers:
Day, IOC, and GTC. While all order types are available for use on
either interface, only the time-in-force modifiers of IOC and Day are
available on the MEO Interface. Market Makers utilize the time-in-force
of Day on orders to be posted on the MIAX Pearl Options Book and to
meet Market Makers' continuous quoting obligations under Exchange Rule
605(d). Other Market Makers, and certain EEMs, that primarily remove
liquidity tend to be more latency sensitive and utilize the time-in-
force of IOC on orders when looking to remove liquidity from the MIAX
Pearl Options Book. The MEO Interface allows the submission of Cancel-
Replacement orders, which allow for the immediate cancellation of a
previously received order and the replacement of that order with a new
order with new terms and conditions. Cancel-Replacement orders are
primarily used by Market Makers as part of their continuous quoting
obligations. Market Makers, and certain EEMs, are the primary users of
the MEO Interface due to its lower latency, higher throughput,
available time-in-force instructions and order types that assist them
in satisfying their market making obligations. The Exchange also offers
its Aggregate Risk Manager (``ARM'') over the MEO Interface and it is
available to both EEMs and Market Makers.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ See Exchange Rules 517(A) (Aggregated Risk Manager for
EEMs) and 517B (Aggregate Risk Manager for Market Makers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FIX Interface provides lower capacity and bandwidth and,
therefore, utilizes less Exchange resources. The FIX Interface is
primarily used by EEMs, who tend to be less latency sensitive and
submit less orders and messages than Market Makers. The FIX Interface
provides EEMs all the functionality necessary for them to satisfy their
best execution obligations. However, EEMs may choose to use the MEO
Interface due to its lower latency, higher throughput, available
functionality based on their business needs if they choose.
The Exchange notes that while Market Maker users of the MEO
Interface continue to account for a vast majority of the increased
System usage placed on the Exchange, Market Makers continue to be
valuable market participants on the exchanges as the options market is
a quote driven industry. The Exchange recognizes the value that Market
Makers bring to the Exchange. The Exchange proposes higher, separate
fees for users of the MEO Interface that are more aligned with the
costs and resources that Market Makers continue to place on the
Exchange and its systems.
The Exchange notes that Market Makers are the predominant users of
the MEO Interface and consume the most bandwidth and resources of the
network, transact the vast majority of the volume on the Exchange, and
require the high touch network support services provided by the
Exchange and its staff. The Exchange notes that users of the FIX
Interface, i.e., non-Market Makers, take up significantly less Exchange
resources as discussed further below. Further, the Exchange notes that
MEO users account for greater than 99% of message traffic over the
network, while FIX users account for less than 1% of message traffic
over the network. In the Exchange's experience, most Exchange Members
do not have a business need for the high performance network solutions,
like MEO, required by Market Makers and certain EEMs.
Over the period from March 2022 through May 2022, the Exchange
processed 1.3 billion messages via the FIX Interface (0.33% of total
messages received). Over that same time period, the Exchange processed
386.1 billion messages (99.67% of total messages received) over the MEO
Interface. This marked difference between the number of FIX and MEO
messages processed, when mapped to servers, software, storage, and
networking results in a much higher allocation of total resources to
support the MEO Interface. For one, the Exchange expends greater
resources to maintain the resilience of the MEO Interface to ensure its
ongoing operation in accordance with Regulation SCI. Another, the
Exchange must expand its storage capacity to retain these increased
messages in compliance with its record keeping obligations. The
Exchange must also expend additional resources to surveil and ensure
proper regulatory oversight of this increased message traffic. These
pulls on Exchange resources have only increased since it first adopted
the Trading Permit fee in March of 2018 \104\ when the Exchange's
trading volume for that month averaged 3.94%.\105\ Today, the
Exchange's average daily trading volume for June 2022 is 4.92%.\106\
This additional volume increases the pull on Exchange resources
necessary to surveil and regulate its market while also procuring
additional capacity to store and monitor those messages in compliance
with its record keeping obligations under the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ See supra note 9.
\105\ See Market at a Glance, supra note 8.
\106\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Users of the MEO Interface, therefore, receive greater value than
Users of the FIX Interface due to its higher throughput, lower latency,
and available functionality. As the above data shows, the Exchange also
expends much more resources to support the MEO Interface than it does
to support the FIX Interface. The existing tiered pricing structure is
designed to account for these facts. Trading Permit fees for Members
who connect through the MEO Interface are, therefore, higher than the
Trading Permit fees for Members who connect through the FIX Interface.
The tiered pricing structure also accounts for the corresponding use of
the MEO and FIX Interfaces and charges more for those that use either
interface more in terms of trading volume and proportionate pull on
Exchange resources. Therefore, the proposed monthly Trading Permit fees
are not unfairly discriminatory because they would be assessed equally
across all Members based on the type of interface and related usage of
Exchange resources.
The tiered pricing structure has been in place since 2018 \107\ and
similar
[[Page 48714]]
membership pricing structures utilized by other options exchanges
assess permit fees at different rates, based upon a member's
participation on that exchange,\108\ and, as such, this concept is not
new or novel. The Exchange also notes the some options exchanges employ
a tiered pricing structure for membership fees based on options
assigned or traded while the Exchange employs a tier pricing structure
based on trading volume. The Exchange believes both are analogous and
lead to the same result. Also see the BZX example explained above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ See supra note 9.
\108\ See e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94894 (May
11, 2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR-BOX-2022-17). NYSE Arca
Options Fees and Charges, p.1 (assessing market makers $6,000 for up
to 175 option issues, an additional $5,000 for up to 350 option
issues, an additional $4,000 for up to 1,000 option issues, an
additional $3,000 for all option issues on the exchange, and an
additional $1,000 for the fifth trading permit and for each trading
permit thereafter); NYSE American Options Fee Schedule, p. 23
(assessing market makers $8,000 for up to 60 plus the bottom 45% of
option issues, an additional $6,000 for up to 150 plus the bottom
45% of option issues, an additional $5,000 for up to 500 plus the
bottom 45% of option issues, and additional $4,000 for up to 1,100
plus the bottom 45% of option issues, an additional $3,000 for all
issues traded on the exchange, and an additional $2,000 for 6th to
9th ATPs; plus an addition fee for premium products). See also BZX
Options assesses the Participant Fee, which is a membership fee,
according to a member's ADV. See Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee
Schedule under ``Membership Fees''. The Participant Fee is $500 if
the member ADV is less than 5000 contracts and $1,000 if the member
ADV is equal to or greater than 5,000 contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed fees are equitable and not unfairly discriminatory as
the fees apply equally to all Members. As such, all similarly situated
Members, with the same trading volume, will be subject to the same
Trading Permit fee. The Exchange also believes that assessing lower
fees to Members with less trading volume is reasonable and appropriate
as it will allow the Exchange to retain and attract smaller-scale
Members, which are an integral component of the options industry
marketplace. Since these smaller Members utilize less bandwidth and
capacity on the Exchange's network due to the lower trading volume, the
Exchange believes it is reasonable and appropriate to offer Members a
lower fee. Furthermore, the Exchange tiered pricing is beneficial and
valued by smaller Market Makers who provide liquidity in less liquid
options classes. The Exchange fears that without its tiered pricing
structure, smaller Market Makers would discontinue their membership and
cease providing much needed liquidity in less liquid options classes to
the detriment of all market participants. The Exchange must, therefore,
consider Members' ability to discontinue their memberships when
considering any potential changes to its tiered volume requirements and
that Members' ability to transition to another exchange they view
offers more attractive volume thresholds and pricing. The proposed
fees, therefore, represent the equitable allocation of reasonable dues,
fees and other charges because the fees are generally lower than other
exchanges and the proposed tiered fees are similar to other tiered
pricing structures on other options exchanges.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ The Exchange does not charge a separate fee to Market
Makers for options assignments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Removal of Monthly Volume Credit and Trading Permit Fee Credit
The Exchange believes its proposal to remove the Monthly Volume
Credit is reasonable, equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because
all market participants will no longer be offered the ability to
achieve the extra credits associated with the Monthly Volume Credit for
submitting Priority Customer volume to the Exchange and access to the
Exchange is offered on terms that are not unfairly discriminatory. The
Exchange believes it is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory to
remove the Monthly Volume Credit from the Fee Schedule for business and
competitive reasons. The Exchange established the Monthly Volume Credit
when it first launched operations to encourage Members to increase
their order flow by providing a credit to those that exceeded a volume
threshold. The Exchange believes that the Exchange's existing Priority
Customer rebates and fees will continue to allow the Exchange to remain
highly competitive and continue to attract order flow and maintain
market share even without the Monthly Volume Credit.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ See the Exchange's Fee Schedule available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/fee_schedule-files/MIAX_Pearl_Options_Fee_Schedule_07122022.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes its proposal to remove the Trading Permit fee
credit for Members that connect via both the MEO Interface and FIX
Interface is reasonable, equitable and not unfairly discriminatory
because all market participants will no longer be offered the ability
to receive the credit and access to the Exchange is offered on terms
that are not unfairly discriminatory. The Exchange believes it is
equitable and not unfairly discriminatory to remove the Trading Permit
fee credit for business and competitive reasons. The Exchange
established the Trading Permit fee credit to lower the costs for
Members that connect via the MEO Interface and/or FIX Interface as a
means to attract order flow and memberships after the Exchange first
launched operations. The Exchange now believes that it is appropriate
to remove this credit in light of the current operating conditions and
membership on the Exchange.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
In accordance with Section 6(b)(8) of the Act, \111\ the Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change would not impose any burden on
intermarket or intramarket competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intra-Market Competition
The Exchange believes the removal of the Monthly Volume Credit and
Trading Permit fee credit will not place certain market participants at
a relative disadvantage to other market participants because, in order
to attract order flow when the Exchange first launched operations, the
Exchange established these credits to lower the initial fixed cost for
Members. The Exchange now believes that it is appropriate to remove
this credit in light of the current operating conditions, including the
Exchange's overall membership and the current type and amount of volume
executed on the Exchange. The Exchange believes that the Exchange's
rebates and fees will still allow the Exchange to remain highly
competitive such that the Exchange should continue to attract order
flow and maintain market share.
As described above, the Exchange's proposed Trading Permit fees are
lower than or similar to the cost of membership and trading permits on
other exchanges,\112\ and therefore, may stimulate intramarket
competition by attracting additional firms to become Members on the
Exchange or at least should not deter interested participants from
joining the Exchange. In addition, membership and trading permit fees
are subject to competition from other exchanges. Accordingly, if the
changes proposed herein are unattractive to market participants, it is
likely the Exchange will see a decline in membership as a result. As
stated above, the number of FIX and MEO Interface users remained
stagnant until August 2021, where one Member that utilized the MEO
Interface ceased utilizing that interface and again in December 2021,
where one Member that utilized the FIX Interface ceased utilizing that
interface.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ See supra notes 38-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange also does not believe charging different fees for MEO
and FIX
[[Page 48715]]
Interface users and basing the amount of such fees on trading volume
would impose any burden on intermarket or intramarket competition that
is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the
Act. As discussed above, the FIX Interface is the uniform industry
message protocol used by most exchanges and provides lower throughput
and bandwidth than the MEO Interface. Users are free to use either
interface based on their business need and the pricing structure is
aligned with the interface used, its pull on Exchange resources, and
the Member's monthly trading volume. The tiered pricing structure is
based on the type of interface and trading volume in place on the
Exchange today and the Exchange does not propose to amend the volume
requirements associated with each Tier. Rather, it is simply seeking to
amend the associated fees. Basing such fees on trading volume would may
also stimulate intramarket competition because it is analogous to other
exchanges that base like fees on options classes traded or assigned. A
Member may cease being a Member if they believe the tiered structure is
not appropriate or that another exchange presents a better value.
Likewise, a market participant that is not already a Member may cease
membership on another exchange or become a Member of MIAX Pearl where
they deem the Exchange's Trading Permit fee to be a better value based
on its trading activity and business needs.
Inter-Market Competition
The Exchange operates in a highly competitive market in which
market participants can readily favor one of the 15 competing options
venues if they deem fee levels at a particular venue to be excessive.
Based on publicly-available information, and excluding index-based
options, no single exchange has more than approximately 16% market
share. Therefore, no exchange possesses significant pricing power
regarding memberships or in the execution of multiply-listed equity and
ETF options order flow. Over the course of 2021 and 2022, the
Exchange's market share has fluctuated between approximately 3-6% of
the U.S. equity options industry.\113\ The Exchange is not aware of any
evidence that a market share of approximately 3-6% provides the
Exchange with anti-competitive pricing power when it comes to
competition for memberships. The Exchange believes that the ever-
shifting market share among exchanges from month to month demonstrates
that market participants can discontinue memberships in response to fee
changes. In such an environment, the Exchange must continually adjust
its fees to remain competitive with other exchanges and to attract and
retain memberships on the Exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ See supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed fee change will not impact intermarket competition
because it will apply to all Members equally. Also, Members are free to
use either the FIX or MEO Interface and may choose the interface that
better meets their business needs based on their trading models and
behavior. The Exchange operates in a highly competitive market in which
market participants can determine whether or not to join the Exchange
based on the value received compared to the cost of joining and
maintaining membership on the Exchange.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange responded to comment letters in a prior proposal.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ See supra note 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act,\115\ and Rule 19b-4(f)(2) \116\ thereunder.
At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change,
the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such
action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether
the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
\116\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-PEARL-2022-30 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-PEARL-2022-30. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-PEARL-2022-30 and should be submitted on
or before August 31, 2022.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\117\
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\117\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-17096 Filed 8-9-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P