New Car Assessment Program, 13452-13521 [2022-04894]

Agencies

• National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 46 (Wednesday, March 9, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13452-13521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04894]



[[Page 13451]]

Vol. 87

Wednesday,

No. 46

March 9, 2022

Part III





Department of Transportation





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





National Highway Traffic Safety Administration





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





New Car Assessment Program; Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / 
Notices

[[Page 13452]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2021-0002]


New Car Assessment Program

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Request for comments (RFC).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) provides comparative 
information on the safety performance of new vehicles to assist 
consumers with vehicle purchasing decisions and to encourage safety 
improvements. In addition to star ratings for crash protection and 
rollover resistance, the NCAP program recommends particular advanced 
driver assistance systems (ADAS) technologies and identifies the 
vehicles in the marketplace that offer the systems that pass NCAP 
performance test criteria for those systems. This notice proposes 
significant upgrades to NCAP, first, by proposing to add four more ADAS 
technologies to those NHTSA currently recommends. The new technologies 
are blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane keeping 
support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking. Other plans on 
updating NCAP are discussed in the Supplementary Information.

DATES: Comments should be submitted no later than May 9, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to the docket number above and be 
submitted by one of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building 
Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. 
ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
     Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting 
comments, see the Public Participation heading of the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document. Note that all comments received 
will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including 
any personal information provided.
     Privacy Act: Anyone can search the electronic form of all 
comments received in any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or at https://www.transportation.gov/privacy. For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or the street 
address listed above. Follow the online instructions for accessing the 
dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, you may contact 
Ms. Jennifer N. Dang, Division Chief, New Car Assessment Program, 
Office of Crashworthiness Standards (Telephone: 202-366-1810). For 
legal issues, you may contact Ms. Sara R. Bennett, Office of Chief 
Counsel (Telephone: 202-366-2992). You may send mail to either of these 
officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice also proposes changes (including 
an increase in stringency) to the test procedures and performance 
criteria for the four currently recommended ADAS technologies in NCAP 
to enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle 
models and to harmonize with other consumer information programs. 
Second, this notice describes (but does not propose at this time) how 
NHTSA could rate vehicles equipped with these ADAS technologies and 
requests comment on how best to develop this rating system. Third, 
NHTSA seeks (but does not propose at this time) to provide a crash 
avoidance rating at the point of sale on a vehicle's window sticker, 
consistent with the 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) 
Act, and discusses ways of implementing the program, including a 
potential process for updating such information. Fourth, as part of a 
new NHTSA approach to NCAP, NHTSA is proposing a ``roadmap'' of the 
Agency's plans to upgrade NCAP in phases over the next several years 
and presents the roadmap for comment. Fifth, as another first for NCAP, 
NHTSA is considering utilizing NCAP to raise consumer awareness of 
certain safety technologies that may have the potential to help people 
make safe driving choices. This information may be of particular 
interest to parents or other caregivers shopping for a vehicle for a 
new or inexperienced driver in the household, or parents wanting to 
know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/heatstroke. Sixth and 
finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several 
programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program. The proposal on 
ADAS technologies and the aforementioned initiatives pave the way for 
the Agency to focus on a much broader safety strategy, including 
fulfilling not only the 2015 FAST Act directive but also the recent 
mandates included in Section 24213 of the November 2021 Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs 
Act, to improve road safety for motor vehicle occupants as well as 
other vulnerable road users.

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. ADAS Performance Testing Program
    A. Lane Keeping Technologies
    1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)
    a. Haptic Alerts
    b. False Positive Tests
    c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications
    2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)
    B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies
    1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)
    a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions
    b. Test Procedure Harmonization
    2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)
    C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)
    D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies
    1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
    2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)
    a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
    b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
    c. Current State of AEB Technology
    d. NHTSA's CIB Characterization Study
    e. Updates to NCAP's CIB Testing
    f. Updates to NCAP's DBS Testing
    g. Updates to NCAP's FCW Testing
    h. Regenerative Braking
    3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in Response to 2015 RFC Notice
    a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Effective Time-to-Collision
    b. False Positive Test Scenarios
    c. Procedure Clarifications
    d. Expand Testing
    e. AEB Strikeable Target
IV. ADAS Rating System
    A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to Consumers
    1. Star Rating System
    2. Medals Rating System
    3. Points-Based Rating System
    4. Incorporating Baseline Risk
    B. ADAS Rating System Concepts
    1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and Nomenclature
    2. Percentage of Test Conditions to Meet--Concept 1
    3. Select Test Conditions to Meet--Concept 2
    4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on Real-World Data--Concept 3
    5. Overall Rating

[[Page 13453]]

V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window Sticker)
VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP
VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices
    A. Driver Monitoring Systems
    B. Driver Distraction
    C. Alcohol Detection
    D. Seat Belt Interlocks
    E. Intelligent Speed Assist
    F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist
VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System
    A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept
    B. Baseline Risk Concept
    C. Half-Star Ratings
    D. Decimal Ratings
    E. Rollover Resistance Test
IX. Other Activities
    A. Programmatic Challenges With Self-Reported Data
    B. Website Updates
    C. Database Changes
X. Economic Analysis
XI. Public Participation
XII. Appendices

I. Executive Summary

    NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) supports NHTSA's mission 
to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries that occur on U.S. 
roadways. NCAP, like many other NHTSA programs, has contributed to 
significant reductions in motor vehicle fatalities. In the decade prior 
to the 1978 start of NCAP, fatalities from motor vehicle crashes 
exceeded 50,000 annually. In 2019, 36,096 people still lost their lives 
on U.S. roads. Passenger vehicle occupant fatalities decreased from 
32,225 in 2000 to 22,215 in 2019.\1\ This reduction is notable, 
particularly in light of the fact that the total number of vehicle 
miles traveled (VMT) in the U.S. has increased over time. However, 
during that same timeframe, pedestrian fatalities increased by 33 
percent, from 4,739 in 2000 to 6,205 in 2019.\2\ Furthermore, a 
statistical projection of traffic fatalities for the first half of 2021 
shows that an estimated 20,160 people died in motor vehicle traffic 
crashes--the highest number of fatalities during the first half of the 
year since 2006, and the highest half-year percentage increase in the 
history of data recorded by the Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS).\3\ In addition, the projected 11,225 fatalities during the 
second quarter of 2021 represents the highest second quarter fatalities 
since 1990, and the highest quarterly percentage change (+23.1 percent) 
in FARS data recorded history. Preliminary data reported by the Federal 
Highway Administration (FHWA) show that VMT in the first half of 2021 
rebounded from a large pandemic-related dip that occurred in the first 
half of 2020, increasing by 173.1 billion miles, or about a 13 percent 
increase over the comparable period in 2020. The fatality rate for the 
first half of 2021 increased to 1.34 fatalities per 100 million VMT, up 
from the projected rate of 1.28 fatalities per 100 million VMT in the 
first half of 2020. Early evidence suggests that these fatality rates 
have increased as a result of increases in risky behaviors like driving 
and riding while unbelted, impaired driving, and speeding.\4\ Although 
there have been notable gains in automotive safety over the past fifty 
years, far more work must be done.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle 
Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.
    \2\ Traffic Safety Facts 2000 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle 
Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the 
General Estimates System.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
    \3\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (2021, 
October), Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities for the 
First Half (January-June) of 2021. (Traffic Safety Facts. Report No. 
DOT HS 813 199), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \4\ See https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2020-fatality-data-show-increased-traffic-fatalities-during-pandemic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This notice discusses how NCAP can support NHTSA's mission through 
its multi-faceted initiatives and broad safety strategies to address 
vehicle safety involving motor vehicle occupants, other vulnerable road 
users, and safe driving choices to further reduce injuries and 
fatalities occurring on the nation's roads. As stated in the Department 
of Transportation's National Roadway Safety Strategy, proposals to 
update NCAP are expected to emphasize safety features that protect 
people both inside and outside of the vehicle, and may include 
consideration of pedestrian protection systems, better understanding of 
impacts to pedestrians (e.g., specific considerations for children), 
and automatic emergency braking and lane keeping assistance to benefit 
bicyclists and pedestrians. In a first-of-its-kind focus--especially 
relevant in light of increases in fatalities caused by risky driving 
behaviors--this notice seeks comment on how automakers could encourage 
consumers to choose safety technologies that could prevent risky 
behaviors from occurring in the first place. This notice also proposes 
significant upgrades to NCAP by adding four additional crash avoidance 
technologies (also termed ADAS throughout this notice) to the program, 
increasing the stringency of the tests for currently recommended ADAS 
technologies in NCAP for enhanced evaluation of their current 
capabilities, and exploring, for the first time, expanding NCAP to 
include safety for road users outside of the vehicle. Finally, this 
document presents a roadmap of NHTSA's current plans to upgrade NCAP in 
phases over the next several years.
    Many of these efforts align with Section 24213 of the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs 
Act \5\ and signed on November 15, 2021. First, this RFC, once 
finalized, fulfills the requirements of Section 24213(a) of the 
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law because NHTSA intends for the addition of 
the four technologies proposed in this RFC to ``finalize the proceeding 
for which comments were requested'' on December 16, 2015.\6\ 
Specifically, the finalization of this RFC will close the December 16, 
2015 proceeding and notice. While NHTSA has future plans described in 
the roadmap that the Agency discussed in the December 16, 2015 notice, 
none are considered an extension of the December 16, 2015 proceeding, 
though all information previously collected by NHTSA may be used in the 
development of future notices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ (Pub. L. 117-58).
    \6\ Id. at Section 24213(a); the notice referred to in the 
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015). This 
is the notice that will be finalized once the final decision notice 
for today's RFC is published.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, this RFC fulfills portions of the requirements in Section 
24213(b) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that mandates the Agency 
``publish a notice, for the purposes of public comment, to establish a 
means for providing consumer information relating to advanced crash-
avoidance technologies'' within one year of enactment that includes: 
(1) An appropriate methodology for determining which advanced crash 
avoidance technologies should be included in the information, (2) 
performance test criteria for use by manufacturers in evaluating those 
technologies, (3) a distinct rating system involving each technology, 
and (4) updating overall vehicle ratings to include the new rating. 
Through this RFC, NHTSA is proposing four additional advanced crash 
avoidance technologies \7\ for inclusion in NCAP, proposing the test 
criteria for evaluating the advanced crash avoidance technologies, and 
seeking comment on the future development of a crash avoidance rating 
system. NHTSA described in detail why it chose the four

[[Page 13454]]

technologies that it did and how those technologies meet NHTSA's 
established criteria for inclusion in NCAP. Since NHTSA is proposing 
the addition of four advanced crash avoidance technologies and test 
criteria for evaluating those technologies, NHTSA meets two of the four 
requirements for fulfillment of the Advanced Crash Avoidance section of 
Sec. 24213(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ This notice refers to the advanced crash avoidance 
technologies as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) 
technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 24213(b) of the law also requires that the Agency publish a 
notice ``to establish a means for providing to consumers information 
relating to pedestrian, bicyclist, or other vulnerable road user safety 
technologies'' within one year of enactment. This notice must meet 
requirements very similar to the advanced crash avoidance notice 
mentioned above. Since NHTSA is today proposing to include pedestrian 
automatic emergency braking (PAEB) in the program and is including test 
criteria for evaluating PAEB, NHTSA meets two of the four requirements 
for fulfillment of the Vulnerable Road User Safety section of Sec. 
24213(b). The remaining requirements will be fulfilled once NHTSA 
proposes and then finalizes a new rating system for the crash avoidance 
technologies in NCAP. The law also requires that NHTSA submit reports 
to Congress on its plans for fulfilling the abovementioned 
requirements. NHTSA plans to fulfill these reporting requirements in a 
timely manner.
    Third, this RFC, once finalized, fulfills the requirements of 
Section 24213(c) for NHTSA to establish a roadmap for implementation of 
NCAP changes that covers a term of ten years, with five year mid-term 
and five year long-term components, and with updates to the roadmap at 
least once every four years to reflect new Agency interests and public 
comments. The first roadmap must be completed within one year of the 
law's enactment. Once finalized, the roadmap on future updates to NCAP 
proposed in this RFC in its entirety would fulfill the ten-year roadmap 
requirement, as some proposed initiatives will be considered in NCAP in 
the first five years while others will be proposed in the second half 
of the ten-year plan. The details and analysis of this fulfillment are 
available in the Roadmap section of this RFC.
    Fourth, this RFC, once finalized, will fulfill a provision in 
Section 24213(c) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that requires 
NHTSA to make the roadmap available for public comment and to consider 
the public comments received before finalizing the roadmap. These 
provisions are in accordance with the Agency's current practice for 
updating NCAP and will be followed to finalize the roadmap. Section 
24213(c) of the Law also requires that NHTSA identify opportunities 
where NCAP would ``benefit from harmonization with third-party safety 
rating programs.'' The Agency is taking steps to harmonize with 
existing consumer information rating programs where possible, and when 
appropriate, as noted in various sections of this RFC.
    Fifth, Section 24213(c) of the Law requires the Agency to engage 
with stakeholders with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints not less than 
annually to develop future roadmaps. Again, this provision is in 
accordance with the Agency's current practice.

Components of the Notice

    There are six main parts to this notice:
    1. Proposes to add four new ADAS technologies to NCAP and updates 
to current NCAP test procedures,
    2. Discusses the Agency's plan to develop a new rating system for 
advanced driver assistance technologies,
    3. Describes steps to list the crash avoidance rating information 
on the vehicle's window sticker (the Monroney label) at the point of 
sale,
    4. Describes roadmap of the Agency's plans to update NCAP in phases 
over the next ten years,
    5. Requests comments on expanding NCAP to provide consumer 
information on safety technologies that could help people drive safer 
by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior, and
    6. Discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several programmatic 
aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole.
    Each of the aforementioned aspects of the notice are described in 
greater detail that follows. First, the notice discusses in detail the 
Agency's proposed upgrade to add four more ADAS technologies to those 
currently recommended by NHTSA through NCAP and that are highlighted on 
the NHTSA website. Since 2010, NCAP has recommended four kinds of ADAS 
technologies to prospective vehicle purchasers, and has identified to 
shoppers the vehicles that have these technologies and that meet NCAP 
performance test criteria.\8\ The current technologies are forward 
collision warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent 
braking (CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS) (with the latter two 
collectively referred to as ``automatic emergency braking).\9\ This 
notice proposes changes (including an increase in stringency) to the 
test procedures and performance criteria for LDW, CIB, DBS, and FCW to 
(1) enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle 
models, (2) reduce test burden, and (3) harmonize with other consumer 
information programs. This notice also describes and proposes four more 
ADAS technologies: Blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane 
keeping support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ NCAP only indicates that a vehicle has a recommended 
technology when NHTSA has data verifying that the technology meets 
the minimum performance requirements set by NHTSA for acceptable 
performance. If a vehicle's ADAS is reported to have satisfied the 
performance requirements using the test methods specified by the 
Agency, then NHTSA uses a checkmark system to indicate on the NHTSA 
website that the vehicle is equipped with the technology. Each year, 
NHTSA also selects a sample of vehicles from that model year to 
verify ADAS system performance by performing its own tests.
    \9\ https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/driver-assistance-technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These four new ADAS technologies are candidates for NCAP because 
data indicate they satisfy NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in 
the program. The prerequisites are: (1) The update to the program 
addresses a safety need; (2) there are system designs (countermeasures) 
that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) existing or new system 
designs have safety benefit potential; and (4) a performance-based 
objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance. In 
order to address (1), a safety need, the Agency inherently looks first 
to address injuries and fatalities stemming from ``high-frequency and 
high-risk crash types''--as these crashes command the largest safety 
need and thus may also afford the biggest potential benefit. NHTSA does 
not calculate relative costs and benefits when considering inclusion in 
NCAP as it is a non-regulatory consumer information program. NHTSA 
discusses in this notice how each of the proposed ADAS technologies 
meets the four prerequisites. As explained in detail in this notice, 
the four new ADAS technologies proposed in NCAP are the only 
technologies that the Agency believes meet the four prerequisites for 
inclusion at this time. Each technology has demonstrated the ability to 
successfully mitigate high frequency and high-risk crash types. With 
the proposal to include pedestrian automatic emergency braking, NCAP 
would be expanded, for the first time, to include safety for people 
outside of the vehicle.
    Second, this notice discusses the Agency's plan to develop a future 
rating system for new vehicles based on the availability and 
performance of all the NCAP-recommended crash avoidance technologies. 
Currently, NCAP only

[[Page 13455]]

recommends crash avoidance technologies to shoppers, and identifies the 
vehicles that offer the recommended technologies that pass NCAP system 
performance criteria. Unlike its crashworthiness and rollover 
protection programs that offer a combined rating based on vehicle 
performance in frontal, side, and rollover tests, the NCAP crash 
avoidance program does not currently have a rating system to 
differentiate the performance of ADAS technologies. NHTSA seeks to 
remedy this by developing a rating system for ADAS technologies to 
provide purchasers improved data with which to compare and shop for 
vehicles, and to spur improved vehicle performance. Accordingly, this 
document seeks public input on how best to develop this rating system.
    Third, this notice announces NHTSA's steps to list the crash 
avoidance rating information on the vehicle's window sticker (the 
Monroney label) at the point of sale, as directed by the FAST Act.\10\ 
NHTSA requests comment on ideas for the Monroney label information. 
Research is underway to maximize the effectiveness of the information 
in informing purchasing decisions. A follow-on notice will propose the 
crash avoidance rating system and explain how NHTSA would use the 
ratings. NHTSA will consider the comments received on this notice in 
conjunction with the information gained from the consumer research, to 
develop a proposal for a revised label. To help shoppers make more 
informed purchasing decisions, NHTSA also plans to provide fuel economy 
and greenhouse gas rating information with the NHTSA safety ratings, 
not only at the point of sale but also on the NHTSA website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ This Act requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to require 
vehicle manufacturers to include crash avoidance information next to 
the crashworthiness information on vehicle window stickers (Monroney 
labels).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, as part of a new approach to advancing NCAP, NHTSA has 
developed a roadmap of the Agency's current plans to upgrade NCAP in 
phases over the next several years. The roadmap sets forth NHTSA's 
near-term and longer-term strategies for upgrading NCAP. The roadmap 
takes a gradual approach, which contemplates NHTSA's issuing proposed 
upgrades in phases, as the technologies mature to readiness for 
proposed inclusion in NCAP. Following a proposal will be a final 
decision document that responds to comments and provides NHTSA's 
decisions for that phase of NCAP updates, including the lead time 
provided for the implementation. The roadmap presents an estimated 
timeframe of the phased request for comment (RFC) notices.
    Fifth, this notice also considers expanding NCAP to provide 
consumer information on safety technologies that could help people 
drive safer by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior. The 
Agency is examining the possibility of expanding NCAP to include 
technologies that promote NHTSA's continuing efforts to combat unsafe 
driving behaviors, such as distracted and impaired driving, riding in a 
vehicle unrestrained, and speeding. NHTSA currently uses many 
approaches to reduce dangerous driving behaviors, including high 
visibility enforcement and advertising campaigns like ``Click it or 
Ticket'' and ``Buzzed Driving is Drunk Driving.'' These campaigns have 
succeeded in reducing, but not eliminating, human causes of crashes and 
there is some evidence that their success has reached a plateau. NHTSA 
is considering how NCAP can promote technologies that would reduce 
unsafe driving or riding behavior like distracted and impaired driving, 
speeding, or riding in a vehicle unrestrained by targeting the human 
behaviors most likely to lead to crashes. This information may be of 
particular interest to parents or other caregivers who are shopping for 
a vehicle for a new or inexperienced driver in the household, or 
caregivers wanting to know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/
heatstroke.
    Sixth and finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating 
several programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole. 
NHTSA requests comment on the Agency's ideas for revising the 5-star 
safety ratings program. This document also discusses ways NHTSA would 
like to update the existing ADAS technology program components, 
outlines challenges the Agency has encountered relating to manufacturer 
self-reported data, and proposes possible solutions to those problems. 
Lastly, the RFC discusses (1) updates to the NCAP website to improve 
the dissemination of vehicle safety information to consumers and (2) 
the development of an NCAP database to modernize the operational 
aspects of the program, including a new vehicle information submission 
process for vehicle manufacturers.
    This RFC includes numbered questions throughout the notice that 
highlight specific topics on which NHTSA seeks comments. Although 
several questions may be posed un-numbered within the body of certain 
sections, these un-numbered questions are reiterated at the conclusion 
of the topic discussion and in Appendix B. To help ensure that NHTSA is 
able to address all comments received, the Agency requests that 
commenters provide corresponding numbering in their responses.

II. Background

    NHTSA established its NCAP in 1978 in response to Title II of the 
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972. When the 
program first began providing consumers with vehicle safety information 
derived from frontal crashworthiness testing, attention within the 
industry to vehicle safety was relatively new. Today's consumers are 
much more interested in vehicle safety, and this has become one of the 
key factors in vehicle purchasing decisions.\11\ Vehicle manufacturers 
have responded to these consumer demands by offering safer vehicles 
that incorporate enhanced safety features. This has resulted in 
improved vehicle safety performance in NCAP, which has historically 
translated into higher NCAP star ratings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See www.regulations.gov, See www.regulations.gov, Docket 
No. NHTSA-2020-0016 for a report of ``New Car Assessment Program 5-
Star Quantitative Consumer Research.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Over the years, NHTSA began to incorporate ADAS technologies into 
NCAP's crash avoidance program. In 2007, NHTSA, for the first time, 
issued an RFC exploring the addition of ADAS technologies in NCAP.\12\ 
Later, based on feedback received from written and oral comments, NHTSA 
published a final decision \13\ expanding NCAP to include certain ADAS 
technologies and specific performance thresholds that a NHTSA-
recommended ADAS system must meet. Beginning with model year 2011, the 
Agency began recommending on its website forward collision warning 
(FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), and electronic stability control 
(ESC),\14\ and identified to shoppers which vehicles have the 
technologies that meet NCAP's performance requirements. NHTSA updated 
NCAP further to include crash imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic 
braking support (DBS)

[[Page 13456]]

technologies, beginning with model year 2018 vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ 72 FR 3473 (January 25, 2007). The RFC included a request 
for comments on a NHTSA report titled, ``The New Car Assessment 
Program (NCAP); Suggested Approaches for Future Enhancements.''
    \13\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
    \14\ ESC was removed from the Agency's list of recommended ADAS 
technologies through NCAP beginning in model year 2014 when the 
technology became mandated under FMVSS No. 126, ``Electronic 
stability control.'' NHTSA also included rear video systems in its 
list of recommended technologies under NCAP from model years 2014 to 
2017 and removed that technology from its list when it became 
mandated under FMVSS No. 111, ``Rear Visibility.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This RFC continues those efforts. Through several notices and 
public meetings, NHTSA has continued discussions with stakeholders 
about which technologies should be included in NCAP and the minimum 
performance thresholds those technologies should meet. NHTSA has set 
forth in Appendix C to this RFC a detailed history of the requests for 
comment, public meetings, and other relevant events that underlie this 
notice.
    The last RFC NHTSA published to discuss potential changes to NCAP 
was published in 2015. It was broad in subject matter and sought 
comment on NCAP's potential use of enhanced tools and techniques for 
evaluating the safety of vehicles, generating star ratings, and 
stimulating further vehicle safety developments.\15\ On the 
crashworthiness front, the RFC sought comment on establishing a new 
frontal oblique test and on using more advanced crash test dummies in 
all tests. The RFC also sought comment about establishing a new crash 
avoidance rating category and including nine advanced crash avoidance 
technologies. Additionally, the RFC sought comment on establishing a 
new pedestrian protection rating category involving the use of adult 
and child head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests and adding two 
new pedestrian crash avoidance technologies. The RFC sought comment on 
combining the three categories (crash avoidance, crashworthiness, and 
pedestrian protection) into one overall 5-star rating. NHTSA also 
received comments at two public hearings, one in Detroit, Michigan, on 
January 14, 2016, and the second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in 
Washington, DC, on January 29, 2016. The numerous comments received on 
the RFC are discussed in a section below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In October 2018, NHTSA hosted a third public meeting to re-engage 
stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the Agency plan the 
future of NCAP.\16\ The Agency has also been working to finalize its 
research efforts on pedestrian crash protection, advanced 
anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) in frontal and side 
impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, and an updated rollover 
risk curve. As discussed in the roadmap, NHTSA plans to upgrade the 
NCAP crashworthiness program in phases over the next several years with 
the knowledge it has acquired from the research programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ October 1, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. ADAS Performance Testing Program

    ADAS technologies have the potential to increase safety by 
preventing crashes or mitigating the severity of crashes that might 
otherwise lead to injury and death. NCAP currently conducts performance 
verification tests for four ADAS technologies: Forward collision 
warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent braking 
(CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS). CIB and DBS are collectively 
referred to as automatic emergency braking (AEB). Vehicles that are 
equipped with one or more of these systems and pass NCAP's performance 
test requirements are listed as ``Recommended'' on NHTSA's website. 
When the Agency first began recommending FCW and LDW systems for model 
year 2011 vehicles, the fitment rate for these systems was less than 
0.2 percent (where ``fitment rate'' means the percent of vehicles 
equipped with a particular ADAS system). For model year 2018 vehicles, 
38.3 percent were equipped with FCW and 30.1 percent were equipped with 
LDW.\17\ Providing vehicle safety information through NCAP can be an 
effective approach to advance the deployment of safer vehicle designs 
and technology in the U.S. market, inform consumer choices, and 
encourage adoption of new technologies that have life-saving potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With this notice, NHTSA is proposing to incorporate four additional 
ADAS technologies into NCAP's crash avoidance program: Lane keeping 
support (LKS), pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB), blind 
spot warning (BSW), and blind spot intervention (BSI). Each of these 
technologies meets the Agency's established criteria for inclusion in 
NCAP: (1) The technology addresses a safety need; (2) system designs 
exist that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) the technology provides 
the potential for safety benefits; and (4) a performance-based 
objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance.\18\ 
Details about how each of the proposed ADAS technologies addresses a 
safety need (criterion 1) will be discussed immediately below, while 
the remaining criteria will be discussed in the relevant sections under 
each technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 78 FR 20599 (Apr. 5, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To gain an understanding of the safety need that current ADAS 
technologies may address, NHTSA analyzed crash data for 84 mutually 
exclusive pre-crash scenarios.\19\ The pre-crash scenarios used in the 
Agency's analysis were devised using a typology \20\ concept \21\ 
published by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe), 
which categorizes crashes into dynamically distinct scenarios based on 
pre-crash vehicle movements and critical events. As detailed in the 
referenced March 2019 report, NHTSA mapped the pre-crash scenario 
typologies to twelve currently available ADAS technologies \22\ 
believed to potentially address certain pre-crash scenarios by 
assisting the driver to avoid or mitigate a crash. These mappings 
served to define the corresponding crash populations (i.e., target 
crash populations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \20\ A typology is the study or analysis of something, or the 
classification of something, based on types or categories.
    \21\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios 
based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 745), 
Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
    \22\ The twelve ADAS technologies were as follows: FCW, DBS, 
CIB, LDW, LKS, lane centering assist (LCA), BSW, BSI, lane change/
merge warning, PAEB, RAB, and rear cross-traffic alert.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since several ADAS technologies presently available on passenger 
vehicles \23\ are designed to mitigate the same crash scenarios, NHTSA 
first grouped the technologies with similar design intent into 
categories. The five technology categories that resulted from this 
grouping process include: (1) Forward collision prevention, (2) lane 
keeping, (3) blind spot detection, (4) forward pedestrian impact, and 
(5) backing collision avoidance. As shown in Table A-6, these 
categories address the following high-level crash types: (1) Rear-end; 
(2) rollover, lane departure, and road departure; (3) lane change/
merge; (4) pedestrian; and (5) backing, respectively. Of the original 
84 pre-crash scenarios studied, we mapped 34 relevant pre-crash 
scenario typologies to the five resulting technology categories that 
represented these crash types.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Passenger vehicles were defined as cars, crossovers, sport 
utility vehicles (SUVs), light trucks, and vans having a gross 
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The forward collision prevention category included three ADAS 
technologies: Forward collision warning, crash imminent braking, and 
dynamic brake support (FCW, CIB, and

[[Page 13457]]

DBS, respectively). The lane keeping category included lane departure 
warning (LDW), lane keeping support (LKS),\24\ and lane centering 
assist (LCA). The blind spot detection category included blind spot 
warning (BSW),\25\ blind spot intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge 
warning. The forward pedestrian impact avoidance category included 
pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB). Lastly, the backing 
collision avoidance category included rear automatic braking (RAB) and 
rear cross-traffic alert (RCTA). These ADAS technologies are 
characterized as SAE International (SAE) Level 0-1 \26\ driving 
automation systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The study uses the term ``lane keeping assist'' (LKA), but 
NCAP terminology differs. NCAP uses the term ``lane keeping 
support'' throughout this document instead.
    \25\ Similarly, the study uses the term ``blind spot detection'' 
(BSD) but NCAP uses the term blind spot warning (BSW) throughout 
this document instead.
    \26\ SAE International (2018), Taxonomy and definitions for 
terms related to driving automation systems for on-road motor 
vehicles (SAE J3016). Level 0: No Automation--The full-time 
performance by the human driver of all aspects of the dynamic 
driving task, even when enhanced by warning or intervention systems. 
Level 1: Driver Assistance--The driving mode-specific execution by a 
driver assistance system of either steering or acceleration/
deceleration using information about the driving environment and 
with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining 
aspects of the dynamic driving task.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA derived target crash populations for each of the five 
technology categories using 2011 to 2015 Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System (FARS) and National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates 
System (NASS GES) data sets, which serve as records of police-reported 
fatal and non-fatal crashes, respectively, on the nation's roads. For a 
given technology category, we compiled data for each of the 
corresponding pre-crash scenarios to generate target crash populations 
surrounding the number of crashes, fatalities, non-fatal injuries, and 
property-damage-only vehicles (PDOVs).\27\ See Table 1 for a breakdown 
of target crash populations for each technology category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ PDOVs are vehicles damaged in non-injury-producing crashes 
(i.e., crashes in which vehicles only incur property damage and no 
occupants incur injury).
    \28\ Defined as reverse automatic braking in DOT HS 812 653.

                             Table 1--Summary of Target Crashes by Technology Group
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Safety systems               Crashes             Fatalities       MAIS 1-5 injuries          PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. FCW/DBS/CIB..............    1,703,541 (29.4%)         1,275 (3.8%)      883,386 (31.5%)    2,641,884 (36.3%)
2. LDW/LKA/LCA..............    1,126,397 (19.4%)       14,844 (44.3%)      479,939 (17.1%)      863,213 (11.9%)
3. BSW/BSI/LCM..............       503,070 (8.7%)           542 (1.6%)       188,304 (6.7%)      860,726 (11.8%)
4. PAEB.....................       111,641 (1.9%)        4,106 (12.3%)       104,066 (3.7%)         6,985 (0.1%)
5. RAB/RvAB \28\ RCTA.......       148,533 (2.6%)            74 (0.2%)        35,268 (1.3%)       231,317 (3.2%)
    Combined................       3,593,18 (62%)       20,841 (62.2%)    1,690,963 (60.3%)    4,604,125 (63.3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is important to note that target crash populations for the five 
technology categories covered 62 percent of all crashes. Crossing path 
crashes, which also represented a large crash population and a 
significant number of fatalities, were not part of our analysis because 
we are not aware of a currently available ADAS technology that can 
effectively mitigate this crash type.\29\ However, there are emerging 
safety countermeasures that hold potential to address some portion of 
these crashes in the future and these technologies will be considered 
for NCAP as they mature. These include intersection safety assist (ISA) 
systems that use onboard sensors with a wide field of view (e.g., 
cameras, lidar, radar) as well as vehicle communications systems.\30\ 
\31\ Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes \32\ also had a 
relatively high target population and fatality rate,\33\ but were not 
included because, aside from electronic stability control (ESC) 
systems, which are mandated,\34\ the Agency is not aware of an ADAS 
technology that effectively prevents this crash type and also meets 
NHTSA's criteria for inclusion in NCAP at this time.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ In its 2019 report, Volpe found that of the 5,480,886 light 
vehicle crashes occurring from 2011 through 2015, crossing path 
crashes, which totaled 1,131,273, represented 21 percent of all 
light vehicle crashes and 16 percent (3,972) of all fatalities 
(25,350).
    \30\ NHTSA recognizes that ISA systems are currently available 
on a small number of light vehicles. However, preliminary NHTSA 
testing has shown that current-generation ISA systems have only 
limited capabilities and therefore would not effectively mitigate 
intersection-related crashes at this time--which is one of the 
requirements in the four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.
    \31\ Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) 
technologies have the potential to address crossing path crashes, 
but, while NHTSA remains strongly interested in these technologies, 
they are not included in the current roadmap. NHTSA is continuing to 
consider the various issues that bear upon the deployment path of 
V2X, including technological evolution and regulatory changes to the 
radio spectrum environment.
    \32\ Crash scenarios were categorized by the first sequence of a 
crash event. Target crashes for a technology (e.g., lane-keeping 
crashes) were a collective of crash scenarios that are relevant to 
the technology. The Loss-of-control in single-vehicle scenario was 
defined as crashes where the first event was initiated by a 
passenger vehicle, and the event was coded as jackknife or traction 
loss. This crash scenario is mutually exclusive from those included 
in the lane-keeping crashes.
    \33\ Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes are about 1% of 
crashes and associated with 3% of fatalities.
    \34\ Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126.
    \35\ In its 2019 report, Volpe categorized 9 percent (470,733) 
of all light vehicle crashes (5,480,886) occurring from 2011 through 
2015 as control loss crashes. Furthermore, 18 percent (4,456) of all 
fatal crashes (25,350) were due to control loss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Of the pre-crash typologies included in NHTSA's March 2019 study, 
rear-end collisions were found to be the most common crash type with an 
annual average of 1,703,541 crashes. Rear-end collisions represented 
29.4 percent of all annual crashes (5,799,883), followed by lane 
keeping typologies (1,126,397 crashes or 19.4 percent), and those 
relating to blind spot detection (503,070 crashes or 8.7 percent). 
Backing crashes (148,533) represented 2.6 percent of all crashes, 
followed by forward pedestrian crashes (111,641) at 1.9 percent.
    Rear-end collisions also had the highest number of Maximum 
Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) \36\ 1-5 injuries at 883,386, which 
represented 31.5 percent of all non-fatal injuries (2,806,260) in Table 
A-1. Lane keeping crashes had the second highest number of injuries at 
479,939 (17.1 percent), as shown in Table A-2, and blind spot crashes 
had the third highest at 188,304 (6.7 percent), as shown in Table A-3. 
These typologies were followed by forward pedestrian crashes at 3.7

[[Page 13458]]

percent and backing crashes at 1.3 percent, as shown in Table A-4.\37\ 
\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is a classification 
system for assessing impact injury severity developed and published 
by the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine and is 
used for coding single injuries, assessing multiple injuries, or for 
assessing cumulative effects on more than one injury. AIS ranks 
individual injuries by body region on a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 = 
minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 = critical, and 6 = 
maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury severity, 
or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., the highest single AIS 
for a person with one or more injuries). MAIS 0 means no injury.
    \37\ The study uses the term ``impacts'' but for consistency 
purposes, NCAP uses the term ``crashes'' in this paragraph.
    \38\ The Agency notes that the highest number of serious 
injuries (i.e., MAIS 3-5 injuries) were recorded for lane keeping 
crashes (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal injuries), followed 
by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent), forward pedestrian 
crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot crashes (3,476 or 0.12 
percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA found that the lane keeping technology category, represented 
by rollover, lane departure, and road departure crashes, included the 
highest number of fatalities: 14,844, or 44.3 percent of all fatalities 
(33,477), as shown in Table A-2. This was followed by the forward 
pedestrian impact category, which included 4,106 pedestrian fatalities 
(12.3 percent), as shown in Table A-4. The forward collision prevention 
category, made up of rear-end crashes, included 1,275 fatalities (3.8 
percent), as shown in Table A-1.\39\ The blind spot detection 
technology category, represented by lane change/merge crashes, 
accounted for 1.6 percent of all fatalities, as shown in Table A-3. 
This was followed by backing crashes at 0.2 percent, as shown in Table 
A-5, which defined the backing collision avoidance category. The Agency 
notes that forward pedestrian crashes, which comprised the forward 
pedestrian impact category, ranked second highest for fatalities, and 
were the deadliest based on frequency of fatalities per crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Similarly, the study uses the term ``impacts'' but for 
consistency purposes, NCAP uses the term ``crashes'' in this 
paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In selecting the ADAS technologies to include in this proposal, the 
Agency wanted not only to target the most frequently occurring crash 
types, but also prioritize the most fatal and highest risk crashes. 
Based on the target crash populations studied, NHTSA believes that 
those represented by the forward collision prevention, lane keeping, 
blind spot detection, and forward pedestrian impact technology 
categories account for the most significant safety need.
    The Agency notes that ADAS technologies representing the backing 
collision avoidance category (i.e., RAB, RvAB, and RCTA) are not being 
proposed for this program update. The backing collision avoidance 
category did not appear in the top third for number of crashes, number 
of fatalities, or number of MAIS 1-5 injuries. This may be due, in 
part, to the fact that a significant part of this crash target 
population is addressed by FMVSS No. 111, ``Rear visibility.'' \40\ The 
Agency needs additional time to assess all available real-world data 
and study the effects of the recent full implementation of FMVSS No. 
111 prior to considering adoption of ADAS technologies designed to 
prevent backing crashes in NCAP. Furthermore, while the Agency 
acknowledges that it previously proposed adding rear automatic braking 
(RAB) to NCAP in the December 2015 notice, it is continuing to make 
changes to the RAB test procedure published in support of that proposal 
to address the comments received. Thus, it is not proposing to add this 
technology to NCAP at this time. The Agency may propose adding to NCAP 
ADAS technologies that address the backing pre-crash typologies as the 
Agency continues to analyze the real-world data and refine test 
procedure revisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ 49 CFR 571.111. See 79 FR 19177 (Apr. 07, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Units of measure contained within this notice include meters (m), 
kilometers (km), millimeters per second (mm/s), meters per second (m/
s), kilometers per hour (kph), feet (ft.), inches per second (in./s), 
feet per second (ft./s), miles per hour (mph), seconds (s), and 
kilograms (kg).

A. Lane Keeping Technologies

    A study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes \41\ from the 
National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Study (NMVCCS) \42\ identified 
that 42 percent of lane departure crashes (i.e., where the driver left 
the lane of travel prior to the crash) resulted in a rollover and 37 
percent resulted in an opposite direction crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & 
Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane 
crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to 
assess lane keeping technologies, 25th International Conference on 
the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan. June 2017, Paper 
Number 17-0220.
    \42\ The National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (NMVVCS) 
was a nationwide survey of 5,471 crashes involving light passenger 
vehicles, with a focus on factors related to pre-crash events, which 
were investigated by the U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA 
over a 2.5-year period from July 3, 2005, to December 31, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After analyzing NHTSA's 2019 target population study, NHTSA 
believes that lane keeping technologies such as lane departure warning 
(LDW), lane keeping support (LKS), and lane centering assist (LCA), can 
address ten pre-crash scenarios including the prevention or mitigation 
of roadway departures and crossing the centerline or median (i.e., 
opposite direction crashes). These pre-crash scenarios represented on 
average 1.13 million crashes annually or 19.4 percent of all crashes 
that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 14,844 fatalities and 
479,939 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-2. This equals 44.3 
percent of all fatalities and 17.1 percent of all injuries 
recorded.\43\ \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \44\ When only serious injuries (i.e., MAIS 3-5 injuries) were 
considered, lane keeping crashes represented the highest number of 
non-fatal injuries (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal 
injuries), followed by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent), 
forward pedestrian crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot 
crashes (3,476 or 0.12 percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02 
percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NCAP currently provides information on the performance of LDW, one 
of the lane keeping ADAS technologies. LDW was introduced in the 
program in 2010 for model year 2011 vehicles.\45\ At the time, the 
fitment rate for LDW was less than 0.2 percent. In model year 2018, it 
was 30.1 percent.\46\ Although the adoption rate for LDW has increased 
over this period, it has not increased as significantly as the fitment 
rate for forward collision warning (FCW), which saw an approximate 40 
percent increase over the same time period. A possible explanation 
regarding the lower fitment rate for LDW will be discussed in the next 
section. A second lane keeping ADAS technology that the Agency believes 
is appropriate for inclusion in NCAP is LKS. NHTSA believes that LKS 
may provide additional safety benefits that LDW cannot and may more 
effectively address the number of fatalities and injuries related to 
lane departure crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
    \46\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)
    Lane departure warning is a NHTSA-recommended technology that is 
currently included in NCAP to mitigate lane departure crashes. LDW 
systems are used to help prevent crashes that result when a driver 
unintentionally allows a vehicle to drift out of its lane of travel. 
These systems often use camera-based sensors to detect lane markers, 
such as solid lines (including those marked for bike lanes), dashed 
lines, or raised reflective indicators such as Botts' Dots, ahead of 
the vehicle.\47\ Lane departure alerts are presented to the driver when 
the system detects that the vehicle is laterally approaching or 
crossing the lane markings. The alert may be visual, audible, and/or 
haptic in

[[Page 13459]]

nature. Visual alerts may show which side of the vehicle is departing 
the lane, and haptic alerts may be presented as steering wheel or seat 
vibrations to alert the driver. It is expected that an LDW alert will 
warn the driver of the unintentional lane shift so the driver can steer 
the vehicle back into its lane. When a turn signal is activated, the 
LDW system acknowledges that the lane change is intentional and does 
not alert the driver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Note that performance of LDW systems may be adversely 
affected by precipitation or poor roadway conditions due to 
construction, unmarked intersections, faded/worn/missing lane 
markings, markings covered with water, etc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As NHTSA continues its assessment of LDW systems under NCAP, it 
plans to use the current NCAP test procedure titled, ``Lane Departure 
Warning System Confirmation Test and Lane Keeping Support Performance 
Documentation,'' dated February 2013.\48\ This protocol assesses the 
system's ability to issue an alert in response to a driving situation 
intended to represent an unintended lane departure and to quantify the 
test vehicle's position relative to the lane line at the time of the 
LDW alert. In NCAP's LDW tests, a test vehicle is accelerated from rest 
to a test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) while travelling in a straight 
line parallel to a single lane line comprised of one of three marking 
types: Continuous white lines, discontinuous (i.e., dashed) yellow 
lines, or discontinuous raised pavement markers (i.e., Botts' Dots). 
The test vehicle is driven such that the centerline of the vehicle is 
approximately 1.8 m (6 ft.) from the lane edge. This path must be 
maintained, and the test speed must be achieved, at least 61.0 m (200 
ft.) prior to the start gate. Once the driver reaches the start gate, 
he or she manually inputs sufficient steering to achieve a lane 
departure with a target lateral velocity of 0.5 m/s (1.6 ft./s) with 
respect to the lane line. The driver of the vehicle does not activate 
the turn signal at any point during the test and does not apply any 
sudden inputs to the accelerator pedal, steering wheel, or brake pedal. 
The test vehicle is driven at constant speed throughout the maneuver. 
The test ends when the vehicle crosses at least 0.5 m (1.7 ft.) over 
the edge of the lane line marking. The scenario is performed for two 
different departure directions, left and right, and for all three lane 
marking types, resulting in a total of six test conditions. Five 
repeated trials runs are performed per test condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013, 
February). Lane departure warning system confirmation test and lane 
keeping support performance documentation. See https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    LDW performance for each test trial is evaluated by examining the 
proximity of the vehicle with respect to the edge of a lane line at the 
time of the LDW alert. The LDW alert must not occur when the lateral 
position of the vehicle, represented by a two-dimensional polygon,\49\ 
is greater than 0.8 m (2.5 ft.) from the inboard edge of the lane line 
(i.e., the line edge closest to the vehicle when the lane departure 
maneuver is initiated), and must occur before the lane departure 
exceeds 0.3 m (1 ft.). To pass the test, the LDW system must satisfy 
the pass criteria for three of the first five valid individual trials 
\50\ for each combination of departure direction and lane line type (60 
percent) and for 20 of the 30 trials overall (66 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ The two-dimensional polygon is defined by the vehicle's 
axles in the X-direction (fore-aft), the outer edge of the vehicle's 
tire in the Y-direction (lateral), and the ground in the Z-direction 
(vertical).
    \50\ Trial or test trial is a test among a set of tests 
conducted under the same test conditions (including test speed) with 
the same subject vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NCAP's LDW test conditions represent pre-crash scenarios that 
correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed 
in real-world lane departure crashes. In its independent review of the 
2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe showed that approximately 40 
and 30 percent of fatalities in fatal road departure and opposite 
direction crashes, respectively, occurred when the posted speed was 
72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.\51\ Similarly, the data indicated 64 and 63 
percent of injuries resulted from road departure and opposite direction 
crashes, respectively, that occurred when the posted speed was 72.4 kph 
(45 mph) or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash 
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although travel speed was unknown or not reported for a high 
percentage of crashes in FARS and GES,\52\ when travel speed was 
reported, approximately 6 and 9 percent of fatal road departure and 
opposite direction crashes, respectively, occurred at travel speeds of 
72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Likewise, the data showed 22 and 25 percent 
of the police-reported non-fatal road departure and opposite direction 
crashes, respectively, occurred at 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Volpe's 
data review indicates that speeding is prevalent in lane departure 
relevant pre-crash scenarios, but most road departure- and opposite 
direction-related fatalities and injuries did not occur on highways. 
For instance, 79 percent of road departure-related fatal crashes and 89 
percent of road departure-related police-reported injuries occurred on 
roads that were not highways. Similarly, for opposite direction-related 
crashes, 87 percent of fatalities and 98 percent of injuries did not 
occur on highways. Because highway driving speeds are on average much 
higher than non-highway speeds, the Volpe data about a high percentage 
of crashes occurring at speeds under 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears 
accurate. The test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears to address a 
large portion of the travel speeds where the crashes are occurring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ For road departure crashes, 63 and 68 percent of the travel 
speed data, respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and 
GES. For opposite direction crashes, 65 and 67 percent of the data, 
respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and GES.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, 62 percent of road departure-related fatalities and 76 
percent of road departure-related injuries occurred on straight roads, 
thereby aligning with NCAP's test procedure. For opposite direction-
related crashes, 69 percent of fatalities and 67 percent of police-
reported injuries occurred on straight roads.
    In its December 2015 notice,\53\ NHTSA expressed concern that the 
safety benefits afforded by LDW technology were being diminished due to 
false activations. Several studies referenced in that notice had found 
that drivers were choosing to disable their vehicle's LDW system 
because it was issuing alerts too frequently. The Agency was also 
concerned about missed detections resulting from tar lines reflecting 
sun light or covered with water and other unforeseen anomalies that 
cause unreliable driver warnings. To address these issues and improve 
consumer acceptance, NHTSA requested comment in 2015 on whether to 
revise certain aspects of NCAP's LDW test procedure. Specifically, the 
Agency solicited comment on whether it is feasible to (1) award NCAP 
credit to LDW systems that only provide haptic alerts, and (2) develop 
additional test scenarios to address false activations and missed 
detections. The Agency also proposed to tighten the inboard lane 
tolerance for its LDW test procedure from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 1.0 
ft.). In doing this, an LDW alert could only occur within a window of 
+0.3 to -0.3 m (+1.0 to -1.0 ft.) with respect to the inside edge of 
the lane line to pass NCAP's LDW procedure. This proposal effectively 
increased the space in which a vehicle could operate within a lane 
before triggering of an LDW alert was permitted. Each of these topics 
are

[[Page 13460]]

discussed in detail in the sections that follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Haptic Alerts
    With respect to haptic warnings, NHTSA mentioned in its December 
2015 notice that these alerts may offer greater consumer acceptance 
compared to audible alerts, and thus improve the effectiveness of LDW 
alerts if the driver does not view the alerts as a nuisance and 
disengage the system. In response to the notice, commenters generally 
did not support a haptic alert requirement. Some commenters suggested 
that requiring a specific feedback type would unnecessarily limit the 
manufacturer's flexibility to issue warnings to the driver, 
particularly when considering the potential effectiveness of different 
feedback types and the need to optimize human-machine interface (HMI) 
designs to address a suite of ADAS. Bosch suggested the Agency should 
allow all warning options to promote the availability of such systems 
in a greater number of vehicles, which should ultimately increase 
consumer awareness and encourage vehicle safety improvements. Advocates 
stated that the Agency should provide details on the effectiveness of 
the different types of sensory feedback (visual, auditory, haptic) to 
justify its decision to encourage one warning type over another. 
Consumers Union (CU) suggested awarding credit for all LDW feedback 
types and awarding additional points or credit for haptic alerts to 
encourage this feedback type in the future. The Automotive Safety 
Council (ASC) acknowledged that haptic warnings may improve driver 
acceptance of LDW systems but suggested that false activations must 
also be reduced to realize improved consumer acceptance and additional 
safety benefits.
    In a large-scale telematics-based study conducted by UMTRI \54\ for 
NHTSA on LDW usage, researchers investigated driver behavior in 
reaction to alerts. Two types of vehicles were included in the study: 
Vehicles with audible-only alerts and vehicles where the driver had the 
option to select either an audible or haptic alert. When the latter was 
available, the driver selected the haptic warning 90 percent of the 
time. Otherwise, the LDW system was turned ``off'' 38 percent of the 
time and thus was not providing alerts. For the system that only 
provided the audible warning, the LDW was turned ``off'' 71 percent of 
the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K., 
Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C., 
and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward 
collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the findings from the UMTRI's research, NHTSA concludes 
that haptic alerts improve driver acceptance of LDW systems. However, 
the Agency is not certain if an increase in driver acceptance will 
translate to an improvement in the overall efficacy of the LDW system 
in reducing crashes. Furthermore, NHTSA does not want to hinder 
optimization of HMI designs given the increasing number of ADAS 
technologies available in vehicles today. Therefore, the Agency has 
decided not to require a specific alert modality for LDW warnings in 
its related NCAP test procedure at this time, but is requesting comment 
on whether this decision is appropriate. Although NHTSA has limited 
data on the effectiveness of the various alert types, it has some 
concern (similar to the one raised for FCW) that certain LDW systems, 
such as those that may provide only a visual alert, may be less 
effective than other alert options in medium or high urgency 
situations.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., Huey, 
R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, September), Human factors for 
connected vehicles: Effective warning interface research findings 
(Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. False Positive Tests
    In responding to the 2015 RFC, vehicle manufacturers and suppliers 
asserted that additional false positive test requirements were not 
needed even though they acknowledged NHTSA's concern regarding the 
effect of nuisance alerts on consumer acceptance. Specifically, the 
Alliance \56\ stated that vehicle manufacturers will optimize their 
systems to minimize false positive activations for consumer acceptance 
purposes, and thus such tests will not be necessary. Similarly, Honda 
stated that vehicle manufacturers must already account for false 
positives when considering marketability and HMI. The manufacturer also 
indicated that it would be difficult for the Agency to create a valid 
false positive test procedure that is robust and repeatable. Mobileye, 
Bosch, and MTS Systems Corporation (MTS) also agreed. In fact, Mobileye 
explained that it would be hard to reproduce the exact test conditions, 
especially with respect to weather, over multiple test locations. Also, 
Bosch stated that the specialized tests required to address the 
Agency's concern may not be truly representative of all real-world 
driving situations that the system encounters. MTS suggested that, 
alternatively, a new test could be added to NCAP's LDW test procedure 
that would evaluate whether an LDW system can inform the driver that it 
is no longer able to issue warnings due to poor environmental 
conditions or other reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ After submitting individual comments on the 2015 RFC, the 
Alliance and Global Automakers merged to form the Alliance for 
Automotive Innovation. This document addresses the individual 
comments from the organizations that were then the Alliance and 
Global Automakers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the concerns expressed regarding repeatability and 
reproducibility of test conditions, and the fact that the Agency's data 
do not currently support adoption of a false positive assessment for 
lane keeping technologies, NHTSA continues to monitor the consumer 
complaint data related to false positives to help inform an appropriate 
next step.
    With respect to the recommendation from MTS, the Agency recognizes 
that vehicle manufacturers install LDW telltales on the instrument 
panel that illuminate to inform drivers when the system is operational. 
The systems are typically operational when the vehicle's travel speed 
has reached a preset activation threshold speed and the lane markings 
and environmental conditions are appropriate. The telltale will 
disappear if those conditions are not met to inform the driver that the 
system is no longer operational. In such a state, the system will not 
provide an alert if the vehicle departs the travel lane. Given this 
feature, NHTSA has decided a test to inform the driver that the system 
is no longer issuing warnings is unnecessary at this time.
c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications
    Support was varied with respect to NHTSA's proposal in the December 
2015 notice to modify the LDW test requirements to reduce the leeway 
for system activation inside of a lane line from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 
1.0 ft.). Global Automakers stated that the proposed change was 
``unduly prescriptive'' and recommended that the Agency retain the 
existing lane line tolerance. The organization explained that research 
showed 90 percent of drivers needed 1.2 s to react to a warning.\57\ 
Citing NCAP's LDW test procedure, which requires a steering input 
having a target lateral velocity of 0.5 to 0.6 m/s (1.6 to 2 ft./s), 
the trade association remarked that this requirement equates to a 
necessary warning distance of 0.6 to 0.72 m (1.9 to 2.4 ft.) to ensure 
that 90 percent of drivers can react in time to prevent a

[[Page 13461]]

lane departure. Advocates agreed that nuisance notifications are a 
concern for driver acceptance, but noted that the Agency provided 
little information about the effectiveness of LDW systems meeting the 
proposed criteria. Conversely, Delphi, ASC, and MTS commented that some 
of the more robust systems that are currently available should be able 
to comply with the narrower specification. However, ASC suggested that 
the Agency may want to evaluate the impact of the proposed changes 
before finalizing the requirements to ensure that narrowing the lane 
line tolerances translates to a reduction in false positive alerts, and 
thus higher consumer acceptance for LDW systems. Mobileye stated that 
the tolerance reduction should increase the required accuracy and 
quality of lane keeping systems. MTS remarked that systems meeting the 
tighter specification will produce higher driver satisfaction, and, in 
turn, system use, compared to those that meet only the current 
requirements. Hyundai Motor Company (Hyundai) also supported the 
tolerance revision. Consumers Union (CU) agreed with others that the 
narrowed lateral tolerance should reduce the issuance of false alerts 
on main roadways but cautioned the Agency that this change may not 
effectively address false alerts on secondary or curved roads, as 
vehicles not only tend to approach within one foot of lane lines, but 
also may cross them. The group suggested that false alert conditions be 
subject to speed limitations or GPS-based position sensors to avoid 
``over activation'' on secondary or curved roads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Tanaka, S., Mochida, T., Aga, M., & Tajima, J. (2012, April 
16). Benefit Estimation of a Lane Departure Warning System using 
ASSTREET. SAE Int. J. Passeng. Cars--Electron. Electr. Syst. 
5(1):133-145, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4271/2012-01-0289.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given NHTSA's goal of reducing nuisance notifications to increase 
consumer acceptance of LDW systems and the statements from several 
commenters that current LDW systems can meet the proposed reduced test 
specification, the Agency believes it is reasonable to propose adopting 
the reduced inboard lane tolerance of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.).
    In addition to the comments received pertaining to the lane line 
tolerance, the Agency also received several suggestions to adopt 
additional test scenarios for NCAP's LDW test procedure or make 
alternative procedural modifications. Similar to CU's suggestion above 
for curved roads, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA add inner and outer 
curve scenarios that allow a larger tolerance for the inner lane 
boundary than that permitted on a straight road. The company further 
recommended that the Agency add road edge detection scenarios, 
including curbs and non-structural delimiters such as gravel or dirt, 
to reflect real-world conditions and crash scenarios more accurately. 
Similarly, Bosch suggested that NHTSA consider introducing road edge 
detection requirements in addition to lane markings since not all roads 
have lane markings. Additionally, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA alter 
the Botts' Dots detail #4 (Botts dots are round, raised markers that 
mark lanes) to align with California detail #13, which is more common, 
and modify the test procedure to include Botts' Dots on both sides of 
the lane or Botts' Dots and a solid line, as these are the most 
frequently observed marking pairings.
    The Agency appreciates suggestions from commenters and agrees that 
there is merit to considering other procedural modifications for NCAP's 
lane departure test procedure(s). As will be discussed in the next 
section, the Agency is planning to conduct a feasibility study to 
determine whether curved roads can be considered for inclusion in NCAP 
test procedures to evaluate LKS systems objectively. NHTSA also plans 
to perform research to assess how lane keeping system performance on a 
test track compares to real-world data for different combinations of 
curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing. Additionally, the 
Agency recognizes that the European NCAP program (Euro NCAP) has 
adopted a road edge detection test that is conducted in a similar 
manner to their ``lane keep assist'' tests (described in the next 
section), but the road edge detection test does not use lane markings. 
Although NHTSA believes the number of vehicles equipped with an ability 
to recognize and respond to road edges not defined with a lane line is 
presently low, it has identified roadways where this capability could 
prevent crashes. Therefore, the Agency is requesting comment on whether 
a road edge detection test for either LDW and/or LKS is appropriate for 
inclusion in NCAP. In consideration of the lane markings currently 
assessed, the Agency proposes to remove the Botts' Dots test scenario 
from the current LDW test, as the lane marking type is being removed 
from use in California.\58\ At this time, the Agency believes the 
traditional dashed and solid lane marking tests would be sufficient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-
century, will disappear from freeways, highways, The Orange County 
Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although NHTSA has tentatively decided not to adopt additional 
false activation requirements for this NCAP upgrade, the Agency is 
still concerned about the low effectiveness of LDW and its lack of 
consumer acceptance stemming from nuisance alerts and missed 
detections.
    When NHTSA decided to include ADAS in the NCAP program in 2008,\59\ 
LDW was selected because it met NCAP's four established criteria: (1) 
The technology addressed a major crash problem; (2) the system design 
of LDW had the potential to mitigate the crash problem; (3) safety 
benefits were projected, and (4) test procedures and evaluation 
criteria were available to ensure an acceptable performance level. At 
the time, the Agency estimated that existing LDW systems were 6 to 11 
percent effective in preventing lane departure crashes. Although the 
system's effectiveness was relatively low, NHTSA cited the large number 
of road departure and opposite direction crashes occurring on the 
nation's roadways as well as the resulting AIS 3+ injuries, as reasons 
to include LDW in NCAP. Several recent studies have provided varying 
results with respect to LDW effectiveness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a 2017 study,\60\ the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
(IIHS) concluded that LDW systems were effective in reducing three 
types of passenger car crashes (single-vehicle, side-swipes, and head-
on) by 11 percent, which is the same rate NHTSA originally estimated. 
Importantly, IIHS also concluded that LDW systems reduce injuries in 
those same types of crashes by 21 percent. In its recent study of real-
world effectiveness of crash avoidance technologies in GM vehicles,\61\ 
UMTRI found that LDW systems showed a 3 percent reduction for 
applicable crashes that was determined to be not statistically 
significant. Conversely, the active safety technology, LKS (which also 
included lane departure warning capability), showed an estimated 30 
percent reduction in applicable crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2017, August 23), 
Lane departure warning, blind spot detection help drivers avoid 
trouble, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/stay-within-the-lines-lane-departure-warning-blind-spot-detection-help-drivers-avoid-trouble.
    \61\ Flannagan, C. and Leslie, A., Crash Avoidance Technology 
Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle 
Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other studies that examined driver deactivation rates also suggest 
that LDW effectiveness may be lower than originally estimated. In a 
survey of Honda vehicles brought into Honda

[[Page 13462]]

dealerships for service,\62\ IIHS researchers found that for 184 models 
equipped with an LDW system, only a third of the vehicles had the 
system activated. Furthermore, in its telematics-based study on LDW 
usage,\63\ UMTRI found that, overall, drivers turned off LDW systems 50 
percent of the time. However, in Consumer Reports' August 2019 survey 
of more than 57,000 CR subscribers, the organization found that 73 
percent of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LDW 
technology. In fact, 33 percent said that the system had helped them 
avoid a crash, and 65 percent said that they trusted the system to work 
every time.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, January 28), 
Most Honda owners turn off lane departure warning, Status Report, 
Vol. 51, No. 1, page 6.
    \63\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K., 
Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C., 
and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward 
collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \64\ Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to lane departure 
warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep 
drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of these findings, the Agency believes that, in addition 
to LDW, there is merit to adopting an active lane keeping system, such 
as lane keeping support (LKS), in NCAP. As an enhanced active system, 
LKS offers the steering and/or braking capability necessary to guide a 
vehicle back into its lane without consumer action and should therefore 
further enhance safety benefits beyond those that can be realized by 
LDW. A detailed discussion pertaining to LKS technology is provided in 
the following section.
2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)
    LDW systems warn a driver that their vehicle is unintentionally 
drifting out of their travel lane, while lane keeping support (LKS) 
systems are designed to actively guide a drifting vehicle back into the 
travel lane by gently counter steering or applying differential 
braking. During an unintended lane departure where the driver is not 
using the turn signal, LKS systems help to prevent: ``Sideswiping'' 
where a vehicle strikes another vehicle in an adjacent lane that is 
travelling in the same direction; opposite direction crashes where a 
vehicle crosses the centerline and strikes another vehicle travelling 
in the opposite direction; and road departure crashes where a vehicle 
runs off the road resulting in a rollover crash or an impact with a 
tree or other object. LKS systems may also help to prevent unintended 
lane departures into designated bicycle lanes in situations where the 
system's speed threshold is met.
    LKS systems typically utilize the same camera(s) used by LDW 
systems to monitor the vehicle's position within the lane, and 
determine whether a vehicle is about to drift out of its lane of travel 
unintentionally. In such instances, LKS automatically intervenes by: 
Braking one or more of the vehicle's wheels; steering; or using a 
combination of braking and steering so that the vehicle returns to its 
intended lane of travel. LKS is one of two active lane keeping 
technologies mentioned in the Agency's March 2019 report,\65\ with the 
other being lane centering assist (LCA). LKS assists the driver by 
providing short-duration steering and/or braking inputs when a lane 
departure is imminent or underway, whereas LCA provides continuous 
assistance to the driver to keep their vehicle centered within the 
lane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the previous section, UMTRI evaluated the real-
world effectiveness of ADAS technologies, including LDW and LKS.\66\ 
The results of the LKS study (which also included lane departure 
warning functionality) showed an estimated 30 percent reduction in 
applicable crashes. Additionally, in its August 2019 survey, 74 percent 
of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LKS 
technology, and 35 percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash. 
Sixty-five percent of owners said that they trusted the system to work 
every time.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ Carol Flannagan, Andrew Leslie, Crash Avoidance Technology 
Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle 
Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.
    \67\ Consumer Reports. (2019, August 5), Guide to lane departure 
warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep 
drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its December 2015 notice, NHTSA did not propose including LKS 
technology as part of the update to NCAP. However, many commenters 
recommended that the Agency consider including the technology. For 
instance, Bosch and Mobileye stated that LKS systems have the potential 
to prevent or mitigate a greater number of collisions involving 
injuries and fatalities than LDW systems. The ASC and Delphi 
recommended that the Agency adopt LKS in lieu of LDW, with the ASC 
adding that Euro NCAP has included LKS in its Lane Support Systems test 
protocol since 2016.\68\ \69\ The ASC, Bosch, and Continental noted the 
maturity of LKS technology and stated that such systems were already 
widely available in vehicles produced at the time. Other proponents of 
adopting LKS technology in NCAP include the National Safety Council 
(NSC), ZF TRW, and Honda. ZF TRW recommended that the Agency adopt both 
active lane keeping (termed LKS in this notice) and lane centering 
systems (termed LCA in this notice) due to the high frequency of fatal 
road departure crashes. Honda also supports the active safety benefits 
of LKS and the system's potential to help prevent crashes. NSC 
suggested that the Agency include LKS, as it would complement LDW, 
which is already in the program, similar to the way the warning 
component of FCW complements the active safety functionality of AEB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ The ASC argued that data from the Highway Loss Data 
Institute (HLDI) have shown no statistically significant difference 
in collision claim frequencies for vehicles equipped with LDW 
compared to those without, and questioned whether LDW systems are 
effective in reducing crashes or fatalities.
    \69\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2015, 
November), Test Protocol--Lane Support Systems, Version 1.0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As mentioned previously, the Agency agrees with commenters that 
there is merit to adopting LKS technology in NCAP. However, NHTSA 
believes an LDW system integrated with LKS may be a better approach for 
the Agency to consider rather than replacing LDW with LKS. NHTSA 
believes, as NSC commented, that an integrated approach (inclusive of 
passive and active safety capabilities for lane support systems) would 
be similar to what the Agency is proposing for frontal collision 
avoidance systems, FCW and AEB, later in this notice.
    NHTSA is considering the adoption of certain test methods (e.g., 
those for ``lane keep assist'') contained within the Euro NCAP Test 
Protocol--Lane Support Systems (LSS) \70\ to assess technology design 
differences for LKS. Since the test speeds and road configurations 
specified in this protocol are similar to those stipulated in the 
Agency's LDW test procedure, the Agency believes Euro NCAP's test 
protocol will sufficiently address the lane keeping crash typology 
previously detailed for LDW.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2019, 
July), Test Protocol--Lane Support Systems, Version 3.0.2. See 
section 7.2.5, Lane Keep Assist tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure includes a series of ``lane keep 
assist''

[[Page 13463]]

trials that are performed with iteratively increasing lateral 
velocities towards the desired lane line. Each ``lane keep assist'' 
trial begins with the subject vehicle (SV) (i.e., the vehicle being 
evaluated) being driven at 72 kph (44.7 mph) down a straight lane 
delineated by a single solid white or dashed white line. Initially, the 
SV path is parallel to the lane line, with an offset from the lane line 
that depends on the lateral velocity used later in the maneuver. Then, 
after a short period of steady-state driving, the direction of travel 
of the SV is headed towards the lane line using a path defined by a 
1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) radius curve. The lateral velocity of the SV's 
approach towards the lane line (from both the left and right 
directions) is increased from 0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) in 0.1 
m/s (0.3 ft./s) increments until acceptable LKS performance is no 
longer realized. Acceptable LKS performance occurs when the SV does not 
cross the inboard leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.3 m (1.0 
ft.).
    NHTSA conducted a limited assessment of five model year 2017 
vehicles equipped with LKS systems. The Agency used a robotic steering 
controller to maximize the repeatability and minimize variability 
associated with manual steering inputs. For this study, NHTSA also used 
a slightly modified and older version of Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure 
from what was discussed above. Specifically, the lateral velocity of 
the SV's approach towards the lane line was increased from 0.1 m/s to 
1.0 m/s in 0.1 m/s increments (0.3 ft./s to 3.3 ft./s in 0.3 ft./s 
increments) to assess how LKS systems would perform at higher 
velocities. In addition, LKS performance was considered acceptable 
(when compared to Euro NCAP's assessment criteria at the time of 
NHTSA's testing) for instances where the SV did not cross the inboard 
leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.4 m (1.3 ft.).\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ At the time of testing, an older version of Euro NCAP's LSS 
test procedure was available. This version stipulated a lane keep 
assist assessment criterion of 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) for the maximum 
excursion over the inside edge of the lane marking. European New Car 
Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). See Assessment Protocol--Safety 
Assist, Version 7.0 (2015, November).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A preliminary analysis of the five tested vehicles identified 
performance differences between the vehicles depending on the lateral 
velocity used during the test. Some vehicles only engaged a steering 
response at lower lateral velocities and others continued to provide a 
steering input as the lateral velocity was increased.\72\ The maximum 
excursion over the lane marking after an LKS activation was also found 
to be inconsistent, particularly as lateral velocity increased. These 
preliminary findings suggested that there are performance differences 
in how vehicle manufacturers are designing their systems for a given 
set of operating conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ Wiacek, C., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & Shain, K. 
(2019), Applying lane keeping support test track performance to 
real-world crash data, 26th Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference, 
Eindhoven, Netherlands. June 2019, Paper Number 19-0208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The results from these tests, as measured by the maximum excursions 
over the lane marking, were compared to the measured shoulder width of 
roads where fatal road departure crashes occurred. The analysis 
identified roadways where the shoulder width of the roadway was less 
than the 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) maximum excursion limit (e.g., certain rural 
roadways) used in the Agency's testing. It was observed that only 
vehicles displaying robust LKS performance, including at higher lateral 
velocities, would likely prevent the vehicle from departing the travel 
lane on these roadways. However, most of the roadway departure crashes 
were on roads where the shoulder width exceeded 0.4 m (1.3 ft.). On 
these roadways, assuming the LKS was engaged, the lane departure could 
have been avoided. However, some vehicles did not perform well, with 
several exhibiting no system intervention, and others exceeding the 
maximum excursion limit as the lateral velocity was increased. To 
supplement these initial findings, additional LKS testing has since 
been conducted and is undergoing analysis.
    Since the analysis showed that most fatal crashes identified in the 
study were on roadways having shoulder widths that exceeded the current 
Euro NCAP test excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.), NHTSA believes that 
adopting the Euro NCAP criterion may provide significant safety 
benefits, but is requesting comment on whether an even smaller 
excursion limit may be more appropriate. Furthermore, as the study also 
identified fatal crashes where lane markers were not present on the 
side of the roadway where a departure occurred (such that LKS would not 
provide any benefit unless it had the capability to identify the edge 
of the roadway), the Agency is also requesting comment (as mentioned 
previously) on adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection test to NCAP so 
that it may begin to address crashes that occur where lane markings may 
not be present.
    Based on the findings from NHTSA's LKS testing, which showed 
differences in LKS performance at greater lateral velocities, the 
Agency is concerned about LKS performance at higher travel speeds when 
the vehicle first transitions from a straight to a curved road where 
lateral velocity may inherently be high. In its independent analysis of 
the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that 29 percent of fatal road 
departure crashes and 26 percent of fatal opposite direction crashes 
occurred at known travel speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph). The 
analysis also showed that 55 percent of fatal road departure crashes 
and 67 percent of opposite direction crashes occurred on roads with 
posted speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph).\73\ \74\ Furthermore, the 
study revealed that speeding was a factor in 31 percent and 13 percent 
of fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes, 
respectively.\75\ Since NHTSA does not currently have data to show that 
LKS system performance at Euro NCAP's current test speed of 72 kph 
(44.7 mph) would be indicative of system performance when tested at 
higher speeds, NHTSA is requesting comment on whether it would be 
beneficial to incorporate additional, higher test speeds to assess the 
performance of lane keeping systems in NCAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash 
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \74\ For data where the travel speed was known, 63 and 65 
percent of the data is unknown or not reported in FARS for road 
departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively. For road 
departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, 3 and 1 
percent of the posted speed data is unknown or not reported in FARS.
    \75\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash 
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To date, NHTSA has only performed test track LKS evaluations using 
the straight road test configuration specified in the Euro NCAP test 
procedure. However, the Agency recognizes that a significant portion of 
road departure and opposite direction crashes resulting in fatalities 
and injuries occur on curved roads. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data 
set \76\ showed that for road departure crashes, 37 percent of 
fatalities and 20 percent of injuries occurred on curved roads. For 
opposite direction crashes, 30 percent of fatalities and 31 percent of 
injuries occurred on curved roads. NHTSA is not certain how LKS 
performance observed during straight road trials performed on a test

[[Page 13464]]

track would correlate to real-world system performance on curved roads. 
However, NHTSA believes, based on on-road performance testing 
experience of newer model year vehicles, that some current system 
designs include provisions to address lane departures on curved roads. 
The Agency observed that some LKS systems engage by providing limited 
operation throughout a curve--which may offer little (if any) safety 
benefits. However, other more sophisticated LKS systems maintain 
engagement longer and offer more directional authority throughout a 
curve. These systems may provide additional safety gains because the 
driver has more time to re-engage (i.e., restore effective manual 
control of the vehicle).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In NHTSA's study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes \77\ from 
NMVCCS, crashes that occurred on curved roads \78\ where the driver 
departed the travel lane were analyzed. The analysis showed that, 
unlike for straight roads where LKS systems may provide smaller 
corrective steering inputs to prevent the vehicle from departing the 
lane, LKS systems would have to provide sustained lateral correction 
(i.e., corrective steering) on a curved road to prevent the vehicle 
from departing the lane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & 
Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane 
crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to 
assess lane keeping technologies, 25th International Technical 
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan. 
June 2017, Paper Number 17-0220.
    \78\ It should be noted that the paper identified crashes where 
lane markings were not present on the side of the departure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, in fleet testing of select model year 2012 through 
2018 vehicles equipped with LDW and LKS (referenced in the report as 
LKA), Transport Canada \79\ found variability in test results and 
generally unpredictable system behavior on curved roads. Thus, 
Transport Canada stated that it was not possible to gather enough data 
to assess the potential safety benefits associated with the technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ Meloche, E., Charlebois, D., Anctil, B., Pierre, G., & 
Saleh, A. (2019), ADAS testing in Canada: Could partial automation 
make our roads safer? 26th International Technical Conference on the 
Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Eindhoven, Netherlands, June 2019, 
Paper Number 19-0339.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address these unknowns and further understand the potential 
effectiveness of LKS systems in the real world, the Agency is 
considering additional research to study whether testing on curved 
roads should be considered for objective evaluation of LKS systems, and 
collect a combination of test track and real-world data to quantify how 
LKS systems will operate when exposed to different combinations of 
curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing (e.g., at curve onset 
or midway through the curve).
    With respect to LDW and LKS, NHTSA is seeking comment on the 
following:
    (1) Should the Agency award credit to vehicles equipped with LDW 
systems that provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert type? Why 
or why not? Are there any LDW alert modalities, such as visual-only 
warnings, that the Agency should not consider acceptable when 
determining whether a vehicle meets NCAP's performance test criteria? 
If so, why? Should the Agency consider only certain alert modalities 
(such as haptic warnings) because they are more effective at re-
engaging the driver and/or have higher consumer acceptance? If so, 
which one(s) and why?
    (2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane keeping assist test methods 
from the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency's LKS test procedure, 
should the LDW test procedure be removed from its NCAP program entirely 
and an LDW requirement be integrated into the LKS test procedure 
instead? Why or why not? For systems that have both LDW and LKS 
capabilities, the Agency would simply turn off LKS to conduct the LDW 
test if both systems are to be assessed separately. What tolerances 
would be appropriate for each test, and why?
    (3) LKS system designs provide steering and/or braking to address 
lane departures (e.g., when a driver is distracted).\80\ To help re-
engage a driver, should the Agency specify that an LDW alert must be 
provided when the LKS is activated? Why or why not?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2016, October), Prevalence of 
driver physical factors leading to unintentional lane departure 
crashes, Traffic Injury Prevention, 18(5), 481-487, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2016.1247446.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (4) Do commenters agree that the Agency should remove the Botts' 
Dots test scenario from the current LDW test procedure since this lane 
marking type is being removed from use in California? \81\ If not, why?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-
century, will disappear from freeways, highways, The Orange County 
Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.) 
over the lane marking (as defined with respect to the inside edge of 
the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, or should the limit be 
reduced to account for crashes occurring on roads with limited shoulder 
width? If the tolerance should be reduced, what tolerance would be 
appropriate and why? Should this tolerance be adopted for LDW in 
addition to LKS? Why or why not?
    (6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP specifies use of a 1,200 m 
(3,937.0 ft.) curve and a series of increasing lateral offsets to 
establish the desired lateral velocity of the SV towards the lane line 
it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that use of 
a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a clearer indication of when 
an LKS intervention occurs when compared to the baseline tests 
performed without LKS, a process specified by the Euro NCAP LSS 
protocol. This is because the small curve radius allows the desired SV 
lateral velocity to be more quickly established; requires less initial 
lateral offset within the travel lane; and allows for a longer period 
of steady state lateral velocity to be realized before an LKS 
intervention occurs. Is use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather 
than 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.), acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS 
test procedure? Why or why not?
    (7) Euro NCAP's LSS protocol specifies a single line lane to 
evaluate system performance. However, since certain LKS systems may 
require two lane lines before they can be enabled, should the Agency 
use a single line or two lines lane in its test procedure? Why?
    (8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection 
test to its NCAP program to begin addressing crashes where lane 
markings may not be present? If not, why? If so, should the test be 
added for LDW, LKS, or both technologies?
    (9) The LKS and ``Road Edge'' recovery tests defined in the Euro 
NCAP LSS protocol specify that a range of lateral velocities from 0.2 
to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system performance, and 
that this range is representative of the lateral velocities associated 
with unintended lane departures (i.e., not an intended lane change). 
However, in the same protocol, Euro NCAP also specifies a range of 
lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to 2.0 ft./s) be used to 
represent unintended lane departures during ``Emergency Lane Keeping--
Oncoming vehicle'' and ``Emergency Lane Keeping--Overtaking vehicle'' 
tests. To encourage the most robust LKS system performance, should 
NHTSA consider a combination of the two Euro NCAP unintended departure 
ranges, lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s), for 
inclusion in the Agency's LKS evaluation? Why or why not?
    (10) As discussed above, the Agency is concerned about LKS 
performance on roads that are curved. As such, can the

[[Page 13465]]

Agency correlate better LKS system performance at higher lateral 
velocities on straight roads with better curved road performance? Why 
or why not? Furthermore, can the Agency assume that a vehicle that does 
not exceed the maximum excursion limits at higher lateral velocities on 
straight roads will have superior curved road performance compared to a 
vehicle that only meets the excursion limits at lower lateral 
velocities on straight roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the 
Agency assume the steering intervention while the vehicle is 
negotiating a curve is sustained long enough for a driver to re-engage? 
If not, why?
    (11) The Agency would like to be assured that when a vehicle is 
redirected after an LKS system intervenes to prevent a lane departure 
when tested on one side, if it approaches the lane marker on the side 
not tested, the LKS will again engage to prevent a secondary lane 
departure by not exceeding the same maximum excursion limit established 
for the first side. To prevent potential secondary lane departures, 
should the Agency consider modifying the Euro NCAP ``lane keep assist'' 
evaluation criteria to be consistent with language developed for 
NHTSA's BSI test procedure to prevent this issue? Why or why not? 
NHTSA's test procedure states the SV BSI intervention shall not cause 
the SV to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more beyond the inboard edge of the 
lane line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to 
the right of it within the validity period. To assess whether this 
occurs, a second lane line is required (only one line is specified in 
the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for LKS testing). Does the introduction of a 
second lane line have the potential to confound LKS testing? Why or why 
not?
    (12) Since most fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes 
occur at higher posted and known travel speeds, should the LKS test 
speed be increased, or does the current test speed adequately indicate 
performance at higher speeds, especially on straight roads? Why or why 
not?
    (13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS test procedure currently 
contains many test conditions (i.e., line type and departure 
direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test 
conditions to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test 
only certain conditions to minimize test burden? For instance, should 
the Agency consider incorporating the test conditions for only one 
departure direction if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to 
assure comparable system performance for the other direction? Or, 
should the Agency consider adopting only the most challenging test 
conditions? If so, which conditions are most appropriate? For instance, 
do the dashed line test conditions provide a greater challenge to 
vehicles than the solid line test conditions?
    (14) What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for 
each LKS test condition, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass 
rate for the LKS tests, and why?
    (15) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current LDW or proposed LKS 
test procedure that need further refinement or clarification? Is so, 
what additional refinements or clarifications are necessary?

B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies

    NHTSA's 2019 target population study showed that blind spot 
detection technologies such as blind spot warning (BSW), blind spot 
intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge warning (LCM) (which is 
essentially a BSI warning system), can help prevent or mitigate five 
pre-crash lane change/merge scenarios. These pre-crash movements 
represented, on average, 503,070 crashes annually, or 8.7 percent of 
all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 542 
fatalities and 188,304 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-3. This 
equated to 1.6 percent of all fatalities and 6.7 percent of all 
injuries recorded.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, NCAP does not include any ADAS technology that is 
designed to address blind spot pre-crash scenarios. NHTSA requested 
comment on the inclusion of BSW as part of its upgrade to the program 
in its 2015 notice. Although the Agency did not recommend BSI for 
inclusion at that time, the Agency is proposing that both BSW and BSI 
technologies be adopted as part of this program update.
    Although the target population for blind spot detection technology 
may not be as large as the populations for AEB or lane keeping 
technologies, NHTSA believes there is merit to including blind spot 
technologies in NCAP. Consumer Reports found in its 2019 survey that 82 
percent of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW technology, 60 
percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash, and 68 percent 
stated that they trusted the system to work every time.\83\ The Agency 
believes the technology's high consumer acceptance rate, in addition to 
its potential safety benefits discussed later in this section, supports 
its inclusion in the Agency's signature consumer information program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ Monticello, M. (2017, June 29), The positive impact of 
advanced safety systems for cars: The latest car-safety technologies 
have the potential to significantly reduce crashes, Consumer 
Reports, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/positive-impact-of-advanced-safety-systems-for-cars/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)
    A BSW system is a warning-based driver assistance system designed 
to help the driver recognize that another vehicle is approaching, or 
being operated within, the blind spot of their vehicle in an adjacent 
lane. In these driving situations, and for all production BSW systems 
known to NHTSA, the BSW alert is automatically presented to the driver, 
and is most relevant to a driver who is contemplating, or who has just 
initiated, a lane change. Depending on the system design, additional 
BSW features may be activated if the system is presenting an alert and 
then the driver operates their turn signal indicator.
    BSW systems use camera-, radar-, or ultrasonic-based sensors, or 
some combination thereof, as their means of detection. These sensors 
are typically located on the sides and/or rear of a vehicle. BSW alerts 
may be auditory, visual (most common), or haptic. Visual alerts are 
usually presented in the side outboard mirror glass, inside edge of the 
mirror housing, or at the base of the front a-pillars inside the 
vehicle. When another vehicle enters, or approaches, the driver's blind 
spot while operating in an adjacent lane, the BSW visual alert will 
typically be continuously illuminated. However, if the driver engages 
the turn signal in the direction of the adjacent vehicle while the 
visual alert is present, the visual alert may transition to a flashing 
state and/or be supplemented with an additional auditory or haptic 
alert (e.g., beeping or vibration of the steering wheel or seat, 
respectively).
    NHTSA requested comment on a draft research blind spot detection 
(BSD) test procedure (referred to in this notice as BSW) published on 
November 21, 2019 \84\ to assess systems' performance and capabilities 
in blind spot related pre-crash scenarios. This test procedure 
exercises the BSW system in two different scenarios on the test track: 
the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test, and the Straight Lane 
Pass-by Test. These two tests assess whether the BSW system displays a 
warning when other vehicles, referred to as principal other

[[Page 13466]]

vehicles (POVs), are within the driver's blind spot. The test occurs 
without activation of the tested vehicle's, referred to as the subject 
vehicle (SV), turn signal. Neither the SV nor POV turn signals are to 
be activated at any point during any test trial. A short description of 
each test scenario and the requirements for a passing result is 
provided below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test--The POV and SV 
are driven parallel to each other at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 
mph) such that the front-most part of the POV is 1.0 m (3.3 ft.) ahead 
of the rear-most part of the SV in the outbound lanes of a three-lane 
straight road. After 2.5 s of steady-state driving, the POV enters 
(i.e., converges into) the SV's blind zone \85\ by making a single lane 
change into the lane immediately adjacent to the SV using a lateral 
velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5 ft./s). The period of steady-
state driving resumes for at least another 2.5 s and then the POV exits 
(i.e., diverges from) the SV's blind zone by returning to its original 
travel lane using a lateral velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5 
ft./s). This test is repeated for a POV approach from both the left and 
the right side of the SV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ SV blind zones are defined by two rectangular regions that 
extend to the side and rear of the SV. Each rectangle is 8.2 ft. 
(2.5 m) wide and is represented by lines parallel to the 
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle but offset 1.6 ft. (0.5 m) 
from the outermost edge of the SV's body excluding the side view 
mirror(s). The rearward projection begins at the rearmost part of 
the SV side mirror housing and ends at a rearward boundary that is 
dependent on the relative speed between the SV and POV. The blind 
zone is fully described in the test procedure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    --To pass a test trial: during the converge lane change, the BSW 
alert must be presented by a time no later than 300 ms after any part 
of the POV enters the SV blind zone and must remain on while any part 
of the POV resides within the SV blind zone; and during the diverge 
lane change, the BSW alert may remain active only when the lateral 
distance between the SV and POV is greater than 3 m (9.8 ft.) but less 
than or equal to 6 m (19.7 ft.). The BSW alert shall not be active once 
the lateral distance between the SV and POV exceeds 6 m (19.7 ft.).
     Straight Lane Pass-by Test--The POV approaches and then 
passes the SV while being driven in an adjacent lane. For each trial, 
the SV is traveling at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) whereas 
the POV is traveling at one of four constant speeds--80.5, 88.5, 96.6, 
or 104.6 kph (50, 55, 60, or 65 mph). The lateral distance between the 
two vehicles, defined as the closest lateral distance between adjacent 
sides of the polygons used to represent each vehicle, shall nominally 
be 1.5 m (4.9 ft.) for the duration of the trial. This test is repeated 
for a POV approach towards the SV from an adjacent lane to the left and 
to the right of the SV.
    --To pass a test trial, the BSW alert must be presented by a time 
no later than 300 ms after the front-most part of the POV enters the SV 
blind zone and remain on while the front-most part of the POV resides 
behind the front-most part of the SV blind zone. The BSW alert shall 
not be active once the longitudinal distance between the front-most 
part of the SV and the rear-most part of the POV exceeds the BSW 
termination distance specified for each POV speed.
    For the BSW tests, each scenario is tested using seven repeated 
trials for each combination of approach direction (left and right side 
of the SV) and test speed. This translates to a total of 14 tests 
overall for the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test and 56 tests 
overall for the Straight Lane Pass-by Test. NCAP is proposing that to 
pass the NCAP system performance requirements, the SV must pass at 
least five out of seven trials conducted for each approach direction 
and test speed.
    The proposed BSW tests represent pre-crash scenarios that 
correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed 
in real-world lane change crashes. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data 
set showed that approximately 28 percent of fatalities and 57 percent 
of injuries in lane change crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds 
of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\86\ For crashes where the travel speed 
was reported in FARS and GES, approximately 14 percent of fatalities 
and 24 percent of injuries occurred at speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or 
lower.\87\ Furthermore, Volpe found that speeding was a factor in only 
18 percent of the fatal lane change crashes and 3 percent of lane 
change crashes that resulted in injuries. This suggests that posted 
speed corresponds well to travel speed in most lane change 
crashes.88 89
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was 
unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of 
lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
    \87\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in 
60 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 68 percent of lane 
change crashes that resulted in injuries.
    \88\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash 
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \89\ It was unknown or not reported whether speeding was a 
factor in 3 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 7 percent of 
lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier, market research conducted by Consumer Reports 
(CR) indicated that BSW systems are desirable in consumer interest 
surveys of various ADAS technologies. In fact, CR found not only that 
an overwhelming majority of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW 
technology, but also that 60 percent of them believed BSW technology 
had helped them avoid a crash. However, in its study to evaluate the 
real-world effectiveness of ADAS technologies in model year 2013-2017 
General Motors' (GM) vehicles, UMTRI found that GM's Side Blind Zone 
Alert produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane change 
crashes. When the Side Blind Zone Alert technology was combined with an 
earlier generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the 
corresponding effectiveness increased to 26 percent.\90\ UMTRI 
attributed this increase to substantially longer vehicle detection 
ranges for the Lane Change Alert with Side Blind Zone Alert system 
compared to GM's earlier generation Side Blind Zone Alert system.\91\ 
An Agency study of three BSW-equipped vehicles also showed that that 
currently available BSW systems may likely exhibit differences in 
detection capabilities and operating conditions such that their 
effectiveness estimates could vary significantly.\92\ For instance, one 
vehicle's system may simply augment a driver's visual awareness whereas 
another may effectively prevent crashes by warning of higher speed lane 
change events. In its response to NCAP's December 2015 notice, Bosch 
provided similar insight. The company stated that some BSW systems may 
only provide benefit for shorter detection distances, such as 7 m (23.0 
ft.) rearward, whereas other systems may provide detection for 
distances up to 70 m (229.7 ft.) rearward, which would help the driver 
avoid collisions with vehicles approaching from the rear in adjacent 
lanes at high speeds. The Agency plans to study these performance 
differences in its testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, C. 
A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors 
production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General 
Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
    \91\ For GM's Lane Chane Alert systems, sensors in the vehicle's 
rear bumper are utilized to warn the driver of vehicles approaching 
from the rear on either the left or right side.
    \92\ Forkenbrock, G., Hoover, R.L., Gerdus, E., Van Buskirk, 
T.R., & Heitz, M. (2014, July), Blind spot monitoring in light 
vehicles--System performance (Report No. DOT HS 812 045), 
Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 13467]]

    NHTSA is proposing to conduct BSW tests in NCAP in accordance with 
the Agency's BSW test procedure. The Agency believes that the Straight 
Lane Pass-by Test scenario, which stipulates incrementally higher test 
speeds for the POV, could be used to distinguish between vehicles that 
have basic versus advanced BSW capability. For instance, an SV that can 
only satisfy the BSW activation criteria when the POV approaches with a 
low relative velocity may be considered as having basic BSW capability, 
whereas a vehicle that can look further rearward, to sense a passing 
vehicle travelling at a much higher speed, may be considered to have 
superior BSW capability. NHTSA believes such an assessment is important 
because when one vehicle encroaches into the adjacent lane of the 
other, the crashes associated with higher speed differentials can be 
expected to be more severe than those that occur when the two vehicle 
speeds are more similar. Furthermore, the capability of a vehicle to 
detect when another vehicle has entered an extended rear zone could be 
important for the application of other ADAS technologies such as blind 
spot intervention (BSI) or SAE \93\ Level 2 partial driving automation 
\94\ systems that incorporate automatic lane change features. 
Therefore, the Agency believes that long-range vehicle detection may 
not only increase the effectiveness of blind spot technologies such as 
BSI, but also enhance capabilities and robustness of other ADAS 
applications. For these reasons, NHTSA is proposing (later in this 
notice) the incorporation of BSI technology in NCAP to encourage the 
proliferation of such systems along with sensing strategies that offer 
a greater field of view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ SAE International (2018), SAE J3016_201806: Taxonomy and 
definitions for terms related to driving automation systems for on-
road motor vehicles, Warrendale, PA, www.sae.org.
    \94\ The sustained driving automation system of both the lateral 
and longitudinal vehicle motion control with the expectation that 
the driver supervises the driving automation system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters to NHTSA's December 2015 notice overwhelmingly supported 
the addition of BSW in NCAP. In fact, many commenters suggested the 
Agency expand the testing requirements to encompass additional test 
targets, such as motorcycles, and test conditions. Several commenters 
also recommended that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test procedure with 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards. Each of 
these topics will be discussed below.
a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions
    Commenters, including the ASC, Continental, Bosch, NSC, and others, 
recommended that the Agency expand the BSW testing requirements to 
include motorcycle detection. Delphi, MTS, Medical College of Wisconsin 
(MCW), and CU suggested that NHTSA evaluate a vehicle's ability to 
detect bicycles in addition to motorcycles. Similarly, Subaru suggested 
that changes to the Straight Lane Pass-by Test should be made to 
address motorcycle detection. MTS and MCW added that motorcycle riders 
and bicyclists are more vulnerable to serious and fatal injuries 
compared to occupants of motor vehicles. A few commenters were not 
supportive of adding a motorcycle detection test in NCAP. Global 
Automakers and Hyundai stated that although it was a reasonable goal 
for the future, no standardized test devices currently existed at the 
time. Similarly, Honda and the Alliance recommended that the Agency 
focus on vehicle detection as a first step since no standard test 
procedure exists for motorcycle detection. The Alliance added that 
since the location of a motorcycle within a lane can vary greatly, test 
procedures would need to specify motorcycle behavior and reasonable 
detection distances. Furthermore, MTS stated that the position of the 
motorcycle POV within the lane (near, center, far) should be specified, 
and the radar cross section and projected area of the motorcycle should 
be considered as well.
    NHTSA agrees that BSW systems capable of detecting motorcycles 
would improve safety. A review of the 2011 through 2015 FARS and GES 
data sets \95\ showed that there were 106 fatal crashes and nearly 
5,100 police-reported crashes annually, on average, for same direction 
lane change crashes involving a vehicle and motorcycle. In comparison, 
as mentioned earlier, there were 542 fatalities and 503,070 police-
reported crashes annually, on average, for lane change crashes 
involving motor vehicles. These data show that more occupants of motor 
vehicles die in lane changing crashes than do motorcyclists. However, 
the fatality rate for motorcyclists is greater than that for vehicle 
occupants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., Yanagisawa, M., & Najm, W. (2018, 
September), Pre-Crash Scenario Characteristics of Motorcycle Crashes 
for Crash Avoidance Research (Report No. DOT HS 812 902), 
Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In 
Press
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At this time, the Agency has decided to prioritize testing of BSW 
systems on motor vehicles for NCAP. NHTSA believes that performing BSW 
testing on light vehicles, particularly at higher POV closing speeds, 
and for active safety systems (as will be discussed next), should 
encourage development of robust sensing systems, which may improve the 
detection of other objects such as motorcycles. That being said, the 
Agency has planned an upcoming research project designed to address 
injuries and fatalities for other vulnerable road users, specifically 
motorcyclists. The Agency will continue to observe the development of 
BSW technology and is likely to include test procedures for motorcycle 
detection in NCAP at a later date if the technology meets the four 
prerequisites mentioned above.
    Several commenters offered additional suggestions for ways NHTSA 
could expand the BSW test procedure. MCW suggested that the Agency 
adopt test scenarios that address curved roads and low light 
conditions. CU proposed that the Agency should assess whether BSW 
systems provide a clear indication to the driver that the system is not 
operating since sensors are sometimes rendered inoperable in poor 
weather or when blocked.
    As with all the ADAS technologies, NHTSA recognizes that there is a 
need to understand and assure crash mitigation performance of BSW 
systems under all practical situations that the driver and vehicle will 
encounter in the real world. However, such comprehensive testing is not 
always practical within the scope of the NCAP program. Thus, for 
technologies that met the four principles for inclusion in NCAP, the 
Agency primarily attempted to address the most frequently occurring, 
most fatal, and most injurious pre-crash scenarios when prioritizing 
tests to add to the program. When ADAS technologies penetrate the fleet 
in sufficient numbers, then the Agency can evaluate how these systems 
are performing in the real world and adjust the system performance 
criteria accordingly to address additional test conditions, such as 
those mentioned by MCW. Regarding CU's suggestion, the Agency believes, 
after reviewing vehicle owner's manuals, that most vehicle 
manufacturers are including provisions in their system designs to 
provide a malfunction indicator to the driver if the system is no 
longer operational because the sensors are blocked or due to severe 
weather conditions.
    NHTSA has also considered Bosch's request to expand the definition 
of BSW to encourage adoption of systems that provide longer detection 
distances. NHTSA believes, as discussed above,

[[Page 13468]]

that by using higher POV closing speeds to assess BSW system 
performance, it may effectively drive enhanced blind spot system 
capabilities such as those required for other rearward-looking ADAS 
applications, like BSI, or automatic lane change functions.
b. Test Procedure Harmonization
    Several commenters suggested that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test 
procedure with International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
standard 17387:2008, Intelligent transport systems--Lane change 
decision aid systems (LCDAS)--Performance requirements and test 
procedures or with various aspects of this standard. Global Automakers 
and Hyundai commented that NHTSA should shift the forward edge of the 
blind zone rearward from the outside rearview mirrors to the eye point 
of a 95th percentile person, as specified in ISO 17387. Hyundai stated 
that the ISO procedure is designed such that when the POV is in-line 
with the SV driver's eye ellipse, the driver's peripheral vision allows 
him/her to see the POV without the assistance of BSW systems. The ASC, 
Continental, and Subaru also suggested that the Agency align the 
warning zones in the Agency's BSW test procedure with those specified 
in ISO 17387.
    The Agency does not agree with commenters' suggestion to adopt the 
ISO procedure for defining the forward edge of the blind zone as 
measured using the eye ellipse from a seated 95th percentile person. 
NHTSA believes that the blind zone should be defined not by a specific 
seated individual but by the vehicle's characteristics, since a real-
world blind spot for any particular vehicle would differ depending on 
the size characteristics of the individual driving the vehicle at the 
time. Since people vary in size, they will sit in different seating 
positions and have different seating preferences. For instance, a 95th 
percentile male will be seated more rearward whereas a 5th percentile 
female will be seated more forward. In addition, drivers have personal 
preferences for adjusting their side view mirrors that may not be 
considered optimal and may not provide a full field of view when 
checking the mirrors to make change lanes. For these reasons, the 
Agency tentatively concludes that it is more appropriate and better for 
the safety of consumers to set the forward plane of the blind zone at 
the rearmost part of the side view mirrors, as specified in its BSW 
test procedure. This approach should not only best accommodate a wide 
variety of driver sizes and seating positions, but also reduce test 
complexity when defining the blind zone.
2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)
    Blind spot intervention (BSI) systems are similar to AEB and LKS 
systems in that they provide active intervention to help the driver 
avoid a collision with another vehicle. BSW systems alert a driver that 
a vehicle is in his/her blind spot, whereas BSI systems activate when 
the BSW alert is ignored, and intervene either by automatically 
applying the vehicle's brakes or providing a steering input to guide 
the vehicle back into the unobstructed lane. With their active 
capability, BSI systems can help a driver avoid collisions with other 
vehicles that are approaching the vehicle's blind spot, in addition to 
preventing crashes with vehicles operating within the vehicle's blind 
spot.
    Like BSW systems, BSI systems utilize rear-facing sensors to detect 
other vehicles that are next to or behind the vehicle in adjacent 
lanes. Depending on the design of these systems, BSI activation may or 
may not require the driver to operate his/her turn signal indicator 
during a lane change. Furthermore, some BSI systems may only operate if 
the vehicle's BSW system is also enabled.
    As discussed earlier, UMTRI found that GM's BSW system, Side Blind 
Zone Alert, produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane 
change crashes. However, when Side Blind Zone Alert was combined with a 
later generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the corresponding 
effectiveness increased to 26 percent.\96\ Given BSI is only now 
penetrating the fleet, NHTSA is unaware of any effectiveness studies 
for this technology. However, as discussed earlier, the Agency believes 
that active safety technologies are more effective than warning 
technologies. The UMTRI study concluded that AEB is more effective than 
FCW alone and that LKS is more effective than LDW. The Agency believes 
the same relationship will likely hold true for blind spot systems, and 
that BSI will be more effective than BSW alone. NHTSA also believes, as 
mentioned above, that adopting ADAS technologies such as BSI should 
also encourage development of enhanced BSW system capabilities (e.g., 
motorcycle and bicycle detection), and may increase the robustness of 
other ADAS applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, 
C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors 
production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General 
Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA is proposing to use its published draft test procedure 
titled, ``Blind Spot Intervention System Confirmation Test,'' \97\ to 
evaluate the performance of vehicles equipped with BSI technology in 
NCAP. The Agency's test procedure consists of three scenarios: Subject 
Vehicle (SV) Lane Change with Constant Headway, SV Lane Change with 
Closing Headway, and SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, False 
Positive Assessment. In the first two scenarios, an SV initiates or 
attempts a lane change into an adjacent lane while a single POV is 
residing within the SV's blind zone (Scenario 1), or is approaching it 
from the rear (Scenario 2). The third scenario is used to evaluate the 
propensity of a BSI system to activate inappropriately in a non-
critical driving scenario that does not present a safety risk to the 
occupants in the SV. In each of the tests, the POV is a strikeable 
object with the characteristics of a compact passenger car. The system 
performance requirements stipulate that the SV may not contact the POV 
during the conduct of any test trial. NHTSA is requesting comment on 
the number of trials that are appropriate for each test. Each of these 
scenarios, along with the proposed evaluation criteria, is detailed 
below: \98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
    \98\ The Agency notes that these test scenario descriptions 
assume the SV is operating in SAE Automation Level 0 or Level 1 
operation with only the Automatic Cruise Control (ACC) enabled. 
Though the Agency's BSI test procedure has provisions to evaluate 
vehicles operating in SAE Automation Levels 2 or 3. Test scenario 
descriptions for these evaluations are not discussed herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     SV Lane Change with Constant Headway--The POV is driven at 
72.4 kph (45 mph) in a lane adjacent and to the left of the SV also 
traveling at 72.4 kph (45 mph) with a constant longitudinal offset such 
that the front-most part of the POV is 1 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-
most part of the SV. After a short period of steady-state driving, the 
SV driver engages the left turn signal indicator at least 3 s after all 
pre-SV lane change test validity criteria have been satisfied. Within 
1.0  0.5 s after the turn signal has been activated, the SV 
driver initiates a manual lane change into the POV's travel lane. The 
SV driver then releases the steering wheel within 250 ms of the SV 
exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius curve during the lane change. To 
meet the performance criteria, the BSI system must intervene so as to 
prevent the left rear of the SV from contacting the right front of the 
POV. Additionally, the SV

[[Page 13469]]

BSI intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or 
more beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel 
lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the validity 
period.
     SV Lane Change with Closing Headway Scenario--The POV is 
driven at a constant speed of 80.5 kph (50 mph) towards the rear of the 
SV in an adjacent lane to the left of the SV, which is traveling at a 
constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph). During the test, the SV driver 
engages the turn signal indicator when the POV is 4.9  0.5 
s from a vertical plane defined by the rear of the SV and perpendicular 
to the SV travel lane. Within 1.0  0.5 s after the turn 
signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a manual lane change 
into the POV's travel lane. The SV driver then releases the steering 
wheel within 250 ms of the SV exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius 
curve. To meet the performance criteria, the BSI system must intervene 
to prevent the left rear of the SV from contacting the right front of 
the POV. Additionally, the SV BSI intervention shall not cause the SV 
to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or more beyond the inboard edge of the lane 
line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to the 
right of it within the validity period.
     SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, False Positive 
Assessment Test--The POV is driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) in a lane that 
is two lanes to the left of the SV's initial travel lane with a 
constant longitudinal offset such that the front-most part of the POV 
is 1 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-most part of the SV, which is also 
travelling at 72.4 kph (45 mph). The SV driver engages the left turn 
signal indicator at least 3 s after all pre-SV lane change test 
validity criteria have been satisfied. Within 1.0  0.5 s 
after the turn signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a 
manual lane change into the left adjacent lane (the one between the SV 
and POV). For this test, the driver does not release the steering 
wheel. Since the lane change will not result in an SV-to-POV impact, 
the SV BSI system must not intervene during any valid trials. To 
determine whether a BSI intervention occurred, the SV yaw rate data 
collected during the individual trials performed in this scenario are 
compared to a baseline composite. After being aligned in time to the 
baseline, the difference between the data must not exceed 1 degree/
second within the test validity period.
    The proposed crash-imminent BSI test scenarios represent pre-crash 
scenarios that correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and 
injuries observed in real-world lane change crashes. As discussed in 
the BSW crash statistics section, Volpe showed that approximately 28 
percent of fatalities and 57 percent of injuries in lane change crashes 
occurred on roads with posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\99\ 
Furthermore, approximately 14 percent of fatalities and 24 percent of 
injuries were reported for crashes that occurred at known travel speeds 
of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was 
unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of 
lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
    \100\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in 
65 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 67 percent of lane 
change crashes that resulted in injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has conducted a series of tests utilizing its proposed BSI 
test procedure. Since BSI systems are not widely available in the 
fleet, the Agency selected vehicles in order to cover as many 
manufacturers as possible that have implemented this technology. All 
vehicles selected for BSW testing also underwent BSI testing. Test 
reports related to both test programs can be found in the docket for 
this notice. For the purposes of this testing, the Agency used the 
Global Vehicle Target (GVT) Revision G to represent the POV, which is 
specified in the BSI test procedure as a strikeable object.\101\ When 
the BSI technology assessment is incorporated into NCAP, the Agency 
plans to use the GVT Revision G as a strikeable target to be consistent 
with Euro NCAP's ADAS test procedures that specify a strikeable target. 
In the context of testing BSW and BSI technologies in NCAP to address 
lane change crashes, NHTSA is seeking comment on the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ The GVT is a three-dimensional surrogate that resembles a 
white hatchback passenger car. It is currently used by other 
consumer organizations, including Euro NCAP, and vehicle 
manufacturers in their internal testing of ADAS technologies. See 
Section III.D.2. of this notice for an expanded discussion of the 
GVT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (16) Should all BSW testing be conducted without the turn signal 
indicator activated? Why or why not? If the Agency was to modify the 
BSW test procedure to stipulate activation of the turn signal 
indicator, should the test vehicle be required to provide an audible or 
haptic warning that another vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a 
visual warning sufficient? If a visual warning is sufficient, should it 
continually flash, at a minimum, to provide a distinction from the 
blind spot status when the turn signal is not in use? Why or why not?
    (17) Is it appropriate for the Agency to use the Straight Lane 
Pass-by Test to quantify and ultimately differentiate a vehicle's BSW 
capability based on its ability to provide acceptable warnings when the 
POV has entered the SV's blind spot (as defined by the blind zone) for 
varying POV-SV speed differentials? Why or why not?
    (18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable POV in the BSI test 
procedure appropriate? Is using Revision G in NCAP appropriate? Why or 
why not?
    (19) The Agency recognizes that the BSW test procedure currently 
contains two test scenarios that have multiple test conditions (e.g., 
test speeds and POV approach directions (left and right side of the 
SV)). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test scenarios and 
test conditions to address the real-world safety problem adequately, or 
could it test only certain scenarios or conditions to minimize test 
burden in NCAP? For instance, should the Agency consider incorporating 
only the most challenging test conditions into NCAP, such as the ones 
with the greatest speed differential, or choose to perform the test 
conditions having the lowest and highest speeds? Should the Agency 
consider only performing the test conditions where the POV passes by 
the SV on the left side if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data 
to assure the left side pass-by tests are also representative of system 
performance during right side pass-by tests? Why or why not?
    (20) Given the Agency's concern about the amount of system 
performance testing under consideration in this RFC, it seeks input on 
whether to include a BSI false positive test. Is a false positive 
assessment needed to insure system robustness and high customer 
satisfaction? Why or why not?
    (21) The BSW test procedure includes 7 repeated trials for each 
test condition (i.e., test speed and POV approach direction). Is this 
an appropriate number of repeat trials? Why or why not? What is the 
appropriate number of test trials to adopt for each BSI test scenario, 
and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass rate for each of the two 
tests, BSW and BSI, and why is it appropriate?
    (22) Is it reasonable to perform only BSI tests in conjunction with 
activation of the turn signal? Why or why not? If the turn signal is 
not used, how can the operation of BSI be differentiated from the 
heading adjustments resulting from an LKS intervention? Should the SV's 
LKS system be switched off during conduct of the Agency's BSI 
evaluations? Why or why not?

C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)

    Another important ADAS technology NHTSA proposes to include in its 
upgrade of NCAP is pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB).

[[Page 13470]]

PAEB systems function similar to AEB systems but detect pedestrians 
instead of vehicles. PAEB uses information from forward-looking sensors 
to issue a warning and actively apply the vehicle's brakes when a 
pedestrian, or sometimes a cyclist, is in front of the vehicle and the 
driver has not acted to avoid the impending impact. Similar to AEB, 
PAEB systems typically use cameras to determine whether a pedestrian is 
in imminent danger of being struck by the vehicle, but some systems may 
use a combination of cameras, radar, lidar, and/or thermal imaging 
sensors.
    Many pedestrian crashes occur when a pedestrian is in the forward 
path of a driver's vehicle. Four common pedestrian crash scenarios 
include when the vehicle is:
    1. Heading straight and a pedestrian is crossing the road;
    2. Turning right and a pedestrian is crossing the road;
    3. Turning left and a pedestrian is crossing the road; and
    4. Heading straight and a pedestrian is walking along or against 
traffic.
    These four crash scenarios are defined as Scenarios S1-S4, 
respectively, by the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP) Crash 
Imminent Braking (CIB) Consortium.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ Carpenter, M.G., Moury, M.T., Skvarce, J.R., Struck, M. 
Zwicky, T. D., & Kiger, S.M. (2014, June), Objective tests for 
forward looking pedestrian crash avoidance/mitigation systems: Final 
report (Report No. DOT HS 812 040), Washington, DC: National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two of these scenarios, S1 and S4, are included in NHTSA's draft 
research PAEB test procedure, published on November 21, 2019, and 
referenced herein as the 2019 PAEB test procedure.\103\ The S1 scenario 
represents a pedestrian crossing the road in front of the vehicle, 
while the S4 scenario represents a pedestrian moving with or against 
traffic along the side of the road in the path of the vehicle. Both 
test scenarios are repeated for multiple pedestrian impact locations. 
The S1 and S4 crash scenarios were chosen for inclusion in NHTSA's 2019 
PAEB test procedure because a review of pedestrian crashes from the 
2011 through 2012 GES and FARS data sets \104\ found that, on average, 
these two pre-crash scenarios (S1 and S4) accounted for approximately 
33,000 (52 percent) of vehicle-pedestrian crashes and 3,000 (90 
percent) fatal vehicle-pedestrian crashes with a light-vehicle striking 
a pedestrian as the first event. Furthermore, these crashes accounted 
for 67 percent of MAIS 2+ and 76 percent of MAIS 3+ injured 
pedestrians.\105\ The 2019 PAEB test procedure only considered daylight 
test conditions for both the S1 and S4 crash scenarios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
    \104\ Yanagisawa, M., Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., & Najm, W.G. 
(2017, April), Estimation of potential safety benefits for 
pedestrian crash avoidance/mitigation systems (Report No. DOT HS 812 
400), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \105\ As explained previously, the Abbreviated Injury Scale 
(AIS) is a classification system for assessing impact injury 
severity. AIS ranks individual injuries by body region on a scale of 
1 to 6 where 1 = minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 = 
critical, and 6 = maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum 
injury severity, or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., the 
highest single AIS for a person with one or more injuries).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency's 2019 PAEB test procedure does not include CAMP 
scenario S2 (vehicle turning right and a pedestrian crossing the road), 
and CAMP scenario S3 (vehicle turning left and a pedestrian crossing 
the road). In response to the December 2015 notice, several commenters 
stated that addressing these scenarios with available technology may 
generate a significant number of false positive detections. Such false 
detections could have the unintended consequences of causing hazardous 
situations (e.g., unexpected sudden braking while turning in traffic) 
that could lead drivers to disable their PAEB systems, or even lead to 
an increase in rear-end collisions. The commenters explained that the 
S2 and S3 test scenarios require more sophisticated algorithms as well 
as more robust test methodologies than those required for scenarios S1 
and S4. However, ZF TRW mentioned that ADAS sensors designed to meet 
Euro NCAP's Vulnerable Road Users test procedures would have increased 
fields of view (FOV), which should improve their effectiveness in 
turning scenarios. Others stated that the articulating mannequins may 
not be representative of a real human for all sensing technologies in 
turning scenarios. Most commenters indicated that it was more 
appropriate to focus on the scenarios affording the most significant 
safety benefits first--S1 and S4. Commenters stated that adding the S2 
and S3 scenarios would be more practical when the technology matures. 
NHTSA will continue to evaluate PAEB systems to assess the feasibility 
of expanding the suite of PAEB tests as technological advancements are 
made. The Agency will consider adding these test scenarios (S2 and S3) 
to NCAP in the future once the Agency has repeatable and reliable test 
data to support their inclusion.
    In the 2019 PAEB test procedure, the S1 test scenario includes 
seven different test conditions--S1a, S1b, S1c, S1d, S1e, S1f, and S1g. 
For these tests, the SV travels in a straight, forward direction at 40 
kph (24.9 mph). Additionally, the SV also travels at 16 kph (9.9 mph) 
for test conditions S1a, S1b, S1c, and S1d. A pedestrian mannequin 
crosses perpendicular to the subject vehicle's line of travel at 5 kph 
(3.1 mph) for all test conditions, except for S1e, in which the 
mannequin crosses at 8 kph (5.0 mph). In test condition S1a, the SV 
encounters a crossing adult pedestrian mannequin walking from the 
nearside (i.e., the passenger's side of the vehicle) with 25 percent 
overlap of the vehicle.\106\ In test conditions S1b and S1c, the SV 
encounters a crossing adult pedestrian walking from the nearside with 
50 percent and 75 percent overlap of the vehicle, respectively. In test 
condition S1d, the SV encounters a crossing child pedestrian mannequin 
running from behind parked vehicles from the nearside with 50 percent 
overlap of the vehicle. In test condition S1e, the SV encounters a 
crossing adult pedestrian running from the ``offside'' (i.e., the 
driver's side of the vehicle) with 50 percent overlap of the vehicle. 
In test condition S1f, the SV encounters a crossing adult pedestrian 
walking from the nearside that stops short (-25% overlap) of entering 
the vehicle's path. In test condition S1g, the SV encounters a crossing 
adult pedestrian walking from the nearside that clears the vehicle's 
path (125% overlap).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ Overlap is defined as the percent of the vehicle's width 
that the pedestrian would traverse prior to impact if the vehicle's 
speed and pedestrian's speed remain constant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The S4 test scenario in the 2019 PAEB test procedure includes three 
different test conditions--S4a, S4b, and S4c. In this test scenario, 
the SV travels in a straight, forward direction at 40 kph (24.9 mph) 
and/or 16 kph (9.9 mph) (for test conditions S4a and S4b) and a 
pedestrian mannequin moves parallel to the flow of traffic at 5 kph 
(3.1 mph) (for test condition S4c) or is stationary (for test condition 
S4a and S4b) in front of the SV. For all S4 test conditions, the SV is 
aligned to impact the pedestrian at 25 percent overlap. In test 
condition S4a, the SV encounters an adult pedestrian standing in front 
of the vehicle on the nearside of the road facing away from the 
approaching SV. In test condition S4b, the SV encounters an adult 
pedestrian standing in front of the vehicle on the nearside of the road 
facing towards the approaching SV. In test condition S4c, the SV 
encounters an adult pedestrian walking in front of the vehicle on the 
nearside of the road facing away from the approaching SV.

[[Page 13471]]

    The Agency is proposing to make several changes to the 2019 PAEB 
test procedure for the purpose of adopting it for use in NCAP. These 
changes involve the pedestrian mannequins, test speeds and included 
test conditions, the specified lighting conditions, and the number of 
test trials required to be conducted for each test condition.
    The first change the Agency is proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB 
test procedure concerns the pedestrian targets. As was recommended by 
several commenters who responded to the December 2015 notice, the 
Agency proposes to utilize state-of-the-art mannequins with 
articulated, moving legs, instead of the posable child and adult 
pedestrian test mannequins specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure. 
NHTSA believes that the articulating pedestrian targets are more 
representative of walking pedestrians and expects that these more 
realistic targets will encourage development of PAEB systems that 
detect, classify, and respond to pedestrians more accurately and 
effectively. In turn, this should allow manufacturers to improve the 
effectiveness of current PAEB systems. The Agency also recognizes that 
adopting the child and adult articulating targets would harmonize with 
other major consumer information-focused entities that use articulating 
mannequins, such as Euro NCAP and IIHS. The Bipartisan Infrastructure 
Law mandated that NHTSA identify opportunities where NCAP would 
``benefit from harmonization with third-party safety rating programs,'' 
and the Agency believes that the pedestrian mannequins represent one 
such opportunity.
    The second change the Agency is proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB 
test procedure for incorporation into NCAP involves test speeds. The 
test speeds specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure correspond to a 
relatively small percentage of crashes that result in pedestrian 
injuries and fatalities. Volpe's analysis of 2011-2015 FARS and GES 
crash data sets showed that 9 percent of pedestrian fatalities and 25 
percent of pedestrian injuries resulted from crashes that occurred on 
roadways with posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 88 
percent of fatalities and 43 percent of injuries occurred for crashes 
on roadways with posted speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25 
mph).107 108 For crashes that occurred on roadways where the 
travel speed was known, 6 percent of pedestrian fatalities and 19 
percent of pedestrian injuries were reported for travel speeds of 40.2 
kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 36 percent of fatalities and 7 percent of 
injuries occurred for travel speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25 
mph).\109\ NHTSA notes that speeding was a factor in only 5 percent of 
the fatal pedestrian crashes, which suggests that the posted speed 
could correlate closely with the travel speed of the vehicle prior to 
impact with the pedestrian.110 111
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash 
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \108\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was 
unknown in 4 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 29 percent of 
pedestrian crashes that resulted in injuries.
    \109\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in 
59 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 72 percent of pedestrian 
crashes that resulted in injuries.
    \110\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash 
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \111\ In 4 percent of pedestrian crashes, it was unknown or not 
reported whether speeding was a factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As Volpe's analysis focused on 2011-2015 FARS and GES crash data 
sets, it is likely that most vehicles studied were not equipped with 
PAEB systems. Recently, IIHS studied approximately 1,500 police-
reported crashes involving a wide variety of 2017-2020 model year 
vehicles from various manufacturers to examine the effects of PAEB 
systems on real-world pedestrian crashes.\112\ In this study, the 
Institute found that ``pedestrian AEB was associated with a 32 percent 
reduction in the odds of a pedestrian crash on roads with speed limits 
of 25 mph or less and a 34 percent reduction on roads with 30-35 mph 
limits, but no reduction at all on roads with speed limits of 50 mph or 
higher. . .''. These findings highlight the limitations of existing 
PAEB systems and the importance of adopting higher test speeds for PAEB 
testing (where feasible) to encourage additional safety improvement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February), Effects of automatic 
emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To establish feasible speed thresholds for adoption in its PAEB 
test procedure, the Agency conducted a series of tests on a selection 
of MY 2020 vehicles from various manufacturers to assess the 
operational range and performance of current PAEB systems. Vehicles for 
the PAEB characterization tests were selected with the intent of 
testing a variety of vehicle makes, types, sizes; global and domestic 
products; and forward-facing sensor types (camera only, stereo camera, 
fused camera plus radar, etc.) for a given manufacturer and across all 
manufacturers.
    For the purpose of this study, the Agency used the 2019 PAEB test 
procedure, but employed the articulating mannequins in lieu of the 
posable mannequins and expanded the test procedure specifications to 
include increased vehicle test speeds for the S1b, S1d, S1e, S4a, and 
S4c test conditions. For these tests, the SV speed was incrementally 
increased to identify when each SV reached its operational limits and 
did not respond to the pedestrian target. Before the tests were 
initiated, the maximum test speeds for the S1 and S4 scenarios were set 
to 60 kph (37.2 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph), respectively.\113\ These 
maximum speeds are consistent with Euro NCAP's AEB Vulnerable Road User 
test protocol and correspond to up to 74 percent of fatal pedestrian 
crashes and 65 percent of injurious pedestrian crashes that occurred on 
U.S. roadways, per Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS and GES analysis of posted 
speed data.\114\ When no or late intervention occurred for a vehicle 
and test condition (i.e., combination of test scenario and speed), 
NHTSA repeated the test condition at a test speed that was 5 kph (3.1 
mph) lower. This reduced speed defined the system's upper capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ These test speeds represent the maximum test speeds 
potentially utilized for a given test condition. The actual speeds 
used for a given combination of vehicle and test condition depended 
on observed PAEB system performance.
    \114\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). (2019, 
July). TEST PROTOCOL--AEB VRU systems 3.0.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A test matrix of the PAEB characterization study regarding test 
speed is provided below.
     Full PAEB test series (includes S1 a-g and S4 a-c)
    Daytime light conditions, articulating dummies, and additional SV 
test speeds in kph (mph) for S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c, as shown in 
Table 4.

[[Page 13472]]



                                               Table 4--Complete Matrix of the PAEB Characterization Study
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Scenario                      S1a        S1b        S1c        S1d        S1e        S1f        S1g        S4a        S4b        S4c
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph)...........   16.0/9.9   16.0/9.9   16.0/9.9   16.0/9.9  40.0/24.9  40.0/24.9  40.0/24.9   16.0/9.9   16.0/9.9   16.0/9.9
                                            40.0/24.9  20.0/12.4  40.0/24.9  20.0/12.4  50.0/31.1  .........  .........  40.0/24.9  40.0/24.9  40.0/24.9
                                            .........  30.0/18.6  .........  30.0/18.6  60.0/37.3  .........  .........  50.0/31.1  .........  50.0/31.1
                                            .........  40.0/24.9  .........  40.0/24.9  .........  .........  .........  60.0/37.3  .........  60.0/37.3
                                            .........  50.0/31.1  .........  50.0/31.1  .........  .........  .........  70.0/43.5  .........  70.0/43.5
                                            .........  60.0/37.3  .........  60.0/37.3  .........  .........  .........  80.0/49.7  .........  80.0/49.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency's characterization testing showed that many MY 2020 
vehicles were able to repeatedly avoid impacting the pedestrian 
mannequins at higher test speeds than those specified in the 2019 PAEB 
test procedure. In fact, several vehicles repeatably achieved full 
crash avoidance at speeds up to 60 kph (37.3 mph) or higher for the 
assessed S1 and S4 test conditions. Test reports related to this 
testing can be found in the docket for this notice.
    In light of these results, NHTSA is proposing to increase the 
maximum SV test speed from the 40 kph (24.9 mph) specified in the 2019 
PAEB test procedure to 60 kph (37.3 mph) for all PAEB test conditions 
the Agency is proposing to include in NCAP. These include S1a-e and 
S4a-c. The Agency notes that it is not proposing to include PAEB false 
positive test conditions (i.e., S1f and S1g) in NCAP at this time, but 
is requesting comment on whether the omission of these test conditions 
is appropriate. NHTSA also notes that 60 kph (37.3 mph) is the maximum 
vehicle speed Euro NCAP uses to assess PAEB performance for test 
conditions that are similar to, if not identical to, some of those 
proposed for use in NCAP, namely S1a, c, d, and e, and S4c. Adopting 
this higher test speed will also drive improved PAEB system performance 
to address a larger portion of real-world fatalities and injuries.
    The Agency is also proposing a minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2 
mph) for all of the proposed test scenarios. Although this speed is 
lower than the minimum test speed used in the 2019 PAEB test procedure 
and in its characterization testing (i.e., 16 kph (9.9 mph)), it is the 
minimum test speed specified in Euro NCAP's pedestrian tests, with the 
exception of Euro NCAP's Car-to-Pedestrian Longitudinal Adult (CPLA) 
scenario. The minimum vehicle test speed for the CPLA scenario, which 
is similar to the Agency's PAEB S4c test scenario, is 20 kph (12.4 
mph).\115\ As stated earlier, in accordance with the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law, the Agency is taking steps to harmonize with 
existing consumer information rating programs where possible and when 
appropriate. NHTSA also believes that reducing the minimum test speed 
to 10 kph (6.2 mph) will assure PAEB system functionality for crashes 
that may still cause injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ One difference in the Agency's proposed S4c test condition 
and Euro NCAP's CPLA test condition is the amount of pedestrian 
overlap with the vehicle at the lower speed (NHTSA uses a 25 percent 
overlap while a 50 percent overlap is used in Euro NCAP's CPLA 
test). NHTSA believes that for the 25 percent overlap condition in 
S4c, a minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) is appropriate and 
does not see a reason to deviate from the minimum test speed (10 kph 
(6.2 mph)) proposed for the other PAEB test conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In an effort to harmonize with other consumer information programs 
on vehicle safety, NHTSA is also proposing to adopt Euro NCAP's 
approach to assessing vehicles' PAEB system performance by 
incrementally increasing the SV speed from the minimum test speed for a 
given scenario to the maximum. The Agency is proposing 10 kph (6.2 mph) 
increments for this progression in test speed. In their comments to the 
December 2015 notice, Global Automakers and Mobileye encouraged NHTSA 
to expand the applicability of the PAEB tests, particularly the S1 
scenario, to include a broader range of test speeds because pedestrian 
injuries occurred over a wide range of crash speeds, as the Agency has 
also indicated. The organizations also mentioned that PAEB system 
performance reflects a trade-off between FOV and collision speed/
detection distance. Systems that have a narrow FOV are more effective 
at addressing higher speed crashes since they can see further, and 
systems that have a wider FOV are more effective at addressing lower 
speed impacts.
    As its third change to the 2019 PAEB test procedure, the Agency is 
proposing to expand PAEB evaluation to include different lighting 
conditions. NHTSA's PAEB characterization study included performance 
assessments for dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime testing), in 
addition to the daylight conditions specified in the 2019 PAEB test 
procedure, for the same test vehicles. For each vehicle model tested, 
one set of tests was conducted with the pedestrian mannequin 
illuminated only by the vehicle's lower beams and a second set of tests 
with the pedestrian mannequin illuminated by the upper beams. The area 
where the mannequin was located was not provided any additional (i.e., 
external) light source. This repeat testing was conducted because 
Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS data set showed that 36 percent of pedestrian 
fatalities occurred in the dark with no overhead lights. Test matrices 
of the PAEB characterization study with respect to dark lighting 
conditions are provided in Tables 5 and 6.
     PAEB test series (includes S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c)
    Dark conditions with lower beams, articulating dummies, and 
additional SV test speeds in kph (mph), are shown in Table 5.

                         Table 5--PAEB Test Series for Dark Conditions With Lower Beams
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Scenario                    S1b             S1d             S1e             S4a             S4c
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph).        16.0/9.9        16.0/9.9       40.0/24.9        16.0/9.9        16.0/9.9
                                       20.0/12.4       20.0/12.4       50.0/31.1       40.0/24.9       40.0/24.9
                                       30.0/18.6       30.0/18.6       60.0/37.3       50.0/31.1       50.0/31.1
                                       40.0/24.9       40.0/24.9  ..............       60.0/37.3       60.0/37.3
                                       50.0/31.1       50.0/31.1  ..............       70.0/43.5       70.0/43.5
                                       60.0/37.3       60.0/37.3  ..............       80.0/49.7       80.0/49.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 13473]]

     PAEB test series (includes S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c)
    Dark conditions with upper beams, articulating dummies, and 
additional SV test speeds in kph (mph), are shown in Table 6.

                         Table 6--PAEB Test Series for Dark Conditions With Upper Beams
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Scenario                    S1b             S1d             S1e             S4a             S4c
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph).        16.0/9.9        16.0/9.9       40.0/24.9        16.0/9.9        16.0/9.9
                                       20.0/12.4       20.0/12.4       50.0/31.1       40.0/24.9       40.0/24.9
                                       30.0/18.6       30.0/18.6       60.0/37.3       50.0/31.1       50.0/31.1
                                       40.0/24.9       40.0/24.9  ..............       60.0/37.3       60.0/37.3
                                       50.0/31.1       50.0/31.1  ..............       70.0/43.5       70.0/43.5
                                       60.0/37.3       60.0/37.3  ..............       80.0/49.7       80.0/49.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency's characterization testing (Tables 5 and 6) revealed 
that PAEB system performance generally degraded in dark conditions 
compared to daylight conditions. Additionally, certain test conditions, 
such as S1d and S1e, were particularly challenging in dark conditions, 
especially when the vehicle's lower beams were used. However, a few 
vehicles were able to repeatedly avoid contact with the pedestrian 
mannequins at speeds up to 60 kph (37.3 mph) for certain test 
conditions when the vehicles' lower beams provided the only source of 
light.
    NHTSA's findings for PAEB system performance during testing align 
generally well with those from IIHS' recent system effectiveness study 
for 2017-2020 model year vehicles. IIHS found that although PAEB 
systems were associated with a 32 percent reduction in pedestrian 
crashes occurring during daylight, and a 33 percent reduction in 
pedestrian crashes for areas with artificial lighting during dawn, 
dusk, or at night, there was no evidence that PAEB systems were 
effective at nighttime without street lighting.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February), Effects of automatic 
emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the results of the PAEB characterization study and IIHS' 
findings in its recent study, NHTSA is proposing to perform the 
proposed test conditions (S1 a-e and S4 a-c) under daylight conditions 
and under dark conditions with the vehicle's lower beams. NHTSA notes 
that Euro NCAP conducts PAEB testing that is similar to the Agency's 
S4c test condition under dark conditions with vehicles' upper beams in 
use. Because the Agency cannot be assured that a vehicle's upper beams 
are in use during nighttime (i.e., dark lighting conditions) real-world 
driving, NHTSA is proposing only to perform nighttime PAEB assessments 
using vehicles' lower beams for all test conditions included in NCAP at 
this time. However, if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting 
systems such as semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or adaptive 
driving beam head lighting system, they shall be enabled to 
automatically engage during the nighttime PAEB assessment. The Agency 
believes this approach covers the two extreme light conditions and as 
such, information regarding performance with the upper beams or under 
infrastructure lighting can be reasonably inferred.
    The Agency recognizes that Euro NCAP performs testing similar to 
S1a and S1c at speeds of 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 mph) in dark 
conditions with the SV lower beams in use; however, overhead 
streetlights are also used in these tests to provide additional light 
source. To study potential performance differences attributable to the 
use of overhead lights during dark conditions, NHTSA performed 
additional testing for PAEB scenarios S1 b, d, and e and S4 a and c for 
a subset of test speeds, 16 kph (9.9 mph) and 40 kph (24.9 mph), for 
two of the MY 2020 vehicles used in its initial characterization study. 
This study was performed using the vehicles' lower beams under dark 
conditions with overhead lights. For this limited testing, the Agency 
observed slightly better PAEB performance in dark lighting conditions 
with overhead lights than in dark lighting conditions without overhead 
lights.
    NHTSA believes that testing with the vehicles' lower beams in dark 
conditions without overhead lights is appropriate, particularly at 
higher test speeds, as it would assure system performance for real-
world situations where visibility is the most limited. Furthermore, as 
mentioned previously, dark lighting conditions with no overhead lights 
represented 36 percent of pedestrian fatalities and dark lighting 
conditions with overhead lights represented 39 percent of pedestrian 
fatalities in Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS data set. Additionally, PAEB 
systems that meet the performance test specifications under dark 
lighting conditions with no overhead lights are likely to meet the 
performance specifications under dark lighting conditions with overhead 
lights. Thus, the Agency believes assessment of PAEB systems under dark 
conditions with no overhead lights and with the vehicle's lower beams 
will encourage vehicle manufacturers to make design improvements to 
address a significant portion of crashes that currently result in 
pedestrian fatalities.
    For the PAEB performance criteria, NHTSA is proposing that a 
vehicle must achieve complete crash avoidance (i.e., have no contact 
with the pedestrian mannequin) in order to pass a test trial conducted 
at each specified test speed (i.e., 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 kph 
(6.2, 12.4, 18.6, 24.9, 31.1, and 37.3 mph)) for each test condition 
(S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). NHTSA believes that this 
approach, used in conjunction with an incremental increase in SV speed, 
should limit damage to the pedestrian mannequin and/or the SV during 
testing.
    Along these lines, NHTSA is proposing a fourth change to the 2019 
PAEB test procedure regarding the number of test trials conducted for 
each combination of test condition and test speed. The 2019 PAEB test 
procedure specifies seven test trials be conducted for each test speed 
under each test condition. The Agency is proposing, however, to not 
require that more than one test be conducted per test speed and test 
condition combination if certain criteria are met, and is proposing 
that the pass rate for a given test speed will be dependent on whether 
additional test trials are required to be performed.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ This is a divergence from assessment of LKS, BSW, and BSI 
where a vehicle must meet performance requirements for five out of 
seven valid test trials for a particular test condition to pass that 
test condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For a given test condition, the test sequence is initiated at the 
10 kph (6.2 mph) minimum speed. To achieve a pass result, the test must 
be valid (i.e., all test specification and tolerances satisfied), and 
the SV must not contact

[[Page 13474]]

the pedestrian mannequin. If the SV does not contact the pedestrian 
mannequin during the first valid test, the test speed is incrementally 
increased by 10 kph (6.2 mph), and the next test in the sequence is 
performed. Unless the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin, this 
iterative process continues until a maximum test speed of 60 kph (37.3 
mph) is evaluated. If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin, and the 
relative longitudinal velocity between the SV and pedestrian mannequin 
is less than or equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, the 
Agency will perform four additional (repeated) test trials at the same 
speed for which the impact occurred. The vehicle must not contact the 
pedestrian mannequin for at least three out of the five test trials 
performed at that same speed to pass that specific combination of test 
condition and test speed.\118\ If the SV contacts the pedestrian 
mannequin during a valid test of a test condition (whether it be the 
first test performed for a particular test speed or a subsequent test 
trial at that same speed), and the relative impact velocity exceeds 50 
percent of the initial speed of the SV, no additional test trials will 
be conducted at the given test speed and test condition and the SV is 
considered to have failed the test condition at that specific test 
speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ The Agency notes that a similar pass/fail criterion (i.e., 
a vehicle must meet performance requirements for three out of five 
trials for a particular test condition to pass the test condition) 
is included in its LDW test procedure, as referenced earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency is pursuing an assessment approach for PAEB systems that 
differs from the evaluation criteria proposed for the other four 
proposed ADAS technologies discussed earlier in an attempt to reduce 
test burden, but still ensure that passing systems include robust 
designs that will afford an enhanced level of safety. NHTSA recognizes 
that it is proposing a large number of PAEB test conditions for 
inclusion in NCAP--eight total. The Agency also acknowledges that these 
test conditions must be repeated for multiple test speeds and lighting 
conditions, which inherently imposes additional test burden. Therefore, 
the Agency believes that it is reasonable to reduce the number of test 
trials that must be conducted at a given test speed for a particular 
test condition since the SV's PAEB system will also be assessed at 
subsequent test speeds, which would help system robustness. This would 
further be supported by the Agency's proposal to require that five test 
trials be performed in instances where the SV is unable to meet the no 
contact performance requirement in the initial valid trial for that 
combination of test condition and speed.
    Although NHTSA believes that the assessment approach for PAEB 
systems proposed herein is the most reasonable one, the Agency is 
requesting comment on whether it should instead pursue an alternative 
approach, such as conducting seven trials for each test condition and 
speed combination, and requiring that five of the seven trials meet the 
no contact performance criterion. Again, this latter approach would be 
similar to the one proposed for the other ADAS technologies discussed 
earlier.
    Previously, NHTSA noted that it did not conduct the S2 and S3 test 
scenarios as part of the characterization study and is not proposing 
these test scenarios for inclusion in this proposal. The Agency agrees 
with the comments mentioned previously that the majority of vehicles in 
the U.S. fleet are not currently equipped with sensing systems capable 
of detecting pedestrians while a vehicle is turning, as they do not 
have the necessary FOV. The American Automobile Association (AAA) \119\ 
recently conducted PAEB tests, including an S2 scenario where the 
vehicle is turning right with an adult pedestrian crossing. The PAEB 
systems in four model year 2019 vehicles that were tested did not react 
to the test targets during a testing scenario that is similar to 
NHTSA's S2 scenario described above, resulting in all test vehicles 
colliding with the pedestrian target. These systems performed better in 
a scenario that was similar to NHTSA's S1; however, the vehicles 
avoided a collision with the pedestrian target 40 percent of the time 
at a 32.2 kph (20 mph) test speed and nearly all the time at a 48.3 kph 
(30 mph) test speed. Furthermore, in its recent study on PAEB system 
effectiveness, IIHS found that while AEB with pedestrian detection was 
associated with significant reductions in pedestrian crash risk (~27 
percent) and pedestrian injury crash risk (~30 percent), there was no 
evidence to suggest that existing systems were effective while the 
PAEB-equipped vehicle was turning.\120\ Considering these findings, 
NHTSA believes that it is more beneficial at this time to focus our 
efforts on performing PAEB testing at higher speeds and with various 
lighting conditions using the proposed S1 and S4 test scenarios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ American Automobile Association (2019, October), Automatic 
emergency braking with pedestrian detection, https://www.aaa.com/AAA/common/aar/files/Research-Report-Pedestrian-Detection.pdf.
    \120\ Cicchino, J. B (2022, February), Effects of automatic 
emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the context of the NCAP PAEB testing program, NHTSA is seeking 
comment on the following:
    (23) Is the proposed test speed range, 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph 
(37.3 mph), to be assessed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments, most 
appropriate for PAEB test scenarios S1 and S4? Why or why not?
    (24) The Agency has proposed to include Scenarios S1 a-e and S4 a-c 
in its NCAP assessment. Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all 
test scenarios and test conditions proposed in this RFC notice to 
address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test only certain 
scenarios or conditions to minimize test burden but still address an 
adequate proportion of the safety problem? Why or why not? If it is not 
necessary for the Agency to perform all test scenarios or test 
conditions, which scenarios/conditions should be assessed? Although 
they are not currently proposed for inclusion, should the Agency also 
adopt the false positive test conditions, S1f and S1g? Why or why not?
    (25) Given that a large portion of pedestrian fatalities and 
injuries occur under dark lighting conditions, the Agency has proposed 
to perform testing for the included test conditions (i.e., S1 a-e and 
S4 a-c) under dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime) in addition to 
daylight test conditions for test speed range 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 
kph (37.3 mph). NHTSA proposes that a vehicle's lower beams would 
provide the source of light during the nighttime assessments. However, 
if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting systems such as 
semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or adaptive driving beam head 
lighting system, they shall be enabled to automatically engage during 
the nighttime PAEB assessment. Is this testing approach appropriate? 
Why or why not? Should the Agency conduct PAEB evaluation tests with 
only the vehicle's lower beams and disable or not use any other 
advanced lighting systems?
    (26) Should the Agency consider performing PAEB testing under dark 
conditions with a vehicle's upper beams as a light source? If yes, 
should this lighting condition be assessed in addition to the proposed 
dark test condition, which would utilize only a vehicle's lower beams 
along with any advanced lighting system enabled to automatically 
engage, or in lieu of the proposed dark testing condition?

[[Page 13475]]

Should the Agency also evaluate PAEB performance in dark lighting 
conditions with overhead lights? Why or why not? What test scenarios, 
conditions, and speed(s) are appropriate for nighttime (i.e., dark 
lighting conditions) testing in NCAP, and why?
    (27) To reduce test burden in NCAP, the Agency proposed to perform 
one test per test speed until contact occurs, or until the vehicle's 
relative impact velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial speed of the 
subject vehicle for the given test condition. If contact occurs and if 
the vehicle's relative impact velocity is less than or equal to 50 
percent of the initial SV speed for the given combination of test speed 
and test condition, an additional four test trials will be conducted at 
the given test speed and test condition, and the SV must meet the 
passing performance criterion (i.e., no contact) for at least three out 
of those five test trials in order to be assessed at the next 
incremental test speed. Is this an appropriate approach to assess PAEB 
system performance in NCAP, or should a certain number of test trials 
be required for each assessed test speed? Why or why not? If a certain 
number of repeat tests is more appropriate, how many test trials should 
be conducted, and why?
    (28) Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for 
the proposed PAEB test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively, 
should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a maximum 
allowable SV-to-mannequin impact speed for any or all of the proposed 
test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed combination)? If 
yes, why, and for which test conditions? For those test conditions, 
what speed reductions would be appropriate? Alternatively, what maximum 
allowable impact speed would be appropriate?
    (29) If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin during the initial 
trial for a given test condition and test speed combination, NHTSA 
proposes to conduct additional test trials only if the relative impact 
velocity observed during that trial is less than or equal to 50 percent 
of the initial speed of the SV. For a test speed of 60 kph (37.3 mph), 
this maximum relative impact velocity is nominally 30 kph (18.6 mph), 
and for a test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph), the maximum relative impact 
velocity is nominally 5 kph (3.1 mph). Is this an appropriate limit on 
the maximum relative impact velocity for the proposed range of test 
speeds? If not, why? Note that the tests in Global Technical Regulation 
(GTR) No. 9 for pedestrian crashworthiness protection simulates a 
pedestrian impact at 40 kph (24.9 mph).
    (30) For each lighting condition, the Agency is proposing 6 test 
speeds (i.e., those performed from 10 to 60 kph (6.2 to 37.3 mph) in 
increments of 10 kph (6.2 mph)) for each of the 8 proposed test 
conditions (S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). This results in a 
total of 48 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds to 
be evaluated per lighting condition, or 96 total combinations for both 
light conditions. The Agency mentions later, in the ADAS Ratings System 
section, that it plans to use check marks, as is done currently, to 
give credit to vehicles that (1) are equipped with the recommended ADAS 
technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system performance test 
requirements for each ADAS technology included in NCAP until it issues 
(1) a final decision notice announcing the new ADAS rating system and 
(2) a final rule to amend the safety rating section of the vehicle 
window sticker (Monroney label). For the purposes of providing credit 
for a technology using check marks, what is an appropriate minimum 
overall pass rate for PAEB performance evaluation? For example, should 
a vehicle be said to meet the PAEB performance requirements if it 
passes two-thirds of the 96 unique combinations of test conditions and 
test speeds for the two lighting conditions (i.e., passes 64 unique 
combinations of test conditions and test speeds)?
    (31) Given previous support from commenters to include S2 and S3 
scenarios in the program at some point in the future and the results of 
AAA's testing for one of the turning conditions, NHTSA seeks comment on 
an appropriate timeframe for including S2 and S3 scenarios into the 
Agency's NCAP. Also, NHTSA requests from vehicle manufacturers 
information on any currently available models designed to address, and 
ideally achieve crash avoidance during conduct of, the S2 and S3 
scenarios to support Agency evaluation for a future program upgrade.
    (32) Should the Agency adopt the articulated mannequins into the 
PAEB test procedure as proposed? Why or why not?
    (33) In addition to tests performed under daylight conditions, the 
Agency is proposing to evaluate the performance of PAEB systems during 
nighttime conditions where a large percentage of real-world pedestrian 
fatalities occur. Are there other technologies and information 
available to the public that the Agency can evaluate under nighttime 
conditions?
    (34) Are there other safety areas that NHTSA should consider as 
part of this or a future upgrade for pedestrian protection?
    (35) Are there any aspects of NCAP's proposed PAEB test procedure 
that need further refinement or clarification before adoption? If so, 
what additional refinement or clarification is necessary, and why?
    In addition to the fleet characterization research conducted for 
this upgrade of NCAP, the Agency is conducting additional research that 
may be used to support future program enhancements. One such research 
project is designed to address injuries and fatalities for other 
vulnerable road users, specifically cyclists.\121\ While some PAEB 
systems may be capable of detecting cyclists and activating to avoid a 
crash, NHTSA's current PAEB test procedure does not include a specific 
cyclist component. However, since the number of cyclists killed on U.S. 
roads continues to rise,\122\ the Agency plans to perform research to 
determine the viability of Euro NCAP's AEB cyclist tests. NHTSA will 
then compare test data with preliminary crash populations to assess the 
adequacy of the test procedure for the U.S. vehicle fleet and roadway 
system. The Euro NCAP test includes four test scenarios: One in which 
the cyclist crosses in front of the vehicle from the near-side; one in 
which the cyclist crosses in front of the vehicle from the near-side 
from behind an obstruction; one in which the cyclist crosses in front 
of the vehicle from the far-side; and the other in which the cyclist 
travels in the same direction as the vehicle. The latter test scenario 
is repeated for both 25 percent and 50 percent overlaps, while the 
first three scenarios are conducted at 50 percent overlap (i.e., the 
vehicle strikes the bicyclist at 50 percent of the vehicle's width). In 
all tests, a cyclist target comprised of an articulating dummy, which 
replicates the pedaling action of a cyclist, is seated on a bicycle 
mounted on a moving platform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ NHTSA notes that this research will also include 
motorcycles.
    \122\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis (2019, June), 
Bicyclists and other cyclists: 2017 data (Traffic Safety Facts. 
Report No. DOT HS 812 765), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA believes that detecting cyclists is technically more 
challenging for vehicle AEB systems than detecting pedestrians since 
cyclists often move at higher speeds. Vehicles must not only be 
equipped with sensors that have wider fields of view (similar to that 
required for the turning PAEB test scenarios), but must also process 
information more quickly as to whether

[[Page 13476]]

to alert the driver and/or automatically brake.
    In the context of this additional research testing, NHTSA requests 
comment on the following:
    (36) Considering not only the increasing number of cyclists killed 
on U.S. roads but also the limitations of current AEB systems in 
detecting cyclists, the Agency seeks comment on the appropriate 
timeframe for adding a cyclist component to NCAP and requests from 
vehicle manufacturers information on any currently available models 
that have the capability to validate the cyclist target and test 
procedures used by Euro NCAP to support evaluation for a future NCAP 
program upgrade.
    (37) In addition to the test procedures used by Euro NCAP, are 
there others that NHTSA should consider to address the cyclist crash 
population in the U.S. and effectiveness of systems?

D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies

    As previously mentioned, NHTSA will retain the currently available 
ADAS technologies (forward collision warning, crash imminent braking 
and dynamic brake support) designed to address forward collisions 
(rear-end crashes) in NCAP's crash avoidance program. As discussed in 
NHTSA's March 2019 study, these technologies have the potential to 
prevent or mitigate eight rear-end pre-crash scenarios, which 
represented approximately 1.70 million crashes annually, on average, or 
29.4 percent of all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways. As shown in 
Table A-1, these crashes resulted in 1,275 fatalities, on average, and 
883,386 MAIS 1-5 injuries annually, which represented 3.8 percent of 
all fatalities and 31.5 percent of all injuries, respectively.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FCW technology evaluations were introduced into NCAP starting with 
model year 2011 vehicles,\124\ while CIB and DBS systems (referred to 
collectively as Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)) were added to the 
program starting with model year 2018 vehicles.\125\ These technologies 
are not being offered as standard equipment on all passenger vehicles, 
so it remains important for NCAP to recommend the technologies and 
inform shoppers which vehicles have the technologies. Further, NHTSA 
observed performance test failures for each of these technologies 
during NCAP's model year 2019 vehicle performance verification testing; 
\126\ thus, NCAP should continue to inform shoppers as to which systems 
perform to NHTSA's benchmark. Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the 
next few sections, NHTSA believes there are opportunities for updating 
the current NCAP performance requirements for these three technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
    \125\ 80 FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015).
    \126\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket Nos. NHTSA-2010-0093 
and NHTSA-2015-0006. (Only one test failure was observed for FCW.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
    An FCW system is an ADAS technology that monitors a vehicle's 
speed, the speed of the vehicle in front of it, and the distance 
between the two vehicles. If the FCW system determines that the 
distance from the driver's vehicle to the vehicle in front of it is too 
short, and the closing velocity between the two vehicles is too high, 
the system warns the driver of an impending rear-end collision.
    Typically, FCW systems are comprised of two components: A sensing 
system, which can detect a vehicle in front of the driver's vehicle; 
and a warning system, which alerts the driver to a potential crash 
threat. The sensing portion of the system may consist of forward-
looking radar, lidar, camera systems, or a combination of these. The 
warning system may provide drivers with a visual display, such as a 
light on the dash, an audible signal (e.g., buzzer or chime), and/or a 
haptic signal that provides tactile feedback to the driver (e.g., rapid 
vibrations of the seat pan or steering wheel) to alert the driver of an 
impending crash so that they may manually intervene (e.g., apply the 
vehicle's brakes or make an evasive steering maneuver) to avoid or 
mitigate the crash.
    Currently, NCAP's FCW test procedure \127\ consists of three 
scenarios that simulate the most frequent types of rear-end crashes. 
These include: Lead vehicle stopped (LVS), lead vehicle decelerating 
(LVD), and lead vehicle moving (LVM) scenarios. In each scenario, the 
vehicle being evaluated is the SV, and the vehicle positioned directly 
in front of the SV, a production mid-size passenger car, is the POV. 
The time-to-collision (TTC) criteria prescribed for each scenario 
represent the time needed for a driver to perceive an impending rear-
end crash, decide the corrective action, and respond with the 
appropriate mitigating action. The TTC for each scenario is calculated 
by considering the speed of the SV relative to the POV at the time of 
the FCW alert. If the FCW system fails to provide an alert within the 
required time during testing, the professional test driver brakes or 
steers away to avoid a collision. A short description of each test 
scenario and the requirements for a passing result based on TTC is 
provided below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013, 
February). Forward collision warning system confirmation test. 
https://www.regulations.gov. Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0134.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     LVS--The SV encounters a stopped POV on a straight road. 
The SV is moving at 72.4 kph (45 mph), and the POV is stationary. To 
pass this test, the SV must issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least 
2.1 s.
     LVD--The SV encounters a POV slowing with constant 
deceleration directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV 
are both driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) with an initial headway of 30.0 m 
(98.4 ft.). The POV then decelerates, braking at a constant 
deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV. To pass this test, the SV must 
issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least 2.4 s.
     LVM--The SV encounters a slower-moving POV directly in 
front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV are driven at constant 
speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. To 
pass this test, the SV must issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least 
2.0 s.
    Each scenario is conducted up to seven times. To pass the NCAP 
system performance criteria, the SV must pass at least five out of 
seven trials \128\ for each of the three test scenarios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ As noted in the Agency's 2015 AEB final decision notice 
(80 FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015)), the Agency believes passing five out 
of seven tests successfully discriminates between functional systems 
versus non-functional systems. To date, the Agency allows two 
failures out of seven attempts to afford some flexibility in 
including emerging technologies into the NCAP program. Furthermore, 
NHTSA test laboratories have experienced unpredictable vehicle 
responses due to the vehicle algorithm designs. Test laboratories 
have observed systems that improve their performance with use, 
systems degrading and shutting down when they do not see other 
vehicles, and systems failing to re-activate if the vehicle is not 
cycled through an ignition cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NCAP's FCW test scenarios are directly related to real-world crash 
data. From its analysis of 2011 to 2015 FARS and GES data, the Agency 
found that crashes analogous to the LVS test scenario, where a struck 
vehicle was stopped at the time of impact, occurred in 65 percent of 
the rear-end crashes studied.\129\ The LVD scenario, in which

[[Page 13477]]

the struck vehicle was decelerating at the time of impact, occurred in 
22 percent of the rear-end crashes, and the LVM scenario, in which the 
struck vehicle was moving at a constant, but slower, speed compared to 
the striking vehicle at impact, occurred in 10 percent of the rear-end 
crashes. Collectively, these test scenarios represented 97 percent of 
rear-end crashes. With respect to test speed, in its independent review 
of the 2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe concluded that 28 
percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 63 percent of all rear-end 
crashes occurred on roadways with posted speed limits of 72.4 kph (45 
mph) or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, NHTSA gives credit on its website by assigning a check 
mark to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that send visual, audible, 
and/or haptic alerts and meet the TTC requirements. However, the 
Agency's research has shown that presenting drivers with an audible 
warning in medium or high urgency situations significantly reduced 
crash severity relative to visual and tactile (or haptic) warnings, 
which did not differ.\130\ This being said, in a large-scale field test 
of FCW and LDW systems on model year 2013 Chevrolet and Cadillac 
vehicles, the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute 
(UMTRI) and GM found that GM's Safety Alert Seat, which provides haptic 
seat vibration pulses, increased driver acceptance of both FCW and LDW 
systems compared to audible alerts.\131\ The study concluded that the 
FCW system was turned off 6 percent of the time when the Safety Alert 
Seat was selected (rather than audible alerts), whereas it was turned 
off 17 percent of the time when only audible alerts were available. In 
light of these findings, the Agency seeks comment on whether to give 
credit to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that only provide a 
passing audible alert, or whether it should also give credit to those 
systems that only provide passing haptic alerts.\132\ If the Agency 
elects to give credit to vehicles with haptic alerts, are there certain 
haptic alert types that should be excluded from consideration (e.g., 
because they may be such a nuisance to drivers that they may be more 
likely to disable the system)? NHTSA also seeks comment on whether it 
should no longer give credit to FCW-equipped vehicles that offer only 
visual FCW alerts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., Huey, 
R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, September), Human factors for 
connected vehicles: Effective warning interface research findings 
(Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.
    \131\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K., 
Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C., 
and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward 
collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \132\ The Agency would give credit to FCW systems that have both 
passing audible and haptic alerts if both alert types were 
available. However, if a vehicle with such a system provided only a 
passing haptic alert and the Agency decided only to give credit to 
systems that provided passing audible alerts, then the vehicle would 
not receive credit as having met the Agency's FCW test requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NCAP's current FCW test procedure states that if an FCW system 
provides a warning timing adjustment setting for the driver, at least 
one timing setting must meet the TTC warning criteria specified in the 
procedure. Therefore, if a vehicle is equipped with a warning timing 
adjustment, only the most conservative (i.e., earliest) warning setting 
is tested. Selecting the most conservative setting is beneficial for 
track testing where the driver of the SV must steer and/or brake to 
avoid a crash with the POV after the FCW alert is issued. However, the 
Agency is concerned that many consumers may not adjust the warning 
timing setting for FCW alerts. Furthermore, consumers that choose to 
adjust the alert timing may be unlikely to select the earliest setting, 
as this setting is most likely to result in false positive alerts 
(i.e., nuisance alerts) during real-world operation.\133\ The Agency 
also recognizes that the earliest FCW setting can be used to pass the 
NCAP test--essentially allowing a vehicle to get NCAP credit even 
though it may not otherwise earn credit if the later warning settings 
are tested. Therefore, by testing the earliest timing adjustment 
setting, the Agency's FCW performance assessment may not be indicative 
of many drivers' real-world experiences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ Nodine, E., Fisher, D., Golembiewski, G., Armstrong, C., 
Lam, A., Jeffers, M.A., Najm, W., Miller, S., Jackson, S., and 
Kehoe, N. (2019, May), Indicators of driver adaptation to forward 
collision warnings: A naturalistic driving evaluation (Report No. 
DOT HS 812 611), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This concern was previously addressed in NHTSA's 2015 AEB final 
decision notice, but the Agency has not since made updates to its FCW 
test procedure.\134\ In that notice, the Agency stated that because 
NCAP is a consumer information program, it should test vehicles as 
delivered, using the factory default FCW warning adjustment setting for 
FCW and AEB testing, including PAEB. Although the Agency believes there 
is still merit to testing the default setting, NHTSA tentatively 
believes testing the middle alert setting may be more appropriate. 
Selection of the middle or next latest alert setting for testing would 
harmonize with Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems test protocol, thus 
potentially driving costs down for manufacturers and attempting to 
ensure that consumers in both the U.S. and European markets benefit 
from similar FCW system settings.\135\ Harmonization was a common theme 
among commenters responding to NCAP's December 2015 notice, with most 
vehicle manufacturers, suppliers, and other industry groups requesting 
that NHTSA harmonize test procedures, test targets, and test 
requirements with other NCAPs around the world, particularly Euro NCAP. 
As mentioned earlier, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also required 
that NHTSA consider harmonization with third-party safety rating 
programs when possible. In light of these considerations, the Agency is 
proposing that it is most appropriate to test the middle (or next 
latest) FCW system setting in lieu of the default setting when 
performing FCW, CIB, DBS, and PAEB NCAP tests on vehicles that offer 
multiple FCW timing adjustment settings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ 80 FR 68614 (Nov. 5, 2015).
    \135\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2019, 
July), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.2. See 
section 7.4.1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FCW systems have been recognized as the first generation of ADAS 
technologies designed to help drivers avoid an impending rear-end 
collision. In 2008, when NHTSA decided to include ADAS in the NCAP 
program, FCW was selected because the Agency believed (1) this 
technology addressed a major crash problem; (2) system designs existed 
that could mitigate this safety problem; (3) safety benefit projections 
were assessed; and (4) performance tests and procedures were available 
to ensure an acceptable performance level.\136\ At the time, the Agency 
estimated that FCW systems were 15 percent effective in preventing 
rear-end crashes. More recently, in a 2017 study, IIHS \137\ found that 
FCW systems may be more effective than NHTSA's initial estimates. IIHS 
found that FCW systems reduced rear-end crashes by 27 percent. 
Moreover, consumers have shown favorable acceptance of these systems. 
For instance, in a 2019 survey of more than 57,000 Consumer Reports 
subscribers, 69 percent of vehicle owners reported that they were 
satisfied with their

[[Page 13478]]

vehicle's FCW technology, 38 percent of vehicle owners said that it had 
helped them avoid a crash, and 54 percent of them remarked that they 
trust the system to work every time.\138\ As consumer acceptance has 
been positive, and system performance has improved over the years, 
fitment rates have also increased. As mentioned previously, less than 
0.2 percent of model year 2011 vehicles were equipped with FCW systems 
compared to 38.3 percent of model year 2018 vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).
    \137\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward 
collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in 
reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009.
    \138\ Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to forward 
collision warning: How FCW helps drivers avoid accidents, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/forward-collision-warning-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One limitation of FCW systems is that they are designed to warn the 
driver, but not to provide significant automatic braking of the vehicle 
(some FCW systems use haptic brake pulses to alert the driver of a 
crash-imminent driving situation, but they are not intended to 
effectively slow the vehicle). Since the introduction of FCW systems 
into NCAP, active safety systems, such as those with automatic braking 
capability (i.e., AEB), have entered the marketplace. In a recent study 
sponsored by GM \139\ to evaluate the real-world effectiveness of ADAS 
technologies (including FCW and AEB) on 3.8 million model year 2013-
2017 GM vehicles, UMTRI found that, for frontal collisions, camera-
based FCW systems produced an estimated 21 percent reduction in rear-
end striking crashes, while the AEB systems studied (which included a 
combination of camera-only, radar-only, and fused camera-radar systems) 
produced an estimated 46 percent reduction in the same crash type.\140\ 
Similarly, in a 2017 study, IIHS found that vehicles equipped with FCW 
and AEB showed a 50 percent reduction for the same crash type.\141\ 
NHTSA is drawing from these research studies, generally, since each has 
limitations and deviations from how NHTSA might evaluate fleet-wide 
\142\ system effectiveness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, 
C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors 
production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General 
Motors LLC. UMTRI-2019-6.
    \140\ The Agency notes that the FCW effectiveness rate (21%) 
observed by UMTRI is similar to that observed by IIHS in its 2019 
study (27%). Differences in data samples and vehicle selection may 
contribute to the specific numerical differences. Regardless, the 
AEB effectiveness rate observed by UMTRI (46%) was significantly 
higher than the corresponding FCW effectiveness rate observed in 
either the IIHS or UMTRI study.
    \141\ Low-speed AEB showed a 43% reduction.
    \142\ The UMTRI study was limited to GM vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From a functional perspective, research suggests that active 
braking systems, such as AEB, provide greater safety benefits than 
corresponding warning systems, such as FCW. However, NHTSA has found 
that current AEB systems often integrate the functionalities of FCW and 
AEB into one frontal crash prevention system to deliver improved real-
world safety performance and high consumer acceptance. Consequently, 
the Agency believes that this system integration may have implications 
for NCAP FCW testing because current NCAP FCW requirements were 
developed at a time when FCW and AEB functionalities were not always 
linked. As will be detailed later in this notice, NHTSA believes that 
FCW could now be considered a component of AEB and PAEB such that FCW 
operation could be evaluated using NCAP's AEB and PAEB tests.
2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)
    To address the rear-end crash problem further, in November 2015, 
NHTSA published a final decision notice announcing the addition of two 
AEB technologies, CIB and DBS, into NCAP effective with model year 2018 
vehicles.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015). CIB and DBS together are 
considered Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unlike FCW systems, AEB systems (i.e., CIB and DBS), are designed 
to help drivers actively avoid or mitigate the severity of rear-end 
crashes. CIB systems provide automatic braking when forward-looking 
sensors indicate that a crash is imminent and the driver has not 
braked, whereas DBS systems provide supplemental braking when sensors 
determine that driver-applied braking is insufficient to avoid an 
imminent crash.
    In Consumer Reports' 2019 subscriber survey, 81 percent of vehicle 
owners reported that they were satisfied with AEB technology, 54 
percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash, and 61 percent 
stated that they trusted the system to work every time.\144\ 
Furthermore, IIHS found in its 2017 study that rear-end collisions 
decreased by 50 percent for vehicles equipped with AEB and FCW.\145\ 
Similarly, as mentioned earlier, UMTRI \146\ found that AEB systems 
produced an estimated 46 percent reduction in applicable rear-end 
crashes when combined with a forward collision alert, which alone 
showed only a 21 percent reduction.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ Consumer Reports, (2019, August 5), Guide to automatic 
emergency braking: How AEB can put the brakes on car collisions, 
https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/automatic-emergency-braking-guide/.
    \145\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward 
collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in 
reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009.
    \146\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, 
C.A. (2019, September), Analysis of the field effectiveness of 
General Motors production active safety and advanced headlighting 
systems, The University of Michigan Transportation Research 
Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
    \147\ The AEB systems studied by UMTRI consisted of camera-only, 
radar-only, and fused camera-radar AEB systems, the latter two 
systems of which also included adaptive cruise control 
functionality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A recent IIHS study \148\ of 2009-2016 crash data from 23 States 
suggested that the increasing effectiveness of AEB technology in 
certain crash situations is changing the rear-end crash problem. The 
Institute's analysis provided insight into the performance of current 
AEB systems and future opportunities for improvement. The study 
identified the types of rear-end crashes in which striking vehicles 
equipped with AEB were over-represented compared to those without 
AEB.\149\ For instance, IIHS found that striking vehicles involved in 
the following rear-end crashes were more likely to have AEB: (1) Where 
the striking vehicle was turning relative to when it was moving 
straight; (2) when the struck vehicle was turning or changing lanes 
relative to when it was slowing or stopped; (3) when the struck vehicle 
was not a passenger vehicle or was a special use vehicle relative to a 
passenger car; (4) on snowy or icy roads; or (5) on roads with speed 
limits of 112.7 kph (70 mph) relative to those with 64.4 to 72.4 kph 
(40 to 45 mph) speed limits. Overall, the study found that 25.3 percent 
of crashes where the striking vehicle was equipped with AEB had at 
least one of these over-represented characteristics, compared with 15.9 
percent of impacts by vehicles that were not equipped with AEB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August), 
Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles 
with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019, 
VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118 https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
    \149\ In this instance, over-represented means a higher 
frequency as a percentage for AEB-equipped vehicles versus non-AEB-
equipped vehicles on a normalized basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These results suggest that the tests used to evaluate the 
performance of AEB systems by the Agency's NCAP and other consumer 
information programs are influencing the development of countermeasures 
capable of minimizing the crash problems that they were intended to 
address. However, the results also imply that AEB systems have not yet 
provided their full crash reduction potential. While they are effective 
at addressing the most common rear-end crashes, they are less effective 
at addressing those crashes that

[[Page 13479]]

are more atypical. IIHS found that in 2016, nearly 300,000 (15 percent) 
of the police reported two-vehicle rear-end crashes involved one of the 
rear-end crashes mentioned above. The Institute suggested that vehicle 
manufacturers would be encouraged to improve AEB system designs for 
situations where AEB was over-represented if consumer programs 
incorporated tests that replicate these rear-end crash events, such as 
an angled target vehicle that simulates a struck vehicle changing 
lanes. IIHS cautioned (and NHTSA agrees) that new testing protocols 
should not drive performance degradation in more typical crash 
situations, create unintended safety consequences, or adversely affect 
AEB use due to nuisance activations.
    While these recent studies suggest that AEB systems (i.e., CIB and 
DBS) have collectively been effective in reducing rear-impact crashes, 
it is not clear how effective each of these systems are as standalone 
systems, and whether their individual effectiveness may change for 
certain crash scenarios, environmental conditions, or driver factors 
(e.g., poor judgement, distraction, etc.). Furthermore, the Agency is 
not aware of any studies of current-generation AEB systems that have 
determined the extent to which CIB and DBS individually contributes to 
crash reduction.
    Prior to considering adopting AEB into NCAP, NHTSA conducted a 
review of 2003-2009 National Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness 
Data System (NASS CDS) data to define the target population for rear-
end crashes.\150\ At the time of the analysis, the Agency concluded 
that CIB and DBS target crash populations were mutually exclusive. In 
other words, they included crashes in which the driver either did not 
brake (CIB) or braked (DBS). The analysis of the crash data showed that 
the driver braked in approximately half of the crashes and did not 
brake in the other half. However, in its analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS 
and GES data sets, Volpe found much more conservative brake rates. The 
organization found that the driver braked in just 8 percent of rear-end 
crashes involving fatalities and 20 percent of those crashes involving 
injuries. The study also showed that the driver made no attempt to 
avoid the crash (e.g., no braking, steering, accelerating) for 56 
percent of the crashes involving fatalities and for 21 percent of those 
involving injuries.\151\ It is possible that the brake rate differed 
for the two studies because of the target crash population refinements 
made for NHTSA's original analysis and because of difference in data 
collection methods between the crash databases. For instance, high-
speed crashes were excluded from NHTSA's target crash population review 
because the AEB systems tested at the time had limited speed reduction 
capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2012, 
June), Forward-looking advanced braking technologies research 
report, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2012-0057-0001.
    \151\ The Agency notes that for the rear-end pre-crash scenario 
group, the driver avoidance maneuver was unknown in 25 percent and 
54 percent of the FARS and GES crashes, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From the refined target crash population, NHTSA computed 
preliminary safety benefits for both CIB and DBS from a limited number 
of CIB- and DBS-equipped vehicles subjected to early versions of the 
Agency's test procedures based upon speed reduction capabilities.\152\ 
The Agency recognized that CIB and DBS systems available at the time 
had limited capabilities and could not address serious crashes where 
fatalities were likely to occur. Nevertheless, the Agency tentatively 
found that if a CIB system alone was equipped on all light vehicles, it 
could potentially prevent approximately 40,000 minor/moderate injuries 
(AIS 1-2), 640 serious-to-critical injuries (AIS 3-5), and save 
approximately 40 lives, annually. If a DBS system alone was equipped on 
all light vehicles, it could potentially prevent approximately 107,000 
minor/moderate injuries (AIS 1-2), 2,100 serious-to-critical injuries 
(AIS 3-5), and save approximately 25 lives, annually. These safety 
benefits from CIB and DBS were considered incremental to the benefits 
stemming from an FCW alert.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2014, 
August), Automatic emergency braking system (AEB) research report, 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2012-0057-0037.
    \153\ FCW, CIB, and DBS combined on all light vehicles could 
potentially prevent approximately 200,000 minor/moderate injuries 
(AIS 1-2), 4,000 (AIS 3-5) serious injuries, and save approximately 
100 lives annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA's analysis showed there was merit to performing testing to 
assess vehicle performance in situations where a driver either does not 
brake (CIB) or brakes (DBS). Volpe's recent analysis on braking 
behavior/rate further validates the need to assess CIB and DBS 
separately. Considering this and the fact that NHTSA cannot currently 
differentiate the individual effectiveness of CIB and DBS systems, 
NHTSA tentatively believes NCAP should continue to assess CIB and DBS 
system performance individually. However, the Agency acknowledges that, 
because it believes AEB systems have advanced significantly in recent 
years, it is appropriate at this time to consider revising performance 
envelopes and dynamic scenarios in NCAP to acknowledge and encourage 
such advances.
    The following sections discuss in detail CIB and DBS systems, and 
more specifically, NCAP's current test procedures and a potential 
updated test program for modern AEB systems. The Agency seeks comment 
on how NCAP can encourage the maximum safety benefits of AEB and 
potentially reduce the number of tests conducted. Comments are also 
sought on future suggestions for AEB beyond any near-term upgrade.
a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
    In response to an FCW alert or a driver noticing an imminent crash 
scenario, a driver may initiate braking to avoid a rear-end crash. In 
situations where the driver's braking is insufficient to prevent a 
collision, DBS can automatically supplement the driver's braking action 
to prevent or mitigate the crash. Similar to FCW and CIB systems, DBS 
systems employ forward-looking sensors such as radar, lidar, and/or 
vision-based sensors to detect vehicles in the path directly ahead and 
monitor a vehicle's operating conditions such as speed or brake 
application. However, DBS systems can actively supplement braking to 
assist the driver whereas FCW systems serve only to warn the driver of 
a potential crash threat, and CIB systems are activated when a rear-end 
crash is imminent, but the driver has not manually applied the 
vehicle's brakes.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ DBS systems differ from traditional brake assist systems 
used with the vehicle's foundation brakes. Whereas both systems rely 
on brake pedal application rate to determine whether supplemental 
braking is required, DBS has a lower activation threshold since it 
also uses information from the aforementioned sensors to verify that 
more braking is needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NCAP's current DBS test procedure \155\ consists of the same three 
rear-end crash scenarios specified in the FCW system performance test 
procedure--LVS, LVD, and LVM, but most of the test speed combinations 
specified in the DBS test procedure differ (the single exception is 
that the FCW and DBS test procedures both use an LVM test performed 
with SV and POV speeds of 72.4 and 32.2 kph (45 and 20 mph), 
respectively). In addition,

[[Page 13480]]

the DBS performance assessment includes a Steel Trench Plate (STP) 
false positive suppression test, which is conducted at two test speeds. 
This fourth test scenario is used to evaluate the propensity of a 
vehicle's DBS system to activate inappropriately in a non-critical 
driving scenario that would not present a safety risk to the vehicle's 
occupants. For the first three test scenarios, where braking is 
expected, the SV must provide enough supplemental braking to avoid 
contact with the POV to pass a trial run. In the case of the DBS false 
positive test scenario, the performance criterion is minimal to no 
activation for both test speeds.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2015, 
October), Dynamic brake support performance evaluation confirmation 
test for the New Car Assessment Program, https://www.regulations.gov, 
Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0006-0026.
    \156\ Minimal activation is defined as a peak SV deceleration 
attributable to DBS intervention that is less than or equal to 1.25 
times the average of the deceleration recorded for the vehicle's 
foundation brake system alone during its approach to the steel 
trench plate. The 1.25 multiplier serves to provide some system 
flexibility, meaning a mild DBS intervention is acceptable, but one 
where the vehicle thinks it must respond to the STP as if it was a 
real vehicle is not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As in the FCW system performance tests, the vehicle that is 
subjected to the DBS test scenarios is the SV. The FCW test procedure 
(which uses professional drivers for acceleration, braking, and 
steering during test conduct) stipulates that a mid-size passenger car 
serve as the POV during testing. The DBS test procedure (which relies 
solely on the use of a programmable brake controller and the vehicle's 
DBS system for braking), however, utilizes a surrogate (i.e., target 
vehicle) to limit the potential for damage to the SV and/or test 
equipment in the event of a collision.
    The target vehicle presently used as the POV by NCAP for the 
Agency's DBS testing is known as the Subject Surrogate Vehicle, or SSV. 
The SSV, developed by NHTSA for the purpose of track testing, appears 
as a ``real'' vehicle to the camera, radar, and lidar sensors used by 
existing AEB systems. The SSV system is comprised of (a) a shell,\157\ 
which is a visually and dimensionally accurate representation of a 
passenger car; (b) a slider and load frame assembly to which the shell 
is attached, (c) a two-rail track on which the slider operates, (d) a 
road-based lateral restraint track, and (e) a tow vehicle, which pulls 
the SSV and its peripherals down the test track during trials where the 
POV (i.e., SSV) must be in motion. A brief discussion on the use of the 
GVT, discussed earlier in the BSI section, as an alternative to the SSV 
for future DBS and CIB testing, is included later in this notice.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ The shell is constructed from lightweight composite 
materials with favorable strength-to-weight characteristics, 
including carbon fiber, Kevlar[supreg], phenolic, and Nomex 
honeycomb. It is also wrapped with a commercially available vinyl 
material to simulate paint on the body panels, rear bumper, and a 
tinted glass rear window. A foam bumper having a neoprene cover is 
attached to the rear of the SSV to reduce the peak forces realized 
immediately after an impact from a test vehicle occurs.
    \158\ If the Agency decides to assess FCW in separate tests to 
that for DBS and CIB, those FCW tests would also be conducted using 
GVT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A short description of each DBS system performance test scenario, 
and the requirements for a passing result, is provided below:
     Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS)--The SV encounters a stopped 
POV on a straight road. The SV is moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and the 
POV is stationary. The SV throttle is released within 500 ms after the 
SV issues an FCW alert, and the SV brake is applied at a TTC of 1.1 s 
(i.e., at a nominal headway of 12.2 m (40 ft.)). To pass this test, the 
SV must not contact the POV.
     Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)--The SV encounters a POV 
slowing with constant deceleration directly in front of it on a 
straight road. The SV and POV are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) with 
an initial headway of 13.8 m (45.3 ft.). The POV brakes are then 
applied at a constant deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV. The SV 
throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert, 
and the SV brakes are applied at a TTC of 1.4 s (i.e., at a nominal 
headway of 9.6 m (31.5 ft.)). To pass this test, the SV must not 
contact the POV.
     Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM)--The SV encounters a slower-
moving POV directly in front of it on a straight road. In the first 
test, the SV and POV are driven on a straight road at a constant speed 
of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In the second 
test, the SV and POV are driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 
mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. In both tests, the SV 
throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert, 
and the SV brakes are applied at a TTC of 1 s (i.e., at a nominal 
headway of 6.7 m (22 ft.) in the first test, and 11.3 m (37 ft.) in the 
second test). To pass these tests, the SV must not contact the POV.
     Steel Trench Plate (STP) test (to assess false positive 
suppression)--The SV is driven over a 2.4 m x 3.7 m x 25.4 mm (8 ft. x 
12 ft. x 1 in.) steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 72.4 kph 
(45 mph). If no FCW alert is issued by a TTC of 2.1 s, the SV throttle 
is released within 500 ms of a TTC of 2.1 s, and the SV brakes are 
applied at a TTC of 1.1 s (i.e., at a nominal distance of 12.3 m (40 
ft.) from the edge of the STP at 40.2 kph (25 mph), or 22.3 m (73 ft.) 
at 72.4 kph (45 mph)). To pass this test, the performance criteria is 
non-activation, as defined above.
    To pass NCAP's DBS system performance criteria, the SV must 
currently pass five out of seven trials for each of the six test 
conditions.
    As previously mentioned, NCAP's LVS, LVM, and LVD test scenarios 
for its DBS evaluations are similar to those for the FCW assessments 
and therefore correspond well with real-world crash data and have 
similar target crash populations. NHTSA's analysis of the 2011-2015 
rear-end crash data from FARS and GES showed target crash populations 
of 65 percent for the LVS scenario, 22 percent for the LVD scenario, 
and 10 percent for the LVM scenario.\159\ Furthermore, Volpe's 
independent review of the 2011-2015 data sets showed that for rear-end 
crashes that occurred on roadways with posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25 
mph) or less, 56.3 kph (35 mph) or less, and 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less, 
the fatality rate was 2 percent, 11 percent, and 28 percent, 
respectively. Additionally, MAIS 1-5 injuries were observed in 6 
percent of all rear-end crashes that occurred on roadways with posted 
speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, 30 percent with posted speeds of 
56.3 kph (35 mph) or less, and 63 percent with posted speeds of 72.4 
kph (45 mph) or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
    If a driver does not take any action to brake when a rear-end crash 
is imminent, CIB systems utilize the same types of forward-looking 
sensors used in DBS systems to apply the vehicle's brakes automatically 
to slow or stop the vehicle. The amount of braking applied varies by 
manufacturer, and several systems are designed to achieve maximum 
vehicle deceleration just prior to impact. In reviewing model year 
2017-2019 NCAP CIB test data, NHTSA observed a deceleration range of 
0.31 to 1.27g during test trials that provided speed reductions capable 
of satisfying the CIB performance criteria for a given test condition. 
Unlike DBS systems, which only provide additional braking to supplement 
the driver's brake input, CIB systems activate when the driver has not 
applied the brake pedal.
    The Agency's current CIB test procedure \160\ is comprised of the 
same

[[Page 13481]]

four test scenarios (LVS, LVD, LVM, and the STP false positive 
suppression test) and accompanying test speeds as set forth in the DBS 
test procedure. However, the performance criteria vary slightly. The 
LVM 40.2 kph/16.1 kph (25 mph/10 mph) test condition stipulates that 
the SV may not contact the POV. The LVS, LVD, and the LVM 72.4 kph/32.2 
kph (45 mph/20 mph) test conditions permit SV-to-POV contact but 
require minimum reductions in the SV speed. In the case of the CIB 
false positive tests, the performance criterion is little-to-no 
activation. Similar to NCAP's DBS tests, the SSV is the POV presently 
used in the program's CIB testing. A short description of each test 
scenario and the requirements for a passing result is provided below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2015, 
October). Crash imminent brake system performance evaluation for the 
New Car Assessment Program. https://www.regulations.gov. Docket No. 
NHTSA-2015-0006-0025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     LVS--SV encounters a stopped POV on a straight road. The 
SV is moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and the POV (i.e., the SSV) is 
stationary. The SV throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV 
issues an FCW alert. To pass this test, the SV speed reduction 
attributable to CIB intervention must be >=15.8 kph (9.8 mph).
     LVD--The SV encounters a POV slowing with constant 
deceleration directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV 
are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) with an initial headway of 13.8 m 
(45.3 ft.). The POV then decelerates, braking at a constant 
deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV, after which the SV throttle is 
released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert. To pass this 
test, the SV speed reduction attributable to CIB intervention must be 
>=16.9 kph (10.5 mph).
     LVM--The SV encounters a slower-moving POV directly in 
front of it on a straight road. In the first test, the SV and POV are 
driven on a straight road at a constant speed of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 
16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In the second test, the SV and POV are 
driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), 
respectively. In both tests, the SV throttle is released within 500 ms 
after the SV issues an FCW alert. To pass the first test, the SV must 
not contact the POV. To pass the second test, the SV speed reduction 
attributable to CIB intervention must be >=15.8 kph (9.8 mph).
     STP test (to assess false positive suppression)--The SV is 
driven towards a steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) in one test 
and 72.4 kph (45 mph) in the other test. If an FCW alert is issued, the 
SV throttle is released within 500 ms of the alert. If no FCW alert is 
issued, the throttle is not released until the test's validity period 
(the time when all test specifications and tolerances must be 
satisfied) has passed. To pass these tests, the SV must not achieve a 
peak deceleration equal to or greater than 0.5g at any time during its 
approach to the steel trench plate.
    To pass NCAP's CIB system performance criteria, the SV must pass 
five out of seven trials for each of the six test conditions.
    Similar to FCW and DBS, NCAP's CIB test scenarios correlate to the 
dynamically distinct rear-end crash data discussed earlier. The 
Agency's analysis of the 2011-2015 crash data showed that the LVS, LVD, 
and LVM scenarios represented 65 percent, 22 percent, and 10 percent, 
respectively, of all rear-end crashes.\161\ With respect to test speed, 
in its independent review of 2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe 
concluded that 2 percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 6 percent of all 
rear-end crashes occurred on roadways with posted speed limits of 40.2 
kph (25 mph) or less. Eleven percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 30 
percent of all rear-end crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds of 
56.3 kph (35 mph) or less. For posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or 
less, these statistics are 28 percent and 63 percent, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Current State of AEB Technology
    When NHTSA's CIB test scenarios were developed, relatively few 
vehicles were equipped with this technology, and those that were 
equipped had systems with limited capabilities. Since then, fitment 
rates for CIB systems have increased significantly. The increased 
fitment was due in part to an industry voluntary commitment made in 
March 2016. At that time, 20 vehicle manufacturers, representing more 
than 99 percent of light motor vehicle sales in the U.S., voluntarily 
committed to install AEB systems on light motor vehicles.\162\ Pursuant 
to this voluntary commitment, the manufacturers would make FCW and CIB 
standard on virtually all light-duty vehicles with a gross vehicle 
weight rating (GVWR) of 3,855.5 kg (8,500 pounds) or less beginning no 
later than September 1, 2022, and all trucks with a GVWR between 
3,856.0 and 4,535.9 kg (8,501 and 10,000 pounds) beginning no later 
than September 1, 2025. Conforming vehicles must be equipped with (1) 
an AEB system that earns at least an ``advanced'' rating from IIHS in 
its front crash prevention track tests and (2) an FCW system that meets 
the performance requirements specified in two of NCAP's three FCW test 
scenarios.\163\ The manufacturers further pledged to submit annual 
progress reports, which IIHS and NHTSA agreed to publish. In 2017, the 
first reporting year, approximately 30 percent of the fleet was 
equipped with CIB systems (though many of those systems were not 
designed to meet the voluntary commitment thresholds), whereas 
participating manufacturers equipped 75 percent of their fleet in 
2019.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, March 17), 
U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic commitment of 20 automakers to 
make automatic emergency braking standard on new vehicles, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
    \163\ To achieve an advanced rating in IIHS' front crash 
prevention track tests, a vehicle's AEB system must show a speed 
reduction of at least 16.1 kph (10 mph) in either the Institute's 
19.3 or 40.2 kph (12 or 25 mph) tests, or a speed reduction of 8.0 
kph (5 mph) in both of these tests. https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
    \164\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019, 
December 17), NHTSA announces update to historic AEB commitment by 
20 automakers, https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/nhtsa-announces-update-historic-aeb-commitment-20-automakers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the voluntary commitment worked to increase fitment rates, 
the stringency included in the agreement for AEB systems is lower than 
that included in NCAP. The voluntary commitment included front crash 
prevention track tests that differed in stringency from the NCAP 
performance thresholds, and in number. The Agency was aware of those 
differences at the time, but considered the voluntary commitment to be 
a path toward greater fleet penetration.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ The Agency also believes that its recommendation of AEB 
systems (i.e., CIB and DBS) that meet NCAP performance criteria on 
its website since the 2018 model year has further encouraged 
adoption of these technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As fitment has increased, the sensor technology for CIB systems has 
also advanced significantly. For instance, in 2017, many systems were 
not designed to meet the voluntary commitment thresholds, whereas in 
2019, most vehicles with FCW and CIB systems were able to pass all 
relevant NCAP test scenarios. NHTSA notes that NCAP's CIB test 
requirements currently require a speed reduction of at least 15.8 kph 
(9.8 mph) in the program's LVS test. These test requirements are more 
stringent than those required by the voluntary commitment, which allow 
a

[[Page 13482]]

vehicle to comply with the memorandum for a speed reduction of 8.0 kph 
(5 mph) in the IIHS 19.3 or 40.2 kph (12 and 25 mph) LVS tests.\166\ 
For the 2021 model year, the pass rate (as reported by vehicle 
manufacturers) for NCAP's FCW and CIB tests for vehicles \167\ equipped 
with these technologies and for which manufacturers submitted data was 
88.8 percent and 69.5 percent, respectively.\168\ Furthermore, NHTSA 
found that 63 percent of model year 2017 vehicles did not contact the 
POV in the LVS scenario during the Agency's testing, whereas 100 
percent of model year 2021 vehicles did not make contact with the POV 
when tested.\169\ As such, the Agency believes current CIB system 
performance far exceeds NCAP's current testing requirements, such that 
it is feasible to update the program's CIB test conditions to further 
safety improvements. Recent NHTSA research supports this assertion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, March 17), 
U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic commitment of 20 automakers to 
make automatic emergency braking standard on new vehicles, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
    \167\ In this instance, ``vehicles'' refers to the total number 
of vehicles in the 2021 fleet, and not the total number of vehicle 
models for that year.
    \168\ These values assume a fifty percent take rate for vehicles 
having optional equipment.
    \169\ No contact was assumed if the test vehicle did not contact 
the POV in 5 or more of the 7 required trial runs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. NHTSA's CIB Characterization Study
    Similar to the fleet testing performed for PAEB, the Agency 
conducted a series of CIB characterization tests using a sample of MY 
2020 NCAP test vehicles from various manufacturers. The goal of this 
testing was to quantify the performance of current CIB systems using 
the previously defined LVS and LVD test scenarios, but with an expanded 
set of input conditions. Testing was conducted in accordance with the 
CIB test procedure prescribed above; however, several scenarios were 
then repeated to assess how specific procedural changes (i.e., 
increases in test speed and deceleration magnitude) affected CIB system 
performance.
     For the additional LVS tests, the Agency incrementally 
increased the vehicle speed for the LVS test scenario (from 40.2 to 
72.4 kph (25 to 45 mph) in 8.0 kph (5 mph) increments), as shown in 
Table 2 below, to identify when/if the vehicle reached its operational 
limits and/or did not react to the POV ahead. When insufficient 
intervention occurred for a given vehicle, the Agency repeated the test 
scenario at a test speed that was 4.0 kph (2.5 mph) lower.\170\ This 
reduced speed was used to define the system's upper capabilities for 
the LVS scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ Insufficient intervention was defined as a maximum (peak) 
deceleration of less than 0.5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     For the additional LVD tests, the Agency evaluated how 
changes made to either the vehicles' speed (72.4 kph versus 56.3 kph 
(45 mph versus 35 mph)) or deceleration magnitude (0.5g versus 0.3g) 
affected CIB performance, as shown in Table 3 below.
    Details of NHTSA's CIB characterization study are provided below 
(with speeds given in kph (mph)):

                       Table 2--Nominal LVS Matrix
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            POV speed,
                   SV speed, (kph/mph)                       (kph/mph)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
40.2/25.................................................             0/0
48.3/30.................................................             0/0
56.3/35.................................................             0/0
64.4/40.................................................             0/0
72.4/45.................................................             0/0
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                           Table 3--Nominal LVD Matrix
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Peak           Minimum
                       SV speed, (kph/mph)                          POV speed,     deceleration      distance,
                                                                     (kph/mph)          (g)           (mft.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
56.3/35.........................................................         56.3/35             0.3       13.8/45.3
56.3/35.........................................................         56.3/35             0.5       13.8/45.3
72.4/45.........................................................         72.4/45             0.3       13.8/45.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    No additional LVM or STP false positive assessments were conducted 
as part of the Agency's CIB characterization study. There were several 
reasons for this. First, in its review of the 2011-2015 FARS and GES 
rear-end crash data sets, NHTSA showed that LVS and LVD rear-end 
scenarios resulted in the highest number of crashes and MAIS 1-5 
injuries. As shown in Table A-1, there were 1,099,868 LVS, 374,624 LVD, 
and 174,217 LVM crashes annually.\171\ Furthermore, there were 561,842 
MAIS 1-5 injuries resulting from the LVS crash scenario, 196,731 for 
LVD, and 97,402 for LVM. The LVS scenario also had the second highest 
number of fatalities. Secondly, it was unclear whether performing a set 
of additional STP false positive tests would provide useful data. When 
the STP test was initially developed, many AEB systems relied solely on 
radar for lead vehicle detection. Today, most vehicles utilize camera-
only or fused systems that rely on both camera and radar. Although the 
Agency has observed instances of false positive test failures during 
CIB and DBS NCAP evaluations performed with radar-only systems, none 
have been observed when camera-only or fused systems were evaluated in 
the program. While some radar-only systems have had difficulty 
classifying the STP correctly, camera-only and fused (i.e., camera plus 
radar) systems have not exhibited this issue.\172\ For these reasons, 
the Agency believes it may be appropriate to remove the false positive 
STP assessments from NCAP's AEB evaluation matrix in this NCAP update 
and is seeking comment in that regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \172\ This is not to suggest that camera systems are superior to 
radar systems in all tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency chose to increase the test speeds of the scenarios 
included in its CIB characterization study because, in its independent 
analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that speeding was 
a factor in 42 percent of the fatal rear-end crashes.\173\ A review of 
Volpe's analysis also showed that approximately 28 percent of 
fatalities and 63 percent of injuries in rear-end crashes occurred when 
the posted speed on roadways is 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. When the 
travel speed was reported in FARS and GES, approximately 7 percent of 
fatal and 34 percent of the police reported real-end crashes resulting 
in injuries occurred at

[[Page 13483]]

speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.\174\ These data suggested that 
there was merit to assessing the capabilities of newer vehicles using 
LVS tests performed at higher speeds since this would allow the Agency 
to gauge the ability of current-generation CIB systems to address a 
greater number of rear-end crashes, particularly those that produce the 
most serious and fatal injuries. The Agency also reasoned that it was 
most appropriate to increase the test speed in NCAP's LVS scenario, in 
particular, since this scenario has the potential to require the 
greatest speed reduction authority to realize potential safety 
benefits. Historically, it has also been a difficult scenario for 
forward-looking sensing systems to address, especially at high vehicle 
speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash 
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \174\ For this crash mode, 62 and 67 percent of the travel speed 
data is not reported in FARS and GES, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although NHTSA acknowledges that the majority of fatal rear-end 
crashes (72 percent) occurred on roads with posted speeds exceeding 
72.4 kph (45 mph), these higher speeds were not assessed as part of the 
Agency's characterization testing. Prior to testing, the Agency had 
safety concerns with conducting LVS tests at speeds of 80.5 kph (50 
mph) or more due to test track length limitations, inherent safety 
considerations for laboratory personnel, and potential damage to either 
the SV or test equipment. That said, as will be discussed later in this 
section, data collected during the Agency's testing showed that higher 
test speeds may be feasible, as several vehicles provided complete 
crash avoidance at 72.4 kph (45 mph).
    NHTSA's intent in evaluating a modified LVD scenario was to 
document the performance of current-generation CIB systems using more 
demanding LVD-based driving situations. The Agency also planned to use 
these test results to determine the feasibility of increasing the 
stringency of NCAP's LVD test. Compared to the LVD test conditions 
presently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure, the modified LVD 
tests, as shown in Table 3, either (1) maintained the existing 13.8 m 
(45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV headway and 0.3g POV deceleration profile, but 
increased the travel speed of both the POV and SV from 56.3 to 72.4 kph 
(35 to 45 mph), or (2) maintained the existing 13.8 m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-
POV headway and existing 56.3 kph (35 mph) POV and SV speeds, but 
increased the average POV deceleration magnitude to 0.5g.
    NHTSA's interest in the first LVD procedural change aligned with 
that mentioned for the LVS scenario changes--a significant number of 
injuries and fatalities in rear-end crashes occurred at higher speeds. 
The second change was made to address situations where the driver of a 
lead vehicle brakes aggressively, causing the driver of the following 
vehicle to have even less time to avoid or mitigate the crash than had 
the lead vehicle braking been at the 0.3g level presently specified. 
The Agency reasoned that implementing these changes for the LVD 
scenario would introduce a more stringent scenario than that which is 
currently prescribed in NHTSA's CIB test procedure, and would thus help 
the Agency understand the capabilities of current CIB systems more 
comprehensively.
    Test reports related to NHTSA's CIB characterization testing can be 
found in the docket for this notice.
e. Updates to NCAP's CIB Testing
    In general, this study has allowed NHTSA to assess the performance 
of current CIB systems and evaluate the technology's future potential 
for the new model years' vehicle fleet. The study showed that many 
vehicles in today's fleet were able to repeatedly provide complete 
crash avoidance at higher test speeds, shorter SV-to-POV headways, and 
generally more aggressive conditions than those specified in the 
Agency's current NCAP CIB test procedure. This study has also provided 
the Agency with new ways to consider differentiating CIB systems' 
performance for NCAP ratings purposes in the future. Furthermore, it 
has provided the Agency with the underlying support necessary for NCAP 
to propose adjustments to the current CIB performance requirements to 
address rear-end crashes that are causing a greater number of injuries 
and fatalities in the real world. Accordingly, the Agency is proposing 
to make several changes to its CIB test procedure for this NCAP 
upgrade. These changes are outlined below for each test scenario. For 
the LVS scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
     Increased SV test speeds and an assessment methodology 
that is similar to that which it proposed to assess PAEB system 
performance. CIB system performance for the LVS scenario will be 
assessed over a range of test speeds. The Agency is proposing a minimum 
SV test speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph), which is similar to that currently 
specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure--40.2 kph (25 mph), and a 
maximum SV test speed of 80.0 kph (49.7 mph). The Agency is proposing 
to increase the subject vehicle test speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) 
increments from the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed for 
the LVS assessment.
    The Agency's characterization testing showed that it is feasible to 
raise the SV speed in NCAP's LVS test to encourage improved performance 
of CIB systems. In fact, several vehicles repeatably afforded full 
crash avoidance (i.e., no contact) at speeds up to 72.4 kph (45 mph) 
for the LVS test scenario. Furthermore, NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP 
performs its Car-to-Car Rear stationary (CCRs) scenario, which is 
comparable to the Agency's LVS tests, at speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7 
mph) for those systems that offer AEB, which also suggests that higher 
test speeds are practicable.\175\ As such, NHTSA believes that it is 
appropriate to harmonize with Euro NCAP on the maximum LVS test speed 
of 80 kph (49.7 mph), as this should better address the higher 
severity, high-speed crash problem and, in turn, further reduce 
fatalities and serious injuries. Although Euro NCAP's protocol 
prescribes a minimum SV test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) for the CCRs 
scenario for AEB systems that also offer FCW, the Agency does not see a 
reason to perform its LVS test at a speed that is less than that which 
is specified in its existing test procedure (40.2 kph (25 mph)). 
Therefore, it is not proposing to harmonize with Euro NCAP with respect 
to the minimum required test speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April 
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See 
section 8.2.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A revised performance requirement. In lieu of a speed 
reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure for 
the LVS scenario, the SV must avoid making contact with the POV target 
to pass a test trial. Similar to PAEB, this should limit damage to the 
SV and POV target during testing and reduce chances that results are 
questioned or invalidated.
     Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVS 
scenario. Currently, NHTSA's CIB test procedure requires that a vehicle 
meet the performance criteria (i.e., specified speed reduction) for 
five out of seven trials. However, similar to that proposed by NHTSA 
for its PAEB assessment, the Agency is proposing that only one test 
trial will be conducted per test speed assessed (i.e., 40, 50, 60, 70, 
and 80 kph or 24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph) if the SV does not 
contact the POV target during the first valid trial for each of the 
test speeds. For a given test condition, the test sequence is initiated 
at the 40 kph (24.9 mph) minimum

[[Page 13484]]

speed. To achieve a passing result, the test must be valid (i.e., all 
test specifications and tolerances satisfied), and the SV must not 
contact the POV. If the SV does not contact the POV during the first 
valid test, the test speed is incrementally increased by 10 kph (6.2 
mph), and the next test in the sequence is performed. Unless the SV 
contacts the POV, this iterative process continues until a maximum test 
speed of 80 kph (31.1 mph) is evaluated. If the SV contacts the POV, 
and the relative longitudinal velocity between the SV and POV is less 
than or equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, the Agency 
will perform four additional (repeated) test trials at the same speed 
for which the impact occurred. The SV must not contact the POV for at 
least three out of the five test trials performed at that same speed to 
pass that specific combination of test condition and test speed.\176\ 
If the SV contacts the POV during a valid test of a test condition 
(whether it be the first test performed for a particular test speed or 
a subsequent test trial at that same speed), and the relative impact 
velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, no 
additional test trials will be conducted at the given test speed and 
test condition and the SV is considered to have failed the test 
condition at that specific test speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ The Agency notes that a similar pass/fail criterion (i.e., 
a vehicle must meet performance requirements for three out of five 
trials for a particular test condition to pass the test condition) 
is included in its LDW test procedure, as referenced earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency is pursuing an assessment approach for the LVS CIB test 
scenario that is similar to that proposed for PAEB systems in order to 
reduce test burden, given that additional test speeds are being 
proposed. NHTSA believes that this alternative approach will continue 
to ensure that passing CIB systems represent robust designs that will 
offer a higher level of performance and safety.
    For the LVD scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
     A reduction in SV and POV test speeds. NHTSA's CIB test 
procedure currently prescribes a test speed of 56 kph (34.8 mph) for 
the SV and POV in the LVD scenario. Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems 
test protocol, Version 3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the Car-to-Car rear 
braking (CCRb) specifies an SV speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph). For this 
upgrade of NCAP, the Agency is proposing to reduce the test speed for 
the SV and POV to 50 kph (31.1 mph) to harmonize with Euro NCAP.\177\ 
Given additional changes proposed for the SV-to-POV headway and 
deceleration magnitude (discussed next), NHTSA does not believe the 
proposed reduction in test speed will lead to an overall reduction in 
test stringency or loss of safety benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April 
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See 
section 8.2.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency is also requesting comment on whether it is appropriate 
to incorporate additional SV test speeds for the LVD test scenario, 
specifically 60, 70, and 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph) or, 
alternatively, whether testing at only 50 kph (31.1 mph) and 80 kph 
(49.7 mph) would be sufficient. As mentioned earlier, Volpe's analysis 
of the 2011-2015 FARS data set showed that the majority of crashes 
occurred on roads with posted speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph), 
suggesting that testing at higher speeds for all CIB test scenarios may 
be warranted. The Agency has simply not performed testing at 80 kph 
(49.7 mph) to date because of concerns surrounding laboratories' 
abilities to safely execute such tests and limited available testing 
real estate, as this test scenario requires that both the SV and POV be 
travelling at the same speed at the onset of the test validity period. 
That being said, NHTSA believes that, (1) given the results from its 
characterization study, and in particular, the braking performance 
demonstrated in the LVS tests, (2) the fact that tested vehicles may 
have higher POV classification confidence for the LVD test compared to 
the LVS test since the POV is always in motion during the LVD test, and 
(3) the POV will be the GVT, which relies on a robotic platform for 
movement, rather than the SSV which must be towed along a monorail 
secured to the test track, vehicles in the current fleet will likely 
also perform well in higher speed LVD tests. To validate this 
assumption, NHTSA will be conducting research next year to assess 
vehicle performance at speeds ranging from 50 kph (31.1 mph) to 80 kph 
(49.7 mph) for 12 and 40 m (39.4 and 131.2 ft.) headways and POV 
deceleration magnitudes of 0.4 and 0.5 g for the LVD CIB test scenario. 
Pending the outcome of that research, the Agency may consider adopting 
additional higher tests speeds (i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 
43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the LVD test scenario in NCAP. The Agency 
requests comment on what SV-to-POV headway and deceleration 
magnitude(s) would be appropriate if the Agency was to adopt any or all 
of these additional test speeds. If additional test speeds are adopted, 
the Agency would implement an assessment methodology similar to that 
proposed for the CIB LVS test scenario, whereby NHTSA would increase 
the SV test speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from the minimum test 
speed to the maximum test speed for the LVD assessment.
     A reduction in SV-to-POV headway. NHTSA's CIB test 
procedure currently specifies a 13.8 m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV headway for 
the LVD scenario. The Agency is proposing to reduce the prescribed 
headway to 12 m (39.4 ft.) to harmonize with Euro NCAP's CCRb scenario. 
Given the proposed test speed reduction, the Agency believes it is 
appropriate to also reduce the headway to maintain similar stringency 
with its current LVD test condition. Whereas Euro NCAP also specifies 
an additional SV-to-POV headway of 40 m (131.2 ft.), the Agency is not 
proposing to conduct this additional assessment as part of this 
proposal. NHTSA does not believe there would be a safety benefit to 
adopting 40 m (131.2 ft.) as an additional, and less stringent, 
headway. Therefore, it would serve to increase the test burden 
unnecessarily.
     An increase in deceleration magnitude. The Agency is 
proposing to increase the POV deceleration magnitude currently 
specified in its CIB test procedure for the LVD scenario from 0.3 g to 
0.5 g. In the Agency's CIB characterization study, some vehicles 
repeatably afforded full crash avoidance (i.e., no contact) for all 
trials when the POV executed a 0.5 g braking maneuver in the LVD 
condition with a SV test speed of 35 mph and SV-to-POV headway of 13.8 
m (45.3 ft.). Although the test speed used in the Agency's study was 
slightly lower than that which the Agency is proposing for the LVD test 
condition, and the SV-to-POV headway was slightly longer, NHTSA 
believes that it is reasonable to adopt a higher POV deceleration 
magnitude for its future LVD testing. The Agency notes that a 
deceleration of 0.5 g falls within the range of deceleration magnitudes 
prescribed by Euro NCAP in its AEB Car-to-Car systems test protocol, 
Version 3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the CCRb scenario. In its CCRb 
test, Euro NCAP specifies POV deceleration magnitudes of 2 m/s\2\ and 6 
m/s\2\ (approximately 0.2 to 0.6 g) for an SV-to-POV headway of 12 m 
(39.4 ft.) and SV test speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph). As the Agency has 
proposed this reduced headway and test speed for its LVD testing, it 
reasons that adopting a 0.5 g POV deceleration magnitude is also 
practicable. The Agency is not proposing 0.6 g as the POV deceleration 
magnitude in its LVD

[[Page 13485]]

test because it has observed instances where the tires on the POV 
target developed flat spots during research testing conducted with the 
Guided Soft Target (GST) system \178\ to assess Traffic Jam Assist 
(TJA) systems. The TJA testing required a braking maneuver for the lead 
vehicle decelerates, accelerates, then decelerates (LVDAD) scenario 
that is similar to that specified in the Agency's CIB LVD test.\179\ 
During this testing, NHTSA also found that it was more difficult to 
achieve and accurately control deceleration when braking maneuvers 
higher than 0.5 g were used.\180\ Extensive tuning efforts related to 
the GST brake applications were made in an attempt to rectify the 
problems encountered, but these adjustments were unable to consistently 
satisfy the test tolerances associated with 0.6 g POV deceleration for 
the LVDAD test and a recommendation was made to reduce the maximum 
nominal POV deceleration from 0.6 g to 0.5 g for future testing. In its 
report findings, the Agency also noted that a deceleration of 0.6 g is 
not only very close to the maximum braking capability of the GST's 
robotic platform used by the Agency, it is also very close to the 
default magnitude used by the LPRV during an emergency stop (maximum 
deceleration). As such, the Agency concluded that a decrease in maximum 
POV deceleration should also reduce equipment wear, particularly for 
the system's tires and braking components, thus improving test 
efficiency. This being said, the Agency acknowledges that newer robotic 
platforms designed to provide greater capabilities, are now becoming 
available, which may resolve the issues observed in the Agency's TJA 
testing. As such, the Agency is requesting comment on whether it is 
feasible to adopt a POV deceleration magnitude of 0.6 g in lieu of 0.5 
g, as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ The GST system is comprised of two main parts--a low 
profile robotic vehicle (LPRV), and a global vehicle target (GVT), 
which is secured to the top of the LPRV.
    \179\ Fogle, E.E., Arquette, T.E. (TRC), and Forkenbrock, G.J. 
(NHTSA), (2021, May), Traffic Jam Assist Draft Test Procedure 
Performability Validation (Report No. DOT HS 812 987), Washington, 
DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
    \180\ From Section 4.1 of DOT HS 812 987--``POV deceleration 
validity check failures occurred during six trials of the eight 
LVDAD trials performed. Four of the seven 0.6 g failures were 
because the POV was unable to achieve the minimum deceleration 
threshold of 0.55 g. The remaining three 0.6 g failures were because 
the POV was unable to maintain a minimum average deceleration of at 
least 0.55 g.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     An alternative performance criterion. In lieu of a speed 
reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure for 
the LVD scenario, the vehicle must avoid making contact with the POV 
target to pass a test trial.
     Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVD 
scenario. NHTSA is adopting an approach to conducting test trials that 
is identical to that described above for the CIB LVS scenario, 
regardless of the number of test speeds adopted (i.e., one speed, 50 
kph (31.1 mph); two speeds, 50 kph (31.1 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph); or 
four speeds, 50, 60, 70, and 80 kph (31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)). 
If only one or two test speeds are selected for inclusion, the Agency 
is seeking comment on whether it is more appropriate to alternatively 
require 7 trials for each test speed, and require that 5 out of the 7 
trials conducted pass the ``no contact'' performance criterion.
    For the LVM scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
     Increased SV test speeds. NHTSA is proposing to assess CIB 
system performance for the LVM scenario over a range of test speeds, 
similar to that proposed for the LVS scenario. The Agency is proposing 
a minimum SV test speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph), which is nearly 
equivalent to the 40.2 kph (25 mph) test speed currently specified in 
NHTSA's CIB test procedure, and a maximum SV test speed of 80 kph (49.7 
mph), which is slightly higher than the 72.4 kph (45 mph) specified for 
the second LVM test condition in NHTSA's current CIB test procedure. 
The Agency is proposing to increase the SV test speed in 10 kph (6.2 
mph) increments from the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed 
for the LVM assessment.
    The Agency did not perform additional LVM testing as part of its 
CIB characterization study. Nonetheless, NHTSA believes that it is 
feasible to raise the SV speed in NCAP's LVM test to encourage improved 
performance of CIB systems, as the Agency's current CIB LVM tests 
(conducted with an SV speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2 
kph (20 mph)) have shown that many vehicles are able to stop without 
contacting the POV target for each of the required test trials. 
Furthermore, NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP performs its Car-to-Car 
Rear moving (CCRm) scenario, which is comparable to the Agency's LVM 
tests, at speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7 mph), which also suggests that 
higher SV test speeds are practicable.\181\ As such, NHTSA believes 
that it is appropriate to harmonize with Euro NCAP on the maximum SV 
test speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph) in the Agency's LVM test, as this 
should also address high-speed crashes and thus further reduce 
fatalities and serious injuries. Although Euro NCAP's protocol 
prescribes a minimum SV test speed of 30 kph (18.6 mph) for the CCRm 
scenario for vehicles that have AEB systems,\182\ the Agency does not 
see a reason to perform its LVM test at a speed that is less than that 
which is specified in its existing test procedure (40.2 kph (25 mph)). 
Therefore, it is not proposing to harmonize with Euro NCAP with respect 
to the minimum required test speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April 
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See 
section 8.2.3.
    \182\ The Agency notes that the minimum SV test for vehicles 
equipped with only FCW (and no AEB) is 50 kph (31.1 mph).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     An alternative POV test speed for all test conditions. 
While the Agency's CIB test procedure currently specifies a POV test 
speed of 16.1 kph (10 mph) when the SV speed is 40.2 kph (25 mph) and a 
POV test speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph) when the SV speed is 72.4 kph (45 
mph), the Agency is proposing to use a POV test speed of 20 kph (12.4 
mph) for every SV test speed that will be assessed for the LVM 
scenario; 40 to 80 kph (24.9 to 49.7 mph), increased in 10.0 kph (6.2 
mph) increments. NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP's CCRm protocol 
specifies a POV test speed of 20 kph (12.4 mph), and this POV speed is 
stipulated for similar testing conducted by various other vehicle 
safety ratings programs. With this proposed NCAP upgrade, NHTSA sees no 
reason to deviate from the other testing organizations with respect to 
the POV speed for its LVM test.
     A performance criterion of ``no contact''. In lieu of a 
speed reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test 
procedure for the Agency's higher speed LVM scenario (i.e., POV of 72.4 
kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph)), the SV must avoid 
making contact with the POV target to pass a test trial for each test 
speed assessed for the LVM scenario; 40 to 80 kph (24.9 to 49.7 mph), 
increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments.
     Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVM 
scenario. NHTSA is adopting an approach to conducting test trials that 
is identical to that described above for the CIB LVS scenario. For the 
proposed CIB LVM tests, the Agency would require one test trial per SV 
speed increment, and four repeat trials in the event of a test failure 
for instances where the SV has a relative velocity at impact that is 
equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial speed.
    NHTSA has chosen to harmonize with Euro NCAP in many respects since 
it

[[Page 13486]]

recognizes that the rear-end crash problem, as defined by the most 
frequently occurring and dynamically distinct pre-crash scenarios, 
could be changing as AEB-equipped vehicles become more prolific in the 
fleet. Accordingly, the Agency believes that it is beneficial to 
standardize the current CIB test specifications with other consumer 
information programs and focus resources on emerging trends.\183\ 
However, the Agency also notes that it will consider making additional 
updates to its CIB test evaluation as the crash problem evolves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August), 
Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles 
with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019, 
VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

f. Updates to NCAP's DBS Testing
    NHTSA did not conduct any testing, as part of its characterization 
study, to evaluate DBS system performance capabilities beyond what is 
currently stipulated in NCAP's DBS test procedure. However, the Agency 
notes that its CIB and DBS test procedures are currently aligned with 
respect to test scenarios, test speeds, headways, etc. Differences 
exist only with respect to the use of an SV manual brake application 
(i.e., for DBS) and most performance criterion. NHTSA's DBS test 
procedure currently specifies ``no contact'' as the performance 
criterion for all DBS test conditions, whereas the Agency's CIB test 
procedure currently requires a specified speed reduction for each of 
the CIB test conditions (with the exception of the lower speed LVM 
condition where the POV speed is 16.1 kph (10 mph) and the SV speed is 
40.2 kph (25 mph), which requires ``no contact''). Therefore, NHTSA 
believes it is reasonable to adopt the CIB test conditions (i.e., test 
speeds, headways, etc.) for the comparable DBS test conditions. 
However, given the Agency's proposal to embrace the more stringent ``no 
contact'' performance criterion for each of the CIB test conditions, 
and for the additional reasons mentioned previously, the Agency also 
believes, as suggested prior, that there may be merit to removing the 
DBS test conditions from NCAP entirely to reduce test burden and the 
associated cost.
    In its comments to the NCAP's December 2015 notice, the Alliance 
\184\ stated that since crash avoidance (i.e., no vehicle contact) is 
the desired outcome for all imminent rear-end crash events, if an SV 
avoids contact with the POV in all CIB tests, DBS testing should not be 
necessary. Although NHTSA agrees with the Alliance's rationale in 
principle, the Agency also believes there is merit to ensuring that 
both AEB systems perform as designed and help the driver to mitigate or 
prevent the crash. The Agency reasons that it is possible for the 
driver to apply the brakes, but with a magnitude that does not result 
in achieving the vehicle's maximum crash avoidance potential (i.e., 
deceleration). In the past, some manufacturers assumed the driver was 
in control when the brake pedal was depressed and would not override 
the driver's input when necessary to avoid a crash. Accordingly, NHTSA 
hesitates to assume that if CIB systems work effectively during 
testing, then DBS systems will automatically do so as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ The Agency notes that the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers (The Alliance) merged with Global Automakers in 
January 2020 to create the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto 
Innovators). Both automotive industry groups separately submitted 
comments to the December 2015 notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of these considerations, the Agency is tentatively 
proposing to retain both CIB and DBS system performance tests in NCAP, 
and to align all test conditions for comparable test scenarios (e.g., 
SV and POV test speeds, headway, etc.) to evaluate whether the DBS 
system will provide supplemental braking if the driver brakes but 
additional braking is warranted. For this testing, the Agency is 
proposing to adopt an assessment approach for DBS that is identical to 
that described previously for PAEB and CIB. The Agency would require 
one test trial per speed for each test scenario, and four repeated 
trials for any specific test condition and speed combination that 
results in a test failure and where the SV has a relative velocity at 
impact that is equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial speed. 
Speeds will be increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from the 
minimum test speed to the maximum test speed. However, the Agency is 
also requesting comment on whether removal of the DBS test scenarios 
from NCAP would be more appropriate.
    As an alternative to retaining all DBS tests in NCAP, or removing 
the DBS performance evaluations from NCAP entirely, the Agency believes 
it may be more reasonable to conduct only the LVS and LVM tests at the 
highest two test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 
mph)--to ensure system functionality and that the SV will not suppress 
AEB operation when the driver applies the vehicle's foundation brakes. 
The Agency would also consider conducting the LVD DBS test at 70 and 80 
kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph) if the Agency decides to also adopt these test 
speeds for the related CIB test. Comments are requested on this 
alternative proposal and whether an alternative assessment method would 
be more appropriate if any or all of the DBS test scenarios were 
conducted only at the two highest test speeds. For a more limited speed 
assessment of the two highest test speeds, 70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 
mph), instead of up to four test speeds (50, 60, 70, and 80 kph (31.1, 
37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)) for LVD, or five test speeds (40, 50, 60, 
70, and 80 kph (24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)) for LVS and 
LVM), should the Agency require one trial per test condition (i.e., 
align with the assessment method outlined for the other AEB test 
conditions) or multiple trials? If multiple trials were to be required, 
how many would be appropriate, and what would be an acceptable pass 
rate?
    If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, it also 
proposes to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is 
initiated. The current DBS test procedure prescribes this shall occur 
at specific TTCs per test scenario: 1.1 seconds (LVS), 1.0 seconds 
(LVM), and 1.4 second (LVD). The proposed revision would initiate 
manual braking at a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW 
alert is issued for all DBS test scenario and speed combinations, 
regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after the FCW alert but 
before initiation of the manual brake application. The Agency reasons 
that this change is more representative of real-world use and driving 
conditions, and is in basic agreement with the approach specified for 
FCW performance evaluations in Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems test 
protocol.\185\ Alternatively, the Agency requests comment on 
appropriate TTCs for the modified test conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April 
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See 
Annex A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

g. Updates to NCAP's FCW Testing
    As mentioned earlier, NHTSA is proposing to consolidate its FCW and 
CIB tests such that the CIB tests will be used as an indicant of FCW 
operation. The Agency is also proposing to similarly assess FCW in the 
context of its PAEB tests. NHTSA believes there is merit to assessing 
the presence of an FCW alert within the CIB and PAEB test because 
operation of FCW and AEB/PAEB systems, in the test scenarios to be used 
by NCAP, are complementary

[[Page 13487]]

and fundamentally intertwined. Also, combining the Agency's FCW tests 
with those used to assess AEB system performance would reduce test 
burden. The Agency proposes that it would evaluate the presence of a 
vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV 
accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert 
is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV 
accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the onset 
of CIB system braking.\186\ Here, the onset of CIB activation is taken 
to be the instant SV deceleration reaches at least 0.5g. If no FCW 
alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any 
braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior 
to impact with the POV. The Agency is also proposing to make similar 
procedural changes to its PAEB test procedure. NHTSA is seeking comment 
as to whether the proposed FCW assessment method is reasonable. 
Furthermore, given that most FCW systems are currently able to pass all 
relevant NCAP test scenarios, as mentioned earlier, the Agency believes 
that, as an alternative to integrating the assessment of FCW into the 
Agency's CIB tests, it may be feasible for NCAP to perform one FCW test 
that could serve as an indicant of FCW system performance (while still 
retaining the previously-stated accelerator pedal release timing to 
ensure CIB activation is not unintentionally suppressed). This would 
also reduce test burden. If the Agency were to choose one of the 
proposed CIB test scenarios to adopt for an FCW test to assess the 
performance of FCW systems, which CIB test scenario do commenters 
believe would be most appropriate and why?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ Previous NHTSA research indicates that human drivers are 
capable of releasing the accelerator pedal within 500 ms after 
returning their eyes to a forward-facing viewing position in 
response to an FCW alert. Forkenbrock, G., Snyder, A., Hoover, R., 
O'Harra, B., Vasko, S., Smith, L. (2011, July), A Test Track 
Protocol for Assessing Forward Collision Warning Driver-Vehicle 
Interface Effectiveness (Report No. DOT HS 811 501), Washington, DC: 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency notes that if it maintains any or all of the FCW test 
scenarios that are currently included in its FCW test procedure, it 
proposes to align the corresponding maximum SV test speeds, POV speeds, 
headway, POV deceleration magnitude, etc., as applicable, with the 
included CIB tests, similar to that which it has proposed for the DBS 
tests. Accordingly, the Agency would adopt the following for the FCW 
tests:
     LVS--SV speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph); POV is stationary.
     LVD--SV and POV speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph) or up to 80 kph 
(49.7 mph), depending on the final test speed adopted for the CIB LVD 
scenario; a 12 m (39.4 ft.) SV-to-POV headway; and a POV deceleration 
magnitude of 0.5 g.
     LVM--SV speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph); POV speed of 20 kph 
(12.4 mph).
    If the Agency continues to conduct separate FCW assessments, it 
will need to revise the prescribed TTCs currently used to assess FCW 
performance to align with the revised test scenario and speed 
combinations.\187\ Given the Agency's thoughts about FCW-AEB 
integration and the revised test conditions that would be adopted for 
any future FCW tests, NHTSA requests comment on what TTC would be 
appropriate for each test scenario. Although the Agency is proposing to 
adopt an assessment approach for FCW that is identical to that 
described previously for PAEB, CIB, and DBS,\188\ it is also requesting 
comment on whether an alternative assessment method would be 
appropriate in instances where it retains one or more FCW scenarios 
that are performed at a single test speed. In such instances, should 
the Agency require one trial per test condition (i.e., align with the 
assessment method outlined for the other AEB test conditions) or 
multiple trials? If multiple trials were to be required, how many would 
be appropriate, and what would be an acceptable pass rate?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \187\ To pass a test trial, the vehicle must issue the FCW alert 
on or prior to the prescribed time-to-collision (TTC) specified for 
each of the three FCW test scenarios.
    \188\ In essence, the Agency would require one test trial per 
speed for each test scenario and four repeat trials in the event of 
a test failure for instances where the SV has a relative velocity at 
impact that is equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial 
speed. Speeds will be increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from 
the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

h. Regenerative Braking
    In addition to the FCW alert setting, discussed earlier, there are 
additional system settings that the Agency must now consider during its 
AEB and PAEB testing. One such setting is that for regenerative 
braking. Regenerative braking, which has become more common as electric 
vehicles have begun to proliferate the fleet, can slow the vehicle when 
the throttle is released. As such, when the throttle is fully released 
upon the issuance of the FCW alert in the Agency's AEB and PAEB 
testing, vehicle speed can reduce significantly prior to the onset of 
braking associated with these technologies, particularly in instances 
where the FCW alert is issued early. For vehicles with regenerative 
braking that have multiple settings (e.g., nominal, more aggressive, 
less aggressive), the Agency is proposing to use the ``off'' setting or 
the setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the accelerator 
is fully released in its AEB and PAEB tests.\189\ Although NHTSA 
reasons that the nominal setting may be the setting most commonly 
chosen by a typical driver, it prefers the least aggressive setting, as 
it would be more indicative of ``worst case''. Selecting a setting that 
affords the lowest deceleration allows the vehicle to travel faster at 
the onset of braking associated with AEB and PAEB. This approach would 
produce a situation that is more comparable to that for vehicles that 
do not have regenerative braking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ The Agency does not plan to make any procedural 
modifications for vehicles that have regenerative braking that 
cannot be switched off or adjusted, as those vehicles should operate 
similarly in the real world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency believes that regenerative braking may also introduce 
complications for the Agency's DBS tests (if the DBS tests are retained 
in NCAP). NHTSA reasons that some vehicles may offer regenerative 
braking that is already so high that there would be only a relatively 
small boost in braking from the braking actuator (acting to provide a 
combined 0.4 g deceleration). For instance, if the regenerative braking 
from simply releasing the accelerator pedal results in 0.3 g braking, 
the additional braking required to get to 0.4 g from the actuator would 
be a very low force and/or brake pedal displacement. The Agency is 
requesting comment on whether regenerative braking may introduce 
additional testing issues and on any recommendations for test 
procedural changes to rectify possible testing issues related to 
regenerative braking.
    With respect to FCW, CIB, and DBS testing in NCAP, NHTSA is seeking 
comment on the following:
    (38) For the Agency's FCW tests:

--If the Agency retains one or more separate tests for FCW, should it 
award credit solely to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide 
a passing audible alert? Or, should it also consider awarding credit to 
vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide passing haptic alerts? 
Are there certain haptic alert types that should be excluded from 
consideration (if the Agency was to award credit to vehicles with 
haptic alerts that pass NCAP tests) because they may be a nuisance to 
drivers such that they are more likely to disable the system? Do 
commenters

[[Page 13488]]

believe that haptic alerts can be accurately and objectively assessed? 
Why or why not? Is it appropriate for the Agency to refrain from 
awarding credit to FCW systems that provide only a passing visual 
alert? Why or why not? If the Agency assesses the sufficiency of the 
FCW alert in the context of CIB (and PAEB) tests, what type of FCW 
alert(s) would be acceptable for use in defining the timing of the 
release of the SV accelerator pedal, and why?
--Is it most appropriate to test the middle (or next latest) FCW system 
setting in lieu of the default setting when performing FCW and AEB 
(including PAEB) NCAP tests on vehicles that offer multiple FCW timing 
adjustment settings? Why or why not? If not, what use setting would be 
most appropriate?
--Should the Agency consider consolidating FCW and CIB testing such 
that NCAP's CIB test scenarios would serve as an indicant of FCW 
operation? Why or why not? The Agency has proposed that if it combines 
the two tests, it would evaluate the presence of a vehicle's FCW system 
during its CIB tests by requiring the SV accelerator pedal be fully 
released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is issued. If no FCW alert 
is issued during a CIB test, the SV accelerator pedal will be fully 
released within 500 ms after the onset of CIB system braking (as 
defined by the instant SV deceleration reaches at least 0.5g). If no 
FCW alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any 
braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior 
to impact with the POV. The Agency notes that it has also proposed 
these test procedural changes for its PAEB tests as well. Is this 
assessment method for FCW operation reasonable? Why or why not?
--If the Agency continues to assess FCW systems separately from CIB, 
how should the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) be amended 
if the Agency aligns the corresponding maximum SV test speeds, POV 
speeds, SV-to-POV headway, POV deceleration magnitude, etc., as 
applicable, with the proposed CIB tests, and why? What assessment 
method should be used--one trial per scenario, or multiple trials, and 
why? If multiple trials should be required, how many would be 
appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an acceptable pass rate, and 
why?
--Is it desirable for NCAP to perform one FCW test scenario (instead of 
the three that are currently included in NCAP's FCW test procedure), 
conducted at the corresponding maximum SV test speed, POV speed, SV-to-
POV headway (as applicable), POV deceleration magnitude, etc. of the 
proposed CIB test to serve as an indicant of FCW system performance? If 
so, which test scenario from NCAP's FCW test procedure is appropriate?
--Are there additional or alternative test scenarios or test conditions 
that the Agency should consider incorporating into the FCW test 
procedure, such as those at even higher test speeds than those proposed 
for the CIB tests, or those having increased complexity? If so, should 
the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) and/or test scenario 
specifications be amended, and to what extent?

    (39) For the Agency's CIB tests:

--Are the SV and POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, deceleration magnitude, 
etc. the Agency has proposed for NCAP's CIB tests appropriate? Why or 
why not? If not, what speeds, headway(s), deceleration magnitude(s) are 
appropriate, and why? Should the Agency adopt a POV deceleration 
magnitude of 0.6 g for its LVD CIB test in lieu of 0.5 g proposed? Why 
or why not?
--Should the Agency consider adopting additional higher tests speeds 
(i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the CIB 
(and potentially DBS) LVD test scenario in NCAP? Why or why not? If 
additional speeds are included, what headway and deceleration magnitude 
would be appropriate for each additional test speed, and why?
--Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for the 
proposed CIB and DBS test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively, 
should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a maximum 
allowable SV-to-POV impact speed for any or all of the proposed test 
conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed combination)? If yes, 
why, and for which test conditions? For those test conditions, what 
speed reductions would be appropriate? Alternatively, what maximum 
allowable impact speed would be appropriate?

    (40) For the Agency's DBS tests:

--Should the Agency remove the DBS test scenarios from NCAP? Why or why 
not? Alternatively, should the Agency conduct the DBS LVS and LVM tests 
at only the highest test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and 80 kph (43.5 
and 49.7 mph)? Why or why not? If the Agency also adopted these higher 
tests speeds (70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)) for the LVD CIB test, 
should it also conduct the LVD DBS test at these same speeds? Why or 
why not?
--If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, is it 
appropriate to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is 
initiated to a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW alert 
is issued (regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after the FCW 
alert but before initiation of the manual brake application)? If not, 
why, and what prescribed TTC values would be appropriate for the 
modified DBS test conditions?

    (41) Is the assessment method NHTSA has proposed for the CIB and 
DBS tests (i.e., one trial per test speed with speed increments of 10 
kph (6.2 mph) for each test condition and repeat trials only in the 
event of POV contact) appropriate? Why or why not? Should an 
alternative assessment method such as multiple trials be required 
instead? If yes, why? If multiple trials should be required, how many 
would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an acceptable pass 
rate, and why? If the proposed assessment method is appropriate, it is 
acceptable even for the LVD test scenario if only one or two test 
speeds are selected for inclusion? Or, is it more appropriate to 
alternatively require 7 trials for each test speed, and require that 5 
out of the 7 trials conducted pass the ``no contact'' performance 
criterion?
    (42) The Agency's proposal to (1) consolidate its FCW and CIB tests 
such that the CIB tests would also serve as an indicant of FCW 
operation, (2) assess 14 test speeds for CIB (5 for LVS, 5 for LVM, and 
potentially 4 for LVD), and (3) assess 6 tests speeds for DBS (2 for 
LVS, 2 for LVM, and potentially 2 for LVD), would result in a total of 
20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds to be 
evaluated for AEB. If the Agency uses check marks to give credit to 
vehicles that (1) are equipped with the recommended ADAS technologies, 
and (2) pass the applicable system performance test requirements for 
each ADAS technology included in NCAP until such time as a new ADAS 
rating system is developed and a final rule to amend the safety rating 
section of the Monroney label is published, what is an appropriate 
minimum pass rate for AEB performance evaluation? For example, a 
vehicle is considered to meet the AEB performance if it passes two-
thirds of the 20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds 
(i.e., passes 14 unique combinations of test conditions and test 
speeds).
    (43) As fused camera-radar forward-looking sensors are becoming 
more

[[Page 13489]]

prevalent in the vehicle fleet, and the Agency has not observed any 
instances of false positive test failures during any of its CIB or DBS 
testing, is it appropriate to remove the false positive STP assessments 
from NCAP's AEB (i.e., CIB and DBS) evaluation matrix in this NCAP 
update? Why or why not?
    (44) For vehicles with regenerative braking that have setting 
options, the Agency is proposing to choose the ``off'' setting, or the 
setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the accelerator is 
fully released. As mentioned, this proposal also applies to the 
Agency's PAEB tests. Are the proposed settings appropriate? Why or why 
not? Will regenerative braking introduce additional complications for 
the Agency's AEB and PAEB testing, and how could the Agency best 
address them?
    (45) Should NCAP adopt any additional AEB tests or alter its 
current tests to address the ``changing'' rear-end crash problem? If 
so, what tests should be added, or how should current tests be 
modified?
    (46) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current FCW, CIB, and/or DBS 
test procedure(s) that need further refinement or clarification? If so, 
what refinements or clarifications are necessary, and why?
3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in Response to 2015 RFC Notice
    NHTSA received several comments in response to the December 2015 
notice pertaining to NCAP's DBS and CIB tests. These included comments 
on FCW effective time-to-collision (TTC), false positive test 
scenarios, procedure clarifications, expanding testing, and the AEB 
strikeable target. These will be discussed over the next few sub-
sections.
a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Effective Time-To-Collision (TTC)
    In its response to NCAP's December 2015 notice, BMW suggested that 
the Agency adopt an ``effective TTC'' for NCAP's FCW test that differs 
from the ``absolute TTC'' currently stipulated in the associated test 
procedure. The manufacturer contended that the deceleration due to an 
activated AEB system effectively prolongs the reaction time for the 
driver such that ``an FCW warning with AEB intervention at an absolute 
TTC of 2.0 seconds is assumed to show an equal or greater effectiveness 
in comparison to an FCW warning at 2.4 seconds without AEB 
intervention.'' BMW suggested that if AEB functionality is intrinsic to 
the frontal crash prevention system, the assessment of the warning TTC 
in the FCW performance test should consider the time gained by AEB 
deceleration and therefore the Agency should assess the ``effective 
TTC,'' not an ``absolute TTC.''
    The Agency agrees with BMW that FCW and AEB are interrelated and is 
thus proposing to assess the presence of an FCW alert as an integral 
component of the CIB test. To assess the adequacy of the FCW alert in 
that context, the Agency has proposed to evaluate the presence of a 
vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV 
accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert 
is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV 
accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the onset 
of CIB system braking. If no FCW alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB 
system does not offer any braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal 
will not be required prior to impact with the POV. The Agency believes 
that this proposal is philosophically aligned with BMW's request, as it 
would no longer require the direct assessment of FCW timing relative to 
an ``absolute TTC.'' Rather, FCW timing, and how it relates to the 
intended onset of CIB activation, would be at the discretion of the 
vehicle manufacturer (who will have explicit knowledge of how the 
operation of their vehicles' CIB systems affect the ``effective TTC''). 
That said, the Agency continues to believe that well-designed FCW 
alerts can provide significant safety benefits in crash-imminent rear-
end crash scenarios, and encourages vehicle manufactures to present 
them such that the driver may be able to respond with sufficient time 
to avoid a crash (i.e., not to solely rely on CIB activation for crash 
avoidance). If a vehicle manufacturer chooses to issue an FCW alert in 
a way that assumes a CIB intervention will effectively extend the 
precrash timeline, but then the AEB system does not activate under 
real-world driving conditions, or activates late, drivers may not have 
enough time to react to avoid an impending crash.
b. False Positive Test Scenarios
    Citing the potential for redundancy with the three active/
supplemental braking scenarios for systems exhibiting lower 
deceleration rates, Mobileye suggested that the Agency impose a maximum 
speed reduction of 2 kph (1.24 mph) for the CIB and DBS tests, or a 
maximum duration of braking over the maximum allowable deceleration 
threshold for the false positive tests. The STP test is designed to 
provide an indication as to whether a vehicle's AEB system may have a 
false activation problem. Some vehicles use haptic braking and/or low-
level braking as part of their FCW alert strategy. These brake 
activations are not intended to slow the vehicle significantly; rather, 
they attempt to get the driver's attention so that he/she will respond 
to the crash-imminent situation. That said, it is quite possible that 
FCW-based braking could reduce speed more than the 2 kph (1.24 mph) 
threshold suggested by Mobileye.
    Recognizing the potential problem for a vehicle to fail the CIB 
false positive test as a consequence of how its FCW system was designed 
to work, NHTSA built some flexibility into the assessment criteria used 
to evaluate how the subject vehicle (SV) responds to the STP. In the 
CIB test, activations can produce peak decelerations of up to 0.5g, 
which was beyond any FCW-based level at the time. In the DBS test, the 
peak deceleration of a given test trial must not exceed 150 percent of 
the average peak deceleration calculated for the baseline test series 
performed at the same nominal SV speed. These provisions are intended 
to tolerate small levels of deceleration, but not the larger magnitudes 
indicative of an AEB intervention.
    BMW objected to the inclusion of the false positive test scenario 
in general for both DBS and CIB systems and raised concerns that such 
tests ``can incentivize vehicle manufacturers to focus on one 
artificial situation, instead of considering the myriad of potential 
real-world traffic situations.'' The manufacturer suggested that if 
this test scenario remains for DBS, then the Agency should allow 
manufacturers to specify a brake pedal application rate limit beyond 
279 mm/s (11 in./s) and up to 400 mm/s (16 in./s) for the false 
positive test scenario, to harmonize with Euro NCAP requirements. BMW 
further stated that limiting the rate to 279 mm/s (11 in./s) could 
increase a DBS system's sensitivity, and thereby increase the 
likelihood of additional false activation events in the real world. The 
manufacturer mentioned that as more frontal crash prevention systems 
combine both FCW and AEB functionalities, speed should reduce for all 
pedal application speeds.
    Regarding BMW's objection to continuing with the false positive 
test scenario for CIB and DBS in NCAP, NHTSA notes that it has 
requested comment on whether eliminating the false positive tests would 
be appropriate at this time. As discussed previously, the Agency has 
not observed false positive test failures in CIB or DBS testing since 
these ADAS technologies were added to NCAP.
    If NHTSA decides it is appropriate to keep the false positive test 
scenario for DBS, BMW requested that

[[Page 13490]]

manufacturers should be permitted to specify a brake pedal application 
rate up to 400 mm/s (16 in./s) since this is the upper brake 
application rate limit established by Euro NCAP. In its November 2015 
final decision notice for AEB, NHTSA addressed a similar request from 
the Alliance, which suggested that the Agency harmonize with Euro 
NCAP's brake application rate range of 200 to 400 mm/s (8 to 16 in./
s).\190\ At the time, the Agency stated that it would retain its 
proposed brake application rate of 254  25.4 mm/s (10 
 1 in./s) in the DBS system performance test. In justifying 
this decision, NHTSA contended that the current application rate value 
is well within the range of the Euro NCAP specification. Also, NHTSA 
reasoned that the current application rate appears to be a feasible 
representation of the activation of DBS systems. DBS systems are 
designed to stop rather than slow down, but not too fast like 
conventional brake assist systems, which typically address emergency 
panic stop situations where the brake application rate exceeds 360 mm/s 
(14.2 in./s). For NHTSA to focus on evaluating system performance for 
DBS technology (not conventional brake technology), the Agency plans to 
retain the current brake pedal application rate of 254  
25.4 mm/s (10  1 in./s) for the DBS test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ 80 FR 68608 (Nov. 5, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Procedure Clarifications
    In response to the November 2015 final decision notice, Mobileye 
asked NHTSA to clarify the process of releasing the accelerator pedal 
within 500 ms of the FCW alert prior to braking. The commenter 
questioned whether the throttle was gradually released over 500 ms, or 
abruptly released over 50 ms. Mobileye also asked that the Agency 
clarify how braking is affected if there is no FCW alert, or if the FCW 
alert occurs very close to the brake activation.
    NHTSA notes that the throttle pedal release rate is not restricted 
in NCAP's CIB test procedure. The test procedure requires only that the 
SV throttle be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is 
issued. As previously mentioned, as part of the Agency's proposed 
changes to the CIB tests, it also intends to include test procedure 
language stating that if no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the 
SV accelerator pedal will be released within 500 ms after the onset of 
CIB system braking, and that if no FCW alert is issued and the 
vehicle's CIB system does not offer any braking, release of the SV 
accelerator pedal will not be required prior to impact with the POV.
    With respect to how SV braking is affected, if there is no FCW 
alert, or if the alert happens very close to brake activation, 
different steps are taken for the crash imminent braking (CIB) and 
dynamic brake support (DBS) tests.
    In the existing DBS tests, the test procedure states that the 
accelerator pedal must be released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is 
issued, but prior to the onset of the manual SV brake application by a 
robotic brake controller. The Agency recognizes that this can create an 
issue if no FCW alert occurs because the throttle may still be 
depressed (since no warning was issued) while the SV brakes are applied 
by the robot at the prescribed TTC. The Agency has documented this 
possibility where the SV throttle and brake pedals are applied at the 
same time and provided a recommendation that up to a 250 ms overlap be 
allowed.\191\ In other words, once the SV driver detects that the robot 
has applied the brakes, the driver will have 250 ms to release the 
accelerator fully. The test would not be valid unless this criterion is 
met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ Forkenbrock, G.J., & Snyder, A.S. (2015, June), NHTSA's 
2014 automatic emergency braking test track evaluations (Report No. 
DOT HS 812 166), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the Agency has proposed to revise when the manual 
(robotic) brake application is initiated to a time that corresponds to 
1.0 second after the FCW alert is issued (regardless of whether a CIB 
activation occurs after the FCW alert but before initiation of the 
manual brake application) if it continues to perform DBS testing in 
NCAP, it has also requested comment on appropriate TTCs for the 
modified DBS test conditions as an alternative to this proposal. 
Therefore, NHTSA is also requesting comment on the following:
    (47) Would a 250 ms overlap of SV throttle and brake pedal 
application be acceptable in instances where no FCW alert has been 
issued by the prescribed TTC in a DBS test, or where the FCW alert 
occurs very close to the brake activation. If a 250 ms overlap is not 
acceptable, what overlap would be acceptable?
d. Expand Testing
    Magna suggested that NHTSA expand testing to encompass low light 
and inclement weather situations. The Agency's proposal for PAEB 
systems includes testing under less-than-ideal environmental conditions 
(specifically at nighttime). The Agency notes that approximately half 
(51 percent) of fatalities caused by rear-end crashes and most MAIS 1-5 
injuries (80 percent) occurred under daylight conditions. Furthermore, 
nearly all fatalities (92 percent) and injuries (88 percent) stemming 
from rear-end collisions occurred in clear weather.\192\ Having said 
that, IIHS's review of 2009-2016 rear-end crash data suggested that 
AEB-equipped vehicles are over-represented for crashes occurring in 
certain weather conditions, such as snow and ice.\193\ Therefore, NHTSA 
is requesting comment on the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & 
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash 
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
    \193\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August), 
Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles 
with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention. 2019, 
VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (48) Should the Agency pursue research in the future to assess AEB 
system performance under less than ideal environmental conditions? If 
so, what environmental conditions would be appropriate?
e. AEB Strikeable Target
    Numerous commenters recommended that NHTSA harmonize its Strikeable 
Surrogate Vehicle (SSV) with the test target used by other testing 
organizations such as IIHS and Euro NCAP. The commenters reasoned that 
harmonization would further advance the implementation of AEB 
technology by reducing the development and testing burden and thereby 
result in lower-cost systems. Mercedes recommended that NHTSA recognize 
other targets as being equivalent devices to the SSV and requested that 
NHTSA allow vehicle manufacturers the option to choose which target is 
used for testing.
    Currently, NHTSA uses the SSV as the principal other vehicle (POV) 
in NCAP testing of DBS and CIB systems. The SSV is a target vehicle 
modeled after a small hatchback car and fabricated from light-weight 
composite materials including carbon fiber and Kevlar[supreg].\194\ 
Using this target imposes certain limitations, most importantly the 
maximum speed it can be operated at, or be struck by, the SV. Due to 
its material properties, the SSV can inflict damage to vehicles that 
impact it at higher speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another target, the Global Vehicle Target (GVT), which was 
referenced earlier with respect to BSI (blind spot intervention) 
testing, resembles a white hatchback passenger car. This three-

[[Page 13491]]

dimensional surrogate is currently used by other consumer 
organizations, including Euro NCAP. It is also used by many vehicle 
manufacturers in their internal testing to NCAP test specifications, 
and by NHTSA to facilitate ADAS research using pre-crash scenarios 
beyond those included in the Agency's FCW, CIB, and DBS test 
procedures.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ Currently, manufacturers use test results from their 
internal testing and submit them to NHTSA for NCAP's recommendation 
of vehicles that pass its performance testing requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The GVT consists of 39 vinyl-covered foam pieces (held together 
with hook and loop fasteners) that form the structure the outer skins 
are attached to. It is secured to the top of a Low-Profile Robotic 
Vehicle (LPRV) using hook and loop fasteners, which separate upon an 
SV-to-GVT collision. When the GVT is hit at low speed, it is typically 
pushed off the LPRV but remains assembled. At higher impact speeds, the 
GVT breaks apart as the SV essentially drives through it, and can then 
be reassembled on top of the LPRV.
    The use of this surrogate vehicle would allow the Agency to perform 
tests at higher speeds, thus increasing safety benefits. For this 
reason, the Agency used the GVT in its characterization study for CIB 
testing at higher speeds. The SSV initially limited the test speeds the 
Agency could adopt for CIB and DBS testing because of concerns over 
potential damage to the testing equipment and test vehicle. Using the 
GVT significantly reduces that possibility for the test speeds 
proposed. Also, as future upgrades for NCAP are planned, the GVT can be 
used to evaluate more challenging crash scenarios, such as those 
required for other ADAS technologies (Intersection Safety Assist and 
Opposing Traffic Safety Assist). NHTSA has recently docketed draft 
research test procedures for these technologies.\196\ \197\ If, in the 
future, the Agency was to consider adopting other test procedures 
requiring a strikeable target, incorporating the GVT would allow 
harmonization across the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019, 
September), Intersection safety assist system confirmation test: 
Working draft, https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2019-
0102-0006.
    \197\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019, 
September), Opposing traffic safety assist system confirmation test: 
Working draft. https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2019-
0102-0008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has conducted vehicle testing to evaluate the FCW alert and 
CIB intervention onset timing observed using the GVT Revision E and 
compared that with the timing recorded for identical tests performed 
with NHTSA's SSV benchmark.\198\ Three light vehicles and three rear-
end crash scenarios were used for this evaluation. A secondary 
objective of this study was to assess the characteristics and 
durability of the GVT for various test track configurations, 
specifically its dynamic stability and in-the-field reconstruction time 
after being struck by a test vehicle. GVT stability was evaluated using 
straight line and curved path maneuvers at various speeds and lateral 
accelerations. Reconstruction times of the GVT after impact were 
examined using different impact speeds, directions of impact, and 
assembly crew sizes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ Snyder, A.C., Forkenbrock, G.J., Davis, I.J., O'Harra, 
B.C., & Schnelle, S.C. (2019, July), A test track comparison of the 
global vehicle target and NHTSA's strikeable surrogate vehicle 
(Report No. DOT HS 812 698), Washington, DC: National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Overall, the results from the study suggested that the onset timing 
of FCW and CIB systems observed during rear-end tests performed with 
the GVT was similar to that recorded for the SSV.\199\ The GVT was also 
found to be physically stable and remained affixed to the robotic 
platform used to facilitate its movement during the high-speed 
longitudinal tests as well as those performed at the limit of the 
platform's lateral road holding capacity. Although the time between 
test trials was longer than that associated with use of the SSV, GVT 
reassembly tests demonstrated that the GVT could be reconstructed in a 
reasonable time between tests after being struck. However, the physical 
reconstruction time is one of three considerations when determining the 
time between tests when the GVT is used. After being reassembled and 
secured to the top of the robotic platform, the platform must re-
establish its communication with the other equipment needed to perform 
the tests, and a ``zero-offset'' check is used. This check not only 
ensures the GVT orientation relative to the platform remains consistent 
for all tests, but also confirms the distance from the SV to the GVT at 
the point of impact is accurately reported as zero when the two first 
make contact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ Comparable observations were made upon review of test data 
from the Agency's CIB characterization testing. Upon review of test 
data from the Agency's CIB characterization testing, FCW and CIB 
onset timings for identical vehicles were highly comparable 
regardless of whether the SSV or GVT Revision G targets were used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA proposes to use the GVT in lieu of the SSV in future NCAP 
testing. Similar to that noted earlier regarding the use of the 
articulated pedestrian mannequins, the use of the GVT provides another 
opportunity for NHTSA to harmonize with other consumer information 
safety rating programs as mandated by the Bipartisan Infrastructure 
Law. Comments are sought on its adoption regardless of whether 
modifications are made to test speeds, deceleration, test scenarios, 
combining test procedures, et cetera, as has been discussed.
    The Agency also recognizes that there have been ongoing revisions 
to the GVT to address its performance in other crash modes that 
exercise different ADAS applications. At this time, NHTSA believes the 
latest Revision G is appropriate for testing in NCAP. However, for the 
purpose of AEB testing only, NHTSA is proposing to accept manufacturer 
verification data for AEB tests conducted using GVT Revision F.\200\ 
\201\ It is the Agency's understanding that Revision G incorporates 
changes to the front, side, and oblique aspects of Revision F.\202\ 
NHTSA believes that modifications implemented for Revision G have not 
altered the physical characteristics of the rear of the target such 
that a vehicle's performance in the rear-end crash mode would be 
impacted. The Agency requests comment on:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ While the Agency used GVT Revision E in its comparative 
testing with the SSV, and it believes that no significant 
differences exist between Revision E and Revision F that would 
affect AEB test results, the Agency does not believe it is necessary 
to accept from vehicle manufacturers AEB test data that was derived 
using Revision E because Revision E is no longer in production. 
Therefore, the Agency believes that any OEM data that is submitted 
should reflect the use of GVT Revision F or Revision G.
    \201\ Although the Agency used GVT Revision E in its comparative 
testing with the SSV, the Agency does not believe that modifications 
made for Revision F would have changed the results of that testing. 
It is the Agency's understanding that several modifications were 
made to the rear of Revision E, which included adding additional 
radar material to the bottom skirt of the target to attenuate 
internal reflections, and reducing the slope of the rear top portion 
of the hatchback to increase the power of the radar return.
    \202\ To improve the real-world characteristics from the front 
and side of the target, several changes to the radar treatment were 
integrated into the components of the GVT body for Revision G 
compared to Revision F, including changes to the skin and wheel 
treatment. There were also some minor shape changes to the front of 
the GVT body to improve front radar return and to the side to 
improve the ability to hold its shape. https://www.dynres.com/2020/02/25/the-new-global-vehicle-target-gvt-has-arrived/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (49) The use of the GVT in lieu of the SSV in future AEB NCAP 
testing,
    (50) whether Revisions F and G should be considered equivalent for 
AEB testing, and
    (51) whether NHTSA should adopt a revision of the GVT other than 
Revision G for use in AEB testing in NCAP.

[[Page 13492]]

    With respect to Mercedes' request that NHTSA consider several 
targets and allow manufacturers the option to choose which target is 
used for testing, the Agency does not believe such an approach is 
feasible. The Agency currently accepts and uses, for recommendation 
purposes on www.NHTSA.gov, data submitted by vehicle manufacturers for 
internal CIB and DBS testing that was conducted using a target other 
than the SSV, such as the Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club e.V 
(ADAC) target, which was previously used by Euro NCAP and IIHS.\203\ 
However, during its system performance verification testing, the Agency 
has observed several test failures, which may be attributed to 
differences in target designs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In NHTSA's November 2015 AEB final decision notice,\204\ NHTSA 
stated that manufacturers do not need to use the SSV to generate and 
submit self-reported test data in support of their AEB systems that 
pass NCAP's system performance requirements and are recommended to 
consumers on the Agency's website. However, if the vehicle does not 
pass NCAP's system performance criteria for AEB systems during the 
program's random system performance verification testing, the Agency 
would remove the recommendation from its website. To uphold the 
credibility of the program and reasonably assure that consumers are 
receiving vehicles that meet a specified minimum performance threshold, 
NHTSA believes that it is critical to accept self-reported data from 
manufacturers that was obtained using tests conducted in accordance 
with NHTSA test procedures. As such, NHTSA is proposing not to accept 
vehicle manufacturer test data that was derived from an alternative 
test target other than that which is specified in NCAP's test 
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \204\ 80 FR 68607 (Nov. 5, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. ADAS Rating System

    NHTSA is planning to create a rating system based on assessments 
related to the performance of ADAS technologies, including, but not 
necessarily limited to, the technologies already part of the program 
and others proposed above. Currently, NCAP places a check mark by the 
relevant ADAS technology on NHTSA's website, www.nhtsa.gov, if two 
conditions are met: (1) A vehicle is equipped with the safety 
technology recommended by NHTSA; and (2) the system meets NCAP's 
performance specifications. Consumers are encouraged to look for 
vehicles equipped with ADAS that meet NCAP's performance tests, which 
are intended to establish a minimum level of performance on which 
consumers can rely and compare among vehicles equipped with similar 
technologies.
    In the Agency's December 2015 notice, NHTSA discussed a series of 
point values for the ADAS technologies at that time. These points would 
have been used in a star rating system for these technologies. Vehicles 
with ADAS that met the criteria set forth in the Agency's test 
procedures would earn full points if offered as standard equipment on a 
particular model and half points if offered only as optional equipment 
for that model. In response to that proposal, commenters provided mixed 
support regarding the feasibility and appropriateness of developing 
such an ADAS rating system versus the current process of just 
identifying the presence of recommended technologies with check 
marks.\205\ Proponents of a rating system were generally supportive of 
the broad concept of rating ADAS, but did not propose specific 
suggestions for how the Agency could develop such a rating system. Some 
commenters responded that ADAS technologies have not yet matured to the 
point that a rating system would be appropriate, while others believed 
that one could be developed. In the responses for the October 1, 2018 
public meeting, support still varied, even when the discussion was more 
focused on how the FAST Act mandate to provide crash avoidance 
information on the Monroney label might be fulfilled in the context of 
an ADAS rating system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to Consumers

    As mentioned previously, NHTSA's current method of providing ADAS 
information to consumers conveys which systems meet NCAP's system 
performance requirements, but provides no overall ADAS technology 
rating for the vehicle. However, as more emerging ADAS technologies are 
available in the market, the Agency believes that a rating mechanism 
for these systems would be more beneficial for consumers because it 
could better distinguish the technologies, including different levels 
of system performance and the technologies' life-saving potential, 
rather than simply listing how many technologies a given vehicle is 
equipped with that meet NCAP's system performance requirements. As will 
be discussed in the sections that follow, ADAS ratings could be 
communicated to consumers using stars, medals, points, or other means, 
thereby allowing them to make better-informed decisions. Also, the 
ratings could be based on the safety benefit potential afforded by 
vehicles' ADAS technologies and system performance. In addition, NHTSA 
plans to explore several approaches on how to present such rating 
information in the Agency's planned consumer research. In this RFC, 
NHTSA is soliciting input solely on the creation of an ADAS rating 
system, not the visual representation or placement of that rating 
system at points of sale. As described in greater detail below, issues 
related to the visual representation and placement of the rating system 
at points of sale will be a topic covered in future notices and 
research.
1. Star Rating System
    NCAP currently uses 1 to 5 stars to communicate vehicle 
crashworthiness ratings to consumers, with both ratings for the 
individual tests and an overall rating. Given the familiarity that 
consumers have with NHTSA's current 5-star ratings system, the Agency 
could also consider the use of stars for a future ADAS rating system. 
However, the Agency has some reservations about pursuing such an 
approach.
    A future star-based ADAS rating system could produce lower ratings 
for technologies than consumers are accustomed to seeing in 
crashworthiness and rollover resistance tests, and may cause 
unnecessary consumer confusion about the additional safety the 
technology on their vehicle provides. For instance, although NHTSA 
believes ADAS could potentially add significant safety benefits in 
addition to the crashworthiness protection afforded on vehicles, the 
Agency questions whether consumers would interpret 1- and 2-star ADAS 
ratings as conveying added benefits beyond the crashworthiness 
protection offered by a vehicle. In addition, vehicles that do not have 
any ADAS ratings could mistakenly be interpreted to have an advantage 
(i.e., additional safety benefits) over those that have low ADAS star 
ratings. Thus, vehicles that have low ADAS star ratings could 
inadvertently discourage consumers from considering ADAS in their 
purchasing decisions, when in fact, those vehicles with 1- and 2-stars 
may offer significant safety benefits over their unrated peers.
    Given these concerns, the Agency could consider reserving star 
ratings to convey crashworthiness results only and distinguish ADAS 
ratings by using another visualization approach, such as a medals 
system or points-based system.

[[Page 13493]]

2. Medals Rating System
    Another potential method of presenting ADAS rating information to 
consumers could be a three-tiered award system similar in concept to 
Olympic medals. Presumably, most consumers are already familiar with 
the designations of bronze, silver, and gold as increasingly more 
prestigious levels of achievement.
    Using an awards system (e.g., medals) rather than stars to 
represent NCAP's rating of ADAS technologies would not only distinguish 
ADAS grades from crashworthiness ratings, but also visually communicate 
that the two ratings are conveying different types of vehicle safety 
information. However, it could cause consumer confusion by having two 
separate rating systems that consumers would need to consider and, to 
the extent there is a divergence between the two systems, potentially 
weigh against one another for a given vehicle.
3. Points-Based Rating System
    NHTSA could use points to convey ADAS rating information. Points 
could be used in lieu of stars or medals or in addition to these 
alternative rating communication concepts, and they may serve as the 
basis for any of the potential rating system approaches discussed in 
the sections that follow. One advantage of a points-based system is 
that it can provide improved delineation in ratings, thus benefiting 
consumers who may want to compare ratings between several vehicle 
models. However, the inherent granularity of a points-based system may 
cause consumer confusion if conveyed in addition to another, coarser, 
communication rating concept, such as stars or medals. As mentioned 
previously, NHTSA plans to conduct consumer research surrounding the 
concept of an overall NCAP rating that would combine results from 
crashworthiness, rollover resistance, and ADAS technology testing.
4. Incorporating Baseline Risk
    Another consideration for the Agency that may add value to an ADAS 
rating system is the notion of conveying a vehicle's performance 
relative to the baseline (or average) performance observed for today's 
vehicle fleet. As detailed later in this notice, this concept is 
currently an element of NCAP's crashworthiness rating system. Star 
ratings generated in NCAP today are a measure of how much more (or 
less) occupant protection (in terms of injury risk) a given vehicle 
affords when compared to an ``average'' vehicle. The Agency could 
consider incorporating the baseline concept when developing an ADAS 
rating system as well. For instance, today's ``average'' vehicle may 
achieve 60 out of a possible 100 points (or 3 out of 5 stars) during 
NCAP's testing. This score (or rating) may translate to a 30 percent 
reduction in the risk of crashes, injuries, deaths, etc. Scores (or 
ratings) for future vehicles, which could also potentially be tied to a 
percent reduction in crashes, could be compared relative to the 
baseline rating of today's fleet, thus affording consumers the 
opportunity to compare scores (or ratings) for vehicles spanning 
different model years.

B. ADAS Rating System Concepts

    Just as there are several ways to communicate ADAS ratings to 
consumers, there are also several ways to rate ADAS technologies, a few 
of which are discussed below. As each of these rating system concepts 
center around vehicle performance in NCAP tests, it was necessary to 
consider the primary components of these tests during concept 
development.
1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and Nomenclature
    As discussed extensively in this notice, each ADAS technology and 
associated test procedure the Agency is considering for inclusion in 
NCAP has the potential to address a real-world safety problem. Each 
test procedure is designed to replicate certain injurious and fatal 
real-world events (termed ``scenarios'' in this new rating concept) 
that can be approximated in a laboratory setting to assess the 
capabilities of a given ADAS. Within each scenario, the Agency defines 
test conditions to replicate types of real-world incidents. Within each 
test condition, one or more test variants (as illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2 below) that assess the limitations of each ADAS technology under 
that test condition is also defined.\206\ Finally, for each test 
variant, the technology would have to pass a certain number of trials 
to receive credit for that part of the ADAS rating. Figure 1 
illustrates a generic structure for describing a given ADAS test 
procedure and its nomenclature in NCAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ In certain test conditions that do not have a multitude of 
assessments (e.g., test condition variants), the test condition and 
assessment would be one and the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P

[[Page 13494]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.002

    The above methodology and diagram can be illustrated further using 
one of the ADAS technologies discussed in this document, PAEB. PAEB is 
intended to address a real-world safety issue involving vulnerable road 
users, like pedestrians. The current test procedure is designed to 
replicate S1 and S4 scenarios (vehicle heading straight with a 
pedestrian crossing the road, and a vehicle heading straight with a 
pedestrian walking along or against traffic, respectively). Within each 
scenario, one or more test conditions are defined. For example, within 
the S1b test scenario (as previously discussed), several test condition 
variants are defined. In this case, the same test condition would have 
to be executed at various speeds (test condition variants). Finally, 
NHTSA would prescribe the number of trials for which the system would 
have to exhibit conformance to receive credit for these particular test 
condition variants and, in turn, scenario. Figure 2 illustrates this 
example.

[[Page 13495]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.003

    To illustrate further the multitude of assessments simplified in 
Figure 1, certain test scenarios only include one test condition and 
one test variant. A specific example of this would be the previously 
mentioned Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS) scenario, evaluated as part of the 
Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) test procedure, where the Subject Vehicle 
(SV) encounters a stopped Principal Other Vehicle (POV) on a straight 
road moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph). This example is illustrated in Figure 
3.

[[Page 13496]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.004

BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
2. Percentage of Test Conditions To Meet--Concept 1
    Given the test procedures' structure, an ADAS rating system could 
be designed with standards of increasing stringency that must be 
achieved to receive higher award levels (as shown in Table 7 below). In 
such a system, different ADAS technologies, each with a related test 
procedure (e.g., FCW, CIB, LKS), are combined into categories where 
each technology addresses a similar crash problem. For instance, ADAS 
Category 1 in Table 7 could represent the Forward Collision Prevention 
category that would be comprised of the three forward collision 
prevention technologies, FCW, CIB, and DBS. Vehicles would have to meet 
increasing numbers of test conditions across all test procedures in 
that particular ADAS category (i.e., three test procedures for the 
example given) to achieve higher ratings (e.g., medals, stars, points). 
For the example rating system concept shown in Table 7, 50 percent of 
test conditions would have to be met to achieve a bronze award, 75 
percent to achieve a silver award, and 100 percent to achieve a gold 
award for each ADAS category.\207\ The lowest ADAS rating among the 
categories could serve as the overall ADAS award if a summary rating is 
established across all included ADAS technologies. Alternatively, an 
overall ADAS award could reflect the average ADAS rating amongst the 
technology categories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \207\ When `Did not meet' is listed for an ADAS category, the 
vehicle failed to pass the requirements for the test condition/
variant when tested. `Did not run' may be used to signify that the 
vehicle is not equipped with the technology to pass the related test 
procedure(s), and as such, the tests were not conducted.

                                  Table 7--3-Tier ADAS Rating System Concept 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       All test procedures & conditions in ADAS category
                                 ------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Bronze (50% of      Silver (75% of                           ADAS category
                                    test conditions     test conditions   Gold (100% of test         award
                                         met)                met)           conditions met)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAS Category 1.................  Meets.............  Did not meet......  Did not run.......  Bronze.
ADAS Category 2.................  Meets.............  Meets.............  Meets.............  Gold.
ADAS Category 3.................  Meets.............  Did not meet......  Did not run.......  Bronze.
ADAS Category 4.................  Meets.............  Meets.............  Did not meet......  Silver.
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Overall ADAS Award..........                                      Bronze
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Select Test Conditions To Meet--Concept 2
    Table 8 demonstrates another possible NCAP ADAS rating system 
concept. As with Concept 1, ADAS technologies are grouped into 
categories that address similar crash problems. Instead of having to 
meet a percentage of all test conditions, NCAP could specifically 
require certain test conditions to be met for each of three award 
levels. These award levels could be based on the following increasingly 
challenging delineations:

[[Page 13497]]

    (1) Bronze (Basic performers)--test conditions that are achievable 
for current systems to meet;
    (2) Silver (Advanced performers)--test conditions that are more 
difficult for current systems to meet but are more easily achievable 
than the current known system limitations; and
    (3) Gold (Highest performers)--test conditions that approach the 
current limits of system testing feasibility, vehicle operations, and 
event extremes.
    Depending on a given technology's test procedure, the number of 
test conditions, test condition variants, and trial passes necessary to 
meet the Agency's requirements could vary. Thus, the ADAS performance 
requirements necessary for reaching each subsequent award level could 
be based on meeting a single test condition variant or meeting a number 
of test conditions. To explain further in the context of Table 8, ADAS 
Group 1 could be the Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) technology category, 
where technology 1 could be LDW, and technology 2 could be LKS. In this 
example, the vehicle's LDW system meets all applicable test conditions 
(bronze, silver, gold). However, its LKS system fails to meet the test 
conditions required for silver, but meets the test conditions to earn 
bronze. Therefore, the highest award this vehicle could achieve for the 
LKA category would be bronze, as it is the highest award achieved by 
both of the technologies (LDW and LKS) included in the LKA category. 
Similar to Concept 1, the lowest or average ADAS rating amongst the 
category groups could serve as the overall ADAS award if a summary 
rating is established across all included ADAS technologies.

                                                      Table 8--3-Tier ADAS Rating System Concept 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Bronze test.....  Silver test.....  Gold test.......                            ADAS group award
                               conditions......  conditions......  conditions......
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAS Group 1.................  1...............  2...............  3...............  1...............  2...............  1...............  Bronze.
    Tech 1...................  Meets...........  Meets...........  ................  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  .............
    Tech 2...................  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Did not meet....  Did not run.....  .............
ADAS Group 2.................  1...............  2...............  3...............  1...............  2...............  1...............  Gold.
    Tech 1...................  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  .............
    Tech 2...................  Meets...........  ................  ................  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  .............
ADAS Group 3.................  1...............  2...............  3...............  1...............  2...............  1...............  Bronze.
    Tech 1...................  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Did not meet....  Did not run.....  Did not run.....  .............
ADAS Group 4.................  1...............  2...............  3...............  1...............  2...............  1...............  Silver.
    Tech 1...................  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Meets...........  Did not meet....  .............
                              --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Overall ADAS Award...                                                            Bronze
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
    A more detailed example of this ADAS rating system concept, which 
uses some of the test conditions and test condition variants discussed 
in this document (distinguished by variables such as speed), is shown 
below in Table 9. In this example, check marks are used to indicate 
that the vehicle's ADAS technology has met the requirements for a given 
test procedure's conditions and test condition variants. An ``X'' 
symbol is used to indicate where vehicles did not meet the test 
condition and/or variants, either because the vehicle was not equipped 
with the technology and therefore could not be tested, or because the 
vehicle's technology was tested, but failed to meet the test procedure 
requirements. Units are in kph unless otherwise noted.
    To further explain the three-tier rating system illustrated in 
Table 9 with context, ADAS Group 3 in the example utilizes Blind Spot 
Detection (BSD) to demonstrate multiple test conditions and test 
condition variants. BSW (categorized as Technology 1 for the BSD 
grouping) has five test condition variants, and BSI (categorized as 
Technology 2 for the BSD grouping) includes three test condition 
variants. In order for BSD to achieve a bronze award in this example, 
the BSW system must meet the three test condition variants included for 
this technology under the `Bronze Test Conditions/Variants' heading. No 
BSI test conditions, or test condition variants, must be met. In order 
for BSD to achieve a silver award, BSW must meet two test conditions 
(comprised of five test condition variants) and BSI must meet two test 
conditions, both of which are included under the `Silver Test 
Conditions/Variants' heading. If the vehicle was also able to meet the 
third test condition included in the BSI test procedure, `SV Lane 
Change w/Closing Headway 72.4/80.5', which is included under the `Gold 
Test Conditions/Variants' heading in Table 9, the vehicle would earn a 
gold award. In the Table 9 example, however, BSI does not meet one of 
the silver test conditions/variants (`SV Lane Change w/Constant Headway 
72.4/72.4'). Consequently, in this example, BSD achieves the next 
lowest award--bronze.

[[Page 13498]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.005


[[Page 13499]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.006

BILLING CODE 4910-59-C

[[Page 13500]]

    The approach presented in Tables 8 and 9 would address the Agency's 
desire to introduce a dynamic ADAS rating system. As technologies 
become more mature, the Agency expects ADAS system performances will 
begin to exceed NCAP testing requirements, and as such, systems will 
have an easier time meeting the required test conditions across all 
test procedures. The Agency could begin providing information on higher 
performing systems by periodically increasing the stringency of 
requirements to achieve the highest NCAP ratings. Lower award levels 
could be reserved for test conditions that are easily achieved by ADAS 
in the current vehicle fleet. Higher award levels could be reserved for 
test conditions that current ADAS have difficulty achieving, or for new 
test scenarios (e.g., PAEB S2 or S3), conditions (e.g., using a 
motorcycle or cyclist as the POV), or variants (e.g., increased SV/POV 
speeds, decreased headways, additional weather conditions, varying 
deceleration rates) that are added to the program over time. This 
approach is expected to continue to provide consumers information on 
vehicle safety designs that introduce truly exceptional ADAS 
performance compared to their peers. It should also incentivize vehicle 
manufacturers to improve their ADAS capabilities to meet consumers' 
expectations for system performance.
    Along these lines, NHTSA could also introduce a slight deviation to 
rating system Concept 2. In this deviation, not only would vehicles 
have to meet the most demanding requirements across all ADAS test 
procedures to receive higher ratings, but also the Agency could set the 
performance target for the highest level rating (gold, 5 stars, maximum 
points, etc.) for those test conditions that are required for an ADAS 
technology that is just emerging in the marketplace, such as 
Intersection Safety Assist (ISA), mentioned later in this notice. In 
doing so, consumers could be assured that purchasing a vehicle that 
earns the highest award level would offer the most advanced ADAS 
capabilities available at that time.
4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on Real-World Data--Concept 3
    The Agency believes it is important to develop an ADAS rating 
system that is not only flexible (i.e., one that can adapt or change 
over time) to keep pace with advancements in technologies, but also 
effective in providing consumer information that encourages the 
proliferation of life-saving technology. As such, a third rating system 
concept that the Agency could consider would be one which weights the 
technology groups based on the target population data and effectiveness 
attributable to each technology to derive the overall ADAS award. In 
essence, the more critical, more lifesaving, and/or more advanced/
effective technology systems would have more contribution (i.e., be 
worth more) in the rating system. Furthermore, for a given technology 
group, the Agency could weight the test conditions that approximate 
more frequent or injurious real-world events so that they have more 
influence in the rating for that group. The selected evaluation method 
could be normalized in such a way that the results of each test 
condition within a scenario could be appropriately combined and 
concisely presented for consumer information or ratings purposes. Such 
an approach could also be incorporated for either Concept 1 or Concept 
2, discussed above.
    Utilizing real-world data to inform the structure of a future ADAS 
rating system is challenging for several reasons. For one, there is no 
single metric (such as target crash populations, fatalities, or 
injuries) that can be used to weight every technology appropriately in 
a rating system when both the related real-world safety problem and 
meaningful influence are considered. In an effort to correlate rating 
system weights directly with potential real-world safety benefits, too 
little weight may be assigned to technologies that have lower target 
populations (such as those for Blind Spot Detection) compared to 
technologies that have much higher target populations (such as those 
for Forward Collision Prevention). Thus, the Agency is concerned that 
it may be possible for manufacturers to offer one or two ADAS systems 
that perform well in the NCAP tests, if those technologies with higher 
target populations are apportioned significant weight in a rating 
system, while choosing not to include the other, lower-weighted 
technologies on their vehicles, or opting to include them even if the 
systems perform poorly. Therefore, the Agency believes that it is 
critical to find an acceptable balance between weights dictated solely 
by real-world data and those that ensure each component provides a 
meaningful contribution to the rating system. In essence, each 
technology should be apportioned within the rating system such that it 
provides a significant contribution while also reflecting the relative 
safety improvement that each technology may afford consumers.
    Changes in target population data (based on real-world crashes) and 
improvements made to ADAS technologies over time pose additional 
challenges for the Agency in using real-word data and system 
effectiveness estimates to inform appropriate weights or proportions to 
assign to the individual test conditions or the corresponding test 
condition variants in an ADAS rating system.\208\ As technology systems 
improve to meet NCAP test scenarios/conditions, system effectiveness 
estimates may increase. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in this 
notice, the real-world crash data may change as technologies are 
designed to address certain crash scenarios, but not others. Ideally, 
the Agency would adjust rating system weights to keep pace with these 
changes, as this would align with NHTSA's goal of developing a flexible 
ADAS rating system that can respond appropriately to improvements or 
changes seen for the fleet. Unfortunately, real-world data for system 
performance advancements is not always readily available to support 
dynamic program upgrades, as the crash data, which takes time to 
reflect changes in the vehicle fleet accurately, lags system updates 
and deployments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Having said that, the Agency sees merit in using available real-
world data, specifically target populations, to determine which ADAS 
technologies should be considered for inclusion in the program. The 
additional time between technology development and NHTSA's ability to 
collect real-world data on target populations has proven in the past to 
be sufficient to ensure that the technology is mature prior to 
considering it in NCAP. As mentioned previously, the four ADAS 
technologies discussed in this proposal focus on the most frequently 
occurring and/or most severe crash types, which the Agency believes is 
a feasible and prudent approach to use when considering whether an ADAS 
technology should be incorporated into NCAP. NHTSA will continue to 
leverage all information and safety studies on ADAS technologies, such 
as those cited in this notice, to support the Agency's proposal. In 
addition, NHTSA plans to leverage all available data to assess real-
world insights into advanced safety technology performance.
5. Overall Rating
    As discussed herein, there are many considerations when developing 
a potential ADAS rating system. These include: (1) What type of system 
to

[[Page 13501]]

adopt; (2) whether to use points, medals, or awards to convey ratings; 
and (3) whether to weight system components based on real-world data. 
Another consideration is whether to have an overall rating. Although 
the concepts discussed thus far have included an overall rating, NHTSA 
could also simply list individual ratings for the included ADAS 
technologies, but not adopt an overall rating. NHTSA believes that 
consumers may have preferences as to which specific ADAS technologies 
they would or would not want on their vehicles and may be interested 
only in how those individual technologies perform in the Agency's 
testing, not in how the vehicle systems perform overall. The Agency 
notes that the assignment of ratings for individual technologies could 
simply supplement the NCAP program's existing list approach, or 
individual technology ratings could be listed concurrently with an 
overall rating. Thus, the Agency requests comment on whether an overall 
rating system is necessary and, if so, whether it should replace or 
simply supplement the existing list approach.
    With regard to a future ADAS rating system, the Agency seeks 
comments on the following:
    (52) The components and development of a full-scale ADAS rating 
system,
    (53) the aforementioned approaches as well as others deemed 
appropriate for the development of a future ADAS rating system in order 
to assist the Agency in developing future proposals,
    (54) the appropriateness of using target populations and technology 
effectiveness estimates to determine weights or proportions to assign 
to individual test conditions, corresponding test combinations, or an 
overall ADAS award,
    (55) the use of a baseline concept to convey ADAS scores/ratings,
    (56) how best to translate points/ratings earned during ADAS 
testing conducted under NCAP to a reduction in crashes, injuries, 
deaths, etc., including which real-world data metric would be most 
appropriate,
    (57) whether an overall rating system is necessary and, if so, 
whether it should replace or simply supplement the existing list 
approach, and
    (58) effective communication of ADAS ratings, including the 
appropriateness of using a points-based ADAS rating system in lieu of, 
or in addition to, a star rating system.
    In responding to these approaches, or in developing new approaches 
for consideration, NHTSA requests that commenters consider a potential 
ADAS rating system that would allow flexibilities for continuous 
improvements to the program and cross-model year comparisons. In this 
notice, the Agency is seeking feedback on the appropriateness of the 
test scenarios, test conditions, test condition variants, and number of 
trials within each test variant for the four proposed technologies 
(PAEB, LKS, BSW, and BSI) discussed in this RFC, in addition to the 
four technologies currently included in NCAP. After NHTSA reviews 
comments in response to this notice, particularly those in response to 
questions raised within each of the ADAS technology sections and the 
rating system concepts discussed herein, the Agency anticipates 
finalizing the related test procedures and would then develop the 
selected ADAS rating system based on the technologies, test scenarios, 
test conditions, etc. that have support for incorporation into the 
program. Until NHTSA issues (1) a final decision notice announcing the 
new ADAS rating system and (2) a final rule to amend the safety rating 
section of the vehicle window sticker (Monroney label), the Agency 
plans to continue assigning NCAP credit, using check marks on 
www.nhtsa.gov, to vehicles that (1) are equipped with its recommended 
ADAS technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system performance test 
requirements.

V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window Sticker)

    The third part to this notice relates to the Fixing America's 
Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, which includes a section that 
requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to ensure crash avoidance 
information is displayed along with crashworthiness information on 
window stickers (also known as Monroney labels) placed on motor 
vehicles by their manufacturers.\209\ At the time of the FAST Act, 
NHTSA was already in the process of developing an RFC notice to present 
many proposed updates to NCAP, including the evaluation of several new 
ADAS and a corresponding update of the Monroney label.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ Section 24321 of the FAST Act, otherwise known as the 
``Safety Through Informed Consumers Act of 2015.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA currently requires vehicle manufacturers to include safety 
rating information, obtained from NHTSA under its NCAP program, on the 
Monroney labels of all new light vehicles manufactured on or after 
September 1, 2007 (49 CFR part 575). This requirement was mandated by 
Section 10307 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act; A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). The purpose 
of the law is to ensure that vehicle manufacturers provide consumers 
with relevant vehicle safety ratings information on all new light 
vehicles at the point of sale so that they can make informed purchasing 
decisions.
    Although the safety rating information included on the Monroney 
label has provided consumers with valuable information at the point of 
sale, there are limitations with the current label for NCAP. For 
instance, currently the vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney 
label only includes vehicle performance information for the 
crashworthiness program in NCAP (known as the 5-star safety ratings), 
which is comprised of a full-frontal impact test, a side impact barrier 
test, a side impact pole test, a static measurement of the vehicle's 
stability factor, and a dynamic assessment of the vehicle's risk to 
rollover in a single-vehicle crash. The other consumer information 
program in NCAP, which is the ADAS technologies assessment, is not 
included in the current vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney 
label. This information is only available on www.nhtsa.gov, along with 
the 5-star safety ratings information.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ 49 CFR part 575, Section 302, ``Vehicle labeling of safety 
rating information (compliance required for model year 2012 and 
later vehicles manufactured on or after January 31, 2012),'' 
specifies that the safety ratings information landscape should be at 
least 4.5 in. wide and 3.5 in. tall or cover at least 8 percent of 
the total area of the Monroney label--whichever is larger. 
Currently, any change that requires modification of the safety 
rating information presented on the Monroney label would require a 
notice and comment rulemaking action pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, NHTSA plans to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 
in 2023 to include ADAS performance information from NCAP in the 
vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney label, as mandated by the 
FAST Act. However, NHTSA seeks a flexible means to keep pace with the 
technological advancement and the frequent development of new ADAS 
technologies while also providing adequate public participation and 
transparency. NHTSA would like to develop a way to allow the Agency 
both to convey NCAP vehicle safety information in the safety rating 
section of the Monroney label and minimize the number of rulemaking 
actions needed each time the Agency incorporates a new technology in 
NCAP.
    At this time, NHTSA believes it may be able to achieve these goals 
by adopting all or some combination of the following three main 
categories for the

[[Page 13502]]

safety rating section of the Monroney label: (1) Crash protection 
information--which would be comprised of a rating (possibly one which 
maintains the Agency's 5-star ratings brand) that is tied to a 
vehicle's performance in NCAP crashworthiness and rollover testing; (2) 
safety technology information--which could be comprised of a rating 
(possibly one that uses the Agency's 5-star ratings brand, a three-tier 
medal award system, or points) that is tied to a vehicle's ability to 
avoid a crash based on its performance in ADAS testing conducted by 
NCAP; and (3) overall vehicle safety performance information--which 
could give recognition to vehicles that are top performers in both the 
crash protection and safety technology information categories for a 
given model year.
    NHTSA believes that efforts to develop a label that incorporates 
these three main overarching categories--crash protection information, 
safety technology information, and overall vehicle safety performance 
information--should also strive to reduce the need to update the 
Monroney label by way of rulemaking when future changes are made to the 
NCAP program.
    NHTSA intends to develop potential label changes by conducting 
consumer research. In the past, NCAP has benefitted from research on 
the illustration of NCAP vehicle safety information in the safety 
rating section of the Monroney label. NHTSA plans to conduct 
qualitative and quantitative consumer market research to: (1) Evaluate 
the overall appeal of the safety rating label concept mentioned above 
and identify specific likes and dislikes associated with each of the 
three main categories on the label; (2) measure the ease of 
comprehension for the safety rating label concept and understand which 
visual and text features are most effective at conveying vehicle safety 
information; (3) assess the distinctiveness of how the information is 
displayed and understand how best to make the vehicle safety 
information stand out on the Monroney label; and (4) identify 
additional areas of improvement related to the three potential main 
label categories relating to crash protection information, safety 
technology information, and overall vehicle performance 
information.\211\ NHTSA plans to use the results of this research to 
determine how best to convey safety rating information to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ NHTSA published a notice on April 28, 2020, seeking public 
comment on the information collection aspect of the consumer market 
research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP

    The fourth part to this notice discusses, for the first time in 
NCAP, a roadmap that sets forth NHTSA's plans for upgrading NCAP over 
the next several years. As mentioned at the beginning of this notice, 
the Agency's efforts outlined herein include both NHTSA's near- and 
long-term strategies for upgrading NCAP.
    Fulfillment of the roadmap will involve NHTSA's issuing planned 
proposed upgrades in phases as vehicle safety-related systems and 
technologies mature and data about their use and efficacy become known. 
The systems and technologies would include new vehicle-based 
crashworthiness and crash avoidance systems as well as systems-based 
improvements, such as occupant restraints and headlamp system 
performance upgrades. NHTSA would issue a final decision document 
following an RFC that responds to comments and provides appropriate 
lead time. This phased process allows stakeholders to provide data and 
views on proposed program updates, and allows NHTSA more flexibility to 
pursue program updates quicker.
    Since 2015, NHTSA has worked to finalize its research on pedestrian 
crash protection (head, and upper and lower leg impact tests), advanced 
anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) in frontal and side 
impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, and an updated rollover 
risk curve. NHTSA has included these initiatives in the mid-term 
component of the 10-year roadmap because the Agency reasonably believes 
they would meet the four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.\212\ 
Initiatives in the mid-term component of the 10-year roadmap identify 
and prioritize safety opportunities and technologies that are practical 
and for which objective tests and criteria, and other consumer data 
exist.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ The four requisites are: (1) The technology addresses a 
safety need; (2) system designs exist that can mitigate the safety 
problem; (3) the technology provides the potential for safety 
benefits; and (4) a performance-based objective test procedure 
exists that can assess system performance.
    \213\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the items in the roadmap discussed below, NHTSA is 
taking an unprecedented step to consider expanding NCAP to include 
safety technologies that may have the potential to help drivers make 
safe driving choices, as discussed in the next section. This aspect of 
NCAP would focus on the relationship between technology and behavioral 
safety, and would provide comparative information on devices that can 
shift driver behavior that contribute to crashes (e.g., speeding, and 
drowsy-, impaired- and distracted-driving). Initiatives on these 
technologies could be woven into both the first and second half (i.e., 
long-term portion) of the 10-year roadmap, depending on whether the 
technologies and objective tests and criteria are sufficiently 
developed to meet NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP. 
Initiatives in the long-term component of the roadmap include an 
identification of any safety opportunity or technology not included in 
the mid-term component for a variety of reasons, and those initiatives 
that would most benefit from stakeholder input and comments from the 
public. The Agency believes the plans outlined below would fulfill the 
requirements set forth in Section 24213 of the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law for the 10-year New Car Assessment Program roadmap 
once this RFC is finalized.
    The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law requires that NHTSA establish a 
roadmap for the implementation of NCAP not later than one year after 
the law's enactment.\214\ This roadmap must cover a term of ten years, 
consisting of a mid-term component and a long-term component.\215\ This 
roadmap aligns with relevant Agency priorities, performance plans, 
agendas, and any other relevant NHTSA plans.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(b).
    \215\ Id.
    \216\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 
32310(c)(2)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the contents of the roadmap must include a plan for 
any changes for NCAP, which includes descriptions of actions to be 
carried out and shall, as applicable, incorporate objective criteria 
for evaluating safety technologies and reasonable time periods for 
changes to NCAP that include new or updated tests.\217\ NHTSA has long-
established criteria for evaluating safety technologies for inclusion 
in NCAP, which is discussed in detail earlier in this notice and in 
several previous notices. NHTSA also uses the notice and comment period 
to ensure the time periods for changes to NCAP are reasonable, and the 
Agency expects this practice to continue. As part of the Agency's 
development of next steps for NCAP, NHTSA regularly evaluates other 
rating systems within the United States and abroad, including whether 
there are safety benefits of consistency with those other rating

[[Page 13503]]

systems.\218\ There are other benefits for being consistent, but safety 
is NHTSA's, and thus, NCAP's, top priority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 
32310(c)(1)(A).
    \218\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 
32310(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Next, the roadmap shall include key milestones, including the 
anticipated start of an action, completion of an action, and effective 
date of an update.\219\ While NHTSA can reasonably anticipate when the 
start of actions may occur in the mid-term portion of the roadmap, many 
technologies in the long-term portion of the roadmap will require 
additional research, test procedure development, product development 
and maturity, and a number of other factors that prevent the Agency 
from providing more detail on the anticipated start of an action. As 
such, NHTSA can only provide the estimated start date of 2025-2031. 
Completion of action is highly dependent upon the notice and comment 
process, and the effective date would be highly dependent on the 
completion of an action. Completion dates are dependent on the number 
and depth of the comments received in response to an RFC, along with 
the technical research necessary to resolve any challenging issues in 
the comments. Effective dates are dependent on completion dates. As 
such, NHTSA cannot reasonably anticipate those timelines in advance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 
32310(c)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also requires that the mid-term 
portion of the roadmap identify and prioritize safety opportunities and 
technologies that are practical and for which objective rating tests, 
evaluation criteria, and other consumer data exist.\220\ In the mid-
term portion of the roadmap, NHTSA has included only those technologies 
that are practical and that otherwise meet the requirements in the law. 
With respect to the long-term portion of the roadmap, NHTSA must 
identify and prioritize safety opportunities and technologies that 
exist or are in development.\221\ NHTSA has met both of these 
requirements in the following sections, prioritizing safety 
opportunities and technologies that are practical and for which 
objective rating tests, evaluation criteria, and other consumer data 
exist in the mid-term portion, and identifying safety opportunities and 
technologies that exist or are in development in the long-term portion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 
32310(c)(2)(A).
    \221\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 
32310(c)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Any safety opportunity or technology not included in this roadmap 
was omitted because NHTSA is not considering inclusion in NCAP at this 
time.\222\ In the next five years, addition of other technologies or 
opportunities to the roadmap would be subject to NHTSA's four 
prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP, the requirements of the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law for inclusion in any part of the roadmap, and the 
appropriateness of the technology or opportunity for a consumer 
information program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 
32310(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Per Sec. 24213(c), NHTSA must request comment on the roadmap and 
review and incorporate these comments, as appropriate.\223\ This RFC 
requests comments from the public on the roadmap. NHTSA considers the 
notice and comment process to be the primary form of stakeholder 
engagement, though the Agency reserves the right to conduct other forms 
of engagement to ensure that input received represents a diversity of 
technical background and viewpoints.\224\ With regard to a roadmap, 
NHTSA requests feedback on the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \223\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(e).
    \224\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (59) Identification of safety opportunities or technologies in 
development that could be included in future roadmaps,
    (60) opportunities to benefit from collaboration or harmonization 
with other rating programs, and
    (61) other issues to assist with long-term planning.

2021-2022 Timeframe

     As discussed in detail in this notice, NHTSA proposes to 
add four new ADAS technologies (LKS, BSD, BSI, and PAEB) in NCAP.
     In addition to improving the safety and protection of 
motor vehicle occupants, NHTSA continues its efforts and focus to 
improve the safety of pedestrians and vulnerable road users. NHTSA 
plans to propose a crashworthiness pedestrian protection testing 
program in NCAP in 2022. The pedestrian protection program would 
incorporate three crashworthiness tests (i.e., head-to-hood, upper leg-
to-hood leading edge, and lower leg-to-bumper) discussed in the 
December 2015 RFC.\225\ A crashworthiness pedestrian protection testing 
program would measure how well passenger cars, trucks, and sport 
utility vehicles protect pedestrians in the event of a crash. The 
program would further complement the safety achieved by pedestrian 
automatic emergency braking by measuring the safety performance of new 
vehicles to pedestrian impacts and encouraging safer vehicle designs 
for pedestrians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \225\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015), pp. 78547-78550.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2022-2023 Timeframe

     NHTSA plans to propose using the THOR-50M in NCAP's full 
frontal impact tests and the WorldSID-50M in the program's side impact 
barrier and side impact pole tests soon after work commences to add the 
dummies to 49 CFR part 572 and FMVSSs.\226\ The Agency would inform the 
public (in request for comment notices) how these crash test dummies 
would be utilized in various NCAP test modes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ NHTSA included new rulemakings in the Spring 2020 
Regulatory Agenda that would adopt the THOR-50M and WorldSID-50M 
into NHTSA's regulation for anthropomorphic test devices, 49 CFR 
part 572 (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM20 and https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM22, respectively). NHTSA also included 
rulemakings that would adopt use of the THOR-50M and WorldSID-50M at 
the manufacturers' option in NHTSA compliance tests for FMVSS No. 
208, ``Occupant crash protection,'' (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 
2127-AM21) and FMVSS No. 214, ``Side impact protection,'' (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM23), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     In the December 2015 notice, NHTSA announced it would like 
to include a frontal oblique crash test in NCAP.\227\ In response to 
that notice, commenters requested that the Agency provide the public 
with additional information on the target population as well as costs 
and benefits. They also argued that countermeasure studies have not 
been completed and questioned the repeatability and reproducibility of 
both the test procedure and the oblique moving deformable barrier. 
NHTSA has continued its frontal oblique research and kept the public 
informed of its findings.\228\ A cornerstone of the procedure is the 
use of THOR-50M dummies in the driver and right front passenger 
positions. NHTSA plans to determine in 2022 whether this new crash test 
mode is appropriate for inclusion in an FMVSS and/or NCAP. If

[[Page 13504]]

a determination is made to include the test in NCAP, the notice and 
comment process would follow soon thereafter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015), pages 78530 through 78531; 
https://one.nhtsa.gov/Research/Crashworthiness/Small%20Overlap%20and%20Oblique%20Testing.
    \228\ See www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0016 for 
document Repeatability and Reproducibility of Oblique Moving 
Deformable Barrier Test Procedure (Saunders 2018); Saunders, J. and 
Parent, D., ``Repeatability and Reproducibility of Oblique Moving 
Deformable Barrier Test Procedure,'' SAE Technical Paper 2018-01-
1055, 2018, doi:10.4271/2018-01-1055; https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/41934 Structural Countermeasure Research Program; https://www.nhtsa.gov/crash-simulation-vehicle-models Vehicle Interior and 
Restraint Modeling and Structural Countermeasure Research Program 
sections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     NHTSA will consider incorporating several additional 
advanced crash avoidance technologies including lighting systems for 
improved nighttime pedestrian visibility into NCAP in the near future, 
and will be announcing next steps during this timeframe. These include: 
(1) Adaptive driving beam headlights; (2) upgraded lower beam 
headlighting; (3) semiautomatic headlamp beam-switching; and (4) rear 
automatic braking for pedestrian protection.

2023-2024 Timeframe

     A multi-year consumer research effort is underway to 
modernize the vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney label. Once 
the consumer research is complete, the Agency plans to begin a 
rulemaking action in 2023 to update the Monroney label with a new 
labeling concept.
     Also in 2023, NHTSA plans to commence revising its 5-star 
safety ratings system. The Agency has sought comment on several 
approaches to provide consumers with vehicle safety ratings that 
provide more meaningful safety information and discriminate performance 
of vehicles among the fleet. NHTSA discusses this issue in detail in a 
section below.

2025-2031 Timeframe

    In NHTSA's long-term component of the roadmap, NHTSA includes a 
variety of technologies and foci that attempt to overcome many safety 
challenges for which the technologies available may not be as mature or 
may warrant additional study from NHTSA. NHTSA is seeking stakeholder 
input on the appropriateness of each of these technologies for the 
program and whether commenters believe that these technologies will 
meet the program's four prerequisites within the next 5- or 10-year 
time frame.
    NHTSA will be further assessing and developing tests for the 
following crash avoidance technologies: (1) Intersection safety assist; 
(2) opposing traffic safety assist; and (3) automatic emergency braking 
for all vulnerable road users (including bicyclists and motorcyclists) 
in all major crash scenarios including when the vehicle is turning left 
or right. NHTSA will also be assessing the effectiveness of systems 
that are or will become available in the fleet. The Agency hopes that 
information will be available that would support a proposal in 2025 or 
beyond to include these three technologies in NCAP.
    Based on comments received from stakeholders, if a technology 
development is mature and the available data in the next several years 
meet the Agency's four prerequisites, NHTSA would issue a proposal for 
inclusion in NCAP during the five-year mid-term timeline.

VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices

    NCAP has traditionally focused on crashworthiness technologies that 
protect the vehicle occupants in the event of a collision. The more 
advanced ADAS technologies that are the focus of this notice take the 
next step and provide technologies that can assist drivers, or in 
certain cases correct drivers' action in ways that can avoid or 
mitigate crashes. NHTSA has also begun to consider ways NCAP could be 
used to encourage technologies that protect road users other than the 
vehicles occupants, such as pedestrians and pedalcyclists.
    As beneficial as these technologies may be, NHTSA recognizes that 
risky driving behaviors and poor driver choices continue to amplify 
crash, injury, and fatality risks on our roadways. Accordingly, NHTSA 
is interested in safety technologies that have the ability to address 
the prevalent driver behaviors that contribute to roadway fatalities. 
For example, there are several available and emerging safety 
technologies that have the potential to address speeding and drowsy-, 
impaired-, distracted-, and unbelted-driving, thereby reducing the risk 
of crashes that lead to injury or death, which are the subjects of 
analysis, research, and examination.
    NHTSA is exploring opportunities to encourage the development and 
deployment of these technologies. While more must be known about the 
effectiveness and consumer acceptance of these systems, NHTSA strongly 
believes that these technologies will mature and show efficacy. In the 
nearer term, then, the Agency sees potential in highlighting vehicles 
equipped with these technologies on its website, and possibly 
elsewhere, to improve public awareness, and encourage vehicle 
manufacturer development and adoption. NHTSA will conduct research to 
develop objective test procedures and criteria to evaluate the 
performance and effectiveness of these technologies. Initiatives on 
these technologies would be woven into both the first and second half 
(i.e., long-term portion) of the 10-year roadmap, depending on whether 
the technologies and objective tests and criteria are sufficiently 
developed to meet NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.

A. Driver Monitoring Systems

    Driver monitoring systems use a variety of sensors and software to 
detect and/or infer driver state based on estimation approaches. For 
example, certain types of driver monitoring systems have shown promise 
in detecting the state of a driver's drowsiness.\229\ As vehicle 
technologies have evolved, driver monitoring systems have been more 
commonly introduced and applied to various driver states, particularly 
as one of the countermeasures against potential misuse of ADAS. 
Currently, there are varied approaches to driver monitoring across 
vehicle and equipment manufacturers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ Brown, T., Lee, J., Schwarz, C., Fiorentino, D., McDonald, 
A., Traube, E., Nadler, E. (2013). Detection of Driver Impairment 
from Drowsiness. 23rd Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference, Seoul, 
Republic of Korea. May 2013. Paper Number 13-0346.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA is considering adding driver monitoring systems as an NCAP 
technology to encourage further deployment of effective driver 
monitoring systems into vehicles. NHTSA seeks comment on the following 
to help the Agency determine whether to implement driver monitoring 
systems in NCAP:
    (62) What are the capabilities of the various available approaches 
to driver monitoring systems (e.g., steering wheel sensors, eye 
tracking cameras, etc.) to detect or infer different driver state 
measurement or estimations (e.g., visual attention, drowsiness, medical 
incapacity, etc.)? What is the associated confidence or reliability in 
detecting or inferring such driver states and what supporting data 
exist?
    (63) Of further interest are the types of system actions taken 
based on a driver monitoring system's estimate of a driver's state. 
What are the types and modes of associated warnings, interventions, and 
other mitigation strategies that are most effective for different 
driver states or impairments (e.g., drowsy, medical, distraction)? What 
research data exist that substantiate effectiveness of these 
interventions?
    (64) Are there relevant thresholds and strategies for performance 
(e.g., alert versus some degree of intervention) that would warrant 
some type of NCAP credit?
    (65) Since different driver states (e.g., visual distraction and 
intoxication) can result in similar driving behaviors (e.g., wide 
within-lane position variability), comments regarding opportunities and

[[Page 13505]]

tradeoffs in mitigation strategies when the originating cause is not 
conclusive are of specific interest.
    (66) What types of consumer acceptance information (e.g., consumer 
interest or feedback data) are available or are foreseen for 
implementation of different types of driver monitoring systems and 
associated mitigation strategies for driver impairment, drowsiness, or 
visual inattention? Are there privacy concerns? What are the related 
privacy protection strategies? Are there use or preference data on a 
selectable feature that could be optionally enabled by consumers (e.g., 
for teen drivers by their parents)?

B. Driver Distraction

    According to NHTSA's statistics, driver distraction resulted in at 
least 3,000 known deaths in 2019.\230\ Often discussions regarding 
distracted driving center around cell phone use and texting, but 
distracted driving also includes other activities such adjusting the 
radio or climate controls or accessing other in-vehicle systems. In-
vehicle devices and Human-Machine Interfaces (HMI) can be strategically 
designed to avoid or limit opportunities for driver distraction.\231\ 
Easy access to manual controls in traditional or expected locations can 
minimize the amount of time a driver's eyes are off the road and hands 
are off the steering wheel, as well as the time needed for the driver 
to activate the control quickly in time-critical traffic conflict 
scenarios (e.g., a driver reaches to activate the horn button in a 
crash-imminent situation, but finds that the control of horn activation 
is not in the expected, typical location).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (2020, 
December). Overview of Motor Vehicle Crashes in 2019. (Traffic 
Safety Facts. Report No. DOT HS 813 060). Washington, DC: National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
    \231\ In 2013, NHTSA published ``Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver 
Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic Devices.'' These 
voluntary guidelines apply to original equipment in-vehicle 
electronic devices used by the driver to perform secondary tasks 
(communications, entertainment, information gathering, navigation 
tasks, etc. are considered secondary tasks) through visual-manual 
means. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/04/26/2013-09883/visual-manual-nhtsa-driver-distraction-guidelines-for-in-vehicle-electronic-devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
    (67) What in-vehicle and HMI design characteristics would be most 
helpful to include in an NCAP rating that focuses on ease of use? What 
research data exist to support objectively characterizing ease of use 
for vehicle controls and displays?
    (68) What are specific countermeasures or approaches to mitigate 
driver distraction, and what are the associated effectiveness metrics 
that may be feasible and appropriate for inclusion in the NCAP program? 
Methods may include driver monitoring and action strategies, HMI design 
considerations, expanded in-motion secondary task lockouts, phone 
application/notification limitations while paired with the vehicle, 
etc.
    (69) What distraction mitigation measures could be considered for 
NCAP credit?

C. Alcohol Detection

    Alcohol-impaired driving continues to be a pervasive contributing 
factor to roadway fatalities, with over 10,000 deaths in the U.S. in 
2019.\232\ NHTSA has explored many ways in which alcohol-impaired 
driving risks can be effectively mitigated both through vehicle 
technologies and strategic public outreach and enforcement.\233\ In 
2020, NHTSA published a Request for Information notice seeking input on 
Impaired Driving Technologies in the Federal Register.\234\ 
Specifically, the notice requested information on available or late 
stage technology under development for impaired driving detection and 
mitigation. A total of 12 comments were received.\235\ Comments were 
submitted about emerging technologies that can directly measure 
impairment though blood alcohol concentration at the beginning of a 
trip as well as technologies that infer alcohol impairment through a 
combination of driver monitoring and other vehicle sensors tracking 
during the course of a trip.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ Ibid.
    \233\ NHTSA has researched the Driver Alcohol Detection System 
for Safety (DADSS) program.
    \234\ 85 FR 71987 (November 12, 2020).
    \235\ https://www.regulations.gov/document/NHTSA-2020-0102-0001/comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA seeks comment on the following aspects of alcohol detection 
systems:
    (70) Are there opportunities for including alcohol-impairment 
technology in NCAP? What types of metrics, thresholds, and tests could 
be considered? Could voluntary deployment or adoption be positively 
influenced through NCAP credit?
    (71) How can NCAP procedures be described in objective terms that 
could be inclusive of various approaches, such as detection systems and 
inference systems? Are there particular challenges with any approach 
that may need special considerations? What supporting research data 
exist that document relevant performance factors such as sensing 
accuracy and detection algorithm efficacy?
    (72) When a system detects alcohol-impairment during the course of 
a trip, what actions could the system take in a safe manner? What are 
the safety considerations related to various options that manufacturers 
may be considering (e.g., speed reduction, performing a safe stop, 
pulling over, or flasher activation)? How should various actions be 
considered for NCAP credit?
    (73) What is known related to consumer acceptance of alcohol-
impaired driving detection and mitigation functions, and how may that 
differ with respect to direct measurement approaches versus estimation 
techniques using a driver monitoring system? What consumer interest or 
feedback data exist relating to this topic? Are there privacy concerns 
or privacy protection strategies with various approaches? What are the 
related privacy protection strategies?

D. Seat Belt Interlocks

    Seat belt use in passenger vehicles saved an estimated 14,955 lives 
in 2017.\236\ The national seat belt use rate in the United States was 
90.7 percent in 2019.\237\ Among the 22,215 passenger vehicle occupants 
killed in 2019, almost half (47 percent) were unrestrained. For those 
passenger vehicle occupants who survived crashes where someone else 
died, only 14 percent were unrestrained compared to 47 percent of those 
who died.\238\ \239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ DOT HS 812 683. Latest agency estimate available.
    \237\ DOT HS 812 875.
    \238\ DOT HS 813 060.
    \239\ Based on known restraint use. Restraint use was unknown 
for 8.7 percent of passenger vehicle occupant fatalities in 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, NHTSA uses an array of countermeasures, including the 
Click It or Ticket campaign and State primary enforcement laws, to 
encourage seat belt use. The Agency requires seat belt reminders for 
the driver's seat.\240\ As of the 2018 model year, about 95 percent of 
vehicles voluntarily offer front passenger warnings. NHTSA also informs 
consumers searching for vehicle ratings on www.NHTSA.gov as to the 
availability of optional front passenger and rear seat belt reminder 
systems, which typically provide a visual and auditory warning to the 
driver at the onset of a trip and if a passenger unbuckles during a 
trip.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ 49 CFR 571.208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Methods for detecting seat belt misuse have advanced in recent 
years. A 2018 NHTSA report, ``Performance Assessment of Prototype Seat 
Belt Misuse Detection System,'' showed that

[[Page 13506]]

the system correctly identified seat belt misuse in 95 percent of 
trials on average across multiple common seat belt misuse 
scenarios.\241\ This type of seat belt misuse or non-use detection 
could be coupled with various types of seat belt interlock systems to 
encourage seat belt use. Although NHTSA is not aware of any such system 
being currently in production, various prototype systems have been 
developed by manufacturers.\242\ These systems could include 
transmission interlock, ignition interlock, and entertainment system 
interlock. Such systems could prevent drivers from shifting into gear, 
starting their vehicle, or using their vehicle's entertainment system, 
respectively, if the driver and/or front passenger is unbelted. Another 
potential strategy could be speed limiter interlock systems. Such a 
system could first issue a seat belt reminder warning if the driver 
begins driving and is unbelted, and then automatically reduce vehicle 
speed to a very low speed after a certain warning period if the driver 
remains unbelted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ DOT HS 812 496.
    \242\ ``NHTSA' Research on Seat Belt Interlocks,'' SAE 
Government Industry Meeting, January 24-26, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA requests comment on the following related to seat belt 
interlock systems:
    (74) Should NCAP consider credit for a seat belt reminder system 
with a continuous or intermittent audible signal that does not cease 
until the seat belt is properly buckled (i.e., after the 60 second 
FMVSS No. 208 minimum)? What data are available to support associated 
effectiveness? Are certain audible signal characteristics more 
effective than others?
    (75) Is there an opportunity for including a seat belt interlock 
assessment in NCAP?
    (76) If the Agency were to encourage seat belt interlock adoption 
through NCAP, should all interlock system approaches be considered, or 
only certain types? If so, which ones? What metrics could be evaluated 
for each? Should differing credit be applied depending upon interlock 
system approach?
    (77) Should seat belt interlocks be considered for all seating 
positions in the vehicle, or only the front seats? Could there be an 
opportunity for differentiation in this respect?
    (78) What information is known or anticipated with respect to 
consumer acceptance of seat belt interlock systems and/or persistent 
seat belt reminder systems in vehicles? What consumer interest or 
feedback data exist on this topic?
    (79) Could there be an NCAP opportunity in a selectable feature 
that could be optionally engaged such as in the context of a ``teen 
mode'' feature?

E. Intelligent Speed Assist

    Speeding continues to be one of the critical factors in fatal 
crashes on American roadways. Specifically, driving too fast for 
conditions and exceeding the posted limit are two prevalent factors 
that contribute to traffic crashes. For more than two decades, NHTSA 
has identified speed as being a factor in at least nearly one-third of 
all motor vehicle related fatalities. For example, in 2019, of the 
36,096 traffic-related fatalities occurred on U.S. roadways, 9,478 of 
those were positively identified as speeding-related.\243\ These totals 
may underreport speeding, potentially to a significant degree, as they 
are based on whether any driver in the crash was charged with a 
speeding-related offense or if a police officer indicated that racing, 
driving too fast for conditions, or exceeding the posted speed limit 
was a contributing factor in the crash. As this reporting is based on 
aggregated police actions rather than an engineering analysis of 
individual crashes, it may tend to underestimate the presence of 
speeding, particularly in crashes where the speeding was not clearly 
obvious but still a factor in either the occurrence or severity of the 
crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \243\ Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle 
Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Too few drivers view speeding as an immediate risk to their 
personal safety or the safety of others, including pedestrians and 
vulnerable road users. Yet, the consequences of speeding include: 
Greater potential for loss of vehicle control; reduced effectiveness of 
occupant protection equipment; increased stopping distance after the 
driver perceives a danger; increased degree of crash severity leading 
to more severe injuries; economic implications of a speed-related 
crash; and increased fuel consumption and cost. The probability of 
death, disfigurement, or debilitating injury grows with higher speed at 
impact.
    NHTSA engages with State and local jurisdictions as well as 
national law enforcement partners to provide funding and educational 
materials which address speeding. Speed limiter features, which prevent 
a vehicle from traveling over a certain speed by limiting engine power, 
are available in the U.S. market and widely used in heavy-duty tractor-
trailers and other fleet-based vehicles. In addition, nearly all 
vehicles are equipped with a mechanism that limits their top-end speed, 
even if that speed is quite high. These systems either prevent a 
vehicle from exceeding a preset specific speed regardless of location, 
or they use GPS and/or camera data to determine the speed limit of the 
current road and apply mitigation measures to reduce speeding. Vehicles 
equipped with an intelligent speed assist system can display the 
current speed limit to the driver at all times. Should the driver 
exceed the speed limit for the road, the system can provide a visual or 
auditory alert or actively slow the vehicle to an appropriate speed. 
Typically, many existing intelligent speed assist systems can be 
temporarily overridden by the driver by depressing the accelerator 
pedal firmly.
    NHTSA is committed to addressing this important safety issue to 
further reduce fatalities and injuries. NHTSA requests comment on the 
following aspects of intelligent speed assist systems in passenger 
vehicles as well as other approaches that are not discussed in this 
notice.
    (80) Should NHTSA take into consideration systems, such as 
intelligent speed assist systems, which determine current speed limits 
and warn the driver or adjust the maximum traveling speed accordingly? 
Should there be a differentiation between warning and intervention type 
intelligent speed assist systems in this consideration? Should systems 
that allow for some small amount of speeding over the limit before 
intervening be treated the same or differently than systems that are 
specifically keyed to a road's speed limit? What about for systems that 
allow driver override versus systems that do not?
    (81) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when 
evaluating speed assist system functionality?
    (82) What information is known or anticipated with respect to 
consumer acceptance of intelligent speed assist systems? What consumer 
interest or feedback data exist on this topic?
    (83) Are there other means that the Agency should consider to 
prevent excessive speeding?

F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist

    Data indicate that since 1998, nearly 900 children (an average of 
38 per year) have died in the U.S. of hyperthermia (vehicular 
heatstroke) because they were left or became trapped in a hot vehicle. 
2018 and 2019 saw a record number of vehicular heatstroke related 
deaths at 53

[[Page 13507]]

each year.\244\ Children were in the vehicles due to a variety of 
circumstances--some gain entry to a parked vehicle, whereas over 50 
percent are forgotten in the vehicle by caregivers.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ www.noheatstroke.org.
    \245\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address these tragedies, many companies have developed 
aftermarket devices to remind parents and caregivers that a child may 
be left inside the vehicle. NHTSA has assessed several products and 
developed a test methodology for evaluating future products.\246\ NHTSA 
subsequently opened a public docket inviting all interested parties to 
submit information regarding efforts or technological innovations to 
help prevent vehicular heatstroke.\247\ Also, NHTSA has media 
campaigns, such as ``Where's Baby? Look Before You Lock,'' to raise 
awareness to parents and caregivers on the dangers of vehicular 
heatstroke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \246\ Rudd, R., Prasad, A., Weston, D., & Wietholter, K. (2015, 
July). Functional assessment of unattended child reminder systems. 
(Report No. DOT HS 812 187). Washington, DC: National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.
    \247\ https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=NHTSA-2019-0126.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In recent years, in-vehicle rear seat child reminder technology has 
been introduced into a number of vehicle makes and models. Many of 
these technological solutions utilize ``door logic'' to determine if 
there is potentially a child in the rear seat of the vehicle. The 
vehicle door logic checks to see if the rear seat doors were opened and 
closed at the start of the trip and then displays a reminder in the 
dash board with an audio cue for the driver to check the back seat when 
the vehicle is turned off. In September 2019, the Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers and the Association of Global Automakers (now 
collectively known as the Alliance for Automotive Innovation) announced 
that a voluntary agreement had been formed by its member companies to 
incorporate rear seat child reminder systems into their vehicles as 
standard equipment no later than the 2025 model year.\248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ https://www.autosinnovate.org/safety/heatstroke/Automakers%20Commit%20to%20Helping%20Combat%20Child%20Heatstroke.pdf.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA requests comment on the following issues related to rear seat 
child reminder systems designed to prevent vehicular heatstroke.
    (84) If NHTSA considers this technology for inclusion in NCAP, are 
door logic solutions sufficient? Should NHTSA only consider systems 
that detect the presence of a child?
    (85) What research data exist to substantiate differences in 
effectiveness of these system types?
    (86) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when 
evaluating these in-vehicle rear seat child reminder systems?
    (87) What information is known or anticipated with respect to 
consumer acceptance of integrated rear seat child reminder systems in 
vehicles? What consumer interest or feedback data exist on this topic?

VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System

    NHTSA is seeking comment on several approaches to provide consumers 
with vehicle safety ratings that provide more meaningful safety 
information and provide consumers with more ways to determine relative 
performance of vehicles among the fleet. In the current 5-star safety 
ratings system, as described in detail in the July 2008 final decision 
notice, injury readings recorded from crash test dummies used in NCAP's 
frontal impact, side impact barrier, and side impact pole tests are 
assessed using injury risk curves designed to predict the chance of a 
vehicle's occupant receiving similar injuries.\249\ For each occupant 
in each crash test, the risks of injury to each body region assessed 
are combined to produce a combined probability of injury to each 
occupant. The combined probabilities of injury for each occupant are 
divided by a predetermined baseline risk of injury. This baseline risk 
of injury approximates the fleet average injury risk for each crash 
test. Dividing each combined occupant probability of injury by the 
baseline risk of injury results in a relative assessment of that 
occupant's combined injury risk versus a known fleet average. These 
calculations result in six summary scores for each vehicle representing 
the relative risk of injury for the following occupants: (1) The driver 
and front seat passenger in the frontal impact test; (2) the driver and 
rear seat passenger in the side impact barrier test; (3) the driver in 
the side impact pole test; and (4) the relative risk for all occupants 
in rollovers with respect to a baseline injury risk. These relative 
risks are then converted to star ratings to help consumers make 
informed vehicle purchasing decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \249\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008), https://regulations.gov, 
Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA seeks public comment on a few potential concepts it could use 
to develop a new 5-star safety ratings system in the future. Some areas 
of consideration discussed below could be used in conjunction with one 
another, while others could work better as standalone options. Ideally, 
any future 5-star safety ratings system should not only fulfill the 
program mission, but also be sufficiently flexible to allow for 
continuing updates to NCAP to encourage further vehicle safety 
improvements.

A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept

    NHTSA is seeking comment on the use of a potential points-based 
system to calculate future 5-star safety ratings for the 
crashworthiness testing program when the Agency decides to update that 
program. In this system, star ratings could be assigned directly from 
point values related to the results from crash test dummies. The 
current system is based on a linear combination of the probability of 
injury for multiple body regions, some at different severity levels, 
which can result in some body regions being overlooked. A point-based 
system, on the other hand, would provide more flexibility to target 
injury criteria more representative of real-world injury incidence. The 
Agency believes that this potential method would provide more 
flexibility in the future when updating the program through a phased 
approach. For instance, new testing devices (e.g., crash test dummies), 
procedures, injury measurements, or other criteria could be added to 
the 5-star-ratings system. Points could be based on critical injury 
risk curve values or on criteria, such as reference values from 
existing Federal regulations or other Agency data.
    This points-based rating system approach would be similar to those 
used in other vehicle safety consumer information programs such as IIHS 
and Euro NCAP. Upper and lower performance targets would be established 
for each test dummy body region assessed in crash tests. Maximum points 
would be awarded if Injury Assessment Reference Values (IARVs) meet the 
lower target or better. A linearized number of points would be awarded 
for injury assessment values that are between the lower and upper 
targets. No points would be assigned for those that exceed the upper 
target for the respective body region (or perhaps the entire occupant). 
Risk curves would no longer be used exclusively to calculate a combined 
injury probability from the various body regions and ultimately star 
ratings. Critical risk curve values, IARVs, or other accepted injury 
limits would be used to establish performance targets and related 
points assignments.

[[Page 13508]]

    In addition to the injury criteria currently included in the 5-star 
safety ratings system, data to support several other injury criteria 
are collected for Agency monitoring and consumer information on the 
respective NCAP dummies (Hybrid III and ES-2re 50th percentile males, 
Hybrid III and SID-IIs 5th percentile females). NHTSA is seeking 
comment on whether any additional measurements that are not part of the 
existing 5-star ratings system are appropriate for use in a points-
based calculation of the future star ratings.
    Currently, if measurements of certain injury criteria that are 
included in related FMVSSs exceed standard limits, the Agency would 
assign a ``safety concern'' designation on its website and on the 
vehicle window sticker (Monroney label).\250\ If measurements of 
certain injury criteria that are not part of FMVSSs exceed established 
limits, the Agency highlights those on its website (but not on the 
Monroney label) with footnotes. In both of these cases, the Agency 
seeks to inform consumers of potentially higher injury risks in body 
regions that are not captured by the existing 5-star safety ratings 
system. The Agency recognizes that consumer confusion may result from 
the presentation of a vehicle with high (4- or 5-star) ratings that is 
also assigned a safety concern or injury-related footnote. One 
potential solution to reduce confusion would be to implement a points-
based system that allows the Agency to include the assessment of all 
injuries within the calculation of the star rating, even those that may 
not have associated risk curves. Thus, the Agency is seeking comment on 
the appropriate method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, NHTSA is exploring several options regarding the 
distribution of points across a potential points-based ratings system. 
Real-world data could be used to apportion the total number of 
available points to each crash mode, dummy, and/or injury value 
according to severity or prevalence in the field. Alternatively, each 
dummy or injury value could be allotted the same number of points, 
effectively normalizing each dummy or injury.

B. Baseline Risk Concept

    Support for adjusting the baseline risk value associated with 5-
star safety ratings has been mixed in the past, with some in favor and 
others advising against it.\251\ As mentioned earlier, the Agency is 
again seeking comment on whether the baseline risk concept should be 
preserved when considering updates to its 5-star safety ratings system 
in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ This is based on comments by participants in the October 
1, 2018 public meeting and respondents to the related docket https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=NHTSA-2018-0055.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With the July 2008 final decision establishing the existing 5-star 
safety ratings system, the concept of a relative star rating system was 
introduced for the first time.\252\ As discussed previously, after 
injury readings from various body regions are converted to combined 
probabilities of injury risks, those combined probabilities are divided 
by a baseline (or average) risk of injury that is an approximation of 
the vehicle fleet average injury risk. Star ratings generated in NCAP 
today are a measure of how much more (or less) occupant protection the 
vehicle affords when compared to an ``average'' vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ Prior to the 2010 program enhancements, NCAP star ratings 
were based on an absolute, independent scale of combined injury 
probability. That is, the combined probability of injury from a 
given occupant was converted directly into a star rating with no 
intermediate calculation except rounding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The intent of the baseline risk as described in the July 2008 
notice was to update its value at regular intervals so that, as the 
average risk of injury decreased over time, ratings could become more 
stringent without changing the underlying criteria. In practice, the 
baseline risk has never been adjusted, which results in recent star 
ratings being assigned using an older benchmark less representative of 
current vehicle safety levels.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ Park, B., Rockwell, T., Collins, L., Smith, C., Aram, M. 
(2015), The enhanced U.S. NCAP: Five years later. 24th Enhanced 
Safety of Vehicles Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2015, Paper 
Number 15-0314.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Half-Star Ratings

    In the December 2015 notice, the Agency sought comments on the 
merits of providing ratings to consumers in half-star increments. 
Commenters were generally supportive of the notion. In this notice, 
NHTSA continues to seek comment on whether the Agency should 
disseminate its 5-star safety ratings with half-star increments. This 
approach could allow better discrimination of vehicle performance for 
consumer information purposes by creating additional levels within the 
existing 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-star levels. Though the Agency has not 
conducted consumer research on this potential approach, NHTSA believes 
that the public is familiar with the general impression of half-star 
ratings as it is commonly found in other consumer product rating 
schemes.
    Future crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings systems most likely 
would contain more elements on which vehicles are assessed. Thus, NHTSA 
believes that using half-star increments may be necessary in future 
rating systems because they allow better discrimination of vehicle 
safety performance. The half-star increments, depending on future 
Agency decisions, could create anywhere from 9 to 11 levels \254\ of 
discrimination for use in rating vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ Depending on possible rating scales from 0-5 stars, 0.5-5 
stars, or 1-5 stars, the amount of total distinct ratings available 
would vary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA could design any half-star rating system to require a vehicle 
to reach the minimum threshold for receiving that rating level. Ratings 
in a system such as this would be ``rounded down'' to the nearest half- 
or whole-star rating and would not be ``rounded up'' to the next half- 
or whole-star rating.

D. Decimal Ratings

    NHTSA is also seeking comments on whether it should consider 
assigning star ratings using a decimal format in addition to or in 
place of assigning whole- or half-star ratings. The decimal rating 
could be based on a conversion of NCAP test results by using a linear 
function approach. For instance, in the current 5-star safety ratings 
system, this could be achieved by relating a linear function to the VSS 
calculation and its associated ranges. In a potential future 5-star 
safety ratings system, like one where the previously discussed points-
based concept is used, a decimal value could also be easily integrated. 
Providing NCAP ratings in decimal format could provide consumers with 
an additional, high delineation method of discriminating vehicle 
performance among the fleet for purchasing reasons.
    Considering these ongoing Agency initiatives currently being 
pursued for future NCAP upgrades, NHTSA requests comment on the 
following:
    (88) What approaches are most effective to provide consumers with 
vehicle safety ratings that provide meaningful information and 
discriminate performance of vehicles among the fleet?
    Specifically with regard to a points-based rating system, the 
Agency seeks comment on the following:
    (89) Is the use of additional injury criteria/body regions that are 
not part of the existing 5-star ratings system appropriate for use in a 
points-based calculation of future star ratings? Some injury criteria 
do not have associated risk curves. Are these regions appropriate to 
include, and if so, what is the appropriate method by which to include 
them?
    Regarding the baseline risk concept and the general concept of 
relative

[[Page 13509]]

ratings, NHTSA is seeking comment on the following:
    (90) Should a crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings system continue 
to measure a vehicle's performance based on a known or expected fleet 
average performer, or should it return to an absolute system of rating 
vehicles?
    (91) Considering the basic structure of the current ratings system 
(combined injury risk), the potential overlapping target populations 
for crashworthiness and ADAS program elements, as well as other 
potential concepts mentioned in this document such as a points-based 
system, what would the best method of calculating the vehicle fleet 
average performance be?
    (92) Should the vehicle fleet average performance be updated at 
regular intervals, and if so, how often?
    (93) What is the most appropriate way to disseminate these updates 
or changes to the public?
    Considering a change in approach to how to present star ratings to 
the public, NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
    (94) Should the Agency disseminate its 5-star ratings with half-
star increments?
    (95) Should the Agency assign star ratings using a decimal format 
in addition to or in place of whole- or half-stars?

E. Rollover Resistance Testing Program

    Currently, there are two rollover resistance tests that the Agency 
conducts and are part of the existing 5-star safety ratings system. The 
first component of this assessment is the static measurement of the 
vehicle's center of gravity height and the track width to determine the 
vehicle's static stability factor. The second component of this 
assessment is the dynamic rollover test (Fishhook test) that simulates 
a driver taking a panic steering action in a loss-of-control situation. 
The Agency uses two formulas (no tip-up and tip-up results) for 
calculating the risk of rollover and then assigns a rollover rating 
based on the risk. NHTSA sought comment on the approach published in 
the December 2015 notice to recalculate its current rollover risk curve 
given the full implementation of electronic stability control (ESC) 
systems as standard equipment in all vehicles manufactured on or after 
September 1, 2011. Commenters who responded to the December 2015 notice 
were generally supportive of the Agency's desire to update the rollover 
risk curve to reflect the role of ESC deployment. However, few specific 
comments on the appropriateness of the approach that was described in 
the notice were received at the time.
    NHTSA is not proposing changes to its two existing rollover 
resistance tests at this time. However, when the Agency proposes 
changes to the existing 5-star ratings system, it may be feasible to 
consider an update to how it assesses the rollover resistance testing 
component. Thus, the Agency is seeking comment on whether any future 
overall vehicle ratings should continue to include rollover resistance 
evaluations. Also, if the Agency updates the rollover risk curve, 
suggestions on how to transition that data into a future overall 
vehicle rating would be encouraged. The Agency expects that any future 
overall vehicle ratings would, at minimum, require reweighting the 
contribution of each test mode to that overall rating and thus the need 
to determine the most appropriate program area to include the rollover 
resistance tests.
    (96) Should the Agency continue to include rollover resistance 
evaluations in its future overall ratings?

IX. Other Activities

A. Programmatic Challenges With Self-Reported Data

    Since model year 2011, vehicle manufacturers have been reporting to 
NHTSA their internal test data that show whether vehicles equipped with 
the recommended ADAS technologies pass NCAP's system performance test 
requirements in order to receive credit from the Agency. NHTSA assesses 
the information provided and then assigns check marks for systems whose 
conformance with NCAP's performance test requirements are supported by 
the data. As the Agency stated in its July 2008 final decision notice, 
commenters were generally supportive of NHTSA's plan to use self-
reported data from the vehicle manufacturers, in conjunction with its 
own spot-check verification testing, to determine whether vehicles met 
NCAP's system performance test requirements.\255\ The process by which 
the Agency has accepted self-reported ADAS technology data for 
recommended technologies has been crucial to the successful 
administration of the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ 72 FR 3473 (Jan. 25, 2007), Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, this process has not been without challenges. Throughout 
the administration of the ADAS assessment program in NCAP, NHTSA has 
identified inconsistencies in vehicle manufacturers' self-reported data 
submissions. The Agency has determined that many of these 
inconsistencies stem from unfamiliarity with NCAP's system performance 
test procedures, including the use of test targets and other 
parameters.
    It is critical to maintain program credibility and public trust 
when accepting manufacturers' ADAS self-reported data and disseminating 
it to the public. One approach to addressing some of the aforementioned 
challenges is to encourage all vehicle manufacturers to provide NHTSA 
with ADAS self-reported data from an independent test facility that 
meets criteria demonstrating competence in NCAP testing protocols. For 
instance, NHTSA's rigorous procurement process for awarding contracts 
to test laboratories provides that qualified laboratories meet specific 
competence requirements.
    To address the challenges mentioned above, NHTSA is considering 
refusing to accept self-reported data and not posting recommendations 
for the vehicle's systems on its website, when:
     Manufacturers' self-reported ADAS test data is provided 
from a test facility that is not designated as NHTSA's contracted test 
laboratory, or
     The corresponding ADAS tests are not conducted in 
accordance with NCAP's testing protocols (including test devices).
    NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
    (97) Considering the Agency's goal of maintaining the integrity of 
the program, should NHTSA accept self-reported test data that is 
generated by test laboratories that are not NHTSA's contracted test 
laboratories? If no, why not? If yes, what criteria are most relevant 
for evaluating whether a given laboratory can acceptably conduct ADAS 
performance tests for NCAP such that the program's credibility is 
upheld?
    (98) As the ADAS assessment program in NCAP continues to grow in 
the future to include new ADAS technologies and more complex test 
procedures, what other means would best address the following program 
challenges: Methods of data collection, maintaining data integrity and 
public trust, and managing test failures, particularly during 
verification testing?

B. Website Updates

    NHTSA uses its website and the safety rating section of the 
Monroney label to convey to consumers vehicle safety information 
provided by NCAP. Although the Monroney label is an important tool 
NHTSA uses to communicate vehicle safety ratings to consumers at the 
point of sale, it has limitations:

[[Page 13510]]

    (1) The Agency must undergo a rulemaking action to change any of 
its content, including minor and non-substantive changes.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ The Agency implemented the Monroney label requirement by 
regulation (49 CFR 575.302) pursuant to Section 10307 of the Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act; A Legacy 
for Users (SAFETEA-LU).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) The label is limited to a certain size, only some of which is 
dedicated to NCAP information, which only allows for the communication 
of limited safety information.
    (3) By virtue of being posted on individual vehicles, the label 
provides limited utility as a comparative shopping tool unless compared 
to labels on vehicles in the same physical location.
    Thus, NHTSA uses its website to communicate a wealth of information 
about vehicle safety beyond what is displayed on the Monroney label. 
NHTSA has structured the information displayed on its website to align 
with the structure of the Monroney label. The same crashworthiness and 
rollover star ratings are shown on both the label and the website. 
However, crash avoidance (ADAS technologies) recommendations are not 
included on the Monroney label because they were too new to be included 
at the time of the most recent Monroney label update, whereas they are 
provided on the website.
    In light of the Monroney label limitations, increasingly complex 
vehicle ratings and results, and NHTSA's desire to communicate safety 
information as timely as possible, NHTSA is considering enhancing the 
information on its website. However, some of these enhancements may 
necessitate that the information provided on the Monroney label and 
website deviate from one another in structure or in content. There are 
limitations on the amount of information that can be usefully conveyed 
on the Monroney label, so NHTSA is currently considering placing some 
information on the website alone. However, while it makes sense to 
provide additional information and comparative tools on the website, 
NHTSA is concerned that consumers could be confused if the information 
in both places is not presented in the same manner. For example, the 
Monroney label is currently limited to displaying whole star ratings. 
If, as a result of this RFC, NHTSA decides to improve the 
differentiation between vehicles by displaying star ratings on its 
website using new methods like a decimal equivalent value or half-
stars, such a discrepancy between the Monroney label and the website 
may confuse consumers.
    During the October 2018 public meeting, Consumers Union suggested 
that NHTSA could provide ratings on its website in a ``more granular, 
sortable and readily comparable manner.'' Currently, the website's 
functionality allows for users to input limited search terms. For 
instance, a consumer may search for all vehicles in a given model year, 
all vehicles of a specific make, or vehicles with a specific model 
name. Consumers may then filter these results by body style, but the 
current body style categories are very broad and can encompass hundreds 
of models. Consumers are currently limited to viewing ten vehicle 
models at a time in search results, meaning that they may need to sift 
through many pages of results if they are simply browsing and do not 
have a particular make or model in mind. NHTSA plans to address these 
issues by improving the organization and versatility of the safety 
ratings data presented to the public.
    Once a consumer selects a vehicle for further details, they may 
choose to compare up to three vehicles, but they must input the year, 
make, and model of the vehicles to be compared. NHTSA intends to make 
changes to its www.nhtsa.gov user interface to allow for simpler 
comparisons between vehicle manufacturers and types. For example, when 
a consumer searches for safety rating information for a particular make 
and model, similar vehicles could also be shown. These vehicles could 
be classified according to body style. The Agency expects to make other 
changes to NHTSA.gov to increase the comparability of safety 
information.
    NHTSA continues to seek comment on the following aspects of vehicle 
information provided on its website:
    (99) What is the potential for consumer confusion if information on 
the Monroney label and on the website differs, and how can this 
confusion be lessened?
    (100) What types of vehicles do consumers compare during their 
search for a new vehicle? Do consumers often consider vehicles with 
different body styles (e.g., midsized sedan versus large sport 
utility)?
    (101) When searching for vehicle safety information, do consumers 
have a clear understanding for which vehicles they are seeking 
information, or do they browse through vehicle ratings to identify 
vehicles they may wish to purchase?
    (102) When classifying vehicles by body style, what degree of 
classification is most appropriate? For example, when purchasing a 
passenger vehicle, do consumers consider all passenger vehicles, or are 
they inclined to narrow their searches to vehicles of a subset of 
passenger vehicles (e.g., subcompact passenger vehicle)?
    (103) Within the context of the updates considered in this notice, 
what is the most important top-level safety-related information that 
consumers should be able to compare amongst vehicles? Which of these 
pieces of information should consumers be able to use to sort and 
filter search results?

C. Database Changes

    NHTSA wishes to take this opportunity to inform the public about 
other ways the Agency is significantly enhancing the NCAP program. We 
have undertaken a considerable developmental effort to modernize the 
OEM submission process and our processing of data, so that consumer 
information can be provided to consumers quickly and accurately. We are 
not requesting comment in this section but are presenting this 
information for the benefit of the reader.
    Each year NHTSA requests vehicle manufacturers to submit new model 
year vehicle information voluntarily on new passenger cars and light 
trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or 
less. This information is used by NCAP primarily for consumer 
information on the Agency's website, presentation on the vehicle window 
stickers, and for the selection of new model year vehicles to be tested 
under NCAP.
    The manner in which NHTSA and vehicle manufacturers communicate 
information has changed over the years--from mailed letters and faxes 
to spreadsheets and emails. However, NHTSA realized a modernized 
process of data submission, collection, analysis, and dissemination is 
necessary due to the ever-growing list of data elements needed to 
support an evolving test portfolio and diverse vehicle fleet. In the 
last model year alone, more than 400 makes and models of passenger 
vehicles were sold in the United States, thus requiring vehicle 
manufacturers not only to assemble detailed new vehicle data and submit 
them to NHTSA, but also NHTSA to collect, sort, and analyze tremendous 
amounts of information.
    Managing this data has become more complex, utilizing electronic 
spreadsheets and email. In addition to processing spreadsheets from 
more than 20 organizations, maintaining version control, checking data 
for accuracy, clarifying ambiguities, sending ratings letters, and 
processing requests have limited the ability of the Agency's current IT 
systems in storing and

[[Page 13511]]

analyzing data. These limitations have been exacerbated by the 
incorporation of ADAS assessments into NCAP, which accepts self-
reported test data from vehicle manufacturers. Historically, these ADAS 
technologies have been available in a mix of vehicles within a 
technology package or trim line at the make and model level, which can 
cause consumer confusion as to which vehicles have the technologies. 
Furthermore, as NCAP is only able to offer consumer information details 
at the make and model level, the additional complexity of parsing trim 
lines and technology packages has been overly burdensome given NHTSA's 
current resources and limitations.
    NHTSA is mindful that any expansion in NCAP's ADAS assessment 
program will create a long-term need to collect considerably more data 
elements from vehicle manufacturers. The current data collection 
process of spreadsheets and emails will not suffice to fulfill this 
need. To that end, NHTSA has undertaken a multi-year, multi-phase 
project to modernize the way in which NCAP communicates with and 
receives data from relevant stakeholders. NHTSA is currently developing 
a new, secure online web portal and database that will be used to send, 
receive, track, store, and process program data elements and 
communications.
    The first phase of this online portal and database development 
focuses on the data submission process from the vehicle manufacturers 
to NHTSA. The online web portal would allow designated representatives 
from each vehicle manufacturer to submit data and correspondence by 
secure and trackable means. Vehicle manufacturers would be able to have 
multiple representatives contribute to and approve the data 
submissions, and submissions could be done in a more dedicated and 
focused manner than is currently feasible with conventional 
spreadsheets. The data submission application would include business 
rules to help vehicle manufacturers identify invalid data or 
typographical errors. The database portion of the project would allow 
NHTSA not only to capture and store data more efficiently, but also to 
manage program functions more quickly--such as faster posting of NCAP 
ratings to the Agency's website. In addition, it would allow NCAP to 
determine twin and carryover status in a timelier manner. Furthermore, 
the database is significantly more flexible and robust than existing 
spreadsheets and would allow more accurate processing of manufacturers' 
self-reported data submitted for the ADAS assessment program as well as 
the side air bag out-of-position testing program. In addition, this 
database would allow NCAP to review vehicle fleet trends and easily 
compare and track changes in individual vehicle models from one model 
year to the next. This phase of the project has already produced a 
prototype, and NHTSA has received preliminary feedback from initial 
beta testing.
    A second phase of the project will focus on data and correspondence 
between NHTSA and its test laboratories. NCAP collects vehicle-specific 
test setup information from the vehicle manufacturer and separately 
transmits this data to its designated test laboratory. This phase of 
the project would streamline the way in which the program communicates 
its day-to-day operations that include the review, transmission, and 
archive of test data. The result of these upgrades would allow NCAP to 
schedule tests, review test data, analyze test anomalies and failures, 
respond to manufacturer contests, and publish safety ratings in a 
timelier manner.

X. Economic Analysis

    The various changes in NCAP discussed in this proposal all enable a 
rating system that improves consumer awareness of ADAS safety features, 
and encourages manufacturers to accelerate their adoption. This 
accelerated adoption of ADAS would drive any economic and societal 
impacts that result from these changes, and are thus the focus of this 
discussion of economic analysis. Hence, the Agency has considered the 
potential economic effects for ADAS technologies proposed for inclusion 
in NCAP and the potential benefit of introducing a rating system for 
ADAS technologies.
    Unlike crashworthiness safety features, where safety improvements 
are attributable to improved occupant protection when a crash occurs, 
the impact that ADAS technologies have on fatality and injury rates is 
a direct function of their effectiveness in preventing crashes or 
reducing the severity of the crashes they are designed to mitigate. 
This effectiveness is typically measured by using real-world 
statistical data, laboratory testing, or Agency expertise.
    With respect to vehicle safety, the Agency believes, as discussed 
in detail in this notice, the four proposed ADAS technologies have the 
potential to reduce vehicle crashes and injury severities further. As 
cited in this notice, researchers have conducted preliminary studies to 
estimate the effectiveness of ADAS technologies. Although these studies 
have been limited to certain models or manufacturers, which may not 
represent the entire fleet, they do illustrate how these systems can 
provide safety benefits. Thus, although the Agency does not have 
sufficient data to determine the monetized safety impacts resulting 
from these technologies in a way similar to that frequently done for 
mandated technologies--when compared to the future without the proposed 
update to NCAP, NHTSA expects that these changes would likely have 
substantial positive safety effects by promoting earlier and more 
widespread deployment of these technologies.
    NCAP also helps address the issue of asymmetric information (i.e., 
when one party in a transaction is in possession of more information 
than the other), which can be considered a market failure.\257\ 
Regarding consumer information, the introduction of a potential new 
ADAS rating system is anticipated to provide consumers additional 
vehicle safety information (e.g., rating based on ADAS performance and 
capability as well as the types of ADAS in vehicles) as opposed to the 
information provided in the current program (e.g., check mark based on 
ADAS performance as pass/fail) to help them make more informed 
purchasing decisions by better presenting the relative safety benefits 
of different ADAS technologies. NHTSA believes that the future ADAS 
rating would increase consumer awareness and understanding of the 
safety benefits in these technologies, and, in turn, incentivize 
vehicle manufacturers to offer the ADAS technologies that lead to 
higher ratings across a broader selection of their vehicles. 
Furthermore, as these ADAS technologies mature and become more reliable 
and efficient, a large portion of vehicles equipped with such systems 
would achieve higher ADAS ratings, and in turn consumers would have an 
increasing number of safer vehicles to choose from. There is an 
unquantifiable value to consumers in receiving accurate and comparable 
performance information about those technologies among manufacturers, 
makes, and models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ See.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to NHTSA sponsored research,\258\ IIHS/HLDI predicted 
that the number of vehicles equipped with ADAS technologies, including 
BSW and Lane Keeping Warning, will increase

[[Page 13512]]

substantially from 2020 to 2030 and reach near full market penetration 
in 2050. Although the Agency has limited data on costs of ADAS 
technologies to consumers, assuming consumer demand for safety remains 
high, the future ADAS rating system would likely accelerate the full 
adaptation of the four technologies included in this RFC--not to 
mention the four existing ones. Nevertheless, the Agency does not have 
sufficient data, such as unit cost and information on how soon the full 
adaptation will be reached with the ADAS rating, to predict the net 
increase in cost to consumers, with a high degree of certainty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \258\ See https://www.iihs.org/media/9517c308-c8d5-42e6-80fd-a69ecd9d2128/3aaYqQ/HLDI%20Research/Bulletins/hldi_bulletin_37-11.pdf. Bulletin Vol. 34, No. 28: September 2017, ``Predicted 
availability and fitment of safety features on registered 
vehicles,'' Highway Loss Data Institute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

XI. Public Participation

    Interested parties are strongly encouraged to submit thorough and 
detailed comments relating to each of the relevant areas discussed in 
this notice. Please see Appendix B for a summarized list of specific 
questions that have been posed in this notice. Comments submitted will 
help the Agency make informed decisions as it strives to advance NCAP 
by encouraging continuous safety improvements for new vehicles and 
enhancing consumer information.
    How do I prepare and submit comments?
    To ensure that your comments are filed correctly in the docket, 
please include the docket number of this document in your comments.
    Your comments must not be more than 15 pages long (49 CFR 553.21). 
NHTSA established this limit to encourage you to write your primary 
comments in a concise fashion. However, you may attach necessary 
additional documents to your comments. There is no limit on the length 
of the attachments.
    Please submit one copy (two copies if submitting by mail or hand 
delivery) of your comments, including the attachments, to the docket 
following the instructions given above under ADDRESSES. Please note, if 
you are submitting comments electronically as a PDF (Adobe) file, NHTSA 
asks that the documents submitted be scanned using an Optical Character 
Recognition (OCR) process, thus allowing the Agency to search and copy 
certain portions of your submissions.
    How do I submit confidential business information?
    If you wish to submit any information under a claim of 
confidentiality, you should submit three copies of your complete 
submission, including the information you claim to be confidential 
business information, to the Office of the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the 
address given above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition, 
you may submit a copy (two copies if submitting by mail or hand 
delivery), from which you have deleted the claimed confidential 
business information, to the docket by one of the methods given above 
under ADDRESSES. When you send a comment containing information claimed 
to be confidential business information, you should include a cover 
letter setting forth the information specified in NHTSA's confidential 
business information regulation (49 CFR part 512).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for 
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT 
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Will the Agency consider late comments?
    NHTSA will consider all comments received before the close of 
business on the comment closing date indicated above under DATES. To 
the extent possible, the Agency will also consider comments received 
after that date. Please note that even after the comment closing date, 
we will continue to file relevant information in the docket as it 
becomes available. Accordingly, we recommend that interested people 
periodically check the docket for new material. You may read the 
comments received at the address given above under ADDRESSES. The hours 
of the docket are indicated above in the same location. You may also 
see the comments on the internet, identified by the docket number at 
the heading of this notice, at www.regulations.gov.

XII. Appendices

Appendix A. Target Population Statistics for Crash Scenarios 
259
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ The crash scenarios referenced for the FCW/CIB/DBS target 
population are those that comprise the subset of the 84 mutually 
exclusive pre-crash scenarios analyzed by VOLPE (Report No. DOT HS 
812 745) that were considered relevant for the forward collision 
prevention crash category (Report No. DOT HS 812 653). Each of the 
84 scenarios is assigned a pre-assigned number and is followed by a 
brief description.

                              Table A-1--Target Population Statistics, FCW/CIB/DBS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     MAIS 1-5
              Crash scenarios \260\                   Crashes       Fatalities       injuries          PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Rear-End, Lead Vehicle (LV) Stopped........       1,099,868             474         561,842       1,719,177
2001 Rear-End, LV Slower........................         174,217             527          97,402         252,341
2002 Rear-End, LV Decelerated...................         374,624             155         196,731         587,031
2003 Rear-End, Other In-lane Vehicle Higher                  598               3             273             829
 Speed..........................................
2009 Rear-End, Other/Unspecified................          50,105              70          24,951          77,034
2300 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle              1,842              37             839           2,510
 Stopped........................................
2301 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle                813               6             486           1,063
 Slower.........................................
2302 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle              1,475               3             860           1,900
 Decelerated....................................
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined Total..............................       1,703,541           1,275         883,386       2,641,884
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Percent of Total Crashes....................            29.4             3.8            31.5            36.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                  Table A-2--Target Population for LDW/LKA/LCA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios                      Crashes       Fatalities       injuries          PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 1V Rollover 1st Event.......................           4,411              63           3,155           2,104
150 2+V Rollover 1st Event......................             243               3             337             197
1000 1V, Roadway Departure (RD).................         966,709           9,751         359,238         679,402
1050 2+V, Roadway Departure.....................          43,957           1,021          32,069          55,856

[[Page 13513]]

 
1100 1V Cross Centerline/Median.................           8,560              75           2,910           6,214
1150 2+V Cross Centerline/Median................           3,427             106           2,678           4,239
3000 ST Opposite Dir(OD), Head-On...............          32,751           2,761          37,848          23,992
3009 ST OD Forward Impact, Other................             115              11              69             135
3100 ST OD, Angle Sideswipe.....................          62,214           1,042          38,655          86,054
3200 Head-On Possible, Other Vehicle Encroaching           4,008              11           2,979           5,019
 OD.............................................
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined Total..............................       1,126,397          14,844         479,939         863,213
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Percent of Total Crashes....................            19.4            44.3            17.1            11.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                  Table A-3--Target Population for BSD/BSI/LCM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios                      Crashes       Fatalities       injuries          PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8000 LCM in Rear End............................          48,749             128          26,040          71,977
8001 LCM in ST SD Forward Impact................             212               4              62             371
8002 LCM in ST SD AS............................         371,504             332         129,595         651,962
8003 LCM CT VT SD...............................          58,389              40          20,685          99,476
8004 LCM Other..................................          24,216              38          11,924          36,940
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined Total..............................         503,070             542         188,304         860,726
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Percent of Total Crashes....................             8.7             1.6             6.7            11.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                      Table A-4--Target Population for PAEB
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios                      Crashes       Fatalities       injuries          PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
300 1V2Ped RD, Forward Impact...................          60,322           3,264          57,480           1,836
309 1V2Ped, Other...............................             306              26             264               0
350 2+V2Ped.....................................             511             259             452               0
400 1V2Cyc RD, Forward Impact...................          50,094             531          45,529           4,910
409 1V2Cyc, Other/Unspecified...................             175               4             172               0
450 2+V2Cyc.....................................             234              23             169             239
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined Total..............................         111,641           4,106         104,066           6,985
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Percent of Total Crashes....................             1.9            12.3             3.7             0.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table A-5--Target Population for RAB/RvAB/RCTA Technologies
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios                      Crashes       Fatalities       injuries          PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
302 1V2Ped, Backup..............................           2,811              44           2,590              88
402 1V2Cyc, Backup..............................             439               3             407              48
602 1V2ParkedV, Backup..........................          41,957               2           5,293          40,389
802 1V2Fixed Object, Backup.....................           1,824               2             217           1,732
6000 Backing Up to Vehicle/Object...............         101,503              23          26,761         189,059
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined Total..............................         148,533              74          35,268         231,317
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Percent of Total Crashes....................             2.6             0.2             1.3             3.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                Table A-6--Mapping of Crash Scenarios With Safety Systems
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Crash scenarios                             1 FCW/CIB/DBS    2 LDW/LKA/LCA    3 BSD/BSI/LCM        4 PAEB       5 RAB/RvAB/RTA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 1V Rollover 1st Event..........................................  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
150 2+V Rollover 1st Event.........................................  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
200 1V Jackknife 1st Event.........................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
250 2+V Jackknife 1st Event........................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
300 1V2Pedestrian Roadway Departure, Forward Impact................  ...............  ...............  ...............           ...............
302 1V2 Pedestrian, Backup.........................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............        

[[Page 13514]]

 
309 1V2 Pedestrian, Specifics Other/Unknown........................  ...............  ...............  ...............           ...............
350 2+V2 Pedestrian................................................  ...............  ...............  ...............           ...............
400 1V2Cyclist Roadway Departure, Forward Impact...................  ...............  ...............  ...............           ...............
402 1V2Cyclist, Backup.............................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............        
409 1V2Cyclist, Specifics Other/Unknown............................  ...............  ...............  ...............           ...............
450 2+V2Cyclist....................................................  ...............  ...............  ...............           ...............
500 1V2Animal Roadway Departure, Avoid Animal......................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
502 1V2Animal, Backup..............................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
509 1V2Animal, Specifics Other/Unknown.............................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
550 2+V2Animal.....................................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
600 1V2Parked Vehicle Roadway Departure, Forward Impact............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
602 1V2Parked Vehicle, Backup......................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............        
609 1V2Parked Vehicle, Specifics Other/Unknown.....................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
650 2+V2Parked Vehicle.............................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
700 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Forward Impact....  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
701 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Traction Loss.....  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
702 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object, Backup..............................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
709 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object, Other...............................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
750 2+V2Other Non-Fixed Object.....................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
800 1V2Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Forward Impact..............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
801 1V2Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Traction Loss...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
802 1V2Fixed Object, Backup........................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............        
809 1V2Fixed Object, Other.........................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
850 2+V2Fixed Object...............................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
1000 1V, Roadway Departure.........................................  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
1001 1V RD, Traction Loss..........................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
1002 1V RD, Avoid Vehicle/Pedestrian/Animal........................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
1003 1V Forward Impact, Ped or Animal..............................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
1004 1V Forward Impact, End Departure..............................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
1005 1V Forward Impact, Specifics Other/Unknown....................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
1009 1V Other/No Impact............................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
1050 2+V, Roadway Departure........................................  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
1100 1V Cross Centerline/Median....................................  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
1150 2+V Cross Centerline/Median *.................................  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
2000 Rear-End, Lead Vehicle Stopped................................           ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2001 Rear-End, LV Slower...........................................           ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2002 Rear-End, LV Decelerated......................................           ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2003 Rear-End, Other In-lane Vehicle Higher Speed..................           ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2009 Rear-End, Specifics Other/Unknown.............................           ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2101 Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact, Loss Control...  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2102 Rear-End Possible, Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward       ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Impact, Avoid Vehicle.............................................
2103 Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact, Avoid Objects..  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2109 Rear-End Possible, Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward       ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Impact, Specifics Other/Unknown...................................
2200 Same Trafficway Same..........................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
Direction, Angle-Sideswipe.........................................
2300 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Stopped..............           ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2301 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Slower...............           ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
2302 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Decelerated..........           ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
3000 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction, Head-On...................  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
3001 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Traction     ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Loss..............................................................
3002 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Avoid        ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Vehicle...........................................................
3003 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Avoid        ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Object............................................................
3009 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Other......  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
3100 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction, Angle Sideswipe...........  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............
3200 Head-On Possible, Other Vehicle Encroaching Opposite Direction  ...............           ...............  ...............  ...............

[[Page 13515]]

 
4000 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Initial    ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Opposite Direction................................................
4001 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Initial    ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Same Direction....................................................
4009 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Specifics  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Other/Unknown.....................................................
4100 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Into Same    ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Direction.........................................................
4101 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Into         ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Opposite Direction................................................
4109 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Specifics    ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Other/Unknown.....................................................
5000 Intersect Paths, Straight Across Path.........................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
5009 Intersect Paths, Straight Path, Specifics, Specifics Other/     ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
 Unknown...........................................................
6000 Backing Up to Vehicle/Object..................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............        
7000 1V Negotiating a Curve........................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
7050 2+V Negotiating a Curve.......................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
8000 Lane Change/Merge Before Rear-End.............................  ...............  ...............           ...............  ...............
8001 Lane Change/Merge in Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward     ...............  ...............           ...............  ...............
 Impact............................................................
8002 Lane Change/Merge in Same Trafficway Same Direction Angle       ...............  ...............           ...............  ...............
 Sideswipe.........................................................
8003 Lane Change/Merge in Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning Initial  ...............  ...............           ...............  ...............
 Same Direction....................................................
8004 Lane Change/Merge Other.......................................  ...............  ...............           ...............  ...............
9000 Equipment Failure.............................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
9020 Loss of Control Due to Tire/Engine/Poor Road..................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
9030 2+V, Left/Right Turn, Unspecified.............................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
9040 2+V U-Turn....................................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
9050 2+V Backing to Moving Vehicle.................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
9060 2+V No Impact.................................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
9070 2+V Other.....................................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
9999 2+V Unknown...................................................  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix B. Questions Asked Throughout This Notice

III. ADAS Performance Testing Program

    (1) Should the Agency award credit to vehicles equipped with LDW 
systems that provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert type? 
Why or why not? Are there any LDW alert modalities, such as visual-
only warnings, that the Agency should not consider acceptable when 
determining whether a vehicle meets NCAP's performance test 
criteria? If so, why? Should the Agency consider only certain alert 
modalities (such as haptic warnings) because they are more effective 
at re-engaging the driver and/or have higher consumer acceptance? If 
so, which one(s) and why?
    (2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane keeping assist test methods 
from the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency's LKS test procedure, 
should the LDW test procedure be removed from its NCAP program 
entirely and an LDW requirement be integrated into the LKS test 
procedure instead? Why or why not? For systems that have both LDW 
and LKS capabilities, the Agency would simply turn off LKS to 
conduct the LDW test if both systems are to be assessed separately. 
What tolerances would be appropriate for each test, and why?
    (3) LKS system designs provide steering and/or braking to 
address lane departures (e.g., when a driver is distracted). To help 
re-engage a driver, should the Agency specify that an LDW alert must 
be provided when the LKS is activated? Why or why not?
    (4) Do commenters agree that the Agency should remove the Botts' 
Dots test scenario from the current LDW test procedure since this 
lane marking type is being removed from use in California? If not, 
why?
    (5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.) 
over the lane marking (as defined with respect to the inside edge of 
the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, or should the limit be 
reduced to account for crashes occurring on roads with limited 
shoulder width? If the tolerance should be reduced, what tolerance 
would be appropriate and why? Should this tolerance be adopted for 
LDW in addition to LKS? Why or why not?
    (6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP specifies use of a 1,200 m 
(3,937.0 ft.) curve and a series of increasing lateral offsets to 
establish the desired lateral velocity of the SV towards the lane 
line it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that 
use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a clearer 
indication of when an LKS intervention occurs when compared to the 
baseline tests performed without LKS, a process specified by the 
Euro NCAP LSS protocol. This is because the small curve radius 
allows the desired SV lateral velocity to be more quickly 
established; requires less initial lateral offset within the travel 
lane; and allows for a longer period of steady state lateral 
velocity to be realized before an LKS intervention occurs. Is use of 
a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather than 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.), 
acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS test procedure? Why or why 
not?
    (7) Euro NCAP's LSS protocol specifies a single line lane to 
evaluate system performance. However, since certain LKS systems may 
require two lane lines before they can be enabled, should the Agency 
use a single line or two lines lane in its test procedure? Why?
    (8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection 
test to its NCAP program to begin addressing crashes where lane 
markings may not be present? If not, why? If so, should the test be 
added for LDW, LKS, or both technologies?
    (9) The LKS and ``Road Edge'' recovery tests defined in the Euro 
NCAP LSS protocol specify that a range of lateral velocities from 
0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system 
performance, and that this range is representative of the lateral 
velocities associated with unintended lane departures (i.e., not an 
intended lane change). However, in the same protocol, Euro NCAP also 
specifies a range of lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to 
2.0 ft./s) be used to represent unintended lane

[[Page 13516]]

departures during ``Emergency Lane Keeping--Oncoming vehicle'' and 
``Emergency Lane Keeping--Overtaking vehicle'' tests. To encourage 
the most robust LKS system performance, should NHTSA consider a 
combination of the two Euro NCAP unintended departure ranges, 
lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s), for 
inclusion in the Agency's LKS evaluation? Why or why not?
    (10) As discussed above, the Agency is concerned about LKS 
performance on roads that are curved. As such, can the Agency 
correlate better LKS system performance at higher lateral velocities 
on straight roads with better curved road performance? Why or why 
not? Furthermore, can the Agency assume that a vehicle that does not 
exceed the maximum excursion limits at higher lateral velocities on 
straight roads will have superior curved road performance compared 
to a vehicle that only meets the excursion limits at lower lateral 
velocities on straight roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the 
Agency assume the steering intervention while the vehicle is 
negotiating a curve is sustained long enough for a driver to re-
engage? If not, why?
    (11) The Agency would like to be assured that when a vehicle is 
redirected after an LKS system intervenes to prevent a lane 
departure when tested on one side, if it approaches the lane marker 
on the side not tested, the LKS will again engage to prevent a 
secondary lane departure by not exceeding the same maximum excursion 
limit established for the first side. To prevent potential secondary 
lane departures, should the Agency consider modifying the Euro NCAP 
``lane keep assist'' evaluation criteria to be consistent with 
language developed for NHTSA's BSI test procedure to prevent this 
issue? Why or why not? NHTSA's test procedure states the SV BSI 
intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more 
beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel 
lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the 
validity period. To assess whether this occurs, a second lane line 
is required (only one line is specified in the Euro NCAP LSS 
protocol for LKS testing). Does the introduction of a second lane 
line have the potential to confound LKS testing? Why or why not?
    (12) Since most fatal road departure and opposite direction 
crashes occur at higher posted and known travel speeds, should the 
LKS test speed be increased, or does the current test speed 
adequately indicate performance at higher speeds, especially on 
straight roads? Why or why not?
    (13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS test procedure currently 
contains many test conditions (i.e., line type and departure 
direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test 
conditions to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP 
test only certain conditions to minimize test burden? For instance, 
should the Agency consider incorporating the test conditions for 
only one departure direction if the vehicle manufacturer provides 
test data to assure comparable system performance for the other 
direction? Or, should the Agency consider adopting only the most 
challenging test conditions? If so, which conditions are most 
appropriate? For instance, do the dashed line test conditions 
provide a greater challenge to vehicles than the solid line test 
conditions?
    (14) What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for 
each LKS test condition, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass 
rate for the LKS tests, and why?
    (15) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current LDW or proposed LKS 
test procedure that need further refinement or clarification? Is so, 
what additional refinements or clarifications are necessary?
    (16) Should all BSW testing be conducted without the turn signal 
indicator activated? Why or why not? If the Agency was to modify the 
BSW test procedure to stipulate activation of the turn signal 
indicator, should the test vehicle be required to provide an audible 
or haptic warning that another vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a 
visual warning sufficient? If a visual warning is sufficient, should 
it continually flash, at a minimum, to provide a distinction from 
the blind spot status when the turn signal is not in use? Why or why 
not?
    (17) Is it appropriate for the Agency to use the Straight Lane 
Pass-by Test to quantify and ultimately differentiate a vehicle's 
BSW capability based on its ability to provide acceptable warnings 
when the POV has entered the SV's blind spot (as defined by the 
blind zone) for varying POV-SV speed differentials? Why or why not?
    (18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable POV in the BSI test 
procedure appropriate? Is using Revision G in NCAP appropriate? Why 
or why not?
    (19) The Agency recognizes that the BSW test procedure currently 
contains two test scenarios that have multiple test conditions 
(e.g., test speeds and POV approach directions (left and right side 
of the SV)). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test 
scenarios and test conditions to address the real-world safety 
problem adequately, or could it test only certain scenarios or 
conditions to minimize test burden in NCAP? For instance, should the 
Agency consider incorporating only the most challenging test 
conditions into NCAP, such as the ones with the greatest speed 
differential, or choose to perform the test conditions having the 
lowest and highest speeds? Should the Agency consider only 
performing the test conditions where the POV passes by the SV on the 
left side if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to assure 
the left side pass-by tests are also representative of system 
performance during right side pass-by tests? Why or why not?
    (20) Given the Agency's concern about the amount of system 
performance testing under consideration in this RFC, it seeks input 
on whether to include a BSI false positive test. Is a false positive 
assessment needed to insure system robustness and high customer 
satisfaction? Why or why not?
    (21) The BSW test procedure includes 7 repeated trials for each 
test condition (i.e., test speed and POV approach direction). Is 
this an appropriate number of repeat trials? Why or why not? What is 
the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for each BSI test 
scenario, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass rate for each 
of the two tests, BSW and BSI, and why is it appropriate?
    (22) Is it reasonable to perform only BSI tests in conjunction 
with activation of the turn signal? Why or why not? If the turn 
signal is not used, how can the operation of BSI be differentiated 
from the heading adjustments resulting from an LKS intervention? 
Should the SV's LKS system be switched off during conduct of the 
Agency's BSI evaluations? Why or why not?
    (23) Is the proposed test speed range, 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 
kph (37.3 mph), to be assessed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments, most 
appropriate for PAEB test scenarios S1 and S4? Why or why not?
    (24) The Agency has proposed to include Scenarios S1 a-e and S4 
a-c in its NCAP assessment. Is it necessary for the Agency to 
perform all test scenarios and test conditions proposed in this RFC 
notice to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test 
only certain scenarios or conditions to minimize test burden but 
still address an adequate proportion of the safety problem? Why or 
why not? If it is not necessary for the Agency to perform all test 
scenarios or test conditions, which scenarios/conditions should be 
assessed? Although they are not currently proposed for inclusion, 
should the Agency also adopt the false positive test conditions, S1f 
and S1g? Why or why not?
    (25) Given that a large portion of pedestrian fatalities and 
injuries occur under dark lighting conditions, the Agency has 
proposed to perform testing for the included test conditions (i.e., 
S1 a-e and S4 a-c) under dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime) 
in addition to daylight test conditions for test speed range 10 kph 
(6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 mph). NHTSA proposes that a vehicle's 
lower beams would provide the source of light during the nighttime 
assessments. However, if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting 
systems such as semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or 
adaptive driving beam head lighting system, they shall be enabled 
during the nighttime PAEB assessment. Is this testing approach 
appropriate? Why or why not? Should the Agency conduct PAEB 
evaluation tests with only the vehicle's lower beams and disable or 
not use any other advanced lighting systems?
    (26) Should the Agency consider performing PAEB testing under 
dark conditions with a vehicle's upper beams as a light source? If 
yes, should this lighting condition be assessed in addition to the 
proposed dark test condition, which would utilize only a vehicle's 
lower beams along with any advanced lighting system enabled, or in 
lieu of the proposed dark testing condition? Should the Agency also 
evaluate PAEB performance in dark lighting conditions with overhead 
lights? Why or why not? What test scenarios, conditions, and 
speed(s) are appropriate for nighttime (i.e., dark lighting 
conditions) testing in NCAP, and why?
    (27) To reduce test burden in NCAP, the Agency proposed to 
perform one test per test speed until contact occurs, or until the 
vehicle's relative impact velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial 
speed of the subject vehicle for the given test condition. If 
contact occurs and if the vehicle's relative impact velocity is less 
than or equal to 50 percent

[[Page 13517]]

of the initial SV speed for the given combination of test speed and 
test condition, an additional four test trials will be conducted at 
the given test speed and test condition, and the SV must meet the 
passing performance criterion (i.e., no contact) for at least three 
out of those five test trials in order to be assessed at the next 
incremental test speed. Is this an appropriate approach to assess 
PAEB system performance in NCAP, or should a certain number of test 
trials be required for each assessed test speed? Why or why not? If 
a certain number of repeat tests is more appropriate, how many test 
trials should be conducted, and why?
    (28) Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate 
for the proposed PAEB test conditions? Why or why not? 
Alternatively, should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or 
specify a maximum allowable SV-to-mannequin impact speed for any or 
all of the proposed test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test 
speed combination)? If yes, why, and for which test conditions? For 
those test conditions, what speed reductions would be appropriate? 
Alternatively, what maximum allowable impact speed would be 
appropriate?
    (29) If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin during the 
initial trial for a given test condition and test speed combination, 
NHTSA proposes to conduct additional test trials only if the 
relative impact velocity observed during that trial is less than or 
equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV. For a test speed 
of 60 kph (37.3 mph), this maximum relative impact velocity is 
nominally 30 kph (18.6 mph), and for a test speed of 10 kph (6.2 
mph), the maximum relative impact velocity is nominally 5 kph (3.1 
mph). Is this an appropriate limit on the maximum relative impact 
velocity for the proposed range of test speeds? If not, why? Note 
that the tests in Global Technical Regulation (GTR) No. 9 for 
pedestrian crashworthiness protection simulates a pedestrian impact 
at 40 kph (24.9 mph).
    (30) For each lighting condition, the Agency is proposing 6 test 
speeds (i.e., those performed from 10 to 60 kph (6.2 to 37.3 mph) in 
increments of 10 kph (6.2 mph)) for each of the 8 proposed test 
conditions (S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). This results in 
a total of 48 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds 
to be evaluated per lighting condition, or 96 total combinations for 
both light conditions. The Agency mentions later in the ADAS Ratings 
System section, that it plans to use check marks, as is done 
currently, to give credit to vehicles that (1) are equipped with the 
recommended ADAS technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system 
performance test requirements for each ADAS technology included in 
NCAP until it issues (1) a final decision notice announcing the new 
ADAS rating system and (2) a final rule to amend the safety rating 
section of the vehicle window sticker (Monroney label). For the 
purposes of providing credit for a technology using check marks, 
what is an appropriate minimum overall pass rate for PAEB 
performance evaluation? For example, should a vehicle be said to 
meet the PAEB performance requirements if it passes two-thirds of 
the 96 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds for 
the two lighting conditions (i.e., passes 64 unique combinations of 
test conditions and test speeds)?
    (31) Given previous support from commenters to include S2 and S3 
scenarios in the program at some point in the future and the results 
of AAA's testing for one of the turning conditions, NHTSA seeks 
comment on an appropriate timeframe for including S2 and S3 
scenarios into the Agency's NCAP. Also, NHTSA requests from vehicle 
manufacturers information on any currently available models designed 
to address, and ideally achieve crash avoidance during conduct of 
the S2 and S3 scenarios to support Agency evaluation for a future 
program upgrade.
    (32) Should the Agency adopt the articulated mannequins into the 
PAEB test procedure as proposed? Why or why not?
    (33) In addition to tests performed under daylight conditions, 
the Agency is proposing to evaluate the performance of PAEB systems 
during nighttime conditions where a large percentage of real-world 
pedestrian fatalities occur. Are there other technologies and 
information available to the public that the Agency can evaluate 
under nighttime conditions?
    (34) Are there other safety areas that NHTSA should consider as 
part of this or a future upgrade for pedestrian protection?
    (35) Are there any aspects of NCAP's proposed PAEB test 
procedure that need further refinement or clarification before 
adoption? If so, what additional refinement or clarification is 
necessary, and why?
    (36) Considering not only the increasing number of cyclists 
killed on U.S. roads but also the limitations of current AEB systems 
in detecting cyclists, the Agency seeks comment on the appropriate 
timeframe for adding a cyclist component to NCAP and requests from 
vehicle manufacturers information on any currently available models 
that have the capability to validate the cyclist target and test 
procedures used by Euro NCAP to support evaluation for a future NCAP 
program upgrade.
    (37) In addition to the test procedures used by Euro NCAP, are 
there others that NHTSA should consider to address the cyclist crash 
population in the U.S. and effectiveness of systems?
    (38) For the Agency's FCW tests:

--If the Agency retains one or more separate tests for FCW, should 
it award credit solely to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that 
provide a passing audible alert? Or, should it also consider 
awarding credit to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide 
passing haptic alerts? Are there certain haptic alert types that 
should be excluded from consideration (if the Agency was to award 
credit to vehicles with haptic alerts that pass NCAP tests) because 
they may be a nuisance to drivers such that they are more likely to 
disable the system? Do commenters believe that haptic alerts can be 
accurately and objectively assessed? Why or why not? Is it 
appropriate for the Agency to refrain from awarding credit to FCW 
systems that provide only a passing visual alert? Why or why not? If 
the Agency assesses the sufficiency of the FCW alert in the context 
of CIB (and PAEB) tests, what type of FCW alert(s) would be 
acceptable for use in defining the timing of the release of the SV 
accelerator pedal, and why?
--Is it most appropriate to test the middle (or next latest) FCW 
system setting in lieu of the default setting when performing FCW 
and AEB (including PAEB) NCAP tests on vehicles that offer multiple 
FCW timing adjustment settings? Why or why not? If not, what use 
setting would be most appropriate?
--Should the Agency consider consolidating FCW and CIB testing such 
that NCAP's CIB test scenarios would serve as an indicant of FCW 
operation? Why or why not? The Agency has proposed that if it 
combines the two tests, it would evaluate the presence of a 
vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV 
accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW 
alert is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV 
accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the 
onset of CIB system braking (as defined by the instant SV 
deceleration reaches at least 0.5g). If no FCW alert is issued and 
the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any braking, release of the 
SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior to impact with the 
POV. The Agency notes that it has also proposed these test 
procedural changes for its PAEB tests as well. Is this assessment 
method for FCW operation reasonable? Why or why not?
--If the Agency continues to assess FCW systems separately from CIB, 
how should the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) be 
amended if the Agency aligns the corresponding maximum SV test 
speeds, POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, POV deceleration magnitude, 
etc., as applicable, with the proposed CIB tests, and why? What 
assessment method should be used--one trial per scenario, or 
multiple trials, and why? If multiple trials should be required, how 
many would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an 
acceptable pass rate, and why?
--Is it desirable for NCAP to perform one FCW test scenario (instead 
of the three that are currently included in NCAP's FCW test 
procedure), conducted at the corresponding maximum SV test speed, 
POV speed, SV-to-POV headway (as applicable), POV deceleration 
magnitude, etc. of the proposed CIB test to serve as an indicant of 
FCW system performance? If so, which test scenario from NCAP's FCW 
test procedure is appropriate?
--Are there additional or alternative test scenarios or test 
conditions that the Agency should consider incorporating into the 
FCW test procedure, such as those at even higher test speeds than 
those proposed for the CIB tests, or those having increased 
complexity? If so, should the current FCW performance criteria 
(i.e., TTCs) and/or test scenario specifications be amended, and to 
what extent?

    (39) For the Agency's CIB tests:
--Are the SV and POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, deceleration 
magnitude, etc. the Agency has proposed for NCAP's CIB tests

[[Page 13518]]

appropriate? Why or why not? If not, what speeds, headway(s), 
deceleration magnitude(s) are appropriate, and why? Should the 
Agency adopt a POV deceleration magnitude of 0.6 g for its LVD CIB 
test in lieu of 0.5 g proposed? Why or why not?
--Should the Agency consider adopting additional higher tests speeds 
(i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the 
CIB (and potentially DBS) LVD test scenario in NCAP? Why or why not? 
If additional speeds are included, what headway and deceleration 
magnitude would be appropriate for each additional test speed, and 
why?
--Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for the 
proposed CIB and DBS test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively, 
should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a 
maximum allowable SV-to-POV impact speed for any or all of the 
proposed test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed 
combination)? If yes, why, and for which test conditions? For those 
test conditions, what speed reductions would be appropriate? 
Alternatively, what maximum allowable impact speed would be 
appropriate?

    (40) For the Agency's DBS tests:
--Should the Agency remove the DBS test scenarios from NCAP? Why or 
why not? Alternatively, should the Agency conduct the DBS LVS and 
LVM tests at only the highest test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and 
80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)? Why or why not? If the Agency also 
adopted these higher tests speeds (70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 
mph)) for the LVD CIB test, should it also conduct the LVD DBS test 
at these same speeds? Why or why not?
--If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, is it 
appropriate to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is 
initiated to a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW 
alert is issued (regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after 
the FCW alert but before initiation of the manual brake 
application)? If not, why, and what prescribed TTC values would be 
appropriate for the modified DBS test conditions?

    (41) Is the assessment method NHTSA has proposed for the CIB and 
DBS tests (i.e., one trial per test speed with speed increments of 
10 kph (6.2 mph) for each test condition and repeat trials only in 
the event of POV contact) appropriate? Why or why not? Should an 
alternative assessment method such as multiple trials be required 
instead? If yes, why? If multiple trials should be required, how 
many would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an 
acceptable pass rate, and why? If the proposed assessment method is 
appropriate, it is acceptable even for the LVD test scenario if only 
one or two test speeds are selected for inclusion? Or, is it more 
appropriate to alternatively require 7 trials for each test speed, 
and require that 5 out of the 7 trials conducted pass the ``no 
contact'' performance criterion?
    (42) The Agency's proposal to (1) consolidate its FCW and CIB 
tests such that the CIB tests would also serve as an indicant of FCW 
operation, (2) assess 14 test speeds for CIB (5 for LVS, 5 for LVM, 
and potentially 4 for LVD), and (3) assess 6 tests speeds for DBS (2 
for LVS, 2 for LVM, and potentially 2 for LVD), would result in a 
total of 20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds 
to be evaluated for AEB. What is an appropriate minimum pass rate 
for AEB performance evaluation? For example, a vehicle is considered 
to meet the AEB performance if it passes two-thirds of the 20 unique 
combinations of test conditions and test speeds (i.e., passes 14 
unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds).
    (43) As fused camera-radar forward-looking sensors are becoming 
more prevalent in the vehicle fleet, and the Agency has not observed 
any instances of false positive test failures during any of its CIB 
or DBS testing, is it appropriate to remove the false positive STP 
assessments from NCAP's AEB (i.e., CIB and DBS) evaluation matrix in 
this NCAP update? Why or why not?
    (44) For vehicles with regenerative braking that have setting 
options, the Agency is proposing to choose the ``off'' setting, or 
the setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the 
accelerator is fully released. As mentioned, this proposal also 
applies to the Agency's PAEB tests. Are the proposed settings 
appropriate? Why or why not? Will regenerative braking introduce 
additional complications for the Agency's AEB and PAEB testing, and 
how could the Agency best address them?
    (45) Should NCAP adopt any additional AEB tests or alter its 
current tests to address the ``changing'' rear-end crash problem? If 
so, what tests should be added, or how should current tests be 
modified?
    (46) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current FCW, CIB, and/or 
DBS test procedure(s) that need further refinement or clarification? 
If so, what refinements or clarifications are necessary, and why?
    (47) Would a 250 ms overlap of SV throttle and brake pedal 
application be acceptable in instances where no FCW alert has been 
issued by the prescribed TTC in a DBS test, or where the FCW alert 
occurs very close to the brake activation. If a 250 ms overlap is 
not acceptable, what overlap would be acceptable?
    (48) Should the Agency pursue research in the future to assess 
AEB system performance under less than ideal environmental 
conditions? If so, what environmental conditions would be 
appropriate?
    (49) The Agency requests comment on the use of the GVT in lieu 
of the SSV in future AEB NCAP testing,
    (50) The Agency requests comment on whether Revisions F and G 
should be considered equivalent for AEB testing.
    (51) The Agency requests comment on whether NHTSA should adopt a 
revision of the GVT other than Revision G for use in AEB testing in 
NCAP.

IV. ADAS Rating System

    With regard to a future ADAS rating system, the Agency seeks 
comments on the following:
    (52) The components and development of a full-scale ADAS rating 
system,
    (53) the aforementioned approaches as well as others deemed 
appropriate for the development of a future ADAS rating system in 
order to assist the Agency in developing future proposals,
    (54) the appropriateness of using target populations and 
technology effectiveness estimates to determine weights or 
proportions to assign to individual test conditions, corresponding 
test combinations, or an overall ADAS award,
    (55) the use of a baseline concept to convey ADAS scores/
ratings,
    (56) how best to translate points/ratings earned during ADAS 
testing conducted under NCAP to a reduction in crashes, injuries, 
deaths, etc., including which real-world data metric would be most 
appropriate,
    (57) whether an overall rating system is necessary and, if so, 
whether it should replace or simply supplement the existing list 
approach, and
    (58) effective communication of ADAS ratings, including the 
appropriateness of using a points-based ADAS rating system in lieu 
of, or in addition to, a star rating system.

VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP

    With regard to a roadmap, NHTSA requests feedback on the 
following:
    (59) Identification of safety opportunities or technologies in 
development that could be included in future roadmaps,
    (60) opportunities to benefit from collaboration or 
harmonization with other rating programs, and
    (61) other issues to assist with long-term planning.

VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices

    (62) What are the capabilities of the various available 
approaches to driver monitoring systems (e.g., steering wheel 
sensors, eye tracking cameras, etc.) to detect or infer different 
driver state measurement or estimations (e.g., visual attention, 
drowsiness, medical incapacity, etc.)? What is the associated 
confidence or reliability in detecting or inferring such driver 
states and what supporting data exist?
    (63) Of further interest are the types of system actions taken 
based on a driver monitoring system's estimate of a driver's state. 
What are the types and modes of associated warnings, interventions, 
and other mitigation strategies that are most effective for 
different driver states or impairments (e.g., drowsy, medical, 
distraction)? What research data exist that substantiate 
effectiveness of these interventions?
    (64) Are there relevant thresholds and strategies for 
performance (e.g., alert versus some degree of intervention) that 
would warrant some type of NCAP credit?
    (65) Since different driver states (e.g., visual distraction and 
intoxication) can result in similar driving behaviors (e.g., wide 
within-lane position variability), comments regarding opportunities 
and tradeoffs in mitigation strategies when the originating cause is 
not conclusive are of specific interest.
    (66) What types of consumer acceptance information (e.g., 
consumer interest or

[[Page 13519]]

feedback data) are available or are foreseen for implementation of 
different types of driver monitoring systems and associated 
mitigation strategies for driver impairment, drowsiness, or visual 
inattention? Are there privacy concerns? What are the related 
privacy protection strategies? Are there use or preference data on a 
selectable feature that could be optionally enabled by consumers 
(e.g., for teen drivers by their parents)?
    (67) What in-vehicle and HMI design characteristics would be 
most helpful to include in an NCAP rating that focuses on ease of 
use? What research data exist to support objectively characterizing 
ease of use for vehicle controls and displays?
    (68) What are specific countermeasures or approaches to mitigate 
driver distraction, and what are the associated effectiveness 
metrics that may be feasible and appropriate for inclusion in the 
NCAP program? Methods may include driver monitoring and action 
strategies, HMI design considerations, expanded in-motion secondary 
task lockouts, phone application/notification limitations while 
paired with the vehicle, etc.
    (69) What distraction mitigation measures could be considered 
for NCAP credit?
    (70) Are there opportunities for including alcohol-impairment 
technology in NCAP? What types of metrics, thresholds, and tests 
could be considered? Could voluntary deployment or adoption be 
positively influenced through NCAP credit?
    (71) How can NCAP procedures be described in objective terms 
that could be inclusive of various approaches, such as detection 
systems and inference systems? Are there particular challenges with 
any approach that may need special considerations? What supporting 
research data exist that document relevant performance factors such 
as sensing accuracy and detection algorithm efficacy?
    (72) When a system detects alcohol-impairment during the course 
of a trip, what actions could the system take in a safe manner? What 
are the safety considerations related to various options that 
manufacturers may be considering (e.g., speed reduction, performing 
a safe stop, pulling over, or flasher activation)? How should 
various actions be considered for NCAP credit?
    (73) What is known related to consumer acceptance of alcohol-
impaired driving detection and mitigation functions, and how may 
that differ with respect to direct measurement approaches versus 
estimation techniques using a driver monitoring system? What 
consumer interest or feedback data exist relating to this topic? Are 
there privacy concerns or privacy protection strategies with various 
approaches? What are the related privacy protection strategies?
    (74) Should NCAP consider credit for a seat belt reminder system 
with a continuous or intermittent audible signal that does not cease 
until the seat belt is properly buckled (i.e., after the 60 second 
FMVSS No. 208 minimum)? What data are available to support 
associated effectiveness? Are certain audible signal characteristics 
more effective than others?
    (75) Is there an opportunity for including a seat belt interlock 
assessment in NCAP?
    (76) If the Agency were to encourage seat belt interlock 
adoption through NCAP, should all interlock system approaches be 
considered, or only certain types? If so, which ones? What metrics 
could be evaluated for each? Should differing credit be applied 
depending upon interlock system approach?
    (77) Should seat belt interlocks be considered for all seating 
positions in the vehicle, or only the front seats? Could there be an 
opportunity for differentiation in this respect?
    (78) What information is known or anticipated with respect to 
consumer acceptance of seat belt interlock systems and/or persistent 
seat belt reminder systems in vehicles? What consumer interest or 
feedback data exist on this topic?
    (79) Could there be an NCAP opportunity in a selectable feature 
that could be optionally engaged such as in the context of a ``teen 
mode'' feature?
    (80) Should NHTSA take into consideration systems, such as 
intelligent speed assist systems, which determine current speed 
limits and warn the driver or adjust the maximum traveling speed 
accordingly? Should there be a differentiation between warning and 
intervention type intelligent speed assist systems in this 
consideration? Should systems that allow for some small amount of 
speeding over the limit before intervening be treated the same or 
differently than systems that are specifically keyed to a road's 
speed limit? What about for systems that allow driver override 
versus systems that do not?
    (81) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when 
evaluating speed assist system functionality?
    (82) What information is known or anticipated with respect to 
consumer acceptance of intelligent speed assist systems? What 
consumer interest or feedback data exist on this topic?
    (83) Are there other means that the Agency should consider to 
prevent excessive speeding?
    (84) If NHTSA considers this technology for inclusion in NCAP, 
are door logic solutions sufficient? Should NHTSA only consider 
systems that detect the presence of a child?
    (85) What research data exist to substantiate differences in 
effectiveness of these system types?
    (86) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when 
evaluating these in-vehicle rear seat child reminder systems?
    (87) What information is known or anticipated with respect to 
consumer acceptance of integrated rear seat child reminder systems 
in vehicles? What consumer interest or feedback data exist on this 
topic?

VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System

    (88) What approaches are most effective to provide consumers 
with vehicle safety ratings that provide meaningful information and 
discriminate performance of vehicles among the fleet?
    (89) Is the use of additional injury criteria/body regions that 
are not part of the existing 5-star ratings system appropriate for 
use in a points-based calculation of future star ratings? Some 
injury criteria do not have associated risk curves. Are these 
regions appropriate to include, and if so, what is the appropriate 
method by which to include them?
    (90) Should a crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings system 
continue to measure a vehicle's performance based on a known or 
expected fleet average performer, or should it return to an absolute 
system of rating vehicles?
    (91) Considering the basic structure of the current ratings 
system (combined injury risk), the potential overlapping target 
populations for crashworthiness and ADAS program elements, as well 
as other potential concepts mentioned in this document such as a 
points-based system, what would the best method of calculating the 
vehicle fleet average performance be?
    (92) Should the vehicle fleet average performance be updated at 
regular intervals, and if so, how often?
    (93) What is the most appropriate way to disseminate these 
updates or changes to the public?
    (94) Should the Agency disseminate its 5-star ratings with half-
star increments?
    (95) Should the Agency assign star ratings using a decimal 
format in addition to or in place of whole- or half-stars?
    (96) Should the Agency continue to include rollover resistance 
evaluations in its future overall ratings?

IX. Other Activities

    (97) Considering the Agency's goal of maintaining the integrity 
of the program, should NHTSA accept self-reported test data that is 
generated by test laboratories that are not NHTSA's contracted test 
laboratories? If no, why not? If yes, what criteria are most 
relevant for evaluating whether a given laboratory can acceptably 
conduct ADAS performance tests for NCAP such that the program's 
credibility is upheld?
    (98) As the ADAS assessment program in NCAP continues to grow in 
the future to include new ADAS technologies and more complex test 
procedures, what other means would best address the following 
program challenges: Methods of data collection, maintaining data 
integrity and public trust, and managing test failures, particularly 
during verification testing?
    (99) What is the potential for consumer confusion if information 
on the Monroney label and on the website differs, and how can this 
confusion be lessened?
    (100) What types of vehicles do consumers compare during their 
search for a new vehicle? Do consumers often consider vehicles with 
different body styles (e.g., midsized sedan versus large sport 
utility)?
    (101) When searching for vehicle safety information, do 
consumers have a clear understanding for which vehicles they are 
seeking information, or do they browse through vehicle ratings to 
identify vehicles they may wish to purchase?
    (102) When classifying vehicles by body style, what degree of 
classification is most appropriate? For example, when purchasing a 
passenger vehicle, do consumers consider all passenger vehicles, or 
are they inclined to narrow their searches to vehicles of a subset

[[Page 13520]]

of passenger vehicles (e.g., subcompact passenger vehicle)?
    (103) Within the context of the updates considered in this 
notice, what is the most important top-level safety-related 
information that consumers should be able to compare amongst 
vehicles? Which of these pieces of information should consumers be 
able to use to sort and filter search results?

Appendix C. History of Relevant Events and Documents Pertaining to This 
Notice

A. April 5, 2013 Request for Comments

    On April 5, 2013, NHTSA published an RFC notice \261\ asking the 
public to ``help identify the potential areas of study for 
improvement to the program that have the greatest potential for 
producing safety benefits.'' Specifically, NHTSA requested comments 
on areas in which the Agency believed enhancements to NCAP could be 
made either in the short term or over a longer period of time. 
Several ADAS applications were discussed for possible future 
inclusion in the crash avoidance program in NCAP, including blind 
spot warning, lane keeping assistance, crash imminent braking, 
dynamic brake support, and pedestrian detection and intervention 
systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \261\ 78 FR 20597 (Apr. 5, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A total of 68 organizations or individuals submitted comments in 
response to the April 2013 notice. The comments received from 
stakeholders, though generally supportive of making improvements to 
NCAP's crash avoidance program by including assessment of additional 
ADAS technologies, exhibited disagreement about how and when a 
particular technology should be added to the program. Specifically, 
these disagreements included the conditions under which these 
technologies should be incorporated into NCAP.
    Generally, most commenters supported the assessment of ADAS 
technologies, such as CIB, DBS, and rearward pedestrian detection, 
in NCAP. There was also support from commenters on the addition of 
pedestrian safety assessment in NCAP. However, opinions varied 
regarding whether an active and/or passive pedestrian safety program 
should be included in NCAP. Moreover, consumer demand for blind spot 
warning technology resulted in many commenters recommending the 
technology for inclusion in NCAP.
    Many commenters encouraged NHTSA to ensure that any program area 
considered for inclusion in NCAP should have the necessary 
supporting data (e.g., safety benefits) and address a safety need. 
Furthermore, many commenters (including both vehicle manufacturers 
and safety advocate groups) asked the Agency to also consider a 
regulatory, as well as a non-regulatory (NCAP) approach, for any 
vehicle safety improvements--especially regarding the introduction 
of new advanced crash test dummies. Vehicle manufacturers requested 
that the Agency consider providing sufficient lead time for 
implementation of any program update. Lastly, many commenters 
recommended harmonizing test procedures, test requirements, test 
devices, and the like with other government agencies and standards 
development organizations, such as the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO), SAE International (SAE), and other 
consumer information programs worldwide.

B. January 28, 2015 Request for Comment and November 5, 2015 Final 
Decision

    On January 28, 2015, in response to favorable feedback received 
on crash imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic brake support (DBS) 
through the 2013 RFC, NHTSA published an RFC proposing to add these 
technologies to NCAP.\262\ On November 5, 2015, NHTSA issued the 
final decision to include these technologies, which became effective 
for model year 2018 vehicles.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ 80 FR 4630 (Jan. 28, 2015).
    \263\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. December 4, 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act

    On December 4, 2015, the President signed the Fixing America's 
Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, which included a section that 
requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to ensure crash avoidance 
information is displayed along with crashworthiness information on 
window stickers placed on motor vehicles by their 
manufacturers.\264\ At the time the FAST Act was enacted, NHTSA was 
already in the process of developing an RFC notice to present many 
proposed updates to NCAP, including the evaluation of several new 
ADAS and a corresponding update of the Monroney label.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ Section 24321 of the FAST Act, otherwise known as the 
``Safety Through Informed Consumers Act of 2015.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. December 16, 2015 Request for Comments

    On December 16, 2015, NHTSA published a broad RFC notice seeking 
comment on using enhanced tools and techniques for evaluating the 
safety of vehicles, generating star ratings, and stimulating further 
vehicle safety developments.\265\ On the crashworthiness front, the 
RFC sought comment on establishment of a new frontal oblique test 
and use of the more advanced crash test dummies in all tests. The 
RFC also sought comment on creation of a new crash avoidance rating 
category and included nine advanced crash avoidance technologies. 
Additionally, the RFC sought comment on creation of a new pedestrian 
protection rating category involving the use of adult and child 
head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests and two new pedestrian 
crash avoidance technologies. The RFC sought comment on combining 
the three categories into one overall 5-star rating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \265\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the notice, NHTSA received more than 300 
comments, more than 200 of which were from individuals supporting 
comments made by the League of American Bicyclists. More than 30 
individuals filed comments addressing a specific program area or 
several topics in the RFC.
    The Agency also received responses to the notice at two public 
hearings, one in Detroit, Michigan, on January 14, 2016, and the 
second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in Washington, DC, on January 
29, 2016. By request, NHTSA also held several meetings with 
stakeholders.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ See www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0119 for a 
full listing of the commenters and the comments they submitted, as 
well as records of the public hearings and smaller meetings relating 
to the RFC that occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the notice, commenters raised many issues 
involving both supporting data for the proposed changes and 
procedural concerns. Commenters stated that the public comment 
period was inadequate for purposes of responding because of the 
complexity of the program described in the RFC, and claimed that the 
technical information supporting the notice was not sufficient to 
allow a full understanding of the contemplated changes. According to 
the commenters, this hindered their ability to prepare substantive 
comments in response to the notice. In addition, most vehicle 
manufacturers stated that the significant cost burden associated 
with fitment of the proposed new technologies and the inclusion of a 
new crash test and new test dummies would increase the price of new 
vehicles. Manufacturers also noted that the advanced crash test 
dummies described in the RFC were not yet standardized and needed 
additional work. Manufacturers, along with safety advocates, further 
expressed the need for data demonstrating that each proposed program 
change would provide sufficient safety improvement to warrant its 
inclusion in NCAP. In addition, several commenters suggested that 
NHTSA develop near-term and long-term roadmaps for NCAP and revise 
NCAP in a more gradual, ``phased'' approach.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ For example, one commenter, the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers, recommended ``that NHTSA revise NCAP in phases to 
maintain a data-driven, science-based foundation for the program by, 
in part, completing the standardization, federalization, and 
docketing of all ATDs and test fixtures to be used in NCAP.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. October 1, 2018 Public Meeting

    In response to the issues raised by those who commented on the 
December 2015 notice and in light of the FAST Act mandate \268\ 
NHTSA issued a notice announcing its plan to host a public meeting 
to re-engage stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the 
Agency plan the future of NCAP. Interested parties were also able to 
submit written comments to the docket.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \268\ Section 24322 ``Passenger Motor Vehicle Information'' of 
this Act requires the Secretary of the Department of Transportation 
to issue a rule no later than 1 year after the enactment of this Act 
``to ensure that crash avoidance information is indicated next to 
crashworthiness information on stickers placed on motor vehicles by 
their manufacturers.''
    \269\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2018-0055.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thirty-five parties participated in the public meeting, 32 of 
which submitted written comments to the docket. Additional written 
comments were submitted by others who did not attend the public 
meeting. These commenters included: Automobile manufacturers, 
consumer organizations, suppliers, industry associations, academia, 
individuals, and other organizations. A large

[[Page 13521]]

number of individuals submitted comments requesting that NCAP 
account for pedestrians and bicyclists in its rating system, as 
members of the League of American Bicyclists.
    Many commenters said an update to NCAP was taking too long. The 
prominent theme from the commenters included the request for an NCAP 
roadmap that lays out planned changes to the program and details 
when those changes are likely to occur. Some commenters pointed to 
the roadmaps of Euro NCAP. In addition, many of the comments focused 
on ADAS and the need for NCAP to stimulate further the incorporation 
of these technologies on vehicles. While supporting an overall 
rating, many commenters stated that the individual ratings for the 
crashworthiness and ADAS programs should be part of the new ratings 
system and be made available to consumers. Automaker commenters 
suggested that any changes to NCAP should allow adequate time for 
manufacturers to incorporate vehicle design changes in response to 
NCAP updates. Some commenters suggested that a vehicle's attributes 
and status following a crash (e.g., notifying appropriate 
authorities) should be part of NCAP ratings as well.
    Several commenters said changes to NCAP should be supported by 
sound science and data and address the safety problem with potential 
effectiveness of any countermeasure being rated. Some commenters 
also suggested that NCAP's promotion of ADAS technologies will lay 
the groundwork for automated driving systems (ADS). Several 
commenters suggested that there should be as much harmonization as 
possible with related global vehicle rating programs to minimize the 
cost and testing burden on vehicle manufacturers. Most commenters 
supported the idea that NHTSA continue to accept manufacturer-
conducted, self-reported test results as evidence that the vehicles 
are equipped with one or more NCAP-recommended technologies (i.e., 
that the Agency does not need to verify that the ADAS meet the NCAP 
system performance requirements).
    Some commenters noted that NHTSA has yet to implement the 
requirement of the 2015 FAST Act to provide crash avoidance 
information on the Monroney label. Those who commented on this issue 
generally supported moving forward and completing this as soon as 
possible. A few additional commenters addressed the issue of 
possible new crash test dummies used in NCAP, but indicated that any 
new dummies should be ``Federalized'' by adding the dummies into 49 
CFR part 572, ``Anthropomorphic test devices,'' before incorporating 
them into NCAP.
    Regarding the dissemination and promotion of NCAP's vehicle 
safety information, some of the commenters urged the expanded use of 
new media and other technological approaches to communicating NCAP 
vehicle safety information. Others recommended that there should be 
traditional public information ``campaigns'' to make the public more 
aware of NCAP. Commenters requested a more robust search capability 
on NHTSA's website, particularly to facilitate consumer comparisons 
of vehicles within a class.
    Among those addressing the utility and effectiveness of the 5-
star ratings system, all supported the continued use of star ratings 
with some suggesting that the use of half-star increments would be a 
way to introduce more differentiation between vehicles and provide 
an incentive for manufacturers to improve vehicle safety in 
situations where doing so would result in an additional half star. 
One commenter suggested a 10-star rating system.
    Comments were split on the question of whether new crash tests 
should be added to NCAP. Some supported adjusting the baseline 
injury risks associated with crashworthiness ratings. One commenter 
stated that NCAP should not pursue differentiation just for the sake 
of differentiation, instead suggesting that the highest priority 
should be to examine the correlation and validity of the current 
star rating system with real-world injury data. Several commenters 
suggested that there be a silver star rating as part of NCAP that 
would highlight safety aspects of vehicles that are of importance to 
older drivers. Others who commented on providing vehicle safety 
information for specific demographic groups either opposed the idea 
of information directed at demographic groups, expressed concerns, 
or said additional research is needed.

    Issued in Washington, DC, under authority delegated in 49 CFR 
1.95 and 501.5.
Steven S. Cliff,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2022-04894 Filed 3-8-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P