Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, To Add the Sponsored GC Service and Make Other Changes, 49580-49587 [2021-19046]
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49580
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 169 / Friday, September 3, 2021 / Notices
Securities and Exchange Commission,
c/o Cynthia Roscoe, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, or by sending an
email to: PRA_Mailbox@sec.gov.
Dated: August 30, 2021.
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021–19029 Filed 9–2–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Submission for OMB Review;
Comment Request
Upon Written Request, Copies Available
From: Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of FOIA Services,
100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549–2736
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Extension:
Rule 301 of Regulation ATS; [SEC File No.
270–451, OMB Control No. 3235–0509]
Notice is hereby given that pursuant
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(‘‘PRA’’) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) has submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget
(‘‘OMB’’) a request for approval of
extension of the previously approved
collection of information provided for in
Rule 301 of Regulation ATS (17 CFR
242.301) under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.)
(‘‘Exchange Act’’).
Regulation ATS provides a regulatory
structure for alternative trading systems.
Rule 301 of Regulation ATS contains
certain record keeping and reporting
requirements, as well as additional
obligations that apply only to alternative
trading systems with significant volume.
The Rule requires all alternative trading
systems that wish to comply with
Regulation ATS to file an initial
operation report on Form ATS.
Alternative trading systems are also
required to supply updates on Form
ATS to the Commission describing
material changes to the system, file
quarterly transaction reports on Form
ATS–R, and file cessation of operations
reports on Form ATS. An alternative
trading system with significant volume
is required to comply with requirements
for fair access and systems capacity,
integrity, and security. Rule 301 also
imposes certain requirements pertaining
to written safeguards and procedures to
protect subscribers’ confidential trading
information.
The Commission staff estimates that
entities subject to the requirements of
Rule 301 will spend a total of
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approximately 2,687 hours a year to
comply with the Rule.
Regulation ATS requires ATSs to
preserve any records, for at least three
years, made in the process of complying
with the systems capacity, integrity and
security requirements.
An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information
under the PRA unless it displays a
currently valid OMB control number.
The public may view background
documentation for this information
collection at the following website:
www.reginfo.gov. Find this particular
information collection by selecting
‘‘Currently under 30-day Review—Open
for Public Comments’’ or by using the
search function. Written comments and
recommendations for the proposed
information collection should be sent
within 30 days of publication of this
notice to (i) www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAMain and (ii) David Bottom,
Director/Chief Information Officer,
Securities and Exchange Commission,
c/o Cynthia Roscoe, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, or by sending an
email to: PRA_Mailbox@sec.gov.
MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED:
Dated: August 30, 2021.
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[Release No. 34–92808; File No. SR–FICC–
2021–003]
[FR Doc. 2021–19030 Filed 9–2–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Sunshine Act Meetings
The agenda
for the meeting includes: Welcome
remarks; approval of previous meeting
minutes; a panel discussion entitled
‘‘Reimagining Investor Protection in a
Digital World: The Behavioral Design of
Online Trading Platforms’’; a panel
discussion regarding competition and
regulatory reform at the PCAOB; a
discussion of a recommendation
regarding 10b5–1 plans; a discussion of
a recommendation regarding SPACs;
subcommittee reports; and a non-public
administrative session.
CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:
For further information and to ascertain
what, if any, matters have been added,
deleted or postponed; please contact
Vanessa A. Countryman from the Office
of the Secretary at (202) 551–5400.
Dated: September 1, 2021.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021–19290 Filed 9–1–21; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed
Income Clearing Corporation; Notice of
Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order
Granting Accelerated Approval of a
Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by
Amendment No. 1, To Add the
Sponsored GC Service and Make Other
Changes
August 30, 2021.
Notice is hereby given,
pursuant to the provisions of the
Government in the Sunshine Act, Public
Law 94–409, that the Securities and
Exchange Commission Investor
Advisory Committee will hold a public
meeting on Thursday, September 9,
2021. The meeting will begin at 10 a.m.
(ET) and will be open to the public.
PLACE: The meeting will be conducted
by remote means and/or at the
Commission’s headquarters, 100 F St
NE, Washington, DC 20549. Members of
the public may watch the webcast of the
meeting on the Commission’s website at
www.sec.gov.
STATUS: This Sunshine Act notice is
being issued because a majority of the
Commission may attend the meeting.
On August 27, 2021, the Commission
published notice of the Committee
meeting (Release Nos. 33–10968, 34–
92783), indicating that the meeting is
open to the public and inviting the
public to submit written comments to
the Committee.
TIME AND DATE:
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On May 12, 2021, Fixed Income
Clearing Corporation (‘‘FICC’’) filed
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘Commission’’), pursuant
to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule
19b–4 thereunder,2 proposed rule
change SR–FICC–2021–003 to amend
FICC’s Government Securities Division
Rulebook 3 to add a new service that
expands FICC’s existing Sponsored
Service.4 The proposed rule change was
1 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
3 FICC’s Government Securities Division (‘‘GSD’’)
Rulebook (‘‘Rules’’) is available at https://
www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures.
4 FICC also filed the proposals contained in the
proposed rule change as advance notice SR–FICC–
2021–801 with the Commission pursuant to Section
806(e)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act entitled the Payment,
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010
(‘‘Clearing Supervision Act’’), 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1),
and Rule 19b–4(n)(1)(i) of the Act, 17 CFR 240.19b–
4(n)(1)(i). Notice of filing of the Advance Notice
was published for comment in the Federal Register
on June 3, 2021. Securities Exchange Act Release
2 17
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published for public comment in the
Federal Register on June 1, 2021.5 On
June 8, 2021, FICC filed Amendment
No. 1 to the proposed rule change, to
correct an erroneous cross reference in
the original filing.6 The proposed rule
change, as modified by Amendment No.
1, is hereinafter referred to as the
‘‘Proposed Rule Change.’’ On June 24,
2021, the Commission published a
notice designating a longer period of
time for Commission action and a longer
period for public comment on the
Proposed Rule Change.7 The
Commission received one comment
letter in support of the Proposed Rule
Change.8
The Commission is publishing this
notice to solicit comments on
Amendment No. 1 from interested
persons and, for the reasons discussed
below, to approve the Proposed Rule
Change on an accelerated basis.
I. Description of the Proposed Rule
Change
A. Background
1. FICC Services for Repurchase
Agreement (‘‘Repo’’) Transactions
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Repos involve a pair of securities
transactions between two parties. The
parties agree to the terms of the trade,
including the securities, principal
No. 92019 (May 27, 2021), 86 FR 29834 (June 3,
2021) (SR–FICC–2021–801).
5 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92014 (May
25, 2021), 86 FR 29334 (June 1, 2021) (SR–FICC–
2020–003) (‘‘Notice’’).
6 Amendment No. 1 made a correction to Exhibit
5 of the filing. On June 8, 2021, FICC filed
Amendment No. 1 to the advance notice to make
the same correction as regarding the proposed rule
change. The advance notice, as modified by
Amendment No. 1, is hereinafter referred to as the
‘‘Advance Notice.’’ On June 11, 2021, the
Commission, by the Division of Trading and
Markets, pursuant to delegated authority, requested
additional information from FICC pursuant to
Section 806(e)(1)(D) of the Clearing Supervision
Act. 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(93); 12 U.S.C.
5465(e)(1)(D). The request for information tolled the
Commission’s period of review of the Advance
Notice until 60 days from the date of the
Commission’s receipt of the information requested
from FICC. See 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(E)(ii) and
(G)(ii); see Memorandum from the Office of
Clearance and Settlement, Division of Trading and
Markets, titled ‘‘Commission’s Request for
Additional Information,’’ available at https://
www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ficc-an/2021/34-92019memo-ficc.pdf. The Commission received the
information requested from FICC on July 2, 2021.
7 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92185
(June 15, 2021), 86 FR 33420 (June 24, 2021) (SR–
FICC–2021–003).
8 The comment is available at https://
www.sec.gov/comments/sr-ficc-2021-003/
srficc2021003.htm. Because the proposals
contained in the Advance Notice and the Proposed
Rule Change are the same, the Commission
considers any public comments received on the
proposal as applicable to both filings, regardless of
whether comments are submitted with respect to
the Advance Notice or the Proposed Rule Change.
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amount, interest rate, haircut, and tenor
(i.e., date of maturity). The first
transaction (the ‘‘Start Leg’’) consists of
the sale of securities, in which one party
(the ‘‘cash borrower’’) delivers
securities, and in exchange, the other
party (the ‘‘cash lender’’) delivers cash.
At the Start Leg, the cash borrower
typically delivers an amount of
securities equal in value to the amount
of cash received from the cash lender,
plus a haircut. Repo durations range
from one day (‘‘overnight’’) to a year or
more, but are usually less than three
months (‘‘term’’). The second
transaction (the ‘‘End Leg’’) occurs on a
date after that of the Start Leg and
consists of the repurchase of securities,
in which the obligations to deliver cash
and securities are the reverse of the Start
Leg. At the End Leg, the cash borrower
typically delivers the amount of cash
borrowed, plus interest, and the cash
lender returns the securities.
FICC serves as CCP and provides
clearance and settlement services to
facilitate both bilateral and tri-party
repo transactions. FICC facilitates
bilateral repos 9 in which all securities
delivery obligations are made against
full payment (‘‘delivery-versuspayment’’ or ‘‘DVP’’) (the ‘‘DVP
Service’’). FICC generally novates and
guarantees settlement of a trade upon
validation of the trade details, which
results in the legally binding and
enforceable contract between FICC and
the parties to the trade.10 On a daily
basis, FICC aggregates and matches a
member’s offsetting obligations resulting
from the member’s trades, thereby
netting the member’s total daily
settlement obligations.11
FICC facilitates tri-party repos 12
through its General Collateral Finance
(‘‘GCF’’) Repo® Service, which enables
members to trade general collateral
9 A bilateral repo is one in which the cash lender
and cash borrower directly exchange cash and
securities. In the bilateral repo market, the parties
specify the securities used as collateral. Therefore,
a cash lender seeking to obtain a particular security
would utilize the bilateral repo market.
10 See Rule 5, supra note 3.
11 See Rule 11, supra note 3.
12 A tri-party repo is one in which a clearing
bank, acting as tri-party agent, provides to both the
cash lender and the cash borrower certain
operational, custodial, collateral management, and
other services. In tri-party repo trading, both parties
maintain accounts at a clearing bank, which
facilitates the payment and delivery of cash and
securities between the parties’ accounts. In contrast
to the bilateral repo market and its use of specific
collateral, the tri-party repo market is exclusively
for general collateral repos, meaning that the parties
agree to use any securities from a pre-approved
basket of acceptable securities as collateral. In a
general collateral repo, the cash lender is indifferent
to the particular securities it receives as collateral,
provided that the securities come from the preapproved basket of acceptable securities.
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49581
finance repos based on rate, term, and
underlying product throughout the day
on a blind basis.13 The Bank of New
York Mellon operates the tri-party
platform that facilitates trades
conducted through the GCF Repo
Service. FICC has established
standardized, generic CUSIP Numbers
exclusively for GCF Repo processing
and to specify the acceptable types of
underlying Fedwire book-entry eligible
collateral, which include U.S.
Treasuries, U.S. government agency
securities, and certain mortgage-backed
securities.14
2. Sponsored Membership
In 2005, FICC established the
Sponsored Service, allowing eligible
members to sponsor their clients into a
limited form of membership.15 A
Sponsoring Member is permitted to
submit to FICC, for comparison,
novation, and netting, certain eligible
securities transactions of its Sponsored
Members. FICC requires each
Sponsoring Member to establish an
omnibus account at FICC (separate from
its regular netting account) for
Sponsored Member trading activity.
Sponsored Members generally have to
meet the definition of a qualified
institutional buyer (‘‘QIB’’), as defined
in Rule 144A 16 under the Securities Act
of 1933.17
For operational and administrative
purposes, FICC interacts solely with the
Sponsoring Member as agent for
purposes of the day-to-day satisfaction
of its Sponsored Members’ obligations
to and from FICC, including their
securities and funds-only settlement
obligations.18 Sponsoring Members are
also responsible for providing FICC with
a Sponsoring Member Guaranty,
whereby the Sponsoring Member
guarantees to FICC the payment and
performance by its Sponsored Members
of their obligations under the Rules.19
Although Sponsored Members are
principally liable to FICC for their own
settlement obligations under the Rules,
the Sponsoring Member Guaranty
requires the Sponsoring Member to
satisfy those settlement obligations on
behalf of a Sponsored Member if the
13 See
Rule 20, supra note 3.
Rule 3 (definitions of ‘‘GCF Repo
Transaction’’ and ‘‘Generic CUSIP Number’’) and
Rule 20, Section 2, supra note 3; Notice, supra note
5 at 29336.
15 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51896
(June 21, 2005), 70 FR 36981 (June 27, 2005) (SR–
FICC–2004–22). See Rule 3A, supra note 3.
16 17 CFR 230.144A.
17 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.
18 See Rule 3A, Section 8, supra note 3.
19 See Rule 1 (definition of ‘‘Sponsoring Member
Guaranty’’) and Rule 3A, Section 2(c), supra note
3.
14 See
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Sponsored Member defaults and fails to
perform its settlement obligations.20
B. Proposed Sponsored GC Service
Currently, the Sponsored Service only
facilitates trading in bilateral DVP repos,
not tri-party repos. In the Proposed Rule
Change, FICC proposes to expand the
Sponsored Service to accommodate triparty repo trading, which FICC believes
would increase term repo activity
within the Sponsored Service. FICC
states that several market participants
have indicated that they currently
transact tri-party term repos outside of
central clearing because they are not
operationally equipped to perform the
collateral management and other
functions associated with term DVP
repos.21 In particular, money market
funds and other mutual funds generally
prefer to use the tri-party repo market
because a clearing bank administers
collateral management and other
functions, as described above.22
Therefore, FICC proposes to add the
Sponsored GC Service, which would
allow (but not require) Sponsoring
Members and their Sponsored Members
to trade general collateral repos with
each other on the tri-party platform of
a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank 23
(each, a ‘‘Sponsored GC Trade’’). Such
general collateral repos would involve
the same asset classes that are currently
available for members using the GCF
Repo Service.24 Consistent with the GCF
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20 Id.
21 See Notice, supra note 5 at 29336. A key
difference between the bilateral and tri-party repo
markets deals with the operational aspects of
managing term repos. In the tri-party repo market,
a clearing bank typically automatically selects
securities from the cash borrower’s account to serve
as collateral that satisfies the credit and liquidity
criteria agreed between the parties. The clearing
bank delivers securities against the simultaneous
delivery of cash between the parties’ accounts at the
clearing bank. The clearing bank manages the
regular revaluation of collateral, variation
margining, income payments on the collateral, and
collateral substitutions. In the bilateral repo market,
the parties themselves perform such collateral
management and other administrative functions.
22 See Notice, supra note 5 at 29336.
23 The Bank of New York Mellon operates the triparty platform that would facilitate trades
conducted through the Sponsored GC Service.
24 FICC would register a new series of Generic
CUSIP Numbers for the Sponsored GC Service as
follows: (i) U.S. Treasury Securities maturing in ten
(10) years or less, (ii) U.S. Treasury Securities
maturing in thirty (30) years or less, (iii) NonMortgage-Backed U.S. Agency Securities, (iv)
Federal National Mortgage Association (‘‘Fannie
Mae’’) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (‘‘Freddie Mac’’) Fixed Rate MortgageBacked Securities, (v) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed Securities, (vi)
Government National Mortgage Association
(‘‘Ginnie Mae’’) Fixed Rate Mortgage-Backed
Securities, (vii) Ginnie Mae Adjustable Rate
Mortgage-Backed Securities, (viii) U.S. Treasury
Inflation-Protected Securities (‘‘TIPS’’) and (ix) U.S.
Treasury Separate Trading of Registered Interest
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16:55 Sep 02, 2021
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Repo Service, the Sponsored GC Service
would also permit cash borrowers to
make collateral substitutions. Sponsored
GC Trades would settle in a manner
similar to the way Sponsoring Members
and Sponsored Members currently settle
tri-party repos with each other outside
of central clearing.
Sponsored GC Service Structure
Sponsored GC Trades would only be
between a Sponsored Member and its
Sponsoring Member. FICC would novate
only the End Legs of Sponsored GC
Trades. Consistent with the current
settlement process of such tri-party
repos outside of central clearing, the
Start Legs of Sponsored GC Trades
would continue to settle on a trade-fortrade basis on the tri-party platform of
a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank.25
Accrued repo interest on Sponsored
GC Trades would be paid and collected
by FICC on a daily basis. Additionally,
if the market value of the securities
collateral decreases from its market
value at the Start Leg, the cash borrower
would be required deliver to FICC
additional securities (and/or cash) such
that the market value of the total
securities collateral remains at least
equal to its market value at the Start
Leg. Conversely, if the market value of
the securities collateral increases from
its market value at the Start Leg, the
cash lender would be required to deliver
to FICC securities (and/or cash) such
that the market value of the remaining
securities collateral remains at least
equal to its market value at the Start
Leg. Such additional securities (and/or
cash) must be delivered within the
timeframe set forth in a proposed new
schedule of Sponsored GC Trade
timeframes set forth in the Rules.
In order to facilitate settlement of
securities and cash obligations, FICC
would direct each party to a Sponsored
GC Trade to make any payment or
delivery due to FICC in respect of a
Sponsored GC Trade (except for certain
and Principal of Securities (‘‘STRIPS’’). The
purpose of registering a new series of Generic
CUSIP Numbers specific to the Sponsored GC
Service is to avoid any operational processing errors
that could otherwise result if a trade intended for
the Sponsored GC Service was inadvertently
processed as a GCF Repo transaction or vice versa.
Notice, supra note 5 at 29336.
25 FICC does not believe it would be efficient or
appropriate to novate the Start Legs of Sponsored
GC Trades, as that novation would unnecessarily
complicate an already efficient process by requiring
the parties to make significant operational and
business changes to include FICC in the transaction
chain. Since Sponsored GC Trades would only be
between a Sponsored Member and its Sponsoring
Member on a known (i.e., not blind) basis, all Start
Leg obligations would settle between a single set of
counterparties, negating any efficiency or reduced
settlement risk that FICC’s novation would provide.
See Notice, supra note 5 at 29337.
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
funds-only settlement obligations, as
discussed below) directly to the relevant
pre-novation counterparty. As a result,
each transfer of securities and daily repo
interest would be made directly
between the Sponsored Member and its
Sponsoring Member via the tri-party
repo platform of a Sponsored GC
Clearing Agent Bank.26
Market Risk Management
FICC would manage its market risk
with respect to Sponsored GC Trades
similar to the manner in which FICC
manages existing trades within the
Sponsored Service. To mitigate market
risk, FICC would calculate the Value at
Risk (‘‘VaR’’) margin component (‘‘VaR
Charge’’) 27 for each Sponsored Member
based on its activity in the Sponsored
Service, including its activity in the
proposed Sponsored GC Service. The
VaR Charge for the Sponsoring
Member’s omnibus account for
Sponsored Member trading activity
would continue to be gross-margined as
the sum of the individual VaR Charges
for each Sponsored Member client.28
Additionally, FICC would assign a
symbol to each Sponsored Member to
facilitate FICC’s ability to surveil the
Sponsored Member’s activity across its
Sponsored GC Trades as well as its
other Sponsored Member Trades within
the existing Sponsored Service (both
with the same Sponsoring Member and
across Sponsoring Members, if
applicable). In addition, FICC would
apply certain heightened requirements
that apply to certain Sponsoring
Members within the Sponsored GC
Service as well.29 For example, FICC
26 FICC similarly does not believe it would be
appropriate for FICC to be in the transaction chain
for each payment and delivery under a Sponsored
GC Trade because inserting FICC in the middle of
the payments and deliveries would require
substantial changes in operational processes for
both Sponsored Members and Sponsoring Members.
FICC does not believe such operational changes are
necessary since there can only be two pre-novation
counterparties involved in the settlement of a
Sponsored GC Trade (i.e., the Sponsoring Member
and its Sponsored Member client). See Notice,
supra note 5 at 29337–38.
27 Each member’s margin consists of a number of
applicable components. The VaR Charge is typically
the largest component of a member’s margin
requirement. The VaR Charge is designed to capture
the potential market price risk associated with the
securities in a member’s portfolio. The VaR Charge
is designed to provide an estimate of FICC’s
projected liquidation losses with respect to a
defaulted member’s portfolio at a 99 percent
confidence level. See Rule 1 (definition of ‘‘VaR
Charge’’), supra note 3; Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 83362 (June 1, 2018), 83 FR 26514 (June
7, 2018) (SR–FICC–2018–001).
28 See Rule 3A, Section 10, supra note 3.
29 Specifically, these restrictions apply to
Category 2 Sponsoring Members, which are other
members that meet certain financial requirements
as compared to Category 1 Sponsoring Members,
which are bank netting members that are well-
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may impose heightened financial
requirements on these Sponsoring
Members based on their anticipated
activity and other factors,30 and FICC
may limit such a Sponsoring Member’s
activity if the sum of the VaR Charges
of its omnibus and netting accounts
exceeds its net capital.31
In addition, FICC would manage the
mark-to-market risk associated with
unaccrued repo interest on a Sponsored
GC Trade through a proposed new
interest rate mark component of fundsonly settlement.32 FICC would also
apply an Interest Adjustment Payment
to Sponsored GC Trades to account for
overnight use of funds by the
Sponsoring Member or Sponsored
Member, as applicable, based on such
party’s receipt from FICC of a Forward
Mark Adjustment Payment (reflecting a
GC Interest Rate Mark) on the previous
business day.33
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Liquidity Risk Management
Currently, trades between a
Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored
Member do not independently create
liquidity risk for FICC. Under its Rules,
if a Sponsoring Member defaults, FICC
may close out (that is, cash settle) the
Sponsored Member trades of the
defaulting Sponsoring Member.34
Similarly, if a Sponsored Member
defaults, FICC may offset its settlement
obligations to the Sponsoring Member
against the Sponsoring Member’s
obligations under the Sponsoring
Member Guaranty to perform on behalf
of its defaulting Sponsored Member.35
Thus, in both default scenarios, FICC
bears no liquidity risk.
As a result, to the extent a Sponsoring
Member either (1) runs a matched book
of Sponsored Member trades (i.e., enters
into offsetting trades with its own
capitalized with $5 billion in equity capital. See
Rule 3A, Section 2(a), supra note 3.
30 See Rule 3A, Section 2(b), supra note 3.
31 See Rule 3A, Section 2(h), supra note 3.
32 This GC Interest Rate Mark would be calculated
in the same manner as the GCF Interest Rate Mark
is for GCF Repo transactions. For a detailed
description of the calculation, see Notice, supra
note 5 at 29337–38.
33 No other components of funds-only settlement
would be necessary to apply to Sponsored GC
Trades because, as described above, (i) all
Sponsored GC Trades would novate after the
settlement of the Start Legs of such trades (i.e., not
during the Forward-Starting Period), (ii) mark-tomarket changes in the value of the securities
transferred under Sponsored GC Trades would be
managed by the Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank
on FICC’s behalf (consistent with the manner in
which GCF Repo transactions are currently
processed), and (iii) the accrued repo interest on
Sponsored GC Trades would be passed on a daily
basis, as described above.
34 See Rule 3A, Section 14(c), supra note 3. See
also Rule 22A, Section 2, supra note 3.
35 See Rule 3A, Section 11, supra note 3.
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16:55 Sep 02, 2021
Jkt 253001
Sponsored Members), or (2) simply
enters into trades with its Sponsored
Member (i.e., without entering into
offsetting trades), such activities do not
increase FICC’s liquidity risk. FICC
bears liquidity risk only when a
Sponsoring Member enters into an
offsetting trade in which a third-party
member is the pre-novation
counterparty. In that scenario, FICC is
required to settle the obligations of a
defaulting Sponsoring Member.
Since Sponsored GC Trades would
not involve third-party members, such
trades would impact FICC’s liquidity
risk in a similar manner to trades
between a Sponsoring Member and its
Sponsored Member in the current
Sponsored Service. As a result, FICC
proposes to manage the liquidity risk
associated with Sponsored GC Trades in
the same manner that it currently
manages such risk for other trades
between a Sponsoring Member and its
Sponsored Member.
C. Proposed Changes to Allocations
Within the Capped Contingency
Liquidity Facility (‘‘CCLF’’)
1. CCLF Background
On April 25, 2017, the Commission
approved FICC’s adoption of the
Clearing Agency Liquidity Risk
Management Framework
(‘‘Framework’’), which broadly
describes FICC’s liquidity risk
management strategy and objective to
maintain sufficient liquid resources in
order to meet the potential amount of
funding required to settle outstanding
transactions of a defaulting member
(including affiliates) in a timely
manner.36 The Framework identifies,
among other things, each of the
qualifying liquid resources available to
FICC, including the CCLF.37 The CCLF
is a rules-based, committed liquidity
resource, designed to enable FICC to
meet its cash settlement obligations in
the event of a default of the member
(including the member’s family of
affiliated members) to which FICC has
the largest exposure in extreme but
plausible market conditions.38 FICC
36 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80489
(April 19, 2017), 82 FR 19120 (April 25, 2017) (SR–
FICC–2017–008).
37 See id.
38 FICC designed the CCLF to meet the regulatory
requirement for a covered clearing agency to
measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk by
maintaining sufficient liquid resources to effect
same-day settlement of payment obligations in the
event of a default of the participant family that
would generate the largest aggregate payment
obligation for the clearing agency in extreme but
plausible market conditions. 17 CFR 240.17Ad–
22(e)(7)(i); see Securities Exchange Act Release No.
82090 (November 15, 2017), 82 FR 55427, 55430
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49583
would activate the CCLF if, upon a
member default, FICC determines that
its non-CCLF liquidity resources would
not generate sufficient cash to satisfy
FICC’s payment obligations to its nondefaulting members. In simple terms, a
CCLF repo is equivalent to a nondefaulting member financing FICC’s
payment obligation under the original
trade, thereby providing FICC with time
to liquidate the securities underlying
the original trade. More specifically,
upon activating the CCLF, members
would be called upon to enter into repo
transactions (as cash lenders) with FICC
(as cash borrower) up to a predetermined capped dollar amount,
thereby providing FICC with sufficient
liquidity to meet its payment
obligations. For a non-defaulting
member to whom FICC has a payment
obligation disrupted by a member
default, a CCLF repo would extinguish
and replace the original trade that gave
rise to FICC’s payment obligation.
FICC determines the total size of the
CCLF based on FICC’s potential cash
settlement obligations that would result
from the default of the member
(including affiliates) presenting the
largest liquidity need to FICC over a
specified look-back period, plus an
additional liquidity buffer. In the
Proposed Rule Change, FICC does not
propose to change the method by which
it determines the total size of the CCLF.
FICC uses a tiered approach to
allocate the total size of the CCLF
among its members to arrive at the
amount of each member’s CCLF
obligation. FICC allocates $15 billion of
the total size of the CCLF among all
members.39 FICC allocates the
remainder of the total size of the CCLF
among members that generate liquidity
needs above the $15 billion threshold
based on the frequency that such
members generate daily liquidity needs
over $15 billion across supplemental
liquidity tiers in $5 billion increments.
Specifically, FICC calculates a dollar
amount for the CCLF obligation
applicable to each supplemental
liquidity tier. FICC allocates the CCLF
obligation for each supplemental
liquidity tier to members on a pro-rata
basis corresponding to the number of
times each member generates liquidity
(November 21, 2017) (SR–FICC–2017–002); Rule
22A, Section 2a, supra note 3.
39 FICC has determined that $15 billion is an
appropriate amount for allocation to all members
because the average member’s liquidity need from
2015–2016 was approximately $7 billion, with a
majority of members (approximately 85 percent)
having liquidity needs less than $15 billion. See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82090
(November 15, 2017), 82 FR 55427, 55430
(November 21, 2017) (SR–FICC–2017–002).
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needs within each supplemental
liquidity tier.40
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2. Current CCLF Allocation
Methodology for the Sponsored Service
Currently, FICC does not impose a
CCLF obligation on a Sponsoring
Member to the extent the Sponsoring
Member runs a matched book of
Sponsored Member trades. This is
because to determine a Sponsoring
Member’s CCLF obligation, FICC nets all
of the positions recorded in the
Sponsoring Member’s omnibus account
(regardless of whether they relate to the
same Sponsored Member) and
separately nets all of the positions in the
Sponsoring Member’s netting account.41
As a result, to the extent a Sponsoring
Member enters into perfectly offsetting
Sponsored Member trades (i.e., the
matched book scenario), the settlement
obligations of those trades net out in the
omnibus account and the netting
account, with no resulting CCLF
obligation for the Sponsoring Member.
However, if a Sponsoring Member
enters into a Sponsored Member trade
without entering into an offsetting
transaction, the Sponsoring Member is
subject to CCLF obligations for the
position of its Sponsored Member
recorded in its omnibus account as well
as its own position arising from the
Sponsored Member trade recorded in its
netting account. Although the positions
in the Sponsoring Member’s omnibus
account and netting account offset each
other, FICC does not currently net such
positions for CCLF purposes because
CCLF allocations are determined at the
participant account level.42 FICC
40 For example, a member that generates daily
liquidity needs in the $15–$20 billion supplemental
liquidity tier would incur a pro-rata share for the
$15–$20 billion supplemental liquidity tier only.
Another member that generates daily liquidity
needs in the $20–$25 billion supplemental liquidity
tier would incur a pro-rata share for both the $15–
$20 and $20–$25 billion supplemental liquidity
tiers. A third member that generates daily liquidity
needs in the $65–$70 billion supplemental liquidity
tier would incur a pro-rata share for every
supplemental liquidity tier. Each member’s pro-rata
share is based on the frequency with which the
member generates daily liquidity needs in each
supplemental liquidity tier. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 80234 (March 14, 2017),
82 FR 14401, 14404–05 (March 20, 2017) (SR–
FICC–2017–002).
41 See Rule 3A, Section 8(b) and Rule 22A,
Section 2a(b), supra note 3.
42 This limitation on offset is consistent with
FICC’s approach of not offsetting the positions of
two accounts of the same member for CCLF
purposes. However, FICC notes an important
difference between Sponsored Member trades and
other FICC repo activity. See Notice, supra note 5
at 29343. Specifically, as mentioned above in
Section I.A.2., the Sponsored Service requires a
Sponsoring Member to maintain an omnibus
account that is separate from its netting account. In
contrast, for all other repo activity, members have
the option to collapse all of their activity into a
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believes the foregoing scenario should
not contribute to the Sponsoring
Member’s CCLF obligation because, as
described above in Section I.B, such
offsetting obligations do not present
liquidity risk to FICC.
3. Proposed CCLF Allocation
Methodology for the Sponsored Service
As described above, trades between a
Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored
Member do not independently create
liquidity risk for FICC, and therefore,
FICC believes that such trades should
not affect the Sponsoring Member’s
CCLF obligation. To ensure that a
Sponsoring Member’s CCLF obligation
is calculated to reflect the lack of
liquidity risk to FICC associated with
Sponsored Member trades, FICC
proposes to take into account, for CCLF
calculation purposes, any offsetting
settlement obligations between a
Sponsoring Member’s netting account
and its omnibus account. This proposed
change would ensure that all Sponsored
Member trades, whether perfectly offset
by other Sponsored Member trades (i.e.,
the matched book scenario) or not,
would be recognized for CCLF purposes
as not affecting FICC’s liquidity risk.
This proposed change would also apply
to trades in the new Sponsored GC
Service.43
Although, as noted above, the
Proposed Rule Change would not affect
the method by which FICC determines
the total CCLF amount, FICC’s proposal
to net offsetting trades between a
Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored
Member for CCLF calculation purposes
would affect the allocation of CCLF
obligations over $15 billion to other
single participant account in order to achieve a
similar netting benefit. Sponsoring Members do not
have that option with respect to their Sponsored
Member trades. Therefore, FICC believes this
proposed change is necessary to ensure that a
Sponsoring Member’s CCLF obligations are
calculated in a manner that more closely aligns
with the liquidity risk associated with Sponsored
Member trades. Id.
43 For Sponsored GC Trades, this proposed
change would ensure that FICC applies an
appropriate CCLF obligation to a Sponsoring
Member in the event a Sponsored GC Clearing
Agent Bank allocates to a Sponsored GC Trade a
different security than the security that underlies an
offsetting Sponsored Member Trade. For example,
a Sponsoring Member may enter into a Sponsored
GC Trade on a Generic CUSIP Number and a
separate offsetting Sponsored Member trade in a
specific CUSIP Number. Although the specific
CUSIP Number might also be an eligible security
under the Generic CUSIP Number underlying the
Sponsored GC Trade, the Sponsored GC Clearing
Agent Bank could allocate to the Sponsored GC
Trade a different eligible CUSIP Number from the
list of eligible securities. FICC’s proposed change
would offset these positions across the Sponsoring
Member’s netting account and omnibus account to
ensure that the CCLF obligation applicable to the
Sponsoring Member accurately reflects the liquidity
risk associated with those positions.
PO 00000
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members. Specifically, as described
above, under the current Rules, if a
Sponsoring Member enters into a
Sponsored Member trade without
entering into an offsetting transaction,
the Sponsoring Member is subject to
CCLF obligations for the position of its
Sponsored Member recorded in its
omnibus account as well as its own
position arising from the Sponsored
Member trade recorded in its netting
account. Under the Proposed Rule
Change, the Sponsoring Member would
not incur CCLF obligations for such
transactions. Therefore, a Sponsoring
Member’s peak daily liquidity is
currently higher than it would be under
the Proposed Rule Change. This, in turn,
may decrease the frequency with which
a Sponsoring Member’s daily peak
liquidity reaches into higher
supplemental liquidity tiers. As a result,
the pro-rata allocation of CCLF
obligations among members with daily
peak liquidity in those supplemental
liquidity tiers would increase.44 When
fewer members generate peak liquidity
needs in a supplemental liquidity tier,
the remaining members that generate
peak liquidity in that tier bear a larger
pro-rata share of the CCLF allocations
for that tier.
D. Other Proposed Changes
FICC proposes to remove a provision
from the Rules requiring a Sponsoring
Member to provide FICC with a
quarterly representation that each of its
Sponsored Members is a either a QIB or
satisfies the financial requirements
necessary to be a QIB.45 FICC proposes
to remove this requirement because an
existing Rule provision requires a
Sponsoring Member to attest that a
Sponsored Member satisfies the QIB
requirement at the time of the
Sponsored Member’s initial
application,46 and another existing Rule
provision requires a Sponsoring
Member to notify FICC if its Sponsored
Member no longer satisfies the QIB
requirement.47 Therefore, FICC believes
the quarterly representation to be an
overlapping and redundant requirement
that creates unnecessary administrative
burdens for FICC and for its Sponsoring
Members.48
FICC also proposes to make certain
corrections to the Rules regarding the
Sponsored Service. First, FICC proposes
to change an erroneous reference to the
44 However, as stated above, the proposals in the
Proposed Rule Change would not change FICC’s
current methodology for calculating the total
amount of the CCLF.
45 See Rule 3A, Section 2(d), supra note 3.
46 See Rule 3A, Section 3(b), supra note 3.
47 See Rule 3A, Section 3(d), supra note 3.
48 See Notice, supra note 5 at 29343.
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‘‘Close Leg’’ in the Rule 1 definition of
Initial Haircut to ‘‘Start Leg.’’ Second,
FICC proposes to clarify the citation to
paragraph (a)(1)(i)(H) of Rule 144A in
Rule 3A, Section 3(a)(ii)(B).
Additionally, FICC proposes to make
several technical and grammatical
changes to section numbers and crossreferences throughout the Rules to
conform with the new proposed Rule
provisions regarding Sponsored GC
Service.
E. Description of Amendment No. 1
In Amendment No. 1, FICC updated
Exhibit 5 to the Proposed Rule Change
to correct an erroneous cross reference
in the original filing. Specifically,
Exhibit 5 to the original filing
erroneously showed the proposed
change to Rule 3A, Section 18,
subsection (a) to include a cross
reference to subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii)
of the Sponsored Trade definition.
Amendment No. 1 corrected Exhibit 5
so that the cross reference is to
subsections (a)(i) and (b) of the
Sponsored Trade definition.
II. Discussion and Commission
Findings
Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act 49
directs the Commission to approve a
proposed rule change of a selfregulatory organization if it finds that
such proposed rule change is consistent
with the requirements of the Act and
rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to such organization. After
carefully considering the Proposed Rule
Change, the Commission finds that the
Proposed Rule Change is consistent
with the requirements of the Act and the
rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to FICC. In particular, the
Commission finds that the Proposed
Rule Change is consistent with Sections
17A(b)(3)(F) 50 of the Act and Rules
17Ad–22(e)(7), (e)(18), and (e)(23)
thereunder.51
A. Consistency With Section
17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act
53 See
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Act 52
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the
requires the rules of a clearing agency
to, among other things, (i) promote the
prompt and accurate clearance and
settlement of securities transactions, (ii)
assure the safeguarding of securities and
funds which are in the custody or
control of the clearing agency or for
which it is responsible, and (iii) protect
investors and the public interest.
49 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
U.S.C. 78q–1(b)(3)(F).
51 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(7), (e)(18), and (e)(23).
52 15 U.S.C. 78q–1(b)(3)(F).
50 15
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As described above in Section I.B.,
FICC’s current Sponsored Service only
facilitates trading in DVP repos, not triparty repos. Certain market participants
(e.g., money market funds and other
mutual funds) have stated that their
participation in the Sponsored Service
is inhibited because they are not
operationally equipped to perform the
collateral management and other
functions associated with term DVP
repos.53 FICC proposes to expand the
Sponsored Service via the Sponsored
GC Service to accommodate tri-party
repo trading, in which a clearing bank
administers such collateral management
and other functions. As a result, FICC
expects the proposed Sponsored GC
Service to increase term repo activity
within the Sponsored Service.54 By
enabling Sponsoring Members and their
Sponsored Members to engage in triparty term repo transactions with each
other, the proposed Sponsored GC
Service would encourage more term
repo trades centrally cleared by FICC
within the Sponsored Service.
Increasing the number of trades
centrally cleared by FICC would
promote the prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of securities
transactions because securities
transactions that might otherwise be
conducted outside of central clearing
would benefit from FICC’s risk
management and guarantee of
settlement.55 Accordingly, FICC’s
proposal to add the Sponsored GC
Service is consistent with promoting the
prompt and accurate clearance and
settlement of securities transactions.
Additionally, as described above in
Section I.C., the CCLF is designed to
provide FICC with sufficient qualifying
liquid resources to cover the default of
the family of affiliated members that
would generate the largest liquidity
need for FICC. The Proposed Rule
Change would change the allocation of
CCLF obligations among FICC’s
members. Specifically, with respect to
Jkt 253001
Notice, supra note 5 at 29336.
id. FICC conducted two surveys of its
Sponsoring Members, the data from which supports
FICC’s expectation that the proposed Sponsored GC
Service would increase term repo activity within
the Sponsored Service. FICC provided the survey
data to the Commission as part of FICC’s response
to the Commission’s request for additional
information in connection with the Advance
Notice. See supra note 6. Pursuant to 17 CFR
240.24b-2, FICC requested confidential treatment of
its response to the Commission’s request for
additional information.
55 See Letter from Robert Toomey, Managing
Director and Associate General Counsel, Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (June
18, 2021) at 2 (commenting on the benefits to
market participants resulting from the expected
increase in greater central clearing of tri-party repos
via the Sponsored GC Service).
54 See
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49585
trades between a Sponsoring Member
and Sponsored Member, FICC proposes
to take into account, for CCLF
calculation purposes, any offsetting
settlement obligations between a
Sponsoring Member’s netting account
and its omnibus account. Such trades do
not independently create liquidity risk
for FICC, and therefore, should not
affect the Sponsoring Member’s CCLF
obligation. Therefore, the Proposed Rule
Change would result in the allocation of
CCLF obligations to FICC’s members
that more accurately reflect the liquidity
needs presented to FICC by each
member. However, the proposed change
in CCLF allocation methodology would
not change the current total overall size
of the CCLF. By maintaining the total
size of the CCLF, FICC should be able
to continue to perform its clearance and
settlement functions with sufficient
qualifying liquidity resources for FICC
to mitigate the losses that the default of
the largest affiliated family of members
could cause, not only to FICC and its
non-defaulting members, but also to the
financial markets more broadly. As
such, the Proposed Rule Change is
consistent with promoting the
safeguarding of securities and funds in
FICC’s custody and control, and thereby
protecting investors and the public
interest.
Finally, as described above in Section
I.D., FICC also proposes to make certain
corrections to the Rules regarding the
Sponsored Service, as well as several
technical and grammatical changes
throughout the Rules to conform with
the new provisions regarding Sponsored
GC Service. Making corrections and
other improvements to clarify the Rules
helps to ensure that the Rules are
accurate and clear to members.
Members that better understand their
rights and obligations regarding the
Rules are more likely to act in
accordance with the Rules, which
generally promotes the prompt and
accurate clearance and settlement of
securities transactions.
For the foregoing reasons, the
Commission believes that the Proposed
Rule Change is designed to promote the
prompt and accurate clearance and
settlement of securities transactions,
safeguard securities and funds that are
in the custody or control of FICC, and
protect investors and the public interest,
consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of
the Exchange Act.56
B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad–22(e)(7)
Rule 17Ad–22(e)(7) under the Act
requires a covered clearing agency to
establish, implement, maintain, and
56 15
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enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to effectively
measure, monitor, and manage the
liquidity risk that arises in or is borne
by the covered clearing agency.57 As
described above in Section I.C., FICC
proposes to change the Rules to allow
netting, for CCLF allocation purposes, of
offsetting positions in a Sponsoring
Member’s omnibus account and netting
account.
FICC’s proposal would not impact
FICC’s current methodology for
determining the total amount of the
CCLF as a liquidity resource. As
discussed above in Section II.A., FICC
proposes to change the Rules regarding
CCLF allocation to ensure that a
Sponsoring Member’s CCLF obligation
aligns more closely with the actual
liquidity risk its trading activity
presents to FICC. As a result, FICC’s
proposed CCLF allocation methodology
represents more efficient liquidity risk
management than the current
methodology. Accordingly, the
Commission believes that FICC’s
proposed CCLF allocation methodology
is consistent with Rule 17Ad–22(e)(7).58
C. Consistency With Rule 17Ad–
22(e)(18)
Rule 17Ad–22(e)(18) under the Act
requires a covered clearing agency to
establish, implement, maintain, and
enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to establish
objective, risk-based, and publicly
disclosed criteria for participation in the
clearing agency.59 As described above in
Section I.D., FICC proposes to remove a
provision from the Rules requiring a
Sponsoring Member to provide FICC
with a quarterly representation that each
of its Sponsored Members is a either a
QIB or satisfies the financial
requirements necessary to be a QIB.
FICC proposes to remove the quarterly
representation requirement because
existing Rule provisions require
Sponsoring Members to attest to its
Sponsored Member’s QIB status 60 and
to notify FICC if a Sponsored Member
no longer satisfies the QIB
requirement.61 Therefore, the quarterly
representation requirement is redundant
and creates unnecessary administrative
burdens for FICC and its Sponsoring
Members. A redundant requirement that
creates unnecessary administrative
burdens is not an objective, risk-based
criterion for participation in FICC.
Accordingly, the Division believes that
57 17
FICC’s proposal to remove the
requirement for Sponsoring Members to
provide FICC with a quarterly
representation verifying the QIB status
of its Sponsored Members is consistent
with Rule 17Ad–22(e)(18).62
D. Consistency With Rule 17Ad–
22(e)(21)
III. Solicitation of Comments
IV. Accelerated Approval of the
Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by
Amendment No. 1
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning whether
Amendment No. 1 is consistent with the
Act. Comments may be submitted by
any of the following methods:
59 17
62 Id.
60 See
63 17
16:55 Sep 02, 2021
Jkt 253001
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to
Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–FICC–2021–003. This file
number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
internet website (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the Proposed Rule
Change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
Proposed Rule Change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such
filings will also be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of FICC and FICC’s website at
https://www.dtcc.com/legal.
All comments received will be posted
without change. Persons submitting
comments are cautioned that we do not
redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions.
You should submit only information
that you wish to make available
publicly. All submissions should refer
to File Number SR–FICC–2021–003 and
should be submitted on or before
September 24, 2021.
CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(7).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
Use the Commission’s internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
FICC–2021–003 on the subject line.
Rule 17Ad–22(e)(21) under the Act
requires a covered clearing agency to
establish, implement, maintain, and
enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to be efficient and
effective in meeting the requirements of
its participants and the markets it
serves, including the clearing agency’s
clearing and settlement arrangements
and the scope of products cleared or
settled.63 As described above in Section
I.B., FICC’s current Sponsored Service
does not accommodate the trading of triparty repos. FICC proposes to expand
the Sponsored Service to allow tri-party
repo trading to meet the needs of market
participants that currently transact triparty term repos outside of central
clearing because they are not
operationally equipped to perform the
collateral management and other
functions associated with term DVP
repos. By expanding the Sponsored
Service to facilitate tri-party repo
trading, FICC seeks to provide a viable
option for its members to transact term
tri-party repos in central clearing.
Sponsored GC Trades would settle in a
manner similar to the way Sponsoring
Members and Sponsored Members
currently settle tri-party repos with each
other outside of central clearing, thereby
making it more operationally efficient
for the parties to transact term repos
with each other using FICC as the CCP.
The Commission believes that the
proposed Sponsored GC Service is
consistent with Rule 17Ad–22(e)(21) 64
because it is responsive to the requests
from FICC’s members for the ability to
trade centrally cleared term tri-party
repos in a manner that is efficient and
effective in meeting the operational
requirements of FICC’s members.
58 Id.
CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(18).
Rule 3A, Section 3(b), supra note 3.
61 See Rule 3A, Section 3(d), supra note 3.
Electronic Comments
CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(21).
64 Id.
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The Commission finds good cause,
pursuant to Section 19(b)(2)(C)(iii) of
the Act,65 to approve the Proposed Rule
Change, as modified by Amendment No.
1, prior to the thirtieth day after the date
of publication of Amendment No. 1 in
the Federal Register. As noted above, in
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Amendment No. 1, FICC updated
Exhibit 5 to the Proposed Rule Change
to correct an erroneous cross reference
in the original filing. Amendment No. 1
neither modifies the Proposed Rule
Change as originally published in any
substantive manner, nor does
Amendment No. 1 affect any rights or
obligations of FICC or its members.
Instead, Amendment No. 1 corrects a
typographical error in the original filing.
Accordingly, the Commission finds
good cause, pursuant to Section
19(b)(2)(C)(iii) of the Act,66 to approve
the Proposed Rule Change, as modified
by Amendment No. 1, prior to the
thirtieth day after the date of
publication of notice of Amendment No.
1 in the Federal Register.
V. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the
Commission finds that the Proposed
Rule Change, as modified by
Amendment No. 1, is consistent with
the requirements of the Act and in
particular with the requirements of
Section 17A of the Act 67 and the rules
and regulations promulgated
thereunder.
It is therefore ordered, pursuant to
Section 19(b)(2) of the Act 68 that
proposed rule change SR–FICC–2021–
003, be, and hereby is, APPROVED.69
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.70
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021–19046 Filed 9–2–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–92802; File No. SR–NYSE–
2021–46]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; New
York Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of
Proposed Rule Change To Extend the
Temporary Period for Specified
Commentaries to Rules 7.35A and
7.35C and Temporary Rule Relief in
Rule 36.30
August 30, 2021.
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) 1 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
66 Id.
67 15
U.S.C. 78q–1.
U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
69 In approving the proposed rule change, the
Commission considered the proposals’ impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 15
U.S.C. 78c(f).
70 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
68 15
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:55 Sep 02, 2021
Jkt 253001
‘‘Act’’) 2 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,3
notice is hereby given that on August
27, 2021, New York Stock Exchange
LLC (‘‘NYSE’’ or the ‘‘Exchange’’) filed
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’) the
proposed rule change as described in
Items I and II below, which Items have
been prepared by the self-regulatory
organization. The Commission is
publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change
from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to extend the
temporary period for specified
Commentaries to Rules 7.35A and 7.35C
and temporary rule relief in Rule 36.30,
to end on the earlier of a full reopening
of the Trading Floor facilities to DMMs
or after the Exchange closes on
December 31, 2021. The proposed rule
change is available on the Exchange’s
website at www.nyse.com, at the
principal office of the Exchange, and at
the Commission’s Public Reference
Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
self-regulatory organization included
statements concerning the purpose of,
and basis for, the proposed rule change
and discussed any comments it received
on the proposed rule change. The text
of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below.
The Exchange has prepared summaries,
set forth in sections A, B, and C below,
of the most significant parts of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to extend the
temporary period for specified
Commentaries to Rules 7.35A and 7.35C
and temporary rule relief to Rule 36.30
to end on the earlier of a full reopening
of the Trading Floor facilities to DMMs
or after the Exchange closes on
December 31, 2021. The current
temporary period that these Rules are in
effect ends on the earlier of a full
reopening of the Trading Floor facilities
to DMMs or after the Exchange closes on
August 31, 2021.
2 15
3 17
PO 00000
U.S.C. 78a.
CFR 240.19b–4.
Frm 00084
Fmt 4703
49587
Background
To slow the spread of COVID–19
through social-distancing measures, on
March 18, 2020, the CEO of the
Exchange made a determination under
Rule 7.1(c)(3) that, beginning March 23,
2020, the Trading Floor facilities located
at 11 Wall Street in New York City
would close and the Exchange would
move, on a temporary basis, to fully
electronic trading.4 On May 14, 2020,
the CEO of the Exchange made a
determination under Rule 7.1(c)(3) to
reopen the Trading Floor on a limited
basis on May 26, 2020 to a subset of
Floor brokers, subject to safety measures
designed to prevent the spread of
COVID–19.5 On June 15, 2020, the CEO
of the Exchange made a determination
under Rule 7.1(c)(3) to begin the second
phase of the Trading Floor reopening by
allowing DMMs to return on June 17,
2020, subject to safety measures
designed to prevent the spread of
COVID–19.6 Consistent with these
safety measures, both DMMs and Floor
broker firms continue to operate with
reduced staff on the Trading Floor.
Proposed Rule Change
Beginning in March 2020, the
Exchange modified its rules to add
Commentaries to Rules 7.35, 7.35A,
7.35B, and 7.35C and rule relief in Rule
36.30,7 and has extended the expiration
4 Pursuant to Rule 7.1(e), the CEO notified the
Board of Directors of the Exchange of this
determination. The Exchange’s current rules
establish how the Exchange will function fullyelectronically. The CEO also closed the NYSE
American Options Trading Floor, which is located
at the same 11 Wall Street facilities, and the NYSE
Arca Options Trading Floor, which is located in
San Francisco, CA. See Press Release, dated March
18, 2020, available here: https://ir.theice.com/press/
press-releases/all-categories/2020/03-18-2020204202110.
5 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 88933
(May 22, 2020), 85 FR 32059 (May 28, 2020) (SR–
NYSE–2020–47) (Notice of filing and immediate
effectiveness of proposed rule change).
6 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89086
(June 17, 2020) (SR–NYSE–2020–52) (Notice of
filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule
change).
7 See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 88413
(March 18, 2020), 85 FR 16713 (March 24, 2020)
(SR–NYSE–2020–19) (amending Rule 7.35C to add
Commentary .01); 88444 (March 20, 2020), 85 FR
17141 (March 26, 2020) (SR–NYSE–2020–22)
(amending Rules 7.35A to add Commentary .01,
7.35B to add Commentary .01, and 7.35C to add
Commentary .02); 88488 (March 26, 2020), 85 FR
18286 (April 1, 2020) (SR–NYSE–2020–23)
(amending Rule 7.35A to add Commentary .02);
88546 (April 2, 2020), 85 FR 19782 (April 8, 2020)
(SR–NYSE–2020–28) (amending Rule 7.35A to add
Commentary .03); 88562 (April 3, 2020), 85 FR
20002 (April 9, 2020) (SR–NYSE–2020–29)
(amending Rule 7.35C to add Commentary .03);
88705 (April 21, 2020), 85 FR 23413 (April 27,
2020) (SR–NYSE–2020–35) (amending Rule 7.35A
to add Commentary .04); 88725 (April 22, 2020), 85
FR 23583 (April 28, 2020) (SR–NYSE–2020–37)
Continued
Sfmt 4703
E:\FR\FM\03SEN1.SGM
03SEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 169 (Friday, September 3, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49580-49587]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-19046]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-92808; File No. SR-FICC-2021-003]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation;
Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, To
Add the Sponsored GC Service and Make Other Changes
August 30, 2021.
On May 12, 2021, Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (``FICC'') filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission''), pursuant
to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'')
\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ proposed rule change SR-FICC-2021-003
to amend FICC's Government Securities Division Rulebook \3\ to add a
new service that expands FICC's existing Sponsored Service.\4\ The
proposed rule change was
[[Page 49581]]
published for public comment in the Federal Register on June 1,
2021.\5\ On June 8, 2021, FICC filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposed
rule change, to correct an erroneous cross reference in the original
filing.\6\ The proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, is
hereinafter referred to as the ``Proposed Rule Change.'' On June 24,
2021, the Commission published a notice designating a longer period of
time for Commission action and a longer period for public comment on
the Proposed Rule Change.\7\ The Commission received one comment letter
in support of the Proposed Rule Change.\8\
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\3\ FICC's Government Securities Division (``GSD'') Rulebook
(``Rules'') is available at https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures.
\4\ FICC also filed the proposals contained in the proposed rule
change as advance notice SR-FICC-2021-801 with the Commission
pursuant to Section 806(e)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act entitled the Payment, Clearing, and
Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (``Clearing Supervision Act''),
12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1), and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) of the Act, 17 CFR
240.19b-4(n)(1)(i). Notice of filing of the Advance Notice was
published for comment in the Federal Register on June 3, 2021.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92019 (May 27, 2021), 86 FR
29834 (June 3, 2021) (SR-FICC-2021-801).
\5\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92014 (May 25, 2021), 86
FR 29334 (June 1, 2021) (SR-FICC-2020-003) (``Notice'').
\6\ Amendment No. 1 made a correction to Exhibit 5 of the
filing. On June 8, 2021, FICC filed Amendment No. 1 to the advance
notice to make the same correction as regarding the proposed rule
change. The advance notice, as modified by Amendment No. 1, is
hereinafter referred to as the ``Advance Notice.'' On June 11, 2021,
the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to
delegated authority, requested additional information from FICC
pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(D) of the Clearing Supervision Act. 17
CFR 200.30-3(a)(93); 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(D). The request for
information tolled the Commission's period of review of the Advance
Notice until 60 days from the date of the Commission's receipt of
the information requested from FICC. See 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(E)(ii)
and (G)(ii); see Memorandum from the Office of Clearance and
Settlement, Division of Trading and Markets, titled ``Commission's
Request for Additional Information,'' available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ficc-an/2021/34-92019-memo-ficc.pdf. The
Commission received the information requested from FICC on July 2,
2021.
\7\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92185 (June 15, 2021),
86 FR 33420 (June 24, 2021) (SR-FICC-2021-003).
\8\ The comment is available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-ficc-2021-003/srficc2021003.htm. Because the proposals contained in
the Advance Notice and the Proposed Rule Change are the same, the
Commission considers any public comments received on the proposal as
applicable to both filings, regardless of whether comments are
submitted with respect to the Advance Notice or the Proposed Rule
Change.
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The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on
Amendment No. 1 from interested persons and, for the reasons discussed
below, to approve the Proposed Rule Change on an accelerated basis.
I. Description of the Proposed Rule Change
A. Background
1. FICC Services for Repurchase Agreement (``Repo'') Transactions
Repos involve a pair of securities transactions between two
parties. The parties agree to the terms of the trade, including the
securities, principal amount, interest rate, haircut, and tenor (i.e.,
date of maturity). The first transaction (the ``Start Leg'') consists
of the sale of securities, in which one party (the ``cash borrower'')
delivers securities, and in exchange, the other party (the ``cash
lender'') delivers cash. At the Start Leg, the cash borrower typically
delivers an amount of securities equal in value to the amount of cash
received from the cash lender, plus a haircut. Repo durations range
from one day (``overnight'') to a year or more, but are usually less
than three months (``term''). The second transaction (the ``End Leg'')
occurs on a date after that of the Start Leg and consists of the
repurchase of securities, in which the obligations to deliver cash and
securities are the reverse of the Start Leg. At the End Leg, the cash
borrower typically delivers the amount of cash borrowed, plus interest,
and the cash lender returns the securities.
FICC serves as CCP and provides clearance and settlement services
to facilitate both bilateral and tri-party repo transactions. FICC
facilitates bilateral repos \9\ in which all securities delivery
obligations are made against full payment (``delivery-versus-payment''
or ``DVP'') (the ``DVP Service''). FICC generally novates and
guarantees settlement of a trade upon validation of the trade details,
which results in the legally binding and enforceable contract between
FICC and the parties to the trade.\10\ On a daily basis, FICC
aggregates and matches a member's offsetting obligations resulting from
the member's trades, thereby netting the member's total daily
settlement obligations.\11\
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\9\ A bilateral repo is one in which the cash lender and cash
borrower directly exchange cash and securities. In the bilateral
repo market, the parties specify the securities used as collateral.
Therefore, a cash lender seeking to obtain a particular security
would utilize the bilateral repo market.
\10\ See Rule 5, supra note 3.
\11\ See Rule 11, supra note 3.
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FICC facilitates tri-party repos \12\ through its General
Collateral Finance (``GCF'') Repo[supreg] Service, which enables
members to trade general collateral finance repos based on rate, term,
and underlying product throughout the day on a blind basis.\13\ The
Bank of New York Mellon operates the tri-party platform that
facilitates trades conducted through the GCF Repo Service. FICC has
established standardized, generic CUSIP Numbers exclusively for GCF
Repo processing and to specify the acceptable types of underlying
Fedwire book-entry eligible collateral, which include U.S. Treasuries,
U.S. government agency securities, and certain mortgage-backed
securities.\14\
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\12\ A tri-party repo is one in which a clearing bank, acting as
tri-party agent, provides to both the cash lender and the cash
borrower certain operational, custodial, collateral management, and
other services. In tri-party repo trading, both parties maintain
accounts at a clearing bank, which facilitates the payment and
delivery of cash and securities between the parties' accounts. In
contrast to the bilateral repo market and its use of specific
collateral, the tri-party repo market is exclusively for general
collateral repos, meaning that the parties agree to use any
securities from a pre-approved basket of acceptable securities as
collateral. In a general collateral repo, the cash lender is
indifferent to the particular securities it receives as collateral,
provided that the securities come from the pre-approved basket of
acceptable securities.
\13\ See Rule 20, supra note 3.
\14\ See Rule 3 (definitions of ``GCF Repo Transaction'' and
``Generic CUSIP Number'') and Rule 20, Section 2, supra note 3;
Notice, supra note 5 at 29336.
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2. Sponsored Membership
In 2005, FICC established the Sponsored Service, allowing eligible
members to sponsor their clients into a limited form of membership.\15\
A Sponsoring Member is permitted to submit to FICC, for comparison,
novation, and netting, certain eligible securities transactions of its
Sponsored Members. FICC requires each Sponsoring Member to establish an
omnibus account at FICC (separate from its regular netting account) for
Sponsored Member trading activity. Sponsored Members generally have to
meet the definition of a qualified institutional buyer (``QIB''), as
defined in Rule 144A \16\ under the Securities Act of 1933.\17\
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\15\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51896 (June 21, 2005),
70 FR 36981 (June 27, 2005) (SR-FICC-2004-22). See Rule 3A, supra
note 3.
\16\ 17 CFR 230.144A.
\17\ 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.
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For operational and administrative purposes, FICC interacts solely
with the Sponsoring Member as agent for purposes of the day-to-day
satisfaction of its Sponsored Members' obligations to and from FICC,
including their securities and funds-only settlement obligations.\18\
Sponsoring Members are also responsible for providing FICC with a
Sponsoring Member Guaranty, whereby the Sponsoring Member guarantees to
FICC the payment and performance by its Sponsored Members of their
obligations under the Rules.\19\ Although Sponsored Members are
principally liable to FICC for their own settlement obligations under
the Rules, the Sponsoring Member Guaranty requires the Sponsoring
Member to satisfy those settlement obligations on behalf of a Sponsored
Member if the
[[Page 49582]]
Sponsored Member defaults and fails to perform its settlement
obligations.\20\
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\18\ See Rule 3A, Section 8, supra note 3.
\19\ See Rule 1 (definition of ``Sponsoring Member Guaranty'')
and Rule 3A, Section 2(c), supra note 3.
\20\ Id.
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B. Proposed Sponsored GC Service
Currently, the Sponsored Service only facilitates trading in
bilateral DVP repos, not tri-party repos. In the Proposed Rule Change,
FICC proposes to expand the Sponsored Service to accommodate tri-party
repo trading, which FICC believes would increase term repo activity
within the Sponsored Service. FICC states that several market
participants have indicated that they currently transact tri-party term
repos outside of central clearing because they are not operationally
equipped to perform the collateral management and other functions
associated with term DVP repos.\21\ In particular, money market funds
and other mutual funds generally prefer to use the tri-party repo
market because a clearing bank administers collateral management and
other functions, as described above.\22\
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\21\ See Notice, supra note 5 at 29336. A key difference between
the bilateral and tri-party repo markets deals with the operational
aspects of managing term repos. In the tri-party repo market, a
clearing bank typically automatically selects securities from the
cash borrower's account to serve as collateral that satisfies the
credit and liquidity criteria agreed between the parties. The
clearing bank delivers securities against the simultaneous delivery
of cash between the parties' accounts at the clearing bank. The
clearing bank manages the regular revaluation of collateral,
variation margining, income payments on the collateral, and
collateral substitutions. In the bilateral repo market, the parties
themselves perform such collateral management and other
administrative functions.
\22\ See Notice, supra note 5 at 29336.
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Therefore, FICC proposes to add the Sponsored GC Service, which
would allow (but not require) Sponsoring Members and their Sponsored
Members to trade general collateral repos with each other on the tri-
party platform of a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank \23\ (each, a
``Sponsored GC Trade''). Such general collateral repos would involve
the same asset classes that are currently available for members using
the GCF Repo Service.\24\ Consistent with the GCF Repo Service, the
Sponsored GC Service would also permit cash borrowers to make
collateral substitutions. Sponsored GC Trades would settle in a manner
similar to the way Sponsoring Members and Sponsored Members currently
settle tri-party repos with each other outside of central clearing.
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\23\ The Bank of New York Mellon operates the tri-party platform
that would facilitate trades conducted through the Sponsored GC
Service.
\24\ FICC would register a new series of Generic CUSIP Numbers
for the Sponsored GC Service as follows: (i) U.S. Treasury
Securities maturing in ten (10) years or less, (ii) U.S. Treasury
Securities maturing in thirty (30) years or less, (iii) Non-
Mortgage-Backed U.S. Agency Securities, (iv) Federal National
Mortgage Association (``Fannie Mae'') and Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (``Freddie Mac'') Fixed Rate Mortgage-Backed Securities,
(v) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Securities, (vi) Government National Mortgage Association (``Ginnie
Mae'') Fixed Rate Mortgage-Backed Securities, (vii) Ginnie Mae
Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed Securities, (viii) U.S. Treasury
Inflation-Protected Securities (``TIPS'') and (ix) U.S. Treasury
Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities
(``STRIPS''). The purpose of registering a new series of Generic
CUSIP Numbers specific to the Sponsored GC Service is to avoid any
operational processing errors that could otherwise result if a trade
intended for the Sponsored GC Service was inadvertently processed as
a GCF Repo transaction or vice versa. Notice, supra note 5 at 29336.
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Sponsored GC Service Structure
Sponsored GC Trades would only be between a Sponsored Member and
its Sponsoring Member. FICC would novate only the End Legs of Sponsored
GC Trades. Consistent with the current settlement process of such tri-
party repos outside of central clearing, the Start Legs of Sponsored GC
Trades would continue to settle on a trade-for-trade basis on the tri-
party platform of a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank.\25\
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\25\ FICC does not believe it would be efficient or appropriate
to novate the Start Legs of Sponsored GC Trades, as that novation
would unnecessarily complicate an already efficient process by
requiring the parties to make significant operational and business
changes to include FICC in the transaction chain. Since Sponsored GC
Trades would only be between a Sponsored Member and its Sponsoring
Member on a known (i.e., not blind) basis, all Start Leg obligations
would settle between a single set of counterparties, negating any
efficiency or reduced settlement risk that FICC's novation would
provide. See Notice, supra note 5 at 29337.
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Accrued repo interest on Sponsored GC Trades would be paid and
collected by FICC on a daily basis. Additionally, if the market value
of the securities collateral decreases from its market value at the
Start Leg, the cash borrower would be required deliver to FICC
additional securities (and/or cash) such that the market value of the
total securities collateral remains at least equal to its market value
at the Start Leg. Conversely, if the market value of the securities
collateral increases from its market value at the Start Leg, the cash
lender would be required to deliver to FICC securities (and/or cash)
such that the market value of the remaining securities collateral
remains at least equal to its market value at the Start Leg. Such
additional securities (and/or cash) must be delivered within the
timeframe set forth in a proposed new schedule of Sponsored GC Trade
timeframes set forth in the Rules.
In order to facilitate settlement of securities and cash
obligations, FICC would direct each party to a Sponsored GC Trade to
make any payment or delivery due to FICC in respect of a Sponsored GC
Trade (except for certain funds-only settlement obligations, as
discussed below) directly to the relevant pre-novation counterparty. As
a result, each transfer of securities and daily repo interest would be
made directly between the Sponsored Member and its Sponsoring Member
via the tri-party repo platform of a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent
Bank.\26\
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\26\ FICC similarly does not believe it would be appropriate for
FICC to be in the transaction chain for each payment and delivery
under a Sponsored GC Trade because inserting FICC in the middle of
the payments and deliveries would require substantial changes in
operational processes for both Sponsored Members and Sponsoring
Members. FICC does not believe such operational changes are
necessary since there can only be two pre-novation counterparties
involved in the settlement of a Sponsored GC Trade (i.e., the
Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored Member client). See Notice,
supra note 5 at 29337-38.
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Market Risk Management
FICC would manage its market risk with respect to Sponsored GC
Trades similar to the manner in which FICC manages existing trades
within the Sponsored Service. To mitigate market risk, FICC would
calculate the Value at Risk (``VaR'') margin component (``VaR Charge'')
\27\ for each Sponsored Member based on its activity in the Sponsored
Service, including its activity in the proposed Sponsored GC Service.
The VaR Charge for the Sponsoring Member's omnibus account for
Sponsored Member trading activity would continue to be gross-margined
as the sum of the individual VaR Charges for each Sponsored Member
client.\28\
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\27\ Each member's margin consists of a number of applicable
components. The VaR Charge is typically the largest component of a
member's margin requirement. The VaR Charge is designed to capture
the potential market price risk associated with the securities in a
member's portfolio. The VaR Charge is designed to provide an
estimate of FICC's projected liquidation losses with respect to a
defaulted member's portfolio at a 99 percent confidence level. See
Rule 1 (definition of ``VaR Charge''), supra note 3; Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 83362 (June 1, 2018), 83 FR 26514 (June 7,
2018) (SR-FICC-2018-001).
\28\ See Rule 3A, Section 10, supra note 3.
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Additionally, FICC would assign a symbol to each Sponsored Member
to facilitate FICC's ability to surveil the Sponsored Member's activity
across its Sponsored GC Trades as well as its other Sponsored Member
Trades within the existing Sponsored Service (both with the same
Sponsoring Member and across Sponsoring Members, if applicable). In
addition, FICC would apply certain heightened requirements that apply
to certain Sponsoring Members within the Sponsored GC Service as
well.\29\ For example, FICC
[[Page 49583]]
may impose heightened financial requirements on these Sponsoring
Members based on their anticipated activity and other factors,\30\ and
FICC may limit such a Sponsoring Member's activity if the sum of the
VaR Charges of its omnibus and netting accounts exceeds its net
capital.\31\
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\29\ Specifically, these restrictions apply to Category 2
Sponsoring Members, which are other members that meet certain
financial requirements as compared to Category 1 Sponsoring Members,
which are bank netting members that are well-capitalized with $5
billion in equity capital. See Rule 3A, Section 2(a), supra note 3.
\30\ See Rule 3A, Section 2(b), supra note 3.
\31\ See Rule 3A, Section 2(h), supra note 3.
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In addition, FICC would manage the mark-to-market risk associated
with unaccrued repo interest on a Sponsored GC Trade through a proposed
new interest rate mark component of funds-only settlement.\32\ FICC
would also apply an Interest Adjustment Payment to Sponsored GC Trades
to account for overnight use of funds by the Sponsoring Member or
Sponsored Member, as applicable, based on such party's receipt from
FICC of a Forward Mark Adjustment Payment (reflecting a GC Interest
Rate Mark) on the previous business day.\33\
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\32\ This GC Interest Rate Mark would be calculated in the same
manner as the GCF Interest Rate Mark is for GCF Repo transactions.
For a detailed description of the calculation, see Notice, supra
note 5 at 29337-38.
\33\ No other components of funds-only settlement would be
necessary to apply to Sponsored GC Trades because, as described
above, (i) all Sponsored GC Trades would novate after the settlement
of the Start Legs of such trades (i.e., not during the Forward-
Starting Period), (ii) mark-to-market changes in the value of the
securities transferred under Sponsored GC Trades would be managed by
the Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank on FICC's behalf (consistent
with the manner in which GCF Repo transactions are currently
processed), and (iii) the accrued repo interest on Sponsored GC
Trades would be passed on a daily basis, as described above.
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Liquidity Risk Management
Currently, trades between a Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored
Member do not independently create liquidity risk for FICC. Under its
Rules, if a Sponsoring Member defaults, FICC may close out (that is,
cash settle) the Sponsored Member trades of the defaulting Sponsoring
Member.\34\ Similarly, if a Sponsored Member defaults, FICC may offset
its settlement obligations to the Sponsoring Member against the
Sponsoring Member's obligations under the Sponsoring Member Guaranty to
perform on behalf of its defaulting Sponsored Member.\35\ Thus, in both
default scenarios, FICC bears no liquidity risk.
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\34\ See Rule 3A, Section 14(c), supra note 3. See also Rule
22A, Section 2, supra note 3.
\35\ See Rule 3A, Section 11, supra note 3.
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As a result, to the extent a Sponsoring Member either (1) runs a
matched book of Sponsored Member trades (i.e., enters into offsetting
trades with its own Sponsored Members), or (2) simply enters into
trades with its Sponsored Member (i.e., without entering into
offsetting trades), such activities do not increase FICC's liquidity
risk. FICC bears liquidity risk only when a Sponsoring Member enters
into an offsetting trade in which a third-party member is the pre-
novation counterparty. In that scenario, FICC is required to settle the
obligations of a defaulting Sponsoring Member.
Since Sponsored GC Trades would not involve third-party members,
such trades would impact FICC's liquidity risk in a similar manner to
trades between a Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored Member in the
current Sponsored Service. As a result, FICC proposes to manage the
liquidity risk associated with Sponsored GC Trades in the same manner
that it currently manages such risk for other trades between a
Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored Member.
C. Proposed Changes to Allocations Within the Capped Contingency
Liquidity Facility (``CCLF'')
1. CCLF Background
On April 25, 2017, the Commission approved FICC's adoption of the
Clearing Agency Liquidity Risk Management Framework (``Framework''),
which broadly describes FICC's liquidity risk management strategy and
objective to maintain sufficient liquid resources in order to meet the
potential amount of funding required to settle outstanding transactions
of a defaulting member (including affiliates) in a timely manner.\36\
The Framework identifies, among other things, each of the qualifying
liquid resources available to FICC, including the CCLF.\37\ The CCLF is
a rules-based, committed liquidity resource, designed to enable FICC to
meet its cash settlement obligations in the event of a default of the
member (including the member's family of affiliated members) to which
FICC has the largest exposure in extreme but plausible market
conditions.\38\ FICC would activate the CCLF if, upon a member default,
FICC determines that its non-CCLF liquidity resources would not
generate sufficient cash to satisfy FICC's payment obligations to its
non-defaulting members. In simple terms, a CCLF repo is equivalent to a
non-defaulting member financing FICC's payment obligation under the
original trade, thereby providing FICC with time to liquidate the
securities underlying the original trade. More specifically, upon
activating the CCLF, members would be called upon to enter into repo
transactions (as cash lenders) with FICC (as cash borrower) up to a
pre-determined capped dollar amount, thereby providing FICC with
sufficient liquidity to meet its payment obligations. For a non-
defaulting member to whom FICC has a payment obligation disrupted by a
member default, a CCLF repo would extinguish and replace the original
trade that gave rise to FICC's payment obligation.
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\36\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80489 (April 19,
2017), 82 FR 19120 (April 25, 2017) (SR-FICC-2017-008).
\37\ See id.
\38\ FICC designed the CCLF to meet the regulatory requirement
for a covered clearing agency to measure, monitor, and manage its
liquidity risk by maintaining sufficient liquid resources to effect
same-day settlement of payment obligations in the event of a default
of the participant family that would generate the largest aggregate
payment obligation for the clearing agency in extreme but plausible
market conditions. 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(7)(i); see Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 82090 (November 15, 2017), 82 FR 55427,
55430 (November 21, 2017) (SR-FICC-2017-002); Rule 22A, Section 2a,
supra note 3.
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FICC determines the total size of the CCLF based on FICC's
potential cash settlement obligations that would result from the
default of the member (including affiliates) presenting the largest
liquidity need to FICC over a specified look-back period, plus an
additional liquidity buffer. In the Proposed Rule Change, FICC does not
propose to change the method by which it determines the total size of
the CCLF.
FICC uses a tiered approach to allocate the total size of the CCLF
among its members to arrive at the amount of each member's CCLF
obligation. FICC allocates $15 billion of the total size of the CCLF
among all members.\39\ FICC allocates the remainder of the total size
of the CCLF among members that generate liquidity needs above the $15
billion threshold based on the frequency that such members generate
daily liquidity needs over $15 billion across supplemental liquidity
tiers in $5 billion increments. Specifically, FICC calculates a dollar
amount for the CCLF obligation applicable to each supplemental
liquidity tier. FICC allocates the CCLF obligation for each
supplemental liquidity tier to members on a pro-rata basis
corresponding to the number of times each member generates liquidity
[[Page 49584]]
needs within each supplemental liquidity tier.\40\
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\39\ FICC has determined that $15 billion is an appropriate
amount for allocation to all members because the average member's
liquidity need from 2015-2016 was approximately $7 billion, with a
majority of members (approximately 85 percent) having liquidity
needs less than $15 billion. See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
82090 (November 15, 2017), 82 FR 55427, 55430 (November 21, 2017)
(SR-FICC-2017-002).
\40\ For example, a member that generates daily liquidity needs
in the $15-$20 billion supplemental liquidity tier would incur a
pro-rata share for the $15-$20 billion supplemental liquidity tier
only. Another member that generates daily liquidity needs in the
$20-$25 billion supplemental liquidity tier would incur a pro-rata
share for both the $15-$20 and $20-$25 billion supplemental
liquidity tiers. A third member that generates daily liquidity needs
in the $65-$70 billion supplemental liquidity tier would incur a
pro-rata share for every supplemental liquidity tier. Each member's
pro-rata share is based on the frequency with which the member
generates daily liquidity needs in each supplemental liquidity tier.
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80234 (March 14, 2017), 82
FR 14401, 14404-05 (March 20, 2017) (SR-FICC-2017-002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Current CCLF Allocation Methodology for the Sponsored Service
Currently, FICC does not impose a CCLF obligation on a Sponsoring
Member to the extent the Sponsoring Member runs a matched book of
Sponsored Member trades. This is because to determine a Sponsoring
Member's CCLF obligation, FICC nets all of the positions recorded in
the Sponsoring Member's omnibus account (regardless of whether they
relate to the same Sponsored Member) and separately nets all of the
positions in the Sponsoring Member's netting account.\41\ As a result,
to the extent a Sponsoring Member enters into perfectly offsetting
Sponsored Member trades (i.e., the matched book scenario), the
settlement obligations of those trades net out in the omnibus account
and the netting account, with no resulting CCLF obligation for the
Sponsoring Member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See Rule 3A, Section 8(b) and Rule 22A, Section 2a(b),
supra note 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, if a Sponsoring Member enters into a Sponsored Member
trade without entering into an offsetting transaction, the Sponsoring
Member is subject to CCLF obligations for the position of its Sponsored
Member recorded in its omnibus account as well as its own position
arising from the Sponsored Member trade recorded in its netting
account. Although the positions in the Sponsoring Member's omnibus
account and netting account offset each other, FICC does not currently
net such positions for CCLF purposes because CCLF allocations are
determined at the participant account level.\42\ FICC believes the
foregoing scenario should not contribute to the Sponsoring Member's
CCLF obligation because, as described above in Section I.B, such
offsetting obligations do not present liquidity risk to FICC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ This limitation on offset is consistent with FICC's
approach of not offsetting the positions of two accounts of the same
member for CCLF purposes. However, FICC notes an important
difference between Sponsored Member trades and other FICC repo
activity. See Notice, supra note 5 at 29343. Specifically, as
mentioned above in Section I.A.2., the Sponsored Service requires a
Sponsoring Member to maintain an omnibus account that is separate
from its netting account. In contrast, for all other repo activity,
members have the option to collapse all of their activity into a
single participant account in order to achieve a similar netting
benefit. Sponsoring Members do not have that option with respect to
their Sponsored Member trades. Therefore, FICC believes this
proposed change is necessary to ensure that a Sponsoring Member's
CCLF obligations are calculated in a manner that more closely aligns
with the liquidity risk associated with Sponsored Member trades. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Proposed CCLF Allocation Methodology for the Sponsored Service
As described above, trades between a Sponsoring Member and its
Sponsored Member do not independently create liquidity risk for FICC,
and therefore, FICC believes that such trades should not affect the
Sponsoring Member's CCLF obligation. To ensure that a Sponsoring
Member's CCLF obligation is calculated to reflect the lack of liquidity
risk to FICC associated with Sponsored Member trades, FICC proposes to
take into account, for CCLF calculation purposes, any offsetting
settlement obligations between a Sponsoring Member's netting account
and its omnibus account. This proposed change would ensure that all
Sponsored Member trades, whether perfectly offset by other Sponsored
Member trades (i.e., the matched book scenario) or not, would be
recognized for CCLF purposes as not affecting FICC's liquidity risk.
This proposed change would also apply to trades in the new Sponsored GC
Service.\43\
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\43\ For Sponsored GC Trades, this proposed change would ensure
that FICC applies an appropriate CCLF obligation to a Sponsoring
Member in the event a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank allocates to
a Sponsored GC Trade a different security than the security that
underlies an offsetting Sponsored Member Trade. For example, a
Sponsoring Member may enter into a Sponsored GC Trade on a Generic
CUSIP Number and a separate offsetting Sponsored Member trade in a
specific CUSIP Number. Although the specific CUSIP Number might also
be an eligible security under the Generic CUSIP Number underlying
the Sponsored GC Trade, the Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank could
allocate to the Sponsored GC Trade a different eligible CUSIP Number
from the list of eligible securities. FICC's proposed change would
offset these positions across the Sponsoring Member's netting
account and omnibus account to ensure that the CCLF obligation
applicable to the Sponsoring Member accurately reflects the
liquidity risk associated with those positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although, as noted above, the Proposed Rule Change would not affect
the method by which FICC determines the total CCLF amount, FICC's
proposal to net offsetting trades between a Sponsoring Member and its
Sponsored Member for CCLF calculation purposes would affect the
allocation of CCLF obligations over $15 billion to other members.
Specifically, as described above, under the current Rules, if a
Sponsoring Member enters into a Sponsored Member trade without entering
into an offsetting transaction, the Sponsoring Member is subject to
CCLF obligations for the position of its Sponsored Member recorded in
its omnibus account as well as its own position arising from the
Sponsored Member trade recorded in its netting account. Under the
Proposed Rule Change, the Sponsoring Member would not incur CCLF
obligations for such transactions. Therefore, a Sponsoring Member's
peak daily liquidity is currently higher than it would be under the
Proposed Rule Change. This, in turn, may decrease the frequency with
which a Sponsoring Member's daily peak liquidity reaches into higher
supplemental liquidity tiers. As a result, the pro-rata allocation of
CCLF obligations among members with daily peak liquidity in those
supplemental liquidity tiers would increase.\44\ When fewer members
generate peak liquidity needs in a supplemental liquidity tier, the
remaining members that generate peak liquidity in that tier bear a
larger pro-rata share of the CCLF allocations for that tier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ However, as stated above, the proposals in the Proposed
Rule Change would not change FICC's current methodology for
calculating the total amount of the CCLF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Other Proposed Changes
FICC proposes to remove a provision from the Rules requiring a
Sponsoring Member to provide FICC with a quarterly representation that
each of its Sponsored Members is a either a QIB or satisfies the
financial requirements necessary to be a QIB.\45\ FICC proposes to
remove this requirement because an existing Rule provision requires a
Sponsoring Member to attest that a Sponsored Member satisfies the QIB
requirement at the time of the Sponsored Member's initial
application,\46\ and another existing Rule provision requires a
Sponsoring Member to notify FICC if its Sponsored Member no longer
satisfies the QIB requirement.\47\ Therefore, FICC believes the
quarterly representation to be an overlapping and redundant requirement
that creates unnecessary administrative burdens for FICC and for its
Sponsoring Members.\48\
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\45\ See Rule 3A, Section 2(d), supra note 3.
\46\ See Rule 3A, Section 3(b), supra note 3.
\47\ See Rule 3A, Section 3(d), supra note 3.
\48\ See Notice, supra note 5 at 29343.
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FICC also proposes to make certain corrections to the Rules
regarding the Sponsored Service. First, FICC proposes to change an
erroneous reference to the
[[Page 49585]]
``Close Leg'' in the Rule 1 definition of Initial Haircut to ``Start
Leg.'' Second, FICC proposes to clarify the citation to paragraph
(a)(1)(i)(H) of Rule 144A in Rule 3A, Section 3(a)(ii)(B).
Additionally, FICC proposes to make several technical and grammatical
changes to section numbers and cross-references throughout the Rules to
conform with the new proposed Rule provisions regarding Sponsored GC
Service.
E. Description of Amendment No. 1
In Amendment No. 1, FICC updated Exhibit 5 to the Proposed Rule
Change to correct an erroneous cross reference in the original filing.
Specifically, Exhibit 5 to the original filing erroneously showed the
proposed change to Rule 3A, Section 18, subsection (a) to include a
cross reference to subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) of the Sponsored
Trade definition. Amendment No. 1 corrected Exhibit 5 so that the cross
reference is to subsections (a)(i) and (b) of the Sponsored Trade
definition.
II. Discussion and Commission Findings
Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act \49\ directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Act and rules and regulations thereunder applicable
to such organization. After carefully considering the Proposed Rule
Change, the Commission finds that the Proposed Rule Change is
consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder applicable to FICC. In particular, the
Commission finds that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with
Sections 17A(b)(3)(F) \50\ of the Act and Rules 17Ad-22(e)(7), (e)(18),
and (e)(23) thereunder.\51\
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\49\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
\50\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\51\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(7), (e)(18), and (e)(23).
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A. Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \52\ requires the rules of a
clearing agency to, among other things, (i) promote the prompt and
accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions, (ii)
assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the
custody or control of the clearing agency or for which it is
responsible, and (iii) protect investors and the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described above in Section I.B., FICC's current Sponsored
Service only facilitates trading in DVP repos, not tri-party repos.
Certain market participants (e.g., money market funds and other mutual
funds) have stated that their participation in the Sponsored Service is
inhibited because they are not operationally equipped to perform the
collateral management and other functions associated with term DVP
repos.\53\ FICC proposes to expand the Sponsored Service via the
Sponsored GC Service to accommodate tri-party repo trading, in which a
clearing bank administers such collateral management and other
functions. As a result, FICC expects the proposed Sponsored GC Service
to increase term repo activity within the Sponsored Service.\54\ By
enabling Sponsoring Members and their Sponsored Members to engage in
tri-party term repo transactions with each other, the proposed
Sponsored GC Service would encourage more term repo trades centrally
cleared by FICC within the Sponsored Service. Increasing the number of
trades centrally cleared by FICC would promote the prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of securities transactions because securities
transactions that might otherwise be conducted outside of central
clearing would benefit from FICC's risk management and guarantee of
settlement.\55\ Accordingly, FICC's proposal to add the Sponsored GC
Service is consistent with promoting the prompt and accurate clearance
and settlement of securities transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ See Notice, supra note 5 at 29336.
\54\ See id. FICC conducted two surveys of its Sponsoring
Members, the data from which supports FICC's expectation that the
proposed Sponsored GC Service would increase term repo activity
within the Sponsored Service. FICC provided the survey data to the
Commission as part of FICC's response to the Commission's request
for additional information in connection with the Advance Notice.
See supra note 6. Pursuant to 17 CFR 240.24b-2, FICC requested
confidential treatment of its response to the Commission's request
for additional information.
\55\ See Letter from Robert Toomey, Managing Director and
Associate General Counsel, Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (June 18, 2021) at 2 (commenting on the benefits to
market participants resulting from the expected increase in greater
central clearing of tri-party repos via the Sponsored GC Service).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, as described above in Section I.C., the CCLF is
designed to provide FICC with sufficient qualifying liquid resources to
cover the default of the family of affiliated members that would
generate the largest liquidity need for FICC. The Proposed Rule Change
would change the allocation of CCLF obligations among FICC's members.
Specifically, with respect to trades between a Sponsoring Member and
Sponsored Member, FICC proposes to take into account, for CCLF
calculation purposes, any offsetting settlement obligations between a
Sponsoring Member's netting account and its omnibus account. Such
trades do not independently create liquidity risk for FICC, and
therefore, should not affect the Sponsoring Member's CCLF obligation.
Therefore, the Proposed Rule Change would result in the allocation of
CCLF obligations to FICC's members that more accurately reflect the
liquidity needs presented to FICC by each member. However, the proposed
change in CCLF allocation methodology would not change the current
total overall size of the CCLF. By maintaining the total size of the
CCLF, FICC should be able to continue to perform its clearance and
settlement functions with sufficient qualifying liquidity resources for
FICC to mitigate the losses that the default of the largest affiliated
family of members could cause, not only to FICC and its non-defaulting
members, but also to the financial markets more broadly. As such, the
Proposed Rule Change is consistent with promoting the safeguarding of
securities and funds in FICC's custody and control, and thereby
protecting investors and the public interest.
Finally, as described above in Section I.D., FICC also proposes to
make certain corrections to the Rules regarding the Sponsored Service,
as well as several technical and grammatical changes throughout the
Rules to conform with the new provisions regarding Sponsored GC
Service. Making corrections and other improvements to clarify the Rules
helps to ensure that the Rules are accurate and clear to members.
Members that better understand their rights and obligations regarding
the Rules are more likely to act in accordance with the Rules, which
generally promotes the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of
securities transactions.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission believes that the
Proposed Rule Change is designed to promote the prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of securities transactions, safeguard
securities and funds that are in the custody or control of FICC, and
protect investors and the public interest, consistent with Section
17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7) under the Act requires a covered clearing agency
to establish, implement, maintain, and
[[Page 49586]]
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to
effectively measure, monitor, and manage the liquidity risk that arises
in or is borne by the covered clearing agency.\57\ As described above
in Section I.C., FICC proposes to change the Rules to allow netting,
for CCLF allocation purposes, of offsetting positions in a Sponsoring
Member's omnibus account and netting account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FICC's proposal would not impact FICC's current methodology for
determining the total amount of the CCLF as a liquidity resource. As
discussed above in Section II.A., FICC proposes to change the Rules
regarding CCLF allocation to ensure that a Sponsoring Member's CCLF
obligation aligns more closely with the actual liquidity risk its
trading activity presents to FICC. As a result, FICC's proposed CCLF
allocation methodology represents more efficient liquidity risk
management than the current methodology. Accordingly, the Commission
believes that FICC's proposed CCLF allocation methodology is consistent
with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7).\58\
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\58\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(18)
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(18) under the Act requires a covered clearing
agency to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to establish objective, risk-based,
and publicly disclosed criteria for participation in the clearing
agency.\59\ As described above in Section I.D., FICC proposes to remove
a provision from the Rules requiring a Sponsoring Member to provide
FICC with a quarterly representation that each of its Sponsored Members
is a either a QIB or satisfies the financial requirements necessary to
be a QIB. FICC proposes to remove the quarterly representation
requirement because existing Rule provisions require Sponsoring Members
to attest to its Sponsored Member's QIB status \60\ and to notify FICC
if a Sponsored Member no longer satisfies the QIB requirement.\61\
Therefore, the quarterly representation requirement is redundant and
creates unnecessary administrative burdens for FICC and its Sponsoring
Members. A redundant requirement that creates unnecessary
administrative burdens is not an objective, risk-based criterion for
participation in FICC. Accordingly, the Division believes that FICC's
proposal to remove the requirement for Sponsoring Members to provide
FICC with a quarterly representation verifying the QIB status of its
Sponsored Members is consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(18).\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(18).
\60\ See Rule 3A, Section 3(b), supra note 3.
\61\ See Rule 3A, Section 3(d), supra note 3.
\62\ Id.
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D. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(21)
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(21) under the Act requires a covered clearing
agency to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to be efficient and effective in
meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves,
including the clearing agency's clearing and settlement arrangements
and the scope of products cleared or settled.\63\ As described above in
Section I.B., FICC's current Sponsored Service does not accommodate the
trading of tri-party repos. FICC proposes to expand the Sponsored
Service to allow tri-party repo trading to meet the needs of market
participants that currently transact tri-party term repos outside of
central clearing because they are not operationally equipped to perform
the collateral management and other functions associated with term DVP
repos. By expanding the Sponsored Service to facilitate tri-party repo
trading, FICC seeks to provide a viable option for its members to
transact term tri-party repos in central clearing. Sponsored GC Trades
would settle in a manner similar to the way Sponsoring Members and
Sponsored Members currently settle tri-party repos with each other
outside of central clearing, thereby making it more operationally
efficient for the parties to transact term repos with each other using
FICC as the CCP. The Commission believes that the proposed Sponsored GC
Service is consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(21) \64\ because it is
responsive to the requests from FICC's members for the ability to trade
centrally cleared term tri-party repos in a manner that is efficient
and effective in meeting the operational requirements of FICC's
members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(21).
\64\ Id.
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III. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning whether Amendment No. 1 is consistent with the
Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include File Number
SR-FICC-2021-003 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-FICC-2021-003. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the Proposed Rule Change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the Proposed
Rule Change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of such filings will also be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of FICC and FICC's website at
https://www.dtcc.com/legal.
All comments received will be posted without change. Persons
submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-FICC-2021-003 and should be
submitted on or before September 24, 2021.
IV. Accelerated Approval of the Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by
Amendment No. 1
The Commission finds good cause, pursuant to Section
19(b)(2)(C)(iii) of the Act,\65\ to approve the Proposed Rule Change,
as modified by Amendment No. 1, prior to the thirtieth day after the
date of publication of Amendment No. 1 in the Federal Register. As
noted above, in
[[Page 49587]]
Amendment No. 1, FICC updated Exhibit 5 to the Proposed Rule Change to
correct an erroneous cross reference in the original filing. Amendment
No. 1 neither modifies the Proposed Rule Change as originally published
in any substantive manner, nor does Amendment No. 1 affect any rights
or obligations of FICC or its members. Instead, Amendment No. 1
corrects a typographical error in the original filing. Accordingly, the
Commission finds good cause, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2)(C)(iii) of
the Act,\66\ to approve the Proposed Rule Change, as modified by
Amendment No. 1, prior to the thirtieth day after the date of
publication of notice of Amendment No. 1 in the Federal Register.
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\65\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C)(iii).
\66\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
Proposed Rule Change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, is consistent
with the requirements of the Act and in particular with the
requirements of Section 17A of the Act \67\ and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act
\68\ that proposed rule change SR-FICC-2021-003, be, and hereby is,
APPROVED.\69\
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\68\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
\69\ In approving the proposed rule change, the Commission
considered the proposals' impact on efficiency, competition, and
capital formation. 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\70\
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\70\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-19046 Filed 9-2-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P