Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 2733-2739 [2021-00501]
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA–2019–0105]
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
priorities, and the likelihood of success
in litigation that might arise from a
determination of a noncompliance or a
defect related to motor vehicle safety,
the Agency will grant or deny the
petition. 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR
552.8.
AGENCY:
2.0
This notice sets forth the
reasons for the denial of a petition
submitted on December 19, 2019, by Mr.
Brian Sparks to NHTSA’s Office of
Defects Investigation (ODI). The petition
requests that the Agency recall Tesla
vehicles for an unidentified defect that
allegedly causes sudden unintended
acceleration (SUA). NHTSA opened
Defect Petition DP20–001 to evaluate
the petitioner’s request. After reviewing
the information provided by the
petitioner and Tesla regarding the
alleged defect and the subject
complaints, NHTSA has concluded that
there is insufficient evidence to warrant
further action at this time. Accordingly,
the Agency has denied the petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Ajit Alkondon, Vehicle Defects
Division—D, Office of Defects
Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590
(telephone 202–366–3565).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
2.1 Petition Chronology
Mr. Brian Sparks (the petitioner) first
submitted a valid petition conforming to
the requirements of 49 CFR 552.4 on
December 19, 2019.1 On December 30,
2019, the petitioner submitted an
addendum to his petition. This
addendum references NHTSA
complaint 11291423, which alleges
unexpected movement of a vehicle that
was parked and unoccupied.
On January 13, 2020, the Office of
Defects Investigation (ODI) opened
Defect Petition DP20–001 to evaluate
the petitioner’s request for a recall of all
Tesla Model S, Model X, and Model 3
vehicles produced to date based on the
information in his correspondence,
petition and various addendums. On
February 21, 2020, the petitioner
submitted another addendum to his
petition, identifying 70 new incidents of
alleged SUA in NHTSA complaints (also
known as Vehicle Owner
Questionnaires, or VOQs) filed since
DP20–001 was opened. Additional
addendums updating VOQ counts were
submitted on April 10, 2020, June 22,
2020, September 10, 2020 and December
1, 2020. The June 22 submission
included a request to update the
petition ‘‘to include a recent analysis of
Tesla’s SUA defect from Dr. Ronald
Belt.’’
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of petition for a defect
investigation.
SUMMARY:
1.0
Introduction
Petition
2733
indicates a severe and systemic
malfunction within Tesla vehicles;’’
2. A third-party analysis of data from
the crash reported in VOQ 11206155,
which theorizes a fault condition that
allegedly ‘‘caused the brake pedal to
behave like an accelerator pedal;’’ and
3. A complaint (VOQ 11291423)
alleging SUA while the driver was
outside the vehicle, which the petitioner
describes as ‘‘the first SUA complaint
involving a Tesla vehicle in which the
driver cannot reasonably be accused of
pressing the accelerator.’’
3.0
Analysis
ODI performed the following analyses
in its evaluation of the petition for a
grant or deny decision:
1. Analyzed crashes identified by
petitioner for connection to SUA;
2. Analyzed EDR or Tesla vehicle log
data or both from 118 crash incidents; 3
3. Reviewed the crash incident
reported in VOQ 11206155;
4. Reviewed the crash incidents
reported in VOQ 11291423;
5. Reviewed Tesla’s system safeguards
for the accelerator pedal position sensor
(APPS) assembly and motor control
system;
6. Reviewed two defect theories
referenced in the petition;
7. Reviewed the brake system designs
for the subject vehicles; and
8. Reviewed service history
information for the accelerator pedal
assemblies, motor control systems, and
brake systems for 204 of the 232
vehicles identified in VOQs submitted
by the petitioner.4
Interested persons may petition
NHTSA requesting that the Agency
initiate an investigation to determine
whether a motor vehicle or item of
replacement equipment does not
comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a
defect that relates to motor vehicle
safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162; 49 CFR part
552. Upon receipt of a properly filed
petition the Agency conducts a
technical review of the petition,
material submitted with the petition,
and any additional information. 49
U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. After
considering the technical review and
taking into account appropriate factors,
which may include, among others,
allocation of Agency resources, Agency
2.2 Petition Basis
Altogether, the petitioner identified a
total of 232 VOQs involving unique
alleged SUA incidents in his
submissions, including 203 reporting
crashes.2 The petitioner also submitted
a document purporting to analyze Event
Data Recorder (EDR) data from the
incident reported in NHTSA VOQ
11216155. The petitioner believes that
‘‘Tesla vehicles have a structural flaw
which puts their drivers and the public
at risk’’ and bases his request for a recall
of the subject vehicles on:
1. His view that, ‘‘The volume of
complaints in the NHTSA database
ODI’s crash analysis reviewed 217
incidents, including the 203 crashes
identified by the petitioner and fourteen
additional crashes reported in VOQs
that were either not selected by the
petitioner (eight) or were submitted after
the petitioner’s most recent submission
(six).
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the
driving environments and crash data
review for the crashes analyzed by ODI.
Crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or
video data) were reviewed for 118 of the
crash incidents. Crash data were not
obtained for most of the incidents
received after DP20–001 was opened.
1 The petitioner first raised concerns about SUA
in Tesla vehicles in September 2019
correspondence with the Agency. NHTSA did not
consider this earlier correspondence to be a validly
submitted petition because the petitioner did not
provide his name and address. See 49 CFR 552.4.
The September 2019 letter cited 110 incidents of
alleged SUA in complaints to NHTSA, including
102 reporting crashes. NHTSA has included the
information in petitioner’s September 2019
correspondence in the Agency’s analysis of the
petition.
2 The petitioner identified a total of 225 VOQ in
the original petition and five addendums. Six of the
VOQs are duplicative of a prior VOQ.
3 This information was not available or not
obtained for the remaining crash incidents, as
detailed below.
4 ODI’s information request letter for DP20–001
requested crash data and service history
information for all 124 VOQs cited in the original
petition and the first two addendums submitted by
the petitioner. On February 10, 2020 and October
20, 2020, ODI requested certain supplemental
information for a total of 83 additional VOQs
alleging crashes, including 80 that were cited in
addendums submitted by the petitioner.
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Crash Classification
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF CRASH INCIDENTS REVIEWED BY ODL
Crash data
reviewed
Category
Crash data
not available
Crash data
not obtained
Total
Parking lot ........................................................................................................
Driveway ..........................................................................................................
Traffic light .......................................................................................................
Parking garage ................................................................................................
City traffic .........................................................................................................
Stop-and-go traffic ...........................................................................................
Highway traffic .................................................................................................
Stop sign ..........................................................................................................
Charging station ...............................................................................................
Street side parking ...........................................................................................
Drive thru .........................................................................................................
School drop-off lane ........................................................................................
Car wash ..........................................................................................................
Gated exit (China incident) ..............................................................................
61
26
11
7
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
44
16
7
5
1
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
9
4
2
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
114
46
20
12
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
Total ..........................................................................................................
118
80
19
217
Six of the crashes reported by the
petitioner were assessed by ODI as
unrelated to SUA. These include all four
of the crashes occurring in highway
traffic, one crash at a traffic light and
one of the driveway crashes. The
highway crashes include two involving
loss of lateral control due to apparent
loss of rear tire grip while driving in the
rain (VOQs 11297507 and 11307255),
one involving late braking for the cut-in
of a slower moving vehicle (VOQ
11278322), and one for which the crash
data do not support the allegation and
show no evidence of speed increase or
failure to respond to driver inputs (VOQ
11174732). The crash at a traffic light
involved unexpected movement of a
vehicle operating with Traffic Aware
Cruise Control enabled after the vehicle
had come to a stop behind another
vehicle at a red light (VOQ 11307023).
The driveway crash incident will be
reviewed later in this report (VOQ
11291423).
All of the remaining 211 crashes,
assessed by ODI as related to SUA,
occurred in locations and driving
circumstances where braking is
expected. Eighty-six (86) percent of
these crashes occurred in parking lots,
driveways or other close-quarter ‘‘notin-traffic’’ locations. Almost all of these
crashes were of short duration, with
crashes occurring within three seconds
of the alleged SUA event.
accelerator pedal is applied, slowing
when the accelerator pedal is released
(generally in regenerative braking mode)
and slowing more rapidly when the
brake is applied. ODI did not observe
any incidents with vehicle accelerations
or motor torques that were not
associated with accelerator pedal
applications. In the few cases where the
brake and accelerator pedal were
applied at the same time, the brake
override logic performed as designed
and cut motor torque.
The data clearly point to pedal
misapplication by the driver as the
cause of SUA in these incidents.
Analysis of log data shows that the
accelerator pedal was applied to 85
percent or greater in 97 percent of the
SUA crashes reviewed by ODI. Peak
accelerator pedal applications were
initiated within two seconds of the
collisions in 97 percent of the cases.
Analysis of brake data showed no
braking in 90 percent of SUA crashes
and late braking initiated less than one
second before impact in the remaining
10 percent. The pre-crash event data
and driver statements indicate that the
SUA crashes have resulted from drivers
mistakenly applying the accelerator
pedal when they intended to apply the
brake pedal. Approximately 51 percent
of the crashes occurred in the first six
months of the driver’s use of the
incident vehicle.
3.2
3.3
SUA Crash Data Analysis
ODI’s analysis of EDR data, log data
or both from 118 crashes did not
identify any evidence of a vehicle-based
cause of unintended acceleration or
ineffective brake system performance in
the subject vehicles. The data shows
that vehicles responded as expected to
driver accelerator and brake pedal
inputs, accelerating when the
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VOQ 11206155
3.3.1 Consumer’s Description of the
Event
NHTSA complaint 11206155 alleges
that a 2018 Tesla Model 3 experienced
an SUA event resulting in a crash in the
owner’s driveway on the evening of May
6, 2019. The complaint states that:
‘‘[The driver] turned into [the driver’s]
driveway and was going to pull into
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[her] garage to park the car, when the
car accelerated suddenly and violently
and crashed into the front stone wall of
[the] house. The stone wall is damaged
and the front right side of the Tesla has
significant damages.’’
The petitioner referenced the incident
reported in VOQ 11206155 in the first
addendum to the petition,5 which
included a third-party analysis of EDR
data from the crash. ODI requested a
copy of the EDR data in the petition
acknowledgement letter. In response,
the petitioner provided an incomplete
copy of the EDR, a copy of a letter Tesla
sent to the consumer, and a document
prepared by the driver that provides
additional details about the SUA
allegation.6 The driver alleges that the
SUA event occurred after the vehicle
was ‘‘slowed to a halt’’ and while the
driver was ‘‘waiting for the garage door
to fully open.’’
3.3.2 Tesla Letter to the Consumer
In a July 11, 2019 letter, Tesla
provided the consumer with the
following summary of its analysis of log
data for the crash event reported in VOQ
11206155: 7
‘‘According to the vehicle’s diagnostic
log, immediately prior to the incident,
the accelerator pedal was released,
regenerative braking was engaged and
slowing the vehicle, and the steering
wheel was turned to the right. Then,
while the vehicle was traveling at
approximately 5 miles per hour and the
5 Email from Brian Sparks to NHTSA Acting
Administrator Owens, ‘‘Motor Vehicle Defect
Petition: Recall Tesla Vehicles Due to Sudden
Unintended Acceleration,’’ December 19, 2019.
6 Email from Brian Sparks to ODI, ‘‘Re_DP20–001
Acknowledgement Letter,’’ February 21, 2020,
attachment titled ‘‘My Experiences with Tesla
Model 3.’’
7 Tesla service manager, letter to the consumer,
July 11, 2019.
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steering wheel was turned sharply to the
right, the accelerator pedal was
manually pressed and over about one
second, increased from approximately
0% to as high as 88%. During this time,
the vehicle speed appropriately
increased in response to the driver’s
manual accelerator pedal input. In the
next two seconds, the accelerator pedal
was released, the brake pedal was
manually pressed, which also engaged
the Anti-Lock Braking System, multiple
crash-related alerts and signals were
triggered, and the vehicle came to a
stop.’’
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3.3.3 ODI Analysis of the Event
ODI’s analysis of the subject crash
event included reviews of vehicle log
data, the EDR report furnished by the
petitioner, statements from the driver,
and a video of the incident provided by
Tesla. This analysis confirmed the
sequence of events described in Tesla’s
letter to the consumer. Figure 1 shows
pre-crash vehicle speed and driver
controls over the ten seconds prior to
impact.
ODI’s review of the vehicle log data
shows that, approximately seven
seconds before the crash, the vehicle is
completing a right turn as the steering
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angle returns from a large positive value
to neutral. Over the next second, the
driver releases the accelerator pedal and
the vehicle begins a moderate
deceleration under regenerative braking.
The vehicle begins to turn right toward
the owner’s driveway approximately
five seconds before impact.
Approximately two seconds before
impact, as the vehicle nears the apex of
the turn into the driveway, the
accelerator pedal position begins to
increase. The accelerator pedal
increases from 0% to 88% in about one
second.
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
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BILLING CODE 4910–59–C
The accelerator pedal returns to 0%
approximately 0.9 seconds before
impact and the brake pedal is applied
approximately 0.5 seconds later. The
late brake application initiates ABS
braking approximately 0.2 seconds
before impact.
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3.3.4
ODI Analysis of Event Video File
An event video file from the vehicle’s
front camera sensor shows the vehicle
moving slowly on a residential street
before beginning the right turn into a
short driveway with a moderate positive
grade leading to twin garage doors
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separated by a center pillar covered by
stonework. The vehicle briefly surges
forward as it nears the apex of the turn
into the driveway. The vehicle never
stops moving and continues to turn
right until impacting the center pillar,
consistent with the steering angle data
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from the log and EDR data. The garage
doors remain closed throughout the
event.
3.3.5 ODI Analysis of EDR Data
The EDR vehicle speed, accelerator
pedal position and steering angle data
mirror the log data, within the range of
expected variation due to differences in
data resolution, sampling intervals and
data latencies in the two data recording
systems. For example, the vehicle speed
data reported in the EDR report for the
Model 3 has a resolution of 1 mph, a
sampling frequency of 5 Hz, and a
maximum latency of approximately 200
milliseconds, while the vehicle speed
data recorded in the log data has a
resolution of 0.05 mph, a logging rate of
1 Hz, and a maximum latency of
approximately 10 milliseconds.
The EDR did not record the late brake
application and subsequent ABS
activation. The data log shows that the
Restraint Control Module (RCM) echoed
the brake application in the near
deployment alert triggered by the
impact, indicating that the EDR would
be expected to show ‘‘On’’ for service
brake status at impact. Tesla indicated
it was unable to investigate the apparent
discrepancy further without an original
copy of the EDR report.8
ODI’s reviews of EDR reports for this
and several other Model 3 crash events
noted that the polarity of the pre-crash
longitudinal acceleration data appeared
to be reversed in relation to vehicle
speed data (i.e., negative acceleration
displayed when the vehicle speed is
increasing and positive acceleration
displayed when vehicle speed is
decreasing).9 Tesla confirmed that the
longitudinal acceleration data polarity
was reversed in Model 3 EDR reports
produced using EDR reporting services
of v20.2.1 or earlier. Tesla advised ODI
that the error has been corrected in EDR
reporting service update v20.29.1.
3.4 Analysis of Log Data for VOQ
11291423
VOQ 11291423 alleges multiple
incidents of unexpected movement of a
2015 Model S after parking on an
inclined driveway in Lancaster,
California on December 26, 2019. The
complaint states that:
‘‘[The] 2015 Model S 85D was
reversed onto driveway then placed in
park and doors were closed and locked.
A few moments later the vehicle started
8 This is the only event reviewed by ODI in this
petition evaluation where the data log showed the
brake was applied at T0 and the EDR did not.
9 Acceleration (a) is the change in velocity (v) per
unit time (t), or a(T) = dv/dt. When vehicle speed
is increasing over a given time interval, the
acceleration is positive in that interval.
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accelerating forward towards the street
and crashed into a parked car. Front
wheels were receiving power while rear
wheels where locked and dragging
rather than wheels spinning. I reversed
vehicle back onto driveway and it
happened another 2 times after first
incident within a 30 minute time span.’’
As previously noted, the petitioner’s
addendum cited this VOQ as an ‘‘SUA
complaint involving a Tesla vehicle in
which the driver cannot reasonably be
accused of pressing the accelerator.’’
When interviewed by ODI, the owner
stated that the vehicle was backed up an
inclined driveway and parked. The
driveway was covered with freshly
fallen snow. Shortly after he shifted to
‘‘park’’ and exited the vehicle, the
owner observed the vehicle move
approximately two car lengths down the
driveway.
The movement stopped when the
vehicle reached the level surface of the
street at the base of the driveway. The
owner alleged the movement occurred
two more times after the vehicle was
backed up the driveway and parked in
a similar position. The second incident
involved a minor impact with a vehicle
parked within a couple of feet of the
Tesla, resulting in a crack in the front
bumper of the second vehicle and no
damage to the Tesla. The third incident
was like the first, with the movement
ending at the base of the inclined
driveway.
ODI’s review of log data from this
vehicle found that the movement
occurred when the vehicle was shutoff
with no torque applied to the front or
rear drive motors. Based on the log data
and the physics of the vehicle
movement from the driveway to the
street, it is ODI’s assessment that the
unexpected movement of the parked
vehicle was most likely caused by
insufficient traction of the rear tires on
the low-friction surface of the snowcovered driveway, which resulted in the
vehicle sliding down the driveway. ODI
has excluded this incident from its
analysis of SUA crashes.
3.5 System Safeguards
The APPS system used in the subject
Tesla vehicles has numerous design
features to detect, and respond to, single
point electrical faults, including:
Redundant position sensors, contactless
inductive sensing technology,
independent power and ground
connections to the sensors, and sensor
voltage curves that differ by a fixed
ratio.10 All subject vehicles are
equipped with accelerator pedal
assemblies with two independent
inductive sensors that convert the
angular position of the pedal to voltage
signals. The pedal position can only be
changed in response to an external force
being applied, such as the driver’s foot.
The Drive Inverter main processor
controls motor torque based on
accelerator pedal voltage. A separate
processor (Pedal Monitor) acts as a
safety monitor, continually checking
both APPS signals for faults and
independently calculating motor torque.
Any malfunction or deviation in the
APPS system results in a fault mode,
cutting torque to zero for driver pedal
applications or regenerative braking. In
addition, the Pedal Monitor can shut off
the Drive Inverter if driver’s
commanded motor torque and actual
motor torque do not match.
The APPS voltage signals pass
through A/D (Analog/Digital) converters
in the drive unit, which then reports the
data to the Controller Area Network
(CAN) communication bus.11 The CAN
data are time stamped and stored at
specified intervals by the data log. The
RCM receives the data from the drive
unit via the CAN bus. The data is
buffered in the RCM random access
memory (RAM) and then written to the
RCM Electrically Erasable
Programmable Read-Only Memory
(EEPROM) 12 in the event of a nondeploy or deployment event.
3.6 ODI Review of SUA Theories
As part of its evaluation of DP20–001,
ODI reviewed two defect theories
alleging vehicle-based causes of SUA in
the subject vehicles. Both theories were
developed by Dr. Ronald Belt, the first
in 2018 and the second in 2020. A paper
describing the most recent theory was
submitted to NHTSA by the petitioner
and is based upon Dr. Belt’s review of
EDR data from the crash reported in
VOQ 11206155. The other theory was
referenced by the consumer who
submitted VOQ 11206155 and is based
upon Dr. Belt’s third-hand
reconstruction of log data from an
unknown SUA event. Both papers are
based upon incorrect event data,
incorrect reconstructions of event
dynamics, and false assumptions
regarding vehicle design factors.
3.6.1 2020 Theory (VOQ 11206155
SUA Event)
In an addendum to the petition
submitted on June 22, 2020, the
petitioner requested that NHTSA
include a recent paper by Dr. Ronald
11 The
10 Second
channel output voltage curve is half the
slope of the first channel.
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APPS data refresh rate is 10 milliseconds.
EEPROM is a non-volatile memory device
that retains stored data after cycling power.
12 The
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Belt in his petition.13 The paper, dated
June 1, 2020, claims to explain how a
‘‘faulty brake light switch [caused] the
brake pedal to behave like an accelerator
pedal’’ in the crash event reported in
VOQ 11206155 that was reviewed
earlier in this report (see section 3.3
VOQ 11206155). The same analysis
alleges that the proposed theory ‘‘is
believed to be the cause of sudden
acceleration in over 70% of Tesla
vehicles.’’
The SUA theory proposed by Dr. Belt
in the June 2020 paper appears to have
originated from his reliance on the precrash longitudinal acceleration data in
the EDR report with the polarity issue
recently corrected by Tesla (see section
3.3.5 ODI Analysis of EDR Data). Rather
than recognizing the conflicts between
the longitudinal acceleration data and
other pre-crash data in the EDR report
(e.g., vehicle speed, rear motor speed
and accelerator pedal position all
increasing over the same time interval
as the reported deceleration), Dr. Belt
develops his reconstruction of the crash
event using the inverted longitudinal
acceleration data and posits a theory to
explain how a faulty brake light switch
can cause the brake pedal to function
like an accelerator pedal. The theory
relies upon numerous assumptions,
including: A defective brake switch, a
large positive torque request from the
electronic stability control (ESC) system,
an alternate explanation for the large
accelerator pedal position increase
shown in the pre-crash data, and an
alleged veer to the left caused by the
presumed ESC activation.
ODI does not believe that Dr. Belt’s
June 2020 paper provides a valid theory
of an SUA defect in the subject incident
or any other crash. The theory is based
upon inaccurate event data and several
false assumptions regarding component
defects, vehicle dynamics, and motor
control system design and operation.
For example, ODI notes the following
factual errors and mistaken assumptions
contained the subject paper:
• The vehicle acceleration data used
by Dr. Belt in his analysis was reported
with the polarity reversed. In other
words, the data shows the vehicle
decelerating when it was accelerating
and accelerating when it was
decelerating. As shown in Figure 1, the
vehicle first accelerates in response to a
large accelerator pedal application, then
decelerates in response to the late brake
13 Belt, Ronald. ‘‘Tesla Regen, Brakes and Sudden
Acceleration.’’ Center for Auto Safety, June 1, 2020.
https://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/Tesla-Regen-Brakes-and-SuddenAcceleration.pdf.
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application that triggered ABS braking
just prior to impact.14
• The evidence shows that the brake
light switch functioned as designed in
the event analyzed by Dr. Belt (see
Figure 1).
• The ESC and Traction Control
systems cannot request positive torque
in the subject vehicles.
• The APPS data recorded in the EDR
report and data log show the physical
position of the accelerator pedal (see
section 3.5 System Safeguards). There is
no other source for the accelerator pedal
data.
• The vehicle does not veer to the left
at any point during the crash event (see
Figure 1 and section 3.3.4 ODI Analysis
of Event Video File).
3.6.2 2018 Theory (Unknown SUA
Event)
ODI also reviewed an earlier paper by
Dr. Belt suggesting a different theory for
a vehicle-based cause of SUA in Tesla
vehicles.15 This paper, dated May 1,
2018, was referenced in a supplemental
submission from the consumer who
submitted VOQ 11206155.16 The SUA
theory proposed by Dr. Belt in the May
2018 paper originated from his
reconstruction of accelerator position
log data from an unknown SUA incident
that was described to him over the
phone.17 Based on this reconstruction,
Dr. Belt concluded that the APPS signal
could not have been produced by the
driver’s application of the accelerator
pedal, as summarized below from the
paper’s abstract: 18
‘‘Examination of the data shows that
the accelerator pedal sensor output
increased to cause the sudden
acceleration. But the increase in the
accelerator pedal sensor output could
not have been caused by the driver.
Instead, the increase in the accelerator
pedal sensor output appears to have
14 ODI estimates that the vehicle was within
approximately five feet of the stone wall when ABS
braking began.
15 Belt, Ronald. ‘‘Tesla’s Sudden Acceleration Log
Data—What It Shows.’’ Center for Auto Safety, May
1, 2018. https://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/03/Teslas-Sudden-Acceleration-LogData-What-It-Shows.pdf.
16 ‘‘My Experiences with Tesla Model 3,’’ p 10.
17 The paper provides the following explanation
of how the accelerator pedal position data was
reconstructed: ‘‘In this paper, the author has
obtained the complete accelerator pedal sensor log
data for a sudden acceleration incident from a
driver who got the log data from Tesla during a
telephone conversation. The Tesla engineer gave a
detailed description of the log data to the driver,
who then provided it to the author. The author then
plotted this data to create the figure used in this
study.’’
18 Dr. Belt’s reconstruction imagines the APPS log
data as a square wave, which he asserts could not
have been produced by a physical application of the
accelerator pedal.
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
been caused by a fault in the motor
speed sensor, with which it shares a
common +5V power and ground.’’
Like his June 2020 paper, the theory
proposed by Dr. Belt in the May 2018
paper is based upon inaccurate event
data and false assumptions about system
design. The APPS data is not recorded
in Tesla’s log data in the manner
claimed in the paper (see section 3.3.5
ODI Analysis of EDR Data).19 In
addition, circuit design information
provided to ODI by Tesla shows that Dr.
Belt’s assumption that ‘‘[t]he two
accelerator pedal sensors and the motor
speed sensor share the same +5V
regulator and ground,’’ is incorrect.
Tesla uses two distinct regulators with
different voltage outputs to supply
power to the APPS and motor speed
sensors. Thus, the May 2018 paper does
not provide a valid explanation for a
fault-based cause of SUA in the subject
vehicles. Based upon the reported
increase in accelerator pedal position to
97 percent shortly before collision, the
most likely cause of the incident
described in the May 2018 Belt paper is
pedal misapplication by the driver.
3.7
Brake System
The subject vehicles are all equipped
with pedal-actuated hydraulic brake
systems that are completely
independent of the motor control
system. No common fault has been
identified or postulated that would
cause simultaneous malfunctions of the
brake and motor control systems in the
subject vehicles. Power assist is
provided either electro-mechanically or
from a dedicated vacuum pump. In
addition, all subject vehicles have
Tesla’s brake override logic that will cut
motor torque if the brake and accelerator
are applied at the same time. If the
accelerator pedal is pressed before the
brake pedal (or within 100 milliseconds
of brake pedal), motor torque is reduced
to zero. If the brake pedal is pressed and
then the accelerator pedal, motor torque
is limited to 250 Nm and motor power
is limited to 50 kW. In the latter
condition, the driver should be able to
hold the vehicle stationary regardless of
accelerator pedal position with 85 to
170 N (19 to 38 lbf) of brake pedal force,
depending on the platform.
Finally, the subject vehicles also
contain Tesla’s Pedal Misapplication
Mitigation (PMM) software which uses
vehicle sensor data to identify potential
pedal misapplications and cut motor
torque to prevent or mitigate SUA
19 ODI does not believe that Dr. Belt’s
reconstruction of the log data is accurate. The data
log is not capable of recording a square wave with
1 Hz sampling of the APPS data.
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13JAN1
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices
crashes. ODI’s analysis found evidence
of PMM activation in approximately 13
percent of crashes where log data was
reviewed for SUA crashes. The
effectiveness of the PMM activations
have been limited by the fact that the
original PMM implementation is
designed for conditions where the
vehicle is traveling straight forward or
rearward toward the collision obstacle.
Most SUA crashes reviewed in this
petition evaluation involved dynamic
steering inputs (i.e., vehicles with
steering angles of 180 degrees or greater
when the SUA occurs) which the
original implementation of PPM was not
designed to address.
3.8 Complaint Vehicle Service History
Review
ODI requested service histories for the
accelerator pedal assemblies, motor
control systems and brake systems for
204 of the vehicles cited by the
petitioner. Only two vehicles had faults
diagnosed in those components: One
motor fault resulting in a vehicle stall
allegation and the other an APPS fault
that appears to have resulted from
damage incurred by the force of the
driver’s foot on the pedal during the
crash event.
One of the VOQs identified by the
petitioner reported feeling a jerk
forward when approaching a stop sign,
then a complete loss of power (VOQ
11164094). The data logs from the
vehicle show no increase in speed and
the system cutting motor torque to zero
in response to a drive inverter fault. ODI
does not consider this incident a valid
example of SUA.
Another vehicle had an accelerator
pedal assembly replaced to repair a
crash induced fault in one of the pedal
tracks (VOQ 11180431). The data log
shows increased drive motor torque in
response to manual application of the
accelerator pedal to 88.4 percent. After
the fault in the pedal assembly was
detected, motor torque was cut to zero
within 0.04 seconds.
The service history analysis indicates
that component faults are not a factor in
the SUA incidents reported to NHTSA.
The data logs for the two incidents that
did involve component faults
demonstrated that system failsafe torque
cut logic worked as designed.
5.0 Conclusion
After reviewing the available data,
ODI has not identified evidence that
would support opening a defect
investigation into SUA in the subject
vehicles. The evidence shows that SUA
crashes in the complaints cited by the
petitioner have been caused by pedal
misapplication. There is no evidence of
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:08 Jan 12, 2021
Jkt 253001
any fault in the accelerator pedal
assemblies, motor control systems, or
brake systems that has contributed to
any of the cited incidents. There is also
no evidence of a design factor
contributing to increased likelihood of
pedal misapplication.
NHTSA is authorized to issue an
order requiring notification and remedy
of a defect if the Agency’s investigation
shows a defect in design, construction,
or performance of a motor vehicle that
presents an unreasonable risk to safety.
49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9), 30118. Given the
fact that the event data do not provide
evidence that the subject SUA was
caused by a vehicle-based defect, it is
unlikely that an order concerning the
notification and remedy of a safetyrelated defect would be issued due to
any investigation opened upon grant of
this petition. Therefore, and upon full
consideration of the information
presented in the petition and the
potential risks to safety, the petition is
denied. The denial of this petition does
not foreclose the Agency from taking
further action if warranted or the
potential for a future finding that a
safety-related defect exists based upon
additional information the Agency may
receive.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations
of authority at CFR 1.95 and 501.8.
Jeffrey Mark Giuseppe,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2021–00501 Filed 1–12–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
[Docket Number: DOT–OST–2020–0254]
Request for Information for the
Inclusive Design Reference Hub
Correction
In notice document 2020–27994
appearing on pages 83152–83154 in the
issue of Monday, December 21, 2020,
make the following correction:
(1) On page 83152, in the first
column, in the DATES section, change
‘‘January 20, 2021’’ to read ‘‘January 21,
2021.’’
[FR Doc. C1–2020–27994 Filed 1–12–21; 8:45 am]
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2739
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
Agency Information Collection
Activities: Information Collection
Renewal; Request for Comment;
Uniform Interagency Transfer Agent
Registration and Deregistration Forms
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice and request for comment.
AGENCY:
The OCC, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork
and respondent burden, invites the
general public and other Federal
agencies to comment on a continuing
information collection as required by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA). An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a respondent is not
required to respond to, an information
collection unless it displays a currently
valid Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) control number. The OCC is
soliciting comment on the renewal of its
collection titled ‘‘Uniform Interagency
Transfer Agent Registration and
Deregistration Forms.’’
DATES: Comments must be submitted on
or before March 15, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Commenters are encouraged
to submit comments by email, if
possible. You may submit comments by
any of the following methods:
• Email: prainfo@occ.treas.gov.
• Mail: Chief Counsel’s Office,
Attention: Comment Processing, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Attention: 1557–0124, 400 7th Street
SW, Suite 3E–218, Washington, DC
20219.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7th
Street SW, Suite 3E–218, Washington,
DC 20219.
• Fax: (571) 465–4326.
Instructions: You must include
‘‘OCC’’ as the agency name and ‘‘1557–
0124’’ in your comment. In general, the
OCC will publish comments on
www.reginfo.gov without change,
including any business or personal
information provided, such as name and
address information, email addresses, or
phone numbers. Comments received,
including attachments and other
supporting materials, are part of the
public record and subject to public
disclosure. Do not include any
information in your comment or
supporting materials that you consider
confidential or inappropriate for public
disclosure.
You may review comments and other
related materials that pertain to this
information collection beginning on the
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\13JAN1.SGM
13JAN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 8 (Wednesday, January 13, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2733-2739]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-00501]
[[Page 2733]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2019-0105]
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of petition for a defect investigation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a
petition submitted on December 19, 2019, by Mr. Brian Sparks to NHTSA's
Office of Defects Investigation (ODI). The petition requests that the
Agency recall Tesla vehicles for an unidentified defect that allegedly
causes sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). NHTSA opened Defect
Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner's request. After reviewing
the information provided by the petitioner and Tesla regarding the
alleged defect and the subject complaints, NHTSA has concluded that
there is insufficient evidence to warrant further action at this time.
Accordingly, the Agency has denied the petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Ajit Alkondon, Vehicle Defects
Division--D, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-366-3565).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1.0 Introduction
Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the Agency
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item
of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162; 49 CFR part 552. Upon receipt of a
properly filed petition the Agency conducts a technical review of the
petition, material submitted with the petition, and any additional
information. 49 U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. After considering the
technical review and taking into account appropriate factors, which may
include, among others, allocation of Agency resources, Agency
priorities, and the likelihood of success in litigation that might
arise from a determination of a noncompliance or a defect related to
motor vehicle safety, the Agency will grant or deny the petition. 49
U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR 552.8.
2.0 Petition
2.1 Petition Chronology
Mr. Brian Sparks (the petitioner) first submitted a valid petition
conforming to the requirements of 49 CFR 552.4 on December 19, 2019.\1\
On December 30, 2019, the petitioner submitted an addendum to his
petition. This addendum references NHTSA complaint 11291423, which
alleges unexpected movement of a vehicle that was parked and
unoccupied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The petitioner first raised concerns about SUA in Tesla
vehicles in September 2019 correspondence with the Agency. NHTSA did
not consider this earlier correspondence to be a validly submitted
petition because the petitioner did not provide his name and
address. See 49 CFR 552.4. The September 2019 letter cited 110
incidents of alleged SUA in complaints to NHTSA, including 102
reporting crashes. NHTSA has included the information in
petitioner's September 2019 correspondence in the Agency's analysis
of the petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 13, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)
opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner's request
for a recall of all Tesla Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles
produced to date based on the information in his correspondence,
petition and various addendums. On February 21, 2020, the petitioner
submitted another addendum to his petition, identifying 70 new
incidents of alleged SUA in NHTSA complaints (also known as Vehicle
Owner Questionnaires, or VOQs) filed since DP20-001 was opened.
Additional addendums updating VOQ counts were submitted on April 10,
2020, June 22, 2020, September 10, 2020 and December 1, 2020. The June
22 submission included a request to update the petition ``to include a
recent analysis of Tesla's SUA defect from Dr. Ronald Belt.''
2.2 Petition Basis
Altogether, the petitioner identified a total of 232 VOQs involving
unique alleged SUA incidents in his submissions, including 203
reporting crashes.\2\ The petitioner also submitted a document
purporting to analyze Event Data Recorder (EDR) data from the incident
reported in NHTSA VOQ 11216155. The petitioner believes that ``Tesla
vehicles have a structural flaw which puts their drivers and the public
at risk'' and bases his request for a recall of the subject vehicles
on:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The petitioner identified a total of 225 VOQ in the original
petition and five addendums. Six of the VOQs are duplicative of a
prior VOQ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. His view that, ``The volume of complaints in the NHTSA database
indicates a severe and systemic malfunction within Tesla vehicles;''
2. A third-party analysis of data from the crash reported in VOQ
11206155, which theorizes a fault condition that allegedly ``caused the
brake pedal to behave like an accelerator pedal;'' and
3. A complaint (VOQ 11291423) alleging SUA while the driver was
outside the vehicle, which the petitioner describes as ``the first SUA
complaint involving a Tesla vehicle in which the driver cannot
reasonably be accused of pressing the accelerator.''
3.0 Analysis
ODI performed the following analyses in its evaluation of the
petition for a grant or deny decision:
1. Analyzed crashes identified by petitioner for connection to SUA;
2. Analyzed EDR or Tesla vehicle log data or both from 118 crash
incidents; \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ This information was not available or not obtained for the
remaining crash incidents, as detailed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Reviewed the crash incident reported in VOQ 11206155;
4. Reviewed the crash incidents reported in VOQ 11291423;
5. Reviewed Tesla's system safeguards for the accelerator pedal
position sensor (APPS) assembly and motor control system;
6. Reviewed two defect theories referenced in the petition;
7. Reviewed the brake system designs for the subject vehicles; and
8. Reviewed service history information for the accelerator pedal
assemblies, motor control systems, and brake systems for 204 of the 232
vehicles identified in VOQs submitted by the petitioner.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ODI's information request letter for DP20-001 requested
crash data and service history information for all 124 VOQs cited in
the original petition and the first two addendums submitted by the
petitioner. On February 10, 2020 and October 20, 2020, ODI requested
certain supplemental information for a total of 83 additional VOQs
alleging crashes, including 80 that were cited in addendums
submitted by the petitioner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.1 Crash Classification
ODI's crash analysis reviewed 217 incidents, including the 203
crashes identified by the petitioner and fourteen additional crashes
reported in VOQs that were either not selected by the petitioner
(eight) or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission
(six).
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the driving environments and crash
data review for the crashes analyzed by ODI. Crash data (EDR, Tesla log
data, and/or video data) were reviewed for 118 of the crash incidents.
Crash data were not obtained for most of the incidents received after
DP20-001 was opened.
[[Page 2734]]
Table 1--Summary of Crash Incidents Reviewed by ODL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crash data Crash data Crash data
Category reviewed not available not obtained Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parking lot..................................... 61 44 9 114
Driveway........................................ 26 16 4 46
Traffic light................................... 11 7 2 20
Parking garage.................................. 7 5 1 12
City traffic.................................... 3 1 0 4
Stop-and-go traffic............................. 2 2 0 4
Highway traffic................................. 2 1 1 4
Stop sign....................................... 2 1 0 3
Charging station................................ 1 1 1 3
Street side parking............................. 1 1 0 2
Drive thru...................................... 1 0 1 2
School drop-off lane............................ 1 0 0 1
Car wash........................................ 0 1 0 1
Gated exit (China incident)..................... 0 1 0 1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total....................................... 118 80 19 217
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Six of the crashes reported by the petitioner were assessed by ODI
as unrelated to SUA. These include all four of the crashes occurring in
highway traffic, one crash at a traffic light and one of the driveway
crashes. The highway crashes include two involving loss of lateral
control due to apparent loss of rear tire grip while driving in the
rain (VOQs 11297507 and 11307255), one involving late braking for the
cut-in of a slower moving vehicle (VOQ 11278322), and one for which the
crash data do not support the allegation and show no evidence of speed
increase or failure to respond to driver inputs (VOQ 11174732). The
crash at a traffic light involved unexpected movement of a vehicle
operating with Traffic Aware Cruise Control enabled after the vehicle
had come to a stop behind another vehicle at a red light (VOQ
11307023). The driveway crash incident will be reviewed later in this
report (VOQ 11291423).
All of the remaining 211 crashes, assessed by ODI as related to
SUA, occurred in locations and driving circumstances where braking is
expected. Eighty-six (86) percent of these crashes occurred in parking
lots, driveways or other close-quarter ``not-in-traffic'' locations.
Almost all of these crashes were of short duration, with crashes
occurring within three seconds of the alleged SUA event.
3.2 SUA Crash Data Analysis
ODI's analysis of EDR data, log data or both from 118 crashes did
not identify any evidence of a vehicle-based cause of unintended
acceleration or ineffective brake system performance in the subject
vehicles. The data shows that vehicles responded as expected to driver
accelerator and brake pedal inputs, accelerating when the accelerator
pedal is applied, slowing when the accelerator pedal is released
(generally in regenerative braking mode) and slowing more rapidly when
the brake is applied. ODI did not observe any incidents with vehicle
accelerations or motor torques that were not associated with
accelerator pedal applications. In the few cases where the brake and
accelerator pedal were applied at the same time, the brake override
logic performed as designed and cut motor torque.
The data clearly point to pedal misapplication by the driver as the
cause of SUA in these incidents. Analysis of log data shows that the
accelerator pedal was applied to 85 percent or greater in 97 percent of
the SUA crashes reviewed by ODI. Peak accelerator pedal applications
were initiated within two seconds of the collisions in 97 percent of
the cases. Analysis of brake data showed no braking in 90 percent of
SUA crashes and late braking initiated less than one second before
impact in the remaining 10 percent. The pre-crash event data and driver
statements indicate that the SUA crashes have resulted from drivers
mistakenly applying the accelerator pedal when they intended to apply
the brake pedal. Approximately 51 percent of the crashes occurred in
the first six months of the driver's use of the incident vehicle.
3.3 VOQ 11206155
3.3.1 Consumer's Description of the Event
NHTSA complaint 11206155 alleges that a 2018 Tesla Model 3
experienced an SUA event resulting in a crash in the owner's driveway
on the evening of May 6, 2019. The complaint states that:
``[The driver] turned into [the driver's] driveway and was going to
pull into [her] garage to park the car, when the car accelerated
suddenly and violently and crashed into the front stone wall of [the]
house. The stone wall is damaged and the front right side of the Tesla
has significant damages.''
The petitioner referenced the incident reported in VOQ 11206155 in
the first addendum to the petition,\5\ which included a third-party
analysis of EDR data from the crash. ODI requested a copy of the EDR
data in the petition acknowledgement letter. In response, the
petitioner provided an incomplete copy of the EDR, a copy of a letter
Tesla sent to the consumer, and a document prepared by the driver that
provides additional details about the SUA allegation.\6\ The driver
alleges that the SUA event occurred after the vehicle was ``slowed to a
halt'' and while the driver was ``waiting for the garage door to fully
open.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Email from Brian Sparks to NHTSA Acting Administrator Owens,
``Motor Vehicle Defect Petition: Recall Tesla Vehicles Due to Sudden
Unintended Acceleration,'' December 19, 2019.
\6\ Email from Brian Sparks to ODI, ``Re_DP20-001
Acknowledgement Letter,'' February 21, 2020, attachment titled ``My
Experiences with Tesla Model 3.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.3.2 Tesla Letter to the Consumer
In a July 11, 2019 letter, Tesla provided the consumer with the
following summary of its analysis of log data for the crash event
reported in VOQ 11206155: \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Tesla service manager, letter to the consumer, July 11,
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``According to the vehicle's diagnostic log, immediately prior to
the incident, the accelerator pedal was released, regenerative braking
was engaged and slowing the vehicle, and the steering wheel was turned
to the right. Then, while the vehicle was traveling at approximately 5
miles per hour and the
[[Page 2735]]
steering wheel was turned sharply to the right, the accelerator pedal
was manually pressed and over about one second, increased from
approximately 0% to as high as 88%. During this time, the vehicle speed
appropriately increased in response to the driver's manual accelerator
pedal input. In the next two seconds, the accelerator pedal was
released, the brake pedal was manually pressed, which also engaged the
Anti-Lock Braking System, multiple crash-related alerts and signals
were triggered, and the vehicle came to a stop.''
3.3.3 ODI Analysis of the Event
ODI's analysis of the subject crash event included reviews of
vehicle log data, the EDR report furnished by the petitioner,
statements from the driver, and a video of the incident provided by
Tesla. This analysis confirmed the sequence of events described in
Tesla's letter to the consumer. Figure 1 shows pre-crash vehicle speed
and driver controls over the ten seconds prior to impact.
ODI's review of the vehicle log data shows that, approximately
seven seconds before the crash, the vehicle is completing a right turn
as the steering angle returns from a large positive value to neutral.
Over the next second, the driver releases the accelerator pedal and the
vehicle begins a moderate deceleration under regenerative braking. The
vehicle begins to turn right toward the owner's driveway approximately
five seconds before impact. Approximately two seconds before impact, as
the vehicle nears the apex of the turn into the driveway, the
accelerator pedal position begins to increase. The accelerator pedal
increases from 0% to 88% in about one second.
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The accelerator pedal returns to 0% approximately 0.9 seconds before
impact and the brake pedal is applied approximately 0.5 seconds later.
The late brake application initiates ABS braking approximately 0.2
seconds before impact.
3.3.4 ODI Analysis of Event Video File
An event video file from the vehicle's front camera sensor shows
the vehicle moving slowly on a residential street before beginning the
right turn into a short driveway with a moderate positive grade leading
to twin garage doors separated by a center pillar covered by stonework.
The vehicle briefly surges forward as it nears the apex of the turn
into the driveway. The vehicle never stops moving and continues to turn
right until impacting the center pillar, consistent with the steering
angle data
[[Page 2737]]
from the log and EDR data. The garage doors remain closed throughout
the event.
3.3.5 ODI Analysis of EDR Data
The EDR vehicle speed, accelerator pedal position and steering
angle data mirror the log data, within the range of expected variation
due to differences in data resolution, sampling intervals and data
latencies in the two data recording systems. For example, the vehicle
speed data reported in the EDR report for the Model 3 has a resolution
of 1 mph, a sampling frequency of 5 Hz, and a maximum latency of
approximately 200 milliseconds, while the vehicle speed data recorded
in the log data has a resolution of 0.05 mph, a logging rate of 1 Hz,
and a maximum latency of approximately 10 milliseconds.
The EDR did not record the late brake application and subsequent
ABS activation. The data log shows that the Restraint Control Module
(RCM) echoed the brake application in the near deployment alert
triggered by the impact, indicating that the EDR would be expected to
show ``On'' for service brake status at impact. Tesla indicated it was
unable to investigate the apparent discrepancy further without an
original copy of the EDR report.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ This is the only event reviewed by ODI in this petition
evaluation where the data log showed the brake was applied at T0 and
the EDR did not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI's reviews of EDR reports for this and several other Model 3
crash events noted that the polarity of the pre-crash longitudinal
acceleration data appeared to be reversed in relation to vehicle speed
data (i.e., negative acceleration displayed when the vehicle speed is
increasing and positive acceleration displayed when vehicle speed is
decreasing).\9\ Tesla confirmed that the longitudinal acceleration data
polarity was reversed in Model 3 EDR reports produced using EDR
reporting services of v20.2.1 or earlier. Tesla advised ODI that the
error has been corrected in EDR reporting service update v20.29.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Acceleration (a) is the change in velocity (v) per unit time
(t), or a(T) = dv/dt. When vehicle speed is increasing over a given
time interval, the acceleration is positive in that interval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.4 Analysis of Log Data for VOQ 11291423
VOQ 11291423 alleges multiple incidents of unexpected movement of a
2015 Model S after parking on an inclined driveway in Lancaster,
California on December 26, 2019. The complaint states that:
``[The] 2015 Model S 85D was reversed onto driveway then placed in
park and doors were closed and locked. A few moments later the vehicle
started accelerating forward towards the street and crashed into a
parked car. Front wheels were receiving power while rear wheels where
locked and dragging rather than wheels spinning. I reversed vehicle
back onto driveway and it happened another 2 times after first incident
within a 30 minute time span.''
As previously noted, the petitioner's addendum cited this VOQ as an
``SUA complaint involving a Tesla vehicle in which the driver cannot
reasonably be accused of pressing the accelerator.'' When interviewed
by ODI, the owner stated that the vehicle was backed up an inclined
driveway and parked. The driveway was covered with freshly fallen snow.
Shortly after he shifted to ``park'' and exited the vehicle, the owner
observed the vehicle move approximately two car lengths down the
driveway.
The movement stopped when the vehicle reached the level surface of
the street at the base of the driveway. The owner alleged the movement
occurred two more times after the vehicle was backed up the driveway
and parked in a similar position. The second incident involved a minor
impact with a vehicle parked within a couple of feet of the Tesla,
resulting in a crack in the front bumper of the second vehicle and no
damage to the Tesla. The third incident was like the first, with the
movement ending at the base of the inclined driveway.
ODI's review of log data from this vehicle found that the movement
occurred when the vehicle was shutoff with no torque applied to the
front or rear drive motors. Based on the log data and the physics of
the vehicle movement from the driveway to the street, it is ODI's
assessment that the unexpected movement of the parked vehicle was most
likely caused by insufficient traction of the rear tires on the low-
friction surface of the snow-covered driveway, which resulted in the
vehicle sliding down the driveway. ODI has excluded this incident from
its analysis of SUA crashes.
3.5 System Safeguards
The APPS system used in the subject Tesla vehicles has numerous
design features to detect, and respond to, single point electrical
faults, including: Redundant position sensors, contactless inductive
sensing technology, independent power and ground connections to the
sensors, and sensor voltage curves that differ by a fixed ratio.\10\
All subject vehicles are equipped with accelerator pedal assemblies
with two independent inductive sensors that convert the angular
position of the pedal to voltage signals. The pedal position can only
be changed in response to an external force being applied, such as the
driver's foot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Second channel output voltage curve is half the slope of
the first channel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Drive Inverter main processor controls motor torque based on
accelerator pedal voltage. A separate processor (Pedal Monitor) acts as
a safety monitor, continually checking both APPS signals for faults and
independently calculating motor torque. Any malfunction or deviation in
the APPS system results in a fault mode, cutting torque to zero for
driver pedal applications or regenerative braking. In addition, the
Pedal Monitor can shut off the Drive Inverter if driver's commanded
motor torque and actual motor torque do not match.
The APPS voltage signals pass through A/D (Analog/Digital)
converters in the drive unit, which then reports the data to the
Controller Area Network (CAN) communication bus.\11\ The CAN data are
time stamped and stored at specified intervals by the data log. The RCM
receives the data from the drive unit via the CAN bus. The data is
buffered in the RCM random access memory (RAM) and then written to the
RCM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) \12\
in the event of a non-deploy or deployment event.
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\11\ The APPS data refresh rate is 10 milliseconds.
\12\ The EEPROM is a non-volatile memory device that retains
stored data after cycling power.
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3.6 ODI Review of SUA Theories
As part of its evaluation of DP20-001, ODI reviewed two defect
theories alleging vehicle-based causes of SUA in the subject vehicles.
Both theories were developed by Dr. Ronald Belt, the first in 2018 and
the second in 2020. A paper describing the most recent theory was
submitted to NHTSA by the petitioner and is based upon Dr. Belt's
review of EDR data from the crash reported in VOQ 11206155. The other
theory was referenced by the consumer who submitted VOQ 11206155 and is
based upon Dr. Belt's third-hand reconstruction of log data from an
unknown SUA event. Both papers are based upon incorrect event data,
incorrect reconstructions of event dynamics, and false assumptions
regarding vehicle design factors.
3.6.1 2020 Theory (VOQ 11206155 SUA Event)
In an addendum to the petition submitted on June 22, 2020, the
petitioner requested that NHTSA include a recent paper by Dr. Ronald
[[Page 2738]]
Belt in his petition.\13\ The paper, dated June 1, 2020, claims to
explain how a ``faulty brake light switch [caused] the brake pedal to
behave like an accelerator pedal'' in the crash event reported in VOQ
11206155 that was reviewed earlier in this report (see section 3.3 VOQ
11206155). The same analysis alleges that the proposed theory ``is
believed to be the cause of sudden acceleration in over 70% of Tesla
vehicles.''
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\13\ Belt, Ronald. ``Tesla Regen, Brakes and Sudden
Acceleration.'' Center for Auto Safety, June 1, 2020. https://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tesla-Regen-Brakes-and-Sudden-Acceleration.pdf.
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The SUA theory proposed by Dr. Belt in the June 2020 paper appears
to have originated from his reliance on the pre-crash longitudinal
acceleration data in the EDR report with the polarity issue recently
corrected by Tesla (see section 3.3.5 ODI Analysis of EDR Data). Rather
than recognizing the conflicts between the longitudinal acceleration
data and other pre-crash data in the EDR report (e.g., vehicle speed,
rear motor speed and accelerator pedal position all increasing over the
same time interval as the reported deceleration), Dr. Belt develops his
reconstruction of the crash event using the inverted longitudinal
acceleration data and posits a theory to explain how a faulty brake
light switch can cause the brake pedal to function like an accelerator
pedal. The theory relies upon numerous assumptions, including: A
defective brake switch, a large positive torque request from the
electronic stability control (ESC) system, an alternate explanation for
the large accelerator pedal position increase shown in the pre-crash
data, and an alleged veer to the left caused by the presumed ESC
activation.
ODI does not believe that Dr. Belt's June 2020 paper provides a
valid theory of an SUA defect in the subject incident or any other
crash. The theory is based upon inaccurate event data and several false
assumptions regarding component defects, vehicle dynamics, and motor
control system design and operation. For example, ODI notes the
following factual errors and mistaken assumptions contained the subject
paper:
The vehicle acceleration data used by Dr. Belt in his
analysis was reported with the polarity reversed. In other words, the
data shows the vehicle decelerating when it was accelerating and
accelerating when it was decelerating. As shown in Figure 1, the
vehicle first accelerates in response to a large accelerator pedal
application, then decelerates in response to the late brake application
that triggered ABS braking just prior to impact.\14\
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\14\ ODI estimates that the vehicle was within approximately
five feet of the stone wall when ABS braking began.
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The evidence shows that the brake light switch functioned
as designed in the event analyzed by Dr. Belt (see Figure 1).
The ESC and Traction Control systems cannot request
positive torque in the subject vehicles.
The APPS data recorded in the EDR report and data log show
the physical position of the accelerator pedal (see section 3.5 System
Safeguards). There is no other source for the accelerator pedal data.
The vehicle does not veer to the left at any point during
the crash event (see Figure 1 and section 3.3.4 ODI Analysis of Event
Video File).
3.6.2 2018 Theory (Unknown SUA Event)
ODI also reviewed an earlier paper by Dr. Belt suggesting a
different theory for a vehicle-based cause of SUA in Tesla
vehicles.\15\ This paper, dated May 1, 2018, was referenced in a
supplemental submission from the consumer who submitted VOQ
11206155.\16\ The SUA theory proposed by Dr. Belt in the May 2018 paper
originated from his reconstruction of accelerator position log data
from an unknown SUA incident that was described to him over the
phone.\17\ Based on this reconstruction, Dr. Belt concluded that the
APPS signal could not have been produced by the driver's application of
the accelerator pedal, as summarized below from the paper's abstract:
\18\
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\15\ Belt, Ronald. ``Tesla's Sudden Acceleration Log Data--What
It Shows.'' Center for Auto Safety, May 1, 2018. https://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Teslas-Sudden-Acceleration-Log-Data-What-It-Shows.pdf.
\16\ ``My Experiences with Tesla Model 3,'' p 10.
\17\ The paper provides the following explanation of how the
accelerator pedal position data was reconstructed: ``In this paper,
the author has obtained the complete accelerator pedal sensor log
data for a sudden acceleration incident from a driver who got the
log data from Tesla during a telephone conversation. The Tesla
engineer gave a detailed description of the log data to the driver,
who then provided it to the author. The author then plotted this
data to create the figure used in this study.''
\18\ Dr. Belt's reconstruction imagines the APPS log data as a
square wave, which he asserts could not have been produced by a
physical application of the accelerator pedal.
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``Examination of the data shows that the accelerator pedal sensor
output increased to cause the sudden acceleration. But the increase in
the accelerator pedal sensor output could not have been caused by the
driver. Instead, the increase in the accelerator pedal sensor output
appears to have been caused by a fault in the motor speed sensor, with
which it shares a common +5V power and ground.''
Like his June 2020 paper, the theory proposed by Dr. Belt in the
May 2018 paper is based upon inaccurate event data and false
assumptions about system design. The APPS data is not recorded in
Tesla's log data in the manner claimed in the paper (see section 3.3.5
ODI Analysis of EDR Data).\19\ In addition, circuit design information
provided to ODI by Tesla shows that Dr. Belt's assumption that ``[t]he
two accelerator pedal sensors and the motor speed sensor share the same
+5V regulator and ground,'' is incorrect. Tesla uses two distinct
regulators with different voltage outputs to supply power to the APPS
and motor speed sensors. Thus, the May 2018 paper does not provide a
valid explanation for a fault-based cause of SUA in the subject
vehicles. Based upon the reported increase in accelerator pedal
position to 97 percent shortly before collision, the most likely cause
of the incident described in the May 2018 Belt paper is pedal
misapplication by the driver.
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\19\ ODI does not believe that Dr. Belt's reconstruction of the
log data is accurate. The data log is not capable of recording a
square wave with 1 Hz sampling of the APPS data.
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3.7 Brake System
The subject vehicles are all equipped with pedal-actuated hydraulic
brake systems that are completely independent of the motor control
system. No common fault has been identified or postulated that would
cause simultaneous malfunctions of the brake and motor control systems
in the subject vehicles. Power assist is provided either electro-
mechanically or from a dedicated vacuum pump. In addition, all subject
vehicles have Tesla's brake override logic that will cut motor torque
if the brake and accelerator are applied at the same time. If the
accelerator pedal is pressed before the brake pedal (or within 100
milliseconds of brake pedal), motor torque is reduced to zero. If the
brake pedal is pressed and then the accelerator pedal, motor torque is
limited to 250 Nm and motor power is limited to 50 kW. In the latter
condition, the driver should be able to hold the vehicle stationary
regardless of accelerator pedal position with 85 to 170 N (19 to 38
lbf) of brake pedal force, depending on the platform.
Finally, the subject vehicles also contain Tesla's Pedal
Misapplication Mitigation (PMM) software which uses vehicle sensor data
to identify potential pedal misapplications and cut motor torque to
prevent or mitigate SUA
[[Page 2739]]
crashes. ODI's analysis found evidence of PMM activation in
approximately 13 percent of crashes where log data was reviewed for SUA
crashes. The effectiveness of the PMM activations have been limited by
the fact that the original PMM implementation is designed for
conditions where the vehicle is traveling straight forward or rearward
toward the collision obstacle. Most SUA crashes reviewed in this
petition evaluation involved dynamic steering inputs (i.e., vehicles
with steering angles of 180 degrees or greater when the SUA occurs)
which the original implementation of PPM was not designed to address.
3.8 Complaint Vehicle Service History Review
ODI requested service histories for the accelerator pedal
assemblies, motor control systems and brake systems for 204 of the
vehicles cited by the petitioner. Only two vehicles had faults
diagnosed in those components: One motor fault resulting in a vehicle
stall allegation and the other an APPS fault that appears to have
resulted from damage incurred by the force of the driver's foot on the
pedal during the crash event.
One of the VOQs identified by the petitioner reported feeling a
jerk forward when approaching a stop sign, then a complete loss of
power (VOQ 11164094). The data logs from the vehicle show no increase
in speed and the system cutting motor torque to zero in response to a
drive inverter fault. ODI does not consider this incident a valid
example of SUA.
Another vehicle had an accelerator pedal assembly replaced to
repair a crash induced fault in one of the pedal tracks (VOQ 11180431).
The data log shows increased drive motor torque in response to manual
application of the accelerator pedal to 88.4 percent. After the fault
in the pedal assembly was detected, motor torque was cut to zero within
0.04 seconds.
The service history analysis indicates that component faults are
not a factor in the SUA incidents reported to NHTSA. The data logs for
the two incidents that did involve component faults demonstrated that
system failsafe torque cut logic worked as designed.
5.0 Conclusion
After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence
that would support opening a defect investigation into SUA in the
subject vehicles. The evidence shows that SUA crashes in the complaints
cited by the petitioner have been caused by pedal misapplication. There
is no evidence of any fault in the accelerator pedal assemblies, motor
control systems, or brake systems that has contributed to any of the
cited incidents. There is also no evidence of a design factor
contributing to increased likelihood of pedal misapplication.
NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and
remedy of a defect if the Agency's investigation shows a defect in
design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents
an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9), 30118. Given the
fact that the event data do not provide evidence that the subject SUA
was caused by a vehicle-based defect, it is unlikely that an order
concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect would
be issued due to any investigation opened upon grant of this petition.
Therefore, and upon full consideration of the information presented in
the petition and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied.
The denial of this petition does not foreclose the Agency from taking
further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that
a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the
Agency may receive.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at CFR
1.95 and 501.8.
Jeffrey Mark Giuseppe,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2021-00501 Filed 1-12-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
