Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1168-1248 [2020-29274]

Agencies

• Wage and Hour Division
• DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 4 (Thursday, January 7, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 1168-1248]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-29274]



[[Page 1167]]

Vol. 86

Thursday,

No. 4

January 7, 2021

Part III





Department of Labor





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Wage and Hour Division





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29 CFR Parts 780, 788 and 795





Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act; Final 
Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 86 , No. 4 / Thursday, January 7, 2021 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 1168]]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Wage and Hour Division

29 CFR Parts 780, 788 and 795

RIN 1235-AA34


Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act

AGENCY: Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Labor (the Department) is revising its 
interpretation of independent contractor status under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA or the Act) to promote certainty for stakeholders, 
reduce litigation, and encourage innovation in the economy.

DATES: This final rule is effective on March 8, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amy DeBisschop, Division of 
Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation, Wage and Hour Division 
(WHD), U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-3502, 200 Constitution Avenue 
NW, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-0406 (this is not a 
toll-free number). Copies of this final rule may be obtained in 
alternative formats (Large Print, Braille, Audio Tape, or Disc), upon 
request, by calling (202) 693-0675 (this is not a toll-free number). 
TTY/TDD callers may dial toll-free 1-877-889-5627 to obtain information 
or request materials in alternative formats.
    Questions of interpretation and/or enforcement of the agency's 
regulations may be directed to the nearest WHD district office. Locate 
the nearest office by calling WHD's toll-free help line at (866) 4US-
WAGE ((866) 487-9243) between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. in your local time 
zone, or logging onto WHD's website for a nationwide listing of WHD 
district and area offices at https://www.dol.gov/whd/america2.htm.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Executive Summary

    The FLSA requires covered employers to pay their nonexempt 
employees at least the Federal minimum wage for every hour worked and 
overtime pay for every hour worked over 40 in a workweek, and it 
mandates that employers keep certain records regarding their employees. 
A worker who performs services for an individual or entity (``person'' 
as defined in the Act) as an independent contractor, however, is not 
that person's employee under the Act. Thus, the FLSA does not require 
such person to pay an independent contractor either the minimum wage or 
overtime pay, nor does it require that person to keep records regarding 
that independent contractor. The Act does not define the term 
``independent contractor,'' but it defines ``employer'' as ``any person 
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee,'' 29 U.S.C. 203(d), ``employee'' as ``any 
individual employed by an employer,'' id. at 203(e) (subject to certain 
exceptions), and ``employ'' as ``includ[ing] to suffer or permit to 
work,'' id. at 203(g). Courts and the Department have long interpreted 
the ``suffer or permit'' standard to require an evaluation of the 
extent of the worker's economic dependence on the potential employer--
i.e., the putative employer or alleged employer--and have developed a 
multifactor test to analyze whether a worker is an employee or an 
independent contractor under the FLSA. The ultimate inquiry is whether, 
as a matter of economic reality, the worker is dependent on a 
particular individual, business, or organization for work (and is thus 
an employee) or is in business for him- or herself (and is thus an 
independent contractor).
    This economic realities test and its component factors have not 
always been sufficiently explained or consistently articulated by 
courts or the Department, resulting in uncertainty among the regulated 
community. The Department believes that a clear articulation will lead 
to increased precision and predictability in the economic reality 
test's application, which will in turn benefit workers and businesses 
and encourage innovation and flexibility in the economy. Accordingly, 
earlier this year the Department proposed to introduce a new part to 
Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations setting forth its 
interpretation of whether workers are ``employees'' or independent 
contractors under the Act.
    Having received and reviewed the comments to its proposal, the 
Department now adopts as a final rule the interpretive guidance set 
forth in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) (85 FR 60600) largely 
as proposed. This regulatory guidance adopts general interpretations to 
which courts and the Department have long adhered. For example, the 
final rule explains that independent contractors are workers who, as a 
matter of economic reality, are in business for themselves as opposed 
to being economically dependent on the potential employer for work. The 
final rule also explains that the inquiry into economic dependence is 
conducted by applying several factors, with no one factor being 
dispositive, and that actual practices are entitled to greater weight 
than what may be contractually or theoretically possible. The final 
rule sharpens this inquiry into five distinct factors, instead of the 
five or more overlapping factors used by most courts and previously the 
Department. Moreover, consistent with the FLSA's text, its purpose, and 
the Department's experience administering and enforcing the Act, the 
final rule explains that two of those factors--(1) the nature and 
degree of the worker's control over the work and (2) the worker's 
opportunity for profit or loss--are more probative of the question of 
economic dependence or lack thereof than other factors, and thus 
typically carry greater weight in the analysis than any others.
    The regulatory guidance promulgated in this final rule regarding 
independent contractor status under the FLSA is generally applicable 
across all industries. As such, it replaces the Department's previous 
interpretations of independent contractor status under the FLSA which 
applied only in certain contexts, found at 29 CFR 780.330(b) 
(interpreting independent contractor status under the FLSA for tenants 
and sharecroppers) and 29 CFR 788.16(a) (interpreting independent 
contractor status under the FLSA for certain forestry and logging 
workers). The Department believes this final rule will significantly 
clarify to stakeholders how to distinguish between employees and 
independent contractors under the Act.
    This final rule is considered to be an Executive Order 13771 
deregulatory action. Details on the estimated increased efficiency and 
cost savings of this rule can be found in the regulatory impact 
analysis (RIA) in section VI.

II. Background

A. Relevant FLSA Definitions

    Enacted in 1938, the FLSA requires that, among other things, 
covered employers pay their nonexempt employees at least the Federal 
minimum wage for every hour worked and overtime pay for every hour 
worked over 40 in a workweek, and it mandates that employers keep 
certain records regarding their employees. See 29 U.S.C. 206(a), 207(a) 
(minimum wage and overtime pay requirements); 29 U.S.C. 211(c) 
(recordkeeping requirements). The FLSA does not define the term 
``independent contractor.'' The Act defines ``employer'' in section 
3(d) to ``include[ ] any person acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of an employer in relation to an employee,'' ``employee'' in 
section 3(e)(1) to mean, subject to certain exceptions, ``any

[[Page 1169]]

individual employed by an employer,'' and ``employ'' in section 3(g) to 
include ``to suffer or permit to work.'' \1\ The Supreme Court has 
recognized that ``there is in the [FLSA] no definition that solves 
problems as to the limits of the employer-employee relationship under 
the Act.'' Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947).
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    \1\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d), (e), (g). The Act defines a ``person'' as 
``an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business 
trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons.'' 29 
U.S.C. 203(a).
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    The Supreme Court has interpreted the ``suffer or permit'' language 
to define FLSA employment to be broad and more inclusive than the 
common law standard. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 
318, 326 (1992). However, the Court also recognized that the Act's 
``statutory definition[s] . . . have [their] limits.'' Tony & Susan 
Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985) (internal 
citation omitted); see also Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 
148, 152 (1947) (``The definition `suffer or permit to work' was 
obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees.''). The 
Supreme Court specifically recognized that ``[t]here may be independent 
contractors who take part in production or distribution who would alone 
be responsible for the wages and hours of their own employees.'' 
Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 729. Accordingly, Federal courts of 
appeals have uniformly held, and the Department has consistently 
maintained, that independent contractors are not ``employees'' for 
purposes of the FLSA. See, e.g., Saleem v. Corporate Transp. Group, 
Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2017); Karlson v. Action Process 
Serv. & Private Investigation, LLC, 860 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 
2017).

B. Economic Dependence and the Economic Reality Test

1. Supreme Court Development of the Economic Reality Test
    As the NPRM explained, the U.S. Supreme Court explored the limits 
of the employer-employee relationship in a series of cases from 1944 to 
1947 under three different Federal statutes: The FLSA, the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the Social Security Act (SSA). 85 FR 
60601 (summarizing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 
(1944); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Bartels v. 
Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); and Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. 722)).
    In Hearst, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA's definition of 
employment was broader than that of the common law. 322 U.S. 123-25. 
Congress responded by amending the definition of employment under the 
NLRA on June 23, 1947, ``with the obvious purpose of hav[ing] the 
[National Labor Relations] Board and the courts apply general agency 
principles in distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors under the [NLRA].'' NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 
U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
    On June 16, 1947, one week before Congress amended the NLRA in 
response to Hearst, the Supreme Court decided Silk, which addressed the 
distinction between employees and independent contractors under the 
SSA. In that case, the Court relied on Hearst to hold that ``economic 
reality,'' as opposed to ``technical concepts'' of the common law 
standard alone, determines workers' classification. 331 U.S. at 712-14. 
Although the Court found it to be ``quite impossible to extract from 
the [SSA] a rule of thumb to define the limits of the employer-
employe[e] relationship,'' it identified five factors as ``important 
for decision'': ``degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss, 
investment in facilities, permanency of relation[,] and skill required 
in the claimed independent operation.'' Id. at 716. The Court added 
that ``[n]o one [factor] is controlling nor is the list complete.'' Id. 
One week after Silk and on the same day Congress amended the NLRA, the 
Court reiterated these five factors in Bartels, another case involving 
employee or independent contractor status under the SSA. In Bartels, 
the Court explained that under the SSA, employee status ``was not to be 
determined solely by the idea of control which an alleged employer may 
or could exercise over the details of the service rendered to his 
business by the worker.'' Id. Although ``control is characteristically 
associated with the employer-employee relationship,'' employees under 
``social legislation'' such as the SSA are ``those who as a matter of 
economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render 
service.'' Id.
    The same day as it decided Silk, the Court ruled in Rutherford Food 
that certain workers at a slaughterhouse were employees under the FLSA, 
and not independent contractors, by examining facts pertaining to the 
five factors identified in Silk.\2\ The Court also considered whether 
the work was ``a part of the integrated unit of production'' (meaning 
whether the putative independent contractors were integrated into the 
assembly line alongside the company's employees) to assess whether they 
were employees or independent contractors under the FLSA. Id. at 729-
730.
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    \2\ For example, the Court noted that the slaughterhouse workers 
performed unskilled work ``on the production line.'' 331 U.S. at 
730. ``The premises and equipment of [the employer] were used for 
the work,'' indicating little investment by the workers. Id. ``The 
group had no business organization that could or did shift as a unit 
from one slaughter-house to another,'' indicating a permanent work 
arrangement. Id. ``The managing official of the plant kept close 
touch on the operation,'' indicating control by the alleged 
employer. Id. And ``[w]hile profits to the boners depended upon the 
efficiency of their work, it was more like piecework than an 
enterprise that actually depended for success upon the initiative, 
judgment or foresight of the typical independent contractor.'' Id.
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    In November 1947, five months after Silk and Rutherford Food, the 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) proposed regulations r defining 
when an individual was an independent contractor or employee under the 
SSA, which used a test that balanced the following factors:
    1. Degree of control of the individual;
    2. Permanency of relation;
    3. Integration of the individual's work in the business to which he 
renders service;
    4. Skill required by the individual;
    5. Investment by the individual in facilities for work; and
    6. Opportunity of the individual for profit or loss.

12 FR 7966. Factors one, two, and four through six corresponded 
directly with the five factors identified as being ``important for 
decision'' in Silk, 331 U.S. at 716, and the third factor corresponded 
with Rutherford Food's consideration of the fact that the workers were 
``part of an integrated unit of production.'' 331 U.S. at 729. The 
Treasury proposal further relied on Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130, to apply 
these factors to determine whether a worker was ``dependent as a matter 
of economic reality upon the business to which he renders services.'' 
12 FR 7966.\3\
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    \3\ The Treasury proposal was never finalized because Congress 
amended the SSA to foreclose the proposal.
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    Congress replaced the interpretations of the definitions of 
``employee'' adopted in Hearst for the NLRA and in Silk and Bartels for 
the SSA ``to demonstrate that the usual common-law principles were the 
keys to meaning.'' Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25. However, Congress did 
not similarly amend the FLSA. Thus, the Supreme Court stated in Darden 
that the scope of employment under the FLSA remains broader than that 
under common law and is determined not by the common law but instead by 
the economic reality of the relationship at issue. See id. Since 
implicitly doing so in Rutherford Food,

[[Page 1170]]

the Court has not again applied (or rejected the application of) the 
Silk factors to an FLSA classification question.
2. Application of the Economic Reality Test by Federal Courts of 
Appeals
    As the NPRM explained, in the 1970s and 1980s Federal courts of 
appeals began to adopt versions of a multifactor ``economic reality'' 
test based on Silk, Rutherford Food, and Bartels and similar to 
Treasury's 1947 proposed SSA regulation to analyze whether a worker was 
an employee or an independent contractor under the FLSA. See 85 FR 
60603.\4\ Drawing on the Supreme Court precedent discussed above, 
courts have recognized that the heart of the inquiry is whether ``as a 
matter of economic reality'' the workers are ``dependent upon the 
business to which they render service.'' Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 
527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130). 
Some courts have clarified that this question of economic dependence 
may be boiled down to asking ``whether, as a matter of economic 
reality, the workers depend upon someone else's business for the 
opportunity to render service or are in business for themselves.'' 
Saleem, 854 F.3d at 139 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Courts have also explained that a non-exhaustive set of 
factors--derived from Silk and Rutherford Food--shape and guide this 
inquiry. See, e.g., Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311 (identifying ``[f]ive 
considerations [which] have been set out as aids to making the 
determination of dependence, vel non''); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry 
Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (articulating a six-
factor test).
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    \4\ As explained below, versions of this multifactor economic 
realty test have also been enforced and articulated by the 
Department in subregulatory guidance since the 1950s.
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    In Driscoll, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described its six-
factor test as follows:
    1. The degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner 
in which the work is to be performed;
    2. the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending 
on his managerial skill;
    3. the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials 
required for his task, or his employment of helpers;
    4. whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
    5. the degree of permanency of the working relationship; and
    6. whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged 
employer's business. Id. at 754.

Most courts of appeals articulate a similar test, but application 
between courts may vary significantly. Compare, e.g., Sec'y of Labor v. 
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534-35 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying six-factor 
economic reality test to hold that pickle pickers were employees under 
the FLSA), with Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1117 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(applying the same six-factor economic reality test to hold that pickle 
pickers were not employees under the FLSA). For example, the Second 
Circuit has analyzed opportunity for profit or loss and investment (the 
second and third factors listed above) together as one factor. See, 
e.g., Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058 (2d Cir. 1988). 
The Fifth Circuit has not adopted the sixth factor listed above, which 
analyzes the integrality of the work, as part of its standard, see, 
e.g., Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311, but has at times assessed integrality as 
an additional factor, see, e.g. Hobbs v. Petroplex Pipe & Constr., 
Inc., 946 F.3d 824, 836 (5th Cir. 2020).
    The NPRM highlighted noteworthy modifications some courts of 
appeals have made to the economic reality factors as originally 
articulated in 1947 by the Supreme Court. See 85 FR 60603-04. First, 
the ``skill required'' factor identified in Silk, 331 U.S. at 716, is 
now articulated more expansively by some courts to include 
``initiative.'' See, e.g., Parrish, 917 F.3d at 379 (``the skill and 
initiative required in performing the job''); Karlson, 860 F.3d at 1093 
(same); Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1058-59 (``the degree of skill and 
independent initiative required to perform the work'').
    Second, Silk analyzed workers' investments, 331 U.S. at 717-19. 
However, the Fifth Circuit has revised the ``investment'' factor to 
instead consider ``the extent of the relative investments of the worker 
and the alleged employer.'' Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343. Some other 
circuits have adopted this ``relative investment'' approach but 
continue to use the phrase ``worker's investment'' to describe the 
factor. See, e.g., Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 810 
(6th Cir. 2015); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1989).
    Third, although the permanence factor under Silk was understood to 
mean the continuity and duration of working relationships, see 12 FR 
7967, some courts of appeals have expanded this factor to also consider 
the exclusivity of such relationships. See, e.g., Scantland, 721 F.3d 
at 1319; Keller, 781 F.3d at 807.
    Finally, Rutherford Food's consideration of whether work is ``part 
of an integrated unit of production,'' 331 U.S. at 729, has now been 
replaced by many courts of appeals by consideration of whether the 
service rendered is ``integral,'' which those courts have applied as 
meaning important or central to the potential employer's business. See, 
e.g., Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 937 F.3d 221, 229 (3rd Cir. 2019) 
(concluding that workers' services were integral because they were the 
providers of the business's ``primary offering''); Acosta v. Off Duty 
Police Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding 
that services provided by workers were ``integral'' because the 
putative employer ``built its business around'' those services); 
McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entertainment, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 244 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (considering ``the importance of the services rendered to 
the company's business'').
    Courts of appeals have cautioned against the ``mechanical 
application'' of the economic reality factors. See, e.g., Saleem, 854 
F.3d at 139. ``Rather, each factor is a tool used to gauge the economic 
dependence of the alleged employee, and each must be applied with this 
ultimate concept in mind.'' Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343. Further, courts 
of appeals make clear that the analysis should draw from the totality 
of circumstances, with no single factor being determinative by itself. 
See, e.g., Keller, 781 F.3d at 807 (``No one factor is 
determinative.''); Baker, 137 F.3d at 1440 (``None of the factors alone 
is dispositive; instead, the court must employ a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach.'').
3. Application of the Economic Reality Test by WHD
    Since at least 1954, WHD has applied variations of this multifactor 
analysis when considering whether a worker is an employee under the 
FLSA or an independent contractor. See WHD Opinion Letter (Aug. 13, 
1954) (applying six factors very similar to the six economic reality 
factors currently used by courts of appeals). In 1964, WHD stated, 
``The Supreme Court has made it clear that an employee, as 
distinguished from a person who is engaged in a business of his own, is 
one who as a matter of economic reality follows the usual path of an 
employee and is dependent on the business which he serves.'' WHD 
Opinion Letter FLSA-795 (Sept. 30, 1964).
    Over the years since, WHD has issued numerous opinion letters 
applying a multifactor analysis very similar to the multifactor 
economic reality test courts use (with some variation) to determine 
whether workers are employees or

[[Page 1171]]

independent contractors.\5\ WHD has also promulgated regulations 
applying a multifactor analysis for independent contractor status under 
the FLSA in certain specific industries. See, e.g., 29 CFR 780.330(b) 
(applying a six factor economic reality test to determine whether a 
sharecropper or tenant is an independent contractor or employee under 
the Act); 29 CFR 788.16(a) (applying a six factor economic reality test 
in forestry and logging operations with no more than eight employees). 
Further, WHD has promulgated a regulation applying a multifactor 
economic reality analysis for determining independent contractor status 
under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
(MSPA). 29 CFR 500.20(h)(4).
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    \5\ See, e.g., WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6 at 4 (Apr. 29, 
2019); WHD Opinion Letter, 2002 WL 32406602, at *2 (Sept. 5, 2002); 
WHD Opinion Letter, 2000 WL 34444342, at *3 (Dec. 7, 2000); WHD 
Opinion Letter, 2000 WL 34444352, at *1 (Jul. 5, 2000); WHD Opinion 
Letter, 1999 WL 1788137, at *1 (Jul. 12, 1999); WHD Opinion Letter, 
1995 WL 1032489, at *1 (June 5, 1995); WHD Opinion Letter, 1995 WL 
1032469, at *1 (Mar. 2, 1995); WHD Opinion Letter, 1986 WL 740454, 
at *1 (June 23, 1986); WHD Opinion Letter, 1986 WL 1171083, at *1 
(Jan. 14, 1986); WHD Opinion Letter WH-476, 1978 WL 51437, at *2 
(Oct. 19, 1978); WHD Opinion Letter WH-361, 1975 WL 40984, at *1 
(Oct. 1, 1975); WHD Opinion Letter (Sept. 12, 1969); WHD Opinion 
Letter (Oct. 12, 1965).
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    The Department's sub-regulatory guidance, WHD Fact Sheet #13, 
``Employment Relationship under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)'' 
(Jul. 2008), similarly stated that, when determining whether an 
employment relationship exists under the FLSA, common law control is 
not the exclusive consideration. Instead, ``it is the total activity or 
situation which controls''; and ``an employee, as distinguished from a 
person who is engaged in a business of his or her own, is one who, as a 
matter of economic reality, follows the usual path of an employee and 
is dependent on the business which he or she serves.'' \6\ The fact 
sheet identified seven economic reality factors; in addition to factors 
that are similar to the six factors identified above, it also 
considered the worker's ``degree of independent business organization 
and operation.'' On July 15, 2015, WHD issued Administrator's 
Interpretation No. 2015-1, ``The Application of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act's `Suffer or Permit' Standard in the Identification of 
Employees Who Are Misclassified as Independent Contractors'' (AI 2015-
1). AI 2015-1 provided guidance regarding the employment relationship 
under the FLSA and the application of the six economic realities 
factors. AI 2015-1 was withdrawn on June 7, 2017 and is no longer in 
effect.
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    \6\ Fact Sheet #13 is available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs13.pdf.
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    WHD's most recent opinion letter addressing this issue, from 2019, 
generally applied the principles and factors similar to those described 
in the prior opinion letters and Fact Sheet #13, but not the 
``independent business organization'' factor because it did not add to 
the analysis as a separate factor and was ``[e]ncompassed within'' the 
other factors. It also stated that the investment factor should focus 
on the ``amount of the worker's investment in facilities, equipment, or 
helpers.'' The opinion letter addressed the FLSA classification of 
service providers who used a virtual marketplace company to be referred 
to end-market consumers to whom the services were actually provided. 
WHD concluded that the service providers appeared to be independent 
contractors and not employees of the virtual marketplace company. See 
WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6 at 7. WHD found that it was ``inherently 
difficult to conceptualize the service providers' `working 
relationship' with [the virtual marketplace company], because as a 
matter of economic reality, they are working for the consumer, not [the 
company].'' Id. Because ``[t]he facts . . . demonstrate economic 
independence, rather than economic dependence, in the working 
relationship between [the virtual marketplace company] and its service 
providers,'' WHD opined that they were not employees of the company 
under the FLSA but rather were independent contractors. Id. at 9.
    As explained below, the Department's prior interpretations of 
independent contractor status, which themselves have evolved over time, 
are subject to similar limitations as that of court opinions, and the 
Department believes that stakeholders would benefit from clarification. 
For these reasons, the Department proposed promulgating a clearer and 
more consistent standard for evaluating whether a worker is an employee 
or independent contractor under the FLSA and is now finalizing that 
proposal, with some modifications based on comments received.

C. The Department's Proposal

    On September 25, 2020, the Department published the NPRM in the 
Federal Register. The Department proposed to adopt an ``economic 
reality'' test to determine a worker's status as an FLSA employee or an 
independent contractor. The test considers whether a worker is in 
business for himself or herself (independent contractor) or is instead 
economically dependent on an employer for work (employee). The 
Department further identified two ``core factors'': The nature and 
degree of the worker's control over the work; and the worker's 
opportunity for profit or loss based on initiative, investment, or 
both. The Department explained it was proposing to emphasize these 
factors because they are the most probative of whether workers are 
economically dependent on someone else's business or are in business 
for themselves. The proposal identified three other factors to also be 
considered, though they are less probative than the core factors: The 
amount of skill required for the work, the degree of permanence of the 
working relationship between the individual and the potential employer, 
and whether the work is part of an integrated unit of production. The 
Department further proposed to advise that the actual practice is more 
probative than what may be contractually or theoretically possible in 
determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor.

D. Comments

    The Department solicited comments on all aspects of the proposed 
rule. More than 1800 individuals and organizations timely commented on 
the Department's NPRM during the thirty-day comment period that ended 
on October 26, 2020. The Department received comments from employers, 
workers, industry associations, worker advocacy groups, and unions, 
among others. All timely comments may be viewed at the website 
www.regulations.gov, docket ID WHD-2020-0007.
    Of the comments received, the Department received approximately 230 
comments from workers who identified themselves as independent 
contractors (not including the over 900 comments received from Uber 
drivers discussed below). Of those, the overwhelming majority expressed 
support for the NPRM. These individuals identified themselves as 
freelancers or independent contractors in jobs including translator, 
journalist, consultant, musician, and many others. Among this group of 
commenters, over 200 expressed support for the proposed rule, while 
only 8 opposed it. The remaining individuals in this group did not 
express a specific position. Uber drivers submitted over 900 comments. 
While many expressed views on Uber corporate policies and not on the 
NPRM itself, the majority of these drivers who addressed the NRPM 
supported the Department's proposal. The Department also received a 
number of other

[[Page 1172]]

comments that are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. For example, 
several commenters expressed opinions related to the issues addressed 
in the Department's proposal but that were specific to state 
legislation or employer policies. Significant issues raised in the 
timely comments received are discussed below, along with the 
Department's response to those comments.

III. Need for Rulemaking

    The NPRM explained that the Department has never promulgated a 
generally-applicable regulation addressing who is an independent 
contractor and thus not an employee under the FLSA. Instead, as 
described above, the Department has issued and revised guidance since 
at least 1954, using different variations of a multifactor economic 
reality test that analyzes economic dependence to distinguish 
independent contractors from employees. Such guidance reflects, in 
large part, application of the general principles of the economic 
reality test by Federal courts of appeals. Such guidance, however, did 
not reflect any public input. Indeed, the NPRM kicked off the 
Department's first ever notice-and-comment rulemaking to provide a 
generally applicable interpretation of independent contractor status 
under the FLSA. As recounted just above, the Department received many 
comments from stakeholders who are actually impacted by FLSA 
classification decisions, which are valuable information and insight 
that the Department has not previously gathered and many of which 
reinforced the Department's view that more clarity is needed in this 
area.
    The Department explained in the NPRM preamble that prior 
articulations of the test have proven to be unclear and unwieldy for 
the four following reasons. First, the test's overarching concept of 
``economic dependence'' is under-developed and sometimes inconsistently 
applied, rendering it a source of confusion. Second, the test is 
indefinite in that it makes all facts potentially relevant without 
guidance on how to prioritize or balance different and sometimes 
competing considerations. Third, inefficiency and lack of structure in 
the test further stem from blurred boundaries between the factors. 
Fourth, these shortcomings have become more apparent over time as 
technology, economic conditions, and work relationships have evolved.
    The Department thus proposed to promulgate a regulation that would 
clarify and sharpen the contours of the economic reality test used to 
determine independent contractor classification under the FLSA. The 
NPRM explained that such a regulation would provide much needed clarity 
and encourage (or at least stop deterring) flexible work arrangements 
that benefit both businesses and workers.
    Commenters in the business community and freelance workers 
generally agreed with the Department that the multifactor balancing 
test is confusing and needs clarification. The National Retail 
Federation (NRF) complained that ``existing tests for independent 
contractor status tend to have a large number of factors which can be 
nebulous, overlapping, and even irrelevant to the ultimate inquiry.'' 
The Workplace Policy Institute of Littler Mendelson, P.C. (WPI) stated 
that ``[b]oth the Department and the courts have struggled to define 
`dependence' '' in the modern economy--resulting in confusion, 
unpredictability and inconsistent results.'' The Society for Human 
Resource Management (SHRM) echoed this sentiment, writing ``the 
business community and workers are left applying numerous factors in a 
variety of ways that is mired in uncertainty and, therefore, 
unnecessary risk.'' The U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated that ``[t]he 
confusion regarding whether a worker is properly classified as an 
employee or an independent contractor has long been a vexing problem 
for the business community, across many different industries and work 
settings.'' See also, e.g., World Floor Covering Association (WFCA) 
(``The current test has resulted in inconsistent decisions, much 
confusion, and unnecessary costs.''). Numerous individual freelancers 
and organizations that represent freelance workers also stated they 
would welcome ``greater clarity and predictability in the application 
of the `economic realities' test.'' Coalition to Promote Independent 
Entrepreneurs (CPIE); see also Coalition of Practicing Translators & 
Interpreters of California (CoPTIC) (requesting ``greater clarity in 
Federal law''). Individual freelancers generally welcomed greater legal 
clarity. For example, one individual commenter wrote ``to express [her] 
support for this proposed rule. As someone who has enjoyed freedom and 
flexibility as a freelancer for 20 years, this would be a welcome 
clarification.'' Another individual freelancer stated that ``[t]he 
clarity and updating of [the FLSA] through this NPRM is long overdue 
and the DOL should issue ruling on independent contracting. . . .''
    These supportive commenters generally agreed with the Department 
that additional clarity would encourage flexible work arrangements that 
benefit businesses and workers alike. For example, the Coalition for 
Workforce Innovation (CWI) asserted that additional clarity of the 
economic reality test would ``allow workers and businesses to pursue [ 
] mutually beneficial opportunities as the United States economy 
evolves with technology.'' Fight for Freelancers explained that its 
members value flexibility that comes with working as independent 
contractors and supported the Department's ``efforts to protect [its 
members'] classification.''
    Some commenters who opposed this rulemaking questioned the need for 
a regulation on this topic. The Southwest Regional Council of 
Carpenters (SWRCC) stated that the ``[t]he first of the Rule's 
shortcomings is its assumption that a new rule is necessary in the 
first place,'' and the American Federation of Labor & Congress of 
Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) asserted that the Department's 
``quest for certainty . . . is quixotic.'' Mr. Edward Tuddenham, an 
attorney, contended that the current test is ``generally consistent and 
predictable'' and thus does not need further clarification. He and 
others repeatedly questioned the Department's reasons for rulemaking by 
asserting that the Department did not identify cases where courts 
reached incorrect outcomes. Rather than focus on the outcomes in 
particular cases, the NPRM highlighted inconsistent or confusing 
reasoning in many decisions to explain why the regulated community 
would benefit from regulatory clarity. See 85 FR 60605. Mr. Tuddenham 
and others also provided thoughtful and detailed comments criticizing 
specific aspects of the reasons presented in the NPRM's need for 
rulemaking discussion. The following discussion retraces those reasons 
and responds to these criticisms.

A. Confusion Regarding the Meaning of Economic Dependence

    The NPRM explained that undeveloped analysis and inconsistency 
cloud the application of ``economic dependence,'' the touchstone of the 
economic reality test. 85 FR 60605. The Department and some courts have 
attempted to furnish a measure of clarity by explaining, for example, 
that the proper inquiry is `` `whether the workers are dependent on a 
particular business or organization for their continued employment' in 
that line of business,'' Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 
1054 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1385), or 
instead ``are in business for themselves,'' Saleem, 854 F.3d at 139.

[[Page 1173]]

But the Department and many courts have often applied the test without 
helpful clarification of the meaning of the economic dependency that 
they are seeking.
    The NPRM explained that the lack of explanation of economic 
dependence has sometimes led to inconsistent approaches and results and 
highlighted as an example the apparently inconsistent results in 
Cromwell v. Driftwood Elec. Contractor, Inc., 348 F. App'x 57 (5th Cir. 
2009) (holding that cable splicers hired by Bellsouth to perform post-
Katrina repairs were employees), and Thibault v. BellSouth 
Telecommunication, 612 F.3d 843 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that cable 
splicer hired by same company under a very similar arrangement was an 
independent contractor). See 85 FR 60605. The Thibault court 
distinguished its result from Cromwell in part by highlighting Mr. 
Thibault's significant income from (1) his own sales company that had 
profits of approximately $500,000, (2) ``eight drag-race cars [that] 
generated $1,478 in income from racing professionally[,]'' and (3) 
``commercial rental property that generated some income.'' Thibault, 
612 F.3d at 849. While these facts indicate that Mr. Thibault may have 
been in business for himself as a manager of a sales business, drag-
race cars, and commercial properties, they are irrelevant as to whether 
he was in business for himself as a cable splicer.\7\ The Thibault 
court nonetheless assigned these facts substantial weight because it 
understood economic dependence to mean dependence for income or wealth, 
which is incompatible with the dependence-for-work approach that other 
courts and the Department apply.\8\ See, e.g., Off Duty Police, 915 
F.3d at 1058 (``[W]hether a worker has more than one source of income 
says little about that worker's employment status.''); Halferty, 821 
F.2d at 268 (``[I]t is not dependence in the sense that one could not 
survive without the income from the job that we examine, but dependence 
for continued employment''); DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1385 (``The 
economic-dependence aspect of the [economic reality] test does not 
concern whether the workers at issue depend on the money they earn for 
obtaining the necessities of life.''). As the DialAmerica court 
explained, the dependence-for-income approach ``would lead to a 
senseless result'' because a wealthy individual who had an independent 
source of income would be an independent contractor even though a 
poorer individual who worked for the same company under the same work 
arrangement is an employee. 757 F.2d at 1385 n.11. Mr. Tuddenham 
initially defended the reasoning in Thibault, but later listed that 
case as an example of ``the occasional erroneous application of the 
[economic reality] test.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The Thibault court also highlighted the fact that Mr. 
Thibault worked for only 3 months--although he intended to work for 
7 or 8 months--before being fired. See 612 F.3d at 846, 849. In 
contrast, the splicers in Cromwell worked approximately 11 months. 
See 348 F. App'x at 58.
    \8\ The Thibault case recognized that ``[a]n individual's wealth 
is not a solely dispositive factor in the economic dependence 
question.'' 612 F.3d at 849 n.4. This confirms that wealth was in 
fact a meaningful consideration, which runs against other cases 
explaining that dependence on wealth is an inappropriate lens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM also highlighted the decision in Parrish v. Premier 
Directional Drilling, 917 F.3d 369, as an example of inconsistent 
articulation of economic dependence. In that case, the court first 
applied a dependence-for-work concept to analyze the control factor and 
then explicitly departed from that framework in favor of a dependence-
for-income analysis of the opportunity factor. See 85 FR 60606. The 
Parrish court impliedly took a third concept of dependence to analyze 
the investment factor through a ``side-by-side comparison'' of each 
worker's individual investment to that of the alleged employer.'' 917 
F.3d at 383. AI 2015-1 took the same approach and explained that ``it 
is the relative investments that matter'' because ``[i]f the worker's 
investment is relatively minor, that suggests that the worker and the 
employer are not on similar footing and that the worker may be 
economically dependent on the employer.'' The comparative analysis of 
investments thus appears to rely on a concept of economic dependence 
that means ``not on a similar footing,'' which is different from the 
``dependence for work'' concept that the Department believes to be 
correct.
    In summary, courts and the Department typically economic dependence 
as ``dependence for work,'' but have sometimes applied other concepts 
of dependence to analyze certain factors, such as ``dependence for 
income'' and ``not on similar footing.'' Because economic dependence is 
the ultimate inquiry of FLSA employment, these different conceptions 
result in essentially different tests that confuse the regulated 
community. Accordingly, the economic reality test needs a more 
developed and dependable touchstone at its heart.

B. Lack of Focus in the Multifactor Balancing Test

    The NPRM explained that the versions of the multifactor economic 
reality test used by courts since at least the 1980s and the Department 
since the 1950s lack clear, generally applicable guidance about how to 
balance the multiple factors and the countless facts encompassed 
therein. See 85 FR 60606.The test's lack of guidance leads to 
uncertainty regarding ``which aspects of `economic reality' matter, and 
why.'' Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1539 (Easterbrook J., concurring).
    As examples of such uncertainty, the NPRM highlighted court 
decisions analyzing economic reality factors to reach an overall 
decision about a worker's classification without meaningful explanation 
of how they balanced the factors to reach the final decision. 85 FR 
60606 (citing, e.g., Parrish, 917 F.3d at 380; Chao v. Mid-Atl. 
Installation Servs., Inc., 16 F. App'x 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2001); and 
Snell, 875 F.2d at 912). Even where many facts and factors support both 
sides of the classification inquiry, courts have not explained how they 
balanced the competing considerations. See, e.g., Acosta v. Paragon 
Contractors Corp., 884 F.3d 1225, 1238 (10th Cir. 2018); Iontchev v. 
AAA Cab. Services, 685 F. App'x 548, 550 (9th Cir. 2017). The NPRM thus 
identified a need for guidance on which factors are most probative.
    Even some commenters critical of the Department's approach in the 
NPRM conceded that the test as currently applied can create 
considerable ambiguity. Mr. Tuddenham asserted that the lack of general 
guidance regarding how to balance factors is ``an unavoidable function 
of determining something as nebulous as `economic dependence.' '' See 
also Farmworker Justice (``[T]he test, as currently applied, creates 
necessary ambiguity.''). The Department disagrees that the concept of 
``economic dependence'' is necessarily ``nebulous.'' FLSA employment 
itself depends on economic dependence, and nothing in the statute 
requires that this standard be nebulous and thus unmanageable. See 
Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311 (``It is dependence that indicates employee 
status.''). Instead, the Department believes the correct concept of 
economic dependence tangibly defines FLSA employment to include 
individuals who are dependent on others for work, and to exclude 
individuals who are, as a matter of economic reality, in business for 
themselves. See Saleem, 854 F.3d at 139. The Department thus believes 
it is

[[Page 1174]]

possible to provide generally applicable guidance regarding how to 
consider and balance the economic reality factors to assess this 
concept of economic dependence.

C. Confusion and Inefficiency Due to Overlapping Factors

    The NPRM next explained that courts and the Department have 
articulated the economic reality factors such that they have 
overlapping coverage, which undermines the structural benefits of a 
multifactor test. See 85 FR 60607. The NPRM noted that most of these 
overlaps did not exist in the Supreme Court's original articulation of 
the economic reality factors in Silk and were instead introduced by 
subsequent court of appeals decisions. The NPRM then explained several 
ways in which extensive overlaps may lead to inefficiency and confusion 
for the regulated community.
    First, the ``skill required'' factor articulated in Silk, 331 U.S. 
at 716, has been expanded by the Department and some courts to analyze 
``skill and initiative.'' See, e.g., Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1060; 
WHD Fact Sheet WHD #13. Because the capacity for on-the-job initiative 
is already part of the control factor, the NPRM explained that this 
approach essentially imports control analysis into the skill factor. 
Indeed, the presence of control appears to overrides the existence of 
skill,\9\ effectively transforming the skill factor into an extension 
of the control factor in some circuits, but not others.\10\ The ``skill 
and initiative'' factor also overlaps with the opportunity factor, 
which considers the impact of initiative on worker's earnings, 
resulting in initiative being analyzed under three different factors. 
As an illustration of confusion resulting from this overlap, the NPRM 
highlighted a case in which a court found that workers exercised enough 
on-the-job initiative for the control and opportunity factors to point 
towards independent contractor status, but nonetheless found the `skill 
and initiative factor points towards employee status' due to `the key 
missing ingredient . . . of initiative.' '' 85 FR 60607 (quoting 
Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery, 161 F.3d at 303).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See, e.g., Selker Bros., 949 F.2d at 1295 (concluding that 
the skill factor weighed towards employee classification due to 
``the degree of control exercised by [the potential employer] over 
the day-to-day operation''); Baker, 137 F.3d at 1443 (finding that 
the skill factor weighed towards employee classification where 
skilled welders ``are told what to do and when to do it''); Superior 
Care, 840 F.2d at 1060 (finding that the skill factor weighed 
towards employee classification for skilled nurses because 
``Superior Care in turn controlled the terms and conditions of the 
employment relationship'').
    \10\ Some courts of appeal continue to analyze skill rather than 
control as part of the skill factor. See, e.g., Paragon, 884 F3d at 
1235 (considering ``the degree of skill required to perform the 
work''); see also Iontchev, 685 F. App'x at 550 (asking ``whether 
services rendered . . . require[d] a special skill''); Keller, 791 
F.3d at 807 (analyzing ``the degree of skill required'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Next, the permanence factor originally concerned the continuity and 
duration of a working relationship but has since been expanded by some 
courts and the Department to also consider the exclusivity of that 
relationship. See 85 FR 60608 (citing Parrish 917 F.3d at 386-87; 
Keller, 781 F.3d at 807-09; Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1319; WHD Opinion 
Letter FLSA 2019-6 at 8). But exclusivity--the ability or inability for 
a worker to offer services to different companies--is already a part of 
the control factor. This overlap results in exclusivity being analyzed 
twice and causes the actual consideration of permanence being 
potentially subsumed by control.
    Third, the ``integral part'' factor is used by some courts to be 
merely a proxy of control. As one such court explained: ``It is 
presumed that, with respect to vital or integral parts of the business, 
the employer will prefer to engage an employee rather than an 
independent contractor. This is so because the employer retains control 
over the employee and can compel attendan[ce] at work on a consistent 
basis.'' Baker v. Dataphase, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 724, 735 (D. Utah 
1992). But the control factor already directly analyzes whether a 
business can compel attendance on a consistent basis. It is unclear 
what additional value can be gained by indirectly analyzing that same 
consideration a second time under the ``integral part'' factor.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ As the NPRM explained, this presumption that firms would 
control all important services on which they rely may rest on a 
mistaken premise because, for example, manufacturers routinely have 
critical parts and components produced and delivered by wholly 
separate companies. 85 FR 60608. And companies whose business is to 
connect independent service providers with customers would find 
those service providers to be important even though they are 
independent from the company's business. See State Dep't of 
Employment, Training & Rehab., Employment Sec. Div. v. Reliable 
Health Care Servs. of S. Nevada, Inc., 983 P.2d 414, 419 (Nev. 1999) 
(``[W]e cannot ignore the simple fact that providing patient care 
and brokering workers are two distinct businesses.' '')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, while Silk articulated the opportunity for profit and loss 
and investment as separate factors, it analyzed the two together in 
concluding that truck drivers in that case were independent contractors 
in part because they ``invested in their own trucks and had ``an 
opportunity for profit from sound management'' of that investment. 331 
U.S. at 719. The Second Circuit recognized such clear overlap, noting 
that ``[e]conomic investment, by definition, creates the opportunity 
for loss, [and] investors take such a risk with an eye to profit.'' 
Saleem, 854 F.3d at 145 n.29. Nonetheless, most courts and Department 
have analyzed opportunity for profit and loss and investment as 
separate factors. When done right, separate analysis leads to 
redundancy. See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Installation Servs., 16 F. App'x at 
106-07. When done wrong, it leads to analysis of investment without 
regard for the worker's profit or loss, such as by comparing the dollar 
value of a worker's personal investments against the total investment 
of a large company that, for example, ``maintain[s] corporate 
offices.'' Hopkins 545 F.3d at 344. The NPRM explained that such a 
comparison says nothing about whether the worker is in business for 
himself, as opposed to being economically dependent on that company for 
work, and is therefore not probative and potentially misleading. 85 FR 
60608. The NRPM concluded that reducing the above-mentioned overlaps 
would make the economic reality test easier to understand and apply.
    The SWRCC contended that ``overlapping factors [have] never been 
the source of--and the DOL cannot point to--any credible criticism,'' 
but did not question or even acknowledge the above criticism discussed 
at length in the NRPM. In contrast, commenters that are significantly 
impacted by the FLSA's obligations generally agreed with the Department 
that overlapping factors have created confusion. For example, the 
Association of General Contractors stated that ``[n]avigating and 
complying with the various overlapping and inconsistent standards are 
confusing and costly,'' and WPI ``agree[d] with the Department that 
such overlap and blurring of factors is confusing and inefficient.'' 
See also, e.g., Center for Workplace Compliance (CWC); NRF; U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce.
    A multifactor test is a useful framework for determining FLSA 
employment in part because it organizes the many facts that are part of 
economic reality into distinct categories, thus providing some 
structure to an otherwise roving inquiry. However, this benefit is lost 
if the lines between those factors blur. Under prior articulations of 
the test, considerations within the control factor--capacity for on-
the-job initiative, exclusivity, and ability to compel attendance--have 
been imported into analysis of three other factors: Skill, permanence, 
and integral

[[Page 1175]]

part. Indeed, those control-based considerations appear to be the most 
important aspect of the other factors, which obscures those factors' 
distinctive probative values. Moreover, considerations under the 
opportunity factor--the ability to affect profits through initiative--
have been imported into the skill factor. And the ability to earn 
profits through investment overlaps completely with the investment 
factor. The Department continues to believe these overlapping coverages 
contribute to confusion and should be reduced where practicable.

D. The Shortcomings and Misconceptions That This Rulemaking Seeks To 
Remedy Are More Apparent in the Modern Economy

    The NPRM explained that certain technological and social changes 
have made shortcomings of the economic reality test more apparent in 
the modern economy. It highlighted the effects of three types of 
change. First, falling transaction costs in many industries makes it 
more cost effective for firms to hire independent contractors rather 
than employees to perform core functions.\12\ This in turn means 
analyzing the importance of the work through the ``integral part'' 
factor, which the Supreme Court never endorsed, is more likely to 
result in misleading signals regarding an individual's employment 
status. Second, the transition from a more industrial-based to a more 
knowledge-based economy reduces the probative value of the investment 
factor in certain industries because individuals can be in business for 
themselves in those industries with minimal physical capital. Third, 
shorter job tenures among employees dull the ability of the permanence 
factor to distinguish between employees and independence contractor. 
See 85 FR 60608-09.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Ronald Coase, Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x. See also Nobel Prizes and Laureates, Oct., 15, 
1991, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1991/press-release/ (explaining The Nature of the Firm's contribution to 
economics literature as a central reason for Coase's receipt of the 
1991 Nobel Prize in Economics); Katz and A. Krueger, ``The Rise and 
Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-
2015,'' p. 25 (2018) (``Coase's (1937) classic explanation for the 
boundary of firms rested on the minimization of transaction costs 
within firm-employee relationships. Technological changes may be 
reducing the transaction costs associated with contracting out job 
tasks, however, and thus supporting the disintermediation of 
work.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters agreed with the Department's assessments of 
modern trends. See, e.g., TechNet (``Given falling transaction costs, 
companies are more willing to allocate certain pieces of their 
production, even integrated parts, to independent contractors.''); Food 
Industry Association (``societal changes have resulted in innovative 
work arrangements and changes in job tenure expectation''). Former 
Deputy Under Secretary of Labor and retired law professor Henry H. 
Perritt, Jr. found the discussion of modern trends to be ``particularly 
insightful and should be retained and expanded in the preamble to any 
final rule.'' Other commenters disagreed. The AFL-CIO, for instance, 
theorized that lower transaction costs ``might just as easily result in 
employers not taking steps to retain employees who perform work central 
to their business, but instead tolerate frequent turnover in such 
positions'' and that the ``job tenure of independent contractors may 
have fallen more'' than for employees--though it did not provide 
evidence in support of its hypotheses.\13\ The Department continues to 
believe that each of the above shortcomings of the previously applied 
economic reality test provides sufficient reason for this rulemaking 
and that technological and societal changes have made these 
shortcomings even more apparent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ The Department notes that it is unlikely that job tenures 
of independent contractors have fallen by more than employees 
because average job tenure for employees have dropped by many years, 
which is greater than the total duration of a typical independent 
contractor relationship. See Julie Hotchkiss and Christopher 
Macpherson, Falling Job Tenure: It's Not Just about Millennials, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, June 8, 2015, https://www.frbatlanta.org/blogs/macroblog/2015/06/08/falling-job-tenure-its-not-just-about-millennials.aspx. (showing that median job tenure 
for individuals born in 1933 was ten years or longer while median 
job tenure for individuals born after 1983 was three years or less).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Effects of Additional Regulatory Clarity on Innovation

    The NPRM expressed concern that the legal uncertainty arising from 
the above-described shortcomings of the multifactor economic reality 
test may deter innovative, flexible work arrangements that benefit 
businesses and workers alike. Some commenters questioned this 
assumption. The Coalition of State Attorneys General, Cities, and 
Municipal Agencies (State AGs), for instance, contended that the 
Department ``provides no empirical evidence or data demonstrating that 
employers now hesitate to engage in innovative arrangements'' and 
further argued that because ``digital platforms have become part of the 
modern economy . . . they have not been stifled by the current test.'' 
But the mere existence of certain types of businesses is insufficient 
evidence that other such businesses are not being stifled, and it is 
unclear what empirical data could measure innovation that is not 
occurring due to legal uncertainty. Commenters who represent technology 
companies stated that legal uncertainty regarding worker classification 
in fact deters them from developing innovative and flexible work 
arrangements. See, e.g., CWI; TechNet. In addition, economists who 
study the impact of labor regulation on entrepreneurship also commented 
that clear independent contractor regulations would assist startup 
companies. Dr. Liya Palagashvilli (``71 percent of startups relied on 
independent contractors and thought it was necessary to use contract 
labor during their early stages''); Dr. Michael Farren and Trace 
Mitchell (``[G]reater legal clarity to employers and workers will allow 
for more efficient production processes and will reduce the resources 
wasted on determining a worker's employment classification through the 
legal process.'').
    For the reasons mentioned above, the Department continues to 
believe that, unless revised, the multifactor economic reality test 
suffers because the analytical lens through which all the factors are 
filtered remains inconsistent; there is no clear principle regarding 
how to balance the multiple factors; the lines between many of the 
factors are blurred; and these shortcomings have become more apparent 
in the modern economy. The resulting legal uncertainty obscures 
workers' and businesses' respective rights and obligations under the 
FLSA and deters innovative work arrangements, thus inhibiting the 
development of new job opportunities or eliminating existing jobs. The 
Department is therefore issuing this final rule to increase legal 
certainty.

IV. Final Regulatory Provisions

    Having reviewed commenter feedback submitted in response to the 
proposed rule, the Department is finalizing the addition of a new part 
795 to Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which will address 
whether particular workers are ``employees'' or independent contractors 
under the FLSA. In relevant part, and as discussed in greater detail 
below, the part includes:
     An introductory provision at Sec.  795.100 explaining the 
purpose and legal authority for the new part;
     a provision at Sec.  795.105(a) explaining that 
independent contractors are not employees under the FLSA;
     a provision at Sec.  795.105(b) discussing the ``economic 
reality'' test for distinguishing FLSA employees from independent 
contractors and clarifying that the concept of economic

[[Page 1176]]

dependence turns on whether a worker is in business for him- or herself 
(independent contractor) or is economically dependent on a potential 
employer for work (employee);
     provisions at Sec.  795.105(c) and (d) describing factors 
examined as part of the economic reality test, including two ``core'' 
factors--the nature and degree of the worker's control over the work 
and the worker's opportunity for profit or loss--which typically carry 
greater weight in the analysis, as well as three other factors that may 
serve as additional guideposts in the analysis;
     a provision at Sec.  795.110 advising that the parties' 
actual practice is more probative than what may be contractually or 
theoretically possible;
     fact-specific examples at Sec.  795.115; and
     a severability provision at Sec.  795.120.
    The Department responds to commenter feedback on the proposed rule 
below.

A. The Purpose of Part 795

    Proposed Sec.  795.100 explained that the interpretations in part 
795 will guide WHD's enforcement of the FLSA and are intended to be 
used by employers, businesses, the public sector, employees, workers, 
and courts to assess employment status classifications under the Act. 
See 85 FR 60638. Proposed Sec.  795.100 further clarified that, if 
proposed part 795 is adopted, employers may safely rely upon the 
interpretations in part 795 under section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal 
Act, unless and until any such interpretation ``is modified or 
rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no 
legal effect.'' Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. 259).
    Few commenters specifically addressed proposed Sec.  795.100, but 
several discussed issues relevant to its content. For example, a few 
commenters questioned the Department's legal authority to promulgate 
any regulation addressing independent contractor status under the FLSA. 
See Northern California Carpenters Regional Council (``At no time since 
the FLSA was passed has Congress made substantive amendments to the 
definitions of employee, employer, or the `suffer or permit to work' 
standard . . . nor has it directed any changes in the controlling 
regulations.''); Rep. Bobby Scott et al. (``Congress has not delegated 
rulemaking authority to the DOL with respect to the scope of the 
employment relationship under the FLSA.''). A few commenters requested 
that the Department explain its source of rulemaking authority and the 
level of deference it expects to receive from courts interpreting its 
proposed regulation. A diverse collection of commenters, including the 
American Trucking Association (ATA), the National Home Delivery 
Association (NHDA), the Northwest Workers Justice Project (NWJP), and 
Winebrake & Santillo, LLC, opined that the Department's proposed 
regulation would be entitled to Skidmore deference from courts, though 
these commenters diverged on the proposed rule's ``power to persuade.'' 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134, 140 (1944). Finally, the AFL-CIO 
asserted that ``[t]he proposed rule is based on considerations that did 
not motivate Congress when it adopted the FLSA, that the Department of 
Labor is not authorized to consider in construing the terms of the 
FLSA, and that the Department has no expertise regarding,'' thus 
placing the proposed rule ``outside the `limits of the delegation' from 
Congress to the Department contained in the Act.'' (quoting Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)).
    The Department appreciates commenter interest in these issues. The 
Department without question has relevant expertise in the area of what 
constitutes an employment relationship under the FLSA, given its 
responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act \14\ and its 
decades of experience doing so. The Department's authority to interpret 
the Act comes with its authority to administer and enforce the Act. See 
Herman v. Fabri-Centers of Am., Inc., 308 F.3d 580, 592-93 (6th Cir. 
2002) (noting that ``[t]he Wage and Hour Division of the Department of 
Labor was created to administer the Act'' while agreeing with the 
Department's interpretation of one of the Act's provisions); Dufrene v. 
Browning-Ferris, Inc., 207 F.3d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 2000) (``By granting 
the Secretary of Labor the power to administer the FLSA, Congress 
implicitly granted him the power to interpret.''); Condo v. Sysco 
Corp., 1 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). The Department believes 
a clear explanation of the test for whether a worker is an employee 
under the FLSA or an independent contractor not entitled to the 
protections of the Act in easily accessible regulatory text is valuable 
to potential employers, to workers, and to other stakeholders. It has a 
long history of offering interpretations in this area and believes this 
rulemaking has great value regardless of what deference courts 
ultimately give to it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See 29 U.S.C. 204, 211(a), 212(b), 216(c), 217; see also 
Fernandez v. Zoni Language Centers, Inc., 858 F.3d 45, 48-49 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (noting that ``[t]he DOL . . . administers the FLSA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While proposed Sec.  795.100 emphasized that part 795 would state 
the Department's interpretation of independent contractor status under 
the FLSA, some commenters expressed concern that it would affect the 
scope of employment under other Federal laws. The United Food and 
Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) believed that the 
proposal may narrow the coverage of the ``Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), and the Equal Pay Act.'' See also National 
Women's Law Center (NWLC); CLASP. The Department reaffirms that the 
rule concerns the distinction between employees and independent 
contractors solely for the purposes of the FLSA, and as such, would not 
affect the scope of employment under other Federal laws.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Additionally and as explained in greater detail below, this 
rule does not narrow the longstanding standard for distinguishing 
between FLSA employees and independent contractors; employees are 
economically dependent on another for work, and independent 
contractors are in business for themselves as matter of economic 
reality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters requested that the Department promulgate a standard 
more broadly applicable across other state and Federal employment laws. 
See, e.g., American Society of Travel Advisors, Inc. (``[The NPRM . . . 
represents something of a missed opportunity insofar as it fails to 
address the longstanding difficulty associated with the continued use 
of multiple tests at the Federal level to determine worker status.''); 
Cambridge Investment Research, Inc. (``[W]ithout a more encompassing 
Department position or guidance addressing different state standards, 
some of the current uncertainty and unpredictability remain.''); Chun 
Fung Kevin Chiu (``[I]nconsistent Federal and state standards with 
regards to classification may render the DOL rules ineffective in 
practice for those independent contractors and businesses affected.''). 
While several commenters acknowledged the Department's lack of 
authority to interpret the scope of laws outside of its jurisdiction, 
the National Association of Manufacturers and the Mechanical 
Contractors Association of America (MCAA) urged the Department to 
collaborate with other Federal agencies to harmonize the varying 
employment definitions under Federal law. Finally, the Zobrist Law 
Group ``urge[d] the Department to prohibit states from using 
classification tests that

[[Page 1177]]

conflict with the proposed rule,'' asserting that ``state law not 
preempted by the FLSA is narrow'' and that state laws ``shifting an 
independent contractor under the FLSA to an employee under state law . 
. . [impose] greater obligations upon those workers.'' But see 
Truckload Carriers Association (``TCA understands that, due to our 
nation's federalist system, individual states such as California can 
pursue misguided statues that are more stringent than the Federal 
standard the Department is seeking to clarify[.]'').
    While the Department appreciates the desire to achieve uniformity 
across the various state and Federal laws which may govern work 
arrangements, requests to modify definitions and tests under different 
laws are outside the scope of this rulemaking.
    Some commenters supportive of the proposed rule requested that the 
Department make conforming edits to its MSPA regulation at 29 CFR 
500.20(h)(4), addressing whether or not a farm labor contractor engaged 
by an agricultural employer/association is an independent contractor or 
an employee under MSPA. See Americans for Prosperity Foundation (AFPF) 
(``To further the Department's goal of clarification, simplification, 
and consistency . . . the same criteria used in the NPRM to define 
independent contractors for purposes of the FLSA also should apply to 
the MSPA, and to any other provision that references the FLSA.''); 
Administrative Law Clinic at the Antonin Scalia Law School (``[T]he 
Department should simply use its proposed regulations in 29 CFR 
795.100, et seq., to determine employee status under MSPA, and repeal 
[29 CFR 500.20(h)] as duplicative.''). Relatedly, Texas RioGrande Legal 
Aid (TRLA), which expressed opposition to the proposed rule, asserted 
that ``the proposed rule will lead to considerable confusion among both 
employers and workers . . . because the proposed rule at odds with the 
Department's [MSPA] regulations,'' but opined that any effort to revise 
29 CFR 500.20(h) ``would be in direct contravention of Congressional 
directives regarding the interpretation of the MSPA.''
    As noted in the NPRM preamble, the Department acknowledges that 
MSPA adopts by reference the FLSA's definition of ``employ,'' see 18 
U.S.C. 1802(5), and that 29 CFR 500.20(h)(4) considers ``whether or not 
an independent contractor or employment relationship exists under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act'' to interpret independent contractor status 
under MSPA. At this time, however, the Department does not see a 
compelling need to revise 29 CFR 500.20(h)(4), as we are unsure whether 
application of the six factor economic reality test described in that 
regulation has resulted in confusion and uncertainty in the more 
limited MSPA context similar to that described in the FLSA context. 
Importantly, the regulatory standard for determining an individual's 
classification status under MSPA is generally consistent with the FLSA 
guidance finalized in this rule: ``In determining if the farm labor 
contractor or worker is an employee or an independent contractor, the 
ultimate question is the economic reality of the relationship--whether 
there is economic dependence upon the agricultural employer/association 
or farm labor contractor, as appropriate.'' 29 CFR 500.20(h)(4). 
Therefore, as explained in the NPRM, the Department prefers to proceed 
incrementally at this time by leaving the MSPA regulation at 29 CFR 
500.20(h)(4) unchanged.16 17
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. FTC, 790 F.3d 
198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (affirming that agency had discretion to 
``proceeding incrementally'' in promulgating rules that were 
directed to one industry but no others); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n, 720 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. 2013) (observing 
that ``[n]othing prohibits Federal agencies from moving in an 
incremental manner'' (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
556 U.S. 502, 522 (2009)); City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 
927,935 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that ``agencies have great 
discretion to treat a problem partially'').
    \17\ Similar to the MSPA regulation at 29 CFR 500.20(h)(4), a 
regulation promulgated by the Department's Veterans' Employment & 
Training Service (VETS) at 20 CFR 1002.44 articulates a six-factor 
balancing test based on the tests used by courts under the FLSA for 
determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act (USERRA). See 70 FR 75254 (``The independent contractor 
provision in this rule is based on Congress's intent that USERRA's 
definition of `employee' be interpreted in the same expansive manner 
as the term is defined under the [FSLA].'' (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
103-65, Pt. I, at 29 (1993); S. Rep. No. 103-58, at 40 (1993))). 
Consistent with this rulemaking's incremental focus of the FLSA 
context, the Department declines to amend 20 CFR 1002.44 at this 
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The American Network of Community Options and Resources (ANCOR) 
expressed concern about the Department's statement in proposed Sec.  
795.100 that, if finalized, the proposed rule ``would contain the 
Department's sole and authoritative interpretation of independent 
contractor status under the FLSA,'' fearing that the statement could be 
interpreted to ``render obsolete the Department's specific guidance on 
the application of the FLSA to shared living in Fact Sheet #79G and 
Administrator's Interpretation No. 2014-1.'' The Department disagrees 
with this interpretation, noting that Sec.  795.100 only rescinds 
earlier WHD guidance addressing independent contractor status under the 
FLSA ``[t]o the extent . . . [that such guidance is] inconsistent or in 
conflict with the interpretations stated in this part.'' As explained 
in the NPRM, the Department engaged in this rulemaking to ``clarify the 
existing standard, not radically transform it,'' 85 FR 60636, and none 
of the industry-specific guidance in Administrator's Interpretation No. 
2014-1 is meaningfully affected by this final rule. For similar 
reasons, we believe that the assertion by the Nebraska Appleseed Center 
for Law in the Public Interest (Appleseed Center) that this rulemaking 
will ``rescind years of [Departmental] guidance'' is an overstatement. 
This rule is premised on familiar FLSA concepts that courts, employers, 
workers, and the Department have applied for years while providing 
updated and clearer explanations of what the concepts mean and how they 
are considered. Although this rule will change the Department's 
analysis for classifying workers as employees or independent 
contractors in some respect, those changes do not favor independent 
contractor classification (i.e., the ultimate legal outcome) relative 
to the status quo, but rather offer greater clarity as to workers' 
proper classifications.

B. Clarification That Independent Contractors Are Not Employees Under 
the Act

    Proposed Sec.  795.105(a) explained that an independent contractor 
who renders services to a person is not an employee of that person 
under the FLSA, and that the Act's wage and hour requirements do not 
apply with respect to a person's independent contractors. See 85 FR 
60638-39. Proposed 795.105(a) similarly explained that the 
recordkeeping obligations for employers under section 11 of the Act do 
not apply to a person with respect to services received from an 
independent contractor. Id.
    The vast majority of substantive comments agreed with proposed 
Sec.  795.105(a). One anonymous commenter suggested that the Department 
interpret the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime pay requirements to 
apply to independent contractors because the Act's ``declaration of 
policy'' at 29 U.S.C. 202 ``suggests the purpose of the FLSA is to 
protect workers.'' The Department does not adopt this interpretation 
because Federal courts of appeals have uniformly held, and the 
Department has consistently maintained, that ``FLSA wage and hour 
requirements do not apply to true independent contractors.'' Karlson, 
860 F.3d at 1092; see also, e.g., Parrish, 917 F.3d at 384; Saleem, 854

[[Page 1178]]

F.3d at 139-40; Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery, 161 F.3d at 305; see 
also Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152 (holding that the FLSA ``was 
obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees'').

C. Adopting the Economic Reality Test To Determine a Worker's Employee 
or Independent Contractor Status Under the Act

    Proposed Sec.  795.105(b) would adopt the economic reality test to 
determine a worker's status as an employee or an independent contractor 
under the Act. As the proposal explained, the inquiry of whether an 
individual is an employee or independent contractor under the Act is 
whether, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is 
economically dependent on the potential employer for work. See 85 FR 
60611; see also Pilgrim Equip., 527 F.2d at 1311 (``It is dependence 
that indicates employee status.''). The proposal and this final rule 
provide further clarity as to the economic reality test's touchstone--
economic dependence.
    The NPRM preamble explained that clarifying the test requires 
putting the question of economic dependence in the proper context. 
``Economic dependence is not conditioned reliance on an alleged 
employer for one's primary source of income, for the necessities of 
life.'' Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1054. Rather, courts have framed 
the question as `` `whether, as a matter of economic reality, the 
workers depend upon someone else's business for the opportunity to 
render service or are in business for themselves.' '' Saleem, 854 F.3d 
at 139 (quoting Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1059). This conception of 
economic dependence comports with the FLSA's definition of employ as 
``includ[ing] to suffer or permit to work.'' See 29 U.S.C. 203(g). An 
individual who depends on a potential employer for work is able to work 
only by the sufferance or permission of the potential employer. Such an 
individual is therefore an employee under the Act. In contrast, an 
independent contractor does not work at the sufferance or permission of 
others because, as a matter of economic reality, he or she is in 
business for him- or herself. In other words, an independent contractor 
is an entrepreneur who works for him- or herself, as opposed to for an 
employer.\18\ The Department did not receive any substantive comments 
disputing this distinction between employee and independent contractor 
classification under the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ The Department's prior guidance has stated that ``an 
employee, as distinguished from a person who is engaged in a 
business of his or her own, is one who, as a matter of economic 
reality, follows the usual path of an employee.'' Fact Sheet #13; 
see also WHD Opinion Letter FLSA-795 (Sept. 30, 1964). Upon 
consideration, however, the Department believes that describing an 
employee as someone who ``follows the usual path of an employee'' is 
circular and unhelpful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department observed in the NPRM preamble that some courts have 
relied on a worker's entrepreneurship with respect to one type of work 
to conclude that the worker was also in business for him- or herself in 
a second, unrelated type of work. See, e.g., Parrish, 917 F.3d at 384 
(considering ``plaintiff's enterprise, such as the goat farm, as part 
of the overall analysis of how dependent plaintiffs were on 
[defendant]'' for working as consultants); Thibault, 612 F.3d at 849 
(concluding that plaintiff was an independent contractor as a cable 
splicer in part because he managed unrelated commercial operations and 
properties in a different state). This approach is inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court's instruction that the economic reality analysis be 
limited to ``the claimed independent operation.'' Silk, 331 U.S. at 
716. Thus, the relevant question in this context is whether the worker 
providing certain service to a potential employer is an entrepreneur 
``in that line of business.'' Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1054. 
Otherwise, businesses must make worker classification decisions based 
on facts outside the working relationship.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ It is possible for a worker to be an employee in one line 
of business and an independent contractor in another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At bottom, the phrase ``economic dependence'' may mean many 
different things. But in the context of the economic reality test, 
``economic dependence'' is best understood in terms of what it is not. 
The phrase excludes individuals who, as a matter of economic reality, 
are in business for themselves. Such individuals work for themselves 
rather than at the sufferance or permission of a potential employer, 
see 29 U.S.C. 203(g), and thus are not dependent on that potential 
employer for work. Section 795.105(b) therefore recognizes the 
principle that, as a matter of economic reality, workers who are in 
business for themselves with respect to work being performed are 
independent contractors for that work.
    Many commenters supported the Department's decision to implement 
the economic reality test applying the above-described approach to 
economic dependence. WPI applauded the ``decision to retain the long-
standing economic reality test while sharpening the factors used to 
apply that test.'' The NRF stated that the economic reality test ``is 
the proper basis for distinguishing independent contractors from 
employees under the FLSA as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court.'' 
ATA) found that the economic dependence framework ``comports with a 
thoughtful reading of decades of court precedent.'' See also Americans 
for Prosperity Foundation; Cetera Financial Group; Center for Workplace 
Compliance (``DOL is correct to propose using the economic dependence 
standard for determining whether an individual is an employee or 
independent contractor'').
    The majority of commenters agreed with the Department's proposal to 
adopt the economic reality test using the above-mentioned definition of 
economic dependence, including commenters that were generally critical 
of the proposed rule. For example, the State AGs approvingly stated 
that ``[f]or nearly three-quarters of a century, the Supreme Court has 
held that whether a worker is a covered ``employee'' under the FLSA is 
governed by the economic reality test.'' See also National Employment 
Law Project (NELP); Signatory Wall and Ceiling Contractors Alliance 
(SWACCA) (recommending adopting an economic reality test with a 
different number of factors). While objecting commenters challenged 
various aspects of the proposed rule, they did not dispute the 
sharpened explanation of the economic dependence inquiry. Commenters, 
both supportive and objecting, made a number of thoughtful suggestions, 
which are addressed below.
    The Administrative Law Clinic at the Antonin Scalia Law School 
suggested further clarifying the test by adding ``[a]n individual is 
not an `employee' merely because he or she is economically dependent in 
some way on the potential employer.'' Such additional language may be 
redundant in Sec.  795.105(b) because that section already articulates 
economic dependence as dependence on a potential employer for work, as 
opposed to being in business for oneself. As explained above, other 
forms of dependence, such as dependence on income or subsistence, do 
not count. However, given how important it is to apply the correct 
concept of economic dependence, the Department believes this point 
bears emphasis through a concrete, fact-specific example in the 
regulatory text. The Department is thus adding an example in Sec.  
795.115 to demonstrate that a different form of dependence, i.e., 
dependence of income or subsistence, is not a relevant consideration in 
the economic reality test.

[[Page 1179]]

    A number of individual commenters who generally support this rule 
requested that the Department allow workers who voluntarily agree to be 
independent contractors to be classified as such, regardless of other 
facts. For example, Farren and Mitchell urged the Department to ``allow 
the parties themselves to explicitly define the nature of their labor 
relationship,'' asserting that such an approach would respect worker 
autonomy, maximize legal certainty, and promote greater flexibility in 
work arrangements. This requested approach would allow voluntary 
agreements to supersede the economic reality test in determining 
classification as an employee or independent contractor. The Supreme 
Court, however, held in Tony & Susan Alamo, 471 U.S. at 302, that the 
FLSA must be ``applied even to those who would decline its 
protections.'' In other words, an individual may not waive application 
of the Act through voluntary agreement. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (``FLSA rights cannot be 
abridged by contract or otherwise waived, because this would `nullify 
the purposes' of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was 
designed to effectuate.'') (quoting Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 
324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945)); Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1544-45 (``The FLSA 
is designed to defeat rather than implement contractual arrangements. 
If employees voluntarily contract to accept $2.00 per hour, the 
agreement is ineffectual.'') (Easterbrook J., concurring). Because this 
request would contradict this precedent by allowing the possibility of 
workers who are employees under the facts and law to waive the FLSA's 
protections by classifying themselves as independent contractors, the 
Department declines to implement it in the final rule.
    Some commenters, including the Minnesota State Building & 
Construction Trades Council, PJC, and SWRCC, suggested that the rule 
include a presumption of employee status. The Supreme Court has said 
and the Department agrees that this is a totality of the circumstances 
analysis, based on the facts. The Department thus declines to create a 
presumption in favor of employee status.
    NELA, Farmworker Justice (FJ), and several other commenters 
requested that the Department abandon the economic reality test in 
favor of the ABC test adopted by the California Supreme Court in 
Dynamex Operations West v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (2018). By 
contrast, other commenters, such as the American Society of Travel 
Advisors (ASTA) and National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), 
urged the Department to adopt the common law standard used to 
distinguish between employees and independent contractors under the 
Internal Revenue Code and other Federal laws. These requests are 
addressed in the discussion of regulatory alternatives in Section VI, 
which explains why the Department is not adopting either the common law 
control test or the ABC test for employment under the FLSA.
    For the reasons discussed above, the Department adopts Sec.  
795.105(b) as proposed to adopt the economic realty test to determine 
whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor under 
the FLSA. Under that test, an individual is an employee if he or she is 
dependent on an employer for work, and is an independent contractor if 
that he or she is, as a matter of economic reality, in business for 
him- or herself.

D. Applying the Economic Reality Factors To Determine a Worker's 
Independent Contractor or Employee Status

    Proposed Sec.  795.105(c) explained that certain nonexclusive 
economic reality factors guide the determination of whether an 
individual is, on one hand, economically dependent on a potential 
employer for work and therefore an employee or, on the other hand, in 
business for him- or herself and therefore an independent contractor. 
See 85 FR 60639. These factors were listed in proposed Sec.  
795.105(d), based on the factors currently used by the Department and 
most Federal courts of appeals, with certain proposed reformulations. 
Id.
    First, the Department proposed to follow the Second Circuit's 
approach of analyzing the worker's investment as part of the 
opportunity factor. The combined factor asked whether the worker has an 
opportunity to earn profits or incur losses based on his or her 
exercise of initiative or management of investments. See 85 FR 60613-
15, 60639. Second, the Department proposed to clarify that the ``skill 
required'' factor originally articulated by the Supreme Court should be 
used, as opposed to the ``skill and initiative'' factor currently used 
in some circuits, because considering initiative as part of the skill 
factor creates unnecessary and confusing overlaps with the control and 
opportunity factors. See 85 FR 60615, 60639. Third, the Department 
proposed to further reduce overlap by analyzing the exclusivity of the 
relationship as a part of the control factor only, as opposed to both 
the control and permanence factors. See 85 FR 60615-16, 60639. Lastly, 
the Department proposed to reframe the ``whether the service rendered 
is an integral part of the alleged employer's business'' factor in 
accordance with the Supreme Court's original inquiry in Rutherford 
Food, 331 U.S. at 729, of whether the work is ``part of an integrated 
unit of production.'' See 85 FR 60616-18, 60639.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Consistent with WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6, the 
Department's proposal did not include the ``independent business 
organization'' factor mentioned in Fact Sheet #13. The opinion 
letter explained that the ``independent business organization'' 
factor was ``[e]ncompassed within'' the other factors. Because the 
ultimate inquiry of the economic dependence test is whether workers 
are ``in business for themselves,'' Saleem, 854 F.3d at 139, 
analyzing the worker's degree of ``independent business 
organization'' restates the inquiry and adds little, if anything, to 
the analysis that is not already covered by the other factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  795.105(c) further aimed to improve the certainty 
and predictability of the test by focusing it on two core factors: (1) 
The nature and degree of the worker's control over the work; and (2) 
the worker's opportunity for profit or loss. The proposed rule 
explained that if both proposed core factors point towards the same 
classification--whether employee or independent contractor--there is a 
substantial likelihood that that classification is appropriate. See 85 
FR 60618-20, 60639.
    The following discussion addresses commenter feedback on the five 
proposed economic reality factors.
1. The ``Nature and Degree of the Individual's Control Over the Work'' 
Factor
    The first core factor identified in the proposed regulatory text 
was the ``nature and degree of the individual's control over the 
work.'' 85 FR 60639. Proposed Sec.  795.105(d)(1)(i) explained that 
this factor ``weighs towards the individual being an independent 
contractor to the extent the individual, as opposed to the potential 
employer, exercises substantial control over key aspects of the 
performance of the work, such as by setting his or her own schedule, by 
selecting his or her projects, and/or through the ability to work for 
others, which might include the potential employer's competitors.'' 
Proposed Sec.  795.105(d)(1)(i) further explained that, in contrast, 
this factor ``weighs in favor of the individual being an employee under 
the Act to the extent the potential employer, as opposed to the 
individual, exercises substantial control over key aspects of the 
performance of the work, such as by controlling the individual's 
schedule or workload and/or by directly or indirectly requiring the 
individual to

[[Page 1180]]

work exclusively for the potential employer.'' In addition, the 
proposal stated that the following actions by the potential employer 
``do[ ] not constitute control that makes the individual more or less 
likely to be an employee under the Act'': ``[r]equiring the individual 
to comply with specific legal obligations, satisfy health and safety 
standards, carry insurance, meet contractually agreed-upon deadlines or 
quality control standards, or satisfy other similar terms that are 
typical of contractual relationships between businesses (as opposed to 
employment relationships).'' Numerous commenters requested changes to 
the proposed control section regarding (1) the perspective from which 
control is framed; (2) the examples of control that are relevant to the 
economic dependence inquiry; and (3) examples of control that are not.
a. Responses to Requests Regarding the Framing of Control
    Some commenters asserted that the control factor should focus on 
the potential employer's substantial control over the worker instead of 
the worker's substantial control over the work. For example, the State 
AGs said that the ``proposed control factor incorrectly focuses on the 
worker's control over the work'' and that ``[w]ell-established 
precedent makes clear that the proper focus is the employer's control 
over the worker.'' According to NELA, ``the control analysis has 
historically been, and should continue to be, on the control that the 
employer has over the employee, not that the employee has over their 
work.'' NELA added that the Department ``cannot deny that its proposal 
casts the control inquiry differently than the Supreme Court, courts of 
appeals, and the Department have in the past.'' And the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America stated that the 
proposal's ``focus on the individual's control over the work turns the 
`suffer or permit' standard on its head'' because that standard 
``references the purported employer's behavior--not the worker's.'' See 
also Northern California Carpenters Regional Council (noting that 
``[b]ecause the `nature and degree of the individual's control over the 
work' . . . focuses on the individual's control, as opposed to the 
employer's control, the factor skews towards most skilled tradespeople 
being classified as independent cont[r]actors''). Relatedly, attorney 
Richard Reibstein suggested that the title of the control subsection 
``be re-drafted in a manner that does not suggest it favors independent 
contractor status because the remaining text regarding [the control 
factor] is neutral.'' Mr. Reibstein suggested that the title be changed 
from the ``nature and degree of the individual's control over the 
work'' to the ``nature and degree of each party's control over the 
work.'' Finally, WPI expected that some commenters would object to the 
Department's proposed articulation of the control factor, and it 
supported the Department's approach by saying that ``the economic 
reality test focuses on the individual--whether the individual is 
economically dependent on another business or in business for him or 
herself,'' and that, ``[t]hus, the focus of each factor should also be 
on the economic realities of the individual, not the businesses with 
which [he or she] contracts.'' See also CPIE (supporting ``the NPRM's 
articulation of this factor'').
    Notwithstanding differing commenter preferences over the primary 
articulation of the control factor, the proposed (and final) regulatory 
text at Sec.  795.105(d)(1)(i) discusses both the individual worker's 
control and the potential employer's control.\21\ This approach is 
consistent with that of courts, which also generally consider both the 
individual's control and the potential employer's control. See, e.g., 
Razak, 951 F.3d at 142; Hobbs, 946 F.3d at 829; Saleem, 854 F.3d at 
144-45; Karlson, 860 F.3d at 1096. The Department explained in the NPRM 
preamble that whether the control factor is articulated with reference 
to the individual worker's control or the potential employer's control 
is a ``distinction . . . of no consequence,'' and that both ``the 
nature and degree of control over the work by the worker and by the 
potential employer are considered to determine whether control 
indicates employee or independent contractor status.'' 85 FR 60612 
n.34. The Department reaffirms that statement now and reiterates that 
both the worker's control and the potential employer's control should 
be considered. To remove any ambiguity on this point, the Department 
has modified the title of subsection 795.105(d)(1)(i) to ``[t]he nature 
and degree of control over the work,'' removing the proposed rule's 
reference to ``the individual's control over the work.'' This revised 
articulation is closer to the Supreme Court's description of the 
economic reality test's control factor in Silk, 331 U.S. at 716 
(``degrees of control''), which does not indicate a focus on either the 
individual worker or the potential employer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ As Mr. Reibstein acknowledged, the proposed regulatory text 
beyond the title of the control section was written in a ``neutral'' 
manner. The final regulatory text is written in a similarly neutral 
manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Reibstein also suggested that the control factor ``should be 
drafted in a manner that focuses attention on the key to control, which 
is control over the manner and means by which the work in question is 
performed.'' He asserted that, as proposed, the control section ``is 
ambiguous at best and may be misleading at worst,'' and suggested that 
``control over the work'' should be changed to ``control over the 
performance of the work, particularly how the work is to be 
performed.'' The Department, however, prefers to retain the ``control 
over the work'' articulation. It is purposefully broad to encompass 
various different types of control that the individual worker and the 
potential employer may exercise over the working relationship. 
Moreover, the Department agrees that who controls the manner and means 
by which the work is performed is a key component of the control 
analysis, and the Department believes that both the proposed and final 
regulatory text reflect the importance of the manner and means by which 
the work is performed.
b. Responses to Comments Regarding Examples of Relevant Control
    A number of comments addressed the proposed regulatory text's three 
non-exhaustive examples of control that may indicate employee or 
independent contractor status, which were setting schedules, selecting 
projects, and working exclusively for the employer or working for 
others.
    Several commenters sought clarification that these examples may not 
always be probative of an employment or independent contracting 
relationship. For instance, NRF stated ``there may be limits on 
schedules that are consistent with business relationships that should 
not be treated as impacting the analysis,'' such as delivery workers 
who can deliver only during the restaurant's operating hours and a 
retailer that arranges for after-hours cleaning services. The 
Department agrees that there are examples of impacts on a workers 
schedule that are not probative of the type of control that indicates 
economic dependence and that NRF has identified two such examples by 
pointing to the fact that a delivery worker can deliver for a 
restaurant only when the restaurant is open and a cleaning worker can 
clean a retailer only when it is closed. But the Department does not 
think any change to the regulatory text is warranted to clarify this 
point, as the regulatory text merely provides a few examples of facets 
of control that may--

[[Page 1181]]

or may not--be probative in any given case depending on the facts. NHDA 
sought clarification of the working for others example because, in its 
view, ``it is not enough for the individual to claim he/she never 
turned down projects or never worked for others. Rather, the individual 
must demonstrate some action, implementation, or execution (in other 
words, act or conduct) by the potential employer that prevented the 
individual from turning down projects or working for others.'' In 
response, the Department notes its statement in the NPRM preamble that 
``a potential employer may exercise substantial control, for example, 
where it explicitly requires an exclusive working relationship or where 
it imposes restrictions that effectively prevent an individual from 
working with others.'' 85 FR 60613 (citing cases where the employer's 
schedule made it ``impossible'' or ``practically impossible'' for the 
worker to work for others). Where a worker could work for others, 
meaning the potential employer is not explicitly or effectively 
preventing the worker from doing so, the worker retains control over 
this aspect of his or her work. That he or she exercises this control 
by choosing to work only for one potential employer does not 
necessarily shift the control to the potential employer. Further, the 
parties' actions, including whether the potential employer enforced an 
explicit bar on working for others or has imposed working conditions 
that make doing so impracticable, are stronger evidence of control than 
contractual or theoretical ability or inability to control this aspect 
of the working relationship.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ The Department received related feedback from commenters 
asking for proposed Sec.  795.110 to discount the relevance of 
voluntary worker practices (e.g., choosing to work exclusively for 
one business, declining to negotiate prices, etc.); as explained in 
greater detail in Section IV(F), coercive behavior by a potential 
employer (e.g., vigilant enforcement of a non-compete clause, 
punishing workers for turning down available work, etc.) constitutes 
stronger evidence of employment status than such voluntary worker 
practices, but is not a prerequisite for such worker practices to 
have import under the FLSA's economic reality test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters interpreted the few examples of control in the 
proposal as an effort to limit the types of control that may be 
considered. For example, Farmworker Justice stated that the proposal 
``improperly and erroneously tries to narrow the relevant 
considerations for the [control] factor.'' According to Edward 
Tuddenham, the proposal ``lists some `key' elements of control that . . 
. may have little or no significance whatsoever'' and ``[s]uch a rigid 
approach to the question of control can only wreak havoc with the 
established common law of FLSA employer/employee relationships.'' 
However, the examples of types of control identified in the proposal 
were not an attempt to narrow or limit the control factor analysis. The 
Department cannot provide an exhaustive list of types of control and so 
instead focused on several key examples of types of control. Any type 
of control over the work by the individual worker or the potential 
employer may be considered. Such considerations should not be 
``mechanical,'' Saleem, 854 F.3d at 140, and instead must focus on 
whether the control exercised by either the individual or the potential 
employer answers the ultimate inquiry of ``whether the individual is, 
as a matter of economic reality, in business for himself,'' as opposed 
to being economically dependent on the potential employer for work. In 
any event, as explained below, the Department is clarifying types of 
control that may be relevant to the analysis.
    Numerous other commenters suggested the addition of dozens of 
examples of types of control that indicate employee or independent 
contractor status. For example, WPI suggested that the following types 
of control by the individual worker are indicative of independent 
contractor status: Controlling whether to work at all; controlling the 
location of where to perform the work; controlling how the work is 
performed; setting prices or choosing between work opportunities based 
on prices; and hiring employees or engaging subcontractors. It 
suggested, conversely, that the following types of control by the 
potential employer are indicative of employee status: Requiring the 
individual worker to comply with company specific procedures regarding 
how the work is performed; requiring a set schedule or minimum hours; 
controlling when the individual can take meal and rest breaks; and 
controlling when the individual can take time off. CWI recommended 
addition of the following as examples of the individual worker's 
control over the work that are indicative of independent contractor 
status: The worker's ability to make decisions with respect to the 
details of how the work is performed, including the staging and 
sequencing of aspects of the work; the worker's selection of supplies, 
tools, or equipment to be used (or not used) by the worker; the 
worker's control over when the work is conducted (e.g., worker 
flexibility in start and end times) where flexibility exists in the 
result to be accomplished or the time periods available to a worker to 
offer their services; the worker's control over where certain aspects 
of the services can be performed where the subparts do not change the 
results provided by the worker; and the worker's discretion to use the 
services of others to perform the work in whole or in part, or to 
support the worker's performance of services (including performing some 
of the contracted work and/or performing supporting services such as 
accounting, legal, administrative, or financial services to support the 
worker or services to support equipment or tools used by the worker to 
perform services). UPS stated that the proposal ``fails to provide 
examples beyond controlling the worker's schedule or workload and 
restricting the worker's ability to work with other entities,'' and 
that ``courts have properly widened the lens when assessing control, 
looking at factors such as background checks, authority to hire and 
fire, training, advertising, licensing, uniforms, monitoring, 
supervision, evaluation, and discipline.'' Farmworker Justice commented 
that the proposal did ``not acknowledge other examples of employer 
control that unquestionably shape a worker's experience and performance 
of daily tasks'' and provided as examples ``[r]equirements about how a 
worker must dress, what language or tone she may use in a professional 
setting, or what prices she must charge customers.'' Likewise, Sen. 
Sherrod Brown and 22 other senators commented that the proposal 
``ignore[s] other critical matters of control that an employer 
typically exercises or retains the right to, including setting the rate 
of pay and the manner in which the work must be performed and 
disciplining workers who do not meet their standards.'' And Human 
Rights Watch commented that the proposed control factor ``potentially 
omits other ways that gig companies control their workers, such as the 
ways in which they unilaterally change the formula for calculating base 
earnings, the setting of default tip options, and restrictions on the 
range of assignments that are offered to workers at a specific time or 
in a specific locale.'' Other commenters provided various industry-
specific examples that they viewed as indicative of control by the 
individual worker or the potential employer.
    The Department has considered the various comments regarding 
additional examples of types of control that can be indicative of 
employee or independent contractor status and declines to make changes 
to the proposed regulatory text in response. While this preamble and

[[Page 1182]]

the regulatory test cannot (and should not) address each and every 
potential scenario and example, they clarify and articulate principles 
related to the control factor that can be applied to an array of fact 
patterns as they arise.
    As an initial matter, a number of commenters' examples fall within 
the general categories of control already identified in the regulatory 
text. For example, the worker's controlling whether to work at all, 
controlling when the work is conducted, and choosing between work 
opportunities based on prices are all examples of the worker's setting 
his or her schedule or selecting his or her projects, which the 
regulatory text identifies as examples of the worker's control over the 
work. Similarly, the potential employer's requiring a set schedule or 
minimum hours, controlling when the individual can take meal and rest 
breaks, controlling when the individual can take time off, and 
restricting the range of assignments that are offered to the worker are 
all examples of the potential employer's control over the worker's 
schedule, workload, or both, which the regulatory text identifies as 
examples of the potential employer's control over the work.
    Moreover, as explained in the NPRM preamble, the Department is 
concerned that application of the economic reality factors has resulted 
in certain overlaps between the factors. See 85 FR 60607-08 
(identifying ways in which the former skill/initiative, permanence, and 
``integral'' factors considered control). Consistent with that 
discussion and in the interest of further clarification, the Department 
reiterates that the worker's ability to exercise significant 
initiative, whether the potential employer directly or indirectly 
requires the worker to work exclusively for it, and the potential 
employer's ability to compel the worker's attendance to work on a 
consistent basis or otherwise closely supervise and manage performance 
of the work are examples of relevant types of control and are part of 
the control analysis. And as stated above, the Department agrees that 
who controls the manner and means by which the work is performed is a 
key component of the control analysis. In addition, the Department 
approvingly cited in the NPRM preamble cases in which the workers' 
ability to accept or reject projects or deliveries without negative 
repercussions or retaliation,\23\ the potential employer's lack of 
close supervision or specifications how the workers should do the 
work,\24\ and the potential employer's allowing the workers broad 
discretion in the manner in which to complete their work \25\ indicated 
substantial control over the work by the workers. Finally, the 
Department agrees that the various examples of types of control 
identified by the commenters above may, at least in some factual 
circumstances, be relevant to the control analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See 85 FR 60612 n.35 (citing Parrish, 917 F.3d at 382; 
Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery, 161 F.3d at 303).
    \24\ See id. (citing Thibault, 612 F.3d at 847).
    \25\ See 85 FR 60612-13 (citing Mid-Atl. Installation, 16 F. 
App'x at 106).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Ultimately, however, it is not possible--and would be 
counterproductive--to identify in the regulatory text every type of 
control (especially industry-specific types of control) that can be 
relevant when determining under the FLSA whether a worker is an 
employee or independent contractor. As explained above, the Department 
purposefully articulated the control analysis in a general manner to 
encompass various different types of control that the individual worker 
and the potential employer may exercise over the working relationship, 
and to avoid any unintended inferences regarding omitted types of 
control. Accordingly, any type of control over the work by the 
individual worker or the potential employer may be considered, although 
some types of control are not probative of economic dependence as set 
forth in the final regulatory text (and discussed below).
    The Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA) objected 
that the proposal ``offers no guidance on how'' the examples of types 
of control ``should be weighed against each other'' and asked whether 
the Department intends ``that a worker must satisfy all of the criteria 
that it mentions in order to be an independent contractor,'' or if 
there is ``some other balance when evaluating this factor.'' OOIDA 
noted that although the proposal stated that no single factor of the 
economic reality test is dispositive, ``it does not offer the same 
clarification when considering the details within a single factor.'' As 
explained above, any type of control over the work by the individual 
worker or the potential employer may be considered to the extent it is 
probative as to whether the individual is, as a matter of economic 
reality, in business for himself, as opposed to being economically 
dependent on the potential employer for work. No single example of 
control, if present or not present, is necessarily dispositive as to 
whether the control factor indicates economic dependence. The examples 
are simply that: Examples.
c. Responses to Comments Regarding Examples of Requirements That Are 
Not Probative
    Despite the final rule's broad articulation of the control factor, 
not every requirement or limitation on the means of doing business 
constitutes control for the purpose of analyzing whether a worker is an 
employee under the FLSA. The proposed regulatory text contained 
examples of requirements by a potential employer that do not constitute 
control and thus are not probative to the ultimate inquiry of whether 
the individual is, as a matter of economic reality, in business for 
himself. These are requirements to ``comply with specific legal 
obligations, satisfy health and safety standards, carry insurance, meet 
contractually agreed-upon deadlines or quality control standards, or 
satisfy other similar terms that are typical of contractual 
relationships between businesses (as opposed to employment 
relationships).'' In other words, insisting on adherence to certain 
rules to which the worker is already legally bound would not make the 
worker more or less likely to be an employee.
    NELA challenged the Department's ``claims that case law supports 
this approach'' and asserted that ``[t]he majority view among courts . 
. . is that evidence of a business compelling its workers to comply 
with certain legal obligations or customer requirements is probative of 
control over the work relationship'' (citing Scantland v. Jeffry 
Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013), among other cases). 
NELA added that ``[c]ourts have routinely held that employer guidelines 
put in place to ensure that workers conform with the law or follow 
safety regulations constitute control over employees'' (citing Narayan 
v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2010), among other cases). 
The National Women's Law Center similarly stated that ``courts have 
regularly rejected arguments that external requirements imposed by the 
defendant company's customers are irrelevant to the right to control 
factor'' (citing cases). NELP asserted that the Department's ``attempts 
to take away consideration of certain employer controls based on the 
source of the control'' is ``nonsense'' because ``if legislators or 
regulators have placed an obligation on employers to comply with 
certain laws, that makes the worker less independent and more dependent 
on that employer, and this should be accorded weight.'' AFL-CIO 
commented that the ``categorical exclusion of evidence of control based 
solely on the reasons why the employer exercises the

[[Page 1183]]

control is both irrational and contrary to Supreme Court precedent and 
Congress' intent.'' And the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America asserted that the Department's proposal would 
``create[ ] a gaping hole that is fertile ground for exploitation by 
irresponsible employers like the ones we find in the construction 
industry.''
    On the other hand, the Coalition to Promote Independent 
Entrepreneurs ``strongly agree[d]'' with this proposal and ``agree[d] 
that these types of requirements frequently apply to work performed by 
employees and independent contractors alike and thus are not probative 
of whether an individual is economically dependent on a company.'' In 
addition, NRF asserted that ``this clarification is important, as there 
is a difference between `control' and `quality control' and/or other 
performance standards.'' And the Independent Bakers Association 
``strongly support[ed] the proposed clarification that requiring an 
individual to comply with specific legal obligations typical of 
business relationships would not constitute evidence of control or make 
an individual more or less likely to be an employee.'' See also SHRM 
(``support[ing] the [p]roposed . . . recognition that contracting 
parties should be able to build compliance with, for example, specific 
legal obligations, satisfy health and safety standards, and the 
carrying of insurance into the contractual relationship'').
    The Department understands that some courts have found requirements 
that workers comply with specific legal obligations or meet quality 
control standards to be indicative of employee status. In particular, 
the Eleventh Circuit in Scantland stated that it examines ``the nature 
and degree of the alleged employer's control, not why the alleged 
employer exercised such control'' and that ``a company must hire 
employees, not independent contractors'' if ``the nature of [its] 
business requires [the] company to exert control over workers to the 
extent that [the defendant] has allegedly done.'' 721 F.3d at 1316. The 
Scantland court correctly recognized that the ultimate inquiry in the 
economic reality test is ``whether an individual is in business for 
himself or is dependent upon finding employment in the business of 
others.'' 721 F.3d at 1312 (quotation marks omitted). But to answer 
that question it is necessary to consider ``why'' the potential 
employer imposed a requirement. If the reason for a requirement applies 
equally to individuals who are in business for themselves and those who 
are employees, imposing the requirement is not probative. See Parrish, 
917 F.3d at 379 (``although requiring safety training and drug testing 
is an exercise of control in the most basic sense of the word, . . . 
[r]equiring . . . safety training and drug testing, when working at an 
oil-drilling site, is not the type of control that counsels in favor of 
employee status.'').
    The Scantland court's discussion of the control factor included the 
fact that ``[t]echnicians could also be . . . fired, for consistently 
misbilling, fraudulently billing, stealing, . . . [and] having 
consistently low quality control ratings'' as evidence that the control 
factor weighed in favored employee classification. 721 F.3d at 1314 
(11th Cir. 2013).\26\ However, employees and independent contractors 
alike are routinely terminated for fraud, theft, and substandard work. 
Such dismissal are therefore not probative as to whether and the 
dismissed workers were in business for themselves, as opposed to being 
economically dependent on the potential employer. In contrast, 
dismissals for failing to work mandatory hours or for disregarding 
close supervision would be probative because mandatory hours and close 
supervision are typically not imposed on individuals who are in 
business for themselves. At bottom, the question of ``why'' workers 
were dismissed matters a great deal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The court also relied on the employers' close supervision, 
control over schedules, and ability to prevent technicians from 
hiring helpers or working for others to conclude that the control 
factors weighed in favor of employee classification. Scantland, 721 
F.3d at 1314-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In any event, Scantland's reasoning appears to be in the minority 
among courts of appeals.\27\ As explained in the NPRM preamble, other 
courts have concluded that requiring such types of compliance is not 
probative of an employment relationship. See, e.g., Parrish 917 F.3d at 
379; Iontchev v. AAA Cab Serv., Inc., 685 F. App'x 548, 550 (9th Cir. 
2017) (noting that the potential employer's ``disciplinary policy 
primarily enforced the Airport's rules and [the city's] regulations 
governing the [drivers'] operations and conduct'' in finding that the 
potential employer ``had relatively little control over the manner in 
which the [d]rivers performed their work''); Mid-Atl. Installation, 16 
F. App'x at 106 (rejecting an argument that backcharging the workers 
``for failing to comply with various local regulations or with 
technical specifications demonstrates the type of control 
characteristic of an employment relationship,'' and noting that 
withholding money in such circumstances is common in contractual 
relationships); cf. Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1048 (finding that, 
because a scheduling requirement was imposed by the potential employer 
and not by state law, it suggested control over the workers). And 
courts have reached analogous conclusions in joint employer cases. See, 
e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. Inc., 355 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(finding that control with respect to ``contractual warranties of 
quality and time of delivery has no bearing on the joint employment 
inquiry'' because such control is ``perfectly consistent with a 
typical, legitimate subcontracting relationship''); Moreau v. Air 
France, 356 F.3d 942, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that control 
exercised by potential joint employer over contractor's employees to 
``ensure compliance with various safety and security regulations'' is 
``qualitatively different'' from control that indicates employer 
status).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ In Narayan, the Ninth Circuit applied California law--not 
the FLSA--and merely recited requirements imposed by the potential 
employer to comply with certain legal obligations among a litany of 
examples of control that precluded summary judgment on the employee 
versus independent contractor issue in that case. See 616 F.3d at 
900-02.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the supportive case law, the extent to which courts 
take differing approaches to the probative value of such requirements 
is yet another example of the need identified by the Department for a 
clear and uniform standard under the FLSA to distinguish between 
employees and independent contractors. Moreover, the Department 
believes that these types of requirements are generally imposed by 
employers on both employees and independent contractors (as some 
commenters indicated). Employers expect and often require all of their 
workers to, for example, comply with the law, satisfy health and safety 
standards, and meet deadlines and quality standards. Thus, the 
existence of the requirements themselves are not probative of whether 
the worker is an employee or independent contractor. Other indicia of 
control over the work, including the indicia of control identified in 
the final regulatory text, are more probative of the worker's economic 
dependence or independence. Accordingly, the Department retains in the 
final regulatory text's statement that requirements by the potential 
employer that the worker ``comply with specific legal obligations, 
satisfy health and safety standards, carry insurance, meet 
contractually agreed-upon deadlines or quality control standards, or 
satisfy other similar terms that are typical of contractual 
relationships between

[[Page 1184]]

businesses (as opposed to employment relationships)'' are not ``control 
that makes the individual more or less likely to be an employee under 
the Act.''
    Although the ATA ``strongly agrees'' with the Department's proposal 
that requirements by the potential employer that the worker ``comply 
with specific legal obligations'' would not be ``control that makes the 
individual more or less likely to be an employee under the Act,'' it 
suggested that ``specific'' be changed to ``any'' in the final 
regulatory text. ATA explained that referring to ``specific'' legal 
obligations ``may unfortunately result in a great deal of litigation 
over whether any particular aspect of a contract is `specifically' 
mandated by law.'' It cited, as examples, laws that impose general 
safety standards with which employers determine the specifics of how to 
comply. See also NHDA (``The proposal carves out compliance with 
specific legal obligations. However, not all legal obligations are 
specific, making other language in the proposal unnecessarily 
problematic.'').
    After careful consideration, the Department declines to adopt the 
suggested change. As an initial matter, the Department used the 
``specific legal obligations'' language in its recent Joint Employer 
Status under the Fair Labor Standards Act final rule. See 85 FR 2859 
(finalizing 29 CFR 791.2(d)(3)).\28\ The Department noted there that 
the obligations include compliance with the FLSA or other similar laws, 
sexual harassment policies, background checks, or workplace safety 
practices and protocols. See id. The Department did not intend a high 
degree of specificity there and intends the same meaning here. 
Moreover, a potential employer's requirement that a worker comply with 
legal obligations without any further specificity as to the law or the 
actual obligations is unlikely to be probative of control in the first 
place. Accordingly, retaining the word ``specific'' is consistent with 
the Department's position that, although requiring workers to comply 
with legal obligations could be some manner of control, such 
requirements reflect the applicable legal regime more than the 
potential employer's control, and encouraging such requirements in 
contractual work relationships has obvious benefits for employers, 
workers, and society generally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The Department's Joint Employer final rule was mostly 
vacated by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York for reasons unrelated to the ``specific legal obligations'' 
language. See New York v. Scalia, No. 1:20-cv-1689-GHW, 2020 WL 
5370871 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2020). The Department appealed the 
decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on 
November 6, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters expressed support for the Department's proposal to 
carve out from the control analysis the identified employer actions 
toward individual workers, but also requested that the Department 
expand its proposal by identifying many additional employer 
requirements as not types of control that make the individual more or 
less likely to be an employee under the Act. For example, SHRM asserted 
that ``the Final Rule must emphasize that all workers, regardless of 
their formal employment status, should be able to benefit from the 
training, resources, and positive workplace practices as those who are 
directly employed in the same workplace,'' and it gave examples of 
workplace trainings and audit measures. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
stated that the Department ``should expand this concept'' and 
``explicitly state that workers and businesses should not be 
discouraged from incorporating terms (and audit and other certification 
processes) into their relationship that support sound, lawful, safe 
work practices.'' It suggested the following examples of such terms: 
``Incorporation of an obligation that the work be performed pursuant to 
acceptable professional, industry and customer service standards, as 
well as commonly accepted safety, ethics, licensure and other standards 
and recommendations (such as compliance with limitations or control 
imposed or necessitated by law, regulation, order or ordinance).'' See 
also Seyfarth Shaw (requesting that the following employer actions 
toward workers be excluded from the control analysis: ``(1) compliance 
with professional obligations and ethics standards; (2) compliance with 
regulatory obligations, including over health and safety; (3) 
compliance with other published industry standards; (4) compliance with 
applicable local, state, and national licensure standards and rules; 
and (5) additional contractual term examples of agreed upon results and 
deadlines''); \29\ WPI (asserting that the potential employer's 
practice or ability to do the following are not probative: Requiring 
the individual to comply with or pass down contractual and legal 
obligations to subcontractors and employees; requiring the individual 
to comply with customer requirements; tracking and monitoring data 
related to the individual; providing the individual with market data on 
pricing; establishing default pricing that the individual may change; 
providing the individual with information related to the establishment 
or running of a business; providing the individual with emergency 
assistance (e.g., protective equipment during a public-health crisis); 
and complying with Federal, state or locals laws related to a 
contracting relationship). Likewise, the Financial Services Institute 
requested that the Department carve out from the control analysis 
requirements that ``Independent Broker-Dealers'' (IBDs) place on their 
``financial advisors'' to ``comply with requirements imposed by FINRA, 
the SEC, and state securities regulators'' and exclusivity requirements 
that IBDs place on their financial advisors to comply with ``the 
extensive supervisory obligations imposed by the SEC and FINRA.'' OOIDA 
also expressed concerns about exclusivity requirements and sought 
clarification that a potential employer's compliance with ``Federal 
regulations requir[ing] that an owner-operator lease[ ] his or her 
equipment exclusively to a carrier for the duration of the lease'' not 
affect the control analysis. Finally, CPIE asked the Department to 
``make clear that duties or requirements imposed by any third party, 
whether it be a government agency or a third-party customer, . . . be 
disregarded'' when applying the control factor. See also NHDA 
(``[C]ontrol weighing in favor of employee status should be control 
exercised by the potential employer that originates with the potential 
employer and does not originate from outside, independent forces or 
circumstances, such as customer requirements or governmental 
regulations.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ In a separate section of its comment, Seyfarth Shaw 
recommended that the Department state that the following are not 
evidence of a potential employer's control over the work of the 
worker: The business provides information regarding the final result 
to be accomplished by the worker; the business provides customer 
specifications/details and feedback relating to the work (including 
requesting confirmation that the customer feedback has been 
addressed); the business provides time frames within which services 
can be provided in light of the services contracted for, and/or the 
time sensitivity or perishable nature of the services/products; the 
business' right to enforce contractual obligations; the business 
provides the worker suggestions, recommendations, guidance, and/or 
tips that are not mandated but informational relating to the 
services; and the business pays the worker by the hour where it is 
customary in the particular business/trade to do so (e.g., 
attorneys, physical trainers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department does not agree with CPIE that any requirement 
stemming from ``duties or requirements imposed by any third party'' be 
``disregarded'' or with NHDA that only control ``that originates with 
the potential employer'' can indicate employee status. This is because 
a third party may explicitly or impliedly encourage businesses to

[[Page 1185]]

impose requirements on workers that signify employee classification. 
For example, clients of a home cleaning company may prefer that the 
company's workers wear uniforms, use the same equipment, and be closely 
supervised. Imposing such requirements, even to satisfy client 
preferences, makes the workers more likely to be classified as 
employees because those requirements are inconsistent with the workers 
being in business for themselves. A company may also require that 
workers it hires perform timely and high-quality work, as clients 
surely prefer. But contractually agreed-upon deadlines and quality 
standards do not signify employee classification because independent 
businesses routinely agree to meet deadlines and quality standards as 
part of their businesses.
    In response to comments requesting that the Department identify 
many additional employer requirements as not types of control that make 
the individual more or less likely to be an employee under the Act, the 
Department declines to change its proposed regulatory text. As an 
initial matter, many of the requested additions are already covered by 
the proposed text. For example, the following requested additions are 
requirements to ``comply with specific legal obligations'' and thus 
already covered: Requirements to comply with limitations or control 
imposed or necessitated by law, regulation, order, or ordinance; 
regulatory obligations; Federal, state, or local laws related to a 
contracting relationship; requirements imposed by FINRA, the SEC, and 
state securities regulators; and Federal regulations requiring that an 
owner-operator lease his or her equipment exclusively to a carrier for 
the duration of the lease.\30\ Other requested additions may fall into 
the ``satisfy health and safety standards'' category (for example: 
Requiring that the work be performed pursuant to commonly accepted 
safety standards; and providing the individual emergency assistance 
such as protective equipment during a public-health crisis) or the 
``meet contractually agreed-upon deadlines or quality control 
standards'' category (for example: Agreements that the work be 
performed pursuant to acceptable professional, industry, or published 
industry standards; agreements to comply with applicable local, state, 
and national licensure standards and rules; and agreed upon results and 
deadlines). Other requested additions are narrow or industry-specific 
in nature, and the Department prefers general guidance that may be used 
by as many employers and workers as possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Uber requested that the Department clarify that background 
checks are not an indicia of control: ``Where a business is required 
by law to engage in certain activities (such as screening potential 
workers for violent crime history), the Department should make clear 
that this required screening is not an indicia of control.'' 
However, requiring a worker to undergo and pass a background check 
when the law requires it falls in the ``comply with specific legal 
obligations'' category. No further clarification is necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In any event, it is not possible to identify in the regulation 
every employer requirement that is not the type of control that makes 
the individual more or less likely to be an employee under the Act. The 
regulatory text accounts for this with a broader final category: 
Requiring the worker to ``satisfy other similar terms that are typical 
of contractual relationships between businesses (as opposed to 
employment relationships).'' This category recognizes that contractual 
work relationships currently vary and will evolve going forward, and 
provides that additional employer requirements that are not expressly 
identified in the regulatory text but which are similar to those 
identified and are typical of such relationships do ``not constitute 
control that makes the individual more or less likely to be an employee 
under the Act.''
    SHRM requested that the Department exclude from the control 
analysis the offering of benefits such as ``health insurance, bonuses, 
or retirement savings.'' According to SHRM, ``the modern workplace 
would suffer if businesses were effectively barred from providing 
workplace enhancements that all workers should enjoy like healthcare or 
retirement savings.'' Other commenters made overlapping requests, 
although not necessarily in the context of applying the control factor. 
For example, TechNet requested that the Department add a ``safe 
harbor'' stating that ``a worker does not lose his or her independent 
status solely because a network platform provides the worker with 
emergency aid or benefits allowed or required under state law.'' 
Similarly, WPI requested a general ``safe harbor'' with respect to the 
provision of ``protections or benefits as allowed or required by 
Federal, state or local laws, including but not limited to minimum 
guaranteed earnings, health insurance, retirement benefits, health or 
retirement subsidies, life insurance, workers compensation or similar 
insurance, unemployment insurance, sick or other paid leave, training 
and expense reimbursement.''
    The Department declines to change the regulatory text in response 
to these comments. The offering of health, retirement, and other 
benefits is not necessarily indicative of employment status. For 
example, payment of proceeds owed into a worker's own health plan or 
retirement account would not indicate an employment relationship. This 
is because it is reasonable for an independent contractor to have a 
personal health or retirement plan, and the precise method of 
compensation--whether cash, contributions to an account, or some other 
method--is not relevant to the question of economic dependence. 
However, providing a worker with the same employer-provided health or 
retirement plans on the terms that a business also gives its own 
employees may indicate the worker is not an independent contractor but 
rather an employee. Certain other benefits could also suggest employee 
status. For example, sick or other paid leave, especially the potential 
employer's administration and authorization of the leave, could be 
indicative of the potential employer's control over the worker's 
schedule. Finally, offering a bonus to a worker may or may not be 
indicative of employee status. For example, a worker's participation in 
a bonus or profit sharing plan in which he or she receives a bonus 
depending on the employer's, a division of the employer's, or his or 
her own performance over a period of time could limit the worker's 
ability to affect his or her profit or loss through initiative or 
investment--suggesting economic dependence and thus employee status. 
But a contractual agreement to provide a worker with a fixed bonus if 
the worker completes a job by a certain deadline or completes a certain 
number of tasks over a fixed period is typical of contractual 
relationships between businesses and itself does not make the worker 
more or less likely to be an employee under the Act. Even if, based on 
the circumstances of a particular case, the provision of certain 
health, retirement, or other benefits suggests classification as an 
employee, that fact is not determinative by itself because other facts 
and factors must also be considered.
2. The ``Opportunity for Profit or Loss'' Factor
    The second core factor identified in the proposed regulatory text 
was the ``individual's opportunity for profit or loss.'' 85 FR 60639. 
This factor, included at proposed Sec.  795.105(d)(1)(ii), ``weighs 
towards the individual being an independent contractor to the extent 
the individual has an opportunity to earn profits or incur losses based 
on his or her exercise of initiative (such as managerial skill or 
business acumen or judgment) or management of his or her

[[Page 1186]]

investment in or capital expenditure on, for example, helpers or 
equipment or material to further his or her work.'' Proposed Sec.  
795.105(d)(1)(ii) further explained that, ``[w]hile the effects of the 
individual's exercise of initiative and management of investment are 
both considered under this factor, the individual does not need to have 
an opportunity for profit or loss based on both for this factor to 
weigh towards the individual being an independent contractor.'' In 
addition, under the proposal, this factor ``weighs towards the 
individual being an employee to the extent the individual is unable to 
affect his or her earnings or is only able to do so by working more 
hours or more efficiently.'' Numerous comments were submitted regarding 
the proposals to analyze investment through the lens of opportunity for 
profit or loss and to focus that analysis on the worker's investment 
rather than comparing the worker's investment to the potential 
employer's investment. One commenter requested eliminating this factor 
altogether, and several commenters requested changes to the other 
aspects of the proposed opportunity factor section.
a. Whether To Analyze Investment Through the Lens of Opportunity for 
Profit or Loss
    Some commenters opposed the proposal to consider the individual 
worker's ``management of his or her investment in or capital 
expenditure on, for example, helpers or equipment or material to 
further his or her work'' as part of the opportunity factor. For 
example, NELA stated that a worker's investment has ``been a critically 
important factor in the economic realities test analysis'' and that 
``[d]iscounting this important piece of the economic reality test, as 
the Department has done here, plainly makes it easier for businesses to 
require workers to make significant financial investments without 
risking a finding of employee status.'' The State AGs similarly 
commented that the proposed approach of considering investment only in 
the context of opportunity for profit or loss ``inappropriately 
subordinates the investment factor to the opportunity for profit or 
loss'' factor. According to the State AGs, ``[c]ourts consider both 
factors, often together, but investment `is, itself, indicative of 
independent contractor status' especially in smaller businesses'' 
(quoting Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Group, Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 144 n.29 
(2d Cir. 2017)). UPS said that ``workers [who] make little or no 
monetary investment toward completion of the work . . . are more likely 
to be dependent on the company,'' but that the Department's proposal 
``ignores that reality'' by suggesting that initiative and investment 
``are on equal footing.'' NELP stated that, although opportunity for 
profit or loss and investment ``are linked, they are hardly duplicative 
and separately serve as useful indicia of an entity's status under the 
FLSA, as the Supreme Court's tests note.''
    On the other hand, some commenters supported the proposal to 
consider investment in the opportunity factor. For example, according 
to WPI, ``[t]he Department's proposal to combine [opportunity for 
profit or loss] with an individual's investment in facilities and 
equipment, following Second Circuit precedent, is a welcome change that 
will bring clarity and reduce overlap.'' It added that ``[w]ise 
decisions about investments are perhaps the clearest path to increasing 
profits or suffering losses.'' CPIE supported the proposed ``adoption 
of the Second Circuit's approach of combining the factors `opportunity 
for profit or loss' and `investment,' and not treating them as separate 
factors.'' According to CPIE, the proposal ``better captures both the 
manufacturing-based independent contractor (who likely has a tangible 
capital business investment) and the new-economy independent contractor 
(who likely does not).''
    Having carefully considered the comments on this issue, the 
Department adopts its proposal, consistent with Second Circuit case 
law, to consider investment as part of the opportunity factor. Some 
courts have acknowledged that the two concepts are related while still 
keeping the factors separate. See McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 243; Lauritzen, 
835 F.2d at 1537. Other courts do not expressly acknowledge that they 
are related but consider investment when evaluating opportunity for 
profit or loss--resulting in unnecessary and duplicative analysis of 
the same facts under two factors. See, e.g., Mid-Atl. Installation, 16 
F. App'x at 106-07 (finding that the worker's capital investments in 
tools, equipment, and a truck indicated independent contractor status 
under both the opportunity and the investment factors). And 
consideration of investment separately has caused other courts to 
discuss the worker's involvement in outside businesses in the context 
of opportunity for profit or loss. See, e.g., Parrish, 917 F.3d at 384 
(considering consultant's management of a goat farm). After considering 
these varying approaches, the Department believes that adopting the 
Second Circuit's approach best furthers the Department's goal: A clear 
and non-duplicative analysis for determining employee versus 
independent contractor status. In sum, the individual worker's 
meaningful capital investments may evince opportunity for profit or 
loss: ``[e]conomic investment, by definition, creates the opportunity 
for loss, [and] investors take such a risk with an eye to profit.'' 
Saleem, 854 F.3d at 145 n.29; see also Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1060 
(identifying ``the workers' opportunity for profit or loss and their 
investment in the business'' as a single factor).
    Moreover, considering investment as part of opportunity for profit 
or loss is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Silk which 
articulated the two factors separately but analyzed them together. In 
particular, the Court found that coal unloaders were employees because 
they had ``no opportunity to gain or lose except from the work of their 
hands and [ ] simple tools,'' while truck drivers who invested in their 
own vehicles had ``opportunity for profit from sound management'' of 
that investment by, for instance, hauling for different customers. Id. 
at 719. Thus, it framed the analysis as whether workers are more like 
unloaders whose profits were based solely on ``the work of their hands 
and [ ] simple tools'' or the drivers whose profits depended on their 
initiative and investments. See id. As the Court explained decades ago 
and as the Second Circuit noted much more recently in Saleem, 
investment is a pathway to opportunity for profit or loss.
    In response to NELA and likeminded commenters' concern that 
employers may require significant investments by their workers to avoid 
employee status, the Department reiterates that the investment must be 
capital in nature and consistent with the worker being in business for 
him/herself for the investment to indicate an opportunity for profit or 
loss. Senator Sherrod Brown and 22 other senators stated that 
``[r]equiring [workers] to purchase a franchise or their own equipment, 
including a vehicle'' or otherwise ``take on financial risk as a 
condition of employment does not convert an employee into an 
independent contractor under the FLSA.'' While no single fact or factor 
may ``convert an employee into an independent contractor,'' the 
prospect of financial risk and reward plays an important role in 
distinguishing ``wage earners toiling for a living'' from ``independent 
entrepreneurs seeking a return on their risky capital investments.'' 
Mr. W. Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1051. Moreover, it matters why certain 
investments are required. If certain capital investments

[[Page 1187]]

are necessary to perform the job for which the contractor is hired, 
then requiring a contractor to make such investments would be 
consistent with the contractor being in business for him- or herself. 
For example, a company that hires independent contractors to haul 
freight may obviously require that drivers bring their own vehicles. 
Silk 331 U.S at 719. In contrast, a requirement to ``invest'' in 
specific, company-provided equipment would not be consistent with the 
worker being in business for him- or herself, and may constitute a 
consideration under the control factor that points towards employee 
status. See Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1318 (concluding that technicians' 
``expenditures [in equipment and materials] detract little from the[ir] 
economic dependence on Knight'' in part because ``many technicians 
purchased specialty tools from Knight directly via payroll 
withholdings''). As such, OOIDA's concern ``that any requirement that a 
worker must purchase services or equipment from the business for which 
they work [w]ould weigh in favor of employee status'' is misplaced. See 
also SWRCC (``[T]his standard would provide a perverse incentive for 
companies to require putative employees to maintain their own equipment 
in an effort to steer those employees to independent contractor 
status.''). Consistent with the economic dependence inquiry, an 
investment must indicate an independent business by the worker, as 
opposed to merely being required by the potential employer, for it to 
indicate an opportunity for profit or loss.
    In response to the State AGs, the Department's approach does not 
subordinate investment; it can still separately indicate independent 
contractor status as they suggest. Finally, the Department's approach 
is not contrary to UPS' assertion that workers who make little or no 
investment ``are more likely to be dependent'' on the potential 
employer.\31\ Workers who make little or no investment are more likely 
to be employees than workers who make significant investments, but of 
course, such a worker's ultimate status as an employee or independent 
contractor will also depend on other factors. As the Department 
explained in the NPRM preamble, workers who do not make significant 
investments may still be independent contractors: ``while the presence 
of significant capital investment is still probative, its absence may 
be less so in more knowledge-based occupations and industries. Indeed, 
technological advances enable, for example, freelance journalists, 
graphic designers, or consultants to be entrepreneurs with little more 
than a personal computer and smartphone.'' 85 FR 60609 (citing Faludi 
v. U.S. Shale Sols., L.L.C., 950 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)); see 
also Meyer v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 607 F. App'x 121, 123 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (concluding that workers who invested little were 
independent contractors primarily because of their control over the 
work and their initiative); Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1540-41 
(Easterbrook, J. concurring) (``[P]ossess[ing] little or no physical 
capital . . . is true of many workers we would call independent 
contractors. Think of lawyers, many of whom do not even own books. The 
bar sells human capital rather than physical capital, but this does not 
imply that lawyers are `employees' of their clients under the 
FLSA.'').\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The American Society of Travel Advisors disagreed at least 
in part, commenting that ``workers in many service industries may 
make only a minimal investment in equipment or materials and in such 
situations this consideration, by itself, should not be taken to 
weigh in favor of employee status.''
    \32\ LocumTenens, an online company that specializes in the 
temporary placement of physicians and other health clinicians, 
requested that the Department eliminate from the economic reality 
test consideration of whether an individual has an opportunity for 
profit or loss. According to LocumTenens, its physicians and 
clinicians who provide temporary healthcare services ``do not have 
an obvious investment or opportunity for profit when they step in'' 
for another physician or clinician. However, as explained later, the 
Department believes that opportunity for profit or loss is very 
predictive of a worker's status as an employee or independent 
contractor. In addition, the rule requires a worker to exercise 
personal initiative or manage capital investments, but not 
necessarily both, for the opportunity factor to indicate independent 
contractor status. In other words, an absence of capital investment 
does not prevent an individual from having an opportunity for profit 
or loss, because such opportunity can be based on the individual's 
initiative. Nor does such absence necessarily prevent an individual 
from being properly classified an independent contractor, 
particularly in knowledge-based industries such as medicine where 
human capital matters more than physical capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Whether To Analyze the Worker's Investment or Compare the Worker's 
Investment With That of the Potential Employer
    The Department noted in the NPRM preamble that, when considering 
investment, some courts use ``a side-by-side comparison method'' that 
directly compares the worker's individual investment to the investment 
by the potential employer. See 85 FR 60614 (citing cases). The 
Department explained that ``such a `side-by-side comparison method' 
does not illuminate the ultimate question of economic dependence,'' but 
instead ``merely highlights the obvious and unhelpful fact that 
individual workers--whether employees or independent contractors--
likely have fewer resources than businesses'' that, for example, 
maintain corporate offices. Id. (citing cases). The Department received 
a number of comments addressing its proposed rejection of the relative 
investment approach.
    For example, UPS stated that the Department's proposal 
``undervalues comparative analysis of investment'' and noted that 
courts ``have evaluated investment comparatively--correctly measuring 
the worker's investment against the company's'' (citing cases). NELA 
added that ``comparing workers' investments to the employer's 
investments'' has been ``a critically important factor in the economic 
realities test analysis'' and ``must be done in the context of the 
working relationship.'' TRLA objected that ``the proposed test does not 
include the Fifth Circuit's `extent of the relative investments of the 
worker and alleged employer' factor'' and asserted that, while its 
usefulness may vary ``depending on the facts of individual cases,'' 
``its wholesale exclusion from the test factors is not warranted, 
especially given the Supreme Court's caution against an exhaustive 
list'' (citing Silk, 331 U.S. at 716). The Southwest Regional Council 
of Carpenters described the relative investment approach as simple and 
efficient by ``lining up the expenses between worker and company'' and 
thus ``advanc[ing] the key interest of all parties concerned with the 
predictability of this part of the independent contractor test.'' 
According to the Pacific Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters, the 
Department acted ``arbitrarily'' in proposing to eliminate 
consideration of relative investments and asserted that, because 
``virtually every craftsperson who works in the various carpentry 
trades owns his or her own tools,'' the proposal would make ``all of 
those individuals more susceptible to being classified as'' independent 
contractors regardless whether the investment is small or extensive.
    Other commenters supported the Department's proposed position. For 
example, the ATA, the Arkansas Trucking Association, NHDA, and 
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary (on behalf of various 
transportation companies) each agreed with the Department's proposal 
``that the relative investment test fashioned by the Fifth Circuit 
`does not illuminate the ultimate question of economic

[[Page 1188]]

dependence' '' (quoting 85 FR 60614). TechNet explained that ``the 
relative sizes of the parties' investments'' are not relevant to the 
analysis, asserting that ``[l]arge businesses may contract with small 
businesses,'' make investments that ``typically exceed their smaller 
partners' investments by orders of magnitude . . . because of their 
size,'' and ``not endanger [their] partners' independence merely 
because [they are] bigger than [their partners] are.'' CPIE stated that 
``the determinative inquiry relative to investment should be whether 
the individual has a sufficient investment in his or her trade or 
business as to enable the individual to operate independently,'' 
asserting that ``[t]he investment of a potential client has no 
discernible relevance to this inquiry.'' See also WFCA (``The issue is 
whether a worker invested in his or her business, not how that 
investment compares to the employing company's investment.'').
    Having carefully considered the comments, the Department reaffirms 
its position that comparing the individual worker's investment to the 
potential employer's investment should not be part of the analysis of 
investment. Comparing their respective investments does little more 
than compare their respective sizes and resources. In Hopkins v. 
Cornerstone America, 545 F.3d 338, 344 (5th Cir. 2008), it was of 
course ``clear that [the insurance company's] investment--including 
maintaining corporate offices, printing brochures and contracts, 
providing accounting services, and developing and underwriting 
insurance products--outweighs the personal investment of any one Sales 
Leader.'' The court, however, never explained how this fact indicated 
the Sales Leaders' economic dependence. See id. Tellingly, when summing 
up the entirety of the facts and analyzing whether the workers were 
economically dependent on the insurance company as a matter of economic 
reality, the court did not even mention the insurance company's larger 
investment. See id. at 346. And in Karlson, 860 F.3d at 1096, the court 
found that comparing the worker's investment with the potential 
employer's total operating expenses had little relevance because 
``[l]arge corporations can hire independent contractors, and small 
businesses can hire employees.'' Cf. Parrish, 917 F.3d at 383 
(comparing relative investments, but noting that ``[o]bviously, [the 
oil drilling company] invested more money at a drill site compared to 
each plaintiff's investments'' and according the factor little weight 
in light of the other evidence). In sum, comparing the relative 
investments does not illuminate the worker's economic dependence or 
independence. By contrast, as explained herein, analyzing the extent to 
which the individual worker has an opportunity for profit or loss 
because of his or her investment in, or capital expenditure on, helpers 
or equipment or material to further his or her work is probative of the 
worker's economic dependence or independence.
c. Other Comments Concerning the Opportunity Factor
    WFCA agreed that ``an evaluation of a worker's investment and 
capital expenditures are relevant factors in determining whether he or 
she is an independent contractor'' and suggested including of ``a 
definition of what constitutes an investment or capital expense.'' WFCA 
suggested the following: ``Investments and capital expenditure shall 
include: The purchase or rental of tools, equipment, material, and 
office or work facilities; the payment for marketing and administrative 
expenses; the payment of costs incurred hiring or using other workers; 
and similar expenditures.'' However, the regulatory text already 
identifies investment in ``helpers or equipment or material'' as 
relevant, and the ``for example'' preceding them in the regulatory text 
makes clear that the list is non-exhaustive. The Department believes 
that general and non-exhaustive examples are more helpful than trying 
to precisely identify as many examples of relevant investments as 
possible.
    NRF commented that ``it is important to emphasize that it is the 
`opportunity' or `ability' to earn profits or incur losses based on 
investment and/or initiative, as opposed to the actual level of 
investment or initiative shown by the individual.'' Relatedly, NRF 
expressed concern whether this factor squares with the discussion in 
proposed Sec.  795.110 that the actual practice of the parties involved 
is more relevant than what may be contractually or theoretically 
possible, asserting that ``the fact that someone might not engage in 
certain practices or take on certain risks that would further impact 
the level of profit or loss should not result in a finding that the 
individual is not an independent contractor, unless that person is 
prevented from doing so by the entity with whom the individual 
contracts.'' Here, the Department believes that NRF is conflating the 
ultimate outcome of independent entrepreneurship (profit or loss) with 
the actions indicative of entrepreneurship (initiative and/or 
investment) that largely determine that outcome. While profits are 
hardly guaranteed for anyone in business for him/herself, the text at 
Sec.  795.105(d)(1)(ii) makes clear that independent contractors 
typically ``exercise . . . initiative'' and/or ``manag[e] . . . 
investment,'' (emphasis added). Thus, a lack of profit viewed in 
hindsight says little about a worker's economic independence; instead, 
the focus is the degree to which the worker actually exercised 
initiative or actually managed investments. A worker's theoretical 
ability to, for example, exercise initiative is weaker evidence than 
the worker's actual practices. See e.g., Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 
1371 (``[T]he fact that Sureway's `agents' possess, in theory, the 
power to set prices . . . and advertise to a limited extent on their 
own is overshadowed by the fact that in reality the `agents' . . . 
charge the same prices, and rely in the main on Sureway for 
advertising.''). However, a worker's conscious decision to not make a 
particular investment (especially when choosing among a range of 
investments) or to not take a particular action (especially when 
choosing among a range of options) may constitute an affirmative 
exercise of initiative to consider among others when evaluating 
opportunity for profit or loss. In sum, in the context of the 
opportunity factor, the focus is the individual worker's opportunity 
for profit or loss, as shown by meaningful investments or the exercise 
of personal initiative; actual profits or losses are less relevant.
    OOIDA expressed ``concern[ ] that the timeline for determining 
profit or loss is not clarified in the NPRM'' and explained that 
certain ``[m]otor carriers that take advantage of drivers through a 
lease-purchase agreement are likely to argue that a driver's 
opportunity for profit is merely a few years in the future, and that 
this full timeline must be considered.'' The Department agrees with 
OOIDA that ``[t]his is a fallacy''; the opportunity for profit or loss 
must be reasonably current to indicate independent contractor status.
    Regarding the Department's proposal to include initiative as a 
consideration in the opportunity factor, NRF agreed that ``[t]he 
ability to impact profits or losses also may be dependent on business 
acumen and managerial skills, regardless of the `skill level' of the 
work or the level of investment.'' NRF added that ``identifying 
`business acumen' or `management skill' as part of the profit or loss 
factor is appropriate and consistent with the FLSA.'' Senator Sherrod 
Brown and 22 other senators disagreed, commenting: ``Just because

[[Page 1189]]

employees can increase their wages by exercising skill or initiative 
does not mean they are running a separate, independent business, 
particularly if they cannot pass along costs to customers.'' They added 
that ``[t]he rule does not include additional, critical considerations 
of skill and initiative that are necessary to define an employment 
relationship.'' And Seyfarth Shaw requested that the Department state 
that ``a worker's business acumen is to be interpreted to cover acumen 
relevant to the wide range of business endeavors in the U.S. economy, 
including, for example: Sales, managerial, customer service, marketing, 
distribution, communications, and other professional, trade, technical, 
and other learned skills, as well as other unique business abilities 
and acumen, including acumen that impacts a worker's ability to 
profitably run their own independent business.''
    Having carefully considered the comments, the Department continues 
to believe that a worker's initiative, such as managerial skill or 
business acumen or judgment, is an appropriate measure of a worker's 
opportunity to earn profits or incur losses. See, e.g., Karlson, 860 
F.3d at 1094-95 (discussing how the worker's decisions and choices 
regarding assignments and customers affected his profits); Saleem, 854 
F.3d at 145 (noting in support of independent contractor status that 
the degree to which the worker's relationship with the potential 
employer ``yielded returns was a function . . . of the business acumen 
of each [worker]''); McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 243 (``The more the worker's 
earnings depend on his own managerial capacity rather than the 
company's . . . the less the worker is economically dependent on the 
business and the more he is in business for himself and hence an 
independent contractor.'') (internal quotation marks omitted); Express 
Sixty-Minutes Delivery, 161 F.3d at 304 (agreeing with district court 
that ``driver's profit or loss is determined largely on his or her 
skill, initiative, ability to cut costs, and understanding of the 
courier business''); WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6 at 6 (``These 
opportunities typically exist where the worker receives additional 
compensation based, not [merely] on greater efficiency, but on the 
exercise of initiative, judgment, or foresight.''). Commenters did not 
seriously dispute the relevance of initiative to a worker's opportunity 
for profit or loss. In response to the comment by Senator Sherrod Brown 
and 22 other senators, the Department agrees that a worker is not 
necessarily an independent contractor because he or she can use 
initiative to affect his or her opportunity for profit or loss but 
maintains that yet initiative is indicative of--or weighs towards--
independent contractor status in the multifactor analysis. And the 
Department agrees that a worker's ability to cut costs, including by 
passing them along to customers, is relevant to determining initiative. 
See Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery, 161 F.3d at 304. Finally, the 
Department agrees with Seyfarth Shaw that a worker's business acumen 
can ``cover acumen relevant to the wide range of business endeavors in 
the U.S. economy''--initiative is not limited to or automatically 
present in any particular type of job.
    Regarding the last sentence of the proposed opportunity factor 
regulatory text (``This factor weighs towards the individual being an 
employee to the extent the individual is unable to affect his or her 
earnings or is only able to do so by working more hours or more 
efficiently.''), WFCA expressed the concern that the sentence means 
that a worker who starts his or her own business and seeks to develop 
efficiencies in so doing will be an employee under the analysis. WFCA 
suggested that the sentence be deleted. WPI also asked that the last 
sentence be deleted because ``[a]n individual who uses initiative, 
skill or judgment to perform a job more efficiently can generate 
greater profits, even if compensated by the hour or piece rate.'' It 
asserted: ``The ability to use managerial skill, expertise, market 
experience, or business acumen to perform work more efficiently is 
indicative of independent contractor status.'' The Department agrees 
that such use of initiative can indicate independent contractor status 
when it affects opportunity for profit or loss. The word 
``efficiently'' was used in proposed Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(ii) to mean 
working faster to perform rote tasks more quickly. See 85 FR 60614 n.38 
(identifying piece-rate workers as ``an example of workers who are able 
to affect their earnings only through working more hours or more 
efficiently.''). Higher earnings that result solely from this ``working 
faster'' concept of efficiency do not by themselves indicate 
independent contractor status. However, as WFCA and WPI note, 
efficiency may also mean effective management based on business acumen, 
which is indicative of being in business for oneself if it results in 
increased earnings. For instance, the Fifth Circuit found that the 
opportunity factor ``points towards independent contractor status'' 
where ``a driver's profit or loss is determined largely on his or her 
skill, initiative, ability to cut costs, and understanding of the 
courier business,'' observing that ``drivers who made the most money 
appeared to be the most experienced and most concerned with efficiency, 
while the less successful drivers tended to be inexperienced and less 
concerned with efficiency.'' Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv. 161 
F.3d at 304. To avoid confusion between multiple potential meanings of 
``more efficiently,'' the Department is revising Sec.  
795.105(d)(2)(ii) to replace that term with ``faster.'' Relatedly, ATA 
and other transportation commenters objected to the Department's 
statements in the NPRM preamble that ``[w]orkers who are paid on a 
piece-rate basis are an example of workers who . . . lack meaningful 
opportunity for profit or loss.'' They asserted that the statements may 
result in some judges refraining from engaging in the actual analysis 
set forth in the rule as to opportunity for profit or loss. They 
further asserted that truck drivers paid on a piece-rate basis may be 
independent contractors based on their management decisions or ability 
to cut costs. The Department's statements in the NPRM preamble 
regarding workers paid on a piece-rate basis were general observations 
supported by case law \33\ and not a categorical rule or the complete 
analysis. The fact that a worker is paid on a piece-rate basis set by 
the potential employer does not indicate an opportunity for profit or 
loss, but whether that worker has an opportunity for profit or loss 
indicative of independent contractor status is determined by a fuller 
analysis of the worker's circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 
33 (1961) (plaintiffs who manufactured knitted goods at home were 
employees under the FLSA, in part, because ``[t]he management fixes 
the piece rates at which they work''); Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 
730 (because workers' earnings ``depended upon the efficiency of 
their work, it was more like piecework than an enterprise that 
actually depended for success upon the initiative, judgment or 
foresight of the typical independent contractor''); Hodgson v. 
Cactus Craft of Arizona, 481 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1973) (persons 
who manufacture novelty and souvenir gift items at homes and were 
compensated at a piece rate were employees under the FLSA). And in 
Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc., the court held that 
homeworkers who were paid on a piece-rate basis to perform the 
simple service of researching telephone numbers were employees who 
lacked meaningful opportunity for profit or loss. See 757 F.2d 1376, 
1385 (3rd Cir. 1985). In contrast, distributors who recruited and 
managed researchers and were paid based on the productivity of those 
they managed were independent contractors, in part, because 
distributors' earnings depended on ``business-like initiative.'' Id. 
at 1387.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters requested additional examples that are indicative

[[Page 1190]]

of an opportunity for profit or loss (many of the suggested examples 
overlapped with each other). TechNet asked for ``concrete examples'' 
and suggested the following: ``[d]rivers who can set their own hours, 
choose which jobs to accept or reject, and use their judgment in how to 
best complete jobs,'' as well as ``[a]pp-based opportunities--including 
opportunities to provide personal transportation, parcel deliveries, 
shopping services, or food delivery, among other types of service.'' 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce offered eleven ``additional examples of a 
worker's initiative or investment that may impact a worker's profit or 
loss.'' \34\ The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also suggested ``examples of 
fact situations which are neutral in the analysis of whether the worker 
controls their profits and losses.'' \35\ SHRM requested numerous 
``additional examples of worker investment and initiative that impact 
profit and loss.'' \36\ SHRM also requested that the final rule make 
``the following explicit statements regarding facts that do not support 
a finding of dependency: [w]orkers may experience financial losses as a 
result of cancellations of their service or the provision of service 
that does not meet customer expectations when the worker has 
flexibility to choose between work opportunities; and [e]ven if the 
business sets the price of goods provided by the worker, that does not 
negate the worker's initiative when the worker controls the amount of 
time, when, and where they provide the services as well as the amount 
of the same service they chose to provide.'' Seyfarth Shaw asked the 
Department to ``expand upon the examples of ways that workers impact 
their own profitability as well as their losses (by impacting their 
profits and their costs)'' and to include numerous examples.\37\ And 
Mr. Reibstein commented that ``[e]xamples of loss should be identified 
. . . so it is clear [that this factor] does not focus only on 
profit.'' He offered the following examples: ``He or she has to re-do 
work that is not consistent with industry standards or does not meet a 
customer's expectations; is potentially liable to the potential 
employer in the event his or her actions or inactions cause harm or 
legal expense to the potential employer; or fails to render services in 
a cost-efficient manner by not managing expenses or investing far too 
much time on activities that are unproductive.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's suggested examples were: 
``(1) The worker's own decision-making with respect to the details 
and means by which they make use of, secure, and pay helpers, 
substitutes, and related labor or specialties . . . (2) The worker's 
own decision-making with respect to the details and means by which 
they purchase, rent, or otherwise obtain and use tools . . . ; (3) 
The worker's own decision-making with respect to the details and 
means by which they purchase or otherwise obtain and use supplies . 
. . ; (4) The worker's own decision-making with respect to the 
details and means by which they purchase, rent, or otherwise obtain 
and use equipment . . . ; (5) The worker's initiative and decisions 
they implement in connection with their own performance of services 
through higher service fees, incentives, charges, and other ways; 
(6) The worker's initiative to invest in the development of skills, 
competencies, and trades . . . ; (7) The worker's expertise in 
delivery of services/products that result in enhanced profits, for 
example through tips and other incentives as a result of providing 
quality customer service; (8) The worker's losses incurred as a 
result of customer complaints or other charges where the worker's 
results were below customer or contractual expectations and 
obligations; (9) The worker's flexibility to choose amongst work 
opportunities offered that impact profits and losses; (10) The 
worker's contractual or other losses if they do not provide the 
accepted services or the worker provides substandard services, and 
are engaged to provide time-sensitive, often perishable services and 
products; and (11) The worker's avoidance of liquidated damages 
charges or indemnification obligations in the parties' agreement 
relating to various provisions, including material breaches of the 
parties' agreement.''
    \35\ These suggested examples were: ``(1) The business pays the 
worker by the hour where it is customary in the particular business/
trade to do so (e.g., attorneys, physical trainers); (2) The 
business sets the price of goods and services offered by a worker to 
customers where the worker controls the amount of time, date and 
place they provide the services as well as the amount of services 
they choose to provide and the price is set to facilitate the time 
sensitive transaction as a result of the time sensitive or 
perishable nature of the service the customer desires[;] and (3) The 
business's facilitation of payments from the customer to the 
worker.''
    \36\ SHRM's suggested examples were: ``[t]he worker's decisions 
in choosing amongst opportunities offered that impact profit and 
loss; [t]he worker's losses suffered from receipt of customer 
complaints where the worker's results were below customer or 
contractual expectations; [t]he worker's decisions in avoiding 
liquidated damages charges or indemnification obligations in the 
parties' agreement; [t]he worker's own decision-making on whether to 
use other workers or services as helpers or substitutes as well as 
the use of related labor or specialties to assist in either the 
services provided, the tools and equipment used, or the maintenance 
of the worker's business structure; [t]he worker's acumen regarding 
the delivery of services/products that result in enhanced profits 
through tips and other incentives; [t]he worker's decision-making 
regarding the details and means by which they obtain supplies, 
tools, and equipment for use in their business, including choices 
regarding from whom to purchase these goods, how much of the goods 
are obtained at any one time, the quality of the goods, and the 
negotiated prices regarding said goods; and [t]he worker's decision-
making regarding investment in skills they deem necessary to achieve 
the desired results from their work, including education, 
certificates, or classes.''
    \37\ Seyfarth Shaw's suggested examples were ``[t]he worker's 
own decision-making regarding the use of helpers, substitutes, and 
related labor or specialties to assist in the services provided, the 
tools and equipment used, or the maintenance of the worker's 
business structure . . . to the extent those decisions impact the 
worker's costs and overall profitability; [t]he worker's initiative 
and the decisions they implement in connection with the performance 
of services and/or capital expenditures on equipment, supplies, and 
tools . . . ; [t]he worker's initiative to invest in the development 
of skills, competencies, and trades (including education, training, 
licenses, certifications, and classes) . . . ; [t]he worker's 
expertise in delivery of services/products that result in enhanced 
profits through tips and other incentives as a result of great 
customer service and exceptional skills, for example[; t]he worker's 
losses incurred as a result of customer complaint or other charges 
where the worker's results were below customer or contractual 
expectations and obligations; and [t]he worker's avoidance of 
liquidated damages charges or indemnification obligations in the 
parties' agreement relating to various provisions, including 
material breaches of the parties' agreement.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has considered the various requests for additional 
examples of initiative and investment that can indicate a worker's 
opportunity for profit or loss, but declines to change to the proposed 
regulatory text. The regulatory text already broadly describes 
initiative as including managerial skill and business acumen or 
judgment, and explains that investment is the worker's management of 
his or her investment in or capital expenditure on, for example, 
helpers or equipment or material to further his or her work. Many of 
the suggested examples seem to fall into one of these categories, and 
some of them effectively repeat concepts already identified in the 
regulatory text--especially the ones involving helpers, tools, 
supplies, and equipment. The Department does not believe that (even 
after culling out all of the overlap) additional examples of initiative 
and investment would benefit employers or workers. It is not possible 
or productive to seek to identify in the regulatory text every example 
of initiative and investment that may be relevant to the opportunity 
for profit or loss analysis. The Department purposefully described both 
initiative and investment in a broad and general manner to provide 
helpful guidance to as many employers and workers as possible. The 
Department believes that this approach, along with the further 
clarification provided throughout this preamble section as well as the 
examples added in Sec.  795.115, will be more helpful and functional 
for employers and workers as they apply the analysis.
3. The ``Skill Required'' Factor
    In the NPRM, the Department identified three other factors that may 
serve as ``additional guideposts'' in the analysis to determine whether 
a worker is an employee or independent contractor. The first of these 
other factors, included at proposed Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(i), is the 
amount of skill required for the work. 85 FR 60639. The Department's 
proposed regulatory text stated that this factor would weigh in favor 
of the individual being an independent contractor to the extent the 
work at issue requires specialized training or skill that the potential

[[Page 1191]]

employer does not provide; conversely, the factor would weigh in favor 
of the individual being an employee to the extent the work at issue 
requires no specialized training or skill and/or the individual is 
dependent upon the potential employer to equip him or her with any 
skills or training necessary to perform the job. As explained in the 
NPRM, the Department proposed to clarify that this factor should focus 
on the amount of skill required because importing aspects of the 
control factor into the skill factor has diluted the consideration of 
actual skill to the point of near irrelevance, and such dilution 
generates confusion regarding the relevance and weight of the worker's 
skill in evaluating economic dependence.
    Employer representatives were generally supportive of the 
Department's clarification and relegation of this factor as an 
``additional guidepost'' but provided additional commentary and 
requests for modification. Several commenters suggested that this 
factor be eliminated entirely. The National Restaurant Association 
commented that this factor ``does not add much clarity to the 
analysis'' and ``unnecessarily discriminates against individuals who 
operate businesses that do not require advanced degrees.'' WPI stated 
that ``[s]o narrowed, this factor has little probative value in 
determining economic dependence and should be eliminated as a separate 
factor.''
    Other commenters suggested that the factor be included within the 
core, ``profit and loss'' factor or otherwise minimized. CWI suggested 
that the factor be incorporated into the profit and loss factor because 
``[w]here specialized skills are required to perform work, workers 
unquestionably have taken the initiative to invest time and money into 
developing those skills.'' SHRM and U.S. Chamber of Commerce agreed 
that this factor should not be a stand-alone factor, but rather should 
be incorporated into the opportunity factor, to ensure that workers who 
desire the flexibility and freedom of independent contractor status--
but who provide services that may not require specialized training--are 
not negatively impacted. See also WFCA (requesting that lack of skill 
should not weigh in favor of the worker being an employee). Commenters 
also stated that this additional factor should be minimized further in 
the analysis, commenting that the factor places too much emphasis on 
the importance of skill, and requested that ``the final rule should at 
least indicate that this may be a relevant factor in some but not all 
instances.'' Reibstein.
    After considering these comments, the Department declines both the 
request to eliminate this factor from consideration entirely and the 
request to include it as part of the opportunity factor. The Department 
agrees with commenters that the concepts of initiative and judgment are 
sufficiently analyzed in multiple ways under the control and 
opportunity core factors, but believes that longstanding case law 
militates in favor of considering this additional factor--skill 
required--when relevant under the particular circumstances of each 
situation. As explained in the NPRM, the Supreme Court articulated the 
factor as ``skill required'' in Silk, 331 U.S. at 716, and multiple 
courts of appeals continue to consider as ``the degree of skill 
required to perform the work.'' Paragon Contractors, 884 F.3d at 1235; 
see also Iontchev, 685 F. App'x at 550; Keller, 781 F.3d at 807. The 
Department believes that sharpening this factor to focus solely on 
skill clarifies the analysis. Moreover, analyzing the worker's ability 
to exercise initiative under the control factor, a core factor that is 
given more weight than the skill factor, appropriately reflects that 
that the presence or absence of initiative is usually more important 
than the presence or absence of skill. Similarly, the effect of the 
worker's initiative is analyzed under the opportunity factor, another 
core factor that, for the reasons explained above, is usually more 
probative than the skill factor.
    Commenters such as the National Restaurant Association and NRF 
suggested that the regulation should focus not on whether the skill 
required is specialized, but rather the extent to which a worker relies 
on the potential employer for training needed to perform the work. The 
Wood Flooring Covering Association, however, stated that the regulation 
as proposed may create unintended limits on training and employers 
should not be discouraged from funding needed training for workers, 
particularly in view of its industry's labor shortage. With respect to 
these requests, the Department declines to eliminate the modifier 
``specialized'' from the regulation. This type of consideration is 
supported by discussions of this factor in case law. See, e.g., 
Simpkins v. DuPage Hous. Auth., 893 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(``whether Simpkins had specialized skills, as well as the extent to 
which he employed them in performing his work, are [material] 
issues''); Carrell v. Sunland Const., Inc., 998 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 
1993) (finding it relevant that ``[p]ipe welding, unlike other types of 
welding, requires specialized skills''). The Department also declines 
to adjust the regulatory text to directly address who provides the 
training because such facts are not necessarily probative in every 
circumstance; the Department notes, however, that it can be suggests 
employee status if a worker receives all specialized skills from the 
employer. See, e.g., Keller, 781 F.3d at 809 (explaining that if ``the 
company provides all workers with the skills necessary to perform the 
job,'' that suggests employee status); Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1318; 
Hughes v. Family Life Care Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1372 (N.D. Fla. 
2015) (``The relevant inquiry [for the skill factor] is whether [the 
worker] is dependent upon [the company] to equip her with the skills 
necessary to perform her job.''). This is because an individual who is 
in business for him- or herself typically brings his or her own skills 
to the job, rather than relying on the client to provide training.
    While the WFCA generally supports this factor, it also requested 
that the Department include examples of specialized training or skill 
that focused on indicators such as certifications and licensing. 
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, a law firm commenting on 
behalf of several unnamed transportation providers, agreed that 
credentials such as testing to earn a Commercial Driver's License can 
demonstrate specialized skill, but also noted that skills needed to 
successfully operate a business should also be considered specialized 
skills to help distinguish independent contractors from employees. The 
Department notes that the opportunity factor already considers whether 
workers have an opportunity for profit or loss based on their business 
acumen or managerial expertise. It would be redundant to analyze 
``skills needed to successfully operate a business'' as part of the 
skill factor. As to requests for examples or additional clarification 
as to what constitutes ``specialized'' skills, the Department agrees 
that credentials such as certifications and licenses can be helpful 
indicators of specialized skill, though they are by no means the only 
indicators of such skill. The Department does not believe any change to 
the regulatory text to clarify this point is warranted, however.
    Employee representatives such as the AFL-CIO expressed concern that 
de-emphasizing the skill factor would ``place considerable competitive 
pressure on law-abiding employers employing employees at the bottom of 
the wage scale, thus undermining the

[[Page 1192]]

national minimum wage standard.'' The AFL-CIO further asserted that the 
proposed regulation would make it more likely that unskilled workers 
such as home care workers, delivery drivers, and janitors will be 
classified as independent contractors, and thus such workers will be 
unprotected by the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime pay standards. See 
AFL-CIO. The National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) commented 
that the Department's proposed regulation ``seeks to constrict and 
demote'' the skill factor, and, relying on case law, noted that 
``courts typically assess whether workers are required to use 
specialized skills, beyond those typically acquired through 
occupational or technical training, in an independent way to perform 
their job'' but that this factor, ``which often favors employee status, 
does not suit the Department's purposes.''
    Regarding farmworkers specifically, TRLA stated that whether the 
services rendered by an employee require special skills has often been 
probative in the farm labor context, and that by largely eliminating 
consideration of this factor, the proposed rule makes the proper 
classification of farmworkers harder to determine. See Texas Rio Grande 
Legal Aid. This ``will lead to more farmworkers being classified as 
independent contractors, thereby denying the protections of the FLSA to 
one of the most vulnerable classes of workers''; moreover, ``[t]o the 
extent that the proposed rule purports to be descriptive of the current 
state of the law, it is flatly inaccurate.''
    The Department has considered these comments but continues to 
believe that its proposal with respect to this factor is logical and 
helpful. Although many courts consider the skill factor, courts appear 
to find the core factors to be more dispositive than the skill factor 
when such factors conflict. See 85 FR 60621-22 (listing cases). 
Continuing to take it into account, but not as one of the core factors, 
adds clarity to the economic realities test. The Department's 
formulation of the test does not preclude the possibility that in some 
circumstances, such as with respect to farmworkers, that this factor 
could be particularly probative.
    The Department adopts Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(i) as proposed.
4. The ``Permanence of the Working Relationship'' Factor
    The second additional guidepost factor, described in the regulatory 
text at Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(ii), is the degree of permanence of the 
working relationship between the individual and the potential employer. 
The Department proposed that this factor would weigh in favor of the 
individual being an independent contractor to the extent the work 
relationship is by design definite in duration or sporadic, which may 
include regularly occurring fixed periods of work, although the 
seasonal nature of work by itself would not necessarily indicate 
independent contractor classification. In particular, the Department 
explained that the seasonal nature of work would not indicate 
independent contractor status where the worker's position is permanent 
for the duration of the relevant season and where the worker has done 
the same work for multiple seasons. See Paragon Contractors, 884 F.3d 
at 1236-37. The proposal also provided that this factor would weigh in 
favor of the individual being an employee to the extent the work 
relationship is instead by design indefinite in duration or continuous. 
As noted in the NPRM, courts and the Department routinely consider this 
factor when applying the economic reality analysis under the FLSA to 
determine employee or independent contractor status. See, e.g., WHD 
Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6 at 4; Razak, 951 F.3d at 142; Hobbs, 946 F.3d 
at 829; Karlson, 860 F.3d at 1092-93; McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 241; 
Keller, 781 F.3d at 807; Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1312.
    Multiple commenters urged the Department to focus this factor 
further on the indefiniteness of a working relationship. For example, 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce commented that independent contractors 
often enter into multiple, long-term contracts with the same business. 
It suggested that the Department clarify that such contracts do not 
indicate employee status merely because of their length, but that only 
contracts of an indefinite length would be indicative of employee 
status. CWI similarly requested that this factor focus only on the 
length of the relationship as reflected in contractual agreements, 
regardless of how long the relationship is in reality.
    The Department considered adding clarifying language to the 
regulation indicating that a relationship whose length is indefinite is 
more indicative of employee status than a relationship that is merely 
long. However, because the focus of the economic realities test is not 
on technical formalities, it may be that a long relationship could be 
evidence of permanence despite a contract with a definite end. For 
example, an employer may have a permanent relationship with an employee 
despite requiring the employee to enter into annual employment 
contracts. Or a potential employer may have a long-term relationship 
reflected in several short-term contracts. The Department has therefore 
retained the proposed regulatory text because, although indefiniteness 
is a stronger indicator of permanence, the length of a working 
relationship is still relevant to this factor.
    One commenter urged the Department to consider the exclusivity of a 
relationship as part of the permanence factor, an approach taken by 
some courts. Specifically, CPIE commented that permanence does not 
indicate an employment relationship unless it is due to the potential 
employer's requirement of exclusivity rather than the worker's choice. 
The Department agrees that exclusivity most strongly indicates an 
employment relationship when the exclusivity is required by the 
potential employer. However, as the Department discussed in the NPRM, 
an exclusivity requirement more strongly relates to the control 
exercised over the worker than the permanence of the relationship. As 
explained in the discussion of the control factor, that factor already 
considers whether a worker has freedom to pursue external opportunities 
by working for others, including a potential employer's rivals. See, 
e.g., Freund, 185 F. App'x at 783 (affirming district court's finding 
that ``Hi-Tech exerted very little control over Mr. Freund,'' in part, 
because ``Freund was free to perform installations for other 
companies'').\38\ The same concept of exclusivity is then re-analyzed 
as part of the permanence factor. Compare id. (``Freund's relationship 
with Hi-Tech was not one with a significant degree of permanence . . . 
[because] Freund was able to take jobs from other installation 
brokers.''), with Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1319 (finding installation 
technicians' relationships with the potential employer were permanent 
because they ``could not work for other companies''). Such duplicative 
analysis of exclusivity under the permanence factor, however, is not 
supported by the Supreme Court's original articulation of that factor 
in Silk. See 331 U.S. at 716 (analyzing the

[[Page 1193]]

``regularity'' of unloaders' work); id. at 719 (analyzing truck 
drivers' ability to work ``for any customer'' as an aspect of ``the 
control exercised'' but not permanence); see also 12 FR 7967 
(describing the permanence factor as pertaining to ``continuity of the 
relation'' but with no reference to exclusivity). Nor is the concept of 
exclusivity part of the common understanding of the word ``permanent.'' 
\39\ In a similar vein to the Department's analysis of the concept of 
initiative, the Department believes analysis of exclusivity as part of 
the permanence factor dilutes the significance of actual permanence 
within that factor, blurs the lines between the economic reality 
factors, and creates confusion by incorporating a concept that is 
distinct from permanence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ In addition, as also noted in the NPRM, the opportunity 
factor considers whether a worker's decisions to work for others 
affects profits or losses. See, e.g., Freund, 185 F. App'x at 783 
(affirming the district court's finding that the ``looseness of the 
relationship between Hi-Tech and Freund permitted him great ability 
to profit,'' in part, because ``Freund could have accepted 
installation jobs from other companies.''). The Department does not 
believe this consideration overlaps with the control factor. While 
the control factor concerns the ability to work for others, the 
opportunity factor concerns the effects of doing so.
    \39\ See Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/permanent (defining permanent as ``continuing 
or enduring without fundamental or marked change''); see also Oxford 
American Dictionary 1980 (defining permanent as ``lasting or meant 
to last indefinitely''); Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary 1947 
(defining permanent as ``Lasting; enduring'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the worker's ability to work for others is already analyzed 
as part of the control factor, proposed Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(ii) 
articulated the permanence factor without referencing the exclusivity 
of the relationship between the worker and potential employer, and the 
Department retains the same language in the final rule.
    Commenters also requested that the Department clarify that long-
term relationships that are based on the workers' choice to continue 
working for the same business rather than the potential employer's 
requirements should not indicate employee status under this factor. NRF 
commented that an independent contractor may choose to focus on a 
particular client for reasons of the contractor's own rather than the 
client's requirements, suggesting that the worker's choice does not 
indicate employee status. The Department does not believe that further 
explanation in the regulatory text is necessary, though it agrees that 
a long-term relationship may not always indicate an employee 
relationship. This factor is not always probative to the analysis, and 
the scenarios described by the commenters may be situations where the 
length of the relationship is not a useful indicator. However, 
explicitly stating that a relationship is not permanent whenever the 
worker chooses for it to be long-term is not accurate. After all, every 
employee to some extent chooses whether to continue working for their 
employer, and the FLSA's definition of ``employ'' includes to passively 
``suffer or permit to work.'' 29 U.S.C. 203(g). A long-term 
relationship is always the result of choices by both the potential 
employer and the worker, but it is sometimes a helpful indicator of 
employee status.
    Edward Tuddenham urged the Department to give examples 
relationships that may or may not be viewed as permanent, such as a 
contract that is repeatedly renewed or an industry that is generally 
itinerant. Although the Department has added one example regarding this 
factor to new Sec.  795.115 to help illustrate how the factor is to be 
considered, the Department does not believe it is possible to address 
all of the possible working relationships and contractual arrangements 
in a useful fashion. Certain general principles should inform any 
analysis of work relationships. The Department reiterates that it is 
not contractual formalities that are relevant to the inquiry, but 
economic reality. A potential employer's attempts to use contractual 
technicalities to label a relationship as temporary even though it is 
indefinite in reality should not affect whether this factor indicates 
employee or independent contractor status. Again, this factor will not 
always be probative, and, for example, in certain industries where 
employees are often employed for short periods, a short term of 
employment would not indicate independent contractor status.
    SWCCA pointed out that a recent WHD opinion letter included 
language stating that ``the existence of a long-term working 
relationship may indirectly indicate permanence.'' WHD Opinion Letter 
FLSA 2019-06 (April 29, 2019). The Alliance requested that this 
language be added to Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(ii). Though the quoted 
language and the case law from which it is drawn remain useful guidance 
for employers, the Department does not believe it is necessary to add 
this language to the regulation, which already indicates that a long-
term relationship points toward an employment relationship.
    Accordingly, the Department finalizes Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(ii) as 
proposed.
5. The ``Integrated Unit'' Factor
    The final additional guidepost factor, described in Sec.  
795.105(d)(2)(iii), is whether the work is part of an integrated unit 
of production. The Department proposed that this factor would weigh in 
favor of the individual being an employee to the extent his or her work 
is a component of the potential employer's integrated production 
process for a good or service. The proposed regulatory text further 
explained that this factor would weigh in favor of an individual being 
an independent contractor to the extent his or her work is segregable 
from the potential employer's production process. The Department 
proposed to clarify that this factor is different from the concept of 
the importance or centrality of the individual's work to the potential 
employer's business.
    As noted in the NPRM, the Department and courts outside of the 
Fifth Circuit have typically articulated the sixth factor of the 
economic reality test as ``the extent to which services rendered are an 
integral part of the [potential employer's] business.'' WHD Fact Sheet 
#13. Under this articulation, the ``integral part'' factor considers 
``the importance of the services rendered to the company's business.'' 
McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 244. In line with this thinking, courts generally 
state that this factor favors employee status if the work performed is 
so important that it is central to or at ``[t]he heart of [the 
potential employer's] business.'' Werner v. Bell Family Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 529 F. App'x 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Baker, 137 F.3d 
at 1443 (``[R]ig welders' work is an important, and indeed integral, 
component of oil and gas pipeline construction work.''); Lauritzen, 835 
F.2d at 1537-38 (``[P]icking the pickles is a necessary and integral 
part of the pickle business[.]''); DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1385 
(``[W]orkers are more likely to be `employees' under the FLSA if they 
perform the primary work of the alleged employer.'').
    The Department explained in the NPRM that it is concerned that this 
focus on importance or centrality departs from the Supreme Court's 
original articulation of the economic reality test, has limited 
probative value regarding the ultimate question of economic dependence, 
and may be misleading in some instances. As such, the Department 
proposed that Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(iii) would clarify that the 
``integral part'' factor should instead consider ``whether the work is 
part of an integrated unit of production,'' which aligns with the 
Supreme Court's analysis in Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 729.
    Many commenters representing workers urged the Department to retain 
the ``integral part'' factor used by courts as part of the economic 
realities test, rather than replacing it with the ``integrated unit'' 
factor articulated in the proposed rule. This ``integral part'' factor 
would consider the importance or centrality of the work performed to 
the purported employer's business. In

[[Page 1194]]

particular, several commenters, including United Food and Commercial 
Workers, Senator Patty Murray, and the State AGs contended that 
removing the ``integral'' factor would be contrary to established 
circuit court precedent. The UFCW asserted that ``[w]hether a worker's 
service is an integral part of the company's business may not be a 
relevant factor in all situations, but it may be in some and some 
courts have found value in analyzing this fact.'' It commented that if 
the Department stated that integrality is not relevant to the economic 
realities test, the Department's proposed rule would unduly limit the 
inquiry. One commenter, the Greenlining Institute, commented that 
eliminating an ``integral part'' factor disfavors workers ``performing 
physical tasks instead of stereotypically `intellectual' pursuits,'' 
who are disproportionately racial or ethnic minorities.
    Many commenters agreed with the Department's proposal to eliminate 
the ``integral part'' factor or any similar factor focused on the 
importance of the work. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, 
commented, ``In today's economy, independent workers provide services 
in all aspects of the economy and all aspects of individual businesses, 
including core and non-core functions, as well as in the same or 
different lines of business.'' The Society for Human Resource 
Management similarly commented that the ``analysis concerning the 
`integrated unit' factor should not focus on the `importance of 
services' provided.''
    Though circuit courts have applied an ``integral part'' factor, it 
was not one of the factors analyzed by the Supreme Court in Rutherford 
Food. Rather, the Court considered whether the worker was part of an 
``integrated unit of production,'' 331 U.S. at 729, as this final rule 
does. The Department believes that circuit courts--and even the 
Department itself--have deviated from the Supreme Court's guidance and, 
in doing so, have introduced an ``integral part'' factor that can be 
misleading. As explained in the NPRM, the ``integral part'' factor was 
not one of the distinct factors identified in Silk as being ``important 
for decision.'' 331 U.S. at 716. The ``integrated unit'' factor instead 
derives from Rutherford Food, where the Supreme Court observed that the 
work at issue was ``part of an integrated unit of production'' in the 
potential employer's business and concluded that workers were employees 
in part because they ``work[ed] alongside admitted employees of the 
plant operator at their tasks.'' 331 U.S. at 729. As the NPRM 
explained, the Department began using the ``integral part'' factor in 
subregulatory guidance in the 1950s. See WHD Opinion Letter (Aug. 13, 
1954); WHD Opinion Letter (Feb. 8, 1956).\40\ And circuit courts in the 
1980s began referring to it as the ``integral part'' factor and 
analyzing it in terms of the ``importance'' of the work to the 
potential employer. See, e.g., Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534-35; 
DialAmerica Mktg., 757 F.2d at 1386.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ A 2002 opinion letter interpreted the factor to focus on 
the importance of the work, explaining that ``[w]hen workers play a 
crucial role in a company's operation, they are more likely to be 
employees than independent contractors.'' WHD Opinion Letter, 2002 
WL 32406602, at *3 (Sept. 5, 2002). However, the Department's most 
recent opinion letter on this subject characterized the factor as 
``the extent of the integration of the worker's services into the 
potential employer's business.'' WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6 at 6 
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM explained the reasons that the Department now believes the 
Supreme Court's original ``integrated unit'' formulation is more 
probative than the ``integral part'' (meaning ``important'') approach. 
As Judge Easterbrook pointed out in his concurrence in Lauritzen, 
``[e]verything the employer does is `integral' to its business--why 
else do it?'' Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1541 (Easterbrook J., concurring); 
see also Zheng, 355 F.3d at 73 (cautioning in the joint employer 
context that interpreting the factor to focus on importance ``could be 
said to be implicated in every subcontracting relationship, because all 
subcontractors perform a function that a general contractor deems 
`integral' to a product or a service'').
    The Department's review of appellate cases since 1975 involving 
independent contractor disputes under the FLSA supports this criticism. 
The Department generally found that, in cases where the ``integral 
part'' factor was addressed, the factor aligned with the ultimate 
classification when the ultimate classification was employee.\41\ 
However, courts' analyses of the ``integral part'' factor--again, if it 
was analyzed at all \42\--were misaligned more frequently than they 
were aligned with the ultimate classification when the ultimate 
classification was independent contractor status. Compare Iontchev, 685 
F. App'x at 551; Meyer, 607 F. App'x at 123; Freund, 185 F. App'x at 
784-85; Mid-Atl. Installation, 16 F. App'x at 107-08; Brandel, 736 F.2d 
at 1120, with Werner, 529 F. App'x at 545-46; DialAmerica Mktg., 757 
F.2d at 1387. This higher rate of misalignment is precisely what Judge 
Easterbrook's criticism would have predicted: If ``[e]verything the 
employer does is `integral,' '' that factor would point towards 
employee status for workers who are employees, but also for workers who 
are independent contractors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ The only appellate case the Department found of 
misalignment in this scenario is Paragon Contractors, 884 F.3d at 
1237-38.
    \42\ As explained elsewhere, the Fifth Circuit does not usually 
consider the ``integral part'' factor in its analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM further explained that ``the relative importance of the 
worker's task to the business of the potential employer says nothing 
about whether the worker economically depends on that business for 
work.'' 85 FR 60617. While some courts assumed that business may desire 
to exert more control over workers who provide important services, 
there is no need to use importance as an indirect proxy for control 
because control is already a separate factor. Id. (citing Dataphase, 
781 F. Supp. at 735, and Barnard Const., 860 F. Supp. at 777, aff'd sub 
nom. Baker v. Flint Eng'g & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436 (10th Cir. 
1998)). And this assumption may not always be valid. Modern 
manufacturers, for example, commonly assemble critical parts and 
components that are produced and delivered by wholly separate companies 
through contract rather than employment arrangements. And low 
transaction costs in many of today's industries make it cost-effective 
for firms to hire contractors to perform routine tasks.
    The Department considered salvaging the ``integral part'' factor by 
deemphasizing ``integral'' and emphasizing ``part.'' Instead of 
focusing on whether the work is important ``to'' a potential employer's 
business, the factor would focus on whether the work is an important 
``part'' of that business. This approach would more closely align with 
how ``integral part'' was used by the Supreme Court in Silk, which 
asked whether workers were ``an integral part of [defendants'] 
businesses,'' as opposed to operating their own businesses. 331 U.S. 
716. But as the NPRM noted, the Silk Court framed that question as the 
ultimate inquiry, and not as a factor that is useful to guide the 
inquiry. See 85 FR 60616 n.41. Asking whether a worker is part of--
integral or otherwise--a potential employer's business is not useful 
because it simply restates the ultimate inquiry: If a worker were part 
of the potential employer's business, then he or she could not be in 
business for him- or herself and therefore would be economically 
dependent. As an added complication, new technologies have led to the 
emergence of platform companies that connect consumers directly with 
service providers, and it is often difficult to determine whether those 
platform companies are in

[[Page 1195]]

business of supporting service providers' own businesses or are in the 
business of hiring service providers to serve customers. Compare Razak, 
951 F.3d at 147 n.12 (``We also believe [there] could be a disputed 
material fact'' whether Uber is ``a technology company that supports 
drivers' transportation businesses, and not a transportation company 
that employs drivers.''), with O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. 
Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (``it is clear that Uber is most 
certainly a transportation company''). For the reasons explained, the 
final rule retains the ``integrated unit'' approach.
    The Department does not share the Greenlining Institute's concern 
that the final rule's ``integrated unit'' factor would result in 
workers who perform ``physical tasks'' being classified as independent 
contractors more than workers who perform white collar, 
``intellectual'' work. Meat deboning is a physical task, but deboners 
were found to be part of an integrated unit of production in Rutherford 
Food. 331 U.S. at 729. On the other hand, freelance writers perform a 
white collar task, but they generally are not integrated into a 
publication's production process because they are not involved in, for 
instance, assigning, editing, or determining the layout of articles. 
Both white collar and physical labor jobs may be part of an integrated 
unit of production. The Department has added one example in new Sec.  
795.115 showing that a newspaper editor--who performs primarily white 
collar tasks--may be part of an integrated unit of production.
    Another commenter, the Arkansas Trucking Association, agreed that 
the ``integrated unit'' factor was superior to ``integral part,'' but 
suggested an alternative formulation based on whether the business's 
activities would cease or be severely impacted by the absence of the 
worker. However, this approach has the same limitations as the 
approaches that emphasize ``importance.'' Almost every worker performs 
work that is in some sense important to the business that has hired the 
worker; otherwise, the business would not hire the worker. Moreover, as 
explained in the NPRM, easily-replaced workers are often more dependent 
on a particular business for work precisely because they are so easily 
replaced. Focusing on the impact of a worker's absence turns the 
economic dependence analysis on its head by essentially looking at the 
business's dependence on the worker. As a result, it sends misleading 
signals about employee status.
    Another group of commenters suggested that the factor should 
include an explicit consideration of the location of the work 
performed. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, suggested that 
the factor should consider whether the worker is performing work ``the 
majority of which is performed off the physical premises of the 
business.''
    Whether the work is performed on the business's physical premises 
may be a consideration under the ``integrated unit'' factor, as it may 
indicate the extent to which the worker is part of an integrated unit 
of production. However, the Department does not believe it is necessary 
to include this consideration as an explicit part of the ``integrated 
unit'' factor. Many businesses have no physical location but 
nevertheless employ employees. In other instances, an employee may be 
part of an integrated unit despite performing work at a different 
location than other employees. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Whitaker House 
Cooperative, Inc., 366 US 28, 32 (1961) (holding that workers who 
produced copies of a sample product at home were employees). Some 
workers perform work on a business's physical premises but perform 
discrete, segregable services unrelated to any integrated process or 
unified purpose. Thus, although the location of the work may be a fact 
that is relevant to the ``integrated unit'' factor, it is not so 
probative that it would be useful to elevate it above other facts that 
may be more relevant in a particular case.
    Several commenters asked that the Department clarify that the 
relevant inquiry is whether the worker is part of an integrated unit of 
production that is part of the potential employer's own processes 
rather than part of a broader supply chain. NRF suggested clarifying 
language that would ``expressly state that merely serving as a link in 
the chain of a company's provision of goods or services'' does not 
indicate employee status. It suggested that such language would make it 
clear that this factor does not indicate employee status where a worker 
is merely one, segregable step in the process of delivering a product 
to a consumer.
    The Department does not believe such a clarification is needed, 
because the text of the final rule states that this factor points 
toward employee status only when the worker performs ``a component of 
the potential employer's integrated production process.'' The relevant 
process is the potential employer's process, not the broader supply 
chain. A worker who performs a segregable step in the process of 
delivering a product but who is not integrated into the employer's own 
production process is not part of an integrated unit of production. 
Multiple businesses, including independent contractors, may perform 
steps in the same supply chain.
    Some commenters suggested that the description of this factor in 
the preamble should define the scope of the ``unified purpose'' toward 
which the potential employer's processes work. WPI requested that the 
Department clarify that the ``unified purpose'' cannot be broader than 
the potential employer's ``core or primary business purpose.'' On the 
other hand, Farmworker Justice urged a broad definition of ``unified 
purpose'' to prevent gamesmanship by which an employer may attempt to 
artificially separate its production process into separate units in 
order to claim that they are segregable rather than parts of a unified 
whole. It cited a hypothetical tomato farmer who could label its tomato 
harvesters as a separate unit rather than as part of the process of 
growing tomatoes.
    The Department rejects these suggestions, because the final rule's 
rejection of the ``integral part'' factor and the question of 
``importance'' or ``centrality'' makes clear that the relevant facts 
are the integration of the worker into the potential employer's 
production processes, rather than the nature of the work performed. As 
explained above, identifying the ``core or primary business purpose'' 
is not a useful inquiry in the modern economy. Falling transaction 
costs and other factors described above allow businesses to hire 
independent contractors to carry out tasks that are part of the 
businesses' core functions, while keeping those functions separate from 
its own production processes. At the same time, seemingly peripheral 
functions may be integrated into an employer's own processes, 
indicating employee status. What matters is the extent of such 
integration rather than the importance or centrality of the functions 
performed, which the Department does not find to be a useful indicator 
of employee or independent contractor status.
    As noted in the NPRM, the Department recognizes that it may be 
difficult to determine the extent to which a worker is part of an 
integrated unit of production. For this reason, this factor is not 
always useful to the economic realities inquiry, and it is less likely 
than the core factors to be determinative. For example, this factor 
would not indicate independent contractor status for Farmworker 
Justice's hypothetical tomato harvesters

[[Page 1196]]

merely because the farmer artificially labeled them a separate unit. As 
has been the case since the concepts underlying the economic realities 
test was articulated, the test does not depend on labels assigned to 
workers. Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 729 (``Where the work done, in 
its essence, follows the usual path of an employee, putting on an 
`independent contractor' label does not take the worker from the 
protection of the Act.''). The factor may indicate either employee or 
independent contractor status based on the extent to which the 
harvesters are integrated into the farmer's production process as a 
matter of fact, but most likely the ultimate determination would depend 
more on other factors, such as control and opportunity for profit or 
loss.
    WPI also suggested that the Department clarify language in the 
preamble to the proposed rule stating that employee status would be 
indicated for a worker who performs work closely alongside conceded 
employees. WPI expressed concern that this language could wrongly imply 
that a worker performing different tasks than the conceded employees 
but in close proximity to them would indicate employee status. The 
Department does not believe such clarification is necessary, because 
the preamble stated that employee status is indicated where the worker 
``performs identical or closely interrelated tasks as those 
employees.'' In other words, WPI is correct that if a worker works 
physically close to conceded employees but performs unrelated tasks, 
that fact alone would not indicate employee status.
    Finally, many commenters requested that the Department add examples 
explaining how this factor would apply to specific industries, 
including trucking, construction, financial advising, and personal 
shopping. Others wanted examples to address certain types of 
contractual arrangements, such as multi-sided platforms, franchisees, 
and buy/sell agreements. In response to these requests, the Department 
notes that the facts that inform the ``integrated unit'' factor are too 
circumstance-specific to apply blanket statements to entire industries 
or broad types of employment arrangements. Any particular task that is 
common in a particular industry may be performed in one instance by a 
worker who is part of an integrated unit of production or by a 
segregable unit. In other words, this factor may point in a different 
direction for workers who perform similar duties in the same industry 
but who are more or less integrated into their potential employer's 
processes based on the potential employer's business model. Moreover, 
contractual formalities such as a buy/sell agreement or contracts 
formed using multi-sided platforms could memorialize either employment 
or independent contractor arrangements; the determination would not 
depend on the labels assigned but on the various economic realities 
factors, including the worker's integration into the potential 
employer's production process.
    That said, as explained elsewhere in this preamble, although the 
Department cannot address all industries or all possible factual 
scenarios, it does appreciate that examples are helpful to 
understanding how each factor operates. The new regulatory provision 
added in this final rule to further illustrate several factors, Sec.  
795.115, includes two examples specifically meant to demonstrate how 
facts about whether a worker is part of an integrated unit of 
production should be considered as part of the employment relationship 
analysis.
    For the reasons explained, the Department finalizes Sec.  
795.105(d)(2)(iii) as proposed.
6. Additional Unlisted Factors
    The National Restaurant Association stated that facts and factors 
not listed in Sec.  795.105(d) may be relevant to the question of 
economic dependence even though they would not be as probative as the 
two core factors. This commenter expressed concern that future courts 
may ignore these unlisted but potentially relevant considerations in 
response to this rulemaking and requested that the Department revise 
the regulatory text to explicitly recognize that unlisted factors may 
be relevant.
    While proposed Sec.  795.105(c) already states that the five 
factors listed in Sec.  795.105(d) are ``not exhaustive,'' \43\ the 
Department agrees that it may be helpful to make this point more 
explicit. The Department is thus adding Sec.  795.105(d)(2)(iv), which 
states that additional factors not listed in Sec.  795.105(d) may be 
relevant to determine whether an individual is an employee or an 
independent contractor under the FLSA. As with any fact or factor, such 
additional factors are relevant only to the extent that they help 
answer whether the individual is in business for him- or herself, as 
opposed to being economically dependent on an employer for work. 
Factors that do not bear on this question, such as whether an 
individual has alternate sources of wealth or income and the size of 
the hiring company, are not relevant. These unlisted factors are less 
probative than the core factors listed in Sec.  795.105(d)(1), while 
their precise weight depends on the circumstances of each case and is 
unlikely to outweigh either of the core factors .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See Silk, 331 U.S. at 716 (``No one [factor] is controlling 
nor is the list complete.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Focusing the Economic Reality Test on Two Core Factors

    Proposed Sec.  795.105(c) was intended to improve the certainty and 
predictability of the economic reality test by focusing the test on two 
core factors: (1) The nature and degree of the worker's control over 
the work; and (2) the worker's opportunity for profit or loss. This 
focus is an important corollary of the sharpened definition of economic 
dependence to include individuals who are dependent on a potential 
employer for work and to exclude individuals who are in business for 
themselves. The NPRM explained that these core factors, listed in 
proposed Sec.  795.105(d)(1), drive at the heart of what is meant by 
being in business for oneself: Such a person typically controls the 
work performed in his or her business and enjoys a meaningful 
opportunity for profit or risk of loss through personal initiative or 
investment. The other economic reality factors--skill, permanence, and 
integration--are also relevant as to whether an individual is in 
business for him- or herself. But they are less probative to that 
determination. For instance, it is not uncommon for comparatively high 
skilled individuals--such as software engineers--to work as employees, 
and for comparatively low skill individuals--such as drivers--to be in 
business for themselves. See, e.g., Saleem, 854 F 3d at 140; Express 
Sixty-Minutes Delivery, 161 F.3d at 306. In contrast, ``[i]n ordinary 
circumstances, an individual `who is in business for him- or herself' 
will have meaningful control over the work performed and a meaningful 
opportunity to profit (or risk loss).'' 85 FR 60618. As such, ``it is 
not possible to properly assess whether workers are in business for 
themselves or are instead dependent on another's business without 
analyzing their control over the work and profit or loss 
opportunities.'' Id.
    The NPRM further explained that focusing on the two core factors is 
also supported by the Department's review of case law. The NPRM 
presented a remarkably consistent trend based on the Department's 
review of the results of appellate decisions since 1975 applying the 
economic reality test. Among those cases, the classification favored by 
the control factor aligned with the worker's

[[Page 1197]]

ultimate classification in all except a handful where the opportunity 
factor pointed in the opposite direction. And the classification 
favored by the opportunity factor aligned with the ultimate 
classification in every case.\44\ These two findings imply that 
whenever the control and opportunity factors both pointed to the same 
classification--whether employee or independent contractor--that was 
the court's conclusion regarding the worker's ultimate 
classification.\45\ See 85 FR 60619. In other words, the Department did 
not uncover a single court decision where the combined weight of the 
control and opportunity factors was outweighed by the other economic 
reality factors. In contrast, the classification supported by other 
economic reality factors was occasionally misaligned with the worker's 
ultimate classification, particularly when the control factor, the 
opportunity factor, or both, favored a different classification. See 
id. at 60621.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ This is not to imply that the opportunity factor 
necessarily aligns with the ultimate classification, but rather that 
the Department is not aware of an appellate case in which 
misalignment occurred.
    \45\ The only cases in which an appellate court's ruling on a 
worker's classification was contrary to the court's conclusions as 
to the control factor were cases in which the opportunity factor 
pointed in the opposite direction. See 85 FR 60619 (citing Paragon 
Contractors, 884 F.3d at 1235-36, and Cromwell, 348 F. App'x at 61).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM thus provided that, given their greater probative value, 
if both proposed core factors point towards the same classification--
whether employee or independent contractor--there is a substantial 
likelihood that is the individual's correct classification. This is 
because it is quite unlikely for the other, less probative factors to 
outweigh the combined weight of the core factors. In other words, where 
the two core factors align, the bulk of the analysis is complete, and 
anyone who is assessing the classification may approach the remaining 
factors and circumstances with skepticism, as only in unusual cases 
would such considerations outweigh the combination of the two core 
factors.
    Numerous commenters welcomed proposed Sec.  795.105(c)'s sharpening 
of the economic reality test by recognizing the two core factors' 
greater probative value on whether an individual is in business for 
him- or herself. For instance, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated that 
``[t]he Department's straightforward focus on two core factors presents 
a concise interpretation of `economic dependency' grounded in the Act's 
statutory definition of `employ' and `employer,' consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent, and well-reasoned courts of appeals' 
decisions.'' The American Bakers Association (ABA) likewise ``supports 
the Department's position that the two most probative `core' factors 
for determining independent contractor status under the FLSA are the 
degree and nature of an individual's control over their work, and the 
opportunity for profit (or loss).'' See also, e.g., ATA; CPIE; National 
Restaurant Association; SHRM. Even one commenter who did not generally 
support this rulemaking ``agreed with the Department that the two main 
factors, control and opportunity for profit or loss, should be given 
greater weight.'' Owner-Operator Independent Driver Association 
(OOIDA).
    Many commenters objected to focusing on the two core factors. 
Broadly speaking, they raised three interrelated concerns. First, 
commenters contended that elevating the two core factors is 
inconsistent with the economic reality test, which they asserted 
requires that factors be either unweighted or weighted equally. See, 
e.g., NELP (objecting to ``elevating two narrow `core' factors''); 
SWACCA; Commissioner Slaughter of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
Second, commenters contended that focusing on two core factors would 
narrow the scope of who is an employee (as opposed to an independent 
contractor) under the FLSA. See, e.g., NELP (``The NPRM narrows the 
FLSA test for employee coverage[.]''); State AGs (``The Proposed Rule's 
interpretation of [employment under] the FLSA is unlawfully narrow.''); 
Appleseed Center (``The Department of Labor is trying to impermissibly 
narrow this definition''); NCFW (objecting to ``agency's proposed 
attempt to narrow the definition of employee''). Third, commenters 
asserted that focusing on two core factors would impermissibly restrict 
the set of circumstances that may be considered when assessing whether 
a worker is an employee or independent contractor under the FLSA. TRLA 
(``proposed reformulation would eliminate . . . any consideration of 
[the skill and permanence] factors''); NELA (objecting to ``a narrow, 
control-dominated inquiry''); State AGs (objecting to proposed rule 
because it ``narrows several areas of inquiry.'').\46\ The Department 
responds to each of the above concerns below, and then addresses other 
requests relating to the focus on the two factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ There are two distinct concepts within the economic reality 
test--and any test for employment status--that can be broad or 
narrow. The first concept is the test's standard for employment, 
which is economic dependence. See Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130. The 
second concept is the set of circumstances that may be considered as 
part of the test, which is the ``circumstances of the whole 
activity.'' See Rutherford Food, 331 U.S at 730. The breadth of 
these two concepts are not always logically related. For instance, 
the ABC test states that a worker is an employee unless the hiring 
party can establish that three criteria are met, see, e.g., Dynamex, 
416 P.3d at 35; thus, the ABC test considers a relatively narrow set 
of circumstances while imposing a broad standard for employment. 
While most commenters that objected to the narrowing of the economic 
reality test did not present the standard of employment and 
circumstance that may be considered as separate concepts, the 
Department addresses them separately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Focusing on Two Core Factors is Consistent With the Economic Reality 
Test
    Many commenters contended that emphasizing core factors over others 
would violate a requirement that economic reality factors be unweighted 
or weighted equally. According to SWACCA, ``[t]he proposed weighted 
rule is a novel concept and a departure from existing caselaw.'' See 
also, e.g., NELA (objecting to ``emphasizing certain factors over what 
should be the `ultimate inquiry' ''). FTC Commissioner Slaughter 
likewise objected that ``[t]he Proposal takes the Supreme Court's five 
factor test, where all five factors are given equal weight, and narrows 
it down to focus on only two [core] factors.'' See also Appleseed 
Center (``[A]ll are given equal weight.''); Senator Patty Murray 
(suggesting that ``DOL afford [factors] equal weight''). NELP appeared 
to agree with the Department that the economic reality test may focus 
on certain factors over others, but asserted that ``the factor of 
integration into the business of another should be weighed heavily,'' 
rather than the proposed rule's two core factors. Several commenters 
further relied on an age discrimination case to contend that the 
economic reality test ``cannot be rigidly applied'' and that ``[i]t is 
impossible to assign to each of these factors a specific and invariably 
applied weight.'' NELP (quoting Hickley v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 
748, 752 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also Michigan Regional Council of 
Carpenters (MRCC) (same).
    The Department disagrees that the economic reality test requires 
factors to be unweighted or equally weighted. Each time the Department 
or a court applies the test, it must balance potentially competing 
factors based on their respective probative value to the ultimate 
inquiry of economic dependence. In the very case that announced the 
economic reality factors, the Supreme Court listed five factors that 
are ``important for decision'' but

[[Page 1198]]

did not treat them equally. Silk, 331 U.S. at 716. It instead 
emphasized the most probative factors, while de-emphasizing less 
probative ones in that case. The Court focused on the fact that coal 
unloaders ``had no opportunity to gain or lose'' to conclude they were 
employees under the SSA, while explaining the fact ``[t]hat the 
unloaders did not work regularly was not significant.'' Id. at 717-18. 
The Court further focused on ``the control exercised [and] the 
opportunity for profit from sound management'' to conclude that truck 
drivers were independent contractors, without discussing any of the 
other economic reality factors. Id. at 719. Similarly, the Court in 
Whitaker House concluded that workers at issue in that case were 
employees based primary on considerations relating to control (e.g., 
the workers were ``regimented under one organization, manufacturing 
what the organization desires'') and opportunity for profit (e.g., the 
workers were ``receiving the [piece rate] compensation the organization 
dictates'' rather than ``selling their products on the market for 
whatever price they can command''). 366 U.S. at 32-33.
    As discussed in the NPRM, courts of appeals also emphasized facts 
and factors that are more probative of the economic dependence inquiry. 
See 85 FR 60620. In Saleem, the Second Circuit focused on facts 
relating to drivers' control over their work and their opportunity for 
profit or loss based on initiative or investment to conclude that they 
were independent contractors.\47\ 854 F.3d at 138-39; see also 
Agerbrink v. Model Service LLC, 787 F. App'x 22, 25-27 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(denying summary judgement based solely on disputed facts regarding 
plaintiff's ``control over her work schedule, whether she had the 
ability to negotiate her pay rate, and, relatedly, her ability to 
accept or decline work''). The Third Circuit in Razak v. Uber 
Technologies took a similar approach by emphasizing disputed facts 
regarding ``whether Uber exercises control over drivers'' ' and had 
``the opportunity for profit or loss depending on managerial skill'' to 
deny summary judgment. 951 F.3d at 145-47.\48\ And the Eight Circuit 
recently emphasized a process server's ability to determine his own 
profits by controlling hours, which assignments to take, and for which 
company to work, to affirm a jury verdict that he was an independent 
contractor. See Karlson, 860 F.3d at 1095.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ In particular, the Saleem court focused on: drivers' 
``considerable discretion in choosing the nature and parameters of 
their relationship with the defendant,'' ``significant control over 
essential determinants of profits in [the] business,'' how they 
``invested heavily in their driving businesses,'' and the ``ability 
to choose how much work to perform.'' 854 F.3d at 137-49.
    \48\ The Razak decision also briefly addressed other factors, 
including a footnote on the ``integral'' factor and a discussion 
that was nominally about the permanence factor but actually 
concerned control: ``On one hand, Uber can take drivers offline, and 
on the other hand, Plaintiffs can drive whenever they choose to turn 
on the Driver App, with no minimum amount of driving time 
required.'' 951 F.3d at 147 n.12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Courts have repeatedly warned against the ``mechanical 
application'' of the economic reality factors when determining whether 
an individual is an employee or independent contractor. See, e.g., 
Saleem, 854 F.3d at 139; Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1059. Rather, the 
factors should be analyzed with the aim of answering the ultimate 
inquiry under the FLSA: ``Whether an individual is `in business for 
himself' or is `dependent upon finding employment in the business of 
others.' '' Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Mednick, 508 F.2d at 
301-02). Commenters who object to focusing on the two core factors do 
not dispute this principle, and some affirmatively support it. For 
instance, NELA and the State AGs both stated that economic reality 
``factors `are aids--tools to be used to gauge the degree of dependence 
of alleged employees on the business with which they are connected' '' 
(quoting Pilgrim Equip., 527 F.2d at 1311). NELA nonetheless believed 
that it would be inappropriate to ``emphasiz[e] certain factors over 
what should be the `ultimate inquiry': The worker's economic dependence 
on the putative employer.'' Emphasizing certain factors, however, would 
dilute the ultimate inquiry of economic dependence only if those 
factors were less probative of economic dependence than others. In 
contrast, emphasizing factors that are more probative would not dilute 
but rather focus the analysis on the ultimate inquiry under the FLSA. 
If NELA and the State AGs are correct that the economic reality factors 
must be ``used to gauge the degree of dependence,'' then focusing on 
factors that are more probative measures of economic dependence is not 
only permitted but preferred.
    The Department's review of case law indicates that courts of 
appeals have effectively been affording the control and opportunity 
factors greater weight, even if they did not always explicitly 
acknowledge doing so.\49\ See 85 FR 60619. Among the appellate 
decisions since 1975 that the Department reviewed, whenever the control 
factor and the opportunity factor both pointed towards the same 
classification--whether employee or independent contractor--that was 
the worker's ultimate classification. Put another way: In those cases 
where the control factor and opportunity factor aligned, had the courts 
hypothetically limited their analysis to just those two factors, it 
appears to the Department that the overall results would have been the 
same. One commenter attempted to dispute this finding. TRLA asserted 
that, in the following four cases, farmworkers who were found to be 
employees ``might be reclassified as independent contractors based on 
the NPRM's two core factors:'' Driscoll, 603 F.2d 748; Lauritzen, 835 
F.2d 1529; Perez v. Howes, 7 F. Supp. 3d 715 (W.D. Mich. 2014); and 
Cavazos v. Foster, 822 F. Supp. 438 (W.D. Mich. 1993). However, the 
court in each of these cases actually concluded that the control and 
opportunity factors both favored employee classification,\50\ and thus 
the farmworkers would have been found to be employees even if those 
courts had hypothetically based is decision solely on the core factors. 
These cases therefore reinforce the Department's conclusion that the 
control and opportunity factors have been consistently afforded 
significant weight in the economic dependence inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Some courts have explicitly acknowledged that facts related 
to the control factor were more probative than facts related to 
other factors. For instance, the court in Saleem stated that 
``whatever `the permanence or duration' of Plaintiffs' affiliation 
with Defendants, both its length and the `regularity' of work was 
entirely of Plaintiffs' choosing.'' 854 F. 3d at 147 (citation 
omitted). When discussing ``the use of special skills,'' the court 
in Selker Brothers similarly explained that, ``[g]iven the degree of 
control exercised by Selker over the day-to-day operations of the 
stations, this criterion cannot be said to support a conclusion of 
independent contractor status.'' 949 F.2d at 1295.
    \50\ Driscoll, 603 F.2d at 755 (``The appellants' affidavits, 
which must be taken as true for summary judgment purposes, plainly 
disclose that [defendant] possesses substantial control over 
important aspects of the appellants' work''); id. (``The appellants' 
opportunity for profit or loss appears to depend more upon the 
managerial skills of [defendant]''); Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1536 
(``The defendants exercise pervasive control over the operation as a 
whole.''); id. (``The Sixth Circuit [in a prior case] found that the 
migrant workers had the opportunity to increase their profits 
through the management of their pickle fields. . . .We do not 
agree.''); Howes 7 F. Supp. 3d at 726, aff'd sub nom. Perez v. D. 
Howes LLC, 790 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2015); (``Accordingly, [the 
control] factor weighs in favor of a finding that the workers were 
employees.''); id. (``[W]orkers could simply increase their wages by 
working longer, harder, and smarter--this does not constitute an 
opportunity for profit.''); Cavazos, 822 F. Supp. at 442 (``Their 
lack of control supports plaintiffs' claim that they are 
employees.''); id. at 443 (noting that the work relationship ``does 
not afford plaintiffs an opportunity for profits'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The consistent empirical trend indicating that the control and 
opportunity factors have been afforded

[[Page 1199]]

greater weight should be unsurprising given their greater probative 
value. As the NPRM explained, those two factors ``strike at the core'' 
of what it means to be in business for oneself, 85 FR 60612, and 
therefore they are more probative of the ultimate inquiry under the 
FLSA: ``whether an individual is `in business for himself' or is 
`dependent upon finding employment in the business of others.' '' 
Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Mednick, 508 F.2d at 301-02). No 
commenters offered a persuasive counterargument to the commonsense 
logic that, when determining whether an individual is in business for 
him- or herself, the extent of the individual's control over his or her 
work is more useful information than, for example, the skill required 
for that work. Nor did any commenters effectively rebut that the extent 
of an individual's ability to earn profits (or suffers losses) through 
initiative or investment is more useful information than, for example, 
how long that individual has worked for a particular company.
    NELP appeared to agree with the Department that emphasis should be 
given to factors that are most probative to the ultimate inquiry of 
whether an individual is in business for him- or herself, but disagrees 
as to what those factors should be. In particular, NELP asserted that 
``the factor of integration into the business of another should be 
weighed heavily and in fact is ultimately the test. If the work is 
integrated this leads to the conclusion that the worker is not 
independently running a business.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ According to NELP, this language is a quotation from AI 
2015-1 that was withdrawn in 2017. But that withdrawn guidance does 
not contain the quoted language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NELP correctly defines the economic dependence inquiry as ``whether 
a person is in business for themselves and therefore independent, or 
works instead in the business of another and dependent on that business 
for work.'' If a worker is economically dependent on an employer for 
work, the worker is not in business for him- or herself. NELP then 
defines the ``integration factor'' to mean the exact same thing: ``If 
the work is integrated this leads to the conclusion that the worker is 
not independently running a business.'' NELP is correct that, when 
defined as such, ``the factor of integration . . . in fact is the 
ultimate test,'' but that factor would not be helpful in ascertaining a 
worker's employment status because it simply restates the question. The 
Department, courts, and the regulated community would still have to 
determine which factors to analyze to determine whether an individual 
is in business for him- or herself. The Department therefore declines 
to create and give greater weight to NELP's concept of the 
``integration factor'' and continues to believe that the control and 
opportunity factors are the most probative as to whether an individual 
is in business for him- or herself as a matter of economic reality.
    NELP and MRCC quoted dicta from an age-discrimination case that 
``[i]t is impossible to assign to each of [the economic reality] 
factors a specific and invariably applied weight.'' Hickley, 699 F.2d 
at 752.\52\ This proposed rule, however, does not run afoul of 
Hickley's dicta. As an initial matter, neither core factor individually 
has ``a specific and invariably applied weight'' because the proposed 
rule does not state that one necessarily outweighs the other. The 
Department nonetheless recognizes that proposed Sec.  795.105(c)' 
statement that ``each [core factor] is afforded greater weight in the 
analysis than is any other factor'' may be overly rigid. For reasons 
explained above, certain types of facts--i.e., those falling within the 
control and opportunity factors--are more probative than others 
regarding whether an individual is in business for him- or herself. But 
that does not necessarily mean the control or opportunity factors are 
entitle to greater weight in all cases. For example, it may be the case 
that, after all the circumstances have been considered, a core factor 
does not weigh very strongly towards a particular classification 
because considerations within that factor point in different 
directions. See Cromwell, 348 F. App'x at 61 (finding that ``defendants 
here did not control the details of how the plaintiffs performed their 
assign jobs'' but did have ``complete control over [their] schedule and 
pay''). A core factor could even be at equipoise, in which case it 
would not weigh at all in favor of a classification. See Johnson, 371 
F. 3d at 730 (concluding that competing facts regarding plaintiffs' 
opportunity for profit or loss meant that the ``jury could have viewed 
this factor as not favoring either side''). In short, there is a subtle 
but important distinction that was not fully reflected in the NPRM's 
language between a factor's probative value as a general matter and its 
specific weight in a particular case. Probative value refers to the 
extent to which a factor encapsulates types of facts that illuminate 
the ultimate inquiry of whether workers are in business for themselves, 
as opposed to being dependent on an employer for work. The weight 
assigned to a factor in a particular case refers to how strongly 
specific facts within the factor, on balance, favors a particular 
classification. Considerations within a core factor may have 
significant probative value even though that factor, on balance, does 
not weigh heavily towards a classification in a specific case. The 
Department therefore revises Sec.  795.105(c) to more clearly 
distinguish between a core factor's probative value as a general matter 
and its' weight in a specific case and to clarify that the core 
factors' greater probative value means that they typically (but not 
necessarily) carry greater weight . Thus it should be clear that the 
rule does not assign any factor a specific or invariable weight. In 
contrast, the approach favored by some commenters, including the 
Appleseed Center and Commission Slaughter, to give each factor ``equal 
weight'' would ``assign to each of the factors a specific and 
invariably applied weight.'' Hickley, 699 F.2d at 752.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ The court in Hickley applied the economic reality test in 
the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 
U.S.C. 621-34, without opining whether that was the correct test 
under the ADEA. 699 F.2d at 752 (``Finding . . . there was no 
evidence . . . that Hickey was an employee under the more liberal 
`economic realities' test used in FLSA cases, [but] express[ing] no 
opinion on whether it or one of the tests used in Title VII cases 
should ultimately be used to determine employee status in ADEA 
cases.''). Hickley's ``specific and invariably applied weight'' 
dicta appears in one FLSA case, Parrish, 719 F.3d at 380, as a see 
also parenthetical to support the proposition that economic reality 
factors should not be applied mechanically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At bottom, the final rule's focus on two core factors thus does not 
depart from the economic reality test--it merely elucidates the 
factors' respective probative values that have always existed but never 
been explained. Cf. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1539 (``Why keep [employers] 
in the dark about the legal consequences of their deeds.'' 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring)). As explained in more detail below, 
providing such clarification for the regulated community would not 
narrow the scope of who is an FLSA employee as opposed to an 
independent contractor. Nor would it narrow the circumstances that may 
be considered under the economic reality test.
2. The Proposed Rule Would Not Narrow the Standard for FLSA Employment
    A number of commenters argued that focusing the economic reality 
test on the control and opportunity factors would narrow the standard 
for employment under the FLSA. The FLSA defines ``employ'' as including 
``to suffer or permit to work,'' 29 U.S.C. 203(g), and these commenters 
argued this definition should be interpreted to provide broad coverage 
in light of the Act's remedial

[[Page 1200]]

purpose. See, e.g., AFL-CIO; NELA; NELP; Senator Patty Murray; State 
AGs. Most of these commenters argued that the proposed rule is 
incompatible with the Act's broad definition of employment because 
focusing on the control factor would effectively adopt the narrower 
scope of employment under the common law control test. One commenter, 
however, had a different view: UPS argued that the proposed rule would 
adopt a narrower standard for employment by giving the control factor 
too little weight.
    Discussing the proposed rule's consistency with the FLSA's standard 
for employment first requires an understanding of the Act's 
definitions. Commenters point out that the Act defines ``employ'' as 
including ``to suffer or permit to work,'' 29 U.S.C. 203(g), but the 
Supreme Court has observed that, although broad, the Act's definitions 
are not clear regarding the scope of relationships that are included. 
Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 728 (``[T]here is in the [FLSA's text] no 
definition that solves problems as to the limits of the employer-
employee relationship under the Act.''). Courts of appeals have 
likewise found the definitions not to clearly indicate the precise 
contours of FLSA employment. See, e.g., Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium 
& Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2011); Steelman v. Hirsch, 
473 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 2007).
    As commenters also noted, the Supreme Court relied on the FLSA's 
purpose and legislative history to interpret the ``suffer and permit'' 
language to encompass a more inclusive definition of employment than 
that of the common law. Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 727 (affirming 
that FLSA employment is not limited to the ``common law test of 
control, as the act concerns itself with the correction of economic 
evils through remedies which were unknown at common law''); see also 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 326. The Supreme Court has ``consistently construed 
the Act liberally in recognition that broad coverage is essential to 
accomplish [its] goal,'' Tony & Susan Alamo, 471 U.S. at 296, but at 
the same time, the Court also recognized that the ``suffer or permit'' 
definition ``does have its limits.'' Id. at 295; see also Portland 
Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152 (``The definition `suffer or permit to work' 
was obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees.''). No 
court has suggested that applying such limits (including the limit that 
bona fide independent contractors are not employees under the Act) 
cannot be reconciled with the Act's remedial purpose. Cf. Encino 
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (Encino II) 
(warning against relying on ``flawed premise that the FLSA `pursues' 
its remedial purpose `at all costs''' when interpreting the Act). 
Ultimately, ``[t]he test of employment under the Act is one of 
`economic reality.''' Tony & Susan Alamo, 471 U.S. at 301 (quoting 
Whitaker House, 366 U.S. at 33)). This rule applies such a test and 
does so with sufficient breadth consistent with the Act's remedial 
purpose.
    While the phrase ``economic reality'' is on its face no clearer 
than the ``suffer or permit'' language, see Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1539 
(Easterbrook J., concurring), decades of case law has refined its 
meaning. The Court determined that employees include ``those who as a 
matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which 
they render service.'' Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130. Courts of appeals have 
subsequently used Bartels's concept of economic dependence to determine 
employment under the FLSA. See, e.g., Saleem, 854 F.3d at 139; Mr. W 
Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1054; DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1385. Thus, the 
courts have interpreted the scope of employment under the Act's 
definition to include any individual who is ``dependent upon finding 
employment in the business of others,'' and to exclude any individual 
who is ``in business for himself.'' Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1312.\53\ 
However, as noted in the need for rulemaking discussion, this principle 
has not always been applied consistently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Courts apply this economic dependence standard for 
employment in the employee-versus-independent contractor context, 
but use different approaches in other contexts. See, e.g., Glatt v. 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department agrees with this interpretation and further believes 
that the economic dependence standard developed by courts comports with 
the ``suffer or permit'' statutory text. As the NPRM explained: ``An 
individual who depends on a potential employer for work is an employee 
whom the employer suffers or permits to work. In contrast, an 
independent contractor does not work at the sufferance or permission of 
an employer because, as a matter of economic reality, he or she is in 
business for him- or herself.'' 85 FR 60606 (citing Saleem, 854 F.3d at 
139). Commenters generally agreed that employee versus independent 
contractor status under the FLSA is determined by the worker's economic 
dependence, and several of the above-mentioned commenters affirmatively 
supported this standard. For example, NELA stated that ``[i]t is 
dependence that indicates employee status'' (quoting Usery, 527 F.2d at 
1311). And the State AGs explain that ``[t]he ultimate concern is 
whether, as a matter of economic reality, the workers depend on someone 
else's business . . . or are in business for themselves'' (quoting 
Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1059).
    Most commenters who objected to focusing the economic reality test 
on the two core factors were concerned that such an approach would 
narrow FLSA employment to the common law standard. For instance, NELA 
stated that ``[b]y affording the control factor greater weight in the 
economic reality analysis, the Department slides back toward the common 
law agency test.'' See, e.g., AFL-CIO (``[T]he proposed rule 
effectively collapses the FLSA's definition into the common law 
definition by giving primacy and controlling weight to the two factors 
of control and opportunity for profit and loss.''). The implied logic 
behind this concern is that if one test gives greater weight to a 
factor that is also given greater weight by a second test, the two 
tests necessarily have an equal scope of employment. But that does not 
follow.
    A comparison with the ABC test is illustrative. That test creates a 
presumption of employee status, which can be overridden only if all 
three factors are established. One of the ABC test's factors is 
``whether the worker is free from the control and direction of the 
hiring entity.'' This factor is given dispositive weight under certain 
circumstances: If the worker is controlled by the hiring party, then he 
or she is automatically an employee, regardless of other 
considerations. The common law control test also gives control 
dispositive weight. While both tests afford control greater weight than 
the economic reality test, one test (ABC) has a broader scope of 
employment than the economic reality test and the other (common law) 
has a narrower scope. The relative weight attached to a particular 
factor does not, by itself, determine whether the ultimate scope of 
employment is broad or narrow. Accordingly, it is not possible to 
compare the breadth of the standards for employment used by two tests 
simply by comparing the weight attached to a shared factor. Rather, it 
is necessary to consider how each test's factors are actually applied.
    Under the common law control test, control is the ultimate inquiry: 
If an individual controls the work, then he or she would be an 
independent contractor rather than an employee. However, such control 
by itself would be insufficient to establish the worker as an 
independent contractor under the Department's rule.

[[Page 1201]]

Other considerations, including the second core factor of opportunity 
for profit or loss, can outweigh the control factor and result in a 
classification of employee status. That is precisely what happened in 
Paragon Contractors, wherein the control and integral part factors 
weighed in favor of independent contractor classification but the court 
nonetheless held that the worker was an employee because the remaining 
factors, including opportunity for profit or loss, favored 
classification as an employee. See 884 F.3d at 1238. And even if the 
individual both controls the work and has a meaningful opportunity for 
profit or loss, he or she still would not necessarily be classified as 
an independent contractor under the Department's rule because other 
factors may outweigh those two core factors in rare cases. In short, 
because the ultimate inquiry under the common law control test is the 
worker's right to control the manner and means by which the work is 
performed, such control by the worker disqualifies the worker from 
being an employee under that test, but more is needed under the rule's 
articulation of the economic reality test because economic dependence 
is the ultimate inquiry. Thus, the rule's standard for employment 
remains broader than the common law standard. Nor does the rule 
``slide[ ] back toward the common law agency test,'' as NELA contends, 
or otherwise narrow the standard of employment under the FLSA. As 
explained above, the standard for determining whether an individual is 
an employee under the FLSA or an independent contractor has always been 
economic dependence. The two core factors are more probative than other 
factors regarding whether an individual is in business for him- or 
herself, as opposed to being dependent on an employer for work. Neither 
NELA nor likeminded commenters dispute this specific claim. NELA 
further recognized that economic reality factors must be ``used to 
gauge the degree of dependence.'' If so, the test should focus on core 
factors that are more probative measures of dependence. Doing otherwise 
would serve no purpose other than to make regulations more confusing, 
thereby reducing compliance and driving up the transaction cost of a 
lawful business practice.
    UPS expressed the opposite concern as NELA and likeminded 
commenters, asserting that the proposed rule did not give enough weight 
to the control factor. According to UPS, treating control as a factor 
to be balanced rather than giving it dispositive weight ``leaves open 
the possibility that a worker could be classified as an `independent 
contractor' even when the common-law control factor indicated employee 
status.'' The potential for such an outcome implies that FLSA 
employment may be narrower than the common law standard in certain 
circumstances.
    As an initial matter, UPS's concern that the control factor may be 
outweighed by other considerations even when it indicates employee 
status also applies to every prior articulation of the economic reality 
test--indeed more so--because none of them gave the control factor 
greater weight, much less dispositive weight. The rule addresses UPS's 
concern because it explicitly identifies control as a core factor that 
is less likely to be outweighed by other factors. More importantly, 
UPS's concern could materialize only if the control factor were 
balanced against other factors without regard for the ultimate inquiry 
for FLSA employment. Courts have cautioned against such ``mechanical 
application'' of the economic reality factors and have instead 
instructed that all factors should guide the analysis of whether the 
individual is in business for him or herself or is dependent on others 
for work. See, e.g., Saleem, 854 F.3d at 140. For these reasons, the 
Department does not share UPS's concern that not giving dispositive 
weight to the control factor results in a standard for employment that 
is narrower than the common law.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ In any event, courts have foreclosed UPS's requested remedy 
of giving the control factor dispositive weight to determine 
employee status. See, e.g., Silk, 331 U.S. at 716 (``No one factor 
is controlling); Keller, 781 F.3d at 807 (``No one factor is 
determinative.''); Baker, 37 F.3d at 1440 (``None of the factors 
alone is dispositive.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The Rulemaking Will Not Restrict the Range of Considerations Within 
Economic Reality Test
    A number of commenters contend that the proposed rule's focus on 
the two core factors is inconsistent with case law requiring the 
``circumstances of the whole activity'' to be considered as part of the 
inquiry into economic dependence. State AGs (quoting Rutherford Food, 
331 U.S. at 730); see also, e.g., NELA (``The economic reality inquiry 
therefore cannot be answered without `employ[ing] a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach.' '' (quoting Baker, 137 F.3d at 1441)); see 
also Senator Patty Murray (``No one test factor is controlling, nor is 
the list exhaustive.''); TRLA (same).
    The Department agrees with commenters that the circumstances of the 
whole activity should be considered as part of the economic reality 
inquiry. See 85 FR 60621 (``Other factors may also be probative as part 
of the circumstances of the whole activity''). While all circumstances 
must be considered, it does not follow that all circumstances or 
categories of circumstance, i.e., factors, must also be ``given equal 
weight.'' See e.g., FTC Commissioner Slaughter; Appleseed Center. 
Assigning one factor less weight than another does not restrict the 
circumstances being considered because the very act of determining 
relative weight requires considering both factors.
    As explained above, each factor should be analyzed in accordance 
with its probative value to the ultimate inquiry of whether an 
individual is in business for him or her-self. To be sure, the specific 
weight of the factors depends on specific circumstances. The control 
and opportunity factors are nonetheless more probative than other 
factors in determining whether an individual is in business for him- or 
herself. As such, it is appropriate to recognize, as the proposed rule 
does, that these two more probative factors should typically carry 
greater weight than other factors. Doing so would not, as TRLA 
contends, ``eliminate . . . any consideration of [other] factors that 
have often been regarded as probative in the farm labor context.'' The 
proposed rule explicitly permits other factors to outweigh the two core 
factors if the specific circumstances of the case--whether in the farm 
labor context or another contexts--warrants such a result. In order to 
determine whether the combined weight of the two core factors are 
outweighed or not by other factors, it is necessary to consider both 
sets of factors. Nor would it make any ``single factor determinative by 
itself.'' Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343. Neither of the core factors can be 
``determinative by itself'' because there is a second core factor 
against which each is balanced. Even when both core factors align, they 
are not ``controlling'' because their combined weight can still be 
outweighed by other considerations.
4. Other Comments Regarding the Focus on the Two Core Factors
    PAM and Global Tranz requested that the Department create a 
``bright-line test'' that ``would be limited to the two `core factors' 
already identified in the Proposed Rule: (1) the nature and degree of 
the individual's control over the work, and (2) the individual's 
opportunity for profit or loss.'' See also Cetera Financial Group (CFG) 
(``we believe it would be appropriate for the Department to limit the 
criteria employed in the economic dependence analysis to the two Core 
factors and

[[Page 1202]]

eliminate the others''). According to these commenters, a two-factor 
test would be even clearer and simpler than the proposal to focus the 
test on the two core factors, while still considering other factors. 
Other commenters requested that the Department eliminate one or more of 
the non-core factors listed in Sec.  795.105(d)(2) from the economic 
reality test because such factors have little to no probative value in 
some circumstance, and may sometimes send misleading signals regarding 
an individual's classification. CWI and the National Restaurant 
Association asked the Department to eliminate the skill required 
factor; SHRM and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce were among several 
commenters who suggested that the Department eliminate the permanence 
factor; and ATA, NDHA, and others requested eliminating the integrated 
unit factor.
    The Department believes that the two core factors of control and 
opportunity are always probative as to whether an individual is in 
business for him- or herself. The Department further agrees with the 
above commenters that the other factors are less probative and may have 
little to no probative value in some circumstances. See, e.g., Silk, 
331 U.S. at 718 (``That the unloaders did not work regularly is not 
significant.''). However, ``circumstances of the whole activity should 
be examined'' as part of the economic reality test, meaning that the 
other factors should be considered in all cases even if they are not 
always probative once considered. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d at 
1382. If a factor is probative in some situations but not in others, 
there is still a need to consider that factor to determine whether it 
is probative in a particular case. Eliminating the non-core factors 
from consideration would therefore be warranted only if those factors 
lacked probative value in all circumstances--that is, if there was 
never a need to even consider whether they had probative value.
    Because non-core factors are probative in many circumstances, the 
Department believes it would be inappropriate to eliminate them. In 
response to commenters' concern that non-core factors may not always be 
probative, the Department is making non-substantive revisions to 
clarify that the two core factors are always probative as to whether an 
individual is in business for him- or herself, but there may be 
circumstances where one or more of the non-core factors, upon 
consideration, has little or no probative value.
    Several commenters requested that the Department revise Sec.  
795.105(c) to state that if the two core factors point towards the same 
classification, there is no need to consider any other factors. See 
e.g., NRF (``if both of the core factors point in the same direction, 
then a court may consider only those two factors and end the analysis 
without examining the three additional possible factors identified by 
DOL''); SHRM (requesting revision ``to ensure that if the Core Factors 
indicate the same status of the worker, no further analysis is 
necessary''). According to the SHRM, such an approach would ``create 
clear expectations and stable grounds to build working relationships.''
    The Department believes that the economic reality test cannot be 
rigidly applied and concludes that its approach of giving certain 
factors greater weight and other factors lesser weight while retaining 
flexibility as to the degree of weight depending on the facts of the 
case best accounts for all of the circumstances that work relationships 
present. Commenters' requests would require the Department to state 
that the combined probative value of the two core factors--whatever 
that might be--always outweighs the combined probative value of other 
factors. The Department believes that will usually be the case, but 
does not rule out the possibility that, in some circumstances, the core 
factors could be outweighed by particularly probative facts related to 
other factors.
    Several commenters effectively requested that the Department assign 
a specific relative weight to one core factor as compared to the other. 
CWI requested that the Department always weigh the two core factors 
equally, while the HR Policy Institute requested that the control 
factor always be given greater weight than the opportunity factor. The 
Department declines to implement both requests. The Department's review 
of U.S. Courts of Appeals cases since 1975 did not indicate that the 
control and opportunity factors should be weighed equally. Nor did that 
review indicate that the control factor should always outweigh the 
opportunity factor. Indeed, in the few cases reviewed by the Department 
where the control and opportunity factors pointed towards different 
classifications, the ultimate classification aligned with the 
opportunity for factor. See 85 FR 60619 (citing Paragon Contractors, 
884 F.3d at 1235-36, and Cromwell, 348 F. App'x at 61). Ultimately, the 
Department is confident in its conclusion that the two core factors are 
more probative than all other factors and that framework is logical, as 
described above. But the Department declines to assign an invariable 
relative weight between the two core factors.
    Several commenters requested that the Department revise Sec.  
795.105(c) to establish a rebuttable presumption of employee or 
independent contractor status if both core factors indicate the same 
classification. Such a presumption would be rebuttable only by 
``substantial evidence to the contrary under all three [other 
factors].'' ATA. According to ATA, a rebuttable presumption ``[w]ould 
further reduce the possibility of courts unnecessarily and potentially 
selectively applying and weighing the three additional factors for 
preferred policy outcomes, which has been a concern with regard to the 
current test in some instances.'' As the NPRM explained, the Department 
considered but did not propose a rebuttable presumption based on 
alignment of the two core factors because it was concerned a formal 
presumption may be needlessly complex or burdensome. See 85 FR 60621. 
The Department further believes that emphasizing the importance of the 
two core factors provides sufficient clarity. As such, the Department 
declines to adopt a presumption-based framework.
    CWI requested that the ``the Final Rule spell out specifically that 
each of the Core Factors should be analyzed independently of the other, 
without overlap.'' The Department agrees with CWI that overlaps between 
economic reality factors, core or otherwise, should be minimized. As 
discussed in the NPRM and in this preamble, reducing such overlap is 
one of the reasons for this rulemaking. That said, the Department 
believes specific regulatory instructions against overlapping analysis 
of the two core factors is not necessary and may be confusing. The 
Department believes proposed Sec.  795.105(d)(1) articulates the two 
core factors without apparent overlap, and CWI does not identity any 
specific considerations that risk being analyzed under both factors. 
Language in the regulatory text warning against overlapping analysis 
may therefore confuse members of the regulated community by priming 
them to look for potential overlapping considerations when there are 
none. The Department therefore declines to add CWI's requested 
language.
    In summary, the economic reality test examines the circumstances of 
the whole activity to determine whether an individual is in business 
for him- or herself, as opposed to being economically deponent on 
others for work. Not all facts or factors are equally probative (if 
they are probative at all) as

[[Page 1203]]

to whether, as a matter of economic reality, an individual is in 
business for him- or herself. Treating them all as equal would not 
focus the inquiry on economic dependence, but rather would distort that 
analysis. In contrast, highlighting factors that are more probative 
would sharpen the test's focus on economic dependence.
    The NPRM presented reasoning and evidence based on the Department's 
review of case law indicating that control and opportunity factors are 
more probative to whether an individual is in business for him- or 
herself, as opposed to being economically dependent. While not all 
commenters agree with this approach, commenters who object to it have 
not convinced the Department to change its original assessment. The 
Department therefore believes that it is appropriate to focus the 
economic reality test on the two core factors that are more probative 
to the test's ultimate inquiry. Such focus appropriately guides how 
factors should be balanced, while retaining flexibility in the test.

F. Proposed Guidance Regarding the Primacy of Actual Practice

    Proposed Sec.  795.110 stated that the actual practice of the 
parties involved--both of the worker (or workers) at issue and of the 
potential employer--is more relevant than what may be contractually or 
theoretically possible. The proposed rule explained that this principle 
is derived from the Supreme Court's holding that `` `economic reality' 
rather than `technical concepts' is to be the test of employment'' 
under the FLSA. Whitaker House, 366 U.S. at 33; see also Tony & Susan 
Alamo, 471 U.S. at 301 (``The test of employment under the [FLSA] is 
one of `economic reality' '' (citing Whitaker House, 366 U.S. at 33)).
    Several commenters expressed support for proposed Sec.  795.110. 
For example, ATA wrote that ``[t]he general principle also is almost 
black letter law--substance is always more important than form--under 
virtually every regulation WHD enforces.'' The Center for Workplace 
Compliance described the language as ``consistent with historical 
interpretation of the economic reality test by Federal courts and 
DOL.'' Other commenters complimented the proposal with little or no 
further explanation, see NHDA; New Jersey Civil Justice Institute; WPI, 
while HR Policy Association urged the final rule to go further by 
entirely disregarding the relevance of unexercised contractual or 
theoretical possibilities. WFCA supported proposed Sec.  795.110, but 
asked the Department to elaborate in the final rule that ``best 
indicator of the actual practices is whether a significant segment of 
the industry has traditionally treated similar workers as independent 
contractors or employees.''
    No worker advocacy organizations specifically commented in support 
of the provision, but several groups, including NELA, the Pacific 
Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters, and the Public Justice 
Center, quoted Judge Frank Easterbrook's observation from Lauritzen, 
835 F.2d at 1545, that ``[t]he FLSA is designed to defeat rather than 
implement contractual arrangements.'' The International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters similarly asserted that Congress ``chose to define 
`employment' in a manner that would allow the Act to be applied 
flexibly so that employers could not simply recalibrate their 
contractual arrangements with workers to evade coverage.'' Finally, 
NELP and 32 other organizations quoted Judge Learned Hand's observation 
from Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547 (2d Cir. 1914), 
cert. denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915), that employment statutes from the 
early 20th century were intended to ``upset the freedom of contract'' 
between workers and businesses. Id. at 553.
    Some business commenters expressed general support for proposed 
Sec.  795.110, but requested edits to discount the relevance of 
voluntary choices on the part of an individual worker that implicate 
one or more of the economic reality factors described in proposed Sec.  
795.105(d), such as choosing to work exclusively for one business, 
accepting all available work assignments from the business, or 
declining to negotiate prices. See, e.g., American Bakers Association; 
ATA; New Jersey Warehousemen & Movers Association (NJWMA); NRF; Private 
Care Association; Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary; U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (``[T]he Chamber urges the Department clarify that 
so long as a business does not take actions to foreclose an individual 
from exercising certain rights, that the individual's choice to not 
exercise those rights does not diminish their indicia of independence 
in the relationship.''). Some of these commenters asserted that 
allowing voluntary worker practices to influence classification 
outcomes would lead to costly and inefficient business decisions. See 
Dart Transit Company (``[T]he practical effect of [proposed Sec.  
795.110] is to require independent contractors to arbitrarily switch 
routes and carriers . . . simply in order to preserve their independent 
status''); Minnesota Trucking Association (``In effect, the motor 
carrier would have to restrict offering to the independent owner 
operator a route both find beneficial in order to ensure that the 
independent owner operator performs services for other motor 
carriers.''). Others asserted that considering voluntary worker 
practices would lead to classification discrepancies between workers 
with similar contractual freedoms. See NRF; SHRM.
    Some business commenters were flatly opposed to proposed Sec.  
795.110. SHRM wrote that ``[a] focus on `practice' as opposed to the 
contractual `rights,' of the parties . . . unnecessarily de-emphasizes 
voluntariness of the contract itself and places ambiguity over parties' 
negotiations.'' The Customized Logistics and Delivery Association 
objected that worker classifications could turn on voluntary worker 
practices that a business may not know about (e.g., whether particular 
workers perform labor for other companies), asserting that proposed 
Sec.  795.110 ``essentially shift[s] the burden of proof to the alleged 
employer to establish a worker's status as an IC'' and ``could force 
mass reclassifications of ICs for motor carriers, and many other 
industries.''
    Finally, several commenters representing workers, as well as 
Senator Patty Murray and the State AGs, voiced opposition to proposed 
Sec.  795.110 on the basis that emphasizing the primacy of an alleged 
employer's practices would establish an employee classification 
standard impermissibly narrower than the common law, which evaluates an 
alleged employer's ``right to control.'' \55\ In this regard, the State 
AGs compared proposed Sec.  795.110 to the Department's interpretation 
in its recent Joint Employer final rule that ``[a] potential joint 
employer must actually exercise--directly or indirectly--one or more . 
. . indicia of control to be jointly liable'' (85 FR 2859). Winebrake & 
Santillo, LLC asserted that proposed Sec.  795.110 conflicts with a 
statement from a recent Third Circuit opinion that ``actual control of 
the manner of work is not essential; rather, it is the right to control 
which is determinative,'' Razak, 951 F.3d at 145, while Edward. 
Tuddenham commented that ``[a]ll of the cases [the Department cited in 
its NPRM] to support the primacy of `actual practice' are referring to 
the actual practices of workers and are not discussing analysis of 
employer controls.'' In rejecting the proposed rule's distinction 
between a potential employer's contractual

[[Page 1204]]

authority to control workers and control that they actually exercise, 
Senator Murray asserted that contractual authority ``provides a 
potential employer an incredible amount of de facto control over a 
worker . . . induc[ing] a worker to perform the work in the manner the 
employer prefers, suggests, recommends, or hints at, even if the 
employer does not ever command it.'' See also State AGs (``[R]eserved 
authority in an agreement, like the looming sword of Damocles, will 
often influence what the parties do[.]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec.  2(3); see also Commun. 
for Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989) (describing ``the 
hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the 
product is accomplished'' as the overarching focus of the common law 
standard).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has carefully considered the views and arguments 
expressed by commenters and decided to implement Sec.  795.110 as 
proposed. As emphasized in the NPRM, and as the plain language of Sec.  
795.110 makes clear, unexercised powers, rights, and freedoms are not 
irrelevant in determining the employment status of workers under the 
economic reality test; \56\ such possibilities are merely less relevant 
than powers, rights, and freedoms which are actually exercised under 
the economic reality test.\57\ Affording equal relevance to reserved 
control and control that is actually exercised--by either party--would 
ignore the Supreme Court's command to focus on the ``reality'' of the 
work arrangement, Silk, 331 U.S. at 713, which places a greater 
importance on what actually happens than what a contract suggests may 
happen. Several Federal courts of appeals decisions have explicitly 
made this observation. See, e.g., Saleem, 854 F.3d at 142 (``[P]ursuant 
to the economic reality test, it is not what [Plaintiffs] could have 
done that counts, but as a matter of economic reality what they 
actually do that is dispositive.'') (citations omitted); Parrish, 917 
F.3d at 387 (``The analysis is focused on economic reality, not 
economic hypotheticals.''); Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1311 (``It is not 
significant how one `could have' acted under the contract terms. The 
controlling economic realities are reflected by the way one actually 
acts.'' (citations omitted)). Moreover, as some commenters pointed out, 
prioritizing substance over form is consistent with the Department's 
general interpretation and enforcement of the FLSA. See, e.g., 29 CFR 
541.2 (``A job title alone is insufficient to establish the exempt 
status of an employee.''); 29 CFR 541.603(a) (providing that employers 
violate the salary basis requirement for certain employees exempt under 
Sec. 13(a)(1) of the Act only when they demonstrate ``an actual 
practice of making improper deductions''); \58\ 29 CFR 778.414 
(``[W]hether a contract which purports to qualify an employee for 
exemption under section 7(f) meets the requirements . . . will in all 
cases depend not merely on the wording of the contract but upon the 
actual practice of the parties thereunder.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Entirely disregarding unexercised contractual rights and 
authorities would not be consistent with the Supreme Court's 
instruction in Rutherford Food to evaluate ``the circumstances of 
the whole activity.'' 331 U.S. at 730; see also Mid-Atl. 
Installation, 16 F. App'x at 107 (determining that cable installers 
were independent contractors in part because they had a ``right to 
employ [their own] workers''); Keller, 781 F.3d at 813 (citing as 
relevant ``the fact that Miri never explicitly prohibited Keller 
from performing installation services for other companies'' and 
finding ``a material dispute as to whether Keller could have 
increased his profitability had he improved his efficiency or 
requested more assignments'').
    \57\ In this respect, Sec.  795.110's emphasis on actual 
practice differs from the treatment of control in the Department's 
partially invalidated Joint Employer rule, which provided that ``[a] 
potential joint employer must actually exercise--directly or 
indirectly--one or more . . . indicia of control to be jointly 
liable.'' 85 FR 2859 (emphasis added).
    \58\ In a 2004 final rule amending this language, the Department 
rejected commenter arguments that the mere existence of a policy 
permitting improper deductions should disqualify an employer from 
claiming the Section 13(a)(1) exemption for salaried employees whose 
earnings and job duties otherwise qualify for exemption. ``[Such an] 
approach . . . would provide a windfall to employees who have not 
even arguably been harmed by a `policy' that a manager has never 
applied and may never intend to apply[.]'' 69 FR 22122, 22180.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department disagrees with commenters who assert that 
prioritizing the actual practice of the parties involved makes the 
economic reality test impermissibly narrower than the common law 
control test. In many instances, the actual practices of the parties 
will establish the existence of an employment relationship despite what 
a ``skillfully devised'' contract might suggest on paper. Silk, 331 
U.S. at 715; see, e.g., Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1313-14 (``Though 
plaintiffs' `Independent Contractor Service Agreements' provided that 
they could `decline any work assignments,' plaintiffs testified that 
they could not reject a route or a work order within their route 
without threat of termination or being refused work in the following 
days.''); Hobbs, 946 F.3d at 833 (dismissing the fact that welders 
determined to be employees ``could hypothetically negotiate their rate 
of pay''). In any event, because the ultimate inquiry of the economic 
reality test is ``economic dependence,'' the test ensures coverage over 
more workers in the aggregate than the common law control test, 
notwithstanding its more nuanced interpretation of the control factor 
itself. See Silk, 331 U.S. at 716 (listing ``degrees of control'' as 
one of several non-dispositive factors in the economic reality test) 
(emphasis added).
    It is true that, under the economic reality test, some workers 
subject to a potential employer's ``right to control'' may nevertheless 
qualify as bona fide independent contractors for other reasons. To the 
extent that this excludes some workers who might qualify as 
``employees'' under a traditional common law test,\59\ this is the 
logical outcome of a multifactor test where ``no one [factor] is 
controlling.'' Silk, 331 U.S. at 716; see also, e.g., Selker Bros., 949 
F.2d at 1293 (``It is a well-established principle that . . . neither 
the presence nor the absence of any particular factor is 
dispositive.''). Moreover, the Supreme Court arrived at precisely this 
outcome in two of its seminal cases applying the economic reality test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See Commun. for Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 
(1989) (``In determining whether a hired party is an employee under 
the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's 
right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished.'') (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, in Silk, the Court evaluated the employment status of owner-
operator truck drivers who contracted to perform services exclusively 
for a motor carrier company, subject to a ``manual of instructions . . 
. purport[ing] to regulate in detail the conduct of the truckmen in the 
performance of their duties.'' 331 U.S. at 709-710. Before reaching its 
own conclusion, the Court excerpted an analysis from the appellate 
court below noting that, ``[w]hile many provisions of the manual, if 
strictly enforced, would go far to establish an employer-employee 
relationship between the Company and its truckmen . . . there was 
evidence to justify the [district] court's disregarding of it,'' 
including testimony that the manual was ``impractical and was not 
adhered to.'' Id. at 716 n.11 (quoting Greyvan Lines v. Harrison, 156 
F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1946)). Although the Court acknowledged ``cases 
. . . where driver-owners of trucks or wagons have been held employees 
in accident suits at tort'' (under the common law), the Court said it 
``agree[d] with the decisions below'' that the owner-operator truck 
drivers were independent contractors, as ``the total situation, 
including . . . the control exercised . . . marks these driver-owners 
as independent contractors.'' Id. at 718-19 (emphasis added).
    The Court in Bartels, even more clearly illustrated of how the 
economic reality test's emphasis on actual practice may indicate 
independent contractor. There, the Court found that band members were 
not employees of a public dance hall that hired them for

[[Page 1205]]

short-term gigs, despite a contract provision stipulating that the 
dance hall ``shall at all times have complete control of the services 
which the [band members] will render under the specifications of this 
contract.'' 332 U.S. at 128. Again applying the economic reality test, 
the Court noted that a worker's employment status ``was not to be 
determined solely by the idea of control which an alleged employer may 
or could exercise over the details of the service rendered to his 
business by the worker or workers.'' Id. at 130 (emphasis added). While 
the Court made clear that other economic reality factors (e.g., skill, 
permanence, profit) indicated that the band members were independent 
contractors, id. at 132, the Court implicitly found that the control 
factor did as well, noting that it was the band leader (and not the 
dance hall) which ``organizes and trains the band . . . [and] selects 
[its] members.'' Id. at 132. In other words, notwithstanding the dance 
hall's contractual authority to ``complete[ly] control'' the band 
members, the actual practice of the parties made clear that the band 
members themselves controlled the work, as a matter of economic 
reality.
    Contrary to the argument put forth by several worker advocacy 
commenters, the outcome and reasoning of the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Silk and Bartels show that the common law control test does not 
establish an irreducible baseline of worker coverage for the broader 
economic reality test applied under the FLSA. In other words, while the 
economic reality test is broad in the sense that it covers more workers 
as a general matter, it does not necessarily include every worker 
considered an employee under the common law.
    At the same time, the Department disagrees with the interpretation 
suggested by various business commenters that only worker practices 
which are affirmatively coerced by a potential employer may indicate 
employee status. Such a reading conflicts with the definition of 
``employ'' in section 3(g) of the Act, which makes clear that the FLSA 
was intended to cover employers who passively ``suffer or permit'' work 
from individuals.\60\ Accordingly, courts applying the economic reality 
test have not hesitated to consider voluntary worker practices where 
such practices indicate economic dependence. See Keller, 781 F.3d at 
814 (``[A] reasonable jury could find that the way that [the defendant] 
scheduled [the worker's] installation appointments made it impossible 
for [the worker] to provide installation services for other 
companies.''). To be sure, the Department agrees that coercive behavior 
by a potential employer (e.g., vigilant enforcement of a non-compete 
clause, punishing workers for turning down available work, etc.) 
constitutes stronger evidence of employment status than voluntary 
worker practices (e.g., the mere existence of an exclusive work 
arrangement, the fact that a worker rarely turn down available work, 
etc.), but coercive action on the part of the potential employer is not 
a prerequisite for such worker practices to have import.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ 29 U.S.C. 203(g). See also 83 C.J.S. Suffer (1953) (``[T]o 
suffer work requires no affirmative act by a putative employer.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department believes that commenters' concerns that proposed 
Sec.  795.110 will cause workers with similar contractual freedoms to 
be classified differently are overstated. Consistent with evaluating 
the ``the circumstances of the whole activity'' in a work arrangement, 
Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 730, courts have often considered the 
rights and practices of similarly situated workers affiliated with a 
particular business, arriving at a single classification outcome for 
the group of workers at issue. See, e.g., Freund, 185 F. App'x. at 784 
(finding independent contractor status in part because ``although 
Freund did not hire any workers, other of Hi-Tech's installers did''); 
Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery, 161 F.3d at 305 (finding independent 
contractor status in part because ``[t]he majority of drivers work for 
Express for a short period of time''); cf. Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 
1048-51 (finding employee status in part because ``the overwhelming 
majority of operators did not engage in independent advertising'' and 
``the vast majority of operators made only minor investments in the 
business''). Even where meaningful factual differences exist between 
workers, courts may separate them into multiple groups for separate 
collective analyses instead of making individualized determinations. 
See, e.g., Off Duty Police, 915 F.3d at 1055-1062 (separate collective 
analyses of ``sworn officers'' and ``nonsworn officers'' who provide 
security and traffic control services); DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1383-
88 (separate collective analyses of home researchers and distributors). 
Judicial application of the economic reality test to groups of workers 
has shown that classification outcomes cannot turn on one factor alone. 
See, e.g., Silk, 331 U.S. at 719 (``In one instance they haul for a 
single business, in the other for any customer. The distinction, though 
important, is not controlling. It is the total situation . . . that 
marks these driver-owners as independent contractors.'').
    In summary, finalized Sec.  795.110's emphasis on the actual 
practices of the parties involved is not a one-way ratchet, applying 
selectively either for or against a finding of independent contractor 
status. Instead, as the examples in Sec.  795.110 illustrate, the 
principle applies to every potentially relevant factor, and can weigh 
in favor of either an employee or independent contractor relationship. 
In some cases, the actual practice of the parties involved may suggest 
that the worker or workers are employees. See, e.g., Sureway Cleaners, 
656 F.2d at 1371 (``[T]he fact that Sureway's `agents' possess, in 
theory, the power to set prices, determine their own hours, and 
advertise to a limited extent on their own is overshadowed by the fact 
that in reality the `agents' work the same hours, charge the same 
prices, and rely in the main on Sureway for advertising.''); 
DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1387 (concluding that evidence showing workers 
were not doing similar work for any other businesses ``although they 
were free to do so'' indicates employee status). In other cases, it may 
suggest that the worker or workers at issue are independent 
contractors. See Saleem, 854 F.3d at 143 (concluding that black-car 
drivers were independent contractors in part because ``many Plaintiffs 
. . . picked up passengers via street hail, despite TLC's (apparently 
under-enforced) prohibition of this practice''); see also Silk, 331 
U.S. at 718-19; Bartels, 332 U.S. at 129. Section 795.110's focus on 
actual practice is a neutral interpretive principle, consistent with 
the way courts and the Department have long applied the FLSA's economic 
reality test. Accordingly, and contrary to the concerns expressed by 
some commenters, it should not disrupt specific industries or result in 
substantial worker reclassifications in either direction (i.e., from 
employee to independent contractor status, or vice versa).

G. Other Comments

    Many substantive comments were not directed towards a specific 
provision of the proposed rule but rather the rule as a whole. These 
comments addressed the following topics: (1) Whether the proposed rule 
would create confusion or clarity for the regulated community; (2) 
whether the proposed rule would exacerbate or ameliorate 
misclassification of employees; (3) whether the rule is consistent with 
the FLSA's purpose; (4) whether

[[Page 1206]]

Congressional inaction prohibits this rulemaking; and (5) whether the 
Department may depart from its prior practice.
1. Whether the Rulemaking Will Create Confusion or Clarity
    Commenters from the business and freelance community generally 
expressed the view that the proposed rule would improve clarity 
regarding which workers are independent contractors versus employees 
under the FLSA. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated that 
``[t]he Proposed Rule would provide long-awaited and much needed 
structure and clarity to the evaluation of worker relationships under 
the Act.'' SHRM agreed that ``[t]he Proposed Rule is necessary to 
provide certainty and consistency to businesses and workers.'' See also 
CWI; WPI; ATA; NRF; National Restaurant Association. Freelancers and 
groups that represent them echoed this message, with the CPIE, for 
instance, stating that ``[w]e believe the proposed guidance would 
provide greater clarity and predictability in the application of the 
`economic realities' test to independent entrepreneurs and their 
clients.'' See also Fight for Freelancers. Individual commenters who 
identified themselves as freelancers or small business owners 
overwhelmingly agreed that the rule would improve legal clarity. For 
example, one individual commenter who believed that ``independent 
contracting . . . kept [her] family afloat when [she] unexpectedly 
became a single mom'' stated that ``[t]his proposed rule is simple to 
understand and provides necessary clarity for both employers and 
individuals like myself that want to engage in freelancing.'' Another 
individual who identified himself as a small business owner believed 
that ``[t]he regulations proposed seem to provide clarity for 
determining an individual's status as an employee or independent 
contractor under the Fair Labor Standards Act.''
    Some government and union commenters took the opposite view. The 
State AGs, for instance, asserted that ``this rule will create 
confusion, not clarity'' in part because they believe it ``departs from 
the statutory text and Supreme Court precedent and is contrary to 
established application of the economic reality test.'' FTC 
Commissioner Slaughter expressed concern that the proposed rule would 
``create legal confusion around the labor exemption to the antitrust 
laws.'' The AFL-CIO argued that ``the proposal is likely to increase 
rather than decrease confusion because it does not clearly define `an 
integrated unit of production.' ''
    The Department continues to believe that the rule will improve 
clarity because it clarifies the meaning of economic dependence, which 
determines FLSA employment, and aligns the economic reality test to 
more accurately analyze that concept by, among other things, 
highlighting the two core factors that are most probative to the 
inquiry. The rule does not depart from the statutory text, which courts 
have interpreted to define FLSA employment based on the concept of 
economic dependence on which this rule focuses. Nor does the rule 
depart from any Supreme Court precedent because it continues to 
consider the circumstances of the activity as a whole to analyze 
whether workers, as a matter of economic reality, depend on another 
business for work, or are in business for themselves. The Department 
further disagrees with the State AGs that the rule departs from the 
``established application of the economic reality test.'' The final 
rule takes into account facts and factors that have historically been 
part of the economic reality test, and decades of appellate decisions 
indicating that the two core factors frequently align with the ultimate 
determination of economic dependence or lack thereof. See 85 FR 60619-
21. As one comment stated, the rulemaking ``synthesizes previous 
understandings of the independent contractor rule,'' as opposed to 
departing from them. See Farren and Mitchell.
    The Department does not believe this final rule will cause 
confusion regarding the labor exemption to antitrust laws because, as 
explained by FTC Commissioner Slaughter, that exemption is governed 
``[u]nder the Clayton Act and the Norris-La Guardia Act.'' In contrast, 
this rule's application is limited to the FLSA, and therefore, would 
not affect the labor exemption to antitrust laws established by other 
statutes. Finally, for reasons explained in the NPRM and this preamble, 
the Department believes this rule's articulation of the ``integrated 
unit'' is clearer than the prior ``integral part'' articulation. For 
added clarity, the Department added a pair of examples in Sec.  795.115 
to further illustrate application of the ``integrated unit'' factor.
    For these reasons, the Department believes the final rule will 
result in greater clarity.
2. Whether the Rulemaking Exacerbates or Ameliorates Misclassification
    Many commenters expressed concern that the proposed rule would 
exacerbate the misclassification of employees as independent 
contractors. See, e.g., Equal Justice Center; Employee Rights Center; 
NELP; State AGs; TRLA. According to these commenters, the proposed rule 
would make it easier for an unscrupulous employer to classify its 
employees as independent contractors, and they cite statistics that 
purport to show high rates of misclassification in support of that 
contention. Several other commenters took the opposite position and 
asserted, for example, that ``[c]larifying the application of the test 
for independent contractor status will promote compliance with labor 
standards under the FLSA and, in turn, reduce worker 
misclassification.'' Opportunity Solutions Project (OSP); see also, 
e.g., TCA (``[t]he increased clarity provided by the [proposed rule] 
would likely lead to reduced misclassification.''); IAW (``This rule 
will clear up misclassifications''); Financial Services Institute (``we 
agree that it will reduce worker misclassification and litigation''). 
These commenters also presented reports that dispute the widespread 
occurrence of misclassification. See, e.g. CWI; U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce; WPI.
    FLSA employee versus independent contractor status is determined in 
terms of economic dependence. Misclassification occurs when an 
individual who is economically dependent on a business is classified by 
that business as an independent contractor and treated as such. This 
can occur inadvertently because the business misunderstands the concept 
of economic dependence or incorrectly analyzes factors to assess the 
concept. It can also occur intentionally. This final rule clearly 
defines economic dependence and explains how to assess facts and 
factors to evaluate whether that dependence exists. It discards 
misleading and confusing interpretations of that concept developed over 
the years and emphasizes the essential aspects. A clearer test means 
more businesses will better understand their obligations under the FLSA 
and thereby inadvertently misclassify fewer workers. As one commenter 
who identified himself as a small business owner explained: ``We want 
to comply [with the FLSA] but we need guidance that allows us to know 
how to comply.'' A clearer test also means more workers will understand 
their rights under the FLSA and thereby will be better positioned to 
combat intentional misclassification through, for example, private 
litigation or complaints to the Department. Unscrupulous employers

[[Page 1207]]

may also be deterred from intentional misclassification in the first 
place if workers better understand their legal rights. For these 
reasons, the Department believes the final rule is likely to reduce 
both inadvertent and intentional FLSA misclassification.
    While several commenters asserted that the proposed rule will 
facilitate misclassification, the Department does not agree. The 
Department's final rule makes clear that a business may classify a 
worker as an independent contractor with greater confidence if the 
worker has control over key aspects of the work and a meaningful 
opportunity for profit or loss based on initiative or investment. 
Except in unusual cases, a worker who enjoys substantial control over 
the work and has opportunity for profit in abundant measures is, as a 
matter of economic reality, in business for him- or herself, and thus 
properly classified as an independent contractor. The rule thus makes 
it easier for a business and its workers to structure their work 
arrangements to create bona fide independent contractor relationships. 
But that effect of the final rule will help avoid misclassification, 
not encourage it.
    As discussed in greater detail in the RIA at Section VI(D)(6), the 
Department has concerns regarding the reliability of statistics cited 
by commenters regarding the prevalence of misclassification. Even 
assuming commenters' statistics are accurate, however, they would 
merely estimate the current rate of misclassification rather than how 
that rate would change as a result of this rule. Insofar as the final 
rule will reduce misclassification, these statistics make this 
rulemaking even more urgent.
    For the above reasons, the Department believes this rule will 
ameliorate rather than exacerbate misclassification of employees under 
the FLSA.
3. Whether the Rulemaking Is Consistent With the FLSA's Remedial 
Purpose
    A number of commenters asserted that this rule ``conflicts with the 
FLSA's remedial purposes of protecting workers.'' State AGs; see also, 
e.g., Pacific Northwest Council of Carpenters (``the Proposed Rule . . 
. is contrary to the statutory definitions and remedial purpose of the 
FLSA''). NELP, for instance, stated that ``DOL's proposed test would 
leave behind workers in high growth sectors with high rates of wage 
theft, contrary to the purposes of the FLSA.'' And NELA indicated that, 
because ``the FLSA is a remedial statute'' its coverage should be 
construed liberally to adopt a standard for employment that is even 
broader than economic dependence.\61\ Commenters that supported the 
proposed rule pointed that the FLSA is not intended to cover all 
workers and that ``Congress intended to cut off [the FLSA's] coverage 
at a certain point to preserve the freedom of workers to operate as 
independent contractors.'' Scalia School; see also WPI (``Nothing in 
the text or legislative history of any Federal employment law indicates 
that Congress intended to supplant or displace independent work and 
require instead for all workers to be employees.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ NELA specifically urged the Department to adopt the ``ABC'' 
test to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or 
an employee under the FLSA. The Regulatory Alternative discussion at 
Section VI(G) provide further explanation why the Department is not 
adopting that test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Supreme Court has cautioned against the ``flawed premise that 
the FLSA `pursues' its remedial purpose `at all costs' '' when 
interpreting the Act. Encino, 138 S. Ct. at 1142. The Encino II Court 
rejected the principle that FLSA's remedial purpose required exemptions 
to be narrowly construed, id, and courts of appeal have followed that 
logic to reject the corollary principle, articulated above by NELA, 
that the Act's remedial purpose requires its coverage to be construed 
broadly. See Sec'y United States Dep't of Labor v. Bristol Excavating, 
Inc., 935 F.3d 122, 135 (3d Cir. 2019) (rejecting broad reading of the 
FLSA based its remedial purpose); Diaz v. Longcore, 751 F. App'x 755, 
758 (6th Cir. 2018) (same). Rather, `` `a fair reading' of the FLSA, 
neither narrow nor broad, is what is called for.'' Bristol, 935 F.3d at 
135 (quoting Encino, 138 S. Ct. at 1142); Diaz, 751 F. App'x at 758 
(``We must instead give the FLSA a `fair' interpretation.'').
    ``The principal congressional purpose in enacting the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 was to protect all covered workers from 
substandard wages and oppressive working hours.'' Barrentine v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Court, however, has long recognized held that the 
FLSA ``was obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees.'' 
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. at 152. As the State AGs stated, the 
``the FLSA must be interpreted with its `remedial and humanitarian 
purpose . . . purpose' in mind to protect `those who sacrifices a full 
measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.' 
'' State AGs (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron. R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 
123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944)). Workers who are economically dependent 
on an employer for work have sacrificed ``freedom and talents to the 
use of profits of others,'' and therefore are covered by the Act as 
employees. But independent contractors use their ``freedom and 
talents'' to operate their own businesses, and thus fall outside of the 
FLSA's coverage. See Saleem, 854 F.3d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(noting that independent contractors are separate from employees in the 
context of the FLSA); Karlson, 860 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(``FLSA wage and hour requirements do not apply to true independent 
contractors.''); Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1311 (``[The Act's] `broad' 
definitions do not, however, bring `independent contractors' within the 
FLSA's ambit.''); Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 342 (observing that the ``FLSA 
applies to employees but not to independent contractors'').
    The Department believes the line between economically dependent 
workers who are covered by the FLSA and independent contractors who are 
not comports with the Act's purpose to ``protect all covered workers 
from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.'' Barrentine, 450 
U.S. at 739. Independent contractors who are in business for themselves 
do not need protection against ``oppressive working hours'' because 
they are not economically dependent on any employer who could oppress 
them. Nor do they need protection from ``substandard wages'' because 
they are not economically dependent on an employer that sets wages. 
Forcing workers who are in business of themselves into the FLSA's 
coverage would not protect them, and would instead unduly restrict 
their ability to operate their own businesses. Indeed, numerous 
individuals who identified as freelancers or independent contractors 
commented that being classified as an employee would undermine their 
ability to operate their own business. For example, one freelance 
translator lamented that ``many of my clients became unwilling to work 
with me'' when a state law required her to be classified as clients' 
employee. Another commenter identified himself ``[a]s a self employed 
professional [who] do[es] NOT want to be forced into employment.'' As a 
final illustrative example, another commenter stated that ``I have no 
desire to be an employee . . . . If I was required to be an employee, I 
would no longer be able to make money for my family from my home on my 
own schedule.''
    The Supreme Court has explained that the FLSA's ``exemptions are as 
much a part of the FLSA's purpose as

[[Page 1208]]

the [Act's] requirement[s].'' Encino, 138 S. Ct. at 1134. By the same 
logic, respecting the independence of workers whom the FLSA does not 
cover is as much a part of the Act's purpose as extending the Act's 
coverage to workers who need its protection. Denying FLSA coverage to 
workers who are economically dependent on an employer for work would 
result in workers loosing needed protection ``from substandard wages 
and oppressive working hours.'' Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739. But 
extending the Act's coverage to workers who, as a matter of economic 
reality, are in business for themselves would unduly restrict 
independent workers who neither need nor benefit from the Act's 
provisions. This rule sharpens the distinction between these two 
categories of worker and thereby furthers the Act's purpose to protect 
employee who need protection without burdening independent contractors 
who do not.
4. Whether Congressional Inaction Prohibits This Rulemaking
    The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
AFL-CIO (AFSCME) asserted that, ``[b]ecause Congress has legislatively 
ratified the existing six-factor Economic Reality test, the Secretary 
and Administrator are powerless to alter the standard. This also means 
the Proposed Rule would fail the first step of the Chevron deference 
analysis and would be entitled to no deference by the courts.'' 
According to AFSCME, ``when Congress re-enacts a statute without 
change, it is presumed to be aware of administrative and judicial 
interpretation of that statute and to have adopted those 
interpretations.'' Based on this principle, AFSCME reasoned that, 
because Congress did not revise the definition of ``employ'' when it 
amended the FLSA in 1966, it must have adopted the ``integrated unit of 
production'' factor articulated in Rutherford Food, 331. U.S. 730. 
Additionally, AFSCME asserted that Congress's 1983 decision to adopt 
the FLSA's definition of ``employ'' without revision in MSPA indicates 
that Congress implicitly adopted the ``six-factor test [that] was well 
embedded as the interpretation of the FLSA's `employ.' ''
    AFSCME's ratification argument is based entirely on the fact that 
Congress has not amended the FLSA's definition of ``employ.'' The 
Supreme Court, however, has ``criticized . . . reliance on 
congressional inaction'' as a tool of statutory interpretation, 
cautioning that, ``[a]s a general matter . . . these arguments deserve 
little weight in the interpretive process.'' Central Bank of Denver, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 
(1994). ``And when . . . Congress has not comprehensively revised a 
statutory scheme but has made only isolated amendments, [the Court has] 
spoken more bluntly: `It is impossible to assert with any degree of 
assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative 
congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation.' '' 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292, (2001) (quoting Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989)). Congress has not 
``comprehensively revised'' the Act's statutory scheme in a manner that 
would indicate Congressional approval of a judicially created six-
factor test as the standard for FLSA employment.
    Even if some insight could be gleaned from Congressional inaction, 
that insight would not support ratifying a specific and definitive six-
factor test because there has never been a uniform test for Congress to 
ratify. The Supreme Court has never articulated a six-factor test, and 
courts of appeals articulate the test differently. As discussed 
earlier, the Second Circuit combines two of the factors. The Fifth 
Circuit omits one factor, while the remaining circuits use a sixth, 
``integral part'' factor that departs from the Supreme Court's 
consideration of ``integrated unit of production.'' Some circuits 
analyze a ``skill and initiative'' factor, while others consider just 
``skill required.'' Some circuits analyze the investment factor by 
comparing the dollar value of the worker's investment against that of 
the hiring entity, while others analyze whether the worker's investment 
creates opportunities for profit or loss. Simply put, there is no 
single test that Congress could have impliedly ratified, nor did AFSCME 
suggest one.
    For these reasons, Congress's inaction does not demonstrate that it 
ratified a specific six-factor economic reality test.
5. Whether the Rulemaking Improperly Departs From Prior Practice
    Several commenters, including NELA, contended that the proposed 
rule would be an improper departure from the Department's prior 
practice. The rule is consistent with the Department's prior position 
that the ultimate inquiry for determining employee versus independent 
contractor status under the FLSA is whether an individual is, as a 
matter of economic reality, economically dependent on another for work 
or is instead in business for him- or herself. The rule is further 
consistent with the Department's longstanding position that all 
economic reality factors should be analyzed when answering that 
ultimate inquiry.
    The Department acknowledges that the rule's focus on two core 
factors that are most probative to that ultimate inquiry is different 
from how the Department articulated the economic reality test in the 
past. ``Agencies are free to change their existing policies as long as 
they provide a reasoned explanation for the change.'' Encino Motorcars, 
LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016). The Department has 
explained its reasoning for focusing the economic reality test on two 
core factors throughout the NPRM and this preamble. The Department 
further acknowledges that the rule lists economic reality factors in 
Sec.  795.105(d) that correspond with how the Department has 
articulated those factors in the past, with a few modifications. The 
Department explained its reasons for these modifications in the NPRM 
and in this preamble. This rule does not improperly depart from the 
Department's prior positions.

H. Examples

    As discussed above, many commenters requested that the regulatory 
text contain examples of how the economic reality test would apply in 
the context of their specific industries or practices. The Department, 
however, prefers to adopt generally applicable principles as opposed to 
attempting to provide guidance for every potential scenario. The later 
approach would require the regulation be drafted as an exhaustive 
treatise that is neither accessible nor helpful for most members of the 
regulated community. It would also invariably omit many important types 
of circumstances and be more difficult to adapt to future industries 
and practices that neither the Department nor commenters could have 
conceived.
    While the Department cannot provide examples for every conceivable 
scenario, it is adding Sec.  795.115 to provide six illustrative 
examples that involve a variety of industries and specific facts. Due 
to the complexities of balancing multiple factors that encompass 
countless facts that are part of the totality of the circumstances, the 
Department does not believe it would be helpful to provide examples 
that make conclusions regarding workers' ultimate classifications. 
Rather, each illustrative example focuses on the classification favored 
by a specific economic reality factor within the context of the fact-
specific scenario. The first example concerns the control factor in the 
context of the long-haul transportation industry. The second example 
concerns

[[Page 1209]]

the opportunity factor in the context of the gig economy. The third 
example concerns the opportunity factor in the context of the 
construction industry and clarifies the concept of economic dependence. 
The fourth example concerns the permanence factor within the context of 
a seasonal hospitality industry. The fifth example concerns the 
reframed ``integrated unit'' factor within the context of the 
journalism industry. The sixth example also concerns the new 
``integrated unit'' factor within the context of the journalism 
industry and is designed to work with the fifth example to elucidate 
the distinction between when this factor favors classification as an 
employee versus independent contractor.

I. Severability

    The Department proposed to include a severability provision in part 
795 so that, if one or more of the provisions of part 795 is held 
invalid or stayed pending further agency action, the remaining 
provisions would remain effective and operative. The Department did not 
receive any comments on this provision, and finalizes it as proposed.

J. Amendments to Existing Regulatory Provisions at Sec. Sec.  
780.330(b) and 788.16(a)

    Finally, in addition to the proposed addition of part 795, the 
Department proposed to amend existing regulatory provisions addressing 
independent contractor status under the FLSA in narrower contexts at 29 
CFR 780.330(b) (tenants and sharecroppers) and 29 CFR 788.16(a) 
(certain forestry and logging workers). Specifically, the Department 
proposed to replace descriptions of the six economic reality factors 
WHD has historically used to evaluate independent contractor status 
under the FLSA with a cross-reference to the guidance provided in new 
part 795. While some commenters invoked the existing provisions at 
Sec. Sec.  780.330(b) and 788.16(a) to justify opposition to proposed 
part 795, the Department did not receive any commenter feedback 
regarding the proposed amendment of these provisions. Accordingly, the 
Department finalizes amendments to these provisions as proposed.

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., 
and its attendant regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, require the Department 
to consider the agency's need for its information collections, their 
practical utility, the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public, and how to minimize those 
burdens. In the NPRM, the Department invited public comment on its 
determination that the proposal did not contain a collection of 
information subject to OMB approval under the PRA. A few commenters, 
while not referencing the PRA directly, discussed records in their 
public comments. However, this was merely to note agreement that 
section 11 of the FLSA does not require the keeping of records 
regarding workers who are independent contractors. This final rule does 
not contain a collection of information subject to OMB approval under 
the PRA.

VI. Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review; and 
Executive Order 13563, Improved Regulation and Regulatory Review

A. Introduction

    Under Executive Order 12866, OMB's Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs determines whether a regulatory action is 
significant and, therefore, subject to the requirements of the 
Executive Order and OMB review.\62\ Section 3(f) of Executive Order 
12866 defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as a regulatory 
action that is likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have an annual 
effect on the economy of $100 million or more, or adversely affect in a 
material way a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, 
the environment, public health or safety, or state, local or tribal 
governments or communities (also referred to as economically 
significant); (2) create serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere 
with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) materially alter 
the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees or loan 
programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) 
raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the 
President's priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive 
Order. Because the annual effect of this rule is estimated to be 
greater than $100 million, this rule will be economically significant 
under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See 58 FR 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
    \63\ The entirety of the estimated costs from this deregulatory 
action, which exceed the $100 million threshold and relate strictly 
to familiarization, fall in the first year alone. The Department's 
Regulatory Impact Analysis further explains that these one-year 
costs are more than offset by continuing annual cost-savings of 
$495.8 million per year, accruing to the same parties that face the 
familiarization costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Executive Order 13563 directs agencies to, among other things, 
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that 
its benefits justify its costs; that it is tailored to impose the least 
burden on society, consistent with obtaining the regulatory objectives; 
and that, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, the 
agency has selected those approaches that maximize net benefits. 
Executive Order 13563 recognizes that some costs and benefits are 
difficult to quantify and provides that, when appropriate and permitted 
by law, agencies may consider and discuss qualitatively values that are 
difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, 
fairness, and distributive impacts.

B. Overview of Analysis

    The Department believes this rule is likely to improve the welfare 
of both workers and businesses on the whole. With respect to 
businesses, the Department believes that the improved clarity offered 
by the rule will increase the efficiency of the labor market, allowing 
businesses to be more productive and decreasing their litigation 
burden. With respect to workers, broadly speaking, this rule is likely 
to have four categories of potential effects.
    First, this rulemaking makes it easier for the millions of 
individuals who currently work as independent contractors and those who 
hire them to comply with the law. See Farren and Mitchell (``The 
proposed rule will likely reduce the cost of complying with the 
relevant Federal regulations.''). Compliance cost savings will be 
shared between the independent contractors and businesses for which 
they work. Id. (``labor regulations are generally paid for by 
reductions in workers' total compensation'').
    Second, as explained above, the legal clarity from this rule is 
likely to reduce occurrences of misclassification by enabling firms and 
workers to better understand their respective obligations and rights 
under the FLSA. The Department agrees with commenters that 
misclassification harms workers and believes this rule will reduce 
those harms by facilitating compliance.
    Third, legal clarity may encourage firms to create independent 
contractor arrangements for roles that did not previously exist, which 
may attract workers who otherwise would not work in that field. Such 
job creation unambiguously benefits workers and firms alike. See Dr. 
Liya Palagashvili (``[W]e got the impression from our interviews that 
the primary concern for startups in terms of labor regulation or policy 
is mostly with regulation of independent contractors.''), and Fuller et 
al. (``[M]ore than two-thirds of [women with advanced degrees or high-

[[Page 1210]]

honors BAs] who drop out of the workforce would not have done so if 
they'd had access to more-flexible job arrangements.'').\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Joseph B. Fuller, et al., Rethinking the On-Demand 
Workforce, Harvard Business Review (Oct. 20, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, as a result of the improved clarity of the rule, businesses 
might convert existing positions from employee to independent 
contractor. This rule provides the most legal certainty to employers 
classifying a worker as an independent contractor if the worker 
substantially controls the work and has a meaningful opportunity for 
profit or loss based on initiative or investment. As such, a job 
conversion attributable to the legal clarity provided by this rule is 
likely to satisfy the control and opportunity criteria.\65\ Businesses 
could reclassify existing employees as independent contractors by 
modifying their working relationship under the criteria of this rule, 
and would only be expected to do so upon determination that the clarity 
provided by this rule materially shifts the balance of tradeoffs. 
Business could also reclassify positions because the increased clarity 
of the rule confirms that their workers are actually already 
effectively independent contractors because their workers have 
substantial control over the work and have an opportunity for 
profit.\66\ Any benefit to businesses of modified classifications would 
need to outweigh the costs, including any autonomy they cede to workers 
in such arrangements and any costs associated with implementation or 
modifying the classification itself, and such a relationship would need 
to be compatible with their business models. Further, generally 
speaking, workers have a choice of whether to agree to the new 
independent contractor arrangement. The overall effect of job 
conversion on workers is ambiguous and could vary from worker to 
worker, as discussed in more detail in section VI(D)(7) below. Impacts 
resulting from litigation avoidance due to increased clarity are 
discussed in section VI(F)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Section 795.105(c) indicates that a worker who lacks both 
control and opportunity is most likely an employee. As such, the 
Department believes this rule would discourage employers from 
converting such workers from employee to independent contractor 
status. Section 795.105(c) would not give an employer sufficient 
confidence that it could change the classification of a worker who 
has only control but not opportunity, or vice versa.
    \66\ The Department notes that the final rule does not, by its 
operation, change the classification of any employee. 
Notwithstanding the assertions of several commentators, as explained 
throughout the analysis, the rule does not narrow the definition of 
who is an employee under the FLSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department did not attempt to quantify all aspects of these 
four categories of potential impacts. In particular, the Department 
believes that significant uncertainty surrounds any attempt to quantify 
the number or nature of new independent contractor relationships that 
could arise as a result of this rule. Although the Department assumes 
that there will be an increase in the number of independent contracting 
relationships, the Department did not attempt to put a specific number 
on this figure and did not attempt to estimate how new independent 
contractors might differ from existing independent contractors. The 
Department is uncertain with respect to several key questions, 
including how many new workers will be added and what their 
characteristics will be, how many existing employee relationships may 
be converted to independent contractor status, and which industries, 
type or sizes of employers would be most impacted. Absent these data, 
the Department is not well positioned to generate a constructive 
estimate or model of impact on the change in independent contracting 
relationships due to the rule. Notwithstanding, the Department 
quantified certain other impacts associated with the final rule, 
including those to current independent contractors and businesses where 
sufficient data and theory afforded greater confidence in the resulting 
estimates.
    Regarding the employees who may be negatively impacted by this 
rule, the Department has ascertained certain characteristics that it 
expects will be representative across this group. This rule provides a 
sharpening of the economic realities test, which is a marginal change 
that may impact firms' assessment of legal risk, leading to an 
increased chance that some employers will choose to reclassify certain 
positions from employee to independent contractor relationships. 
Because this analysis attempts to quantify the marginal impacts of this 
rule, if the only change is increased legal clarity, any resulting 
change in classification will most likely be limited to workers who 
already possess characteristics associated with independent contractor 
status, including control and opportunity for profit or loss.\67\ Due 
to the customary negotiation between firms and workers, most workers 
whose positions are converted will be in a position to influence the 
tradeoffs between employee and independent contractor status. The one 
group of workers for whom these assumptions may not apply is those 
workers paid the minimum wage, and whose positions already resemble 
characteristics of independent contractors. Workers earning the minimum 
wage may lack the bargaining power to fully offset the adverse effects 
triggered by the job conversion; however, independent contractor status 
often carries flexibilities that may further offset some of these 
effects, albeit non-monetarily. Further, on one hand, these workers 
likely do not have extensive benefits coverage, but on the other hand, 
they may qualify for access to benefits from other means. There are 
approximately 370,000 workers over the age of 19 who earn the minimum 
wage, which represents 0.24 percent of the workforce. It is unclear how 
many of these jobs could be converted to independent contractor status 
without material modifications to the position or substantive 
negotiation on overall compensation, but it is not likely to be many. 
Further, many of these workers may have access to health insurance 
coverage via a spouse or partner, a parent, or a government program 
(Medicaid, Medicare, Tricare, etc.). For these reasons, the Department 
does not expect there to be many current employees whose positions are 
converted to independent contractor relationships without meaningful 
ability to influence the terms of the new position in a way that 
mitigates deleterious impacts of the resulting tradeoffs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ For greater discussion on this and other points in this 
summary, please see Section XXXX on Job Conversion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department estimates there were 10.6 million workers who worked 
at any given time as independent contractors as their primary jobs in 
the United States in 2017 (6.9 percent of all workers), the most recent 
year of data available. Including independent contracting on secondary 
jobs results in an estimate of 18.9 million independent contractors 
(12.3 percent of all workers). The Department discusses other studies 
estimating the total number of independent contractors, ranging from 
6.1 percent to 14.1 percent of workers (see Table 2 in VI.C.2). Due to 
uncertainties regarding magnitude and other factors, the Department has 
not quantified the potential change to the aggregate number of 
independent contractors that may occur as a result of this rule. 
Furthermore, the Department's analysis relies on data collected prior 
to 2020, which reflects the state of the economy prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic. The Department acknowledges that data on independent 
contractors could look different during the pandemic and following its

[[Page 1211]]

economic effects, but does not yet have information to determine how 
the number of independent contractors could change nor whether these 
changes would be lasting or a near term market distortion.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ Recent studies and news reports suggest that more 
individuals are working under freelance or independent contractor 
arrangements during the pandemic. See, e.g., Press Release, New 
Upword Study Finds 36% of the U.S. Workforce Freelance Amid the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, Sep. 15, 2020, available at https://www.upwork.com/press/releases/new-upwork-study-finds-36-of-the-us-workforce-freelance-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic; Kim Mackrael, In the 
Covid Economy, Laid-Off Employees become New Entrepreneurs, Wall 
Street Journal, Nov. 18, 2020; Uri Berliner, Jobs in the Pandemic: 
More Are Freelance and may stay that way forever, NPR, Sep. 16, 
2020; Jon Younger, A New Payoneer Report Shows Covid 19 is 
Accelerating Freelance Growth, Forbes, Sep. 1., 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department estimates regulatory familiarization costs to be 
$370.9 million in the first year. The Department estimates cost savings 
due to increased clarity to be $447.1 million per year, and cost 
savings due to reduced litigation to be $48.7 million per year. This 
results in a 10-year annualized net cost savings of $452.4 million 
using a 3 percent discount rate and $443.0 million using a 7 percent 
discount rate.\69\ For purposes of Executive Order 13771, the 
Department calculated the difference between the total cost savings and 
the total costs in $2016, discounted over a perpetual time horizon 
using a 7 percent discount rate beginning in 2021 when the rule will 
take effect. This results in an annualized net cost savings over a 
perpetual time horizon of $315.5 million.\70\ Other anticipated costs, 
benefits, and cost savings are discussed qualitatively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Discount rates are directed by OMB. See Circular A-4, OMB 
(Sept. 17, 2003).
    \70\ $332.9 million-$17.4 million = $315.5 million. Per OMB 
guidelines, Executive Order 13771 data is represented in 2016 
dollars, inflation-adjusted for when the rule will take effect.

                                        Table 1--Summary of Rule Impacts
                                                [$2019 Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Annualized values \a\
                     Impact                           Year 1        Years 2-10   -------------------------------
                                                                                    7% Discount     3% Discount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory Familiarization Costs:
    Establishments..............................          $152.3            $0.0           $21.7           $17.9
    Independent Contractors.....................           218.6             0.0            31.1            25.6
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...................................           370.9             0.0            52.8            43.5
Cost Savings from Increased Clarity:
    Employers...................................           369.0           369.0           369.0           369.0
    Independent Contractors.....................            78.1            78.1            78.1            78.1
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...................................           447.1           447.1           447.1           447.1
Cost Savings from Reduced Litigation............            48.7            48.7            48.7            48.7
Total Cost Savings..............................           495.8           495.8           495.8           495.8
Net Cost Savings (Cost Savings--Costs)..........           125.0           495.8           443.0           452.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Annualized over 10-years.

C. Independent Contractors: Size and Demographics

    The Department extrapolated from U.S. Census Bureau data to 
estimate that there are 15.6 to 22.1 million individuals who work as 
independent contractors as either a primary or secondary job. This 
estimated figure could be higher or lower depending on different data 
sources and methodologies discussed below. The Department used the 
median of the above range, 18.9 million, for its estimates to avoid 
overestimation by accounting for a number of criteria, which are 
presented in this section.
1. Current Number of Independent Contractors
    The Department estimated the number of independent contractors. 
There are a variety of estimates of the number of independent 
contractors spanning a wide range depending on methodologies and how 
the population is defined. The Department believes that the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) Contingent Worker Supplement (CWS) offers an 
appropriate lower bound for the number of independent contractors; 
however, there are potential biases in these data that will be noted. 
Additionally, estimates from other sources will be presented to 
demonstrate the potential range.
    The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the CPS and it is published monthly 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The sample includes 
approximately 60,000 households and is nationally representative. 
Periodically since 1995, and most recently in 2017, the CPS has 
included a supplement to the May survey to collect data on contingent 
and alternative employment arrangements. Based on the CWS, there were 
10.6 million independent contractors in 2017, amounting to 6.9 percent 
of workers.\71\ The CWS measures those who say that their independent 
contractor job is their primary job and that they worked at the 
independent contractor job in the survey's reference week. However, 
while the Department refers to the CWS measure of independent 
contractors throughout this analysis, due to the survey's design it 
should be uniformly recognized as representing a constrained subsection 
of the entire independent contractor pool. Due to its clear 
methodological constraints, the CWS measure should be differentiated 
from other, more comprehensive measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangements--May 2017,'' USDL-18-0942 (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The BLS's estimate of independent contractors includes ``[w]orkers 
who are identified as independent contractors, independent consultants, 
or freelance workers, regardless of whether they are self-employed or 
wage and salary workers.'' BLS asks two questions to identify 
independent contractors: \72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ The variables used are PES8IC=1 for self-employed and 
PES7=1 for other workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Workers reporting that they are self-employed are asked: 
``Are you self-employed as an independent contractor, independent 
consultant, freelance worker, or something else (such as a shop or 
restaurant owner)?'' (9.0 million independent contractors.) We refer to 
these workers as ``self-employed

[[Page 1212]]

independent contractors'' in the remainder of the analysis.
     Workers reporting that they are wage and salary workers 
are asked: ``Last week, were you working as an independent contractor, 
an independent consultant, or a freelance worker? That is, someone who 
obtains customers on their own to provide a product or service.'' (1.6 
million independent contractors.) We refer to these workers as ``other 
independent contractors'' in the remainder of the analysis.
    It is important to note that independent contractors are identified 
in the CWS in the context of the respondent's ``main'' job (i.e., the 
job with the most hours).\73\ Therefore, the estimate of independent 
contractors does not include those who may be defined as an employee 
for their primary job, but may work as an independent contractor for a 
secondary or tertiary job.\74\ For example, Lim et al. (2019) estimate 
that independent contracting work is the primary source of income for 
48 percent of independent contractors.\75\ Applying this estimate to 
the 10.6 million independent contractors estimated from the CWS, 
results in 22.1 million independent contractors (10.6 million / 0.48). 
Alternatively, a survey of independent contractors in Washington found 
that 68 percent of respondents reported that independent contract work 
was their primary source of income.\76\ Applying that estimate to the 
10.6 million independent contractors from the CWS results in an 
estimated 15.6 million independent contractors (10.6 million / 0.68).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ While self-employed independent contractors are identified 
by the worker's main job, other independent contractors answered yes 
to the CWS question about working as an independent contractor last 
week. Although the survey question does not ask explicitly about the 
respondent's main job, it follows questions asked in reference to 
the respondent's main job.
    \74\ Even among independent contractors, failure to report 
multiple jobs in response to survey questions is common. For 
example, Katz and Krueger (2019) asked Amazon Mechanical Turk 
participants the CPS-style question ``Last week did you have more 
than one job or business, including part time, evening or weekend 
work?'' In total, 39 percent of respondents responded affirmatively. 
However, these participants were asked the follow-up question ``Did 
you work on any gigs, HITs or other small paid jobs last week that 
you did not include in your response to the previous question?'' 
After this question, which differs from the CPS, 61 percent of those 
who indicated that they did not hold multiple jobs on the CPS-style 
question acknowledged that they failed to report other work in the 
previous week. As Katz and Krueger write, ``If these workers are 
added to the multiple job holders, the percent of workers who are 
multiple job holders would almost double from 39 percent to 77 
percent.'' See L. Katz and A. Krueger, ``Understanding Trends in 
Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States,'' RSF: The 
Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 5(5), p. 132-
46 (2019).
    \75\ K. Lim, A. Miller, M. Risch, and E. Wilking, ``Independent 
Contractors in the U.S.: New Trends from 15 years of Administrative 
Tax Data,'' Department of Treasury, p. 61 (Jul. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpindcontractorinus.pdf.
    \76\ Washington Department of Commerce, ``Independent Contractor 
Study,'' p. 21 (Jul. 2019), https://deptofcommerce.app.box.com/v/independent-contractor-study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Coalition for Workforce Innovation (CWI) submitted a survey 
they conducted of 600 self-identified independent contractors. The 
survey found that independent contracting is the primary source of 
income for 71 percent of respondents.\77\ This is consistent with the 
prior estimate from Washington State. Applying this estimate to the 
10.6 million primary independent contractors estimated from the CWS, 
results in 14.9 million independent contractors (10.6 million / 0.71).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Coalition for Workforce Innovation. ``National Survey of 
600 Self-Identified Independent Contractors'' (January 2020), 
https://rilastagemedia.blob.core.windows.net/rila-web/rila.web/media/media/pdfs/letters%20to%20hill/hr/cwi-report-final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CWS's large sample size results in small sampling error. 
However, the questionnaire's design may result in some non-sampling 
error. For example, one potential source of bias is that the CWS only 
considers independent contractors during a single point in time--the 
survey week (generally the week prior to the interview).
    These numbers will thus underestimate the prevalence of independent 
contracting over a longer timeframe, which may better capture the size 
of the population.\78\ For example, Farrell and Greig (2016) used a 
randomized sample of 1 million Chase customers to estimate prevalence 
of the Online Platform Economy.\79\ They found that ``[a]lthough 1 
percent of adults earned income from the Online Platform Economy in a 
given month, more than 4 percent participated over the three-year 
period.'' Additionally, Collins et al. (2019) examined tax data from 
2000 through 2016 and found that the number of workers who filed a form 
1099 grew substantially over that period, and that fewer than half of 
these workers earned more than $2,500 from 1099 work in 2016. The 
prevalence of lower annual earnings implies that most workers who 
received a 1099 did not work as an independent contractor every 
week.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ In any given week, the total number of independent 
contractors would have been roughly the same, but the identity of 
the individuals who do it for less than the full year would likely 
vary. Thus, the number of unique individuals who work at some point 
in a year as independent contractors would exceed the number of 
independent contractors who work within any one-week period as 
independent contractors.
    \79\ D. Farrell and F. Greig, ``Paychecks, Paydays, and the 
Online Platform,'' JPMorgan Chase Institute (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2911293.
    \80\ B. Collins, A. Garin, E. Jackson, D. Koustas, and M. Payne, 
``Is Gig Work Replacing Traditional Employment? Evidence from Two 
Decades of Tax Returns,'' IRS SOI Joint Statistical Research Program 
(2019) (unpublished paper), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpgigworkreplacingtraditionalemployment.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CWS also uses proxy responses, which may underestimate the 
number of independent contractors. The RAND American Life Panel (ALP) 
survey conducted a supplement in 2015 to mimic the CWS questionnaire, 
but used self-responses only. The results of the survey were summarized 
by Katz and Krueger (2018).\81\ This survey found that independent 
contractors comprise 7.2 percent of workers.\82\ Katz and Krueger 
identified that the 0.5 percentage point difference in magnitude 
between the CWS and the ALP was due to both cyclical conditions, and 
the lack of proxy responses in the ALP.\83\ Therefore, the Department 
believes a reasonable upper-bound on the potential bias due to the use 
of proxy responses in the CWS is 0.5 percentage points (7.2 versus 
6.7).84 85
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ See Katz and Krueger (2018), supra note 12.
    \82\ Id. at 49. The estimate is 9.6 percent without correcting 
for overrepresentation of self-employed workers or multiple job 
holders. Id. at 31.
    \83\ Id. at Addendum (``Reconciling the 2017 BLS Contingent 
Worker Survey'').
    \84\ Note that they estimate 6.7 percent of employed workers are 
independent contractors using the CWS, as opposed to 6.9 percent as 
estimated by the BLS. This difference is attributable to changes to 
the sample to create consistency.
    \85\ In addition to the use of proxy responses, this difference 
is also due to cyclical conditions. The impacts of these two are not 
disaggregated for independent contractors, but if we applied the 
relative sizes reported for all alternative work arrangements, we 
would get 0.36 percentage point difference due to proxy responses. 
Additionally, it should be noted that this may not entirely be a 
bias. It stems from differences in independent contracting reported 
by proxy respondents and actual respondents. As Katz and Krueger 
explain, this difference may be due to a ``mode'' bias or proxy 
respondents may be less likely to be independent contractors. Id. at 
Addendum p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another potential source of bias in the CWS is that some 
respondents may not self-identify as independent contractors, and 
others who self-identify may themselves be improperly classified. There 
are reasons to believe that some workers, who are legally considered 
independent contractors, would not self-identify as such. For example, 
if the worker has only one employer/client, or did not actively pursue 
the employer/client, then they may not agree that they ``[obtain] 
customers on their own to provide a product or service.'' Additionally, 
individuals who do only

[[Page 1213]]

informal work may not view themselves as independent contractors.\86\ 
This population could be substantial. Abraham and Houseman (2019) 
confirmed this in their examination of the Survey of Household 
Economics and Decision-making. They found that 28 percent of 
respondents reported doing informal work for money over the past 
month.\87\ Conversely, some workers who are improperly classified by 
their employers as independent contractors may answer in the 
affirmative, despite not truly being independent contractors. The 
prevalence of misclassification is unknown, but it likely occurs across 
numerous sectors in the economy.\88\ Because reliable data on the 
potential magnitude of these biases are unavailable, and so the net 
direction of the biases is unknown, the Department has not attempted to 
calculate how these biases may impact the estimated number of 
independent contractors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ The Department believes that including data on informal 
work is useful when discussing the magnitude of independent 
contracting, although not all informal work is done by independent 
contractors. The Survey of Household Economics and Decision-making 
asked respondents whether they engaged in informal work sometime in 
the prior month. It categorized informal work into three broad 
categories: Personal services, on-line activities, and off-line 
sales and other activities, which is broader than the scope of 
independent contractors. These categories include activities like 
house sitting, selling goods online through sites like eBay or 
craigslist, or selling goods at a garage sale. The Department 
acknowledges that the data discussed in this study might not be a 
one-to-one match with independent contracting, but it nonetheless 
provides useful data for this purpose.
    \87\ K. Abraham, and S. Houseman. ``Making Ends Meet: The Role 
of Informal Work in Supplementing Americans' Income.'' RSF: The 
Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 5(5): 110-31 
(2019), https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2019/preliminary/paper/QreAaS2h.
    \88\ See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-09-717, 
Employee Misclassification: Improved Coordination, Outreach, and 
Targeting Could Better Ensure Detection and Prevention 10 (2008) 
(``Although the national extent of employee misclassification is 
unknown, earlier national studies and more recent, though not 
comprehensive, studies suggest that employee misclassification could 
be a significant problem with adverse consequences.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the CWS estimate represents only the number of workers who 
worked as independent contractors on their primary job during the 
survey reference week, the Department applied the research literature 
and adjusted this measure to include workers who are independent 
contractors in a secondary job or who were excluded from the CWS 
estimate due to other factors. As noted above, integrating the 
estimated proportions of workers who are independent contractors on 
secondary or otherwise excluded jobs produces estimates of 15.6 million 
and 22.1 million. The Department uses the average of these two 
estimates, 18.9 million, as the estimated total number of workers 
working as independent contractors in any job at a given time. Given 
the prevalence of independent contractors who work sporadically and 
earn minimal income, adjusting the estimate according to these sources 
captures some of this population. It is likely that this figure is 
still an underestimate of the true independent contractor pool.
2. Range of Estimates in the Literature
    To further consider the range of estimates available, the 
Department conducted a literature review, the findings of which are 
presented in Table 2. Other studies were also considered but are 
excluded from this table because the study populations were broader 
than just independent contractors or limited to one state.\89\ The RAND 
ALP \90\ and the General Social Survey's (GSS's) Quality of Worklife 
(QWL) \91\ supplement are widely cited alternative estimates. However, 
the Department chose to use sources with significantly larger sample 
sizes and more recent data for the primary estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ Including, but not limited to: McKinsey Global Institute, 
``Independent Work: Choice, Necessity, and the Gig Economy'' (2016), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/independent-work-choice-necessity-and-the-gig-economy; Kelly 
Services, ``Agents of Change'' (2015), https://www.kellyservices.com/global/siteassets/3-kelly-global-services/uploadedfiles/3-kelly_global_services/content/sectionless_pages/kocg1047720freeagent20whitepaper20210x21020final2.pdf; Robles and 
McGee, ``Exploring Online and Offline Informal Work: Findings from 
the Enterprising and Informal Work Activities (EIWA) Survey'' 
(2016); Upwork, ``Freelancing in America'' (2019); Washington 
Department of Commerce, supra note 76; Farrell and Greig, supra note 
79; MBO Partners, ``State of Independence in America'' (2016); 
Abraham et al., ``Measuring the Gig Economy: Current Knowledge and 
Open Issues'' (2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24950; Collins et 
al. (2019), supra note 80; Gitis et al., ``The Gig Economy: Research 
and Policy Implications of Regional, Economic, and Demographic 
Trends,'' American Action Forum (2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/gig-economy-research-policy-implications-regional-economic-demographic-trends/#ixzz5IpbJp79a; 
Dourado and Koopman, ``Evaluating the Growth of the 1099 
Workforce,'' Mercatus Center (2015), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/evaluating-growth-1099-workforce.
    \90\ See Katz and Krueger (2018), supra note 12.
    \91\ See Abraham et al. (2018), supra note 89, Table 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Jackson et al. (2017) \92\ and Lim et al. (2019) \93\ use tax 
information to estimate the prevalence of independent contracting. In 
general, studies using tax data tend to show an increase in prevalence 
of independent contracting over time. The use of tax data has some 
advantages and disadvantages over survey data. Advantages include large 
sample sizes, the ability to link information reported on different 
records, the reduction in certain biases such as reporting bias, 
records of all activity throughout the calendar year (the CWS only 
references one week), and inclusion of both primary and secondary 
independent contractors. Disadvantages are that independent contractor 
status needs to be inferred; there is likely an underreporting bias 
(i.e., some workers do not file taxes); researchers are generally 
trying to match the IRS definition of independent contractor, which 
does not mirror the scope of independent contractors under the FLSA; 
and the estimates include misclassified independent contractors.\94\ A 
major disadvantage of using tax data for this analysis is that the 
detailed source data are not publicly available and thus the analyses 
cannot be directly verified or adjusted as necessary (e.g., to describe 
characteristics of independent contractors, etc.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ E. Jackson, A. Looney, and S. Ramnath, ``The Rise of 
Alternative Work Arrangements: Evidence and Implications for Tax 
Filing and Benefit Coverage,'' OTA Working Paper 114 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-114.pdf.
    \93\ Lim et al., supra note 75.
    \94\ In comparison to household survey data, tax data may reduce 
certain types of biases (such as recall bias) while increasing other 
types (such as underreporting bias). Because the Department is 
unable to quantify this tradeoff, it could not determine whether, on 
balance, survey or tax data are more reliable.

                            Table 2--Summary of Estimates of Independent Contracting
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Percent of workers
        Source                Method          Definition \a\            (%)             Sample size        Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CPS CWS...............  Survey...........  Independent                         6.9  50,392.............     2017
                                            contractor,
                                            consultant or
                                            freelance worker
                                            (main only).
ALP...................  Survey...........  Independent                         7.2  6,028..............     2015
                                            contractor,
                                            consultant or
                                            freelance worker
                                            (main only).

[[Page 1214]]

 
GSS QWL...............  Survey...........  Independent                        14.1  2,538..............     2014
                                            contractor,
                                            consultant or
                                            freelancer (main
                                            only).
Jackson et al.........  Tax data.........  Independent                     \b\ 6.1  ~5.9 million \c\...     2014
                                            contractor,
                                            household worker.
Lim et al.............  Tax data.........  Independent                         8.1  1% of 1099-MISC and     2016
                                            contractor.                              5% of 1099-K.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a The survey data only identify independent contractors on their main job. Jackson et al. include independent
  contractors as long as at least 15 percent of their earnings were from self-employment income; thus, this
  population is broader. If Jackson et al.'s estimate is adjusted to exclude those who are primary wage earners,
  the rate is 4.0 percent. Lim et al. include independent contractors on all jobs. If Lim et al.'s estimate is
  adjusted to only those who receive a majority of their labor income from independent contracting, the rate is
  3.9 percent.
b Summation of (1) 2,132,800 filers with earnings from both wages and sole proprietorships and expenses less
  than $5,000, (2) 4,125,200 primarily sole proprietorships and with less than $5,000 in expenses, and (3)
  3,416,300 primarily wage earners.
c Estimate based on a 10 percent sample of self-employed workers and a 1 percent sample of W-2 recipients.

3. Demographics of Independent Contractors
    The Department reviewed demographic information on independent 
contractors using the CWS, which, as stated above, only measures those 
who say that their independent contractor job is their primary job and 
that they worked at the independent contractor job in the survey's 
reference week. According to the CWS, these primary independent 
contractors are most prevalent in the construction and professional and 
business services industries. These two industries employ 44 percent of 
primary independent contractors. Independent contractors tend to be 
older and predominately male (65 percent). Millennials have a 
significantly lower prevalence of primary independent contracting than 
older generations: 3.6 percent for Millennials compared to 6.0 percent 
for Generation X and 8.8 percent for Baby Boomers and Matures.\95\ 
However, surveys suggest that this trend is reversed when secondary 
independent contractors, or those who did informal work as independent 
contractors, are included. These divergent data suggest that younger 
workers are more likely to use contractor work sporadically and/or for 
supplemental income.\96\ White workers are somewhat overrepresented 
among primary independent contractors; they comprise 85 percent of this 
population but only 79 percent of the population of workers. 
Conversely, black workers are somewhat underrepresented (comprising 9 
percent and 13 percent, respectively).\97\ The opposite trends emerge 
when evaluating informal work, where racial minorities participate at a 
higher rate than white workers.\98\ Primary independent contractors are 
spread across the educational spectrum, with no group especially 
overrepresented. The same trend in education attainment holds for 
workers who participate in informal work.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ The Department used the generational breakdown used in the 
MBO Partner's 2017 report, ``The State of Independence in America.'' 
``Millennials'' were defined as individuals born 1980-1996, 
``Generation X'' were defined as individuals born 1965-1980, and 
``Baby Boomers and Matures'' were defined as individuals born before 
1965.
    \96\ Abraham and Houseman (2019), supra note 87, find that 
informal work decreases as a worker's age increases. Among 18 to 24 
years olds, 41.3 percent did informal work over the past month. The 
rate fell to 25.7 percent for 45 to 54 year olds, and 13.4 percent 
for those 75 years and older. See also Upwork (2019), supra note 89.
    \97\ These numbers are based on the respondents who state that 
their race is ``white only'' or ``black only'' as opposed to 
identifying as multi-racial.
    \98\ Abraham and Houseman (2019), supra note 87.
    \99\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Potential Transfers

    Given the current universe of independent contractors and the 
possibility that more individuals may become independent contractors 
after the rule is finalized, the Department here identifies the 
possible transfers among workers and between workers and businesses, 
which may occur. These transfer effects are discussed qualitatively and 
include effects relating to employer provided benefits, tax liability, 
earnings, minimum wage and overtime pay, accurate classification of 
workers, and conversions of employee jobs to independent contractor 
jobs.
    In evaluating potential transfers that could be occasioned by the 
rule, the Department notes at the outset that the substantive effect of 
the rule is not intended to favor independent contractor or employee 
classification relative to the status quo of the Department's existing 
guidance and precedent from courts. However, the Department assumes in 
this RIA that the increased legal certainty associated with this final 
rule could lead to an increase in the number of independent contractor 
arrangements by reducing the transaction and compliance costs inherent 
in structuring such an arrangement. The Department has not attempted to 
estimate the magnitude of this change, primarily because there are not 
objective tools for quantifying the clarity, simplification, and 
enhanced probative value of the Department's proposals for sharpening 
and focusing the economic reality test.\100\ Several commenters assumed 
the increase in independent contractors would be 5 percent, although 
none provided substantive support to bolster the assumption. See EPI, 
Washington Center. Due to the lack of certainty and data to support a 
reliable estimate, the Department does not attempt to estimate the 
increase in independent contractor relationships that would result due 
to this rule. Therefore, potential transfers are discussed 
qualitatively with some numbers presented on a per worker basis. 
Potential transfers may result from differences in benefits, tax 
liabilities, and earnings between employees and independent 
contractors. Although employment benefits could decrease, and tax 
liabilities could increase, the Department believes the net impact on 
total compensation should be small in either direction. Furthermore, to 
attract qualified workers, companies must offer competitive 
compensation. Therefore,

[[Page 1215]]

for workers in a competitive labor market, any reduction in benefits 
and increase in taxes are expected to be offset by higher base 
earnings. This concept is discussed further below in the Earnings 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ Another uncertainty limiting the Department's ability to 
quantify the possible increase in independent contracting is the 
nature and effect of state wage and hour laws. Some states, such as 
California, have laws that place more stringent limitations on who 
may qualify as independent contractors than the FLSA. See Cal. Labor 
Code 2775 (establishing a demanding ``ABC'' test applicable to most 
workers when determining independent contractor status under 
California law). Because the FLSA does not preclude states and 
localities from establishing broader wage and hour protections than 
those that exist under the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C. 218(a), workers in 
some states may be unaffected by this final rule. However, because 
the Department is not well positioned to interpret the precise scope 
of each state's wage and hour laws, the Department is unable to 
definitively determine the degree to which workers in particular 
states would or would not be affected by this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Assuming that independent contractor arrangements increase 
following this final rule, it is unclear the extent to which this would 
occur as a result of current employees being subsequently classified as 
independent contractors or as a result of the hiring of new workers as 
independent contractors. This will have implications for transfers. If 
current employees change classifications, then there may be transfers. 
Employers could change the classification of current employees only if 
those workers could already have been classified as independent 
contractors or if the working conditions are modified such that the 
relationship becomes a true independent contractor relationship, 
assuming doing so is consistent with any applicable employment 
contracts, collective bargaining agreement, or other applicable 
laws.\101\ Lim et al. (2019) found in the status quo that there was 
``little evidence that firms are increasingly reclassifying existing 
employee relationships as [independent contractor] relationships,'' 
however, they found that ``firms are hiring more new workers as 
[independent contractors] rather than as employees.'' \102\ The 
Department does not anticipate this phenomenon will cease occurring in 
the presence of the final rule. As discussed below, the limited number 
of businesses with employees whose roles would meet the requirements to 
be independent contractors likely face incentives to maintain the 
status quo for those workers, but there will likely be some degree of 
innovation in the labor market in response to the rule that compounds 
the current trend towards greater numbers of independent contractors. 
For more discussion on how employees may be affected by transfers, see 
the Job Conversion discussion in Section VI(D)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ Under the final rule, a worker may be classified only if 
the job meets the requirements of section 795.105.
    \102\ Lim et al., supra note 75 at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By decreasing uncertainty and thus potentially opening new 
opportunities for firms, companies may hire independent contractors who 
they otherwise would not have hired. In this case, there may be a 
decrease in unemployment, an increase in the size of the labor force, 
or both. In a study of respondents from both Europe and the U.S., 
McKinsey Global Institute found that 15 percent of those not working 
are interested in becoming an independent contractor as their primary 
job.\103\ Attracting these individuals to join the labor force would be 
classified as a societal benefit, rather than a transfer. These impacts 
are evaluated more fully below as part of the discussion on Cost 
Savings and Benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ McKinsey Global Institute, supra note 89 at 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department requested comments on its assumption that use of 
independent contractors will increase if the proposed rule is 
finalized. Most commenters took the view that, consistent with the 
Department's assumption, the final rule will lead to an increase in the 
number and proportion of workers who are independent contractors. Some 
commenters, such as the Signatory Wall and Ceiling Contractors Alliance 
(SWACCA) and other construction workers' unions commented that the rule 
could lead to increases in the percentage of independent contractors in 
the workforce by narrowing the standard for FLSA employment. But as 
explained above in Section IV(E)(2) and later in the discussion of 
regulatory alternatives in Section VI(G)(2), the final rule does not 
narrow or expand the standard for FLSA employment. Rather, the 
Department agrees with many commenters representing businesses and 
freelance workers that the final rule serves only to make that standard 
clearer, enabling businesses and individuals to structure their work 
relationships to comply with the law. See Section III (discussing 
commenter feedback). While this could lead to a greater incidence of 
independent contracting--as businesses and workers will be able to more 
freely adopt independent worker arrangements without fear of FLSA 
liability--the final rule does not narrow the standard for FLSA 
employment.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ The fact that the final rule is not an expansion or 
narrowing of the FLSA's scope of employment is not to say that 
courts have never in the past misapplied the economic reality test 
in particular cases. For example, some courts have expressly 
disagreed on the meaning of the ``integral/integrated'' factor in 
the test. The existence of seemingly contradictory and inconsistent 
case law is one of the reasons why the Department sees a need to 
issue this final rule. However, as discussed extensively above, the 
Department believes that the statement of the economic reality test 
in the final rule is consistent with precedent and the FLSA as a 
whole, even if it is in tension with particular cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters disagreed with the Department's decision not to 
specifically quantify a change in the number of independent 
contractors. Furthermore, most of the commenters who included 
assumptions of growing numbers of independent contractors also assumed 
that those workers were drawn from the existing pool of employees, not 
from the otherwise unemployed or those outside the labor market.\105\ 
The Washington Center for Equitable Growth (Washington Center), for 
instance, simply assumed a 5 percent increase in the number of 
independent contractors (corresponding to an equivalent decline in 
employees); \106\ however, it neither provided explanation why that 
percentage was reasonable nor justified its assumption that the 
percentage would entirely represent a shift of existing employment 
relationships to independent contractor relationships. Many commenters 
asserting and estimating a sizable shift from employment to independent 
contracting relationships seem to have based their estimates on the 
false impression that the final rule would narrow the FLSA scope of 
employment. As explained above, this is not the case--the final rule 
does not shift the definition of who is an employee under the FLSA. Any 
shift, the Department believes, would have to result from increased 
certainty, reduced overhead, and reduced misclassification. Conversely, 
the Americans for Prosperity Foundation (AFPF) agreed with the 
Department's decision to not quantify potential changes in the 
aggregate number of independent contractors and supported the 
Department's analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ Some commenters and reports (See e.g., Palagashvili; 
Fuller et al.,) cited data that indicate increased regulatory 
clarity would likely result in workers entering the workforce due to 
the greater flexibility and control provided by independent 
contracting relationships. This would expand the workforce rather 
than transfer workers between classifications.
    \106\ EPI, Washington Center, and other commenters who use this 
5 percent estimate assume the entire increase to independent 
contractors consists of workers whose overall compensation will 
decline and whose jobs otherwise remain the same. See EPI 
(characterizing converted workers as having ``the same job for 
substantially less compensation''). The Department finds this highly 
unlikely. For more discussion on this topic, see the Job Conversion 
topic in Section II.D.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department continues to believe that the necessary data and 
information are not available to quantify either any shift in 
independent contracting away from employee relationships or the number 
of new independent contractors who may enter the workforce in response 
to the rule and the impact of such a shift on workers and businesses. 
As explained in the NPRM, any attempt to produce a useful estimate for 
the impact of an increase in independent contractors requires 
ascertaining a

[[Page 1216]]

number of additional variables, including how this reduction in 
administrative overhead and misclassification would impact independent 
contracting. See 85 FR 60626. The approach taken by some commenters of 
simply choosing a number without support and applying it across the 
entire economy, given the extremely large number of employment 
relationships in the United States, the differences in how a worker may 
value certain ``benefits,'' \107\ and the unique relationships between 
different types of independent contractors and different businesses, 
could create a misleading and uncertain estimate of the impact of the 
rule without lending any additional clarity because of the lack of the 
basis for such a figure and likely differences between the current 
independent contractor population and the population likely to arise as 
a result of this rule. Since commenters, including those in support and 
those in opposition, did not proffer sufficient data upon which to 
build more accurate assumptions, the Department has not attempted to 
quantify this impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ If, for example, a state mandates that employees receive 
paid parental leave, but the worker does not have and intends not to 
have children, this ``benefit'' is of no value to that worker. 
Estimating how an individual worker values a particular ``benefit'' 
or even a tax liability would require a worker-by-worker analysis 
for which the Department lacks necessary data.
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1. Impact of COVID-19 on the Rule
    The Department also requested data and comment on the possible 
impacts resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic as it relates to the 
composition of the labor market, the share and scope of independent 
contractors in the workforce, and any associated wage effects. Several 
commenters noted the importance of independent contracting in 
weathering the pandemic. For example, the Center for Growth and 
Opportunity at Utah State University (CGO) wrote that the benefits of 
independent contracting ``are likely to grow if the United States labor 
market adapts to the recession spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic 
similarly as it did to the financial crisis of 2008.'' They note that 
during an economic downturn, workers can turn to alternative work 
arrangements such as independent contracting to supplement their 
income. The view is supported by a recent Harvard Business Review 
article that describes how firms have increasingly relied on 
freelancing and platforms that allow access to the growing supply of 
on-demand workers to identify innovative solutions more flexibly and 
quickly than relying solely on their fulltime workforce, noting that 
``Early signs suggest that Covid-19 will also speed up this shift.'' 
\108\ It is also supported by a range of recent news reports indicating 
that freelance opportunities provide an important path for individuals 
to return to the workforce who lost their jobs due to the 
pandemic.\109\ Women Employed claimed that this rule will degrade jobs, 
and that doing so in the midst of a pandemic would be harmful, basing 
this claim on assumptions that this rule would ``undermine the FLSA'' 
and increase misclassification of workers. But as explained above, this 
rule does not undermine the FLSA; it sharpens the focus of the economic 
reality test and clarifies the meaning of economic dependence that 
courts, the Department, and most commenters agree is the standard for 
employment under the Act. This clearer standard is likely to reduce 
rather than increase occurrences of misclassification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Fuller, et al., supra note 64 (``Many freelance platforms 
offer access to workers from around the world with a wide variety of 
skills, and payment is often per completed task. Covid-19 is 
accelerating the move toward these platforms. . ..''); see also 
Press Release, New Upwork Study Finds 36% of the U.S. Workforce 
Freelance Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, Sep. 15, 2020, available at 
https://www.upwork.com/press/releases/new-upwork-study-finds-36-of-the-us-workforce-freelance-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic.
    \109\ See, e.g., Kim Mackrael, In the Covid Economy, Laid-Off 
Employees become New Entrepreneurs, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 
2020; Uri Berliner, Jobs in the Pandemic: More Are Freelance and may 
stay that way forever, NPR, Sep. 16, 2020; Jon Younger, A New 
Payoneer Report Shows Covid 19 is Accelerating Freelance Growth, 
Forbes, Sep. 1. 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Employer Provided Benefits
    In the context of transfers, the Department attempted to evaluate 
how an increase in independent contracting relationships could affect 
employer provided benefits. Although this rule only addresses workers' 
independent contractor status under the FLSA, the Department assumes in 
this analysis that employers are likely to keep the status of most 
workers the same across all benefits and requirements.\110\ To the 
extent that employers currently provide employees benefits such as 
health insurance, retirement contributions, and paid time off, these 
would likely decrease with an increase in the use of independent 
contractors because independent contractors generally do not receive 
these benefits directly (although independent contractors are able to 
purchase at least some of these benefits for themselves and, as 
explained in the preamble, the offering of health, retirement, and 
other benefits to workers is not necessarily indicative of employee 
status). Employer-provided benefits are often a significant share of 
workers' compensation. According to the BLS's Employer Costs for 
Employee Compensation (ECEC), the value of employer benefits that 
directly benefit employees average 21 percent of total 
compensation.\111\ The Department notes that this 21 percent figure is 
an average for all employees and may not be representative of the 
subset of employees whose classification may be impacted by this rule. 
Since the 21 percent figure includes paid leave (7.2 percentage points) 
and retirement benefits (5.3 percentage points), and workers may value 
these benefits at very different levels, applying these elements does 
not seem reasonable in the context of this analysis.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ Courts have noted that the FLSA has the broadest 
conception of employment under Federal law. See, e.g., Darden, 503 
U.S. at 326. To the extent that businesses making employment status 
determinations base their decisions on the most demanding Federal 
standard, a rulemaking addressing the FLSA's distinction between 
employees and independent contractors may affect the businesses' 
classification decisions for purposes of benefits and legal 
requirements under other Federal and state laws.
    \111\ BLS, ``Employer Costs for Employee Compensation News 
Release'' (Sept. 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_12182019.htm. For Civilian Workers, this includes paid leave 
($2.68), insurance ($3.22), and retirement and savings benefits 
($1.96). It does not include overtime and premium pay, shift 
differential pay, nonproduction bonuses, or legally required 
benefits. Calculated as ($2.68 + $3.22 + $1.96)/$37.03.
    \112\ The average economy-wide provision of insurance benefits, 
which represent 8.7 percentage points of the 21 percent figure, is 
also likely to be an overestimate for the average percentage of 
compensation offered to the workers most likely to be impacted by 
this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department used the CWS to compare prevalence of health 
insurance and retirement benefits across employees and independent 
contractors to produce a highly generalized picture. However, it should 
be noted that these two populations may differ in other ways than just 
their employment classification and the particular elements of their 
compensation packages discussed in the preceding paragraph which may 
impact benefit amounts. For instance, an employee shifting to 
independent contractor status who already receives health benefits 
through a partner's benefit plan would not be impacted by losing heath 
benefit eligibility. Additionally, lower benefits may be offset by 
increased base pay to attract workers because workers consider the full 
package of pay and benefits when accepting a job.
    According to the CWS's relatively narrow definition of independent 
contractor:

[[Page 1217]]

     79.4 percent of self-employed independent contractors have 
health insurance. Most of these workers either purchased insurance on 
their own (31.5 percent) or have access through their spouse (28.6 
percent).
     80.7 percent of other independent contractors have health 
insurance. There are three main ways these workers receive health 
insurance: Through their spouse (25.1 percent), through an employer 
(24.2), or on their own (20.1 percent).
     88.3 percent of employees have health insurance. Most of 
these workers receive health insurance through their work (64.1 
percent). Furthermore, according to the ECEC, employers pay on average 
12 percent of an employee's base compensation in health insurance 
premiums.
    Several commenters estimated the prevalence of health insurance 
among independent contractors. In early 2020, CWI commissioned a 
national survey of 600 self-identified independent contractors. Their 
survey found that 84 percent of independent contractors have healthcare 
coverage.\113\ The Workplace Policy Institute of Littler Mendelson, 
P.C. (WPI) pointed to a study that found about 90 percent of gig 
workers have health insurance.\114\ The study also found that less than 
one-third of 1099-MISC workers purchase their own health insurance, 
``and most indicate that health insurance does not affect their 
decision to work as an independent contractor.'' It also notes that the 
businesses interviewed believe that workers may have ``made an economic 
decision with their spouse--where one spouse works without benefits for 
higher pay and the other receives lower pay with benefits--resulting in 
a higher total income and health benefits for the household.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ Coalition for Workforce Innovation (2020), supra note 77.
    \114\ A. Yildirmaz, M. Goldar, S. Klein, ``Illuminating the 
Shadow Workforce: Insights Into the Gig Workforce in Businesses,'' 
ADP Research Institute (February 2020), https://www.adpri.org/research/illuminating-the-shadow-workforce/?release=illuminating-the-shadow-workforce-2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From these data, it is unclear exactly how health insurance 
coverage would change if the number of independent contractors 
increased, but the data suggest that independent contractors, on 
average, may be less likely to have health insurance coverage. That 
said, employment is not a guarantee of health insurance, nor do 
independent contractors generally lack health insurance. Additionally, 
simply comparing rates between independent contractors and employees 
may be misleading. As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce pointed out, many 
independent contractors would not be eligible for benefits even if they 
were employees due to the short-term and/or part-time nature of such an 
employment relationship.
    Women Employed noted that the although the Department showed high 
rates of health insurance among independent contractors in general, the 
Department did not show that low-wage independent contractors have 
access to health insurance. In response, the Department compared health 
insurance rates for workers earning less than $15 per hour and found 
that 71.0 percent of such independent contractors have health insurance 
compared with 78.5 percent of such employees. Health insurance rates 
are lower for both independent contractors and employees when limited 
to low-wage workers. However, the gap in coverage between low-wage 
employees and independent contractors remains comparable to that for 
all workers: 7.5 percentage points for low-wage workers compared to 8.1 
percentage points for all workers.
    A major source of retirement savings is employer sponsored 
retirement accounts. According to the CWS, 55.5 percent of employees 
have a retirement account with their current employer; in addition, the 
ECEC found that employers pay 5.3 percent of employees' total 
compensation in retirement benefits on average ($1.96/$37.03). If a 
worker shifts from employee to independent contractor status, that 
worker may no longer receive employer-provided retirement benefits, but 
may choose alternate personal investment options. As with health 
insurance, it is not clear whether retirement savings for such a worker 
would increase or decrease, but such a worker would likely need to take 
a more active role in saving for retirement vis-[agrave]-vis an 
employee with an employer-sponsored retirement plan.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ Access to such benefits might be similar for both 
employees and independent contractors, but it is unlikely that the 
business will contribute similar sums to benefits for an independent 
contractor and employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters pointed out that independent contractors generally have 
retirement accounts. CWIs survey of independent contractors found that 
73 percent have a retirement savings plan. The WPI pointed to a study 
by T. Rowe Price that found that more than half of independent 
contractors are saving for retirement.\116\ Conversely, commenters such 
as the Washington Center cited a study showing that independent 
contractors are ``less likely . . . to make contributions to a 
retirement account.'' \117\ However, that study narrowly defines 
retirement accounts to include ``employer-sponsored plans'' while 
excluding other common long-term saving methods, which biases the 
comparison between independent contractors and employees. This hampers 
the ability to substantively compare this commenter's position with 
those of other commenters, such as CWI and WPI, listed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ T. Rowe Price, ``Press Release: The Majority of 
Independent Workers are Actively Saving for Retirement'' (March 25, 
2019), https://www.troweprice.com/corporate/en/press/t-rowe-price-the-majority-of-independent-workersare-actively-.html
    \117\ Jackson, Looney, and Ramnath (2017), supra note 92.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters asserted the Department should quantify the impact 
of the rule on benefits such as health insurance and retirement 
savings. This includes a letter from 107 U.S. Representatives and 
separate letters from Rep. Donald Norcross and Rep. Pramila Jayapal. 
The Texas RioGrande Legal Aid (TRLA) claimed that because the 
Department did not estimate the ``financial impact on the health and 
retirement accounts of workers'' it violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act. However, the Department does not believe that these 
impacts could be usefully quantified. First, quantifying these impacts 
necessarily requires estimating any increase in the prevalence of 
independent contracting relationships. As explained previously, the 
Department does not believe that this figure can be meaningfully 
estimated. Second, classification under the FLSA does not directly 
determine whether workers qualify for these benefit programs, and as 
such, it is difficult to assess how the specific workers who are 
converted from employee to independent contractor status under the FLSA 
could have their individual benefits affected. If an employer provides 
health and retirement benefits to employees, but does not provide them 
to the same workers upon conversion of the positions into independent 
contractor relationships, overall compensation will be negatively 
impacted unless offset by sufficiently higher earnings. However, this 
could happen only in non-competitive labor markets in which employers 
have the ability to set compensation without regard for worker 
preferences. While some employers may desire to save the costs of 
providing certain benefits to employees by engaging independent 
contractors, if the relevant labor markets are even somewhat 
competitive, they likely will need to increase monetary compensation, 
give up, for example,

[[Page 1218]]

certain elements of control (i.e., non-pecuniary compensation), or both 
to recruit workers for providing the same work. The impacts of the rule 
would not be uniform across workers, especially with respect to those 
workers that may become independent contractors. Furthermore and as 
explained further in Section VI(D)(7), the Department believes the 
ability for firms to deny benefits by converting their workers into 
independent contractors is constrained.
3. Tax Liability
    Another potentially important source of transfers affected by the 
prevalence of independent contracting is tax liability. Payroll tax 
liability is generally divided between the employer and the employee in 
the United States. Most economists believe that the ``incidence'' of 
the payroll tax, regardless of liability, falls on the employee.\118\ 
As self-employed workers, independent contractors are legally obligated 
to pay both the employee and employer shares of the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA) taxes. Thus, if workers' classifications 
change from employees to independent contractors, there may be a 
transfer in Federal tax liabilities from employers to workers 
(regardless of whether this affects the actual cost of these taxes to 
the worker). These payroll taxes include: \119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ The share of payroll taxes borne by employees versus firms 
is unknown but economists generally believe that employer payroll 
taxes are partially-to-completely shifted to employees in the long 
run. For a detailed review of the literature see J. Deslauriers, B. 
Dostie, R. Gagn[eacute], and J. Par[eacute], ``Estimating the 
Impacts of Payroll Taxes: Evidence from Canadian Employer-Employee 
Tax Data,'' IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series 
IZA DP No. 11598 (June 2018), https://ftp.iza.org/dp11598.pdf. 
Further information is available by the Tax Foundation, https://taxfoundation.org/what-are-payroll-taxes-and-who-pays-them/.
    \119\ Internal Revenue Service, ``Publication 15, (Circular E), 
Employer's Tax Guide'' (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Social Security tax: The 6.2 percent employer component 
(half of the 12.4 percent total).\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ The social security tax has a wage base limit of $137,700 
in 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Medicare tax: The 1.45 percent employer component (half of 
the 2.9 percent total).\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ An additional Medicare Tax of 0.9 percent applies to wages 
paid in excess of $200,000 in a calendar year for individual filers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In sum, vis-[agrave]-vis an employee, independent contractors are 
legally responsible for an additional 7.65 percent of their earnings in 
FICA taxes (less the applicable tax deduction for this additional 
payment). However, any tax-related transfers from employers to workers 
would likely be offset by higher wages employers pay independent 
contractors. Employers will not pay payroll taxes for work transferred 
to workers classified as independent contractors and market forces 
could compel them to pass the full wage (wage + payroll tax) to the 
independent contractors. That is not the only reason we expect 
independent contractors will earn higher hourly earnings, but is the 
focus here. For discussion on other expected wage effects, see Section 
VI(D)(4) below.
    Companies also cover unemployment insurance and workers' 
compensation taxes for their employees. Independent contractors may 
choose to pay for comparable insurance protection offered in the 
private market, but are not obligated to. The resulting regulatory 
effect (experienced as savings, either by companies or employees, 
depending on who ultimately bears the cost of the tax) combines 
societal cost savings (the lessened administrative cost of 
incrementally lower participation in unemployment insurance and 
workers' compensation programs) and transfers (from individuals whose 
unemployment insurance or workers' compensation payments decline, to 
entities paying less in taxes). Independent contractors may recoup some 
or all of the employer portion of these taxes and insurance premiums in 
the form of increased wages. This rule could decrease employers' tax 
liabilities and increase independent contractors' take-home 
compensation. However, there are costs to independent contractors if 
they are out of work or injured or ill on the job because they no 
longer are protected, unless they purchase their own private 
insurance.\122\ Many of these impacts will depend on the individual 
risk tolerances of the workers. It is likely that workers who are more 
comfortable taking risks will be attracted to the potentially higher 
take-home compensation of independent contractor status, while workers 
who are risk averse will likely prefer the predictability of 
traditional employee relationships. It is uncertain how the universe of 
workers is dispersed, beyond theoretical generalizations. It is further 
unclear how workers' risk preferences will be distributed across the 
market for insurance products. The Department was not able to identify 
economy-wide distributional data on worker preferences and projected 
purchasing dynamics. That is likely because worker preferences are 
difficult to accurately measure and capture in datasets due to their 
high variability worker to worker and ambiguity of sorting across 
economic sectors. Without access to such data, the Department did not 
attempt to quantify the cost of changes in coverage or whether the net 
effect is a benefit or cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ The Department did not undertake to comprehensively review 
state law on unemployment insurance in this area, but notes that 
some states do not use the economic reality test to determine which 
individuals are covered by state unemployment insurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Earnings
    Potential transfers could also occur through changes to earnings as 
a result of an increase in independent contracting. These transfers 
could occur if workers who were employees experience a change in 
earnings by becoming independent contractors, or if workers who are out 
of the labor market enter in order to become independent contractors. 
Although the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of the FLSA 
would no longer apply to workers who shift from employee status to 
independent contractor status, as discussed below, this does not 
sufficiently explain the potential transfers that could occur as a 
result of such a shift. Furthermore, the Department anticipates an 
increase in labor force activity, but for the reasons stated above, the 
Department does not attempt to quantify the magnitude of any increase 
or decrease in earnings as a result of increased labor force activity.
    If currently unemployed workers or individuals who are out of the 
labor market become independent contractors due to this rule, their 
earnings will increase as they currently have no work-related earnings 
other than possibly unemployment benefits. The impact on earnings is 
more ambiguous if employees' classifications change to independent 
contractors. In theory, because independent contractors likely prefer 
to have at least similar levels of total compensation as they would 
earn if they were employees, companies would likely have to pay more 
per hour to independent contractors than to employees because 
independent contractors generally do not receive company-provided 
benefits and have higher tax liabilities. Data show an hourly wage 
premium for independent contractors when comparing unadjusted mean 
averages. But as the analysis below illustrates, when controlling for 
certain differences in worker characteristics, this expected wage 
premium may not always be observable at a statistically significant 
level. It should be noted, however, that these estimates do not attempt 
to incorporate the value of flexibility and satisfaction that many 
independent contractors cite as key factors in their preference of

[[Page 1219]]

independent contracting arrangements over traditional employment.
    Comparing the average earnings, hourly wages, and hours of current 
employees and independent contractors may provide some indication of 
the impact on wages of a worker who transitions from an employee to 
independent contractor classification. A regression analysis that 
controls for observable differences between independent contractors and 
employees may help isolate the impact on earning, hourly wages, and 
usual hours of being an independent contractor. Katz and Krueger (2018) 
\123\ regressed the natural log of hourly wages on independent 
contractor status,\124\ occupation, sex, potential experience, 
potential experience squared, education, race, and ethnicity. They use 
the 2005 CWS and the 2015 RAND ALP (the 2017 CWS was not available at 
the time of their analysis). The Department conducted a similar 
regression using the 2017 CWS. In both Katz and Krueger's regression 
results and the Department's calculations, the following outlying 
values were removed: Workers reporting earning less than $50 per week, 
less than $1 per hour, or more than $1,000 per hour.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ See Katz and Krueger (2018), supra note 12.
    \124\ On-call workers, temporary help agency workers, and 
workers provided by contract firms are excluded from the base group 
of ``traditional'' employees.
    \125\ Choice of exclusionary criteria from Katz and Krueger 
(2018), supra note 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department combined the CWS data on usual earnings per week and 
hours worked per week to estimate hourly wage rates to normalize the 
comparison between independent contractors and employees.\126\ The 
Department found that independent contractors tend to earn more per 
hour: Employees earned an average of $24.07 per hour, self-employed 
independent contractors earned an average of $27.43 per hour, and other 
independent contractors earned an average of $26.71 per hour (the 
average hourly wage is $27.29 when combining the two types of 
independent contractors).\127\ Katz and Krueger conducted similar 
hourly earnings estimates based on 2005 CWS and 2015 ALP data. Their 
analysis of the 2005 CWS data indicated that ``[b]efore conditioning on 
covariates, the 2005 and 2015 results are similar: freelancers and 
contract workers are paid more per hour than traditional employees.'' 
\128\ When controlling for education, potential experience, potential 
experience squared, race, ethnicity, sex and occupation, independent 
contractors' higher hourly wages in the 2005 CWS data remained higher 
but were not statistically significant. But Katz and Krueger's analysis 
of the 2015 ALP data under the same specifications found that primary 
independent contractors earned more per hour than traditional 
employees, and the estimates were statistically significant.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ The CWS data, based on its relatively narrow definition of 
independent contractors, indicated that employees worked more hours 
per week in comparison to primary independent contractors. The 
Department found that 81 percent of employees worked full-time, 
compared to 72 percent for self-employed independent contractors and 
69 percent for other independent contractors. Katz and Krueger 
similarly found that independent contractors work fewer hours per 
week than employees (statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level of significance in all specifications with both datasets). 
Despite working fewer hours per week than employees, self-employed 
independent contractors earned more per week on average ($980 per 
week compared to $943 per week). Other independent contractors, on 
average, worked fewer hours per week and earned less per week than 
employees ($869 per week compared to $943 per week). Given the 
difference between hours worked by primary independent contractors 
and employees, and the appeal of flexibility cited by many 
independent contractors, average weekly earnings may be an 
inadequate measure. Accordingly, the Department's analysis focuses 
on hourly wages.
    \127\ The Department followed Katz and Krueger's methodology in 
excluding observations with weekly earnings less than $50, hourly 
wages less than $1, or with hourly wages above $1,000. Additionally, 
workers with weekly earnings above $2,885 are topcoded at $2,885. 
Weekly earnings are used to calculate imputed hourly wages.
    \128\ Id. at 19.
    \129\ Id. at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Conceptually, the Department expects that independent contractors 
would earn more per hour than traditional employees in base 
compensation as an offset to employer-provided benefits and increases 
in tax liabilities. Katz and Krueger's analysis of the 2015 RAND ALP 
data appears to support this prediction.\130\ However, they recommend 
caution in interpreting the estimates from the ALP due to the 
relatively small sample size. Their analysis of the 2005 CWS data and 
the Department's similar analysis of 2017 CWS data did not show a 
statistically significant difference. But as previously noted, 
comparing current employees to current primary independent contractors 
may not be indicative of how earnings would change for current 
employees who became independent contractors. Nor do such wage-based 
comparisons reflect the non-pecuniary attributes of employees and 
independent contractors.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See Katz and Kreuger (2018), supra note 12 at 20 (``A 
positive hourly wage premium for independent contractors could 
reflect a compensating differential for lower benefits and the need 
to pay self-employment taxes.'').
    \131\ In particular, at least some research reveals significant 
non-pecuniary advantages to independent contracting, including 
through increased job satisfaction. See ``The State of Independence 
in America,'' MBO Partners (2019), https://www.mbopartners.com/state-of-independence/; Chen et al., ``The Value of Flexible Work: 
Evidence from Uber Drivers,'' Journal of Political Economy 127:6, 
2735-794 (2019); He, H. et al., ``Do Workers Value Flexible Jobs? A 
Field Experiment,'' NBER Working Paper No. w25423, (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3311395; McKinsey Global Institute, supra note 89; 
Upwork (2019), supra note 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One potential reason for the variance among the estimates for 
independent contractor wages could be error in the measurement of 
independent contractor status and earnings, a factor that is present 
throughout every analysis in this area. As a recent analysis concluded, 
``different data sources provide quite different answers to the simple 
question of what is the level and trend of self-employment in the U.S. 
economy,'' which suggest substantial measurement error in at least some 
data sources.\132\ As noted above, reporting errors by survey 
respondents may contribute to measurement error in CWS data.\133\ 
Additionally, CWS questions ``were asked only about people who had 
already been identified as employed in response to the survey's 
standard employment questions and only about their main jobs,'' and 
therefore may miss important segments of the population. BLS has 
recently acknowledged limitations in the 2017 CWS survey in response to 
a GAO audit and is reevaluating how it would measure independent 
contractors in the future.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ Abraham et al. (2018), supra note 89 at 15. Generally, 
``[h]ousehold surveys consistently show lower levels of self-
employment than tax data and a relatively flat or declining long-
term trend in self-employment as contrasted with the upward trend 
that is evident in tax data.'' Id.; see also id. at 45.
    \133\ ``For example, a household survey respondent might fail to 
mention informal work that they do not think of as a job, something 
that further probing might uncover. To take another example, a 
household member who is doing work for a business may be reported as 
an employee of that business, even in cases where further probing 
might reveal that the person is in fact an independent contractor or 
freelancer.'' Id. at 15.
    \134\ Specifically, BLS recognized that: (1) The ``CWS measures 
only respondents' main jobs . . ., thus potentially missing workers 
with nontraditional second or supplementary income jobs''; (2) ``CWS 
only asks respondents about their work in the past week and may fail 
to capture seasonal workers or workers that supplement their income 
with occasional work''; and (3) ``added questions regarding 
electronically-mediated employment resulted in a large number of 
false positive answers.'' Government Accountability Office, 
Contingent Workforce: BLS is Reassessing Measurement of 
Nontraditional Workers, Jan. 29, 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696643.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another potential bias in the Department's results could be due to 
the exclusion of relevant explanatory variables from the model 
specification, including the omission of observable variables that 
correlate with hourly earnings. For example, the Department's analysis 
of 2017 CWS data used 22

[[Page 1220]]

occupation dummy variables but did not control for a worker's job 
position within any of the occupations (although it did control for 
``potential experience''). However, as the Department's guidance 
indicates, a statistical comparison of earnings between workers 
generally must control for ``job level or grade'' in addition to 
experience to ensure the comparison is for workers in similar 
jobs.\135\ If, hypothetically, independent contractors on average have 
lower job levels (or equivalents) than traditional employees within 
each occupation,\136\ the Department's analysis would not be comparing 
the hourly earnings of primary independent contractors and employees 
who have the same jobs. Instead, the Department would be comparing a 
population of relatively low-level independent contractors with a 
population that includes both low- and high-level employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contracting 
Compliance Programs, Directive 2018-5, (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/directives/2018-05#ftn.id10.
    \136\ For example, because individuals working in that 
occupation as independent contractors are less likely to be in 
positions with managerial responsibilities over other workers than 
are employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The existence of unobservable differences between independent 
contractors and employees that are correlated with earnings, such as 
productivity, skill, and preference for flexibility also bias 
comparison of hourly earnings. For example, independent contractors may 
be on average more willing than employees to trade monetary 
compensation for increased workplace flexibility that may accompany 
independent contractor status, which would obscure the observability of 
an earnings premium for independent contractors.\137\ Non-pecuniary 
benefits of independent contracting, often including workplace 
flexibility, may impact the occurrence of an earnings premium, measured 
strictly in monetary terms, but may contribute to workers' evaluation 
of the merits of in engaging as independent contractors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ He, H. et al. (2019), supra note 131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Independent contractors' hourly earnings premium may be best 
observed at the margin, such as comparing a worker's behavior when 
deciding between two similar positions, one as an employee and one as 
an independent contractor. However, the Department could not find data 
on such situations to allow for an economy-wide estimate, nor did 
commenters provide such data.
    Some commenters expressed concern that the Department did not 
sufficiently justify its claim that independent contractors earn an 
earnings premium. Other commenters cited evidence purporting to show 
that workers misclassified as independent contractors earn less than 
employees. Much of this evidence, however, relates only to total take-
home pay, which may reflect mere variation in hours-worked, rather than 
indicate any relation to the existence of an earnings premium. Some 
other evidence on lower earnings relates to misclassified workers--but 
the final rule is expected to reduce misclassifications by increasing 
certainty, and as explained further below, the Department does not 
believe that evidence relating to misclassified workers is applicable 
to the independent contracting population as a whole. For example, the 
Coalition of State Attorneys General, Cities, and Municipal Agencies 
(State AGs) cited recent state data on awards to workers who were 
misclassified and evidence that the misclassified workers face higher 
rates of wage theft and wage suppression.138 139 They 
additionally cited evidence produced by another critical commenter of 
this rule, the National Employment Law Project (NELP), that the State 
AGs claimed shows that once controls are implemented to account for 
taxes, business expenses, and legal risks, workers who have been 
misclassified as independent contractors often earn significantly less 
than similar workers paid as employees.\140\ The Department expects the 
rule to reduce misclassification, which based on these above 
commenters' analyses will result in significant cost savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ California Labor Commissioner's Office, 2017-2018 Fiscal 
Year Report on the Effectiveness of the Bureau of Field Enforcement 
(2018), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/BOFE_LegReport2018.pdf. 
Massachusetts Council on the Underground Economy, 2017 Annual 
Report, (2017), https://www.mass.gov/doc/cue-annual-report-2017-0/download. Written Testimony of Jennifer L. Berrier, Deputy 
Secretary, Department of Labor & Industry Before the House Labor & 
Industry Committee (April 29, 2019).
    \139\ C. Ruckelshaus and C. Gao, ``Who's the Boss: Restoring 
Accountability for Labor Standards in Outsourced Work,'' National 
Employment Law Project, 9-27, (2014), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Whos-the-Boss-Restoring-Accountability-Labor-Standards-Outsourced-Work-Report.pdf.
    \140\ S. Leberstein and C. Ruckelshaus, ``Independent Contractor 
vs. Employee: Why Independent Contractor Misclassification Matters 
and What We Can Do to Stop It,'' National Employment Law Project, 
(2016), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Policy-Brief-Independent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
``Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements--May 2017,'' 
(2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/conemp_06072018.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of other commenters made similar claims that the 
Department did not adequately address the misclassification of workers, 
and posited this would impose costs. In each case, the commenter did 
not demonstrate how the rule would increase the frequency of 
misclassification. North America's Building Trades Unions made similar 
claims. Its comment cited a number of studies, including a GAO study 
finding contingent workers (workers who lack an explicit or implicit 
contract for long-term employment, but who can be employees or 
independent contractors under the FLSA) have lower earnings than those 
who are not contingent workers; a DC Office of Attorney General study 
that estimated misclassified construction workers in DC may earn 11.5 
percent less in take-home pay than employees, based on implied findings 
that result from a series of selected assumptions; and a sampling of 
studies on construction workers that claimed significant losses in net 
pay for construction workers misclassified as independent contractors 
compared to employees.\141\ The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America asserted that many construction companies 
misclassify workers as independent contractors in order to pay them 
less than employees and cited estimates of the magnitude of the 
difference, and claims that the Department's rule ``does nothing to 
stem the abuse.'' \142\ Commenter Matt Brown cited a Washington Center 
report that claims low- and middle-wage gig workers make less than 
comparable employees.\143\ The same commenter noted that, applied 
appropriately, ``Independent contracting is a critical part of the 
economy.'' NELP and the National Women's Law Center (NWLC) cited a 
study, notably from a report for New York's taxi and limousine 
industry, claiming that while independent contractors in New York in a 
subset of industries (construction, retail, personal care, and others)

[[Page 1221]]

experienced positive wage growth, they had lower increases in their 
real annual earnings from 2013 to 2018 than the counterpart 
employees.\144\ PA L&I claimed that the Department provided ``no 
evidence'' to support other claims about compensation premiums. 
However, the Department offered a significant data-backed rationale for 
those sections, and in fact notes that PA L&I's own comment refers to 
some of these sources in its critique, though it offers no data of its 
own. Some commenters asserted that companies make workers independent 
contractors specifically because they can pay them less due to a lack 
of bargaining power, but they do not offer substantive data to 
demonstrate that this is the case throughout the economy. Since the 
failure to pay misclassified workers the wages that are due them is 
already prohibited by law, the Department determined comments on the 
topic fall outside the scope of this rule and analysis. As stated 
elsewhere, the Department expects that misclassification will be 
reduced because of this rule. Further, because meeting the proper 
standards for legitimate independent contracting will generally entail 
a substantively different relationship between a worker and a business 
beyond a simple change in classification, and no commenters nor the 
Department's own review of past court cases yielded any examples of 
this phenomenon in practice, the Department has not attempted to 
quantify it. For most discussion, see the Job Conversion discussion at 
Section (VI)(D)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Contingent 
Workforce,'' GAO-15-168R. DC, (2018). Office of Attorney General, 
``Illegal Worker Misclassification: Payroll Fraud in the District's 
Construction Industry,'' (2019). Ormiston, R., Belman, D., Brockman, 
J., and M. Hinkel, ``Rebuilding Residential Construction,'' in 
Creating Good Jobs: An Industry-Based Strategy 75, 80 (Paul Osterman 
ed., MIT Press 2020).
    \142\ R. Ormiston et al. (2020), supra note 141. Liu, Y.Y., 
Flaming, D. and P. Burns, ``Sinking Underground: The Growing 
Informal Economy in California Construction,'' Economic Roundtable, 
2 (2014), https://economicrt.org/publication/sinking-underground.
    \143\ C. Husak, ``How U.S. Companies Harm Workers by Making them 
Independent Contractors,'' Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 
(2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/how-u-s-companies-harm-workers-by-making-them-independent-contractors/.
    \144\ J.A. Parrott and M. Reich, ``An Earnings Standard for New 
York City's App-based Drivers: Economic Analysis and Policy 
Assessment,'' Report for the New York City Taxi and Limousine 
Commission, (2018), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/5b3a3aaa0e2e72ca74079142/1530542764109/Parrott-Reich+NYC+App+Drivers+TLC+Jul+2018jul1.pdf.
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    The data employed in the comments and the reports commenters cite 
to support their claims on impacts to earnings are not strictly based 
on independent contractors. In fact, several of them focus explicitly 
on contingent workers, who are defined as ``persons who do not expect 
their jobs to last or who report that their jobs are temporary.'' \145\ 
These persons can be employees or independent contractors, and may not 
include all independent contractors, depending on the nature of the 
contractor's work. Estimates based on these definitions are not useful 
for the purpose of evaluating the universe of independent contractors. 
The non-representative data sources preclude widespread applicability. 
Further, these commenters and their cited sources largely focused on 
misclassified workers, who are defined as workers unlawfully classified 
as independent contractors in order to limit employers' monetary and 
legal liabilities. Selection bias causes the estimates of the impacts 
on this group to be unreliable; the sample likely includes illicit 
actors. The Department recognizes that some illicit actors 
intentionally evade the law, but its analysis of this rule's impact 
naturally focuses on employers, employees, and independent contractors 
that would follow the rule to the best of their ability. While these 
comments and the sources upon which they rely highlight important 
worker issues, the non-representative data presented cannot be 
extrapolated to the universe of individuals classified as independent 
contractors, for whom the literature offers strong evidence of an 
earnings premium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ BLS, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters provided specific concerns with the Department's 
numbers. SWACCA disputes the Department's justification of the 
assertion that independent contractors earn more than employees because 
the unconditional mean hourly rate of independent contractors is higher 
than the unconditional mean hourly rate of employees. They note that 
the 11 to 14 percent higher hourly wage ($26.71 and $27.43 per hour for 
independent contractors versus $24.07 per hour for employees) is 
insufficient to cover the average of 21 percent of total compensation 
that employees receive in employer-provided benefits. While SWACCA 
correctly identified that the hourly wage premium independent 
contractors enjoy economy-wide may be less than employer's total cost 
of providing benefits, such a comparison may not accurately reflect the 
value the employee places on the employer-provided benefits. If, for 
example, a worker already has access to health insurance as a military 
veteran, that worker will not value the employer's provision of health 
insurance. Further, even assuming the worker values these benefits at 
the same level as the employer's cost for the benefits, the analysis 
cited earnings premiums and benefits which are based on all employees 
and independent contractors in the economy and may not reflect the 
narrower universe of employees whose classification is most likely be 
affected by this rule.\146\ Employing economy-wide averages to compare 
niche subsets of the economy is not a sound approach. As such, it is 
inappropriate to assume, as SWACCA did, that the average employee who 
is converted to independent contractor status as a result of the rule 
would gain the same earnings premium enjoyed by the average economy-
wide independent contractor, or lose benefits equal to the benefits 
enjoyed by the average economy-wide employee. The Department believes 
that many workers who are most likely to be converted due to this rule 
likely do not presently receive benefits or, if they do receive fringe 
benefits, their value (both as measured by the worker and as an 
absolute cost to the employer) falls below the economy-wide 
average.\147\ Due to the highly individualized impacts that vary across 
numerous undefined variables (risk tolerances; specifics regarding 
level of position, industry, location; access to other means of 
benefits provision; etc.), the Department did not attempt to quantify 
such an impact. Considered qualitatively, the Department notes that 
employees who make more than the minimum wage implicitly display a 
measure of bargaining power because their employer could lawfully 
reduce their wages but has not. If employees have bargaining power--
meaning labor market conditions require employers to account for 
workers' preferences-- they would be positioned to negotiate an 
earnings premium that could offset a reduction in benefits that may 
result from being converted to independent contractors, which may be 
higher or lower than the economy-wide average. Similarly, a worker 
without bargaining power would be unlikely to receive the 11 to 14 
percent earnings premium if converted from employee to independent 
contractor status--but such no-bargaining-power employees are also much 
less likely to have any company-provided benefits to lose as a result 
of the conversion. Ultimately, there is no reason to believe employees 
whose classification may be affected by the rule are likely to have the 
same benefits as an average employee or, if converted to independent 
contractors, would receive the same earnings premium that the average 
independent contractor has over the average employee. As explained 
below further in Section

[[Page 1222]]

VI(D)(7), the Department expects that most workers whose classification 
may be affected by this rule will have a measure of bargaining power 
that could allow them to offset reductions in benefits with higher 
earnings, better working conditions, or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ The 11 to 14 percent earnings premium for independent 
contractors is also an economy-wide finding.
    \147\ The Department expects that many new independent 
contractor jobs will be created due to this rule, but does not 
anticipate many existing employee positions to be converted to 
independent contractor relationships because of it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Washington Center asserted that the population of independent 
contractors is very diverse and that comparing mean wages is not 
appropriate, expounding that the independent contractor market includes 
both high-wage workers with adequate bargaining power and low-wage 
workers with little bargaining power. The commenter did not explain how 
this point meaningfully applies to the Department's analysis, which 
addressed the diversity of the labor market in its regression 
specifications, controlling for many more variables than simply income. 
Nonetheless, in response to this comment the Department conducted two 
additional regression analyses as a proxy for the labor market for low-
wage workers. The results were largely consistent with the initial 
conclusions presented in the NPRM. The Department ran its regression 
model including only low-education workers (a high school diploma or 
less). In this case, independent contractors had an average wage about 
9 percent higher, and the results were statistically significant. The 
Department also ran a regression including only workers in low-wage 
occupations (12 occupations with mean hourly rate less than the overall 
mean), for which the coefficient on independent contractor was 
positive, although small.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ The result is statistically significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level but not at the 95 percent level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimated annual transfers from 
workers to employers of $3.3 billion in supplemental pay, paid leave, 
insurance and retirement benefits, and the employer share of Social 
Security and Medicare taxes. Its estimate is based on the primary 
assumptions that (1) employees reclassified as independent contractors 
will be paid the same in nominal wages and (2) there will be an 
increase of 5 percent in the number of independent contractors. EPI 
states that the first assumption is based on sources demonstrating that 
perfect competition in labor markets is rare, a claim stated by several 
other commenters. However, Alan Manning, the author of the foundational 
source referenced to make this case (cited by EPI, sources cited by EPI 
in the same section, and other commenters), explicitly caveats that the 
wage-setting assumption should not be applied to the self-employed 
(under which category independent contractors fall).\149\ Manning 
states, ``In this book it is assumed that firms set wages. This is a 
more appropriate assumption in some labour markets than others. For 
example, it would not seem to be appropriate [. . .] for the self-
employed.'' \150\ The sources that EPI cites thus do not support its 
ultimate conclusion. Rather, EPI's methodological assumptions appear to 
run counter to a widely-cited source that EPI itself relies on. 
Finally, the EPI analysis also relied on firms' wage-setting power to 
be absolute, that labor supply is perfectly inelastic. EPI's analysis 
proceeds from the premise that ``perfect competition is rare,'' but 
then jumps to the claim that ``most labor markets do not function 
competitively,'' and that worker are particularly ``likely to lack the 
power to bargain for higher wages to compensate for their loss of 
benefits and increase in taxes when they become independent 
contractors.'' However, each of the sources the EPI cites for this 
proposition, which are discussed above, clearly show that firms do not 
possess or exert such absolute wage-setting power. These flaws 
fundamentally undermine EPI's estimates and yet go unaddressed by EPI 
and other commenters that reference EPI's estimates. The Department, 
therefore, declined to integrate these unreliable estimates into its 
analysis due to such methodological concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ EPI cites three sources alongside its claim, Manning 
(2003), Dube et al. (2018), and a literature review by the 
Washington Center, which also submitted a comment opposing this 
rule. The Manning book is cited by both other commenters, with the 
Washington Center's analysis drawing on it in numerous sections of 
its review as fundamental support. The Dube et al study focused 
exclusively on users of a specific online task portal (Amazon 
Mechanical Turk), which is a niche market of independent contractors 
and is a marketplace accessible to 49 countries, which makes it 
difficult to apply the findings with confidence to the U.S. market 
and the whole independent contractor universe. The Washington Center 
citation was a literature review of work in the field of monopsony 
in labor markets; its findings did not offer direct applications to 
the independent contractor universe. Furthermore, its review 
concluded, ``our results provide evidence on the elasticity of labor 
supply to the firm and the implied degree of firms' wage-setting 
power, but not necessarily whether the firms are able to exercise 
this power,'' explaining that it appears other forces rein in firms' 
wage-setting power to some degree.
    \150\ A. Manning, Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in 
Labor Markets, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, (2003). 
A. Sokolova and T. Sorensen, ``Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-
Analysis,'' Washington Center for Equitable Growth, (February 2020). 
A. Dube, J. Jacobs, S. Naidu, and S. Suri, ``Monopsony in Online 
Labor Markets,'' American Economic Review: Insights 2(1): 33-46 
(March 2020), https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20180150.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPI's analysis states that ``it is difficult to imagine that there 
are a meaningful number of workers who would get more satisfaction from 
doing the same job for substantially less compensation as an 
independent contractor than for substantially more compensation as a 
payroll employee.'' But this statement exposes what appears to be a 
flawed assumption in EPI's analysis. Under the economic reality test, 
an employee typically cannot possess the ``same job'' as an independent 
contractor. Rather, for the worker to be classified as an independent 
contractor, the worker must, on the whole, possess the characteristics 
of an independent contractor, which often include meaningful control 
over the work or meaningful opportunity for profit. EPI's analysis 
assumes, however, that the employer can and will simply reclassify a 
worker as an independent contractor without regard for the features of 
the working relationship.
    EPI's analysis considers only monetary compensation as part of the 
``value of a job to a worker.'' In the May 2017 Contingent Worker 
Supplement (CWS) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) workers 
classified as independent contractors were asked about their 
preferences toward employment arrangement. Their responses are 
indicative of non-monetary value derived from independent contractor 
status. When asked, ``Would you prefer to work for someone else?'' 
independent contractors resoundingly stated ``No'' over ``Yes'' by a 
ratio of nearly 8 to 1. Furthermore, the two most noted responses to 
the question, ``What is the main reason you are self-employed/an 
independent contractor?'' were ``Flexibility of schedule'' and ``Enjoys 
being own boss/independent.'' It is evident that most independent 
contractors strongly value the non-pecuniary compensation they receive. 
EPI does not address how these non-pecuniary benefits factor into 
worker compensation.
    Arguing against the Department's inclusion of flexibility and 
satisfaction as important non-pecuniary compensation factors in the 
NPRM, EPI states that ``employers are able to provide a huge amount of 
flexibility to payroll employees if they choose to; the `inherent' 
tradeoff between flexibility and payroll employment is greatly 
exaggerated.'' \151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ Some sources have argued that businesses, in fact, use 
scheduling in a way that negatively affect worker flexibility. See 
e.g., L. Golden, ``Irregular Work Scheduling and Its Consequences,'' 
Economic Policy Institute, (April 2015), https://files.epi.org/pdf/82524.pdf (``Facilitated by new software technology, many employers 
are adopting a human resource strategy of hiring a cadre of part-
time employees whose work schedules are modified, often on short 
notice, to match the employer's staffing with customer demand at the 
moment.'').

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 1223]]

    EPI's argument is less than persuasive for a number of reasons. 
First, economists have long recognized that workers value leisure as 
well as the remuneration of labor. As such, any worker selecting 
between jobs is likely to consider the flexibility of work schedules, 
the compensation package, fringe benefits, and a host of non-pecuniary 
compensation factors when deciding both whether to work at a particular 
company and how many hours to spend working at that company. Second, 
the fact that some employees have flexibility does not imply that those 
employees do not value the flexibility or that greater flexibility is 
not something employees would trade for lower compensation. Third, in 
many jobs, employee flexibility is necessarily limited because the 
business requires a certain number of employees working together to 
accomplish a task, and so granting significant flexibility to employees 
would result in less productivity for the business which would likely 
result in lower compensation for the workers. Fourth, some employers do 
offer employees flexibility, but often that flexibility comes at a cost 
to the workers (of note, payroll employees generally have less control 
over their own schedules than similarly-situated independent 
contractors).
    EPI, however, fails to explain why an employer would, all things 
equal, allow its employees to work for direct competitors, let them 
choose assignments, or set their own hours. The point of hiring 
employees is to have workers that an employer can call upon and direct 
to perform desired tasks, as opposed to contractors who operate their 
own businesses. While some employers may provide a measure of 
flexibility they generally would not offer the same degree of 
flexibility enjoyed by individuals who are in business for themselves. 
The Department believes, based on data in the CWS survey and beyond, 
that independent contractors experience significantly more flexibility 
than employees and that such a feature is a core motivator.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangements--May 2017,'' USDL-18-0942 (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf. MBO Partners, The 
State of Independence in America: 2018: The New Normal, 2018, 7. 
James Manyika et al., Independent Work: Choice, Necessity, and the 
Gig Economy (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, October 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department notes several other key weaknesses in EPI's estimate 
that undermine its assertions. EPI's estimate of transfers from workers 
to employers is an estimate of the gross transfer without taking into 
account that the independent contractors also have the ability to 
deduct some of their additional expenses on their income taxes and thus 
is not a comprehensive comparison of the net earnings of employees and 
independent contractors. EPI's estimate is based on applying a net loss 
in income for every new independent contractor, yet the data 
resoundingly show that workers pursue independent contract work 
voluntarily and in vast numbers, suggesting that other factors, 
unmentioned by the commenter, are significant to worker decisions in 
this field. EPI nonetheless assumes a blanket negative impact will be 
felt economy-wide for all new independent contractors--an assumption 
the Department believes is unsupportable in the face of the existing 
evidence.
    Ultimately, based on the assumption that the final rule will 
increase independent contracting arrangements, the Department 
acknowledges that there may be transfers between employers and 
employees, and some of those transfers may come about as a result of 
changes in earnings. However, for the reasons stated above, the 
Department does not believe that these transfers can be quantified with 
a reasonable degree of certainty for purposes of this rule. The 
Department also does not believe that independent contracting roles are 
usefully compared by focusing solely on earnings to employee roles--
under the economic reality test embraced by the final rule, control and 
an opportunity for profit are core considerations for determining who 
is an independent contractor. The Department believes that these 
factors are often valued by workers in ways that are difficult to 
quantify. Furthermore, the Department believes that workers as a whole 
will benefit from this rule, both from increased labor force 
participation as a result of the enhanced certainty provided by the 
rule, and from the substantial other benefits detailed below.
5. Minimum Wage and Overtime Pay
    As noted above, an additional consideration in the discussion of 
transfers is that minimum wage and overtime pay requirements would no 
longer apply if workers shift from employee status to independent 
contractor status. The 2017 CWS data indicate that, before conditioning 
on covariates, primary independent contractors are more likely than 
employees to report earning less than the FLSA minimum wage of $7.25 
per hour (8 percent for self-employed independent contractors, 5 
percent for other independent contractors, and 2 percent for 
employees).
    Several commenters highlighted this possibility that independent 
contractors could earn below the minimum wage. The Washington Center 
cited a report by the Center of American Progress that estimated that 
almost 10 percent of independent contractors earn less than the Federal 
minimum wage.\153\ Representative Mark Takano pointed to literature 
finding that in California and New York many gig drivers receive 
significantly less than the state minimum wage.\154\ A letter from 107 
U.S. Representatives referenced an instance where the Wage and Hour 
Division (WHD) recovered roughly $250,000 in unpaid overtime and 
minimum wages for 75 workers misclassified as independent contractors 
by a cleaning company.\155\ EPI stated in its comment, ``The workers 
most likely to be affected by this rule are workers in lower-wage 
occupations in labor-intensive industries, such as delivery workers, 
transportation workers like taxi drivers and some truckers, logistics 
workers including warehouse workers, home care workers, housecleaners, 
construction laborers and carpenters, agricultural workers, janitors, 
call center workers, and staffing agency workers in lower-paid 
placements.'' However, EPI did not provide a source for this important 
assumption, and the Department was unable to verify EPI's assertion in 
the Department's own research. The nature of the work done by workers 
across the diverse fields EPI identified is uncertain, although many 
roles in the

[[Page 1224]]

above fields could lack features that would facilitate a position 
conversion to independent contractor status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ K. Walter and K. Bahn, ``Raising Pay and Providing 
Benefits for Workers in a Disruptive Economy.'' Washington: Center 
for American Progress (2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/10/13/440483/raising-pay-providing-benefits-workers-disruptive-economy/.
    \154\ M. Reich. ``Pay, Passengers and Profits: Effects of 
Employee Status for California TNC Drivers.'' University of 
California, Berkeley (October 5, 2020), https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2020/10/Pay-Passengers-and-Profits.pdf; L. Moe, et al. ``The 
Magnitude of Low-Paid Gig and Independent Contract Work in New York 
State,'' The New School Center for New York City Affairs (February 
2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/5e424affd767af4f34c0d9a9/1581402883035/Feb112020_GigReport.pdf.
    \155\ ``Skokie Cleaning Business Must Pay $500K In Unpaid Wages, 
Damages to Workers,'' CHICAGO.CBSLOCAL.COM (May 5, 2012), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/05/05/skokie-cleaning-business-must-pay-500k-in-unpaid-wages-damages-to-workers/. The Department believes 
that misclassification is an important concern that the rule 
addresses, and that the rule will reduce the ability of employers to 
misclassify its workers by rendering the test more clear and 
understandable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to overtime, CWS has further indicated that, before 
conditioning on covariates, primary independent contractors are more 
likely to work overtime or extra hours beyond what they usually work at 
their main job (30 percent for self-employed independent contractors 
and 19 percent for other independent contractors versus 18 percent for 
employees). The Department was unable to determine whether these 
differences were the result of differences in worker classification, as 
opposed to other factors. The Department has cited many sources 
throughout this analysis that point to a wide range of income for 
independent contractors, and does not believe that this rule will be 
especially applicable to any particular income segment of independent 
contractors. Accordingly, the Department believes it prudent to rely on 
the numerous sources it has drawn on in the development of this rule, 
rather than to focus on any particular slice of the income 
distribution. And while independent contractors are not, by definition, 
subject to the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA, none of the 
evidence cited by commenters suggests that the final rule is likely to 
significantly impact this issue, and if so, to what extent. 
Accordingly, the Department did not attempt to quantify these potential 
transfers.
6. Misclassification
    Many commenters expressed concerns regarding misclassification of 
employees as independent contractors, which occurs when an individual 
who is economically dependent on an employer is classified by that 
employer as an independent contractor. FLSA misclassification may be 
inadvertent or intentional and its direct effects could include a 
transfer from the worker to the employer if the employer fails to pay 
minimum wage and overtime pay to which the worker is entitled. 
Conversely, reducing misclassification could result in a transfer from 
employers to workers.
    Several commenters believe that ``[c]larifying the application of 
the test for independent contractor status will promote compliance with 
labor standards under the FLSA and, in turn, reduce worker 
misclassification.'' Opportunity Solutions Project (OSP); see also, 
e.g., Truckload Carriers Association (``[t]he increased clarity 
provided by the [proposed rule] would likely lead to reduced 
misclassification.''); IAW (``This rule will clear up 
misclassifications''); Financial Services Institute (``we agree that it 
will reduce worker misclassification and litigation''). Other 
commenters believe this rule may make it easier for employers to 
misclassify employees as independent contractors. See, e.g., Equal 
Justice Center; Employee Rights Center; NELP; State AGs; TRLA. These 
commenters cited reports purporting to show extremely high rates of 
misclassification. For example, a 2020 NELP report cited by many 
commenters reviewed state audits and concluded that ``these state 
reports show that 10 to 30 percent of employers (or more) misclassify 
their employees as independent contractors.'' \156\ The Washington 
Center also cited a study conducted by the Department of Labor in 2000 
to claim that ``between 10 percent and 30 percent of employers audited 
in 9 states misclassified workers as independent contractors.'' \157\
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    \156\ NELP, Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes 
Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, Oct. 2020, 
available at https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-workers-Federal-state-treasuries-update-october-2020.
    \157\ Lalith de Silva, Adrian Millett, Dominic Rotondi, and 
William F. Sullivan, ``Independent Contractors: Prevalence and 
Implications for Unemployment Insurance Programs'' Report of 
Planmatics, Inc., for U.S. Department of Labor Employment and 
Training Administration (2000), available at https://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These estimates, however, appear to be unreliable for at least two 
reasons. First, they make generalized conclusions regarding rates of 
misclassification using non-representative audit data. For example, the 
Department's 2000 study cited by the Washington Center states that 
audits were ``selected on a targeted basis because of some prior 
evidence of possible non-compliance.'' \158\ The 2020 NELP report 
likewise explained that ``[m]ost studies [on misclassification] rely on 
audit data from unemployment insurance and workers' compensation 
audits, targeted or random.'' \159\ As a 2015 EPI report explained, 
``[a]udit methods vary across states in the extent to which they target 
employers for audit: They can base the audits on specific criteria 
(e.g., a record of prior violation), or use a random sample of 
employers within industries prone to misclassification, or a mix of 
both methods.'' \160\ Thus, even ``random'' audits are not necessarily 
representative because they target industries with high rates of 
misclassification. Because audits focus on groups of businesses or 
industries in which misclassification rates are the highest, their 
results would not support generalized conclusions regarding the wider 
population. As such, the reports' generalized conclusion lack reliable 
and representative evidence, and are almost certainly significant 
overestimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ Id. (emphasis added).
    \159\ NELP, Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes 
Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, Policy Brief 
Oct. 2020, available at https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-workers-Federal-state-treasuries-update-october-2020/.
    \160\ Employment Policy Institute. Carre, Francoise, 
(In)dependent Contractor Misclassification. https://www.epi.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the audit data cited by NELP and others do not necessarily 
focus on misclassification of employees as independent contractors; 
some states' data are evaluated based on prevalence of employer 
violations, which is not representative of percentages of workers 
misclassified as independent contractors. For example, the 2020 NELP 
report appears to state that audits conducted by Ohio found a 
misclassification rate of 45 percent, but the cited Ohio report stated 
otherwise. The report explained that the audits searched for 
unemployment insurance violations, not just misclassifications, and 
that ``45% of the audits produce findings, in many cases for workers 
misclassification.'' \161\ In other words, the Ohio audits found 45% of 
audited employers failed to comply with some unemployment insurance 
requirement, with an unspecified subset committing misclassification. 
This and other misunderstandings of state audit findings may result in 
a misleading estimate of the frequency with which employers misclassify 
employees as independent contractors. Furthermore, the reporting is 
based on misclassification (or other issues, as documented above) on a 
per employer basis. The employer rate of misclassification may not 
necessarily correspond to the rate of employee misclassification. For 
example, if an employer employs 100 employees and misclassifies only 
one of them, the employer is recorded as a misclassifying employer in 
the aggregated results.\162\

[[Page 1225]]

This binary approach to data collection on a per employer basis 
prevents a disambiguation to analyze the actual number of misclassified 
workers in the labor force. This phenomenon is present is another study 
conducted by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue cited by NELP, which 
claimed that ``In 2018, 44% of audited employers were found to be 
misclassifying workers.'' \163\ However, that data seems to be 
misleading for multiple reasons. First, the quotation does not appear 
to match the cited source. Appendix 2 of the Wisconsin Workforce Report 
states that in 2019 the ``percentage of audited employers with 
misclassified workers'' was 33.3 percent (divergent from the ``44 
percent'' that NELP stated). Second, the number of businesses found to 
be misclassifying workers does not address how many workers were 
misclassified. The percentage of workers misclassified was 10.6, across 
all of the audited employers, which is much smaller than either 33 or 
44 percent. Finally, all of these estimates are compounded by the 
targeting bias described earlier, namely that the results only reflect 
businesses specifically targeted for audits, which presents only a 
partial picture of the incidence of such misclassification economy-
wide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ Report of the Ohio Attorney General on the Economic Impact 
of Misclassified Workers for State and Local Governments in Ohio 16-
17 (Feb. 18, 2009), available at https://iiiffc.org/images/pdf/employee_classification/OH%20AG%20Rpt%20on%20Misclass.Workers.2009.pdf.
    \162\ If 11 percent of businesses misclassify only one worker as 
an independent contractor, there are 100 businesses, and each 
employer has 20 workers, then the total percentage of these 
misclassified workers is actually 0.5 percent. To find that 11 
percent of workers are misclassified as independent contractors, all 
of the businesses who misclassified workers as independent 
contractors would need to have misclassified 100 percent of their 
workforce as independent contractors.
    \163\ Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Payroll 
Fraud and Worker Misclassification Report 16 (2020), available at: 
https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/misclassification/pdf/2019-2020-misclassification-task-force-report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Ultimately, and as explained above in Section VI(G)(2), commenters' 
estimates regarding current rates of misclassification--whether 
accurate or not--have little bearing on how misclassification rates are 
likely to change as a result of this rule. This rule establishes a 
clearer test for when a worker is an independent contractor rather than 
an employee under the FLSA. As such, it would reduce inadvertent 
misclassification by employers who are confused by the prior test, 
particularly small businesses that lack resources to hire expensive 
attorneys. For example, one small business owner commented to explain 
that ``the ability to understand and properly determine worker status 
under the FSLA is paramount for small businesses who cannot afford the 
cost of litigation . . . I believe that with the proper transparency 
within the regulations, the better the outcome not only for small 
businesses, but the worker, and ultimately the care recipient. We want 
to comply, and I have confidence that the proposed [rule] . . . will be 
highly effective in achieving the desired clarity and certainty.'' A 
clearer test also means more workers will better understand their 
rights under the FLSA and can defend those rights through private 
litigation or complaints to the Department, which should deter 
unscrupulous employers from intentionally misclassifying them.
    In summary, the Department believes that the simplicity and clarity 
this rule provides will reduce both inadvertent and intentional 
misclassification, which could produce transfers from employers to 
employees who are more likely to be correctly classified and given 
minimum wage and overtime pay. The Department is unable to calculate 
the exact transfer amount because it lacks reliable metrics on, for 
example, the existing misclassification rates in the general economy, 
the precise extent to which this rule improves legal clarity, and how 
firms will respond to that clarity.
7. Job Conversion
    Many commentators expressed concerns that the rule would cause 
businesses to reclassify their workers as independent contractors, 
causing those workers to lose the benefits of the FLSA with little gain 
in return. See, e.g., Washington Center (asserting that ``independent 
contractors tend to be worse-off than their wage-and-salary 
counterparts''); National Women's Law Center (``if finalized, this rule 
will cost workers . . . in the form of reduced compensation''); EPI 
(estimating that converted ``workers would lose $6,963 per year''). 
Some of these issues are discussed above. For example, the Department 
discussed possible earnings effects of workers converting from employee 
to independent contractor extensively in this section VI(D) and 
concluded it could not definitively determine whether overall 
compensation--i.e., earnings plus benefits--for a job that is converted 
from employee to independent contractor classification in response to 
this rule is likely to rise or fall on average. Regardless, the 
Department acknowledges that whether the overall effect of job 
conversion is likely to be, on balance, positive depends on the 
individual, reclassified worker, the unique circumstances of the 
business, and whether or not the working conditions were changed in 
order to reclassify the worker.
    If the converted position is an entirely new position, it is more 
likely to be filled by one of the many individuals who desire to work 
as an independent contractor, for example because they value the 
``flexibility to choose when and where to work'' that the position may 
provide more than ``access to a steady income and benefits.'' \164\ 
Such an individual may, for example, discount the value of certain 
types of compensation associated with employee classification, such as 
health insurance, that he or she might already enjoy from a different 
source. The individual may also simply prefer to trade overall 
compensation for the greater flexibility that often accompanies 
independent contractor roles. Thus, the lower paid converted new jobs 
do not necessarily reduce such workers' welfare because they could 
offer tradeoffs that may be preferable to the workers who are most 
likely to sort themselves into those positions. On balance, the 
Department believes conversion of new jobs will have an overall 
positive impact on workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ See Coalition for Workforce Innovation (2020), supra note 
77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second category of job conversion discussed above occurs when 
employers modify their working relationship with existing employees 
such that they are rendered independent contractors under this rule. As 
explained above, to act on the legal certainty provided by this rule, 
the converted position likely would have to provide the worker with 
substantial control over the work and a meaningful opportunity for 
profit or loss. The Department believes such conversions will be less 
common than conversion of future positions because the marginal cost of 
restructuring an existing work arrangement is greater than altering the 
arrangement of an unfilled position. And such restructuring would 
disrupt the preexisting working relationships, which risks negatively 
impacting worker morale, productivity, and retention. Nonetheless, some 
conversion of existing positions may occur, and some converted workers 
may prefer the additional flexibility and earn more by taking advantage 
of the opportunity for profit or loss that may accompany the 
conversion. The effect of the rule would be positive for these workers. 
Other converted workers may prefer the security, stability, and other 
features of an employment relationship or earn less due to, for 
example, reduction of employer-provided benefits, employment taxes, and 
loss of the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime pay. The effect of the 
rule would be negative for these converted workers, but, as explained 
above, the Department believes this type of conversion will be rare.
    Finally, an employer may reclassify an existing employee position 
to an independent contractor position

[[Page 1226]]

without meaningfully changing the nature of the job in response to the 
added legal clarity provided by this rule. Employers could be most 
confident of such reclassification under this rule if the preexisting 
job already provided the worker with substantial control over the work 
and a meaningful opportunity for profit or loss. The Department 
believes this phenomenon is likely to be rare because the current 
position would have to be held by an individual who is in business for 
him- or herself as an economic reality but is nonetheless presently 
classified as an employee. While many commenters warned that 
economically dependent employees may be improperly classified as 
independent contractors, none expressed concern that there is 
widespread classification of individuals who are in business for 
themselves as employees.\165\ Such employees may nonetheless exist and 
be converted into independent contractors as a result of this rule. 
Features of these converted workers' work, for example the level of 
flexibility and stability, would remain unchanged because the job 
remains the same. Firms could potentially reclassify existing workers 
who are already in business for themselves in a manner that reduces 
overall compensation, but their ability do to so would be constrained 
because such reduction could negatively impact worker morale, 
productivity, and retention.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ Commenters in the business and freelancer community 
indicated that--rather than classify independent entrepreneurs as 
employee in response to legal uncertainty regarding classification--
business simply decline to do business with those entrepreneurs in 
the first place. See, e.g., ASTA (``The prospect of inconsistent 
determinations has had a chilling effect on the growth of businesses 
in industries reliant on contract workers which has resulted in 
fewer opportunities for individuals who choose to offer their 
services as independent entrepreneurs.''); CPIE (``uncertainty 
associated with worker classification under the FLSA . . . 
discourages companies from doing business with independent 
entrepreneurs''). The effects described by these commenters are 
unsurprising. For example, it makes little sense for a business to 
classify a worker as an employee, thus obligating themselves to pay 
a premium rate for overtime work under the FLSA, if it is the worker 
and not the business who determines how many hours to work each 
week. Rather, the business likely would either not hire the worker 
at all or hire him or her as an employee but insist on controlling 
hours worked.
    \166\ Most firms can already reduce the overall compensation of 
their employees whose wages exceed the minimum wage through more 
direct means than reclassification as independent contractors but do 
not do so because of risks regarding morale, productivity, and 
retention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nonetheless, the sharpening of the economic reality test may 
negatively impact some current employees who could be reclassified as 
independent contractors in a manner that results in reduced overall 
compensation but are not afforded non-pecuniary benefits, for example 
additional flexibility, in return.\167\ EPI and likeminded commenters 
believe these workers would be ``doing the same job for substantially 
less compensation as an independent contractor,'' and that this class 
of worker comprises the majority or even all of the workers impacted by 
this rule. The Department agrees that some workers could be impacted in 
this manner, but believes such occasions are likely to be rare because 
two necessary conditions limit the number of such workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ Employers and employees could make similar conversions to 
independent contractor status for reasons outside the sharpening of 
the economic reality test this rule provides. Such shifts would not 
be identified as impacts in this analysis because the impetus for 
such conversion is due to factors other than this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, in order for conversion to have an unambiguously negative 
affect, a converted worker's overall compensation must be at the 
minimum wage. Generally, firms impacted by the rule can already 
directly reduce wages and benefits of their employees--they do not need 
to convert those employees to independent contractor to achieve these 
labor cost savings. However, most firms do not reduce their employees' 
compensation due to the risk of lowering morale, reducing productivity, 
and causing turnover. That is to say, the labor markets in which most 
firms operate prevents them from setting compensation without regard 
for worker preferences. The Department believes that a firms' ability 
and willingness to reduce its employees' compensation is shaped by the 
tradeoff between labor savings, on one hand, and the risk of lower 
productivity and higher turnover, on the other. Clarifying the legal 
requirement for firms to convert a position from employee to 
independent contractor status would not make firms any more willing or 
able to reduce compensation unless the worker was already earning the 
minimum wage and receiving no benefits. According to BLS, based on CPS 
data, in 2017 there were 370,000 adult \168\ employees paid at the 
minimum wage, which comprise 0.24 percent of the U.S. labor force.\169\ 
Second and as explained above, the converted worker whose job remains 
unchanged is likely to already have substantial control over the work 
and a meaningful opportunity for profit or loss such that he or she can 
be classified as independent contractor with the most legal certainty 
this rule can provide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ This figure excludes workers under the age of 19. If 
excluding workers under the age of 24, this figure drops over 40 
percent to 221,000. This figure does not include workers who make 
less than the minimum wage, a vast majority of whom work in the 
restaurant industry and receive tips for their work. The average 
earnings of a restaurant worker who receives tips is significantly 
above the minimum wage. The figure includes part time workers, who 
would not likely receive overtime compensation due to the limited 
number of hours they work.
    \169\ In 2017, there were approximately 152,000,000 workers in 
the U.S., according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department was unable to determine how many of the 370,000 
current minimum wage employees also meet these two criteria, although 
it expects the number to be low. The Department attempted to identify 
examples of minimum wage employees who enjoy substantial control over 
their work and a meaningful opportunity for profit or loss, but was 
unable to do so. Nor did commenters provide specific data or examples 
of minimum wage employees who would meet these criteria. Several 
commenters argued that the Department failed to adequately consider the 
effects of these possible conversions from employee to independent 
contractor, or the potential negative effects of misclassification on 
workers. NELA, for instance, asserted that the NPRM's cost-benefit 
analysis focused solely on companies rather than workers and further 
claimed that the Department ``ignores the massive cost to misclassified 
workers.'' Other commenters stated that the final rule would harm 
workers by either increasing the rate of misclassification or by 
allowing employers to reduce wages and benefits of employees who are 
converted into independent contractors. See, e.g., Washington Center 
for Equitable Growth (Washington Center) (asserting that ``independent 
contractors tend to be worse-off than their wage-and-salary 
counterparts''); Appleseed Center (expressing concern that rule ``will 
harm workers across a broad spectrum, [but] will have a 
disproportionate impact on Black and Hispanic workers who are 
overrepresented in the low-paying jobs where independent contractor 
misclassification is common''); National Women Law Center (``if 
finalized, this rule will cost workers . . . in the form of reduced 
compensation''); EPI (estimating that individual ``workers would lose 
$6,963 per year'').
    As is explained in greater detail below, the Department disagrees 
with these comments that the rule will broadly harm workers. The 
Department agrees with the numerous commenters, including nearly all 
individual commenters who self-identified as freelancer workers, who 
asserted that the rule would encourage flexible work arrangements and 
thereby create meaningful--though not easily measurable-- value for 
workers. One

[[Page 1227]]

commenter explained that ``[b]eing an independent worker allows for me 
to do what I can as a single mother, have flexibility.'' Another stated 
that ``[f]reelancing has afforded me independence and flexibility and 
the opportunity to be a productive member of society, and do my best 
work.'' As a final illustrative example, another commenter asserted 
that ``[t]he primary value for myself as an independent contractor for 
my services is the freedom to negotiate, to choose, and the freedom to 
limit what services I provide, the days, and hours of work, and the 
price of my labor, unencumbered by the less flexible but more secure 
employer employee relationship.'' Although some workers in positions 
converted from employees to independent contractor relationships may 
receive fewer benefits traditionally associated with classification as 
employees, the Department believes that this would likely be infrequent 
and their net effect would not necessarily be negative.\170\ Moreover, 
the Department believes any negative effects would be outweighed by the 
significant value the rule delivers to other workers and businesses by 
clarifying, simplifying, and reducing transaction costs around 
independent contractor arrangements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ As explained in more detailed above, this is because most 
workers can be converted from employee into independent contractor 
classification only if they are provided with greater control over 
their work and opportunity for profit or loss based on their 
initiative or investment. Such flexibility and entrepreneurial 
opportunities may be more valuable to such workers than potential 
reduction in benefits associated with classification as employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    No commenter provided evidence or specific cases in which 
individuals or types of workers would, as a result of this rule, be 
converted from employees to independent contractors. Because the rule 
does not change the classification of any employee, any jobs converted 
without meaningful change would have had to already have satisfied the 
requirements of bona fide independent contracting arrangements under 
this rule, with the only change likely being a lower assessed 
litigation risk for certain businesses. While the number of workers for 
whom reclassification occurs without bringing them meaningful benefits 
may not be zero, the Department believes such cases will be rare 
exceptions. Even if the classification of a worker were to change, the 
business could face market forces that would likely hold overall 
compensation steady. Furthermore, businesses would need to take caution 
that any new contract relationship would neither damage worker 
relations nor its underlying business model, both of which would likely 
negatively impact productivity.
    In summary, the most common categories of job conversions--e.g., 
new positions--are likely to positively impact workers. And the 
category of job conversions that is likely to produce negative 
impacts--i.e., reclassification of workers without changes to the job--
is most likely the rarest. For these reasons, the Department believes 
benefits to workers from job conversions will, on balance, exceed 
costs.

E. Costs

    The Department considered several costs in evaluating the rule. The 
Department quantified regulatory familiarization costs and estimated 
that they will total $370.9 million in Year 1. Other potential costs, 
including those raised by commentators, were not quantified, for 
reasons explained in the sections that follow.
1. Regulatory Familiarization Costs
    Regulatory familiarization costs represent direct costs to 
businesses and current independent contractors associated with 
reviewing the new regulation. To estimate the total regulatory 
familiarization costs, the Department used (1) the number of 
establishments, government entities, and current independent 
contractors; (2) the wage rates for the employees and for the 
independent contractors reviewing the rule; and (3) the number of hours 
that it estimates employers and independent contractors will spend 
reviewing the rule. This section presents the calculation for 
establishments first and then the calculation for independent 
contractors.
    For a rule like this one, it is not clear whether regulatory 
familiarization costs are a function of the number of establishments or 
the number of firms.\171\ Presumably, the headquarters of a firm will 
conduct the regulatory review for businesses with multiple locations, 
and also may require some locations to familiarize themselves with the 
regulation at the establishment level. Other firms may either review 
the rule to consolidate key takeaways for their affiliates or they may 
rely entirely on outside experts to evaluate the rule and relay the 
relevant information to their organization (e.g., a chamber of 
commerce). The Department used the number of establishments to estimate 
the fundamental pool of regulated entities--which is larger than the 
number of firms. This assumes that regulatory familiarization occurs at 
both the headquarters and establishment levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ An establishment is commonly understood as a single 
economic unit, such as a farm, a mine, a factory, or a store, that 
produces goods or services. Establishments are typically at one 
physical location and engaged in one, or predominantly one, type of 
economic activity for which a single industrial classification may 
be applied. An establishment contrasts with a firm, or a company, 
which is a business and may consist of one or more establishments. 
See BLS, ``Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages: Concepts,'' 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/cew/concepts.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There may be differences in familiarization cost by the size of 
establishments; however, the analysis does not compute different costs 
for establishments of different sizes. Furthermore, the analysis does 
not revise down for states where the laws may more stringently limit 
who qualifies as an independent contractor (such as California) and 
thus the new rule will have little to no effect on classifications. To 
estimate the number of establishments incurring regulatory 
familiarization costs, the Department began by using the Statistics of 
U.S. Businesses (SUSB) to define the total pool of establishments in 
the United States.\172\ In 2017, the most recent year available, there 
were 7.86 million establishments. These data were supplemented with the 
2017 Census of Government that reports 90,075 local government 
entities, and 51 state and Federal government entities.\173\ The total 
number of establishments and governments in the universe used for this 
analysis is 7,950,800.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 SUSB Annual Data Tables by 
Establishment Industry. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html.
    \173\ U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Census of Governments. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The applicable universe used by the Department for assessing 
familiarization costs of this final rule is all establishments that 
engage independent contractors, which is a subset of the universe of 
all establishments. In its analyses, the Department estimates the 
impact of regulatory familiarization based upon assessment of the 
regulated universe. In several recent rulemakings, the Department 
estimated that the regulated universe comprised all establishments 
because the rules were broadly applicable to every employer.\174\ For 
those rules, the Department estimated familiarization costs by assuming 
each establishment would review each rule. Because this final rule 
affects only some establishments, i.e.,

[[Page 1228]]

those that currently or may in short order face an independent 
contractor versus employee classification determination, the Department 
accordingly reduces the estimated pool to better estimate the 
establishments affected by the rule by assessing regulatory familiarity 
costs only for those establishments that engage independent 
contractors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ These include Joint Employer Status under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act; Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, 
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees; 
and Regular Rate Under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2019, Lim et al. used extensive IRS data to model the 
independent contractor market, finding that 34.7 percent of firms hire 
independent contractors.\175\ These data are based on annual tax 
filings, so the dataset includes firms that may contract for only parts 
of a year. The 34.7 percent of establishments provides a figure of 
2,758,928, which forms the foundation of the multiplier used in this 
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ Table 10: Firm sample summary statistics by year (2001-
2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpindcontractorinus.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department did not estimate familiarization costs for companies 
that may decide to work with independent contractors only after the new 
rule is finalized, because they would need to familiarize themselves 
with the current legal framework even in the absence of this rule.\176\ 
Although firms that do not currently use independent contractors are 
not counted in this universe of employers, to allow for an error 
margin, the Department is using a rounded 35 percent of the total 
number of establishments defined above (7,950,800), resulting in 
2,782,780 establishments estimated to incur familiarization costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ An added dimension is that the final rule is expected to 
provide significant clarity, which would result in time and cost 
savings (net of regulatory familiarization costs) for those outside 
the pool of firms with existing independent contractor 
relationships. These (net) cost savings are not included in this 
analysis, consistent with this analysis' treatment of resulting 
growth in the independent contractor universe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry (PA L&I) commented 
that the Department underestimated the cost of the rule by failing to 
include businesses that are newly incentivized to consider 
reclassifying workers to independent contractors. As stated above, even 
without the new rule any firm that does not currently engage any 
independent contractors but chooses to do so in the future would have 
already had to familiarize itself in the baseline case, so this rule 
does not impact those firms. Since the commenter's point is premised on 
the fact that the firm may be incentivized to investigate the 
regulation, it would be reasonable to assume that any firm without 
independent contractors that reviews the new rule and ultimately 
decides to hire independent contractors is doing so because the firm 
believes the new relationship will be beneficial to itself and the 
independent contractor also believes that the new relationship will be 
beneficial to him or herself. Such a situation would result in net 
benefits to the employer that more than fully compensate for any 
familiarization costs. Notably, and for comparability in estimates, the 
Department does not add these potential firms to the Benefits section 
either.
    The Department assumes that a Compensation, Benefits, and Job 
Analysis Specialist (SOC 13-1141) (or a staff member in a similar 
position) will review the rule.\177\ According to the Occupational 
Employment Statistics (OES), these workers had a mean wage of $33.58 
per hour in 2019 (most recent data available). Given the proposed 
clarification to the Department's interpretation of who is an employee 
and who is an independent contractor under the FLSA, the Department 
assumes that it will take on average about 1 hour to review the rule as 
proposed. The Department believes that an hour, on average, is 
appropriate, because while some establishments will spend longer than 
one hour to review the rule, many establishments may rely on third-
party summaries of the changes or spend little or no time reviewing the 
rule. Assuming benefits are paid at a rate of 46 percent of the base 
wage, and overhead costs are 17 percent of the base wage, the 
reviewer's effective hourly rate is $54.74; thus, the average cost per 
establishment conducting regulatory familiarization is $54.74. 
Therefore, regulatory familiarization costs to businesses in Year 1 are 
estimated to be $152.3 million ($54.74 x 2,782,780) in 2019 dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ A Compensation/Benefits Specialist ensures company 
compliance with Federal and state laws, including reporting 
requirements; evaluates job positions, determining classification, 
exempt or non-exempt status, and salary; plans, develops, evaluates, 
improves, and communicates methods and techniques for selecting, 
promoting, compensating, evaluating, and training workers. See BLS, 
``13-1141 Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists,'' 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes131141.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For regulatory familiarization costs for independent contractors, 
the Department used its estimate of 18.9 million independent 
contractors and assumed each independent contractor will spend 15 
minutes to review the regulation. The average time spent by independent 
contractors is estimated to be smaller than for establishments. This 
difference is in part because the Department believes independent 
contractors are likely to rely on summaries of the key elements of the 
rule change published by the Department, worker advocacy groups, media 
outlets, and accountancy and consultancy firms, as has occurred with 
other rulemakings. Furthermore, the repercussions for independent 
contractors are smaller (i.e., the litigation costs, damages, and 
penalties associated with misclassification tend to fall on 
establishments).\178\ This time is valued at $46.36, which is the mean 
hourly wage rate for independent contractors in the CWS, $27.27, with 
an additional 46 percent benefits and 17 percent for overhead, then 
updated to 2019 dollars. Therefore, regulatory familiarization costs to 
independent contractors in Year 1 are estimated to be $218.6 million 
($46.36 x 15 minutes x 18.9 million).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ An independent contractor that hires independent 
contractors would already be captured in the ``establishment'' 
calculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The estimate of 18.9 million independent contractors captures the 
universe of workers over a one-year period. Using this figure for the 
overall cost estimate results in an artificially high value because it 
includes workers who would have otherwise been included in the baseline 
case without the rule and thus spent time familiarizing themselves with 
the legal framework in the matter of course, without incurring a 
supplementary cost. Furthermore, the Department believes that it is 
probable that independent contractors would review the regulation only 
when they had reason to believe that the benefits would outweigh the 
costs incurred in familiarizing themselves with the rule, and since 
this analysis does not attempt to calculate those economic benefits it 
is possible that the costs presented in this section are 
overestimated.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ For example, independent contractors in states with 
classification frameworks that are known to be more stringent than 
the existing FLSA classification framework, such as in California, 
may not review the rule since it would be unlikely to affect their 
classification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total one-time regulatory familiarization costs for 
establishments and independent contractors are estimated to be $370.9 
million. Regulatory familiarization costs in future years are assumed 
to be de minimis. Similar to the baseline case for employers, 
independent contractors would continue to familiarize themselves with 
the applicable legal framework in the absence of the rule, so this 
rulemaking--anticipated to provide more clarity--is not expected to 
impose costs after the first year.\180\ This

[[Page 1229]]

amounts to a 10-year annualized cost of $43.5 million at a discount 
rate of 3 percent or $52.8 million at a discount rate of 7 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ As explained below, the Department considers that the 
regulation may produce benefits along this dimension in future years 
by simplifying the regulatory environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SWACCA commented that regulatory familiarization costs were 
underestimated because they ``would not only be imposed upon adoption 
of a final rule but would be ongoing as stakeholders begin to 
understand whether and how it will be applied.'' Additionally, they 
asserted the costs for businesses to familiarize themselves with the 
new guidance would exceed the cost of familiarization for the existing 
guidance, a claim that the commenter did not substantiate with data. 
The Department disagrees with this assertion. The rule is expected to 
reduce the time spent analyzing how the economic reality test's factors 
interact. Accordingly, the Department reiterates that incremental 
regulatory familiarization costs in future years are expected to be de 
minimis.
    A number of commenters expressed support for the cost estimates. 
The CGO states that, ``As currently written, the proposed rule 
carefully quantifies the cost savings of reduced litigation and 
increased clarity.'' AFPF posited that, if anything, the calculations 
would tend to reflect ``an overstatement of regulatory familiarization 
costs.''
2. Other Costs \181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ Various commenters to the NPRM raised points that they 
considered ``costs,'' although those points may more accurately be 
defined as transfers under Executive Order 12866. To clearly address 
these points, the Department decided to address the following areas 
with the language used by commenters. For further discussion of 
related impacts, please see the Potential Transfers section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is possible this rule will result in costs beyond the above 
described familiarization costs. In the NPRM, the Department invited 
comments and data on potential other costs of this rule. The Department 
received comments responsive to these requests which generally fell 
into seven categories: Impacts to workers; impacts to tax revenues; 
impacts on competition; impacts on income inequality and to minorities 
and women; tax filing; implementation; and impacts on income stability. 
The Department evaluated all of the potential costs that were 
identified, and examined many of the citations provided. In general, 
the commenters did not provide ample data or other evidence to support 
their claims, and, upon review, the Department was unable to confirm or 
substantiate the proposed cost categories in its own research. 
Therefore, in this section of the analysis, the Department addresses 
the points raised and discusses the qualitative merits, but does not 
quantify estimates for inclusion in its top line figures.\182\ Detailed 
explanations are presented in each category below, including discussion 
of the range of uncertainties and data limitations identified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \182\ In some cases, commenters raised points that may very well 
impact certain individuals in specialized circumstances, but which 
are not, when aggregated across the economy as a whole, cumulatively 
significant or representative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Additional Impacts to Workers
    Several commenters asserted that the NPRM's discussion of costs did 
not include a discussion of effects on workers beyond minimum wage and 
overtime pay. Ironworkers Local Union 7 stressed the importance of 
benefits such as workers' compensation for the dangerous nature of the 
work of their members and other construction workers. The Center for 
Law and Social Policy (CLASP) noted that the rule could also impact 
other benefits based on the FLSA's definition of employment, such as 
access to paid sick leave in general and under the Families First 
Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA). The Washington Center, among others, 
contended it may also impact workers' rights to join a union. The 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters commented that the liquidated 
damages remedy for willful or bad faith violations of the FLSA is not 
available to workers who are classified as independent contractors. 
Other commenters asserted that independent contractors are also not 
protected by the Federal anti-discrimination and health and safety 
statutes, and that the Department failed to consider this effect.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ The Department has not conducted a thorough review of 
discrimination law at the Federal or state level for the purposes of 
this rulemaking, but notes that independent contractors are 
protected by at least some Federal anti-discrimination laws. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1981. Further, the scope of these laws is not 
dependent on employee status under the FLSA. See, e.g., Gulino v. 
New York State Educ. Dep't, 460 F.3d 361, 379 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(``[T]he Supreme Court has given us guidelines for discerning the 
existence of an employment relationship [in the race-discrimination 
context]: Traditional indicators of employment under the common law 
of agency.''); Weary v. Cochran, 377 F.3d 522, 524 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(``[T]he proper test to apply in determining whether a hired party 
is an employee or an independent contractor under the [Age 
Discrimination in Employment] Act is the `common law agency test.' 
'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These potential impacts do not change the Department's overarching 
view that workers as a whole will be better off as a result of this 
rule, even if some workers may not be better off. Generally speaking, 
the above commenters raise points that fundamentally rest on the 
assumption that independent contractors cannot adequately assess their 
risks, needs, and goals. Furthermore, these commentators seem to assume 
that the listed features could be obtained by workers with no cost to 
the worker. The Department does not agree with such assessments. The 
Independent Women's Forum stated that the flexibility afforded by 
independent contracting is especially ``crucial for women who are the 
primary caregivers in their households.'' Palagashvili; Independent 
Women's Forum (``Women find independent contracting appealing because 
of the flexibility, autonomy, and freedom it provides.''). Nor did 
individual freelancer commenters, who repeatedly affirmed their ability 
to make rational decisions for themselves and their own businesses. One 
such commenter stated that ``I prefer the option to make my own 
schedule and decide how I want to proceed in making my money at my own 
discretion.'' Another explained that, ``[a]s an independent contractor 
I am free to choose when and where I work. This is important to me as a 
caregiver for elderly relatives.'' As a final illustrative example, a 
freelancer stated that ``I have chosen this profession because of the 
freedom and flexibility it affords me. I also can earn more freelancing 
than I could working in a similar full-time job [. . .]. I am a far 
better judge of what is good for me than a politician in Washington.'' 
Independent workers are a bedrock of the U.S. economy and are acutely 
aware of their own values and needs. Fundamental to being an 
independent contractor is the ability to control one's own work, which 
enables workers to be the deciding factor in accepting or declining 
work that may be risky or not as rewarding. The commenters above did 
not cite or offer data to support their assumption that employees 
covered by the FLSA are intrinsically better off compared to genuine 
independent contractors who are not covered by the FLSA. Several 
commenters, notably CLASP and NWLC, who submitted comments related to 
the pandemic do not address the abundant data demonstrating that access 
to independent contracting has been essential for many workers 
attempting to balance responsibilities, especially for women and 
caregivers. Accordingly, to the extent the final rule will increase the 
frequency of independent contracting, the Department believes that 
workers will, on net, benefit from that option.

[[Page 1230]]

b. Impacts to Tax Revenue and Public Assistance
    Some commenters asserted that the rule will either reduce tax 
revenue or increase public assistance. For example, some commenters 
pointed out that low-income workers who are classified as independent 
contractors are often forced to rely on public assistance programs. The 
UFCW cites a study finding 15 percent of platform workers in the San 
Francisco area receive some form of public support (e.g. food stamps, 
housing assistance) and 30 percent were on state public-access health 
insurance.\184\ This report did not, however, compare this finding with 
the extent to which low-income employees rely on public assistance. The 
Department notes that public assistance is available to low-income 
individual whether they are employees or independent contractors. An 
increase in independent contracting will not necessarily lead to 
increased public assistance expenditures. To the contrary, if 
independent contracting, even at a low income, is the alternative to 
unemployment or nonparticipation in the labor force, then it would 
reduce means-tested public assistance expenditures. Several individual 
commenters suggested that they would not be working at all but for 
independent contractor opportunities. One commenter said, ``I am an 
independent contractor, i.e. business owner; I am self-employed. I 
would not be able to work in any capacity, other than self-employed.'' 
Another explained, ``I am 71 years old and cannot (and will not) take 
regular employment. Earning an income from my home is safer, more 
effective and more satisfying.'' As a final illustrative example, a 
woman explained that ``[a]s a single mother trying to go back to school 
I have day and night classes. Having a regular job during this time be 
[sic] very challenging to meet my school hours.'' Thus, making it 
easier for individuals to work as independent contractors may reduce 
the burden on public assistance. Furthermore, since this RIA focuses on 
the changes at the margin based on increased clarity of the 
classification factors, the concerns raised by the studies cited by 
these commenters would not necessarily apply to those this rule 
impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ C. Benner, E. Johansson, K. Feng, and H. Witt. ``On-Demand 
and On the Edge: Ride-Hailing & Delivery Workers in San Francisco'' 
(May 5, 2020), https://transform.ucsc.edu/on-demand-and-on-the-edge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters noted that taxpayers funded unemployment 
payments for independent contractors through the Pandemic Unemployment 
Assistance (PUA) program. SWACCA noted that more than 11 million self-
employed individuals have received assistance from PUA.\185\ The 
nationwide response to the COVID-19 pandemic was intentionally robust. 
PUA assistance was funded by Congress in the CARES Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Report (October 15, 
2020), https://oui.doleta.gov/press/2020/101520.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters noted that any shift from employees to 
independent contractors will result in lost tax revenue. Specifically, 
the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters cites estimates of the loss 
in taxes in Michigan and other states due to misclassification.\186\ 
Notably, misclassified workers are not the same as independent 
contractors. In fact, this rule clarifies the classification of workers 
and is expected to result in fewer total cases of misclassified 
workers. The Department does not agree with the assumptions about the 
U.S. labor market held by commenters to this rule that reference 
studies on the cost of misclassified workers. EPI estimated that the 
increase in workers classified as independent contractors will lead to 
a transfer of at least $750 million annually from social insurance 
funds. EPI's estimate is predicated on an assumption that eligibility 
for independent contractors to receive unemployment benefits ``will 
occur in future recessions.'' The unprecedented CARES Act funded 
unemployment benefits through PUA for the first time in history. EPI's 
entire estimate rests on such unprecedented relief becoming 
commonplace, a view which the Department does not share. The Washington 
Center cites a study by Harvard Law School's Labor and Worklife program 
that ``found that between 2013 and 2017, the state of Washington lost 
$152 million in unemployment taxes and the Federal government lost $299 
million in payroll taxes due to worker misclassification in the 
state.'' \187\ Again, worker misclassification is erroneously compared 
to independent contractors. Further, the majority of these estimates of 
lost revenue are due to an assumption that freelance workers do not 
report their full earnings, which is a criminal offense. A letter from 
seven Congressional Representatives cited a 1984 IRS estimate that 
misclassification cost the Federal government $3.72 billion (adjusted 
to 2019 dollars), nearly 60 percent of which was from misclassified 
workers failing to pay income taxes and the remainder was due to 
failure to pay taxes used to fund social insurance programs. Once 
again, this comment failed to meaningfully explain how the studies it 
cites can be extrapolated across independent contractors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ D. Belman and R. Block, ``Informing the Debate: The Social 
and Economic Costs of Misclassification in the Michigan Construction 
Industry,'' Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, 
Michigan State University (2008), https://ippsr.msu.edu/publications/ARMisClass.pdf. F. Carre, ``(In)dependent Contractor 
Misclassification,'' EPI Briefing Paper #403 (June 8, 2015), https://files.epi.org/pdf/87595.pdf. O. Cooke, D. Figart, J. Froonjian, and 
K. Sloane, ``The Underground Construction Economy in New Jersey,'' 
Stockton University (2016), https://www.mcofnj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Underground-Construction-Economy-Summary-June-2016.pdf.
    \187\ L. Xu and M. Erlich, ``Economic Consequences of 
Misclassification in the State of Washington.'' Harvard Law School 
Labor and Worklife Program (2019), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/news/worker-misclassification-washington-state-leads-millions-revenue-losses-new-harvard-report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department notes that certain employer required taxes, such as 
unemployment insurance and workers' compensation, are not required for 
independent contractors, and thus the associated tax revenue will 
decrease if more individuals choose to work as independent contractors. 
However, the lack of transfer means that the worker keeps more money, 
which may be saved to provide for periods of unemployment. 
Additionally, these are transfer programs where the benefits are paid 
to the workers who pay into the program through their employers. Thus, 
if independent contractors are not eligible to participate in these 
program, government expenditures would also decrease. Therefore, 
providing unemployment benefit or workers' compensation to independent 
contractors is generally not a cost to state and local governments. To 
demonstrate, consider unemployment programs, which are a type of 
insurance. Reduced unemployment taxes are generally offset by reduced 
unemployment benefits. The only direct cost would be if workers who no 
longer pay into these programs continue to receive benefits. These 
direct costs are expected to be small.
    Government revenue from other taxes, such as income and Medicare 
taxes, may go up or down as a result of this rulemaking depending on 
the total income of employers, employees, and independent contractors. 
However, a decrease in tax revenue due to a failure of some independent 
contractors to fully pay their required taxes is not a cost 
attributable to the Department's rulemaking revising the standards for 
independent contractor status under a

[[Page 1231]]

Federal law separate and apart from any tax law.
    Finally, the Department notes that overall state and local tax 
revenue may increase as a result of the efficiency and flexibility this 
rule promotes. The Department believes that legal clarity provided by 
this rule will result in, among other things, lower regulatory 
compliance and litigation costs, more efficient and innovative work 
arrangements, and new jobs for individuals who otherwise would not 
work. All of this could increase firms' profits and workers' incomes, 
which results in a larger pool from which state and local taxes are 
drawn. The overall positive effect on state and local tax revenue may 
dwarf, for example, any reduction in unemployment insurance or workers 
compensation taxes. The Department, however, declines to quantify net 
effects on state and local tax revenue because it believe any such 
attempt to do so would require too many assumptions.
c. Fair Competition
    Several commenters stated that expanding the scope of independent 
contractors will ``fuel a race to the bottom,'' where companies will 
feel pressure to classify workers as independent contractor to reduce 
labor costs in order to compete in their market. UPS claimed that 
companies misclassifying workers as independent contractors externalize 
their costs and hurt other businesses through unfair competition.\188\ 
The Department believes that this will be unlikely because the risks of 
losing workers likely prevents businesses from reducing overall 
compensation, which includes the fully burdened wage rate (i.e., with 
taxes and benefits included). Any decrease in compensation below this 
level would likely result in firms not being able to hire adequate 
labor (either quantity or quality). This rule does not, as some 
commenters claimed, expand the scope of permissible independent 
contracting arrangements but rather clarifies and sharpens the test for 
determining proper classification, which is expected to benefit both 
workers and firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ UPS does not use independent contractors for some of the 
roles or occupations that its largest competitor, FedEx, does. FedEx 
relies heavily on independent contractors for its business model, 
and recently won a legal case against the National Labor Relations 
Board, in which the court found that certain FedEx drivers were 
legitimately classified as independent contractors under the NLRA. 
See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 893 F.3d 1123No. 14-1196 (D.C. Cir. 
2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Income Inequality and Impacts on Minorities and Women
    Some commenters asserted that the rule could increase racial and 
gender income inequality. NWLC wrote that additional protections other 
than minimum wage and overtime pay afforded by the FLSA were 
particularly important for working women, such as ``employer 
obligations to accommodate breastfeeding workers'' \189\ and 
``protections against pay discrimination.'' The Washington Center cited 
a study on outsourcing that it believed shows independent contracting 
``has contributed to increased wage inequality in the United States.'' 
\190\ But the cited study actually found something different: ``the 
increased concentration of typically low-wage occupations over time can 
be explained by changes in the characteristics of establishments 
employing these occupations.'' \191\ In other words, the study linked 
wage inequality to employers outsourcing jobs to other employers that 
paid lower wages, and made no attempt to isolate the effects of 
independent contracting. The evidence discussed in this analysis shows 
that independent contractors often earn more than their employee 
counterparts further undermines the commenter's assertion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ Independent contractor relationships provide flexibility 
to accommodate individual worker needs, such as child care and 
breastfeeding.
    \190\ Including E. Handwerker and others. ``Increased 
Concentration of Occupations, Outsourcing, and Growing Wage 
Inequality in the United States,'' (2015), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Increased-Concentration-of-Occupations%2C-and-Growing-Handwerker-Abraham/f7d0d2c9cfcbf53f961bb07a2542abefe4be84c0?p2df.
    \191\ Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    UFCW wrote that ``[t]he proposed regulation fails to address its 
potential impact on people of color who are overrepresented in low-wage 
independent contractor positions such as app-based platform work.'' 
This rule clarifies for app-based platforms how to properly classify 
workers, thereby reducing regulatory compliance, litigation, and 
transaction costs. Some of these cost savings could be shared by app-
based workers in the form of increased earnings, bonuses, or more job 
opportunities.\192\ To the extent that certain racial groups make up a 
disproportionate share of app-based workers, those groups will also 
enjoy a disproportionate share of benefits. Regarding gender-based 
inequality in the gig economy, a recent NBER study found that the 
gender wage gap among on-demand rideshare workers is lower than that of 
the rest of the economy and is ``entirely attributed'' to differences 
in experience and preferences.\193\ The NBER study specifically found 
that ``discrimination is not creating a gender gap in this setting,'' 
and ``no other paper has ever estimated such a precise `zero' gender 
gap in any setting.'' \194\ Several commenters cited other studies that 
document measurable benefits of independent contractor opportunities 
for women. Dr. Liya Palagashvili provided a lengthy review of the 
literature on the beneficial impacts of independent contract work for 
women. She cited a study that finds that women are the main caregivers 
at home, and 96 percent of women ``indicate that the primary benefit of 
engaging in platform-economy work is the flexible working hours.'' See 
also Independent Women's Forum (``Women find independent contracting 
appealing because of the flexibility, autonomy, and freedom it 
provides.''). A McKinsey Global Institute study, discussed in an 
earlier section, found that independent work offers caregivers, who are 
predominantly women, access to economic opportunity they would 
otherwise not have, concluding that ``[t]his type of flexibility can 
ease the burden on financially stressed households facing logistical 
challenges.'' Dr. Palagashvili cited numerous other studies that are 
consistent in their findings: Women are very much attracted to work 
arrangements that offer flexibility, including one that finds ``75 
percent of self-identified homemakers, or stay-at-home mothers in the 
United States, indicated they would be likely to return to work if they 
were to have flexible options.'' These studies offer data based on 
primary research, and several sources are based on economy-wide survey 
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ If, for example, the platform were to transfer some of 
these increased earnings to consumers in the form of discounts, the 
demand quantity for the services (and thus the job opportunities for 
the ICs) could increase.
    \193\ Cody Cook, et al., The Gender Earnings Gap in the Gig 
Economy: Evidence From Over a Million Rideshare Drivers, NBER 
Working Paper No. 24732, June 2018, available at https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24732/w24732.pdf.
    \194\ Id. at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dr. Palagashvili's comments are supported by many individual women 
who commented to affirm that independent contracting provides necessary 
flexibility to balance their work and life priorities. One woman 
explained that ``[a]s a work-at-home mom, I ramped up my business to 
coincide with the time I had available while raising my kids. I worked 
during their nap times, and then added more hours as they went to 
school.'' Another

[[Page 1232]]

stated, ``I have been a military spouse for 17 years and the ability to 
work as an independent contractor has been invaluable to my family. 
Through every move, my job comes with me; all I need is a computer and 
access to the internet. Had I been forced to find a new job with each 
[change of station], our family would have had some very tough times.'' 
As a final illustrative example, a woman informed the Department that, 
``I have been an independent contractor for more than 3 decades; it 
helped me as a single mother and now it helps me help the kids with my 
granddaughter.''
    The Department agrees with the above commenters and data indicating 
that women would benefit from greater access to independent contracting 
opportunities. By clarifying how workers can be properly classified as 
an independent contractor, this rule promotes the formation of such 
opportunities.
e. Tax Filing Costs
    The AFL-CIO and the Washington Center commented that independent 
contractors have more time-intensive accounting and tax filing 
processes, and the Department should address these costs. The 
Washington Center claims that it is inappropriate to quantify time 
savings from increased clarity but not to quantify the increased time 
necessary to file taxes, which they estimate to amount to $832.3 
million annually. Even assuming independent contractors spent more on 
their tax filings than employees, the Washington Center's estimate is 
based on average costs for all business filers in the country, drawn 
from the IRS's ``Estimated Average Taxpayer Burden for Individuals by 
Activity'' Table in its 2019 instructions on form 1040.\195\ This group 
of business filers includes anyone with income from rental property, 
royalties, S corporation earnings, farming, and other business 
ventures, which dramatically expands the scope beyond independent 
contractors. The Washington Center neither attempts to adjust for this 
overestimate nor explain how one might disentangle the conflated 
grouping, so the Department was unable to assess whether a real impact 
can be expected. The Department noted in the NPRM that it did not 
attempt to quantify the numerous benefits that it expects from the 
increased clarity regarding classification. Instead, it assumed that 
market actors operate in their own best interest, noting that for those 
workers that choose to pursue work as an independent contractor, as 
opposed to an employee, and file taxes as such it can be assumed that 
they have correctly determined for themselves that the benefits 
outweigh the costs, including any costs associated with increased time 
spent on tax filings.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ Based on the difference in estimates of burdens for 
businesses and nonbusinesses from the table ``Estimated Average 
Taxpayer Burden for Individuals by Activity'' in U.S. Internal 
Revenue Services, ``1040 and 1040-SR Instructions,'' p. 101, (2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf.
    \196\ All workers are required to file with the IRS regardless 
of classification. The time and cost of tax filing is highly 
dependent on the individual circumstances of the workers. The 
Department believes workers are able to best assess the costs and 
benefits of tax filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

f. Implementation Costs
    The PA L&I asserted that the Department ``provided zero estimates 
for the cost of actual implementation of the regulation.'' PA L&I also 
claimed that implementation costs include reclassifying current workers 
and identifying the employment status of new hires. Concerning the 
first, the Department maintains that workers will only be reclassified 
when the benefits to businesses outweigh the costs. Concerning the 
later, the Department believes there will be a cost savings when new 
employment relationships must be analyzed (see following section on 
cost savings). The Department believes the implementation costs will be 
de minimis.
g. Income Stability
    Several commenters asserted that independent contracting is 
associated with more volatile earnings. The Washington Center asserted 
that income stability is important for these workers and their 
families. UFCW cited literature finding that inconsistent earnings are 
one of the most reported disadvantages to gig work.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ Prudential Research, ``Gig Workers in America'' (2017), 
https://www.prudential.com/media/managed/documents/rp/Gig_Economy_Whitepaper.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department agrees that income volatility may be problematic for 
some workers and may require better money management to smooth 
consumption over periods of higher and lower income. However, as stated 
above, the Department assumes that market actors operate in their own 
best interest, and if a worker chooses to pursue work as an independent 
contractor, as opposed to an employee, it can be assumed that the 
worker has determined for himself or herself that the benefits outweigh 
the costs. The Department also believes income security is best 
achieved by removing barriers that prevent laid-off Americans from 
finding paid work, including as independent contractors. This lesson 
may be more important in the wake of the COVID-19 emergency, a point 
that has been presented by hundreds of academics.\198\ Additionally, 
some literature indicates that many independent contractors value 
flexibility over income stability. CWI submitted a survey they 
conducted that found 61 percent of independent contractors prefer the 
``flexibility to choose when and where to work'' over ``having access 
to a steady income and benefits.'' \199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ See 151 Ph.D. Economists and Political Scientists in 
California, ``Open Letter to Suspend California AB-5'' (April 14, 
2020).
    \199\ Coalition for Workforce Innovation (2020), supra note 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Cost Savings

    This final rule is expected to result in cost savings to firms and 
workers. While the Department believes that there are multiple areas 
where firms and workers may experience cost savings, the Department has 
quantified only two: The cost savings from increased clarity and 
reduced litigation. The Department estimates that annual cost savings 
associated with this rule would be $495.9 million ($447.2 million in 
increased clarity + $48.7 million in avoided litigation costs). Other 
areas of anticipated cost savings were not estimated due to 
uncertainties or data limitations. The Department believe the rule will 
result in the following additional cost savings, which are discussed 
qualitatively: Making labor market more efficient; improving worker 
autonomy satisfaction; providing an alternate source of income for some 
workers during the pandemic; and facilitating independent contractors' 
ability to work for multiple customers.
    While public comments specific to parts of the calculations are 
addressed at the corresponding location throughout this section, some 
commenters submitted general comments about the cost savings estimates. 
Several commenters offered supportive comments. The CGO said that ``the 
proposed rule carefully quantifies the cost savings of reduced 
litigation and increased clarity.'' The AFPF also expressed support but 
suggested that cost-savings may be underestimated. Conversely, other 
commenters objected to the estimated cost savings, including that it 
was inappropriate to quantify the potential cost savings from this rule 
but not quantify the costs to workers. Representative Pramila Jayapal 
asserted that the Department's analysis did not include ``any serious, 
fact-based argument as to why this rules change would be of benefit to 
the workers who would be most impacted by this rule change.'' Other 
commenters offered equivocal comments, including one

[[Page 1233]]

individual who noted that ``point made about less litigation is a valid 
one,'' but countered that the ``cost-savings pointed out seem to fall 
only on the side of the business/employer.''
1. Increased Clarity
    This final rule is expected to increase clarity concerning whether 
a worker is classified as an employee or as an independent contractor 
under the FLSA. This would reduce the burden faced by employers, 
potential employers, and workers in understanding the distinction and 
how the working relationship should be classified. It is unclear 
exactly how much time would be saved, but the Department provides some 
quantitative estimates to provide a sense of the magnitude.
    The importance of increased clarity is noted by a study coauthored 
and cited by the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) that 
found human resources professionals' largest challenge concerning 
external workers that they would like to see resolved is the legal 
ambiguity regarding the use and management of external workers.\200\ 
Commenters from the business community agreed with the Department that 
the rule would improve legal clarity. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce; CWI; WPI; ATA; NRF; National Restaurant Association. Groups 
that represent freelancers and individual freelancers who commented 
also believe this rule would improve legal clarity. See, e.g., CPIE; 
Fight for Freelancers. However, several commenters dispute the 
Department's claim that the rule will increase clarity, with some 
focusing on specific industries. The TRLA stated that ``the proposed 
rule unnecessarily muddies the waters with respect to the farm labor 
market'' because they believe it contradicts ``Federal courts' 
interpretation of a Federal statute.'' The State AGs also stated this 
rule will create confusion because ``many jurisdictions have applied 
the economic reality test'' to distinguish between employees and 
independent contractors for decades.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ SHRM and SAP SuccessFactors. ``Want Your Business to 
Thrive? Cultivate Your External Talent'' (2019), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/pages/external-workers.aspx.
    \201\ While state-imposed requirements may influence the use of 
flexibilities provided by this rule, and could impact the number of 
entities and workers affected, the Department does not possess the 
requisite data to estimate the number of states that would implement 
measures or the magnitude of their impact on the universe of 
independent contractors considered in this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department expects this rule to produce beneficial cost savings 
by clarifying the classification process. To quantify this benefit, the 
following variables need to be defined and estimated: (1) The number of 
new employer-worker relationships being assessed to determine the 
appropriate classification; (2) the amount of time saved per 
assessment; and (3) an average wage rate for the time spent. The 
Department estimates this will result in a $447.2 million in savings 
annually.
    The Department began with its estimate of the number of current 
independent contractors as the basis for estimating the number of new 
relationships. As discussed in section VI(C), according to the CWS, 
there are 10.6 million workers who are independent contractors on their 
primary job. Adjusting this figure to account for independent 
contractors on their secondary job results in 18.9 million independent 
contractors. According to Lim et al. (2019), in 2016 the average number 
of 1099-MISC forms issued per independent contractor was 1.43. 
Therefore, the Department assumes the average independent contractor 
has 1.43 jobs per year.\202\ This number does not account for the 
workers who do not file taxes, a recognized limitation in the cited 
study. Because it is unclear whether those who do not file taxes would 
have a higher or lower number of jobs per year, the Department does not 
believe that this limitation biases the estimate in either direction. 
Multiplying these two numbers results in an estimated 27.0 million new 
independent contractor relationships each year.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ Lim et al., supra note 75, at 61.
    \203\ The Department did not incorporate estimates of potential 
growth in independent contracting due to uncertainty. For example, 
the trend in independent contracting varies significantly based on 
the source. Additionally, the impact of this rule on the prevalence 
of independent contracting is uncertain. Lastly, state laws, such as 
those in California discussed below, may have significant impacts on 
the prevalence of independent contracting, which would make 
historical growth rates potentially inappropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The independent contracting sector is characterized by churn. In 
their annual State of Independence in America 2019 report, MBO 
Partners, a leading American staffing firm, finds that 47.8 percent of 
U.S. adults reported working as an independent contractor at some point 
in their career; they estimate that figure will reach 53 percent in the 
next five years.\204\ This fits with the range of estimates for the 
size of the independent contractor universe presented in section VI(C). 
Thus, it is assumed that over the ten-year time horizon of this 
analysis, millions of Americans will choose independent contractor work 
either for the first time or return to it. This churn is not explicitly 
estimated for use in this analysis, but it provides a qualitative 
rationale for not attempting to taper the expected size of the 
independent contractor universe over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \204\ MBO Partners (2019), supra note 131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A subset of new independent contractor relationships may have time 
savings associated with the final rule. Such a reduction is difficult 
to quantify because it is unclear how many establishments and 
independent contractors will realize benefits of increased clarity. It 
is also possible that the increased clarity of the classification 
process will lead to compound effects that generate far greater 
benefits over time. Nonetheless, because it is possible that only a 
subset of contracts would receive the cost savings associated with 
increased clarity, the Department has reduced the number of contracts 
in the estimate by 25 percent. This results in 20.2 million contracts 
with cost savings to both the employer and the independent 
contractor.\205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ 18.9 million independent contractors x 1.43 contracts per 
year x (1-0.25 possible reduction in clarity benefits) = 20.2 
million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In her comment, Representative Pramila Jayapal questioned the 
breadth of the time savings benefit. She claimed that the only 
beneficiaries of this rulemaking would be large, repeat players that 
frequently misclassify workers. It is unclear what data Representative 
Jayapal relied on to come to this conclusion. Furthermore, 
Representative Jayapal largely ignores the millions of properly 
classified independent contractors that will benefit from added 
regulatory clarity. The Department disagrees that the cost savings 
benefits will be limited to large, repeat players. Other comments 
concur with the Department's view, supported by data-backed arguments 
that the expect the rule to enable access to flexible work for 
caregivers responding to the pandemic, enable workers to readily 
supplement their income, and unlock the potential of the growing tech 
sector. Farren and Mitchell, of the Mercatus Center, assert that the 
rule, ``builds on existing precedent and serves largely as a synthesis 
and clarification of previous economic reality tests, rather than 
implementing any sort of radical change,'' adding that independent 
contractors will likely ``develop more productive economic 
relationships.''
    Per each new contract with time savings, the Department has assumed 
that employers would save 20 minutes of time and independent 
contractors

[[Page 1234]]

would save 5 minutes.\206\ These numbers are small because they 
represent the marginal time savings for each contract, not the entire 
time necessary to identify whether an independent contractor 
relationship holds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ These time savings are based on a 33 percent assumed 
reduction in the estimated familiarization time per contract for 
both independent contractors (15 minutes) and employers (1 hour).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Washington Center commented, ``[t]here is no transparency into 
what surveys or studies were used to quantify the current amount of 
time individuals and businesses currently spend on independent 
contractor regulatory familiarization. Further, there was no attempt to 
explain with any degree of accuracy how this rule will change that time 
spent.'' The Washington Center seems to misunderstand the analysis 
presented. The time savings variables are estimates of how the clarity 
provided in the rule will facilitate the contracting process. 
Estimating administrative time spend due to comply with government laws 
and regulations is a typical component of economic analyses and is 
often informed by consultation with subject matter experts. The 
Department requested data to further refine its estimate, but did not 
receive any. Notwithstanding, numerous commenters expressed support of 
the analysis the Department presented.
    The UFCW believes that there will be an increase in time to assess 
employment status because employers and independent contractors will 
now evaluate the classification under both current precedent and the 
definition laid out in this rule; ``courts may decide to ignore the 
DOL's new interpretation, meaning that companies and workers would now 
analyze their FLSA independent contractor determinations under current 
precedent and also the agency's proposed non-binding new test.'' The 
Department disagrees that courts will ignore the final rule. The RIA 
already includes a familiarization cost for the new rule, and, in the 
baseline, establishments are assumed to be familiar with the status quo 
environment. Accordingly, additional costs as stated in this comment 
are likely to be insignificant.
    To estimate the cost savings due to the increased clarity this rule 
provides, the Department applies the following estimates. For 
employers, this time is valued at a loaded hourly wage rate of $54.74. 
This is the mean hourly rate of Compensation, Benefits & Job Analysis 
Specialists (13-1141) from the OES multiplied by 1.63 to account for 
benefits and overhead. For independent contractors, this time is valued 
at $46.36 per hour (mean wage rate for independent contractors in the 
CWS of $27.29 with the amount of benefits and overhead paid by 
employers for employees, then adjusted to 2019 dollars using the GDP 
deflator).
    Using these numbers, the Department estimates that employers will 
save $369.0 million annually and independent contractors will save 
$78.1 million annually due to increased clarity (Table 3). In sum, this 
is estimated to be a $447.1 million savings. The Department assumes the 
parameters used in this cost savings estimate will remain constant over 
time. This assumes no growth in independent contracting, no real wage 
growth, and no subsequent innovation in the employer-worker 
relationship. These assumptions facilitate simplicity of 
calculation.\207\ The annualized savings over both a 10-year horizon 
and in perpetuity, with both the 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates 
is $447.1 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \207\ By applying these assumptions to the Department's 
estimates, instead of incorporating anticipated growth and 
innovation impacts, the results may be an underestimate of total 
cost savings.

Table 3--Cost Savings for Increased Clarity to Employers and Independent
                               Contractors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Parameter                              Value
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of new relationships (per year):
  Independent contractors...............................      18,858,000
  Number of jobs per contractor.........................            1.43
  New independent contractor jobs.......................      26,966,940
  Adjustment factor.....................................             75%
                                                         ---------------
    Total...............................................      20,225,205
                                                         ===============
Time savings per job (minutes):
  Employers.............................................              20
  Independent contractors...............................               5
Value of time:
    Employers...........................................          $54.74
    Independent contractors.............................          $46.36
Total savings:
    Employers...........................................    $369,011,556
    Independent contractors.............................     $78,137,248
                                                         ---------------
    Total...............................................    $447,148,804
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to increased clarity when assessing whether each 
relationship qualifies as an independent contractor or employment 
relationship, there may also be upfront time savings for new entrants 
who must familiarize themselves with the standard for being an employee 
as compared to an independent contractor, and who now have clearer 
guidance to aid in that understanding. This would apply to new 
independent contractors, new establishments, and current establishments 
that are considering hiring independent contractors for the first time. 
The Department did not quantify this benefit due to uncertainty and the 
difficulty of determining reliable variables for the number of new 
relationships that might occur due to the rule. However, such benefits 
are expected to be real and significant.
2. Reduced Litigation
    The changes included in this rule are expected to result in 
decreased litigation due to increased clarity and reduced 
misclassification. The methodology of this section mirrors previous 
final rules promulgated in recent years.\208\ The rule would clarify to 
stakeholders how to distinguish between employees and independent 
contractors under the Act. The increased clarity is expected to result 
in fewer independent contractor misclassification legal disputes, and 
lower litigation costs. The Department estimates that $48.7 million in 
litigation costs related to independent contractor disputes will be 
avoided per year as a result of this rule. This may be a lower-bound 
estimate, reasons for which are described in more detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ For example, the Department applied a similar approach to 
litigation costs in the 2019 final rule Defining and Delimiting the 
Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside 
Sales and Computer Employees, 81 FR 51230 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department estimates litigation cost savings as being equal to 
an estimate of the number of cases avoided as a result of the rule 
multiplied by the average litigation cost per case.
Number of Cases Avoided
    According to the Public Access to Court Records (PACER) system, 
there were 7,238 Federal cases relating to the FLSA closed in 
2019.\209\ The Department estimates that 9.4 percent of these cases 
relate to independent contractor status.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ Downloaded from Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(PACER).
    \210\ PACER does not provide a granular classification of FLSA 
case types to identify the number of cases specific to independent 
contractor disputes, so the Department performed a keyword analysis 
with spot checking of a random sample of 500 cases closed in 2019, 
determining that 9.4 percent of cases were related to independent 
contractor status (47/500 = 9.4 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the NPRM, to determine this percentage of cases relating to 
independent contracting, the Department reviewed a previous random 
sample of FLSA cases closed in 2014.\211\ For this final rule, the

[[Page 1235]]

Department updated its dataset, using a sample that included 500 cases 
closed in 2019. Of those cases, the Department identified 47 cases 
within this sample that related to independent contractor status. This 
ratio was applied to the 7,238 FLSA cases closed in 2019 to estimate 
680 cases related to independent contractor status. The Department 
assumes that the increased clarity of the rule would reduce the number 
of Federal FLSA cases involving independent contractor classification 
disputes by 10 percent as stakeholders would better understand and be 
better able to agree on classification determinations without having to 
litigate.\212\ Multiplying these variables results in an estimated 68 
cases related to independent contractor disputes avoided annually. This 
estimate of the reduction in the number of independent contractor 
disputes filed does not take into account any reduction in the number 
of FLSA cases related to independent contractor disputes heard in state 
courts (e.g., where the state has adopted the FLSA standards for 
classifying workers), nor does it take into account any reduction in 
filings resolved before litigation or by alternative dispute 
resolution, neither of which are captured in PACER data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ The Department used data from 2014 already obtained for 
use in the analyses performed for the 2019 overtime and regular rate 
final rules. See 84 FR 51230, 51280-81 (reduced litigation estimate 
for the final rule updating the FLSA's white collar exemptions at 29 
CFR part 541); 84 FR 68736, 68767-68 (reduced litigation estimate 
for the final rule updating the FLSA's ``regular rate'' regulations 
at 29 CFR part 778).
    \212\ This aligns with the methodology the Department has 
applied in a number of rulemakings (See e.g., Regular Rate Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act), and in the NPRM for this rule. In each 
rulemaking with this assumption, the Department requested comments 
and data on this point, which yielded no substantive data or 
critiques on its merit. Therefore, the Department believes this is 
an appropriate assumption in this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Average Litigation Cost per Case
    The Department applied a previous estimate of litigation costs of 
$654,182 per case. To obtain this estimate, the Department conducted a 
search for FLSA cases concluded between 2012 and 2015 in the Westlaw 
Case Evaluator tool and on PACER and identified 56 cases that contained 
sufficient litigation cost information to estimate the average costs of 
litigation.213 214 The Department looked at records of court 
filings in the Westlaw Case Evaluator tool and on PACER to ascertain 
how much plaintiffs in these cases were paid for attorney fees, 
administrative fees, and/or other costs, apart from any monetary 
damages attributable to the alleged FLSA violations. After determining 
the plaintiff's total litigation costs for each case, the Department 
then doubled the figures to account for litigation costs that the 
defendant employers incurred. According to this analysis, the average 
litigation cost for FLSA cases concluded between 2012 and 2015 was 
$654,182. Adjusting for inflation, using the GDP deflator, results in a 
value of $715,637 in 2019 dollars.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ Litigation costs are not tracked in a systematic way by 
any publicly available source. Individual case records are available 
through various sources (e.g. PACER and Westlaw), but litigation 
costs are often not reported because of undisclosed settlement 
agreements or because attorney fees are not included in verdict 
judgements. However, because the FLSA entitles prevailing plaintiffs 
to litigation cost awards, the Department was able to ascertain 
costs for 56 relevant cases.
    \214\ The 56 cases used for this analysis were retrieved from 
Westlaw's Case Evaluator database using a keyword search for case 
summaries between 2012 and 2015 mentioning the terms ``FLSA'' and 
``fees.'' This was not limited to cases associated with independent 
contracting. Although the initial search yielded 64 responsive 
cases, the Department excluded one duplicate case, one case 
resolving litigation costs through a confidential settlement 
agreement, and six cases where the defendant employer(s) ultimately 
prevailed. Because the FLSA only entitles prevailing plaintiffs to 
litigation cost awards, information about litigation costs was only 
available for the remaining 56 FLSA cases that ended in settlement 
agreements or court verdicts favoring the plaintiff employees.
    \215\ This average litigation cost per case may underestimate 
total average costs because some attorneys representing FLSA 
plaintiffs may take a contingency fee atop their statutorily awarded 
fees and costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Applying these figures to the estimated 68 cases that could be 
prevented each year due to this rulemaking, the Department estimates 
that avoided litigation costs resulting from the rule total $48.7 
million per year (2019 dollars).216 217
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ Using the median litigation cost, rather than the mean, 
results in a value of $122,341 (2019 dollars) per case, which for 
the estimated 68 annual cases produces a total annual litigation 
cost savings of $8.3 million. However, the median values do not 
adequately capture the magnitude of the impact resulting from the 
large-scale litigation cases that are expected to benefit from the 
clarity provided in this final rule. Therefore, the mean average is 
used for this analysis.
    \217\ The Department's approach to estimating litigation cost 
savings takes into account the impact of the rule on the number of 
relevant cases filed. The approach does not take into account the 
impact of the rule on promoting settlements in the future among 
cases that are filed. Clarifying a rule may increase the settlement 
rate among cases filed, reducing litigation costs further (see 
Gelbach, J., ``The Reduced Form of Litigation Models and the 
Plaintiff's Win Rate,'' J. Law & Economics 61(1), (2018), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/699151).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Improved Labor Market Conditions
    The Department anticipates the final rule will produce benefits by 
reducing uncertainty and improving labor market conditions. Removing 
uncertainty improves labor market efficiency by reducing deadweight 
loss. As discussed in the need for rulemaking, the Department believes 
emerging and innovative economic arrangements that benefit both workers 
and business require reasonable certainty regarding the worker's 
classification as an independent contractor. The current legal 
uncertainty may deter businesses from offering these arrangements or 
developing them in the first place.\218\ If so, the result would be 
economic deadweight loss: Legal uncertainty prevents mutually 
beneficial independent contractor arrangements. This final rule may 
produce cost savings by reducing deadweight loss. Nonetheless, due to 
the abundance of variables at play, the Department has not attempted to 
quantify the precise amount of that reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ See Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, The Prism of 
Entrepreneurship: Creating A New Lens for Worker Classification, 70 
Baylor L. Rev. 595, 628 (2018) (``The continued demand for 
innovative work solutions requires a new classification test. 
Without clarification, parties will be unwilling to engage in new or 
innovative work arrangements.''); see also R. Hollrah and P. 
Hollrah, ``The Time Has Come for Congress to Finish Its Work on 
Harmonizing the Definition of `Employee,' '' J. L. & Pol'y 26(2), p. 
439 (2018), https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol26/iss2/1/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CGO concurred in its public comment, emphasizing that an 
important benefit of this rule will likely be increased labor market 
flexibility. They note that ``most labor models suggest flexibility is 
crucial in allowing labor markets to efficiently match workers with 
jobs, spur entrepreneurship, and act as an important source of 
countercyclical income during a recession.'' They cite a study showing 
that a 10 percent increase in the freelance workforce is correlated 
with a 1 percent increase in entrepreneurial activity.\219\ Similarly, 
CWI submitted their report that finds independent workers ``can be an 
important part of improving business performance, such as by increasing 
speed to market, increasing organizational agility, improving overall 
financial performance, and allowing firms to compete in a digital world 
where increasingly relevant, highly-skilled talent is in short-
supply.'' \220\ By decreasing uncertainty and thus potentially opening 
new opportunities for firms, this final rule may encourage companies to 
hire independent contractors whom they otherwise would not have hired. 
Eisenach (2010) outlines the potential costs of curtailing independent 
contracting.\221\ If

[[Page 1236]]

independent contracting is expanded due to this rule, this could 
generate benefits that may include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ A. Burke, I. Zawwar, and S. Hussels. ``Do Freelance 
Independent Contractors Promote Entrepreneurship?'' Small Business 
Economics 55(2), 415-27 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-019-00242-w.
    \220\ J. Langenfeld and C. Ring. ``Analysis of Literature on 
Technology and Alternative Workforce Arrangements.'' Ankura (October 
2020).
    \221\ J. Eisenach, ``The Role of Independent Contractors in The 
U.S. Economy,'' Navigant Economics (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1717932.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Increased job creation and small business formation.
     Increased competition and decreased prices.
     A more flexible and dynamic work force, where workers are 
able to more easily move to locations or to employers where their labor 
and skills are needed.

Eisenach explains several channels through which these efficiency gains 
may be achieved. First, by avoiding some fixed employment costs, it is 
easier for firms to adjust their labor needs based on fluctuations in 
demand. Second, by using pay-for-preference, independent contractors 
are incentivized to increase production and quality. Third, 
``contracting can be an important mechanism for overcoming legal and 
regulatory barriers to economically efficient employment 
arrangements.'' The analysis of these benefits assumes that businesses, 
especially in other industries, would like to increase their use of 
independent contractors, but have refrained from doing so because of 
uncertainty regarding who can appropriately be engaged as an 
independent contractor under the FLSA. Conversely, significant use of 
independent contractors may not be suitable for all industries, thus 
limiting the growth in its utilization.
    Some commenters agreed that expanding independent contracting can 
lead to employment gains. For example, Dr. Palagashvili discussed the 
literature showing how restricting independent contracting can lead to 
loss of jobs. This final rule, by expanding independent contracting, 
could conversely increase employment. She also noted the importance of 
independent contracting for unemployed workers, referencing a paper 
that found workers who ``suffered a spell of unemployment are 7 to 17 
percentage points more likely than observationally similar workers to 
be employed in an alternative work arrangement when surveyed 1 to 2.5 
years later.'' 222 223
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ L. Katz and A. Krueger, ``The Role of Unemployment in the 
Rise in Alternative Work Arrangements,'' American Economic Review, 
107(5), p. 388 (2017), https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20171092.
    \223\ It should be noted that government-mandated coverage is 
not free. The total value that a worker provides a business must be 
at least as large as the wage, any provided benefits, and government 
(state or Federal) mandates combined. Congress and/or state 
governments may conclude that the value of mandating certain 
coverages outweighs the costs of such coverage, but that does not 
necessarily mean that all covered workers receive significant 
benefits from such coverage or value such coverage compared to other 
compensation. In fact, in some cases workers may be able to strike a 
better deal with a business than would be provided under the terms 
of an employee relationship that operates under the associated 
mandates. Such as in a situation where a worker has clusters of 
available time to work punctuated by extended periods of inability 
to work, such as a long-haul shipper who spends a month at sea and 
then a month at home or a divorced parent who has five kids to care 
for every other week but is fully available on the off weeks to work 
as many hours as needed. In these cases, independent contractor 
relationships may be pivotal in mutually benefiting workers and 
business owners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    She also emphasized the importance of independent contracting to 
startup firms. She references her work conducting interviews and a 
survey of technology startup executives. During these interviews they 
found that ``71 percent of startups relied on independent contractors 
and thought it was necessary to use contract labor during their early 
stages.'' Independent contractors are important to startups because 
``during unpredictable times, when startups are trying to find their 
market and build their product, they need flexible labor and need to be 
able to hire and fire easily.''
    Several commenters disagreed that the rule would improve outcomes 
in the labor market. FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter commented 
that it is inappropriate to conclude ``that `competition will increase 
and prices will decrease' when more workers are classified as 
independent contractors'' because, according to the commenter, the only 
support offered in the NPRM was a 2010 non-peer-reviewed article 
providing little evidence of this claim. The Department maintains that 
economic laws generally apply to labor markets, and that as supply 
increases then prices can be expected to decrease. UFCW contested the 
Department's claim that this rule will lead to increased productivity. 
They presented an example of how independent contracting hurts 
efficiency: ``Instead of ecommerce fulfil[l]ment carried out by a team 
of output-optimizing role players, the `independent contractor' item 
selection and packing is carried out by the same individual who does 
the delivery, adding unnecessary and time consuming steps to the 
process. The `independent contractor' must first park his or her car, 
walk into the store, orient him or herself to the store layout, select 
and pack the items, transact the payment, then carry the packed items 
back to the car.'' The Department does not think UFCW's claims are 
valid across the incredibly dynamic range of independent contractor 
jobs, and further questions UFCW's unsupported assertion that the 
expansive emergence of mobile customer-service-focused delivery 
applications ``reduces the opportunity for productivity-enhancing 
innovation.'' Further, even the example ignores that efficiencies will 
likely be gained over time as the independent contractor fulfils 
additional orders each day, week, and month. The Department does not 
believe that these commenters provided reliable data to revise its 
analysis, especially in light of the data provided to its support by 
other commenters.
4. Improved Worker Satisfaction and Flexibility
    The Department believes this rulemaking may also result in greater 
autonomy and job satisfaction for workers. Several surveys have shown 
that independent contractors have high job satisfaction.\224\ Using the 
CWS, which only considers primary, active contractors, the Department 
estimates that of independent contractors with valid responses, 83 
percent prefer their current arrangement rather than being an employee, 
compared with only 9 percent who would prefer an employment arrangement 
(the remaining 8 percent responded that it depends).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ See, e.g., MBO Partners (2019), supra note 131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the main reasons individuals work as independent 
contractors demonstrate that being an independent contractor often has 
valuable benefits. The 2017 CWS asked, ``What is the main reason you 
are self-employed/an independent contractor?'' The two most popular 
reasons were (1) being their own boss, and (2) scheduling 
flexibility.\225\ In fact, these two choices were each selected over 
three times more often than any of the other options.\226\ 
Additionally, McKinsey Global Institute found that ``[i]ndependent 
workers report higher levels of satisfaction on many aspects of their 
work life than traditional workers.'' \227\ The McKinsey Global 
Institute examined workers who work

[[Page 1237]]

independently by choice and those who do so by necessity (such as 
needing supplemental income) and found that both groups report being 
happy with the flexibility and autonomy of their work.\228\ Similarly, 
Kelly Services found that ``free agents''--i.e., workers who ``derive 
their primary income from independent work and actively prefer it''--
report higher satisfaction than traditional workers concerning overall 
employment situation; work-life balance; opportunities to expand 
skills; and opportunities to advance career.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \225\ The Department used PES26IC to identify preferred work 
arrangement and PES26IR to identify the reason they work as an 
independent contractor.
    \226\ The third most commonly selected reason was ``Money is 
better,'' supporting the Department's view that monetary and non-
pecuniary benefits are central motivations of most independent 
contractors.
    \227\ McKinsey Global Institute, supra note 89 at 11. A 2009 Pew 
survey similarly found that self-employed workers are 
``significantly more satisfied with their jobs than other workers.'' 
Rich Morin, ``Job Satisfaction among the Self-Employed,'' Pew 
Research Center, (September 2009), https://pewsocialtrends.org/pubs/743/job-satisfaction-highest-among-self-employed. In particular, 39 
percent of self-employed workers reported being ``completely 
satisfied'' with their jobs, compared with 28 percent of employees. 
Id.
    \228\ McKinsey Global Institute, supra note 89 at 10. The 
McKinsey survey found that, while ``those working independently out 
of necessity report being happier with the flexibility and content 
of the work,'' they also report being ``less satisfied with their 
level of income level and their income security.'' Id. The 
Department believes this rulemaking is unlikely to negatively impact 
the average income level of such workers by encouraging independent 
contractor opportunities. As discussed above, there are data 
indicating that independent contractors, on average, may earn higher 
hourly wages than employees. Nor is rulemaking likely to negatively 
impact workers' income security, on average (see Section 
VI(E)(2)(viii)).
    \229\ Kelly Services (2015), supra note 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters agreed that the scheduling flexibility afforded to 
independent contractors is of importance to many of these workers. WPI 
pointed out that many independent contractors require flexibility to 
balance work and other obligations. They cite a recent report that 
found ``48 percent of freelancers report being caregivers, while 33 
percent report having a disability in their household.'' \230\ Dr. 
Palagashvili discussed the significance of independent contracting work 
for women, who tend to be the primary caregiver, and thus value 
scheduling flexibility. She cited several papers demonstrating the 
importance of flexible work arrangements for women. For example, a 
survey by HyperWallet found that ``96 percent of women indicate that 
the primary benefit of engaging in platform-economy work is the 
flexible working hours.\231\ SHRM pointed to their survey that found 
that 49 percent of external workers chose that work arrangement for the 
ability to set their own hours.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ Upwork, Freelance Forward 2020: The U.S. Independent 
Workforce Report (September 2020).
    \231\ HyperWallet. ``The Future of Gig Work Is Female: A Study 
on the Behaviors and Career Aspirations of Women in the Gig 
Economy,'' (2017), https://www.hyperwallet.com/app/uploads/HW_The_Future_of_Gig_Work_is_Female.pdf.
    \232\ SHRM and SAP SuccessFactors (2019), supra note 200.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Conversely, other commenters asserted that valuing flexibility is 
not relevant as a benefit to a worker who is classified as an 
independent contractor. The Department believes that non-pecuniary 
benefits like flexibility are very important to workers and should 
receive adequate attention in this RIA. Research has shown that 
flexibility is a criterion workers consider when evaluating job 
offers.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \233\ He, H. et al. (2019), supra note 131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The PA L&I wrote that it is inappropriate to present flexibility 
for independent contractors as a ``replacement for lower wages and no 
benefits.'' PA L&I also stated that the Department does not discuss 
independent contractors' counteracting loss of stability in income, 
location of work, and frequency and schedule of work and instead simply 
``presumes that workers prize flexibility over stability'' without 
citing any evidence. The Department notes that it examined numerous 
studies that directly address, and provide evidence regarding, the 
tradeoffs many independent contractors voluntarily make to attain 
flexibility. To that point, a survey submitted by CWI found 61 percent 
of independent contractors prefer the ``flexibility to choose when and 
where to work'' over ``having access to a steady income and benefits.'' 
\234\ Additionally, the workers who value flexibility will be the ones 
drawn to those independent contracting arrangements that provide 
flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ Coalition for Workforce Innovation (2020), supra note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Washington Center posited that in many industries, such as 
trucking and deliveries, the flexibility benefits for independent 
contractors are small because workers often do not have control over 
their routes or work hours. This was echoed by the UFCW, who pointed 
out that in retail the use of just-in-time scheduling limits the 
scheduling flexibility for workers classified as independent 
contractors. The Department acknowledges that the flexibility benefits 
may differ across industries, but that they tend to exist in all 
industries to some degree.
    UFCW contended that although current independent contractors may be 
satisfied with their employment status, this will not necessarily hold 
for newly classified workers. The Department acknowledges that new 
independent contractors may differ from current independent contractors 
but lacks any data to show how their satisfaction levels would differ. 
Lacking such data, which commenters did not provide, the best predictor 
of job satisfaction for new independent contractors is job satisfaction 
among current independent contractors. Further, the Department notes, 
as explained above, that this rule will not directly reclassify any 
workers but rather provides clarity regarding the current process for 
determining worker classification.
    UFCW used a 2017 report from Prudential Research, specifically 
regarding gig workers, to dispute the Department's claim that 
independent contractors are more satisfied than employees. UFCW 
excerpted from the report that, ``on-demand independent contractors who 
work full-time hours are less satisfied with their current work 
situation than full-time employees (44 percent vs. 55 percent).'' \235\ 
However, the commenter did not include all of the findings in the 
source it cited; the same Prudential study notes that for gig workers 
who also have other jobs, their job satisfaction rate is 86 percent. 
Notably, UFCW focused on gig workers in its comment, but conflates such 
workers with the entire universe of independent contractors. The 
Department acknowledges that although there may be lower job 
satisfaction for some subsets of independent contractors, studies that 
consider all independent contractors generally find that independent 
contractors report similar or higher job satisfaction than employees. 
For example, CWI submitted a survey they conducted finding that 94 
percent of independent workers are satisfied with their work 
arrangements.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ Prudential Research (2017), supra note.
    \236\ Coalition for Workforce Innovation (2020), supra note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By clarifying that control and opportunity for profit or loss are 
the core economic reality factors, this final rule is likely to 
encourage the creation of independent contractor jobs that provide 
autonomy and entrepreneurial opportunities that many workers find 
satisfying. For the same reason, this final rule likely will diminish 
the incidence of independent contractor jobs that lack these widely 
desired characteristics. Thus, the Department expects this final rule 
to result in more independent contractor opportunities which bring with 
them autonomy and job satisfaction. The benefits of worker autonomy and 
satisfaction obviously ``are difficult or impossible to quantify,'' but 
they nonetheless merit consideration.
5. Income Smoothing
    Several commenters asserted that independent contracting plays a 
key role in smoothing income during recessions by providing an 
alternative source of income. Commenters cited to a JPMorgan Chase 
Institute study that makes this case.\237\ Other commenters

[[Page 1238]]

held the opposite view and highlighted the economic downturn related to 
COVID-19. For example, the Center for Innovation in Worker Organization 
claimed that high unemployment increases the likelihood that employers 
fail to pay minimum wage. Because this rule is focused on independent 
contractors, even assuming the premise of the comment from the Center 
for Innovation in Worker Organization is correct, this concern does not 
directly apply. Further, this commenter did not provide clear evidence 
that independent contracting does not help workers supplement their 
income.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ D. Farrell, F. Greig, and A. Hamoudi, ``The Online 
Platform Economy in 27 Metro Areas: JPMorgan Chase Institute,'' 
JPMorgan Chase Institute (2019), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/research/labor-markets/report-ope-cities.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Opportunities To Work for Multiple Customers
    In the NPRM, the Department noted that independent contractors may 
more easily work for multiple companies simultaneously. The Washington 
Center disputed this claim, asserting that ``economists have found that 
about 75 percent of workers receiving non-employee compensation are 
tied to one employer'' and the likelihood of being tied to a single 
employer is similar for wage earners and contractors.\238\ But the 
economists whom the Washington Center cites in support of their 
assertion explicitly noted that the independent contractors in their 
study ``include[ ] those who are primarily employed at a W2 job, and 
vice versa.'' \239\ This overlap prevents meaningful comparisons 
between independent contractors and W2 employees for the purpose of 
this RIA. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, a Commissioner at the FTC wrote: 
``Independent contractor status is not what allows a worker to work for 
two rivals. Indeed, many hourly workers are employed at more than one 
job, including for two employers who are rivals in the same industry.'' 
Commissioner Slaughter gave an example of a worker who holds two jobs 
at competing fast food restaurants, but this does not undermine the 
Department's discussion of independent contractors being able to use 
mobile applications to pick which tasks they choose to perform in real 
time on a job-by-job basis. That fast food worker cannot always decide 
which job he wants to work for each shift of the day. Additionally, 
Slaughter commented that working for multiple employers may demonstrate 
a worker's need to hold multiple jobs to pay bills rather than being 
indicative of flexibility. This point, however, was not substantiated 
by data showing that such a critique can effectively be applied across 
the universe of millions of independent contractors who cite 
flexibility as a core motivator. And as explained in Sections III(A) 
and IV(C), courts have repeatedly explained that need for income is not 
the correct legal lens through which to analyze whether a worker is an 
independent contractor or employee under the FLSA.\240\ Lastly, she 
noted that ``Uber has been known to discourage multi-apping by 
monitoring whether drivers were logging into more than one platform 
simultaneously and penalizing those that did not exclusively take Uber 
customers.'' \241\ Under this rule, Uber's monitoring and controlling 
certain drivers' ability to multi-app would be a consideration under 
the control factors of the economic reality test as applied to those 
drivers. See Razak, 951 F.3d at 145-46 (including drivers' contention 
``that while `online' for Uber, they cannot also accept rides through 
other platforms'' in list of ``disputed facts regarding control''). But 
it appears that the majority of rideshare drivers are able to multi-
app.\242\ The Department believes that economy-wide data reveal that 
many independent contractors hold multiple jobs,\243\ and they 
resoundingly prize the flexibility to work when, where, and how they 
choose.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ Collins et al. (2019), supra note 80.
    \239\ Id. at 14 n.7.
    \240\ See, e.g., Halferty, 821 F.2d at 268 (``[I]t is not 
dependence in the sense that one could not survive without the 
income from the job that we examine, but dependence for continued 
employment''); DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1385 (``The economic-
dependence aspect of the [economic reality] test does not concern 
whether the workers at issue depend on the money they earn for 
obtaining the necessities of life.'').
    \241\ Commissioner Slaughter cited a note submitted as 
background material for an OECD meeting and a law review article to 
support this contention. See M. Steinbaum, Monopsony and the 
Business Model of Gig Economy Platforms, OECD 7 (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2019)66/en/pdf; M. 
Steinbaum, ``Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power,'' 
82 Law and Contemp. Probs. 45, 55 (2019), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4918&context=lcp.
    \242\ See This App Lets Drivers Juggle Competing Uber and Lyft 
Rides, Wired (Feb. 15, 2018) (estimating that over 70 percent of 
rideshare drivers multi-app), https://www.wired.com/story/this-app-lets-drivers-juggle-competing-uber-and-lyft-rides/.
    \243\ Lim et al., supra note 75, at 61.
    \244\ See the May 2017 CWS supplement to the CPS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Regulatory Alternatives

    Pursuant to its obligations under Executive Order 12866,\245\ the 
Department assessed three regulatory alternatives to the standard 
promulgated in this final rule. These three alternatives are the same 
as those analyzed in the NPRM,\246\ listed below in order from least to 
most restrictive of independent contracting: \247\
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    \245\ Exec. Order No. 12866 Sec.  6(a)(3)(C)(iii), 58 FR 51741.
    \246\ See 85 FR 60634 (discussing regulatory alternative to the 
proposed rule).
    \247\ OMB guidance advises that, where possible, agencies should 
analyze at least one ``more stringent option'' and one ``less 
stringent option'' to the proposed approach. OMB Circular A-4 at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Codification of the common law control test, which applies in 
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors under 
various other Federal laws; \248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ See 26 U.S.C. 3121(d)(2) (generally defining the term 
``employee'' under the Internal Revenue Code as ``any individual 
who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the 
employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee''); 42 
U.S.C. 410(j) (similarly defining ``employee'' under the Social 
Security Act); see also, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence 
v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989) (applying ``principles of general 
common law of agency'' to determine ``whether . . . work was 
prepared by an employee or an independent contractor'' under the 
Copyright Act of 1976); Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (holding that ``a 
common-law test'' should resolve employee/independent contractor 
disputes under ERISA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) Codification of the traditional six-factor ``economic reality'' 
balancing test, as recently articulated in WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-
6; and
    (3) Codification of the ``ABC'' test, as adopted by the California 
Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 
P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \249\ See also Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 465 
(N.J. 2015) (extending the ABC test to state wage claims in New 
Jersey).

Although the Department believes that legal limitations preclude 
adoption of the ``common law'' and ``ABC'' test alternatives listed 
above, the Department notes that Congress is presently considering 
separate bills that would amend the FLSA to adopt these 
alternatives,\250\ and accordingly presents them for the benefit of the 
public as recommended by OMB guidance.\251\ All

[[Page 1239]]

three regulatory alternatives are analyzed in qualitative terms, due to 
data constraints and inherent uncertainty in measuring the exact 
stringency of multi-factor legal tests and likely responses from the 
regulated community. The Department appreciates the feedback it 
received on these regulatory alternatives from commenters, which is 
described and addressed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ The Modern Worker Empowerment Act, H.R. 4069, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (introduced by Rep. Elise Stefanik), would amend Sec. 3(e) of 
the FLSA statute to clarify that the term ``employee'' is 
``determined under the usual common law rules (as applied for 
purposes of section 3121(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986).'' 
See also S. 2973, 116th Cong. (2019) (companion Senate bill 
introduced by Sen. Tim Scott). By contrast, the Worker Flexibility 
and Small Business Protection Act, H.R. 8375, 116th Cong. (2020) 
(introduced by Rep. Rosa DeLauro) would, among other provisions, 
amend the FLSA and other labor statutes to clarify that ``[a]n 
individual performing any labor for remuneration shall be considered 
an employee and not an independent contractor'' unless such 
individual passes the ``ABC'' test discussed in this analysis. See 
also S. 4738, 116th Cong. (2020) (companion bill introduced by 
Senators Patty Murray and Sherrod Brown).
    \251\ OMB Circular A-4 advises that agencies ``should discuss 
the statutory requirements that affect the selection of regulatory 
approach. If legal constraints prevent the selection of a regulatory 
action that best satisfies the philosophy and principles of 
Executive Order 12866, [agencies] should identify these constraints 
and estimate their opportunity cost. Such information may be useful 
to Congress under the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Codifying a Common Law Control Test
    The least stringent alternative to the final rule's streamlined 
``economic reality'' test would be to adopt a common law control test, 
as is generally used to determine independent contractor classification 
questions arising under the Internal Revenue Code and various other 
Federal laws.\252\ The overarching focus of the common law control test 
is ``the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which 
[work] is accomplished,'' Reid, 490 U.S. at 751, but the Supreme Court 
has explained that ``other factors relevant to the inquiry [include] 
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; the duration of the parties' relationship; 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to 
the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when 
and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in 
hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; 
the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired 
party.'' Id. at 751-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ See supra note 248. The Supreme Court has explained that 
the common law standard of employment applies by default under 
Federal law ``unless [Congress] clearly indicates otherwise.'' 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 325; see also Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 US 730, 739-40 (1989) (``[W]hen Congress has 
used the term `employee' without defining it, we have concluded that 
Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant 
relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the common law control test considers many of the same 
factors as those identified in the final rule's ``economic reality'' 
test (e.g., skill, length of the working relationship, the source of 
equipment and materials, etc.), courts generally recognize that, 
because of its focus on control, the common law test is more permissive 
of independent contracting arrangements than the economic reality test, 
which more broadly examines the economic dependence of the worker. See, 
e.g., Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272 n.1 
(5th Cir. 1988) (observing that ``[t]he `economic realities' test is a 
more expansive standard for determining employee status'' than the 
common law control test). Thus, if a common law control test determined 
independent contractor status under the FLSA, it is possible that some 
workers presently classified as FLSA employees could be reclassified as 
independent contractors, increasing the overall number of independent 
contractors and reducing the overall number of employees. The 
Department is unable to estimate the exact magnitude of such a 
reclassification effect, but believes that the vast majority of FLSA 
employees would remain FLSA employees even under a common law control 
test.
    As discussed in the NPRM, codifying a common law control test that 
is used for purposes of at least some other Federal statutes would 
create a simpler legal regime for regulated entities interested in 
receiving services from an independent contractor, thereby reducing 
confusion, compliance costs, and legal risk for entities interested in 
doing business with independent contractors. Entities would not have to 
understand and apply a different employment classification standard for 
FLSA purposes. Thus, adopting the common law control test would likely 
increase perpetual cost savings for regulated entities attributable to 
improved clarity and reduced litigation as compared to the final rule. 
It could, on the other hand, impose burdens on workers who might prefer 
to be employees subject to FLSA protections. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the ``suffer or permit'' language in section 3(g) 
of the FLSA as establishing a broader definition of employment than the 
common law. See, e.g., Darden, 503 U.S. at 326; Portland Terminal Co., 
330 at 150-51.
    A handful of business commenters addressed the merits of the common 
law control test as a regulatory alternative. In a joint comment, 
Vanliner Insurance Company and the Great American Trucking Division 
implicitly requested adoption of the common law standard presently used 
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Social Security 
Act (SSA), as they urged the Department to ``foster efficiency and 
consistency by creating uniformity for compliance with the FLSA, the 
[NLRA], and the [SSA].'' The American Society of Travel Advisors, Inc. 
(ASTA) asserted that ``the simplest means to accomplish [a uniform 
classification standard under Federal law] would be to revise the FLSA, 
either legislatively or through regulation, to replace the economic 
reality test with the right of control test.'' While appearing to 
support the common law control test on substance, the Workplace Policy 
Institute warned that ``any attempt by the Department to depart from 
the economic reality test likely would result in a successful legal 
challenge to this rulemaking,'' expressing support for the Department's 
proposed economic reality test ``in the spirit of `don't let the 
perfect be the enemy of the good.' '' See also Dr. Palagashvili 
(``[A]lthough the DOL is constrained in adopting a common law control 
test, I suggest that lawmakers amend the FLSA to allow for codification 
thereof.''). By contrast, the National Federation of Independent 
Business (NFIB) criticized the Department's conclusion in the NPRM that 
it lacks the legal authority to implement a common law standard through 
rulemaking as ``unfortunate'' and ``questionable.''
    The Department appreciates the policy appeal of establishing a 
uniform Federal classification standard, and understands that the 
standard most familiar to the regulated community is likely the common 
law control test used for tax and other purposes. However, such an 
approach would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's statement that 
FLSA employment is more inclusive than the common law control test. 
See, e.g., Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947) 
(``[I]n determining who are `employees under the [FLSA], common law 
employee categories . . . are not of controlling significance.''). The 
overwhelming majority of commenters who mentioned the common law 
standard in their comment, including business commenters inclined to 
favor the relative permissiveness of a common law standard, expressed 
agreement with that conclusion.
2. Codifying the Six-Factor ``Economic Reality'' Balancing Test
    As discussed earlier in section II(B), WHD has long applied a 
multifactor ``economic reality'' balancing test to distinguish between 
employees and independent contractors in enforcement actions and 
subregulatory guidance. The six factors in WHD's multifactor balancing 
test, as recently articulated in WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6, are as 
follows:
    (1) The nature and degree of the potential employer's control;

[[Page 1240]]

    (2) The permanency of the worker's relationship with the potential 
employer;
    (3) The amount of the worker's investment in facilities, equipment, 
or helpers;
    (4) The amount of skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight 
required for the worker's services;
    (5) The worker's opportunities for profit or loss; and
    (6) The extent of integration of the worker's services into the 
potential employer's business.

WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6 at 4 (citing Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 
730, and Silk, 331 U.S. at 716).
    As discussed in the NPRM, the Department believes that this six-
factor balancing test is neither more nor less permissive of 
independent contractor relationships as compared to the streamlined 
test finalized in this rulemaking. Both tests describe the ``economic 
dependence'' of the worker at issue as the ultimate inquiry; both 
emphasize the primacy of actual practice over contractual or 
theoretical possibilities (i.e., the ``economic reality'' of the work 
arrangement); and both evaluate the same set of underlying factors, 
notwithstanding an emphasis and consolidation of certain factors under 
this rule's streamlined test. Notably, like Sec.  795.105(d)(1)(i) of 
the final rule, WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6 advised that certain 
safety measures and quality control standards do not constitute 
``control'' indicative of an FLSA employment relationship. See id. at 8 
n.4. However, the Department explained in the NPRM that the six-factor 
balancing test used by WHD and most courts, with some significant 
variations, would benefit from clarification, sharpening, and 
streamlining.
    A number of commenters urged the Department to codify a six-factor 
balancing test. Several commenters, including NELP, Eastern Atlantic 
States Regional Council of Carpenters (EASRCC), and the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters, specifically requested that the Department 
reinstate AI 2015-1, which was withdrawn in 2017. SWACCA asserted that 
``codification of the six[hyphen]factor balancing test may well achieve 
more consistency of application from the courts as it pushes them to 
develop their similar precedents to align with the Department's 
views,'' criticizing the proposed rule as ``a novel weighted test that 
will result in more litigation and less certain outcomes[.]'' SWACCA 
also disputed the Department's assumption in the NPRM that codifying 
the six[hyphen]factor balancing test would not reduce initial 
regulatory familiarization costs or provide greater per[hyphen]contract 
cost savings compared to the proposed rule, see 85 FR 60635, arguing 
that this assumption ``overlooks the fact that codifying the 
six[hyphen]factor balancing test would simply incorporate what is now 
subregulatory guidance at the regulatory level.'' Finally, NELP, NWLC, 
and the State AGs asserted that the Department has no legal authority 
to promulgate any regulatory standard except the traditional six-factor 
balancing test, citing to Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 576 U.S. 446 
(2015), for the proposition that the six-factor balancing test derived 
from Silk and Rutherford Food has effectively become part of the FLSA's 
``statutory scheme.'' See id. at 456 (``All [of the Supreme Court's] 
interpretive decisions, in whatever way reasoned, effectively become 
part of the statutory scheme, subject (just like the rest) to 
congressional change.'').
    While the Department agrees with NELP, NWLC, and the State AGs that 
Supreme Court precedent requires application of an ``economic reality'' 
test to evaluate independent contractor claims under the FLSA, we 
disagree that the Court has definitively prescribed the specific 
components of such a test. As explained earlier, courts in different 
Federal circuits have articulated the number and nature of relevant 
factors in different ways, so any formulation endorsed by the 
Department would be at least marginally ``novel'' to courts and 
affected stakeholders across jurisdictions in some respect. Moreover, 
many commenters are overstating the degree to which the standard 
finalized in this rule meaningfully departs from existing precedent. If 
anything, by elevating the two factors that are most probative to what 
courts have established as the ultimate inquiry of the test--i.e., 
whether workers ``are in business for themselves,'' Saleem, 854 F.3d at 
139--the Department's approach is more faithful to courts' instruction 
that the factors ``must be applied with that ultimate notion in mind.'' 
Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311. Moreover, because the Department's analysis of 
appellate case law since 1975 has found workers' control and 
opportunity for profit or loss to be most predictive of a worker's 
classification status, the finalized standard provides more accurate 
guidance.
    To the extent that some businesses and independent contractors 
familiar with the Department's earlier subregulatory guidance might 
spend less time reviewing new regulatory language on the topic under 
this alternative, any reduction in initial regulatory familiarization 
costs compared to the streamlined test adopted in this final rule would 
likely be minimal. By contrast, and as we explained in the NPRM, 
codification of the traditional six-factor balancing test would yield 
smaller recurring benefits and cost savings over the long term, as the 
Department continues to believe in the added clarity of an 
appropriately weighted test with less overlapping redundancy.
    The Department further believes that reinstatement of AI 2015-1's 
specific articulation of the six-factor test would be inappropriate 
because that withdrawn guidance exacerbates the very shortcomings that 
this rule remedies. As discussed in Section III(A), the first such 
shortcoming is the need for consistent application of economic 
dependence. While the AI 2015-1 correctly stated that ``[t]he ultimate 
inquiry under the FLSA is whether the worker is economically dependent 
on the employer or truly in business for him or herself,'' it failed to 
apply that concept consistently. Notably, it explained that the 
investment factor should be analyzed by comparing the amount of the 
worker's investments with the amount the potential employer invests 
because ``[i]f the worker's investment is relatively minor, that 
suggests that the worker and the [potential] employer are not on 
similar footings and that the worker may be economically dependent on 
the employer.'' But the correct concept of economic dependence is not 
an inquiry into whether two entities are on a ``similar footing,'' but 
rather whether an individual is in business for him- or herself.\253\ 
Such an approach to the investment factor is misleading by placing the 
focus on the worker's financial means instead of the worker's 
relationship with the purported employer. Several cases explicitly or 
implicitly reject the ``similar footing'' analysis, most plainly 
because independent contractors routinely work for companies with whom 
they are not on a ``similar footing.'' See Karlson, 860 F.3d at 1096 
(``Large corporations can hire independent contractors''). The 
``similar footing'' concept of economic dependence is also inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court's analysis in Silk, 331 U.S. 718, which found 
that truck drivers who invested in their own vehicles were independent 
contractors who transported coal for a coal company. The Court did not 
compare

[[Page 1241]]

the relative investment of the drivers with that of the coal company or 
ask whether they were on a ``similar footing''--they obviously were 
not. Instead, the Court ruled that the drivers were independent 
contractors, in part because they had ``the opportunity for profit from 
sound management'' of their investment. Id. at 719. What matters is not 
the relative size of a worker's investment, but whether the worker has 
a meaningful opportunity for profit or loss based on that investment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ The Department is also concerned that the phrase ``similar 
footing'' lacks a clear meaning and therefore may be confusing to 
the regulated community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second shortcoming discussed at Section III(B) is the need for 
guidance regarding which economic reality factors are more probative. 
AI 2015-1 exacerbates this shortcoming by relegating the more probative 
control factor while elevating the less probative ``integral part'' 
factor. In particular, AI-2015 stated that ``[t]he control factor 
should not overtake the other factors of the economic realities test.'' 
Such guidance is plainly inconsistent with cases in which control 
explicitly ``overtakes'' other factors. See, e.g., Saleem; 854 F.3d at 
147 (``whatever `the permanence or duration' of Plaintiffs' affiliation 
with Defendants, both its length and the `regularity' of work was 
entirely of Plaintiffs' choosing'' (citation omitted)); Selker Bros. 84 
F.3d at 147 (``Given the degree of control exercised by Selker over the 
day-to-day operations of the stations, this [use of special skills] 
cannot be said to support a conclusion of independent contractor 
status.''). Deemphasizing the control factor is also at odds with 
commonsense logic; control over the work seems to be extremely 
probative as to whether an individual is in business for him- or 
herself. In addition to de-emphasizing a highly probative factor, AI-
2015 also states that ``[c]ourts have found the `integral' factor to be 
compelling,'' citing Snell, 875 F.2d at 811 and Lauritzen, F.2d at 
1537-38 for support. But both cited cases actually analyzed the 
``integral part'' factor as an afterthought: Each devoted only a few 
conclusory sentences to this factor after more in depth analysis of the 
other factors Snell, 875 F.2d at 811 and Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1537-
38. The ``integral part'' factor falls short of even an afterthought in 
the Fifth Circuit, which typically does not analyze it at all. As 
explained in Section IV(D)(5), the ``integral part'' factor--as used in 
AI 2015-1 to mean a worker's importance to a business--is not supported 
by Supreme Court precedent and may send misleading signals in many 
cases.
    The third shortcoming discussed at Section III(C) is overlaps 
between economic reality factors, which undermines the structural 
benefits of a multifactor test by blurring the lines between factors. 
One type of overlap highlighted by the NPRM is the importation of the 
analysis of initiative and business judgment, which are already part of 
the control and opportunity factors, into the skill factor, thus 
``dilut[ing] the consideration of actual skill to the point of 
irrelevance.'' 85 FR 60607. Id. AI 2015-1 reinforces this problem by 
focusing the skill factor entirely on initiative and business judgment, 
thus eliminating consideration of skill: ``A worker's business skills, 
judgment, and initiative, not his or her technical skills, will aid in 
determining whether the worker is economically independent.'' The 
withdrawn guidance makes clear that it is not simply that skill matters 
less than initiative, but that skill matters not at all, because it 
unequivocally states that ``specialized skill do not indicate that 
workers are in business for themselves.'' This categorical statement, 
however, is supported by more circumspect case law explaining that 
``skill is not itself indicative of independent contractor status.'' AI 
2015-1 (quoting Superior Care, 84 F.2d at 1060 (emphasis added)); see 
also id. (``the use of special skills is not itself indicative of 
independent contractor status'' (quoting Selker Bros. 949 F.d at 1295) 
(emphasis added)). AI 2015-1's categorical position is also at odds 
with the Supreme Court's instruction in Silk that ``skill required'' 
may be ``important for decision.'' 331 U.S. at 716; see also Simpkins, 
893 F.3d at 966 (``whether Simpkins had specialized skills, as well as 
the extent to which he employed them in performing his work, are 
[material] issues'').
    Further, reinstating AI 2015-1 or otherwise adopting a six-factor 
test with overlapping factors and without guidance regarding the 
factors' relative probative value would negate the overall beneficial 
effects that would likely result from this rule, which are discussed 
above.
    For these reasons, the Department declines commenters' requests to 
reinstate AI 2015-1.The Department further notes that, unlike this 
rule, AI 2015-1 was issued without notice and comment and thus did not 
benefit from helpful input from the regulated community.
3. Codifying California's ``ABC'' Test
    The most stringent regulatory alternative to the Department's 
proposed rule would be to codify the ``ABC'' test recently adopted 
under California's state wage and hour law to distinguish between 
employee/independent contractor statuses.\254\ As described by the 
California Supreme Court in Dynamex, ``[t]he ABC test presumptively 
considers all workers to be employees, and permits workers to be 
classified as independent contractors only if the hiring business 
demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies each of three 
conditions: (a) That the worker is free from the control and direction 
of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both under 
the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and (b) that 
the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring 
entity's business; and (c) that the worker is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same 
nature as that involved in the work performed.'' 416 P.3d at 34.\255\ 
In justifying the adoption of such a stringent test, the Dynamex court 
noted the existence of an ``exceptionally broad suffer or permit to 
work standard'' in California's wage and hour statute, id. at 31,\256\ 
as well as ``the more general principle that wage orders are the type 
of remedial legislation that must be liberally construed in a manner 
that serves its remedial purposes.'' Id. at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ See Dynamex, 416 P.3d 1; Assembly Bill (``A.B.'') 5, Ch. 
296, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (codifying the ABC test 
articulated in Dynamex); A.B. 2257, Ch. 38, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2020) (exempting certain professions, occupations, and 
industries from the ABC test that A.B. 5 had codified). The ABC test 
originated in state unemployment insurance statutes, but some state 
courts and legislatures have recently extended the test to govern 
employee/independent contractor disputes under state wage and hour 
laws. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Gig-Dependence: Finding the 
Real Independent Contractors of Platform Work, 39 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 
379, 408-11 (2019) (discussing the origins and recent expansion of 
the ABC test).
    \255\ California's ABC test is slightly more stringent than 
versions of the ABC test adopted (or presently under consideration) 
in other states. For example, New Jersey provides that a hiring 
entity may satisfy the ABC test's ``B'' prong by establishing 
either: (1) That the work provided is outside the usual course of 
the business for which the work is performed, or (2) that the work 
performed is outside all the places of business of the hiring 
entity. N.J. Stat. Ann. Sec.  43:21-19(i)(6)(A-C). The Department 
has chosen to analyze California's ABC test as a regulatory 
alternative because businesses subject to multiple standards, 
including nationwide businesses, are likely to comply with the most 
demanding standard if they wish to make consistent classification 
determinations.
    \256\ See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, Sec.  11090, subd. 2(D) 
(```Employ' means to engage, suffer, or permit to work.''). The 
Dynamex court noted that California's adoption of the ``suffer or 
permit to work'' standard predated the enactment of the FLSA and was 
therefore ``not intended to embrace the Federal economic reality 
test'' that subsequently developed. 416 P.3d at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On its face, California's ABC test is far more restrictive of 
independent contracting arrangements than any formulation of an 
``economic reality''

[[Page 1242]]

balancing test, including the proposed rule. Whereas no single factor 
necessarily disqualifies a worker from independent contractor status 
under an economic reality test, each of the ABC test's three factors 
may alone disqualify the worker from independent contractor status. 
Thus, the NPRM stated that adoption of an ABC test to govern 
independent contractor status under the FLSA would directly result in a 
large-scale reclassification of many workers presently classified as 
independent contractors into FLSA-covered employees, particularly those 
in industries that depend on independent contracting arrangements 
within the ``usual course of the hiring entity's business.'' Dynamex, 
416 P.3d at 34. While some independent contractors might benefit from 
reclassification by newly receiving overtime pay or a guaranteed 
minimum wage, these workers might also experience a reduction in work 
hours or diminished scheduling flexibility as their new employers 
attempt to avoid incurring additional expenses for overtime work. 
Others workers, particularly off-site workers who operate free from the 
business' direct control and supervision, might see their work 
arrangements terminated by businesses unwilling or unable to assume the 
financial burden and legal risk of the FLSA's overtime pay requirement. 
After highlighting some of the reports of adverse consequences 
experienced by workers and businesses in California following the 
passage A.B. 5, the Department concluded that adopting the ABC test as 
the FLSA's generally applicable standard for distinguishing employees 
from independent contractors would be unduly restrictive and disruptive 
to the economy. Finally, as a matter of law, the Department asserted 
that adoption of California's ABC test would be inconsistent with the 
more flexible economic reality test adopted by the Supreme Court, as it 
would cover workers who have been held by the Supreme Court to be 
independent contractors under the economic reality test. See Silk, 331 
U.S. at 719; Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130.
    The Department received a large volume of commenter feedback on the 
merits of California's ABC test. While the majority of these comments 
were highly critical of the standard, it did have several supporters. 
Commenters in favor of the ABC test asserted that, as the regulatory 
alternative most restrictive of independent contracting considered by 
the Department, it would best effectuate Congress' intent to extend 
FLSA coverage broadly and reduce unlawful misclassification of 
employees as independent contractors. See, e.g., Matt Brown; National 
Domestic Workers Alliance; Public Justice Center; SEIU. Numerous 
commenters asserted that the ABC test, with its three individually 
determinative factors, was also the clearest and most predictable 
approach considered. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters; 
Writers Guild of America, East, AFL-CIO. New York University's People's 
Parity Project argued that ``[g]iven the importance of the California 
market to the national economy and the fact that it follows the more 
stringent ABC standard, any business that wishes to operate in 
California, and any national business, will have economic motivation to 
follow the ABC standard.'' NELA similarly disputed concerns that 
adoption of the ABC test would be unduly disruptive, asserting that 
Massachusetts wage and hour law has used an ABC test since 2004 and 
that ``[m]any other states, including New Jersey, Illinois, 
Connecticut, and Hawaii, use an ABC test for certain [other] purposes, 
and have similarly suffered no disruption to their economies.'' 
Finally, regarding the Department's legal authority to adopt the ABC 
test, NELA asserted that ``none of the cases on which the Department 
relies suggest that the multi-factor test is the only way to test 
`economic reality' or that the ABC test ignores `economic reality.' ''
    A diverse array of commenters voiced strong opposition to adopting 
an ABC test under the FLSA, including law firms, trade associations, 
advocacy organizations, academics, and individual freelancers. Several 
commenters dedicated the entirety or vast majority of their comment 
towards criticizing California's ABC test. See, e.g., American Consumer 
Institute Center for Citizen Research (ACI); Fight for Freelancers USA; 
Institute for the American Worker; Joint Comment of the Pacific Legal 
Foundation (PLF), the American Society of Journalists and Authors, Inc. 
(ASJA), and the National Press Photographers Association (NPPA); Dr. 
Palagashvili; The People v. AB5. The primary objection voiced by 
commenters critical of the ABC test regarded the disruptive economic 
effects of implementing such a stringent standard, with several 
asserting that an ABC test would devastate their industry. See, e.g., 
American Council of Life Insurers (``Thousands of jobs would likely 
have been lost had the California legislature failed to create [an 
exemption for insurance professionals].''); Coalition of Practicing 
Translators & Interpreters of California (CoPTIC) (``[A.B. 5] posed an 
existential threat to the survival of our profession.''); Intermodal 
Association of North America (IANA)) (``The ABC test essentially 
eliminates the independent contractor model for motor carriers involved 
in intermodal drayage.''). Several commenters invoked the numerous 
exemptions to the ABC test that California lawmakers initially adopted 
in A.B. 5 and subsequently expanded in A.B. 2257 as evidence of the 
standard's overreach. See, e.g., California Chamber of Commerce 
(``During the first few months of the 2020 Legislative Session, more 
than 30 bills were introduced to add a myriad of exemptions to the ABC 
test. . . . As a result of the adoption of AB 2257, which was signed 
into law in September, there are now 109 exemptions to the ABC 
test.''); Rep. Virginia Foxx et al. (``Rather than setting a dependable 
and workable standard, the AB 5 framework results in arbitrary 
treatment of industries based on political considerations to the 
detriment of workers.''); Joint Comment of PLF, ASJA, and NPPA (``If a 
law requires dozens of exceptions to avoid destroying the careers of 
successful independent professionals, it is a strong indication that 
the law's basic premise--the ABC test--is flawed.''). Some individual 
freelancers, including writer Karen Kroll, filmmaker/actor Margarita 
Reyes, unspecified professional Chun Fung Kevin Chiu, and unspecified 
professional Carola Berger, asserted that the ABC test is falsely 
premised on the assumption that all independent contractors, or at 
least those who provide services in a client's usual course of 
business, feel exploited and would prefer to be employees. The 
Independent Women's Forum and Dr. Palagashvili asserted that the ABC 
test implemented in California disproportionately burdened female 
workers with caregiving responsibilities, who are less able to find 
adequately flexible work schedules through traditional employment. 
Finally, some commenters agreed with the Department's conclusion in the 
NPRM that Supreme Court precedent precludes the Department from 
adopting an ABC test under the FLSA. See NRF; FMI--The Food Industry 
Association.
    After reviewing commenter feedback, the Department continues to 
believe that the ABC test would be infeasible, difficult to administer, 
and disruptive to the economy if adopted as the FLSA standard. The 
weight of data, arguments, and anecdotes that commenters shared about 
the ABC test's

[[Page 1243]]

effects in California support the NPRM's conclusion that adopting an 
ABC test would have unacceptably disruptive economic effects. For 
instance, a self-employed ``professional handyman with technical skills 
in furniture assembly and home repair'' stated that ``[a]s a California 
resident, it has been concerning to watch the way AB-5 has affected our 
state. I don't believe legislators should make decisions that make it 
harder for people like me to find work and earn a living the way we 
want to.'' A medical translator stated that ``ABC test simply doesn't 
work in my field and it is not a fair standard to measure my situation. 
The original AB5 law in California was destructive to the livelihood of 
many of my colleagues in that state.'' And as a final illustrative 
example, a freelance journalist in California characterized that 
state's adoption of the ABC test as an ``attempt to legislate an entire 
class of entrepreneurs out of business.'' See also, e.g., People vs. 
AB5; Fight for Freelancers; NPPA; WPI.
    Moreover, as commenters pointed out, the numerous exemptions 
initially and subsequently passed by the California legislature 
indicate the ABC test's inadequacy as a generally applicable standard, 
as well as its unpopularity with affected stakeholders. An ``owner of a 
small, one-woman business in California'' explained in her comment that 
``[t]he absurdity and overreach of AB5 is evidenced by the numerous 
attempts at clean-up bills in California (SB 875, SB 1039, SB 900, AB 
1850, AB 2257 . . .) that clogged the CA legislative landscape for 
months, culminating in the now adopted AB 2257, which lists too many 
exemptions to count.'' The recent passage of the high-profile 
Proposition 22 ballot initiative in California,\257\ which occurred 
shortly after the end of the comment period for this rulemaking and 
exempted numerous gig workers from the ABC test, is further evidence in 
this regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ See Kate Conger, ``Uber and Lyft Drivers in California 
Will Remain Contractors,'' NY Times (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/technology/california-uber-lyft-prop-22.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While California retains the ABC test for some industries but not 
others, the Department is required to apply the FLSA consistently for 
all covered industries (absent explicit statutory authority to do 
otherwise). Thus, if the Department adopted the ABC test, that standard 
would apply to virtually all industries nationwide, including numerous 
industries that the Californian legislature and voters exempted because 
they would suffer undue disruption under that standard. NELA contended 
that adoption of the ABC test by Massachusetts has not led to the same 
type of disruption experienced in California, which is disputed by some 
commenters from Massachusetts. See e.g., New Jobs for Massachusetts; 
IFA; Fight for Freelancers. But even if NELA were correct, a nationwide 
ABC test would still disrupt California, the state with the largest 
population and economy, and likely many others. In the Department's 
view, the fact that a legal standard may be disruptive in only some 
states (e.g., California) but not others (e.g., Massachusetts) is not a 
persuasive reason for nationwide adoption.
    Additionally, the Department continues to believe that it lacks 
legal authority to adopt the ABC test under the FLSA because that test 
is far too rigid and restrictive of independent contracting 
arrangements. As a threshold matter, each of the ABC test's three 
independently determinative factors would contradict binding Supreme 
Court precedent applying the economic reality test, where ``[n]o one 
[factor] is controlling.'' Silk, 331 U.S. at 716. In particular, the 
test's ``B'' prong--denying independent contractor status unless the 
contractor ``performs work that is outside the usual course of the 
hiring entity's business''--would contradict the Court's recognition in 
Silk that ``[f]ew businesses are so completely integrated that they can 
themselves produce the raw material, manufacture and distribute the 
finished product to the ultimate consumer without assistance from 
independent contractors.'' 331 U.S. at 714; see also Rutherford Food, 
331 U.S. at 729 (recognizing that ``[t]here may be independent 
contractors who take part in [the] production or distribution'' of a 
hiring party). Indeed, application of California's ABC test would 
result in different classification outcomes than those the Supreme 
Court arrived at applying the economic reality test in Silk, 331 U.S. 
at 719 (ruling that truckers who were ``an integral part of the 
businesses of retailing coal or transporting freight'' were independent 
contractors), and Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130 (concluding that musicians 
were independent contractors rather than employees of the music hall 
where they played). Absent revised guidance from the Supreme Court or 
Congressional legislation amending the FLSA statute, the Department 
continues to believe that it lacks the legal authority to implement a 
California-style ``ABC'' test through administrative rulemaking.
    NELA contended that ``an ABC test is more faithful to the broad, 
remedial purpose of the FLSA.'' According to NELA, ``[a]t its core, the 
FLSA is a remedial statute'' and therefore, the Department should 
interpret the FLSA's standard of employment to be broader than economic 
dependence. However, the Supreme Court warned against relying on 
``flawed premise that the FLSA `pursues' its remedial purpose `at all 
costs' '' when interpreting the Act. Encino, 138 S. Ct. at 1142; see 
also Bristol, 935 F.3d 122 (`` `[A] fair reading' of the FLSA, neither 
narrow nor broad, is what is called for.'' (quoting Encino, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1142)); Diaz, 751 F. App'x at, 758 (rejecting request to interpret 
FLSA provisions to provide ``broad'' coverage because ``[w]e must 
instead give the FLSA a `fair' interpretation.''). Furthermore, even if 
remedial statutes should be liberally construed, the ABC test still 
runs afoul of the Supreme Court's stated limits on the extent of the 
FLSA's definition of employment, as explained above. As such, the 
Department may not (and no court has ever suggested that it could) 
replace the economic reality test with the ABC test to be faithful to 
the FLSA's remedial purpose.
    In sum, legal constraints and the disruptive economic effects of 
adopting the ABC test in the FLSA context. As we stated in the NPRM, 
the Department engaged in this rulemaking to clarify the existing 
standard, not to radically transform it.

H. Summary of Impacts

    In summary, the Department believes that this rule will increase 
clarity regarding whether a worker is classified as an employee or an 
independent contractor under the FLSA. This clarity could result in an 
increased use of independent contractors. The costs and benefits to a 
worker being classified as an independent contractor are discussed 
throughout this analysis, and are summarized below.
    The Department believes that there are real benefits to the use of 
independent contractor status, for both workers and employers. 
Independent contractors generally have greater autonomy and more 
flexibility in their hours, providing them more control over the 
management of their time. The use of independent contracting for 
employers allows for a more flexible and dynamic workforce, where 
workers provide labor and skills where and when they are needed. 
Independent contractors may more easily work for multiple companies 
simultaneously, have more control over their labor-leisure balance, and 
more explicitly

[[Page 1244]]

define the nature of their work. Independent contractors also appear to 
have higher job satisfaction.
    An increase in the number of job openings for independent 
contractors can also have benefits for the economy as a whole. 
Increased job creation and enhanced flexibility in work arrangements 
are critical benefits during periods of economic uncertainty, such as 
the current COVID-19 pandemic.
    There are also certain challenges that face independent contractors 
compared to employees subject to the FLSA. Independent contractors are 
not subject to the protections of the FLSA, such as minimum wage and 
overtime pay. Independent contractors generally do not receive the same 
employer-provided benefits as employees, such as health insurance, 
retirement contributions, and paid time off.\258\ Independent 
contractors may have a higher tax liability than employees, as they are 
legally obligated to pay both the employee and employer shares of the 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes. However, economists 
recognize that payroll taxes generally are subtracted from the wage 
rate of employees. Employers also cover unemployment insurance and 
workers' compensation taxes for their employees. These costs are also 
components of businesses' worker costs, and employee wages are expected 
to reflect that accordingly. Independent contractors do not pay these 
taxes nor are they generally protected by these insurance programs, but 
there are private insurance companies that offer equivalent coverage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \258\ In some situations, independent contractors may be 
provided with benefits similar to those provided to employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the Department does not know how many workers may shift 
from employee status to independent contractor status, or how many 
people who were previously unemployed or out of the labor force will 
gain work as an independent contractor, these costs and benefits have 
not been quantified.

VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996, Public Law 104-121 (1996), requires Federal agencies engaged in 
rulemaking to consider the impact of their proposals on small entities, 
consider alternatives to minimize that impact, and solicit public 
comment on their analyses. The RFA requires the assessment of the 
impact of a regulation on a wide range of small entities, including 
small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small governmental 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, the Department examined the regulatory 
requirements of this final rule to determine whether they would have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
Because both costs and cost savings are minimal for small business 
entities, the Department certifies that this final rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    The Department used the Small Business Administration size 
standards, which determine whether a business qualifies for small-
business status, to estimate the number of small 
entities.259 260 The Department then applied these 
thresholds to the U.S. Census Bureau's 2012 Economic Census to obtain 
the number of establishments with employment or sales/receipts below 
the small business threshold in the industry.\261\ These ratios of 
small to large establishments were then applied to the more recent 2017 
Economic Census data on number of establishments.\262\ Next, the 
Department estimated the number of small governments, defined as having 
population less than 50,000, from the 2017 Census of Governments.\263\ 
In total, the Department estimated there are 6.4 million small 
establishments or governments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ SBA, Summary of Size Standards by Industry Sector, 2017, 
www.sba.gov/document/support--table-size-standards.
    \260\ The most recent size standards were issued in 2019. 
However, the Department used the 2017 standards for consistency with 
the older Economic Census data.
    \261\ The 2012 data are the most recently available with revenue 
data.
    \262\ For this analysis, the Department excluded independent 
contractors who are not registered as small businesses, and who are 
generally not captured in the Economic Census, from the calculation 
of small establishments.
    \263\ 2017 Census of Governments. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department assumes that a Compensation, Benefits, and Job 
Analysis Specialist (SOC 13-1141) (or a staff member in a similar 
position) will review the rule.\264\ According to the Occupational 
Employment Statistics (OES), these workers had a mean wage of $33.58 
per hour in 2019 (most recent data available). Given the proposed 
clarification to the Department's interpretation of who is an employee 
and who is an independent contractor under the FLSA, the Department 
assumes that it will take on average about 1 hour to review the rule as 
proposed. The Department believes that an hour, on average, is 
appropriate, because while some establishments will spend longer than 
one hour to review the rule, many establishments may rely on third-
party summaries of the changes or spend little or no time reviewing the 
rule. Assuming benefits are paid at a rate of 46 percent of the base 
wage, and overhead costs are 17 percent of the base wage, the 
reviewer's effective hourly rate is $54.74; thus, the average cost per 
establishment conducting regulatory familiarization is $54.74. The per-
entity rule familiarization cost for independent contractors, some of 
whom would be small businesses, is $11.59, or the fully loaded mean 
hourly wage of independent contractors in the CWS ($46.36) multiplied 
by 0.25 hour. The Department believes that 15 minutes, on average, is 
appropriate, because while some independent contractors will spend 
longer than one hour to review the rule, many will spend little or no 
time reviewing the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ A Compensation/Benefits Specialist ensures company 
compliance with Federal and state laws, including reporting 
requirements; evaluates job positions, determining classification, 
exempt or non-exempt status, and salary; plans, develops, evaluates, 
improves, and communicates methods and techniques for selecting, 
promoting, compensating, evaluating, and training workers. See BLS, 
``13-1141 Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists,'' 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes131141.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The cost savings due to increased clarity estimated per year for 
each small business employer is $18.25, or the fully loaded mean hourly 
wage of a Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialist 
multiplied by 0.33 hours. The cost savings due to increased clarity for 
each independent contractor, some of whom would be a small business, is 
$4.14 per year, or the fully loaded mean hourly wage of independent 
contractors in the CWS multiplied by 0.89 hours.\265\ Because 
regulatory familiarization is a one-time cost and the cost savings from 
clarity recur each year, the Department expects cost savings to 
outweigh regulatory familiarization costs in the long run. Because both 
costs and cost savings are minimal for small business entities, and 
well below one percent of their gross annual revenues, which is 
typically at least $100,000 per year for the smallest businesses, the 
Department certifies that this final rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \265\ Note that the NPRM reported $3.86 which is the cost per 
job, rather than the cost per independent contractor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There is some evidence that small firms use independent contractors 
for a greater proportion of their workforce than large firms.\266\ If 
so, then it may be reasonable to assume that the increased

[[Page 1245]]

use of independent contractors may also favor smaller companies. In 
which case, costs and benefits and cost savings may be larger for these 
small firms. Because benefits and cost savings are expected to outweigh 
costs, the Department does not expect this rule will result in an undue 
hardship for small businesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ Lim et al, supra note 75 at 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AFL-CIO disagreed with including cost savings from increased 
clarity for independent contractors. They argue that ``the independent 
contractors at issue--those who falls [sic] close to the line 
separating independent contractors from employees are not themselves 
employers, they provide services solely as individuals and they have no 
need to determine if they are themselves independent contractors.'' 
They additionally stated that the analysis failed to include compliance 
costs for the new small businesses created--the workers newly 
classified as independent contractors. Specifically, these new 
independent contractors will have increased regulatory burden due to 
additional accounting and tax filing costs. The Department believes it 
did address this because workers who choose to pursue independent 
contractor roles will not take them unless they believe the gains will 
offset the costs.
    The AFL-CIO asserts that the Department failed to conduct the 
outreach to small businesses as required by Section 609(a) of the RFA. 
The Department notes that these requirements only apply when the rule 
will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities, which is not the case for this rulemaking.

VIII. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Analysis

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) \267\ requires 
agencies to prepare a written statement for rules with a Federal 
mandate that may result in increased expenditures by state, local, and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $156 
million ($100 million in 1995 dollars adjusted for inflation) or more 
in at least one year.\268\ This statement must: (1) Identify the 
authorizing legislation; (2) present the estimated costs and benefits 
of the rule and, to the extent that such estimates are feasible and 
relevant, its estimated effects on the national economy; (3) summarize 
and evaluate state, local, and tribal government input; and (4) 
identify reasonable alternatives and select, or explain the non-
selection, of the least costly, most cost-effective, or least 
burdensome alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ See 2 U.S.C. 1501.
    \268\ Calculated using growth in the Gross Domestic Product 
deflator from 1995 to 2019. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table 
1.1.9. Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Authorizing Legislation

    This final rule is issued pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.

B. Assessment of Costs and Benefits

    For purposes of the UMRA, this rule includes a Federal mandate that 
is expected to result in increased expenditures by the private sector 
of more than $156 million in at least one year, but will not result in 
increased expenditures by state, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, of $156 million or more in any one year.
    Based on the cost analysis from this final rule, the Department 
determined that it will result in Year 1 total costs for state and 
local governments totaling $1.7 million, all for regulatory 
familiarization. There will be no additional costs incurred in 
subsequent years.
    The Department determined that the rule will result in Year 1 total 
costs for the private sector of $369.2 million, all of them incurred 
for regulatory familiarization. The Department included all independent 
contractors in the private sector total regulatory familiarization 
costs. There will be no additional costs incurred in subsequent years.
    UMRA requires agencies to estimate the effect of a regulation on 
the national economy if such estimates are reasonably feasible and the 
effect is relevant and material.\269\ However, OMB guidance on this 
requirement notes that such macroeconomic effects tend to be measurable 
in nationwide econometric models only if the economic effect of the 
regulation reaches 0.25 percent to 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), or in the range of $53.6 billion to $107.2 billion 
(using 2019 GDP).\270\ A regulation with a smaller aggregate effect is 
not likely to have a measurable effect in macroeconomic terms, unless 
it is highly focused on a particular geographic region or economic 
sector, which is not the case with this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ See 2 U.S.C. 1532(a)(4).
    \270\ According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019 GDP was 
$21.43 trillion. https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-02/gdp4q19_2nd_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department's RIA estimates that the total costs of the final 
rule will be $369.2 million. Given OMB's guidance, the Department has 
determined that a full macroeconomic analysis is not likely to show 
that these costs would have any measurable effect on the economy.
    Many commenters claim that the rule will result in costs to Federal 
and state governments in the form of increased public assistance and 
decreased tax revenue. The Department discussed these potential costs 
in the RIA and directs the reader to Section VI(E)(2)(ii).
    The State AGs stated that the Department failed to include the 
increased administrative and enforcement costs to states due to the 
change in the standard for determining independent contractor status 
under the FLSA. They wrote that states ``would need to invest time and 
resources into training agency employees and educating the public,'' 
particularly in states with laws that are more restrictive than the 
economic reality test. States do not enforce Federal laws and therefore 
have no need to train their personnel in the enforcement of the FLSA or 
the Department's regulations. There is also no need for states to be 
``educating'' the public about FLSA regulations--aside from pointing 
out that Federal law may impose different requirements than state labor 
laws. Finally, under the nation's federalist system, states may and 
often do enact and enforce labor standards and are more restrictive 
than Federal standards. A state's decision to do so, however, rests 
with the state because no state is forced to enact labor standards that 
are stricter than the Federal standard. Any costs associated with 
implementing a stricter standard, including training and education, 
reflect the free choice of the individual state, and not the existence 
of a different Federal standard. As such, costs that a state choose to 
bear in enacting and enforcing their own laws are the result of the 
state's own decision, and are outside the scope of the unfunded mandate 
concept.

C. Least Burdensome Option Explained

    The Department believes that it has chosen the least burdensome but 
still cost-effective methodology to clarify the FLSA's distinction 
between employees and independent contractors. Although the regulation 
will impose costs for regulatory familiarization, the Department 
believes that its proposal would reduce the overall burden on 
organizations by simplifying and clarifying the analysis for 
determining whether a worker is classified as an employee or an 
independent contractor under the FLSA. The Department believes that, 
after familiarization, this rule will reduce the time spent by 
organizations to determine whether a worker is an independent 
contractor. Moreover, the additional clarification

[[Page 1246]]

could promote innovation and certainty in business relationships. The 
AFPF agreed ``that the Department has adequately analyzed potential 
alternatives as well as selected the least burdensome option under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.''

IX. Effects on Families

    The undersigned hereby certifies that the proposed rule would not 
adversely affect the well-being of families, as discussed under section 
654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999.

List of Subjects

29 CFR Part 780

    Agriculture, Child labor, Wages.

29 CFR Part 788

    Forests and forest products, Wages.

29 CFR Part 795

    Employment, Wages.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 31st day of December, 2020.
Cheryl M. Stanton,
Administrator, Wage and Hour Division.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Department of Labor 
amends 29 CFR chapter V as follows:

PART 780--EXEMPTIONS APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE, PROCESSING OF 
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND RELATED SUBJECTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT

0
1. The authority citation for part 780 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 1-19, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201-
219.


0
2. Amend Sec.  780.330 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  780.330   Sharecroppers and tenant farmers.

* * * * *
    (b) In determining whether such individuals are employees or 
independent contractors, the criteria laid down in Sec. Sec.  795.100 
through 795.110 of this chapter are used.
* * * * *

PART 788--FORESTRY OR LOGGING OPERATIONS IN WHICH NOT MORE THAN 
EIGHT EMPLOYEES ARE EMPLOYED

0
3. The authority citation for part 788 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 1-19, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201-
219.


0
4. Amend Sec.  788.16 by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:


Sec.  788.16   Employment relationship.

    (a) In determining whether individuals are employees or independent 
contractors, the criteria laid down in Sec. Sec.  795.100 through 
795.110 of this chapter are used.
* * * * *

0
5. Add part 795 to subchapter B to read as follows:

PART 795--EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CLASSIFICATION UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Sec.
795.100 Introductory statement.
795.105 Determining employee and independent contractor 
classification under the FLSA.
795.110 Primacy of actual practice.
795.115 Examples of analyzing economic reality factors.
795.120 Severability.

    Authority: 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201-219.


Sec.  795.100  Introductory statement.

    This part contains the Department of Labor's general 
interpretations of the text governing individuals' classification as 
employees or independent contractors under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA or Act). See 29 U.S.C. 201-19. The Administrator of the Wage and 
Hour Division will use these interpretations to guide the performance 
of his or her duties under the Act, and intends the interpretations to 
be used by employers, employees, and courts to understand employers' 
obligations and employees' rights under the Act. To the extent that 
prior administrative rulings, interpretations, practices, or 
enforcement policies relating to classification as an employee or 
independent contractor under the Act are inconsistent or in conflict 
with the interpretations stated in this part, they are hereby 
rescinded. The interpretations stated in this part may be relied upon 
in accordance with section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. 
251-262, notwithstanding that after any such act or omission in the 
course of such reliance, any such interpretation in this part ``is 
modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be 
invalid or of no legal effect.'' 29 U.S.C. 259.


Sec.  795.105  Determining employee and independent contractor 
classification under the FLSA.

    (a) Independent contractors are not employees under the Act. An 
individual who renders services to a potential employer--i.e., a 
putative employer or alleged employer--as an independent contractor is 
not that potential employer's employee under the Act. As such, sections 
6, 7, and 11 of the Act, which impose obligations on employers 
regarding their employees, are inapplicable. Accordingly, the Act does 
not require a potential employer to pay an independent contractor 
either the minimum wage or overtime pay under sections 6 or 7. Nor does 
section 11 of the Act require a potential employer to keep records 
regarding an independent contractor's activities.
    (b) Economic dependence as the ultimate inquiry. An ``employee'' 
under the Act is an individual whom an employer suffers, permits, or 
otherwise employs to work. 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1), (g). An employer 
suffers or permits an individual to work as an employee if, as a matter 
of economic reality, the individual is economically dependent on that 
employer for work. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 
(1947); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947). An individual 
is an independent contractor, as distinguished from an ``employee'' 
under the Act, if the individual is, as a matter of economic reality, 
in business for him- or herself.
    (c) Determining economic dependence. The economic reality factors 
in paragraph (d) of this section guide the determination of whether the 
relationship between an individual and a potential employer is one of 
economic dependence and therefore whether an individual is properly 
classified as an employee or independent contractor. These factors are 
not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive. However, the two 
core factors listed in paragraph (d)(1) of this section are the most 
probative as to whether or not an individual is an economically 
dependent ``employee,'' 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1), and each therefore 
typically carries greater weight in the analysis than any other factor. 
Given these two core factors' greater probative value, if they both 
point towards the same classification, whether employee or independent 
contractor, there is a substantial likelihood that is the individual's 
accurate classification. This is because other factors are less 
probative and, in some cases, may not be probative at all, and thus are 
highly unlikely, either individually or collectively, to outweigh the 
combined probative value of the two core factors.
    (d) Economic reality factors--(1) Core factors--(i) The nature and 
degree of control over the work. This factor weighs towards the 
individual being an independent contractor to the extent the 
individual, as opposed to the potential employer, exercises substantial 
control over key aspects of the performance of

[[Page 1247]]

the work, such as by setting his or her own schedule, by selecting his 
or her projects, and/or through the ability to work for others, which 
might include the potential employer's competitors. In contrast, this 
factor weighs in favor of the individual being an employee under the 
Act to the extent the potential employer, as opposed to the individual, 
exercises substantial control over key aspects of the performance of 
the work, such as by controlling the individual's schedule or workload 
and/or by directly or indirectly requiring the individual to work 
exclusively for the potential employer. Requiring the individual to 
comply with specific legal obligations, satisfy health and safety 
standards, carry insurance, meet contractually agreed-upon deadlines or 
quality control standards, or satisfy other similar terms that are 
typical of contractual relationships between businesses (as opposed to 
employment relationships) does not constitute control that makes the 
individual more or less likely to be an employee under the Act.
    (ii) The individual's opportunity for profit or loss. This factor 
weighs towards the individual being an independent contractor to the 
extent the individual has an opportunity to earn profits or incur 
losses based on his or her exercise of initiative (such as managerial 
skill or business acumen or judgment) or management of his or her 
investment in or capital expenditure on, for example, helpers or 
equipment or material to further his or her work. While the effects of 
the individual's exercise of initiative and management of investment 
are both considered under this factor, the individual does not need to 
have an opportunity for profit or loss based on both for this factor to 
weigh towards the individual being an independent contractor. This 
factor weighs towards the individual being an employee to the extent 
the individual is unable to affect his or her earnings or is only able 
to do so by working more hours or faster.
    (2) Other factors--(i) The amount of skill required for the work. 
This factor weighs in favor of the individual being an independent 
contractor to the extent the work at issue requires specialized 
training or skill that the potential employer does not provide. This 
factor weighs in favor of the individual being an employee to the 
extent the work at issue requires no specialized training or skill and/
or the individual is dependent upon the potential employer to equip him 
or her with any skills or training necessary to perform the job.
    (ii) The degree of permanence of the working relationship between 
the individual and the potential employer. This factor weighs in favor 
of the individual being an independent contractor to the extent the 
work relationship is by design definite in duration or sporadic, which 
may include regularly occurring fixed periods of work, although the 
seasonal nature of work by itself would not necessarily indicate 
independent contractor classification. This factor weighs in favor of 
the individual being an employee to the extent the work relationship is 
instead by design indefinite in duration or continuous.
    (iii) Whether the work is part of an integrated unit of production. 
This factor weighs in favor of the individual being an employee to the 
extent his or her work is a component of the potential employer's 
integrated production process for a good or service. This factor weighs 
in favor of an individual being an independent contractor to the extent 
his or her work is segregable from the potential employer's production 
process. This factor is different from the concept of the importance or 
centrality of the individual's work to the potential employer's 
business.
    (iv) Additional factors. Additional factors may be relevant in 
determining whether an individual is an employee or independent 
contractor for purposes of the FLSA, but only if the factors in some 
way indicate whether the individual is in business for him- or herself, 
as opposed to being economically dependent on the potential employer 
for work.


Sec.  795.110  Primacy of actual practice.

    In evaluating the individual's economic dependence on the potential 
employer, the actual practice of the parties involved is more relevant 
than what may be contractually or theoretically possible. For example, 
an individual's theoretical abilities to negotiate prices or to work 
for competing businesses are less meaningful if, as a practical matter, 
the individual is prevented from exercising such rights. Likewise, a 
business' contractual authority to supervise or discipline an 
individual may be of little relevance if in practice the business never 
exercises such authority.


Sec.  795.115  Examples of analyzing economic reality factors.

    (a) The following illustrative examples demonstrate how the factors 
listed in Sec.  795.105(d) may be analyzed under the facts presented 
and are limited to substantially similar factual situations.
    (b)(1)(i) Example. An individual is the owner and operator of a 
tractor-trailer and performs transportation services for a logistics 
company. The owner-operator substantially controls the key aspects of 
the work. However, the logistics company has installed, at its own 
expense, a device that limits the maximum speed of the owner-operator's 
vehicle and monitors the speed through GPS. The company limits the 
owner-operator's speed in order to comply with federally mandated motor 
carrier safety regulations and to ensure that she complies with local 
traffic laws. The company also requires the owner-operator to meet 
certain contractually agreed-upon delivery deadlines, and her contract 
includes agreed-upon incentives for meeting, and penalties for missing, 
the deadlines.
    (ii) Application. The owner-operator exercises substantial control 
over key aspects of her work, indicating independent contractor status. 
The fact that the company has installed a device that limits and 
monitors the speed of the owner-operator's vehicle does not change the 
above conclusion. This measure is implemented in order to comply with 
specific legal obligations and to ensure safety, and thus under Sec.  
795.105(d)(1)(i) would not constitute control that makes the owner-
operator more or less likely to be an employee under the Act. The 
contractually agreed-upon delivery deadlines, incentives, and penalties 
are typical of contractual relationships between businesses and 
likewise would not constitute control that makes the owner-operator 
more or less likely to be an employee under the Act.
    (2)(i) Example. An individual accepts assignments from a company 
that provides an app-based service linking those who need home-repair 
work with those who perform home-repair work. The individual is able to 
meaningful increase his earnings by exercising initiative and business 
acumen and by investing in his own equipment. The company, however, has 
invested millions of dollars in developing and maintaining the app, 
marketing itself, maintaining the security of information submitted by 
actual and prospective customers and workers, and monitoring customer 
satisfaction with the work performed.
    (ii) Application. The opportunity for profit or loss factor favors 
independent contractor status for the individual, despite the 
substantial difference in the monetary value of the investments made by 
each party. While the company may have invested substantially more in 
its business, the value of that investment is not relevant in 
determining whether the individual has a meaningful opportunity for 
profit or loss through his initiative, investment, or both.

[[Page 1248]]

    (3)(i) Example. An individual worker works full time performing 
home renovation and repair services for a residential construction 
company. She is also the part owner of a food truck, which she operates 
on weekends. In performing the construction work, the worker is paid a 
fixed hourly rate, and the company determines how many and which tasks 
she performs. Her food truck recently became very popular and has 
generated substantial profits for her.
    (ii) Application. With regard to the construction work, the worker 
does not have a meaningful opportunity for profit or loss based on her 
exercise of initiative or investment, indicating employee status. She 
is unable to profit, i.e., increase her earnings, by exercising 
initiative or managing investments because she is paid a fixed hourly 
rate and the company determines the assignment of work. While she earns 
substantial profits through her food truck, that is a separate business 
from her work in the construction industry, and therefore is not 
relevant to the question of whether she is an employee of the 
construction company or in business for herself in the construction 
industry.
    (4)(i) Example. A housekeeper works for a ski resort every winter. 
At the end of each winter, he stops working for the ski resort because 
the resort shuts down. At the beginning of each of the past several 
winters, the housekeeper returned to his prior position at the ski 
resort without formally applying or interviewing.
    (ii) Application. The housekeeper has a long-term and indefinite 
work relationship with the ski resort under the permanence factor, 
which weighs in favor of classification as an employee. That his 
periods of working for the ski resort end at the end of each winter is 
a result of the seasonal nature of the ski industry and is thus not 
indicative of a sporadic relationship. The fact that the housekeeper 
returns to his prior position each new season indicates that his 
relationship with ski resort does not end and is indefinite as a matter 
of economic reality.
    (5)(i) Example. An editor works part-time for a newspaper. The 
editor works from home and is responsible for assigning and reviewing 
many articles published by the newspaper. Sometimes she also writes or 
rewrites articles. The editor is responsible for determining the layout 
and order in which all articles appear in the newspaper's print and 
online editions. She makes assignment and lay-out decisions in 
coordination with several full-time editors who make similar decisions 
with respect to different articles in the same publication and who are 
employees of the newspaper.
    (ii) Application. The editor is part of an integrated unit of 
production of the newspaper because she is involved in the entire 
production process of the newspaper, including assigning, reviewing, 
drafting, and laying out articles. This factor points in the direction 
of her being an employee of the newspaper. This conclusion is further 
supported by the fact that the editor performs the same work as 
employees of the newspaper in coordination with those employees. The 
fact that she does not physically work at the newspaper's office does 
not outweigh these more probative considerations of the integrated unit 
factor.
    (6)(i) Example. A journalist writes articles for a newspaper on a 
freelance basis. The journalist does not have an office and generally 
works from home. He submits an article to the newspaper once every 2 to 
3 weeks, which the newspaper may accept or reject. The journalist 
sometimes corresponds with the newspaper's editor regarding what to 
write about or regarding revisions to the articles that he submits, but 
he does not otherwise communicate or work with any of the newspaper's 
employees. The journalist never assigns articles to others nor does he 
review or revise articles that others submit. He is not responsible for 
determining where his article or any other articles appear in the 
newspaper's print and online editions.
    (ii) Application. The journalist is not part of an integrated unit 
of production of the newspaper, indicating independent contractor 
status. His work is limited to the specific articles that he submits 
and is completely segregated from other parts of the newspaper's 
processes that serve its specific, unified purpose of producing 
newspapers. It is not relevant in analyzing this factor that the 
writing of articles is an important part of producing newspapers. 
Likewise, the fact that he works at home does not strongly indicate 
either status, because the nature of the journalist's work is such that 
the physical location where it is performed is largely irrelevant.


Sec.  795.120  Severability.

    If any provision of this part is held to be invalid or 
unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person or 
circumstance, or stayed pending further agency action, the provision 
shall be construed so as to continue to give the maximum effect to the 
provision permitted by law, unless such holding shall be one of utter 
invalidity or unenforceability, in which event the provision shall be 
severable from this part and shall not affect the remainder thereof.

[FR Doc. 2020-29274 Filed 1-6-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-27-P