Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend Its Fees Schedule in Connection With Migration, 71666-71689 [2020-24884]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 10, 2020 / Notices
quality impacts, and no impacts to
historic and cultural resources from the
proposed action. Therefore, there are no
significant non-radiological
environmental impacts associated with
the proposed action.
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that
there are no significant environmental
impacts associated with the proposed
action.
Environmental Impacts of the
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
As an alternative to the proposed
action, the NRC staff considered denial
of the proposed action (i.e., the ‘‘noaction’’ alternative). Denial of the
proposed action would result in no
change in current environmental
impacts. The environmental impacts of
the proposed action and the alternative
action are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
There are no unresolved conflicts
concerning alternative uses of available
resources under the proposed action.
Agencies or Persons Consulted
No additional agencies or persons
were consulted regarding the
environmental impact of the proposed
III. Finding of No Significant Impact
The requested exemption from 10
CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A) and 10 CFR
50.75(h)(1)(iv) would allow HDI to use
funds from the NDTs for spent fuel
management and site restoration
activities, without prior written
notification to the NRC. The proposed
action would not significantly affect
plant safety, would not have a
significant adverse effect on the
probability of an accident occurring,
and would not have any significant
radiological or non-radiological impacts.
The reason the human environment
would not be significantly affected is
that the proposed action involves an
exemption from requirements that are of
a financial or administrative nature and
that do not have an impact on the
human environment. Consistent with 10
CFR 51.21, the NRC conducted the EA
for the proposed action, and this FONSI
incorporates by reference the EA
included in Section II of this document.
Therefore, the NRC concludes that the
proposed action will not have
significant effects on the quality of the
human environment. Accordingly, the
NRC has determined not to prepare an
environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
Other than HDI’s letter dated February
12, 2020, there are no other
environmental documents associated
with this review. This document is
available for public inspection as
indicated in Section I.
Previous considerations regarding the
environmental impacts of operating
IPEC are described in NUREG–1437,
Supplement 38, Volume 1, ‘‘Generic
Environmental Impact Statement for
License Renewal of Nuclear Plants:
Supplement 38 Regarding Indian Point
Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3—
Final Report, Main Report and
Comment Responses,’’ dated December
2010 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML103350405), and Volume 5, ‘‘Generic
Environmental Impact Statement for
License Renewal of Nuclear Plants:
Supplement 38 Regarding Indian Point
Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3—
Final,’’ dated April 2018 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML18107A759).
IV. Availability of Documents
ADAMS
Accession No.
Date
Title
5/12/2020 ........
Letter from ENOI to NRC, ‘‘Certifications of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations and Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2’’.
Letter from HDI to NRC, ‘‘Request for Exemptions from 10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A) and 10 CFR
50.75(h)(1)(iv)’’.
Letter from HDI to NRC, ‘‘Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report including Site-Specific Decommissioning Cost Estimate for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2, and 3’’.
Letter from ENOI to NRC, ‘‘Application for Order Consenting to Transfers of Control of Licenses and Approving Conforming License Amendments’’.
NUREG–1437, Supplement 38, Volume 5, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal
of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 38, Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3—Final’’.
Letter from ENOI to NRC, ‘‘Notification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations, Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3’’.
NUREG–1437, Supplement 38, Volume 1, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal
of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 38, Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3—Final
Report, Main Report and Comment Responses’’.
2/12/2020 ........
12/19/2019 ......
11/21/2019 ......
4/2018 .............
2/8/2017 ..........
12/2010 ...........
Dated: November 5, 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Richard V. Guzman,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing
Branch I, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2020–24935 Filed 11–9–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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action. On October 28, 2020, the NRC
notified the State of New York
representative of the EA and FONSI.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–90333; File No. SR–CBOE–
2020–105]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe
Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and
Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed
Rule Change To Amend Its Fees
Schedule in Connection With Migration
November 4, 2020.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
1 15
2 17
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U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
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ML20133J902.
ML20043C539.
ML19354A698.
ML19326B953.
ML18107A759.
ML17044A004.
ML103350405.
notice is hereby given that on October
23, 2020, Cboe Exchange, Inc. (the
‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘Cboe Options’’) filed
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’) the
proposed rule change as described in
Items I, II and III below, which Items
have been prepared by the Exchange.
The Commission is publishing this
notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested
persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of the Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
Cboe Exchange, Inc. (the ‘‘Exchange’’
or ‘‘Cboe Options’’) proposes to amend
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its Fees Schedule in connection with
migration. The text of the proposed rule
change is provided in Exhibit 5.3
The text of the proposed rule change
is also available on the Exchange’s
website (https://www.cboe.com/About
CBOE/CBOELegalRegulatory
Home.aspx), at the Exchange’s Office of
the Secretary, and at the Commission’s
Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
1. Purpose
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In 2016, the Exchange’s parent
company, Cboe Global Markets, Inc.
(formerly named CBOE Holdings, Inc.)
(‘‘Cboe Global’’), which is also the
parent company of Cboe C2 Exchange,
3 The Exchange notes that subsequent to the
Original Filing that proposed these changes on
October 1 and 2, 2019 (SR–CBOE–2019–077 and
SR–CBOE–2019–082) and subsequent to the Second
Proposed Rule Change and Third Proposed Rule
Change Filings that proposed these changes on
November 29, 2019 (SR–CBOE–2019–111) and
January 28, 2020 (SR–CBOE–2020–005), the
Exchange submitted SR–CBOE–2020–021 which
adopted Footnote 12. Footnote 12 governs pricing
changes in the event the Exchange trading floor
becomes inoperable and is appended to the MarketMaker Tier Appointment Fees and Floor Broker
Trading Permit Sliding Scales tables. Additionally,
subsequent to the Fourth Proposed Rule Change
filed on March 27, 2020 (SR–CBOE–2020–028), the
Exchange submitted SR–CBOE–2020–044, which
appended Footnotes 41 to the Market maker Tier
Appointment Fees table and the Floor Broker
Trading Surcharge. Subsequent to the Exchange’s
Fifth Proposed Rule Change filed on May 22, 2020
(SR–CBOE–2020–48), the Exchange submitted (1)
SR–CBOE–2020–058, which adopted new Footnote
24, appended Footnote 24 in the Market-Maker Tier
Appointment Fees table and Floor Trading Permit
Sliding Scales Table, as well as added language to
the Floor Broker ADV Discount Table and (2) SR–
CBOE–2020–061 which added further language in
Footnote 24. Lastly, subsequent to the Seventh
Proposed Rule Change filed on September 2, 2020,
the Exchange submitted SR–CBOE–2020–097 which
amended language in Footnote 24. The additions
proposed by filings SR–CBOE–2020–021, SR–
CBOE–2020–044, SR–CBOE–2020–058, SR–CBOE–
2020–061 and SR–CBOE–2020–097 are double
underlined in Exhibit 5A.
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Inc. (‘‘C2’’), acquired Cboe EDGA
Exchange, Inc. (‘‘EDGA’’), Cboe EDGX
Exchange, Inc. (‘‘EDGX’’ or ‘‘EDGX
Options’’), Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc.
(‘‘BZX’’ or ‘‘BZX Options’’), and Cboe
BYX Exchange, Inc. (‘‘BYX’’ and,
together with Cboe Options, C2, EDGX,
EDGA, and BZX, the ‘‘Affiliated
Exchanges’’). The Cboe Affiliated
Exchanges recently aligned certain
system functionality, including with
respect to connectivity, retaining only
intended differences between the
Affiliated Exchanges, in the context of a
technology migration. The Exchange
migrated its trading platform to the
same system used by the Affiliated
Exchanges, which the Exchange
completed on October 7, 2019 (the
‘‘migration’’). As a result of this
migration, the Exchange’s pre-migration
connectivity architecture was rendered
obsolete, and as such, the Exchange now
offers new functionality, including new
logical connectivity, and therefore
proposes to adopt corresponding fees.4
In determining the proposed fee
changes, the Exchange assessed the
impact on market participants to ensure
that the proposed fees would not create
an undue financial burden on any
market participants, including smaller
market participants. While the Exchange
has no way of predicting with certainty
the impact of the proposed changes, the
Exchange had anticipated its postmigration connectivity revenue 5 to be
approximately 1.75% lower than
connectivity revenue pre-migration.6 In
4 As of October 7, 2019, market participants no
longer have the ability to connect to the old
Exchange architecture.
5 Connectivity revenue post-migration includes
revenue from physical port fees (other than for
disaster recovery), Cboe Data Services Port Fee,
logical port fees, Trading Permit Fees, MarketMaker EAP Appointment Unit fees, Tier
Appointment Surcharges and Floor Broker Trading
Surcharges, less the Floor Broker ADV discounts
and discounts on BOE Bulk Ports via the Affiliate
Volume Plan and the Market-Maker Access Credit
program.
6 For February 2020, the Exchange’s connectivity
revenue was approximately 2.5% higher than
connectivity revenue pre-migration. For purposes of
a fair comparison of the Exchange’s initial
projection of post-migration connectivity revenue to
realized post-migration revenue connectivity, the
Exchange excluded from the February 2020
calculation revenue from a Trading Permit Holder
who became a Market-Maker post October 7, 2019,
a Trading Permit Holder that grew it’s footprint on
the Exchange significantly, and revenue derived
from incremental usage in light of the extreme
volatility and volume experienced in February, as
such circumstances were not otherwise anticipated
or incorporated into the Exchange’s original
projection. As noted, the Exchange had no way of
predicting with certainty the impact of the
proposed changes, nor control over choices market
participants ultimately decided to make. The
Exchange notes connectivity revenue was higher
than anticipated in part due to (1) a higher number
of 10 Gb Physical Ports being maintained by TPHs
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addition to providing a consistent
technology offering across the Cboe
Affiliated Exchanges, the migration also
provided market participants a latency
equalized infrastructure, improved
system performance, and increased
sustained order and quote per second
capacity, as discussed more fully below.
Accordingly, in connection with the
migration and in order to more closely
align the Exchange’s fee structure with
that of its Affiliated Exchanges, the
Exchange intends to update and
simplify its fee structure with respect to
access and connectivity and adopt new
access and connectivity fees.
The Exchange initially filed the
proposed fee changes on October 1,
2019 (SR–CBOE–2019–077) (the
‘‘Original Filing’’).7 The Commission
received only one comment letter on the
Original Filing, six days after the
comment period deadline ended.8 On
November 29, 2019, the Exchange
withdrew the Original Filing and
submitted SR–CBOE–2019–111
(‘‘Second Proposed Rule Change’’).9
Among other things, the Second
Proposed Rule Change was filed in
response to, and addressed, the
Commission’s request for inclusion of
the following information: Clarity as to
what revenue streams are included in
the Exchange’s calculation of
than expected (although 34% of Trading Permit
Holders maintained the same number of 10 Gb
Physical and 44% reduced the amount of 10 Gb
Physical Ports maintained), (2) a higher quantity of
BOE/FIX Logical Ports being purchased than
predicted, and (3) a significantly higher quantity of
the optional Drop, GRP, Multicast PITCH/Top Spin
Server Ports and Purge Ports being purchased than
predicted. For April 2020, the Exchange’s
connectivity revenue was approximately 21.97%
less than connectivity revenue pre-migration using
the same calculation. For May 2020, the Exchange’s
connectivity revenue was approximately 22.32%
less than connectivity revenue pre-migration using
the same calculation. The Exchange notes that due
to the closure of its trading floor on March 16, 2020
through June 15, 2020, it adopted a number of
corresponding temporary pricing changes,
including waiving floor Trading Permit fees. See
Cboe Options Fees Schedule. The Exchange also
notes that it has provided the dollar amounts of the
Exchange’s monthly connectivity revenue to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the
‘‘Commission’’) for the months of February–June
2020 with a confidential treatment request. The
Exchange also intends to provide further
information to the Commission relating to monthly
connectivity revenue for additional months, which
will also be subject to a confidential treatment
request.
7 On business date October 2, 2019, due to a
technical error, the Exchange withdrew that filing
and submitted SR–CBOE–2019–082. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 87304 (October 15, 2019),
84 FR 56240, (October 21, 2019) (‘‘Original Filing’’).
8 See Letter from Tyler Gellasch, Executive
Director, The Healthy Markets Association
(‘‘Healthy Markets’’), to Vanessa Countryman,
Secretary, Commission, dated November 18, 2019.
9 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 87727
(December 12, 2019), 84 FR 69428 (December 18,
2019).
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‘‘connectivity’’ revenue; an update on
post-migration connectivity revenue; 10
further information regarding the
Exchange’s new latency equalized
infrastructure including additional
detail regarding the benefits of such
structure; clarity on how the Cboe Data
Services Port fee is applied; data
regarding the number of market
participants that connect directly versus
indirectly and the volume attributed to
each; enhanced discussion regarding
products that compete with exclusively
listed products; an update on whether
any market participant terminated their
direct connectivity or membership postmigration (and whether it was because
of the fee changes); and generally
provide an update on various
projections made in the filing, including
how many ports market participants
purchased post-migration, how many
Trading Permit Holders were paying
higher or lower fees, and how many
Trading Permit Holders achieved
proposed incentive tiers. The
Commission received no comment
letters on the Second Proposed Rule
Change.
On January 28, 2020, the Exchange
withdrew the Second Proposed Rule
Change filing and submitted SR–CBOE–
2020–005 (‘‘Third Proposed Rule
Change’’).11 The Third Proposed Rule
Change was filed in response to, and
addressed, the Commission’s request for
further discussion regarding how
competitive forces constrained fees,
further detail on potential substitute
products for the Exchange’s exclusively
listed products, updated data on the
number of ports purchased postmigration and an update on the
projected post-migration connectivity
revenue.12 The Exchange also provided
updated data on how many Trading
Permit Holders connected directly
versus indirectly to the Exchange and
the volume attributed to each. The
Commission received no comment
letters on the Third Proposed Rule
Change.
On March 27, 2020, the Exchange
submitted SR–CBOE–2020–028
10 Many market participants were still
transitioning to the new connectivity structure at
that time and as such, the Exchange noted it did
not expect its connectivity revenue projections
regarding port purchases to be realized prior to
February 2020.
11 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 88164
(February 11, 2020), 85 FR 8897, (February 18,
2020).
12 Many market participants were still
transitioning to the new connectivity structure at
that time and as such, the Exchange again noted it
did not expect its connectivity revenue projections
regarding port purchases to be realized prior to
February 2020.
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(‘‘Fourth Proposed Rule Change’’).13
The Fourth Proposed Rule Change was
filed in response to the Commission’s
sole request to update the connectivity
revenue collected in February 2020, as
the transition of physical ports had been
completed. The Commission received
only one comment letter on the Fourth
Proposed Rule Change.14
On May 21, 2020, the Exchange
withdrew that filing and submitted SR–
CBOE–20202–048 (‘‘Fifth Proposed Rule
Change’’).15 The Fifth Proposed Rule
Change was filed in response to the
Commission’s request for (1) updated
connectivity revenue for April 2020, (2)
examples of alternative products to VIX
and (3) any further evidence the
Exchange had to support its argument
that competitive forces constrain
pricing. The Commission received no
comments letters on the Fifth Proposed
Rule Change.
On July 2, 2020, the Exchange
withdrew the Fifth Proposed Rule
Change and submitted SR–CBOE–2020–
064 (‘‘Sixth Proposed Rule Change’’).16
The Sixth Proposed Rule Change was
filed to respond to the Commission’s
request for another update on the
Exchange’s post-migration connectivity
revenue and to provide further data
demonstrating competition in the
marketplace. The Commission again
received no negative comments letters
on the Sixth Proposed Rule Change.
Notably however, the Exchange did
receive three positive comment letters
on the Sixth Proposed Rule Change (one
from a market-maker TPH and two from
floor broker TPHs), each noting that the
TPHS believes the proposed fees are
reasonable and encouraging the
Commission to allow the fees to remain
effective and avoid an unnecessary
suspension and disapproval
proceeding.17
13 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 88586
(April 8, 2020), 85 FR 20773, (April 14, 2020).
14 See Letter from Tyler Gellasch, Executive
Director, The Healthy Markets Association
(‘‘Healthy Markets’’), to Vanessa Countryman,
Secretary, Commission, dated May 5, 2020, which
letter mischaracterized the Exchange’s proposed
fees as linking market data costs to trading volume,
among other factual inaccuracies.
15 The Exchange refiled the Fifth Proposed Rule
Change on May 22, 2020 due to a technical error
(SR–CBOE–2020–048). See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 88984 (June 1, 2020), 85 FR 34670,
(June 6, 2020).
16 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89239
(July 7, 2020), 85 FR 42042, (July 13, 2020).
17 See Letters from Steve Crutchfield, Head of
Market Structure, Chicago Trading Company
(‘‘CTC’’) and William Ellington, Managing Member/
CEO, X-Change Financial Access (‘‘XFA’’) to
Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated
August 27, 2020. See also Letter from Lakeshore
Securities to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary,
Commission, dated August 31, 2020.
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On August 31, 2020, the Exchange
withdrew the Sixth Proposed Rule
Change and submitted SR–CBOE–2020–
083 (‘‘Seventh Proposed Rule
Change’’).18 The Seventh Proposed Rule
Change was filed in order to respond to
an additional request from the
Commission for further information and
dialog. The Commission received only
one comment letter on the Seventh
Proposed Rule Change, which was
submitted from the same industry
participant that commented on this
proposed rule change on two previous
occasions and that frequently submits
negative comment letters on exchange
fee filings.19
Today, the Exchange is withdrawing
the Seventh Proposed Rule change and
submitting this filing (‘‘Eighth Proposed
Rule Change’’), as part of its ongoing
efforts to adopt the post-migration
connectivity fees and to respond to the
Commission’s most recent and most
extensive request for further
information, including among other
things: (1) Total connectivity and access
fee revenues over a period of time, (2)
data relating to each TPH that has
connected directly to the Exchange over
a period of time (including contract
volume and access and connectivity fees
paid on a month-by-month and firm-byfirm basis), (3) information relating to
previous access and connectivity
pricing changes that have been
proposed; and (4) information relating
to the Exchange’s profit margins and
return on assets for each of Cboe’s
business lines.20
The Exchange notes the proposed fees
have been effective, and thus have been
paid by Trading Permit Holders, for over
18 The Exchange refiled the Seventh Proposed
Rule Change on September 2, 2020 due to a
technical error (SR–CBOE–2020–086). See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89826
(September 10, 2020), 85 FR 57900, (September 16,
2020).
19 See Letter from Tyler Gellasch, Executive
Director, The Healthy Markets Association
(‘‘Healthy Markets’’), to Vanessa Countryman,
Secretary, Commission, dated September 30, 2020,
which letter, like the first two Healthy Markets
comment letters, consists of a number of conclusory
statements and mischaracterizes the Exchange’s
proposed fees as linking market data costs to
trading volume, among other factual inaccuracies.
20 Data responsive to the Commission’s request
for additional information is being provided to the
Commission with a confidential treatment request.
The Exchange notes that it is unable to provide data
addressing the Commission’s request for
information relating to its profit margins and return
on assets, as its costs are not kept in the
disaggregated manner requested by the
Commission. The Exchange notes that to
disaggregate its cost in that way would require an
artificial and arbitrary division resulting in
inaccurate and potentially meaningless data.
Moreover, the Exchange notes that it did not raise
any arguments relating to its profitability nor is it
required to do so in order to demonstrate that its
fees are reasonable and consistent with the Act.
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one year. The Exchange believes it is
notable that during this time no other
industry group or exchange, and
particularly no market participants who
connect to the Exchange, have claimed
in comment letters to the Commission
that the Exchange’s new fee structure is
unreasonable. The Exchange also
believes it’s significant and notable that,
in addition to positive feedback
regarding the improved connectivity
under the new structure, it received
feedback from a number of market
participants that the Exchange’s
proposed fee changes are regarded as
reasonable, both informally via
conversations with the firms and
formally via the comment letters
submitted in support of this fee change.
As discussed herein, the Exchange
believes that the proposed changes are
consistent with the Act because they are
reasonable, equitably allocated, not
unfairly discriminatory, and not an
undue burden on competition, as they
are are supported by evidence
(including data and analysis) and are
constrained by significant competitive
forces. The Exchange also believes the
proposed fees are reasonable as they are
in line with the amounts assessed by
other exchanges for similar connectivity
offerings. Additionally, the Exchange
believes the proposed changes are
consistent with the SEC Division of
Trading and Markets (the ‘‘Division’’)
issued non-rulemaking fee filing
guidance titled ‘‘Staff Guidance on SRO
Rule Filings Relating to Fees’’ (‘‘Fee
Guidance’’) issued on May 21, 2020.21
Accordingly, the Exchange believes that
the Commission should find that the
Proposed Fee Increases are consistent
with the Act. The proposed rule change
is immediately effective upon filing
with the Commission pursuant to
Section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act.
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Physical Connectivity
A physical port is utilized by a
Trading Permit Holder (‘‘TPH’’) or nonTPH to connect to the Exchange at the
data centers where the Exchange’s
21 Where possible, the Exchange is including
numerical examples and percentages, including
with respect to revenue impact. In addition, the
Exchange is providing data to the Commission in
support of its arguments herein, which is consistent
with the Fee Guidance. The non-rulemaking Fee
Guidance covers all aspects of a fee filing, but as
acknowledged by the Commission, has ‘‘no legal
force or effect’’, is ‘‘not a rule, regulation or
statement of the Commission’’, does not ‘‘alter or
amend applicable law’’ and ‘‘creates no new or
additional obligations for SROs and the
Commission.’’ See Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement
on Division of Trading and Markets Staff Fee
Guidance, June 12, 2019. The Exchange nonetheless
has extensively addressed the Fee Guidance
throughout this filing and prior versions of this
filing.
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servers are located. The Exchange
currently assesses fees for Network
Access Ports for these physical
connections to the Exchange.
Specifically, TPHs and non-TPHs can
elect to connect to Cboe Options’
trading system via either a 1 gigabit per
second (‘‘Gb’’) Network Access Port or
a 10 Gb Network Access Port. Premigration the Exchange assessed a
monthly fee of $1,500 per port for 1 Gb
Network Access Ports and a monthly fee
of $5,000 per port for 10 Gb Network
Access Ports for access to Cboe Options
primary system. Through January 31,
2020, Cboe Options market participants
will continue to have the ability to
connect to Cboe Options’ trading system
via the current Network Access Ports.
As of October 7, 2019, in connection
with the migration, TPHs and non-TPHs
may alternatively elect to connect to
Cboe Options via new latency equalized
Physical Ports.22 The new Physical Ports
similarly allow TPHs and non-TPHs the
ability to connect to the Exchange at the
data center where the Exchange’s
servers are located and TPHs and nonTPHs have the option to connect via 1
Gb or 10 Gb Physical Ports. As noted
above, both the new 1 Gb and 10 Gb
Physical Ports provide latency
equalization, meaning that each market
participant will be afforded the same
latency for 1 Gb or 10 Gb Physical Ports
in the primary data center to the
Exchange’s customer-facing switches
regardless of location of the market
participant’s cage 23 in the primary data
center relative to the Exchange’s servers.
Conversely, the legacy Network Access
Ports are not latency equalized, meaning
the location of a market participant’s
cage within the data center may affect
latency. For example, in the legacy
system, a cage located further from the
Exchange’s servers may experience
higher latency than those located closer
to the Exchange’s servers.24 As such, the
proposed Physical Ports ensure all
market participants connected to the
Exchange via the new Physical Ports
will receive the same respective latency
for each port size and ensure that no
market participant has a latency
advantage over another market
participant within the primary data
22 As previously noted, market participants will
continue to have the option of connecting to Cboe
Options via a 1 Gbps or 10 Gbps Network Access
Port at the same rates as proposed, respectively.
23 A market participant’s ‘‘cage’’ is the cage
within the data center that contains a market
participant’s servers, switches and cabling.
24 The Exchange equalizes physical connectivity
in the data center for its primary system by taking
the farthest possible distance that a Cboe market
participant cage may exist from the Exchange’s
customer-facing switches and using that distance as
the cable length for any cross-connect.
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center.25 Additionally, the new
infrastructure utilizes new and faster
switches resulting in lower overall
latency.
The Exchange proposes to assess the
following fees for any physical port,
regardless of whether the TPH or nonTPH connects via the current Network
Access Ports or the new Physical Ports.
Specifically, the Exchange proposes to
continue to assess a monthly fee of
$1,500 per port for 1 Gb Network Access
Ports and new Physical Ports and
increase the monthly fee for 10 Gb
Network Access Ports and new Physical
Ports to $7,000 per port. Physical port
fees will be prorated based on the
remaining trading days in the calendar
month. The proposed fee for 10 Gb
Physical Ports is in line with the
amounts assessed by other exchanges
for similar connections by its Affiliated
Exchanges and other Exchanges that
utilize the same connectivity
infrastructure.26
In addition to the benefits resulting
from the new Physical Ports providing
latency equalization and new switches
(i.e., improved latency), TPHs and nonTPHs may be able to reduce their overall
physical connectivity fees. Particularly,
Network Access Port fees are assessed
for unicast (orders, quotes) and
multicast (market data) connectivity
separately. More specifically, Network
Access Ports may only receive one type
of connectivity each (thus requiring a
market participant to maintain two ports
if that market participant desires both
types of connectivity). The new Physical
Ports however, allow access to both
unicast and multicast connectivity with
a single physical connection to the
25 The Exchange notes that 10 Gb Physical Ports
have an 11 microsecond latency advantage over 1
Gb Physical Ports. Other than this difference, there
are no other means to receive a latency advantage
as compared to another market participant in the
new connectivity structure.
26 See Cboe EDGA U.S. Equities Exchange Fee
Schedule, Physical Connectivity Fees; Cboe EDGX
U.S. Equities Exchange Fee Schedule, Physical
Connectivity Fees; Cboe BZX U.S. Equities
Exchange Fee Schedule, Physical Connectivity
Fees; Cboe BYX U.S. Equities Exchange Fee
Schedule, Physical Connectivity Fees; Cboe EDGX
Options Exchange Fee Schedule, Physical
Connectivity Fees; and Cboe BZX Options Exchange
Fee Schedule, Physical Connectivity Fees
(collectively, ‘‘Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules’’).
See e.g., Nasdaq PHLX and ISE Rules, General
Equity and Options Rules, General 8. Phlx and ISE
each charge a monthly fee of $2,500 for each 1Gb
connection, $10,000 for each 10Gb connection and
$15,000 for each 10Gb Ultra connection. See also
Nasdaq Price List—Trading Connectivity. Nasdaq
charges a monthly fee of $7,500 for each 10Gb
direct connection to Nasdaq and $2,500 for each
direct connection that supports up to 1Gb. See also
NYSE American Fee Schedule, Section V.B, and
Arca Fees and Charges, Co-Location Fees. NYSE
American and Arca each charge a monthly fee of
$5,000 for each 1Gb circuit, $14,000 for each 10Gb
circuit and $22,000 for each 10Gb LX circuit.
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Exchange. Therefore, TPHs and nonTPHs that currently purchase two legacy
Network Access Ports for the purpose of
receiving each type of connectivity now
have the option to purchase only one
new Physical Port to accommodate their
connectivity needs, which may result in
reduced costs for physical
connectivity.27
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Cboe Data Services—Port Fees
The Exchange proposes to amend the
‘‘Port Fee’’ under the Cboe Data Services
(‘‘CDS’’) Fees Schedule. Currently, the
Port Fee is payable by any Customer 28
that receives data through two types of
sources; a direct connection to CDS
(‘‘direct connection’’) or through a
connection to CDS provided by an
extranet service provider (‘‘extranet
connection’’). The Port Fee applies to
receipt of any Cboe Options data feed
but is only assessed once per data port.
The Exchange proposes to amend the
monthly CDS Port Fee to provide that it
is payable ‘‘per source’’ used to receive
data, instead of ‘‘per data port’’. The
Exchange also proposes to increase the
fee from $500 per data port/month to
$1,000 per data source/month.29 The
Exchange notes the proposed change in
assessing the fee (i.e., per source vs per
27 The Exchange proposes to eliminate the current
Cboe Command Connectivity Charges table in its
entirety and create and relocate such fees in a new
table in the Fees Schedule that addresses fees for
physical connectivity, including fees for the current
Network Access Ports, the new Physical Ports and
Disaster Recovery (‘‘DR’’) Ports. The Exchange notes
that it is not proposing any changes with respect to
DR Ports other than renaming the DR ports from
‘‘Network Access Ports’’ to ‘‘Physical Ports’’ to
conform to the new Physical Port terminology. The
Exchange also notes that subsequent to the initial
filings that proposed these fee changes on October
1 and 2, 2019 (SR–CBOE–2019–077 and SR–CBOE–
2019–082), the Exchange amended the proposed
port fees to waive fees for ports used for PULSe in
filing No. SR–CBOE–2019–105. The additions
proposed by filing SR–CBOE–2019–105 are double
underlined in Exhibit 5A and the deletions are
doubled bracketed in Exhibit 5A.
28 A Customer is any person, company or other
entity that, pursuant to a market data agreement
with CDS, is entitled to receive data, either directly
from CDS or through an authorized redistributor
(i.e., a Customer or extranet service provider),
whether that data is distributed externally or used
internally.
29 For example, under the pre-migration ‘‘per
port’’ methodology, if a TPH maintained 4 ports
that receive market data, that TPH would be
assessed $2,000 per month (i.e., $500 × 4 ports),
regardless of how many sources it used to receive
data. Under the proposed ‘‘per source’’
methodology, if a TPH maintains 4 ports that
receive market data, but receives data through only
one source (e.g., a direct connection) that TPH
would be assessed $1,000 per month (i.e., $1000 ×
1 source). If that TPH maintains 4 ports but receives
data from both a direct connection and an extranet
connection, that TPH would be assessed $2,000 per
month (i.e., $1,000 × 2 sources). Similarly, if that
TPH maintains 4 ports and receives data from two
separate extranet providers, that TPH would be
assessed $2,000 per month (i.e., $1,000 × 2).
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port) and the proposed fee amount are
the same as the corresponding fee on its
affiliate C2.30
In connection with the proposed
change, the Exchange also proposes to
rename the ‘‘Port Fee’’ to ‘‘Direct Data
Access Fee’’. As the fee will be payable
‘‘per data source’’ used to receive data,
instead of ‘‘per data port’’, the Exchange
believes the proposed name is more
appropriate and that eliminating the
term ‘‘port’’ from the fee will eliminate
confusion as to how the fee is assessed.
Logical Connectivity
Next, the Exchange proposes to
amend its login fees. By way of
background, Cboe Options market
participants were able to access Cboe
Command via either a CMI or a FIX
Port, depending on how their systems
are configured. Effective October 7,
2019, market participants are no longer
able to use CMI and FIX Login IDs.
Rather, the Exchange utilizes a variety
of logical connectivity ports as further
described below. Both a legacy CMI/FIX
Login ID and logical port represent a
technical port established by the
Exchange within the Exchange’s trading
system for the delivery and/or receipt of
trading messages—i.e., orders, accepts,
cancels, transactions, etc. Market
participants that wish to connect
directly to the Exchange can request a
number of different types of ports,
including ports that support order entry,
customizable purge functionality, or the
receipt of market data. Market
participants can also choose to connect
indirectly through a number of different
third-party providers, such as another
broker-dealer or service bureau that the
Exchange permits through specialized
access to the Exchange’s trading system
and that may provide additional
services or operate at a lower
mutualized cost by providing access to
multiple members. In light of the
discontinuation of CMI and FIX Login
IDs, the Exchange proposes to eliminate
the fees associated with the CMI and
FIX login IDs and adopt the below
pricing for logical connectivity in its
place.
Service
Cost per month
Logical Ports (BOE,
FIX) 1 to 5.
Logical Ports (BOE,
FIX) >5.
Logical Ports (Drop) ..
BOE Bulk Ports 1 to
5.
$750 per port.
$800 per port.
$750 per port.
$1,500 per port.
30 See Cboe C2 Options Exchange Fee Schedule,
Cboe Data Services, LLC Fees, Section IV, Systems
Fees.
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Service
BOE Bulk Ports 6 to
30.
BOE Bulk Ports >30 ..
Purge ports ...............
GRP Ports .................
Multicast PITCH/Top
Spin Server Ports.
Cost per month
$2,500 per port.
$3,000 per port.
$850 per port.
$750/primary (A or C
Feed).
$750/set of primary
(A or C feed).
The Exchange proposes to provide for
each of the logical connectivity fees that
new requests will be prorated for the
first month of service. Cancellation
requests are billed in full month
increments as firms are required to pay
for the service for the remainder of the
month, unless the session is terminated
within the first month of service. The
Exchange notes that the proration policy
is the same on its Affiliated
Exchanges.31
Logical Ports (BOE, FIX, Drop): The
new Logical Ports represent ports
established by the Exchange within the
Exchange’s system for trading purposes.
Each Logical Port established is specific
to a TPH or non-TPH and grants that
TPH or non-TPH the ability to operate
a specific application, such as order/
quote 32 entry (FIX and BOE Logical
Ports) or drop copies (Drop Logical
Ports). Similar to CMI and FIX Login
IDs, each Logical Port will entitle a firm
to submit message traffic of up to
specified number of orders per
second.33 The Exchange proposes to
assess $750 per port per month for all
Drop Logical Ports and also assess $750
per port per month (which is the same
amount currently assessed per CMI/FIX
Login ID per month), for the first 5 FIX/
BOE Logical Ports and thereafter assess
$800 per port, per month for each
additional FIX/BOE Logical Port. While
the proposed ports will be assessed the
same monthly fees as current CMI/FIX
Login IDs (for the first five logical ports),
the proposed logical ports provide for
significantly more message traffic (and
thus cost less per message sent) as
shown below:
31 See Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules, Logical
Port Fees.
32 As of October 7, 2019, the definition of quote
in Cboe Options Rule 1.1 means a firm bid or offer
a Market-Maker (a) submits electronically as an
order or bulk message (including to update any bid
or offer submitted in a previous order or bulk
message) or (b) represents in open outcry on the
trading floor.
33 Login Ids restrict the maximum number of
orders and quotes per second in the same way
logical ports do, and Users may similarly have
multiple logical ports as they may have Trading
Permits and/or bandwidth packets to accommodate
their order and quote entry needs.
34 Each Login ID has a bandwidth limit of 80,000
quotes per 3 seconds. However, in order to place
such bandwidth onto a single Login ID, a TPH or
non-TPH would need to purchase a minimum of 15
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CMI/FIX login Ids
Bandwidth Limit per login ..............
Cost ................................................
Cost per Quote/Order Sent @Limit
BOE/FIX logical ports
Quotes
Orders
Quotes/orders
5,000 quotes/3 sec 34 ...................
$750 each .....................................
$0.15 per quote/3 sec ..................
30 orders/sec ................................
$750 each .....................................
$25.00 per order/sec ....................
15,000 quotes/orders/3 sec.
$750/$800 each.
$0.05/$0.053 per quote/order/3
sec.
Logical Port fees will be limited to
Logical Ports in the Exchange’s primary
data center and no Logical Port fees will
be assessed for redundant secondary
data center ports. Each BOE or FIX
Logical Port will incur the logical port
fee indicated in the table above when
used to enter up to 70,000 orders per
trading day per logical port as measured
on average in a single month. Each
incremental usage of up to 70,000 per
day per logical port will incur an
additional logical port fee of $800 per
month. Incremental usage will be
determined on a monthly basis based on
the average orders per day entered in a
single month across all of a market
participant’s subscribed BOE and FIX
Logical Ports. The Exchange believes
that the pricing implications of going
beyond 70,000 orders per trading day
per Logical Port encourage users to
mitigate message traffic as necessary.
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The Exchange notes that the proposed
fee of $750 per port is the same amount
assessed not only for current CMI and
FIX Login Ids, but also similar ports
available on an affiliate exchange.35
The Exchange also proposes to
provide that the fee for one FIX Logical
Port connection to PULSe and one FIX
Logical Port connection to Cboe Silexx
will be waived per TPH. The Exchange
notes that only one FIX Logical Port
connection is required to support a
firm’s access through each of PULSe and
Cboe Silexx FLEX.
BOE Bulk Logical Ports: The Exchange
also offers BOE Bulk Logical Ports,
which provide users with the ability to
submit single and bulk order messages
to enter, modify, or cancel orders
designated as Post Only Orders with a
Time-in-Force of Day or GTD with an
expiration time on that trading day.
While BOE Bulk Ports will be available
to all market participants, the Exchange
anticipates they will be used primarily
by Market-Makers or firms that conduct
similar business activity, as the primary
purpose of the proposed bulk message
functionality is to encourage marketmaker quoting on exchanges. As
indicated above, BOE Bulk Logical Ports
are assessed $1,500 per port, per month
for the first 5 BOE Bulk Logical Ports,
assessed $2,500 per port, per month
thereafter up to 30 ports and thereafter
assessed $3,000 per port, per month for
each additional BOE Bulk Logical Port.
Like CMI and FIX Login IDs, and FIX/
BOX Logical Ports, BOE Bulk Ports will
also entitle a firm to submit message
traffic of up to specified number of
quotes/orders per second.36 The
proposed BOE Bulk ports also provide
for significantly more message traffic
(and thus cost less per message sent) as
compared to current CMI/FIX Login IDs,
as shown below:
CMI/FIX Login Ids
BOE Bulk Ports
Quotes
Quotes 37
Bandwidth Limit .................................................
Cost ...................................................................
Cost per Quote/Order Sent @Limit ...................
5,000 quotes/3 sec 38 .......................................
$750 each .........................................................
$0.15 .................................................................
per quote/3 sec ................................................
225,000 quotes 3 sec.
$1,500/$2,500/$3,000 each.
$0.006/$0.011/$0.013
per quote/3 sec.
Each BOE Bulk Logical Port will incur
the logical port fee indicated in the table
above when used to enter up to
30,000,000 orders per trading day per
logical port as measured on average in
a single month. Each incremental usage
of up to 30,000,000 orders per day per
BOE Bulk Logical Port will incur an
additional logical port fee of $3,000 per
month. Incremental usage will be
determined on a monthly basis based on
the average orders per day entered in a
single month across all of a market
participant’s subscribed BOE Bulk
Logical Ports. The Exchange believes
that the pricing implications of going
beyond 30,000,000 orders per trading
day per BOE Bulk Logical Port
encourage users to mitigate message
traffic as necessary. The Exchange notes
that the proposed BOE Bulk Logical Port
fees are similar to the fees assessed for
these ports by BZX Options.39
Purge Ports: As part of the migration,
the Exchange introduced Purge Ports to
provide TPHs additional risk
management and open order control
functionality. Purge ports were designed
to assist TPHs, in the management of,
and risk control over, their quotes,
particularly if the TPH is dealing with
a large number of options. Particularly,
Purge Ports allow TPHs to submit a
cancelation for all open orders, or a
subset thereof, across multiple sessions
under the same Executing Firm ID
(‘‘EFID’’). This would allow TPHs to
seamlessly avoid unintended
executions, while continuing to evaluate
the direction of the market. While Purge
Ports are available to all market
participants, the Exchange anticipates
they will be used primarily by MarketMakers or firms that conduct similar
business activity and are therefore
Market-Maker Permits or Bandwidth Packets (each
Market-Maker Permit and Bandwidth Packet
provides 5,000 quotes/3 sec). For purposes of
comparing ‘‘quote’’ bandwidth, the provided
example assumes only 1 Market-Maker Permit or
Bandwidth Packet has been purchased.
35 See Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee Schedule,
Options Logical Port Fees.
36 The Exchange notes that while technically
there is no bandwidth limit per BOE Bulk Port,
there may be possible performance degradation at
15,000 messages per second (which is the
equivalent of 225,000 quotes/orders per 3 seconds).
As such, the Exchange uses the number at which
performance may be degraded for purposes of
comparison.
37 See Cboe Options Rule 1.1.
38 Each Login ID has a bandwidth limit of 80,000
quotes per 3 seconds. However, in order to place
such bandwidth onto a single Login ID, a TPH or
non-TPH would need to purchase a minimum of 15
Market-Maker Permits or Bandwidth Packets (each
Market-Maker Permit and Bandwidth Packet
provides 5,000 quotes/3 sec). For purposes of
comparing ‘‘quote’’ bandwidth, the provided
example assumes only 1 Market-Maker Permit or
Bandwidth Packet has been purchased.
39 See Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee Schedule,
Options Logical Port Fees.
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exposed to a large amount of risk across
a number of securities. The Exchange
notes that market participants are also
able to cancel orders through FIX/BOE
Logical Ports and as such a dedicated
Purge Port is not required nor necessary.
Rather, Purge Ports were specially
developed as an optional service to
further assist firms in effectively
managing risk. As indicated in the table
above, the Exchange proposes to assess
a monthly charge of $850 per Purge
Port. The Exchange notes that the
proposed fee is in line with the fee
assessed by other exchanges, including
its Affiliated Exchanges, for Purge
Ports.40
Multicast PITCH/Top Spin Server and
GRP Ports: In connection with the
migration, the Exchange also offers
optional Multicast PITCH/Top Spin
Server (‘‘Spin’’) and GRP ports and
proposes to assess $750 per month, per
port. Spin Ports and GRP Ports are used
to request and receive a retransmission
of data from the Exchange’s Multicast
PITCH/Top data feeds. The Exchange’s
Multicast PITCH/Top data feeds are
available from two primary feeds,
identified as the ‘‘A feed’’ and the ‘‘C
feed’’, which contain the same
information but differ only in the way
such feeds are received. The Exchange
also offers two redundant feeds,
identified as the ‘‘B feed’’ and the ‘‘D
feed.’’ All secondary feed Spin and GRP
Ports will be provided for redundancy at
no additional cost. The Exchange notes
a dedicated Spin and GRP Port is not
required nor necessary. Rather, Spin
ports enable a market participant to
receive a snapshot of the current book
quickly in the middle of the trading
session without worry of gap request
limits and GRP Ports were specially
developed to request and receive
retransmission of data in the event of
missed or dropped message. The
Exchange notes that the proposed fee is
in line with the fee assessed for the
same ports on BZX Options.41
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Access Credits
The Exchange next proposes to amend
its Affiliate Volume Plan (‘‘AVP’’) to
provide Market-Makers an opportunity
40 See e.g., Nasdaq ISE Options Pricing Schedule,
Section 7(C), Ports and Other Services. See also
Cboe EDGX Options Exchange Fee Schedule,
Options Logical Port Fees; Cboe C2 Options
Exchange Fee Schedule, Options Logical Port Fees
and Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee Schedule,
Options Logical Port Fees.
41 See Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee Schedule,
Options Logical Port Fees.
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provide increasingly higher benefits for
satisfying increasingly more stringent
criteria.
In addition to the opportunity to
receive credits via AVP, the Exchange
proposes to provide an additional
opportunity for Market-Makers to obtain
credits on their monthly BOE Bulk Port
fees based on the previous month’s
make rate percentage. By way of
background, the Liquidity Provider
Sliding Scale Adjustment Table
provides that Taker fees be applied to
electronic ‘‘Taker’’ volume and a Maker
rebate be applied to electronic ‘‘Maker’’
volume, in addition to the transaction
fees assessed under the Liquidity
Provider Sliding Scale.46 The amount of
the Taker fee (or Maker rebate) is
determined by the Liquidity Provider’s
percentage of volume from the previous
month that was Maker (‘‘Make Rate’’).47
Market-Makers are given a Performance
Tier based on their Make Rate
percentage which currently provides
adjustments to transaction fees. Thus,
Percent credit the program is designed to attract
Market Maker
on monthly
liquidity from traditional Marketaffiliate
VIP tier
BOE bulk port
access credit
Makers. The Exchange proposes to now
fees
also provide BOE Bulk Port fee credits
Credit Tier .....
1
0 if Market-Makers satisfy the thresholds
2
0 of certain Performance Tiers.
3
0 Particularly, the Performance Tier
4
15 earned will also determine the
5
25 percentage credit applied to a MarketMaker’s monthly BOE Bulk Port fees, as
The Exchange believes the proposed
shown below:
change to AVP continues to allow the
Exchange to provide TPHs that have
46 See Cboe Options Exchange Fees Schedule,
both Market-Maker and agency
Liquidity Provider Sliding Scale Adjustment Table.
47 More specifically, the Make Rate is derived
operations reduced Market-Maker costs
from a Liquidity Provider’s electronic volume the
via the credits, albeit credits on BOE
month in all symbols excluding
Bulk Port fees instead of Trading Permit previous
Underlying Symbol List A using the following
fees. AVP also continues to provide
formula: (i) The Liquidity Provider’s total electronic
incremental incentives for TPHs to
automatic execution (‘‘auto-ex’’) volume (i.e.,
volume resulting from that Liquidity Provider’s
strive for the higher tier levels, which
to obtain credits on their monthly BOE
Bulk Port Fees.42 By way of background,
under AVP, if a TPH Affiliate 43 or
Appointed OFP 44 (collectively, an
‘‘affiliate’’) of a Market-Maker qualifies
under the Volume Incentive Program
(‘‘VIP’’) (i.e., achieves VIP Tiers 2–5),
that Market-Maker will also qualify for
a discount on that Market-Maker’s
Liquidity Provider (‘‘LP’’) Sliding Scale
transaction fees and Trading Permit
fees. The Exchange proposes to amend
AVP to provide that qualifying MarketMakers will receive a discount on Bulk
Port fees (instead of Trading Permits)
where an affiliate achieves VIP Tiers 4
or 5. As discussed more fully below, the
Exchange is amending its Trading
Permit structure, such that off-floor
Market-Makers no longer need to hold
more than one Market-Maker Trading
Permit. As such, in place of credits for
Trading Permits, the Exchange will
provide credits for BOE Bulk Ports.45
The proposed credits are as follows:
42 As
noted above, while BOE Bulk Ports will be
available to all market participants, the Exchange
anticipates they will be used primarily by Market
Makers or firms that conduct similar business
activity.
43 For purposes of AVP, ‘‘Affiliate’’ is defined as
having at least 75% common ownership between
the two entities as reflected on each entity’s Form
BD, Schedule A.
44 See Cboe Options Fees Schedule Footnote 23.
Particularly, a Market-Maker may designate an
Order Flow Provider (‘‘OFP’’) as its ‘‘Appointed
OFP’’ and an OFP may designate a Market-Maker
to be its ‘‘Appointed Market-Maker’’ for purposes of
qualifying for credits under AVP.
45 The Exchange notes that Trading Permits
currently each include a set bandwidth allowance
and 3 logins. Current logins and bandwidth are akin
to the proposed logical ports, including BOE Bulk
Ports which will primarily be used by MarketMakers.
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resting quotes or single sided quotes/orders that
were executed by an incoming order or quote),
divided by (ii) the Liquidity Provider’s total autoex volume (i.e., volume that resulted from the
Liquidity Provider’s resting quotes/orders and
volume that resulted from that LP’s quotes/orders
that removed liquidity). For example, a TPH’s
electronic Make volume in September 2019 is
2,500,000 contracts and its total electronic auto-ex
volume is 3,000,000 contracts, resulting in a Make
Rate of 83% (Performance Tier 4). As such, the TPH
would receive a 40% credit on its monthly Bulk
Port fees for the month of October 2019. For the
month of October 2019, the Exchange will be billing
certain incentive programs separately, including the
Liquidity Provider Sliding Scale Adjustment Table,
for the periods of October 1–October 4 and October
7–October 31 in light of the migration of its billing
system. As such, a Market-Maker’s Performance
Tier for November 2019 will be determined by the
Market-Maker’s percentage of volume that was
Maker from the period of October 7–October 31,
2019.
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Liquidity provider
sliding scale
adjustment
performance tier
Market Maker access credit
Credit Tier .................................................................
The Exchange believes the proposal
mitigates costs incurred by traditional
Market-Makers that focus on adding
liquidity to the Exchange (as opposed to
those that provide and take, or just
take). The Exchange lastly notes that
both the Market-Maker Affiliate Access
Credit under AVP and the Market-Maker
Access Credit tied to Performance Tiers
can both be earned by a TPH, and these
credits will each apply to the total
monthly BOE Bulk Port Fees including
any incremental BOE Bulk Port fees
incurred, before any credits/adjustments
have been applied (i.e. an electronic
MM can earn a credit from 15% to
65%).
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Bandwidth Packets
As described above, post-migration,
the Exchange utilizes a variety of logical
ports. Part of this functionality is similar
to bandwidth packets that were
previously available on the Exchange.
Bandwidth packets restricted the
maximum number of orders and quotes
per second. Post-migration, market
participants may similarly have
multiple Logical Ports and/or BOE Bulk
Ports as they may have had bandwidth
packets to accommodate their order and
quote entry needs. As such, the
Exchange proposes to eliminate all of
the current Bandwidth Packet fees.48
The Exchange believes that the
proposed pricing implications of going
beyond specified bandwidth described
above in the logical connectivity fees
section will be able to otherwise
mitigate message traffic as necessary.
CAS Servers
By way of background, in order to
connect to the legacy Cboe Command,
which allowed a TPH to trade on the
Cboe Options System, a TPH had to
connect via either a CMI or FIX interface
(depending on the configuration of the
TPH’s own systems). For TPHs that
connected via a CMI interface, they had
to use CMI CAS Servers. In order to
ensure that a CAS Server was not
overburdened by quoting activity for
Market-Makers, the Exchange allotted
each Market-Maker a certain number of
48 See Cboe Options Fees Schedule, Bandwidth
Packet Fees.
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1
2
3
4
5
Make Rate(% based on prior month)
0%–50% .....................................................................
Above 50%–60% .......................................................
Above 60%–75% .......................................................
Above 75%–90% .......................................................
Above 90% .................................................................
CASs (in addition to the shared
backups) based on the amount of
quoting bandwidth that the MarketMaker had. The Exchange no longer
uses CAS Servers, post-migration. In
light of the elimination of CAS Servers,
the Exchange proposes to eliminate the
CAS Server allotment table and extra
CAS Server fee.
Trading Permit Fees
By way of background, the Exchange
may issue different types of Trading
Permits and determine the fees for those
Trading Permits.49 Pre-migration, the
Exchange issued the following three
types of Trading Permits: (1) MarketMaker Trading Permits, which were
assessed a monthly fee of $5,000 per
permit; (2) Floor Broker Trading
Permits, which were assessed a monthly
fee of $9,000 per permit; and (3)
Electronic Access Permits (‘‘EAPs’’),
which were assessed a monthly fee of
$1,600 per permit. The Exchange also
offered separate Market-Maker and
Electronic Access Permits for the Global
Trading Hours (‘‘GTH’’) session, which
were assessed a monthly fee of $1,000
per permit and $500 per permit
respectively.50 For further color, a
Market-Maker Trading Permit entitled
the holder to act as a Market-Maker,
including a Market-Maker trading
remotely, DPM, eDPM, or LMM, and
also provided an appointment credit of
1.0, a quoting and order entry
bandwidth allowance, up to three
logins, trading floor access and TPH
status.51 A Floor Broker Trading Permit
entitled the holder to act as a Floor
Broker, provided an order entry
bandwidth allowance, up to 3 logins,
trading floor access and TPH status.52
Lastly, an EAP entitled the holder to
electronic access to the Exchange.
Holders of EAPs must have been brokerdealers registered with the Exchange in
one or more of the following capacities:
(a) Clearing TPH, (b) TPH organization
approved to transact business with the
49 See
Cboe Options Rules 3.1(a)(iv)–(v).
50 The fees were waived through September 2019
for the first Market-Maker and Electronic Access
GTH Trading Permits.
51 See Cboe Options Fees Schedule.
52 Id.
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Percent credit
on monthly
BOE bulk port
fees
0
0
0
40
40
public, (c) Proprietary TPHs and (d)
order service firms. The permit did not
provide access to the trading floor. An
EAP also provided an order entry
bandwidth allowance, up to 3 logins
and TPH status.53 The Exchange also
provided an opportunity for TPHs to
pay reduced rates for Trading Permits
via the Market Maker and Floor Broker
Trading Permit Sliding Scale Programs
(‘‘TP Sliding Scales’’). Particularly, the
TP Sliding Scales allowed MarketMakers and Floor Brokers to pay
reduced rates for their Trading Permits
if they committed in advance to a
specific tier that includes a minimum
number of eligible Market-Maker and
Floor Broker Trading Permits,
respectively, for each calendar year.54
As noted above, Trading Permits were
tied to bandwidth allocation, logins and
appointment costs, and as such, TPH
organizations may hold multiple
Trading Permits of the same type in
order to meet their connectivity and
appointment cost needs. Post-Migration,
bandwidth allocation, logins and
appointment costs are no longer tied to
a Trading Permit, and as such, the
Exchange proposes to modify its
Trading Permit structure. Particularly,
in connection with the migration, the
Exchange adopted separate on-floor and
off-floor Trading Permits for MarketMakers and Floor Brokers, adopted a
new Clearing TPH Permit, and proposes
to modify the corresponding fees and
discounts. As was the case premigration, the proposed access fees
discussed below will continue to be
non-refundable and will be assessed
through the integrated billing system
during the first week of the following
month. If a Trading Permit is issued
during a calendar month after the first
trading day of the month, the access fee
for the Trading Permit for that calendar
month is prorated based on the
remaining trading days in the calendar
month. Trading Permits will be renewed
53 Id.
54 Due to the October 7 migration, the Exchange
had amended the TP Sliding Scale Programs to
provide that any commitment to Trading Permits
under the TP Sliding Scales shall be in place
through September 2019, instead of the calendar
year. See Cboe Options Fees Schedule, Footnotes 24
and 25.
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automatically for the next month unless
the Trading Permit Holder submits
written notification to the Membership
Services Department by 4 p.m. CT on
the second-to-last business day of the
prior month to cancel the Trading
Permit effective at or prior to the end of
the applicable month. Trading Permit
Holders will only be assessed a single
monthly fee for each type of electronic
Trading Permit it holds.
First, TPHs no longer need to hold
multiple permits for each type of
electronic Trading Permit (i.e.,
electronic Market-Maker Trading
Permits and/or and Electronic Access
Permits). Rather, for electronic access to
the Exchange, a TPH need only
purchase one of the following permit
types for each trading function the TPH
intends to perform: Market-Maker
Electronic Access Permit (‘‘MM EAP’’)
in order to act as an off-floor MarketMaker and which will continue to be
assessed a monthly fee of $5,000,
Electronic Access Permit (‘‘EAP’’) in
order to submit orders electronically to
the Exchange 55 and which will be
assessed a monthly fee of $3,000, and a
Clearing TPH Permit, for TPHs acting
solely as a Clearing TPH, which will be
assessed a monthly fee of $2,000 (and is
more fully described below). For
example, a TPH organization that
wishes to act as a Market-Maker and
also submit orders electronically in a
non-Market Maker capacity would have
to purchase one MM EAP and one EAP.
TPHs will be assessed the monthly fee
for each type of Permit once per
electronic access capacity.
Next, the Exchange proposes to adopt
a new Trading Permit, exclusively for
Clearing TPHs that are approved to act
solely as a Clearing TPH (as opposed to
those that are also approved in a
capacity that allows them to submit
orders electronically). Currently any
TPH that is registered to act as a
Clearing TPH must purchase an EAP,
whether or not that Clearing TPH acts
solely as a Clearing TPH or acts as a
Clearing TPH and submits orders
electronically. The Exchange proposes
to adopt a new Trading Permit, for any
TPH that is registered to act solely as
Clearing TPH at a discounted rate of
$2,000 per month.56
Additionally, the Exchange proposes
to eliminate its fees for Global Trading
Hours Trading Permits. Particularly, the
Exchange proposes to provide that any
Market-Maker EAP, EAP and Clearing
TPH Permit provides access (at no
additional cost) to the GTH session.57
Additionally, the Exchange proposes to
amend Footnote 37 of the Fees Schedule
regarding GTH in connection with the
migration. Currently Footnote 37
provides that separate access permits
and connectivity is needed for the GTH
session. The Exchange proposes to
eliminate this language as that is no
longer the case post-migration (i.e., an
electronic Trading Permits will grant
access to both sessions and physical and
logical ports may be used in both
sessions, eliminating the need to
purchase separate connectivity). The
Exchange also notes that in connection
with migration, the Book used during
Regular Trading Hours (‘‘RTH’’) will be
the same Book used during GTH (as
compared to pre-migration where the
Exchange maintained separate Books for
each session). The Exchange therefore
also proposes to eliminate language in
Footnote 37 stating that GTH is a
segregated trading session and that there
is no market interaction between the
two sessions.
The Exchange next proposes to adopt
MM EAP Appointment fees. By way of
background, a registered Market-Maker
may currently create a Virtual Trading
Crowd (‘‘VTC’’) Appointment, which
confers the right to quote electronically
in an appropriate number of classes
selected from ‘‘tiers’’ that have been
structured according to trading volume
statistics, except for the AA tier.58 Each
Trading Permit historically held by a
Market-Maker had an appointment
credit of 1.0. A Market-Maker could
select for each Trading Permit the
Market-Maker held any combination of
classes whose aggregate appointment
cost did not exceed 1.0. A Market-Maker
could not hold a combination of
appointments whose aggregate
appointment cost was greater than the
number of Trading Permits that MarketMaker held.59
As discussed, post-migration,
bandwidth allocation, logins and
appointment costs are no longer tied to
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Market-Maker EAP
appointments
Appointment Units ....
Exchange notes that Clearing TPHs must be
properly authorized by the Options Clearing
Corporation (‘‘OCC’’) to operate during the Global
Trading Hours session and all TPHs must have a
Letter of Guarantee to participate in the GTH
session (as is the case today).
58 See Cboe Options Rule 5.50 (Appointment of
Market-Makers).
59 For example, if a Market-Maker selected a
combination of appointments that has an aggregate
appointment cost of 2.5, that Market-Maker must
hold at least 3 Market-Maker Trading Permits.
PO 00000
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Quantity
1
2
3 to 5
>5
Monthly
fees
(per unit)
$0
6,000
4,000
3,100
As noted above, upon migration the
Exchange required separate Trading
Permits for on-floor and off-floor
activity. As such, the Exchange
60 See
57 The
55 EAPs may be purchased by TPHs that both
clear transactions for other TPHs (i.e., a ‘‘Clearing
TPH’’) and submit orders electronically.
56 Cboe Option Rules provides the Exchange
authority to issue different types of Trading Permits
which allows holders, among other things, to act in
one or more trading functions authorized by the
Rules. See Cboe Options Rule 3.1(a)(iv). The
Exchange notes that currently 17 out of 38 Clearing
TPHs are acting solely as a Clearing TPH on the
Exchange.
a single Trading Permit and therefore
TPHs no longer need to have multiple
permits for each type of electronic
Trading Permit. Market-Makers must
still select class appointments in the
classes they seek to make markets
electronically.60 Particularly, a MarketMaker firm will only be required to have
one permit and will thereafter be
charged for one or more ‘‘Appointment
Units’’ (which will scale from 1 ‘‘unit’’
to more than 5 ‘‘units’’), depending on
which classes they elect appointments
in. Appointment Units will replace the
standard 1.0 appointment cost, but
function in the same manner.
Appointment weights (formerly known
as ‘‘appointment costs’’) for each
appointed class will be set forth in Cboe
Options Rule 5.50(g) and will be
summed for each Market-Maker in order
to determine the total appointment
units, to which fees will be assessed.
This was the manner in which the tier
costs per class appointment were
summed to meet the 1.0 appointment
cost, the only difference being that if a
Market-Maker exceeds this ‘‘unit’’, then
their fees will be assessed under the
‘‘unit’’ that corresponds to the total of
their appointment weights, as opposed
to holding another Trading Permit
because it exceeded the 1.0 ‘‘unit’’.
Particularly, the Exchange proposes to
adopt a new MM EAP Appointment
Sliding Scale. Appointment Units for
each assigned class will be aggregated
for each Market-Maker and MarketMaker affiliate. If the sum of
appointments is a fractional amount, the
total will be rounded up to the next
highest whole Appointment Unit. The
following lists the progressive monthly
fees for Appointment Units: 61
Cboe Options Rule 5.50(a).
example, if a Market-Maker’s total
appointment costs amount to 3.5 unites, the MarketMaker will be assessed a total monthly fee of
$14,000 (1 appointment unit at $0, 1 appointment
unit at $6,000 and 2 appointment units at $4,000)
as and for appointment fees and $5,000 for a
Market-Maker Trading Permit, for a total monthly
sum of $19,000, where a Market-Maker currently
(i.e., prior to migration) with a total appointment
cost of 3.5 would need to hold 4 Trading Permits
and would therefore be assessed a monthly fee of
$20,000.
61 For
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proposes to maintain a Floor Broker
Trading Permit and adopt a new MarketMaker Floor Permit for on-floor MarketMakers. In addition, RUT, SPX, and VIX
Tier Appointment fees will be charged
separately for Permit, as discussed more
fully below.
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
Trading Permits, respectively, for each
calendar year. The Exchange proposes
to eliminate the current TP Sliding
Scales, including the requirement to
commit to a specific tier, and replace it
with new TP Sliding Scales as
follows: 62
As briefly described above, the
Exchange currently maintains TP
Sliding Scales, which allow MarketMakers and Floor Brokers to pay
reduced rates for their Trading Permits
if they commit in advance to a specific
tier that includes a minimum number of
eligible Market-Maker and Floor Broker
Floor TPH permits
Current permit qty
Current
monthly fee
(per permit)
Market-Maker Floor Permit ....................................................
1–10
11–20
21 or more
..................................................
1
2–5
6 or more
..................................................
$5,000
3,700
1,800
........................
9,000
5,000
3,000
........................
Floor Broker Permit ...............................................................
71675
contracts executed per day over the
course of a calendar month in all
underlying symbols, while the rebate
amount will be modified to be a
percentage of the TPH’s Floor Broker
Permit total costs, instead of a straight
rebate.63 The criteria and corresponding
percentage rebates are noted below.64
Proposed
permit qty
1
2 to 5
6 to 10
>10
1
2 to 3
4 to 5
>5
Proposed
monthly fee
(per permit)
$6,000
4,500
3,500
2,000
7,500
5,700
4,500
3,200
Floor Broker ADV Discount
Footnote 25, which governs rebates on
Floor Broker Trading Permits, currently
provides that any Floor Broker that
executes a certain average of customer
or professional customer/voluntary
customer (collectively ‘‘customer’’)
open-outcry contracts per day over the
course of a calendar month in all
underlying symbols excluding
Underlying Symbol List A (except RLG,
RLV, RUI, and UKXM), DJX, XSP, and
subcabinet trades (‘‘Qualifying
Symbols’’), will receive a rebate on that
TPH’s Floor Broker Trading Permit Fees.
Specifically, any Floor Broker Trading
Permit Holder that executes an average
of 15,000 customer (‘‘C’’ origin code)
and/or professional customer and
voluntary customer (‘‘W’’ origin code)
open-outcry contracts per day over the
course of a calendar month in
Qualifying Symbols will receive a rebate
of $9,000 on that TPH’s Floor Broker
Trading Permit fees. Additionally, any
Floor Broker that executes an average of
25,000 customer open-outcry contracts
per day over the course of a calendar
month in Qualifying Symbols will
receive a rebate of $14,000 on that
TPH’s Floor Broker Trading Permit fees.
The Exchange proposes to maintain, but
modify, its discount for Floor Broker
Trading Permit fees. First, the
measurement criteria to qualify for a
rebate will be modified to only include
customer (‘‘C’’ origin code) open-outcry
Next, the Exchange proposes to
modify its SPX, VIX and RUT Tier
Appointment Fees. Currently, these fees
are assessed to any Market-Maker TPH
that either (i) has the respective SPX,
VIX or RUT appointment at any time
during a calendar month and trades a
specified number of contracts or (ii)
trades a specified number of contracts in
open outcry during a calendar month.
More specifically, the Fees Schedule
provides that the $3,000 per month SPX
Tier Appointment is assessed to any
Market-Maker Trading Permit Holder
that either (i) has an SPX Tier
Appointment at any time during a
calendar month and trades at least 100
SPX contracts while that appointment is
active or (ii) conducts any open outcry
transaction in SPX or SPX Weeklys at
any time during the month. The $2,000
per month VIX Tier Appointment is
assessed to any Market-Maker Trading
Permit Holder that either (i) has an SPX
Tier Appointment at any time during a
calendar month and trades at least 100
VIX contracts while that appointment is
active or (ii) conducts at least 1000 open
outcry transaction in VIX at any time
during the month. Lastly, the $1,000
RUT Tier Appointment is assessed to
any Market-Maker Trading Permit
Holder that either (i) has an RUT Tier
Appointment at any time during a
calendar month and trades at least 100
RUT contracts while that appointment
is active or (ii) conducts at least 1000
open outcry transaction in RUT at any
time during the month.
Because the Exchange is separating
Market-Maker Trading Permits for
electronic and open-outcry marketmaking, the Exchange will be assessing
separate Tier Appointment Fees for each
type of Market-Maker Trading Permit.
The Exchange proposes that a MM EAP
will be assessed the Tier Appointment
Fee whenever the Market-Maker
executes the corresponding specified
number of contracts, if any. The
Exchange also proposes to modify the
threshold number of contracts a MarketMaker must execute in a month to
trigger the fee for SPX, VIX and RUT.
Particularly, for SPX, the Exchange
proposes to eliminate the 100 contract
threshold for electronic SPX
executions.65 The Exchange notes that
62 In light of the proposed change to eliminate the
TP Sliding Scale, the Exchange proposes to
eliminate Footnote 24 in its entirety.
63 As is the case today, the Floor Broker ADV
Discount will be available for all Floor Broker
Trading Permits held by affiliated Trading Permit
Holders and TPH organizations.
64 In light of the proposal to eliminate the TP
Sliding Scales and the Floor Broker rebates
currently set forth under Footnote 25, the Exchange
proposes to eliminate Footnote 25 in its entirety.
65 The Exchange notes that subsequent to the
Original Filing that proposed these changes on
October 1 and 2, 2019 (SR–CBOE–2019–077 and
SR–CBOE–2019–082), and subsequent to the
Second Proposed Rule Change filing that proposed
these changes on November 29, 2019 (SR–CBOE–
2019–111), the Exchange amended the proposed
Market-Maker Tier Appointment fees to provide
that the SPX Tier Appointment Fee will be assessed
to any Market-Maker EAP that executes at least
1,000 contracts in SPX (including SPXW) excluding
contracts executed during the opening rotation on
the final settlement date of VIX options and futures
with the expiration used in the VIX settlement
calculation in filing No. SR–CBOE–2019–124. The
additions proposed by filing SR–CBOE–2019–124
are double underlined in Exhibit 5A and the
deletions are doubled bracketed in Exhibit 5A.
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Floor
broker ADV
discount
tier
ADV
1 .................
2 .................
3 .................
0 to 99,999 ..................
100,000 to 174,999 .....
>174,999 .....................
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(percent)
0
15
25
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historically, all TPHs that trade SPX
electronically executed more than 100
contracts electronically each month (i.e.,
no TPH electronically traded between 1
and 100 contracts of SPX). As no TPH
would currently be negatively impacted
by this change, the Exchange proposes
to eliminate the threshold for SPX and
align the electronic SPX Tier
Appointment Fee with that of the floor
SPX Tier Appointment Fee, which is
not subject to any executed volume
threshold. For the VIX and RUT Tier
appointments, the Exchange proposes to
increase the threshold from 100
contracts a month to 1,000 contracts a
month. The Exchange notes the Tier
Appointment Fee amounts are not
changing.66 In connection with the
proposed changes, the Exchange
proposes to relocate the Tier
Appointment Fees to a new table and
eliminate the language in the current
respective notes sections of each Tier
Appointment Fee as it is no longer
necessary.
Trading Permit Holder Regulatory Fee
The Fees Schedule provides for a
Trading Permit Holder Regulatory Fee of
$90 per month, per RTH Trading Permit,
applicable to all TPHs, which fee helps
more closely cover the costs of
regulating all TPHs and performing
regulatory responsibilities. In light of
the changes to the Exchange’s Trading
Permit structure, the Exchange proposes
to eliminate the TPH Regulatory Fee.
The Exchange notes that there is no
regulatory requirement to maintain this
fee.
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change is consistent with the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
‘‘Act’’) and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to the Exchange
and, in particular, the requirements of
Section 6(b) of the Act.67 Specifically,
the Exchange believes the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Section
6(b)(5) 68 requirements that the rules of
an exchange be designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to foster cooperation
and coordination with persons engaged
in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to,
66 Floor Broker Trading Surcharges for SPX/
SPXW and VIX are also not changing. The Exchange
however, is creating a new table for Floor Broker
Trading Surcharges and relocating such fees in the
Fees Schedule in connection with the proposal to
eliminate fees currently set forth in the ‘‘Trading
Permit and Tier Appointment Fees’’ Table.
67 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
68 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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17:21 Nov 09, 2020
Jkt 253001
and facilitating transactions in
securities, to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market
system, and, in general, to protect
investors and the public interest.
Additionally, the Exchange believes the
proposed rule change is consistent with
Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,69 which
requires that Exchange rules provide for
the equitable allocation of reasonable
dues, fees, and other charges among its
Trading Permit Holders and other
persons using its facilities. Additionally,
the Exchange believes the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Section
6(b)(5) 70 requirement that the rules of
an exchange not be designed to permit
unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.
The Exchange first stresses that the
proposed changes were not designed
with the objective to generate an overall
increase in access fee revenue, as
demonstrated by the anticipated loss of
revenue discussed above. Rather, the
proposed changes were prompted by the
Exchange’s technology migration and
the adoption of a new (and improved)
connectivity infrastructure, rendering
the pre-migration structure obsolete.
Such changes accordingly necessitated
an overhaul of the Exchange’s previous
access fee structure and corresponding
fees. Moreover, the proposed changes
more closely align the Exchange’s access
fees to those of its Affiliated Exchanges,
and reasonably so, as the Affiliated
Exchanges offer substantially similar
connectivity and functionality and are
on the same platform that the Exchange
has now migrated to.
The Exchange also operates in a
highly competitive environment. The
SEC Division of Trading and Markets’
Fee Guidance provides that in
determining whether a proposed fee is
constrained by significant competitive
forces, the Commission will consider
whether there are reasonable substitutes
for the product or service that is the
subject of a proposed fee. As described
in further detail below, the Exchange
believes substitutable products and
services are in fact available to market
participants, including, among other
things, other options exchanges a
market participant may connect to in
lieu of the Exchange, indirect
connectivity to the Exchange via a thirdparty reseller of connectivity and/or
trading of any options product,
including proprietary products, in the
Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets.
Indeed, there are currently 16 registered
options exchanges that trade options,
69 15
70 15
PO 00000
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U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
Frm 00074
Fmt 4703
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some of which have similar or lower
connectivity fees.71 Based on publicly
available information, no single options
exchange has more than 17% of the
market share as of October 21, 2020.72
Further, low barriers to entry mean that
new exchanges may rapidly and
inexpensively enter the market and offer
additional substitute platforms to
further compete with the Exchange. For
example, there have been 4 exchanges
that have been added in the U.S. options
markets in the last 5 years (i.e., Cboe
EDGX Inc., Nasdaq MRX, LLC, MIAX
Pearl, LLC and MIAX Emerald LLC).
There is also no regulatory
requirement that any market participant
connect to any one options exchange,
that any market participant connect at a
particular connection speed or act in a
particular capacity on the Exchange, or
trade any particular product offered on
an exchange. Moreover, membership is
not a requirement to participate on the
Exchange. A market participant may
submit orders to the Exchange via a TPH
broker.73 Indeed, the Exchange is
unaware of any one options exchange
whose membership includes every
registered broker-dealer. In fact, the
Exchange believes that as of October 21,
2020, only 3 broker-dealers out of
approximately 250 broker-dealers that
are members of at least one exchange
that lists options for trading were
members of all 16 options exchanges.74
Additionally, several broker-dealers are
members of only a single exchange that
lists options for trading.75 The Exchange
has also identified numerous brokerdealers that are members of other
options exchanges, but not the
Exchange. For example, the Exchange
has identified approximately 25 brokerdealers that are members of Nasdaq ISE,
LLC (an exchange that lists only
options), but not Cboe Exchange, Inc
71 See e.g., Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules.
See also e.g., BOX Options Fees Schedule, Section
VI (Technology Fees) and Section IX (Participant
Fees).
72 See Cboe Global Markets U.S. Options Market
Volume Summary (October 21, 2020), available at
https://markets.cboe.com/us/options/market_
statistics/.
73 Such market participant would be subject to
the fees of that broker. The Exchange notes that
such broker is not required to publicize, let alone
justify or file with the Commission its fees, and as
such could charge the market participant any fees
it deems appropriate, even if such fees would
otherwise be considered potentially unreasonable
or uncompetitive fees.
74 See SEC October 2020 Active Broker Dealer
Report, provided by the SEC Office of Managing
Executive on October 8, 2020.
75 Id. Approximately 7 broker-dealers are
members of the Cboe Exchange, Inc. only,
approximately 7 broker-dealers are members of only
Nasdaq PHLX LLC, and approximately 3 brokerdealers are members of only Nasdaq ISE, Inc.
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(which also lists only options).76
Similarly, the Exchange has identified at
least 4 broker-dealers that trade options
and are members of one or more of the
Exchange’s affiliated options exchanges,
but not Cboe Exchange, Inc. Indeed, the
number of members at each exchange
that trades options varies greatly.
Particularly, the number of members of
exchanges that trade options vary
between approximately 9 and 171
broker-dealers.77 Even the number of
members between the Exchange and its
3 other options exchange affiliates vary.
Particularly, while the Exchange
currently has 92 members, Cboe C2 has
54 members, Cboe EDGX has 52
members that trade options and Cboe
BZX has 66 members that trade options.
The rule structure for options
exchanges are also fundamentally
different from those of equities
exchanges. In particular, options market
participants are not forced to connect to
(and purchase market data from) all
options exchanges. For example, there
are many order types that are available
in the equities markets that are not
utilized in the options markets, which
relate to mid-point pricing and pegged
pricing which require connection to the
SIPs and each of the equities exchanges
in order to properly execute those
orders in compliance with best
execution obligations. Additionally, in
the options markets, the linkage routing
and trade through protection are
handled by the exchanges, not by the
individual members. Thus not
connecting to an options exchange or
disconnecting from an options exchange
does not potentially subject a brokerdealer to violate order protection
requirements.78 Gone are the days when
the retail brokerage firms (such as
Fidelity, Schwab, and eTrade) were
members of the options exchanges—
they are not members of the Exchange
or its affiliates, they do not purchase
76 Id. The Exchange notes this is an increase since
June 2020, when approximately 20 broker-dealers
were members of ISE but not Cboe Options. See
SEC June 2020 Active Broker Dealer Report.
77 See e.g., SEC June 2020 Active Broker Dealer
Report. More specifically, 1 exchange had 9
members, 4 exchanges had between 36–50
members, 5 exchanges had between 50–100
members, 4 exchanges had between 100–150
members and 2 exchanges had more than 150
members. The Exchange notes however that some
of these exchanges also trade equities and the
Exchange is therefore unable to determine how
many members at each exchange trade options.
78 The Exchange notes this discussion is
consistent with the Fee Guidance suggestion that
any discussion of alternatives should ‘‘include a
discussion of how regulatory requirements,
particularly best execution obligations, Regulation
NMS Rule 611 (the Order Protection Rule), and/or
the Options Order Protection and Locked/Crossed
Market Plan (Options Linkage Plan), as applicable,
affect the competitive analysis.’’
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connectivity to the Exchange, and they
do not purchase market data from the
Exchange. Accordingly, not only is there
not an actual regulatory requirement to
connect to every options exchange, the
Exchange believes there is also no ‘‘de
facto’’ or practical requirement as well,
as further evidenced by the recent
significant reduction in the number of
broker-dealers that are members of all
options exchanges.
The Exchange is also not aware of any
reason why any particular market
participant could not simply drop its
connections and cease being a TPH of
the Exchange if the Exchange were to
establish ‘‘unreasonable’’ and
uncompetitive price increases for its
connectivity alternatives. As further
evidence of the fact that market
participants can and do disconnect from
exchanges based on connectivity
pricing, R2G Services LLC (‘‘R2G’’) filed
a comment letter after BOX Exchange
LLC (‘‘BOX’’) proposed rule changes to
increase its connectivity fees (SR–BOX–
2018–24, SRBOX–2018–37, and SR–
BOX–2019–04).79 The R2G Letter stated,
‘‘[w]hen BOX instituted a $10,000/
month price increase for connectivity;
we had no choice but to terminate
connectivity into them as well as
terminate our market data relationship.
The cost benefit analysis just didn’t
make any sense for us at those new
levels.’’ Accordingly, this example
shows that if an exchange sets too high
of a fee for connectivity and/or market
data services for its relevant
marketplace, market participants can
choose to disconnect from the
Exchange. Moreover, the Exchange does
not assess any termination fee for a
market participant to drop its
connectivity or membership, nor is the
Exchange aware of any other costs that
would be incurred by a market
participant to do so. The Exchange notes
that in fact, a number of firms currently
do not participate on the Exchange or
participate on the Exchange though
sponsored access arrangements with
other broker-dealers rather than by
becoming a member. Additionally, as
noted above, only 3 broker-dealers are
currently members of all 16 options
exchanges, which the Exchange believes
further demonstrates that, in addition to
the absence of a rule requirement to
connect to every option exchange, there
is no prevailing business model that
would practically require a brokerdealer to connect to every single options
79 See Letter from Stefano Durdic, R2G, to
Vanessa Countryman, Acting Secretary,
Commission, dated March 27, 2019 (the ‘‘R2G
Letter’’).
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71677
exchange.80 Moreover, of these 3 brokerdealers, only 1 such broker-dealer
connects directly to the Exchange and
that broker-dealer does not provide
connectivity to any other TPH.
Additionally, the Exchange notes that
non-TPHs such as Service Bureaus and
Extranets resell Cboe Options
connectivity.81 This indirect
connectivity is another viable
alternative for market participants to
trade on the Exchange without
connecting directly to the Exchange
(and thus not pay the Exchange’s
connectivity fees), which alternative is
already being used by non-TPHs and
further constrains the price that the
Exchange is able to charge for
connectivity to its Exchange. The
Exchange notes that it could, but
chooses not to, preclude market
participants from reselling its
connectivity. The Exchange also
chooses not to adopt fees that would be
assessed to third-party resellers on a per
customer basis (i.e., fee based on
number of TPHs that connect to the
Exchange indirectly via the third-party).
Indeed, the Exchange does not receive
any connectivity revenue when
connectivity is resold by a third-party,
which often is resold to multiple
customers, some of whom are agency
broker-dealers that have numerous
customers of their own.82 Moreover, the
Exchange has seen an increase in the
number of resellers since pre-migration,
adding to the pool of potential
competitors. In sum, the Exchange
believes this creates and fosters a
competitive environment and subjects
the Exchange to competitive forces in
pricing its connectivity. Particularly, in
the event that a market participant
80 The Exchange further notes that these 3 brokerdealers represent different market participants.
Particularly, 1 of these broker-dealers is a bulge
bracket bank, 1 is a brokerage firm and 1 is a
clearing firm.
81 Prior to migration, there were 13 firms that
resold Cboe Options connectivity. Post-migration,
the Exchange anticipated that there would be 19
firms that resell Cboe Options connectivity (both
physical and logical) and as of October 2020 there
are 17 firms that resell Cboe Options connectivity.
The Exchange does not have specific knowledge as
to what latency a market participant may
experience using an indirect connection versus a
direct connection and notes it may vary by the
service provided by the extranet provider and vary
between extranet providers. The Exchange believes
however, that there are extranet providers able to
provide connections with a latency that is
comparable to latency experienced using a direct
connection.
82 The Exchange notes that resellers are not
required to publicize, let alone justify or file with
the Commission their fees, and as such could
charge the market participant any fees it deems
appropriate (including connectivity fees higher than
the Exchange’s connectivity fees), even if such fees
would otherwise be considered potentially
unreasonable or uncompetitive fees.
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views the Exchange’s direct
connectivity and access fees as more or
less attractive than the competition, that
market participant can choose to
connect to the Exchange indirectly or
may choose not to connect to that
exchange and connect instead to one or
more of the other 15 options markets.
For example, two TPHs that connected
directly to the Exchange pre-migration,
began connecting indirectly via an
extranet provider shortly after the
October 2019 migration and currently
still connect via extranets. An
additional four TPHs transitioned to
indirect connectivity from direct
connectivity in or around February
2020, which was the first month after
the legacy Network Access Ports were
decommissioned. The Exchange notes
that it has not received any comments
that, and has no evidence to suggest, the
six total TPHs that transitioned from
direct connections to an indirect
connections post-migration were the
result of an undue financial burden
resulting from the proposed fee
changes.83 Rather, the Exchange
believes the transitions demonstrate that
indirect connectivity is in fact a viable
option for market participants, therefore
reflecting a competitive environment
that the Exchange must be mindful of
when determining its connectivity
fees.84 It further demonstrates the
manner in which market participants
connect to the Exchange is entirely
within the discretion of market
participants, who can consider the fees
charged by the Exchange and by
resellers when making decisions.
Additionally, pre-migration, in
August 2019, the Exchange had 97
members (TPH organizations), of which
nearly half connected indirectly to the
Exchange.85 Similarly, in December
2019, after a new broker-dealer became
a member of the Exchange in late
November 2019,86 the Exchange had 97
members, of which nearly half of the
83 The Exchange notes that TPHs are not required
to specify to the Exchange why it opts to no longer
be a TPH, or why it cancels its ports, nor is a nonTPH market participating required to specify to the
Exchange why it opts to not be a TPH and directly
connect to the Exchange.
84 In the post-migration period between February
2020 and June 2020, approximately 38 TPHs on
average were directly connected to the Exchange
each month, which is notably fewer than the
approximately 45 TPHs that were directly
connected each month during the pre-migration
period between June 2017 through September 2019.
85 The Exchange notes that one firm terminated in
late September 2019, but that it believes it was
unrelated to the migration and the proposed fee
changes.
86 In February 2020, such member also became a
member of the Exchange’s affiliated options
exchanges, which have similar physical and logical
connectivity fees to the proposed fees in this filing.
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participants connected indirectly to the
Exchange. More specifically, in
December 2019, 47 TPHs connected
directly to the Exchange and accounted
for approximately 66% of the
Exchange’s volume, 46 TPHs connected
indirectly to the Exchange and
accounted for approximately 29% of the
Exchange’s volume and 4 TPHs utilized
both direct and indirect connections
and accounted for approximately 5% of
the Exchange’s volume.87 In December
2019, TPHs that connected directly to
the Exchange purchased a collective 179
physical ports (including legacy
physical ports), 144 of which were 10
Gb ports and 35 of which were 1 Gb
ports.88 The Exchange notes that of
those market participants that do
connect to the Exchange, it is the
individual needs of each market
participant that determine the amount
and type of Trading Permits and
physical and logical connections to the
Exchange.89 With respect to physical
connectivity, many TPHs were able to
purchase small quantities of physical
ports. For example, approximately 36%
of TPHs that connected directly to the
Exchange purchased only one to two 1
Gb ports, approximately 40% purchased
only one to two 10 Gb ports, and
approximately 40% had purchased a
combined total of one to two ports (for
both 1 Gb and 10 Gb). Further, no TPHs
that connected directly to the Exchange
had more than five 1 Gb ports, and only
8.5% of TPHs that connected directly to
the Exchange had between six and ten
10 GB ports and only 8.5% had between
ten and fourteen 10 Gb ports. There
were also a combined total of 41 ports
used for indirect connectivity (twentyone 1 Gb ports and twenty 10 Gb
ports).90 The Exchange notes that all
types of members connected indirectly
to the Exchange including Clearing
firms, Floor Brokers, order flow
providers, and on-floor and off-floor
Market-Makers, further reflecting the
fact that each type of market participant
87 Between June 2017 and December 2019, the
number of TPHs that connected directly to the
Exchange ranged from 43 to 47 TPHs and on
average, accounted for an average of approximately
61% of the Exchange’s total volume each month.
88 Of the 4 TPHs that connected both directly and
indirectly to the Exchange, 1 TPH had two 1 Gb
Ports and the remaining 3 TPHs had a combined
total of six 10 Gb ports.
89 To assist market participants that are connected
or considering connecting to the Exchange, the
Exchange provides detailed information and
specifications about its available connectivity
alternatives in the Cboe C1 Options Exchange
Connectivity Manual, as well as the various
technical specifications. See https://
markets.cboe.com/us/options/support/technical/.
90 The Exchange notes that it does not know how
many, and which kind of, connections each TPH
that indirectly connects to the Exchange has.
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has the option to participate on an
exchange without direct connectivity.
Indeed, market participants choose if
and how to connect to a particular
exchange and because it is a choice, the
Exchange must set reasonable
connectivity pricing, otherwise
prospective members would not connect
and existing members would disconnect
or connect through a third-party reseller
of connectivity.91
Moreover, the Exchange notes that the
Commission itself has repeatedly
expressed its preference for competition
over regulatory intervention in
determining prices, products, and
services in the securities markets.
Particularly, in Regulation NMS, the
Commission highlighted the importance
of market forces in determining prices
and SRO revenues and, also, recognized
that current regulation of the market
system ‘‘has been remarkably successful
in promoting market competition in its
broader forms that are most important to
investors and listed companies.’’ 92 The
number of available exchanges to
connect to ensures increased
competition in the marketplace, and
constrains the ability of exchanges to
charge supracompetitive fees for access
to its market. The Exchange is also not
aware of any evidence that has been
offered or demonstrated that a market
share of approximately 17% provides
the Exchange with anti-competitive
pricing power. Indeed, the Exchange
believes for all the reasons articulated
above, that its market share does not
provide it with anti-competitive pricing
power. Moreover, the Exchange believes
the fact that it can lose, and has lost,
market share demonstrates the
competitive forces to which the
Exchange is subject. For example, in
2019 and through March 2020, the
Exchange generally had a market share
percentage in the low to mid 20s. Since
March 2020, the Exchange’s market
share has generally been in the mid to
high teens.93 Furthermore, the
Exchange’s affiliated options exchanges
have substantially similar physical and
logical connectivity fees,
notwithstanding a much lower market
share ranging from approximately
91 As shown above, the availability of 15
alternative options exchanges in addition to the
viable option of indirect connectivity demonstrates
that substitute connectivity products and services
do exist, supporting the assertion the proposed fees
are constrained by competitive forces.
92 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808
(June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496, 37499 (June 29, 2005)
(‘‘Regulation NMS Adopting Release’’).
93 See The Options Clearing Corporation, Market
Data, Daily Volume, available at https://
www.theocc.com/Market-Data/Market-DataReports/Volume-and-Open-Interest/Daily-Volume.
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2.5%–9%.94 As discussed extensively, if
an exchange sets too high of a fee for
connectivity and/or market data services
for its relevant marketplace, market
participants can choose to disconnect
from the Exchange.
The Exchange also believes that
competition in the marketplace
constrains the ability of exchanges to
charge supracompetitive fees for access
to its market, even if such market, like
the Exchange, offers proprietary
products exclusive to that market.
Notably, just as there is no regulatory
requirement to become a member of any
one options exchange, there is also no
regulatory requirement for any market
participant to trade any particular
product, nor is there any requirement
that any Exchange create or indefinitely
maintain any particular product.95 The
Exchange also highlights that market
participants may trade an Exchange’s
proprietary products through a thirdparty without directly or indirectly
connecting to the Exchange.
Additionally, market participants may
trade any options product, including
proprietary products, in the unregulated
Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets for
which there is no requirement for fees
related to those markets to be public.
Given the benefits offered by trading
options on a listed exchange, such as
increased market transparency and
heightened contra-party
creditworthiness due to the role of the
Options Clearing Corporation as issuer
and guarantor, the Exchange generally
seeks to incentivize market participants
to trade options on an exchange, which
further constrains connectivity pricing.
Market participants may also access
other exchanges to trade other similar or
competing proprietary or multi-listed
products. Alternative products to the
Exchange’s proprietary products may
include other options products,
including options on ETFs or options
futures, as well as particular ETFs or
futures. For example, exclusively listed
94 See Cboe Global Markets U.S. Options Market
Volume Summary (August 31, 2020), available at
https://markets.cboe.com/us/options/market_
statistics/.
95 If an option class is open for trading on another
national securities exchange, the Exchange may
delist such option class immediately. For
proprietary products, the Exchange may determine
to not open for trading any additional series in that
option class; may restrict series with open interest
to closing transactions, provided that, opening
transactions by Market-Makers executed to
accommodate closing transactions of other market
participants and opening transactions by TPH
organizations to facilitate the closing transactions of
public customers executed as crosses pursuant to
and in accordance with Rule 6.74(b) or (d) may be
permitted; and may delist the option class when all
series within that class have expired. See Cboe Rule
4.4, Interpretations and Policies .11.
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SPX options may compete with the
following products traded on other
markets: Multiply-listed SPY options
(options on the ETF), E-mini S&P 500
Options (options on futures), and EMini S&P 500 futures (futures on index).
Additionally, exclusively listed VIX
options may compete with the following
products traded on other markets:
Multiply-listed VXX options (options on
the ETF) and exclusively listed SPIKES
options on the Miami International
Securities Exchange, LLC (‘‘MIAX’’).96
Other options exchanges are also not
precluded from creating new
proprietary products that may achieve
similar objectives to (and therefore
compete with) the Exchange’s existing
proprietary products. For example,
Nasdaq PHLX exclusively lists options
on the Nasdaq-100, which options, like
index options listed on the Exchange,
offer investors an alternative method to
manage and hedge portfolio exposure to
the U.S. equity markets. Indeed, even
though exclusively listed proprietary
products may not be offered by
competitors, a competitor could create
similar products if demand were
adequate. As noted above for example,
MIAX created its exclusive product
SPIKES specifically to compete against
VIX options.97 In connection with a
recently proposed amendment to the
National Market System Plan Governing
the Consolidated Audit Trail (‘‘CAT
NMS Plan’’),98 the Commission
discussed the existence of competition
in the marketplace generally, and
particularly for exchanges with unique
business models. Specifically, the
Commission contemplated the
possibility of a forced exit by an
exchange as a result of a proposed
amendment that could reduce the
amount of CAT funding a participant
could recover if certain implementation
milestones were missed. The
Commission acknowledged that, even if
an exchange were to exit the
marketplace due to its proposed feerelated change, it would not
significantly impact competition in the
market for exchange trading services
because these markets are served by
multiple competitors.99 The
Commission explicitly stated that
‘‘[c]onsequently, demand for these
96 MIAX has described SPIKES options as
‘‘designed specifically to compete head-to-head
against Cboe’s proprietary VIX® product.’’ See
MIAX Press Release, SPIKES Options Launched on
MIAX, February 21, 2019, available at https://
www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/press_
release-files/MIAX_Press_Release_02212019.pdf.
97 Id.
98 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 86901
(September 9, 2019), 84 FR 48458 (September 13,
2019) (File No. S7–13–19).
99 Id.
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71679
services in the event of the exit of a
competitor is likely to be swiftly met by
existing competitors.’’ 100 The
Commission further recognized that
while some exchanges may have a
unique business model that is not
currently offered by competitors, a
competitor could create similar business
models if demand were adequate, and if
a competitor did not do so, the
Commission believes it would be likely
that new entrants would do so if the
exchange with that unique business
model was otherwise profitable.101
Similarly, although the Exchange may
have proprietary products not offered by
other competitors, not unlike unique
business models, a competitor could
create similar products to an existing
proprietary product if demand were
adequate. As noted above, other
exchanges, that have comparable
connectivity fees, also currently offer
exclusively listed products.102 As such,
the Exchange is still very much subject
to competition and does not possess
anti-competitive pricing power, even
with its offering of proprietary products.
Rather, the Exchange must still set
reasonable connectivity pricing,
otherwise prospective members would
not connect, and existing members
would disconnect or connect through a
third-party reseller of connectivity,
regardless of what products its offers.
Recently, on October 16, 2020, the
Commission approved a proposal by
NYSE National, Inc. (‘‘NYSE National’’)
to adopt fees for the NYSE National
Integrated Feed (a NYSE National-only
market data feed), finding that NYSE
National provided sufficient
information to demonstrate that it was
subject to significant substitution-based
competitive forces in setting the
proposed fees.103 In the approval order,
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See e.g., Nasdaq PHLX LLC Rules, (Options 7
Pricing Schedule), Section 8A (Permit and
Registration Fees) which provide for floor permit
fees between $4,000 to $6,000 per permit and
Section 9B (Port Fees), which provides various port
fees ranging from $500 to $1,250 per port. See also
Nasdaq PHLX LLC Rules, General 8 Connectivity,
which provides for monthly physical connectivity
fees including fees for 1 Gb physical connections
priced at $2,500 per port and for 10 Gb physical
connections starting at $10,000 per port and see
MIAX Options Fees Schedule, Section 3b
(Membership Fees, Monthly Trading Permit Fee),
which provides for trading permit fees ranging from
$1,500 to $22,000 per permit (which may include
market-maker appointment costs) and Section 5
(System Connectivity Fees) which provides for
monthly physical connectivity fees including fees
for 1 Gb physical connections priced at $1,400 per
port and for 10 Gb physical connections priced at
$6,100 per port.
103 See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
90217 (October 16, 2020) (SR–NYSENAT–2020–
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the Commission cited NetCoalition I, in
which the D.C. Circuit in vacating the
Commission’s 2008 ArcaBook Approval
Order, stated ‘‘the existence of a
substitute does not necessarily preclude
market power,’’ that ‘‘whether a market
is competitive notwithstanding
potential alternatives depends on factors
such as the number of buyers who
consider other products interchangeable
and at what prices,’’ and that ‘‘[t]he
inquiry into whether a market for a
product is competitive . . . focuses on
. . . the product’s elasticity of
demand.’’ 104 The Commission also
noted that the court found that the
Commission’s analysis of alternatives in
the 2008 ArcaBook Approval Order did
not reveal the number of potential users
of the data or how they might react to
a change in price.105 The court also
stated that there was no information
regarding how many traders accessed
NYSE Arca’s depth-of-book data during
the period it was offered without charge
(and thus how many traders might have
been interested in paying for NYSE
Arca’s depth-of-book data), or whether
the traders who wanted depth-of-book
data would have declined to purchase it
if met with a supracompetitive price.106
In contrast to the facts in the 2008
ArcaBook Approval Order, the
Commission pointed out in the NYSE
National Approval Order that NYSE
National had in fact provided
information regarding potential users of
the proposed data feed, along with
information regarding the reactions of
users to the change in price. The
Commission also cited information that
was provided to show that market
participants did not subscribe to the
data feed, even when the fee was offered
for free. The Commission ultimately
relied on, in part, this information in
making its determination that NYSE
National was subject to significant
competitive forces in pricing their
product.
The Exchange points out that it too
has provided similar types of
information to the Commission and
believes such information supports the
finding that the Exchange is subject to
significant substitution-based
competitive forces in pricing its
connectivity and access fees. For
instance, the Exchange noted there are
approximately 250 broker-dealers that
are potential ‘‘users’’ of the Exchange’s
005) (order approving proposed fees for NYSE
National Integrated Feed) (‘‘NYSE National
Approval Order’’).
104 See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 542
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (‘‘NetCoalition I’’) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
105 Id.
106 Id.
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services (i.e., broker-dealers who are
members of at least one options
exchange and may become a member of,
and/or connect directly to, the
Exchange). Additionally, the Exchange
provided the number of broker-dealers
that are members of the Exchange
(approximately 92—which is less than
half of the potential user base) and the
number of members that have connected
directly to the Exchange (approximately
38—which is less than half of the
Exchange’s members). The Exchange
also provided information
demonstrating that market participants
have access to one or more substitutes
to (i) trade options without becoming a
member of the Exchange (e.g., the
availability of 15 other options
exchanges, the ability to trade through
a third-party, and the ability to trade
options products in the OTC market)
and (ii) connect indirectly to the
Exchange (e.g., the ability to connect
indirectly through one of 17 third-party
resellers). The Exchange also cited to
data demonstrating TPHs can, and have,
transitioned their direct access to
indirect access (6 TPHs transitioned to
indirect connectivity subsequent to this
proposed rule change).107 Furthermore,
the Exchange provided information
relating to the number of market
participants that are either not members
of the Exchange (at least 25 brokerdealers 108) or that do not or did not
connect directly to the Exchange both
after and before the fee change
(approximately 38). Lastly, the
Exchange has described the reactions of
TPHs to the price change, received both
informally and formally, and which
again, were notably positive. The
Exchange stresses that the proof of
competitive constraints does not depend
on showing that members walked away,
or threatened to walk away, from a
product due to a pricing change. Rather,
the very absence of such negative
feedback (in and of itself, and
particularly when coupled with positive
feedback) is indicative that the proposed
fees are, in fact, reasonable and
consistent with the Exchange being
subject to competitive forces in setting
fees. Accordingly, the Exchange believes
the Commission has a sufficient basis to
determine that the Exchange was subject
107 The Exchange again notes however that the
TPHs did not explain to the Exchange as to why
they terminated their direct connectivity in favor of
connecting indirectly to the Exchange.
108 As discussed, the Exchange identified
approximately 25 broker-dealers that are members
of Nasdaq ISE, LLC (an exchange that lists only
options) and not members the Exchange. The
Exchange believes there are additional brokerdealers that trade options but do not trade on the
Exchange, but uses the ISE comparison as an
example.
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to significant competitive forces in
setting the terms of its proposed fees.
Moreover, the Commission has found
that, if an exchange meets the burden of
demonstrating it was subject to
significant competitive forces in setting
its fees, the Commission ‘‘will find that
its fee rule is consistent with the Act
unless ‘‘there is a substantial
countervailing basis to find that the
terms’’ of the rule violate the Act or the
rules thereunder.’’ 109 The Exchange is
not aware of, nor has the Commission
articulated, a substantial countervailing
basis for finding the proposal violates
the Act or the rules thereunder.
In addition to all the reasons
discussed above, the Exchange believes
its proposed fees are reasonable in light
of the numerous benefits the new
connectivity infrastructure provides
market participants. As described, the
post-migration connectivity architecture
provides for a latency equalized
infrastructure, improved system
performance, and increased sustained
order and quote per second capacity. As
such, even where a fee for a particular
type or kind of connectivity may be
higher than it was to its pre-migration
equivalent, such increase is reasonable
given the increased benefits market
participants are getting for a similar or
modestly higher price. Moreover, as
noted above, the objective of the
proposed fee changes was not to
generate an overall increase in access
fee revenue, but rather adopt fees in
connection with a new (and improved)
connectivity infrastructure. Indeed, the
Exchange tried to the best of its ability
to approximate the overall connectivity
revenue generated by the Exchange’s
pre-migration fees. Notably, the
Exchange’s pre-migration access fees
were previously filed with the
Commission and not suspended nor
disapproved.110 The Exchange further
109 See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
59039 (December 2, 2008), 73 FR 74770, 74781
(December 9, 2008) (‘‘2008 ArcaBook Approval
Order’’) (approving proposed rule change to
establish fees for a depth-of-book market data
product).
110 Although the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the ‘‘DoddFrank Act’’) amended 19(b) of the Exchange Act to
provide that SROs’ fee changes become
immediately effective on filing, the legislative
history makes clear that while Congress intended to
streamline SROs’ rule filing procedures, the
proposed change did not ‘‘[diminish ]the SEC’s
authority to reject an improperly filed rule,
disapprove a rule that is not consistent with the
Exchange Act or [diminish] the applicable public
notice and comment period.’’ See S. Rep 111–176,
at 106 (2010). The Commission therefore had every
right to pursue a suspension and disapproval order
of prior rule filings that adopted or amended
connectivity fees that were in place prior to the
migration if it had believed any proposed fees in
those rule filings were not consistent with the
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believes that the reasonableness of its
proposed connectivity fees is
demonstrated by the very fact that such
fees are in line with, and in some cases
lower than, the costs of connectivity at
other Exchanges,111 including its own
affiliated exchanges which have the
same connectivity infrastructure as the
Exchange currently does since
migration.112 The Exchange notes these
fees were similarly filed with the
Commission and not suspended nor
disapproved.113 Particularly, the
Exchange’s affiliate C2, previously
migrated to the same trading platform to
which the Exchange has now migrated.
In that connection, C2 overhauled its
connectivity structure and adopted
similar connectivity fees under similar
circumstances as those proposed
herein.114 The Commission did not
suspend that C2 proposed rule change
and did not contend that C2 had failed
to demonstrate its proposal was
reasonable, equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory. The C2 migration filing
was filed subsequent to the D.C. Circuit
decision in Susquehanna Int’l Grp., LLC
v. SEC, 866 F.3d 442 (D.C. Cir. 2017),
meaning that such filing was subject to
the same (and current) standard for SEC
review and approval as the standard to
which this filing is subject.
Furthermore, in determining the
proposed fee changes discussed above,
the Exchange reviewed the current
competitive landscape, considered the
fees historically paid by market
Exchange Act. Additionally, the Commission did
not request additional data or discussion in
connection with prior rule filings regarding
connectivity fees, as it has with respect to the
proposed fees in this filing (and its previous
versions). In the absence of such an order, the
Exchange presumes that its pre-migration fees were
reasonable and consistent with the Exchange Act.
111 See e.g., Nasdaq PHLX and ISE Rules, General
Equity and Options Rules, General 8. Phlx and ISE
each charge a monthly fee of $2,500 for each 1Gb
connection, $10,000 for each 10Gb connection and
$15,000 for each 10Gb Ultra connection. See also
Nasdaq Price List—Trading Connectivity. Nasdaq
charges a monthly fee of $7,500 for each 10Gb
direct connection to Nasdaq and $2,500 for each
direct connection that supports up to 1Gb. See also
NYSE American Fee Schedule, Section V.B, and
Arca Fees and Charges, Co-Location Fees. NYSE
American and Arca each charge a monthly fee of
$5,000 for each 1Gb circuit, $14,000 for each 10Gb
circuit and $22,000 for each 10Gb LX circuit.
112 See e.g., Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules,
Physical Connectivity Fees. For example, Cboe
BZX, Cboe EDGX and C2 each charge a monthly fee
of $2,500 for each 1Gb connection and $7,500 for
each 10Gb connection.
113 For the same reason noted above, the
Exchange presumes that the fees of other exchanges,
including its affiliates, are reasonable, as required
by the Exchange Act in the absence of any
suspension or disapproval order by the Commission
providing otherwise.
114 See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
83201 (May 9, 2018), 83 FR 22546 (May 15, 2018)
(SR–C2–2018–006).
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participants for connectivity to the premigration system, and also assessed the
impact on market participants to ensure
that the proposed fees would not create
an undue financial burden on any
market participants, including smaller
market participants. Indeed, the
Exchange received no comments from
any TPH suggesting that it was unduly
burdened by the proposed changes
described herein, which were first
announced via Exchange Notice nearly
two months in advance of the migration
(now over one year ago),115 nor were
any timely comment letters received by
the Commission by the comment period
submission deadline of November 12,
2019. The Exchange again underscores
the fact that no comment letters were
received in response to its Second,
Third, Fifth or Sixth Proposed Rule
Change, and that no individual market
participant has provided any written
comments specifically suggesting that
the Exchange has failed to provide
sufficient information in the Original,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth
Proposed Rule Change to meets its
burden to demonstrate its proposed fees
are consistent with the requirements of
the Exchange Act. As discussed, the
three comment letters the Exchange did
receive on its Original Filing and the
Fourth and Seventh Proposed Rule
Changes were all submitted by the same
industry participant and consisted of
conclusory statements and factual
inaccuracies. More importantly, the
Exchange received three positive
comment letters from members (which
the Exchange believes is rare with
respect to fees), all of which expressed
their support for the proposed fees;
noting the belief that the fees were
reasonable and encouraging the
Commission to allow the fees to remain
effective.116
Furthermore, the Exchange wishes to
highlight that at least two market
participants have in fact expanded their
connectivity footprint since the
implementation of the proposed fee
changes. One of those market
participants was a TPH that had
discussed terminating its membership
from the Exchange altogether prior to
migration. However, after that TPH
reviewed the notice the Exchange issued
115 See Exchange Notice ‘‘Cboe Options Exchange
Access and Capacity Fee Schedule Changes
Effective October 1, 2019 and November 1, 2019’’
Reference ID C2019081900.
116 See Letters from Steve Crutchfield, Head of
Market Structure, Chicago Trading Company
(‘‘CTC’’) and William Ellington, Managing Member/
CEO, X-Change Financial Access (‘‘XFA’’) to
Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated
August 27, 2020. See also Letter from Lakeshore
Securities to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary,
Commission, dated August 31, 2020.
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71681
describing the proposed post-migration
fees, the TPH relayed to the Exchange
that it would instead remain a member
and add logical connectivity in light of
the cost savings it expected to realize
due to the proposed changes. The
Exchange believes this further
demonstrates competition within the
market for exchange connectivity,
which as a result constrains fees the
Exchange may charge for that
connectivity. Another TPH, that prior to
migration acted only as a proprietary
trading firm, added the trading function
as a Market-Maker on the Exchange
(which required the purchase of
additional trading permits and
connectivity). The Exchange also notes
that since migration, one TPH
terminated its membership with the
Exchange but retained its membership
with 10 other SROs.117 The Exchange
believes the fact that only one TPH
terminated in the past eleven months
but retained its memberships at other
options exchanges demonstrates the
proposed fees are appropriate and
reasonable and not unduly burdensome.
While the TPH that did terminate did
not specify to the Exchange why it
ended its membership, if it had in fact
determined that the Exchange’s
proposed connectivity fees did not make
business sense for itself, for all the
reasons discussed above, it was free to
leave the Exchange at no cost and retain
its membership with other SROs and/or
pursue new memberships.
The proposed connectivity structure
and corresponding fees, like the premigration connectivity structure and
fees, continue to provide market
participants flexibility with respect to
how to connect to the Exchange based
on each market participants’ respective
business needs. For example, the
amount and type of physical and logical
ports are determined by factors relevant
and specific to each market participant,
including its business model, costs of
connectivity, how its business is
segmented and allocated and volume of
messages sent to the Exchange.
Moreover, the Exchange notes that it
117 Two other Trading Permit Holders also
terminated their respective memberships in the first
quarter of 2020. The Exchange notes, however, that
one TPH consolidated its membership with an
affiliate and another TPH no longer appears to be
a registered broker-dealer. In the second quarter,
another TPH terminated its membership with the
Exchange but similarly merged its business with
another TPH. In August 2020, a TPH terminated its
membership with the Exchange, along with all of
its other SRO memberships as well. Lastly, in
September 2020, two TPHs terminated their
membership with the Exchange. One of those TPHs
merged with another TPH and the other terminated
its memberships with other options exchanges at
the same time it terminated its membership with
the Exchange.
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does not have unlimited system
capacity to support an unlimited
number of order and quote entry per
second. Accordingly, the proposed
connectivity fees, and connectivity
structure are designed to encourage
market participants to be efficient with
their respective physical and logical
port usage. While the Exchange has no
way of predicting with certainty the
amount or type of connections market
participants will in fact purchase, if any,
the Exchange anticipates that like today,
some market participants will continue
to decline to connect and participate on
the Exchange, some will participate on
the Exchange via indirect connectivity,
some will only purchase one physical
connection and/or logical port
connection, and others will purchase
multiple connections.
In sum, the Exchange believes the
proposed fees are reasonable and reflect
a competitive environment, as the
Exchange seeks to amend its access fees
in connection with the migration of its
technology platform, while still
attracting market participants to
continue to be, or become, connected to
the Exchange.
Physical Ports
The Exchange believes increasing the
fee for the new 10 Gb Physical Port is
reasonable because unlike, the current
10 Gb Network Access Ports, the new
Physical Ports provides a connection
through a latency equalized
infrastructure with faster switches and
also allows access to both unicast order
entry and multicast market data with a
single physical connection. As
discussed above, legacy Network Access
Ports do not permit market participants
to receive unicast and multicast
connectivity. As such, in order to
receive both connectivity types premigration, a market participant needed
to purchase and maintain at least two 10
Gb Network Access Ports. The proposed
Physical Ports not only provide latency
equalization (i.e., eliminate latency
advantages between market participants
based on location) as compared to the
legacy ports, but also alleviate the need
to pay for two physical ports as a result
of needing unicast and multicast
connectivity. Accordingly, market
participants who historically had to
purchase two separate ports for each of
multicast and unicast activity, will be
able to purchase only one port, and
consequently pay lower fees overall. For
example, pre-migration if a TPH had
two 10 Gb legacy Network Access Ports,
one of which received unicast traffic
and the other of which received
multicast traffic, that TPH would have
been assessed $10,000 per month
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17:21 Nov 09, 2020
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($5,000 per port). Under the proposed
rule change, using the new Physical
Ports, that TPH has the option of
utilizing one single port, instead of two
ports, to receive both unicast and
multicast traffic, therefore paying only
$7,000 per month for a port that
provides both connectivity types. The
Exchange notes that pre-migration,
approximately 50% of TPHs maintained
two or more 10 Gb Network Access
Ports. While the Exchange has no way
of predicting with certainty the amount
or type of connections market
participants will in fact purchase postmigration, the Exchange anticipated
approximately 50% of the TPHs with
two or more 10 Gb Network Access
Ports to reduce the number of 10 Gb
Physical Ports that they purchase and
expected the remaining 50% of TPHs to
maintain their current 10 Gb Physical
Ports, but reduce the number of 1 Gb
Physical Ports. Particularly, premigration, a number of TPHs
maintained two 10 Gb Network Access
Ports to receive multicast data and two
1 Gb Network Access Ports for order
entry (unicast connectivity). As the new
10 Gb Physical Ports are able to
accommodate unicast connectivity
(order entry), TPHs may choose to
eliminate their 1 Gb Network Access
Ports and utilize the new 10 Gb Physical
Ports for both multicast and unicast
connectivity. The Exchange notes that
in February 2020, approximately 78% of
TPHs that maintained a 1 Gb Network
Access Port pre-migration, no longer
maintained a 1 Gb Physical Port.
Additionally, as of February 2020,
approximately 44% reduced the
quantity of 10 Gb Physical Ports they
maintained as compared to premigration.
As discussed above, if a TPH deems
a particular exchange as charging
excessive fees for connectivity, such
market participants may opt to
terminate their connectivity
arrangements with that exchange, and
adopt a possible range of alternative
strategies, including routing to the
applicable exchange through another
participant or market center or taking
that exchange’s data indirectly.
Accordingly, if the Exchange charges
excessive fees, it would stand to lose not
only connectivity revenues but also
revenues associated with the execution
of orders routed to it, and, to the extent
applicable, market data revenues. The
Exchange believes that this competitive
dynamic imposes powerful restraints on
the ability of any exchange to charge
unreasonable fees for physical
connectivity. The Exchange also notes
that the proposal represents an equitable
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
allocation of reasonable dues, fees and
other charges as its fees for physical
connectivity are reasonably constrained
by competitive alternatives, as
discussed above. The proposed amounts
are in line with, and in some cases
lower than, the costs of physical
connectivity at other Exchanges,118
including the Cboe Affiliated
Exchanges, which have the same
connectivity infrastructure the Exchange
has migrated to and some of which also
offer exclusive products.119 The
Exchange does not believe it is
unreasonable to assess fees that are in
line with fees that have already been
established for the same physical ports
used to connect to the same
connectivity infrastructure and common
platform. The Exchange believes the
proposed Physical Port fees are
equitable and not unreasonably
discriminatory as the connectivity
pricing is associated with relative usage
of the various market participants
(including smaller participants) and the
Exchange has not been presented with
any evidence to suggest its proposed fee
changes would impose a barrier to entry
for participants, including smaller
participants. In fact, as noted above, the
Exchange is unaware of any market
participant that has terminated direct
connectivity solely as a result of the
proposed fee changes. The Exchange
also believes increasing the fee for 10 Gb
Physical Ports and charging a higher fee
as compared to the 1 Gb Physical Port
is equitable as the 1 Gb Physical Port is
1/10th the size of the 10 Gb Physical
Port and therefore does not offer access
to many of the products and services
offered by the Exchange (e.g., ability to
receive certain market data products).
Thus the value of the 1 Gb alternative
is lower than the value of the 10 Gb
alternative, when measured based on
the type of Exchange access it offers.
Moreover, market participants that
purchase 10 Gb Physical Ports utilize
the most bandwidth and therefore
consume the most resources from the
118 See e.g., Nasdaq PHLX and ISE Rules, General
Equity and Options Rules, General 8. Phlx and ISE
each charge a monthly fee of $2,500 for each 1Gb
connection, $10,000 for each 10Gb connection and
$15,000 for each 10Gb Ultra connection. See also
Nasdaq Price List—Trading Connectivity. Nasdaq
charges a monthly fee of $7,500 for each 10Gb
direct connection to Nasdaq and $2,500 for each
direct connection that supports up to 1Gb. See also
NYSE American Fee Schedule, Section V.B, and
Arca Fees and Charges, Co-Location Fees. NYSE
American and Arca each charge a monthly fee of
$5,000 for each 1Gb circuit, $14,000 for each 10Gb
circuit and $22,000 for each 10Gb LX circuit.
119 See e.g., Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules,
Physical Connectivity Fees. For example, Cboe
BZX, Cboe EDGX and C2 each charge a monthly fee
of $2,500 for each 1Gb connection and $7,500 for
each 10Gb connection.
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network. As such, the Exchange believes
the proposed fees for the 1 and 10 Gb
Physical Ports, respectively are
reasonably and appropriately allocated.
Data Port Fees
The Exchange believes assessing the
data port fee per data source, instead of
per port, is reasonable because it may
allow for market participants to
maintain more ports at a lower cost and
applies uniformly to all market
participants. The Exchange believes the
proposed increase is reasonable
because, as noted above, market
participants may pay lower fees as a
result of charging per data source and
not per data port. Indeed, while the
Exchange has no way of predicting with
certainty the impact of the proposed
changes, the Exchange had anticipated
approximately 76% of the 51 market
participants who pay data port fees to
pay the same or lower fees upon
implementation of the proposed change.
As of December 2019, 46 market
participants 120 pay the proposed data
port fees, of which approximately 78%
market participants are paying the same
or lower fees in connection with the
proposed change. Monthly savings for
firms paying lower fees range from $500
to $6,000 per month. The Exchange also
anticipated that 19% of TPHs who pay
data port fees would pay a modest
increase of only $500 per month. In
December 2019, approximately 22%
market participants paid higher fees,
with the majority of those market
participants paying a modest monthly
increase of $500 and only 3 firms paying
either $1,000 or $1,500 more per month.
Additionally, as discussed above, the
Exchange’s affiliate C2 has the same fee
which is also assessed at the proposed
rate and assessed by data source instead
of per port. The proposed name change
is also appropriate in light of the
Exchange’s proposed changes and may
alleviate potential confusion.
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Logical Connectivity
Port fees
The Exchange believes it’s reasonable
to eliminate certain fees associated with
legacy options for connecting to the
Exchange and to replace them with fees
associated with new options for
connecting to the Exchange that are
similar to those offered at its Affiliated
Exchanges. In particular, the Exchange
believes it’s reasonable to no longer
assess fees for CMI and FIX Login IDs
because the Login IDs were retired and
rendered obsolete upon migration and
120 The Exchange notes the reduction in market
participants that pay the data port fee is due to firm
consolidations and acquisitions.
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because the Exchange is proposing to
replace them with fees associated with
the new logical connectivity options.
The Exchange believes that it is
reasonable to harmonize the Exchange’s
logical connectivity options and
corresponding connectivity fees now
that the Exchange is on a common
platform as its Affiliated Exchanges.
Additionally, the Exchange notes the
proposed fees are the same as, or in line
with, the fees assessed on its Affiliated
Exchanges for similar connectivity.121
The proposed logical connectivity fees
are also equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because the Exchange
will apply the same fees to all market
participants that use the same respective
connectivity options.
The Exchange believes the proposed
Logical Port fees are reasonable as it is
the same fee for Drop Ports and the first
five BOE/FIX Ports that is assessed for
CMI and FIX Logins, which the
Exchange is eliminating in lieu of
logical ports. Additionally, while the
proposed ports will be assessed the
same monthly fees as current CMI/FIX
Login IDs, the proposed logical ports
provide for significantly more message
traffic. Specifically, the proposed BOE/
FIX Logical Ports will provide for 3
times the amount of quoting 122 capacity
and approximately 165 times order
entry capacity. Similarly, the Exchange
believes the proposed BOE Bulk Port
fees are reasonable because while the
fees are higher than the CMI and FIX
Login Id fees and the proposed Logical
Port fees, BOE Bulk Ports offer
significantly more bandwidth capacity
than both CMI and FIX Login Ids and
Logical Ports. Particularly, a single BOE
Bulk Port offers 45 times the amount of
quoting bandwidth than CMI/FIX Login
Ids 123 and 5 times the amount of
quoting bandwidth than Logical Ports
will offer. Additionally, the Exchange
believes that its fees for logical
connectivity are reasonable, equitable,
and not unfairly discriminatory as they
are designed to ensure that firms that
use the most capacity pay for that
capacity, rather than placing that
burden on market participants that have
more modest needs. Although the
Exchange charges a ‘‘per port’’ fee for
logical connectivity, it notes that this fee
is in effect a capacity fee as each FIX,
BOE or BOE Bulk port used for order/
quote entry supports a specified
capacity (i.e., messages per second) in
121 See Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules,
Logical Port Fees.
122 Based on the purchase of a single MarketMaker Trading Permit or Bandwidth Packet.
123 Based on the purchase of a single MarketMaker Trading Permit or Bandwidth Packet.
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71683
the matching engine, and firms
purchase additional logical ports when
they require more capacity due to their
business needs.
An obvious driver for a market
participant’s decision to purchase
multiple ports will be their desire to
send or receive additional levels of
message traffic in some manner, either
by increasing their total amount of
message capacity available, or by
segregating order flow for different
trading desks and clients to avoid
latency sensitive applications from
competing for a single thread of
resources. For example, a TPH may
purchase one or more ports for its
market making business based on the
amount of message traffic needed to
support that business, and then
purchase separate ports for proprietary
trading or customer facing businesses so
that those businesses have their own
distinct connection, allowing the firm to
send multiple messages into the
Exchange’s trading system in parallel
rather than sequentially. Some TPHs
that provide direct market access to
their customers may also choose to
purchase separate ports for different
clients as a service for latency sensitive
customers that desire the lowest
possible latency to improve trading
performance. Thus, while a smaller TPH
that demands more limited message
traffic may connect through a service
bureau or other service provider, or may
choose to purchase one or two logical
ports that are billed at a rate of $750 per
month each, a larger market participant
with a substantial and diversified U.S.
options business may opt to purchase
additional ports to support both the
volume and types of activity that they
conduct on the Exchange. While the
Exchange has no way of predicting with
certainty the amount or type of logical
ports market participants will in fact
purchase post-migration, the Exchange
anticipated approximately 16% of TPHs
to purchase one to two logical ports, and
approximately 22% of TPHs to not
purchase any logical ports. In December
2019, 13% of TPHs purchased one to
two logical ports and 27% have not
purchased any logical ports. At the same
time, market participants that desire
more total capacity due to their business
needs, or that wish to segregate order
flow by purchasing separate capacity
allocations to reduce latency or for other
operational reasons, would be permitted
to choose to purchase such additional
capacity at the same marginal cost. The
Exchange believes the proposal to assess
an additional Logical and BOE Bulk port
fee for incremental usage per logical
port is reasonable because the proposed
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fees are modestly higher than the
proposed Logical Port and BOE Bulk
fees and encourage users to mitigate
message traffic as necessary. The
Exchange notes one of its Affiliated
Exchanges has similar implied port
fees.124
In sum, the Exchange believes that the
proposed BOE/FIX Logical Port and
BOE Bulk Port fees are appropriate as
these fees would ensure that market
participants continue to pay for the
amount of capacity that they request,
and the market participants that pay the
most are the ones that demand the most
resources from the Exchange. The
Exchange also believes that its logical
connectivity fees are aligned with the
goals of the Commission in facilitating
a competitive market for all firms that
trade on the Exchange and of ensuring
that critical market infrastructure has
‘‘levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency,
availability, and security adequate to
maintain their operational capability
and promote the maintenance of fair
and orderly markets.’’ 125
The Exchange believes waiving the
FIX/BOE Logical Port fee for one FIX
Logical Port used to access PULSe and
Silexx (for FLEX Trading) is reasonable
because it will allow all TPHs using
PULSe and Silexx to avoid having to
pay a fee that they would otherwise
have to pay. The waiver is equitable and
not unfairly discriminatory because
TPHs using PULSe are already subject to
a monthly fee for the PULSe
Workstation, which the Exchange views
as inclusive of fees to access the
Exchange. Moreover, while PULSe users
today do not require a FIX/CMI Login
Id, post-migration, due to changes to the
connectivity infrastructure, PULSe users
will be required to maintain a FIX
Logical Port and as such incur a fee they
previously would not have been subject
to. Similarly, the Exchange believes that
the waiver for Silexx (for FLEX trading)
will encourage TPHs to transact
business using FLEX Options using the
new Silexx System and encourage
trading of FLEX Options. Additionally,
the Exchange notes that it currently
waives the Login Id fees for Login IDs
used to access the CFLEX system.
The Exchange believes its proposed
fee for Purge Ports is reasonable as it is
also in line with the amount assessed
for purge ports offered by its Affiliated
Exchanges, as well as other
124 See e.g., Cboe C2 Options Exchange Fees
Schedule, Logical Connectivity Fees.
125 See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
73639 (November 19, 2014), 79 FR 72251
(December 5, 2014) (File No. S7–01–13) (Regulation
SCI Adopting Release).
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exchanges.126 Moreover, the Exchange
believes that offering purge port
functionality at the Exchange level
promotes robust risk management across
the industry, and thereby facilitates
investor protection. Some market
participants, and, in particular, larger
firms, could build similar risk
functionality on their trading systems
that permit the flexible cancellation of
orders entered on the Exchange.
Offering Exchange level protections
however, ensures that such
functionality is widely available to all
firms, including smaller firms that may
otherwise not be willing to incur the
costs and development work necessary
to support their own customized mass
cancel functionality. The Exchange
operates in a highly competitive market
in which exchanges offer connectivity
and related services as a means to
facilitate the trading activities of TPHs
and other participants. As the proposed
Purge Ports provide voluntary risk
management functionality, excessive
fees would simply serve to reduce
demand for this optional product. The
Exchange also believes that the
proposed Purge Port fees are not
unfairly discriminatory because they
will apply uniformly to all TPHs that
choose to use dedicated Purge Ports.
The proposed Purge Ports are
completely voluntary and, as they relate
solely to optional risk management
functionality, no TPH is required or
under any regulatory obligation to
utilize them. The Exchange believes that
adopting separate fees for these ports
ensures that the associated costs are
borne exclusively by TPHs that
determine to use them based on their
business needs, including MarketMakers or similarly situated market
participants. Similar to Purge Ports,
Spin and GRP Ports are optional
products that provide an alternative
means for market participants to receive
multicast data and request and receive
a retransmission of such data. As such
excessive fees would simply serve to
reduce demand for these products,
which TPHs are under no regulatory
obligation to utilize. All TPHs that
voluntarily select these service options
(i.e., Purge Ports, Spin Ports or GRP
Ports) will be charged the same amount
for the same respective services. All
TPHs have the option to select any
connectivity option, and there is no
differentiation among TPHs with regard
126 See Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules,
Logical Port Fees. See also, Nasdaq ISE Pricing
Schedule, Section 7(C). ISE charges a fee of $1,100
per month for SQF Purge Ports.
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to the fees charged for the services
offered by the Exchange.
Access Credits
The Exchange believes the proposal to
adopt credits for BOE Bulk Ports is
reasonable, equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because it provides an
opportunity for TPHs to pay lower fees
for logical connectivity. The Exchange
notes that the proposed credits are in
lieu of the current credits that MarketMakers are eligible to receive today for
Trading Permits fees. Although only
Market-Makers may receive the
proposed BOE Bulk Port credits,
Market-Makers are valuable market
participants that provide liquidity in the
marketplace and incur costs that other
market participants do not incur. For
example, Market-Makers have a number
of obligations, including quoting
obligations and fees associated with
appointments that other market
participants do not have. The Exchange
also believes that the proposals provide
incremental incentives for TPHs to
strive for the higher tier levels, which
provide increasingly higher benefits for
satisfying increasingly more stringent
criteria, including criteria to provide
more liquidity to the Exchange. The
Exchange believes the value of the
proposed credits is commensurate with
the difficulty to achieve the
corresponding tier thresholds of each
program.
First, the Exchange believes the
proposed BOE Bulk Port fee credits
provided under AVP will incentivize
the routing of orders to the Exchange by
TPHs that have both Market-Maker and
agency operations, as well as incent
Market-Makers to continue to provide
critical liquidity notwithstanding the
costs incurred with being a MarketMaker. More specifically, in the options
industry, many options orders are
routed by consolidators, which are firms
that have both order router and MarketMaker operations. The Exchange is
aware not only of the importance of
providing credits on the order routing
side in order to encourage the
submission of orders, but also of the
operations costs on the Market-Maker
side. The Exchange believes the
proposed change to AVP continues to
allow the Exchange to provide relief to
the Market-Maker side via the credits,
albeit credits on BOE Bulk Port fees
instead of Trading Permit fees.
Additionally, the proposed credits may
incentivize and attract more volume and
liquidity to the Exchange, which will
benefit all Exchange participants
through increased opportunities to trade
as well as enhancing price discovery.
While the Exchange has no way of
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predicting with certainty how many and
which TPHs will satisfy the required
criteria to receive the credits, the
Exchange had anticipated
approximately two TPHs (out of
approximately 5 TPHs that are eligible
for AVP) to reach VIP Tiers 4 or 5 and
consequently earn the BOE Bulk Port fee
credits for their respective MarketMaker affiliate. For the month of
October 2019, two TPHs received access
credits under Tier 5 and no TPHs
received credits under Tier 4. The
Exchange notes that it believes its
reasonable, equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory to no longer provide
access credits for Market-Makers whose
affiliates achieve VIP Tiers 2 or 3 as the
Exchange has adopted another
opportunity for all Market-Makers, not
just Market-Makers that are part of a
consolidator, to receive credits on BOE
Bulk Port fees (i.e., credits available via
the proposed Market-Maker Access
Credit Program). More specifically,
limiting the credits under AVP to the
top two tiers enables the Exchange to
provide further credits under the new
Market-Maker Access Credit Program.
Furthermore, the Exchange notes that it
is not required to provide any credits at
any tier level.
The Exchange believes the proposed
BOE Bulk Port fee credits available for
TPHs that reach certain Performance
Tiers under the Liquidity Provider
Sliding Scale Adjustment Table is
reasonable as the credits provide for
reduced connectivity costs for those
Market-Makers that reach the required
thresholds. The Exchange believe it’s
reasonable, equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory to provide credits to
those Market-Makers that primarily
provide and post liquidity to the
Exchange, as the Exchange wants to
continue to encourage Market-Makers
with significant Make Rates to continue
to participate on the Exchange and add
liquidity. Greater liquidity benefits all
market participants by providing more
trading opportunities and tighter
spreads.
Moreover, the Exchange notes that
Market-Makers with a high Make Rate
percentage generally require higher
amounts of capacity than other MarketMakers. Particularly, Market-Makers
with high Make Rates are generally
streaming significantly more quotes
than those with lower Make Rates. As
such, Market-Makers with high Make
Rates may incur more costs than other
Market-Makers as they may need to
purchase multiple BOE Bulk Ports in
order to accommodate their capacity
needs. The Exchange believes the
proposed credits for BOE Bulk Ports
encourages Market-Makers to continue
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to provide liquidity for the Exchange,
notwithstanding the costs incurred by
purchasing multiple ports. Particularly,
the proposal is intended to mitigate the
costs incurred by traditional MarketMakers that focus on adding liquidity to
the Exchange (as opposed to those that
provide and take, or just take). While
the Exchange cannot predict with
certainty which Market-Makers will
reach Performance Tiers 4 and 5 each
month, based on historical performance
it anticipated approximately 10 MarketMakers would achieve Tiers 4 or 5. In
October 2019, 12 Market-Makers
achieved Tiers 4 or 5. Lastly, the
Exchange notes that it is common
practice among options exchanges to
differentiate fees for adding liquidity
and fees for removing liquidity.127
Bandwidth Packets and CMI CAS Server
Fees
The Exchange believes it’s reasonable
to eliminate Bandwidth Packet fees and
the CMI CAS Server fee because TPHs
will not pay fees for these connectivity
options and because Bandwidth Packets
and CAS Servers have been retired and
rendered obsolete as part of the
migration. The Exchange believes that
even though it will be discontinuing
Bandwidth Packets, the proposed
incremental pricing for Logical Ports
and BOE Bulk Ports will continue to
encourage users to mitigate message
traffic. The proposed change is equitable
and not unfairly discriminatory because
it will apply uniformly to all TPHs.
Access Fees
The Exchange believes the
restructuring of its Trading Permits is
reasonable in light of the changes to the
Exchange’s connectivity infrastructure
in connection with the migration and
the resulting separation of bandwidth
allowance, logins and appointment
costs from each Trading Permit. The
Exchange also believes that it is
reasonable to harmonize the Exchange’s
Trading Permit structure and
corresponding connectivity options to
more closely align with the structures
offered at its Affiliated Exchanges once
the Exchange is on a common platform
as its Affiliated Exchanges.128 The
proposed Trading Permit structure and
corresponding fees are also in line with
the structure and fees provided by other
127 See e.g., MIAX Options Fees Schedule,
Section 1(a), Market Maker Transaction Fees.
128 For example, the Exchange’s affiliate, C2,
similarly provides for Trading Permits that are not
tied to connectivity, and similar physical and
logical port options at similar pricings. See Cboe C2
Options Exchange Fees Schedule. Physical
connectivity and logical connectivity are also not
tied to any type of permits on the Exchange’s other
options exchange affiliates.
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exchanges. The proposed Trading
Permit fees are also equitable and not
unfairly discriminatory because the
Exchange will apply the same fees to all
market participants that use the same
type and number of Trading Permits.
With respect to electronic Trading
Permits, the Exchange notes that TPHs
previously requested multiple Trading
Permits because of bandwidth, login or
appointment cost needs. As described
above, in connection with migration,
bandwidth, logins and appointment
costs are no longer tied to Trading
Permits or Bandwidth Packets and as
such, the need to hold multiple permits
and/or Bandwidth Packets is obsolete.
As such, the Exchange believes the
structure to require only one of each
type of applicable electronic Trading
Permit is appropriate. Moreover, the
Exchange believes offering separate
marketing making permits for off-floor
and on-floor Market-Makers provides for
a cleaner, more streamlined approach to
trading permits and corresponding fees.
Other exchanges similarly provide
separate and distinct fees for MarketMakers that operate on-floor vs off-floor
and their corresponding fees are similar
to those proposed by the Exchange.129
The Exchange believes the proposed
fee for its MM EAP Trading Permits is
reasonable as it is the same fee it
assesses today for Market-Maker
Trading Permits (i.e., $5,000 per month
per permit). Additionally, the proposed
fee is in line with, and in some cases
even lower than, the amounts assessed
for similar access fees at other
exchanges, including its affiliate C2.130
The Exchange believes the proposed
EAP fee is also reasonable, and in line
with the fees assessed by other
Exchanges for non-Market-Maker
electronic access.131 The Exchange
notes that while the Trading Permit fee
is increasing, TPHs overall cost to
129 See e.g., PHLX Section 8A, Permit and
Registration Fees. See also, BOX Options Fee
Schedule, Section IX Participant Fees; NYSE
American Options Fees Schedule, Section III(A)
Monthly ATP Fees and NYSE Arca Options Fees
and Charges, OTP Trading Participant Rights. For
similar Trading Floor Permits for Floor Market
Makers, Nasdaq PHLX charges $6,000; BOX charges
up to $5,500 for 3 registered permits in addition to
a $1,500 Participant Fee, NYSE Arca charges up to
$6,000; and NYSE American charges up to $8,000.
130 See e.g., Cboe C2 Options Exchange Fees
Schedule. See also, NYSE Arca Options Fees and
Charges, General Options and Trading Permit (OTP)
Fees, which assesses up to $6,000 per Market Maker
OTP and NYSE American Options Fee Schedule,
Section III. Monthly ATP Fees, which assess up to
$8,000 per Market Maker ATP. See also, PHLX
Section 8A, Permit and Registration Fees, which
assesses up to $4,000 per Market Maker Permit.
131 See e.g., PHLX Section 8A, Permit and
Registration Fees, which assesses up to $4,000 per
Permit for all member and member organizations
other than Floor Specialists and Market Makers.
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access the Exchange may be reduced in
light of the fact that a TPH no longer
must purchase multiple Trading
Permits, Bandwidth Packets and Login
Ids in order to receive sufficient
bandwidth and logins to meet their
respective business needs. To illustrate
the value of the new connectivity
infrastructure, the Exchange notes that
the cost that would be incurred by a
TPH today in order to receive the same
amount of order capacity that will be
provided by a single Logical Port postmigration (i.e., 5,000 orders per second),
is approximately 98% higher than the
cost for the same capacity postmigration. The following examples
further demonstrate potential cost
savings/value added for an EAP holder
with modest capacity needs and an EAP
holder with larger capacity needs:
TPH THAT HOLDS 1 EAP, NO BANDWIDTH PACKETS AND 1 CMI LOGIN
Current fee structure
EAP .........................................................................................................
CMI Login/Logical Port ............................................................................
Bandwidth Packets ..................................................................................
Total Bandwidth Available .......................................................................
Total Cost ................................................................................................
Total Cost per message ..........................................................................
Post-migration fee structure
$1,600 ............................................
$750 ...............................................
0 .....................................................
30 orders/sec .................................
$2,350 ............................................
$78.33/order/sec ............................
$3,000.
$750.
N/A.
5,000 orders/sec.
$3,750.
$0.75/order/sec.
TPH THAT HOLDS 1 EAP, 4 BANDWIDTH PACKETS AND 15 CMI LOGINS
Current fee structure
EAP .........................................................................................................
CMI Login/Logical Port ............................................................................
Bandwidth Packets ..................................................................................
Total Bandwidth Available .......................................................................
Total Cost ................................................................................................
Total Cost per message ..........................................................................
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The Exchange believes the proposal to
adopt a new Clearing TPH Permit is
reasonable because it offers TPHs that
only clear transactions of TPHs a
discount. Particularly, Clearing TPHs
that also submit orders electronically to
the Exchange would purchase the
proposed EAP at $3,000 per permit. The
Exchange believe it’s reasonable to
provide a discount to Clearing TPHs
that only clear transactions and do not
otherwise submit electronic orders to
the Exchange. The Exchange notes that
another exchange similarly charges a
separate fee for clearing firms.132
The Exchange believes the proposed
fee structure for on-floor Market-Makers
is reasonable as the fees are in line with
those offered at other Exchanges.133 The
Exchange believes that the proposed fee
for MM Floor Permits as compared to
MM EAPs is reasonable because it is
only modestly higher than MM EAPs
and Floor MMs don’t have other costs
that MM EAP holders have, such as MM
EAP Appointment fees.
The Exchange believes its proposed
fees for Floor Broker Permits are
reasonable because the fees are similar
to, and in some cases lower than, the
fees the Exchange currently assesses for
such permits. Specifically, based on the
132 See e.g., NYSE Arca Options Fees and
Charges, General Options and Trading Permit (OTP)
Fees and NYSE American Options Fee Schedule,
Section III. Monthly ATP Fees.
133 See e.g., PHLX Section 8A, Permit and
Registration Fees, which assesses $6,000 per permit
for Floor Specialists and Market Makers.
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$1,600 ............................................
$11,250 (15@750) ........................
$6,400 (4@$1,600) .......................
150 orders/sec ...............................
$19,250 ..........................................
$128.33/order/sec ..........................
number of Trading Permits TPHs held
upon migration, 60% of TPHs that hold
Floor Broker Trading Permits will pay
lower Trading Permit fees. Particularly,
any Floor Broker holding ten or less
Floor Broker Trading Permits will pay
lower fees under the proposed tiers as
compared to what they pay today. While
the remaining 40% of TPHs holding
Floor Broker Trading Permits (who each
hold between 12–21 Floor Broker
Trading Permits) will pay higher fees,
the Exchange notes the monthly
increase is de minimis, ranging from an
increase of 0.6%–2.72%.134
The Exchange believes the proposed
ADV Discount is reasonable because it
provides an opportunity for Floor
Brokers to pay lower FB Trading Permit
fees, similar to the current rebate
program offered to Floor Brokers. The
Exchange notes that while the new ADV
Discount program includes only
customer volume (‘‘C’’ origin code) as
compared to Customer and Professional
Customer/Voluntary Professional, the
amount of Professional Customer/
Voluntary Professional volume was de
minimis and the Exchange does not
believe the absence of such volume will
have a significant impact.135
Additionally, the Exchange notes that
134 The Floor Brokers whose fees are increasing
have each committed to a minimum number of
permits and therefore currently receive the rates set
forth in the current Floor Broker TP Sliding Scale.
135 Furthermore, post-migration the Exchange will
not have Voluntary Professionals.
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Post-migration fee structure
Sfmt 4703
$3,000.
$750.
N/A.
5,000 orders/sec.
$3,750.
$0.75/order/sec.
while the ADV requirements under the
proposed ADV Discount program are
higher than are required under the
current rebate program, the proposed
ADV Discount counts volume from all
products towards the thresholds as
compared to the current rebate program
which excludes volume from
Underlying Symbol List A (except RLG,
RLV, RUI, and UKXM), DJX, XSP, and
subcabinet trades. Moreover, the ADV
Discount is designed to encourage the
execution of orders in all classes via
open outcry, which may increase
volume, which would benefit all market
participants (including Floor Brokers
who do not hit the ADV thresholds)
trading via open outcry (and indeed,
this increased volume could make it
possible for some Floor Brokers to hit
the ADV thresholds). The Exchange
believes the proposed discounts are
equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because all Floor Brokers
are eligible. While the Exchange has no
way of predicting with certainty how
many and which TPHs will satisfy the
various thresholds under the ADV
Discount, the Exchange anticipated
approximately 3 Floor Brokers to
receive a rebate under the program. In
December 2019, 2 Floor Brokers
received a rebate under the program.
The Exchange believes its proposed
MM EAP Appointment fees are
reasonable in light of the Exchange’s
elimination of appointment costs tied to
Trading Permits. Other exchanges also
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offer a similar structure with respect to
fees for appointment classes.136
Additionally, the proposed MM EAP
Appointment fee structure results in
approximately 36% electronic MMs
paying lower fees for trading permit and
appointment costs. For example, in
order to have the ability to make
electronic markets in every class on the
Exchange, a Market-Maker would need
1 Market-Maker Trading Permit and 37
Appointment Units post-migration.
Under, the current pricing structure, in
order for a Market-Maker to quote the
entire universe of available classes, a
Market-Maker would need 33
Appointment Credits, thus necessitating
33 Market-Maker Trading Permits. With
respect to fees for Trading Permits and
Appointment Unit Fees, under the
proposed pricing structure, the cost for
a TPH wishing to quote the entire
universe of available classes is
approximately 29% less (if they are not
eligible for the MM TP Sliding Scale) or
approximately 2% less (if they are
eligible for the MM TP Sliding Scale).
To further demonstrate the potential
cost savings/value added, the Exchange
is providing the following examples
comparing current Market-Maker
connectivity and access fees to projected
connectivity and access fees for
different scenarios. The Exchange notes
that the below examples not only
compare Trading Permit and
71687
Appointment Unit costs, but also the
cost incurred for logical connectivity
and bandwidth. Particularly, the first
example demonstrates the total
minimum cost that would be incurred
today in order for a Market-Maker to
have the same amount of capacity as a
Market-Maker post-migration that
would have only 1 MM EAP and 1
Logical Port (i.e., 15,000 quotes/3 sec).
The Exchange is also providing
examples that demonstrate the costs of
(i) a Market-Maker with small capacity
needs and appointment unit of 1.0 and
(ii) a Market-Maker with large capacity
needs and appointment cost/unit of
30.0:
MARKET-MAKER THAT NEEDS CAPACITY OF 15,000/QUOTES/3 SECONDS
Current fee structure
MM Permit/MM EAP ................................................................................
Appointment Unit Cost ............................................................................
CMI Login/Logical Port ............................................................................
Bandwidth Packets ..................................................................................
Total Bandwidth Available .......................................................................
Total Cost ................................................................................................
Total Cost per message allowed ............................................................
Post-migration fee structure
$5,000 ............................................
N/A (1 appointment cost) ..............
$750 137 .........................................
$5,500 (2@$2,750) .......................
15,000 quotes/3 sec ......................
$11,250 ..........................................
$0.75/quote/3 sec ..........................
$5,000.
$0 (1 appointment unit).
$750.
N/A.
15,000 quotes/3 sec.
$5,750.
$0.38/quote/3 sec.
MARKET MAKER THAT NEEDS CAPACITY OF NO MORE THAN 5,000 QUOTES/3 SECS
Current fee structure
MM Permit/MM EAP ................................................................................
Appointment Unit Cost ............................................................................
CMI Login/Logical Port ............................................................................
Bandwidth Packets ..................................................................................
Total Bandwidth Available .......................................................................
Total Cost ................................................................................................
Total Cost per message allowed ............................................................
Post-migration fee structure
$5,000 ............................................
N/A (1 appointment cost) ..............
$750 ...............................................
0 .....................................................
5,000 quotes/3 sec ........................
$5,750 ............................................
$1.15/quote/3 sec ..........................
$5,000.
$0 (1 appointment unit).
$750.
N/A.
15,000 quotes/3 sec.
$5,750.
$0.38/quote/3 sec.
MARKET-MAKER THAT NEEDS 30 APPOINTMENT UNITS AND CAPACITY OF 300,000 QUOTES/3 SEC
Current fee structure
MM Permits/MM EAP ..............................................................................
Appointment Units Cost ..........................................................................
CMI Logins/BOE Bulk Port ......................................................................
Bandwidth Packets ..................................................................................
Total Bandwidth Available .......................................................................
Total Cost ................................................................................................
Total Cost per message allowed ............................................................
Post-migration fee structure
$105,000 (30 MM Permits assumes eligible for MM TP Sliding Scale) 138.
N/A (30 appointment costs) ...........
$3,000 (4@$750) 139 .....................
$82,500 (30@$2750) ....................
300,000 quotes/3 sec ....................
$190,500 ........................................
$0.63/quotes/3 sec ........................
$5,000.
$95,500 (30 appointment units).
$3,000 (2 BOE Bulk@$1,500).
N/A.
* 450,000 quotes/3 sec.
$103,500.
$0.23/quote/3 sec.
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* Possible performance degradation at 15,000 messages per second.
The Exchange believes its proposal to
provide separate fees for Tier
Appointments for MM EAPs and MM
Floor Permits as the Exchange will be
issuing separate Trading Permits for onfloor and off-floor market making as
discussed above. The proposal to
eliminate the volume threshold for the
electronic SPX Tier Appointment fee is
reasonable as no TPHs in the past
several months have electronically
traded more than 1 SPX contract or less
than 100 SPX contracts per month and
therefore will not be negatively
impacted by the proposed change, and
because it aligns the electronic SPX Tier
Appointment with the floor SPX Tier
Appointment, which has no volume
136 See e.g., PHLX Section 8. Membership Fees, B,
Streaming Quote Trader (‘‘SQT’’) Fees and C.
Remote Market Maker Organization (RMO) Fee.
137 The maximum quoting bandwidth that may be
applied to a single Login Id is 80,000 quotes/3 sec.
138 For simplicity of the comparison, this assumes
no appointments in SPX, VIX, RUT, XEO or OEX
(which are not included in the TP Sliding Scale).
139 Given the bandwidth limit per Login Id of
80,000 quotes/3 sec, example assumes Market-
Maker purchases minimum amount of Login IDs to
accommodate 300,000 quotes/3 sec.
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threshold. The Exchange believes the
proposal to increase the electronic
volume thresholds for VIX and RUT are
reasonable as those that do not regularly
trade VIX or RUT in open-outcry will
continue to not be assessed the fee. In
fact, any TPH that executes more than
100 contracts but less than 1,000 in the
respective classes will no longer have to
pay the proposed Tier Appointment fee.
As noted above, the Exchange is not
proposing to change the amounts
assessed for each Tier Appointment Fee.
The proposed change is equitable and
not unfairly discriminatory because it
will apply uniformly to all TPHs.
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Trading Permit Holder Regulatory Fee
The Exchange believes it’s reasonable
to eliminate the Trading Permit Holder
Regulatory fee because TPHs will not
pay this fee and because the Exchange
is restructuring its Trading Permit
structure. The Exchange notes that
although it will less closely be covering
the costs of regulating all TPHs and
performing its regulatory
responsibilities, it still has sufficient
funds to do so. The proposed change is
equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because it will apply
uniformly to all TPHs.
The Exchange believes corresponding
changes to eliminate obsolete language
in connection with the proposed
changes described above and to relocate
and reorganize its fees in connection
with the proposed changes maintain
clarity in the Fees Schedule and
alleviate potential confusion, thereby
removing impediments to and
perfecting the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market
system, and, in general, protecting
investors and the public interest.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that
the proposed rule change will impose
any burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act.
With respect to intra-market
competition, the Exchange does not
believe that the proposed rule change
would place certain market participants
at the Exchange at a relative
disadvantage compared to other market
participants or affect the ability of such
market participants to compete. As
stated above, the Exchange does not
believe its proposed pricing will impose
a barrier to entry to smaller participants
and notes that its proposed connectivity
pricing is associated with relative usage
of the various market participants. For
example, market participants with
modest capacity needs can buy the less
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expensive 1 Gb Physical Port and utilize
only one Logical Port. Moreover, the
pricing for 1 Gb Physical Ports and FIX/
BOE Logical Ports are no different than
are assessed today (i.e., $1,500 and $750
per port, respectively), yet the capacity
and access associated with each is
greatly increasing. While pricing may be
increased for larger capacity physical
and logical ports, such options provide
far more capacity and are purchased by
those that consume more resources from
the network. Accordingly, the proposed
connectivity fees do not favor certain
categories of market participants in a
manner that would impose a burden on
competition; rather, the allocation
reflects the network resources
consumed by the various size of market
participants—lowest bandwidth
consuming members pay the least, and
highest bandwidth consuming members
pays the most, particularly since higher
bandwidth consumption translates to
higher costs to the Exchange.
The Exchange also does not believe
that the proposed rule change will result
in any burden on inter-market
competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. As discussed in the
Statutory Basis section above, options
market participants are not forced to
connect to (or purchase market data
from) all options exchanges, as shown
by the number of TPHs at Cboe and
shown by the fact that there are varying
number of members across each of
Cboe’s Affiliated Exchanges. The
Exchange operates in a highly
competitive environment, and as
discussed above, its ability to price
access and connectivity is constrained
by competition among exchanges and
third parties. As discussed, there are
other options markets of which market
participants may connect to trade
options. There is also a possible range
of alternative strategies, including
routing to the exchange through another
participant or market center or accessing
the Exchange indirectly. For example,
there are 15 other U.S. options
exchanges, which the Exchange must
consider in its pricing discipline in
order to compete for market
participants. In this competitive
environment, market participants are
free to choose which competing
exchange or reseller to use to satisfy
their business needs. As a result, the
Exchange believes this proposed rule
change permits fair competition among
national securities exchanges.
Accordingly, the Exchange does not
believe its proposed fee change imposes
any burden on competition that is not
PO 00000
Frm 00086
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange neither solicited nor
received written comments on the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)
of the Act 140 and paragraph (f) of Rule
19b–4 141 thereunder. At any time
within 60 days of the filing of the
proposed rule change, the Commission
summarily may temporarily suspend
such rule change if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission will
institute proceedings to determine
whether the proposed rule change
should be approved or disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
CBOE–2020–105 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CBOE–2020–105. This file
number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
internet website (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
140 15
141 17
E:\FR\FM\10NON1.SGM
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
CFR 240.19b–4(f).
10NON1
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 10, 2020 / Notices
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549 on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change.
Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from
comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish
to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CBOE–2020–105, and
should be submitted on or before
December 1, 2020.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.142
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020–24884 Filed 11–9–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend the
Exchange’s transaction fees at Equity 7,
Section 3, as discussed below.
The text of the proposed rule change
is available on the Exchange’s website at
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/
rulebook/phlx/rules, at the principal
office of the Exchange, and at the
Commission’s Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
1. Purpose
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–90339; File No. SR–Phlx–
2020–50]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Nasdaq
PHLX LLC; Notice of Filing and
Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed
Rule Change To Amend the
Exchange’s Transaction Fees at Equity
7, Section 3
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
November 4, 2020.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on October
26, 2020, Nasdaq PHLX LLC (‘‘Phlx’’ or
‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (‘‘SEC’’ or
‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I, II, and
III below, which Items have been
prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
142 17
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
2 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
1 15
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:21 Nov 09, 2020
Jkt 253001
During the week of October 26–30,
2020, the Exchange will temporarily
relocate its place of primary operations
from Carteret, New Jersey to Chicago,
Illinois. The purpose of this temporary
relocation is to demonstrate that the
Exchange is capable of and willing to
operate outside of the State of New
Jersey in the event that the New Jersey
State Government enacts pending
legislation that would impose a tax on
securities transactions processed within
the State. If enacted, the tax would be
prohibitively expensive and onerous,
not only for the Exchange, but also for
its member organizations and ultimately
for investors, and the Exchange likely
would have no option but to relocate
permanently outside of New Jersey.
Although the Exchange believes that
its member organizations will maintain
their ordinary trading activity during
the relocation period, the Exchange also
recognizes the possibility that some of
its member organizations will adjust
their trading behavior during this time,
and that if they do so, they may fail to
qualify for credits or discounted charges
that the Exchange would otherwise
provide to them if they were to achieve
PO 00000
Frm 00087
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
71689
certain threshold levels of total
Consolidated Volume 3 on the Exchange
during the month.
To help minimize any adverse impact
of the temporary relocation on member
organizations, Exchange proposes to
amend its pricing schedule at Equities 7,
Section 3 to state that for purposes of
determining which of the execution
charges and credits listed therein a
member organization qualifies for
during the month of October 2020, the
Exchange will calculate the member
organization’s total Consolidated
Volume on the Exchange for the full
month of October as well as for the
month of October excluding the week of
October 26–30, 2020. Furthermore, the
Exchange proposes to state that it will
then assess which total Consolidated
Volume calculations would qualify the
member organization for the most
advantageous credits and charges for the
month of October and then it will apply
those credits and charges to the member
organization. Thus, if but for the
relocation, a member organization
would qualify for a higher credit or a
lower fee tier in October, then the
Exchange will apply that higher credit
or lower fee tier to the member
organization’s trading activity during
the month.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that its
proposal is consistent with Section 6(b)
of the Act,4 in general, and furthers the
objectives of Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5)
of the Act,5 in particular, in that it
provides for the equitable allocation of
reasonable dues, fees and other charges
among members and issuers and other
persons using any facility, and is not
designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers,
issuers, brokers, or dealers.
The Exchange believes that the
proposal is reasonable and equitable
because in its absence, member
organizations may fail to qualify for
certain volume-based credits or charges
in October should they determine to
alter their trading behavior when the
Exchange relocates to Chicago during
the week of October 26–30, 2020. The
Exchange does not wish to penalize
these member organizations for altering
their trading behavior in response to the
Exchange’s decision to relocate
3 As set forth in Equity 7, Section 3(a)(1), the term
‘‘Consolidated Volume’’ means the total
consolidated volume reported to all consolidated
transaction reporting plans by all exchanges and
trade reporting facilities during a month in equity
securities, excluding executed orders with a size of
less than one round lot.
4 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
5 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
E:\FR\FM\10NON1.SGM
10NON1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 218 (Tuesday, November 10, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71666-71689]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-24884]
=======================================================================
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-90333; File No. SR-CBOE-2020-105]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe Exchange, Inc.; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend
Its Fees Schedule in Connection With Migration
November 4, 2020.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that on October 23, 2020, Cboe Exchange, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or
``Cboe Options'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I,
II and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of the
Substance of the Proposed Rule Change
Cboe Exchange, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or ``Cboe Options'') proposes
to amend
[[Page 71667]]
its Fees Schedule in connection with migration. The text of the
proposed rule change is provided in Exhibit 5.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Exchange notes that subsequent to the Original Filing
that proposed these changes on October 1 and 2, 2019 (SR-CBOE-2019-
077 and SR-CBOE-2019-082) and subsequent to the Second Proposed Rule
Change and Third Proposed Rule Change Filings that proposed these
changes on November 29, 2019 (SR-CBOE-2019-111) and January 28, 2020
(SR-CBOE-2020-005), the Exchange submitted SR-CBOE-2020-021 which
adopted Footnote 12. Footnote 12 governs pricing changes in the
event the Exchange trading floor becomes inoperable and is appended
to the Market-Maker Tier Appointment Fees and Floor Broker Trading
Permit Sliding Scales tables. Additionally, subsequent to the Fourth
Proposed Rule Change filed on March 27, 2020 (SR-CBOE-2020-028), the
Exchange submitted SR-CBOE-2020-044, which appended Footnotes 41 to
the Market maker Tier Appointment Fees table and the Floor Broker
Trading Surcharge. Subsequent to the Exchange's Fifth Proposed Rule
Change filed on May 22, 2020 (SR-CBOE-2020-48), the Exchange
submitted (1) SR-CBOE-2020-058, which adopted new Footnote 24,
appended Footnote 24 in the Market-Maker Tier Appointment Fees table
and Floor Trading Permit Sliding Scales Table, as well as added
language to the Floor Broker ADV Discount Table and (2) SR-CBOE-
2020-061 which added further language in Footnote 24. Lastly,
subsequent to the Seventh Proposed Rule Change filed on September 2,
2020, the Exchange submitted SR-CBOE-2020-097 which amended language
in Footnote 24. The additions proposed by filings SR-CBOE-2020-021,
SR-CBOE-2020-044, SR-CBOE-2020-058, SR-CBOE-2020-061 and SR-CBOE-
2020-097 are double underlined in Exhibit 5A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The text of the proposed rule change is also available on the
Exchange's website (https://www.cboe.com/AboutCBOE/CBOELegalRegulatoryHome.aspx), at the Exchange's Office of the
Secretary, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
In 2016, the Exchange's parent company, Cboe Global Markets, Inc.
(formerly named CBOE Holdings, Inc.) (``Cboe Global''), which is also
the parent company of Cboe C2 Exchange, Inc. (``C2''), acquired Cboe
EDGA Exchange, Inc. (``EDGA''), Cboe EDGX Exchange, Inc. (``EDGX'' or
``EDGX Options''), Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (``BZX'' or ``BZX
Options''), and Cboe BYX Exchange, Inc. (``BYX'' and, together with
Cboe Options, C2, EDGX, EDGA, and BZX, the ``Affiliated Exchanges'').
The Cboe Affiliated Exchanges recently aligned certain system
functionality, including with respect to connectivity, retaining only
intended differences between the Affiliated Exchanges, in the context
of a technology migration. The Exchange migrated its trading platform
to the same system used by the Affiliated Exchanges, which the Exchange
completed on October 7, 2019 (the ``migration''). As a result of this
migration, the Exchange's pre-migration connectivity architecture was
rendered obsolete, and as such, the Exchange now offers new
functionality, including new logical connectivity, and therefore
proposes to adopt corresponding fees.\4\ In determining the proposed
fee changes, the Exchange assessed the impact on market participants to
ensure that the proposed fees would not create an undue financial
burden on any market participants, including smaller market
participants. While the Exchange has no way of predicting with
certainty the impact of the proposed changes, the Exchange had
anticipated its post-migration connectivity revenue \5\ to be
approximately 1.75% lower than connectivity revenue pre-migration.\6\
In addition to providing a consistent technology offering across the
Cboe Affiliated Exchanges, the migration also provided market
participants a latency equalized infrastructure, improved system
performance, and increased sustained order and quote per second
capacity, as discussed more fully below. Accordingly, in connection
with the migration and in order to more closely align the Exchange's
fee structure with that of its Affiliated Exchanges, the Exchange
intends to update and simplify its fee structure with respect to access
and connectivity and adopt new access and connectivity fees.
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\4\ As of October 7, 2019, market participants no longer have
the ability to connect to the old Exchange architecture.
\5\ Connectivity revenue post-migration includes revenue from
physical port fees (other than for disaster recovery), Cboe Data
Services Port Fee, logical port fees, Trading Permit Fees, Market-
Maker EAP Appointment Unit fees, Tier Appointment Surcharges and
Floor Broker Trading Surcharges, less the Floor Broker ADV discounts
and discounts on BOE Bulk Ports via the Affiliate Volume Plan and
the Market-Maker Access Credit program.
\6\ For February 2020, the Exchange's connectivity revenue was
approximately 2.5% higher than connectivity revenue pre-migration.
For purposes of a fair comparison of the Exchange's initial
projection of post-migration connectivity revenue to realized post-
migration revenue connectivity, the Exchange excluded from the
February 2020 calculation revenue from a Trading Permit Holder who
became a Market-Maker post October 7, 2019, a Trading Permit Holder
that grew it's footprint on the Exchange significantly, and revenue
derived from incremental usage in light of the extreme volatility
and volume experienced in February, as such circumstances were not
otherwise anticipated or incorporated into the Exchange's original
projection. As noted, the Exchange had no way of predicting with
certainty the impact of the proposed changes, nor control over
choices market participants ultimately decided to make. The Exchange
notes connectivity revenue was higher than anticipated in part due
to (1) a higher number of 10 Gb Physical Ports being maintained by
TPHs than expected (although 34% of Trading Permit Holders
maintained the same number of 10 Gb Physical and 44% reduced the
amount of 10 Gb Physical Ports maintained), (2) a higher quantity of
BOE/FIX Logical Ports being purchased than predicted, and (3) a
significantly higher quantity of the optional Drop, GRP, Multicast
PITCH/Top Spin Server Ports and Purge Ports being purchased than
predicted. For April 2020, the Exchange's connectivity revenue was
approximately 21.97% less than connectivity revenue pre-migration
using the same calculation. For May 2020, the Exchange's
connectivity revenue was approximately 22.32% less than connectivity
revenue pre-migration using the same calculation. The Exchange notes
that due to the closure of its trading floor on March 16, 2020
through June 15, 2020, it adopted a number of corresponding
temporary pricing changes, including waiving floor Trading Permit
fees. See Cboe Options Fees Schedule. The Exchange also notes that
it has provided the dollar amounts of the Exchange's monthly
connectivity revenue to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') for the months of February-June 2020 with a
confidential treatment request. The Exchange also intends to provide
further information to the Commission relating to monthly
connectivity revenue for additional months, which will also be
subject to a confidential treatment request.
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The Exchange initially filed the proposed fee changes on October 1,
2019 (SR-CBOE-2019-077) (the ``Original Filing'').\7\ The Commission
received only one comment letter on the Original Filing, six days after
the comment period deadline ended.\8\ On November 29, 2019, the
Exchange withdrew the Original Filing and submitted SR-CBOE-2019-111
(``Second Proposed Rule Change'').\9\ Among other things, the Second
Proposed Rule Change was filed in response to, and addressed, the
Commission's request for inclusion of the following information:
Clarity as to what revenue streams are included in the Exchange's
calculation of
[[Page 71668]]
``connectivity'' revenue; an update on post-migration connectivity
revenue; \10\ further information regarding the Exchange's new latency
equalized infrastructure including additional detail regarding the
benefits of such structure; clarity on how the Cboe Data Services Port
fee is applied; data regarding the number of market participants that
connect directly versus indirectly and the volume attributed to each;
enhanced discussion regarding products that compete with exclusively
listed products; an update on whether any market participant terminated
their direct connectivity or membership post-migration (and whether it
was because of the fee changes); and generally provide an update on
various projections made in the filing, including how many ports market
participants purchased post-migration, how many Trading Permit Holders
were paying higher or lower fees, and how many Trading Permit Holders
achieved proposed incentive tiers. The Commission received no comment
letters on the Second Proposed Rule Change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ On business date October 2, 2019, due to a technical error,
the Exchange withdrew that filing and submitted SR-CBOE-2019-082.
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 87304 (October 15, 2019), 84
FR 56240, (October 21, 2019) (``Original Filing'').
\8\ See Letter from Tyler Gellasch, Executive Director, The
Healthy Markets Association (``Healthy Markets''), to Vanessa
Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated November 18, 2019.
\9\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 87727 (December 12,
2019), 84 FR 69428 (December 18, 2019).
\10\ Many market participants were still transitioning to the
new connectivity structure at that time and as such, the Exchange
noted it did not expect its connectivity revenue projections
regarding port purchases to be realized prior to February 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 28, 2020, the Exchange withdrew the Second Proposed Rule
Change filing and submitted SR-CBOE-2020-005 (``Third Proposed Rule
Change'').\11\ The Third Proposed Rule Change was filed in response to,
and addressed, the Commission's request for further discussion
regarding how competitive forces constrained fees, further detail on
potential substitute products for the Exchange's exclusively listed
products, updated data on the number of ports purchased post-migration
and an update on the projected post-migration connectivity revenue.\12\
The Exchange also provided updated data on how many Trading Permit
Holders connected directly versus indirectly to the Exchange and the
volume attributed to each. The Commission received no comment letters
on the Third Proposed Rule Change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 88164 (February 11,
2020), 85 FR 8897, (February 18, 2020).
\12\ Many market participants were still transitioning to the
new connectivity structure at that time and as such, the Exchange
again noted it did not expect its connectivity revenue projections
regarding port purchases to be realized prior to February 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 27, 2020, the Exchange submitted SR-CBOE-2020-028
(``Fourth Proposed Rule Change'').\13\ The Fourth Proposed Rule Change
was filed in response to the Commission's sole request to update the
connectivity revenue collected in February 2020, as the transition of
physical ports had been completed. The Commission received only one
comment letter on the Fourth Proposed Rule Change.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 88586 (April 8,
2020), 85 FR 20773, (April 14, 2020).
\14\ See Letter from Tyler Gellasch, Executive Director, The
Healthy Markets Association (``Healthy Markets''), to Vanessa
Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated May 5, 2020, which letter
mischaracterized the Exchange's proposed fees as linking market data
costs to trading volume, among other factual inaccuracies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 21, 2020, the Exchange withdrew that filing and submitted
SR-CBOE-20202-048 (``Fifth Proposed Rule Change'').\15\ The Fifth
Proposed Rule Change was filed in response to the Commission's request
for (1) updated connectivity revenue for April 2020, (2) examples of
alternative products to VIX and (3) any further evidence the Exchange
had to support its argument that competitive forces constrain pricing.
The Commission received no comments letters on the Fifth Proposed Rule
Change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ The Exchange refiled the Fifth Proposed Rule Change on May
22, 2020 due to a technical error (SR-CBOE-2020-048). See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 88984 (June 1, 2020), 85 FR 34670, (June 6,
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 2, 2020, the Exchange withdrew the Fifth Proposed Rule
Change and submitted SR-CBOE-2020-064 (``Sixth Proposed Rule
Change'').\16\ The Sixth Proposed Rule Change was filed to respond to
the Commission's request for another update on the Exchange's post-
migration connectivity revenue and to provide further data
demonstrating competition in the marketplace. The Commission again
received no negative comments letters on the Sixth Proposed Rule
Change. Notably however, the Exchange did receive three positive
comment letters on the Sixth Proposed Rule Change (one from a market-
maker TPH and two from floor broker TPHs), each noting that the TPHS
believes the proposed fees are reasonable and encouraging the
Commission to allow the fees to remain effective and avoid an
unnecessary suspension and disapproval proceeding.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89239 (July 7,
2020), 85 FR 42042, (July 13, 2020).
\17\ See Letters from Steve Crutchfield, Head of Market
Structure, Chicago Trading Company (``CTC'') and William Ellington,
Managing Member/CEO, X-Change Financial Access (``XFA'') to Vanessa
Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated August 27, 2020. See also
Letter from Lakeshore Securities to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary,
Commission, dated August 31, 2020.
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On August 31, 2020, the Exchange withdrew the Sixth Proposed Rule
Change and submitted SR-CBOE-2020-083 (``Seventh Proposed Rule
Change'').\18\ The Seventh Proposed Rule Change was filed in order to
respond to an additional request from the Commission for further
information and dialog. The Commission received only one comment letter
on the Seventh Proposed Rule Change, which was submitted from the same
industry participant that commented on this proposed rule change on two
previous occasions and that frequently submits negative comment letters
on exchange fee filings.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The Exchange refiled the Seventh Proposed Rule Change on
September 2, 2020 due to a technical error (SR-CBOE-2020-086). See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89826 (September 10, 2020), 85
FR 57900, (September 16, 2020).
\19\ See Letter from Tyler Gellasch, Executive Director, The
Healthy Markets Association (``Healthy Markets''), to Vanessa
Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated September 30, 2020, which
letter, like the first two Healthy Markets comment letters, consists
of a number of conclusory statements and mischaracterizes the
Exchange's proposed fees as linking market data costs to trading
volume, among other factual inaccuracies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, the Exchange is withdrawing the Seventh Proposed Rule change
and submitting this filing (``Eighth Proposed Rule Change''), as part
of its ongoing efforts to adopt the post-migration connectivity fees
and to respond to the Commission's most recent and most extensive
request for further information, including among other things: (1)
Total connectivity and access fee revenues over a period of time, (2)
data relating to each TPH that has connected directly to the Exchange
over a period of time (including contract volume and access and
connectivity fees paid on a month-by-month and firm-by-firm basis), (3)
information relating to previous access and connectivity pricing
changes that have been proposed; and (4) information relating to the
Exchange's profit margins and return on assets for each of Cboe's
business lines.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Data responsive to the Commission's request for additional
information is being provided to the Commission with a confidential
treatment request. The Exchange notes that it is unable to provide
data addressing the Commission's request for information relating to
its profit margins and return on assets, as its costs are not kept
in the disaggregated manner requested by the Commission. The
Exchange notes that to disaggregate its cost in that way would
require an artificial and arbitrary division resulting in inaccurate
and potentially meaningless data. Moreover, the Exchange notes that
it did not raise any arguments relating to its profitability nor is
it required to do so in order to demonstrate that its fees are
reasonable and consistent with the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange notes the proposed fees have been effective, and thus
have been paid by Trading Permit Holders, for over
[[Page 71669]]
one year. The Exchange believes it is notable that during this time no
other industry group or exchange, and particularly no market
participants who connect to the Exchange, have claimed in comment
letters to the Commission that the Exchange's new fee structure is
unreasonable. The Exchange also believes it's significant and notable
that, in addition to positive feedback regarding the improved
connectivity under the new structure, it received feedback from a
number of market participants that the Exchange's proposed fee changes
are regarded as reasonable, both informally via conversations with the
firms and formally via the comment letters submitted in support of this
fee change.
As discussed herein, the Exchange believes that the proposed
changes are consistent with the Act because they are reasonable,
equitably allocated, not unfairly discriminatory, and not an undue
burden on competition, as they are are supported by evidence (including
data and analysis) and are constrained by significant competitive
forces. The Exchange also believes the proposed fees are reasonable as
they are in line with the amounts assessed by other exchanges for
similar connectivity offerings. Additionally, the Exchange believes the
proposed changes are consistent with the SEC Division of Trading and
Markets (the ``Division'') issued non-rulemaking fee filing guidance
titled ``Staff Guidance on SRO Rule Filings Relating to Fees'' (``Fee
Guidance'') issued on May 21, 2020.\21\ Accordingly, the Exchange
believes that the Commission should find that the Proposed Fee
Increases are consistent with the Act. The proposed rule change is
immediately effective upon filing with the Commission pursuant to
Section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Where possible, the Exchange is including numerical
examples and percentages, including with respect to revenue impact.
In addition, the Exchange is providing data to the Commission in
support of its arguments herein, which is consistent with the Fee
Guidance. The non-rulemaking Fee Guidance covers all aspects of a
fee filing, but as acknowledged by the Commission, has ``no legal
force or effect'', is ``not a rule, regulation or statement of the
Commission'', does not ``alter or amend applicable law'' and
``creates no new or additional obligations for SROs and the
Commission.'' See Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on Division of
Trading and Markets Staff Fee Guidance, June 12, 2019. The Exchange
nonetheless has extensively addressed the Fee Guidance throughout
this filing and prior versions of this filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Physical Connectivity
A physical port is utilized by a Trading Permit Holder (``TPH'') or
non-TPH to connect to the Exchange at the data centers where the
Exchange's servers are located. The Exchange currently assesses fees
for Network Access Ports for these physical connections to the
Exchange. Specifically, TPHs and non-TPHs can elect to connect to Cboe
Options' trading system via either a 1 gigabit per second (``Gb'')
Network Access Port or a 10 Gb Network Access Port. Pre-migration the
Exchange assessed a monthly fee of $1,500 per port for 1 Gb Network
Access Ports and a monthly fee of $5,000 per port for 10 Gb Network
Access Ports for access to Cboe Options primary system. Through January
31, 2020, Cboe Options market participants will continue to have the
ability to connect to Cboe Options' trading system via the current
Network Access Ports. As of October 7, 2019, in connection with the
migration, TPHs and non-TPHs may alternatively elect to connect to Cboe
Options via new latency equalized Physical Ports.\22\ The new Physical
Ports similarly allow TPHs and non-TPHs the ability to connect to the
Exchange at the data center where the Exchange's servers are located
and TPHs and non-TPHs have the option to connect via 1 Gb or 10 Gb
Physical Ports. As noted above, both the new 1 Gb and 10 Gb Physical
Ports provide latency equalization, meaning that each market
participant will be afforded the same latency for 1 Gb or 10 Gb
Physical Ports in the primary data center to the Exchange's customer-
facing switches regardless of location of the market participant's cage
\23\ in the primary data center relative to the Exchange's servers.
Conversely, the legacy Network Access Ports are not latency equalized,
meaning the location of a market participant's cage within the data
center may affect latency. For example, in the legacy system, a cage
located further from the Exchange's servers may experience higher
latency than those located closer to the Exchange's servers.\24\ As
such, the proposed Physical Ports ensure all market participants
connected to the Exchange via the new Physical Ports will receive the
same respective latency for each port size and ensure that no market
participant has a latency advantage over another market participant
within the primary data center.\25\ Additionally, the new
infrastructure utilizes new and faster switches resulting in lower
overall latency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ As previously noted, market participants will continue to
have the option of connecting to Cboe Options via a 1 Gbps or 10
Gbps Network Access Port at the same rates as proposed,
respectively.
\23\ A market participant's ``cage'' is the cage within the data
center that contains a market participant's servers, switches and
cabling.
\24\ The Exchange equalizes physical connectivity in the data
center for its primary system by taking the farthest possible
distance that a Cboe market participant cage may exist from the
Exchange's customer-facing switches and using that distance as the
cable length for any cross-connect.
\25\ The Exchange notes that 10 Gb Physical Ports have an 11
microsecond latency advantage over 1 Gb Physical Ports. Other than
this difference, there are no other means to receive a latency
advantage as compared to another market participant in the new
connectivity structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange proposes to assess the following fees for any physical
port, regardless of whether the TPH or non-TPH connects via the current
Network Access Ports or the new Physical Ports. Specifically, the
Exchange proposes to continue to assess a monthly fee of $1,500 per
port for 1 Gb Network Access Ports and new Physical Ports and increase
the monthly fee for 10 Gb Network Access Ports and new Physical Ports
to $7,000 per port. Physical port fees will be prorated based on the
remaining trading days in the calendar month. The proposed fee for 10
Gb Physical Ports is in line with the amounts assessed by other
exchanges for similar connections by its Affiliated Exchanges and other
Exchanges that utilize the same connectivity infrastructure.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See Cboe EDGA U.S. Equities Exchange Fee Schedule, Physical
Connectivity Fees; Cboe EDGX U.S. Equities Exchange Fee Schedule,
Physical Connectivity Fees; Cboe BZX U.S. Equities Exchange Fee
Schedule, Physical Connectivity Fees; Cboe BYX U.S. Equities
Exchange Fee Schedule, Physical Connectivity Fees; Cboe EDGX Options
Exchange Fee Schedule, Physical Connectivity Fees; and Cboe BZX
Options Exchange Fee Schedule, Physical Connectivity Fees
(collectively, ``Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules''). See e.g.,
Nasdaq PHLX and ISE Rules, General Equity and Options Rules, General
8. Phlx and ISE each charge a monthly fee of $2,500 for each 1Gb
connection, $10,000 for each 10Gb connection and $15,000 for each
10Gb Ultra connection. See also Nasdaq Price List--Trading
Connectivity. Nasdaq charges a monthly fee of $7,500 for each 10Gb
direct connection to Nasdaq and $2,500 for each direct connection
that supports up to 1Gb. See also NYSE American Fee Schedule,
Section V.B, and Arca Fees and Charges, Co-Location Fees. NYSE
American and Arca each charge a monthly fee of $5,000 for each 1Gb
circuit, $14,000 for each 10Gb circuit and $22,000 for each 10Gb LX
circuit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the benefits resulting from the new Physical Ports
providing latency equalization and new switches (i.e., improved
latency), TPHs and non-TPHs may be able to reduce their overall
physical connectivity fees. Particularly, Network Access Port fees are
assessed for unicast (orders, quotes) and multicast (market data)
connectivity separately. More specifically, Network Access Ports may
only receive one type of connectivity each (thus requiring a market
participant to maintain two ports if that market participant desires
both types of connectivity). The new Physical Ports however, allow
access to both unicast and multicast connectivity with a single
physical connection to the
[[Page 71670]]
Exchange. Therefore, TPHs and non-TPHs that currently purchase two
legacy Network Access Ports for the purpose of receiving each type of
connectivity now have the option to purchase only one new Physical Port
to accommodate their connectivity needs, which may result in reduced
costs for physical connectivity.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ The Exchange proposes to eliminate the current Cboe Command
Connectivity Charges table in its entirety and create and relocate
such fees in a new table in the Fees Schedule that addresses fees
for physical connectivity, including fees for the current Network
Access Ports, the new Physical Ports and Disaster Recovery (``DR'')
Ports. The Exchange notes that it is not proposing any changes with
respect to DR Ports other than renaming the DR ports from ``Network
Access Ports'' to ``Physical Ports'' to conform to the new Physical
Port terminology. The Exchange also notes that subsequent to the
initial filings that proposed these fee changes on October 1 and 2,
2019 (SR-CBOE-2019-077 and SR-CBOE-2019-082), the Exchange amended
the proposed port fees to waive fees for ports used for PULSe in
filing No. SR-CBOE-2019-105. The additions proposed by filing SR-
CBOE-2019-105 are double underlined in Exhibit 5A and the deletions
are doubled bracketed in Exhibit 5A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cboe Data Services--Port Fees
The Exchange proposes to amend the ``Port Fee'' under the Cboe Data
Services (``CDS'') Fees Schedule. Currently, the Port Fee is payable by
any Customer \28\ that receives data through two types of sources; a
direct connection to CDS (``direct connection'') or through a
connection to CDS provided by an extranet service provider (``extranet
connection''). The Port Fee applies to receipt of any Cboe Options data
feed but is only assessed once per data port. The Exchange proposes to
amend the monthly CDS Port Fee to provide that it is payable ``per
source'' used to receive data, instead of ``per data port''. The
Exchange also proposes to increase the fee from $500 per data port/
month to $1,000 per data source/month.\29\ The Exchange notes the
proposed change in assessing the fee (i.e., per source vs per port) and
the proposed fee amount are the same as the corresponding fee on its
affiliate C2.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ A Customer is any person, company or other entity that,
pursuant to a market data agreement with CDS, is entitled to receive
data, either directly from CDS or through an authorized
redistributor (i.e., a Customer or extranet service provider),
whether that data is distributed externally or used internally.
\29\ For example, under the pre-migration ``per port''
methodology, if a TPH maintained 4 ports that receive market data,
that TPH would be assessed $2,000 per month (i.e., $500 x 4 ports),
regardless of how many sources it used to receive data. Under the
proposed ``per source'' methodology, if a TPH maintains 4 ports that
receive market data, but receives data through only one source
(e.g., a direct connection) that TPH would be assessed $1,000 per
month (i.e., $1000 x 1 source). If that TPH maintains 4 ports but
receives data from both a direct connection and an extranet
connection, that TPH would be assessed $2,000 per month (i.e.,
$1,000 x 2 sources). Similarly, if that TPH maintains 4 ports and
receives data from two separate extranet providers, that TPH would
be assessed $2,000 per month (i.e., $1,000 x 2).
\30\ See Cboe C2 Options Exchange Fee Schedule, Cboe Data
Services, LLC Fees, Section IV, Systems Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In connection with the proposed change, the Exchange also proposes
to rename the ``Port Fee'' to ``Direct Data Access Fee''. As the fee
will be payable ``per data source'' used to receive data, instead of
``per data port'', the Exchange believes the proposed name is more
appropriate and that eliminating the term ``port'' from the fee will
eliminate confusion as to how the fee is assessed.
Logical Connectivity
Next, the Exchange proposes to amend its login fees. By way of
background, Cboe Options market participants were able to access Cboe
Command via either a CMI or a FIX Port, depending on how their systems
are configured. Effective October 7, 2019, market participants are no
longer able to use CMI and FIX Login IDs. Rather, the Exchange utilizes
a variety of logical connectivity ports as further described below.
Both a legacy CMI/FIX Login ID and logical port represent a technical
port established by the Exchange within the Exchange's trading system
for the delivery and/or receipt of trading messages--i.e., orders,
accepts, cancels, transactions, etc. Market participants that wish to
connect directly to the Exchange can request a number of different
types of ports, including ports that support order entry, customizable
purge functionality, or the receipt of market data. Market participants
can also choose to connect indirectly through a number of different
third-party providers, such as another broker-dealer or service bureau
that the Exchange permits through specialized access to the Exchange's
trading system and that may provide additional services or operate at a
lower mutualized cost by providing access to multiple members. In light
of the discontinuation of CMI and FIX Login IDs, the Exchange proposes
to eliminate the fees associated with the CMI and FIX login IDs and
adopt the below pricing for logical connectivity in its place.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service Cost per month
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Logical Ports (BOE, FIX) 1 to 5........... $750 per port.
Logical Ports (BOE, FIX) >5............... $800 per port.
Logical Ports (Drop)...................... $750 per port.
BOE Bulk Ports 1 to 5..................... $1,500 per port.
BOE Bulk Ports 6 to 30.................... $2,500 per port.
BOE Bulk Ports >30........................ $3,000 per port.
Purge ports............................... $850 per port.
GRP Ports................................. $750/primary (A or C Feed).
Multicast PITCH/Top Spin Server Ports..... $750/set of primary (A or C
feed).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange proposes to provide for each of the logical
connectivity fees that new requests will be prorated for the first
month of service. Cancellation requests are billed in full month
increments as firms are required to pay for the service for the
remainder of the month, unless the session is terminated within the
first month of service. The Exchange notes that the proration policy is
the same on its Affiliated Exchanges.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules, Logical Port Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Logical Ports (BOE, FIX, Drop): The new Logical Ports represent
ports established by the Exchange within the Exchange's system for
trading purposes. Each Logical Port established is specific to a TPH or
non-TPH and grants that TPH or non-TPH the ability to operate a
specific application, such as order/quote \32\ entry (FIX and BOE
Logical Ports) or drop copies (Drop Logical Ports). Similar to CMI and
FIX Login IDs, each Logical Port will entitle a firm to submit message
traffic of up to specified number of orders per second.\33\ The
Exchange proposes to assess $750 per port per month for all Drop
Logical Ports and also assess $750 per port per month (which is the
same amount currently assessed per CMI/FIX Login ID per month), for the
first 5 FIX/BOE Logical Ports and thereafter assess $800 per port, per
month for each additional FIX/BOE Logical Port. While the proposed
ports will be assessed the same monthly fees as current CMI/FIX Login
IDs (for the first five logical ports), the proposed logical ports
provide for significantly more message traffic (and thus cost less per
message sent) as shown below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ As of October 7, 2019, the definition of quote in Cboe
Options Rule 1.1 means a firm bid or offer a Market-Maker (a)
submits electronically as an order or bulk message (including to
update any bid or offer submitted in a previous order or bulk
message) or (b) represents in open outcry on the trading floor.
\33\ Login Ids restrict the maximum number of orders and quotes
per second in the same way logical ports do, and Users may similarly
have multiple logical ports as they may have Trading Permits and/or
bandwidth packets to accommodate their order and quote entry needs.
\34\ Each Login ID has a bandwidth limit of 80,000 quotes per 3
seconds. However, in order to place such bandwidth onto a single
Login ID, a TPH or non-TPH would need to purchase a minimum of 15
Market-Maker Permits or Bandwidth Packets (each Market-Maker Permit
and Bandwidth Packet provides 5,000 quotes/3 sec). For purposes of
comparing ``quote'' bandwidth, the provided example assumes only 1
Market-Maker Permit or Bandwidth Packet has been purchased.
[[Page 71671]]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CMI/FIX login Ids BOE/FIX logical ports
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quotes Orders Quotes/orders
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bandwidth Limit per login............ 5,000 quotes/3 sec \34\ 30 orders/sec.......... 15,000 quotes/orders/3
sec.
Cost................................. $750 each.............. $750 each.............. $750/$800 each.
Cost per Quote/Order Sent @Limit..... $0.15 per quote/3 sec.. $25.00 per order/sec... $0.05/$0.053 per quote/
order/3 sec.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Logical Port fees will be limited to Logical Ports in the
Exchange's primary data center and no Logical Port fees will be
assessed for redundant secondary data center ports. Each BOE or FIX
Logical Port will incur the logical port fee indicated in the table
above when used to enter up to 70,000 orders per trading day per
logical port as measured on average in a single month. Each incremental
usage of up to 70,000 per day per logical port will incur an additional
logical port fee of $800 per month. Incremental usage will be
determined on a monthly basis based on the average orders per day
entered in a single month across all of a market participant's
subscribed BOE and FIX Logical Ports. The Exchange believes that the
pricing implications of going beyond 70,000 orders per trading day per
Logical Port encourage users to mitigate message traffic as necessary.
The Exchange notes that the proposed fee of $750 per port is the same
amount assessed not only for current CMI and FIX Login Ids, but also
similar ports available on an affiliate exchange.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee Schedule, Options Logical
Port Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange also proposes to provide that the fee for one FIX
Logical Port connection to PULSe and one FIX Logical Port connection to
Cboe Silexx will be waived per TPH. The Exchange notes that only one
FIX Logical Port connection is required to support a firm's access
through each of PULSe and Cboe Silexx FLEX.
BOE Bulk Logical Ports: The Exchange also offers BOE Bulk Logical
Ports, which provide users with the ability to submit single and bulk
order messages to enter, modify, or cancel orders designated as Post
Only Orders with a Time-in-Force of Day or GTD with an expiration time
on that trading day. While BOE Bulk Ports will be available to all
market participants, the Exchange anticipates they will be used
primarily by Market-Makers or firms that conduct similar business
activity, as the primary purpose of the proposed bulk message
functionality is to encourage market-maker quoting on exchanges. As
indicated above, BOE Bulk Logical Ports are assessed $1,500 per port,
per month for the first 5 BOE Bulk Logical Ports, assessed $2,500 per
port, per month thereafter up to 30 ports and thereafter assessed
$3,000 per port, per month for each additional BOE Bulk Logical Port.
Like CMI and FIX Login IDs, and FIX/BOX Logical Ports, BOE Bulk Ports
will also entitle a firm to submit message traffic of up to specified
number of quotes/orders per second.\36\ The proposed BOE Bulk ports
also provide for significantly more message traffic (and thus cost less
per message sent) as compared to current CMI/FIX Login IDs, as shown
below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ The Exchange notes that while technically there is no
bandwidth limit per BOE Bulk Port, there may be possible performance
degradation at 15,000 messages per second (which is the equivalent
of 225,000 quotes/orders per 3 seconds). As such, the Exchange uses
the number at which performance may be degraded for purposes of
comparison.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CMI/FIX Login Ids BOE Bulk Ports
---------------------------------------
Quotes Quotes \37\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bandwidth Limit................. 5,000 quotes/3 sec 225,000 quotes 3
\38\. sec.
Cost............................ $750 each......... $1,500/$2,500/
$3,000 each.
Cost per Quote/Order Sent @Limit $0.15............. $0.006/$0.011/
per quote/3 sec... $0.013
per quote/3 sec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each BOE Bulk Logical Port will incur the logical port fee
indicated in the table above when used to enter up to 30,000,000 orders
per trading day per logical port as measured on average in a single
month. Each incremental usage of up to 30,000,000 orders per day per
BOE Bulk Logical Port will incur an additional logical port fee of
$3,000 per month. Incremental usage will be determined on a monthly
basis based on the average orders per day entered in a single month
across all of a market participant's subscribed BOE Bulk Logical Ports.
The Exchange believes that the pricing implications of going beyond
30,000,000 orders per trading day per BOE Bulk Logical Port encourage
users to mitigate message traffic as necessary. The Exchange notes that
the proposed BOE Bulk Logical Port fees are similar to the fees
assessed for these ports by BZX Options.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See Cboe Options Rule 1.1.
\38\ Each Login ID has a bandwidth limit of 80,000 quotes per 3
seconds. However, in order to place such bandwidth onto a single
Login ID, a TPH or non-TPH would need to purchase a minimum of 15
Market-Maker Permits or Bandwidth Packets (each Market-Maker Permit
and Bandwidth Packet provides 5,000 quotes/3 sec). For purposes of
comparing ``quote'' bandwidth, the provided example assumes only 1
Market-Maker Permit or Bandwidth Packet has been purchased.
\39\ See Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee Schedule, Options Logical
Port Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Purge Ports: As part of the migration, the Exchange introduced
Purge Ports to provide TPHs additional risk management and open order
control functionality. Purge ports were designed to assist TPHs, in the
management of, and risk control over, their quotes, particularly if the
TPH is dealing with a large number of options. Particularly, Purge
Ports allow TPHs to submit a cancelation for all open orders, or a
subset thereof, across multiple sessions under the same Executing Firm
ID (``EFID''). This would allow TPHs to seamlessly avoid unintended
executions, while continuing to evaluate the direction of the market.
While Purge Ports are available to all market participants, the
Exchange anticipates they will be used primarily by Market-Makers or
firms that conduct similar business activity and are therefore
[[Page 71672]]
exposed to a large amount of risk across a number of securities. The
Exchange notes that market participants are also able to cancel orders
through FIX/BOE Logical Ports and as such a dedicated Purge Port is not
required nor necessary. Rather, Purge Ports were specially developed as
an optional service to further assist firms in effectively managing
risk. As indicated in the table above, the Exchange proposes to assess
a monthly charge of $850 per Purge Port. The Exchange notes that the
proposed fee is in line with the fee assessed by other exchanges,
including its Affiliated Exchanges, for Purge Ports.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ See e.g., Nasdaq ISE Options Pricing Schedule, Section
7(C), Ports and Other Services. See also Cboe EDGX Options Exchange
Fee Schedule, Options Logical Port Fees; Cboe C2 Options Exchange
Fee Schedule, Options Logical Port Fees and Cboe BZX Options
Exchange Fee Schedule, Options Logical Port Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multicast PITCH/Top Spin Server and GRP Ports: In connection with
the migration, the Exchange also offers optional Multicast PITCH/Top
Spin Server (``Spin'') and GRP ports and proposes to assess $750 per
month, per port. Spin Ports and GRP Ports are used to request and
receive a retransmission of data from the Exchange's Multicast PITCH/
Top data feeds. The Exchange's Multicast PITCH/Top data feeds are
available from two primary feeds, identified as the ``A feed'' and the
``C feed'', which contain the same information but differ only in the
way such feeds are received. The Exchange also offers two redundant
feeds, identified as the ``B feed'' and the ``D feed.'' All secondary
feed Spin and GRP Ports will be provided for redundancy at no
additional cost. The Exchange notes a dedicated Spin and GRP Port is
not required nor necessary. Rather, Spin ports enable a market
participant to receive a snapshot of the current book quickly in the
middle of the trading session without worry of gap request limits and
GRP Ports were specially developed to request and receive
retransmission of data in the event of missed or dropped message. The
Exchange notes that the proposed fee is in line with the fee assessed
for the same ports on BZX Options.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See Cboe BZX Options Exchange Fee Schedule, Options Logical
Port Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Access Credits
The Exchange next proposes to amend its Affiliate Volume Plan
(``AVP'') to provide Market-Makers an opportunity to obtain credits on
their monthly BOE Bulk Port Fees.\42\ By way of background, under AVP,
if a TPH Affiliate \43\ or Appointed OFP \44\ (collectively, an
``affiliate'') of a Market-Maker qualifies under the Volume Incentive
Program (``VIP'') (i.e., achieves VIP Tiers 2-5), that Market-Maker
will also qualify for a discount on that Market-Maker's Liquidity
Provider (``LP'') Sliding Scale transaction fees and Trading Permit
fees. The Exchange proposes to amend AVP to provide that qualifying
Market-Makers will receive a discount on Bulk Port fees (instead of
Trading Permits) where an affiliate achieves VIP Tiers 4 or 5. As
discussed more fully below, the Exchange is amending its Trading Permit
structure, such that off-floor Market-Makers no longer need to hold
more than one Market-Maker Trading Permit. As such, in place of credits
for Trading Permits, the Exchange will provide credits for BOE Bulk
Ports.\45\ The proposed credits are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ As noted above, while BOE Bulk Ports will be available to
all market participants, the Exchange anticipates they will be used
primarily by Market Makers or firms that conduct similar business
activity.
\43\ For purposes of AVP, ``Affiliate'' is defined as having at
least 75% common ownership between the two entities as reflected on
each entity's Form BD, Schedule A.
\44\ See Cboe Options Fees Schedule Footnote 23. Particularly, a
Market-Maker may designate an Order Flow Provider (``OFP'') as its
``Appointed OFP'' and an OFP may designate a Market-Maker to be its
``Appointed Market-Maker'' for purposes of qualifying for credits
under AVP.
\45\ The Exchange notes that Trading Permits currently each
include a set bandwidth allowance and 3 logins. Current logins and
bandwidth are akin to the proposed logical ports, including BOE Bulk
Ports which will primarily be used by Market-Makers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent credit
Market Maker affiliate access credit VIP tier on monthly BOE
bulk port fees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credit Tier................................ 1 0
2 0
3 0
4 15
5 25
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes the proposed change to AVP continues to allow
the Exchange to provide TPHs that have both Market-Maker and agency
operations reduced Market-Maker costs via the credits, albeit credits
on BOE Bulk Port fees instead of Trading Permit fees. AVP also
continues to provide incremental incentives for TPHs to strive for the
higher tier levels, which provide increasingly higher benefits for
satisfying increasingly more stringent criteria.
In addition to the opportunity to receive credits via AVP, the
Exchange proposes to provide an additional opportunity for Market-
Makers to obtain credits on their monthly BOE Bulk Port fees based on
the previous month's make rate percentage. By way of background, the
Liquidity Provider Sliding Scale Adjustment Table provides that Taker
fees be applied to electronic ``Taker'' volume and a Maker rebate be
applied to electronic ``Maker'' volume, in addition to the transaction
fees assessed under the Liquidity Provider Sliding Scale.\46\ The
amount of the Taker fee (or Maker rebate) is determined by the
Liquidity Provider's percentage of volume from the previous month that
was Maker (``Make Rate'').\47\ Market-Makers are given a Performance
Tier based on their Make Rate percentage which currently provides
adjustments to transaction fees. Thus, the program is designed to
attract liquidity from traditional Market-Makers. The Exchange proposes
to now also provide BOE Bulk Port fee credits if Market-Makers satisfy
the thresholds of certain Performance Tiers. Particularly, the
Performance Tier earned will also determine the percentage credit
applied to a Market-Maker's monthly BOE Bulk Port fees, as shown below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ See Cboe Options Exchange Fees Schedule, Liquidity Provider
Sliding Scale Adjustment Table.
\47\ More specifically, the Make Rate is derived from a
Liquidity Provider's electronic volume the previous month in all
symbols excluding Underlying Symbol List A using the following
formula: (i) The Liquidity Provider's total electronic automatic
execution (``auto-ex'') volume (i.e., volume resulting from that
Liquidity Provider's resting quotes or single sided quotes/orders
that were executed by an incoming order or quote), divided by (ii)
the Liquidity Provider's total auto-ex volume (i.e., volume that
resulted from the Liquidity Provider's resting quotes/orders and
volume that resulted from that LP's quotes/orders that removed
liquidity). For example, a TPH's electronic Make volume in September
2019 is 2,500,000 contracts and its total electronic auto-ex volume
is 3,000,000 contracts, resulting in a Make Rate of 83% (Performance
Tier 4). As such, the TPH would receive a 40% credit on its monthly
Bulk Port fees for the month of October 2019. For the month of
October 2019, the Exchange will be billing certain incentive
programs separately, including the Liquidity Provider Sliding Scale
Adjustment Table, for the periods of October 1-October 4 and October
7-October 31 in light of the migration of its billing system. As
such, a Market-Maker's Performance Tier for November 2019 will be
determined by the Market-Maker's percentage of volume that was Maker
from the period of October 7-October 31, 2019.
[[Page 71673]]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquidity
provider sliding Make Rate(% based on prior Percent credit
Market Maker access credit scale adjustment month) on monthly BOE
performance tier bulk port fees
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credit Tier................................. 1 0%-50%......................... 0
2 Above 50%-60%.................. 0
3 Above 60%-75%.................. 0
4 Above 75%-90%.................. 40
5 Above 90%...................... 40
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes the proposal mitigates costs incurred by
traditional Market-Makers that focus on adding liquidity to the
Exchange (as opposed to those that provide and take, or just take). The
Exchange lastly notes that both the Market-Maker Affiliate Access
Credit under AVP and the Market-Maker Access Credit tied to Performance
Tiers can both be earned by a TPH, and these credits will each apply to
the total monthly BOE Bulk Port Fees including any incremental BOE Bulk
Port fees incurred, before any credits/adjustments have been applied
(i.e. an electronic MM can earn a credit from 15% to 65%).
Bandwidth Packets
As described above, post-migration, the Exchange utilizes a variety
of logical ports. Part of this functionality is similar to bandwidth
packets that were previously available on the Exchange. Bandwidth
packets restricted the maximum number of orders and quotes per second.
Post-migration, market participants may similarly have multiple Logical
Ports and/or BOE Bulk Ports as they may have had bandwidth packets to
accommodate their order and quote entry needs. As such, the Exchange
proposes to eliminate all of the current Bandwidth Packet fees.\48\ The
Exchange believes that the proposed pricing implications of going
beyond specified bandwidth described above in the logical connectivity
fees section will be able to otherwise mitigate message traffic as
necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See Cboe Options Fees Schedule, Bandwidth Packet Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAS Servers
By way of background, in order to connect to the legacy Cboe
Command, which allowed a TPH to trade on the Cboe Options System, a TPH
had to connect via either a CMI or FIX interface (depending on the
configuration of the TPH's own systems). For TPHs that connected via a
CMI interface, they had to use CMI CAS Servers. In order to ensure that
a CAS Server was not overburdened by quoting activity for Market-
Makers, the Exchange allotted each Market-Maker a certain number of
CASs (in addition to the shared backups) based on the amount of quoting
bandwidth that the Market-Maker had. The Exchange no longer uses CAS
Servers, post-migration. In light of the elimination of CAS Servers,
the Exchange proposes to eliminate the CAS Server allotment table and
extra CAS Server fee.
Trading Permit Fees
By way of background, the Exchange may issue different types of
Trading Permits and determine the fees for those Trading Permits.\49\
Pre-migration, the Exchange issued the following three types of Trading
Permits: (1) Market-Maker Trading Permits, which were assessed a
monthly fee of $5,000 per permit; (2) Floor Broker Trading Permits,
which were assessed a monthly fee of $9,000 per permit; and (3)
Electronic Access Permits (``EAPs''), which were assessed a monthly fee
of $1,600 per permit. The Exchange also offered separate Market-Maker
and Electronic Access Permits for the Global Trading Hours (``GTH'')
session, which were assessed a monthly fee of $1,000 per permit and
$500 per permit respectively.\50\ For further color, a Market-Maker
Trading Permit entitled the holder to act as a Market-Maker, including
a Market-Maker trading remotely, DPM, eDPM, or LMM, and also provided
an appointment credit of 1.0, a quoting and order entry bandwidth
allowance, up to three logins, trading floor access and TPH status.\51\
A Floor Broker Trading Permit entitled the holder to act as a Floor
Broker, provided an order entry bandwidth allowance, up to 3 logins,
trading floor access and TPH status.\52\ Lastly, an EAP entitled the
holder to electronic access to the Exchange. Holders of EAPs must have
been broker-dealers registered with the Exchange in one or more of the
following capacities: (a) Clearing TPH, (b) TPH organization approved
to transact business with the public, (c) Proprietary TPHs and (d)
order service firms. The permit did not provide access to the trading
floor. An EAP also provided an order entry bandwidth allowance, up to 3
logins and TPH status.\53\ The Exchange also provided an opportunity
for TPHs to pay reduced rates for Trading Permits via the Market Maker
and Floor Broker Trading Permit Sliding Scale Programs (``TP Sliding
Scales''). Particularly, the TP Sliding Scales allowed Market-Makers
and Floor Brokers to pay reduced rates for their Trading Permits if
they committed in advance to a specific tier that includes a minimum
number of eligible Market-Maker and Floor Broker Trading Permits,
respectively, for each calendar year.\54\
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\49\ See Cboe Options Rules 3.1(a)(iv)-(v).
\50\ The fees were waived through September 2019 for the first
Market-Maker and Electronic Access GTH Trading Permits.
\51\ See Cboe Options Fees Schedule.
\52\ Id.
\53\ Id.
\54\ Due to the October 7 migration, the Exchange had amended
the TP Sliding Scale Programs to provide that any commitment to
Trading Permits under the TP Sliding Scales shall be in place
through September 2019, instead of the calendar year. See Cboe
Options Fees Schedule, Footnotes 24 and 25.
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As noted above, Trading Permits were tied to bandwidth allocation,
logins and appointment costs, and as such, TPH organizations may hold
multiple Trading Permits of the same type in order to meet their
connectivity and appointment cost needs. Post-Migration, bandwidth
allocation, logins and appointment costs are no longer tied to a
Trading Permit, and as such, the Exchange proposes to modify its
Trading Permit structure. Particularly, in connection with the
migration, the Exchange adopted separate on-floor and off-floor Trading
Permits for Market-Makers and Floor Brokers, adopted a new Clearing TPH
Permit, and proposes to modify the corresponding fees and discounts. As
was the case pre-migration, the proposed access fees discussed below
will continue to be non-refundable and will be assessed through the
integrated billing system during the first week of the following month.
If a Trading Permit is issued during a calendar month after the first
trading day of the month, the access fee for the Trading Permit for
that calendar month is prorated based on the remaining trading days in
the calendar month. Trading Permits will be renewed
[[Page 71674]]
automatically for the next month unless the Trading Permit Holder
submits written notification to the Membership Services Department by 4
p.m. CT on the second-to-last business day of the prior month to cancel
the Trading Permit effective at or prior to the end of the applicable
month. Trading Permit Holders will only be assessed a single monthly
fee for each type of electronic Trading Permit it holds.
First, TPHs no longer need to hold multiple permits for each type
of electronic Trading Permit (i.e., electronic Market-Maker Trading
Permits and/or and Electronic Access Permits). Rather, for electronic
access to the Exchange, a TPH need only purchase one of the following
permit types for each trading function the TPH intends to perform:
Market-Maker Electronic Access Permit (``MM EAP'') in order to act as
an off-floor Market-Maker and which will continue to be assessed a
monthly fee of $5,000, Electronic Access Permit (``EAP'') in order to
submit orders electronically to the Exchange \55\ and which will be
assessed a monthly fee of $3,000, and a Clearing TPH Permit, for TPHs
acting solely as a Clearing TPH, which will be assessed a monthly fee
of $2,000 (and is more fully described below). For example, a TPH
organization that wishes to act as a Market-Maker and also submit
orders electronically in a non-Market Maker capacity would have to
purchase one MM EAP and one EAP. TPHs will be assessed the monthly fee
for each type of Permit once per electronic access capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ EAPs may be purchased by TPHs that both clear transactions
for other TPHs (i.e., a ``Clearing TPH'') and submit orders
electronically.
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Next, the Exchange proposes to adopt a new Trading Permit,
exclusively for Clearing TPHs that are approved to act solely as a
Clearing TPH (as opposed to those that are also approved in a capacity
that allows them to submit orders electronically). Currently any TPH
that is registered to act as a Clearing TPH must purchase an EAP,
whether or not that Clearing TPH acts solely as a Clearing TPH or acts
as a Clearing TPH and submits orders electronically. The Exchange
proposes to adopt a new Trading Permit, for any TPH that is registered
to act solely as Clearing TPH at a discounted rate of $2,000 per
month.\56\
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\56\ Cboe Option Rules provides the Exchange authority to issue
different types of Trading Permits which allows holders, among other
things, to act in one or more trading functions authorized by the
Rules. See Cboe Options Rule 3.1(a)(iv). The Exchange notes that
currently 17 out of 38 Clearing TPHs are acting solely as a Clearing
TPH on the Exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the Exchange proposes to eliminate its fees for
Global Trading Hours Trading Permits. Particularly, the Exchange
proposes to provide that any Market-Maker EAP, EAP and Clearing TPH
Permit provides access (at no additional cost) to the GTH session.\57\
Additionally, the Exchange proposes to amend Footnote 37 of the Fees
Schedule regarding GTH in connection with the migration. Currently
Footnote 37 provides that separate access permits and connectivity is
needed for the GTH session. The Exchange proposes to eliminate this
language as that is no longer the case post-migration (i.e., an
electronic Trading Permits will grant access to both sessions and
physical and logical ports may be used in both sessions, eliminating
the need to purchase separate connectivity). The Exchange also notes
that in connection with migration, the Book used during Regular Trading
Hours (``RTH'') will be the same Book used during GTH (as compared to
pre-migration where the Exchange maintained separate Books for each
session). The Exchange therefore also proposes to eliminate language in
Footnote 37 stating that GTH is a segregated trading session and that
there is no market interaction between the two sessions.
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\57\ The Exchange notes that Clearing TPHs must be properly
authorized by the Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'') to operate
during the Global Trading Hours session and all TPHs must have a
Letter of Guarantee to participate in the GTH session (as is the
case today).
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The Exchange next proposes to adopt MM EAP Appointment fees. By way
of background, a registered Market-Maker may currently create a Virtual
Trading Crowd (``VTC'') Appointment, which confers the right to quote
electronically in an appropriate number of classes selected from
``tiers'' that have been structured according to trading volume
statistics, except for the AA tier.\58\ Each Trading Permit
historically held by a Market-Maker had an appointment credit of 1.0. A
Market-Maker could select for each Trading Permit the Market-Maker held
any combination of classes whose aggregate appointment cost did not
exceed 1.0. A Market-Maker could not hold a combination of appointments
whose aggregate appointment cost was greater than the number of Trading
Permits that Market-Maker held.\59\
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\58\ See Cboe Options Rule 5.50 (Appointment of Market-Makers).
\59\ For example, if a Market-Maker selected a combination of
appointments that has an aggregate appointment cost of 2.5, that
Market-Maker must hold at least 3 Market-Maker Trading Permits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed, post-migration, bandwidth allocation, logins and
appointment costs are no longer tied to a single Trading Permit and
therefore TPHs no longer need to have multiple permits for each type of
electronic Trading Permit. Market-Makers must still select class
appointments in the classes they seek to make markets
electronically.\60\ Particularly, a Market-Maker firm will only be
required to have one permit and will thereafter be charged for one or
more ``Appointment Units'' (which will scale from 1 ``unit'' to more
than 5 ``units''), depending on which classes they elect appointments
in. Appointment Units will replace the standard 1.0 appointment cost,
but function in the same manner. Appointment weights (formerly known as
``appointment costs'') for each appointed class will be set forth in
Cboe Options Rule 5.50(g) and will be summed for each Market-Maker in
order to determine the total appointment units, to which fees will be
assessed. This was the manner in which the tier costs per class
appointment were summed to meet the 1.0 appointment cost, the only
difference being that if a Market-Maker exceeds this ``unit'', then
their fees will be assessed under the ``unit'' that corresponds to the
total of their appointment weights, as opposed to holding another
Trading Permit because it exceeded the 1.0 ``unit''. Particularly, the
Exchange proposes to adopt a new MM EAP Appointment Sliding Scale.
Appointment Units for each assigned class will be aggregated for each
Market-Maker and Market-Maker affiliate. If the sum of appointments is
a fractional amount, the total will be rounded up to the next highest
whole Appointment Unit. The following lists the progressive monthly
fees for Appointment Units: \61\
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\60\ See Cboe Options Rule 5.50(a).
\61\ For example, if a Market-Maker's total appointment costs
amount to 3.5 unites, the Market-Maker will be assessed a total
monthly fee of $14,000 (1 appointment unit at $0, 1 appointment unit
at $6,000 and 2 appointment units at $4,000) as and for appointment
fees and $5,000 for a Market-Maker Trading Permit, for a total
monthly sum of $19,000, where a Market-Maker currently (i.e., prior
to migration) with a total appointment cost of 3.5 would need to
hold 4 Trading Permits and would therefore be assessed a monthly fee
of $20,000.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly
fees
Market-Maker EAP appointments Quantity (per
unit)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appointment Units................................. 1 $0
2 6,000
3 to 5 4,000
>5 3,100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, upon migration the Exchange required separate
Trading Permits for on-floor and off-floor activity. As such, the
Exchange
[[Page 71675]]
proposes to maintain a Floor Broker Trading Permit and adopt a new
Market-Maker Floor Permit for on-floor Market-Makers. In addition, RUT,
SPX, and VIX Tier Appointment fees will be charged separately for
Permit, as discussed more fully below.
As briefly described above, the Exchange currently maintains TP
Sliding Scales, which allow Market-Makers and Floor Brokers to pay
reduced rates for their Trading Permits if they commit in advance to a
specific tier that includes a minimum number of eligible Market-Maker
and Floor Broker Trading Permits, respectively, for each calendar year.
The Exchange proposes to eliminate the current TP Sliding Scales,
including the requirement to commit to a specific tier, and replace it
with new TP Sliding Scales as follows: \62\
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\62\ In light of the proposed change to eliminate the TP Sliding
Scale, the Exchange proposes to eliminate Footnote 24 in its
entirety.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Proposed
Floor TPH permits Current permit qty monthly fee Proposed monthly fee
(per permit) permit qty (per permit)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market-Maker Floor Permit......... 1-10 $5,000 1 $6,000
11-20 3,700 2 to 5 4,500
21 or more 1,800 6 to 10 3,500
............................ .............. >10 2,000
Floor Broker Permit............... 1 9,000 1 7,500
2-5 5,000 2 to 3 5,700
6 or more 3,000 4 to 5 4,500
............................ .............. >5 3,200
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Floor Broker ADV Discount
Footnote 25, which governs rebates on Floor Broker Trading Permits,
currently provides that any Floor Broker that executes a certain
average of customer or professional customer/voluntary customer
(collectively ``customer'') open-outcry contracts per day over the
course of a calendar month in all underlying symbols excluding
Underlying Symbol List A (except RLG, RLV, RUI, and UKXM), DJX, XSP,
and subcabinet trades (``Qualifying Symbols''), will receive a rebate
on that TPH's Floor Broker Trading Permit Fees. Specifically, any Floor
Broker Trading Permit Holder that executes an average of 15,000
customer (``C'' origin code) and/or professional customer and voluntary
customer (``W'' origin code) open-outcry contracts per day over the
course of a calendar month in Qualifying Symbols will receive a rebate
of $9,000 on that TPH's Floor Broker Trading Permit fees. Additionally,
any Floor Broker that executes an average of 25,000 customer open-
outcry contracts per day over the course of a calendar month in
Qualifying Symbols will receive a rebate of $14,000 on that TPH's Floor
Broker Trading Permit fees. The Exchange proposes to maintain, but
modify, its discount for Floor Broker Trading Permit fees. First, the
measurement criteria to qualify for a rebate will be modified to only
include customer (``C'' origin code) open-outcry contracts executed per
day over the course of a calendar month in all underlying symbols,
while the rebate amount will be modified to be a percentage of the
TPH's Floor Broker Permit total costs, instead of a straight
rebate.\63\ The criteria and corresponding percentage rebates are noted
below.\64\
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\63\ As is the case today, the Floor Broker ADV Discount will be
available for all Floor Broker Trading Permits held by affiliated
Trading Permit Holders and TPH organizations.
\64\ In light of the proposal to eliminate the TP Sliding Scales
and the Floor Broker rebates currently set forth under Footnote 25,
the Exchange proposes to eliminate Footnote 25 in its entirety.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Floor
broker
Floor broker ADV discount tier ADV permit
rebate
(percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.................................. 0 to 99,999........... 0
2.................................. 100,000 to 174,999.... 15
3.................................. >174,999.............. 25
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next, the Exchange proposes to modify its SPX, VIX and RUT Tier
Appointment Fees. Currently, these fees are assessed to any Market-
Maker TPH that either (i) has the respective SPX, VIX or RUT
appointment at any time during a calendar month and trades a specified
number of contracts or (ii) trades a specified number of contracts in
open outcry during a calendar month. More specifically, the Fees
Schedule provides that the $3,000 per month SPX Tier Appointment is
assessed to any Market-Maker Trading Permit Holder that either (i) has
an SPX Tier Appointment at any time during a calendar month and trades
at least 100 SPX contracts while that appointment is active or (ii)
conducts any open outcry transaction in SPX or SPX Weeklys at any time
during the month. The $2,000 per month VIX Tier Appointment is assessed
to any Market-Maker Trading Permit Holder that either (i) has an SPX
Tier Appointment at any time during a calendar month and trades at
least 100 VIX contracts while that appointment is active or (ii)
conducts at least 1000 open outcry transaction in VIX at any time
during the month. Lastly, the $1,000 RUT Tier Appointment is assessed
to any Market-Maker Trading Permit Holder that either (i) has an RUT
Tier Appointment at any time during a calendar month and trades at
least 100 RUT contracts while that appointment is active or (ii)
conducts at least 1000 open outcry transaction in RUT at any time
during the month.
Because the Exchange is separating Market-Maker Trading Permits for
electronic and open-outcry market-making, the Exchange will be
assessing separate Tier Appointment Fees for each type of Market-Maker
Trading Permit. The Exchange proposes that a MM EAP will be assessed
the Tier Appointment Fee whenever the Market-Maker executes the
corresponding specified number of contracts, if any. The Exchange also
proposes to modify the threshold number of contracts a Market-Maker
must execute in a month to trigger the fee for SPX, VIX and RUT.
Particularly, for SPX, the Exchange proposes to eliminate the 100
contract threshold for electronic SPX executions.\65\ The Exchange
notes that
[[Page 71676]]
historically, all TPHs that trade SPX electronically executed more than
100 contracts electronically each month (i.e., no TPH electronically
traded between 1 and 100 contracts of SPX). As no TPH would currently
be negatively impacted by this change, the Exchange proposes to
eliminate the threshold for SPX and align the electronic SPX Tier
Appointment Fee with that of the floor SPX Tier Appointment Fee, which
is not subject to any executed volume threshold. For the VIX and RUT
Tier appointments, the Exchange proposes to increase the threshold from
100 contracts a month to 1,000 contracts a month. The Exchange notes
the Tier Appointment Fee amounts are not changing.\66\ In connection
with the proposed changes, the Exchange proposes to relocate the Tier
Appointment Fees to a new table and eliminate the language in the
current respective notes sections of each Tier Appointment Fee as it is
no longer necessary.
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\65\ The Exchange notes that subsequent to the Original Filing
that proposed these changes on October 1 and 2, 2019 (SR-CBOE-2019-
077 and SR-CBOE-2019-082), and subsequent to the Second Proposed
Rule Change filing that proposed these changes on November 29, 2019
(SR-CBOE-2019-111), the Exchange amended the proposed Market-Maker
Tier Appointment fees to provide that the SPX Tier Appointment Fee
will be assessed to any Market-Maker EAP that executes at least
1,000 contracts in SPX (including SPXW) excluding contracts executed
during the opening rotation on the final settlement date of VIX
options and futures with the expiration used in the VIX settlement
calculation in filing No. SR-CBOE-2019-124. The additions proposed
by filing SR-CBOE-2019-124 are double underlined in Exhibit 5A and
the deletions are doubled bracketed in Exhibit 5A.
\66\ Floor Broker Trading Surcharges for SPX/SPXW and VIX are
also not changing. The Exchange however, is creating a new table for
Floor Broker Trading Surcharges and relocating such fees in the Fees
Schedule in connection with the proposal to eliminate fees currently
set forth in the ``Trading Permit and Tier Appointment Fees'' Table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trading Permit Holder Regulatory Fee
The Fees Schedule provides for a Trading Permit Holder Regulatory
Fee of $90 per month, per RTH Trading Permit, applicable to all TPHs,
which fee helps more closely cover the costs of regulating all TPHs and
performing regulatory responsibilities. In light of the changes to the
Exchange's Trading Permit structure, the Exchange proposes to eliminate
the TPH Regulatory Fee. The Exchange notes that there is no regulatory
requirement to maintain this fee.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ``Act'') and the rules and
regulations thereunder applicable to the Exchange and, in particular,
the requirements of Section 6(b) of the Act.\67\ Specifically, the
Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the
Section 6(b)(5) \68\ requirements that the rules of an exchange be
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation
and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing,
settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and,
in general, to protect investors and the public interest. Additionally,
the Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with
Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,\69\ which requires that Exchange rules
provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and
other charges among its Trading Permit Holders and other persons using
its facilities. Additionally, the Exchange believes the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Section 6(b)(5) \70\ requirement that the
rules of an exchange not be designed to permit unfair discrimination
between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.
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\67\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\68\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
\69\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
\70\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange first stresses that the proposed changes were not
designed with the objective to generate an overall increase in access
fee revenue, as demonstrated by the anticipated loss of revenue
discussed above. Rather, the proposed changes were prompted by the
Exchange's technology migration and the adoption of a new (and
improved) connectivity infrastructure, rendering the pre-migration
structure obsolete. Such changes accordingly necessitated an overhaul
of the Exchange's previous access fee structure and corresponding fees.
Moreover, the proposed changes more closely align the Exchange's access
fees to those of its Affiliated Exchanges, and reasonably so, as the
Affiliated Exchanges offer substantially similar connectivity and
functionality and are on the same platform that the Exchange has now
migrated to.
The Exchange also operates in a highly competitive environment. The
SEC Division of Trading and Markets' Fee Guidance provides that in
determining whether a proposed fee is constrained by significant
competitive forces, the Commission will consider whether there are
reasonable substitutes for the product or service that is the subject
of a proposed fee. As described in further detail below, the Exchange
believes substitutable products and services are in fact available to
market participants, including, among other things, other options
exchanges a market participant may connect to in lieu of the Exchange,
indirect connectivity to the Exchange via a third-party reseller of
connectivity and/or trading of any options product, including
proprietary products, in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets. Indeed,
there are currently 16 registered options exchanges that trade options,
some of which have similar or lower connectivity fees.\71\ Based on
publicly available information, no single options exchange has more
than 17% of the market share as of October 21, 2020.\72\ Further, low
barriers to entry mean that new exchanges may rapidly and inexpensively
enter the market and offer additional substitute platforms to further
compete with the Exchange. For example, there have been 4 exchanges
that have been added in the U.S. options markets in the last 5 years
(i.e., Cboe EDGX Inc., Nasdaq MRX, LLC, MIAX Pearl, LLC and MIAX
Emerald LLC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ See e.g., Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules. See also e.g.,
BOX Options Fees Schedule, Section VI (Technology Fees) and Section
IX (Participant Fees).
\72\ See Cboe Global Markets U.S. Options Market Volume Summary
(October 21, 2020), available at https://markets.cboe.com/us/options/market_statistics/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also no regulatory requirement that any market participant
connect to any one options exchange, that any market participant
connect at a particular connection speed or act in a particular
capacity on the Exchange, or trade any particular product offered on an
exchange. Moreover, membership is not a requirement to participate on
the Exchange. A market participant may submit orders to the Exchange
via a TPH broker.\73\ Indeed, the Exchange is unaware of any one
options exchange whose membership includes every registered broker-
dealer. In fact, the Exchange believes that as of October 21, 2020,
only 3 broker-dealers out of approximately 250 broker-dealers that are
members of at least one exchange that lists options for trading were
members of all 16 options exchanges.\74\ Additionally, several broker-
dealers are members of only a single exchange that lists options for
trading.\75\ The Exchange has also identified numerous broker-dealers
that are members of other options exchanges, but not the Exchange. For
example, the Exchange has identified approximately 25 broker-dealers
that are members of Nasdaq ISE, LLC (an exchange that lists only
options), but not Cboe Exchange, Inc
[[Page 71677]]
(which also lists only options).\76\ Similarly, the Exchange has
identified at least 4 broker-dealers that trade options and are members
of one or more of the Exchange's affiliated options exchanges, but not
Cboe Exchange, Inc. Indeed, the number of members at each exchange that
trades options varies greatly. Particularly, the number of members of
exchanges that trade options vary between approximately 9 and 171
broker-dealers.\77\ Even the number of members between the Exchange and
its 3 other options exchange affiliates vary. Particularly, while the
Exchange currently has 92 members, Cboe C2 has 54 members, Cboe EDGX
has 52 members that trade options and Cboe BZX has 66 members that
trade options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Such market participant would be subject to the fees of
that broker. The Exchange notes that such broker is not required to
publicize, let alone justify or file with the Commission its fees,
and as such could charge the market participant any fees it deems
appropriate, even if such fees would otherwise be considered
potentially unreasonable or uncompetitive fees.
\74\ See SEC October 2020 Active Broker Dealer Report, provided
by the SEC Office of Managing Executive on October 8, 2020.
\75\ Id. Approximately 7 broker-dealers are members of the Cboe
Exchange, Inc. only, approximately 7 broker-dealers are members of
only Nasdaq PHLX LLC, and approximately 3 broker-dealers are members
of only Nasdaq ISE, Inc.
\76\ Id. The Exchange notes this is an increase since June 2020,
when approximately 20 broker-dealers were members of ISE but not
Cboe Options. See SEC June 2020 Active Broker Dealer Report.
\77\ See e.g., SEC June 2020 Active Broker Dealer Report. More
specifically, 1 exchange had 9 members, 4 exchanges had between 36-
50 members, 5 exchanges had between 50-100 members, 4 exchanges had
between 100-150 members and 2 exchanges had more than 150 members.
The Exchange notes however that some of these exchanges also trade
equities and the Exchange is therefore unable to determine how many
members at each exchange trade options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The rule structure for options exchanges are also fundamentally
different from those of equities exchanges. In particular, options
market participants are not forced to connect to (and purchase market
data from) all options exchanges. For example, there are many order
types that are available in the equities markets that are not utilized
in the options markets, which relate to mid-point pricing and pegged
pricing which require connection to the SIPs and each of the equities
exchanges in order to properly execute those orders in compliance with
best execution obligations. Additionally, in the options markets, the
linkage routing and trade through protection are handled by the
exchanges, not by the individual members. Thus not connecting to an
options exchange or disconnecting from an options exchange does not
potentially subject a broker-dealer to violate order protection
requirements.\78\ Gone are the days when the retail brokerage firms
(such as Fidelity, Schwab, and eTrade) were members of the options
exchanges--they are not members of the Exchange or its affiliates, they
do not purchase connectivity to the Exchange, and they do not purchase
market data from the Exchange. Accordingly, not only is there not an
actual regulatory requirement to connect to every options exchange, the
Exchange believes there is also no ``de facto'' or practical
requirement as well, as further evidenced by the recent significant
reduction in the number of broker-dealers that are members of all
options exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ The Exchange notes this discussion is consistent with the
Fee Guidance suggestion that any discussion of alternatives should
``include a discussion of how regulatory requirements, particularly
best execution obligations, Regulation NMS Rule 611 (the Order
Protection Rule), and/or the Options Order Protection and Locked/
Crossed Market Plan (Options Linkage Plan), as applicable, affect
the competitive analysis.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange is also not aware of any reason why any particular
market participant could not simply drop its connections and cease
being a TPH of the Exchange if the Exchange were to establish
``unreasonable'' and uncompetitive price increases for its connectivity
alternatives. As further evidence of the fact that market participants
can and do disconnect from exchanges based on connectivity pricing, R2G
Services LLC (``R2G'') filed a comment letter after BOX Exchange LLC
(``BOX'') proposed rule changes to increase its connectivity fees (SR-
BOX-2018-24, SRBOX-2018-37, and SR-BOX-2019-04).\79\ The R2G Letter
stated, ``[w]hen BOX instituted a $10,000/month price increase for
connectivity; we had no choice but to terminate connectivity into them
as well as terminate our market data relationship. The cost benefit
analysis just didn't make any sense for us at those new levels.''
Accordingly, this example shows that if an exchange sets too high of a
fee for connectivity and/or market data services for its relevant
marketplace, market participants can choose to disconnect from the
Exchange. Moreover, the Exchange does not assess any termination fee
for a market participant to drop its connectivity or membership, nor is
the Exchange aware of any other costs that would be incurred by a
market participant to do so. The Exchange notes that in fact, a number
of firms currently do not participate on the Exchange or participate on
the Exchange though sponsored access arrangements with other broker-
dealers rather than by becoming a member. Additionally, as noted above,
only 3 broker-dealers are currently members of all 16 options
exchanges, which the Exchange believes further demonstrates that, in
addition to the absence of a rule requirement to connect to every
option exchange, there is no prevailing business model that would
practically require a broker-dealer to connect to every single options
exchange.\80\ Moreover, of these 3 broker-dealers, only 1 such broker-
dealer connects directly to the Exchange and that broker-dealer does
not provide connectivity to any other TPH.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ See Letter from Stefano Durdic, R2G, to Vanessa Countryman,
Acting Secretary, Commission, dated March 27, 2019 (the ``R2G
Letter'').
\80\ The Exchange further notes that these 3 broker-dealers
represent different market participants. Particularly, 1 of these
broker-dealers is a bulge bracket bank, 1 is a brokerage firm and 1
is a clearing firm.
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Additionally, the Exchange notes that non-TPHs such as Service
Bureaus and Extranets resell Cboe Options connectivity.\81\ This
indirect connectivity is another viable alternative for market
participants to trade on the Exchange without connecting directly to
the Exchange (and thus not pay the Exchange's connectivity fees), which
alternative is already being used by non-TPHs and further constrains
the price that the Exchange is able to charge for connectivity to its
Exchange. The Exchange notes that it could, but chooses not to,
preclude market participants from reselling its connectivity. The
Exchange also chooses not to adopt fees that would be assessed to
third-party resellers on a per customer basis (i.e., fee based on
number of TPHs that connect to the Exchange indirectly via the third-
party). Indeed, the Exchange does not receive any connectivity revenue
when connectivity is resold by a third-party, which often is resold to
multiple customers, some of whom are agency broker-dealers that have
numerous customers of their own.\82\ Moreover, the Exchange has seen an
increase in the number of resellers since pre-migration, adding to the
pool of potential competitors. In sum, the Exchange believes this
creates and fosters a competitive environment and subjects the Exchange
to competitive forces in pricing its connectivity. Particularly, in the
event that a market participant
[[Page 71678]]
views the Exchange's direct connectivity and access fees as more or
less attractive than the competition, that market participant can
choose to connect to the Exchange indirectly or may choose not to
connect to that exchange and connect instead to one or more of the
other 15 options markets. For example, two TPHs that connected directly
to the Exchange pre-migration, began connecting indirectly via an
extranet provider shortly after the October 2019 migration and
currently still connect via extranets. An additional four TPHs
transitioned to indirect connectivity from direct connectivity in or
around February 2020, which was the first month after the legacy
Network Access Ports were decommissioned. The Exchange notes that it
has not received any comments that, and has no evidence to suggest, the
six total TPHs that transitioned from direct connections to an indirect
connections post-migration were the result of an undue financial burden
resulting from the proposed fee changes.\83\ Rather, the Exchange
believes the transitions demonstrate that indirect connectivity is in
fact a viable option for market participants, therefore reflecting a
competitive environment that the Exchange must be mindful of when
determining its connectivity fees.\84\ It further demonstrates the
manner in which market participants connect to the Exchange is entirely
within the discretion of market participants, who can consider the fees
charged by the Exchange and by resellers when making decisions.
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\81\ Prior to migration, there were 13 firms that resold Cboe
Options connectivity. Post-migration, the Exchange anticipated that
there would be 19 firms that resell Cboe Options connectivity (both
physical and logical) and as of October 2020 there are 17 firms that
resell Cboe Options connectivity. The Exchange does not have
specific knowledge as to what latency a market participant may
experience using an indirect connection versus a direct connection
and notes it may vary by the service provided by the extranet
provider and vary between extranet providers. The Exchange believes
however, that there are extranet providers able to provide
connections with a latency that is comparable to latency experienced
using a direct connection.
\82\ The Exchange notes that resellers are not required to
publicize, let alone justify or file with the Commission their fees,
and as such could charge the market participant any fees it deems
appropriate (including connectivity fees higher than the Exchange's
connectivity fees), even if such fees would otherwise be considered
potentially unreasonable or uncompetitive fees.
\83\ The Exchange notes that TPHs are not required to specify to
the Exchange why it opts to no longer be a TPH, or why it cancels
its ports, nor is a non-TPH market participating required to specify
to the Exchange why it opts to not be a TPH and directly connect to
the Exchange.
\84\ In the post-migration period between February 2020 and June
2020, approximately 38 TPHs on average were directly connected to
the Exchange each month, which is notably fewer than the
approximately 45 TPHs that were directly connected each month during
the pre-migration period between June 2017 through September 2019.
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Additionally, pre-migration, in August 2019, the Exchange had 97
members (TPH organizations), of which nearly half connected indirectly
to the Exchange.\85\ Similarly, in December 2019, after a new broker-
dealer became a member of the Exchange in late November 2019,\86\ the
Exchange had 97 members, of which nearly half of the participants
connected indirectly to the Exchange. More specifically, in December
2019, 47 TPHs connected directly to the Exchange and accounted for
approximately 66% of the Exchange's volume, 46 TPHs connected
indirectly to the Exchange and accounted for approximately 29% of the
Exchange's volume and 4 TPHs utilized both direct and indirect
connections and accounted for approximately 5% of the Exchange's
volume.\87\ In December 2019, TPHs that connected directly to the
Exchange purchased a collective 179 physical ports (including legacy
physical ports), 144 of which were 10 Gb ports and 35 of which were 1
Gb ports.\88\ The Exchange notes that of those market participants that
do connect to the Exchange, it is the individual needs of each market
participant that determine the amount and type of Trading Permits and
physical and logical connections to the Exchange.\89\ With respect to
physical connectivity, many TPHs were able to purchase small quantities
of physical ports. For example, approximately 36% of TPHs that
connected directly to the Exchange purchased only one to two 1 Gb
ports, approximately 40% purchased only one to two 10 Gb ports, and
approximately 40% had purchased a combined total of one to two ports
(for both 1 Gb and 10 Gb). Further, no TPHs that connected directly to
the Exchange had more than five 1 Gb ports, and only 8.5% of TPHs that
connected directly to the Exchange had between six and ten 10 GB ports
and only 8.5% had between ten and fourteen 10 Gb ports. There were also
a combined total of 41 ports used for indirect connectivity (twenty-one
1 Gb ports and twenty 10 Gb ports).\90\ The Exchange notes that all
types of members connected indirectly to the Exchange including
Clearing firms, Floor Brokers, order flow providers, and on-floor and
off-floor Market-Makers, further reflecting the fact that each type of
market participant has the option to participate on an exchange without
direct connectivity. Indeed, market participants choose if and how to
connect to a particular exchange and because it is a choice, the
Exchange must set reasonable connectivity pricing, otherwise
prospective members would not connect and existing members would
disconnect or connect through a third-party reseller of
connectivity.\91\
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\85\ The Exchange notes that one firm terminated in late
September 2019, but that it believes it was unrelated to the
migration and the proposed fee changes.
\86\ In February 2020, such member also became a member of the
Exchange's affiliated options exchanges, which have similar physical
and logical connectivity fees to the proposed fees in this filing.
\87\ Between June 2017 and December 2019, the number of TPHs
that connected directly to the Exchange ranged from 43 to 47 TPHs
and on average, accounted for an average of approximately 61% of the
Exchange's total volume each month.
\88\ Of the 4 TPHs that connected both directly and indirectly
to the Exchange, 1 TPH had two 1 Gb Ports and the remaining 3 TPHs
had a combined total of six 10 Gb ports.
\89\ To assist market participants that are connected or
considering connecting to the Exchange, the Exchange provides
detailed information and specifications about its available
connectivity alternatives in the Cboe C1 Options Exchange
Connectivity Manual, as well as the various technical
specifications. See https://markets.cboe.com/us/options/support/technical/.
\90\ The Exchange notes that it does not know how many, and
which kind of, connections each TPH that indirectly connects to the
Exchange has.
\91\ As shown above, the availability of 15 alternative options
exchanges in addition to the viable option of indirect connectivity
demonstrates that substitute connectivity products and services do
exist, supporting the assertion the proposed fees are constrained by
competitive forces.
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Moreover, the Exchange notes that the Commission itself has
repeatedly expressed its preference for competition over regulatory
intervention in determining prices, products, and services in the
securities markets. Particularly, in Regulation NMS, the Commission
highlighted the importance of market forces in determining prices and
SRO revenues and, also, recognized that current regulation of the
market system ``has been remarkably successful in promoting market
competition in its broader forms that are most important to investors
and listed companies.'' \92\ The number of available exchanges to
connect to ensures increased competition in the marketplace, and
constrains the ability of exchanges to charge supracompetitive fees for
access to its market. The Exchange is also not aware of any evidence
that has been offered or demonstrated that a market share of
approximately 17% provides the Exchange with anti-competitive pricing
power. Indeed, the Exchange believes for all the reasons articulated
above, that its market share does not provide it with anti-competitive
pricing power. Moreover, the Exchange believes the fact that it can
lose, and has lost, market share demonstrates the competitive forces to
which the Exchange is subject. For example, in 2019 and through March
2020, the Exchange generally had a market share percentage in the low
to mid 20s. Since March 2020, the Exchange's market share has generally
been in the mid to high teens.\93\ Furthermore, the Exchange's
affiliated options exchanges have substantially similar physical and
logical connectivity fees, notwithstanding a much lower market share
ranging from approximately
[[Page 71679]]
2.5%-9%.\94\ As discussed extensively, if an exchange sets too high of
a fee for connectivity and/or market data services for its relevant
marketplace, market participants can choose to disconnect from the
Exchange.
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\92\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9,
2005), 70 FR 37496, 37499 (June 29, 2005) (``Regulation NMS Adopting
Release'').
\93\ See The Options Clearing Corporation, Market Data, Daily
Volume, available at https://www.theocc.com/Market-Data/Market-Data-Reports/Volume-and-Open-Interest/Daily-Volume.
\94\ See Cboe Global Markets U.S. Options Market Volume Summary
(August 31, 2020), available at https://markets.cboe.com/us/options/market_statistics/.
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The Exchange also believes that competition in the marketplace
constrains the ability of exchanges to charge supracompetitive fees for
access to its market, even if such market, like the Exchange, offers
proprietary products exclusive to that market. Notably, just as there
is no regulatory requirement to become a member of any one options
exchange, there is also no regulatory requirement for any market
participant to trade any particular product, nor is there any
requirement that any Exchange create or indefinitely maintain any
particular product.\95\ The Exchange also highlights that market
participants may trade an Exchange's proprietary products through a
third-party without directly or indirectly connecting to the Exchange.
Additionally, market participants may trade any options product,
including proprietary products, in the unregulated Over-the-Counter
(OTC) markets for which there is no requirement for fees related to
those markets to be public. Given the benefits offered by trading
options on a listed exchange, such as increased market transparency and
heightened contra-party creditworthiness due to the role of the Options
Clearing Corporation as issuer and guarantor, the Exchange generally
seeks to incentivize market participants to trade options on an
exchange, which further constrains connectivity pricing. Market
participants may also access other exchanges to trade other similar or
competing proprietary or multi-listed products. Alternative products to
the Exchange's proprietary products may include other options products,
including options on ETFs or options futures, as well as particular
ETFs or futures. For example, exclusively listed SPX options may
compete with the following products traded on other markets: Multiply-
listed SPY options (options on the ETF), E-mini S&P 500 Options
(options on futures), and E-Mini S&P 500 futures (futures on index).
Additionally, exclusively listed VIX options may compete with the
following products traded on other markets: Multiply-listed VXX options
(options on the ETF) and exclusively listed SPIKES options on the Miami
International Securities Exchange, LLC (``MIAX'').\96\ Other options
exchanges are also not precluded from creating new proprietary products
that may achieve similar objectives to (and therefore compete with) the
Exchange's existing proprietary products. For example, Nasdaq PHLX
exclusively lists options on the Nasdaq-100, which options, like index
options listed on the Exchange, offer investors an alternative method
to manage and hedge portfolio exposure to the U.S. equity markets.
Indeed, even though exclusively listed proprietary products may not be
offered by competitors, a competitor could create similar products if
demand were adequate. As noted above for example, MIAX created its
exclusive product SPIKES specifically to compete against VIX
options.\97\ In connection with a recently proposed amendment to the
National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail
(``CAT NMS Plan''),\98\ the Commission discussed the existence of
competition in the marketplace generally, and particularly for
exchanges with unique business models. Specifically, the Commission
contemplated the possibility of a forced exit by an exchange as a
result of a proposed amendment that could reduce the amount of CAT
funding a participant could recover if certain implementation
milestones were missed. The Commission acknowledged that, even if an
exchange were to exit the marketplace due to its proposed fee-related
change, it would not significantly impact competition in the market for
exchange trading services because these markets are served by multiple
competitors.\99\ The Commission explicitly stated that
``[c]onsequently, demand for these services in the event of the exit of
a competitor is likely to be swiftly met by existing competitors.''
\100\ The Commission further recognized that while some exchanges may
have a unique business model that is not currently offered by
competitors, a competitor could create similar business models if
demand were adequate, and if a competitor did not do so, the Commission
believes it would be likely that new entrants would do so if the
exchange with that unique business model was otherwise profitable.\101\
Similarly, although the Exchange may have proprietary products not
offered by other competitors, not unlike unique business models, a
competitor could create similar products to an existing proprietary
product if demand were adequate. As noted above, other exchanges, that
have comparable connectivity fees, also currently offer exclusively
listed products.\102\ As such, the Exchange is still very much subject
to competition and does not possess anti-competitive pricing power,
even with its offering of proprietary products. Rather, the Exchange
must still set reasonable connectivity pricing, otherwise prospective
members would not connect, and existing members would disconnect or
connect through a third-party reseller of connectivity, regardless of
what products its offers.
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\95\ If an option class is open for trading on another national
securities exchange, the Exchange may delist such option class
immediately. For proprietary products, the Exchange may determine to
not open for trading any additional series in that option class; may
restrict series with open interest to closing transactions, provided
that, opening transactions by Market-Makers executed to accommodate
closing transactions of other market participants and opening
transactions by TPH organizations to facilitate the closing
transactions of public customers executed as crosses pursuant to and
in accordance with Rule 6.74(b) or (d) may be permitted; and may
delist the option class when all series within that class have
expired. See Cboe Rule 4.4, Interpretations and Policies .11.
\96\ MIAX has described SPIKES options as ``designed
specifically to compete head-to-head against Cboe's proprietary
VIX[supreg] product.'' See MIAX Press Release, SPIKES Options
Launched on MIAX, February 21, 2019, available at https://www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/press_release-files/MIAX_Press_Release_02212019.pdf.
\97\ Id.
\98\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 86901 (September 9,
2019), 84 FR 48458 (September 13, 2019) (File No. S7-13-19).
\99\ Id.
\100\ Id.
\101\ Id.
\102\ See e.g., Nasdaq PHLX LLC Rules, (Options 7 Pricing
Schedule), Section 8A (Permit and Registration Fees) which provide
for floor permit fees between $4,000 to $6,000 per permit and
Section 9B (Port Fees), which provides various port fees ranging
from $500 to $1,250 per port. See also Nasdaq PHLX LLC Rules,
General 8 Connectivity, which provides for monthly physical
connectivity fees including fees for 1 Gb physical connections
priced at $2,500 per port and for 10 Gb physical connections
starting at $10,000 per port and see MIAX Options Fees Schedule,
Section 3b (Membership Fees, Monthly Trading Permit Fee), which
provides for trading permit fees ranging from $1,500 to $22,000 per
permit (which may include market-maker appointment costs) and
Section 5 (System Connectivity Fees) which provides for monthly
physical connectivity fees including fees for 1 Gb physical
connections priced at $1,400 per port and for 10 Gb physical
connections priced at $6,100 per port.
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Recently, on October 16, 2020, the Commission approved a proposal
by NYSE National, Inc. (``NYSE National'') to adopt fees for the NYSE
National Integrated Feed (a NYSE National-only market data feed),
finding that NYSE National provided sufficient information to
demonstrate that it was subject to significant substitution-based
competitive forces in setting the proposed fees.\103\ In the approval
order,
[[Page 71680]]
the Commission cited NetCoalition I, in which the D.C. Circuit in
vacating the Commission's 2008 ArcaBook Approval Order, stated ``the
existence of a substitute does not necessarily preclude market power,''
that ``whether a market is competitive notwithstanding potential
alternatives depends on factors such as the number of buyers who
consider other products interchangeable and at what prices,'' and that
``[t]he inquiry into whether a market for a product is competitive . .
. focuses on . . . the product's elasticity of demand.'' \104\ The
Commission also noted that the court found that the Commission's
analysis of alternatives in the 2008 ArcaBook Approval Order did not
reveal the number of potential users of the data or how they might
react to a change in price.\105\ The court also stated that there was
no information regarding how many traders accessed NYSE Arca's depth-
of-book data during the period it was offered without charge (and thus
how many traders might have been interested in paying for NYSE Arca's
depth-of-book data), or whether the traders who wanted depth-of-book
data would have declined to purchase it if met with a supracompetitive
price.\106\ In contrast to the facts in the 2008 ArcaBook Approval
Order, the Commission pointed out in the NYSE National Approval Order
that NYSE National had in fact provided information regarding potential
users of the proposed data feed, along with information regarding the
reactions of users to the change in price. The Commission also cited
information that was provided to show that market participants did not
subscribe to the data feed, even when the fee was offered for free. The
Commission ultimately relied on, in part, this information in making
its determination that NYSE National was subject to significant
competitive forces in pricing their product.
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\103\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90217 (October 16,
2020) (SR-NYSENAT-2020-005) (order approving proposed fees for NYSE
National Integrated Feed) (``NYSE National Approval Order'').
\104\ See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 542 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (``NetCoalition I'') (internal quotation marks omitted).
\105\ Id.
\106\ Id.
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The Exchange points out that it too has provided similar types of
information to the Commission and believes such information supports
the finding that the Exchange is subject to significant substitution-
based competitive forces in pricing its connectivity and access fees.
For instance, the Exchange noted there are approximately 250 broker-
dealers that are potential ``users'' of the Exchange's services (i.e.,
broker-dealers who are members of at least one options exchange and may
become a member of, and/or connect directly to, the Exchange).
Additionally, the Exchange provided the number of broker-dealers that
are members of the Exchange (approximately 92--which is less than half
of the potential user base) and the number of members that have
connected directly to the Exchange (approximately 38--which is less
than half of the Exchange's members). The Exchange also provided
information demonstrating that market participants have access to one
or more substitutes to (i) trade options without becoming a member of
the Exchange (e.g., the availability of 15 other options exchanges, the
ability to trade through a third-party, and the ability to trade
options products in the OTC market) and (ii) connect indirectly to the
Exchange (e.g., the ability to connect indirectly through one of 17
third-party resellers). The Exchange also cited to data demonstrating
TPHs can, and have, transitioned their direct access to indirect access
(6 TPHs transitioned to indirect connectivity subsequent to this
proposed rule change).\107\ Furthermore, the Exchange provided
information relating to the number of market participants that are
either not members of the Exchange (at least 25 broker-dealers \108\)
or that do not or did not connect directly to the Exchange both after
and before the fee change (approximately 38). Lastly, the Exchange has
described the reactions of TPHs to the price change, received both
informally and formally, and which again, were notably positive. The
Exchange stresses that the proof of competitive constraints does not
depend on showing that members walked away, or threatened to walk away,
from a product due to a pricing change. Rather, the very absence of
such negative feedback (in and of itself, and particularly when coupled
with positive feedback) is indicative that the proposed fees are, in
fact, reasonable and consistent with the Exchange being subject to
competitive forces in setting fees. Accordingly, the Exchange believes
the Commission has a sufficient basis to determine that the Exchange
was subject to significant competitive forces in setting the terms of
its proposed fees. Moreover, the Commission has found that, if an
exchange meets the burden of demonstrating it was subject to
significant competitive forces in setting its fees, the Commission
``will find that its fee rule is consistent with the Act unless ``there
is a substantial countervailing basis to find that the terms'' of the
rule violate the Act or the rules thereunder.'' \109\ The Exchange is
not aware of, nor has the Commission articulated, a substantial
countervailing basis for finding the proposal violates the Act or the
rules thereunder.
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\107\ The Exchange again notes however that the TPHs did not
explain to the Exchange as to why they terminated their direct
connectivity in favor of connecting indirectly to the Exchange.
\108\ As discussed, the Exchange identified approximately 25
broker-dealers that are members of Nasdaq ISE, LLC (an exchange that
lists only options) and not members the Exchange. The Exchange
believes there are additional broker-dealers that trade options but
do not trade on the Exchange, but uses the ISE comparison as an
example.
\109\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (December 2,
2008), 73 FR 74770, 74781 (December 9, 2008) (``2008 ArcaBook
Approval Order'') (approving proposed rule change to establish fees
for a depth-of-book market data product).
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In addition to all the reasons discussed above, the Exchange
believes its proposed fees are reasonable in light of the numerous
benefits the new connectivity infrastructure provides market
participants. As described, the post-migration connectivity
architecture provides for a latency equalized infrastructure, improved
system performance, and increased sustained order and quote per second
capacity. As such, even where a fee for a particular type or kind of
connectivity may be higher than it was to its pre-migration equivalent,
such increase is reasonable given the increased benefits market
participants are getting for a similar or modestly higher price.
Moreover, as noted above, the objective of the proposed fee changes was
not to generate an overall increase in access fee revenue, but rather
adopt fees in connection with a new (and improved) connectivity
infrastructure. Indeed, the Exchange tried to the best of its ability
to approximate the overall connectivity revenue generated by the
Exchange's pre-migration fees. Notably, the Exchange's pre-migration
access fees were previously filed with the Commission and not suspended
nor disapproved.\110\ The Exchange further
[[Page 71681]]
believes that the reasonableness of its proposed connectivity fees is
demonstrated by the very fact that such fees are in line with, and in
some cases lower than, the costs of connectivity at other
Exchanges,\111\ including its own affiliated exchanges which have the
same connectivity infrastructure as the Exchange currently does since
migration.\112\ The Exchange notes these fees were similarly filed with
the Commission and not suspended nor disapproved.\113\ Particularly,
the Exchange's affiliate C2, previously migrated to the same trading
platform to which the Exchange has now migrated. In that connection, C2
overhauled its connectivity structure and adopted similar connectivity
fees under similar circumstances as those proposed herein.\114\ The
Commission did not suspend that C2 proposed rule change and did not
contend that C2 had failed to demonstrate its proposal was reasonable,
equitable and not unfairly discriminatory. The C2 migration filing was
filed subsequent to the D.C. Circuit decision in Susquehanna Int'l
Grp., LLC v. SEC, 866 F.3d 442 (D.C. Cir. 2017), meaning that such
filing was subject to the same (and current) standard for SEC review
and approval as the standard to which this filing is subject.
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\110\ Although the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (the ``Dodd-Frank Act'') amended 19(b) of the
Exchange Act to provide that SROs' fee changes become immediately
effective on filing, the legislative history makes clear that while
Congress intended to streamline SROs' rule filing procedures, the
proposed change did not ``[diminish ]the SEC's authority to reject
an improperly filed rule, disapprove a rule that is not consistent
with the Exchange Act or [diminish] the applicable public notice and
comment period.'' See S. Rep 111-176, at 106 (2010). The Commission
therefore had every right to pursue a suspension and disapproval
order of prior rule filings that adopted or amended connectivity
fees that were in place prior to the migration if it had believed
any proposed fees in those rule filings were not consistent with the
Exchange Act. Additionally, the Commission did not request
additional data or discussion in connection with prior rule filings
regarding connectivity fees, as it has with respect to the proposed
fees in this filing (and its previous versions). In the absence of
such an order, the Exchange presumes that its pre-migration fees
were reasonable and consistent with the Exchange Act.
\111\ See e.g., Nasdaq PHLX and ISE Rules, General Equity and
Options Rules, General 8. Phlx and ISE each charge a monthly fee of
$2,500 for each 1Gb connection, $10,000 for each 10Gb connection and
$15,000 for each 10Gb Ultra connection. See also Nasdaq Price List--
Trading Connectivity. Nasdaq charges a monthly fee of $7,500 for
each 10Gb direct connection to Nasdaq and $2,500 for each direct
connection that supports up to 1Gb. See also NYSE American Fee
Schedule, Section V.B, and Arca Fees and Charges, Co-Location Fees.
NYSE American and Arca each charge a monthly fee of $5,000 for each
1Gb circuit, $14,000 for each 10Gb circuit and $22,000 for each 10Gb
LX circuit.
\112\ See e.g., Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules, Physical
Connectivity Fees. For example, Cboe BZX, Cboe EDGX and C2 each
charge a monthly fee of $2,500 for each 1Gb connection and $7,500
for each 10Gb connection.
\113\ For the same reason noted above, the Exchange presumes
that the fees of other exchanges, including its affiliates, are
reasonable, as required by the Exchange Act in the absence of any
suspension or disapproval order by the Commission providing
otherwise.
\114\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83201 (May 9,
2018), 83 FR 22546 (May 15, 2018) (SR-C2-2018-006).
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Furthermore, in determining the proposed fee changes discussed
above, the Exchange reviewed the current competitive landscape,
considered the fees historically paid by market participants for
connectivity to the pre-migration system, and also assessed the impact
on market participants to ensure that the proposed fees would not
create an undue financial burden on any market participants, including
smaller market participants. Indeed, the Exchange received no comments
from any TPH suggesting that it was unduly burdened by the proposed
changes described herein, which were first announced via Exchange
Notice nearly two months in advance of the migration (now over one year
ago),\115\ nor were any timely comment letters received by the
Commission by the comment period submission deadline of November 12,
2019. The Exchange again underscores the fact that no comment letters
were received in response to its Second, Third, Fifth or Sixth Proposed
Rule Change, and that no individual market participant has provided any
written comments specifically suggesting that the Exchange has failed
to provide sufficient information in the Original, Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Proposed Rule Change to meets its burden to
demonstrate its proposed fees are consistent with the requirements of
the Exchange Act. As discussed, the three comment letters the Exchange
did receive on its Original Filing and the Fourth and Seventh Proposed
Rule Changes were all submitted by the same industry participant and
consisted of conclusory statements and factual inaccuracies. More
importantly, the Exchange received three positive comment letters from
members (which the Exchange believes is rare with respect to fees), all
of which expressed their support for the proposed fees; noting the
belief that the fees were reasonable and encouraging the Commission to
allow the fees to remain effective.\116\
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\115\ See Exchange Notice ``Cboe Options Exchange Access and
Capacity Fee Schedule Changes Effective October 1, 2019 and November
1, 2019'' Reference ID C2019081900.
\116\ See Letters from Steve Crutchfield, Head of Market
Structure, Chicago Trading Company (``CTC'') and William Ellington,
Managing Member/CEO, X-Change Financial Access (``XFA'') to Vanessa
Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated August 27, 2020. See also
Letter from Lakeshore Securities to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary,
Commission, dated August 31, 2020.
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Furthermore, the Exchange wishes to highlight that at least two
market participants have in fact expanded their connectivity footprint
since the implementation of the proposed fee changes. One of those
market participants was a TPH that had discussed terminating its
membership from the Exchange altogether prior to migration. However,
after that TPH reviewed the notice the Exchange issued describing the
proposed post-migration fees, the TPH relayed to the Exchange that it
would instead remain a member and add logical connectivity in light of
the cost savings it expected to realize due to the proposed changes.
The Exchange believes this further demonstrates competition within the
market for exchange connectivity, which as a result constrains fees the
Exchange may charge for that connectivity. Another TPH, that prior to
migration acted only as a proprietary trading firm, added the trading
function as a Market-Maker on the Exchange (which required the purchase
of additional trading permits and connectivity). The Exchange also
notes that since migration, one TPH terminated its membership with the
Exchange but retained its membership with 10 other SROs.\117\ The
Exchange believes the fact that only one TPH terminated in the past
eleven months but retained its memberships at other options exchanges
demonstrates the proposed fees are appropriate and reasonable and not
unduly burdensome. While the TPH that did terminate did not specify to
the Exchange why it ended its membership, if it had in fact determined
that the Exchange's proposed connectivity fees did not make business
sense for itself, for all the reasons discussed above, it was free to
leave the Exchange at no cost and retain its membership with other SROs
and/or pursue new memberships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Two other Trading Permit Holders also terminated their
respective memberships in the first quarter of 2020. The Exchange
notes, however, that one TPH consolidated its membership with an
affiliate and another TPH no longer appears to be a registered
broker-dealer. In the second quarter, another TPH terminated its
membership with the Exchange but similarly merged its business with
another TPH. In August 2020, a TPH terminated its membership with
the Exchange, along with all of its other SRO memberships as well.
Lastly, in September 2020, two TPHs terminated their membership with
the Exchange. One of those TPHs merged with another TPH and the
other terminated its memberships with other options exchanges at the
same time it terminated its membership with the Exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed connectivity structure and corresponding fees, like
the pre-migration connectivity structure and fees, continue to provide
market participants flexibility with respect to how to connect to the
Exchange based on each market participants' respective business needs.
For example, the amount and type of physical and logical ports are
determined by factors relevant and specific to each market participant,
including its business model, costs of connectivity, how its business
is segmented and allocated and volume of messages sent to the Exchange.
Moreover, the Exchange notes that it
[[Page 71682]]
does not have unlimited system capacity to support an unlimited number
of order and quote entry per second. Accordingly, the proposed
connectivity fees, and connectivity structure are designed to encourage
market participants to be efficient with their respective physical and
logical port usage. While the Exchange has no way of predicting with
certainty the amount or type of connections market participants will in
fact purchase, if any, the Exchange anticipates that like today, some
market participants will continue to decline to connect and participate
on the Exchange, some will participate on the Exchange via indirect
connectivity, some will only purchase one physical connection and/or
logical port connection, and others will purchase multiple connections.
In sum, the Exchange believes the proposed fees are reasonable and
reflect a competitive environment, as the Exchange seeks to amend its
access fees in connection with the migration of its technology
platform, while still attracting market participants to continue to be,
or become, connected to the Exchange.
Physical Ports
The Exchange believes increasing the fee for the new 10 Gb Physical
Port is reasonable because unlike, the current 10 Gb Network Access
Ports, the new Physical Ports provides a connection through a latency
equalized infrastructure with faster switches and also allows access to
both unicast order entry and multicast market data with a single
physical connection. As discussed above, legacy Network Access Ports do
not permit market participants to receive unicast and multicast
connectivity. As such, in order to receive both connectivity types pre-
migration, a market participant needed to purchase and maintain at
least two 10 Gb Network Access Ports. The proposed Physical Ports not
only provide latency equalization (i.e., eliminate latency advantages
between market participants based on location) as compared to the
legacy ports, but also alleviate the need to pay for two physical ports
as a result of needing unicast and multicast connectivity. Accordingly,
market participants who historically had to purchase two separate ports
for each of multicast and unicast activity, will be able to purchase
only one port, and consequently pay lower fees overall. For example,
pre-migration if a TPH had two 10 Gb legacy Network Access Ports, one
of which received unicast traffic and the other of which received
multicast traffic, that TPH would have been assessed $10,000 per month
($5,000 per port). Under the proposed rule change, using the new
Physical Ports, that TPH has the option of utilizing one single port,
instead of two ports, to receive both unicast and multicast traffic,
therefore paying only $7,000 per month for a port that provides both
connectivity types. The Exchange notes that pre-migration,
approximately 50% of TPHs maintained two or more 10 Gb Network Access
Ports. While the Exchange has no way of predicting with certainty the
amount or type of connections market participants will in fact purchase
post-migration, the Exchange anticipated approximately 50% of the TPHs
with two or more 10 Gb Network Access Ports to reduce the number of 10
Gb Physical Ports that they purchase and expected the remaining 50% of
TPHs to maintain their current 10 Gb Physical Ports, but reduce the
number of 1 Gb Physical Ports. Particularly, pre-migration, a number of
TPHs maintained two 10 Gb Network Access Ports to receive multicast
data and two 1 Gb Network Access Ports for order entry (unicast
connectivity). As the new 10 Gb Physical Ports are able to accommodate
unicast connectivity (order entry), TPHs may choose to eliminate their
1 Gb Network Access Ports and utilize the new 10 Gb Physical Ports for
both multicast and unicast connectivity. The Exchange notes that in
February 2020, approximately 78% of TPHs that maintained a 1 Gb Network
Access Port pre-migration, no longer maintained a 1 Gb Physical Port.
Additionally, as of February 2020, approximately 44% reduced the
quantity of 10 Gb Physical Ports they maintained as compared to pre-
migration.
As discussed above, if a TPH deems a particular exchange as
charging excessive fees for connectivity, such market participants may
opt to terminate their connectivity arrangements with that exchange,
and adopt a possible range of alternative strategies, including routing
to the applicable exchange through another participant or market center
or taking that exchange's data indirectly. Accordingly, if the Exchange
charges excessive fees, it would stand to lose not only connectivity
revenues but also revenues associated with the execution of orders
routed to it, and, to the extent applicable, market data revenues. The
Exchange believes that this competitive dynamic imposes powerful
restraints on the ability of any exchange to charge unreasonable fees
for physical connectivity. The Exchange also notes that the proposal
represents an equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other
charges as its fees for physical connectivity are reasonably
constrained by competitive alternatives, as discussed above. The
proposed amounts are in line with, and in some cases lower than, the
costs of physical connectivity at other Exchanges,\118\ including the
Cboe Affiliated Exchanges, which have the same connectivity
infrastructure the Exchange has migrated to and some of which also
offer exclusive products.\119\ The Exchange does not believe it is
unreasonable to assess fees that are in line with fees that have
already been established for the same physical ports used to connect to
the same connectivity infrastructure and common platform. The Exchange
believes the proposed Physical Port fees are equitable and not
unreasonably discriminatory as the connectivity pricing is associated
with relative usage of the various market participants (including
smaller participants) and the Exchange has not been presented with any
evidence to suggest its proposed fee changes would impose a barrier to
entry for participants, including smaller participants. In fact, as
noted above, the Exchange is unaware of any market participant that has
terminated direct connectivity solely as a result of the proposed fee
changes. The Exchange also believes increasing the fee for 10 Gb
Physical Ports and charging a higher fee as compared to the 1 Gb
Physical Port is equitable as the 1 Gb Physical Port is 1/10th the size
of the 10 Gb Physical Port and therefore does not offer access to many
of the products and services offered by the Exchange (e.g., ability to
receive certain market data products). Thus the value of the 1 Gb
alternative is lower than the value of the 10 Gb alternative, when
measured based on the type of Exchange access it offers. Moreover,
market participants that purchase 10 Gb Physical Ports utilize the most
bandwidth and therefore consume the most resources from the
[[Page 71683]]
network. As such, the Exchange believes the proposed fees for the 1 and
10 Gb Physical Ports, respectively are reasonably and appropriately
allocated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ See e.g., Nasdaq PHLX and ISE Rules, General Equity and
Options Rules, General 8. Phlx and ISE each charge a monthly fee of
$2,500 for each 1Gb connection, $10,000 for each 10Gb connection and
$15,000 for each 10Gb Ultra connection. See also Nasdaq Price List--
Trading Connectivity. Nasdaq charges a monthly fee of $7,500 for
each 10Gb direct connection to Nasdaq and $2,500 for each direct
connection that supports up to 1Gb. See also NYSE American Fee
Schedule, Section V.B, and Arca Fees and Charges, Co-Location Fees.
NYSE American and Arca each charge a monthly fee of $5,000 for each
1Gb circuit, $14,000 for each 10Gb circuit and $22,000 for each 10Gb
LX circuit.
\119\ See e.g., Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules, Physical
Connectivity Fees. For example, Cboe BZX, Cboe EDGX and C2 each
charge a monthly fee of $2,500 for each 1Gb connection and $7,500
for each 10Gb connection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data Port Fees
The Exchange believes assessing the data port fee per data source,
instead of per port, is reasonable because it may allow for market
participants to maintain more ports at a lower cost and applies
uniformly to all market participants. The Exchange believes the
proposed increase is reasonable because, as noted above, market
participants may pay lower fees as a result of charging per data source
and not per data port. Indeed, while the Exchange has no way of
predicting with certainty the impact of the proposed changes, the
Exchange had anticipated approximately 76% of the 51 market
participants who pay data port fees to pay the same or lower fees upon
implementation of the proposed change. As of December 2019, 46 market
participants \120\ pay the proposed data port fees, of which
approximately 78% market participants are paying the same or lower fees
in connection with the proposed change. Monthly savings for firms
paying lower fees range from $500 to $6,000 per month. The Exchange
also anticipated that 19% of TPHs who pay data port fees would pay a
modest increase of only $500 per month. In December 2019, approximately
22% market participants paid higher fees, with the majority of those
market participants paying a modest monthly increase of $500 and only 3
firms paying either $1,000 or $1,500 more per month. Additionally, as
discussed above, the Exchange's affiliate C2 has the same fee which is
also assessed at the proposed rate and assessed by data source instead
of per port. The proposed name change is also appropriate in light of
the Exchange's proposed changes and may alleviate potential confusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ The Exchange notes the reduction in market participants
that pay the data port fee is due to firm consolidations and
acquisitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Logical Connectivity
Port fees
The Exchange believes it's reasonable to eliminate certain fees
associated with legacy options for connecting to the Exchange and to
replace them with fees associated with new options for connecting to
the Exchange that are similar to those offered at its Affiliated
Exchanges. In particular, the Exchange believes it's reasonable to no
longer assess fees for CMI and FIX Login IDs because the Login IDs were
retired and rendered obsolete upon migration and because the Exchange
is proposing to replace them with fees associated with the new logical
connectivity options. The Exchange believes that it is reasonable to
harmonize the Exchange's logical connectivity options and corresponding
connectivity fees now that the Exchange is on a common platform as its
Affiliated Exchanges. Additionally, the Exchange notes the proposed
fees are the same as, or in line with, the fees assessed on its
Affiliated Exchanges for similar connectivity.\121\ The proposed
logical connectivity fees are also equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because the Exchange will apply the same fees to all
market participants that use the same respective connectivity options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ See Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules, Logical Port Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes the proposed Logical Port fees are reasonable
as it is the same fee for Drop Ports and the first five BOE/FIX Ports
that is assessed for CMI and FIX Logins, which the Exchange is
eliminating in lieu of logical ports. Additionally, while the proposed
ports will be assessed the same monthly fees as current CMI/FIX Login
IDs, the proposed logical ports provide for significantly more message
traffic. Specifically, the proposed BOE/FIX Logical Ports will provide
for 3 times the amount of quoting \122\ capacity and approximately 165
times order entry capacity. Similarly, the Exchange believes the
proposed BOE Bulk Port fees are reasonable because while the fees are
higher than the CMI and FIX Login Id fees and the proposed Logical Port
fees, BOE Bulk Ports offer significantly more bandwidth capacity than
both CMI and FIX Login Ids and Logical Ports. Particularly, a single
BOE Bulk Port offers 45 times the amount of quoting bandwidth than CMI/
FIX Login Ids \123\ and 5 times the amount of quoting bandwidth than
Logical Ports will offer. Additionally, the Exchange believes that its
fees for logical connectivity are reasonable, equitable, and not
unfairly discriminatory as they are designed to ensure that firms that
use the most capacity pay for that capacity, rather than placing that
burden on market participants that have more modest needs. Although the
Exchange charges a ``per port'' fee for logical connectivity, it notes
that this fee is in effect a capacity fee as each FIX, BOE or BOE Bulk
port used for order/quote entry supports a specified capacity (i.e.,
messages per second) in the matching engine, and firms purchase
additional logical ports when they require more capacity due to their
business needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Based on the purchase of a single Market-Maker Trading
Permit or Bandwidth Packet.
\123\ Based on the purchase of a single Market-Maker Trading
Permit or Bandwidth Packet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An obvious driver for a market participant's decision to purchase
multiple ports will be their desire to send or receive additional
levels of message traffic in some manner, either by increasing their
total amount of message capacity available, or by segregating order
flow for different trading desks and clients to avoid latency sensitive
applications from competing for a single thread of resources. For
example, a TPH may purchase one or more ports for its market making
business based on the amount of message traffic needed to support that
business, and then purchase separate ports for proprietary trading or
customer facing businesses so that those businesses have their own
distinct connection, allowing the firm to send multiple messages into
the Exchange's trading system in parallel rather than sequentially.
Some TPHs that provide direct market access to their customers may also
choose to purchase separate ports for different clients as a service
for latency sensitive customers that desire the lowest possible latency
to improve trading performance. Thus, while a smaller TPH that demands
more limited message traffic may connect through a service bureau or
other service provider, or may choose to purchase one or two logical
ports that are billed at a rate of $750 per month each, a larger market
participant with a substantial and diversified U.S. options business
may opt to purchase additional ports to support both the volume and
types of activity that they conduct on the Exchange. While the Exchange
has no way of predicting with certainty the amount or type of logical
ports market participants will in fact purchase post-migration, the
Exchange anticipated approximately 16% of TPHs to purchase one to two
logical ports, and approximately 22% of TPHs to not purchase any
logical ports. In December 2019, 13% of TPHs purchased one to two
logical ports and 27% have not purchased any logical ports. At the same
time, market participants that desire more total capacity due to their
business needs, or that wish to segregate order flow by purchasing
separate capacity allocations to reduce latency or for other
operational reasons, would be permitted to choose to purchase such
additional capacity at the same marginal cost. The Exchange believes
the proposal to assess an additional Logical and BOE Bulk port fee for
incremental usage per logical port is reasonable because the proposed
[[Page 71684]]
fees are modestly higher than the proposed Logical Port and BOE Bulk
fees and encourage users to mitigate message traffic as necessary. The
Exchange notes one of its Affiliated Exchanges has similar implied port
fees.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ See e.g., Cboe C2 Options Exchange Fees Schedule, Logical
Connectivity Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, the Exchange believes that the proposed BOE/FIX Logical
Port and BOE Bulk Port fees are appropriate as these fees would ensure
that market participants continue to pay for the amount of capacity
that they request, and the market participants that pay the most are
the ones that demand the most resources from the Exchange. The Exchange
also believes that its logical connectivity fees are aligned with the
goals of the Commission in facilitating a competitive market for all
firms that trade on the Exchange and of ensuring that critical market
infrastructure has ``levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency,
availability, and security adequate to maintain their operational
capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.''
\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73639 (November
19, 2014), 79 FR 72251 (December 5, 2014) (File No. S7-01-13)
(Regulation SCI Adopting Release).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes waiving the FIX/BOE Logical Port fee for one
FIX Logical Port used to access PULSe and Silexx (for FLEX Trading) is
reasonable because it will allow all TPHs using PULSe and Silexx to
avoid having to pay a fee that they would otherwise have to pay. The
waiver is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because TPHs using
PULSe are already subject to a monthly fee for the PULSe Workstation,
which the Exchange views as inclusive of fees to access the Exchange.
Moreover, while PULSe users today do not require a FIX/CMI Login Id,
post-migration, due to changes to the connectivity infrastructure,
PULSe users will be required to maintain a FIX Logical Port and as such
incur a fee they previously would not have been subject to. Similarly,
the Exchange believes that the waiver for Silexx (for FLEX trading)
will encourage TPHs to transact business using FLEX Options using the
new Silexx System and encourage trading of FLEX Options. Additionally,
the Exchange notes that it currently waives the Login Id fees for Login
IDs used to access the CFLEX system.
The Exchange believes its proposed fee for Purge Ports is
reasonable as it is also in line with the amount assessed for purge
ports offered by its Affiliated Exchanges, as well as other
exchanges.\126\ Moreover, the Exchange believes that offering purge
port functionality at the Exchange level promotes robust risk
management across the industry, and thereby facilitates investor
protection. Some market participants, and, in particular, larger firms,
could build similar risk functionality on their trading systems that
permit the flexible cancellation of orders entered on the Exchange.
Offering Exchange level protections however, ensures that such
functionality is widely available to all firms, including smaller firms
that may otherwise not be willing to incur the costs and development
work necessary to support their own customized mass cancel
functionality. The Exchange operates in a highly competitive market in
which exchanges offer connectivity and related services as a means to
facilitate the trading activities of TPHs and other participants. As
the proposed Purge Ports provide voluntary risk management
functionality, excessive fees would simply serve to reduce demand for
this optional product. The Exchange also believes that the proposed
Purge Port fees are not unfairly discriminatory because they will apply
uniformly to all TPHs that choose to use dedicated Purge Ports. The
proposed Purge Ports are completely voluntary and, as they relate
solely to optional risk management functionality, no TPH is required or
under any regulatory obligation to utilize them. The Exchange believes
that adopting separate fees for these ports ensures that the associated
costs are borne exclusively by TPHs that determine to use them based on
their business needs, including Market-Makers or similarly situated
market participants. Similar to Purge Ports, Spin and GRP Ports are
optional products that provide an alternative means for market
participants to receive multicast data and request and receive a
retransmission of such data. As such excessive fees would simply serve
to reduce demand for these products, which TPHs are under no regulatory
obligation to utilize. All TPHs that voluntarily select these service
options (i.e., Purge Ports, Spin Ports or GRP Ports) will be charged
the same amount for the same respective services. All TPHs have the
option to select any connectivity option, and there is no
differentiation among TPHs with regard to the fees charged for the
services offered by the Exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ See Affiliated Exchange Fee Schedules, Logical Port Fees.
See also, Nasdaq ISE Pricing Schedule, Section 7(C). ISE charges a
fee of $1,100 per month for SQF Purge Ports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Access Credits
The Exchange believes the proposal to adopt credits for BOE Bulk
Ports is reasonable, equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because
it provides an opportunity for TPHs to pay lower fees for logical
connectivity. The Exchange notes that the proposed credits are in lieu
of the current credits that Market-Makers are eligible to receive today
for Trading Permits fees. Although only Market-Makers may receive the
proposed BOE Bulk Port credits, Market-Makers are valuable market
participants that provide liquidity in the marketplace and incur costs
that other market participants do not incur. For example, Market-Makers
have a number of obligations, including quoting obligations and fees
associated with appointments that other market participants do not
have. The Exchange also believes that the proposals provide incremental
incentives for TPHs to strive for the higher tier levels, which provide
increasingly higher benefits for satisfying increasingly more stringent
criteria, including criteria to provide more liquidity to the Exchange.
The Exchange believes the value of the proposed credits is commensurate
with the difficulty to achieve the corresponding tier thresholds of
each program.
First, the Exchange believes the proposed BOE Bulk Port fee credits
provided under AVP will incentivize the routing of orders to the
Exchange by TPHs that have both Market-Maker and agency operations, as
well as incent Market-Makers to continue to provide critical liquidity
notwithstanding the costs incurred with being a Market-Maker. More
specifically, in the options industry, many options orders are routed
by consolidators, which are firms that have both order router and
Market-Maker operations. The Exchange is aware not only of the
importance of providing credits on the order routing side in order to
encourage the submission of orders, but also of the operations costs on
the Market-Maker side. The Exchange believes the proposed change to AVP
continues to allow the Exchange to provide relief to the Market-Maker
side via the credits, albeit credits on BOE Bulk Port fees instead of
Trading Permit fees. Additionally, the proposed credits may incentivize
and attract more volume and liquidity to the Exchange, which will
benefit all Exchange participants through increased opportunities to
trade as well as enhancing price discovery. While the Exchange has no
way of
[[Page 71685]]
predicting with certainty how many and which TPHs will satisfy the
required criteria to receive the credits, the Exchange had anticipated
approximately two TPHs (out of approximately 5 TPHs that are eligible
for AVP) to reach VIP Tiers 4 or 5 and consequently earn the BOE Bulk
Port fee credits for their respective Market-Maker affiliate. For the
month of October 2019, two TPHs received access credits under Tier 5
and no TPHs received credits under Tier 4. The Exchange notes that it
believes its reasonable, equitable and not unfairly discriminatory to
no longer provide access credits for Market-Makers whose affiliates
achieve VIP Tiers 2 or 3 as the Exchange has adopted another
opportunity for all Market-Makers, not just Market-Makers that are part
of a consolidator, to receive credits on BOE Bulk Port fees (i.e.,
credits available via the proposed Market-Maker Access Credit Program).
More specifically, limiting the credits under AVP to the top two tiers
enables the Exchange to provide further credits under the new Market-
Maker Access Credit Program. Furthermore, the Exchange notes that it is
not required to provide any credits at any tier level.
The Exchange believes the proposed BOE Bulk Port fee credits
available for TPHs that reach certain Performance Tiers under the
Liquidity Provider Sliding Scale Adjustment Table is reasonable as the
credits provide for reduced connectivity costs for those Market-Makers
that reach the required thresholds. The Exchange believe it's
reasonable, equitable and not unfairly discriminatory to provide
credits to those Market-Makers that primarily provide and post
liquidity to the Exchange, as the Exchange wants to continue to
encourage Market-Makers with significant Make Rates to continue to
participate on the Exchange and add liquidity. Greater liquidity
benefits all market participants by providing more trading
opportunities and tighter spreads.
Moreover, the Exchange notes that Market-Makers with a high Make
Rate percentage generally require higher amounts of capacity than other
Market-Makers. Particularly, Market-Makers with high Make Rates are
generally streaming significantly more quotes than those with lower
Make Rates. As such, Market-Makers with high Make Rates may incur more
costs than other Market-Makers as they may need to purchase multiple
BOE Bulk Ports in order to accommodate their capacity needs. The
Exchange believes the proposed credits for BOE Bulk Ports encourages
Market-Makers to continue to provide liquidity for the Exchange,
notwithstanding the costs incurred by purchasing multiple ports.
Particularly, the proposal is intended to mitigate the costs incurred
by traditional Market-Makers that focus on adding liquidity to the
Exchange (as opposed to those that provide and take, or just take).
While the Exchange cannot predict with certainty which Market-Makers
will reach Performance Tiers 4 and 5 each month, based on historical
performance it anticipated approximately 10 Market-Makers would achieve
Tiers 4 or 5. In October 2019, 12 Market-Makers achieved Tiers 4 or 5.
Lastly, the Exchange notes that it is common practice among options
exchanges to differentiate fees for adding liquidity and fees for
removing liquidity.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ See e.g., MIAX Options Fees Schedule, Section 1(a), Market
Maker Transaction Fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bandwidth Packets and CMI CAS Server Fees
The Exchange believes it's reasonable to eliminate Bandwidth Packet
fees and the CMI CAS Server fee because TPHs will not pay fees for
these connectivity options and because Bandwidth Packets and CAS
Servers have been retired and rendered obsolete as part of the
migration. The Exchange believes that even though it will be
discontinuing Bandwidth Packets, the proposed incremental pricing for
Logical Ports and BOE Bulk Ports will continue to encourage users to
mitigate message traffic. The proposed change is equitable and not
unfairly discriminatory because it will apply uniformly to all TPHs.
Access Fees
The Exchange believes the restructuring of its Trading Permits is
reasonable in light of the changes to the Exchange's connectivity
infrastructure in connection with the migration and the resulting
separation of bandwidth allowance, logins and appointment costs from
each Trading Permit. The Exchange also believes that it is reasonable
to harmonize the Exchange's Trading Permit structure and corresponding
connectivity options to more closely align with the structures offered
at its Affiliated Exchanges once the Exchange is on a common platform
as its Affiliated Exchanges.\128\ The proposed Trading Permit structure
and corresponding fees are also in line with the structure and fees
provided by other exchanges. The proposed Trading Permit fees are also
equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because the Exchange will
apply the same fees to all market participants that use the same type
and number of Trading Permits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ For example, the Exchange's affiliate, C2, similarly
provides for Trading Permits that are not tied to connectivity, and
similar physical and logical port options at similar pricings. See
Cboe C2 Options Exchange Fees Schedule. Physical connectivity and
logical connectivity are also not tied to any type of permits on the
Exchange's other options exchange affiliates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to electronic Trading Permits, the Exchange notes that
TPHs previously requested multiple Trading Permits because of
bandwidth, login or appointment cost needs. As described above, in
connection with migration, bandwidth, logins and appointment costs are
no longer tied to Trading Permits or Bandwidth Packets and as such, the
need to hold multiple permits and/or Bandwidth Packets is obsolete. As
such, the Exchange believes the structure to require only one of each
type of applicable electronic Trading Permit is appropriate. Moreover,
the Exchange believes offering separate marketing making permits for
off-floor and on-floor Market-Makers provides for a cleaner, more
streamlined approach to trading permits and corresponding fees. Other
exchanges similarly provide separate and distinct fees for Market-
Makers that operate on-floor vs off-floor and their corresponding fees
are similar to those proposed by the Exchange.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ See e.g., PHLX Section 8A, Permit and Registration Fees.
See also, BOX Options Fee Schedule, Section IX Participant Fees;
NYSE American Options Fees Schedule, Section III(A) Monthly ATP Fees
and NYSE Arca Options Fees and Charges, OTP Trading Participant
Rights. For similar Trading Floor Permits for Floor Market Makers,
Nasdaq PHLX charges $6,000; BOX charges up to $5,500 for 3
registered permits in addition to a $1,500 Participant Fee, NYSE
Arca charges up to $6,000; and NYSE American charges up to $8,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes the proposed fee for its MM EAP Trading
Permits is reasonable as it is the same fee it assesses today for
Market-Maker Trading Permits (i.e., $5,000 per month per permit).
Additionally, the proposed fee is in line with, and in some cases even
lower than, the amounts assessed for similar access fees at other
exchanges, including its affiliate C2.\130\ The Exchange believes the
proposed EAP fee is also reasonable, and in line with the fees assessed
by other Exchanges for non-Market-Maker electronic access.\131\ The
Exchange notes that while the Trading Permit fee is increasing, TPHs
overall cost to
[[Page 71686]]
access the Exchange may be reduced in light of the fact that a TPH no
longer must purchase multiple Trading Permits, Bandwidth Packets and
Login Ids in order to receive sufficient bandwidth and logins to meet
their respective business needs. To illustrate the value of the new
connectivity infrastructure, the Exchange notes that the cost that
would be incurred by a TPH today in order to receive the same amount of
order capacity that will be provided by a single Logical Port post-
migration (i.e., 5,000 orders per second), is approximately 98% higher
than the cost for the same capacity post-migration. The following
examples further demonstrate potential cost savings/value added for an
EAP holder with modest capacity needs and an EAP holder with larger
capacity needs:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ See e.g., Cboe C2 Options Exchange Fees Schedule. See
also, NYSE Arca Options Fees and Charges, General Options and
Trading Permit (OTP) Fees, which assesses up to $6,000 per Market
Maker OTP and NYSE American Options Fee Schedule, Section III.
Monthly ATP Fees, which assess up to $8,000 per Market Maker ATP.
See also, PHLX Section 8A, Permit and Registration Fees, which
assesses up to $4,000 per Market Maker Permit.
\131\ See e.g., PHLX Section 8A, Permit and Registration Fees,
which assesses up to $4,000 per Permit for all member and member
organizations other than Floor Specialists and Market Makers.
TPH That Holds 1 EAP, No Bandwidth Packets and 1 CMI Login
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current fee Post-migration fee
structure structure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EAP............................. $1,600............ $3,000.
CMI Login/Logical Port.......... $750.............. $750.
Bandwidth Packets............... 0................. N/A.
Total Bandwidth Available....... 30 orders/sec..... 5,000 orders/sec.
Total Cost...................... $2,350............ $3,750.
Total Cost per message.......... $78.33/order/sec.. $0.75/order/sec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TPH That Holds 1 EAP, 4 Bandwidth Packets and 15 CMI Logins
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current fee Post-migration fee
structure structure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EAP............................. $1,600............ $3,000.
CMI Login/Logical Port.......... $11,250 ([email protected]).. $750.
Bandwidth Packets............... $6,400 ([email protected]$1,600). N/A.
Total Bandwidth Available....... 150 orders/sec.... 5,000 orders/sec.
Total Cost...................... $19,250........... $3,750.
Total Cost per message.......... $128.33/order/sec. $0.75/order/sec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes the proposal to adopt a new Clearing TPH
Permit is reasonable because it offers TPHs that only clear
transactions of TPHs a discount. Particularly, Clearing TPHs that also
submit orders electronically to the Exchange would purchase the
proposed EAP at $3,000 per permit. The Exchange believe it's reasonable
to provide a discount to Clearing TPHs that only clear transactions and
do not otherwise submit electronic orders to the Exchange. The Exchange
notes that another exchange similarly charges a separate fee for
clearing firms.\132\
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\132\ See e.g., NYSE Arca Options Fees and Charges, General
Options and Trading Permit (OTP) Fees and NYSE American Options Fee
Schedule, Section III. Monthly ATP Fees.
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The Exchange believes the proposed fee structure for on-floor
Market-Makers is reasonable as the fees are in line with those offered
at other Exchanges.\133\ The Exchange believes that the proposed fee
for MM Floor Permits as compared to MM EAPs is reasonable because it is
only modestly higher than MM EAPs and Floor MMs don't have other costs
that MM EAP holders have, such as MM EAP Appointment fees.
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\133\ See e.g., PHLX Section 8A, Permit and Registration Fees,
which assesses $6,000 per permit for Floor Specialists and Market
Makers.
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The Exchange believes its proposed fees for Floor Broker Permits
are reasonable because the fees are similar to, and in some cases lower
than, the fees the Exchange currently assesses for such permits.
Specifically, based on the number of Trading Permits TPHs held upon
migration, 60% of TPHs that hold Floor Broker Trading Permits will pay
lower Trading Permit fees. Particularly, any Floor Broker holding ten
or less Floor Broker Trading Permits will pay lower fees under the
proposed tiers as compared to what they pay today. While the remaining
40% of TPHs holding Floor Broker Trading Permits (who each hold between
12-21 Floor Broker Trading Permits) will pay higher fees, the Exchange
notes the monthly increase is de minimis, ranging from an increase of
0.6%-2.72%.\134\
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\134\ The Floor Brokers whose fees are increasing have each
committed to a minimum number of permits and therefore currently
receive the rates set forth in the current Floor Broker TP Sliding
Scale.
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The Exchange believes the proposed ADV Discount is reasonable
because it provides an opportunity for Floor Brokers to pay lower FB
Trading Permit fees, similar to the current rebate program offered to
Floor Brokers. The Exchange notes that while the new ADV Discount
program includes only customer volume (``C'' origin code) as compared
to Customer and Professional Customer/Voluntary Professional, the
amount of Professional Customer/Voluntary Professional volume was de
minimis and the Exchange does not believe the absence of such volume
will have a significant impact.\135\ Additionally, the Exchange notes
that while the ADV requirements under the proposed ADV Discount program
are higher than are required under the current rebate program, the
proposed ADV Discount counts volume from all products towards the
thresholds as compared to the current rebate program which excludes
volume from Underlying Symbol List A (except RLG, RLV, RUI, and UKXM),
DJX, XSP, and subcabinet trades. Moreover, the ADV Discount is designed
to encourage the execution of orders in all classes via open outcry,
which may increase volume, which would benefit all market participants
(including Floor Brokers who do not hit the ADV thresholds) trading via
open outcry (and indeed, this increased volume could make it possible
for some Floor Brokers to hit the ADV thresholds). The Exchange
believes the proposed discounts are equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because all Floor Brokers are eligible. While the
Exchange has no way of predicting with certainty how many and which
TPHs will satisfy the various thresholds under the ADV Discount, the
Exchange anticipated approximately 3 Floor Brokers to receive a rebate
under the program. In December 2019, 2 Floor Brokers received a rebate
under the program.
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\135\ Furthermore, post-migration the Exchange will not have
Voluntary Professionals.
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The Exchange believes its proposed MM EAP Appointment fees are
reasonable in light of the Exchange's elimination of appointment costs
tied to Trading Permits. Other exchanges also
[[Page 71687]]
offer a similar structure with respect to fees for appointment
classes.\136\ Additionally, the proposed MM EAP Appointment fee
structure results in approximately 36% electronic MMs paying lower fees
for trading permit and appointment costs. For example, in order to have
the ability to make electronic markets in every class on the Exchange,
a Market-Maker would need 1 Market-Maker Trading Permit and 37
Appointment Units post-migration. Under, the current pricing structure,
in order for a Market-Maker to quote the entire universe of available
classes, a Market-Maker would need 33 Appointment Credits, thus
necessitating 33 Market-Maker Trading Permits. With respect to fees for
Trading Permits and Appointment Unit Fees, under the proposed pricing
structure, the cost for a TPH wishing to quote the entire universe of
available classes is approximately 29% less (if they are not eligible
for the MM TP Sliding Scale) or approximately 2% less (if they are
eligible for the MM TP Sliding Scale). To further demonstrate the
potential cost savings/value added, the Exchange is providing the
following examples comparing current Market-Maker connectivity and
access fees to projected connectivity and access fees for different
scenarios. The Exchange notes that the below examples not only compare
Trading Permit and Appointment Unit costs, but also the cost incurred
for logical connectivity and bandwidth. Particularly, the first example
demonstrates the total minimum cost that would be incurred today in
order for a Market-Maker to have the same amount of capacity as a
Market-Maker post-migration that would have only 1 MM EAP and 1 Logical
Port (i.e., 15,000 quotes/3 sec). The Exchange is also providing
examples that demonstrate the costs of (i) a Market-Maker with small
capacity needs and appointment unit of 1.0 and (ii) a Market-Maker with
large capacity needs and appointment cost/unit of 30.0:
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\136\ See e.g., PHLX Section 8. Membership Fees, B, Streaming
Quote Trader (``SQT'') Fees and C. Remote Market Maker Organization
(RMO) Fee.
\137\ The maximum quoting bandwidth that may be applied to a
single Login Id is 80,000 quotes/3 sec.
\138\ For simplicity of the comparison, this assumes no
appointments in SPX, VIX, RUT, XEO or OEX (which are not included in
the TP Sliding Scale).
\139\ Given the bandwidth limit per Login Id of 80,000 quotes/3
sec, example assumes Market-Maker purchases minimum amount of Login
IDs to accommodate 300,000 quotes/3 sec.
Market-Maker That Needs Capacity of 15,000/Quotes/3 Seconds
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current fee Post-migration fee
structure structure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MM Permit/MM EAP................ $5,000............ $5,000.
Appointment Unit Cost........... N/A (1 appointment $0 (1 appointment
cost). unit).
CMI Login/Logical Port.......... $750 \137\........ $750.
Bandwidth Packets............... $5,500 ([email protected]$2,750). N/A.
Total Bandwidth Available....... 15,000 quotes/3 15,000 quotes/3
sec. sec.
Total Cost...................... $11,250........... $5,750.
Total Cost per message allowed.. $0.75/quote/3 sec. $0.38/quote/3 sec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market Maker That Needs Capacity of No More Than 5,000 Quotes/3 Secs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current fee Post-migration fee
structure structure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MM Permit/MM EAP................ $5,000............ $5,000.
Appointment Unit Cost........... N/A (1 appointment $0 (1 appointment
cost). unit).
CMI Login/Logical Port.......... $750.............. $750.
Bandwidth Packets............... 0................. N/A.
Total Bandwidth Available....... 5,000 quotes/3 sec 15,000 quotes/3
sec.
Total Cost...................... $5,750............ $5,750.
Total Cost per message allowed.. $1.15/quote/3 sec. $0.38/quote/3 sec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market-Maker That Needs 30 Appointment Units and Capacity of 300,000
Quotes/3 Sec
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current fee Post-migration fee
structure structure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MM Permits/MM EAP............... $105,000 (30 MM $5,000.
Permits assumes
eligible for MM
TP Sliding Scale)
\138\.
Appointment Units Cost.......... N/A (30 $95,500 (30
appointment appointment
costs). units).
CMI Logins/BOE Bulk Port........ $3,000 ([email protected]$750) $3,000 (2 BOE
\139\. [email protected]$1,500).
Bandwidth Packets............... $82,500 ([email protected]$2750) N/A.
Total Bandwidth Available....... 300,000 quotes/3 * 450,000 quotes/3
sec. sec.
Total Cost...................... $190,500.......... $103,500.
Total Cost per message allowed.. $0.63/quotes/3 sec $0.23/quote/3 sec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Possible performance degradation at 15,000 messages per second.
The Exchange believes its proposal to provide separate fees for
Tier Appointments for MM EAPs and MM Floor Permits as the Exchange will
be issuing separate Trading Permits for on-floor and off-floor market
making as discussed above. The proposal to eliminate the volume
threshold for the electronic SPX Tier Appointment fee is reasonable as
no TPHs in the past several months have electronically traded more than
1 SPX contract or less than 100 SPX contracts per month and therefore
will not be negatively impacted by the proposed change, and because it
aligns the electronic SPX Tier Appointment with the floor SPX Tier
Appointment, which has no volume
[[Page 71688]]
threshold. The Exchange believes the proposal to increase the
electronic volume thresholds for VIX and RUT are reasonable as those
that do not regularly trade VIX or RUT in open-outcry will continue to
not be assessed the fee. In fact, any TPH that executes more than 100
contracts but less than 1,000 in the respective classes will no longer
have to pay the proposed Tier Appointment fee. As noted above, the
Exchange is not proposing to change the amounts assessed for each Tier
Appointment Fee. The proposed change is equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because it will apply uniformly to all TPHs.
Trading Permit Holder Regulatory Fee
The Exchange believes it's reasonable to eliminate the Trading
Permit Holder Regulatory fee because TPHs will not pay this fee and
because the Exchange is restructuring its Trading Permit structure. The
Exchange notes that although it will less closely be covering the costs
of regulating all TPHs and performing its regulatory responsibilities,
it still has sufficient funds to do so. The proposed change is
equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because it will apply
uniformly to all TPHs.
The Exchange believes corresponding changes to eliminate obsolete
language in connection with the proposed changes described above and to
relocate and reorganize its fees in connection with the proposed
changes maintain clarity in the Fees Schedule and alleviate potential
confusion, thereby removing impediments to and perfecting the mechanism
of a free and open market and a national market system, and, in
general, protecting investors and the public interest.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
With respect to intra-market competition, the Exchange does not
believe that the proposed rule change would place certain market
participants at the Exchange at a relative disadvantage compared to
other market participants or affect the ability of such market
participants to compete. As stated above, the Exchange does not believe
its proposed pricing will impose a barrier to entry to smaller
participants and notes that its proposed connectivity pricing is
associated with relative usage of the various market participants. For
example, market participants with modest capacity needs can buy the
less expensive 1 Gb Physical Port and utilize only one Logical Port.
Moreover, the pricing for 1 Gb Physical Ports and FIX/BOE Logical Ports
are no different than are assessed today (i.e., $1,500 and $750 per
port, respectively), yet the capacity and access associated with each
is greatly increasing. While pricing may be increased for larger
capacity physical and logical ports, such options provide far more
capacity and are purchased by those that consume more resources from
the network. Accordingly, the proposed connectivity fees do not favor
certain categories of market participants in a manner that would impose
a burden on competition; rather, the allocation reflects the network
resources consumed by the various size of market participants--lowest
bandwidth consuming members pay the least, and highest bandwidth
consuming members pays the most, particularly since higher bandwidth
consumption translates to higher costs to the Exchange.
The Exchange also does not believe that the proposed rule change
will result in any burden on inter-market competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. As
discussed in the Statutory Basis section above, options market
participants are not forced to connect to (or purchase market data
from) all options exchanges, as shown by the number of TPHs at Cboe and
shown by the fact that there are varying number of members across each
of Cboe's Affiliated Exchanges. The Exchange operates in a highly
competitive environment, and as discussed above, its ability to price
access and connectivity is constrained by competition among exchanges
and third parties. As discussed, there are other options markets of
which market participants may connect to trade options. There is also a
possible range of alternative strategies, including routing to the
exchange through another participant or market center or accessing the
Exchange indirectly. For example, there are 15 other U.S. options
exchanges, which the Exchange must consider in its pricing discipline
in order to compete for market participants. In this competitive
environment, market participants are free to choose which competing
exchange or reseller to use to satisfy their business needs. As a
result, the Exchange believes this proposed rule change permits fair
competition among national securities exchanges. Accordingly, the
Exchange does not believe its proposed fee change imposes any burden on
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange neither solicited nor received written comments on the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A) of the Act \140\ and paragraph (f) of Rule 19b-4 \141\
thereunder. At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed
rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission will institute proceedings to
determine whether the proposed rule change should be approved or
disapproved.
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\140\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
\141\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-CBOE-2020-105 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CBOE-2020-105. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements
[[Page 71689]]
with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-CBOE-2020-105, and should be submitted
on or before December 1, 2020.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\142\
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\142\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-24884 Filed 11-9-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P