Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe EDGX Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To Adopt Rule 21.22 (Complex Automated Improvement Mechanism), 22178-22189 [2019-10125]
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22178
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 95 / Thursday, May 16, 2019 / Notices
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
CboeBYX–2019–008 on the subject line.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Paper Comments
[Release No. 34–85831; File No. SR–
CboeEDGX–2019–028]
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CboeBYX–2019–008. This
file number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
internet website (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change.
Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from
comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish
to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CboeBYX–2019–008 and
should be submitted on or before June
6, 2019.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.12
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Deputy Secretary.
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[FR Doc. 2019–10113 Filed 5–15–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe
EDGX Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing
of a Proposed Rule Change To Adopt
Rule 21.22 (Complex Automated
Improvement Mechanism)
May 10, 2019.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on April 26,
2019, Cboe EDGX Exchange, Inc. (the
‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘EDGX’’) filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(the ‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I, II, and
III below, which Items have been
prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of the Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
Cboe EDGX Exchange, Inc. (the
‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘EDGX’’) proposes to
adopt Rule 21.22. The text of the
proposed rule change is provided in
Exhibit 5.
The text of the proposed rule change
is also available on the Exchange’s
website (https://markets.cboe.com/us/
options/regulation/rule_filings/edgx/),
at the Exchange’s Office of the
Secretary, and at the Commission’s
Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
1 15
12 17
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
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CFR 240.19b–4.
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A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
1. Purpose
In 2016, the Exchange’s parent
company, Cboe Global Markets, Inc.
(‘‘Cboe Global’’), which is the parent
company of Cboe Exchange, Inc. (‘‘Cboe
Options’’) and Cboe C2 Exchange, Inc.
(‘‘C2’’), acquired the Exchange, Cboe
EDGA Exchange, Inc. (‘‘EDGA’’), Cboe
BZX Exchange, Inc. (‘‘BZX or BZX
Options’’), and Cboe BYX Exchange,
Inc. (‘‘BYX’’ and, together with C2, Cboe
Options, the Exchange, EDGA, and BZX,
the ‘‘Cboe Affiliated Exchanges’’). The
Cboe Affiliated Exchanges are working
to align certain system functionality,
retaining only intended differences
between the Cboe Affiliated Exchanges,
in the context of a technology migration.
Cboe Options intends to migrate its
technology to the same trading platform
used by the Exchange, C2, and BZX
Options in the fourth quarter of 2019.
The proposal set forth below is intended
to add certain functionality to the
Exchange’s System that is available on
Cboe Options in order to ultimately
provide a consistent technology offering
for market participants who interact
with the Cboe Affiliated Exchanges.
Although the Exchange intentionally
offers certain features that differ from
those offered by its affiliates and will
continue to do so, the Exchange believes
that offering similar functionality to the
extent practicable will reduce potential
confusion for Users.
The proposed rule change permits use
of its Automated Improvement
Mechanism (‘‘AIM’’) for complex orders.
Specifically, the proposed rule change
adopts Rule 21.22, which describes how
complex orders may be submitted to
and will be processed in an AIM
Auction (‘‘C–AIM’’ or ‘‘C–AIM
Auction’’).3 Complex orders will be
processed and executed in a C–AIM
Auction pursuant to proposed Rule
21.22 in a similar manner as simple
orders are processed and executed in an
AIM Auction pursuant to Rule 21.19.
C–AIM will provide market participants
with an opportunity to receive price
improvement for their complex orders.
The proposed rule change is similar to
the complex order price improvement
mechanism of Cboe Options and other
3 While the proposed rule change defines an AIM
Auction for complex orders as a C–AIM Auction,
the same mechanism is used to process both simple
orders and complex orders. For clarity and ease of
reference, the Exchange proposes a separate name
and rule for C–AIM to help Users distinguish how
the mechanism applies to simple and complex
orders.
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options exchanges. The Exchange
believes the similarity of C–AIM to AIM
and the mechanisms of other exchanges
will allow the Exchange’s proposed
price improvement functionality to fit
seamlessly into the options market and
benefit market participants who are
already familiar with this similar
functionality. The Exchange also
believes this will encourage Options
Members to compete vigorously to
provide the opportunity for price
improvement for complex orders in a
competitive auction process.
An Options Member (the ‘‘Initiating
Member’’) may electronically submit for
execution a complex order it represents
as agent (‘‘Agency Order’’) against
principal interest or a solicited complex
order(s) 4 (an ‘‘Initiating Order’’)
provided it submits the Agency Order
for electronic execution into a C–AIM
Auction pursuant to proposed Rule
21.22. For purposes of proposed Rule
21.22, the term ‘‘SBBO’’ means the
synthetic best bid or offer 5 at the
particular point in time applicable to
the reference, and the term ‘‘Initial
SBBO’’ means the synthetic best bid or
offer at the time the C–AIM Auction is
initiated.6
As defined, the Initiating Order may
be comprised of multiple orders, in
which case they must total the same size
as the Agency Order. This will
accommodate multiple contra-parties
and increase the opportunities for
customer orders to be submitted into a
C–AIM Auction with the potential for
price improvement, since the Initiating
Order must stop the full size of the
Agency Order. This will have no impact
on the execution of the Agency Order,
which may trade against multiple
contra-parties depending on the final
execution price(s), as set forth in
proposed paragraph (e). The Exchange
notes that with regard to order entry, the
4 Unlike simple AIM, there is no restriction on the
solicited order being for the account of any Options
Market Maker registered in the applicable series on
the Exchange, as there are no Market Maker
appointments to complex strategies. Additionally,
bulk messages (the equivalent of quoting
functionality) are not available for complex orders.
See Rule 21.20(b).
5 The SBBO is calculated using the best displayed
price for each component of a complex strategy
from the Simple Book. See Rule 21.20(a)(11).
6 See proposed introductory paragraph to Rule
21.22. This proposed paragraph is the same as the
corresponding paragraph for simple AIM
(introductory paragraph to Rule 21.19), except it
refers to SBBO rather than the national best bid or
offer (‘‘NBBO’’). There is no NBBO for complex
orders, as complex orders may be executed without
consideration of any prices for the complex strategy
that might be available on other exchanges trading
the same complex strategy. See Rule 21.20(c)(2)(E).
Additionally, executions of legs of complex orders
are exceptions to the prohibition of trade-throughs.
See Rule 27.2(b)(8).
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first order submitted into the system is
marked as the agency side and the
second order is marked as the initiating/
contra-side. Additionally, the Initiating
Order will always be entered as a single
order, even if that order consists of
multiple contra-parties, which are
allocated their portion of the trade in a
post-trade allocation.
The Initiating Member may initiate a
C–AIM Auction if all of the following
conditions are met:
• The Agency Order may be in any
class of options traded on the Exchange.
• The Initiating Member must mark
an Agency Order for C–AIM Auction
processing.
• There is no minimum size for
Agency Orders. The Initiating Order
must be for the same size as the Agency
Order.
• The price of the Agency Order and
Initiating Order must be in an increment
of $0.01.
• The Initiating Member may not
designate an Agency Order or Initiating
Order as Post Only.
• An Initiating Member may only
submit an Agency Order to a C–AIM
Auction after the complex order book
(‘‘COB’’) opens.
The System rejects or cancels both an
Agency Order and Initiating Order
submitted to a C–AIM Auction that do
not meet these conditions.7
The Initiating Order must stop the
entire Agency Order at a price that
satisfies the following:
• If the Agency Order is to buy (sell)
and (a) the applicable side of the
Exchange’s best bid or offer (‘‘BBO’’) on
any component of the complex strategy
represents a Priority Customer order on
the Simple Book, the stop price must be
at least $0.01 better than the SBB (SBO);
or (b) the applicable side of the BBO on
each component of the complex strategy
represents a non-Priority Customer
order or quote on the Simple Book, the
stop price must be at or better than the
SBB (SBO). This ensures the execution
price of the Agency Order will improve
the price of any Priority Customer
orders resting on the Simple Book.8
7 See proposed Rule 21.22(a). Proposed paragraph
(a) is the same as the corresponding paragraph for
simple AIM (see Rule 21.19(a)), except the proposed
rule change does not provide that an Initiating
Member may not submit an Agency Order if the
NBBO is crossed (unless the Agency Order is an
AIM ISO or Sweep and AIM). As noted above, there
is no NBBO for complex orders, and the legs of
complex orders are not subject to the restriction on
NBBO trade-throughs. Additionally, the proposed
rule change references the opening of the COB
rather than the market open, as the opening of the
COB is when complex orders may begin trading.
8 This is consistent with complex order priority,
which ensures the execution price of complex
orders will not be executed at prices inferior to the
SBBO or at a price equal to the SBBO when there
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22179
• If the Agency Order is to buy (sell)
and (a) a Priority Customer buy (sell)
complex order rests on the COB, the
stop price must be at least $0.01 better
than the bid (offer) of the resting
complex order; or (b) a non-Priority
Customer buy (sell) complex order rests
on the COB, the stop price must be at
least $0.01 better than the bid (offer) of
the resting complex order, unless the
Agency Order is a Priority Customer
order, in which case the stop price must
be at or better than the bid (offer) of the
resting complex order. This ensures the
execution price of the Agency Order
will improve the price of any resting
Priority Customer complex orders on
the COB, and that the execution price of
a Priority Customer Agency Order will
not be inferior to the price of any resting
non-Priority Customer complex orders
on the COB.9
• If the Agency Order is to buy (sell)
and (a) the BBO of any component of
the complex strategy represents a
Priority Customer order on the Simple
Book, the stop price must be at least
$0.01 better than the SBO (SBB), or (b)
the BBO of each component of the
complex strategy represents a nonPriority Customer order on the Simple
Book, the stop price must be at or better
than the SBO (SBB). This ensures the
execution price of the Agency Order
will improve the price of any Priority
Customer orders resting in the Simple
Book at the opposite side of the SBBO,
and not be through the opposite side of
the SBBO. While the stop price may
cross the opposite side best-priced
complex order resting on the opposite
side of the COB, as noted below, any
complex interest at a better price than
the stop price will trade ahead of the
Initiating Order. Pursuant to proposed
paragraph (e), any contra-side interest
available at better prices than the stop
price at the conclusion of a C–AIM
Auction will execute against the Agency
Order ahead of the Initiating Order.
Therefore, the Agency Order will
execute at the best prices available at
the conclusion of the C–AIM Auction,
even if the stop price was inferior to
those prices. Simple AIM Auctions may
similarly start at prices inferior to the
is a Priority Customer at the BBO for any
component. See Rule 21.20(c)(2)(E). As noted
above, there is no NBBO for complex orders, so the
proposed rule change does not have a price
requirement for the stop price related to the NBBO,
unlike simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(b)(1).
9 This corresponds to the same-side simple order
check for AIM, which requires the Agency Order to
improve the price of a resting Priority Customer
order on the Simple Book, or a non-Priority
Customer order or quote on the Simple Book unless
the Agency Order is for a Priority Customer. See
Rule 21.19(b)(2).
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NBBO for the series in certain
instances.10
• The Initiating Member must specify
(a) a single price at which it seeks to
execute the Agency Order against the
Initiating Order (a ‘‘single-price
submission’’), including whether it
elects to have last priority in allocation
(as described below), or (b) an initial
stop price and instruction to
automatically match the price and size
of all C–AIM responses and other
trading interest (‘‘auto-match’’) up to a
designated limit price or at all prices
that improve the stop price. These
options provide the Initiating Member
with flexibility regarding the prices at
which it desires to trade against the
Initiating Order, and the same flexibility
that is currently available to Options
Members with respect to simple
orders.11
The System rejects or cancels both an
Agency Order and Initiating Order
submitted to a C–AIM Auction that do
not meet these conditions.12
Upon receipt of an Agency Order that
meets the above conditions, the C–AIM
Auction process commences. With
respect to Agency Orders for which the
smallest leg is less than 50 standard
option contracts (or 500 mini-option
contracts), only one C–AIM Auction
may be ongoing at any given time in a
complex strategy, and C–AIM Auctions
in the same complex strategy may not
queue or overlap in any manner. One or
more C–AIM Auctions in the same
complex strategy for Agency Orders for
which the smallest leg is 50 standard
option contracts (or 500 mini-option
contracts) or more may occur at the
same time. C–AIM Auctions in different
complex strategies may be ongoing at
any given time, even if the complex
10 Simple AIM has no price checks for orders on
the opposite side of the Agency Order. The
proposed rule change adopts price checks for
simple orders that constitute the SBBO on the
opposite side of the Agency Order to ensure that the
Agency Order does not execute at a price through
the opposite side SBBO to protect orders (including
Priority Customer orders) resting in the Simple
Book. While there is no complex AIM sweep or
complex sweep and AIM order for C–AIM, because
complex orders do not route (and there is no
applicable NBBO), permitting the stop price to cross
the opposite side of the COB is consistent with
those order types in simple AIM, which permit the
stop price to be inferior to the Initial NBBO. See
Rule 21.19(b)(3). The execution at the conclusion of
a C–AIM Auction will essentially ‘‘sweep’’ betterpriced contra-side complex interest that is available
on the Exchange.
11 These are the same options available for
Initiating Members in simple AIM. See Rule
21.19(b)(4).
12 See proposed Rule 21.22(b). Proposed
paragraph (a) is the same as the corresponding
paragraph for simple AIM (see Rule 21.19(a)),
except as described above, including using the
SBBO and COB prices rather than the NBBO as
reference prices for the stop price.
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strategies have overlapping components.
A C–AIM Auction may be ongoing at the
same time as an AIM Auction in any
component of the complex strategy.
To the extent there is more than one
C–AIM Auction in a complex strategy
underway at a time, the C–AIM
Auctions conclude sequentially based
on the exact time each C–AIM Auction
commenced, unless terminated early
pursuant to proposed paragraph (d). In
the event there are multiple C–AIM
Auctions underway that are each
terminated early pursuant to proposed
paragraph (d), the System processes the
C–AIM Auctions sequentially based on
the exact time each C–AIM
Auction commenced. If the System
receives a simple order that causes an
AIM and C–AIM (or multiple AIM and/
or C–AIM) Auctions to conclude
pursuant to proposed paragraph (d) and
Rule 21.19(d), the System first processes
AIM Auctions (in price-time priority)
and then processes C–AIM Auctions (in
price-time priority). At the time each
C–AIM Auction concludes, the System
allocates the Agency Order pursuant to
proposed paragraph (e) and takes into
account all C–AIM Auction responses
and unrelated orders and quotes in
place at the exact time of conclusion.13
The Exchange currently permits
concurrent AIM Auctions in the same
series (for Agency Orders of 50 or more
contracts) and thus believes it is
appropriate to similarly permit
concurrent C–AIM Auctions in the same
complex strategy (for Agency Orders for
which the smallest leg is for 50 or more
contracts). Different complex strategies
are essentially different products, as
orders in those strategies cannot
interact, just as orders in different series
or classes cannot interact. Therefore, the
Exchange believes concurrent C–AIM
Auctions in different complex strategies
is appropriate given that concurrent
simple AIM Auctions in different series
or different classes may occur.
Similarly, while it is possible for a
complex order to leg into the Simple
Book, a complex order may only execute
against simple orders if there is interest
in each component in the appropriate
ratio for the complex strategy. A simple
order in one component of a complex
13 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(1). Proposed
paragraph (c)(1) is the same as the corresponding
paragraph for simple AIM (see Rule 21.19(c)(1)),
except the proposed change adds how the System
will handle ongoing auctions that include an
overlapping component (whether that component is
the subject of an ongoing simple AIM Auction or
part of a complex strategy for which a different
C–AIM Auction is ongoing) and adds that whether
concurrent C–AIM Auctions (subject to the same
minimum size restriction as simple orders) in the
same complex strategy may occur is based on the
size of the smallest leg of the Agency Order.
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strategy cannot on its own interact with
a complex order in that complex
strategy. Therefore, the Exchange
believes it is appropriate to permit
concurrent AIM and C–AIM Auctions
that share a component. As proposed,
C–AIM Auctions will ensure that
Agency Orders execute at prices that
protect Priority Customer orders in the
Simple Book and that are not inferior to
the SBBO at the conclusion of the
C–AIM Auction, even when there are
concurrent simple and complex
auctions occurring. The proposed rule
change sets forth how any auctions with
overlapping components will conclude
if terminated due to the same event.
The Exchange notes it is currently
possible for auctions in a component leg
and a complex strategy containing that
component (such as a simple AIM
Auction in the component and a
complex order auction (‘‘COA’’) in the
complex strategy that contains that
component) to occur concurrently, and
at the end of each auction, it is possible
for interest resting in the Simple Book
to trade against the complex order
subject to the COA. While these
auctions may be occurring at the same
time, they will be processed in the order
in which they are terminated (similar to
how the System will process auctions as
proposed above). In other words,
suppose there is an AIM Auction in a
series and a COA in a complex strategy
for which one of the components is the
same series both occurring, which began
and will terminate in that order, and
each of which last 100 milliseconds.
While it is possible for both auctions to
terminate nearly simultaneously, the
System will still process them in the
order in which they terminate. When
the AIM Auction terminates, the System
will process it in accordance with Rule
21.19, and the auctioned order may
trade against any resting interest (in
addition to the contra-side order and
responses submitted to that AIM
Auction, which may only trade against
the order auctioned in that AIM
pursuant to Rule 21.19). The System
will then process the COA Auction
when it terminates, and the auctioned
order may trade against any resting
interest, including any simple interest
that did not execute against the AIM
order (in addition to the contra-side
order and responses submitted to that
COA Auction, which may only trade
against the order auctioned in that
COA), pursuant to Rule 21.20.
The System initiates the C–AIM
Auction process by sending a C–AIM
Auction notification message detailing
the side, size, price, Capacity, Auction
ID, and complex strategy of the Agency
Order to all Options Members that elect
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to receive C–AIM Auction notification
messages. C–AIM Auction notification
messages are not included in OPRA.14 A
C–AIM Auction will last for a period of
time determined by the Exchange,
which may be no less than 100
milliseconds and no more than one
second, and which the Exchange will
announce to Options Members via
Exchange Notice and/or technical
specifications.15 An Initiating Member
may not modify or cancel an Agency
Order or Initiating Order after
submission to a C–AIM Auction.16
Any User other than the Initiating
Member (determined by EFID) may
submit responses to a C–AIM Auction
that are properly marked specifying
size, side of the market, and the Auction
ID for the C–AIM Auction to which the
User is submitting the response. A
C–AIM Auction response may only
participate in the C–AIM Auction with
the Auction ID specified in the
response.17
• The minimum price increment for
C–AIM responses is $0.01. The System
rejects a C–AIM response that is not in
a $0.01 increment.18
• C–AIM responses that cross the
Initial SBBO or the price of a complex
order resting at the top of the COB on
the same side as the Agency Order are
capped at (a) the better of the Initial
SBBO or the price of the resting
complex order, or (b) $0.01 better than
the better of the Initial SBBO or the
resting complex order if the BBO of any
component of the complex strategy or
the resting complex order, respectively,
is a Priority Customer order. The System
executes these C–AIM responses, if
possible, at the most aggressive
permissible price not outside the Initial
SBBO or price of the resting complex
order. This will ensure the execution
14 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(2). The proposed
C–AIM Auction notification message is the same as
the corresponding message for simple AIM (see
Rule 21.19(c)(2)), except the proposed rule change
indicates the notification message for a C–AIM
Auction will include the complex strategy rather
than the series. The proposed rule change also
states the C–AIM notification message will include
the Capacity of the Agency Order. The notification
message for simple AIM includes Capacity, but that
detail is not currently included in Rule 21.19.
15 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(3). The proposed
C–AIM Auction period is the same as the auction
period for simple AIM (see Rule 21.19(c)(3)).
16 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(4). The proposed
C–AIM Auction notification message [sic] is the
same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM (see Rule 21.19(c)(4)).
17 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5). The proposed
provisions regarding C–AIM responses are the same
as the provisions regarding AIM responses, except
as set forth below. See Rule 21.19(c)(5).
18 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(A). The
proposed minimum increment for C–AIM responses
is the same as the minimum increment for AIM
responses. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(A).
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price does not cross the Initial SBBO or
prices of resting complex orders, which
the stop price must be at or better than
(and must be better than if represented
by a Priority Customer order) as
discussed above.19
• A User may submit multiple C–AIM
responses at the same or multiple prices
to a C–AIM Auction. The System
aggregates all of a User’s complex orders
on the COB and C–AIM responses for
the same EFID at the same price.20 The
Exchange believes this is appropriate
since all interest at a single price is
considered for execution against the
Agency Order at that price, and can then
together be subject to the size cap, as
discussed below. This (combined with
the proposed size cap described below)
will prevent an Options Member from
submitting multiple orders or responses
at the same price to obtain a larger prorata share of the Agency Order.
• The System caps the size of a
C–AIM response, or the aggregate size of
a User’s complex orders on the COB and
C–AIM responses for the same EFID at
the same price, at the size of the Agency
Order (i.e., the System ignores size in
excess of the size of the Agency Order
when processing the C–AIM Auction).
The Exchange believes this will prevent
an Options Member from submitting an
order or response with an extremely
large size in order to obtain a larger prorata share of the Agency Order.21
• C–AIM responses must be on the
opposite side of the market as the
Agency Order. The System rejects a
C–AIM response on the same side of the
market as the Agency Order.22
• C–AIM responses may be
designated with the MTP modifier of
MTP Cancel Newest, but no other MTP
modifiers. The System rejects a C–AIM
response with any other MTP
modifier.23
• C–AIM responses may not be
designated as immediate-or-cancel
19 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(B); see also
proposed Rule 21.22(b)(2). This proposed provision
is similar to the corresponding provision for AIM
responses, except it refers to the SBBO and prices
of complex order rather than the NBBO. See Rule
21.19(c)(5)(B).
20 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(C). This is the
same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM, except it proposes to aggregate responses with
complex order interest rather than simple order
interest. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(C).
21 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(D). This is the
same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM, except it proposes to aggregate responses with
complex order interest, and cap aggregate complex
size, rather than simple order interest. See Rule
21.19(c)(5)(D).
22 See proposed Rule 21.21(c)(5)(E). This is the
same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(E).
23 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(F). This is the
same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(F).
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22181
(‘‘IOC’’). The System rejects a C–AIM
response designated as IOC.24
• C–AIM responses are not visible to
C–AIM Auction participants or
disseminated to OPRA.25
• A User may modify or cancel its C–
AIM responses during the C–AIM
Auction.26
A C–AIM Auction concludes at the
earliest to occur of the following times:
• The end of the C–AIM Auction
period;
• upon receipt by the System of an
unrelated non-Priority Customer
complex order on the same side as the
Agency Order that would post to the
COB at a price better than the stop price;
• upon receipt by the System of an
unrelated Priority Customer complex
order on the same side as the Agency
Order that would post to the COB at a
price equal to or better than the stop
price;
• upon receipt by the System of an
unrelated non-Priority Customer order
or quote that would post to the Simple
Book and cause the SBBO on the same
side as the Agency Order to be better
than the stop price;
• upon receipt by the System of a
Priority Customer order in any
component of the complex strategy that
would post to the Simple Book and
cause the SBBO on the same side as the
Agency Order to be equal to or better
than the stop price;
• upon receipt by the System of a
simple non-Priority Customer order that
would cause the SBBO on the opposite
side of the Agency Order to be better
than the stop price, or a Priority
Customer order that would cause the
SBBO on the opposite side of the
Agency Order to be equal to or better
than the stop price;
• the market close; and
• any time the Exchange halts trading
in the complex strategy or any
component of the complex strategy,
provided, however, that in such
instance, the C–AIM Auction concludes
without execution.27
24 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(G). This is the
same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM, except the proposed rule change does not
reference fill-or-kill (‘‘FOK’’) as a prohibited
designated for C–AIM response. FOK is never
available for complex orders, and thus will not be
available for C–AIM responses (and does not need
to be specifically prohibited for C–AIM responses).
See Rules 21.19(c)(5)(G) and 21.20(b).
25 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(H). This is the
same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(H).
26 See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(I). This is the
same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(I).
27 See proposed Rule 21.22(d). The proposed
events that cause a C–AIM Auction to conclude are
similar as those that cause a simple AIM Auction
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The Exchange proposes to conclude
the C–AIM Auction in response to the
incoming orders described above, as
they would cause the SBBO or the bestpriced complex order on the same side
of the market as the Agency Order to be
better priced than the stop price, or
cause the stop price to be the same price
as the SBBO with a Priority Customer
order on the BBO for a component or a
Priority Customer complex order on the
COB. Similarly, the incoming orders
described above would cause the
opposite side SBBO to be at or better
than the stop price. These events would
create circumstances under which a
C–AIM Auction would not have been
initiated, and therefore, the Exchange
believes it is appropriate to conclude a
C–AIM Auction when they exist.
If the System receives an unrelated
market or marketable limit complex
order (against the SBBO or the best price
of a complex order resting in the COB),
including a Post Only complex order, on
the opposite side of the market during
a C–AIM Auction, the C–AIM Auction
does not end early, and the System
executes the order against interest
outside the C–AIM Auction or posts the
complex order to the COB. If contracts
remain from the unrelated complex
order at the time the C–AIM Auction
ends, they may be allocated for
execution against the Agency Order
pursuant to proposed paragraph (e).28
Because these orders may have the
opportunity to trade against the Agency
Order following the conclusion of the
C–AIM Auction, which execution must
still be at or better than the SBBO and
the best-priced complex orders on the
COB, the Exchange does not believe it
is necessary to cause a C–AIM Auction
to conclude early in the event the
Exchange receives such orders. This
will provide more time for potential
price improvement, and the unrelated
complex order will have the
opportunity to trade against the Agency
Order in the same manner as all other
contra-side interest.
At the conclusion of the C–AIM
Auction, the System executes the
Agency Order against the Initiating
Order or contra-side complex interest
(which includes complex orders on the
COB and C–AIM responses) at the best
price(s) as follows, which price(s) must
be at or between the SBBO and the best
prices of any complex orders resting on
to conclude, except are based on the entry of simple
or complex orders that impact the SBBO or the best
available prices on the same side of the COB rather
than the BBO. See Rule 21.19(d).
28 See proposed Rule 21.22(d). Similarly, market
or marketable limit simple orders on the opposite
side of the Agency Order will not cause an AIM
Auction to end. See Rule 21.19(d).
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each side of the COB at the conclusion
of the C–AIM Auction:
• If the C–AIM Auction results in no
price improvement, the System executes
the Agency Order at the stop price
against contra-side interest in the
following order:
Æ Priority Customer complex orders
on the COB (in time priority);
Æ the Initiating Order for the greater
of (a) one contract or (b) up to 50% of
the Agency Order if there is contra-side
complex interest from one other User at
the stop price or 40% of the Agency
Order if there is contra-side complex
interest from two or more other Users at
the stop price (which percentages are
based on the number of contracts
remaining after execution against
Priority Customer complex orders).
Under no circumstances does the
Initiating Member receive an allocation
percentage, at the final price point, of
more than 50% of the initial Agency
Order in the event there is interest from
one other User or 40% of the initial
Agency Order in the event there is
interest from two or more other Users;
Æ remaining contra-side complex
interest in a pro-rata manner; and
Æ the Initiating Order to the extent
there are any remaining contracts.29
• If the C–AIM Auction results in
price improvement for the Agency
Order and the Initiating Member
selected a single-price submission, the
System executes the Agency Order at
each price level better than the stop
price against contra-side complex
interest in the following order:
Æ Priority Customer complex orders
on the COB (in time priority); and
Æ all other contra-side complex
interest in a pro-rata manner.
If the price at which the balance of the
Agency Order can be fully executed
equals the stop price, then the System
executes any remaining contracts from
the Agency Order at that price in the
order described in the preceding
bulleted paragraph.30
• If the C–AIM Auction results in
price improvement for the Agency
Order and the Initiating Member
selected auto-match, at each price level
29 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(2). This is the same
as the allocation of contra-side simple interest in
simple AIM if there is price improvement for a
single-price submission, except the Exchange does
not propose to make Priority Orders available in
C–AIM, and the Exchange does not offer complex
reserve orders so there would be no nondisplayed
Reserve Quantity available on the COB for
execution. See Rule 21.19(e)(1).
30 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(1). This is the same
as the allocation of contra-side simple interest in
simple AIM if there is no price improvement,
except the Exchange does not propose to make
Priority Orders available in C–AIM. See Rule
21.19(e)(1).
PO 00000
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Sfmt 4703
better than the stop price (or at each
price level better than the stop price up
to the limit price if the Initiating
Member specified one), the System
executes the Agency Order against the
Initiating Order for the number of
contracts equal to the aggregate size of
all other contra-side complex interest
and then executes the Agency Order
against that contra-side complex interest
in the order set forth in the preceding
bulleted paragraph. If the price at which
the balance of the Agency Order can be
fully executed equals the stop price, the
System executes those contracts at that
price in the order set forth in first
bulleted paragraph above.31
• If the Initiating Member selects a
single-price submission, it may elect for
the Initiating Order to have last priority
to trade against the Agency Order. If the
Initiating Member elects last priority,
then notwithstanding proposed
subparagraphs (e)(1) and (2) (as
described above), the System only
executes the Initiating Order against any
remaining Agency Order contracts at the
stop price after the Agency Order is
allocated to all contra-side complex
interest (in the order set forth in
proposed subparagraph (e)(2) above) at
all prices equal to or better than the stop
price. Last priority information is not
available to other market participants
and may not be modified after it is
submitted.32
The System cancels or rejects any
unexecuted C-Aim responses (or
unexecuted portions) at the conclusion
of the C–AIM Auction.33
Because, as proposed, the execution
prices for an Agency Order will always
be better than the SBBO existing at the
conclusion of the C–AIM Auction if it
includes a Priority Customer order on
any leg, the Agency Order will only
execute against the Initiating Order, C–
AIM responses, and complex orders
resting in the COB, and will not leg into
the Simple Book, at the conclusion of a
C–AIM Auction. This is consistent with
current complex order priority
principles, pursuant to which complex
orders may only trade against complex
interest at prices that improve the BBO
of any component that is represented by
a Priority Customer order.34
Currently, the Exchange makes one
auction available to complex orders, the
31 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(3). The proposed
auto-match functionality for C–AIM is the same as
the corresponding auto-match functionality for
simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(e)(3).
32 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(4). The proposed
last priority option for C–AIM is the same as the
corresponding last priority option for simple AIM.
See Rule 21.19(e)(4).
33 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(6).
34 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(5) and current Rule
21.20(c)(3).
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complex order auction (‘‘COA’’).35
Pursuant to current EDGX Rules for
execution following a COA, a complex
order will be allocated first in price
priority and then at the same price to
Priority Customer orders resting on the
Simple Book, COA responses and
unrelated complex orders on the COB in
time priority, and remaining individual
orders in the Simple Book (i.e., nonPriority Customer), which will be
allocated pursuant to Rule 21.8.36
The Simple Book and the COB are
separate, and orders on each do not
interact unless a complex order legs into
the Simple Book. As a result, the System
is not able to calculate the aggregate size
of complex auction responses and
complex orders on the COB and the size
of simple orders in the legs that
comprise the complex strategy at each
potential execution price (as executions
may occur at multiple prices) prior to
execution of an order following the
complex auction. Following a COA, the
System first looks to determine whether
there are Priority Customer orders
resting in the Simple Book at the final
auction price (and in the applicable
ratio). If there are, the System executes
the complex order against those simple
orders. Following that execution, the
System then looks back at the COA
responses and complex orders resting in
the COB to determine whether there is
interest against which the order can
execute. If there is, the System executes
the remaining portion of the complex
order against that complex contra-side
interest. Finally, if there is any size left,
the System looks back at the Simple
Book to determine whether any orders
in the legs are able to trade against any
remaining contracts in the complex
order. If there is, the System executes
the remaining portion of the complex
order again against orders in the Simple
Book. Because of this process, prior to
execution against any Priority Customer
simple orders at a single price level, the
System would not know the aggregate
interest available on both the Simple
Book and COB to execute against the
auctioned order at that price level.
If the Exchange permitted Agency
Orders to leg into the Simple Book
following a C–AIM Auction, it similarly
would not know how much aggregate
simple and complex interest is available
at a price level once it began executing
the Agency Order at that price level.
Unlike a COA, however, the amount of
aggregate interest available to execute
against the Agency Order will be
relevant in a C–AIM Auction with
respect to the allocation of contracts
35 See
36 See
Rule 21.20(d).
Rule 21.20(d)(7).
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against the Agency Order and other
interest at each price level, and with
respect to determining the final price
level at which the Agency Order will
execute. For example, when auto-match
is selected, because the System will not
be able to determine the aggregate size
of contra-side interest (including simple
and complex) at that price level, it
would not be able to determine how
many contracts of the Agency Order
should execute against the Initiating
Order (which should equal the aggregate
size of that contra-side interest).
Additionally, because the System will
not be able to determine the aggregate
size of contra-side interest (including
simple and complex) at the stop price,
it would not be able to determine the
applicable percentage of the Agency
Order that should execute against the
Initiating Order.
The Exchange notes there would be
significant technical complexities
associated with reprogramming priority
within the System to permit Agency
Orders to leg into the Simple Book
following a C–AIM Auction 37 and
allocate the Agency Order in a manner
consistent with standard priority
principles and crossing auctions, while
making the most crossing functionality
available to Options Members. The
proposed rule change will ensure the
Agency Order executes in accordance
with the C–AIM allocation principles
(which are consistent with AIM
allocation principles), which provide
Priority Customers with priority over
the Initiating Order (and other contraside interest) but also provide for the
Initiating Order to execute against a
certain portion of the Agency Order, as
well as provide Initiating Members with
flexibility to submit single-price
submissions or auto-match at multiple
price levels. The Exchange believes
providing this functionality will
encourage Options Members to submit
complex orders into C–AIM Auctions
and provide customer orders with
opportunities for price improvement. It
will also ensure orders (including
Priority Customer orders) on the Simple
Book are protected in accordance with
current complex order priority
37 The Exchange notes it currently does not
permit all-or-none (‘‘AON’’) orders to leg into the
Simple Book following a COA due to the same
technical complexities.37 [sic] While an Agency
Order is not submitted as an AON order, an Agency
Order, like an AON order, must execute in its
entirety or not at all. See Rule 21.1(d)(4). Because
an Agency Order must fully execute at the
conclusion of a C–AIM Auction (and will never rest
in the COB), it effectively functions like an AON
Order, and the Exchange believes it is similarly
appropriate to not leg Agency Orders into the
Simple Book.
PO 00000
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22183
principles,38 as an Agency Order will
only be permitted to execute at prices
that do not trade at the SBBO existing
at the conclusion of the C–AIM Auction
if it includes a Priority Customer order
on any leg, and that do not trade
through the SBBO existing at the
conclusion of the C–AIM Auction.39
In lieu of the procedures set forth
above, an Initiating Member may enter
an Agency Order for the account of a
Priority Customer paired with a
solicited order(s) for the account of a
Priority Customer, which paired orders
the System automatically executes
without a C–AIM Auction (‘‘Customerto-Customer C–AIM Immediate Cross’’),
subject to the following:
• The transaction price must be at or
between the SBBO and may not equal
either side of the SBBO if the BBO of
any component of the complex strategy
represents a Priority Customer order on
the Simple Book;
• the transaction price must be at or
between the best-priced complex orders
in the complex strategy resting on the
COB and may not equal the price of a
Priority Customer complex order resting
on either side of the COB; and
• the System does not initiate a
Customer-to-Customer Complex C–AIM
Immediate Cross if the transaction price
equals (A) either side of the SBBO and
the BBO of any component of the
complex strategy represents a Priority
Customer order on the Simple Book, or
(B) the price of a Priority Customer
complex order resting on either side of
the COB. Instead, the System cancels
the Agency Order and Initiating
Order.40
An Options Member may only use a
C–AIM Auction where there is a
genuine intention to execute a bona fide
transaction.41
A pattern or practice of submitting
orders or quotes for the purpose of
disrupting or manipulating C–AIM
Auctions, including to cause a C–AIM
Auction to conclude before the end of
the C–AIM Auction period, will be
deemed conduct inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade and a
violation of Rule 3.1. It will also be
38 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(5) and current Rule
21.20(c)(3).
39 See Rule 21.20(c)(2)(E) and (d)(6).
40 See proposed Rule 21.22(f). The proposed
Customer-to-Customer C–AIM Immediate Cross is
similar to the Customer-to-Customer AIM
Immediate Cross, except it compares the price of
the Priority Customer orders to the SBBO and bestpriced complex orders in the COB rather than the
NBBO, as the simple AIM version does. See Rule
21.19(f).
41 See proposed Rule 21.22, Interpretation and
Policy .01. This provision is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM. See Rule
21.19, Interpretation and Policy .01.
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deemed conduct inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade and a
violation of Rule 3.1 to engage in a
pattern of conduct where the Initiating
Member breaks up an Agency Order into
separate orders for the purpose of
gaining a higher allocation percentage
than the Initiating Member would have
otherwise received in accordance with
the allocation procedures contained in
proposed paragraph (e) above.42
Rule 22.12 prevents an Options
Member from executing agency orders
to increase its economic gain from
trading against the order without first
giving other trading interests on the
Exchange an opportunity to either trade
with the agency order or to trade at the
execution price when the Options
Member was already bidding or offering
on the book. However, the Exchange
recognizes that it may be possible for an
Options Member to establish a
relationship with a Priority Customer or
other person to deny agency orders the
opportunity to interact on the Exchange
and to realize similar economic benefits
as it would achieve by executing agency
orders as principal. It would be a
violation of Rule 22.12 for an Options
Member to circumvent such rule by
providing an opportunity for (a) a
Priority Customer affiliated with the
Options Member, or (b) a Priority
Customer with whom the Options
Member has an arrangement that allows
the Options Member to realize similar
economic benefits from the transaction
as the Options Member would achieve
by executing agency orders as principal,
to regularly execute against agency
orders handled by the firm immediately
upon their entry as Customer-toCustomer C–AIM Immediate Crosses
pursuant to proposed paragraph (f) of
this Rule.43 In addition to proposed
Interpretation and Policy .03, the
Exchange proposes to amend Rule
22.12(c) to add reference to C–AIM as an
exception to the general restriction on
the execution of orders as principal
against orders they represent as agent.
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2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change is consistent with the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
‘‘Act’’) and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to the Exchange
and, in particular, the requirements of
42 See proposed Rule 21.22, Interpretation and
Policy .02. This provision is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM. See Rule
21.19, Interpretation and Policy .02.
43 See proposed Rule 21.22, Interpretation and
Policy .031 [sic]. This provision is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM. See Rule
21.19, Interpretation and Policy .03.
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Section 6(b) of the Act.44 Specifically,
the Exchange believes the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Section
6(b)(5) 45 requirements that the rules of
an exchange be designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to foster cooperation
and coordination with persons engaged
in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to,
and facilitating transactions in
securities, to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market
system, and, in general, to protect
investors and the public interest.
Additionally, the Exchange believes the
proposed rule change is consistent with
the Section 6(b)(5) 46 requirement that
the rules of an exchange not be designed
to permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.
The proposed rule change is generally
intended to add certain system
functionality currently offered by Cboe
Options to the Exchange’s System in
order to provide a consistent technology
offering for the Cboe Affiliated
Exchanges. A consistent technology
offering, in turn, will simplify the
technology implementation, changes,
and maintenance by Users of the
Exchange that are also participants on
Cboe Affiliated Exchanges. This will
provide Users with greater
harmonization of price improvement
auction mechanisms available among
the Cboe Affiliated Exchanges.
The proposed rule change will
provide market participants with access
to an auction mechanism for execution
of complex orders, which will provide
them with greater flexibility in pricing
complex orders and may provide more
opportunities for price improvement. C–
AIM as proposed will function in a
substantially similar manner as AIM for
simple orders, the Exchange’s current
price improvement mechanism—the
proposed differences relate primarily to
basing the price and execution of the
Agency Order on the SBBO and the
COB, rather than on the NBBO, and to
ensure execution prices are consistent
with complex order priority principles.
C–AIM provides equal access to the
exposed Agency Orders for all market
participants, as all Options Members
that subscribe to the Exchange’s data
feeds will have the opportunity to
interact with orders submitted into C–
44 15
45 15
U.S.C. 78f(b).
U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
46 Id.
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AIM Auctions.47 C–AIM will benefit
investors, because it is designed to
provide investors seeking to execute
complex orders with opportunities to
access additional liquidity and receive
price improvement. It will provide
Options Members with a facility in
which to execute customers’ complex
orders, potentially at improved prices.
The proposed rule change may result in
increased liquidity available at
improved prices for complex orders,
with competitive final pricing out of the
Initiating Member’s control. The
Exchange believes C–AIM will promote
and foster competition and provide
more options contracts with the
opportunity for price improvement.
The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change will remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market
system, because other options
exchanges similarly permit complex
orders to be submitted into their price
improvement auctions.48 The general
framework of the proposed C–AIM
Auction process (such as the eligibility
requirements, the auction response
period, the same-side stop price
requirements, response requirements,
and auction notification process),49 is
substantively the same as the framework
of the AIM Auction for simple orders,
except to account for the differences
between simple and complex orders, as
described above. The Exchange believes
using the same general framework for
the simple and complex auctions will
benefit investors, as it will minimize
confusion regarding how the auction
mechanisms work.
Further, the new functionality may
lead to an increase in Exchange volume
and should allow the Exchange to better
compete against other markets that
already offer an electronic complex
order price improvement mechanism,
while providing an opportunity for
price improvement for Agency Orders
and ensuring that Priority Customers on
the Simple Book and the COB are
protected. C–AIM Auction functionality
should promote and foster competition
and provide more options contracts
with the opportunity for price
improvement, which should benefit
market participants.
47 Any Options Member can subscribe to the
options data disseminated through the Exchange’s
data feeds.
48 See, e.g., Cboe Options Rule 6.74A,
Interpretation and Policy .08; Nasdaq ISE LLC
(‘‘ISE’’) Rule 723(e); Nasdaq PHLX LLC (‘‘PHLX’’)
Rule 1087; BOX Exchange LLC (‘‘BOX’’) Rule 7245;
and Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC
(‘‘MIAX’’) Rule 515A, Interpretation and Policy .12.
49 See Rule 21.19.
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The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change will result in efficient
trading and reduce the risk for investors
that seek access to additional liquidity
and price improvement for complex
orders by providing additional
opportunities to do so. The proposed
priority and allocation rules in the C–
AIM Auction are consistent with the
Exchange’s current complex order
priority principles, pursuant to which
complex orders may only trade against
complex interest at prices that improve
the BBO of any component that is
represented by a Priority Customer
order.50 This will ensure a fair and
orderly market by protecting Priority
Customer orders on the Simple Book
while still affording the opportunity for
price improvement for complex orders
during each C–AIM Auction
commenced on the Exchange. The
proposed allocation is also consistent
with the allocation principles for the
simple AIM Auction, which ensures
protection of Priority Customer orders
resting on the COB.51 In a simple AIM
Auction, Priority Customer orders
receive priority, including over the
Initiating Order’s guaranteed
participation. Similarly, in a C–AIM
Auction, Priority Customer complex
orders receive priority, including over
the Initiating Order’s guaranteed
participation.
The purpose of C–AIM is to provide
a facility for Options Members that
locate liquidity for their customer orders
to execute these orders (and potentially
obtain better prices). An Initiating
Member that provides or locates interest
to execute against its customer orders at
the best then-available price (or better)
will receive in exchange for that effort
execution priority over non-Priority
Customers (who do not expend similar
efforts to trade against the Agency Order
and do not provide price improvement)
to trade against a specified percentage of
the Agency Order at the stop price. The
Exchange believes the proposed rule
change promotes just and equitable
principles of trade, because it will
protect Priority Customer complex
orders resting on the COB while
encouraging Options Members to
continue to provide or locate liquidity
against which their customers may
execute their complex orders. The
Exchange believes this may also
encourage non-Priority Customers to
submit interest at improved prices if
they seek to execute against Agency
Orders.
50 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(5) and current Rule
21.20(c)(3).
51 See Rule 21.19(e).
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By keeping the priority and allocation
rules for a C–AIM Auction similar to the
allocation used for a simple AIM
Auction on the Exchange, consistent
with current complex order priority,
and consistent across possible outcomes
of a C–AIM Auction, the proposed rule
change reduces the ability of market
participants to misuse the C–AIM
Auction to circumvent standard priority
rules in a manner that is designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, and to promote just
and equitable principles of trade on the
Exchange. The proposed execution and
priority rules will allow orders to
interact with interest in the COB, and
will allow interest on the COB to
interact with option orders in the price
improvement mechanisms in an
efficient and orderly manner. The
Exchange believes this interaction of
orders will benefit investors by
increasing the opportunity for complex
orders to receive executions, while also
enhancing the execution quality for
orders resting on the COB.
The proposed C–AIM Auction
eligibility requirements are reasonable
and promote a fair and orderly market
and national market system, because
they are the same as the eligibility
requirements for a simple AIM Auction,
except the proposed rule change
excludes the requirement related to the
NBBO, because there is no NBBO for
complex orders, and the legs of complex
orders are not subject to the restriction
on NBBO trade-throughs. Additionally,
the proposed rule change references the
opening of the COB rather than the
market open, as the opening of the COB
is when complex orders may begin
trading. These are minor differences that
relate solely to underlying differences
between simple and complex orders.
The proposed rule that an Initiating
Member may not designate an Agency
Order or Initiating Order as Post Only
protects investors, because it provides
transparency regarding functionality
that will not be available for C–AIM.
The Exchange believes this is
appropriate, as the purpose of a Post
Only complex order is to not execute
upon entry and instead rest in the COB,
while the purpose of submitting orders
to a C–AIM Auction is to receive an
execution following the auction and not
enter the COB. Pursuant to proposed
Rule 21.22, an Agency Order will fully
execute against contra-side interest (the
Initiating Order, other contra-side
complex interest, or a combination of
both), and thus there cannot be
remaining contracts in an Agency Order
to enter the COB. Similarly, the
Initiating Order may only execute
against the Agency Order at the
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22185
conclusion of a C–AIM Auction, and
thus will not enter the COB.
The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change to permit the Initiating
Order to be comprised of multiple
orders that total the size of the Agency
Order may increase liquidity and
opportunity for Agency Orders to
participate in C–AIM Auctions, and
therefore provide Agency Orders with
additional opportunities for price
improvement, which is consistent with
the principles behind the C–AIM
Auction. The Exchange believes this
will be beneficial to participants
because allowing multiple contraparties should foster competition for
filling the contra-side order and thereby
result in potentially better prices, as
opposed to only allowing one contraparty, which would require that contraparty to guarantee the entire Agency
Order, which could result in a worse
price for the trade. The Initiating Order
for simple AIM Auctions may be
comprised of multiple contra-parties.52
The proposed C–AIM Auction
requirements for the stop price are
reasonable and promote a fair and
orderly market and national market
system, because they are consistent with
the corresponding requirements for a
simple AIM Auction (including the
options for a single-price submission
and auto-match), except the proposed
requirements are based on the SBBO
and complex order prices in the COB
rather than the NBBO. As noted above,
there is no NBBO for complex orders.
The proposed stop price requirements
promote just and equitable principles of
trade, because they protect Priority
Customer orders in the Simple Book and
Priority Customer complex orders in the
COB, and prevent trading through the
SBBO and the best-priced orders on the
COB.
As discussed above, the Exchange has
proposed to allow C–AIM Auctions to
occur concurrently with other C–AIM
Auctions for the same complex
strategies. Although C–AIM Auctions
for Agency Orders will be allowed to
overlap, the Exchange does not believe
this raises any issues that are not
addressed through the proposed rule
change described above. For example,
although overlapping, each C–AIM
Auction will be started in a sequence
and with a time that will determine its
processing. Thus, even if there are two
C–AIM Auctions in the same complex
strategy that commence and conclude,
at nearly the same time, each C–AIM
Auction will have a distinct conclusion
at which time the C–AIM Auction will
be allocated. In turn, when the first C–
52 See
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AIM Auction concludes, unrelated
orders that then exist will be considered
for participation in the C–AIM Auction.
If unrelated orders are fully executed in
such C–AIM Auction, then there will be
no unrelated orders for consideration
when the subsequent C–AIM Auction is
processed (unless new unrelated order
interest has arrived). If instead there is
remaining unrelated order interest after
the first C–AIM Auction has been
allocated, then such unrelated order
interest will be considered for allocation
when the subsequent C–AIM Auction is
processed. As another example, each C–
AIM response is required to specifically
identify the Auction for which it is
targeted and if not fully executed will be
cancelled back at the conclusion of the
Auction. Thus, C–AIM responses will be
specifically considered only in the
specified C–AIM Auction.
The Exchange does not believe that
allowing multiple auctions to overlap
for Agency Orders presents any unique
issues that differ from functionality
already in place on the Exchange.
Pursuant to Rule 21.19(c)(1), multiple
AIM Auctions for Agency Orders for 50
or more contracts may overlap. Different
complex strategies are essentially
different products, as orders in those
strategies cannot interact, just as orders
in different series or classes cannot
interact. Therefore, the Exchange
believes concurrent C–AIM Auctions in
different complex strategies is
appropriate given that concurrent
simple AIM Auctions in different series
or different classes may occur.
Similarly, while it is possible for a
complex order to leg into the Simple
Book, a complex order may only execute
against simple orders if there is interest
in each component in the ratio of the
complex strategy. A simple order in one
component of a complex strategy cannot
on its own interact with a complex
order in that complex strategy.
Therefore, the Exchange believes it is
appropriate to permit concurrent AIM
and C–AIM Auctions in the same
component. As proposed, C–AIM
Auctions will ensure that Agency
Orders execute at prices that protect
Priority Customer orders in the Simple
Book and that are not inferior to the
SBBO, even when there are concurrent
simple and complex auctions occurring.
The proposed rule change sets forth
how any auctions with overlapping
components will conclude if terminated
due to the same event. The Rules do not
currently prevent a COA in a complex
strategy from occurring at the same time
as an AIM in one of the components of
the complex strategy. Therefore, the
Exchange believes it is similarly
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reasonable to permit a C–AIM in a
complex strategy to occur at the same
time as an AIM in one of the
components of the complex strategy.
The proposed auction process will
promote a free and open market,
because it ensures equal access to
information regarding C–AIM Auctions
and the exposed Agency Orders for all
market participants, as all Options
Members that subscribe to the
Exchange’s data feeds with the
opportunity to interact with orders
submitted into C–AIM Auctions.53 The
proposed auction notification message
includes the same information as the
auction notification message for simple
AIM Auctions, and will be available in
the same data feed. The Exchange has
proposed a range between no less than
100 milliseconds and no more than one
second for the duration of a C–AIM
Auction, which is the same duration of
a simple AIM Auction. This will
provide investors with more timely
execution of their complex orders, while
ensuring there is an adequate exposure
of complex orders. This proposed
auction response time should provide
investors with the opportunity to
receive price improvement for complex
orders through C–AIM while reducing
market risk. The Exchange believes a
briefer time period reduces the market
risk for the Initiating Member, versus an
auction with a longer period, as well as
for any Options Member providing
responses to a broadcast. As such, the
Exchange believes the proposed rule
change would help perfect the
mechanism for a free and open national
market system, and generally help
protect investors and the public interest.
All Options Members will have an equal
opportunity to respond with their best
prices during the C–AIM Auction. Since
the Exchange considers all complex
interest present in the System, and not
solely C–AIM responses, for execution
against the Agency Order, those
participants who are not explicit
responders to a C–AIM Auction may
receive executions via C–AIM as well.
The proposed C–AIM Auction
response requirements are reasonable
and promote a fair and orderly market
and national market system, because
they are virtually identical to the
corresponding requirements for a simple
AIM Auction and benefit investors by
providing clarity regarding how they
may respond to a C–AIM Auction. The
only differences are the proposed rule
change does not explicitly prohibit
FOK, because it is never available for
53 Any Options Member can subscribe to the
options data disseminated through the Exchange’s
data feeds.
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complex orders (and thus would not be
available for C–AIM responses), C–AIM
responses will be aggregated with other
complex size rather than other simple
interest, and C–AIM responses will be
capped at the SBBO or prices of
complex orders rather than the NBBO
(because, as discussed above, there is no
NBBO for complex orders and
restricting prices based on the SBBO
and complex orders will ensure
protection of Priority Customer orders).
This will further benefit investors by
providing consistency across the
Exchange’s price improvement
mechanisms.
The proposed rule change will also
perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market
system, because it is consistent with
linkage rules. Rule 27.2(b)(8) provides
that a transaction that is effected as a
portion of a complex trade is exception
to the prohibition on effecting tradethroughs. As discussed above, any
executions following a C–AIM Auction
will not trade-through the SBBO or
prices of complex orders resting on the
COB (and will always improve the
SBBO or COB prices if they consist of
a Priority Customer order).
The proposed events that will
conclude a C–AIM Auction are
reasonable and promote a fair and
orderly market and national market
system, because they are consistent with
the corresponding events that will
conclude a simple AIM Auction, and
benefit investors by providing clarity
regarding what will cause a C–AIM
Auction to conclude. These events
would create circumstances under
which a C–AIM would not have been
permitted to start, and thus the
Exchange believes it is appropriate to
conclude a C–AIM Auction if those
circumstances occur. As is the case with
a simple AIM Auction (which will not
conclude early due to the receipt of an
opposite side simple order), the
Exchange will not conclude a C–AIM
Auction early due to the receipt of an
opposite side complex order. The
Exchange believes this promotes just
and equitable principles of trade,
because these orders may have the
opportunity to trade against the Agency
Order following the conclusion of the
C–AIM Auction, which execution must
still be at or better than the SBBO and
prices of complex orders in the COB.
The Exchange believes this will protect
investors, because it will provide more
time for price improvement, and the
unrelated order will have the
opportunity to trade against the Agency
Order in the same manner as all other
contra-side complex interest.
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With respect to trading halts, as
described above, in the case of a trading
halt on the Exchange in the affected
complex strategy or any component
series, the C–AIM Auction will be
cancelled without execution. This is
consistent with simple AIM, which will
be cancelled without execution if there
is a trading halt on the Exchange in the
affected series. Cancelling C–AIM
Auctions without execution in this
circumstance is consistent with
Exchange handling of trading halts in
the context of continuous trading on
EDGX Options and promotes just and
equitable principles of trade and, in
general, protects investors and the
public interest.54
The Exchange believes the proposed
execution of Agency Orders at the
conclusion of a C–AIM Auction are
reasonable and promote a fair and
orderly market and national market
system, because they are consistent with
the execution of Agency Orders at the
conclusion of a simple AIM Auction.
Similar to the allocation that occurs
following a simple AIM Auction (which
allocates contra-side simple interest in
the same manner), best-priced contraside interest executes against the
Agency Order first, and Priority
Customer complex orders will have first
priority at each price level, followed by
other contra-side complex interest. The
proposed rule change provides for the
Initiating Order to receive the same
percentage entitlement at the stop price,
and also allows the Initiating Member to
receive last priority, or auto-match at
prices better than the stop price. The
proposed rule change does not adopt
Priority Order status for C–AIM, which
is only available in simple AIM for
classes the Exchange designates.
As noted above, there would be
significant technical complexities
associated with reprogramming priority
within the System to permit Agency
Orders to leg into the Simple Book
following a C–AIM Auction 55 and
allocate the Agency Order in a manner
consistent with standard priority
principles and crossing auctions, while
making the most crossing functionality
54 The Exchange notes that trading on the
Exchange in any option contract will be halted
whenever trading in the underlying security has
been paused or halted by the primary listing market
and other circumstances. See Rule 20.3.
55 The Exchange notes it currently does not
permit all-or-none (‘‘AON’’) orders to leg into the
Simple Book following a COA due to the same
technical complexities.55 [sic] While an Agency
Order is not submitted as an AON order, an Agency
Order, like an AON order, must execute in its
entirety or not at all and thus effectively functions
like an AON Order. See Rule 21.1(d)(4). Therefore,
the Exchange believes it is similarly appropriate to
not leg Agency Orders into the Simple Book at the
conclusion of a C–AIM Auction.
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available to Options Members. The
proposed rule change will ensure the
Agency Order executes in accordance
with the C–AIM allocation principles
(which are consistent with AIM
allocation principles), which provide
Priority Customers with priority but also
provide for the Initiating Order to
execute against a certain portion of the
Agency Order, as well as provide
Initiating Members with flexibility to
auto-match executions at multiple price
levels. The Exchange believes providing
this functionality will encourage
Options Members to submit complex
orders into C–AIM Auctions and
provide customer orders with
opportunities for price improvement. It
will also ensure orders (including
Priority Customer orders) on the Simple
Book are protected in accordance with
current complex order priority
principles,56 as an Agency Order will
only be permitted to execute at prices
that do not trade at the SBBO existing
at the conclusion of the C–AIM Auction
if it includes a Priority Customer order
at the BBO on any leg, and that do not
trade through the SBBO existing at the
conclusion of the C–AIM Auction.57 The
proposed allocation will also ensure the
Agency Order does not trade at the same
price as a Priority Customer complex
order resting on the COB or through the
best-priced complex orders on the COB,
and will protect investors by providing
Priority Customer complex orders with
priority at each price level.
The proposed Customer-to-Customer
C–AIM Immediate Cross functionality is
reasonable and will promote a fair and
orderly market and national market
system, because it is consistent with the
corresponding Customer-to-Customer
AIM Immediate Cross functionality.
Similar to above, the pricing restrictions
for Customer-to-Customer C–AIM
Immediate Cross are based on the SBBO
and complex orders in the COB rather
than the NBBO (as is the case for
Customer-to-Customer AIM Immediate
Cross). The proposed pricing
restrictions will ensure that the
transaction price for Customer-toCustomer C–AIM Immediate Crosses
may not be at the same price as any
Priority Customer complex orders
resting on the COB or at the SBBO if the
BBO of any component of the complex
strategy represents a Priority Customer
order on the Simple Book, and thus at
a price at least as good as the price at
which the orders would have executed
had they been submitted separately to
the COB. The proposed functionality
56 See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(5) and current Rule
21.20(c)(3).
57 See Rule 21.20(c)(2)(E) and (d)(6).
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22187
will benefit investors, because it will
enhance and automate order entry firms’
ability to submit two contra-side side
[sic] customer complex orders. The
proposed rule change will provide
Options Member [sic] with a more
efficient means of executing their
customer complex orders (in the same
efficient manner in which they may
currently execute their customer simple
orders) subject to the Exchange’s
existing requirements limiting principal
transactions.
As is the case with AIM, an Options
Member may not use C–AIM to create a
misleading impression of market
activity (i.e., C–AIM may only be used
where there is a genuine intention to
execute a bona fide transaction). The
proposed regulatory provisions are
substantially the same as those
applicable to simple AIM, and the
Exchange believes they will protect
customers and the public interest,
prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, and promote just and
equitable principles of trade.
The proposed rule change is also
consistent with Section 11(a)(1) of the
Act 58 and the rules promulgated
thereunder. Generally, Section 11(a)(1)
of the Act restricts any member of a
national securities exchange from
effecting any transaction on such
exchange for (a) the member’s own
account, (b) the account of a person
associated with the member, or (c) an
account over which the member or a
person associated with the member
exercises discretion (collectively
referred to as ‘‘covered accounts’’),
unless a specific exemption is available.
Examples of common exemptions
include the exemption for transactions
by broker dealers acting in the capacity
of a market maker under Section
11(a)(1)(A),59 the ‘‘G’’ exemption for
yielding priority to non-members under
Section 11(a)(1)(G) of the Act and Rule
11a1–1(T) thereunder,60 and ‘‘Effect vs.
Execute’’ exemption under Rule 11a2–
2(T) under the Act.61 The ‘‘Effect vs.
Execute’’ exemption permits an
exchange member, subject to certain
conditions, to effect transactions for
covered accounts by arranging for an
unaffiliated member to execute
transactions on the exchange. To
comply with Rule 11a2–2(T)’s
5815 U.S.C. 78k(a). Section 11(a)(1) prohibits a
member of a national securities exchange from
effecting transactions on that exchange for its own
account, the account of an associated person, or an
account over which it or its associated person
exercises discretion unless an exception applies.
59 15 U.S.C. 78k(a)(1)(A).
60 15 U.S.C. 78k(a)(1)(G) and 17 CFR 240.11a1–
1(T).
61 17 CFR 240.11a2–2(T).
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conditions, a member: (a) Must transmit
the order from off the exchange floor; (b)
may not participate in the execution of
the transaction once it has been
transmitted to the member performing
the execution;62 (c) may not be affiliated
with the executing member; and (d)
with respect to an account over which
the member has investment discretion,
neither the member nor its associated
person may retain any compensation in
connection with effecting the
transaction except as provided in the
Rule. For the reasons set forth below,
the Exchange believes that Exchange
Members entering orders into a C–AIM
Auction would satisfy the requirements
of Rule 11a2–2(T).
The Exchange does not operate a
physical trading floor. In the context of
automated trading systems, the
Commission has found that the off-floor
transmission requirement is met if a
covered account order is transmitted
from a remote location directly to an
exchange’s floor by electronic means.63
The Exchange represents that the
System and the proposed C–AIM
Auction receive all orders electronically
through remote terminals or computerto-computer interfaces. The Exchange
represents that orders for covered
accounts from Options Members will be
transmitted from a remote location
directly to the proposed C–AIM
mechanism by electronic means.
The second condition of Rule 11a2–
2(T) requires that neither a member nor
an associated person participate in the
execution of its order once the order is
transmitted to the floor for execution.
The Exchange represents that, upon
submission to the C–AIM Auction, an
order or C–AIM response will be
executed automatically pursuant to the
rules set forth for C–AIM. In particular,
execution of an order (including the
Agency Order and the Initiating Order)
or a C–AIM response sent to the
mechanism depends not on the Options
Member entering the order or response,
62 The member may, however, participate in
clearing and settling the transaction.
63 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos.
61419 (January 26, 2010), 75 FR 5157 (February 1,
2010) (SR–BATS–2009–031) (approving BATS
options trading); 59154 (December 23, 2008), 73 FR
80468 (December 31, 2008) (SRBSE–2008–48)
(approving equity securities listing and trading on
BSE); 57478 (March 12, 2008), 73 FR 14521 (March
18, 2008) (SR–NASDAQ–2007–004 and SR–
NASDAQ–2007–080) (approving NOM options
trading); 53128 (January 13, 2006), 71 FR 3550
(January 23, 2006) (File No. 10–131) (approving The
Nasdaq Stock Market LLC); 44983 (October 25,
2001), 66 FR 55225 (November 1, 2001) (SR–PCX–
00–25) (approving Archipelago Exchange); 29237
(May 24, 1991), 56 FR 24853 (May 31, 1991) (SR–
NYSE–90–52 and SR–NYSE–90–53) (approving
NYSE’s Off-Hours Trading Facility); and 15533
(January 29, 1979), 44 FR 6084 (January 31, 1979)
(‘‘1979 Release’’).
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but rather on what other orders and
responses are present and the priority of
those orders and responses. Thus, at no
time following the submission of an
order or response is an Options Member
able to acquire control or influence over
the result or timing of order or response
execution.64 Once the Agency Order
and Initiating Order have been
transmitted, the Initiating Member that
transmitted the orders will not
participate in the execution of the
Agency Order or Initiating Order.
Initiating Members submitting Agency
Orders and Initiating Orders will
relinquish control to modify or cancel
their Agency Orders and Initiating
Orders upon transmission to the
System. Further, no Options Member,
including the Initiating Member, will
see a C–AIM response submitted into C–
AIM, and therefore and will not be able
to influence or guide the execution of
their Agency Orders, Initiating Orders,
or C–AIM responses, as applicable.
Finally, the last priority feature will not
permit an Options Member to have any
control over an order. The election to
apply last priority to an Initiating Order
is available prior to the submission of
the order and therefore could not be
utilized to gain influence or guide the
execution of the Agency Order. The
information provided with respect to
the last priority feature by the Initiating
Member will not be broadcast and
further, the information may not be
modified by the Initiating Member
during the Auction [sic].
Rule 11a2–2(T)’s third condition
requires that the order be executed by
an exchange member who is unaffiliated
with the member initiating the order.
The Commission has stated that the
requirement is satisfied when
automated exchange facilities, such as
the C–AIM Auction, are used, as long as
the design of these systems ensures that
members do not possess any special or
unique trading advantages in handling
their orders after transmitting them to
the exchange.65 The Exchange
64 An Initiating Member may not cancel or modify
an Agency Order or Initiating Order after it has been
submitted into C–AIM. See proposed Rule
21.22(c)(4). Options Members may modify or cancel
their responses after being submitted to into a C–
AIM. See proposed Rule 21.22(d)(5)(H). The
Exchange notes that the Commission has stated that
the non-participation requirement does not
preclude members from cancelling or modifying
orders, or from modifying instructions for executing
orders, after they have been transmitted so long as
such modifications or cancellations are also
transmitted from off the floor. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 14563 (March 14, 1978),
43 FR 11542, 11547 (the ‘‘1978 Release’’).
65 In considering the operation of automated
execution systems operated by an exchange, the
Commission noted that, while there is not an
independent executing exchange member, the
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represents that the C–AIM Auction is
designed so that no Options Member
has any special or unique trading
advantage in the handling of its orders
after transmitting its orders to the
mechanism.
Rule 11a2–2(T)’s fourth condition
requires that, in the case of a transaction
effected for an account with respect to
which the initiating member or an
associated person thereof exercises
investment discretion, neither the
initiating member nor any associated
person thereof may retain any
compensation in connection with
effecting the transaction, unless the
person authorized to transact business
for the account has expressly provided
otherwise by written contract referring
to Section 11(a) of the Act and Rule
11a2–2(T) thereunder.66 The Exchange
recognizes that Options Members
relying on Rule 11a2–2(T) for
transactions effected through the C–AIM
Auction must comply with this
condition of the Rule and the Exchange
will enforce this requirement pursuant
to its obligations under Section 6(b)(1)
of the Act to enforce compliance with
federal securities laws.
The Exchange believes that the instant
proposal is consistent with Rule 11a2–
2(T), and that therefore the exception
should apply in this case.
The proposed rule change will also
perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market
system, because it is consistent with
linkage rules. Rule 27.2(b)(8) provides
that a transaction that is effected as a
portion of a complex trade is exception
to the prohibition on effecting tradethroughs. As discussed above, any
executions following a C–AIM Auction
execution of an order is automatic once it has been
transmitted into the system. Because the design of
these systems ensures that members do not possess
any special or unique trading advantages in
handling their orders after transmitting them to the
exchange, the Commission has stated that
executions obtained through these systems satisfy
the independent execution requirement of Rule
11a2–2(T). See 1979 Release.
66 See 17 CFR 240.11a2–2(T)(a)(2)(iv). In addition,
Rule 11a2–2(T)(d) requires a member or associated
person authorized by written contract to retain
compensation, in connection with effecting
transactions for covered accounts over which such
member or associated persons thereof exercises
investment discretion, to furnish at least annually
to the person authorized to transact business for the
account a statement setting forth the total amount
of compensation retained by the member in
connection with effecting transactions for the
account during the period covered by the statement
which amount must be exclusive of all amounts
paid to others during that period for services
rendered to effect such transactions. See also 1978
Release (stating ‘‘[t]he contractual and disclosure
requirements are designed to assure that accounts
electing to permit transaction-related compensation
do so only after deciding that such arrangements are
suitable to their interests’’).
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will not trade-through the SBBO or
prices of complex orders resting on the
COB (and will always improve the
SBBO or COB prices if they consist of
a Priority Customer order).
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B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that
the proposed rule change will impose
any burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act. The
Exchange does not believe the proposed
rule change will impose any burden on
intramarket competition, as the
proposed rule change will apply in the
same manner to all orders submitted to
a C–AIM Auction. The proposed C–AIM
Auction is voluntary for Options
Members to use and will be available to
all Options Members. As discussed
above, the Exchange believes the
proposed rule change should encourage
Options Members to compete amongst
each other by responding with their best
price and size for a particular auction.
By offering all Options Members the
ability to participate in the proposed
allocation during the C–AIM Auction,
an Options Member will be encouraged
to submit complex orders outside of the
C–AIM Auction at the best and most
aggressive prices. Within the C–AIM
Auction, the Exchange believes the
proposed rule change will encourage
Options Member [sic] to compete
vigorously to provide the opportunity
for price improvement in a competitive
auction process. The proposed
execution and allocation rules are
consistent with those applicable to
simple AIM, as well as complex order
priority, and therefore will ensure
protection of Priority Customer orders
in both the Simple Book and the COB.
The Exchange does not believe the
proposed rule change will impose any
burden on intermarket competition,
because other options exchanges offer
similar complex order price
improvement auctions.67 The general
framework and primary features of the
proposed C–AIM Auction process (such
as the eligibility requirements, auction
response period, response requirements,
and auction notification process),68 are
substantively the same as the framework
for simple AIM. The auction process is
also similar, and is modified to address
the underlying differences between
simple and complex orders. For
example, C–AIM will base pricing and
67 See, e.g., Cboe Options Rule 6.74A,
Interpretation and Policy .08; ISE Rule 723(e);
PHLX Rule 1087; BOX Rule 7245; and MIAX Rule
515A, Interpretation and Policy .12.
68 See Rule 21.19.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:22 May 15, 2019
Jkt 247001
execution requirements on the SBBO
and complex orders in the COB, rather
than the NBBO (which does not apply
to complex orders), to ensure
consistency with Priority Customer
priority and complex order priority
principles.
The Exchange believes that the
proposed rule change will relieve any
burden on, or otherwise promote,
competition. The Exchange believes this
proposed rule change is necessary to
permit fair competition among the
options exchanges and to establish more
uniform price improvement auction
rules on the various options exchanges.
The Exchange anticipates that this
proposal will create new opportunities
for the Exchange to attract new business
and compete on equal footing with
those options exchanges with complex
order price improvement auctions and
for this reason the proposal does not
create an undue burden on intermarket
competition. Rather, the Exchange
believes that the proposed rule would
bolster intermarket competition by
promoting fair competition among
individual markets.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange neither solicited nor
received comments on the proposed
rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 45 days of the date of
publication of this notice in the Federal
Register or within such longer period
up to 90 days (i) as the Commission may
designate if it finds such longer period
to be appropriate and publishes its
reasons for so finding or (ii) as to which
the Exchange consents, the Commission
will:
A. By order approve or disapprove
such proposed rule change, or
B. institute proceedings to determine
whether the proposed rule change
should be disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
PO 00000
Frm 00085
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
22189
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
CboeEDGX–2019–028 on the subject
line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CboeEDGX–2019–028. This
file number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
internet website (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20549 on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change.
Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from
comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish
to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR-CboeEDGX–2019–028, and
should be submitted on or before June
6, 2019.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.69
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019–10125 Filed 5–15–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
69 17
E:\FR\FM\16MYN1.SGM
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
16MYN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 95 (Thursday, May 16, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22178-22189]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-10125]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-85831; File No. SR-CboeEDGX-2019-028]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe EDGX Exchange, Inc.; Notice
of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To Adopt Rule 21.22 (Complex
Automated Improvement Mechanism)
May 10, 2019.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that on April 26, 2019, Cboe EDGX Exchange, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or
``EDGX'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II,
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of the
Substance of the Proposed Rule Change
Cboe EDGX Exchange, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or ``EDGX'') proposes to
adopt Rule 21.22. The text of the proposed rule change is provided in
Exhibit 5.
The text of the proposed rule change is also available on the
Exchange's website (https://markets.cboe.com/us/options/regulation/rule_filings/edgx/), at the Exchange's Office of the Secretary, and at
the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
In 2016, the Exchange's parent company, Cboe Global Markets, Inc.
(``Cboe Global''), which is the parent company of Cboe Exchange, Inc.
(``Cboe Options'') and Cboe C2 Exchange, Inc. (``C2''), acquired the
Exchange, Cboe EDGA Exchange, Inc. (``EDGA''), Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc.
(``BZX or BZX Options''), and Cboe BYX Exchange, Inc. (``BYX'' and,
together with C2, Cboe Options, the Exchange, EDGA, and BZX, the ``Cboe
Affiliated Exchanges''). The Cboe Affiliated Exchanges are working to
align certain system functionality, retaining only intended differences
between the Cboe Affiliated Exchanges, in the context of a technology
migration. Cboe Options intends to migrate its technology to the same
trading platform used by the Exchange, C2, and BZX Options in the
fourth quarter of 2019. The proposal set forth below is intended to add
certain functionality to the Exchange's System that is available on
Cboe Options in order to ultimately provide a consistent technology
offering for market participants who interact with the Cboe Affiliated
Exchanges. Although the Exchange intentionally offers certain features
that differ from those offered by its affiliates and will continue to
do so, the Exchange believes that offering similar functionality to the
extent practicable will reduce potential confusion for Users.
The proposed rule change permits use of its Automated Improvement
Mechanism (``AIM'') for complex orders. Specifically, the proposed rule
change adopts Rule 21.22, which describes how complex orders may be
submitted to and will be processed in an AIM Auction (``C-AIM'' or ``C-
AIM Auction'').\3\ Complex orders will be processed and executed in a
C-AIM Auction pursuant to proposed Rule 21.22 in a similar manner as
simple orders are processed and executed in an AIM Auction pursuant to
Rule 21.19. C-AIM will provide market participants with an opportunity
to receive price improvement for their complex orders. The proposed
rule change is similar to the complex order price improvement mechanism
of Cboe Options and other
[[Page 22179]]
options exchanges. The Exchange believes the similarity of C-AIM to AIM
and the mechanisms of other exchanges will allow the Exchange's
proposed price improvement functionality to fit seamlessly into the
options market and benefit market participants who are already familiar
with this similar functionality. The Exchange also believes this will
encourage Options Members to compete vigorously to provide the
opportunity for price improvement for complex orders in a competitive
auction process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ While the proposed rule change defines an AIM Auction for
complex orders as a C-AIM Auction, the same mechanism is used to
process both simple orders and complex orders. For clarity and ease
of reference, the Exchange proposes a separate name and rule for C-
AIM to help Users distinguish how the mechanism applies to simple
and complex orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An Options Member (the ``Initiating Member'') may electronically
submit for execution a complex order it represents as agent (``Agency
Order'') against principal interest or a solicited complex order(s) \4\
(an ``Initiating Order'') provided it submits the Agency Order for
electronic execution into a C-AIM Auction pursuant to proposed Rule
21.22. For purposes of proposed Rule 21.22, the term ``SBBO'' means the
synthetic best bid or offer \5\ at the particular point in time
applicable to the reference, and the term ``Initial SBBO'' means the
synthetic best bid or offer at the time the C-AIM Auction is
initiated.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Unlike simple AIM, there is no restriction on the solicited
order being for the account of any Options Market Maker registered
in the applicable series on the Exchange, as there are no Market
Maker appointments to complex strategies. Additionally, bulk
messages (the equivalent of quoting functionality) are not available
for complex orders. See Rule 21.20(b).
\5\ The SBBO is calculated using the best displayed price for
each component of a complex strategy from the Simple Book. See Rule
21.20(a)(11).
\6\ See proposed introductory paragraph to Rule 21.22. This
proposed paragraph is the same as the corresponding paragraph for
simple AIM (introductory paragraph to Rule 21.19), except it refers
to SBBO rather than the national best bid or offer (``NBBO''). There
is no NBBO for complex orders, as complex orders may be executed
without consideration of any prices for the complex strategy that
might be available on other exchanges trading the same complex
strategy. See Rule 21.20(c)(2)(E). Additionally, executions of legs
of complex orders are exceptions to the prohibition of trade-
throughs. See Rule 27.2(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As defined, the Initiating Order may be comprised of multiple
orders, in which case they must total the same size as the Agency
Order. This will accommodate multiple contra-parties and increase the
opportunities for customer orders to be submitted into a C-AIM Auction
with the potential for price improvement, since the Initiating Order
must stop the full size of the Agency Order. This will have no impact
on the execution of the Agency Order, which may trade against multiple
contra-parties depending on the final execution price(s), as set forth
in proposed paragraph (e). The Exchange notes that with regard to order
entry, the first order submitted into the system is marked as the
agency side and the second order is marked as the initiating/contra-
side. Additionally, the Initiating Order will always be entered as a
single order, even if that order consists of multiple contra-parties,
which are allocated their portion of the trade in a post-trade
allocation.
The Initiating Member may initiate a C-AIM Auction if all of the
following conditions are met:
The Agency Order may be in any class of options traded on
the Exchange.
The Initiating Member must mark an Agency Order for C-AIM
Auction processing.
There is no minimum size for Agency Orders. The Initiating
Order must be for the same size as the Agency Order.
The price of the Agency Order and Initiating Order must be
in an increment of $0.01.
The Initiating Member may not designate an Agency Order or
Initiating Order as Post Only.
An Initiating Member may only submit an Agency Order to a
C-AIM Auction after the complex order book (``COB'') opens.
The System rejects or cancels both an Agency Order and Initiating
Order submitted to a C-AIM Auction that do not meet these
conditions.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See proposed Rule 21.22(a). Proposed paragraph (a) is the
same as the corresponding paragraph for simple AIM (see Rule
21.19(a)), except the proposed rule change does not provide that an
Initiating Member may not submit an Agency Order if the NBBO is
crossed (unless the Agency Order is an AIM ISO or Sweep and AIM). As
noted above, there is no NBBO for complex orders, and the legs of
complex orders are not subject to the restriction on NBBO trade-
throughs. Additionally, the proposed rule change references the
opening of the COB rather than the market open, as the opening of
the COB is when complex orders may begin trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Initiating Order must stop the entire Agency Order at a price
that satisfies the following:
If the Agency Order is to buy (sell) and (a) the
applicable side of the Exchange's best bid or offer (``BBO'') on any
component of the complex strategy represents a Priority Customer order
on the Simple Book, the stop price must be at least $0.01 better than
the SBB (SBO); or (b) the applicable side of the BBO on each component
of the complex strategy represents a non-Priority Customer order or
quote on the Simple Book, the stop price must be at or better than the
SBB (SBO). This ensures the execution price of the Agency Order will
improve the price of any Priority Customer orders resting on the Simple
Book.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ This is consistent with complex order priority, which
ensures the execution price of complex orders will not be executed
at prices inferior to the SBBO or at a price equal to the SBBO when
there is a Priority Customer at the BBO for any component. See Rule
21.20(c)(2)(E). As noted above, there is no NBBO for complex orders,
so the proposed rule change does not have a price requirement for
the stop price related to the NBBO, unlike simple AIM. See Rule
21.19(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Agency Order is to buy (sell) and (a) a Priority
Customer buy (sell) complex order rests on the COB, the stop price must
be at least $0.01 better than the bid (offer) of the resting complex
order; or (b) a non-Priority Customer buy (sell) complex order rests on
the COB, the stop price must be at least $0.01 better than the bid
(offer) of the resting complex order, unless the Agency Order is a
Priority Customer order, in which case the stop price must be at or
better than the bid (offer) of the resting complex order. This ensures
the execution price of the Agency Order will improve the price of any
resting Priority Customer complex orders on the COB, and that the
execution price of a Priority Customer Agency Order will not be
inferior to the price of any resting non-Priority Customer complex
orders on the COB.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ This corresponds to the same-side simple order check for
AIM, which requires the Agency Order to improve the price of a
resting Priority Customer order on the Simple Book, or a non-
Priority Customer order or quote on the Simple Book unless the
Agency Order is for a Priority Customer. See Rule 21.19(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Agency Order is to buy (sell) and (a) the BBO of
any component of the complex strategy represents a Priority Customer
order on the Simple Book, the stop price must be at least $0.01 better
than the SBO (SBB), or (b) the BBO of each component of the complex
strategy represents a non-Priority Customer order on the Simple Book,
the stop price must be at or better than the SBO (SBB). This ensures
the execution price of the Agency Order will improve the price of any
Priority Customer orders resting in the Simple Book at the opposite
side of the SBBO, and not be through the opposite side of the SBBO.
While the stop price may cross the opposite side best-priced complex
order resting on the opposite side of the COB, as noted below, any
complex interest at a better price than the stop price will trade ahead
of the Initiating Order. Pursuant to proposed paragraph (e), any
contra-side interest available at better prices than the stop price at
the conclusion of a C-AIM Auction will execute against the Agency Order
ahead of the Initiating Order. Therefore, the Agency Order will execute
at the best prices available at the conclusion of the C-AIM Auction,
even if the stop price was inferior to those prices. Simple AIM
Auctions may similarly start at prices inferior to the
[[Page 22180]]
NBBO for the series in certain instances.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Simple AIM has no price checks for orders on the opposite
side of the Agency Order. The proposed rule change adopts price
checks for simple orders that constitute the SBBO on the opposite
side of the Agency Order to ensure that the Agency Order does not
execute at a price through the opposite side SBBO to protect orders
(including Priority Customer orders) resting in the Simple Book.
While there is no complex AIM sweep or complex sweep and AIM order
for C-AIM, because complex orders do not route (and there is no
applicable NBBO), permitting the stop price to cross the opposite
side of the COB is consistent with those order types in simple AIM,
which permit the stop price to be inferior to the Initial NBBO. See
Rule 21.19(b)(3). The execution at the conclusion of a C-AIM Auction
will essentially ``sweep'' better-priced contra-side complex
interest that is available on the Exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Initiating Member must specify (a) a single price at
which it seeks to execute the Agency Order against the Initiating Order
(a ``single-price submission''), including whether it elects to have
last priority in allocation (as described below), or (b) an initial
stop price and instruction to automatically match the price and size of
all C-AIM responses and other trading interest (``auto-match'') up to a
designated limit price or at all prices that improve the stop price.
These options provide the Initiating Member with flexibility regarding
the prices at which it desires to trade against the Initiating Order,
and the same flexibility that is currently available to Options Members
with respect to simple orders.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ These are the same options available for Initiating Members
in simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The System rejects or cancels both an Agency Order and Initiating
Order submitted to a C-AIM Auction that do not meet these
conditions.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See proposed Rule 21.22(b). Proposed paragraph (a) is the
same as the corresponding paragraph for simple AIM (see Rule
21.19(a)), except as described above, including using the SBBO and
COB prices rather than the NBBO as reference prices for the stop
price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon receipt of an Agency Order that meets the above conditions,
the C-AIM Auction process commences. With respect to Agency Orders for
which the smallest leg is less than 50 standard option contracts (or
500 mini-option contracts), only one C-AIM Auction may be ongoing at
any given time in a complex strategy, and C-AIM Auctions in the same
complex strategy may not queue or overlap in any manner. One or more C-
AIM Auctions in the same complex strategy for Agency Orders for which
the smallest leg is 50 standard option contracts (or 500 mini-option
contracts) or more may occur at the same time. C-AIM Auctions in
different complex strategies may be ongoing at any given time, even if
the complex strategies have overlapping components. A C-AIM Auction may
be ongoing at the same time as an AIM Auction in any component of the
complex strategy.
To the extent there is more than one C-AIM Auction in a complex
strategy underway at a time, the C-AIM Auctions conclude sequentially
based on the exact time each C-AIM Auction commenced, unless terminated
early pursuant to proposed paragraph (d). In the event there are
multiple C-AIM Auctions underway that are each terminated early
pursuant to proposed paragraph (d), the System processes the C-AIM
Auctions sequentially based on the exact time each C-AIM Auction
commenced. If the System receives a simple order that causes an AIM and
C-AIM (or multiple AIM and/or C-AIM) Auctions to conclude pursuant to
proposed paragraph (d) and Rule 21.19(d), the System first processes
AIM Auctions (in price-time priority) and then processes C-AIM Auctions
(in price-time priority). At the time each C-AIM Auction concludes, the
System allocates the Agency Order pursuant to proposed paragraph (e)
and takes into account all C-AIM Auction responses and unrelated orders
and quotes in place at the exact time of conclusion.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(1). Proposed paragraph (c)(1) is
the same as the corresponding paragraph for simple AIM (see Rule
21.19(c)(1)), except the proposed change adds how the System will
handle ongoing auctions that include an overlapping component
(whether that component is the subject of an ongoing simple AIM
Auction or part of a complex strategy for which a different C-AIM
Auction is ongoing) and adds that whether concurrent C-AIM Auctions
(subject to the same minimum size restriction as simple orders) in
the same complex strategy may occur is based on the size of the
smallest leg of the Agency Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange currently permits concurrent AIM Auctions in the same
series (for Agency Orders of 50 or more contracts) and thus believes it
is appropriate to similarly permit concurrent C-AIM Auctions in the
same complex strategy (for Agency Orders for which the smallest leg is
for 50 or more contracts). Different complex strategies are essentially
different products, as orders in those strategies cannot interact, just
as orders in different series or classes cannot interact. Therefore,
the Exchange believes concurrent C-AIM Auctions in different complex
strategies is appropriate given that concurrent simple AIM Auctions in
different series or different classes may occur. Similarly, while it is
possible for a complex order to leg into the Simple Book, a complex
order may only execute against simple orders if there is interest in
each component in the appropriate ratio for the complex strategy. A
simple order in one component of a complex strategy cannot on its own
interact with a complex order in that complex strategy. Therefore, the
Exchange believes it is appropriate to permit concurrent AIM and C-AIM
Auctions that share a component. As proposed, C-AIM Auctions will
ensure that Agency Orders execute at prices that protect Priority
Customer orders in the Simple Book and that are not inferior to the
SBBO at the conclusion of the C-AIM Auction, even when there are
concurrent simple and complex auctions occurring. The proposed rule
change sets forth how any auctions with overlapping components will
conclude if terminated due to the same event.
The Exchange notes it is currently possible for auctions in a
component leg and a complex strategy containing that component (such as
a simple AIM Auction in the component and a complex order auction
(``COA'') in the complex strategy that contains that component) to
occur concurrently, and at the end of each auction, it is possible for
interest resting in the Simple Book to trade against the complex order
subject to the COA. While these auctions may be occurring at the same
time, they will be processed in the order in which they are terminated
(similar to how the System will process auctions as proposed above). In
other words, suppose there is an AIM Auction in a series and a COA in a
complex strategy for which one of the components is the same series
both occurring, which began and will terminate in that order, and each
of which last 100 milliseconds. While it is possible for both auctions
to terminate nearly simultaneously, the System will still process them
in the order in which they terminate. When the AIM Auction terminates,
the System will process it in accordance with Rule 21.19, and the
auctioned order may trade against any resting interest (in addition to
the contra-side order and responses submitted to that AIM Auction,
which may only trade against the order auctioned in that AIM pursuant
to Rule 21.19). The System will then process the COA Auction when it
terminates, and the auctioned order may trade against any resting
interest, including any simple interest that did not execute against
the AIM order (in addition to the contra-side order and responses
submitted to that COA Auction, which may only trade against the order
auctioned in that COA), pursuant to Rule 21.20.
The System initiates the C-AIM Auction process by sending a C-AIM
Auction notification message detailing the side, size, price, Capacity,
Auction ID, and complex strategy of the Agency Order to all Options
Members that elect
[[Page 22181]]
to receive C-AIM Auction notification messages. C-AIM Auction
notification messages are not included in OPRA.\14\ A C-AIM Auction
will last for a period of time determined by the Exchange, which may be
no less than 100 milliseconds and no more than one second, and which
the Exchange will announce to Options Members via Exchange Notice and/
or technical specifications.\15\ An Initiating Member may not modify or
cancel an Agency Order or Initiating Order after submission to a C-AIM
Auction.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(2). The proposed C-AIM Auction
notification message is the same as the corresponding message for
simple AIM (see Rule 21.19(c)(2)), except the proposed rule change
indicates the notification message for a C-AIM Auction will include
the complex strategy rather than the series. The proposed rule
change also states the C-AIM notification message will include the
Capacity of the Agency Order. The notification message for simple
AIM includes Capacity, but that detail is not currently included in
Rule 21.19.
\15\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(3). The proposed C-AIM Auction
period is the same as the auction period for simple AIM (see Rule
21.19(c)(3)).
\16\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(4). The proposed C-AIM Auction
notification message [sic] is the same as the corresponding
provision for simple AIM (see Rule 21.19(c)(4)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any User other than the Initiating Member (determined by EFID) may
submit responses to a C-AIM Auction that are properly marked specifying
size, side of the market, and the Auction ID for the C-AIM Auction to
which the User is submitting the response. A C-AIM Auction response may
only participate in the C-AIM Auction with the Auction ID specified in
the response.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5). The proposed provisions
regarding C-AIM responses are the same as the provisions regarding
AIM responses, except as set forth below. See Rule 21.19(c)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The minimum price increment for C-AIM responses is $0.01.
The System rejects a C-AIM response that is not in a $0.01
increment.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(A). The proposed minimum
increment for C-AIM responses is the same as the minimum increment
for AIM responses. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-AIM responses that cross the Initial SBBO or the price
of a complex order resting at the top of the COB on the same side as
the Agency Order are capped at (a) the better of the Initial SBBO or
the price of the resting complex order, or (b) $0.01 better than the
better of the Initial SBBO or the resting complex order if the BBO of
any component of the complex strategy or the resting complex order,
respectively, is a Priority Customer order. The System executes these
C-AIM responses, if possible, at the most aggressive permissible price
not outside the Initial SBBO or price of the resting complex order.
This will ensure the execution price does not cross the Initial SBBO or
prices of resting complex orders, which the stop price must be at or
better than (and must be better than if represented by a Priority
Customer order) as discussed above.\19\
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\19\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(B); see also proposed Rule
21.22(b)(2). This proposed provision is similar to the corresponding
provision for AIM responses, except it refers to the SBBO and prices
of complex order rather than the NBBO. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A User may submit multiple C-AIM responses at the same or
multiple prices to a C-AIM Auction. The System aggregates all of a
User's complex orders on the COB and C-AIM responses for the same EFID
at the same price.\20\ The Exchange believes this is appropriate since
all interest at a single price is considered for execution against the
Agency Order at that price, and can then together be subject to the
size cap, as discussed below. This (combined with the proposed size cap
described below) will prevent an Options Member from submitting
multiple orders or responses at the same price to obtain a larger pro-
rata share of the Agency Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(C). This is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM, except it proposes to
aggregate responses with complex order interest rather than simple
order interest. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The System caps the size of a C-AIM response, or the
aggregate size of a User's complex orders on the COB and C-AIM
responses for the same EFID at the same price, at the size of the
Agency Order (i.e., the System ignores size in excess of the size of
the Agency Order when processing the C-AIM Auction). The Exchange
believes this will prevent an Options Member from submitting an order
or response with an extremely large size in order to obtain a larger
pro-rata share of the Agency Order.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(D). This is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM, except it proposes to
aggregate responses with complex order interest, and cap aggregate
complex size, rather than simple order interest. See Rule
21.19(c)(5)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-AIM responses must be on the opposite side of the market
as the Agency Order. The System rejects a C-AIM response on the same
side of the market as the Agency Order.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See proposed Rule 21.21(c)(5)(E). This is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(E).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-AIM responses may be designated with the MTP modifier of
MTP Cancel Newest, but no other MTP modifiers. The System rejects a C-
AIM response with any other MTP modifier.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(F). This is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-AIM responses may not be designated as immediate-or-
cancel (``IOC''). The System rejects a C-AIM response designated as
IOC.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(G). This is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM, except the proposed rule
change does not reference fill-or-kill (``FOK'') as a prohibited
designated for C-AIM response. FOK is never available for complex
orders, and thus will not be available for C-AIM responses (and does
not need to be specifically prohibited for C-AIM responses). See
Rules 21.19(c)(5)(G) and 21.20(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-AIM responses are not visible to C-AIM Auction
participants or disseminated to OPRA.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(H). This is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(H).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A User may modify or cancel its C-AIM responses during the
C-AIM Auction.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(5)(I). This is the same as the
corresponding provision for simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(c)(5)(I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A C-AIM Auction concludes at the earliest to occur of the following
times:
The end of the C-AIM Auction period;
upon receipt by the System of an unrelated non-Priority
Customer complex order on the same side as the Agency Order that would
post to the COB at a price better than the stop price;
upon receipt by the System of an unrelated Priority
Customer complex order on the same side as the Agency Order that would
post to the COB at a price equal to or better than the stop price;
upon receipt by the System of an unrelated non-Priority
Customer order or quote that would post to the Simple Book and cause
the SBBO on the same side as the Agency Order to be better than the
stop price;
upon receipt by the System of a Priority Customer order in
any component of the complex strategy that would post to the Simple
Book and cause the SBBO on the same side as the Agency Order to be
equal to or better than the stop price;
upon receipt by the System of a simple non-Priority
Customer order that would cause the SBBO on the opposite side of the
Agency Order to be better than the stop price, or a Priority Customer
order that would cause the SBBO on the opposite side of the Agency
Order to be equal to or better than the stop price;
the market close; and
any time the Exchange halts trading in the complex
strategy or any component of the complex strategy, provided, however,
that in such instance, the C-AIM Auction concludes without
execution.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See proposed Rule 21.22(d). The proposed events that cause
a C-AIM Auction to conclude are similar as those that cause a simple
AIM Auction to conclude, except are based on the entry of simple or
complex orders that impact the SBBO or the best available prices on
the same side of the COB rather than the BBO. See Rule 21.19(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 22182]]
The Exchange proposes to conclude the C-AIM Auction in response to
the incoming orders described above, as they would cause the SBBO or
the best-priced complex order on the same side of the market as the
Agency Order to be better priced than the stop price, or cause the stop
price to be the same price as the SBBO with a Priority Customer order
on the BBO for a component or a Priority Customer complex order on the
COB. Similarly, the incoming orders described above would cause the
opposite side SBBO to be at or better than the stop price. These events
would create circumstances under which a C-AIM Auction would not have
been initiated, and therefore, the Exchange believes it is appropriate
to conclude a C-AIM Auction when they exist.
If the System receives an unrelated market or marketable limit
complex order (against the SBBO or the best price of a complex order
resting in the COB), including a Post Only complex order, on the
opposite side of the market during a C-AIM Auction, the C-AIM Auction
does not end early, and the System executes the order against interest
outside the C-AIM Auction or posts the complex order to the COB. If
contracts remain from the unrelated complex order at the time the C-AIM
Auction ends, they may be allocated for execution against the Agency
Order pursuant to proposed paragraph (e).\28\ Because these orders may
have the opportunity to trade against the Agency Order following the
conclusion of the C-AIM Auction, which execution must still be at or
better than the SBBO and the best-priced complex orders on the COB, the
Exchange does not believe it is necessary to cause a C-AIM Auction to
conclude early in the event the Exchange receives such orders. This
will provide more time for potential price improvement, and the
unrelated complex order will have the opportunity to trade against the
Agency Order in the same manner as all other contra-side interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See proposed Rule 21.22(d). Similarly, market or marketable
limit simple orders on the opposite side of the Agency Order will
not cause an AIM Auction to end. See Rule 21.19(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the conclusion of the C-AIM Auction, the System executes the
Agency Order against the Initiating Order or contra-side complex
interest (which includes complex orders on the COB and C-AIM responses)
at the best price(s) as follows, which price(s) must be at or between
the SBBO and the best prices of any complex orders resting on each side
of the COB at the conclusion of the C-AIM Auction:
If the C-AIM Auction results in no price improvement, the
System executes the Agency Order at the stop price against contra-side
interest in the following order:
[cir] Priority Customer complex orders on the COB (in time
priority);
[cir] the Initiating Order for the greater of (a) one contract or
(b) up to 50% of the Agency Order if there is contra-side complex
interest from one other User at the stop price or 40% of the Agency
Order if there is contra-side complex interest from two or more other
Users at the stop price (which percentages are based on the number of
contracts remaining after execution against Priority Customer complex
orders). Under no circumstances does the Initiating Member receive an
allocation percentage, at the final price point, of more than 50% of
the initial Agency Order in the event there is interest from one other
User or 40% of the initial Agency Order in the event there is interest
from two or more other Users;
[cir] remaining contra-side complex interest in a pro-rata manner;
and
[cir] the Initiating Order to the extent there are any remaining
contracts.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(2). This is the same as the
allocation of contra-side simple interest in simple AIM if there is
price improvement for a single-price submission, except the Exchange
does not propose to make Priority Orders available in C-AIM, and the
Exchange does not offer complex reserve orders so there would be no
nondisplayed Reserve Quantity available on the COB for execution.
See Rule 21.19(e)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the C-AIM Auction results in price improvement for the
Agency Order and the Initiating Member selected a single-price
submission, the System executes the Agency Order at each price level
better than the stop price against contra-side complex interest in the
following order:
[cir] Priority Customer complex orders on the COB (in time
priority); and
[cir] all other contra-side complex interest in a pro-rata manner.
If the price at which the balance of the Agency Order can be fully
executed equals the stop price, then the System executes any remaining
contracts from the Agency Order at that price in the order described in
the preceding bulleted paragraph.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(1). This is the same as the
allocation of contra-side simple interest in simple AIM if there is
no price improvement, except the Exchange does not propose to make
Priority Orders available in C-AIM. See Rule 21.19(e)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the C-AIM Auction results in price improvement for the
Agency Order and the Initiating Member selected auto-match, at each
price level better than the stop price (or at each price level better
than the stop price up to the limit price if the Initiating Member
specified one), the System executes the Agency Order against the
Initiating Order for the number of contracts equal to the aggregate
size of all other contra-side complex interest and then executes the
Agency Order against that contra-side complex interest in the order set
forth in the preceding bulleted paragraph. If the price at which the
balance of the Agency Order can be fully executed equals the stop
price, the System executes those contracts at that price in the order
set forth in first bulleted paragraph above.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(3). The proposed auto-match
functionality for C-AIM is the same as the corresponding auto-match
functionality for simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Initiating Member selects a single-price
submission, it may elect for the Initiating Order to have last priority
to trade against the Agency Order. If the Initiating Member elects last
priority, then notwithstanding proposed subparagraphs (e)(1) and (2)
(as described above), the System only executes the Initiating Order
against any remaining Agency Order contracts at the stop price after
the Agency Order is allocated to all contra-side complex interest (in
the order set forth in proposed subparagraph (e)(2) above) at all
prices equal to or better than the stop price. Last priority
information is not available to other market participants and may not
be modified after it is submitted.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(4). The proposed last priority
option for C-AIM is the same as the corresponding last priority
option for simple AIM. See Rule 21.19(e)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The System cancels or rejects any unexecuted C-Aim responses (or
unexecuted portions) at the conclusion of the C-AIM Auction.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because, as proposed, the execution prices for an Agency Order will
always be better than the SBBO existing at the conclusion of the C-AIM
Auction if it includes a Priority Customer order on any leg, the Agency
Order will only execute against the Initiating Order, C-AIM responses,
and complex orders resting in the COB, and will not leg into the Simple
Book, at the conclusion of a C-AIM Auction. This is consistent with
current complex order priority principles, pursuant to which complex
orders may only trade against complex interest at prices that improve
the BBO of any component that is represented by a Priority Customer
order.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(5) and current Rule 21.20(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, the Exchange makes one auction available to complex
orders, the
[[Page 22183]]
complex order auction (``COA'').\35\ Pursuant to current EDGX Rules for
execution following a COA, a complex order will be allocated first in
price priority and then at the same price to Priority Customer orders
resting on the Simple Book, COA responses and unrelated complex orders
on the COB in time priority, and remaining individual orders in the
Simple Book (i.e., non-Priority Customer), which will be allocated
pursuant to Rule 21.8.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See Rule 21.20(d).
\36\ See Rule 21.20(d)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Simple Book and the COB are separate, and orders on each do not
interact unless a complex order legs into the Simple Book. As a result,
the System is not able to calculate the aggregate size of complex
auction responses and complex orders on the COB and the size of simple
orders in the legs that comprise the complex strategy at each potential
execution price (as executions may occur at multiple prices) prior to
execution of an order following the complex auction. Following a COA,
the System first looks to determine whether there are Priority Customer
orders resting in the Simple Book at the final auction price (and in
the applicable ratio). If there are, the System executes the complex
order against those simple orders. Following that execution, the System
then looks back at the COA responses and complex orders resting in the
COB to determine whether there is interest against which the order can
execute. If there is, the System executes the remaining portion of the
complex order against that complex contra-side interest. Finally, if
there is any size left, the System looks back at the Simple Book to
determine whether any orders in the legs are able to trade against any
remaining contracts in the complex order. If there is, the System
executes the remaining portion of the complex order again against
orders in the Simple Book. Because of this process, prior to execution
against any Priority Customer simple orders at a single price level,
the System would not know the aggregate interest available on both the
Simple Book and COB to execute against the auctioned order at that
price level.
If the Exchange permitted Agency Orders to leg into the Simple Book
following a C-AIM Auction, it similarly would not know how much
aggregate simple and complex interest is available at a price level
once it began executing the Agency Order at that price level. Unlike a
COA, however, the amount of aggregate interest available to execute
against the Agency Order will be relevant in a C-AIM Auction with
respect to the allocation of contracts against the Agency Order and
other interest at each price level, and with respect to determining the
final price level at which the Agency Order will execute. For example,
when auto-match is selected, because the System will not be able to
determine the aggregate size of contra-side interest (including simple
and complex) at that price level, it would not be able to determine how
many contracts of the Agency Order should execute against the
Initiating Order (which should equal the aggregate size of that contra-
side interest). Additionally, because the System will not be able to
determine the aggregate size of contra-side interest (including simple
and complex) at the stop price, it would not be able to determine the
applicable percentage of the Agency Order that should execute against
the Initiating Order.
The Exchange notes there would be significant technical
complexities associated with reprogramming priority within the System
to permit Agency Orders to leg into the Simple Book following a C-AIM
Auction \37\ and allocate the Agency Order in a manner consistent with
standard priority principles and crossing auctions, while making the
most crossing functionality available to Options Members. The proposed
rule change will ensure the Agency Order executes in accordance with
the C-AIM allocation principles (which are consistent with AIM
allocation principles), which provide Priority Customers with priority
over the Initiating Order (and other contra-side interest) but also
provide for the Initiating Order to execute against a certain portion
of the Agency Order, as well as provide Initiating Members with
flexibility to submit single-price submissions or auto-match at
multiple price levels. The Exchange believes providing this
functionality will encourage Options Members to submit complex orders
into C-AIM Auctions and provide customer orders with opportunities for
price improvement. It will also ensure orders (including Priority
Customer orders) on the Simple Book are protected in accordance with
current complex order priority principles,\38\ as an Agency Order will
only be permitted to execute at prices that do not trade at the SBBO
existing at the conclusion of the C-AIM Auction if it includes a
Priority Customer order on any leg, and that do not trade through the
SBBO existing at the conclusion of the C-AIM Auction.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ The Exchange notes it currently does not permit all-or-none
(``AON'') orders to leg into the Simple Book following a COA due to
the same technical complexities.\37\ [sic] While an Agency Order is
not submitted as an AON order, an Agency Order, like an AON order,
must execute in its entirety or not at all. See Rule 21.1(d)(4).
Because an Agency Order must fully execute at the conclusion of a C-
AIM Auction (and will never rest in the COB), it effectively
functions like an AON Order, and the Exchange believes it is
similarly appropriate to not leg Agency Orders into the Simple Book.
\38\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(5) and current Rule 21.20(c)(3).
\39\ See Rule 21.20(c)(2)(E) and (d)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In lieu of the procedures set forth above, an Initiating Member may
enter an Agency Order for the account of a Priority Customer paired
with a solicited order(s) for the account of a Priority Customer, which
paired orders the System automatically executes without a C-AIM Auction
(``Customer-to-Customer C-AIM Immediate Cross''), subject to the
following:
The transaction price must be at or between the SBBO and
may not equal either side of the SBBO if the BBO of any component of
the complex strategy represents a Priority Customer order on the Simple
Book;
the transaction price must be at or between the best-
priced complex orders in the complex strategy resting on the COB and
may not equal the price of a Priority Customer complex order resting on
either side of the COB; and
the System does not initiate a Customer-to-Customer
Complex C-AIM Immediate Cross if the transaction price equals (A)
either side of the SBBO and the BBO of any component of the complex
strategy represents a Priority Customer order on the Simple Book, or
(B) the price of a Priority Customer complex order resting on either
side of the COB. Instead, the System cancels the Agency Order and
Initiating Order.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ See proposed Rule 21.22(f). The proposed Customer-to-
Customer C-AIM Immediate Cross is similar to the Customer-to-
Customer AIM Immediate Cross, except it compares the price of the
Priority Customer orders to the SBBO and best-priced complex orders
in the COB rather than the NBBO, as the simple AIM version does. See
Rule 21.19(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An Options Member may only use a C-AIM Auction where there is a
genuine intention to execute a bona fide transaction.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See proposed Rule 21.22, Interpretation and Policy .01.
This provision is the same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM. See Rule 21.19, Interpretation and Policy .01.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A pattern or practice of submitting orders or quotes for the
purpose of disrupting or manipulating C-AIM Auctions, including to
cause a C-AIM Auction to conclude before the end of the C-AIM Auction
period, will be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade and a violation of Rule 3.1. It will also be
[[Page 22184]]
deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade
and a violation of Rule 3.1 to engage in a pattern of conduct where the
Initiating Member breaks up an Agency Order into separate orders for
the purpose of gaining a higher allocation percentage than the
Initiating Member would have otherwise received in accordance with the
allocation procedures contained in proposed paragraph (e) above.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ See proposed Rule 21.22, Interpretation and Policy .02.
This provision is the same as the corresponding provision for simple
AIM. See Rule 21.19, Interpretation and Policy .02.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 22.12 prevents an Options Member from executing agency orders
to increase its economic gain from trading against the order without
first giving other trading interests on the Exchange an opportunity to
either trade with the agency order or to trade at the execution price
when the Options Member was already bidding or offering on the book.
However, the Exchange recognizes that it may be possible for an Options
Member to establish a relationship with a Priority Customer or other
person to deny agency orders the opportunity to interact on the
Exchange and to realize similar economic benefits as it would achieve
by executing agency orders as principal. It would be a violation of
Rule 22.12 for an Options Member to circumvent such rule by providing
an opportunity for (a) a Priority Customer affiliated with the Options
Member, or (b) a Priority Customer with whom the Options Member has an
arrangement that allows the Options Member to realize similar economic
benefits from the transaction as the Options Member would achieve by
executing agency orders as principal, to regularly execute against
agency orders handled by the firm immediately upon their entry as
Customer-to-Customer C-AIM Immediate Crosses pursuant to proposed
paragraph (f) of this Rule.\43\ In addition to proposed Interpretation
and Policy .03, the Exchange proposes to amend Rule 22.12(c) to add
reference to C-AIM as an exception to the general restriction on the
execution of orders as principal against orders they represent as
agent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See proposed Rule 21.22, Interpretation and Policy .031
[sic]. This provision is the same as the corresponding provision for
simple AIM. See Rule 21.19, Interpretation and Policy .03.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ``Act'') and the rules and
regulations thereunder applicable to the Exchange and, in particular,
the requirements of Section 6(b) of the Act.\44\ Specifically, the
Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the
Section 6(b)(5) \45\ requirements that the rules of an exchange be
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation
and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing,
settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and,
in general, to protect investors and the public interest. Additionally,
the Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the
Section 6(b)(5) \46\ requirement that the rules of an exchange not be
designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers,
brokers, or dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\45\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
\46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule change is generally intended to add certain
system functionality currently offered by Cboe Options to the
Exchange's System in order to provide a consistent technology offering
for the Cboe Affiliated Exchanges. A consistent technology offering, in
turn, will simplify the technology implementation, changes, and
maintenance by Users of the Exchange that are also participants on Cboe
Affiliated Exchanges. This will provide Users with greater
harmonization of price improvement auction mechanisms available among
the Cboe Affiliated Exchanges.
The proposed rule change will provide market participants with
access to an auction mechanism for execution of complex orders, which
will provide them with greater flexibility in pricing complex orders
and may provide more opportunities for price improvement. C-AIM as
proposed will function in a substantially similar manner as AIM for
simple orders, the Exchange's current price improvement mechanism--the
proposed differences relate primarily to basing the price and execution
of the Agency Order on the SBBO and the COB, rather than on the NBBO,
and to ensure execution prices are consistent with complex order
priority principles. C-AIM provides equal access to the exposed Agency
Orders for all market participants, as all Options Members that
subscribe to the Exchange's data feeds will have the opportunity to
interact with orders submitted into C-AIM Auctions.\47\ C-AIM will
benefit investors, because it is designed to provide investors seeking
to execute complex orders with opportunities to access additional
liquidity and receive price improvement. It will provide Options
Members with a facility in which to execute customers' complex orders,
potentially at improved prices. The proposed rule change may result in
increased liquidity available at improved prices for complex orders,
with competitive final pricing out of the Initiating Member's control.
The Exchange believes C-AIM will promote and foster competition and
provide more options contracts with the opportunity for price
improvement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Any Options Member can subscribe to the options data
disseminated through the Exchange's data feeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes the proposed rule change will remove
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and
a national market system, because other options exchanges similarly
permit complex orders to be submitted into their price improvement
auctions.\48\ The general framework of the proposed C-AIM Auction
process (such as the eligibility requirements, the auction response
period, the same-side stop price requirements, response requirements,
and auction notification process),\49\ is substantively the same as the
framework of the AIM Auction for simple orders, except to account for
the differences between simple and complex orders, as described above.
The Exchange believes using the same general framework for the simple
and complex auctions will benefit investors, as it will minimize
confusion regarding how the auction mechanisms work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See, e.g., Cboe Options Rule 6.74A, Interpretation and
Policy .08; Nasdaq ISE LLC (``ISE'') Rule 723(e); Nasdaq PHLX LLC
(``PHLX'') Rule 1087; BOX Exchange LLC (``BOX'') Rule 7245; and
Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC (``MIAX'') Rule 515A,
Interpretation and Policy .12.
\49\ See Rule 21.19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the new functionality may lead to an increase in Exchange
volume and should allow the Exchange to better compete against other
markets that already offer an electronic complex order price
improvement mechanism, while providing an opportunity for price
improvement for Agency Orders and ensuring that Priority Customers on
the Simple Book and the COB are protected. C-AIM Auction functionality
should promote and foster competition and provide more options
contracts with the opportunity for price improvement, which should
benefit market participants.
[[Page 22185]]
The Exchange believes the proposed rule change will result in
efficient trading and reduce the risk for investors that seek access to
additional liquidity and price improvement for complex orders by
providing additional opportunities to do so. The proposed priority and
allocation rules in the C-AIM Auction are consistent with the
Exchange's current complex order priority principles, pursuant to which
complex orders may only trade against complex interest at prices that
improve the BBO of any component that is represented by a Priority
Customer order.\50\ This will ensure a fair and orderly market by
protecting Priority Customer orders on the Simple Book while still
affording the opportunity for price improvement for complex orders
during each C-AIM Auction commenced on the Exchange. The proposed
allocation is also consistent with the allocation principles for the
simple AIM Auction, which ensures protection of Priority Customer
orders resting on the COB.\51\ In a simple AIM Auction, Priority
Customer orders receive priority, including over the Initiating Order's
guaranteed participation. Similarly, in a C-AIM Auction, Priority
Customer complex orders receive priority, including over the Initiating
Order's guaranteed participation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(5) and current Rule 21.20(c)(3).
\51\ See Rule 21.19(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The purpose of C-AIM is to provide a facility for Options Members
that locate liquidity for their customer orders to execute these orders
(and potentially obtain better prices). An Initiating Member that
provides or locates interest to execute against its customer orders at
the best then-available price (or better) will receive in exchange for
that effort execution priority over non-Priority Customers (who do not
expend similar efforts to trade against the Agency Order and do not
provide price improvement) to trade against a specified percentage of
the Agency Order at the stop price. The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change promotes just and equitable principles of trade, because it
will protect Priority Customer complex orders resting on the COB while
encouraging Options Members to continue to provide or locate liquidity
against which their customers may execute their complex orders. The
Exchange believes this may also encourage non-Priority Customers to
submit interest at improved prices if they seek to execute against
Agency Orders.
By keeping the priority and allocation rules for a C-AIM Auction
similar to the allocation used for a simple AIM Auction on the
Exchange, consistent with current complex order priority, and
consistent across possible outcomes of a C-AIM Auction, the proposed
rule change reduces the ability of market participants to misuse the C-
AIM Auction to circumvent standard priority rules in a manner that is
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and
to promote just and equitable principles of trade on the Exchange. The
proposed execution and priority rules will allow orders to interact
with interest in the COB, and will allow interest on the COB to
interact with option orders in the price improvement mechanisms in an
efficient and orderly manner. The Exchange believes this interaction of
orders will benefit investors by increasing the opportunity for complex
orders to receive executions, while also enhancing the execution
quality for orders resting on the COB.
The proposed C-AIM Auction eligibility requirements are reasonable
and promote a fair and orderly market and national market system,
because they are the same as the eligibility requirements for a simple
AIM Auction, except the proposed rule change excludes the requirement
related to the NBBO, because there is no NBBO for complex orders, and
the legs of complex orders are not subject to the restriction on NBBO
trade-throughs. Additionally, the proposed rule change references the
opening of the COB rather than the market open, as the opening of the
COB is when complex orders may begin trading. These are minor
differences that relate solely to underlying differences between simple
and complex orders.
The proposed rule that an Initiating Member may not designate an
Agency Order or Initiating Order as Post Only protects investors,
because it provides transparency regarding functionality that will not
be available for C-AIM. The Exchange believes this is appropriate, as
the purpose of a Post Only complex order is to not execute upon entry
and instead rest in the COB, while the purpose of submitting orders to
a C-AIM Auction is to receive an execution following the auction and
not enter the COB. Pursuant to proposed Rule 21.22, an Agency Order
will fully execute against contra-side interest (the Initiating Order,
other contra-side complex interest, or a combination of both), and thus
there cannot be remaining contracts in an Agency Order to enter the
COB. Similarly, the Initiating Order may only execute against the
Agency Order at the conclusion of a C-AIM Auction, and thus will not
enter the COB.
The Exchange believes the proposed rule change to permit the
Initiating Order to be comprised of multiple orders that total the size
of the Agency Order may increase liquidity and opportunity for Agency
Orders to participate in C-AIM Auctions, and therefore provide Agency
Orders with additional opportunities for price improvement, which is
consistent with the principles behind the C-AIM Auction. The Exchange
believes this will be beneficial to participants because allowing
multiple contra-parties should foster competition for filling the
contra-side order and thereby result in potentially better prices, as
opposed to only allowing one contra-party, which would require that
contra-party to guarantee the entire Agency Order, which could result
in a worse price for the trade. The Initiating Order for simple AIM
Auctions may be comprised of multiple contra-parties.\52\
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\52\ See Rule 21.19.
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The proposed C-AIM Auction requirements for the stop price are
reasonable and promote a fair and orderly market and national market
system, because they are consistent with the corresponding requirements
for a simple AIM Auction (including the options for a single-price
submission and auto-match), except the proposed requirements are based
on the SBBO and complex order prices in the COB rather than the NBBO.
As noted above, there is no NBBO for complex orders. The proposed stop
price requirements promote just and equitable principles of trade,
because they protect Priority Customer orders in the Simple Book and
Priority Customer complex orders in the COB, and prevent trading
through the SBBO and the best-priced orders on the COB.
As discussed above, the Exchange has proposed to allow C-AIM
Auctions to occur concurrently with other C-AIM Auctions for the same
complex strategies. Although C-AIM Auctions for Agency Orders will be
allowed to overlap, the Exchange does not believe this raises any
issues that are not addressed through the proposed rule change
described above. For example, although overlapping, each C-AIM Auction
will be started in a sequence and with a time that will determine its
processing. Thus, even if there are two C-AIM Auctions in the same
complex strategy that commence and conclude, at nearly the same time,
each C-AIM Auction will have a distinct conclusion at which time the C-
AIM Auction will be allocated. In turn, when the first C-
[[Page 22186]]
AIM Auction concludes, unrelated orders that then exist will be
considered for participation in the C-AIM Auction. If unrelated orders
are fully executed in such C-AIM Auction, then there will be no
unrelated orders for consideration when the subsequent C-AIM Auction is
processed (unless new unrelated order interest has arrived). If instead
there is remaining unrelated order interest after the first C-AIM
Auction has been allocated, then such unrelated order interest will be
considered for allocation when the subsequent C-AIM Auction is
processed. As another example, each C-AIM response is required to
specifically identify the Auction for which it is targeted and if not
fully executed will be cancelled back at the conclusion of the Auction.
Thus, C-AIM responses will be specifically considered only in the
specified C-AIM Auction.
The Exchange does not believe that allowing multiple auctions to
overlap for Agency Orders presents any unique issues that differ from
functionality already in place on the Exchange. Pursuant to Rule
21.19(c)(1), multiple AIM Auctions for Agency Orders for 50 or more
contracts may overlap. Different complex strategies are essentially
different products, as orders in those strategies cannot interact, just
as orders in different series or classes cannot interact. Therefore,
the Exchange believes concurrent C-AIM Auctions in different complex
strategies is appropriate given that concurrent simple AIM Auctions in
different series or different classes may occur. Similarly, while it is
possible for a complex order to leg into the Simple Book, a complex
order may only execute against simple orders if there is interest in
each component in the ratio of the complex strategy. A simple order in
one component of a complex strategy cannot on its own interact with a
complex order in that complex strategy. Therefore, the Exchange
believes it is appropriate to permit concurrent AIM and C-AIM Auctions
in the same component. As proposed, C-AIM Auctions will ensure that
Agency Orders execute at prices that protect Priority Customer orders
in the Simple Book and that are not inferior to the SBBO, even when
there are concurrent simple and complex auctions occurring. The
proposed rule change sets forth how any auctions with overlapping
components will conclude if terminated due to the same event. The Rules
do not currently prevent a COA in a complex strategy from occurring at
the same time as an AIM in one of the components of the complex
strategy. Therefore, the Exchange believes it is similarly reasonable
to permit a C-AIM in a complex strategy to occur at the same time as an
AIM in one of the components of the complex strategy.
The proposed auction process will promote a free and open market,
because it ensures equal access to information regarding C-AIM Auctions
and the exposed Agency Orders for all market participants, as all
Options Members that subscribe to the Exchange's data feeds with the
opportunity to interact with orders submitted into C-AIM Auctions.\53\
The proposed auction notification message includes the same information
as the auction notification message for simple AIM Auctions, and will
be available in the same data feed. The Exchange has proposed a range
between no less than 100 milliseconds and no more than one second for
the duration of a C-AIM Auction, which is the same duration of a simple
AIM Auction. This will provide investors with more timely execution of
their complex orders, while ensuring there is an adequate exposure of
complex orders. This proposed auction response time should provide
investors with the opportunity to receive price improvement for complex
orders through C-AIM while reducing market risk. The Exchange believes
a briefer time period reduces the market risk for the Initiating
Member, versus an auction with a longer period, as well as for any
Options Member providing responses to a broadcast. As such, the
Exchange believes the proposed rule change would help perfect the
mechanism for a free and open national market system, and generally
help protect investors and the public interest. All Options Members
will have an equal opportunity to respond with their best prices during
the C-AIM Auction. Since the Exchange considers all complex interest
present in the System, and not solely C-AIM responses, for execution
against the Agency Order, those participants who are not explicit
responders to a C-AIM Auction may receive executions via C-AIM as well.
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\53\ Any Options Member can subscribe to the options data
disseminated through the Exchange's data feeds.
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The proposed C-AIM Auction response requirements are reasonable and
promote a fair and orderly market and national market system, because
they are virtually identical to the corresponding requirements for a
simple AIM Auction and benefit investors by providing clarity regarding
how they may respond to a C-AIM Auction. The only differences are the
proposed rule change does not explicitly prohibit FOK, because it is
never available for complex orders (and thus would not be available for
C-AIM responses), C-AIM responses will be aggregated with other complex
size rather than other simple interest, and C-AIM responses will be
capped at the SBBO or prices of complex orders rather than the NBBO
(because, as discussed above, there is no NBBO for complex orders and
restricting prices based on the SBBO and complex orders will ensure
protection of Priority Customer orders). This will further benefit
investors by providing consistency across the Exchange's price
improvement mechanisms.
The proposed rule change will also perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market and a national market system, because it is consistent
with linkage rules. Rule 27.2(b)(8) provides that a transaction that is
effected as a portion of a complex trade is exception to the
prohibition on effecting trade-throughs. As discussed above, any
executions following a C-AIM Auction will not trade-through the SBBO or
prices of complex orders resting on the COB (and will always improve
the SBBO or COB prices if they consist of a Priority Customer order).
The proposed events that will conclude a C-AIM Auction are
reasonable and promote a fair and orderly market and national market
system, because they are consistent with the corresponding events that
will conclude a simple AIM Auction, and benefit investors by providing
clarity regarding what will cause a C-AIM Auction to conclude. These
events would create circumstances under which a C-AIM would not have
been permitted to start, and thus the Exchange believes it is
appropriate to conclude a C-AIM Auction if those circumstances occur.
As is the case with a simple AIM Auction (which will not conclude early
due to the receipt of an opposite side simple order), the Exchange will
not conclude a C-AIM Auction early due to the receipt of an opposite
side complex order. The Exchange believes this promotes just and
equitable principles of trade, because these orders may have the
opportunity to trade against the Agency Order following the conclusion
of the C-AIM Auction, which execution must still be at or better than
the SBBO and prices of complex orders in the COB. The Exchange believes
this will protect investors, because it will provide more time for
price improvement, and the unrelated order will have the opportunity to
trade against the Agency Order in the same manner as all other contra-
side complex interest.
[[Page 22187]]
With respect to trading halts, as described above, in the case of a
trading halt on the Exchange in the affected complex strategy or any
component series, the C-AIM Auction will be cancelled without
execution. This is consistent with simple AIM, which will be cancelled
without execution if there is a trading halt on the Exchange in the
affected series. Cancelling C-AIM Auctions without execution in this
circumstance is consistent with Exchange handling of trading halts in
the context of continuous trading on EDGX Options and promotes just and
equitable principles of trade and, in general, protects investors and
the public interest.\54\
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\54\ The Exchange notes that trading on the Exchange in any
option contract will be halted whenever trading in the underlying
security has been paused or halted by the primary listing market and
other circumstances. See Rule 20.3.
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The Exchange believes the proposed execution of Agency Orders at
the conclusion of a C-AIM Auction are reasonable and promote a fair and
orderly market and national market system, because they are consistent
with the execution of Agency Orders at the conclusion of a simple AIM
Auction. Similar to the allocation that occurs following a simple AIM
Auction (which allocates contra-side simple interest in the same
manner), best-priced contra-side interest executes against the Agency
Order first, and Priority Customer complex orders will have first
priority at each price level, followed by other contra-side complex
interest. The proposed rule change provides for the Initiating Order to
receive the same percentage entitlement at the stop price, and also
allows the Initiating Member to receive last priority, or auto-match at
prices better than the stop price. The proposed rule change does not
adopt Priority Order status for C-AIM, which is only available in
simple AIM for classes the Exchange designates.
As noted above, there would be significant technical complexities
associated with reprogramming priority within the System to permit
Agency Orders to leg into the Simple Book following a C-AIM Auction
\55\ and allocate the Agency Order in a manner consistent with standard
priority principles and crossing auctions, while making the most
crossing functionality available to Options Members. The proposed rule
change will ensure the Agency Order executes in accordance with the C-
AIM allocation principles (which are consistent with AIM allocation
principles), which provide Priority Customers with priority but also
provide for the Initiating Order to execute against a certain portion
of the Agency Order, as well as provide Initiating Members with
flexibility to auto-match executions at multiple price levels. The
Exchange believes providing this functionality will encourage Options
Members to submit complex orders into C-AIM Auctions and provide
customer orders with opportunities for price improvement. It will also
ensure orders (including Priority Customer orders) on the Simple Book
are protected in accordance with current complex order priority
principles,\56\ as an Agency Order will only be permitted to execute at
prices that do not trade at the SBBO existing at the conclusion of the
C-AIM Auction if it includes a Priority Customer order at the BBO on
any leg, and that do not trade through the SBBO existing at the
conclusion of the C-AIM Auction.\57\ The proposed allocation will also
ensure the Agency Order does not trade at the same price as a Priority
Customer complex order resting on the COB or through the best-priced
complex orders on the COB, and will protect investors by providing
Priority Customer complex orders with priority at each price level.
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\55\ The Exchange notes it currently does not permit all-or-none
(``AON'') orders to leg into the Simple Book following a COA due to
the same technical complexities.\55\ [sic] While an Agency Order is
not submitted as an AON order, an Agency Order, like an AON order,
must execute in its entirety or not at all and thus effectively
functions like an AON Order. See Rule 21.1(d)(4). Therefore, the
Exchange believes it is similarly appropriate to not leg Agency
Orders into the Simple Book at the conclusion of a C-AIM Auction.
\56\ See proposed Rule 21.22(e)(5) and current Rule 21.20(c)(3).
\57\ See Rule 21.20(c)(2)(E) and (d)(6).
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The proposed Customer-to-Customer C-AIM Immediate Cross
functionality is reasonable and will promote a fair and orderly market
and national market system, because it is consistent with the
corresponding Customer-to-Customer AIM Immediate Cross functionality.
Similar to above, the pricing restrictions for Customer-to-Customer C-
AIM Immediate Cross are based on the SBBO and complex orders in the COB
rather than the NBBO (as is the case for Customer-to-Customer AIM
Immediate Cross). The proposed pricing restrictions will ensure that
the transaction price for Customer-to-Customer C-AIM Immediate Crosses
may not be at the same price as any Priority Customer complex orders
resting on the COB or at the SBBO if the BBO of any component of the
complex strategy represents a Priority Customer order on the Simple
Book, and thus at a price at least as good as the price at which the
orders would have executed had they been submitted separately to the
COB. The proposed functionality will benefit investors, because it will
enhance and automate order entry firms' ability to submit two contra-
side side [sic] customer complex orders. The proposed rule change will
provide Options Member [sic] with a more efficient means of executing
their customer complex orders (in the same efficient manner in which
they may currently execute their customer simple orders) subject to the
Exchange's existing requirements limiting principal transactions.
As is the case with AIM, an Options Member may not use C-AIM to
create a misleading impression of market activity (i.e., C-AIM may only
be used where there is a genuine intention to execute a bona fide
transaction). The proposed regulatory provisions are substantially the
same as those applicable to simple AIM, and the Exchange believes they
will protect customers and the public interest, prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, and promote just and equitable
principles of trade.
The proposed rule change is also consistent with Section 11(a)(1)
of the Act \58\ and the rules promulgated thereunder. Generally,
Section 11(a)(1) of the Act restricts any member of a national
securities exchange from effecting any transaction on such exchange for
(a) the member's own account, (b) the account of a person associated
with the member, or (c) an account over which the member or a person
associated with the member exercises discretion (collectively referred
to as ``covered accounts''), unless a specific exemption is available.
Examples of common exemptions include the exemption for transactions by
broker dealers acting in the capacity of a market maker under Section
11(a)(1)(A),\59\ the ``G'' exemption for yielding priority to non-
members under Section 11(a)(1)(G) of the Act and Rule 11a1-1(T)
thereunder,\60\ and ``Effect vs. Execute'' exemption under Rule 11a2-
2(T) under the Act.\61\ The ``Effect vs. Execute'' exemption permits an
exchange member, subject to certain conditions, to effect transactions
for covered accounts by arranging for an unaffiliated member to execute
transactions on the exchange. To comply with Rule 11a2-2(T)'s
[[Page 22188]]
conditions, a member: (a) Must transmit the order from off the exchange
floor; (b) may not participate in the execution of the transaction once
it has been transmitted to the member performing the execution;\62\ (c)
may not be affiliated with the executing member; and (d) with respect
to an account over which the member has investment discretion, neither
the member nor its associated person may retain any compensation in
connection with effecting the transaction except as provided in the
Rule. For the reasons set forth below, the Exchange believes that
Exchange Members entering orders into a C-AIM Auction would satisfy the
requirements of Rule 11a2-2(T).
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\58\15 U.S.C. 78k(a). Section 11(a)(1) prohibits a member of a
national securities exchange from effecting transactions on that
exchange for its own account, the account of an associated person,
or an account over which it or its associated person exercises
discretion unless an exception applies.
\59\ 15 U.S.C. 78k(a)(1)(A).
\60\ 15 U.S.C. 78k(a)(1)(G) and 17 CFR 240.11a1-1(T).
\61\ 17 CFR 240.11a2-2(T).
\62\ The member may, however, participate in clearing and
settling the transaction.
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The Exchange does not operate a physical trading floor. In the
context of automated trading systems, the Commission has found that the
off-floor transmission requirement is met if a covered account order is
transmitted from a remote location directly to an exchange's floor by
electronic means.\63\ The Exchange represents that the System and the
proposed C-AIM Auction receive all orders electronically through remote
terminals or computer-to-computer interfaces. The Exchange represents
that orders for covered accounts from Options Members will be
transmitted from a remote location directly to the proposed C-AIM
mechanism by electronic means.
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\63\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 61419
(January 26, 2010), 75 FR 5157 (February 1, 2010) (SR-BATS-2009-031)
(approving BATS options trading); 59154 (December 23, 2008), 73 FR
80468 (December 31, 2008) (SRBSE-2008-48) (approving equity
securities listing and trading on BSE); 57478 (March 12, 2008), 73
FR 14521 (March 18, 2008) (SR-NASDAQ-2007-004 and SR-NASDAQ-2007-
080) (approving NOM options trading); 53128 (January 13, 2006), 71
FR 3550 (January 23, 2006) (File No. 10-131) (approving The Nasdaq
Stock Market LLC); 44983 (October 25, 2001), 66 FR 55225 (November
1, 2001) (SR-PCX-00-25) (approving Archipelago Exchange); 29237 (May
24, 1991), 56 FR 24853 (May 31, 1991) (SR-NYSE-90-52 and SR-NYSE-90-
53) (approving NYSE's Off-Hours Trading Facility); and 15533
(January 29, 1979), 44 FR 6084 (January 31, 1979) (``1979
Release'').
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The second condition of Rule 11a2-2(T) requires that neither a
member nor an associated person participate in the execution of its
order once the order is transmitted to the floor for execution. The
Exchange represents that, upon submission to the C-AIM Auction, an
order or C-AIM response will be executed automatically pursuant to the
rules set forth for C-AIM. In particular, execution of an order
(including the Agency Order and the Initiating Order) or a C-AIM
response sent to the mechanism depends not on the Options Member
entering the order or response, but rather on what other orders and
responses are present and the priority of those orders and responses.
Thus, at no time following the submission of an order or response is an
Options Member able to acquire control or influence over the result or
timing of order or response execution.\64\ Once the Agency Order and
Initiating Order have been transmitted, the Initiating Member that
transmitted the orders will not participate in the execution of the
Agency Order or Initiating Order. Initiating Members submitting Agency
Orders and Initiating Orders will relinquish control to modify or
cancel their Agency Orders and Initiating Orders upon transmission to
the System. Further, no Options Member, including the Initiating
Member, will see a C-AIM response submitted into C-AIM, and therefore
and will not be able to influence or guide the execution of their
Agency Orders, Initiating Orders, or C-AIM responses, as applicable.
Finally, the last priority feature will not permit an Options Member to
have any control over an order. The election to apply last priority to
an Initiating Order is available prior to the submission of the order
and therefore could not be utilized to gain influence or guide the
execution of the Agency Order. The information provided with respect to
the last priority feature by the Initiating Member will not be
broadcast and further, the information may not be modified by the
Initiating Member during the Auction [sic].
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\64\ An Initiating Member may not cancel or modify an Agency
Order or Initiating Order after it has been submitted into C-AIM.
See proposed Rule 21.22(c)(4). Options Members may modify or cancel
their responses after being submitted to into a C-AIM. See proposed
Rule 21.22(d)(5)(H). The Exchange notes that the Commission has
stated that the non-participation requirement does not preclude
members from cancelling or modifying orders, or from modifying
instructions for executing orders, after they have been transmitted
so long as such modifications or cancellations are also transmitted
from off the floor. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14563
(March 14, 1978), 43 FR 11542, 11547 (the ``1978 Release'').
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Rule 11a2-2(T)'s third condition requires that the order be
executed by an exchange member who is unaffiliated with the member
initiating the order. The Commission has stated that the requirement is
satisfied when automated exchange facilities, such as the C-AIM
Auction, are used, as long as the design of these systems ensures that
members do not possess any special or unique trading advantages in
handling their orders after transmitting them to the exchange.\65\ The
Exchange represents that the C-AIM Auction is designed so that no
Options Member has any special or unique trading advantage in the
handling of its orders after transmitting its orders to the mechanism.
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\65\ In considering the operation of automated execution systems
operated by an exchange, the Commission noted that, while there is
not an independent executing exchange member, the execution of an
order is automatic once it has been transmitted into the system.
Because the design of these systems ensures that members do not
possess any special or unique trading advantages in handling their
orders after transmitting them to the exchange, the Commission has
stated that executions obtained through these systems satisfy the
independent execution requirement of Rule 11a2-2(T). See 1979
Release.
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Rule 11a2-2(T)'s fourth condition requires that, in the case of a
transaction effected for an account with respect to which the
initiating member or an associated person thereof exercises investment
discretion, neither the initiating member nor any associated person
thereof may retain any compensation in connection with effecting the
transaction, unless the person authorized to transact business for the
account has expressly provided otherwise by written contract referring
to Section 11(a) of the Act and Rule 11a2-2(T) thereunder.\66\ The
Exchange recognizes that Options Members relying on Rule 11a2-2(T) for
transactions effected through the C-AIM Auction must comply with this
condition of the Rule and the Exchange will enforce this requirement
pursuant to its obligations under Section 6(b)(1) of the Act to enforce
compliance with federal securities laws.
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\66\ See 17 CFR 240.11a2-2(T)(a)(2)(iv). In addition, Rule 11a2-
2(T)(d) requires a member or associated person authorized by written
contract to retain compensation, in connection with effecting
transactions for covered accounts over which such member or
associated persons thereof exercises investment discretion, to
furnish at least annually to the person authorized to transact
business for the account a statement setting forth the total amount
of compensation retained by the member in connection with effecting
transactions for the account during the period covered by the
statement which amount must be exclusive of all amounts paid to
others during that period for services rendered to effect such
transactions. See also 1978 Release (stating ``[t]he contractual and
disclosure requirements are designed to assure that accounts
electing to permit transaction-related compensation do so only after
deciding that such arrangements are suitable to their interests'').
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The Exchange believes that the instant proposal is consistent with
Rule 11a2-2(T), and that therefore the exception should apply in this
case.
The proposed rule change will also perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market and a national market system, because it is consistent
with linkage rules. Rule 27.2(b)(8) provides that a transaction that is
effected as a portion of a complex trade is exception to the
prohibition on effecting trade-throughs. As discussed above, any
executions following a C-AIM Auction
[[Page 22189]]
will not trade-through the SBBO or prices of complex orders resting on
the COB (and will always improve the SBBO or COB prices if they consist
of a Priority Customer order).
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The Exchange does not
believe the proposed rule change will impose any burden on intramarket
competition, as the proposed rule change will apply in the same manner
to all orders submitted to a C-AIM Auction. The proposed C-AIM Auction
is voluntary for Options Members to use and will be available to all
Options Members. As discussed above, the Exchange believes the proposed
rule change should encourage Options Members to compete amongst each
other by responding with their best price and size for a particular
auction. By offering all Options Members the ability to participate in
the proposed allocation during the C-AIM Auction, an Options Member
will be encouraged to submit complex orders outside of the C-AIM
Auction at the best and most aggressive prices. Within the C-AIM
Auction, the Exchange believes the proposed rule change will encourage
Options Member [sic] to compete vigorously to provide the opportunity
for price improvement in a competitive auction process. The proposed
execution and allocation rules are consistent with those applicable to
simple AIM, as well as complex order priority, and therefore will
ensure protection of Priority Customer orders in both the Simple Book
and the COB.
The Exchange does not believe the proposed rule change will impose
any burden on intermarket competition, because other options exchanges
offer similar complex order price improvement auctions.\67\ The general
framework and primary features of the proposed C-AIM Auction process
(such as the eligibility requirements, auction response period,
response requirements, and auction notification process),\68\ are
substantively the same as the framework for simple AIM. The auction
process is also similar, and is modified to address the underlying
differences between simple and complex orders. For example, C-AIM will
base pricing and execution requirements on the SBBO and complex orders
in the COB, rather than the NBBO (which does not apply to complex
orders), to ensure consistency with Priority Customer priority and
complex order priority principles.
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\67\ See, e.g., Cboe Options Rule 6.74A, Interpretation and
Policy .08; ISE Rule 723(e); PHLX Rule 1087; BOX Rule 7245; and MIAX
Rule 515A, Interpretation and Policy .12.
\68\ See Rule 21.19.
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The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change will relieve
any burden on, or otherwise promote, competition. The Exchange believes
this proposed rule change is necessary to permit fair competition among
the options exchanges and to establish more uniform price improvement
auction rules on the various options exchanges. The Exchange
anticipates that this proposal will create new opportunities for the
Exchange to attract new business and compete on equal footing with
those options exchanges with complex order price improvement auctions
and for this reason the proposal does not create an undue burden on
intermarket competition. Rather, the Exchange believes that the
proposed rule would bolster intermarket competition by promoting fair
competition among individual markets.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange neither solicited nor received comments on the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the Exchange consents, the Commission will:
A. By order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
B. institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-CboeEDGX-2019-028 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CboeEDGX-2019-028. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE, Washington,
DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-CboeEDGX-2019-028, and should be
submitted on or before June 6, 2019.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\69\
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\69\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Eduardo A. Aleman,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-10125 Filed 5-15-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P