Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 14043-14061 [2019-06500]

Agencies

• Wage and Hour Division
• DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 68 (Tuesday, April 9, 2019)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 14043-14061]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-06500]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Wage and Hour Division

29 CFR Part 791

RIN 1235-AA26


Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act

AGENCY: Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This proposed rulemaking is intended to update and clarify the 
Department of Labor's (Department) interpretation of joint employer 
status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act), which has not 
been significantly revised in over 60 years. The proposed changes are 
designed to promote certainty for employers and employees, reduce 
litigation, promote greater uniformity among court decisions, and 
encourage innovation in the economy.

DATES: Submit written comments on or before June 10, 2019.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Regulatory 
Information Number (RIN) 1235-AA26, by either of the following methods: 
Electronic Comments: Submit comments through the Federal eRulemaking 
Portal at https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for 
submitting comments. Mail: Address written submissions to Division of 
Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation, Wage and Hour Division, 
U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-3502, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, 
Washington, DC 20210. Instructions: Please submit only one copy of your 
comments by only one method. All

[[Page 14044]]

submissions must include the agency name and RIN, identified above, for 
this rulemaking. Please be advised that comments received will become a 
matter of public record and will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided. All 
comments must be received by 11:59 p.m. on the date indicated for 
consideration in this rulemaking. Commenters should transmit comments 
early to ensure timely receipt prior to the close of the comment 
period, as the Department continues to experience delays in the receipt 
of mail. Submit only one copy of your comments by only one method. 
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments, go to the Federal eRulemaking Portal at https://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melissa Smith, Director of the 
Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation, Wage and Hour 
Division, U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-3502, 200 Constitution 
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-0406 (this is not 
a toll-free number). Copies of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) may be obtained in alternative formats (Large Print, Audio Tape, 
or Disc), upon request, by calling (202) 693-0675 (this is not a toll-
free number). TTY/TDD callers may dial toll-free 1-877-889-5627 to 
obtain information or request materials in alternative formats. 
Questions of interpretation and/or enforcement of the agency's 
regulations may be directed to the nearest WHD district office. Locate 
the nearest office by calling WHD's toll-free help line at (866) 4US-
WAGE ((866) 487-9243) between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. in your local time 
zone, or log onto WHD's website for a nationwide listing of WHD 
district and area offices at https://www.dol.gov/whd/america2.htm.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

    The FLSA requires covered employers to pay nonexempt employees at 
least the federal minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime for 
all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.\1\ Although the FLSA does not 
use the term ``joint employer,'' the Act contemplates situations where 
additional persons \2\ are jointly and severally liable with the 
employer for the employee's wages due under the Act.
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    \1\ See 29 U.S.C. 206(a), 207(a).
    \2\ Under the Act, ``person'' means ``any individual, 
partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal 
representative, or any organized group of persons.'' 29 U.S.C. 
203(a).
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    Over 60 years ago, in 1958, the Department promulgated a 
regulation, codified at part 791 of Title 29, Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), interpreting joint employer status under the Act.\3\ 
The Department has not meaningfully revised this regulation since its 
promulgation. Under part 791, multiple persons can be joint employers 
of an employee if they are ``not completely disassociated'' with 
respect to the employment of the employee.\4\ Part 791 does not 
adequately explain what it means to be ``not completely disassociated'' 
in one of the joint employer scenarios--where the employer suffers, 
permits, or otherwise employs the employee to work one set of hours in 
a workweek, and that work simultaneously benefits another person. In 
that scenario, the employer and the other person are almost never 
``completely disassociated,'' and the real question is not whether they 
are associated but whether the other person's actions in relation to 
the employee merit joint and several liability under the Act. 
Additional guidance could therefore be helpful. Accordingly, the 
Department proposes to revise part 791 to provide additional guidance 
for determining whether the other person is a joint employer in that 
scenario.\5\
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    \3\ See 23 FR 5905 (Aug. 5, 1958).
    \4\ 29 CFR 791.2(a).
    \5\ The Department's current regulation identifies two distinct 
joint employer scenarios, which is consistent with its enforcement 
experience. See 29 CFR 791.2(b) (one scenario is ``[w]here the 
employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more 
employers''; the other is where the employee ``works for two or more 
employers at different times during the workweek'').
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    The Department proposes that if an employee has an employer who 
suffers, permits, or otherwise employs the employee to work and another 
person simultaneously benefits from that work, the other person is the 
employee's joint employer under the Act for those hours worked only if 
that person is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the 
employer in relation to the employee.\6\ To make that determination 
simpler and more consistent, the Department proposes to adopt a four-
factor balancing test derived (with one modification) from Bonnette v. 
California Health & Welfare Agency.\7\ A plurality of circuit courts 
use or incorporate Bonnette's factors in their joint-employer test. The 
Department's proposed test would assess whether the potential joint 
employer:
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    \6\ See 29 U.S.C. 203(d) (`` `Employer' includes any person 
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee. . . .'').
    \7\ 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds, 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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     Hires or fires the employee;
     Supervises and controls the employee's work schedule or 
conditions of employment;
     Determines the employee's rate and method of payment; and
     Maintains the employee's employment records.
    These factors are consistent with section 3(d) of the FLSA, which 
defines an ``employer'' to ``include[ ] any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,'' 
29 U.S.C. 203(d), and with Supreme Court precedent. They are clear and 
easy to understand. They can be used across a wide variety of contexts. 
And they are highly probative of the ultimate inquiry in determining 
joint employer status: Whether a potential joint employer, as a matter 
of economic reality, actually exercises sufficient control over an 
employee to qualify as a joint employer under the Act.
    As mentioned above, the Department proposes to modify the first 
Bonnette factor to explain that a person's ability, power, or reserved 
contractual right to act with respect to the employee's terms and 
conditions of employment would not be relevant to that person's joint 
employer status under the Act. Only actions taken with respect to the 
employee's terms and conditions of employment, rather than the 
theoretical ability to do so under a contract, are relevant to joint 
employer status under the Act. Requiring the actual exercise of power 
ensures that the four-factor test is consistent with the provision of 
3(d) that determines joint employer status, which requires an employer 
to be ``acting . . . in relation to an employee.'' \8\
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    \8\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
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    The Department also proposes to explain that additional factors may 
be relevant to this joint employer analysis, but only if they are 
indicia of whether the potential joint employer is:
     Exercising significant control over the terms and 
conditions of the employee's work; or
     Otherwise acting directly or indirectly in the interest of 
the employer in relation to the employee.
    The Department further proposes to explain that, in determining the 
economic reality of the potential joint employer's status under the 
Act, whether an employee is economically dependent on the potential 
joint

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employer is not relevant.\9\ As such, the Department proposes to 
identify certain ``economic dependence'' factors that are not relevant 
to the joint employer analysis. Those factors would include, but would 
not be limited to, whether the employee:
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    \9\ As explained below, economic dependence only measures 
whether a worker is an employee under the Act or an independent 
contractor.
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     Is in a specialty job or a job otherwise requiring special 
skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight;
     Has the opportunity for profit or loss based on his or her 
managerial skill; and
     Invests in equipment or materials required for work or for 
the employment of helpers.
    In addition, the Department's proposal would note that a joint 
employer may be any ``person'' as defined by the Act, which includes 
``any organized group of persons.'' \10\ It would also explain that a 
person's business model (such as a franchise model), certain business 
practices (such as allowing an employer to operate a store on the 
person's premises or participating in an association health or 
retirement plan), and certain business agreements (such as requiring an 
employer in a business contract to institute sexual harassment 
policies), do not make joint employer status more or less likely under 
the Act.
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    \10\ 29 U.S.C. 203(a).
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    In the other joint employer scenario under the Act--where multiple 
employers suffer, permit, or otherwise employ the employee to work 
separate sets of hours in the same workweek--the Department is 
proposing only non-substantive revisions that better reflect the 
Department's longstanding practice. Part 791's current focus on the 
association between the potential joint employers is useful for 
determining joint employer status in this scenario. If the multiple 
employers are joint employers in this scenario, then the employee's 
separate hours worked for them in the workweek are aggregated for 
purposes of complying with the Act's overtime pay requirement.
    Finally, the Department's proposed rule would include several other 
provisions. First, it would reiterate that a person who is a joint 
employer is jointly and severally liable with the employer and any 
other joint employers for all wages due to the employee under the 
Act.\11\ Second, it would provide a number of illustrative examples 
that apply the Department's proposed joint employer rule. Third, it 
would contain a severability provision.
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    \11\ This means that for every workweek that they are joint 
employers, the employer and all joint employers are each fully 
responsible for the entire amount of minimum wages and overtime pay 
due to the employee in that workweek. If one of them is unable or 
unwilling to pay, the others are responsible for the full amount 
owed.
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    Employee earnings and overtime pay under the Act would not be 
affected by the proposed rule. Employers would remain obligated to 
comply with the FLSA in all respects, including its minimum-wage and 
overtime provisions.
    The Department believes that all of the above proposals would be 
consistent with the text of the Act and supported by judicial 
precedent. The Department further believes that these proposals would 
clarify the scope of joint employer status under the Act, thereby 
reducing litigation and compliance costs, easing administration of the 
law, and offering guidance to courts, which may result in greater 
uniformity among court decisions.
    This proposed rule is expected to be an Executive Order (E.O.) 
13771 deregulatory action. Discussion of the estimated reduced burdens 
and cost savings of this proposed rule can be found in the NPRM's 
economic analysis. The Department welcomes comments from the public on 
any aspect of this NPRM.

II. Background

    The FLSA requires covered employers to pay their employees at least 
the federal minimum wage for every hour worked and overtime for every 
hour worked over 40 in a workweek.\12\ The FLSA defines the term 
``employee'' in section 3(e)(1) to mean ``any individual employed by an 
employer,'' \13\ and defines the term ``employ'' to include ``to suffer 
or permit to work.'' \14\ ``Employer'' is defined in section 3(d) to 
``include[ ] any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest 
of an employer in relation to an employee.'' \15\
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    \12\ See 29 U.S.C. 206(a), 207(a).
    \13\ 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1).
    \14\ 29 U.S.C. 203(g).
    \15\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
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    One year after the FLSA's enactment, in July 1939, WHD issued 
Interpretative Bulletin No. 13 addressing, among other topics, whether 
two or more companies could be jointly and severally liable for a 
single employee's hours worked under the Act.\16\ The Bulletin 
acknowledged the possibility of joint employer liability and provided 
an example where two companies arranged ``to employ a common watchman'' 
who had ``the duty of watching the property of both companies 
concurrently for a specified number of hours each night.'' \17\ The 
Bulletin concluded that the companies ``are not each required to pay 
the minimum rate required under the statute for all hours worked by the 
watchman . . . but . . . should be considered as a joint employer for 
purposes of the [A]ct.'' \18\
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    \16\ See Interpretative Bulletin No. 13, ``Hours Worked: 
Determination of Hours for Which Employees are Entitled to 
Compensation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,'' ]] 16-17. 
In October 1939 and October 1940, the Department revised other 
portions of the Bulletin that are not pertinent here.
    \17\ Id. ] 16.
    \18\ Id.
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    The Bulletin also set forth a second example where an employee 
works 40 hours for company A and 15 hours for company B during the same 
workweek.\19\ The Bulletin explained that if A and B are ``acting 
entirely independently of each other with respect to the employment of 
the particular employee,'' they are not joint employers and may 
``disregard all work performed by the employee for the other company'' 
in determining their obligations to the employee under the Act for that 
workweek.\20\ On the other hand, if ``the employment by A is not 
completely disassociated from the employment by B,'' they are joint 
employers and must consider the hours worked for both as a whole to 
determine their obligations to the employee under the Act for that 
workweek.\21\ Relying on section 3(d), the Bulletin concluded by saying 
that, ``at least in the following situations, an employer will be 
considered as acting in the interest of another employer in relation to 
an employee: If the employers make an arrangement for the interchange 
of employees or if one company controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with, directly or indirectly, the other company.'' \22\
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    \19\ See id. ] 17.
    \20\ Id.
    \21\ Id.
    \22\ Id.
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    In 1958, the Department published a regulation, codified in 29 CFR 
part 791, that expounded on Interpretative Bulletin No. 13.\23\ Section 
791.2(a) reiterated that joint employer status depends on whether 
multiple persons are ``not completely disassociated'' or ``acting 
entirely independently of each other'' with respect to the employee's 
employment.\24\ Section 791.2(b) explained, ``Where the employee 
performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or 
works for two or more employers at different times during the 
workweek,'' they are generally considered joint employers:
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    \23\ See 23 FR 5905 (Aug. 5, 1958).
    \24\ 29 CFR 791.2(a).


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    (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share 
the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; 
or
    (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the 
employee; or
    (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with 
respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed 
to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason 
of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is 
under common control with the other employer.\25\
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    \25\ 29 CFR 791.2(b) (footnotes omitted).

    In 1961, the Department amended a footnote in the regulation to 
clarify that a joint employer is also jointly liable for overtime 
pay.\26\ Since this 1961 update, the Department has not published any 
other updates to part 791.
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    \26\ See 26 FR 7732 (Aug. 18, 1961).
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    In 1973, the Supreme Court decided a joint employer case in Falk v. 
Brennan.\27\ Falk did not cite or rely on part 791, but instead used 
section 3(d) to determine whether an apartment management company was a 
joint employer of the employees of the apartment buildings that it 
managed.\28\ The Court held that, because the management company 
exercised ``substantial control [over] the terms and conditions of the 
[employees'] work,'' the management company was an employer under 3(d), 
and was therefore jointly liable with the building owners for any wages 
due to the employees under the FLSA.\29\
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    \27\ See 414 U.S. 190.
    \28\ See id. at 195.
    \29\ Id.
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    In 1983, the Ninth Circuit issued a seminal joint employer 
decision, Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency.\30\ In 
Bonnette, seniors and individuals with disabilities receiving state 
welfare assistance (the ``recipients'') employed home care workers as 
part of a state welfare program.\31\ Taking an approach similar to 
Falk, the court addressed whether California and several of its 
counties (the ``counties'') were joint employers of the workers under 
section 3(d).\32\ In determining whether the counties were jointly 
liable for the home care workers under 3(d), the court found ``four 
factors [to be] relevant'': ``whether the alleged [joint] employer (1) 
had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and 
controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) 
determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained 
employment records.'' \33\ The court noted that these four factors 
``are not etched in stone and will not be blindly applied'' and that 
the determination of joint employer status depends on the circumstances 
of the whole activity.\34\ Applying the four factors, the court 
concluded that the counties ``exercised considerable control'' and 
``had complete economic control'' over ``the nature and structure of 
the employment relationship'' between the recipients and home care 
workers, and were therefore ``employers'' under 3(d), jointly and 
severally liable with the recipients to the home care workers.\35\
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    \30\ See 704 F.2d 1465. Although the Ninth Circuit later adopted 
a thirteen-factor test in Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639-41 
(9th Cir. 1997), Bonnette remains relevant because many courts have 
treated it as the baseline for their own joint employer tests.
    \31\ See 704 F.2d at 1467-68.
    \32\ See id. at 1469-70.
    \33\ Id. at 1470.
    \34\ Id.
    \35\ Id.
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    In 2014, the Department issued Administrator's Interpretation No. 
2014-2, concerning joint employer status in the context of home care 
workers.\36\ The Home Care AI described, consistent with Sec.  791.2, a 
joint employer as an additional employer who is ``not completely 
disassociated'' from the other employer(s) with respect to a common 
employee, and further explained that section 3(g) determines the scope 
of joint employer status.\37\ The Home Care AI opined that ``the focus 
of the joint employer regulation is the degree to which the two 
possible joint employers share control with respect to the employee and 
the degree to which the employee is economically dependent on the 
purported joint employers.'' \38\ The Home Care AI opined that ``a set 
of [joint employer] factors that addresses only control is not 
consistent with the breadth of [joint] employment under the FLSA'' 
because section 3(g)'s ``suffer or permit'' language governs FLSA joint 
employer status.\39\ However, the Home Care AI applied the four 
Bonnette factors as part of a larger multi-factor analysis that 
provided specific guidance about joint employer status in the home care 
industry.\40\
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    \36\ WHD Administrator's Interpretation No. 2014-2, ``Joint 
Employment of Home Care Workers in Consumer-Directed, Medicaid-
Funded Programs by Public Entities under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act'' [hereinafter Home Care AI], available at https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2014/FLSAAI2014_2.pdf.
    \37\ Id.
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ Id.
    \40\ See id.
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    In 2016, the Department issued Administrator's Interpretation No. 
2016-1 concerning joint employer status under the FLSA and the Migrant 
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA), which the 
Department intended to be ``harmonious'' and ``read in conjunction 
with'' the Home Care AI's discussion of joint employer status.\41\ The 
Joint Employer AI also described section 3(g) as determining the scope 
of joint employer status.\42\ The Joint Employer AI opined that ``joint 
employment, like employment generally, `should be defined expansively.' 
'' \43\ It further opined that, ``joint employment under the FLSA and 
MSPA [is] notably broader than the common law . . . which look[s] to 
the amount of control that an employer exercises over an employee.'' 
\44\ The Joint Employer AI concluded that, because ``the expansive 
definition of `employ' '' in both the FLSA and MSPA ``rejected the 
common law control standard,'' ``the scope of employment relationships 
and joint employment under the FLSA and MSPA is as broad as possible.'' 
\45\ The Department rescinded the Joint Employer AI effective June 7, 
2017.\46\
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    \41\ WHD Administrator's Interpretation No. 2016-1, ``Joint 
employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act'' [hereinafter Joint 
Employer AI].
    \42\ See id.
    \43\ Id. (quoting Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639).
    \44\ Id.
    \45\ Id.
    \46\ See U.S. Secretary of Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, 
Independent Contractor Informal Guidance, (2017), available at 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/opa/opa20170607.
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Need for Rulemaking

    As noted, the Department has not meaningfully revised its joint 
employer regulation, 29 CFR part 791, since its promulgation in 1958. 
The current regulation provides some helpful guidance for determining 
joint employer status, but as explained below, the Department believes 
that it is helpful to offer additional guidance on how to determine 
joint employer status in one of the joint employer scenarios under the 
Act--where an employer suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an 
employee to work, and another person simultaneously benefits from that 
work.
    Part 791 currently determines joint employer status by asking 
whether multiple persons are ``not completely disassociated'' with 
respect to the employment of a particular employee.\47\ This standard, 
however, does not provide adequate guidance for resolving the situation 
where an employee's work for an employer simultaneously benefits 
another person (for example, where the employer is a subcontractor or 
staffing

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agency, and the other person is a general contractor or staffing agency 
client). In this scenario, the employer and the other person are almost 
never ``completely disassociated.'' The ``not completely 
disassociated'' standard may therefore suggest--contrary to the 
Department's longstanding position--that these situations always result 
in joint employer status. Moreover, courts have generally not focused 
on the degree of association between the employer and potential joint 
employer in this scenario. Therefore, it would be helpful to clarify 
the standard for joint employer status in order to give the public more 
meaningful guidance and proper notice of what the regulation actually 
requires.
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    \47\ See 29 CFR 791.2(a).
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    It would also be helpful to revise part 791 given the current 
judicial landscape. Circuit courts currently use a variety of multi-
factor tests to determine joint employer status, and as a result, 
organizations operating in multiple jurisdictions may be subject to 
joint employer liability in one jurisdiction, but not in another, for 
the same business practices. The Department's proposed four-factor 
test, if adopted, would provide guidance to courts that may promote 
greater uniformity among court decisions. This would promote fairness 
and predictability for organizations and employees.
    Additionally, revising the Department's regulation could promote 
innovation and certainty in business relationships. The modern economy 
involves a web of complex interactions filled with a variety of unique 
business organizations and contractual relationships. When an employer 
contemplates a business relationship with another person, the other 
person may not be able to assess what degree of association with the 
employer will result in joint and several liability for the employer's 
employees. Indeed, the other person may be concerned by such liability 
despite having insignificant control over the employer's employees. 
This uncertainty could impact the other person's willingness to engage 
in any number of business practices vis-[agrave]-vis the employer--such 
as providing a sample employee handbook, or other forms, to the 
employer as part of a franchise arrangement; allowing the employer to 
operate a facility on its premises; using or establishing an 
association health plan or association retirement plan that is also 
used by the employer; or jointly participating with the employer in an 
apprenticeship program. Uncertainty regarding joint liability could 
also impact that person's willingness to bargain for certain 
contractual provisions with the employer--such as requiring the 
employer to institute workplace safety practices, a wage floor, sexual 
harassment policies, morality clauses, or other measures intended to 
encourage compliance with the law or to promote other desired business 
practices. To provide more certainty when organizations are considering 
these and other business practices, it would be helpful for the 
Department to provide more clarity about what kinds of activities could 
result in joint employer status.
    It would also be helpful for the Department to clarify that a 
person's business model does not make joint employer status more or 
less likely under the Act. Part 791 is currently silent on this point, 
and that silence may cause unnecessary confusion and uncertainty. For 
example, a business that contracts with a staffing agency to receive 
labor services is ``not completely disassociated'' from the staffing 
agency, but that business is not more or less likely to be a joint 
employer simply because it uses a staffing agency. Similarly, a 
franchisor and franchisee are ``not completely disassociated.'' 
However, when the Department investigates a typical franchisee for 
potential FLSA violations, the Department does not seek recovery from 
the franchisor as a joint employer simply because it has a franchise 
arrangement. It is therefore helpful for the Department to explain its 
longstanding position that a business model--such as the franchise 
model--does not itself indicate joint employer status under the FLSA. 
Under the FLSA, a person is a joint employer if it is ``acting . . . in 
relation to'' an employee of an employer--not simply because it has a 
certain business model.\48\
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    \48\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
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    It would also be helpful to revise the current regulation to 
explain the statutory basis for joint employer status under the Act. It 
is axiomatic that any Department interpretation of the FLSA must begin 
with the text of the statute, following well-settled principles of 
statutory construction by ``reading the whole statutory text, 
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any 
precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.'' \49\ There are 
three terms defined in the Act (``employee,'' ``employ,'' and 
``employer'' \50\) that could potentially be relevant to the joint 
employer analysis, but the current part 791 does not clearly identify 
the textual basis for the scope of joint employer status under the Act. 
Clarifying the textual basis for joint employer status would help 
ensure that the Department's guidance on this subject is fully 
consistent with the text of the Act.
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    \49\ See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 
U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (interpreting the FLSA) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).
    \50\ See 29 U.S.C. 203(d), (e)(1), (g).
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    Finally, it would be helpful for the Department to update its 
guidance regarding joint employer status given public interest in the 
issue. Recently, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued 
decisions that altered its analysis for determining joint employer 
status under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (a separate 
statute from the FLSA).\51\ The NLRB is engaging in rulemaking 
regarding the joint employer standard under the NLRA.\52\ In recent 
years, Congress has held hearings and considered legislation on joint 
employer status.\53\ In addition, 84 U.S. Representatives and 26 
Senators have expressed their concern and have urged the Department to 
update part 791.\54\ These and other developments have generated a 
tremendous amount of attention, concern, and debate about joint 
employer status in every context, including the FLSA. Rulemaking would 
help bring clarity to this discussion.
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    \51\ See Browning-Ferris Indus. of California, Inc., 362 NLRB 
No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015).
    \52\ See The Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status, 83 
FR 46,681, 46,686 (Sept. 14, 2018).
    \53\ See House Cmte. on Educ. & the Workforce, Hearing: 
``Redefining Joint Employer Standards: Barriers to Job Creation and 
Entrepreneurship'' (July 12, 2017), https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=106218; Senate Cmte. on 
Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, Hearing: ``Who's the Boss? The 
`Joint Employer' Standard and Business Ownership (Feb. 5, 2015), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg93358/pdf/CHRG-114shrg93358.pdf; H.R. 3441, 115th Congress (2017-2018), Save Local 
Business Act.
    \54\ See Byrne Leads Bipartisan Letter Asking Acosta to Act on 
Joint Employer, (2018), https://byrne.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/byrne-leads-bipartisan-letter-asking-acosta-to-act-on-joint-employer. On September 28, 2018, Senator Isakson sent a 
similar letter to the Department, signed by 25 other Senators.
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III. Proposed Regulatory Revisions

    The Department proposes to revise its existing joint employer 
regulation in part 791 to address these issues. In relevant part, and 
as discussed in greater detail below, the Department proposes:
     To make non-substantive revisions to the introductory 
provision in section 791.1;
     To replace the language of ``not completely 
disassociated'' as the standard in one of the joint employer 
scenarios--where an employer suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an 
employee to work one set of hours in a

[[Page 14048]]

workweek, and that work simultaneously benefits another person--with a 
four-factor balancing test assessing whether the other person:
    [cir] Hires or fires the employee;
    [cir] Supervises and controls the employee's work schedules or 
conditions of employment;
    [cir] Determines the employee's rate and method of payment; and
    [cir] Maintains the employee's employment records;
     To explain that additional factors may be used to 
determine joint employer status, but only if they are indicative of 
whether the potential joint employer is:
    [cir] Exercising significant control over the terms and conditions 
of the employee's work; or
    [cir] Otherwise acting directly or indirectly in the interest of 
the employer in relation to the employee;
     To explain that the employee's ``economic dependence'' on 
the potential joint employer does not determine the potential joint 
employer's liability under the Act;
     To identify three examples of ``economic dependence'' 
factors that are not relevant for determining joint employer status 
under the Act--including, but not limited to, whether the employee:
    [cir] Is in a specialty job or a job that otherwise requires 
special skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight;
    [cir] Has the opportunity for profit or loss based on his or her 
managerial skill; and
    [cir] Invests in equipment or materials required for work or the 
employment of helpers;
     To explain that the potential joint employer's ability, 
power, or reserved contractual right to act in relation to the employee 
is not relevant for determining the potential joint employer's 
liability under the Act;
     To clarify that indirect action in relation to an employee 
may establish joint employer status under the Act;
     To explain that FLSA section 3(d) only, not section 
3(e)(1) or 3(g), determines joint employer status under the Act;
     To clarify that a person's business model--for example, 
operating as a franchisor--does not make joint employer status more or 
less likely under the Act;
     To explain that certain business practices--for example, 
providing a sample employee handbook to a franchisee; participating in 
or sponsoring an association health or retirement plan; allowing an 
employer to operate a facility on one's premises; or jointly 
participating with an employer in an apprenticeship program--do not 
make joint employer status more or less likely under the Act;
     To explain that certain business agreements--for example, 
requiring an employer to institute workplace safety measures, wage 
floors, sexual harassment policies, morality clauses, or requirements 
to comply with the law or promote other desired business practices--do 
not make joint employer status more or less likely under the Act;
     To make non-substantive clarifications to the joint 
employer standard for the other joint employer scenario under the Act--
where multiple employers suffer, permit, or otherwise employ an 
employee to work separate sets of hours in the same workweek; and
     To provide illustrative examples demonstrating how the 
Department's proposed joint employer regulation would apply.
    These proposed revisions to part 791 would significantly clarify 
how to determine joint employer status under the Act.
    The Department welcomes comment on all aspects of its proposal.

A. Proposal To Replace the ``Not Completely Disassociated'' Standard 
With a Four-Factor Balancing Test for One of the Joint Employer 
Scenarios Under the Act (One Set of Hours)

    Part 791 currently determines joint employer status by asking 
whether two or more persons are ``not completely disassociated with 
respect to the employment of a particular employee.'' \55\ This 
standard is not as helpful for determining joint employer status in one 
of the joint employer scenarios under the Act--where an employer 
suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an employee to work one set of 
hours in a workweek, and that work simultaneously benefits another 
person.\56\ The Department therefore proposes to replace the ``not 
completely disassociated'' standard in this scenario with a four-factor 
balancing test derived (with one modification) from Bonnette v. 
California Health & Welfare Agency. The proposed test would assess 
whether the other person:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See 29 CFR 791.2. The regulation similarly advises that 
joint employer liability does not exist where ``two or more 
employers are acting entirely independently of each other.'' Id.
    \56\ Under the Act, ``person'' means ``any individual, 
partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal 
representative, or any organized group of persons.'' 29 U.S.C. 
203(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Hires or fires the employee;
     Supervises and controls the employee's work schedules or 
conditions of employment;
     Determines the employee's rate and method of payment; and
     Maintains the employee's employment records.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Cf. 704 F.2d at 1470 (considering ``whether the alleged 
[joint] employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, 
(2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions 
of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and 
(4) maintained employment records'' (quotation marks omitted)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These proposed factors focus on the economic realities of the 
potential joint employer's exercise of control over the terms and 
conditions of the employee's work.\58\ They closely track the language 
of Bonnette, with a modification to the first factor.\59\ Whereas 
Bonnette describes the first factor as the ``power'' to hire and fire, 
the Department proposes rephrasing this factor to require actual 
exercise of power to ensure that its four-factor test is fully 
consistent with the text of section 3(d), which requires a person be 
``acting . . . in relation to an employee.'' \60\ The Department's 
proposal would also clarify that, under 3(d), the potential joint 
employer's actions in relation to the employee may be ``indirect.'' 
\61\ The Department believes that its four proposed factors--which 
weigh the economic reality of the potential joint employer's active 
control, direct or indirect, over the employee--would be most relevant 
to the joint employer analysis for several reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Cf. id. (``The appellants exercised considerable control 
over the nature and structure of the employment relationship.'').
    \59\ See id. (considering whether the potential joint employer 
``had the power to hire and fire the employees,'' rather than 
whether the potential joint employer actually hired or fired them).
    \60\ See 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
    \61\ See id. (`` `Employer' includes any person acting directly 
or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee. . . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, these four factors are fully consistent with the text of the 
section 3(d). When another person exercises control over the terms and 
conditions of the employee's work, that person is ``acting . . . in the 
interest of'' the employer ``in relation to'' the employee.\62\ 
Recognizing this provision, Bonnette adopted an almost identical four-
factor test to determine whether a potential joint employer is liable 
under 3(d).\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Id.
    \63\ See 704 F.2d at 1469-70 (``We conclude that, under the 
FLSA's liberal definition of ``employer'' [in section 3(d)], the 
appellants were employers of the chore workers.'').
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    Second, these factors are consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
The Supreme Court held in Falk v. Brennan that under 3(d) another 
person is jointly liable for an employee if that person exercises 
``substantial control'' over the terms and conditions of the employee's

[[Page 14049]]

work.\64\ The Department's proposed four-factor balancing test, which 
weighs the potential joint employer's exercise of control over the 
terms and conditions of the employee's work, uses the same reasoning as 
Falk to determine joint employer status under 3(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See 414 U.S. at 195 (``In view of the expansiveness of the 
Act's definition of `employer' [in section 3(d)] and the extent of D 
& F's managerial responsibilities at each of the buildings, which 
gave it substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work 
of these employees, we hold that D & F is, under the statutory 
definition [in 3(d)], an `employer' of the maintenance workers.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, these factors are highly probative of joint employer status 
under the Act. Each factor weighs the potential joint employer's 
exercise of control over the more essential terms and conditions of 
employment. The potential joint employer's exercise of this control 
therefore has a direct relation to the employee's work. And this direct 
relation makes it reasonable to hold the potential joint employer 
liable for the employee's work. Accordingly, the Department's proposed 
test focuses on those facts that strongly indicate joint and several 
liability under the Act.
    Fourth, these factors are simple, clear-cut, and easy to apply. The 
greater the number of factors in a multi-factor test, the more complex 
and difficult the analysis may be in any given case, and the greater 
the likelihood of inconsistent results in other similar cases. By using 
these factors that focus on the exercise of control over the more 
essential terms and conditions of employment, the Department believes 
its proposed test would determine FLSA joint employer status with 
greater ease and consistency. This simplicity would also provide 
greater certainty to the public, helping workers and organizations to 
determine more accurately who is and is not a joint employer under the 
Act before any investigation or litigation begins.
    Fifth, these factors are generally applicable and are almost always 
present in the scenario where an employee's work for an employer 
simultaneously benefits another person. Therefore they should be 
helpful for determining joint employer status in a wide variety of 
contexts.
    Sixth, the Department's proposed four-factor test finds 
considerable support in the plurality of circuit courts that already 
apply similar multi-factor, economic realities tests. The First and 
Fifth Circuits apply the Bonnette test, which is nearly identical to 
the Department's proposed test.\65\ The Seventh Circuit uses this same 
test as a baseline to determine joint employer status under the 
FMLA,\66\ and district courts in the Seventh Circuit apply it in FLSA 
cases.\67\ Moreover, the Third Circuit applies a similar four-factor 
test that considers whether the potential joint employer:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 
668, 675-76 (1st Cir. 1998); see Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 355-
57 (5th Cir. 2012). Although Gray involved whether an individual 
owner of the employer was jointly liable under the FLSA, the court 
noted that it ``must apply the economic realities test to each 
individual or entity alleged to be an employer and each must satisfy 
the four part test.'' 673 F.3d at 355 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). Two older Fifth Circuit decisions applied a different 
test to determine whether an entity was a joint employer under the 
Act, and the Fifth Circuit has not yet overruled those decisions--
creating some uncertainty about what joint employer test applies in 
the Fifth Circuit. See Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 
471 F.2d 235, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1973); Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 
405 F.2d 668, 669-670 (5th Cir. 1968).
    \66\ See Moldenhauer v. Tazewell-Pekin Consol. Commc'ns Ctr., 
536 F.3d 640, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2008) (``[W]e hold generally that . . 
. each alleged [joint] employer must exercise control over the 
working conditions of the employee . . .'' (citing Reyes v. 
Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2007)). While 
the Seventh Circuit's FLSA decision in Reyes did not use the 
Bonnette factors, the court in Moldenhauer stated that Reyes ``held 
that both the farm that employed migrant workers and the recruiter 
who placed the workers at the farm . . . controlled the workers' 
daily activities and working conditions.'' Moldenhauer, 536 F.3d at 
644 (citing Reyes, 495 F.3d at 404-08).
    \67\ See, e.g., In re Jimmy John's Overtime Litig., Nos. 14 C 
5509, 15 C 1681, & 15 C 6010, 2018 WL 3231273, at *13-14 (N.D. Ill. 
June 14, 2018); Babych v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., No. 09 C 
8000, 2011 WL 5507374, at *6-8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Has authority to hire and fire employees;
     Has authority to promulgate work rules and assignments, 
and set conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, and 
hours;
     Exercises day-to-day supervision, including employee 
discipline; and
     Controls employee records, including payroll, insurance, 
taxes, and the like.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 
683 F.3d 462, 469-71 (3d Cir. 2012).

According to the Third Circuit, ``[t]hese factors are not materially 
different from'' the Bonnette factors.\69\ Finally, additional 
precedent supports the Department's proposed factors.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Id. at 469.
    \70\ See Bacon v. Subway Sandwiches & Salads LLC, 2015 WL 
729632, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2015) (applying in an FLSA case 
three factors similar to the Bonnette factors); Ash v. Anderson 
Merchandisers, LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2015) (suggesting in 
an FLSA case that three factors similar to the Bonnette factors 
would apply to determine joint employer status).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although four other circuit courts apply different joint employer 
tests, each of them applies at least one factor that resembles one of 
the Department's proposed factors derived from the Bonnette test.\71\ 
The Second and Fourth Circuits rejected the Bonnette test because they 
did not believe it could ``be reconciled with the `suffer or permit' 
language in [FLSA section 3(g)], which necessarily reaches beyond 
traditional agency law.'' \72\ But the Department believes that section 
3(d), not section 3(g), is the touchstone for joint employer status and 
that its proposed four-factor balancing test is preferable and 
consistent with the text of that section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 
141-42 (4th Cir. 2017) (of the six factors comprising the first step 
of its joint employer analysis, applying three factors resembling 
the Bonnette factors); Layton v. DHL Exp. (USA), Inc., 686 F.3d 
1172, 1176 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying an eight-factor test with five 
factors resembling the Bonnette factors); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel 
Co. Inc., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying a six-factor test 
with one factor resembling one of the Bonnette factors); Torres-
Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639-41 (applying a thirteen-factor test with five 
factors resembling the Bonnette factors).
    \72\ Salinas, 848 F.3d at 136 (quotation marks omitted); Zheng, 
355 F.3d at 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Proposal To Explain What Additional Joint Employer Factors Could Be 
Relevant

    The Department proposes to revise part 791 to address whether any 
additional factors may be relevant for determining joint employer 
status. Because joint employer status is determined by 3(d), the 
Department proposes to explain that any additional factors must be 
consistent with the text of 3(d). Thus, any additional factors 
indicating ``significant control'' \73\ are relevant because the 
potential joint employer's exercise of significant control over the 
employee's work establishes its joint liability under 3(d).\74\ 
Finally, the Department proposes to explain that any factors that do 
not fit within these parameters--as indicative of significant control 
or otherwise consistent with the text of 3(d)--are not relevant to the 
joint employer analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 470 (holding that additional joint 
employer factors should be ``indicia of `significant control' '' 
(citing Moldenhauer, 536 F.3d at 645 (``In Reyes and Grace, the 
primary employer placed workers with the alleged secondary employer, 
but both employers maintained significant control over the employee 
and were thus found to be joint employers.'' (citations omitted)))).
    \74\ See, e.g., Falk, 414 U.S. at 195 (finding joint employer 
liability under 3(d) where the potential joint employer exercised 
``substantial control [over] the terms and conditions of the 
[employees'] work''); Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 (finding joint 
employer liability under 3(d) where the potential joint employer 
``exercised considerable control'' and ``had complete economic 
control'' ``over the nature and structure of the employment 
relationship'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These proposals would not take away from the dynamic and fact-bound 
nature of the joint employer inquiry, but they would recognize that the 
text of 3(d) determines the scope of--and therefore

[[Page 14050]]

places limitations on--joint liability. The Department believes that 
these proposals would provide workers and organizations with more 
certainty regarding joint employer status under the Act.

C. Proposal To Explain That Joint Employer Status Under the Act Is Not 
Determined by the Employee's ``Economic Dependence'' and To Identify 
Three Examples of ``Economic Dependence'' Factors That Are Not Relevant

    The Department proposes to explain that joint employer status is 
not determined by the employee's ``economic dependence'' on the 
potential joint employer and to identify three examples of ``economic 
dependence'' factors that are not relevant to the Department's proposed 
multi-factor test and section 3(d). Identifying specific factors that 
are not relevant will help the public to have more certainty over what 
factors to apply when determining whether a person qualifies as a joint 
employer under the Act.
    Because section 3(d) establishes joint liability for ``any person 
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee,'' \75\ joint employer status is determined by 
the actions of the potential joint employer--not by the actions of the 
employee or his or her employer.\76\ As such, any factors that focus on 
the actions of the employee or his or her employer are not relevant to 
the joint employer inquiry, including those focusing on the employee's 
``economic dependence.'' The Department therefore proposes to explain 
that joint employer status is determined by the actions of the 
potential joint employer--not by the employee's economic dependence--
and to identify three examples of economic dependence factors that are 
not relevant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
    \76\ See id. (``Employer'' includes any person acting directly 
or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee . . . '' (emphasis added)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the Department proposes to identify as not relevant 
whether the employee: (1) Is in a specialty job or a job that otherwise 
requires special skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight; (2) has the 
opportunity for profit or loss based on his or her managerial skill; 
and (3) invests in equipment or materials required for work or the 
employment of helpers. These three factors focus on whether the 
employee is correctly classified as such under the Act--and not on 
whether the potential joint employer is acting in the interest of the 
employer in relation to the employee. While courts have used these 
factors for determining whether a worker is an employee or independent 
contractor, they are not relevant for determining whether additional 
persons are jointly liable under the Act to a worker whose 
classification as an employee has already been established.
    Finally, there is judicial precedent for specifically identifying 
factors that are not relevant to the joint employer inquiry. Notably, 
the Eleventh Circuit identified three factors--including the skill 
required and the opportunity for profit and loss--as not relevant to 
the joint employer inquiry.\77\ The Eleventh Circuit explained that 
these factors ``only distinguished whether [a worker] was an employee 
or an independent contractor,'' not whether an additional person was a 
joint employer of the worker.\78\ Similarly, the courts have found that 
the ``usefulness'' of the traditional employment relationship test--
which includes factors such as the skill required, opportunity for 
profit or loss, and investment in the business--is ``significantly 
limited'' in a joint employer case where the employee already has an 
employer and the question is whether an additional person is jointly 
liable with the employer for the employee.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See Layton, 686 F.3d at 1176.
    \78\ Id.
    \79\ E.g., Baystate, 163 F.3d at 675 n.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Proposal To Explain That Joint Employer Status Is Determined by FLSA 
Section 3(d) Only, Not by Section 3(e)(1) or 3(g)

    The Department proposes to explain that the textual basis for FLSA 
joint employer status is section 3(d), not section 3(e)(1) or 3(g). 
While the FLSA does not use the term ``joint employer,'' the FLSA 
contemplates joint liability in section 3(d). First, the FLSA defines 
the term ``employee'' in section 3(e)(1) to mean ``any individual 
employed by an employer.'' \80\ The FLSA, in turn, defines the term 
``employ'' in section 3(g): `` `[e]mploy' includes to suffer or permit 
to work.'' \81\ Reading 3(e)(1) and 3(g) together, an employer is a 
person who suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an individual to 
work, and an employee is an individual whom another person suffers, 
permits, or otherwise employs to work. The FLSA further defines 
``employer'' in section 3(d) to ``include[ ]'' joint employers--``any 
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee.'' \82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1) (emphasis added).
    \81\ 29 U.S.C. 203(g).
    \82\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sections 3(d), 3(e)(1), and 3(g) therefore work in harmony. If an 
employer suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an employee to work 
under 3(e)(1) and 3(g), and another person is acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of the employer in relation to the employee 
under 3(d), then the employer and the other person are jointly and 
severally liable for the employee's hours worked. During that period, 
the employer is liable for the hours that it suffers, permits, or 
otherwise employs the employee to work, and the other person is a joint 
employer under 3(d), jointly and severally liable for those same hours 
worked.
    Accordingly, 3(e)(1) and 3(g) determine whether there is an 
employment relationship between the potential employer and the worker 
for a specific set of hours worked, and 3(d) alone determines another 
person's joint liability for those hours worked. This delineation is 
confirmed by the structure of the text. A person who is, under 3(d), 
acting ``in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee'' 
is, by definition, a second employer.\83\ Another person can become a 
joint employer of an employee under 3(d) only if an employer is already 
suffering, permitting, or otherwise employing that employee to work 
under sections 3(e)(1) and 3(g).\84\ By contrast, sections 3(e)(1) and 
3(g) do not expressly address the possibility of a second employment 
relationship. In fact, 3(e)(1) defines an ``employee'' as ``any 
individual employed by an employer''--singular.\85\ But 3(d)'s 
inclusion of ``any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest 
of an employer in relation to an employee'' encompasses any additional 
persons that may be held jointly liable for the employee's hours worked 
in a workweek. The Department's interpretation of sections 3(d), 
(e)(1), and (g) is therefore consistent with the text of the Act which 
expands employer liability beyond the initial employment relationship 
to additional persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ Id.
    \84\ Id. (```Employer' includes any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee 
. . . . '' (emphasis added)).
    \85\ In contrast, the definition of ``employee'' in the NLRA 
expressly contemplates the existence of multiple employers. See 29 
U.S.C. 152(3) (``The term `employee''' shall include any employee, 
and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer . 
. . '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This clear textual delineation is consistent with judicial 
precedent. In Rutherford Food, the Supreme Court identified the FLSA's 
definition of ``employ'' in section 3(g) in particular when determining 
whether the workers

[[Page 14051]]

at issue were employees or independent contractors.\86\ The Court cited 
section 3(d) only in passing in a footnote.\87\ By contrast, in Falk 
the Supreme Court relied on the FLSA's definition of ``employer'' in 
section 3(d) to determine joint employer status.\88\ The Court in Falk 
found joint employer status under 3(d) because of the potential joint 
employer's exercise of control over the terms and conditions of the 
employee's work.\89\ Falk did not cite 3(g).\90\ In the same way, 
Bonnette determined joint employer status according to the text of 3(d) 
alone, without citing 3(g).\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727-29 
(1947) (``We pass . . . upon the question whether the [workers] were 
employees of the operator of the Kansas plant under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. . . . We conclude . . . that these [workers] are not 
independent contractors.'').
    \87\ See id. at 728 n.6. In addition to Rutherford, the Court 
has consistently defined employment relationships under the FLSA by 
reference to sections 3(e)(1) and 3(g), not section 3(d). See, e.g., 
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 31-33 (1961) 
(finding an employment relationship under sections 3(e) and 3(g)); 
United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362-64 (1945) (relying 
on sections 3(e) and (g) and finding an employment relationship 
without citation to 3(d)).
    \88\ See 414 U.S. at 195.
    \89\ See id.
    \90\ See id. Falk mentioned 3(e)(1), but only in passing. See 
id.
    \91\ See 704 F.2d at 1469-70 (``We conclude that, under the 
FLSA's liberal definition of `employer' [in 3(d)], the appellants 
were [joint] employers of the chore workers.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Department proposes to revise part 791 to better 
account for section 3(d), Falk, and Bonnette by explaining that joint 
employer status is determined by 3(d) alone--whether the potential 
joint employer is acting in the interest of an employer in relation to 
an employee. Explicitly tethering the joint employer standard in part 
791 to section 3(d) will provide clearer guidance on how to determine 
joint employer status consistent with the text of the Act.

E. Proposal To Clarify That a Person's Business Model, Certain Business 
Practices, and Certain Contractual Provisions Do Not Make Joint 
Employer Status More or Less Likely

    The Department proposes to clarify that a potential joint 
employer's business model does not make joint employer status more or 
less likely under the Act. Under the FLSA, a person is a joint employer 
if it is ``acting . . . in relation to'' an employee of an employer--
not simply because it has a certain business model.\92\ Accordingly, 
the mere fact that a potential joint employer enters into a franchise 
arrangement with an employer does not itself make that person jointly 
liable for the employer's employees. The potential joint employer must 
be acting, directly or indirectly, ``in relation to'' those employees 
to be jointly liable for them.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
    \93\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department also proposes to clarify that certain business 
practices that the Department has encountered--such as providing a 
sample employee handbook or other forms to an employer as part of a 
franchise arrangement; allowing an employer to operate a facility on 
its premises; offering or participating in an association health or 
retirement plan; \94\ or jointly participating with an employer in an 
apprenticeship program--do not make joint employer liability more or 
less likely under the Act. Of course, if a potential joint employer 
enforced the terms of a franchise handbook against a franchisee's 
employee, or directed an employer's employee to participate in a joint 
apprenticeship program, or exercised control over an employer's 
employee who worked on its premises, those actions ``in relation to'' 
the employee could indicate joint employer status. The mere business 
practices themselves--participating in the apprenticeship program, 
health plan, or retirement plan; sharing the premises; or providing the 
handbook--do not necessarily involve the potential joint employer 
``acting . . . in relation to'' the employer's employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ Proposing to clarify that offering or participating in an 
association health or retirement plan does not make joint employer 
status more or less likely under the FLSA does not impact the 
interpretation of ``employer'' under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) because ERISA defines ``employer'' differently 
than the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. 1002(5) (defining ``employer'' under 
ERISA to mean ``any person acting . . . in relation to an employee 
benefit plan'' and to include ``a group or association of employers 
acting for an employer in such capacity'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department also proposes to clarify that certain contractual 
provisions between an employer and another person--such as requiring 
the employer to institute workplace safety practices, a wage floor, 
sexual harassment policies, morality clauses,\95\ or other measures to 
encourage compliance with the law or to promote desired business 
practices--do not make joint employer status more or less likely under 
the Act. Of course, if a potential joint employer enforced the terms of 
these provisions--for example, by directly firing one of the employer's 
employees for violating a sexual harassment policy--those actions ``in 
relation to'' the employee could indicate joint employer status. 
However, the provisions themselves merely require the employer to 
institute generic policies. They do not show control over any actual 
employment decisions. They do not involve the potential joint employer 
``acting . . . in relation to'' any of the employer's employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ Morality clauses require employees to maintain standards of 
behavior to protect the reputation of their employer. See, e.g., 
Galaviz v. Post-Newsweek Stations, 380 F. App'x 457, 459 (5th Cir. 
2010), and Bernsen v. Innovative Legal Marketing, LLC, No. 
2:11CV546, 2012 WL 3525612 (E.D. Va. Jun. 20, 2012), for examples of 
morality clauses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Proposal To Replace the Phrase ``Joint Employment''

    The Department also proposes to replace the phrase ``joint 
employment'' with ``joint employer status'' throughout part 791. This 
change will help to focus the inquiry on whether the potential joint 
employer has taken sufficient action to be held jointly and severally 
liable under 3(d).

G. Proposal To Reiterate That a Joint Employer Can Be Any Legal Person 
Under the Act

    Because section 3(d) ``includes any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,'' 
\96\ the Department proposes to add the Act's definition of ``person'' 
to part 791.\97\ This addition would ensure that a joint employer under 
3(d) broadly encompasses every kind of person contemplated by the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d) (emphasis added).
    \97\ 29 U.S.C. 203(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Proposal To Make Non-Substantive Revisions to the Department's 
Current Joint Employer Standard in the Other Joint Employer Scenario 
(Separate Sets of Hours)

    The Department believes that part 791's ``not completely 
disassociated'' standard provides clear and useful guidance in the 
other joint employer scenario, where multiple employers suffer, permit, 
or otherwise employ an employee to work separate sets of hours in the 
same workweek. In this scenario, employer A suffers or permits the 
employee to work one set of hours in a workweek--for example, 30 hours 
Monday through Wednesday--and employer B suffers or permits the 
employee to work a second set of hours in the same workweek--for 
example, 20 hours Thursday and Friday. If employers A and B are ``not 
completely disassociated'' with respect to the employee's employment, 
then the employee's hours worked for them in the workweek are 
aggregated and A and B are jointly and severally liable to the employee 
for 40 hours plus 10 overtime hours.

[[Page 14052]]

    Under part 791, employers A and B will generally be considered to 
be sufficiently associated if: (1) There is an arrangement between them 
to share the employee's services; (2) one employer is acting directly 
or indirectly in the interest of the other employer in relation to the 
employee; or (3) they share control of the employee, directly or 
indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. The 
second of these three situations is simply a restatement of the 
statutory basis for joint liability in section 3(d), and the first and 
third situations--sharing an employee and exercising common control 
over that employee--involve the employers acting in each other's 
interest in relation to an employee in specific ways (establishing 
joint liability under 3(d)). The Department believes that this standard 
provides adequate clarity to determine joint employer status in this 
scenario, and to identify the statutory basis for that joint liability. 
Indeed, courts have applied the Department's current regulation in this 
scenario and have found it useful.\98\ Additionally, the Department has 
issued opinion letters applying its current regulation to determine 
whether certain facts satisfy this joint employer scenario.\99\ The 
Department accordingly proposes only non-substantive revisions to the 
current regulation with respect to this scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See, e.g., Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 
917-18 (9th Cir. 2003) (relying on Sec.  791.2 to find two home 
health care providers that shared staff, had common management, and 
were operated under common control of the same person to be joint 
employers); Murphy v. Heartshare Human Servs. of New York, 254 
F.Supp.3d 392, 399-404 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (relying on Sec.  791.2 to 
hold that former employees pled with sufficient particularity that a 
school and a residence house were joint employers for separate hours 
worked because they coordinated the employees' work assignments, 
some of the employees' duties benefitted both, and they had 
overlapping management and human resources functions); Li v. A 
Perfect Day Franchise, Inc., 281 FRD. 373, 400-01 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(relying on the ``common control'' provision in Sec.  791.2 to find 
joint employer status); Chao v. Barbeque Ventures, LLC, No. 
8:06CV676, 2007 WL 5971772, at *6 (D. Neb. Dec. 12, 2007) (relying 
on section 3(d), Sec.  791.2, and Falk to find that separate 
restaurants that shared owners and had the same managers controlling 
both restaurants were joint employers).
    \99\ See, e.g., Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FLSA 2005-17NA, 
2005 WL 6219105 (June 14, 2005) (applying Sec.  791.2 to determine 
that separate health care facilities were joint employers and 
employees' hours worked for different facilities must be aggregated 
in a workweek to calculate whether overtime pay is due); Wage & Hour 
Division Opinion Letter 1998 WL 1147714 (Jul. 13, 1998) (applying 
Sec.  791.2 to determine that separate health care entities were 
joint employers and employees' hours worked for different entities 
must be aggregated in a workweek for purposes of calculating any 
overtime pay due under the Act).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Joint Employer Examples

    The Department proposes to include several illustrative examples 
applying the Department's proposed analysis to determine joint employer 
status. The Department's proposed conclusions following each example 
are, like all illustrative examples, limited to substantially similar 
factual situations.

J. Severability

    Finally, the Department proposes to include a severability 
provision in part 791 so that, if one or more of the provisions of part 
791 is held invalid or stayed pending further agency action, the 
remaining provisions would remain effective and operative. The 
Department proposes to add this provision as Sec.  791.3.

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., 
and its attendant regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, require the Department 
to consider the agency's need for its information collections, their 
practical utility, as well as the impact of paperwork and other 
information collection burdens imposed on the public, and how to 
minimize those burdens. The PRA typically requires an agency to provide 
notice and seek public comments on any proposed collection of 
information contained in a proposed rule. See 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B); 
5 CFR 1320.8. This NPRM does not contain a collection of information 
subject to OMB approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The 
Department welcomes comments on this determination.

V. Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review; and Executive 
Order 13563, Improved Regulation and Regulatory Review

    Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the 
costs and benefits of a regulation and to adopt a regulation only upon 
a reasoned determination that the regulation's net benefits (including 
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety effects, 
distributive impacts, and equity) justify its costs. Executive Order 
13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, 
of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility.
    Under Executive Order 12866, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) must determine whether a regulatory action is a ``significant 
regulatory action,'' which includes an action that has an annual effect 
of $100 million or more on the economy. Significant regulatory actions 
are subject to review by OMB. As described below, this proposed rule is 
economically significant. Therefore, the Department has prepared a 
preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) in connection with this 
NPRM as required under section 6(a)(3) of Executive Order 12866, and 
OMB has reviewed the rule.
    By simplifying the standard for determining joint employer status, 
this proposed rule would reduce the burden on the public. This proposed 
rule is accordingly expected to be an Executive Order 13771 
deregulatory action.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ 82 FR 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Introduction

1. Background
    The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires a covered employer to 
pay its nonexempt employees at least the federal minimum wage for every 
hour worked and overtime premium pay of at least 1.5-times their 
regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 
The FLSA defines an ``employer'' to ``include[ ] any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee.'' These persons are ``joint'' employers who are jointly and 
severally liable with the employer for every hour worked by the 
employee in a workweek. 29 CFR part 791 contains the Department's 
official interpretation of joint employer status under the FLSA. In 
this NPRM, the Department proposes to revise part 791 to adopt a four-
factor balancing test to determine joint employer status in one of the 
joint employer scenarios under the Act--where an employer suffers, 
permits, or otherwise employs an employee to work, and another person 
simultaneously benefits from that work. This proposed rule would 
explain what additional factors should and should not be considered, 
and provide guidance on how to apply this multi-factor test. The 
Department proposes no substantive changes to part 791's guidance in 
the other joint employer scenario--where multiple employers suffer, 
permit, or otherwise employ an employee to work separate sets of hours 
in the same workweek. The Department believes that its proposals would 
make it easier to determine whether a person is or is not a joint 
employer under the Act, thereby promoting compliance with the FLSA.
2. Need for Rulemaking
    For the reasons explained above, the Department has determined that 
its interpretation of joint employer status requires revision as it 
applies to the first joint employer scenario identified above

[[Page 14053]]

(one set of hours worked in a workweek). The Department is concerned 
that the current regulation does not adequately address this scenario, 
and believes that its proposed revisions would provide needed clarity 
in this scenario. The Department also believes a proposed rule:
     Could help bring clarity to the current judicial 
landscape, where different courts are applying different joint employer 
tests that have resulted in inconsistent treatment of similar worker 
situations, uncertainty for organizations, and increased compliance and 
litigation costs;
     Would reduce the chill on organizations who may be 
hesitant to enter into certain relationships or engage in certain kinds 
of business practices for fear of being held liable for counterparty 
employees over which they have insignificant control;
     Would better ground the Department's interpretation of 
joint employer status in the text of the FLSA; and
     Would be responsive to the current public and 
Congressional interest in the joint employer issue.
    The Department believes that the current regulation provides clear 
and useful guidance to determine joint employer status in the second 
scenario, but that non-substantive revisions to better reflect the 
Department's longstanding practice would be desirable.

B. Economic Impacts

    The Department estimated the number of affected firms and 
quantified the costs associated with this proposed rule. The Department 
expects that all businesses and state and local government entities 
would need to review the text of this rule, and therefore would incur 
regulatory familiarization costs. However, on a per-entity basis, these 
costs would be small (see Section V.2 for detailed analysis of 
regulatory familiarization costs). Because this rule does not alter the 
standard for determining joint employer status in the second joint 
employer scenario where the employee works separate sets of hours for 
multiple employers in the same workweek, the Department believes that 
there would be no change in the aggregation of workers' hours to 
determine overtime hours worked.\101\ Therefore, there would be no 
impact on workers in the form of lost overtime, and no transfers 
between employers and employees. Although this rule would alter the 
standard for determining joint employer status where the employee works 
one set of hours in a workweek that simultaneously benefits another 
person, the Department believes that there would still be no impact on 
workers' wages due under the FLSA. This proposed standard would not 
change the amount of wages the employee is due under the FLSA, but 
could reduce, in some cases, the number of persons who are liable for 
payment of those wages. To the extent this proposal provides a clearer 
standard for determining joint employer status where the employee works 
one set of hours for his or her employer that simultaneously benefits 
another person, this rule may make it easier to determine who is liable 
for earned wages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ In this scenario, the employee's separate sets of hours 
are aggregated so that both employers are jointly and severally 
liable for the total hours the employee works in the workweek. As 
such, a finding of joint liability in this situation can result in 
some hours qualifying for an overtime premium. For example, if the 
employee works for employer A for 40 hours in the workweek, and for 
employer B for 10 hours in the same workweek, and those employers 
are found to be joint employers, A and B are jointly and severally 
liable to the employee for 50 hours worked--which includes 10 
overtime hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Costs
    Updating the rules interpreting joint employer status will impose 
direct costs on private businesses and state and local government 
entities by requiring them to review the new regulation. To estimate 
these regulatory familiarization costs, the Department must determine: 
(1) The number of potentially affected entities, (2) the average hourly 
wage rate of the employees reviewing the regulation, and (3) the amount 
of time required to review the regulation.
    It is uncertain whether private entities will incur regulatory 
familiarization costs at the firm or the establishment level. For 
example, in smaller businesses there might be just one specialist 
reviewing the regulation. Larger businesses might review the rule at 
corporate headquarters and determine policy for all establishments 
owned by the business, while more decentralized businesses might assign 
a separate specialist to the task in each of their establishments. To 
avoid underestimating the costs of this rule, the Department uses both 
the number of establishments and the number of firms to estimate a 
potential range for regulatory familiarization costs. The lower bound 
of the range is calculated assuming that one specialist per firm will 
review the regulation, and the upper bound of the range assumes one 
specialist per establishment.
    The most recent data on private sector entities at the time this 
NPRM was drafted are from the 2016 Statistics of U.S. Businesses 
(SUSB), which reports 6.1 million private firms and 7.8 million private 
establishments with paid employees.\102\ Additionally, the Department 
estimates 90,106 state and local governments (2012 Census of 
Governments) might incur costs under the proposal.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ Statistics of U.S. Businesses 2016, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb.html.
    \103\ 2012 Census of Governments: Government Organization 
Summary Report, https://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department believes that even entities that do not currently 
have workers with one or more joint employers will incur regulatory 
familiarization costs, because they will need to confirm whether this 
proposed rule includes any provisions that may affect them or their 
employees.
    The Department judges one hour per entity, on average, to be an 
appropriate review time for the rule. The relevant statutory 
definitions have been in the FLSA since its enactment in 1938, the 
Department has recognized the concept of joint employer status since at 
least 1939, and the Department already issued a rule interpreting joint 
employer status in 1958. Therefore, the Department expects that the 
standards applied by this proposed rule should be at least partially 
familiar to the specialists tasked with reviewing it. Additionally, the 
Department believes many entities are not joint employers and thus 
would spend significantly less than one hour reviewing the rule. 
Therefore, the one-hour review time represents an average of less than 
one hour per entity for the majority of entities that are not joint 
employers, and more than one hour for review by entities that might be 
joint employers. The Department welcomes comments on the estimate of 
one hour of review time per entity, and data on the amount of time 
typically spent by small businesses in regulatory review.
    The Department's analysis assumes that the proposed rule would be 
reviewed by Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists (SOC 
13-1141) or employees of similar status and comparable pay. The mean 
hourly wage for these workers is $32.29 per hour.\104\ In addition, the 
Department also assumes that benefits are paid at a rate of 46 percent 
\105\ and overhead costs are

[[Page 14054]]

paid at a rate of 17 percent of the base wage, resulting in an hourly 
rate of $52.63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2017, https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/oes131141.htm.
    \105\ The benefits-earnings ratio is derived from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics' Employer Costs for Employee Compensation data 
using variables CMU1020000000000D and CMU1030000000000D.

   Table 1--Total Regulatory Familiarization Costs, Calculation by Number of Firms and Establishments ($1000s)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            By firm                     By establishment
                 NAICS sector                  -----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Firms         Cost \a\      Establishments      Cost \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting....          21,830          $1,149            22,594          $1,189
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil/Gas Extraction.....          20,309           1,069            27,234           1,433
Utilities.....................................           5,893             310            18,159             956
Construction..................................         683,352          35,967           696,733          36,671
Manufacturing.................................         249,962          13,156           291,543          15,345
Wholesale Trade...............................         303,155          15,956           412,526          21,712
Retail Trade..................................         650,997          34,264         1,069,096          56,269
Transportation and Warehousing................         181,459           9,551           230,994          12,158
Information...................................          75,766           3,988           146,407           7,706
Finance and Insurance.........................         237,973          12,525           476,985          25,105
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing............         300,058          15,793           390,500          20,553
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Serv..         805,745          42,409           903,534          47,555
Management of Companies and Enterprises.......          27,184           1,431            55,384           2,915
Administrative and Support Services...........         340,893          17,942           409,518          21,554
Educational Services..........................          91,774           4,830           103,364           5,440
Health Care and Social Assistance.............         661,643          34,824           890,519          46,870
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation...........         126,247           6,645           137,210           7,222
Accommodation and Food Services...............         527,632          27,771           703,528          37,029
Other Services (except Public Admin.).........         690,329          36,334           754,229          39,697
State and Local Governments...................          90,106           4,743            90,106           4,743
    All Industries............................       6,092,307         320,655         7,830,163         412,123
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Average Annualized Costs, 7 Percent Discount Rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 10 years                                                           42,667                            54,838
In perpetuity                                                           20,977                            26,961
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Average Annualized Costs, 3 Percent Discount Rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 10 years                                                           36,496                            46,906
In perpetuity                                                            9,339                            12,004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Each entity is expected to allocate one hour of Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists' (SOC
  13-1141) time for regulatory familiarization. The unloaded hourly rate for this occupation is $32.29, and the
  wage load factor is 1.63 (0.46 for benefits and 0.17 for overhead). Therefore, the per-entity cost is $52.63.

    The Department estimates that the lower bound of regulatory 
familiarization cost range would be $320.7 million, and the upper 
bound, $412.1 million. Additionally, the Department estimates that the 
Retail Trade industry would have the highest upper bound ($56.3 
million), while the Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 
industry would have the highest lower bound ($42.4 million). The 
Department estimates that all regulatory familiarization costs would 
occur in Year 1.
    Additionally, the Department estimated average annualized costs of 
this rule over 10 years and in perpetuity. Over 10 years, this rule 
would have an average annual cost of $42.7 million to $54.8 million, 
calculated at a 7 percent discount rate ($36.5 million to $46.9 million 
calculated at a 3 percent discount rate). In perpetuity, this rule 
would have an average annual cost of $21.0 million to $27.0 million, 
calculated at a 7 percent discount rate ($9.3 million to $12.0 million 
calculated at a 3 percent discount rate).
2. Potential Transfers
    There are two joint employer scenarios under the FLSA: (1) 
Employees work one set of hours that simultaneously benefit the 
employer and another person, and (2) employees work separate sets of 
hours for multiple employers. The Department does not expect this rule 
to generate transfers to or from workers that currently have one or 
more joint employers under either of these scenarios.
    Employees who work one set of hours for an employer that 
simultaneously benefit another person are not likely to see a change in 
the wages owed them under the FLSA as a result of this rule. In this 
scenario, the employee's employer is liable to the employee for all 
wages due under the Act for the hours worked. If a joint employer 
exists, then that person is jointly and severally liable with the 
employer for all wages due under the Act for those hours worked. To the 
extent that the proposed standard for determining joint employer status 
reduces the number of persons who are joint employers in this scenario, 
neither the wages due the employee under the Act nor the employer's 
liability for the entire wages due would change. If the person is no 
longer a joint employer as a result of the proposal, the employee would 
no longer have a legal right to collect the wages due under the Act 
from that person but would still be able to collect the entire wages 
due from the employer. In sum, changing the standard for determining 
whether a person is a joint employer in this scenario would not impact 
the wages due the employee under the Act, and assuming that all 
employers always fulfill their legal obligations under the Act, would 
not result in any reduction

[[Page 14055]]

in wages received by the employee because the employer would pay the 
wages in full. The Department recognizes that there could be a transfer 
between the employer and any joint employers, but lacks information 
about how many individuals or entities would be affected and to what 
degree.
    Employees who work separate sets of hours for multiple employers 
are not affected because the Department is not proposing any 
substantive revisions to the standard for determining joint employer 
status in this scenario. Therefore, no joint liability (or lack 
thereof) in this scenario will be altered by the promulgation of this 
rule.
3. Other Potential Impacts
    To the extent revising the Department's regulation provides more 
clarity, the revision could promote innovation and certainty in 
business relationships, which also benefits employees. The modern 
economy involves a web of complex interactions filled with a variety of 
unique business organizations and contractual relationships. When an 
employer contemplates a business relationship with another person, the 
other person may not be able to assess what degree of association with 
the employer will result in joint and several liability for the 
employer's employees. Indeed, the other person may be concerned with 
such liability despite having insignificant control over the employer's 
employee. This uncertainty could impact the other person's willingness 
to engage in any number of business practices vis-[agrave]-vis the 
employer--such as providing a sample employee handbook, or other forms, 
to the employer as part of a franchise arrangement; allowing the 
employer to operate a facility on its premises; using or establishing 
an association health plan or association retirement plan used by the 
employer; or jointly participating with an employer in an 
apprenticeship program--even though these business practices could 
benefit the employer's employees. Similarly, uncertainty regarding 
joint liability could also impact that person's willingness to bargain 
for certain contractual provisions with the employer, such as requiring 
workplace safety practices, a wage floor, sexual harassment policies, 
morality clauses, or other measures intended to encourage compliance 
with the law or to promote other desired business practices. The 
Department's proposal may provide additional certainty as businesses 
consider whether to adopt such business practices.
    The Department expects that this proposed rule would reduce burdens 
on organizations. After initial rule familiarization, this proposal may 
reduce the time spent by organizations to determine whether they are 
joint employers. Likewise, clarity may reduce FLSA-related litigation 
regarding joint employer status, and reduce litigation among 
organizations regarding allocation of FLSA-related liability and 
damages. The rule may also promote greater uniformity among court 
decisions, providing clarity for organizations operating in multiple 
jurisdictions. This uniformity could reduce organizations' costs 
because they would not have to consider multiple, jurisdiction-specific 
legal standards before entering into economic relationships.
    Because the Department does not have data on the number of joint 
employers, and the number of joint employer situations that could be 
affected, cost-savings attributable to this proposed rule have not been 
quantified. The Department requests comments, studies, and data on the 
prevalence of joint employers, how this proposed rule would affect 
members of the public, and how to quantify those impacts, if such 
quantification is possible. The Department also requests comments and 
data on any additional potential benefits of this proposed rule.

VII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) as amended by the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), 
hereafter jointly referred to as the RFA, requires that an agency 
prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) when 
proposing, and a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) when 
issuing, regulations that will have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The agency is also required to 
respond to public comment on the NPRM. The Chief Counsel for Advocacy 
of the Small Business Administration was notified of this proposed rule 
upon submission of the rule to OMB under Executive Order 12866. The 
Department invites commenters to provide input on data analysis and/or 
methodology used throughout this IRFA.

A. Reasons Why Action by the Agency Is Being Considered

    The Department has determined that its interpretation of joint 
employer status requires revision as it applies to one of the joint 
employer scenarios under the Act (one set of hours worked for an 
employer that simultaneously benefits another person). The Department 
is concerned that the current regulation does not adequately address 
this scenario, and the Department believes that its proposed revisions 
would provide needed clarity and ensure consistency with the Act's 
text.

B. Statement of Objectives and Legal Basis for the Proposed Rule

    29 CFR part 791 contains the Department's official interpretations 
for determining joint employer status under the FLSA. It is intended to 
serve as a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the 
Department will look to apply it. However, the Department has not 
meaningfully revised this part since its promulgation in 1958, over 60 
years ago.
    The Department's objective is to update its joint employer rule in 
29 CFR part 791 to provide guidance for determining joint employer 
status in one of the joint employer scenarios under the Act (one set of 
hours worked for an employer that simultaneously benefits another 
person) in a manner that is clear and consistent with section 3(d) of 
the Act.

C. Description of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Proposed 
Rule Will Apply

    The RFA defines a ``small entity'' as a (1) small not-for-profit 
organization, (2) small governmental jurisdiction, or (3) small 
business. The Department used the entity size standards defined by SBA, 
in effect as of October 1, 2017, to classify entities as small. SBA 
establishes separate standards for 6-digit NAICS industry codes, and 
standard cutoffs are typically based on either the average number of 
employees, or the average annual receipts. For example, small 
businesses are generally defined as having fewer than 500, 1,000, or 
1,250 employees in manufacturing industries and less than $7.5 million 
in average annual receipts for nonmanufacturing industries. However, 
some exceptions do exist, the most notable being that depository 
institutions (including credit unions, commercial banks, and non-
commercial banks) are classified by total assets (small defined as less 
than $550 million in assets). Small governmental jurisdictions are 
another noteworthy exception. They are defined as the governments of 
cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or 
special districts with populations of less than 50,000 people.
    The Department obtained data from several sources to determine the 
number

[[Page 14056]]

of small entities. However, the Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB, 
2012) was used for most industries (the 2012 data is the most recent 
SUSB data that includes information on receipts). Industries for which 
the Department used alternative sources include credit unions,\106\ 
commercial banks and savings institutions,\107\ agriculture,\108\ and 
public administration.\109\ The Department used the latest available 
data in each case, so data years differ between sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ Nat'l Credit Union Ass'n. (2012). 2012 Year End Statistics 
for Federally Insured Credit Unions, https://www.ncua.gov/analysis/Pages/call-report-data/reports/chart-pack/chart-pack-2018-q1.pdf.
    \107\ Fed. Depository Ins. Corp. (2018). Statistics on 
Depository Institutions--Compare Banks. Available at: https://www5.fdic.gov/SDI/index.asp. Data are from 3/31/18. Data is from 3/
11/2018 for employment, and data is from 6/30/2017 for the share of 
firms and establishments that are ``small''.
    \108\ U.S. Dep't of Agric. (2014). 2012 Census of Agriculture: 
United States Summary and State Data: Volume 1, Geographic Area 
Series, Part 51. Available at: https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf.
    \109\ Hogue, C. (2012). Government Organization Summary Report: 
2012. Available at: https://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For each industry, the SUSB data tabulates total establishment and 
firm counts by both enterprise employment size (e.g., 0-4 employees, 5-
9 employees) and receipt size (e.g., less than $100,000, $100,000-
$499,999).\110\ The Department combined these categories with the SBA 
size standards to estimate the proportion of establishments and firms 
in each industry that are considered small. The general methodological 
approach was to classify all establishments or firms in categories 
below the SBA cutoff as a ``small entity.'' If a cutoff fell in the 
middle of a defined category, the Department assumed a uniform 
distribution of employees across that bracket to determine what 
proportion should be classified as small. The Department assumed that 
the small entity share of credit card issuing and other depository 
credit intermediation institutions (which were not separately 
represented in FDIC asset data), is similar to that of commercial 
banking and savings institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ The SUSB defines employment as of the week of March 12th 
of the particular year for which it is published.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Costs for Small Entities Affected by the Proposed Rule

    Table 2 presents the estimated number of small entities affected by 
the proposed rule. Based on the methodology described above, the 
Department found that 5.9 million of the 6.1 million firms (99 percent) 
and 6.3 million of the 7.8 million establishments (81 percent) qualify 
as small by SBA standards. As discussed in Section V.B, these do not 
exclude entities that currently do not have joint employees, as those 
will still need to familiarize themselves with the text of the new 
rule. Moreover, we assume that the cost structure of regulatory 
familiarization will not differ between small and large entities (i.e., 
small entities will need the same amount of time for review and will 
assign the same type of specialist to the task).

                        Table 2--Regulatory Familiarization Costs for Small Entities, Average by Firm and Establishment ($1000s)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            By firm                                     By establishment
                                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     NAICS sector                                         Percent of     Cost per firm                      Percent of    Cost per estab
                                                             Firms           total            \a\        Establishments        total            \a\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agric./Forestry/Fishing/Hunting.......................          18,307            83.9             $53            18,930            83.8             $53
Mining/Quarrying/Oil & Gas Extraction.................          19,625            96.6              53            21,974            80.7              53
Utilities.............................................           5,487            93.1              53             7,762            42.7              53
Construction..........................................         673,521            98.6              53           676,913            97.2              53
Manufacturing.........................................         241,932            96.8              53           264,112            90.6              53
Wholesale Trade.......................................         292,615            96.5              53           328,327            79.6              53
Retail Trade..........................................         636,069            97.7              53           688,835            64.4              53
Transportation & Warehousing..........................         174,523            96.2              53           183,810            79.6              53
Information...........................................          73,288            96.7              53            83,559            57.1              53
Finance and Insurance.................................         229,002            96.2              53           269,991            56.6              53
Real Estate & Rental & Leasing........................         293,693            97.9              53           310,740            79.6              53
Prof., Scientific, & Technical Services...............         790,834            98.1              53           819,115            90.7              53
Management of Companies & Ent.........................          18,004            66.2              53            34,124            61.6              53
Administrative & Support Services.....................         332,072            97.4              53           347,167            84.8              53
Educational Services..................................          87,566            95.4              53            90,559            87.6              53
Health Care & Social Assistance.......................         638,699            96.5              53           726,524            81.6              53
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation.....................         123,530            97.8              53           126,281            92.0              53
Accommodation & Food Services.........................         520,690            98.7              53           556,588            79.1              53
Other Services........................................         681,696            98.7              53           700,496            92.9              53
State & Local Governments \b\.........................          72,844            80.8              53            72,844            80.8              53
    All Industries....................................       5,923,996            97.2              53         6,328,653            80.8              53
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Average Annualized Costs, 7 Percent Discount Rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 10 years                                                                                        7                                                 7
In perpetuity                                                                                        3                                                 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Average Annualized Costs, 3 Percent Discount Rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 10 years                                                                                        6                                                 6
In perpetuity                                                                                        2                                                 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Each entity is expected to allocate one hour of Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists' (SOC 13-1141) time for regulatory
  familiarization. The unloaded hourly rate for this occupation is $32.29, and the wage load factor is 1.63 (0.46 for benefits and 0.17 for overhead).
  Therefore, the per-entity cost is $52.63.
\b\ Government entities are not classified as firms or establishments; therefore, we use the total number of entities for both calculations.


[[Page 14057]]

    The Department estimates that in Year 1, small entities will incur 
a minimum of approximately $312 million in total regulatory 
familiarization costs, and a maximum of approximately $333 million. 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services is the industry that 
will incur the highest total costs ($41.6 million to $43.1 million).
    Additionally, the Department estimated average annualized costs to 
small entities of this rule over 10 years and in perpetuity. Over 10 
years, this rule will have an average annual cost of $41.5 million to 
$44.3 million, calculated at a 7 percent discount rate ($35.5 million 
to $37.9 million calculated at a 3 percent discount rate). In 
perpetuity, this rule will have an average annual cost of $20.4 million 
to $21.8 million, calculated at a 7 percent discount rate ($9.1 million 
to $9.7 million calculated at a 3 percent discount rate).
    Based on the analysis above, the Department does not expect that 
small entities will incur large individual costs as a result of this 
rule. Even though all entities will incur familiarization costs, these 
costs will be relatively small on a per-entity basis (an average of 
$52.63 per entity). Furthermore, no costs will be incurred past the 
first year of the promulgation of this rule. As a share of revenues, 
costs do not exceed 0.003 percent on average for all industries (Table 
3). The industry where costs are the highest percent of revenues is 
Management of Companies and Enterprises where costs range from a lower 
bound of 0.015 percent to an upper bound of 0.028 percent of revenues. 
Additionally, the Department calculated the revenue per firm/
establishment for entities with 0 to 4 employees, as per SUSB data. The 
industry that has had the smallest revenue per entity is Accommodation 
and Food Services (NAICS 72)--$221,600 per firm and $221,100 per 
establishment, in 2017 dollars. In both cases, the per-entity cost 
($53) is approximately 0.024% of revenue. Accordingly, the Department 
does not expect that the proposed rule would have a significant 
economic cost impact on a substantial number of small entities.

            Table 3--Total Regulatory Familiarization Costs for Small Entities, as Share of Revenues
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Total revenue   Cost as percent of revenue \c\
                                                                   for small   ---------------------------------
                         NAICS sector                              entities                            By
                                                                (millions) \a\     By firms      establishments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting......................         $21,978           0.004             0.005
Mining, Quarrying, & Oil/Gas Extraction.......................         183,236           0.001             0.001
Utilities.....................................................         124,928           0.000             0.000
Construction..................................................         754,055           0.005             0.005
Manufacturing.................................................       1,836,516           0.001             0.001
Wholesale Trade...............................................       2,584,835           0.001             0.001
Retail Trade..................................................       1,419,180           0.002             0.003
Transportation & Warehousing..................................         235,647           0.004             0.004
Information...................................................         198,347           0.002             0.002
Finance & Insurance...........................................         260,753           0.005             0.005
Real Estate & Rental & Leasing................................         195,889           0.008             0.008
Professional, Scientific, & Technical Services................         636,424           0.007             0.007
Management of Companies & Enterprises.........................           6,492           0.015             0.028
Administrative & Support Services.............................         259,794           0.007             0.007
Educational Services..........................................          79,796           0.006             0.006
Health Care & Social Assistance...............................         628,701           0.005             0.006
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation.............................          92,957           0.007             0.007
Accommodation & Food Services.................................         367,996           0.007             0.008
Other Services (except Public Administration).................         368,806           0.010             0.010
State & Local Governments.....................................           (\b\)           (\b\)             (\b\)
    All Industries............................................      10,256,328           0.003             0.003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Inflated to 2017 dollars using the GDP deflator.
\b\ Government entities are considered small if the relevant population is less than 50,000. Government revenue
  data are not readily available by size of government entity.
\c\ Calculated by dividing total revenues per industry by total costs per industry, by firm and by
  establishment, as shown in Table 2.

E. Analysis of Regulatory Alternatives

    In developing this NPRM, the Department considered proposing 
alternative tests for the first joint employer scenario--where an 
employee works one set of hours that simultaneously benefits another 
person. Those alternative tests, such as the Second and Fourth 
Circuits' joint employer tests, have more factors than the Department's 
proposed test, may have a second step, and rely substantially on the 
``suffer or permit'' language in FLSA section 3(g).\111\ The 
Department, however, believes that section 3(d), not section 3(g), is 
the touchstone for joint employer status and that its proposed four-
factor balancing test is preferable, in part because it is consistent 
with section 3(d). The Department's proposed test is simpler and easier 
to apply because it has fewer factors and only one step, whereas the 
alternative tests involve a consideration of additional factors and are 
therefore more complex and indeterminate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ See Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69; Salinas, 848 F.3d at 136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department also considered applying the four-factor balancing 
test in Bonnette without modification. The Department instead proposes 
a four-factor test that closely tracks the language of Bonnette with a 
modification to the first factor. Whereas the Bonnette test considers 
whether the potential joint employer had the ``power'' to hire and 
fire, the Department proposes a test that considers whether the 
employer actually exercised the power to hire and fire. The Department 
believes that this modification will help ensure that its joint 
employer test is fully consistent

[[Page 14058]]

with the text of section 3(d), which requires a potential joint 
employer to be ``acting . . . in relation to an employee.'' \112\ By 
rooting the joint employer standard in the text of the statute, the 
Department believes that its proposal could provide workers and 
organizations with more clarity in determining who is a joint employer 
under the Act, thereby promoting innovation and certainty in businesses 
relationships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Unfunded Mandates

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) \113\ requires 
agencies to prepare a written statement for rules for which a general 
notice of proposed rulemaking was published and that include any 
federal mandate that may result in increased expenditures by state, 
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $161 million ($100 million in 1995 dollars adjusted for 
inflation) or more in at least one year. This statement must: (1) 
Identify the authorizing legislation; (2) present the estimated costs 
and benefits of the rule and, to the extent that such estimates are 
feasible and relevant, its estimated effects on the national economy; 
(3) summarize and evaluate state, local, and tribal government input; 
and (4) identify reasonable alternatives and select, or explain the 
non-selection, of the least costly, most cost-effective, or least 
burdensome alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ See 2 U.S.C. 1501.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Authorizing Legislation

    This proposed rule is issued pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.

B. Assessment of Quantified \114\ Costs and Benefits
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ Only the rule familiarization cost is quantified, but the 
Department believes that there are potential cost savings that it 
could not quantify due to lack of data at this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of the UMRA, this rule includes a federal mandate that 
is expected to result in increased expenditures by the private sector 
of more than $161 million in at least one year, but the rule will not 
result in increased expenditures by state, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, of $161 million or more in any one year.
    Based on the cost analysis from this proposed rule, the Department 
determined that the proposed rule will result in Year 1 total costs for 
state and local governments totaling $4.7 million, all of them incurred 
for regulatory familiarization (see Table 1). There will be no 
additional costs incurred in subsequent years.
    The Department determined that the proposed rule will result in 
Year 1 total costs for the private sector between $315.9 million and 
$407.4 million, all of them incurred for regulatory familiarization. 
There will be no additional costs incurred in subsequent years.
    UMRA requires agencies to estimate the effect of a regulation on 
the national economy if, at its discretion, such estimates are 
reasonably feasible and the effect is relevant and material.\115\ 
However, OMB guidance on this requirement notes that such macroeconomic 
effects tend to be measurable in nationwide econometric models only if 
the economic effect of the regulation reaches 0.25 percent to 0.5 
percent of GDP, or in the range of $48.5 billion to $97.0 billion 
(using 2017 GDP). A regulation with smaller aggregate effect is not 
likely to have a measurable effect in macroeconomic terms unless it is 
highly focused on a particular geographic region or economic sector, 
which is not the case with this proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See 2 U.S.C. 1532(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department's PRIA estimates that the total costs of the 
proposed rule will be between $320.7 million and $412.1 million (see 
Table 1). All costs will occur in the first year of the promulgation of 
this rule, and there will be no additional costs in subsequent years. 
Given OMB's guidance, the Department has determined that a full 
macroeconomic analysis is not likely to show that these costs would 
have any measurable effect on the economy.

C. Least Burdensome Option Explained

    This Department believes that it has chosen the least burdensome 
but still cost-effective methodology to revise its rule for determining 
joint employer status under the FLSA consistent with the Department's 
statutory obligation. Although the proposed regulation would impose 
costs for regulatory familiarization, the Department believes that its 
proposal would reduce the overall burden on organizations by 
simplifying the standard for determining joint employer status. The 
Department believes that, after familiarization, this rule may reduce 
the time spent by organizations to determine whether they are joint 
employers. Additionally, revising the Department's guidance to provide 
more clarity could promote innovation and certainty in business 
relationships.

IX. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The Department has (1) reviewed this proposed rule in accordance 
with Executive Order 13132 regarding federalism and (2) determined that 
it does not have federalism implications. The proposed rule would not 
have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship 
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

X. Executive Order 13175, Indian Tribal Governments

    This proposed rule would not have substantial direct effects on one 
or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal 
Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 791

    Wages.


0
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Department proposes to 
revise part 791 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations as 
follows:

PART 791--JOINT EMPLOYER STATUS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Sec
791.1 Introductory statement
791.2 Determining Joint Employer Status under the FLSA
791.3 Severability

    Authority: 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201-219; 
Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950; Secretary's Order 01-2014 (Dec. 
19, 2014), 79 FR 77527.


Sec.  791.1  Introductory statement.

    This part contains the Department of Labor's general 
interpretations of the text governing joint employer status under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C. 201-19. The Administrator of 
the Wage and Hour Division intends that these interpretations will 
serve as ``a practical guide to employers and employees as to how [the 
Wage and Hour Division] will seek to apply [the Act].'' Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944). The Administrator believes that 
they are correct interpretations of the law and will accordingly use 
them to guide the performance of his or her duties under the Act until 
he or she concludes upon reexamination that they are incorrect or is 
otherwise directed by an authoritative judicial decision. To the extent 
that prior administrative rulings, interpretations, practices, or 
enforcement policies relating to joint

[[Page 14059]]

employer status under the Act are inconsistent or in conflict with the 
interpretations stated in this part, they are hereby rescinded. These 
interpretations stated in this part may be relied upon in accordance 
with section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. 251-262, so long 
as the Department does not modify, amend, or rescind them, and judicial 
authority does not determine that they are incorrect.


Sec.  791.2  Determining Joint Employer Status under the FLSA.

    There are two joint employer scenarios under the FLSA.
    (a)(1) In the first joint employer scenario, the employee has an 
employer who suffers, permits, or otherwise employs the employee to 
work, see 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1), (g), but another person simultaneously 
benefits from that work. The other person is the employee's joint 
employer only if that person is acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of the employer in relation to the employee. See 29 U.S.C. 
203(d). In this situation, the following four factors are relevant to 
the determination. Those four factors are whether the other person:
    (i) Hires or fires the employee;
    (ii) Supervises and controls the employee's work schedule or 
conditions of employment;
    (iii) Determines the employee's rate and method of payment; and
    (iv) Maintains the employee's employment records.
    (2) The potential joint employer must actually exercise--directly 
or indirectly--one or more of these indicia of control to be jointly 
liable under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. 203(d). The potential joint 
employer's ability, power, or reserved contractual right to act in 
relation to the employee is not relevant for determining joint employer 
status. No single factor is dispositive in determining the economic 
reality of the potential joint employer's status under the Act. Whether 
a person is a joint employer under the Act will depend on all the facts 
in a particular case, and the appropriate weight to give each factor 
will vary depending on the circumstances.
    (b) Additional factors may be relevant for determining joint 
employer status in this scenario, but only if they are indicia of 
whether the potential joint employer is:
    (1) Exercising significant control over the terms and conditions of 
the employee's work; or
    (2) Otherwise acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the 
employer in relation to the employee.
    (c) Whether the employee is economically dependent on the potential 
joint employer is not relevant for determining the potential joint 
employer's liability under the Act. Accordingly, to determine joint 
employer status, no factors should be used to assess economic 
dependence. Examples of factors that are not relevant because they 
assess economic dependence include, but are not limited to, whether the 
employee:
    (1) Is in a specialty job or a job that otherwise requires special 
skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight;
    (2) Has the opportunity for profit or loss based on his or her 
managerial skill; and
    (3) Invests in equipment or materials required for work or the 
employment of helpers.
    (d) (1) A joint employer may be an individual, partnership, 
association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any 
organized group of persons. See 29 U.S.C. 203(a), (d).
    (2) The potential joint employer's business model--for example, 
operating as a franchisor--does not make joint employer status more or 
less likely under the Act.
    (3) The potential joint employer's contractual agreements with the 
employer requiring the employer to, for example, set a wage floor, 
institute sexual harassment policies, establish workplace safety 
practices, require morality clauses, adopt similar generalized business 
practices, or otherwise comply with the law, do not make joint employer 
status more or less likely under the Act.
    (4) The potential joint employer's practice of providing a sample 
employee handbook, or other forms, to the employer; allowing the 
employer to operate a business on its premises (including ``store 
within a store'' arrangements); offering an association health plan or 
association retirement plan to the employer or participating in such a 
plan with the employer; jointly participating in an apprenticeship 
program with the employer; or any other similar business practice, does 
not make joint employer status more or less likely under the Act.
    (e)(1) In the second joint employer scenario, one employer employs 
a worker for one set of hours in a workweek, and another employer 
employs the same worker for a separate set of hours in the same 
workweek. The jobs and the hours worked for each employer are separate, 
but if the employers are joint employers, both employers are jointly 
and severally liable for all of the hours the employee worked for them 
in the workweek.
    (2) In this second scenario, if the employers are acting 
independently of each other and are disassociated with respect to the 
employment of the employee, each employer may disregard all work 
performed by the employee for the other employer in determining its own 
responsibilities under the Act. However, if the employers are 
sufficiently associated with respect to the employment of the employee, 
they are joint employers and must aggregate the hours worked for each 
for purposes of determining compliance with the Act. The employers will 
generally be sufficiently associated if:
    (i) There is an arrangement between them to share the employee's 
services;
    (ii) One employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest 
of the other employer in relation to the employee; or
    (iii) They share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, 
by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or 
is under common control with the other employer. Such a determination 
depends on all of the facts and circumstances. Certain business 
relationships, for example, which have little to do with the employment 
of specific workers--such as sharing a vendor or being franchisees of 
the same franchisor--are alone insufficient to establish that two 
employers are sufficiently associated to be joint employers.
    (f) For each workweek that a person is a joint employer of an 
employee, that joint employer is jointly and severally liable with the 
employer and any other joint employers for compliance with all of the 
applicable provisions of the Act, including the overtime provisions, 
for all of the hours worked by the employee in that workweek. In 
discharging this joint obligation in a particular workweek, the 
employer and joint employers may take credit toward minimum wage and 
overtime requirements for all payments made to the employee by the 
employer and any joint employers.
    (g) The following illustrative examples demonstrate the application 
of the principles described in paragraphs (a)-(f) of this section under 
the facts presented and are limited to substantially similar factual 
situations:
    (1)(i) Example. An individual works 30 hours per week as a cook at 
one restaurant establishment, and 15 hours per week as a cook at a 
different restaurant establishment affiliated with the same nationwide 
franchise. These establishments are locally owned and managed by 
different franchisees that do not coordinate in any way with respect

[[Page 14060]]

to the employee. Are they joint employers of the cook?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the restaurant establishments 
are not joint employers of the cook because they are not associated in 
any meaningful way with respect to the cook's employment. The 
similarity of the cook's work at each restaurant, and the fact that 
both restaurants are part of the same nationwide franchise, are not 
relevant to the joint employer analysis, because those facts have no 
bearing on the question whether the restaurants are acting directly or 
indirectly in each other's interest in relation to the cook.
    (2)(i) Example. An individual works 30 hours per week as a cook at 
one restaurant establishment, and 15 hours per week as a cook at a 
different restaurant establishment owned by the same person. Each week, 
the restaurants coordinate and set the cook's schedule of hours at each 
location, and the cook works interchangeably at both restaurants. The 
restaurants decided together to pay the cook the same hourly rate. Are 
they joint employers of the cook?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the restaurant establishments 
are joint employers of the cook because they share common ownership, 
coordinate the cook's schedule of hours at the restaurants, and jointly 
decide the cook's terms and conditions of employment, such as the pay 
rate. Because the restaurants are sufficiently associated with respect 
to the cook's employment, they must aggregate the cook's hours worked 
across the two restaurants for purposes of complying with the Act.
    (3)(i) Example. An office park company hires a janitorial services 
company to clean the office park building after-hours. According to a 
contractual agreement with the office park and the janitorial company, 
the office park agrees to pay the janitorial company a fixed fee for 
these services and reserves the right to supervise the janitorial 
employees in their performance of those cleaning services. However, 
office park personnel do not set the janitorial employees' pay rates or 
individual schedules and do not in fact supervise the workers' 
performance of their work in any way. Is the office park a joint 
employer of the janitorial employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the office park is not a joint 
employer of the janitorial employees because it does not hire or fire 
the employees, determine their rate or method of payment, or exercise 
control over their conditions of employment. The office park's reserved 
contractual right to control the employee's conditions of employment 
does not demonstrate that it is a joint employer.
    (4)(i) Example. A country club contracts with a landscaping company 
to maintain its golf course. The contract does not give the country 
club authority to hire or fire the landscaping company's employees or 
to supervise their work on the country club premises. However, in 
practice a club official oversees the work of employees of the 
landscaping company by sporadically assigning them tasks throughout 
each workweek, providing them with periodic instructions during each 
workday, and keeping intermittent records of their work. Moreover, at 
the country club's direction, the landscaping company agrees to 
terminate an individual worker for failure to follow the club 
official's instructions. Is the country club a joint employer of the 
landscaping employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the country club is a joint 
employer of the landscaping employees because the club exercises 
sufficient control, both direct and indirect, over the terms and 
conditions of their employment. The country club directly supervises 
the landscaping employees' work and determines their schedules on what 
amounts to a regular basis. This routine control is further established 
by the fact that the country club indirectly fired one of landscaping 
employees for not following its directions.
    (5)(i) Example. A packaging company requests workers on a daily 
basis from a staffing agency. The packaging company determines each 
worker's hourly rate of pay, supervises their work, and uses 
sophisticated analysis of expected customer demand to continuously 
adjust the number of workers it requests and the specific hours for 
each worker, sending workers home depending on workload. Is the 
packaging company a joint employer of the staffing agency's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the packaging company is a 
joint employer of the staffing agency's employees because it exercises 
sufficient control over their terms and conditions of employment by 
setting their rate of pay, supervising their work, and controlling 
their work schedules.
    (6)(i) Example. An Association, whose membership is subject to 
certain criteria such as geography or type of business, provides 
optional group health coverage and an optional pension plan to its 
members to offer to their employees. Employer B and Employer C both 
meet the Association's specified criteria, become members, and provide 
the Association's optional group health coverage and pension plan to 
their respective employees. The employees of both B and C choose to opt 
in to the health and pension plans. Does the participation of B and C 
in the Association's health and pension plans make the Association a 
joint employer of B's and C's employees, or B and C joint employers of 
each other's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the Association is not a joint 
employer of B's or C's employees, and B and C are not joint employers 
of each other's employees. Participation in the Association's optional 
plans does not involve any control by the Association, direct or 
indirect, over B's or C's employees. And while B and C independently 
offer the same plans to their respective employees, there is no 
indication that B and C are coordinating, directly or indirectly, to 
control the other's employees. B and C are therefore not acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of the other in relation to any 
employee.
    (7(i)) Example. Entity A, a large national company, contracts with 
multiple other businesses in its supply chain. As a precondition of 
doing business with A, all contracting businesses must agree to comply 
with a code of conduct, which includes a minimum hourly wage higher 
than the federal minimum wage, as well as a promise to comply with all 
applicable federal, state, and local laws. Employer B contracts with A 
and signs the code of conduct. Does A qualify as a joint employer of 
B's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, A is not a joint employer of 
B's employees. Entity A is not acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of B in relation to B's employees--hiring, firing, maintaining 
records, or supervising or controlling work schedules or conditions of 
employment. Nor is A exercising significant control over Employer B's 
rate or method of pay--although A requires B to maintain a wage floor, 
B retains control over how and how much to pay its employees. Finally, 
because there is no indication that A's requirement that B commit to 
comply with all applicable federal, state, and local law exerts any 
direct or indirect control over B's employees, this requirement has no 
bearing on the joint employer analysis.
    (8)(i) Example. Franchisor A is a global organization representing 
a hospitality brand with several thousand hotels under franchise 
agreements. Franchisee B owns one of these hotels and is a licensee of 
A's brand. In addition, A provides B with a sample employment 
application, a sample

[[Page 14061]]

employee handbook, and other forms and documents for use in operating 
the franchise. The licensing agreement is an industry-standard document 
explaining that B is solely responsible for all day-to-day operations, 
including hiring and firing of employees, setting the rate and method 
of pay, maintaining records, and supervising and controlling conditions 
of employment. Is A a joint employer of B's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, A is not a joint employer of 
B's employees. A does not exercise direct or indirect control over B's 
employees. Providing samples, forms, and documents does not amount to 
direct or indirect control over B's employees that would establish 
joint liability.
    (9)(i) Example. A retail company owns and operates a large store. 
The retail company contracts with a cell phone repair company, allowing 
the repair company to run its business operations inside the building 
in an open space near one of the building entrances. As part of the 
arrangement, the retail company requires the repair company to 
establish a policy of wearing specific shirts and to provide the shirts 
to its employees that look substantially similar to the shirts worn by 
employees of the retail company. Additionally, the contract requires 
the repair company to institute a code of conduct for its employees 
stating that the employees must act professionally in their 
interactions with all customers on the premises. Is the retail company 
a joint employer of the repair company's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the retail company is not a 
joint employer of the cell phone repair company's employees. The retail 
company's requirement that the repair company provide specific shirts 
to its employees and establish a policy that its employees to wear 
those shirts does not, on its own, demonstrate substantial control over 
the repair company's employees' terms and conditions of employment. 
Moreover, requiring the repair company to institute a code of conduct 
or allowing the repair company to operate on its premises does not make 
joint employer status more or less likely under the Act. There is no 
indication that the retail company hires or fires the repair company's 
employees, controls any other terms and conditions of their employment, 
determines their rate and method of payment, or maintains their 
employment records.


Sec.  791.3  Severability.

    If any provision of this part is held to be invalid or 
unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person or 
circumstance, or stayed pending further agency action, the provision 
shall be construed so as to continue to give the maximum effect to the 
provision permitted by law, unless such holding shall be one of utter 
invalidity or unenforceability, in which event the provision shall be 
severable from part 791 and shall not affect the remainder thereof.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 29th day of March, 2019.
Keith E. Sonderling,
Acting Administrator, Wage and Hour Division.
[FR Doc. 2019-06500 Filed 4-8-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-27-P