Definition of “Employer” Under Section 3(5) of ERISA-Association Retirement Plans and Other Multiple-Employer Plans, 53534-53561 [2018-23065]

Agencies

• Employee Benefits Security Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 205 (Tuesday, October 23, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 53534-53561]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-23065]



[[Page 53533]]

Vol. 83

Tuesday,

No. 205

October 23, 2018

Part II





 Department of Labor





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Employee Benefits Security Administration





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29 CFR Part 2510





Definition of ``Employer'' Under Section 3(5) of ERISA--Association 
Retirement Plans and Other Multiple-Employer Plans; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 83 , No. 205 / Tuesday, October 23, 2018 / 
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employee Benefits Security Administration

29 CFR Part 2510

RIN 1210-AB88


Definition of ``Employer'' Under Section 3(5) of ERISA--
Association Retirement Plans and Other Multiple-Employer Plans

AGENCY: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of Labor.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Labor proposes a regulation under title 29 
of the Code of Federal Regulations to expand access to affordable 
quality retirement saving options by clarifying the circumstances under 
which an employer group or association or a professional employer 
organization (PEO) may sponsor a workplace retirement plan. In 
particular, the proposed regulation clarifies that employer groups or 
associations and PEOs can, when satisfying certain criteria, constitute 
``employers'' within the meaning of section 3(5) of ERISA for purposes 
of establishing or maintaining an individual account ``employee pension 
benefit plan'' within the meaning of ERISA section 3(2). As an 
``employer,'' a group or association can sponsor a defined contribution 
retirement plan for its members, as can a PEO sponsor a plan for client 
employers (collectively referred to as ``MEPs'' unless otherwise 
specified). The proposed regulation would allow different businesses to 
join a MEP, either through a group or association or through a PEO. The 
proposal would also permit certain working owners without employees to 
participate in a MEP sponsored by a group or association. The proposal 
would primarily affect groups or associations of employers, PEOs, plan 
participants, and plan beneficiaries. The proposal would not affect 
whether groups, associations, or PEOs assume joint-employment 
relationships with member-employers or client employers. But the 
proposal may affect banks, insurance companies, securities broker-
dealers, record keepers, and other commercial enterprises that provide 
retirement-plan products and services.

DATES: Comments are due by December 24, 2018.

ADDRESSES: You may submit written comments, identified by RIN 1210-
AB88, by one of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Office of Regulations and Interpretations, Employee 
Benefits Security Administration, Room N-5655, U.S. Department of 
Labor, 200 Constitution Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20210, Attention: 
Definition of Employer--MEPs RIN 1210-AB88.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
Regulatory Identifier Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. If you submit 
comments electronically, do not submit paper copies. Comments will be 
available to the public, without charge, online at https://www.regulations.gov and https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa and at the 
Public Disclosure Room, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 
Suite N-1513, 200 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20210.
    Warning: Do not include any personally identifiable or confidential 
business information that you do not want publicly disclosed. Comments 
are public records posted on the internet as received and can be 
retrieved by most internet search engines.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mara S. Blumenthal, Office of 
Regulations and Interpretations, Employee Benefits Security 
Administration, (202) 693-8500. This is not a toll-free number.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

A. Overview and Purpose of Regulatory Action

    Expanding access to workplace retirement plans is critical to 
helping more American workers financially prepare to retire. 
Approximately 38 million private-sector employees in the United States 
do not have access to a retirement plan through their employers.\1\ 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 23 percent of all 
private-sector, full-time workers have no access to a workplace 
retirement plan.\2\ The percentage of private-sector workers without 
access to a workplace retirement plan increases to 32 percent when 
part-time workers are included.\3\
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    \1\ This number was estimated by the U.S. Department of Labor's 
Employee Benefits Security Administration using statistics from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: 
Employee Benefits in the United States, March 2018 (www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2018/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2018.pdf). According to Table 2 (entitled Retirement Benefits: 
Access, Participation and Take-up rates, Private Industry Workers) 
of this survey, approximately 68% of private-sector industry workers 
have access to retirement benefits through their employers in 2018. 
According to Appendix Table 2, the survey represents approximately 
118.1 million workers in 2018. Thus, the number of private industry 
workers without access to retirement plans through their employers 
is estimated to be approximately 38 million ((100%-68%) x 118.1 
million).
    \2\ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation 
Survey: Employee Benefits in the United States, March 2018 at Table 
2 (entitled Retirement Benefits: Access, Participation and Take-up 
rates, Private Industry Workers). The survey is available at 
(www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2018/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2018.pdf).
    \3\ Id.
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    Small businesses are less likely to offer retirement benefits. In 
2018, approximately 85 percent of workers at private-sector 
establishments with 100 or more workers were offered a retirement plan. 
In contrast, only 53 percent of workers at private-sector 
establishments with fewer than 100 workers had access to such plans.\4\ 
Contingent or temporary workers are less likely to have access to a 
workplace retirement plan than those who are traditionally employed.\5\ 
Access to an employment-based retirement plan is critical to the 
financial security of aging workers. Among workers who do not have 
access to a workplace retirement plan, only about 13 percent regularly 
contribute to individual retirement accounts, commonly called IRAs.\6\
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    \4\ Id.
    \5\ See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements--May 2017. See also Copeland, 
Employee Benefit Research Institute, Employment-Based Retirement 
Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 2013, 
(October 2014); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingent 
Workforce: Size, Characteristics, Earnings, and Benefits, April 20, 
2015; U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-15-566, RETIREMENT 
SECURITY--Federal Action Could Help State Efforts to Expand Private 
Sector Coverage (Sept. 2015) (www.gao.gov/assets/680/672419.pdf).
    \6\ The Department calculated this using Survey of Income and 
Program Participation 2008 Panel Data Waves 10 and 11.
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    Regulatory complexity discourages employers--especially small 
businesses--from offering workplace retirement plans for their 
employees. Establishing and maintaining a plan is expensive for small 
businesses. A survey by the Pew Charitable Trusts found that only 53 
percent of small-to mid-sized businesses offer a retirement plan; 37 
percent of those not offering a plan cited cost as a reason.\7\ 
Employers

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often cite annual reporting costs and exposure to potential fiduciary 
liability as major impediments to plan sponsorship.\8\
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    \7\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, Employer Barriers to and 
Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits, (June 2017) (https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/09/employer_barriers_to_and_motivations.pdf) (``Most commonly, 
employers without plans said that starting a retirement plan is too 
expensive to set up (37 percent). Another 22 percent cited a lack of 
administrative resources. In focus groups, some business 
representatives said their mix of workers--especially if they 
included low-wage or short-term employees--translated into limited 
employee interest in or demand for retirement benefits. But in the 
survey, only 17 percent cited lack of employee interest as the main 
reason they did not offer a plan.'').
    \8\ See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-12-326, Private 
Pensions Better Agency Coordination Could Help Small Employers 
Address Challenges to Plan Sponsorship (March 2012) 18-19, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-326.
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    MEPs thus have the potential to broaden the availability of 
workplace retirement plans, especially among small employers.\9\ MEPs 
are a structure under which different businesses can adopt a single 
retirement plan. Pooling resources in this way can be an efficient way 
not only to reduce costs but also to encourage more plan formation. For 
example, investment companies often charge lower fund fees for plans 
with greater asset accumulations. And because MEPs facilitate the 
pooling of plan participants and assets in one large plan, rather than 
many small plans, they enable small businesses to give their employees 
access to the same low-cost funds as large employers offer.
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    \9\ Two other types of pension arrangements share features of 
MEPs, but are not the focus of this proposal. A ``multiemployer 
plan'' as defined in ERISA section 3(37) is a plan to which more 
than one employer is required to contribute and which is maintained 
pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements between one 
or more employee organizations and more than one employer. There are 
also Pre-approved Plans, which are plans that are made available by 
providers for adoption by employers. See Rev. Proc. 2017-41, 2017-29 
IRB 92. A plan that uses a Pre-approved Plan document may either be 
a single-employer plan or a MEP. With respect to single-employer 
Pre-approved Plans, providers often offer services relating to 
central administration and may pool the assets of different plans 
into a central investment fund.
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    For a small business, in particular, a MEP may present an 
attractive alternative to taking on the responsibilities of sponsoring 
or administering its own plan. The MEP structure can reduce the 
employer's cost of sponsoring a benefit plan and effectively transfer 
substantial legal risk to professional fiduciaries responsible for the 
management of the plan. Although employers would retain some fiduciary 
responsibility for choosing and monitoring the arrangement and 
forwarding required contributions to the MEP, the employer could keep 
more of its day-to-day focus on managing its business, rather than on 
its plan.
    Under the proposal here, an employer generally would be required to 
execute a participation agreement or similar instrument that lays out 
the rights and obligations of the MEP sponsor and the participating 
employer before participating. But these employers would not be viewed 
as sponsoring their own separate, individual plans under ERISA. Rather, 
the MEP, if meeting the conditions of the proposal below, would 
constitute a single employee benefit plan for purposes of title I of 
ERISA. Consequently, the MEP sponsor --and not the participating 
employers--would generally be responsible, as plan administrator, for 
compliance with the requirements of title I of ERISA, including 
reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary obligations. This is so because 
the individual employers would not each have to act as plan 
administrators under ERISA section 3(16) or as named fiduciaries under 
section 402 of ERISA.
    Under the Department's proposal, an employer group or association 
or PEO would be acting as the ``employer'' sponsoring the plan within 
the meaning of section 3(5) of ERISA. This means that, typically, the 
employer group or association or PEO would act as a plan administrator 
and named fiduciary and, thus, would assume most fiduciary 
responsibilities. A MEP under this proposal would be subject to all of 
the ERISA provisions applicable to defined contribution retirement 
plans, including the fiduciary responsibility and prohibited 
transaction provisions in title I of ERISA. As a plan that is 
maintained by more than one employer, the MEP would have to satisfy the 
requirements of section 210 (a) of ERISA.

B. The Need for Reform

    Workers have limited tax-favored options to save for retirement 
beyond workplace plans. IRAs are not comparable to workplace retirement 
savings options. As compared to IRAs, the advantages to employees of 
ERISA-protected retirement plans include: (1) Higher contribution 
limits; (2) generally lower investment management fees as the size of 
plan assets increases; (3) a well-established uniform regulatory 
structure with important consumer protections, including fiduciary 
obligations, recordkeeping and disclosure requirements, legal 
accountability provisions, and spousal protections; (4) automatic 
enrollment; and (5) stronger protections from creditors. At the same 
time, workplace retirement plans provide employers with choice among 
plan features and the flexibility to tailor retirement plans that meet 
their business and employment needs.
    Although many MEPs already exist, there are reasons why they are 
not more widely available. The Department knows from the ``association 
health plan'' rulemaking process (AHP Rule), for instance, that many 
employer groups and associations already exist and have an expressed 
interest in providing access to employee benefits to their members. We 
understand that several of these groups and associations view the 
Department's current interpretive position in subregulatory 
interpretive rulings, regarding the extent to which these entities may 
be considered ``employers'' to sponsor a benefit plan, as overly 
restrictive. Certain groups and associations may view the current 
position in subregulatory interpretive rulings as an undue impediment 
to greater sponsorship of retirement plans, in the same way that 
certain groups and associations viewed the Department's guidance for 
health plans prior to the AHP Rule. Likewise, we understand an active 
PEO industry already exists and that its members, much like employer 
groups and associations, offer or would like to offer MEPs to their 
clients. At least some PEOs may be discouraged from doing so by a lack 
of clear standards, to the detriment of employers, especially small 
employers.
    Federal policy makers across the spectrum are increasingly focusing 
on the potential for MEPs to help America's workers. The Department is 
cognizant of Congress's efforts to promote MEPs through 
legislation.\10\ The President, too, has declared it the policy of the 
Executive Branch to ``[e]xpand[ ] access to multiple employer plans . . 
. [as] an efficient way to reduce administrative costs of retirement 
plan establishment and maintenance and [to] encourage more plan 
formation and broader availability of workplace retirement plans, 
especially among small employers.'' \11\
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    \10\ In both the 114th and 115th Congress, a number of mostly 
bipartisan legislative proposals have been introduced encouraging 
the creation of MEPs. In the 115th Congress alone, the following 
eight bills have been introduced: H.R. 854, the ``Retirement 
Security for American Workers Act,'' sponsored by Rep. Vern Buchanan 
and five bipartisan cosponsors on Feb. 3, 2017, its Senate companion 
bill, S. 1383, the ``Retirement Security Act,'' sponsored by Sens. 
Susan Collins (R-ME) and Bill Nelson (D-FL) on June 6, 2017; .H.R. 
4523, the ``Automatic Retirement Act of 2017,'' sponsored by Rep. 
Richard Neal (D-MA) on Dec. 8, 2017; H.R. 4637, the ``Small 
Businesses Add Value Act of 2017'' (SAVE Act), sponsored by Reps. 
Ron Kind (D-WI) and Dave Reichert (R-WA) on Dec. 13, 2017; S. 2526/
H.R. 5282, the bipartisan bill, the ``Retirement Enhancement and 
Savings Act of 2018'' (RESA), sponsored, respectively by Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Ranking Member Ron 
Wyden (D-OR) on March 9, 2018, and Rep. Mike Kelly (R-PA) and 76 
cosponsors (as of Sept. 19) on March 14, 2018; S. 3219, The ``Small 
Business Employees Retirement Enhancement Act, '' introduced by 
Sens. Tom Cotton (R-AR), Todd Young (R-IN), Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND), 
and Cory Booker (D-NJ) on July 17, 2018; and H.R. 6757, the ``Family 
Savings Act 2018,'' introduced on Sept. 10, 2018, by Rep. Rodney 
Davis (R-IL) and 29 cosponsors . H.R. 6757 was passed by the House 
of Representatives on Sept. 27, 2018, and referred to the Senate 
Finance Committee on Sept. 28, 2018, for consideration.
    \11\ Executive Order 13847 (83 FR 45321) (Sept. 6, 2018).

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    The Department's proposal differs in significant ways from several 
legislative proposals introduced in Congress. For one thing, the 
Department's proposal is more limited because it relies solely on the 
Department's authority to promulgate regulations administering title I 
of ERISA. Unlike the Department, Congress has authority to make 
statutory changes to ERISA and other areas of law that govern 
retirement savings, such as the Internal Revenue Code (Code).
    The Department does, however, have authority to interpret the 
statutes it administers, and it believes that a regulation clarifying 
the meaning of the statutory term ``employer,'' 29 U.S.C. 1003(a)(1), 
will ensure that statutory term is a clear legal standard for the use 
of MEPs under title I of ERISA. The Department had previously issued 
subregulatory guidance interpreting this provision that took a narrow 
view of the circumstances under which a group or association of 
employers could band together to act ``in the interest of'' employer 
members in relation to the offering of retirement savings plans. By 
clarifying its interpretation of the statutory language, the Department 
believes it could improve access to employer-sponsored retirement 
savings plans in America.
    The Department recently promulgated a similar rule to expand access 
to more affordable, quality healthcare by enhancing the ability of 
employers to band together to provide health benefits through a single 
ERISA-covered plan, called an ``association health plan'' (AHP). That 
regulation, the AHP Rule, issued on June 21, 2018, explains how 
employers acting together to provide such health benefits may meet the 
definition of the term ``employer'' in ERISA section 3(5).\12\ The AHP 
Rule sets forth several criteria under which groups or associations of 
employers may establish an ERISA-covered multiple employer group health 
plan. Several commenters on the AHP proposed rule encouraged the 
Department to bring MEPs within the sweep of that rule or a new rule. 
In the AHP Rule, the Department said it would consider those comments 
in the retirement plan context.\13\
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    \12\ 83 FR 28912 (June 21, 2018).
    \13\ Id. at 28964, n.10 (The ``Department will consider comments 
submitted in connection with this rule as a part of its evaluation 
of MEP issues in the retirement plan and other welfare benefit plan 
contexts.'')
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    On August 31, 2018, President Trump issued Executive Order 13847, 
``Strengthening Retirement Security in America,'' (Executive Order), 
which states that ``[i]t shall be the policy of the Federal Government 
to expand access to workplace retirement plans for American workers.'' 
The Executive Order directed the Secretary of Labor to examine policies 
that would: (1) Clarify and expand the circumstances under which U.S. 
employers, especially small and mid-sized businesses, may sponsor or 
adopt a MEP as a workplace retirement savings option for their 
employees, subject to appropriate safeguards; and (2) increase 
retirement security for part-time workers, sole proprietors, working 
owners, and other entrepreneurial workers with non-traditional 
employer-employee relationships by expanding their access to workplace 
retirement savings plans, including MEPs. The Executive Order further 
directed, to the extent consistent with applicable law and the policy 
of the Executive Order, that the Department consider within 180 days of 
the date of the Executive Order whether to issue a notice of proposed 
rulemaking, other guidance, or both, that would clarify when a group or 
association of employers or other appropriate business or organization 
could be an ``employer'' within the meaning of ERISA section 3(5).
    The Department reviewed current policies regarding MEPs and 
concluded that it should clarify through regulation that an employer 
group or association or a PEO that meets certain conditions may sponsor 
a single MEP under title I of ERISA (as opposed to providing an 
arrangement that constitutes multiple retirement plans). The 
Department, therefore, is proposing to issue a regulation interpreting 
the term ``employer'' for purposes of ERISA section 3(5). This proposed 
rule would supersede subregulatory interpretive rulings under ERISA 
section 3(5), and it would establish more flexible standards and 
criteria for sponsorship of these MEPs than currently articulated in 
that prior guidance. This proposed rule is intended to facilitate the 
adoption and administration of MEPs and to expand access to workplace 
retirement plans. The Department especially seeks to expand such access 
for employees of small employers and for certain self-employed 
individuals. The Department's proposal would not impact existing auto-
enrollment options and other features that make 401(k) plans attractive 
for employers.
    As explained more fully in the regulatory impact analysis below, 
the Department also seeks to level the playing field for small-business 
employees by permitting them to have access to the lowest-cost funds, 
often reserved for employees in large-asset plans. Small differences in 
fund fees can translate into enormous differences in retirement savings 
over a career.\14\ The GAO, for instance, has determined that 
``participants in smaller plans typically pay higher fees than 
participants in larger plans.'' \15\ GAO has emphasized the need for 
small businesses ``to understand plan fees in order to help 
participants secure adequate retirement savings.'' \16\
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    \14\ Assume an employee with 35 years until retirement and a 
current 401(k) account balance of $25,000. If returns on investments 
over the next 35 years average 7 percent and fees and expenses 
reduce average returns on the account by 0.5 percent, the account 
balance will grow to $227,000 at retirement, even if there are no 
further contributions to the account. If fees and expenses are 1.5 
percent, however, the account balance will grow to only $163,000. 
The 1 percent difference in fees and expenses would reduce the 
account balance at retirement by 28 percent. https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/a-look-at-401k-plan-fees.pdf.
    \15\ GAO-12-325, Increased Educational Outreach and Broader 
Oversight May Help Reduce Plan Fees (April 2012) at 21, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-325.
    \16\ GAO Testimony before the Senate Comm. on Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions, Statement of Charles A. Jeszeck, GAO Director of 
Education, Workforce and Income Security, GAO-13-748T (July 16, 
2013) at 16, https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655889.pdf.
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    The Department acknowledges that the term ``multiple employer 
plan'' is used to refer to different kinds of employee-benefit 
arrangements. This proposal, however, addresses only two kinds of 
arrangements: Sponsorship of a MEP plan by either a group or 
association of employers or by a PEO. The proposed regulation sets 
forth the circumstances in which a group or association or a PEO is 
appropriately treated, within the meaning of ERISA section 3(5), as an 
``employer'' in sponsoring an employee benefit plan for participating 
employers and their employees. The Department's proposal also would not 
involve defined benefit plans, in part, because the Department's view 
is that such plans raise different policy considerations. In addition, 
according to the Government Accountability Office, sponsorship of MEPs 
``seems to be following the general trend away from traditional benefit 
plans and towards defined contribution plans.'' \17\ Therefore, the 
proposed rule would apply solely to defined contribution plans.
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    \17\ GAO-18-111SP, The Nation's Retirement System: A 
Comprehensive Re-evaluation Is Needed to Better Promote Future 
Retirement Security (Oct. 2017); 2012 GAO report, at 10, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-111SP.
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    The Department solicits public comment on whether the Department 
should address, by regulation or otherwise, whether there are other 
types of entities that should be treated as an ``employer,'' within the 
meaning of

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ERISA section 3(5), for purposes of sponsoring a MEP. See Section E, 
below, entitled ``Request for Public Comments.''
    The Department also notes that nothing in the proposed rule is 
intended to suggest that participating in a MEP sponsored either by a 
bona fide group or association of employers or by a PEO gives rise to 
joint employer status under any federal or State law, rule, or 
regulation. The proposal also should not be read to indicate that a 
business that contracts with individuals as independent contractors 
becomes the employer of the independent contractor merely by 
participating in a MEP with those independent contractors, who would 
participate as working owners, if applicable, or promoting 
participation in a MEP to those independent contractors, as working 
owners. The Department asks for comment as to whether concerns about 
joint employment issues should be addressed further as part of any 
final rule.

C. Legal Background

1. Statutory Definitions

    ERISA section 4 governs the reach of ERISA and, accordingly, of the 
Department's authority over benefit plans. ERISA applies not to every 
benefit plan but only to an ``employee benefit plan'' sponsored ``by 
any employer.'' ERISA section 4(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. 1003(a)(1). The 
provision reads in relevant part: ERISA ``shall apply to any employee 
benefit plan if it is established or maintained by any employer.'' \18\ 
ERISA defines ``employee pension benefit plan'' to include ``any plan, 
fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer . . . 
to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding 
circumstances'' it provides retirement income to employees or the 
deferral of such income. The term ``employer'' is again essential to 
recognizing an ``employee pension benefit plan'' within the meaning of 
ERISA. Thus, a prerequisite of ERISA coverage is that the retirement 
plan must be established or maintained by an ``employer.''
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    \18\ ERISA also covers benefit plans established or maintained 
by employee organizations and such plains operated by both employers 
and employee organizations.
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    ERISA section 3(5) defines the term ``employer.'' ERISA section 
3(5); 29 U.S.C. 1002(5). ERISA's definitional provision reads in full:
    The term `employer' means any person acting directly as an 
employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to 
an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of 
employers acting for an employer in such capacity.
    When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, it copied this important 
definition from the 1958 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. 
Public Law 85-836, sec. 3(a)(4), 72 Stat. 997, 998 (1958).
    But ERISA does not explain what it means for an entity to act 
``directly as an employer'' or ``indirectly in the interest of an 
employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan.'' Nor does the 
statute explain what is meant by a ``group or association of 
employers.'' In short, these ambiguous statutory terms are not 
themselves defined. As one court has recognized, the ``problem lies, 
obviously enough, in determining what is meant by these oblique 
definitions of employer.'' Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352, 356 
(5th Cir. 1993). The statutory lacunae have proven problematic for some 
courts. They ``have found the phrase `act . . . indirectly in the 
interest of an employer' difficult to interpret.'' Mass. Laborers' 
Health & Welfare Fund v. Starrett Paving Corp., 845 F.2d 23, 24 (1st 
Cir. 1988); accord Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 
F.3d 561, 575 (2d Cir. 1995). So too is there statutory ambiguity with 
the term ``group or association of employers.'' Because ERISA ``does 
not define th[at] term,'' this ``void injects ambiguity into the 
statute.'' MD Physicians & Assocs. v. State Bd. of Ind., 957 F.2d 178, 
184 (5th Cir. 1992). Although ERISA contains a definition of 
``employer,'' the important terms used within that definition are 
unexplained.
    In light of all this, and consistent with longstanding principles 
of administrative law, the Department is best-positioned to address 
this statutory ambiguity by exercising its discretion to explicate some 
of the terms used in section 3(5). In doing so, the Department is aided 
both by the common understanding of the broad terms used in ERISA 
section 3(5) and by the statutory context.

2. Bona Fide Groups or Associations

    The Department has long taken the position that, even in the 
absence of the involvement of an employee organization, a single 
``multiple employer plan'' under ERISA may exist where a cognizable 
group or association of employers, acting in the interest of its 
employer members, establishes a benefit program for the employees of 
member employers. To satisfy these criteria, the group or association 
must exercise control over the amendment process, plan termination, and 
other similar functions of the plan on behalf of the participating-
employer members with respect to the plan and any trust established 
under the program.\19\ DOL guidance generally refers to these 
entities--i.e., entities that qualify as groups or association, within 
the meaning of section 3(5)--as ``bona fide'' employer groups or 
associations.\20\ For each employer that adopts for its employees a 
program of pension or welfare benefits sponsored by an employer group 
or association that is not ``bona fide,'' such employer establishes its 
own separate employee benefit plan covered by ERISA.\21\ Largely, but 
not exclusively, in the context of welfare-benefit plans, the 
Department has previously distinguished employer groups or associations 
that can act as an ERISA section 3(5) employer in sponsoring a multiple 
employer plan from those that cannot. To do so, the Department has 
asked whether the group or association has a sufficiently close 
economic or representational nexus to the employers and employees that 
participate in the welfare plan that is unrelated to the provision of 
benefits.\22\
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    \19\ See 83 FR at 28912, 28920.
    \20\ See, e.g., Advisory Opinions 2008-07A, 2003-17A, and 2001-
04A.
    \21\ See 83 FR 28912, 13 (citing Advisory Opinion 96-25A).
    \22\  See 83 FR 28912; see also Advisory Opinions 2012-04A, 
1983-21A, 1983-15A, and 1981-44A.
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    DOL advisory opinions and court decisions have long applied a 
facts-and-circumstances approach to determine whether there is a 
sufficient common economic or representational interest or genuine 
organizational relationship for there to be a bona fide employer group 
or association capable of sponsoring an ERISA plan on behalf of its 
employer members. This analysis has focused on three broad sets of 
issues, in particular: (1) Whether the group or association is a bona 
fide organization with business/organizational purposes and functions 
unrelated to the provision of benefits; (2) whether the employers share 
some commonality and genuine organizational relationship unrelated to 
the provision of benefits; and (3) whether the employers that 
participate in a plan, either directly or indirectly, exercise control 
over the plan, both in form and substance. This approach has ensured 
that the Department's regulation of employee benefit plans is focused 
on employment-based arrangements, as contemplated by ERISA's text. This 
approach also helps distinguish the establishment by a group or 
association of an employee benefit plan from ``commercial insurance,''

[[Page 53538]]

consonant with ERISA's structure.\23\ The Department continues to 
believe that this approach provides for a sound reading of ERISA and 
that it represents a sound policy choice. Concerns for simplicity and 
uniformity in approach justify applying the same requirement to an 
entity acting as ``a group or association'' in the pension context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ 83 FR 28914, 28917.
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3. Professional Employer Organizations

    According to the IRS, the term ``PEO'' generally refers to an 
organization that ``. . . enters into an agreement with a client to 
perform some or all of the federal employment tax withholding, 
reporting, and payment functions related to workers performing services 
for the client.'' \24\ The provisions of a PEO arrangement typically 
state that the PEO assumes certain employment responsibilities that the 
client-employer would otherwise fulfill with respect to employees. 
Under the terms of a typical PEO contract, the PEO assumes 
responsibility for paying the employees and for related employment tax 
compliance, with attending contractual responsibilities and obligations 
without regard to payment from the client employer to the PEO. A PEO 
also may manage human resources, employee benefits, workers-
compensation claims, and unemployment-insurance claims for the client 
employer. The client employer typically pays the PEO a fee based on 
payroll costs plus an additional amount.\25\ According to a 
representative of the PEO industry, ``[f]or the obligations a PEO 
agrees to take on with respect to its clients, the PEO assumes specific 
employer rights, responsibilities, and risks through the establishment 
and maintenance of a relationship with the workers of the client[,]'' 
including in some cases to ``reserve a right of direction and control 
of the employees with respect to particular matters.'' \26\ Within the 
array of PEO-provided services and functions, nearly all PEOs offer 
some type of retirement plan to their client employers.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Certified Professional Employer Organizations, 81 FR 27315-
01 (May 6, 2016).
    \25\ Foster, Michael D., Certified Professional Employer 
Organizations (July 7, 2016) https://www.jacksonkelly.com/tax-monitor-blog/certified-professional-employer-organizations.
    \26\ National Association of Professional Employer Organizations 
(https://www.napeo.org/what-is-a-peo/about-the-peo-industry/what-is-co-employment).
    \27\ See, e.g., Bassi, Laurie, Professional Employer 
Organizations: Fueling Small business Growth, (Sept. 2013), at 2-3 
(https://www.napeo.org/docs/default-source/white-papers/whitepaper1.pdf?sfvrsn=2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(a) Current Primary Legal Authority
    Although many PEOs administer plans for their client employers 
today, there is little direct authority on precisely what it means for 
a PEO or other entity to act ``indirectly in the interest'' of its 
client employers in relation to an employee benefit plan for purposes 
of ERISA section 3(5). But whether a PEO is an ``employer'' under 
section 3(5) depends on the ``indirectly in the interest of an 
employer'' provision, not the ``employer group or association'' 
provision. And neither existing subregulatory guidance nor judicial 
authority has articulated a specific test to determine when a PEO is 
sufficiently tied to its client-employer to be said to be acting 
``indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee 
benefit plan,'' within the meaning of section 3(5).\28\ The different 
statutory text and differences in the nature of the employer 
relationships merit a different regulatory approach to PEOs than to 
employer groups or associations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The lack of a specific and clear test leads to different 
outcomes. Compare Yearous v. Pacificare of California, 554 F. Supp. 
2d 1132 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (applying factors in Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), court concluded that PEO is 
direct employer of owner of company for purposes of sponsoring an 
ERISA covered healthcare plan covering the owner and his 
beneficiaries) with Texas v. Alliance Employee Leasing Co., 797 F. 
Supp. 542 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (finding leasing company did not act 
directly or indirectly as employer under ERISA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The IRS, for example, has already recognized that a PEO may offer a 
MEP for its clients under the Code. The Code sets forth rules for a 
plan maintained by more than one employer. Specifically, Code section 
413(c) addresses the tax-qualified status of certain pension ``plans'' 
that cover the employees of multiple employers.\29\ Under Sec.  1.413-
2(a)(2), a plan is subject to the requirements of section 413(c) if it 
is a single plan within the meaning of Sec.  1.413-1(a)(2) \30\ and the 
plan is maintained by more than one employer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Several of the rules applicable to plans under section 
413(c) of the Code are parallel to the rules for plans maintained by 
more than one employer under section 210 of ERISA. Under section 101 
of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 (43 FR 47713), the Secretary of 
the Treasury has interpretive jurisdiction over ERISA section 210.
    \30\ Section 1.413-1(a)(2) applies the definition of a single 
plan in Sec.  1.414(l)-1(b), providing that a plan is a single plan 
if and only if, on an ongoing basis, all of the plan assets are 
available to pay benefits to employees who are covered by the plan 
and their beneficiaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to section 413(c) and the regulations thereunder, for 
purposes of certain qualification requirements, all employees of each 
of the employers maintaining a MEP (participating employers) are 
treated as being employed by a single employer.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ For example, under section 413(c)(1) of the Code and Sec.  
1.413-2(b) of the Income Tax Regulations, Code section 410(a) 
(participation) and the regulations thereunder are applied as if all 
employees of each of the employers who maintain the plan are 
employed by a single employer. In addition, under section 413(c)(2) 
of the Code and Sec.  1.413-2(c) of the Income Tax Regulations, in 
determining whether a MEP is, with respect to each participating 
employer, for the exclusive benefit of its employees (and their 
beneficiaries), all of the employees participating in the plan are 
treated as employees of each such employer. See IRS Rev. Proc. 2002-
21 (providing ``a framework under which plans sponsored by PEOs will 
not be treated as violating the exclusive benefit rule solely 
because they provide benefits to Worksite Employees.''). Finally, 
under section 413(c)(3) of the Code and Sec.  1.413-2(d) of the 
Income Tax regulations, Code section 411 (minimum vesting standards) 
and the regulations thereunder are generally applied as if all 
employers who maintain the plan constituted a single employer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under section 413 of the Code, other qualification rules are 
applied separately to each participating employer. For example, under 
Sec.  1.413-2(a)(3)(ii) of the Income Tax Regulations, the minimum 
coverage requirements of Code section 410(b) and related 
nondiscrimination requirements are generally applied to a MEP on an 
employer-by-employer basis.
(b) Current Secondary Legal Authority
    Some federal statutes treat a PEO as an ``employer'' for limited 
purposes in other circumstances. For instance, regulations issued 
pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) 
specifically recognize that a PEO may, under certain circumstances, 
enter into a relationship with the employees of its client companies 
such that it is considered a ``joint employer'' for purposes of 
determining FMLA coverage and eligibility, enforcing the FMLA's anti-
retaliation provisions, and in limited situations, providing job 
restoration.\32\ In the main, however, the FMLA regulations clarify 
that a ``PEO does not enter into a joint employment relationship with 
the employees of its client companies when it merely performs . . . 
administrative functions,'' such as ``payroll benefits, regulatory 
paperwork, and updating employment policies.'' 29 CFR 825.106(b)(2). 
The regulation makes clear that PEOs do not become joint employers 
simply by virtue of providing such services to client-employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ 29 CFR 825.106(b)(2), (e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, Code section 3401(d) defines the term ``employer,'' 
for purposes of income tax withholding, this way: ``the person for whom 
an individual performs or performed any service . . . as the employee 
of such person except that if the person for

[[Page 53539]]

whom the individual performs or performed the services does not have 
control of the payment of the wages for such services, [then] the term 
`employer' . . . means the person having control of the payment of such 
wages.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ In Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974), the Supreme 
Court held that a person who is an employer under section 
3401(d)(1), relating to income tax withholding, is also an employer 
for purposes of withholding the employee share of Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA) under section 3102. The Otte decision has 
been extended to provide that the person having control of the 
payment of the wages is also an employer for purposes of section 
3111, which imposes the FICA tax on employers, and section 3301 
(Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax). See In re Armadillo 
Corp., 410 F. Supp. 407 (D. Colo. 1976), affd, 561 F.2d 1382 (10th 
Cir. 1977); In re The Laub Baking Co., 642 F.2d 196, 199 (6th 
Cir.1981).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An entity meeting these requirements is referred to as the 
``statutory employer.'' Although generally PEOs do not have exclusive 
control of the payment of wages within the meaning of the applicable 
regulations requiring ``legal control'', in some cases, a PEO has been 
found to be the employer under Code Sec.  3401(d)(1) under the facts of 
the case.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ United States v. Total Employment Co. Inc., 305 B.R. 333 
(M.D. Fla. 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Public Law 
113-295 (Dec. 19, 2014) required the IRS to establish a voluntary 
certification program for such PEOs (CPEO Program) as discussed in more 
detail below.
    The CPEO Program recognizes PEOs that meet certain requirements 
within the Code and provides a level of assurance to small-business 
owners that rely on a CPEO to handle their employment-tax issues. CPEOs 
are treated as employers under the Code for employment tax purposes 
with regard to remuneration paid to their customers' employees under 
CPEO service contracts. A CPEO is solely liable for the employment tax 
withholding, payment, and reporting obligations with respect to 
remuneration it pays to work site employees (as defined in IRC 
7705(e)).'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See IRC section 3511(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Overview of Proposed Regulation

1. General

    The Department believes that providing additional opportunities for 
employers to join MEPs as a way to offer workplace retirement savings 
plans to their employees could, under the conditions proposed here, 
offer many small businesses more affordable and less burdensome 
retirement savings plan alternatives than are currently available. The 
Department expects that the proposal, if finalized, would prompt some 
small businesses that do not currently offer workplace retirement 
benefits to offer such benefits. The proposal could increase the number 
of employees enrolled in workplace retirement plans, thereby offering 
America's workers better retirement savings opportunities and greater 
retirement security.
    Paragraph (a) of the proposal defines the scope of the rulemaking. 
This paragraph provides that bona fide employer groups or associations 
and bona fide PEOs may act as an ``employer'' under ERISA section 3(5) 
for purposes of sponsoring a MEP. In each case, this interpretation is 
based upon the Department's conclusion that such bona fide employer 
groups, associations, or PEOs act ``in the interest of'' their employer 
members in relation to a retirement savings plan. Paragraph (a) would 
limit this rulemaking to defined contribution plans, as defined in 
ERISA section 3(34); the proposal thus does not cover welfare plans or 
other types of pension plans. The proposal is limited in this manner 
because the Department believes that consideration and development of 
any proposal covering other types of pension and welfare plans or other 
persons or organizations as plan sponsors would benefit from public 
comments and additional consideration by the Department.

2. Bona Fide Employer Groups or Associations

    Paragraph (b) of the proposal would define and clarify the criteria 
for a ``bona fide'' group or association of employers capable of 
establishing a MEP.\36\ This paragraph would replace and supersede 
criteria in prior subregulatory guidance. The proposed criteria are 
intended to distinguish bona fide group or association MEPs from 
products and services offered by purely commercial pension 
administrators, managers, and record keepers. These commercial 
enterprises are outside the scope of the rule as proposed.\37\
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    \36\ The term ``bona fide'' in the proposal refers to a group, 
association, or PEO that meets the conditions of the proposed 
regulation and, therefore, is able to be an ``employer'' for 
purposes of section 3(5) of ERISA. No inferences should be drawn 
from the use of this term regarding the actual bona fides of the 
group, association or organization outside of this context.
    \37\ See Section E, Request for Public Comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, paragraph (b)(1) of the proposal contains seven 
criteria for determining whether a group or association of employers is 
a ``bona fide'' group or association of employers for purposes of ERISA 
section 3(5) and the regulation. With one exception, these criteria 
parallel those used in the AHP Rule and are intended to have the same 
meaning and effect here, as they have there. Four of the criteria 
provide that the group or association must have a formal organizational 
structure, be controlled by its employer members, have at least one 
substantial business purpose unrelated to offering and providing 
employee benefits to its employer members, and limit plan participation 
to employees and former employees of employer members.\38\ Two other 
criteria provide that employer members must have a commonality of 
interest and that each employer must act directly as an employer of at 
least one employee participating in the MEP. The intent of including 
these criteria in paragraph (b) is to distinguish between groups and 
associations that act as employers within the meaning of ERISA section 
3(5), from other entities that do not act as an ``employer.'' As 
explained in the AHP Rule, ERISA section 3(5) of ERISA and ERISA Title 
I's overall structure contemplate employment-based benefit 
arrangements.\39\ Moreover, the Department's authority to define 
``employer'' and ``group or association of employers'' under ERISA 
section 3(5) does not broadly extend to arrangements established to 
provide benefits outside the employment context and without regard to 
the members' status as employers.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ A bona fide group or association may sponsor both an AHP 
and a MEP, but the group or association would have to have at least 
one substantial business purpose other than offering employee 
benefit plans.
    \39\ 83 FR 28912, 28913 (June 21, 2018).
    \40\ Id. at 28916.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The AHP Rule, in relevant part, prohibits health-insurance 
companies from being treated as a bona fide group or association. A 
construction of ``employer'' encompassing insurance companies that are 
merely selling commercial insurance products and services to employers 
would effectively read the definition's employment-based limitation out 
of the statute. In a broad colloquial sense, it is possible to say that 
commercial service providers, such as banks, trust companies, insurance 
companies, and brokers, act ``indirectly in the interest of'' their 
customers, but that does not convert every service provider into an 
ERISA-covered ``employer'' of their customer's employees. Accordingly, 
the Department required that the individual employer members of the 
group or association must control the AHP, and the Department declined 
to construe ``employer'' in a manner that would permit commercial 
insurers to market insurance products and services as AHP sponsors.

[[Page 53540]]

    The Department believes that applying a similar understanding of 
``group or association'' of employers in the pension context as in the 
AHP context promotes simplicity and uniformity in regulatory structure. 
The Department therefore applies a similar approach to employer groups 
or associations sponsoring MEPs. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(vii) of the 
proposal would prohibit an employer group or association from being a 
bank, trust company, insurance issuer, broker-dealer, or other similar 
financial-services firm (including pension record keepers and third-
party administrators) and from being owned or controlled by such a 
financial-services firm.
    The proposed rule does not contain provisions analogous to the 
healthcare nondiscrimination provisions of the AHP Rule because defined 
contribution retirement plans do not underwrite health risk and are not 
susceptible to the rating and segmentation pressures that characterize 
the healthcare marketplaces. Some defined contribution plans may offer 
lifetime income features, such as immediate or deferred annuities, 
which potentially implicate some degree of longevity risk. The 
Department, however, does not believe the presence of longevity risk in 
ancillary features of defined contribution MEPs warrants 
nondiscrimination provisions analogous to those of the AHP Rule. The 
Department also believes that any relevant nondiscrimination concerns 
are already addressed in the tax-qualification provisions of the Code 
or other federal laws. The Department solicits comments on this issue.
    Paragraph (b)(2) of the proposal sets forth standards for 
determining whether employers have sufficient commonality of interests 
for purposes of the commonality requirement in paragraph (b)(1). 
Specifically, this paragraph would allow employers to band together for 
the express purpose of offering MEP coverage if the employers are in 
the same trade, industry, line of business, or profession; or if the 
employers have a principal place of business within a region that does 
not exceed the boundaries of the same state or the same metropolitan 
area (even if the metropolitan area includes more than one state). 
Determinations of what is a ``trade,'' ``industry,'' ``line of 
business,'' or ``profession,'' as well as whether an employer fits into 
one or more of these categories, are based on all relevant facts and 
circumstances; the Department intends for these terms to be construed 
broadly to expand employer and employee access to MEP coverage.

3. Professional Employer Organizations

    Paragraph (c) of the proposal would establish four criteria that 
must be met for a PEO to qualify as a ``bona fide'' PEO that may act 
``indirectly in the interest of [its client] employers'' and, 
consequently, as an ``employer'' under ERISA section 3(5) for purposes 
of sponsoring a MEP covering the employees of client employers. 
Specifically, paragraph (c)(1)(i) of the proposal would require the PEO 
to perform substantial employment functions on behalf of the client 
employers. Paragraph (c)(1)(ii) would require the PEO to have 
substantial control over the functions and activities of the MEP, and 
assume certain statutory roles under ERISA. As further explained below, 
looking to substantial control is sensible given the language of 
section 3(5) of ERISA. Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) would require the PEO to 
ensure that each client-employer participating in the MEP has at least 
one employee who is a participant covered under the MEP. Paragraph 
(c)(1)(iv) of the proposal would provide that the PEO must ensure that 
participation in the MEP is limited to current and former employees of 
the PEO and of client-employers, as well as their beneficiaries.
    A PEO's assumption and performance of substantial employment 
functions on behalf of its client-employers is one of the lynchpins of 
the proposal. Just as commonality and control establish the nexus for 
groups or associations of employers under paragraph (b) of the 
proposal, the PEO's assumption and performance of employment functions 
for its client employers contributes significantly to the establishment 
of the requisite nexus for PEOs. Requiring the PEO to stand in the 
shoes of the participating client employers--by assuming and performing 
substantial employment functions that the client-employers otherwise 
would fulfill with respect to their employees--is what distinguishes 
bona fide PEOs under the proposal from service providers or other 
entrepreneurial ventures that in substance merely market or offer 
client-employers access to retirement plan services and products. This 
requirement applies a clear limiting principle to entities that can be 
said to be acting ``indirectly in the interest of'' another employer 
within the meaning of ERISA section 3(5).
    A PEO's status under this proposal and whether a PEO performs 
substantial employment functions as described herein, however, is not 
tantamount to the PEO's assumption or creation of an employment 
relationship (whether referred to as joint employment or otherwise) 
with the client-employer, for purposes of other laws or liabilities. 
The question of joint employment for purposes of other laws and 
liabilities is an independent inquiry wholly unaffected by a PEO's 
potential status as an ``employer'' within the meaning of ERISA section 
3(5). Whether a PEO qualifies as an ERISA section 3(5) ``employer'' 
under the ``indirectly'' provision has no effect on the rights or 
responsibilities of any party under any other law, including the Code, 
and neither supports nor prohibits a finding of an employment 
relationship.
    A second important limiting principle in construing section 3(5)'s 
``indirectly in the interest of'' clause is that the PEO must have 
substantial control of the functions and activities of the employee 
benefit plan at issue. This construction comports with the definition's 
reference to a person acting as the employer ``in relation to the 
plan.'' Consequently, paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of the proposal would 
require the PEO to have substantial control over the functions and 
activities of the MEP, as the plan sponsor (within the meaning of 
section 3(16)(B) of the Act), the plan administrator (within the 
meaning of section 3(16)(A) of the Act), and a named fiduciary (within 
the meaning of section 402 of the Act).
    To provide guidance on what is meant by performing ``substantial 
employment functions'' under the proposal, paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of the 
proposed rule provides a disjunctive list of nine relevant criteria, 
even one of which may be sufficient to establish substantiality 
depending on the particular facts and circumstances and the particular 
criterion. This list was drawn from the types of services and functions 
PEOs routinely offer their clients, and with reference to the CPEO 
statutory and regulatory provisions.
    The list of ``substantial employment functions'' in paragraph 
(c)(2)(ii) of the proposal would look to whether, with respect to 
client-employer employees participating in the PEO's plan, the 
organization is responsible for:
     Payment of wages to the employees without regard to the 
receipt or adequacy of payment from its client employers;
     Reporting, withholding, and paying any applicable federal 
employment taxes, without regard to the receipt or adequacy of payment 
from its client employers;
     Recruiting, hiring, and firing workers in addition to the 
client-employer's responsibility for recruiting, hiring, and firing 
workers;
     Establishing employment policies, conditions of 
employment, and

[[Page 53541]]

supervising employees in addition to the client-employer's 
responsibility to perform these same functions;
     Determining employee compensation, including method and 
amount, in addition to the client-employer's responsibility to 
determine employee compensation;
     Providing workers' compensation coverage in satisfaction 
of applicable State law, without regard to the receipt or adequacy of 
payment from its client employers;
     Integral human-resource functions, such as job description 
development, background screening, drug testing, employee-handbook 
preparation, performance review, paid time-off tracking, employee 
grievances, or exit interviews, in addition to the client employer's 
responsibility to perform these same functions;
     Regulatory compliance in the areas of workplace 
discrimination, family and medical leave, citizenship or immigration 
status, workplace safety and health, or permanent labor-certification 
program, in addition to the client employer's responsibility for 
regulatory compliance; or
     The organization continues to have employee benefit plan 
obligations to MEP participants after the client employer no longer 
contracts with the organization.
    The proposal provides that, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular situation, even one of these criteria 
alone may be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a PEO perform 
substantial employment functions on behalf of its client employers. 
Just as a way of illustrating the Department's intent with respect to 
the provision, with respect to the PEO's responsibility to supervise 
employees of client employers (as contemplated under the criterion in 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(D) of the proposal), the Department would likely 
consider a PEO to meet the substantiality requirement if, for example, 
the PEO controlled the manner and means by which employees accomplished 
their assigned chores or completed their assignments, without regard to 
the extent or degree to which the PEO satisfied the other eight 
criteria. On the other hand, the Department likely would not reach the 
same conclusion if the only function performed by the PEO, for example, 
is that it performs drug testing on behalf of its client-employers, 
even if the PEO assumes complete responsibility for that task.
    Although this approach offers PEOs the flexibility of a facts-and-
circumstances approach, the Department also understands that some 
entities may prefer more regulatory certainty in ordering their 
business affairs. For this reason, the proposal contains two regulatory 
safe harbors separate from the facts-and-circumstances test described 
above.
    The first safe harbor provides that a PEO will be considered to 
perform substantial employment functions on behalf of its client-
employers if it is a ``certified professional employer organization'' 
(CPEO) within the meaning of Code section 7705 and regulations 
thereunder, has a ``service contract'' within the meaning of Code 
section 7705(e)(2) with the client employers who adopt the MEP with 
respect to the client-employer employees participating in the MEP, 
satisfies the criteria in paragraphs (c)(2)(ii)(A)-(C) of the proposal, 
and also meets at least two criteria listed in paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(D) 
through (I) of the proposal. Generally a CPEO is a PEO that has applied 
for certification and has been certified by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) as meeting the requirements of Code section 7705(b). To 
become and remain a CPEO, a PEO must demonstrate (and continue to 
demonstrate) to the IRS that it meets specified requirements relating 
to tax status, background, experience, business location, and annual 
financial audits. Among other requirements, to become and remain a 
CPEO, the PEO must also agree to satisfy certain bond, financial 
review, and reporting requirements.\41\ The IRS has the authority to 
suspend and revoke the certification of any CPEO if it determines that 
the CPEO is not satisfying the requirements of Code sections 7705(b) or 
(c) or fails to satisfy applicable accounting, reporting, payment, or 
deposit requirements. These attributes are also relevant to employers' 
consideration of PEOs when evaluating retirement options because they 
may reduce the potential for fraud, abuse, and mismanagement with 
respect to employment functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ IRC section 7705(b) and (c); 26 CFR 301.7705-2T--CPEO 
Certification Requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second safe harbor is for PEOs that do not satisfy the CPEO 
safe harbor but meet five or more criteria from the list in paragraph 
(c)(2)(ii) of the proposal. The Department understands that the CPEO 
Program is voluntary; therefore, not all PEOs are (or remain) CPEOs. 
The Department does not believe that the absence of CPEO status 
necessarily should disqualify a PEO from acting as an employer in 
sponsoring a MEP. This safe harbor thus applies when covered PEOs meet 
at least half of the relevant criteria, with the choice as to the five 
particular criteria left to the discretion of the PEO based on its 
business structure and operations. Although any single criterion alone 
may, depending on the facts and circumstances and particular criterion, 
be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a PEO perform substantial 
employment functions on behalf of its client employers, as a safe 
harbor, the Department is of the view that meeting at least half of the 
listed criteria demonstrates convincingly that the PEO is performing 
substantial employment functions and ensures that PEOs using this safe 
harbor provision will fall well within the definition in section 3(5). 
The same standard of five criteria also effectively applies to the CPEO 
safe harbor in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of the proposal because CPEOs 
entering into CPEO service-contracts within the meaning of section 
7705(e)(2) with client-employers who adopt the MEP must both assume and 
perform employment functions on behalf of client-employers under the 
relevant criteria set forth in paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(A)-(C) of the 
proposed regulation with respect to the client-employer employees 
participating in the MEP, and would still need to satisfy two more 
criteria to fall within the CPEO safe harbor.

4. Dual Treatment of Working Owners as Employers and Employees

    Like the AHP Rule,\42\ paragraph (d) of this proposed rule would 
expressly provide that working owners, such as sole proprietors and 
other self-employed individuals, may elect to act as employers for 
purposes of participating in a bona fide employer group or association 
as described in (b)(1) of the proposed regulation and also be treated 
as employees of their businesses for purposes of being able to 
participate in the MEP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ 83 FR at 28964.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To qualify as a working owner, a person would be required to work 
at least 20 hours per week or 80 hours per month, on average, or have 
wages or self-employment income above a certain level. Specifically, 
the working owner's wages or self-employment income must equal or 
exceed the working owner's cost of coverage to participate in the group 
or association's health plan, if the group or association has such a 
plan. In other words, if the working owner makes enough money to be 
considered both an employer and employee under the AHP Rule, the 
working owner may also be considered both an employer

[[Page 53542]]

and employee under this proposal.\43\ The Department adopts this 
threshold because, unlike healthcare coverage, participation in a MEP 
does not have a specific dollar amount associated with the benefits; 
thus, there is no minimum cost of participation.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ The earned income standard in the proposal is informed by 
Federal tax standards, including section 162(l) of the Code, that 
describe conditions for self-employed individuals to deduct the cost 
of health insurance. Thus, for purposes of the working owner 
provisions of paragraph (d) of the proposal, the definitions of 
``wages'' and ``self-employment income'' in Code sections 3121(a) 
and 1402(b) (but without regard to the exclusion in section 
1402(b)(2)), respectively, would apply.
    \44\ Under section 401(c) of the Code, a self-employed 
individual must have earned income in order to participate in a 
qualified retirement plan. The Department's provisional view is that 
it seems unlikely that a ``working owner'' as defined in paragraph 
(d)(2) of the proposal who is not a common law employee would fail 
to meet the requirements of section 401(c) of the Code. The 
Department invites comments on whether this view is correct, and if 
not correct, whether a final rule should include changes to the 
working-owner definition for MEPs designed to be qualified under 
section 401(a) of the Code. For example, a final rule could further 
limit the definition of working owners to self-employed individuals 
described in 401(c) of the Code. One way to accomplish this 
limitation could be to add a condition to paragraph (d)(2) of the 
proposal to ensure that the working owner ``is an employee within 
the meaning of section 401(c)(1) of the Code, and the employer of 
such individual is the person treated as his employer under section 
401(c)(4) of the Code.'' Alternatively, consistent with E.O. 13847 
and the Code, the Department invites comments on whether, if the 
Department's provisional view is not correct, the Secretary of the 
Treasury should consider action pursuant to Section 2(b) of E.O. 
13847, which directs the Secretary of the Treasury to consider 
proposing amendments to regulations or other guidance regarding the 
circumstances under which a MEP must satisfy the tax qualification 
requirements in the Code. Because the Secretary of the Treasury has 
interpretive jurisdiction over section 401 of the Code, any comments 
relating to this topic will be shared with the Department of the 
Treasury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would not extend this definition to MEPs 
sponsored by PEOs under paragraph (c) of the proposal. Thus, a working 
owner's trade or business would have to have at least one common law 
employee to participate in a PEO's MEP under paragraph (c) of the 
proposed regulation. The Department understands that working owners 
without employees generally would not have need for the employment 
services of PEOs, such as payroll, compliance with federal and state 
workplace laws, and human-resources support. Thus, a trade or business 
without employees would not seem to have a genuine need for a 
relationship with a PEO. Accordingly, the working-owner provision would 
only apply for purposes of participation in MEPs sponsored by a bona 
fide group or association. The Department understands, however, that 
there may be circumstances in which a working owner without common law 
employees has a genuine need to be in a PEO's MEP. For example, if the 
working owner has had common law employees and used a PEO, including 
joining the PEO's MEP, but was later unable to afford to continue to 
employ others and did not want to stop participating in the PEO plan. 
Accordingly, the Department solicits comments on the circumstances, if 
any, under which working owners without employees should be able to 
participate in a multiple employer plan through a PEO under title I of 
ERISA.

E. Request for Public Comments

    The proposed regulation addresses when a group or association of 
employers or PEO falls within the definition of ``employer'' under 
ERISA section 3(5) for purposes of sponsoring a MEP under title I of 
ERISA to cover the employees of member employers. The Department 
invites comments on all aspects of this proposal, including its scope, 
as well any data, studies or other information that would help refine 
and improve the proposal's estimated costs, benefits, and transfers.
    The Executive Order called on the Department to consider more 
generally whether businesses or organizations other than groups or 
associations of employers and PEOs should be able to sponsor a single 
MEP under title I of ERISA by acting indirectly in the interest of 
participating employers in relation to the plan within the meaning of 
ERISA section 3(5). The Department is aware of at least two other types 
or categories of MEPs not specifically addressed in the proposed 
rule.\45\ While both of these categories are outside the scope of the 
rule as proposed, the Department specifically solicits public comments 
on whether the Department should address one or more of these other 
categories of MEPs, by regulation or otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ A 2012 GAO report separated MEPs into four categories. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, GAO, ``12-665, ``Private Sector 
Pensions--Federal Agencies Should Collect Data and Coordinate 
Oversight of Multiple Employer Plans,'' (Sept. 2012) (https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-665).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The first category includes so-called ``corporate MEPs,'' which are 
plans that cover employees of related employers which are not in the 
same controlled group or affiliated service group, within the meaning 
of section 414(b), (c), and (m) of the Code. While corporate MEPs are 
not directly addressed in this guidance, the Department does not intend 
to convey that a corporate MEP could not be a single employee benefit 
plan under title I of ERISA. Rather, comments specifically are 
requested on whether any regulatory provisions or other guidance is 
needed to address the MEP status of plans maintained by such related 
employers.
    The second category consists of ``open MEPs,'' which are plans that 
cover employees of employers with no relationship other than their 
joint participation in the MEP. As mentioned earlier in this preamble, 
many recent legislative proposals center on these later arrangements, 
which are often referred to as ``pooled employer plans.'' Comments 
specifically are requested on whether, and under what circumstances, 
so-called ``open MEPs'' or ``pooled employer plans,'' as depicted in 
the various legislative proposals, could be operated as an employment-
based arrangement, as contemplated by ERISA's text. To the extent 
commenters believe that these arrangements should be addressed in this 
or a future rulemaking, the Department asks that the comments include a 
discussion of why such an arrangement should be treated as one employee 
benefit plan within the meaning of title I of ERISA rather than as a 
collection of separate employer plans being serviced by a commercial 
enterprise that provides retirement plan products and services. Such 
commenters also should provide suggestions regarding the regulatory 
conditions that should apply to the particular arrangement.
    The Department solicits comments on whether including working 
owners in the current proposal could affect the utility of 401(k) plans 
for working owners, who may prefer those plans because of their ERISA-
exempt status (or other reasons). Under current law, working owners 
without employees can sponsor 401(k) plans, often called solo-401(k) 
plans. Under the Code, these plans, like other 401(k) plans, are 
subject to rules concerning eligibility, contributions, taxes, and 
distributions. Solo 401(k) plans, however, have historically been 
outside the coverage of title 1 of ERISA. 29 CFR 2510.3-3. The 
Department's proposal would permit working owners to participate in 
ERISA-covered MEPs without altering its position that a ``plan under 
which . . . only a sole proprietor'' participates ``will not be covered 
under title I.'' 29 CFR 2510.3-3(b). The Department seeks comments on 
whether additional or different regulatory amendments should be made to 
confirm or clarify the long-established exclusion from ERISA of solo 
401(k) plans, given the proposal to permit working owners to 
participate in ERISA-covered ARPs.
    Comments are also invited on the interaction of the proposal with 
and consequences under other state and federal laws, including the 
interaction

[[Page 53543]]

with Code section 413(c), which would apply to all tax-qualified MEPs 
including those described in paragraph (b) and (c) of the proposal.\46\ 
The Department's provisional view is that it seems unlikely that a MEP 
that is sponsored and maintained by an employer group or association or 
PEO, and that is subject to the rules of section 413(c) of the Code, 
would fail to qualify under the Department's proposed criteria. The 
Department invites comments on whether this view is correct and, if not 
correct, on the extent to which grandfathering rules or transitional 
assistance or guidance might be advisable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Under section 101 of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 (43 
FR 47713), the Secretary of the Treasury has interpretive 
jurisdiction over section 413 of the Code and ERISA section 210. 
Accordingly, any comments relating to section 413(c) of the Code 
will be shared with the Department of the Treasury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department also invites comments on whether any notice or 
reporting requirements are needed to ensure that participating 
employers, participants, and beneficiaries of MEPs, are adequately 
informed of their rights or responsibilities with respect to MEP 
coverage and that the public has adequate information regarding the 
existence and operations of MEPs. Comments are also solicited for data, 
studies or other information that would help estimate the benefits, 
costs, and transfers.
    As indicated, a MEP would be a single ERISA plan under title I of 
ERISA if it complies with the requirements in the proposed rule. As 
such, ERISA would apply to the MEP in the same way that ERISA applies 
to any employee benefit plan, but the MEP sponsor, typically acting as 
the plan's administrator and named fiduciary, would administer the 
MEP.\47\ This person will have considerable discretion in determining, 
as a matter of plan design or a matter of plan administration, how to 
treat the different interests of the multiple participating employers 
and their employees. Accordingly, this person, in distributing, 
investing, and managing the MEP's assets, must be neutral and fair, 
dealing impartially with the participating employers and their 
employees, taking into account any differing interests.\48\ For 
example, when the fiduciary of a large MEP uses its size to negotiate 
and secure discounted prices on investments and other services from 
plan services providers, as is generally required by ERISA, the 
fiduciary is bargaining on behalf of all participants regardless of the 
size of their employer, and should take care to see that these 
advantages are allocated among participants in an evenhanded manner. 
Treating participating employers and their employees differently 
without a reasonable and equitable basis would raise serious concerns 
for the Department. Comments are invited on whether there is a need for 
guidance or clarification on the application of this principle to the 
various aspects of MEP administration, including investment management, 
recordkeeping, and allocating plan costs and expenses among the 
participants and beneficiaries of participating employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ As noted elsewhere, in the case of a PEO MEP under 
paragraph (c) of the proposal, the PEO, as the plan sponsor, must 
always act as the plan's administrator (within the meaning of 
section 3(16)(A)) and a named fiduciary (within the meaning of 
section 402 of ERISA) of the MEP.
    \48\ See Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2003-03 (addressing what 
rules apply to how expenses are allocated among plan participants in 
a defined contribution pension plan). See also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 
516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996) (``The common law of trusts recognizes the 
need to preserve assets to satisfy future, as well as present, 
claims and requires a trustee to take impartial account of the 
interests of all beneficiaries.''); Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
section 183 (``If a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the 
trustee, in distributing, investing, and managing the trust 
property, shall deal impartially with them, taking into account any 
differing interests.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Regulatory Impact Analysis

1. Summary

    As discussed earlier in this preamble, this proposed rule is 
intended to facilitate the creation and maintenance of MEPs by 
clarifying the circumstances under which a person may act as an 
``employer'' within the meaning of ERISA section 3(5) in sponsoring a 
MEP. Workplace retirement plans provide an effective way for employees 
to save for retirement. Many hardworking Americans, however, do not 
have access to a retirement plan at work, especially those employed by 
small employers or acting as ``working owners'' without employees 
(referred to herein as the ``self-employed''). This has become a more 
significant issue as employees are living longer and facing the 
difficult prospect of outliving their retirement savings. Expanding 
access to private sector MEPs could encourage the formation of 
workplace retirement plans and broaden the access to such plans among 
small employers and the self-employed.
    Many employer groups and associations have a thorough knowledge of 
the economic challenges their members face. Using this knowledge and 
the regulatory flexibility provided by this proposed rule, employer 
groups and associations could sponsor MEPs tailored to the retirement 
plan needs of their members at lower costs than currently available 
options. Thus, this proposed rule, if finalized, could provide 
employers with an important option to increase access of workers, 
particularly those employed at small businesses and the self-employed, 
to high-quality workplace retirement plans.
    Small employers could benefit from economies of scale by 
participating in MEPs, which could reduce their administrative burdens, 
fiduciary liability exposure, and plan fees. Like other large 
retirement plans, large MEPs created by sponsors meeting the conditions 
set forth in the proposal would enjoy scale discounts and might 
exercise bargaining power with financial services companies. Large MEPs 
would pass some of these savings through to participating small 
employers. In particular, investment funds with tiered pricing have 
decreasing expense ratios based on the aggregate amount of money 
invested by a single plan.\49\ As a single plan, MEPs should lower the 
expense ratio for investment management through the pooling of 
investments from member employers because the fee thresholds would 
apply at the MEP level rather than at the member employer level.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ According to Morningstar, nearly half of all investment 
funds have management fee breakpoints at which fees are 
automatically reduced upon reaching an investment threshold. See 
Michael Rawson and Ben Johnson, ``2015 Fee Study: Investors Are 
Driving Expense Ratios Down,'' Morningstar, 2015, available at 
https://news.morningstar.com/pdfs/2015_fee_study.pdf.
    \50\ MEPs create a pool of assets for investment that, at the 
investment management level, are no different from pools of assets 
from other employee benefit plans. Consistent with the Department's 
view that the pool of assets is a single plan, the Department 
expects that breakpoints for expense ratios would be applied at the 
MEP level rather than at the member employer level. The Department 
solicits comments on this matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many well-established, geographically based organizations, such as 
local chambers of commerce, are strong candidates to sponsor MEPs. 
Currently, these geographically based organizations are restricted from 
doing so as a sponsor of a single plan under title I of ERISA, however, 
unless their MEP meets the requirements of the Department's 2012 
subregulatory guidance for determining whether groups or associations 
of employers, or PEOs were able to act as employers under section 3(5) 
of ERISA. Such previous guidance requires groups or associations to 
have a particularly close economic or representational nexus to 
employers and employees participating in the plan. Many groups or 
associations and PEOs have identified these criteria, along with the 
absence of a clear

[[Page 53544]]

pathway for PEOs to sponsor MEPs, as major impediments to the expansion 
of MEPs that are treated as single plans. By providing greater 
flexibility governing the sponsorship of MEPs, the Department expects 
that this proposed rule would reduce costs and increase access to 
workplace retirement plans for many employees of small businesses and 
the self-employed.
    Other benefits of the expansion of MEPs include: (1) Increased 
economic efficiency as small firms can more easily compete with larger 
firms in recruiting and retaining workers; (2) increased tax equity as 
workers who previously did not have access to a qualified workplace 
retirement plan begin to benefit from tax savings when their employers 
provide access to a retirement plan through a MEP; (3) enhanced 
portability for employees that leave employment with an employer to 
work for another employer participating in the same MEP; and (4) higher 
quality data (more accurate and complete) reported on the Form 5500.
    The Department is aware that MEPs could be the target of fraud or 
abuse. By their nature, MEPs have the potential to build up a 
substantial amount of assets quickly and the effect of any abusive 
schemes on future retirement distributions may be hidden or difficult 
to detect for a long period. The Department, however, is not aware of 
direct information indicating that the risk for fraud and abuse is 
greater for MEPs than for single employer defined contribution pension 
plans. Furthermore, the Department has compliance assistance and 
enforcement systems in place to safeguard plan assets.
    The Department believes that participation in workplace retirement 
plans would increase because of this proposal; however, there is some 
uncertainty regarding the extent. Participation levels in workplace 
retirement plans depend on both how many employers decide to offer 
plans and how many employees choose to participate in those plans. An 
employer's decision to offer a retirement plan relies on many factors, 
only some of which this proposed rule would affect. If more employers 
adopt MEPs, it is unclear how many of their employees would choose to 
enroll and by how much aggregate retirement savings would increase. 
Nevertheless, given the significant potential for MEPs to expand access 
to affordable retirement plans, the Department has concluded that this 
proposed rule would deliver social benefits that justify its costs. Its 
analysis is explained more fully below.

2. Executive Orders

    Executive Orders 12866 \51\ and 13563 \52\ direct agencies to 
assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, 
if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that 
maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, 
public health and safety effects; distributive impacts; and equity). 
Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both 
costs and benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of 
promoting flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
    \52\ 76 FR 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Executive Order 12866, ``significant'' regulatory actions are 
subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Section 
3(f) of the Executive Order defines a ``significant regulatory action'' 
as an action that is likely to result in a rule: (1) Having an annual 
effect on the economy of $100 million or more in any one year, or 
adversely and materially affecting a sector of the economy, 
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or 
safety, or State, local or tribal governments or communities (also 
referred to as ``economically significant''); (2) creating a serious 
inconsistency or otherwise interfering with an action taken or planned 
by another agency; (3) materially altering the budgetary impacts of 
entitlement grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and 
obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) raising novel legal or policy 
issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or 
the principles set forth in the Executive Order. It has been determined 
that this proposed rule is economically significant within the meaning 
of section 3(f)(1) of the Executive Order. Therefore, OMB has reviewed 
the proposed rule pursuant to the Executive Order. The background to 
the proposed rule is discussed earlier in this preamble. This section 
assesses the expected economic effects of the proposed rule.

3. Introduction and Need for Regulation

    While many Americans have accumulated significant retirement 
savings, many others have little, if any, assets saved for retirement. 
For example, the Employee Benefit Research Institute projects that 24 
percent of the population aged 35-64 will experience a retirement 
savings shortfall, meaning resources in retirement will not be 
sufficient to meet their average retirement expenditures.\53\ If 
uncovered long-term care expenses from nursing homes and home health 
care are included in the retirement readiness calculation, 43 percent 
of that population will experience a shortfall, and the projected 
retirement savings deficit is $4.13 trillion.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Jack VanDerhei, ``EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model 
[supreg](RSPM)--Analyzing Policy and
    Design Proposals,'' Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue 
Brief, no. 451 (May 31, 2018).
    \54\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Among all workers aged 26 to 64 in 2013, 63 percent participated in 
a retirement plan either directly or through a working spouse. That 
percentage ranged, however, from 52 percent of those aged 26 to 34 to 
68 percent of those aged 55 to 64; and from 25 percent for those with 
adjusted gross income (AGI) less than $20,000 per person to 85 percent 
for those with AGI of $100,000 per person or more.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Peter J. Brady, ``Who Participates in Retirement Plans,'' 
ICI Research Perspective, vol. 23, no. 05, (July 2017.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Workplace retirement plans often provide a more effective way for 
employees to save for retirement than saving in their own IRAs. 
Compared with IRAs, workplace retirement plans provide employees with: 
(1) Higher contribution limits; (2) generally lower investment 
management fees as the size of plan assets increases; (3) a well-
established uniform regulatory structure with important consumer 
protections, including fiduciary obligations, recordkeeping and 
disclosure requirements, legal accountability provisions, and spousal 
protections; (4) automatic enrollment; and (5) stronger protections 
from creditors.\56\ At the same time, workplace retirement plans 
provide employers with choice among plan features and the flexibility 
to tailor retirement plans that meet their business and employment 
needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 522), 
provides an unlimited exemption for SEP and Simple IRAs, and 
pension, profit sharing, and qualified plans, such as 401(k)s, as 
well as plan assets that are rolled over to an IRA. However, other 
traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs are protected up to a value of 
$1,283,025 per person for 2018 (inflation adjusted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In spite of these advantages, many workers, particularly those 
employed by small employers and the self-employed, lack access to 
workplace retirement plans. Table 1 below shows that at business 
establishments with fewer than 50 workers, 49 percent of the workers 
have access to retirement benefits.\57\ In contrast, at business 
establishments with more than 500 workers, 88 percent

[[Page 53545]]

of workers have access to retirement benefits. Table 1 also shows that 
many small employers do not offer a retirement plan to their 
workers.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ These statistics apply to private industry. U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey, Employee Benefits in 
the U.S. (March 2018).
    \58\ Id.

                               Table 1--Retirement Plan Coverage by Employer Size
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Workers:                 Establishments:
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  Share
         Establishment size: Number of workers           Share with access   participating in   Share offering a
                                                          to a retirement   a retirement plan   retirement plan
                                                              plan (%)             (%)                (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-49...................................................                 49                 34                 45
50-99..................................................                 65                 46                 75
100-499................................................                 79                 58                 88
500+...................................................                 89                 76                 94
All....................................................                 66                 50                 48
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: These statistics apply to private industry. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation
  Survey, Employee Benefits in the U.S. (March 2018).

    Surveys of employers have suggested several reasons employers--
especially small businesses--do not offer a workplace retirement plan 
to their employees. Regulatory burdens and complexity add costs and can 
be significant disincentives. A survey by the Pew Charitable Trusts 
found that only 53 percent of small-to mid-sized businesses offer a 
retirement plan, and 37 percent of those not offering a plan cited cost 
as the main reason.\59\ Employers often also cite annual reporting 
costs and exposure to potential fiduciary liability as major 
impediments to plan sponsorship.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Employer Barriers to and 
Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits,'' Issue Brief (June 
21, 2017). https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2017/06/employer-barriers-to-and-motivations-for-offering-retirement-benefits#0-overview.
    \60\ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-326: 
``Private Pensions: Better Agency Coordination Could Help Small 
Employers Address Challenges to Plan Sponsorship'' (March 2012) at 
18-19. (https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-326).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some employers may also have not offered retirement benefits 
because they do not perceive such benefits as necessary to recruit and 
retain good employees.\61\ In focus groups, many employers not offering 
retirement benefits reported believing that their employees would 
prefer to receive higher salaries, more paid time-off, or health 
insurance benefits than retirement benefits.\62\ Small employers 
themselves may not have much incentive to offer retirement benefits 
because they are not sure how long their businesses are going to 
survive. This may lead them to focus on short-term concerns rather than 
their employees' long-term well-being. In analyzing new establishments, 
researchers found that 56 percent did not survive for four years.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Employee Benefit Research Institute, ``Low Worker Take Up 
of Workplace Benefits May Impact Financial Wellbeing'' (April 10, 
2018).
    \62\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Employer Barriers to and 
Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits,'' 2017.
    \63\ Amy E. Knaup and Merissa C. Piazza, ``Business Employment 
Dynamics data: survival and longevity, II,'' Monthly Labor Review 
(Sept. 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many small businesses also may have not taken advantage of the 
existing opportunities to establish workplace retirement savings plans 
because of a lack of awareness. As found in a Pew survey, two-thirds of 
small and midsize employers that were not offering a retirement plan 
said they were not at all familiar with currently available options 
such as Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) and Savings Incentive Match 
Plan for Employees (SIMPLE) plans.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Employer Barriers to and 
Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits,'' 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    MEPs may address several of these issues. Specifically, to the 
extent that MEPs reduce the total cost of providing various types of 
plans to small employers, market forces may lead MEPs to offer and 
promote such plans to small employers that would otherwise have been 
overlooked because of high costs. Moreover, groups or associations and 
PEOs sponsoring MEPs sometimes may have more success raising (1) the 
awareness of retirement savings plan options for small employers, 
particularly where such employers are already clients or members, and 
(2) the benefits of establishing such plans as a tool for recruiting or 
retaining qualified workers.
    Small businesses typically have fewer administrative efficiencies 
and less potential bargaining power than large employers do. The 
proposal could provide a way for small employers and the self-employed 
to band together in MEPs that, as single, large plans, have some of the 
same economic advantages as other large plans. As discussed above, the 
Department's prior subregulatory guidance limits the ability of small 
employers and self-employed individuals to join MEPs and thereby to 
realize attendant potential administrative cost savings. With certain 
exceptions, each employer operating a separate plan must file its own 
Form 5500 annual report, and generally, if the plan has 100 or more 
participants, an accountant's audit of the plan's financial position 
instead of relying on the audit of a combined plan.\65\ Each small 
employer also would have to obtain a separate fidelity bond satisfying 
the requirements of ERISA.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Note that ERISA regulations exempt small plans, generally 
those with under 100 participants, from the audit requirement if 
they meet certain conditions. 29 CFR 2520.104-46. In 2015, more than 
99 percent of small defined contribution pension plans that filed 
the Form 5500 or the Form 5500-SF did not attach an audit report.
    \66\ ERISA section 412 and related regulations (29 CFR 2550.412-
1 and 29 CFR part 2580) generally require every fiduciary of an 
employee benefit plan and every person who handles funds or other 
property of such plan to be bonded. ERISA's bonding requirements are 
intended to protect employee benefit plans from risk of loss due to 
fraud or dishonesty on the part of persons who handle plan funds or 
other property. ERISA refers to persons who handle funds or other 
property of an employee benefit plan as plan officials. A plan 
official must be bonded for at least 10% of the amount of funds he 
or she handles, subject to a minimum bond amount of $1,000 per plan 
with respect to which the plan official has handling functions. In 
most instances, the maximum bond amount that can be required under 
ERISA with respect to any one plan official is $500,000 per plan; 
however, the maximum required bond amount is $1,000,000 for plan 
officials of plans that hold employer securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As stated earlier in this preamble, on August 31, 2018, President 
Trump issued Executive Order 13847,

[[Page 53546]]

``Strengthening Retirement Security in America,'' stating that ``[i]t 
shall be the policy of the Federal Government to promote programs that 
enhance retirement security and expand access to workplace retirement 
savings plans for American workers.'' The Executive Order directed the 
Secretary of Labor to examine policies that would: (1) Clarify and 
expand the circumstances under which United States employers, 
especially small and mid-sized businesses, may sponsor or participate 
in a MEP as a workplace retirement savings option offered to their 
employees, subject to appropriate safeguards; and (2) increase 
retirement security for part-time workers, sole proprietors, working 
owners, and other entrepreneurial workers with non-traditional 
employer-employee relationships by expanding their access to workplace 
retirement savings plans, including MEPs. The Executive Order further 
directed, to the extent permitted by law and supported by sound policy, 
that the Department consider within 180 days of the date of the 
Executive Order whether to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking, other 
guidance, or both, that would clarify when a group or association of 
employers, or other appropriate business or organization could be an 
``employer'' within the meaning of ERISA section 3(5).
    In response to the Executive Order, the Department has conducted a 
thorough review of its current policies regarding MEPs and determined 
that its existing interpretive position is unnecessarily narrow. The 
Department has concluded that regulatory action is appropriate to 
establish greater flexibility in the regulatory standards governing the 
criteria that must exist in order for an employer group or association 
or PEO to sponsor a MEP.
    The proposed rule generally would provide this flexibility by 
making five important changes to the Department's prior subregulatory 
guidance. First, it would clarify the existing requirement in prior 
subregulatory guidance that bona fide groups or associations must have 
at least one substantial business purpose unrelated to the provision of 
benefits. Second, it would relax the requirement that group or 
association members share a common interest, as long as they operate in 
a common geographic area. Third, it would make clear that groups or 
associations whose members operate in the same industry could sponsor 
MEPs, regardless of geographic distribution. Fourth, it would clarify 
that working owners without employees are eligible to participate in 
MEPs sponsored by bona fide employer groups or associations that meet 
the requirements of the proposal. Fifth, it would establish criteria 
under which ``bona fide'' PEOs may sponsor MEPs covering the employees 
of their client employers.
    The proposed criteria also result in more MEPs being treated 
consistently under the Code and title I of ERISA, and such consistency 
could remove another barrier inhibiting the broader establishment of 
MEPs. As discussed earlier in this preamble, a retirement plan covering 
employees of multiple employers that satisfies the requirements of IRC 
section 413(c) is considered a single plan under IRC section 413(c), 
which addresses the tax-qualified status of MEPs. Moreover, in Revenue 
Procedure 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 911, the IRS issued guidance that 
provided an avenue for PEOs to administer a MEP for the benefit of 
worksite employees of client organizations and not violate the 
exclusive benefit rule.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 413(c)(2) and Sec.  
1.413-2(c) of the Income Tax Regulations, which provide that, in 
determining whether a MEP is for the exclusive benefit of its 
employees (and their beneficiaries), all employees participating in 
the plan are treated as employees of each such employer. IRC 
sections 413(c)(1) and (3) provide that IRC sections 410(a) 
(participation) and 411 (minimum vesting standards) also are applied 
as if all employees of each of the employers who maintain the plan 
were employed by a single employer. Under Treas. Reg. Sec.  1.413-
2(a)(2), a plan is subject to the requirements of IRC section 413(c) 
if it is a single plan and the plan is maintained by more than one 
employer.
    See generally Treas. Reg. Sec. Sec.  1.413-1(a)(2),1.413-
2(a)(2), and 1.414(l)-1(b)(1). However, the minimum coverage 
requirements of IRC section 410(b) and related nondiscrimination 
requirements are generally applied to a MEP on an employer-by-
employer basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By establishing greater flexibility in the standards and criteria 
for sponsoring MEPs than previously articulated in subregulatory 
interpretive rulings under ERISA section 3(5), the proposed regulation 
would facilitate the adoption and administration of MEPs and expand 
access to, and lower the cost of, workplace retirement savings plans, 
especially for employees of small employers and certain self-employed 
individuals. At the same time, reflecting the position taken in its 
subregulatory guidance, the Department intends that the conditions 
included in the proposed regulation would continue to distinguish plans 
sponsored by entities that satisfy ERISA's definition of ``employer'' 
from arrangements or services offered by other entities.

4. Affected Entities

    If finalized, the proposed rule may encourage both the creation of 
new MEPs and the expansion of existing MEPs. In order to determine the 
entities that this proposal would affect and its effects on those 
entities, the Department has reviewed the characteristics of existing 
MEPs that file Forms 5500.\68\ As explained below, however, the 
information available on the Form 5500 includes both defined 
contribution and defined benefit MEPs. This proposed rule is limited to 
defined contribution pension plans and this document generally refers 
only to defined contribution MEPs (DC MEPs) when referring to ``MEPs.'' 
Because they are part of the multiple employer pension plan filing 
population, defined benefit MEPs are included in the discussion below 
to understand the universe of MEPs filing the form. This section uses 
the terms DC MEPs and DB MEPs to differentiate the types of plans that 
currently file Forms 5500.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ ``Forms 5500'' refers collectively to the Form 5500 (Annual 
Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan) and the Form 5500-SF (Annual 
Return/Report of Small Employee Benefit Plan).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently DC MEPs comprise only a small share of the private sector 
retirement system, as shown in Table 2.\69\ Based on the latest 
available data, about 4,592 DC MEPs exist with approximately 5.1 
million total participants, 4.1 million of whom are active 
participants. DC MEPs hold about $232 billion in assets.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ EBSA performed these calculations using the 2015 Research 
File of Form 5500 filings. The estimates are weighted and rounded, 
which means they may not sum precisely. The Department derived these 
estimates by identifying plans that indicated ``multiple employer 
plan'' status on the Form 5500 Part 1 Line A. Then, the Department 
removed nine plans that upon further review appear to be 
multiemployer plans.
    \70\ Id.

                                                           Table 2--Current Statistics on MEPs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Number of MEPs         Total participants              Active participants                Total assets
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEP DC Plans.........................              4,592  5.1 million...................  4.1 million...................  $232 billion.

[[Page 53547]]

 
    As a share of all ERISA DC plans.               0.7%  5.3%..........................  5.3%..........................  4.4%.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEP DC Plans.........................              4,592  5.1 million...................  4.1 million...................  $232 billion.
    401(k) Plans.....................              4,345  4.8 million...................  3.9 million...................  $216 billion.
    Other DC Plans...................                248  0.4 million...................  0.3 million...................  $15 billion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEP DC Plans.........................              4,592  5.1 million...................  4.1 million...................  $232 billion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEP DB Plans.........................                242  1.5 million...................  0.6 million...................  $132 billion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total MEP Plans..................              4,834  6.6 million...................  4.7 million...................  $363 billion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: EBSA performed these calculations using the 2015 Research File of Form 5500 filings. The estimates are weighted and rounded, which means they
  may not sum precisely. The Department derived these estimates by identifying plans that indicated ``multiple employer plan'' status on the Form 5500
  Part 1 Line A. Then, the Department removed nine plans that upon further review appear to be multiemployer plans.

    Some MEPs are very large; 59 percent of total participants are in 
MEPs with 10,000 or more participants.\71\ Furthermore, 98 percent of 
total participants are in MEPs with 100 or more participants. There are 
47 MEPs holding over $1 billion in assets each.\72\ In existing DC 
MEPs, 91.6 percent of participants direct all of the investments, 
another 5.6 percent direct the investment of a portion of the assets, 
and the remainder did not direct the investment of any of the 
assets.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Id.
    \72\ Id.
    \73\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are caveats to keep in mind when interpreting the data 
presented in Table 2 above. For example, under the Department's prior 
subregulatory guidance, some plans established and maintained by groups 
of employers that might meet the conditions of the proposed rule, would 
currently be deemed to be individual plans sponsored by each of the 
employers in the group. In these circumstances, each participating 
employer is required to file a Form 5500 just as it would if it 
established its own plan. These filings are indistinguishable from 
typical single-employer plans and do not appear in the data set as 
identifiable multiple employer plans.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ In addition, there are some plans that are erroneously 
indicating that they are ``multiple employer plans'' rather than 
``single-employer plans'' under title I of ERISA. These plans may in 
fact be group or association or PEO-type MEPs that do not meet the 
conditions of the prior DOL subregulatory guidance. This distorts 
the database and leads to inaccurate estimates. In particular, the 
high number of plans erroneously reporting that they are MEPs likely 
overestimates the number of existing MEPs for purposes of title I of 
ERISA and underestimates the average size of MEPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As stated earlier in this preamble, PEOs generally are entities 
that enter into agreements with client employers to provide certain 
employment responsibilities, such as tax withholding, to the 
individuals who perform services for the client employers. At the end 
of 2017, there were 907 PEOs operating in the United States, providing 
services to 175,000 client employers with 3.7 million employees.\75\ 
The proposed rule would allow certain PEOs meeting the requirements of 
paragraph (c) to sponsor MEPs and offer coverage to their client 
employers' employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Laurie Bassi and Dan McMurrer, ``An Economic Analysis: The 
PEO Industry Footprint in 2018,'' National Association of 
Professional Employer Organizations, September 2018, available at 
https://www.napeo.org/docs/default-source/white-papers/2018-white-paper-final.pdf?sfvrsn=6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposal would benefit many workers that might otherwise tend 
to lack access to high-quality, affordable, on-the-job retirement 
savings opportunities. These workers include self-employed individuals, 
sole proprietors without employees, participants in the ``gig'' 
economy, ``contingent'' workers, and workers in various ``alternative'' 
work arrangements. Although there are other retirement savings vehicles 
available to these workers, the workers in these categories are less 
likely to access and participate in retirement plans. For example, only 
six percent of self-employed individuals participated in retirement 
plans in 2013.\76\ Among contingent workers, only 23 percent were 
eligible to participate in employer- provided retirement plans in 
2017.\77\ The proposal would provide many of these workers with a new 
opportunity to access a retirement plan by joining a MEP. Approximately 
8 million self-employed workers between ages 21 and 70, representing 6 
percent of all similarly aged workers, have no employees and usually 
work at least 20 hours per week, and under this proposal would become 
eligible to join MEPs.\78\ These workers are involved in a wide range 
of occupations: l\Lawyers, doctors, real estate agents, childcare 
providers, as well as ``gig economy'' workers, who provide on-demand 
services, often through online intermediaries, such as ride-sharing 
online platforms. In many respects, the self-employed are quite 
different from employees in a traditional employer-employee 
arrangement. For example, self-employed persons often have complex work 
arrangements--they are more likely to work part-time or hold multiple 
jobs.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Craig Copeland, ``Employment-Based Retirement Plan 
Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 2013,'' EBRI Issue 
Brief, no. 405, October 2014. In this report, the self-employed 
include mostly unincorporated self-employed.
    \77\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangements--May 2017,'' June 7, 2018.
    \78\ DOL tabulations of the June 2018 Current Population Survey 
basic monthly data.
    \79\ For tax administrative data, see Emilie Jackson, Adam 
Looney, and Shanthi Ramnath, ``The Rise of Alternative Work 
Arrangements: Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit 
Coverage.'' U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, 
Working Paper 114 (January 2017). For survey data, see the Survey of 
Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons, 2012 from the Census 
Bureau at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=SBO_2012_00CSCBO04&prodType=table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Gig economy workers, in particular, may face obstacles to saving 
for retirement. While a number of tax-preferred retirement savings 
vehicles are already available to them, many might find it difficult 
and expensive to navigate these options on their own.\80\ Relatively 
few gig workers have access to employer-sponsored retirement plans,

[[Page 53548]]

one survey found.\81\ According to another survey, many traditional 
workers who pursue gig work on the side do so at least partly to help 
them save more for retirement. On the other hand, most of those for 
whom gig work is their main job have less than $1,000 set aside for 
retirement.\82\ MEPs could help raise awareness and ease entry to 
retirement coverage for broad classes of gig workers such as on-demand 
drivers or workers in cities where gig work is common.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ For related information see, for example, Jonathan Kahler, 
``Retirement planning in a `gig economy','' Vanguard, June 13, 2018, 
available at https://vanguardblog.com/2018/06/13/retirement-planning-in-a-gig-economy/, which explains that a gig worker is 
``running your own HR department and you're the benefits manager, 
which means taking sole responsibility for your retirement.''
    \81\ ``Gig Workers in America: Profiles, Mindsets, and Financial 
Wellness,'' Prudential, 2017, available at https://research.prudential.com/documents/rp/Gig_Economy_Whitepaper.pdf.
    \82\ ``Gig Economy and the Future of Retirement,'' Betterment, 
2018, available at https://www.betterment.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/The-Gig-Economy-Freelancing-and-Retirement-Betterment-Survey-2018_edited.pdf. This same survey found, however, that most 
gig workers are paying off debt. It is sometimes better to retire 
debt before saving aggressively for retirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to the May 2017 Contingent Worker Supplement survey, 3.8 
percent of workers identified themselves as ``contingent'' workers,\83\ 
meaning they did not expect their jobs to last or reported that their 
jobs were temporary. About 10 percent of workers fell under 
``alternative,'' non-traditional work arrangements that include 
independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency 
workers, and workers provided by contract firms.\84\ The group of 
contingent workers and the group of workers in alternative arrangements 
overlap. Using a different survey, Katz and Krueger, found that the 
share of workers in alternative arrangements was approximately 15.8 
percent in 2015.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements--May 2017'' (June 7, 2018).
    \84\ Id.
    \85\ Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, ``The Rise and Nature 
of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015,'' 
(June 18, 2017). This survey has a smaller sample size than the 
Contingent Worker Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Policymakers have expressed concern about whether some gig workers, 
and, more generally self-employed persons, have access to retirement 
plans and adequately save for retirement. According to the Contingent 
Worker Survey, in 2017, 23 percent of contingent workers were eligible 
to participate in employer provided retirement plans, which is 
substantially lower than the corresponding 48 percent figure for non-
contingent workers. Workers in alternative arrangements (13 percent for 
temporary help agency workers, 35 percent for on-call workers, and 48 
percent for workers provided by contract firms) were less likely than 
workers with traditional arrangements (51 percent) to be eligible for 
employer-provided retirement plans.\86\ Thus, by allowing the self-
employed to participate in MEPs, the proposal would increase retirement 
plan access for them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ The self-employed--both incorporated and unincorporated--
and the independent contractors were excluded from calculating these 
percentages. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Contingent and 
Alternative Employment Arrangements--May 2017'' (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Benefits

a. Expanded Access to Coverage
    Generally, employees rarely choose to save for retirement outside 
of the workplace, despite having options to save in tax-favored savings 
vehicles, such as investing either in traditional IRAs or Roth IRAs. 
Thus, the availability of workplace retirement plans is a significant 
factor affecting whether workers save for their retirement. Yet, 
despite the advantages of workplace retirement plans, access to such 
plans for employees of small businesses is relatively low. The 
proposal's expansion of access to certain MEPs would enable groups of 
private-sector employers to participate in a collective retirement plan 
and provide employers with another efficient way to reduce some costs 
of offering workplace retirement plans. Thereby, more plan formation 
and broader availability of such plans would occur, especially among 
small employers.
    The MEP structure could address significant concerns from employers 
about the costs to set up and administer retirement benefit plans. In 
order to participate in a MEP, employers generally would be required to 
execute a participation agreement or similar instrument setting forth 
the rights and obligations of the MEP and participating employers. 
These employers would then be participating in a single plan, rather 
than sponsoring their own separate, individual ERISA-covered plan; 
therefore the employer group or association or PEO would be acting as 
the ``employer'' sponsoring the MEP within the meaning of section 3(5) 
of ERISA. That employer group or association typically, or in the case 
of PEOs always, would assume the roles of plan administrator and named 
fiduciary. The individual employers would not be directly responsible 
for the MEP's overall compliance with ERISA's reporting and disclosure 
obligations. Accordingly, the MEP structure could address small 
employers' concerns regarding the cost associated with fiduciary 
liability of sponsoring a retirement plan by effectively transferring 
much of the legal risks and responsibilities to professional 
fiduciaries who would be responsible for managing plan assets and 
selecting investment menu options, among other things. Participating 
employers' continuing involvement in the day-to-day operations and 
administration of their MEP generally could be limited to enrolling 
employees and forwarding voluntary employee and employer contributions 
to the plan. Thus, participating employers could keep more of their 
day-to-day focus on managing their businesses, rather than their 
pension plans.
    Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation intended to lower 
costs, simplify requirements, and ease administrative burdens for small 
employers to sponsor retirement plans. For example, the Revenue Act of 
1978 \87\ and the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 \88\ 
established the SEP IRA plan and the SIMPLE IRA plan, respectively, 
featuring fewer compliance requirements than other plan types. The 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) \89\ 
included provisions that are intended to increase access to retirement 
plans for small businesses by: (1) Eliminating top-heavy testing 
requirements for safe harbor 401(k) plans; (2) increasing contribution 
limits for employer-sponsored IRA plans and 401(k) plans; and (3) 
creating tax credits for small employers to offset new plan startup 
costs and for individuals within certain income limits who make 
eligible contributions to retirement plans. Despite these legislative 
efforts to increase access to retirement savings plans for small 
employers, as shown in Table 1, above, the percentage of the U.S. 
workforce participating in a workplace retirement plan remains around 
50 percent. Therefore, a critical question is whether MEPs meeting the 
requirements of the proposal can increase access to workplace 
retirement plans when other initiatives have had limited effect. 
Several factors indicate to the Department that they can.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ Public Law 95-600, sec. 152, 92 Stat. 2763, 2791.
    \88\ Public Law 104-188, sec. 1421, 110 Stat. 1755, 1792.
    \89\ Public Law 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, the Department believes that employers may be more likely to 
participate in a MEP sponsored by a PEO, group, or association of 
employers with which they have a pre-existing relationship based on 
trust, familiarity, and efficiency stemming from that relationship. For 
example, a PEO that performs payroll or human resources

[[Page 53549]]

services for an employer would have connected information technology 
infrastructures that would facilitate efficient transfers of employee 
and employer contributions. Similarly, small employers obtaining health 
insurance coverage through an AHP sponsored by a group or association 
may find it convenient and cost effective to establish retirement plans 
offered by the same group or association. In many cases, the group or 
association and small employers may link their information technology 
systems to collect health care premiums from participating 
employers,\90\ and that infrastructure could also be used to collect 
retirement contributions, resulting in IT-related start-up costs 
savings. In addition, small employers' and self-employed individuals 
may encounter fewer administrative burdens if the same group or 
association administers both their health and retirement plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ In the analogous context of health plans, the Department 
recently issued a final regulation that enhances the ability of 
unrelated employers to band together to provide health benefits 
through a single ERISA-covered plan called an AHP. The AHP Rule, 
which was issued on June 21, 2018, expands access to more 
affordable, quality health care by amending the definition of 
``employer'' under section 3(5) of ERISA for AHPs. Similar to this 
proposal, the AHP Rule established alternative criteria under 
ERISA's section 3(5) definition of employer to permit more groups or 
associations of employers to establish a multiple employer group 
health plan that is a single employee welfare benefit plan within 
the meaning of ERISA section 3(1) of ERISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, employers may be incentivized to sponsor these plans based 
on cost savings that may occur when payroll services are integrated 
with retirement plan record-keeping systems. Several firms in the 
market already provide payroll services and plan record-keeping 
services particularly tailored to small employers.\91\ These firms can 
afford to provide these integrated services at a competitive price, 
suggesting that integrating these services could lead to some 
efficiency gains. Since PEOs already provide payroll services to client 
employers, a MEP sponsored by a PEO can reap the benefits of 
integrating these services, which can in turn benefit participating 
employers through lower fees and ease of administration. According to a 
survey of small employers, those with outsourced payroll systems are 
twice as likely to begin offering a retirement plan in the next two 
years as those that handle their payroll internally.\92\ This may be 
evidence of causation: Outsourcing payroll may encourage employers to 
offer retirement plans because it makes such offering less costly, as 
some of the information technology infrastructure necessary to maintain 
a retirement plan already is in place. On the other hand, this might be 
mere correlation, wherein small employers generating steady revenue 
streams are more likely to outsource payroll systems and also more 
likely to sponsor retirement plans in the near future because they are 
generally more financially secure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ Cerulli Associates, U.S. Retirement Markets 2016 (available 
at https://www.cerulli.com/vapi/public/getcerullifile?filecid=Cerulli-US-Retirement-Markets-2016-Information-Packet).
    \92\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Employer Barriers to and 
Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits,'' 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As further discussed in the uncertainty section below, the 
Department does not have sufficient data to determine precisely the 
likely extent of participation by small employers and the self-employed 
in MEPs under the proposal. However, overall, the Department believes 
that the proposed rule would provide a new valuable option for small 
employers and the self-employed to adopt retirement savings plans for 
their employees, which could increase access to retirement plans for 
many American workers.
b. Reduced Fees and Administration Savings
    Many MEPs would benefit from scale advantages that small businesses 
do not currently enjoy, and MEPs would pass some of the attendant 
savings onto participating employers and participants.\93\ Grouping 
small employers together into a MEP could facilitate savings through 
administrative efficiencies (economies of scale) and sometimes through 
price negotiation (market power). The degree of potential savings may 
be different for different types of administrative functions. For 
example, scale efficiencies can be very large with respect to asset 
management, and may be smaller, but still meaningful, with respect to 
recordkeeping.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ See, e.g., BlackRock, ``Expanding Access to Retirement 
Savings for Small Business,'' Viewpoint (Nov. 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Large scale may create two distinct economic advantages for MEPs. 
First, as scale increases, marginal costs for MEPs would diminish, and 
MEPs would spread fixed costs over a larger pool of member employers 
and employee participants, creating direct economic efficiencies. 
Second, larger scale may increase the negotiating power of MEPs. 
Negotiating power matters when competition among financial services 
providers is less than perfect and they can command greater profits 
than in an environment with perfect competition. Very large plans may 
sometimes exercise their own market power to negotiate lower prices, 
translating what would have been higher revenue for financial services 
providers into savings for member employers and employee participants.
    There may be times when scale efficiencies would not translate into 
savings for small employer members and their employee participants 
because regulatory requirements applicable to large MEPs may be more 
stringent than those applicable to most separate small plans. For 
example, some small plans are exempt from annual reporting 
requirements, and many others are subject to more streamlined reporting 
requirements than larger plans.
    But in most cases, the savings from scale efficiency of MEPs would 
be larger than the savings from scale efficiencies that other providers 
of bundled financial services could offer to small employers. First, 
the market position of MEPs would sometimes provide them with relative 
advantages over other providers of bundled financial services. For 
example, existing groups, associations, or PEOs that have multi-purpose 
relationships with small employers may enjoy lower marginal costs for 
marketing, distributing, and administering defined benefit plans 
through MEPs with their member employers than other providers of 
bundled financial services enjoy. Second, the legal status of MEPs as a 
single large plan may streamline certain regulatory burdens. For 
example, a MEP can file a single annual return/report and obtain a 
single bond in lieu of the multiple reports and bonds necessary when 
other providers of bundled financial services administer many separate 
plans.
    Relative to separate small employer plans, MEPs operating as a 
large single plan would likely secure substantially lower prices from 
financial services companies. Asset managers commonly offer 
proportionately lower prices, relative to assets invested, to larger 
investors, under so-called tiered pricing practices. For example, 
investment companies often offer lower-priced mutual fund share classes 
to customers whose investments in a fund surpass specified break 
points.\94\ These lower

[[Page 53550]]

prices may reflect scale economies in any or all aspects of 
administering larger accounts, such as marketing, distribution, asset 
management, recordkeeping, and transaction processing. Large MEPs would 
likely qualify for lower pricing compared with separate plans of small 
employers. MEP participants that benefit from lower asset-based fees 
would enjoy superior investment returns net of fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ Sarah Holden, James Duvall, and Elena Barone Chism, ``The 
Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans: Services, Fees, and Expenses, 
2017,'' ICI Research Perspective 24: no. 4 (June 2018) (concluding 
that 401(k) mutual fund investors pay lower expense ratios for a 
number or reasons, including ``market discipline'' imposed by 
performance- and cost-conscious plan sponsors). See also Russel 
Kinnel, ``Mutual Fund Expense Ratio Trends,'' Morningstar, (June 
2014), at https://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/researchpapers/fee_trend.pdf (accessed Aug. 21, 2018) (stating that 
breakpoints are built into mutual fund management fees so that a 
fund charges less for each additional dollar managed); Vanguard, 
``What You Should Know About Mutual Fund Share Classes and 
Breakpoints,'' at https://www.vanguard.com/pdf/v415.pdf (stating that 
investors in certain class shares may be eligible for volume 
discounts if their purchases meet certain investment levels, or 
breakpoints).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The availability and magnitude of scale efficiencies may be 
different with respect to different retirement plan services. For 
example, asset management generally enjoys very large-scale 
efficiencies. Investors of all kinds generally benefit by investing in 
large co-mingled pools. Even within large pools, however, small 
investors often pay higher prices than larger ones. Mutual funds often 
charge lower ``asset management'' fees for larger investors, in both 
retail and institutional markets. The Department invites comments on 
the degree to which large MEPs would provide small employers with scale 
advantages in asset management larger than those provided by other 
large pooled asset management vehicles, such as mutual funds, available 
to separate small plans.
    As with asset management, scale efficiencies often are available 
with respect to other plan services. For example, the marginal costs 
for services such as marketing and distribution, account 
administration, and transaction processing often decrease as customer 
size increases. MEPs, as large customers, may enjoy scale efficiencies 
in the acquisition of such services. It is also possible, however, that 
the cost to MEPs of servicing their small employer-members may diminish 
or even offset such efficiencies. Stated differently, MEPs scale 
efficiencies may not always exceed the scale efficiencies from other 
providers of bundled financial services used by small employers that 
sponsor separate plans. For example, small pension plans sometimes 
incur high distribution costs, reflecting commissions paid to agents 
and brokers who sell investment products to plans. MEPs, unlike large 
single-employer plans, must themselves incur some cost to distribute 
retirement plans to large numbers of small businesses. But relative to 
traditional agents and brokers, MEPs could reduce costs if they are 
able to take economic advantage of members' existing ties to a 
sponsoring group or association of employers or PEO. This can be a more 
efficient business model than sending out brokers and investment 
advisers to reach out to small businesses one-by-one, which could 
result in lower administrative fees for plan sponsors and participants.
    For much the same reason, MEPs sponsored by pre-existing groups or 
associations of employers that perform multiple functions for their 
members other than offering retirement coverage (such as chambers of 
commerce or trade associations) and PEOs might have more potential to 
deliver administrative savings than those established for the principal 
purpose of offering retirement coverage. These existing organizations 
may already have extensive memberships and relationships with small 
employers; thus, they may have fewer setup, recruitment, and enrollment 
costs than organizations newly formed to offer retirement benefits. 
These existing organizations may currently be limited in their ability 
to offer MEPs to some or all of their existing members and clients (for 
example, to working owners, workers outside of a common industry, or 
employers contracting with PEOs) by the Department's prior 
subregulatory guidance. Under the requirements of this proposed rule, 
they could newly provide such members and clients with access to MEPs.
    All of this suggests that many MEPs will enjoy scale efficiencies 
greater than the scale efficiencies available from other providers of 
bundled financial services. However, the scale efficiencies of MEPs 
would still likely be smaller than the scale efficiencies enjoyed by 
very large single-employer plans. The Department invites comments on 
the nature, magnitude, and determinants of MEPs' potential scale 
advantages, and on the conditions under which MEPs will pass more or 
less of the attendant savings to different participating employers.
    By enabling MEPs to comprise otherwise unrelated small employers 
and self-employed individuals (1) who are in the same trade, industry, 
line of business, or profession; or (2) have a principal place of 
business with a region that does not exceed the boundaries of the same 
State or metropolitan area (even if the area includes more than one 
State), this proposed rule would allow more MEPs to be established and 
to claim a significant market presence and thereby pursue scale 
advantages. Consequently, this proposal would extend scale advantages 
to some MEPs that otherwise might have been too small to achieve them 
and to small employers and working owners that absent the proposal 
would have offered separate plans (or no plans) but that under this 
proposal may join large MEPs.
    While MEPs' scale advantages may be smaller than the scale 
advantages enjoyed by very large single-employer plans, it nonetheless 
is illuminating to consider the deep savings historically enjoyed by 
the latter. Table 3 shows how much investment fees vary based on the 
amount of assets in a 401(k) plan.\95\ The table focuses on mutual 
funds, which are the most common investment vehicle in 401(k) plans, 
and shows that the average expense ratio for several dominant types of 
mutual funds is much lower for large plans than for smaller plans. And 
this data shows the fees actually paid, rather than the lowest fees 
available to a plan. It is unclear what features and quality aspects 
accompanied the fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ Average expense ratios are expressed in basis points and 
asset-weighted. The sample includes plans with audited 401(k) 
filings in the BrightScope database for 2015 and comprises 15,110 
plans with $1.4 trillion in mutual fund assets. Plans were included 
if they had at least $1 million in assets and between 4 and 100 
investment options. BrightScope/ICI, ``The BrightScope/ICI Defined 
Contribution Plan Profile: A Close Look at 401(k) Plans, 2015'' 
(March 2018).

                                  Table 3--Average Expense Ratios of Mutual Funds in 401(k) Plans in Basis Points, 2015
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             International                                                              Balanced mutual
              Plan assets                Domestic equity     equity mutual      Domestic bond      International       Target date     funds (non-target
                                           mutual funds          funds           mutual funds    bond mutual funds     mutual funds          date)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1M-$10M..............................                 81                101                 72                 85                 79                 80
$10M-$50M.............................                 68                 85                 59                 77                 68                 64

[[Page 53551]]

 
$50M-$100M............................                 55                 72                 44                 66                 54                 50
$100M-$250M...........................                 52                 68                 40                 64                 55                 45
$250M-$500M...........................                 49                 63                 36                 67                 50                 42
$500M-$1B.............................                 45                 60                 33                 65                 50                 39
More than $1B.........................                 36                 52                 26                 65                 48                 32
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Average expense ratios are expressed in basis points and asset-weighted. The sample includes plans with audited 401(k) filings in the
  BrightScope database for 2015 and comprises 15,110 plans with $1.4 trillion in mutual fund assets. Plans were included if they had at least $1 million
  in assets and between 4 and 100 investment options. BrightScope/ICI, ``The BrightScope/ICI Defined Contribution Plan Profile: A Close Look at 401(k)
  Plans, 2015'' (March 2018).

    There are some important caveats to interpreting Table 3. The first 
is that it does not include data for most of the smallest plans because 
plans with fewer than 100 participants generally are not required to 
submit audited financial statements with their Forms 5500. The second 
is that there is variation across plans in whether and to what degree 
the cost of recordkeeping is included in the mutual fund expense ratios 
paid by participants. In plans where recordkeeping is not entirely 
included in the expense ratios, it may be paid by employers, as a per-
participant fee, or as some combination of these. These caveats mean 
that the link between fees and size could be either stronger or weaker 
than Table 3 suggests, creating some uncertainty about how large an 
advantage MEPs could offer.
    An alternative method of comparing potential size advantages is a 
broader measure called ``total plan cost'' calculated by 
Brightscope.\96\ Total plan cost likely provides a better way to 
compare costs because, in addition to costs paid in the form of expense 
ratios, it includes fees reported on the audited Form 5500. It 
comprises all costs regardless of whether they are paid by the plan, 
the employer, or the participants. Total plan cost includes 
recordkeeping services for all plans, for example, which is one reason 
that it is a more comparable measure than the data presented above in 
Table 3. When plans invest in mutual funds and similar products, 
BrightScope uses expense data from Lipper, a financial services firm. 
When plans invest in collective investment trusts and pooled separate 
accounts, BrightScope generates an estimate of the investment fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using total plan cost yields generally very similar results about 
the cost differences facing small and large plans. Table 4 shows that 
very few of the smaller plans are enjoying the low fees that are 
commonplace among larger plans.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ Id. Data is plan-weighted. The sample is plans with audited 
401(k) filings in the BrightScope database for 2015, which comprises 
18,853 plans with $3.2 trillion in assets. Plans were included if 
they had at least $1 million in assets and between 4 and 100 
investment options.

                              Table 4--Larger Plans Tend To Have Lower Fees Overall
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Total plan cost (in basis points)
                      Plan assets                       --------------------------------------------------------
                                                          10th percentile         Median        90th percentile
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1M-$10M...............................................                 75                111                162
$10M-$50M..............................................                 61                 91                129
$50M-$100M.............................................                 37                 65                 93
$100M-$250M............................................                 22                 54                 74
$250M-$500M............................................                 21                 48                 66
$500M-$1B..............................................                 21                 43                 59
More than $1B..........................................                 14                 27                 51
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Data is plan-weighted. The sample is plans with audited 401(k) filings in the BrightScope database for
  2015, which comprises 18,853 plans with $3.2 trillion in assets. Plans were included if they had at least $1
  million in assets and between 4 and 100 investment options. BrightScope/ICI, ``The BrightScope/ICI Defined
  Contribution Plan Profile: A Close Look at 401(k) Plans, 2015'' (March 2018).

    Deloitte Consulting LLP, for the Investment Company Institute, 
conducted a survey of 361 defined contribution plans. The study 
calculates an ``all-in'' fee that is comparable across plans. It 
includes both administrative and investment fees paid by both the plan 
and the participant. Generally, small plans with 10 participants are 
paying approximately 50 basis points more than plans with 1,000 
participants.\98\ Small plans with 10 participants are paying about 90 
basis points more than large plans with 50,000 participants. Deloitte 
predicted these estimates by analyzing the survey results using a 
regression approach, calculating basis points as a share of assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ Deloitte Consulting and Investment Company Institute, 
``Inside the Structure of Defined Contribution/401(k) Plan Fees, 
2013: A Study Assessing the Mechanics of the `All-in' Fee'' (Aug. 
2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These research findings have shown that small plans and their 
participants generally pay higher fees than large plans and their 
participants. Because this rule would give many small employers the 
opportunity to join a MEP, some of which are very large plans, then 
many of these employers would likely incur lower fees. Many employers 
that are not currently offering any retirement plan may join a MEP, 
leading their employees to save for retirement. Many employers already 
sponsoring a retirement plan might

[[Page 53552]]

decide to join a MEP instead, seeking lower fees and reduced fiduciary 
liability exposure. If there indeed are lower fees in the MEPs than in 
their previous plans, those lower fees could translate into higher 
savings.
c. Reporting and Audit Cost Savings
    The potential for MEPs to enjoy reporting cost savings merits 
separate attention because this potential is shaped by not only 
economic forces, but also the reporting requirements applicable to 
different plans. On the one hand, a MEP, as a single plan, can file a 
single report and conduct a single audit, while separate plans may be 
required to file separate reports and conduct separate audits. On the 
other hand, a MEP, as a large plan, is generally subject to more 
stringent reporting and audit requirements than a small plan, which 
likely files no or streamlined reports and undergoes no audits. With 
respect to reporting and audits then, MEPs sometimes may offer more 
savings to medium-sized employers (with more than 100 retirement plan 
participants) already subject to more stringent reporting and audit 
requirements than to small employers. Small employers that otherwise 
would have fallen outside of reporting and audit requirements sometimes 
might incur slightly higher costs by joining MEPs, though this increase 
is likely to be offset by other sources of MEP savings and by improved 
security and availability of data that might derive from MEPs' 
reporting and audits.
    Sponsors of ERISA-covered retirement plans generally must file a 
Form 5500, with all required schedules and attachments annually. The 
cost burden incurred to satisfy the Form 5500 related reporting 
requirements varies by plan type, size, and complexity. Analyzing the 
2015 Form 5500 filings, the Department estimates that the average cost 
to file the Form 5500 is as follows: $276 per filer for small 
(generally less than 100 plan participants) single-employer DC plans 
eligible for Form 5500-SF; $437 per filer for small single-employer DC 
plans not eligible to file Form 5500-SF; and $1,685 per filer for large 
(generally 100 participants or more) single-employer DC plans, plus the 
cost of an audit.
    Additional schedules and reporting may be required for large and 
complex plans. For example, large retirement plans are required to 
attach auditor's reports with Form 5500. Most small plans are not 
required to attach such reports.\99\ Hiring an auditor and obtaining an 
audit report can be costly for plans, and audit fees may increase as 
plans get larger or if plans are more complex. Some recent reports 
state that the fee to audit a 401(k) plan ranges between $6,500 and 
$13,000.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ Under certain circumstances, some small plans may still 
need to attach auditor's reports. For more details, see https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/plan-administration-and-compliance/reporting-and-filing/form-5500/2017-instructions.pdf. In 2015, approximately 3,600 small plans that 
filed the Form 5500 and not the Form 5500-SF submitted audit reports 
as part of their Form 5500 filing.
    \100\ See https://www.thayerpartnersllc.com/blog/the-hidden-costs-of-a-401k-audit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If an employer joins a MEP meeting the requirements of the 
proposal, it can save some costs associated with filing Form 5500 and 
fulfilling audit requirements because a MEP is considered a single 
plan. Thus, one Form 5500 and audit report would satisfy the reporting 
requirements, and each participating employer would not need to file 
its own, separate Form 5500 and, for large plans or those few small 
plans that do not meet the small plan audit waiver, an audit report. 
According to a GAO report, most association MEPs interviewed by the GAO 
have over 100 participating employers.\101\ PEOs also tend to have a 
large number of client employers, at least 400 participating employers 
in their PEO-sponsored DC plans.\102\ Assuming reporting costs are 
shared by participating employers within a MEP, an employer joining a 
MEP can save virtually all the reporting costs discussed above. As PEOs 
seem to have more participating employers than associations, an 
employer sometimes might save slightly more by joining a PEO MEP 
compared to joining a group or association MEP, but the additional 
savings are minimal.\103\ Large plans could enjoy even higher cost 
savings if audit costs are taken into account. The Department estimates 
that reporting cost savings associated with Form 5500 and an audit 
report would be approximately $8,103 per year for a large plan joining 
an association MEP and $8,165 per year for a large plan joining a PEO 
MEP.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-665, 
``Federal Agencies Should Collect Data and Coordinate Oversight of 
Multiple Employer Plans,'' (Sept. 2012) (https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-665).
    \102\ Id.
    \103\ Cost savings for small single employer DC plans eligible 
for Form 5500-SF would be $259.51 per filer if it joins an 
association-sponsored MEP as opposed to $272.15 per filer if it 
joins a PEO-sponsored MEP; for small single employer DC plans not 
eligible for Form 5500-SF cost savings would be $420.31 per filer if 
it joins an association-sponsored MEP as opposed to $432.94 per 
filer if it joins a PEO-sponsored MEP; for large single employer DC 
plans cost savings would be $1,668.36 per filer if it joins an 
association-sponsored MEP as opposed to $1,681.00 per filer if it 
joins a PEO-sponsored MEP.
    \104\ The Department conservatively estimated these cost savings 
based on the lower end of the audit fees, $6,500. If the higher end 
of the fees, $13,000 is assumed, the annual cost savings for large 
plans (including audit fees and estimated Form 5500 preparation 
costs) would range from $14,538 per filer to $14,649 per filer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is less clear whether the self-employed would experience similar 
reporting cost savings by joining a MEP. The Department estimates these 
potential cost savings by comparing the reporting costs of an employer 
that participates in a MEP rather than sponsoring its own plan. But as 
discussed earlier, several retirement savings options are already 
available for self-employed persons, and most have minimal or no 
reporting requirements. For example, both SEP IRA and SIMPLE IRA plans 
are available for small employers and the self-employed, and neither 
option requires Form 5500 filings.\105\ Solo 401(k) plans are also 
available to the self-employed persons, and they may be exempt from 
Form 5500-EZ reporting requirement if the plans assets are less than 
$250,000.\106\ Thus, if self-employed individuals join a MEP, they 
would be unlikely to realize reporting costs savings. In fact, it is 
possible that their reporting costs could slightly increase, because 
the self-employed would share reporting costs with other MEP 
participating employers that they otherwise would not incur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ SEPs that conform to the alternative method of compliance 
in 29 CFR 2520.104-48 or 2520.104-49 do not have to file a Form 
5500; SIMPLEs do not have to file. For more detailed reporting 
requirements for SEPs and SIMPLE IRAs, see https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/forum15_sep_simple_avoiding_pitfalls.pdf; see also https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/retirement-plans-for-self-employed-people.
    \106\ Sometimes solo 401(k) is called as ``individual 401(k),'' 
or ``one-participant 401(k)'' or ``uni-401(k).'' For more 
information about solo-401(k) plans, including reporting 
requirements, see https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/one-participant-401k-plans. Because solo 401(k) plans do not cover any 
common law employees, they are not required to file an annual report 
under title I of ERISA, but must file a return under the Code. Such 
plans may be able to file a Form 5500-SF electronically to satisfy 
the requirement to file a Form 5500-EZ with the IRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Reduced Bonding Costs
    The potential for bonding cost savings in MEPs merits separate 
attention. As noted above, ERISA section 412 and related regulations 
\107\ generally require every fiduciary of an employee benefit plan and 
every person who handles funds or other property of such plan to be 
bonded. ERISA's bonding requirements are intended to protect employee 
benefit plans from risk of loss due to fraud or dishonesty on the part

[[Page 53553]]

of persons who handle plan funds or other property, generally referred 
to as plan officials. A plan official must be bonded for at least 10 
percent of the amount of funds he or she handles, subject to a minimum 
bond amount of $1,000 per plan with respect to which the plan official 
has handling functions. In most instances, the maximum bond amount that 
can be required under ERISA with respect to any one plan official is 
$500,000 per plan; however, the maximum required bond amount is 
$1,000,000 for plan officials of plans that hold employer 
securities.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ 29 CFR 2550.412-1 and 29 CFR part 2580.
    \108\ See DOL Field Assistance Bulletin 2008-04, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2008-04.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rule, MEPs generally might enjoy lower bonding 
costs than would an otherwise equivalent collection of smaller, 
separate plans, for two reasons. First, it might be less expensive to 
buy one bond covering a large number of individuals who handle plan 
funds than a large number of bonds covering the same individuals 
separately or in smaller more numerous groups. Second, the number of 
people handling plan funds and therefore subject to ERISA's bonding 
requirement in the context of a MEP may be smaller than in the context 
of an otherwise equivalent collection of smaller, separate plans.
e. Increased Retirement Savings
    The various effects of this rule, if finalized, could lead in 
aggregate to increased retirement savings. As discussed above, many 
workers would likely go from not having any access to a retirement plan 
to having access through a MEP. This has the potential to result in an 
increase in retirement savings, on average, for this group of workers. 
While some workers may choose not to participate, surveys indicate that 
a large number could. For a defined contribution pension plan, about 73 
percent of all workers with access take up the plan.\109\ Among workers 
whose salary tends to be in the lowest 10 percent of the salary range, 
this figure is about 40 percent.\110\ One reason that these take-up 
rates are relatively high is that many plans use automatic enrollment 
to enroll newly hired workers, as well as, sometimes, existing workers. 
Automatic enrollment is particularly prevalent among large plans; in 
2016 about 75 percent of plans with 1,000-4,999 participants use 
automatic enrollment, while only about 34 percent of plans with 1-49 
participants do.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ These statistics apply to private industry. U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey, Employee Benefits in 
the U.S. (March 2018).
    \110\ Id.
    \111\ Plan Sponsor Council of America, ``60th Annual Survey of 
Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans, Reflecting 2016 Plan Year 
Experience'' (2017), Table 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some workers may be saving in an IRA, either in an employer-
sponsored IRA, payroll deduction IRA, or on their own. If they begin 
participating in a MEP 401(k), they would have the opportunity to take 
advantage of higher contribution limits, and some individuals could 
begin receiving employer contributions when participating in a MEP when 
they did not previously.
    In general, MEPs could offer participants a way to save for 
retirement with lower fees. In particular, the fees are likely to be 
lower than in most small plans and in retail IRAs. The savings in fees 
could result in higher investment returns and thus higher retirement 
savings.
f. Improved Portability
    In an economy where workers may change jobs many times over their 
career, portability of retirement savings is an important feature that 
can help workers keep track of their savings, retain tax-qualified 
status, and gain access to the investment options and fees that they 
desire. Some plan sponsors are not willing to accept rollovers from 
other qualified plans, which impedes portability. This is true 
particularly with respect to small plan sponsors that do not want to 
confront the administrative burden associated with processing 
rollovers. On the other hand, most large plans accept rollovers from 
other qualified plans, and the Department believes that it is 
reasonable to assume that MEPs meeting the requirements of this 
proposal also would accept rollovers, because, generally, they would 
constitute large plans.\112\ Moreover, MEPs could facilitate increased 
portability for employees that leave employment to work for another 
employer that adopted the same MEP.\113\ This might occur when the 
employers that adopted the MEP are in the same industry or are located 
in the same geographic area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ A survey of plan sponsors indicates that in 2016, about 76 
percent of 401(k) plans with 1-49 participants accepted rollovers 
from other plans. Among larger plans, the figure is much higher; for 
example, approximately 95 percent of plans with 1,000-4,999 
participants accept rollovers. The full details are more complex 
because many 401(k) plans responding yes accept rollover from some 
sources, such as another 401(k) plan, but not others, such as a 
defined benefit pension or an IRA.
    \113\ Paul M. Secunda, ``Uber Retirement,'' Marquette Law School 
Legal Studies Paper No. 17-1, (Jan. 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

g. Increased Labor Market Efficiency
    The increased prevalence of MEPs would allow small employers the 
opportunity to offer retirement benefits that are comparable to what 
large employers provide. Since employees value retirement benefits, 
this development would tend to shift talented employees toward small 
businesses. Such a shift would make small businesses more competitive. 
The reallocation of talent across different sectors of the economy 
would increase efficiency.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ John J. Kalamarides, Robert J. Doyle, and Bennett 
Kleinberg, ``Multiple Employer Plans: Expanding Retirement Savings 
Opportunities,'' Prudential (Feb. 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

h. Increased Equality
    Increased availability of MEPs also has the potential to increase 
equality among workers saving for retirement. As noted above, automatic 
enrollment is particularly common among larger plans, and one study 
found that from 2007 to 2010, increasing use of automatic enrollment by 
plan sponsors increased participation in such plans.\115\ Indeed, 
defined contribution pension plan participation dramatically increases 
when plans have an automatic enrollment feature, which helps bring 
black and Hispanic participation to similar levels as whites and 
Asians.\116\ For those not subject to automatic enrollment, black and 
Hispanic participation rates are 13 percentage points and 18 percentage 
points, respectively, behind white participation.\117\ However, for 
those subject to automatic enrollment, black and Hispanic participation 
rates are only three percentage points and two percentage points behind 
white participation.\118\ The effect of automatic enrollment on 
minority participation is even more pronounced for lower salary 
brackets.\119\ It is likely that minority participation rate would 
similarly increase if MEPs include an automatic enrollment feature like 
most large retirement plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ The Ariel/Aon Hewitt Study, ``401(k) Plans in Living 
Color: A Study of 401(k) Savings Disparities Across Racial and 
Ethnic Groups,'' (April 2012).
    \116\ Id.
    \117\ Id.
    \118\ Id.
    \119\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule also has the potential to increase equality 
among men and women in terms of retirement savings. As of 2012, working 
women are participating in retirement plans at the

[[Page 53554]]

same rate as working men,\120\ but women are still less prepared for 
retirement than men due to differences in labor force participation and 
household production. In addition to having more time out of the labor 
force on average, women are more likely to work part time, leading to 
lower savings in DC plans and lower accruals in DB plans. In 2014, 
among Vanguard's three million participants, the median amount 
accumulated in defined contribution pension plan accounts was $36,875 
for men and $24,446 for women. For defined benefit pension plans in 
2010, men received $17,856 in median income, whereas women received 
$12,000. For individuals that are 65 and older, women have a median 
household income that is 26 percent less income than that for men.\121\ 
This proposed rule could help women in the workforce increase saving 
for retirement because of increased access and portability, especially 
to the degree that there would be benefits for part-time workers and 
self-employed workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ The authors' estimates are based on analysis of the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation using interviews that were 
conducted in 2012. Jennifer Erin Brown, Nari Rhee, Joelle Saad-
Lessler, and Diane Oakley, ``Shortchanged in Retirement: Continuing 
Challenges to Women's Financial Future,'' National Institute on 
Retirement Security, (March 2016).
    \121\ Household income is the sum of income from all sources 
including wages, Social Security, defined benefit pensions, 
withdrawals from defined contribution accounts and IRAs, and other. 
Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Code generally gives tax advantages to certain retirement 
savings over most other forms of savings.\122\ Consequently, all else 
being equal, a worker who is saving money in tax-qualified retirement 
savings vehicle generally can enjoy higher lifetime consumption and 
wealth than one who does not. The magnitude of the relative advantage 
generally depends on the worker's tax bracket, the amount contributed 
to the plan, the timing of contributions and withdrawals, and the 
investment performance of the assets in the account. Workers that do 
not contribute to a qualified retirement savings vehicle due to lack of 
access to a workplace retirement plan do not reap this relative 
advantage. This proposed rule would likely increase the number of 
American workers with access to a tax-qualified workplace retirement 
plan, which would spread this financial advantage to some people who 
are not currently receiving it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ But for the special tax status of retirement contributions 
and investments, employer contributions to pension plans and income 
earned on pension assets generally would be taxable to employees as 
the contributions are made and as the income is earned, and 
employees would not receive any deduction or exclusion for their 
pension contributions. Currently under the Code, employer 
contributions to qualified pension plans and, generally, employee 
contributions made at the election of the employee through salary 
reduction are not taxed until distributed to the employee, and 
income earned on pension assets is not taxed until distributed. The 
tax expenditure for ``net exclusion of pension contributions and 
earnings'' is computed as the income taxes forgone on current tax-
excluded pension contributions and earnings less the income taxes 
paid on current pension distributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Improved Data Collection
    This proposed rule also has the potential to improve the 
Department's data collection for purposes of its ERISA enforcement. As 
noted above, the expansion of MEPs is likely to lead to some employers 
who previously filed their own Form 5500s \123\ to join a MEP that 
files a single Form 5500 on behalf of its participating employers. 
Since MEPs are usually large plans, they will likely have a much more 
detailed filing with associated schedules and an audit report. This 
filing will tend to be higher quality, more accurate data than the 
Department currently receives when a collection of participating 
employers are filing as single-employer plans. That is both because the 
required filing for plans with more than 100 participants requires more 
detail and because participating employers would start being part of an 
audit when they were not audited previously. This audit would add a 
layer of review that may help to prevent fraud and abuse. And on the 
whole, the proposal would both lead to more robust data collection for 
the Department to undertake its research, oversight, and enforcement 
responsibilities under ERISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ Although the individual participating employers are filing 
their own Forms 5500 (or Forms 5500-SF), the entity may be providing 
Form 5500 preparation and filing services for all the participating 
employers and be acting as a ``batch submitter'' and otherwise 
taking advantage of certain economies of scale.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department also believes that this proposal would improve the 
quality of information collected. The Department has encountered 
instances of separate Form 5500 filings that fail to account properly 
for each participating employer's plan financial and demographic 
information on a granular enough level for accurate reporting of each 
participating employer's proper proportion of the MEP as a whole. The 
Department also has at times received almost identical filings for each 
participating employer within a MEP. This duplication can lead to an 
overstatement or understatement of participant counts, amount of 
assets, amount of fees, and other important financial and demographic 
data for single employer plans and a failure to be able to assess the 
statistics of all MEPs. The Department continually strives to detect 
and correct filing errors and to improve filing instructions. 
Nonetheless, data quality could be improved insofar as MEPs meeting the 
requirements of the proposal would be likely to possess the expertise 
to file Form 5500 correctly. Moreover, it might require fewer resources 
for the Department to detect and correct filing errors among a 
relatively small number of reports filed by large MEPs than among a far 
larger number of reports filed by separate small plans.

6. Costs

    The proposed rule would not impose any direct costs because it 
merely clarifies which persons may act as an ``employer'' within the 
meaning of section 3(5) of ERISA in sponsoring a MEP. The rule imposes 
no mandates but rather is permissive relative to baseline conditions. 
Concerns have been expressed, however, that MEPs could be vulnerable to 
abuse, such as fraud, mishandling of plan assets or charging excessive 
fees. Abuses might result from the fact that employers are not directly 
overseeing the plan. For example, employers acting as plan sponsors of 
single-employer plans can be effective fiduciaries as they have 
incentives to protect their plans. In the case of a MEP, however, an 
adopting employer will have limited fiduciary duties and may assume 
other participating employers are more thoroughly policing the plan. In 
fact, GAO found that some MEPs' marketing materials, and even MEP 
representatives, mislead employers about fiduciary responsibilities 
with claims that joining a MEP removes their fiduciary responsibility 
entirely.\124\ Less monitoring provides an environment where abuses can 
occur. On the other hand, having multiple participating employers 
monitoring a MEP plan sponsor may actually lead to heightened 
protections for the collective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO, 12-665, 
``Private Sector Pensions--Federal Agencies Should Collect Data and 
Coordinate Oversight of Multiple Employer Plans,'' (Sept. 2012) 
(https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-665).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    MEPs have the potential to build up a substantial amount of assets 
quickly, particularly where employers that already offer plans join 
MEPs and transfer existing retirement assets to the MEP, thus making 
them a target for fraud and abuse. Because the assets are used to fund 
future retirement distributions, such fraudulent schemes could be 
hidden or difficult to detect for a long period. A 2012 GAO report 
regarding federal oversight of data and coordination of MEPs discusses 
potential abuses by MEPs, such as

[[Page 53555]]

charging excessive fees or mishandling plan assets.\125\ If MEPs are at 
greater risk for fraud and abuse than single-employer plans, and some 
employers who are currently sponsoring single-employer retirement plans 
decide to join a MEP instead, that could put more participants and 
their assets at greater risk of fraud and abuse. But single-employer DC 
plans are also vulnerable to these abuses and to mismanagement, and 
some MEPs may be more secure than some otherwise separate small plans. 
The Department is not aware of any direct information indicating 
whether the risk for fraud and abuse is greater in the MEP context than 
in other plans. Many small employers have relationships based on trust 
with trade associations that may sponsor MEPs under the proposal, and 
those associations have an interest in maintaining these trust 
relationships by ensuring that fraud does not occur in MEPs they 
sponsor. Nevertheless, employers choosing to begin and continue 
participating in a MEP should ensure that the MEP is sponsored and 
operated by high quality, reputable providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department does not have a basis to believe that there will be 
increased risk of fraud and abuse due to the proposed rule's provisions 
with respect to PEOs. As stated earlier in the preamble, a PEO's 
assumption and performance of substantial employment functions on 
behalf of its client employers is a lynchpin of the proposal. Requiring 
the PEO to provide employment functions mitigates to some extent fraud 
concerns because the PEO will be a fiduciary and bear all of the 
responsibilities associated with that. The Department believes this 
proposal mitigates fraud concerns associated with the expansion of PEO-
sponsored plans.
    Moreover, the proposal provides a safe harbor for certain 
``certified professional employer organization'' (CPEO) within the 
meaning of section 7705 of the Code and regulations thereunder. 
Generally, a CPEO is a PEO that demonstrates a specified level of 
structural and financial integrity under federal tax law. To become and 
remain a CPEO, the PEO must satisfy certain requirements as to its 
federal employment tax compliance and as to the status of its positive 
working capital, have certain background and experience in functioning 
as a PEO, be organized and have a physical business location within the 
United States, report its annual audited financials to the IRS, and 
meet bonding and other requirements described in the CPEO statute and 
regulations including independent auditing and related attestation 
requirements. Employers may consider these attributes when evaluating 
retirement options because they may reduce the potential for fraud, 
abuse, and mismanagement when PEOs perform employment functions on 
behalf of client employers.

7. Transfers

    Several transfers are possible as a result of this proposed rule. 
To the extent the expansion of MEPs leads employers that previously 
sponsored other types of retirement plans to terminate or freeze these 
plans and adopt a MEP, there may be a transfer between the employer and 
the employees, although the direction of the transfer is unclear. 
Additionally, if employers terminate or freeze other plans to enroll in 
a MEP, and if that MEP utilizes different service providers and asset 
types than the terminated plan, those different service providers would 
experience gains or losses of income or market share. Service providers 
that specialize in providing services to MEPs might benefit at the 
expense of other providers who specialize in providing services to 
small plans.
    The proposed rule could also result in asset transfers if MEPs 
invest in different types of assets. For example, small plans tend to 
rely more on mutual funds, while larger plans have greater access to 
other types of investment vehicles such as bank common collective 
trusts and insurance company pooled separate accounts, which allow for 
specialization and plan specific fees. This movement of assets could 
see profits move from mutual funds to other types of investment 
managers.
    Finally, the Code provides substantial tax preferences for 
retirement savings. If access to retirement plans and savings increase 
as a result of this proposed rule, a transfer will occur flowing from 
all taxpayers to those individuals receiving tax preferences as a 
result of new and increased retirement savings.

8. Impact on the Federal Budget

    The effects of the proposed rule on the federal budget are 
uncertain. Because the proposed rule would increase access to 
retirement plans, tax revenues would be reduced in the short run due to 
the tax deferral associated with an increase in retirement savings. But 
the amount of the reduction would depend upon how many more dollars 
would be invested in retirement plans receiving traditional tax 
treatment rather than after-tax Roth treatment. And it is unclear to 
what degree people would consume less to save more, or alternatively 
offset their new savings by going into debt or by reducing savings in 
non-retirement accounts or future retirement savings. Consequently, the 
long run net change in consumption and investment and effect on the 
federal budget is uncertain.

9. Uncertainty

    As discussed above, the Department expects this proposed rule would 
expand workers' access to employment-based retirement plans by easing 
the burden of offering retirement benefits for employers--particularly 
small employers. However, the exact extent to which access to 
employment-based retirement plans would increase under this proposed 
rule is uncertain.
    Several reports suggest that, although important, employers may not 
consider offering retirement plans a priority as compared to other 
types of benefits. The most commonly offered benefit is paid leave, 
followed by health insurance; retirement plans rank third.\126\ This 
order holds true for small employers, as well.\127\ Another survey of 
employers confirms that small employers offer health insurance more 
often than retirement plans.\128\ That study also suggests that company 
earnings and the number of employees affect the decision whether or not 
to offer retirement plans: Employers that experience increases in 
earnings or the number of employees are more likely to offer retirement 
plans.\129\ The top reason provided for employers to start offering a 
retirement plan is the increase in business profits.\130\ Similarly, in 
another survey, employers not offering retirement plans cite ``the 
company is not big enough'' most frequently as the reason why they do 
not offer retirement plans.\131\ Although this rule would make it 
easier and less costly for employers to offer a workplace retirement 
savings vehicle, these surveys suggest that small employers are not 
likely to adopt a MEP unless their business is in a strong financial 
position and generating sufficient revenue streams. Also, it can

[[Page 53556]]

be quite challenging for a small employer or self-employed individual 
to determine which plan is most appropriate. Business owners must 
understand the characteristics and features of the available options in 
order to choose the most suitable plan. A discussion of some of these 
options and their features follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, ``Report 
on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017'' (May 2018).
    \127\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Employer Barriers to and 
Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits,'' 2017.
    \128\ Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies, ``All About 
Retirement: An Employer Survey, 17th Annual Transamerica Retirement 
Survey'' (Aug. 2017).
    \129\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Employer Barriers to and 
Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits,'' 2017.
    \130\ Id.
    \131\ Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies, ``All About 
Retirement,'' 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SEP: Simplified Employee Pensions can be established by sole 
proprietors, partnerships, and corporations to provide retirement plan 
coverage to employees. SEPs must be offered to all employees who are at 
least 21 years old, were employed by the employer in three out of the 
last five years, and received compensation for the year ($600 for 
2018).
    SEPs are completely employer funded and they cannot accept employee 
contributions.\132\ Each year the employer can set the level of 
contributions it wants to make, if any. The employer usually makes a 
contribution to each eligible employee's SEP-IRA that is equal to the 
same percentage of salary for each employee. The annual per-participant 
contribution cannot exceed the lesser of 25 percent of compensation or 
$55,000 in 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ This rule does not apply to a SEP in effect on December 
31, 1996, if the SEP provided for pre-tax employee contributions 
(commonly referred to as a SARSEP) as of that date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Participants can withdraw funds from their SEP-IRA at any time 
subject to federal income taxes, and possibly a 10 percent additional 
tax on early distributions, if the participant is under age 59\1/2\. 
Participants cannot take loans from their SEP-IRAs.
    Generally, these plans are easy to set up; the business owner may 
use IRS Form 5305-SEP to establish the plan, and in some circumstance 
there are no set-up fees or annual maintenance charges. SEPs normally 
do not have to file a Form 5500.
    SIMPLE IRA Plan: The Savings Incentive Match Plan for Employees of 
Small Employers allows businesses with fewer than 100 employees to 
establish an IRA for each employee. The employer must make the plan 
available to all employees who received compensation of at least $5,000 
in any prior two years and are reasonably expected to earn at least 
$5,000 in the current year. In 2018, employees are allowed to make 
salary deferral contributions up to the lesser of 100 percent of 
compensation or $12,500. Employees 50 or older may also make additional 
(``catch-up'') contributions of up to $3,000. The employer also must 
make either a matching contribution dollar-for-dollar for employee 
contributions up to three percent of compensation, or a non-elective 
contribution set at two percent of compensation.
    Participants can withdraw funds from their SIMPLE-IRA at any time 
subject to federal income taxes. A 25 percent additional tax may apply 
to withdrawals occurring within two years of commencing participation, 
if the participant is under age 59\1/2\. A 10 percent additional tax 
may apply after the two-year period, if the participant is under age 
59\1/2\. Participants cannot take loans from their SIMPLE IRAs.
    Similar to SEPs, SIMPLE IRA plans are easy to set up and have few 
administrative burdens. The employer may use IRS Form 5304-SIMPLE or 
5305-SIMPLE to set up the plan, and there is no annual filing 
requirement for the employer. Banks or other financial institutions 
handle most of the paperwork. Similar to SEPs, some companies offer to 
set up SIMPLE IRAs with no set-up fees or annual maintenance charges.
    Payroll Deduction IRAs: An easy way for small employers to provide 
their employees with an opportunity to save for retirement is by 
establishing payroll deduction IRAs. Many people not covered by a 
workplace retirement plan could save through an IRA, but do not do so 
on their own. A payroll deduction IRA at work can simplify the process 
and encourage employees to get started. The employer sets up the 
payroll deduction IRA program with a bank, insurance company or other 
financial institution. Then each employee chooses whether to 
participate and if so, the amount of payroll deduction for contribution 
to the IRA. Employees are always 100 percent vested in (have ownership 
in) all the funds in their IRAs. Participant loans are not permitted. 
Withdrawals are permitted anytime, but they are subject to income tax 
(except for certain distributions from nondeductible IRAs and Roth 
IRAs). An additional 10 percent additional tax may be imposed if the 
employee is under age 59\1/2\.
    Employees' contributions are limited to $5,500 for 2018. Additional 
``catch-up'' contributions of $1,000 per year are permitted for 
employees age 50 or over. Employees control where their money is 
invested and also bear the investment risk.
    Payroll deduction IRAs are not covered by ERISA if:
     No contributions are made by the employer;
     Participation is completely voluntary for employees;
     The employer's sole involvement in the program is to 
permit the IRA provider to publicize the program to employees without 
endorsement, to collect contributions through payroll deductions, and 
to remit them to the IRA provider; and
     The employer receives no consideration in the form of cash 
or otherwise, other than reasonable compensation for services actually 
rendered in connection with payroll deductions.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ 29 CFR 2510.3-2(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Solo 401(k): Self-employed individuals with no employees other than 
themselves and their spouses may establish a self-employed 401(k), 
colloquially referred to as a solo 401(k). As an employee, a self-
employed individual may make salary deferrals up to the lesser of 100 
percent of compensation or $18,500 in 2018.\134\ They also can make 
nonelective contributions up to 25% of compensation provided that, when 
added to any salary deferrals, the total contribution does not exceed 
the lesser of 100 percent of a participant's compensation or $55,000 
\135\ (for 2018). In addition, those aged 50 or older can make 
additional (``catch-up'') contributions of $6,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ IRC section 402(g).
    \135\ IRC section 415(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Withdrawals are permitted only upon the occurrence of a specified 
event (retirement, plan termination, etc.), and they are subject to 
federal income taxes and possibly a 10 percent additional tax if the 
participant is under age 59\1/2\. The plan may permit loans and 
hardship withdrawals.
    Solo 401(k) plans are more administratively burdensome than other 
types of plans available to small employers. A model form is not 
available to establish the plan. A Form 5500 must be filed when plan 
assets exceed $250,000.
    Credit for Pension Start-Up Costs: A tax credit is available for 
small employers to claim part of the ordinary and necessary costs to 
start a SEP, SIMPLE IRA, or 401(k) plan. To be eligible for the credit, 
an employer must have had no more than 100 employees who received at 
least $5,000 of compensation from the employer during the tax year 
preceding the first credit year. The credit is limited to 50 percent of 
the qualified cost to set up and administer the plan, up to a maximum 
of $500 per year for each of the first three years of the plan.
    Saver's Credit: A nonrefundable tax credit for certain low- and 
moderate-income individuals (including self-employed) who contribute to 
their plans also is available (``Saver's Credit''). The

[[Page 53557]]

amount of the Saver's Credit is 50 percent, 20 percent, or 10 percent 
of the participant's contribution to an IRA or an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan such as a 401(k) depending on the individual's adjusted 
gross income (reported on Form 1040 series return). The maximum credit 
amount is $2,000 ($4,000 if married filing jointly).
    Comparison of Options: The options discussed above may better serve 
an employer's needs than a MEP would in some circumstances. Some 
companies offer to set up solo 401(k) plans with no set-up fees.\136\ 
Despite these currently available options for self-employed workers, 
about 94 percent of self-employed (not wage and salary workers) did not 
participate in retirement plans in 2013.\137\ Although these low levels 
of take-up with these other options create some uncertainty that this 
proposed rule would persuade many self-employed individuals to join a 
MEP, this uncertainty alone is no basis to ignore MEPs as a possible 
solution to a stronger retirement for America's workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ Kerry Hannon, ``The Best Retirement Plans for the Self-
Employed.'' Forbes, (April 1, 2011).
    \137\ Copeland, ``Employment-Based Retirement Plan 
Participation, 2013.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SEP and SIMPLE IRA plans, for example, could meet the needs of many 
small employers. As discussed above, they are easy to set up and have 
low start-up and administration costs. Furthermore, small employers can 
claim tax credits for part of the costs of starting up SEP or SIMPLE 
IRA plans and certain employees may take advantage of the Saver's 
Credit. Despite these advantageous features, these plans did not gain 
much traction in the market, and the effect of MEPs is uncertain. This 
line of reasoning suggests that increased access to MEPs may only have 
modest success in increasing retirement coverage.
    In addition to these plan options, there are other ways that 
existing small employers can offer retirement plans at low costs. For 
micro plans with assets less than $5 million, employers can use 
providers of bundled financial services that include both payroll and 
recordkeeping services on their 401(k) products. In 2016, about 69 
percent of plans with less than $1 million in assets used these bundled 
providers.\138\ Given that multiple low-cost options already exist for 
small employers, it is unclear to what degree small employers and their 
workers would benefit from also having the option to join various MEPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ Cerulli Associates, U.S. Retirement Markets 2016. 
(available at https://www.cerulli.com/vapi/public/getcerullifile?filecid=Cerulli-US-Retirement-Markets-2016-Information-Packet).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although this rule would ease the burden of employers, particularly 
small employers, in offering retirement plans for their workers, it is 
uncertain how many more employers would offer retirement plans to their 
workers because of this proposed rule and how many more employees would 
chose to participate in those retirement plans. To begin, workers 
employed by small employers not offering retirement plans tend to be 
younger workers, lower-paid workers, part-time workers, or 
immigrants,\139\ characteristics that at least one survey suggests 
reduce the lack of demand for retirement benefits.\140\ Indeed, one 
study found that large employers not sponsoring retirement plans tended 
to have similar characteristics among their employees: Higher 
proportions of part-time or part-year employees, younger employees, 
employees with lower earnings, and employees with less education. 
Another study found that the unobservable factors influencing the 
decision to be self-employed were also likely to decrease participation 
in retirement plans.\141\ This implies the low sponsorship rate at 
small firms could be due more to differences in demand for retirement 
benefits by employees than to the higher per-employee administration 
costs.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ Copeland, ``Employment-Based Retirement Plan 
Participation, 2013.'' Constantijn W.A. Panis & Michael J. Brien 
``Target Populations of State-Level Automatic IRA Initiatives,'' 
(August 28, 2015) (available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/researchers/analysis/retirement/target-populations-of-state-level-automatic-ira-initiatives.pdf).
    \140\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Employer Barriers to and 
Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits,'' 2017.
    \141\ Sharon A. Devaney and Yi-Wen Chien, ``Participation in 
Retirement Plans: A Comparison of the Self-employed and Wage and 
Salary Workers,'' Compensation and Working Conditions, (Winter 2000) 
(available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/participation-in-retirement-plans-a-comparison-of-the-self-employed-and-wage-and-salary-workers.pdf).
    \142\ Peter Brady and Michael Bogdan, ``Who Gets Retirement 
Plans and Why: An Update,'' ICI Research Perspective, vol. 17, No. 3 
(March 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another factor influencing employee participation in retirement 
savings plans is employers' matching contributions,\143\ which this 
rule would not directly affect. While most small plan sponsors offer 
matching contributions, small plan sponsors are a little less likely to 
offer matching contributions than large plan sponsors.\144\ It is 
difficult to anticipate how many small employers would join a MEP, 
whether they would offer matching contributions, and whether and how 
those contributions would differ from those offered previously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ Cerulli Associates, U.S. Evolution of the Retirement 
Investor 2017 (available at https://www.cerulli.com/vapi/public/getcerullifile?filecid=Cerulli-2017-US-Evolution-of-the-Retirement-Investor-Information-Packet).
    \144\ Transamerica's employer survey found that the share of 
small plan sponsors offering matching contributions was 77 percent 
compared with 84 percent for large plan sponsors. Transamerica 
Center for Retirement Studies, ``All about Retirement,'' 2017). Plan 
Sponsor Council of America, ``60th Annual Survey of Profit Sharing 
and 401(k) Plans Reflecting 2016 Plan Year Experience,'' 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several additional factors may influence employer participation in 
expanded or newly established MEPs. For large employers, even though 
the potential cost savings associated with filing Form 5500s and audit 
reports discussed earlier can be substantial, the savings may not be 
large enough to persuade them to join a MEP. Switching from an existing 
well-established plan to a MEP could be a difficult and costly 
procedure in the short term. Furthermore, some employers may be 
hesitant to join a MEP due to the unified plan rule,\145\ colloquially 
referred to as the ``one bad apple'' rule. Under the unified plan rule, 
the qualification of a MEP is determined with respect to all employers 
maintaining the MEP. Consequently, the failure by one employer 
maintaining the plan (or by the plan itself) to satisfy an applicable 
qualification requirement will result in the disqualification of the 
section 413(c) plan for all employers maintaining the plan. In addition 
to the directives to the Secretary of Labor, described earlier, the 
Executive Order directs the Secretary of the Treasury to consider 
proposing amendments to regulations or other guidance regarding the 
circumstances in which a MEP may satisfy the tax qualification 
requirements, including the consequences if one or more employers that 
sponsored or adopted the plan fails to take one or more actions 
necessary to meet those requirements.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ Treas. Reg. Sec.  1.413-2(a)(3)(iv).
    \146\ The Department of the Treasury and the IRS have informed 
the Department that they are actively considering matters relating 
to the Executive Order, including whether additional regulatory or 
other guidance would be beneficial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In sum, there are many challenges and inherent uncertainties 
associated with efforts to expand the coverage of retirement plans, but 
this proposed rule would provide another opportunity for small 
employers and the self-employed to adopt a retirement savings plan. By 
reducing some of the burdens associated with setting up and 
administering retirement plans, this proposed rule could lower costs 
and encourage employers, particularly small employers, to establish a 
retirement savings plan for their workers.

[[Page 53558]]

10. Regulatory Alternatives

    As required by E.O. 12866, the Department considered various 
alternative approaches in developing this proposed rule, which are 
discussed below.
    Covering Other Types of MEPS: The Executive Order on Strengthening 
Retirement Security in America called on the Department to consider 
whether businesses or organizations other than groups or associations 
of employers and PEOs should be able to sponsor a MEP by acting 
indirectly in the interest of participating employers in relation to 
the plan within the meaning of section 3(5) of ERISA. The Department is 
aware of two other types or categories of MEPs not specifically 
addressed in the proposed rule.\147\ The first category includes so-
called ``corporate MEPs,'' which are plans that cover employees of 
related employers, such as affiliates and subsidiary companies, but 
that are not in the same controlled group, within the meaning of 
section 414(b) and (c) of the Code. The second category consists of 
``open MEPs,'' which are pension plans that cover employees of 
employers with no relationship other than their joint participation in 
the MEP, which often are referred to as ``pooled employer plans.'' MEPs 
pool the assets of unrelated employers to pay the benefits and cover 
costs. The Department considered, but decided not to include such 
categories of MEPs in the proposal because they implicate different 
policy concerns. Nevertheless, consistent with the Executive Order, in 
Section E above in this preamble, the Department specifically solicits 
public comments on whether it should address one or more of these other 
categories of MEPs, by regulation or other means. It also solicits 
comments on whether the rule should apply to types of pension plans 
other than defined contribution pension plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ A 2012 GAO report separated MEPs into four categories. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO, ``12-665, ``Private 
Sector Pensions--Federal Agencies Should Collect Data and Coordinate 
Oversight of Multiple Employer Plans,'' (Sept. 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PEO Safe Harbor: The proposal contains two regulatory safe harbors 
for PEOs to determine whether they will be considered to perform 
substantial employment functions on behalf of its client-employers. The 
first safe harbor provides that a PEO will satisfy the requirement if, 
among other things, it is a CPEO and meets at least two criteria in the 
list in paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(D) through (I) of the proposal. The second 
safe harbor is for PEOs that do not satisfy the CPEO safe harbor but 
meet five or more criteria from the list in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of the 
proposal. In considering possible alternatives, the Department 
considered requiring PEOs to satisfy additional criteria listed in 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of the proposal. Additionally, the Department 
considered requiring PEOs to satisfy fewer criteria listed in paragraph 
(c)(2)(ii) of the proposal. Ultimately, for this proposal, the 
Department chose five as the number of criteria because the covered 
PEOs then must meet at least half of the relevant criteria. The 
Department is of the view that meeting at least half of the listed 
criteria demonstrates convincingly that the PEO is performing 
substantial employment functions and ensures that PEOs that satisfy the 
safe harbor provision do not represent borderline cases under the 
employer definition in section 3(5) of ERISA.
    Working Owner Definition: The proposed definition of working owner 
would require that a person must work a certain number of hours (i.e., 
20 hours per week or 80 hours per month) or have wages or self-
employment income above a certain level (i.e., wages or income must 
equal or exceed the working owner's cost of coverage to participate in 
the group or association's health plan if the individual is 
participating in that plan). In considering possible alternatives, the 
Department considered relying only the hours worked threshold. However, 
the Department chose the formulation in this proposal (i.e., allowing 
either the hours worked threshold or the income level threshold), 
because it best clarified when a working owner could join a group or 
association retirement plan and paralleled the working owner definition 
from the AHP Rule.

11. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The proposed rule is not subject to the requirements of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA 95) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) 
because it does not contain a collection of information as defined in 
44 U.S.C. 3502(3).

12. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) (RFA) imposes 
certain requirements with respect to federal rules that are subject to 
the notice and comment requirements of section 553(b) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) and that are likely 
to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. Unless an agency determines that a proposal is not likely to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, section 603 of the RFA requires the agency to present an 
initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) of the proposed rule. 
The Department has determined that this proposed rule, which would 
clarify the persons that may act as an ``employer'' within the meaning 
of section 3(5) of ERISA in sponsoring a MEP, is likely to have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
Therefore, the Department provides its IRFA of the proposed rule, 
below.
a. Need for and Objectives of the Rule
    As discussed earlier in this preamble, the proposed rule is 
necessary to expand access to MEPs, which could enable groups of 
private-sector employers to participate in a collective retirement 
plan. MEPs meeting the requirements of the proposed rule could be an 
efficient way to reduce costs and complexity associated with 
establishing and maintaining defined contribution plans, which could 
encourage more plan formation and broader availability of more 
affordable workplace retirement savings plans, especially among small 
employers and certain working owners. Thus, the Department intends and 
expects that the proposed rule would deliver benefits primarily to the 
employees of many small businesses and their families including many 
working owners, as well as, many small businesses themselves.
b. Affected Small Entities
    The Small Business Administration estimates that 99.9 percent of 
employer firms meet its definition of a small business.\148\ The 
applicability of these proposed rules does not depend on the size of 
the firm as defined by the Small Business Administration. Small 
businesses, including sole proprietors, can join MEPs as long as they 
are eligible to do so and the MEP sponsor meets the requirements of the 
proposed rule. The Department believes that the smallest firms, those 
with less than 50 employees, are most likely to benefit from the 
savings and increased choice derived from the expanded MEPs coverage 
under the proposed rule. Section D.4, the ``Affected Entities'' 
section, above discusses which firms currently are covered by MEPs. 
These same types of firms, which are disproportionately small 
businesses, are

[[Page 53559]]

more likely to be covered in the future under this proposal. 
Approximately 8 million self-employed workers between ages 21 and 70, 
representing six percent of all similarly aged workers, have no 
employees and usually work at least 20 hours per week. These self-
employed workers would become eligible to join MEPs under the 
proposal.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ The Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, 
2018 Small Business Profile. https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/2018-Small-Business-Profiles-US.pdf. Lasted Accessed 
10/03/2018. The SBA also reports that there are 5,881,267 business 
with between 1-499 employees. These firms are able to enroll in MEPs 
if they are eligible.
    \149\ DOL tabulations of the June 2018 Current Population Survey 
basic monthly data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Impact of the Rule
    As stated above, by expanding MEPs, this proposed rule could 
provide a more affordable option for retirement savings coverage for 
many small businesses, thereby potentially yielding economic benefits 
for participating small businesses and their employees. Some advantages 
of an ERISA-covered retirement plan (including MEPs, SEP-IRAs, and 
SIMPLE IRAs) over IRA-based savings options outside the workplace 
include: (1) Higher contribution limits; (2) potentially lower 
investment management fees, especially in larger plans; (3) a well-
established uniform regulatory structure with important consumer 
protections, including fiduciary obligations, recordkeeping and 
disclosure requirements, legal accountability provisions, and spousal 
protections; (4) automatic enrollment; and (5) stronger protections 
from creditors. At the same time, they provide employers with choice 
among plan features and the flexibility to tailor retirement plans that 
meet their business and employment needs.
    There are no new record keeping or reporting requirements for 
compliance with the rule and, in fact, the recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements could decrease for some small employers under the 
proposal. If an employer joins a MEP meeting the requirements of the 
proposal, it can save some costs associated with filing Form 5500 and 
fulfilling audit requirements because a MEP is considered a single 
plan. Thus, one Form 5500 and audit report would satisfy the reporting 
requirements, and each participating employer would not need to file 
its own, separate Form 5500 and, for large plans or those few small 
plans that do not meet the small plan audit waiver, an audit report. 
These reports are normally prepared by a combination of legal 
professionals, human resource professionals and accountants.
    The Department considered several alternatives such as whether to 
cover other types of MEPs and it developing its formulation of the PEO 
Safe Harbor and Working Owner definition. The ``Regulatory 
Alternatives'' section of the RIA above discusses these significant 
regulatory alternatives considered by the Department in more detail.
d. Duplicate, Overlapping, or Relevant Federal Rules
    The proposed rule would not conflict with any relevant federal 
rules. As discussed above, the proposed rule would merely broaden the 
conditions under which the Department will view a group or association 
as acting as an ``employer'' under ERISA for purposes of offering a 
MEP, and make clear the conditions for PEO sponsorship. As such, the 
proposed criteria could also result in more MEPs being treated 
consistently under the Code and title I of ERISA, including MEPs 
administered by PEOs for the benefit of the employees of their client 
employers, as described in Rev. Proc. 2002-21.

13. Congressional Review Act

    The proposed rule is subject to the Congressional Review Act (CRA) 
provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996 (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) and, if finalized, will be transmitted to 
Congress and the Comptroller General for review. The proposed rule is a 
``major rule'' as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 804(2), because it 
is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million 
or more.

14. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one 
year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by 
the private sector. For purposes of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 
as well as Executive Order 12875, this proposal does not include any 
federal mandate that the Department expects would result in such 
expenditures by State, local, or tribal governments, or the private 
sector. This is because the proposal merely clarifies which persons may 
act as an ``employer'' within the meaning of section 3(5) of ERISA in 
sponsoring a MEP and does not require any action or impose any 
requirement on the public sector or states.

15. Federalism Statement

    Executive Order 13132 outlines fundamental principles of 
federalism. E.O. 13132 requires federal agencies to follow specific 
criteria in forming and implementing policies that have ``substantial 
direct effects'' on the States, the relationship between the national 
government and States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Federal 
agencies promulgating regulations that have federalism implications 
must consult with State and local officials and describe the extent of 
their consultation and the nature of the concerns of State and local 
officials in the preamble to the final rule.
    In the Department's view, these proposed regulations would not have 
federalism implications because they would have not have a direct 
effect on the States, the relationship between the national government 
and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities 
among various levels of government.
    The Department welcomes input from affected States and other 
interested parties regarding this assessment.

16. Executive Order 13771 Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs

    Executive Order 13771, titled Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs, was issued on January 30, 2017. This proposed rule is 
expected to be an E.O. 13771 deregulatory action, because it would 
provide critical guidance that would expand small businesses' access to 
high quality retirement plans at lower costs than would otherwise be 
available, by removing certain Department-imposed restrictions on the 
establishment and maintenance of MEPs under ERISA.

List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 2510

    Employee benefit plans, Pensions.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Department of Labor 
proposes to amend 29 CFR part 2510 as follows:

PART 2510--DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN SUBCHAPTERS C, D, E, F, G, 
AND L OF THIS CHAPTER

0
1. The authority citation for part 2510 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  29 U.S.C. 1002(1), 1002(2), 1002(3), 1002(5), 
1002(16), 1002(21), 1002(37), 1002(38), 1002(40), 1002(42), 1031, 
and 1135; Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2011, 77 FR 1088 (Jan. 9, 
2012); Sec. 2510.3-101 and 2510.3-102 also issued under sec. 102 of 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. At 237 (2012), 
(E.O. 12108, 44 FR 1065 (Jan. 3, 1979) and 29 U.S.C. 1135 note. Sec. 
2510.3-38 is also issued under sec. 1, Pub. L. 105-72, 111 Stat. 
1457 (1997).


[[Page 53560]]


0
2. Section 2510.3-3 is amended by revising paragraph (c) introductory 
text to read as follows:


Sec.  2510.3-3   Employee benefit plan.

* * * * *
    (c) Employees. For purposes of this section and except as provided 
in Sec.  2510.3-5(e) and Sec.  2510.3-55(d):
* * * * *
0
3. Revise the heading for Sec.  2510.3-5 to read as follows:


Sec.  2510.3-5   Definition of Employer--Association Health Plans.

* * * * *
0
4. Add Sec.  2510.3-55 to read as follows:


Sec.  2510.3-55   Definition of Employer--Association Retirement Plans 
and Other Multiple Employer Pension Benefit Plans.

    (a) In general. The purpose of this section is to clarify which 
persons may act as an ``employer'' within the meaning of section 3(5) 
of the Act in sponsoring a multiple employer defined contribution 
pension plan (hereinafter ``MEP''). The Act defines the term ``employee 
pension benefit plan'' in section 3(2), in relevant part, as any plan, 
fund, or program established or maintained by an employer, employee 
organization, or by both an employer and an employee organization, to 
the extent by its express terms or as a result of surrounding 
circumstances such plan, fund, or program provides retirement income to 
employees or results in a deferral of income by employees for periods 
extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond. For 
purposes of being able to establish and maintain an employee pension 
benefit plan within the meaning of section 3(2), an ``employer'' under 
section 3(5) of the Act includes any person acting directly as an 
employer, or any person acting indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee benefit plan. A group or 
association of employers is specifically identified in section 3(5) of 
the Act as a person able to act directly or indirectly in the interest 
of an employer, including for purposes of establishing or maintaining 
an employee benefit plan. A bona fide group or association of employers 
(as defined in paragraph (b) of this section) and a bona fide 
professional employer organization (as described in paragraph (c) of 
this section) shall be deemed to be able to act in the interest of an 
employer within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act by satisfying 
the criteria set forth in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, 
respectively.
    (b)(1) Bona fide group or association of employers. For purposes of 
title I of the Act and this chapter, a bona fide group or association 
of employers capable of establishing a MEP shall include a group or 
association of employers that meets the following requirements:
    (i) The primary purpose of the group or association may be to offer 
and provide MEP coverage to its employer members and their employees; 
however, the group or association also must have at least one 
substantial business purpose unrelated to offering and providing MEP 
coverage or other employee benefits to its employer members and their 
employees. For purposes of satisfying the standard of this paragraph 
(b)(1)(i), as a safe harbor, a substantial business purpose is 
considered to exist if the group or association would be a viable 
entity in the absence of sponsoring an employee benefit plan. For 
purposes of this paragraph (b)(1)(i), a business purpose includes 
promoting common business interests of its members or the common 
economic interests in a given trade or employer community and is not 
required to be a for-profit activity;
    (ii) Each employer member of the group or association participating 
in the plan is a person acting directly as an employer of at least one 
employee who is a participant covered under the plan;
    (iii) The group or association has a formal organizational 
structure with a governing body and has by-laws or other similar 
indications of formality;
    (iv) The functions and activities of the group or association are 
controlled by its employer members, and the group's or association's 
employer members that participate in the plan control the plan. Control 
must be present both in form and in substance;
    (v) The employer members have a commonality of interest as 
described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section;
    (vi) The group or association does not make plan participation 
through the association available other than to employees and former 
employees of employer members, and their beneficiaries; and
    (vii) The group or association is not a bank or trust company, 
insurance issuer, broker-dealer, or other similar financial services 
firm (including pension record keepers and third-party administrators), 
or owned or controlled by such an entity or any subsidiary or affiliate 
of such an entity, other than to the extent such an entity, subsidiary 
or affiliate participates in the group or association in its capacity 
as an employer member of the group or association.
    (2) Commonality of interest. (i) Employer members of a group or 
association will be treated as having a commonality of interest if 
either:
    (A) The employers are in the same trade, industry, line of business 
or profession; or
    (B) Each employer has a principal place of business in the same 
region that does not exceed the boundaries of a single State or a 
metropolitan area (even if the metropolitan area includes more than one 
State).
    (ii) In the case of a group or association that is sponsoring a MEP 
under this section and that is itself an employer member of the group 
or association, the group or association will be deemed for purposes of 
paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section to be in the same trade, 
industry, line of business, or profession, as applicable, as the other 
employer members of the group or association.
    (c)(1) Bona fide professional employer organization. A professional 
employer organization (PEO) is a human-resource company that 
contractually assumes certain employer responsibilities of its client 
employers. For purposes of title I of the Act and this chapter, a bona 
fide PEO is capable of establishing a MEP. A bona fide PEO is an 
organization that meets the following requirements:
    (i) The organization performs substantial employment functions, as 
described in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, on behalf of its client 
employers, and maintains adequate records relating to such functions;
    (ii) The organization has substantial control over the functions 
and activities of the MEP, as the plan sponsor (within the meaning of 
section 3(16)(B) of the Act), the plan administrator (within the 
meaning of section 3(16)(A) of the Act), and a named fiduciary (within 
the meaning of section 402 of the Act);
    (iii) The organization ensures that each client employer that 
adopts the MEP acts directly as an employer of at least one employee 
who is a participant covered under the defined contribution MEP; and
    (iv) The organization ensures that participation in the MEP is 
available only to employees and former employees of the organization 
and client employers, and their beneficiaries.
    (2) Criteria for substantial employment functions. The criteria in 
this paragraph (c)(2) are relevant to whether a PEO performs 
substantial employment functions on behalf of its client employers. 
Although a single criterion alone may, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular situation and the particular criterion, 
be sufficient to satisfy paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, as a safe 
harbor, an organization shall be considered to perform substantial 
employment

[[Page 53561]]

functions on behalf of its client employers if--
    (i) The organization is a ``certified professional employer 
organization'' (CPEO) as defined in section 7705(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, and regulations thereunder, the CPEO has entered into a 
``service contract'' within the meaning of section 7705(e)(2) of the 
Internal Revenue Code with respect to its client-employers that adopt 
the defined contribution MEP with respect to the client-employer 
employees participating in the MEP, pursuant to which it satisfies the 
criteria in paragraphs (c)(2)(ii)(A), (B), and (C) of this section, and 
the organization meets any two or more of the criteria set forth in 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(D) though (I) of this section; or
    (ii) The organization meets any five or more of the following 
criteria with respect to client-employer employees participating in the 
plan:
    (A) The organization is responsible for payment of wages to 
employees of its client-employers that adopt the plan without regard to 
the receipt or adequacy of payment from those client-employers;
    (B) The organization is responsible for reporting, withholding, and 
paying any applicable federal employment taxes for its client employers 
that adopt the plan, without regard to the receipt or adequacy of 
payment from those client-employers;
    (C) The organization is responsible for recruiting, hiring, and 
firing workers of its client-employers that adopt the plan in addition 
to the client-employer's responsibility for recruiting, hiring, and 
firing workers;
    (D) The organization is responsible for establishing employment 
policies, establishing conditions of employment, and supervising 
employees of its client-employers that adopt the plan in addition to 
the client-employer's responsibility to perform these same functions;
    (E) The organization is responsible for determining employee 
compensation, including method and amount, of employees of its client-
employers that adopt the plan in addition to the client-employers' 
responsibility to determine employee compensation;
    (F) The organization is responsible for providing workers' 
compensation coverage in satisfaction of applicable state law to 
employees of its client-employers that adopt the plan, without regard 
to the receipt or adequacy of payment from those client-employers;
    (G) The organization is responsible for integral human-resource 
functions of its client-employers that adopt the plan, such as job-
description development, background screening, drug testing, employee-
handbook preparation, performance review, paid time-off tracking, 
employee grievances, or exit interviews, in addition to the client 
employer's responsibility to perform these same functions;
    (H) The organization is responsible for regulatory compliance of 
its client-employers participating in the plan in the areas of 
workplace discrimination, family-and-medical leave, citizenship or 
immigration status, workplace safety and health, or Program Electronic 
Review Management labor certification, in addition to the client-
employer's responsibility for regulatory compliance; or
    (I) The organization continues to have employee-benefit-plan 
obligations to MEP participants after the client employer no longer 
contracts with the organization.
    (d) Dual treatment of working owners as employers and employees. 
(1) A working owner of a trade or business without common law employees 
may qualify as both an employer and as an employee of the trade or 
business for purposes of the requirements in paragraph (b) of this 
section, including the requirement in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this 
section that each employer member of the group or association adopting 
the MEP must be a person acting directly as an employer of one or more 
employees who are participants covered under the MEP, and the 
requirement in paragraph (b)(1)(vi) of this section that the group or 
association does not make participation through the group or 
association available other than to certain employees and former 
employees and their beneficiaries.
    (2) The term ``working owner'' as used in this paragraph (d) means 
any person who a responsible plan fiduciary reasonably determines is an 
individual:
    (i) Who has an ownership right of any nature in a trade or 
business, whether incorporated or unincorporated, including a partner 
or other self-employed individual;
    (ii) Who is earning wages or self-employment income from the trade 
or business for providing personal services to the trade or business; 
and
    (iii) Who either:
    (A) Works on average at least 20 hours per week or at least 80 
hours per month providing personal services to the working owner's 
trade or business, or
    (B) In the case of a MEP described in paragraph (b) of this 
section, if applicable, has wages or self-employment income from such 
trade or business that at least equals the working owner's cost of 
coverage for participation by the working owner and any covered 
beneficiaries in any group health plan sponsored by the group or 
association in which the individual is participating or is eligible to 
participate.
    (3) The determination under this paragraph (d) must be made when 
the working owner first becomes eligible for participation in the 
defined contribution MEP and continued eligibility must be periodically 
confirmed pursuant to reasonable monitoring procedures.

    Signed at Washington, DC, October 16, 2018.
Preston Rutledge,
Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 
Department of Labor.
[FR Doc. 2018-23065 Filed 10-22-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4510-29-P