Self-Regulatory Organizations; Investors Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Modify its Fee Schedule To Charge a More Deterministic Fee of $0.0003 Per Share for Executions at or Above $1.00 That Result From Removing Liquidity With an Order That is Executable at the Far Side of the NBBO, 20118-20123 [2018-09577]
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20118
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2018 / Notices
5745.41 This proposed rule change is
consistent with those filings and raises
no novel issues. The Shares will be
purchased and sold in the secondary
market at prices directly linked to the
Fund’s next-determined NAV using the
trading protocol called ‘‘NAV-Based
Trading,’’ and the Fund’s permitted
investments will be consistent with
those approved in prior filings.
Accordingly, the Commission believes
that waiver of the 30-day operative
delay is consistent with the protection
of investors and the public interest and
hereby waives the operative delay and
designates the proposed rule change
operative upon filing.42
At any time within 60 days of the
filing of the proposed rule change, the
Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend such rule change if
it appears to the Commission that such
action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, for the protection of
investors, or otherwise in furtherance of
the purposes of the Act.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
NASDAQ–2018–032 on the subject line.
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Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NASDAQ–2018–032. This
file number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
41 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos.
82730 (Feb. 16, 2018), 83 FR 8118 (Feb. 23, 2018)
(SR–NASDAQ–2017–131) (Order Granting
Approval of a Proposed Rule Change To List and
Trade the Shares of the Reinhart Intermediate Bond
NextShares Fund Under Nasdaq Rule 5745) and
82564 (Jan. 22, 2018), 83 FR 3842 (Jan. 26, 2018)
(SR–NASDAQ–2017–123) (Order Granting
Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified
by Amendment No. 1, To List and Trade Shares of
the Causeway International Value NextSharesTM
and the Causeway Global Value NextSharesTM
Under Nasdaq Rule 5745).
42 For purposes only of waiving the 30-day
operative delay, the Commission also has
considered the proposed rule’s impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See
15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
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Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
internet website (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549 on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change.
Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from
comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish
to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NASDAQ–2018–032, and
should be submitted on or before May
29, 2018.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.43
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018–09572 Filed 5–4–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–83147; File No. SR–IEX–
2018–09]
Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Investors Exchange LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of
Proposed Rule Change To Modify its
Fee Schedule To Charge a More
Deterministic Fee of $0.0003 Per Share
for Executions at or Above $1.00 That
Result From Removing Liquidity With
an Order That is Executable at the Far
Side of the NBBO
May 1, 2018.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) 1 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
43 17
1 15
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CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
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‘‘Act’’) 2 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,3
notice is hereby given that, on April 20,
2018, the Investors Exchange LLC
(‘‘IEX’’ or the ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(the ‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I, II and III
below, which Items have been prepared
by the self-regulatory organization. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
Pursuant to the provisions of Section
19(b)(1) under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’),4 and Rule 19b–4
thereunder,5 Investors Exchange LLC
(‘‘IEX’’ or ‘‘Exchange’’) is filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) a proposed rule change
to modify its Fee Schedule, pursuant to
IEX Rule 15.110(a) and (c), to charge a
more deterministic fee of $0.0003 per
share for executions at or above $1.00
that result from removing liquidity with
an order that is executable at the far side
of the NBBO 6 (the ‘‘Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee’’). Consistent with the
Exchange’s existing Fee Schedule,
executions below $1.00 will be 0.30% of
the total dollar value of the transaction.
Changes to the Fee Schedule pursuant
to this proposal are effective upon filing
and will be operative on May 1, 2018.
The text of the proposed rule change
is available at the Exchange’s website at
www.iextrading.com, at the principal
office of the Exchange, and at the
Commission’s Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
self-regulatory organization included
statements concerning the purpose of
and basis for the proposed rule change
and discussed any comments it received
on the proposed rule change. The text
of these statement may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below.
The self-regulatory organization has
prepared summaries, set forth in
Sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant aspects of such statements.
2 15
U.S.C. 78a.
CFR 240.19b–4.
4 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
5 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
6 As defined by Regulation NMS Rule 600(b)(42).
17 CFR 242.600.
3 17
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A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
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1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to modify its
Fee Schedule, pursuant to IEX Rule
15.110(a) and (c), to charge a more
deterministic fee of $0.0003 per share
for executions at or above $1.00 that
result from removing liquidity with an
order that is executable at the far side
of the NBBO (i.e., a buy order that is
executable at the NBO or higher, or a
sell order that is executable at the NBB
or lower). In an effort to incentivize
Members to submit displayed orders to
the Exchange, the Exchange currently
charges a fee of $0.0003 per share (or
0.30% of the total dollar value of the
transaction for securities priced below
$1.00) to Members for executions on IEX
that provide or take resting interest with
displayed priority (i.e., an order or
portion of a reserve order that is booked
and ranked with display priority on the
Order Book).7 Furthermore, the
Exchange currently charges $0.0009 per
share (or 0.30% of the total dollar value
of the transaction for securities priced
below $1.00) to Members for executions
on IEX that provide or take resting
interest with non-displayed priority
(i.e., an order or portion of a reserve
order that is booked and ranked with
non-displayed priority on the Order
Book).8 The Exchange does not charge
any fee to Members for executions on
IEX when the adding and removing
order originated from the same
Exchange Member.9
After informal discussions with
various Members, the Exchange
recognizes that some Members may be
dissuaded from seeking to access IEX
quotations at the NBBO due to the
variability in execution fees when
routing orders to the Exchange that are
executable at the far side of the NBBO
and intended to trade against the
Exchange’s displayed quotation, but
7 This pricing is referred to by the Exchange as
‘‘Displayed Match Fee’’ with a Fee Code of ‘L’
provided by the Exchange on execution reports. See
the Investors Exchange Fee Schedule, available on
the Exchange public website.
8 This pricing is referred to by the Exchange as
‘‘Non-Displayed Match Fee’’ with a Fee Code of ‘I’
provided by the Exchange on execution reports. See
the Investors Exchange Fee Schedule, available on
the Exchange public website.
9 This pricing is referred to by the Exchange as
‘‘Internalization Fee’’ with a Fee Code of ‘S’
provided by the Exchange on execution reports.
Orders from different market participant identifiers
of the same broker dealer, with the same Central
Registration Depository registration number, are
treated as originating from the same Exchange
Member. See the Investors Exchange Fee Schedule,
available on the Exchange public website.
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inadvertently remove non-displayed
liquidity resting at or within the spread.
While such spread-crossing orders
would receive price improvement equal
to the delta between the execution price
and the far side quotation (i.e., the
difference between the trade price and
the NBO (NBB) for buy (sell) orders),10
the potential for interacting with nondisplayed liquidity resting within the
spread, and therefore being assessed the
Non-Displayed Match Fee of $0.0009
versus the Displayed Match Fee of
$0.0003, makes it difficult for Members
to estimate access fees on a pre-trade
basis, which the Exchange believes
thereby presents difficulties for some
Members when determining which
venues to route marketable orders to.11
In order to reduce the variability in
fees to access liquidity on the Exchange
and thereby incentivize Members to
route more orders to the Exchange that
are executable at the far side of the
NBBO, the Exchange is proposing to
offer a more deterministic SpreadCrossing Remove Fee of $0.0003 per
share to all executions at or above $1.00
that result from removing liquidity with
a buy (sell) order that is executable at
the NBO (NBB). Consistent with the
Exchange’s existing Fee Schedule,
executions below $1.00 will be 0.30% of
the total dollar value of the transaction.
Members will receive a Fee Code of ‘‘N’’
on execution reports provided by the
Exchange for transactions that receive
the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee.12
The Exchange believes that
incentivizing additional spread-crossing
interest by offering the proposed
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee will
10 The Exchange notes that when handling client
orders as agent, IEX Members must ensure they are
satisfying their duty of best execution, which
requires that in any transaction for or with a
customer or a customer of another broker-dealer, a
member and persons associated with a member
shall use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best
market for the subject security and buy or sell in
such market so that the resultant price to the
customer is as favorable as possible under
prevailing market conditions. Members must also
conduct regular and rigorous reviews of execution
quality in order to determine which market center
to route customer orders, and should explicitly
consider the extent to which an order may obtain
price improvement at other venues. See FINRA
Rule 5310, including Supplementary Material .09
thereto.
11 The Exchange notes that FINRA has released
guidance clarifying that firms should not allow
access fees charged by venues to inappropriately
affect their routing decisions, and, in general, a
firm’s routing decisions should not be unduly
influenced by a particular venue’s fee or rebate
structure. See FINRA Regulatory Notice 15–46
(November 2015) at 6.
12 Pursuant to the Exchange’s existing Fee
Schedule, a Fee Code of ‘‘N’’ applies to executions
that are part of an IPO Auction. Accordingly, the
Exchange is proposing to replace the Fee Code for
executions in an IPO Auction with a Fee Code of
‘‘P’’.
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20119
enhance public price discovery and
overall execution quality on the
Exchange in several ways. First, as
described above, to the extent spreadcrossing interest removes non-displayed
liquidity within the spread, the spreadcrossing orders will receive price
improvement equal to the delta between
the execution price and the far side
quotation, while the non-displayed
resting interest will have received the
benefit of trading passively and also
capturing the spread in part. Similarly,
to the extent spread-crossing interest
removes displayed liquidity resting at
the NBBO, such resting displayed
liquidity will have increased
opportunities to capture the full spread.
If market makers and other Members are
more frequently capturing the spread
when resting displayed orders on the
Exchange, such Members may be
incentivized to enter additional
aggressively priced displayed orders on
the Exchange, thereby contributing to
public price discovery, consistent with
the overall goal of enhancing market
quality.
Pursuant to Rules 11.190(a)(1)–(3), the
Exchange offers three general order
types—market orders, limit orders, and
pegged orders—each of which have
distinct functional behaviors, and are
further controlled by various Userdefined order parameters that dictate
additional functional behaviors of the
order within the Exchange’s System.13
Orders entered on the Exchange are
eligible to remove liquidity on entry
pursuant to the distinct behavior of the
User-selected order type and order
parameters. In addition, non-displayed
orders that are resting on the Order
Book and eligible to trade at least as
aggressively as the Midpoint Price are
eligible to remove liquidity on Order
Execution Recheck, or ‘‘Book Recheck’’,
pursuant to Rule 11.230(a)(4)(d). Book
Recheck is a process within the IEX
System that detects new trading
opportunities for resting orders upon a
change to the Order Book, the NBBO, or
as part of processing inbound messages,
resulting in an invitation for nondisplayed orders to attempt to remove
liquidity from the contra side.14
Pursuant the Exchange’s Rules, in
addition to the terms of each order type
and order parameter, every order is
subject to various legal and technical
constraints that are designed to optimize
order interactions within the System,
and to comply with the Act and the
rules and regulations thereunder. Rule
13 See Rule 11.190(b) (Order Parameters) for a full
description of the available order parameters.
14 See Rule 11.230(a)(4)(d), which provides a
complete description of Book Recheck.
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11.190(f)(1)(Order Collars) describes the
IEX Order Collar, which prevents any
incoming order or order resting on the
Order Book, including those marked
ISO, from executing at a price outside of
the Order Collar price range (i.e.,
prevents buy orders from trading at
prices above the collar and prevents sell
orders from trading at prices below the
collar).15 Furthermore, Rule
11.190(h)(Price Sliding) describes the
Exchange’s price sliding processes that
are designed to ensure compliance with
Regulation NMS (including the Plan to
Address Extraordinary Market Volatility
pursuant to Rule 608 thereunder (the
‘‘LULD Plan’’),16 as well as Rule 201 of
Regulation SHO.17
If an order—based on market
conditions, User instructions, applicable
IEX Rules and/or the Act and the rules
and regulations thereunder—is not
executable at the far side of the NBBO,
such order will not be eligible for the
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee.
Specifically, for a buy (sell) order to be
deemed ‘‘executable’’ at the NBO (NBB),
in the case of a market order, the
applicable IEX Order Collar and the
price of the Upper (Lower) LULD Price
Band, as well as the result of any other
price sliding necessary pursuant to Rule
11.190(h), must be marketable to the
NBO (NBB) upon entry, because market
orders, despite not having a maximum
(minimum) price at which the User is
willing to buy (sell), remain constrained
by the least aggressive of the IEX Order
Collar and the LULD Price Band, as well
as the result of any other price sliding
necessary pursuant to Rule 11.190(h).
For example, in a Tier 1 security, if the
NBBO is $10.10 by $10.20, the IEX
Order Collar is $9.13 by $11.16, and the
LULD Price Band is $9.64 by $10.65, a
15 The Order Collar price range is calculated by
applying the numerical guidelines for clearly
erroneous executions to the ‘‘Order Collar Reference
Price’’, which is defined as the most current of (i)
the last sale price disseminated during the Regular
Market Session on the current trade date; (ii) last
trade price disseminated outside of the Regular
Market Session (Form T, as communicated by the
relevant SIP) on trade date which other than for the
Form T designation would have been considered a
valid last sale price; or (iii) if neither of the prices
above are available, the prior days Official Closing
Price from the listing exchange, adjusted to account
for corporate actions, news events, etc. In the event
there is no valid Order Collar Reference Price or
Router Constraint Reference Price, the Exchange
generally rejects orders for the security.
16 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67091
(May 31, 2012), 77 FR 33498 (June 6, 2012). Note,
unless otherwise specified, capitalized terms used
in reference to the LULD Plan have the same
meaning as set forth in the LULD Plan or in
Exchange rules. See also Rule 11.280(e)(Limit UpLimit Down Mechanism), which sets forth the
Exchange’s methodology for re-pricing and
canceling interest pursuant to the LULD Plan.
17 17 CFR 242.201. See also Rule
11.190(h)(4)(Short Sale Price Sliding).
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market order to buy (sell) that removes
liquidity from the Order Book (against
either displayed or non-displayed
liquidity on the Order Book) will
receive the Spread-Crossing Remove
Fee, because the Upper (Lower) LULD
Price Band of $10.65 ($9.64) (which is
less aggressive than the IEX Order
Collar, and therefore controlling), is
marketable to the NBO (NBB) of $10.20
($10.10).
In the case of a limit order, the Userdefined and System-adjusted limit price
(i.e., the price at which the order is
eligible to execute after accounting for
the User-defined limit price, the IEX
Order Collar, and the LULD Price Band,
as well as the result of any other price
sliding necessary pursuant to Rule
11.190(h)) must be executable at the
NBO (NBB) upon entry, or on Book
Recheck. For example, in a Tier 1
security, if the NBBO is $10.10 by
$10.20, the IEX Order Collar is $9.13 by
$11.16, and the LULD Price Band is
$9.64 by $10.65, a limit order to buy
with a limit price of $10.20 that removes
liquidity from the Order Book (against
either displayed or non-displayed
liquidity on the Order Book) will
receive the Spread-Crossing Remove
Fee, because the User-defined limit
price is marketable to the NBO, and less
aggressive than the IEX Order Collar and
the LULD Price Band, and does not
otherwise necessitate additional price
sliding pursuant to Rule 11.190(h)(4).
As a general matter, pegged orders do
not qualify for the Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee, because such orders, by
their terms, are explicitly designed to
capture the spread in full or in part by
executing at prices that are equal to or
more passive than the Midpoint Price.
However, pursuant to Rule
11.190(h)(3)(C)(i), in the event the
market becomes locked (i.e., the price of
the NBB is equal to the price of NBO),
the Exchange considers the Midpoint
Price to be equal to the locking price.
Therefore, in a locked market, Midpoint
Peg 18 and Discretionary Peg 19 orders
that remove liquidity at the locking
price on entry or on Book Recheck will
receive the Spread-Crossing Remove
Fee. For example, if the NBBO is locked
at $10.10 by $10.10, a Midpoint Peg
order to buy (sell) that removes liquidity
at $10.10 will receive the Spread18 Pursuant to Rule 11.190(b)(9), upon entry and
on Book Recheck, Midpoint Peg orders attempt to
remove all available liquidity at the less aggressive
of the Midpoint Price or the orders limit price, if
any.
19 Pursuant to Rule 11.190(b)(10), upon entry and
on Book Recheck, Discretionary Peg orders attempt
to remove all available liquidity at the less
aggressive of the Midpoint Price or the orders limit
price, if any.
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Crossing Remove Fee. In contrast,
Primary Peg orders are never eligible to
remove liquidity, and therefore will
never receive the Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee.20
Similarly, when a short sale price test
restriction 21 is in effect, short sale
orders not marked short exempt that are
priced at or more aggressive than the
NBB are subject to the short sale price
sliding process pursuant to Rule
11.190(h)(4) and are therefore never
executable at or below the NBB.
Accordingly, when a short sale price
test restriction is in effect, short sale
orders not marked short exempt that are
priced to execute at or below the NBB
will not receive the Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee. For example, for a security
subject to the short sale price test
restriction, if the NBBO is $10.10 by
$10.20, and IEX receives a nondisplayed short sale limit order not
marked short exempt with a limit price
of $10.10, such order is ineligible for
execution at its limit price pursuant to
Rule 11.190(h)(4)(B), would only be
executable above the current NBB upon
entry or on Book Recheck, and would
otherwise be repriced and ranked by the
System on the Order Book nondisplayed pursuant to the Midpoint
Price Constraint at the current Midpoint
Price.22 Accordingly, such order is
never executable at the NBB, and
therefore would not receive the SpreadCrossing Remove Fee.
Finally, in the case of a crossed
market (i.e., when the price of the NBB
is higher than the NBO), all removers of
liquidity will receive the SpreadCrossing Remove Fee. For example, if
the NBBO is crossed at $10.13 by
20 Pursuant to Rule 11.190(b)(8), upon entry,
Primary Peg orders attempt to remove liquidity at
the less aggressive of one (1) MPV less aggressive
than the NBB (NBO) for buy (sell) orders or the
orders limit price, if any. Therefore, because the
System will not generate an internally locked or
crossed book (as a result of execution and price
sliding logic, including the Exchange’s price sliding
processes for non-displayed orders (the ‘‘Midpoint
Price Constraint’’), which restricts non-displayed
orders from resting on the Order Book at a price
more aggressive than the midpoint of the NBBO,
Primary Peg orders Primary Peg orders are never
eligible to remove liquidity. Accordingly, Primary
Peg orders are not eligible for Book Recheck.
21 Generally, if the current NBB for a covered
security decreased by 10% or more from the
security’s closing price as determined by the listing
market, Rule 201 of Regulation SHO prohibits the
execution or display of a short sale order not
marked short exempt at a price that is less than or
equal to the NBB. See 17 CFR 242.201.
22 To continue to this example, if the Exchange
has non-displayed liquidity to buy resting on the
Order Book at $10.11, a short sale order not marked
short exempt would be eligible to remove such
interest upon entry (or, if such interest was entered
after the short sale order, on Book Recheck), but
would not receive the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee,
because such order is not executable at the NBB.
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$10.10, and IEX has a displayed offer at
$10.10, a limit order to buy with a limit
price of $10.10 or higher that removes
liquidity will receive the SpreadCrossing Remove Fee. While the
Exchange believes the arbitrage
opportunity provides a natural incentive
for market participants to resolve the
crossing quotation, the Exchange
intends to further incentivize such
market improving behavior by charging
such removers the proposed SpreadCrossing Remove Fee.
The Exchange notes that executions
subject to the Crumbling Quote Remove
Fee are not eligible for the SpreadCrossing Remove Fee.23 Accordingly,
transactions that are subject to the
Crumbling Quote Remove Fee that
remove liquidity with an order
executable at the far side of the NBBO
will be charged the Crumbling Quote
Remove Fee, rather than the SpreadCrossing Remove Fee. Furthermore, the
Exchange is not proposing any change
to the Internalization Fee whereby no
fee is charged for executions when the
adding and removing order originated
from the same Exchange Member. Thus,
transactions that qualify for the
Internalization Fee and the proposed
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee will be
charged the Internalization Fee rather
than the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee,
since the IEX Fee Schedule provides
that to the extent a Member receives
multiple Fee Codes on an execution, the
lower fee shall apply.24
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2. Statutory Basis
IEX believes that the proposed rule
change is consistent with the provisions
of Section 6(b) 25 of the Act in general,
and furthers the objectives of Sections
6(b)(4) 26 of the Act, in particular, in that
it is designed to provide for the
23 See Fee Code Q (Crumbling Quote Remove Fee
Indicator), along with the footnote appurtenant
thereto in the Investors Exchange Fee Schedule,
available on the Exchange public website, which
together describe the applicable fee for executions
that take liquidity during periods of quote
instability as defined in Rule 11.190(g) that exceed
the CQRF Threshold, which is equal to is equal to
5% of the sum of a Member’s total monthly
executions on IEX if at least 1,000,000 shares during
the calendar month, measured on an MPID basis.
See also Securities and Exchange Act Release No.
81484 (August 25, 2017) 82 FR 41446 (August 31,
2017) (SR–IEX–2017–27). See also footnote three
under Transaction Fees in the Investors Exchange
Fee Schedule, which specifies that, except for the
Crumbling Quote Remove Fee Code of Q, to the
extent a Member receives multiple Fee Codes on an
execution, the lower fee shall apply.
24 See footnote three under Transaction Fees in
the Investors Exchange Fee Schedule, which
specifies that, except for the Crumbling Quote
Remove Fee Code of Q, to the extent a Member
receives multiple Fee Codes on an execution, the
lower fee shall apply.
25 15 U.S.C. 78f.
26 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
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equitable allocation of reasonable dues,
fees and other charges among its
Members and other persons using its
facilities. The Exchange believes that
the proposed fee change is reasonable,
fair and equitable, and nondiscriminatory. The Exchange operates
in a highly competitive market in which
market participants can readily direct
order flow to competing venues if they
deem fee levels at a particular venue to
be excessive.
As proposed, the Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee is designed to reduce the
variability in fees to access liquidity on
the Exchange, therefore making the
Exchange’s Fee Schedule more clear and
predictable to the benefit of all market
participants. Furthermore, as discussed
in the Purpose section, the Exchange
believes that to the extent the proposed
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee
incentivizes additional spread-crossing
orders on the Exchange, resting
displayed interest will have enhanced
opportunities to capture the spread,
which may result in additional
aggressively priced orders being entered
on the Exchange, thereby contributing to
public price discovery, consistent with
the overall goal of enhancing market
quality.
The Exchange does not believe that
the proposed change represents a
significant departure from pricing
currently offered by the Exchange. As
described in the Purpose section, the
proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee
is equal to the Displayed Match Fee, and
less than the Non-Displayed Match Fee,
thus falling within the range of
transaction fees currently charged by the
Exchange. Furthermore, the proposed
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee is
substantially lower than the fee for
removing liquidity on competing
exchanges with a ‘‘maker-taker’’ fee
structure (i.e., that provide a rebate to
liquidity adders and charge liquidity
removers).27
As proposed, Members that remove
non-displayed liquidity on the
Exchange will be charged disparate fees
depending on whether or not the
removing order was executable at the far
27 See, e.g., the New York Stock Exchange
(‘‘NYSE’’) trading fee schedule on its public website
reflects fees to ‘‘take’’ liquidity ranging from
$0.0024–$0.0030 depending on the type of market
participant, order and execution; the Nasdaq Stock
Market (‘‘Nasdaq’’) trading fee schedule on its
public website reflects fees to ‘‘remove’’ liquidity
ranging from $0.0025–$0.0030 per share for shares
executed in continuous trading at or above $1.00 or
0.30% of total dollar volume for shares executed
below $1.00; the Cboe BZX Exchange (‘‘Cboe BZX’’)
trading fee schedule on its public website reflects
fees for ‘‘removing’’ liquidity ranging from $0.0025–
$0.0030, for shares executed in continuous trading
at or above $1.00 or 0.30% of total dollar volume
for shares executed below $1.00.
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20121
side of the NBBO. For example, a limit
order with a User-defined and systemadjusted limit price that is marketable to
the Midpoint Price that removes nondisplayed liquidity at the Midpoint
Price will be charged the Non-Displayed
Match Fee, whereas a limit order with
a User-defined and system-adjusted
limit price that is executable at the far
side of the NBBO that removes nondisplayed liquidity at the Midpoint
Price will be charged the SpreadCrossing Remove Fee. The Exchange
believes it is reasonable, equitable and
not unfairly discriminatory to charge
disparate fees for removing liquidity on
the Exchange depending on whether or
not the removing order was executable
at the far side of the NBBO, because
spread-crossing orders are willing to
interact with the Exchange’s resting
displayed orders, thereby potentially
incentivizing Members to enter more
aggressively priced displayed orders by
enhancing opportunities for such orders
to capture the full spread.
The Exchange believes incentivizing
market makers and other Members to
enter more aggressively priced
displayed orders on the Exchange by
enhancing trading opportunities at the
NBBO significantly contributes to
public price discovery, consistent with
the overall goal of enhancing market
quality. Furthermore, removers of nondisplayed liquidity that are not willing
to cross the spread are receiving the
benefit of trading more passively and
receiving price improvement, which the
Exchange believes is a substantial
incentive and benefit in and of itself.28
Similarly, non-displayed orders resting
on the Exchange are receiving the
benefit of resting passively on the Order
Book and capturing the spread in whole
or in part. Therefore, the Exchange
believes it is reasonable, equitable and
not unfairly discriminatory to charge
Members that add non-displayed
liquidity a different fee then Members
that remove non-displayed liquidity
with an order that is executable at the
far side of the NBBO.29
28 The Exchange notes the spread-crossing
removers may also receive such price improvement
to the extent they remove non-displayed liquidity
resting within the spread. However, such price
improvement is not guaranteed, and spreadcrossing removers consciously choose to pay the
full spread with only the possibility of price
improvement.
29 The Exchange also notes that it is common for
Exchange’s to charge Members different fees for
adding and removing liquidity, and thus the
Exchange’s proposal is not novel in this regard. See,
e.g., the New York Stock Exchange (‘‘NYSE’’)
trading fee schedule on its public website which
reflects fees to ‘‘take’’ liquidity ranging from
$0.0024–$0.0030 depending on the type of market
participant, order and execution. Additionally,
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07MYN1
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
20122
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2018 / Notices
The Exchange also believes that it is
reasonable, fair and equitable, and nondiscriminatory to not offer the proposed
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee to orders
that are subject to the Crumbling Quote
Remove Fee because such executions
are necessarily a part of a trading
strategy that the Exchange believes
evidences a form of predatory latency
arbitrage that leverages low latency
proprietary market data feeds and
connectivity along with predictive
models to chase short-term price
momentum and successfully target
resting orders at unstable prices.
Furthermore, if the Exchange were to
apply the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee
to executions that are subject to the
Crumbling Quote Remove Fee, it would
frustrate its fundamental purpose of
disincentivizing predatory trading
strategies to further incentivize
additional resting liquidity, including
displayed liquidity, on IEX. Thus, a
Member that removes liquidity with
spread-crossing orders that are subject
to the Crumbling Quote Remove Fee,
should not be afforded the benefit of the
proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee
on such executions.
The Exchange also notes that the
Crumbling Quote Remove Fee, in
combination with the proposed SpreadCrossing Remove Fee, is designed to
incentivize spread-crossing interest that
is not part of what the Exchange
believes is a predatory trading strategy,
therefore potentially increasing the
entry of orders executable at the far side
of the NBBO during periods of relative
market stability. If the Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee is successful in this regard,
the opportunity for execution and the
resultant execution performance for
non-displayed resting orders within the
spread, as well as displayed orders
resting at the NBBO, would be
significantly enhanced. Consequently,
enhanced trading opportunities may
incentivize the entry of non-displayed
orders resting at or within the spread, as
well as displayed order resting at the
NBBO, thereby contributing to the posttrade and pre-trade public price
discovery process, respectively.
Accordingly, the Exchange believes that
the Crumbling Quote Remove Fee, in
combination with the proposed SpreadCrossing Remove Fee, is reasonable, fair
and equitable, and non-discriminatory.
Additionally, the Exchange believes
that it is reasonable, fair and equitable,
and non-discriminatory to continue to
charge the Internalization Fee rather
than the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee
when the adding and removing order
originated from the same Exchange
Member. IEX believes that the same
factors that support not charging fees for
such transactions, as described in its
rule filing adopting this fee structure,
continue to be relevant.30 Specifically,
not charging a fee is designed to
incentivize Members (and their
customers) to send orders to IEX that
may otherwise be internalized off
exchange, with the goal of increasing
order interaction on IEX. Internalization
on IEX is not guaranteed, and the
additional order flow that does not
internalize is available to trade by all
Members.
Finally, the Exchange believes that
the proposed fees are nondiscriminatory
because they will apply uniformly to all
Members.
NYSE fees to ‘‘add’’ liquidity range from $0.0018–
$0.0030 per share for shares executed in continuous
trading; [sic]
30 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78550
(August 11, 2016), 81 FR 54873 (August 17, 2016)
(SR–IEX–2016–09).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:38 May 04, 2018
Jkt 244001
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
IEX does not believe that the
proposed rule change will result in any
burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act. The
Exchange does not believe that the
proposed rule change will impose any
burden on intermarket competition that
is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
The Exchange operates in a highly
competitive market in which market
participants can readily favor competing
venues if fee schedules at other venues
are viewed as more favorable.
Consequently, the Exchange believes
that the degree to which IEX fees could
impose any burden on competition is
extremely limited and does not believe
that such fees would burden
competition between Members or
competing venues in a manner that is
not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
Moreover, as noted in the Statutory
Basis section, the Exchange does not
believe that the proposed changes
represent a significant departure from
its current fee structure, and competing
venues are able to adopt comparable
pricing.
The Exchange does not believe that
the proposed rule change will impose
any burden on intramarket competition
that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act
because, while different fees are
assessed in some circumstances, these
different fees are not based on the type
of Member entering the orders that
match but on the type of order entered
PO 00000
Frm 00091
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
and the market conditions in which
such order was entered. Moreover, the
proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee
will apply equally to all Members that
remove liquidity with an order
executable at the far side of the NBBO.
The Exchange notes that all Members
can submit any of the Exchange’s
approved order types and order
parameters, including orders that are
executable at the far side of the NBBO.
Further, the proposed fee changes
continue to be intended to encourage
market participants to bring increased
order flow to the Exchange, which
benefits all market participants.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
Written comments were neither
solicited nor received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) 31 of the Act.
At any time within 60 days of the
filing of the proposed rule change, the
Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend such rule change if
it appears to the Commission that such
action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, for the protection of
investors, or otherwise in furtherance of
the purposes of the Act. If the
Commission takes such action, the
Commission shall institute proceedings
under Section 19(b)(2)(B) 32 of the Act to
determine whether the proposed rule
change should be approved or
disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File No. SR–
IEX–2018–09 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
31 15
32 15
E:\FR\FM\07MYN1.SGM
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
07MYN1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2018 / Notices
Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File No.
SR–IEX–2018–09. This file number
should be included on the subject line
if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
internet website (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change.
Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from
comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish
to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File No.
SR–IEX–2018–09, and should be
submitted on or before May 29, 2018.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.33
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018–09577 Filed 5–4–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.; Notice
of Designation of a Longer Period on
Commission Action on a Proposed
Rule Change To Adopt the Route QCT
Cross Routing Option
May 1, 2018.
On March 6, 2018, the Chicago Stock
Exchange, Inc. (‘‘Exchange’’) filed with
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:38 May 04, 2018
Jkt 244001
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.6
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018–09573 Filed 5–4–18; 8:45 am]
[Release No. 34–83143; File No. SR–CHX–
2018–001]
33 17
the Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘Commission’’), pursuant
to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Exchange
Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,2 a
proposed rule change to adopt the Route
QCT Cross routing option. The proposed
rule change was published for comment
in the Federal Register on March 20,
2018.3 The Commission has received no
comment letters on the proposed rule
change.
Section 19(b)(2) of the Act 4 provides
that within 45 days of the publication of
notice of the filing of a proposed rule
change, or within such longer period up
to 90 days as the Commission may
designate if it finds such longer period
to be appropriate and publishes its
reasons for so finding, or as to which the
self-regulatory organization consents,
the Commission shall either approve the
proposed rule change, disapprove the
proposed rule change, or institute
proceedings to determine whether the
proposed rule change should be
disapproved. The 45th day after
publication of the notice for this
proposed rule change is May 4, 2018.
The Commission is extending this 45day time period.
The Commission finds it appropriate
to designate a longer period within
which to take action on the proposed
rule change so that it has sufficient time
to consider this proposed rule change.
Accordingly, the Commission, pursuant
to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,5
designates June 18, 2018, as the date by
which the Commission shall either
approve or disapprove, or institute
proceedings to determine whether to
disapprove, the proposed rule change
(File No. SR–CHX–2018–001).
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
20123
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–83141; File No. SR–Phlx–
2018–32]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Nasdaq
PHLX LLC; Notice of Filing and
Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed
Rule Change To Adopt a New Market
Order Spread Protection
May 1, 2018.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on April 20,
2018, Nasdaq PHLX LLC (‘‘Phlx’’ or
‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I and II
below, which Items have been prepared
by the Exchange. The Commission is
publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change
from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to adopt a
new Market Order Spread Protection.
The text of the proposed rule change
is available on the Exchange’s website at
https://nasdaqphlx.cchwallstreet.com/,
at the principal office of the Exchange,
and at the Commission’s Public
Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
1 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
2 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
3 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82870
(March 14, 2018), 83 FR 12214.
4 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
5 Id.
6 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(31).
PO 00000
Frm 00092
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
1. Purpose
The purpose of this rule change is to
adopt a new Market Order Spread
Protection rule similar to The Nasdaq
1 15
2 17
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
E:\FR\FM\07MYN1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 88 (Monday, May 7, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20118-20123]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-09577]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-83147; File No. SR-IEX-2018-09]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Investors Exchange LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Modify
its Fee Schedule To Charge a More Deterministic Fee of $0.0003 Per
Share for Executions at or Above $1.00 That Result From Removing
Liquidity With an Order That is Executable at the Far Side of the NBBO
May 1, 2018.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the ``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby
given that, on April 20, 2018, the Investors Exchange LLC (``IEX'' or
the ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I,
II and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
\3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act''),\4\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\5\
Investors Exchange LLC (``IEX'' or ``Exchange'') is filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') a proposed rule
change to modify its Fee Schedule, pursuant to IEX Rule 15.110(a) and
(c), to charge a more deterministic fee of $0.0003 per share for
executions at or above $1.00 that result from removing liquidity with
an order that is executable at the far side of the NBBO \6\ (the
``Spread-Crossing Remove Fee''). Consistent with the Exchange's
existing Fee Schedule, executions below $1.00 will be 0.30% of the
total dollar value of the transaction. Changes to the Fee Schedule
pursuant to this proposal are effective upon filing and will be
operative on May 1, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\5\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\6\ As defined by Regulation NMS Rule 600(b)(42). 17 CFR
242.600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The text of the proposed rule change is available at the Exchange's
website at www.iextrading.com, at the principal office of the Exchange,
and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these statement may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The self-regulatory organization
has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C below, of the
most significant aspects of such statements.
[[Page 20119]]
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to modify its Fee Schedule, pursuant to IEX
Rule 15.110(a) and (c), to charge a more deterministic fee of $0.0003
per share for executions at or above $1.00 that result from removing
liquidity with an order that is executable at the far side of the NBBO
(i.e., a buy order that is executable at the NBO or higher, or a sell
order that is executable at the NBB or lower). In an effort to
incentivize Members to submit displayed orders to the Exchange, the
Exchange currently charges a fee of $0.0003 per share (or 0.30% of the
total dollar value of the transaction for securities priced below
$1.00) to Members for executions on IEX that provide or take resting
interest with displayed priority (i.e., an order or portion of a
reserve order that is booked and ranked with display priority on the
Order Book).\7\ Furthermore, the Exchange currently charges $0.0009 per
share (or 0.30% of the total dollar value of the transaction for
securities priced below $1.00) to Members for executions on IEX that
provide or take resting interest with non-displayed priority (i.e., an
order or portion of a reserve order that is booked and ranked with non-
displayed priority on the Order Book).\8\ The Exchange does not charge
any fee to Members for executions on IEX when the adding and removing
order originated from the same Exchange Member.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ This pricing is referred to by the Exchange as ``Displayed
Match Fee'' with a Fee Code of `L' provided by the Exchange on
execution reports. See the Investors Exchange Fee Schedule,
available on the Exchange public website.
\8\ This pricing is referred to by the Exchange as ``Non-
Displayed Match Fee'' with a Fee Code of `I' provided by the
Exchange on execution reports. See the Investors Exchange Fee
Schedule, available on the Exchange public website.
\9\ This pricing is referred to by the Exchange as
``Internalization Fee'' with a Fee Code of `S' provided by the
Exchange on execution reports. Orders from different market
participant identifiers of the same broker dealer, with the same
Central Registration Depository registration number, are treated as
originating from the same Exchange Member. See the Investors
Exchange Fee Schedule, available on the Exchange public website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After informal discussions with various Members, the Exchange
recognizes that some Members may be dissuaded from seeking to access
IEX quotations at the NBBO due to the variability in execution fees
when routing orders to the Exchange that are executable at the far side
of the NBBO and intended to trade against the Exchange's displayed
quotation, but inadvertently remove non-displayed liquidity resting at
or within the spread. While such spread-crossing orders would receive
price improvement equal to the delta between the execution price and
the far side quotation (i.e., the difference between the trade price
and the NBO (NBB) for buy (sell) orders),\10\ the potential for
interacting with non-displayed liquidity resting within the spread, and
therefore being assessed the Non-Displayed Match Fee of $0.0009 versus
the Displayed Match Fee of $0.0003, makes it difficult for Members to
estimate access fees on a pre-trade basis, which the Exchange believes
thereby presents difficulties for some Members when determining which
venues to route marketable orders to.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The Exchange notes that when handling client orders as
agent, IEX Members must ensure they are satisfying their duty of
best execution, which requires that in any transaction for or with a
customer or a customer of another broker-dealer, a member and
persons associated with a member shall use reasonable diligence to
ascertain the best market for the subject security and buy or sell
in such market so that the resultant price to the customer is as
favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions. Members
must also conduct regular and rigorous reviews of execution quality
in order to determine which market center to route customer orders,
and should explicitly consider the extent to which an order may
obtain price improvement at other venues. See FINRA Rule 5310,
including Supplementary Material .09 thereto.
\11\ The Exchange notes that FINRA has released guidance
clarifying that firms should not allow access fees charged by venues
to inappropriately affect their routing decisions, and, in general,
a firm's routing decisions should not be unduly influenced by a
particular venue's fee or rebate structure. See FINRA Regulatory
Notice 15-46 (November 2015) at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to reduce the variability in fees to access liquidity on
the Exchange and thereby incentivize Members to route more orders to
the Exchange that are executable at the far side of the NBBO, the
Exchange is proposing to offer a more deterministic Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee of $0.0003 per share to all executions at or above $1.00
that result from removing liquidity with a buy (sell) order that is
executable at the NBO (NBB). Consistent with the Exchange's existing
Fee Schedule, executions below $1.00 will be 0.30% of the total dollar
value of the transaction. Members will receive a Fee Code of ``N'' on
execution reports provided by the Exchange for transactions that
receive the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Pursuant to the Exchange's existing Fee Schedule, a Fee
Code of ``N'' applies to executions that are part of an IPO Auction.
Accordingly, the Exchange is proposing to replace the Fee Code for
executions in an IPO Auction with a Fee Code of ``P''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes that incentivizing additional spread-crossing
interest by offering the proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee will
enhance public price discovery and overall execution quality on the
Exchange in several ways. First, as described above, to the extent
spread-crossing interest removes non-displayed liquidity within the
spread, the spread-crossing orders will receive price improvement equal
to the delta between the execution price and the far side quotation,
while the non-displayed resting interest will have received the benefit
of trading passively and also capturing the spread in part. Similarly,
to the extent spread-crossing interest removes displayed liquidity
resting at the NBBO, such resting displayed liquidity will have
increased opportunities to capture the full spread. If market makers
and other Members are more frequently capturing the spread when resting
displayed orders on the Exchange, such Members may be incentivized to
enter additional aggressively priced displayed orders on the Exchange,
thereby contributing to public price discovery, consistent with the
overall goal of enhancing market quality.
Pursuant to Rules 11.190(a)(1)-(3), the Exchange offers three
general order types--market orders, limit orders, and pegged orders--
each of which have distinct functional behaviors, and are further
controlled by various User-defined order parameters that dictate
additional functional behaviors of the order within the Exchange's
System.\13\ Orders entered on the Exchange are eligible to remove
liquidity on entry pursuant to the distinct behavior of the User-
selected order type and order parameters. In addition, non-displayed
orders that are resting on the Order Book and eligible to trade at
least as aggressively as the Midpoint Price are eligible to remove
liquidity on Order Execution Recheck, or ``Book Recheck'', pursuant to
Rule 11.230(a)(4)(d). Book Recheck is a process within the IEX System
that detects new trading opportunities for resting orders upon a change
to the Order Book, the NBBO, or as part of processing inbound messages,
resulting in an invitation for non-displayed orders to attempt to
remove liquidity from the contra side.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Rule 11.190(b) (Order Parameters) for a full
description of the available order parameters.
\14\ See Rule 11.230(a)(4)(d), which provides a complete
description of Book Recheck.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant the Exchange's Rules, in addition to the terms of each
order type and order parameter, every order is subject to various legal
and technical constraints that are designed to optimize order
interactions within the System, and to comply with the Act and the
rules and regulations thereunder. Rule
[[Page 20120]]
11.190(f)(1)(Order Collars) describes the IEX Order Collar, which
prevents any incoming order or order resting on the Order Book,
including those marked ISO, from executing at a price outside of the
Order Collar price range (i.e., prevents buy orders from trading at
prices above the collar and prevents sell orders from trading at prices
below the collar).\15\ Furthermore, Rule 11.190(h)(Price Sliding)
describes the Exchange's price sliding processes that are designed to
ensure compliance with Regulation NMS (including the Plan to Address
Extraordinary Market Volatility pursuant to Rule 608 thereunder (the
``LULD Plan''),\16\ as well as Rule 201 of Regulation SHO.\17\
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\15\ The Order Collar price range is calculated by applying the
numerical guidelines for clearly erroneous executions to the ``Order
Collar Reference Price'', which is defined as the most current of
(i) the last sale price disseminated during the Regular Market
Session on the current trade date; (ii) last trade price
disseminated outside of the Regular Market Session (Form T, as
communicated by the relevant SIP) on trade date which other than for
the Form T designation would have been considered a valid last sale
price; or (iii) if neither of the prices above are available, the
prior days Official Closing Price from the listing exchange,
adjusted to account for corporate actions, news events, etc. In the
event there is no valid Order Collar Reference Price or Router
Constraint Reference Price, the Exchange generally rejects orders
for the security.
\16\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67091 (May 31,
2012), 77 FR 33498 (June 6, 2012). Note, unless otherwise specified,
capitalized terms used in reference to the LULD Plan have the same
meaning as set forth in the LULD Plan or in Exchange rules. See also
Rule 11.280(e)(Limit Up-Limit Down Mechanism), which sets forth the
Exchange's methodology for re-pricing and canceling interest
pursuant to the LULD Plan.
\17\ 17 CFR 242.201. See also Rule 11.190(h)(4)(Short Sale Price
Sliding).
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If an order--based on market conditions, User instructions,
applicable IEX Rules and/or the Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder--is not executable at the far side of the NBBO, such order
will not be eligible for the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee. Specifically,
for a buy (sell) order to be deemed ``executable'' at the NBO (NBB), in
the case of a market order, the applicable IEX Order Collar and the
price of the Upper (Lower) LULD Price Band, as well as the result of
any other price sliding necessary pursuant to Rule 11.190(h), must be
marketable to the NBO (NBB) upon entry, because market orders, despite
not having a maximum (minimum) price at which the User is willing to
buy (sell), remain constrained by the least aggressive of the IEX Order
Collar and the LULD Price Band, as well as the result of any other
price sliding necessary pursuant to Rule 11.190(h). For example, in a
Tier 1 security, if the NBBO is $10.10 by $10.20, the IEX Order Collar
is $9.13 by $11.16, and the LULD Price Band is $9.64 by $10.65, a
market order to buy (sell) that removes liquidity from the Order Book
(against either displayed or non-displayed liquidity on the Order Book)
will receive the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee, because the Upper (Lower)
LULD Price Band of $10.65 ($9.64) (which is less aggressive than the
IEX Order Collar, and therefore controlling), is marketable to the NBO
(NBB) of $10.20 ($10.10).
In the case of a limit order, the User-defined and System-adjusted
limit price (i.e., the price at which the order is eligible to execute
after accounting for the User-defined limit price, the IEX Order
Collar, and the LULD Price Band, as well as the result of any other
price sliding necessary pursuant to Rule 11.190(h)) must be executable
at the NBO (NBB) upon entry, or on Book Recheck. For example, in a Tier
1 security, if the NBBO is $10.10 by $10.20, the IEX Order Collar is
$9.13 by $11.16, and the LULD Price Band is $9.64 by $10.65, a limit
order to buy with a limit price of $10.20 that removes liquidity from
the Order Book (against either displayed or non-displayed liquidity on
the Order Book) will receive the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee, because
the User-defined limit price is marketable to the NBO, and less
aggressive than the IEX Order Collar and the LULD Price Band, and does
not otherwise necessitate additional price sliding pursuant to Rule
11.190(h)(4).
As a general matter, pegged orders do not qualify for the Spread-
Crossing Remove Fee, because such orders, by their terms, are
explicitly designed to capture the spread in full or in part by
executing at prices that are equal to or more passive than the Midpoint
Price. However, pursuant to Rule 11.190(h)(3)(C)(i), in the event the
market becomes locked (i.e., the price of the NBB is equal to the price
of NBO), the Exchange considers the Midpoint Price to be equal to the
locking price. Therefore, in a locked market, Midpoint Peg \18\ and
Discretionary Peg \19\ orders that remove liquidity at the locking
price on entry or on Book Recheck will receive the Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee. For example, if the NBBO is locked at $10.10 by $10.10, a
Midpoint Peg order to buy (sell) that removes liquidity at $10.10 will
receive the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee. In contrast, Primary Peg orders
are never eligible to remove liquidity, and therefore will never
receive the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee.\20\
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\18\ Pursuant to Rule 11.190(b)(9), upon entry and on Book
Recheck, Midpoint Peg orders attempt to remove all available
liquidity at the less aggressive of the Midpoint Price or the orders
limit price, if any.
\19\ Pursuant to Rule 11.190(b)(10), upon entry and on Book
Recheck, Discretionary Peg orders attempt to remove all available
liquidity at the less aggressive of the Midpoint Price or the orders
limit price, if any.
\20\ Pursuant to Rule 11.190(b)(8), upon entry, Primary Peg
orders attempt to remove liquidity at the less aggressive of one (1)
MPV less aggressive than the NBB (NBO) for buy (sell) orders or the
orders limit price, if any. Therefore, because the System will not
generate an internally locked or crossed book (as a result of
execution and price sliding logic, including the Exchange's price
sliding processes for non-displayed orders (the ``Midpoint Price
Constraint''), which restricts non-displayed orders from resting on
the Order Book at a price more aggressive than the midpoint of the
NBBO, Primary Peg orders Primary Peg orders are never eligible to
remove liquidity. Accordingly, Primary Peg orders are not eligible
for Book Recheck.
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Similarly, when a short sale price test restriction \21\ is in
effect, short sale orders not marked short exempt that are priced at or
more aggressive than the NBB are subject to the short sale price
sliding process pursuant to Rule 11.190(h)(4) and are therefore never
executable at or below the NBB. Accordingly, when a short sale price
test restriction is in effect, short sale orders not marked short
exempt that are priced to execute at or below the NBB will not receive
the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee. For example, for a security subject to
the short sale price test restriction, if the NBBO is $10.10 by $10.20,
and IEX receives a non-displayed short sale limit order not marked
short exempt with a limit price of $10.10, such order is ineligible for
execution at its limit price pursuant to Rule 11.190(h)(4)(B), would
only be executable above the current NBB upon entry or on Book Recheck,
and would otherwise be repriced and ranked by the System on the Order
Book non-displayed pursuant to the Midpoint Price Constraint at the
current Midpoint Price.\22\ Accordingly, such order is never executable
at the NBB, and therefore would not receive the Spread-Crossing Remove
Fee.
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\21\ Generally, if the current NBB for a covered security
decreased by 10% or more from the security's closing price as
determined by the listing market, Rule 201 of Regulation SHO
prohibits the execution or display of a short sale order not marked
short exempt at a price that is less than or equal to the NBB. See
17 CFR 242.201.
\22\ To continue to this example, if the Exchange has non-
displayed liquidity to buy resting on the Order Book at $10.11, a
short sale order not marked short exempt would be eligible to remove
such interest upon entry (or, if such interest was entered after the
short sale order, on Book Recheck), but would not receive the
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee, because such order is not executable at
the NBB.
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Finally, in the case of a crossed market (i.e., when the price of
the NBB is higher than the NBO), all removers of liquidity will receive
the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee. For example, if the NBBO is crossed at
$10.13 by
[[Page 20121]]
$10.10, and IEX has a displayed offer at $10.10, a limit order to buy
with a limit price of $10.10 or higher that removes liquidity will
receive the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee. While the Exchange believes the
arbitrage opportunity provides a natural incentive for market
participants to resolve the crossing quotation, the Exchange intends to
further incentivize such market improving behavior by charging such
removers the proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee.
The Exchange notes that executions subject to the Crumbling Quote
Remove Fee are not eligible for the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee.\23\
Accordingly, transactions that are subject to the Crumbling Quote
Remove Fee that remove liquidity with an order executable at the far
side of the NBBO will be charged the Crumbling Quote Remove Fee, rather
than the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee. Furthermore, the Exchange is not
proposing any change to the Internalization Fee whereby no fee is
charged for executions when the adding and removing order originated
from the same Exchange Member. Thus, transactions that qualify for the
Internalization Fee and the proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee will be
charged the Internalization Fee rather than the Spread-Crossing Remove
Fee, since the IEX Fee Schedule provides that to the extent a Member
receives multiple Fee Codes on an execution, the lower fee shall
apply.\24\
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\23\ See Fee Code Q (Crumbling Quote Remove Fee Indicator),
along with the footnote appurtenant thereto in the Investors
Exchange Fee Schedule, available on the Exchange public website,
which together describe the applicable fee for executions that take
liquidity during periods of quote instability as defined in Rule
11.190(g) that exceed the CQRF Threshold, which is equal to is equal
to 5% of the sum of a Member's total monthly executions on IEX if at
least 1,000,000 shares during the calendar month, measured on an
MPID basis. See also Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 81484
(August 25, 2017) 82 FR 41446 (August 31, 2017) (SR-IEX-2017-27).
See also footnote three under Transaction Fees in the Investors
Exchange Fee Schedule, which specifies that, except for the
Crumbling Quote Remove Fee Code of Q, to the extent a Member
receives multiple Fee Codes on an execution, the lower fee shall
apply.
\24\ See footnote three under Transaction Fees in the Investors
Exchange Fee Schedule, which specifies that, except for the
Crumbling Quote Remove Fee Code of Q, to the extent a Member
receives multiple Fee Codes on an execution, the lower fee shall
apply.
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2. Statutory Basis
IEX believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the
provisions of Section 6(b) \25\ of the Act in general, and furthers the
objectives of Sections 6(b)(4) \26\ of the Act, in particular, in that
it is designed to provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable
dues, fees and other charges among its Members and other persons using
its facilities. The Exchange believes that the proposed fee change is
reasonable, fair and equitable, and non-discriminatory. The Exchange
operates in a highly competitive market in which market participants
can readily direct order flow to competing venues if they deem fee
levels at a particular venue to be excessive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\26\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As proposed, the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee is designed to reduce
the variability in fees to access liquidity on the Exchange, therefore
making the Exchange's Fee Schedule more clear and predictable to the
benefit of all market participants. Furthermore, as discussed in the
Purpose section, the Exchange believes that to the extent the proposed
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee incentivizes additional spread-crossing
orders on the Exchange, resting displayed interest will have enhanced
opportunities to capture the spread, which may result in additional
aggressively priced orders being entered on the Exchange, thereby
contributing to public price discovery, consistent with the overall
goal of enhancing market quality.
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed change represents a
significant departure from pricing currently offered by the Exchange.
As described in the Purpose section, the proposed Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee is equal to the Displayed Match Fee, and less than the Non-
Displayed Match Fee, thus falling within the range of transaction fees
currently charged by the Exchange. Furthermore, the proposed Spread-
Crossing Remove Fee is substantially lower than the fee for removing
liquidity on competing exchanges with a ``maker-taker'' fee structure
(i.e., that provide a rebate to liquidity adders and charge liquidity
removers).\27\
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\27\ See, e.g., the New York Stock Exchange (``NYSE'') trading
fee schedule on its public website reflects fees to ``take''
liquidity ranging from $0.0024-$0.0030 depending on the type of
market participant, order and execution; the Nasdaq Stock Market
(``Nasdaq'') trading fee schedule on its public website reflects
fees to ``remove'' liquidity ranging from $0.0025-$0.0030 per share
for shares executed in continuous trading at or above $1.00 or 0.30%
of total dollar volume for shares executed below $1.00; the Cboe BZX
Exchange (``Cboe BZX'') trading fee schedule on its public website
reflects fees for ``removing'' liquidity ranging from $0.0025-
$0.0030, for shares executed in continuous trading at or above $1.00
or 0.30% of total dollar volume for shares executed below $1.00.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As proposed, Members that remove non-displayed liquidity on the
Exchange will be charged disparate fees depending on whether or not the
removing order was executable at the far side of the NBBO. For example,
a limit order with a User-defined and system-adjusted limit price that
is marketable to the Midpoint Price that removes non-displayed
liquidity at the Midpoint Price will be charged the Non-Displayed Match
Fee, whereas a limit order with a User-defined and system-adjusted
limit price that is executable at the far side of the NBBO that removes
non-displayed liquidity at the Midpoint Price will be charged the
Spread-Crossing Remove Fee. The Exchange believes it is reasonable,
equitable and not unfairly discriminatory to charge disparate fees for
removing liquidity on the Exchange depending on whether or not the
removing order was executable at the far side of the NBBO, because
spread-crossing orders are willing to interact with the Exchange's
resting displayed orders, thereby potentially incentivizing Members to
enter more aggressively priced displayed orders by enhancing
opportunities for such orders to capture the full spread.
The Exchange believes incentivizing market makers and other Members
to enter more aggressively priced displayed orders on the Exchange by
enhancing trading opportunities at the NBBO significantly contributes
to public price discovery, consistent with the overall goal of
enhancing market quality. Furthermore, removers of non-displayed
liquidity that are not willing to cross the spread are receiving the
benefit of trading more passively and receiving price improvement,
which the Exchange believes is a substantial incentive and benefit in
and of itself.\28\ Similarly, non-displayed orders resting on the
Exchange are receiving the benefit of resting passively on the Order
Book and capturing the spread in whole or in part. Therefore, the
Exchange believes it is reasonable, equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory to charge Members that add non-displayed liquidity a
different fee then Members that remove non-displayed liquidity with an
order that is executable at the far side of the NBBO.\29\
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\28\ The Exchange notes the spread-crossing removers may also
receive such price improvement to the extent they remove non-
displayed liquidity resting within the spread. However, such price
improvement is not guaranteed, and spread-crossing removers
consciously choose to pay the full spread with only the possibility
of price improvement.
\29\ The Exchange also notes that it is common for Exchange's to
charge Members different fees for adding and removing liquidity, and
thus the Exchange's proposal is not novel in this regard. See, e.g.,
the New York Stock Exchange (``NYSE'') trading fee schedule on its
public website which reflects fees to ``take'' liquidity ranging
from $0.0024-$0.0030 depending on the type of market participant,
order and execution. Additionally, NYSE fees to ``add'' liquidity
range from $0.0018-$0.0030 per share for shares executed in
continuous trading; [sic]
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[[Page 20122]]
The Exchange also believes that it is reasonable, fair and
equitable, and non-discriminatory to not offer the proposed Spread-
Crossing Remove Fee to orders that are subject to the Crumbling Quote
Remove Fee because such executions are necessarily a part of a trading
strategy that the Exchange believes evidences a form of predatory
latency arbitrage that leverages low latency proprietary market data
feeds and connectivity along with predictive models to chase short-term
price momentum and successfully target resting orders at unstable
prices. Furthermore, if the Exchange were to apply the Spread-Crossing
Remove Fee to executions that are subject to the Crumbling Quote Remove
Fee, it would frustrate its fundamental purpose of disincentivizing
predatory trading strategies to further incentivize additional resting
liquidity, including displayed liquidity, on IEX. Thus, a Member that
removes liquidity with spread-crossing orders that are subject to the
Crumbling Quote Remove Fee, should not be afforded the benefit of the
proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee on such executions.
The Exchange also notes that the Crumbling Quote Remove Fee, in
combination with the proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee, is designed
to incentivize spread-crossing interest that is not part of what the
Exchange believes is a predatory trading strategy, therefore
potentially increasing the entry of orders executable at the far side
of the NBBO during periods of relative market stability. If the Spread-
Crossing Remove Fee is successful in this regard, the opportunity for
execution and the resultant execution performance for non-displayed
resting orders within the spread, as well as displayed orders resting
at the NBBO, would be significantly enhanced. Consequently, enhanced
trading opportunities may incentivize the entry of non-displayed orders
resting at or within the spread, as well as displayed order resting at
the NBBO, thereby contributing to the post-trade and pre-trade public
price discovery process, respectively. Accordingly, the Exchange
believes that the Crumbling Quote Remove Fee, in combination with the
proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee, is reasonable, fair and equitable,
and non-discriminatory.
Additionally, the Exchange believes that it is reasonable, fair and
equitable, and non-discriminatory to continue to charge the
Internalization Fee rather than the Spread-Crossing Remove Fee when the
adding and removing order originated from the same Exchange Member. IEX
believes that the same factors that support not charging fees for such
transactions, as described in its rule filing adopting this fee
structure, continue to be relevant.\30\ Specifically, not charging a
fee is designed to incentivize Members (and their customers) to send
orders to IEX that may otherwise be internalized off exchange, with the
goal of increasing order interaction on IEX. Internalization on IEX is
not guaranteed, and the additional order flow that does not internalize
is available to trade by all Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78550 (August 11,
2016), 81 FR 54873 (August 17, 2016) (SR-IEX-2016-09).
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Finally, the Exchange believes that the proposed fees are
nondiscriminatory because they will apply uniformly to all Members.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
IEX does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in
any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The Exchange does not believe
that the proposed rule change will impose any burden on intermarket
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. The Exchange operates in a highly competitive
market in which market participants can readily favor competing venues
if fee schedules at other venues are viewed as more favorable.
Consequently, the Exchange believes that the degree to which IEX fees
could impose any burden on competition is extremely limited and does
not believe that such fees would burden competition between Members or
competing venues in a manner that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. Moreover, as noted in the
Statutory Basis section, the Exchange does not believe that the
proposed changes represent a significant departure from its current fee
structure, and competing venues are able to adopt comparable pricing.
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on intramarket competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act because, while
different fees are assessed in some circumstances, these different fees
are not based on the type of Member entering the orders that match but
on the type of order entered and the market conditions in which such
order was entered. Moreover, the proposed Spread-Crossing Remove Fee
will apply equally to all Members that remove liquidity with an order
executable at the far side of the NBBO. The Exchange notes that all
Members can submit any of the Exchange's approved order types and order
parameters, including orders that are executable at the far side of the
NBBO. Further, the proposed fee changes continue to be intended to
encourage market participants to bring increased order flow to the
Exchange, which benefits all market participants.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
Written comments were neither solicited nor received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) \31\ of the Act.
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\31\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under
Section 19(b)(2)(B) \32\ of the Act to determine whether the proposed
rule change should be approved or disapproved.
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\32\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File No. SR-IEX-2018-09 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange
[[Page 20123]]
Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File No. SR-IEX-2018-09. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File No. SR-IEX-2018-09, and should be submitted on or
before May 29, 2018.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\33\
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\33\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-09577 Filed 5-4-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
