Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc., Grant of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 11289-11293 [2018-05136]
Download as PDF
<![CDATA[
11289
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 50 / Wednesday, March 14, 2018 / Notices
this notice and the vessel name in order
for MARAD to properly consider the
comments. Comments should also state
the commenter’s interest in the waiver
application, and address the waiver
criteria given in section 388.4 of
MARAD’s regulations at 46 CFR part
388.
Privacy Act
In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c),
DOT/MARAD solicits comments from
the public to better inform its
rulemaking process. DOT/MARAD posts
these comments, without edit, to
www.regulations.gov, as described in
the system of records notice, DOT/ALL–
14 FDMS, accessible through
www.dot.gov/privacy. In order to
facilitate comment tracking and
response, we encourage commenters to
provide their name, or the name of their
organization; however, submission of
names is completely optional. Whether
or not commenters identify themselves,
all timely comments will be fully
considered. If you wish to provide
comments containing proprietary or
confidential information, please contact
the agency for alternate submission
instructions.
Authority: 49 CFR 1.93(a), 46 U.S.C.
55103, 46 U.S.C. 12121.
*
*
*
*
*
By Order of the Maritime Administrator.
Dated: March 9, 2018.
T. Mitchell Hudson, Jr.,
Secretary, Maritime Administration.
[FR Doc. 2018–05126 Filed 3–13–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–81–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Maritime Administration
[Docket No. MARAD–2018 0033]
Requested Administrative Waiver of
the Coastwise Trade Laws: Vessel
PULPO; Invitation for Public
Comments
Maritime Administration, DOT.
Notice.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Secretary of
Transportation, as represented by the
Maritime Administration (MARAD), is
authorized to grant waivers of the U.S.build requirement of the coastwise laws
under certain circumstances. A request
for such a waiver has been received by
MARAD. The vessel, and a brief
description of the proposed service, is
listed below.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
April 13, 2018.
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:17 Mar 13, 2018
Jkt 244001
Comments should refer to
docket number MARAD–2018–0033.
Written comments may be submitted by
hand or by mail to the Docket Clerk,
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M–30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590. You may also
send comments electronically via the
internet at https://www.regulations.gov.
All comments will become part of this
docket and will be available for
inspection and copying at the above
address between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
federal holidays. An electronic version
of this document and all documents
entered into this docket is available at
https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Bianca Carr, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Maritime
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Room W23–453,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–
366–9309, Email Bianca.carr@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As
described by the applicant the intended
service of the vessel PULPO is:
—Intended Commercial use of Vessel:
‘‘uninspected small passenger vessel
day sight seeing excursions on local
waterways’’
—Geographic Region: ‘‘Florida’’
The complete application is given in
DOT docket MARAD–2018–0033 at
https://www.regulations.gov. Interested
parties may comment on the effect this
action may have on U.S. vessel builders
or businesses in the U.S. that use U.S.flag vessels. If MARAD determines, in
accordance with 46 U.S.C. 12121 and
MARAD’s regulations at 46 CFR part
388, that the issuance of the waiver will
have an unduly adverse effect on a U.S.vessel builder or a business that uses
U.S.-flag vessels in that business, a
waiver will not be granted. Comments
should refer to the docket number of
this notice and the vessel name in order
for MARAD to properly consider the
comments. Comments should also state
the commenter’s interest in the waiver
application, and address the waiver
criteria given in section 388.4 of
MARAD’s regulations at 46 CFR part
388.
ADDRESSES:
Privacy Act
In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c),
DOT/MARAD solicits comments from
the public to better inform its
rulemaking process. DOT/MARAD posts
these comments, without edit, to
www.regulations.gov, as described in
the system of records notice, DOT/ALL–
14 FDMS, accessible through
PO 00000
Frm 00122
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
www.dot.gov/privacy. In order to
facilitate comment tracking and
response, we encourage commenters to
provide their name, or the name of their
organization; however, submission of
names is completely optional. Whether
or not commenters identify themselves,
all timely comments will be fully
considered. If you wish to provide
comments containing proprietary or
confidential information, please contact
the agency for alternate submission
instructions.
Authority: 49 CFR 1.93(a), 46 U.S.C.
55103, 46 U.S.C. 12121.
*
*
*
*
*
By Order of the Maritime Administrator.
Dated: March 9, 2018.
T. Mitchell Hudson, Jr.,
Secretary, Maritime Administration.
[FR Doc. 2018–05125 Filed 3–13–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–81–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA–2016–0129; Notice 2]
Toyota Motor Engineering &
Manufacturing North America, Inc.,
Grant of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Grant of petition.
AGENCY:
Toyota Motor Engineering &
Manufacturing North America, Inc., on
behalf of Toyota Motor Corporation and
certain other specified Toyota
manufacturing entities (collectively
referred to as ‘‘Toyota’’), has determined
that certain model year (MY) 2016–2017
Lexus RX350 and Lexus RX450H motor
vehicles do not fully comply with
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) No. 202a, Head Restraints.
Toyota filed a noncompliance
information report dated November 29,
2016. Toyota also petitioned NHTSA on
December 21, 2016, for a decision that
the subject noncompliance is
inconsequential as it relates to motor
vehicle safety.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ed
Chan, Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, NHTSA, telephone (202)
493–0335, facsimile (202) 366–3081.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Overview: Toyota, has determined
that certain MY 2016–2017 Lexus
RX350 and RX450H motor vehicles do
not fully comply with paragraph S4.5 of
FMVSS No. 202a, Head Restraints (49
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\14MRN1.SGM
14MRN1
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
11290
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 50 / Wednesday, March 14, 2018 / Notices
CFR 571.202a). Toyota filed a
noncompliance information report
dated November 29, 2016, pursuant to
49 CFR part 573, Defect and
Noncompliance Responsibility and
Reports. Toyota also petitioned NHTSA
on December 21, 2016, pursuant to 49
U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h) and 49
CFR part 556, for an exemption from the
notification and remedy requirements of
49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 on the basis that
this noncompliance is inconsequential
as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
Notice of receipt of the petition was
published with a 30-day public
comment period, on April 7, 2017, in
the Federal Register (82 FR 17079). One
comment was received. To view the
petition and all supporting documents
log onto the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS) website at:
https://www.regulations.gov/. Then
follow the online search instructions to
locate docket number ‘‘NHTSA–2016–
0129.’’
II. Vehicles Involved: Approximately
120,748 MY 2016–2017 Lexus RX350
and Lexus RX450H motor vehicles
manufactured between September 28,
2016, and November 23, 2016, are
potentially involved.
III. Noncompliance: Toyota explains
that the rear seat outboard head
restraints are removable by utilizing the
same action (i.e., depressing the lock
release button while the headrest is
being pulled upward) that is used to
adjust the head restraints from the first
adjustment position to the second.
Therefore, the requirements of
paragraph S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a are
not met.
IV. Rule Requirements: Paragraph
S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a, titled
‘‘Removability of Head Restraints’’
includes the requirements relevant to
this petition:
• The head restraint must not be
removable without a deliberate action
distinct from any act necessary for
upward adjustment.
V. Summary of Toyota’s Petition:
Toyota described the subject
noncompliance and stated its belief that
the noncompliance is inconsequential
as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
In support of its petition, Toyota
submitted the following reasoning:
1. The rear outboard head restraints
continue to meet the underlying
purpose of S4.5 of the standard:
a. Background of S4.5: Toyota
referenced a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) that NHTSA issued
in 2001 1 to upgrade FMVSS No. 202
and stated that its principal focus was
to improve performance of front and
1 66
FR 968 (January 4, 2001)
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:17 Mar 13, 2018
rear outboard head restraints to mitigate
‘‘whiplash’’ injuries, particularly in rear
crashes. Toyota stated that the agency
recognized that existing adjustable head
restraints could be manually removed
solely by hand, and not be replaced,
thereby creating a greater risk of injury.
As a result, the proposed rule stated that
removable front seat head restraints
would not be permitted, but that due to
concerns with rear visibility, removable
restraints in the rear would not be
prohibited. Toyota stated that the draft
rule did not contain any requirement
comparable to the one set forth in
paragraph S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a.
Toyota further explained that when
NHTSA issued the FMVSS No. 202
Final Rule in 2004,2 it made a variety of
changes from the requirements
proposed in the NPRM. One of those
was to not require rear seat outboard
head restraints, but to impose certain
requirements on head restraints that
were voluntarily installed. Toyota noted
that most of the comments submitted on
the NPRM favored removability of both
front and rear seat head restraints solely
by hand, although some supported a
prohibition on removability at all
positions, because a removed restraint
might not be replaced or correctly
reinstalled. Toyota stated that NHTSA
ultimately decided to allow head
restraint removability for both front and
rear restraints, but for both front and
rear optional head restraints, specified
that removal must be by means of a
deliberate action that is distinct from
any act necessary for adjustment to
ensure that head restraints are not
accidentally removed when being
adjusted, thereby reducing the
likelihood of inadvertent head restraint
removal and increasing the chances that
vehicle occupants will receive the
benefits of properly positioned head
restraints. To implement this
requirement, the agency added the text
in paragraph S4.5. In 2007, the agency
amended the standard by adding the
word ‘‘upward’’ before ‘‘adjustment’’ to
clarify the upward adjustment and
removability aspects of the requirement.
b. The noncompliance is
inconsequential because the rear
outboard head restraints meet the
underlying purpose of S4.5: Toyota
stated that the rear seat head restraints
in the subject vehicles allow manual
adjustment by sliding the head restraint
in and out of the seat back on stays
attached to the head restraint. Position
locking is achieved by two notches in
one of the stays, allowing for a detent
mechanism. Toyota stated that the posts
go through plates on top of the seat
2 69
Jkt 244001
PO 00000
FR 74848 (December 14, 2004)
Frm 00123
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
back, one of which contains a button
which is pressed to allow the restraint
to be removed. To adjust the height of
the head restraint from the fully stowed
position on top of the seatback to the
first notch on the stay, the restraint is
simply pulled upward. To reach the
second notch, the button must first be
pressed to allow the restraint to be
lifted; it then will lock in position. To
remove the restraint, the button must
again be pressed before lifting it out of
the seatback. Because the button must
be pressed to adjust the restraint from
the first notch position to the second,
and the same action is required to start
the removal process, the restraint does
not conform to paragraph S4.5 of
FMVSS No. 202a.
Toyota stated that there are three
factors, when considered together, that
make this noncompliance
inconsequential to motor vehicles
safety:
i. With the subject head restraints, the
necessity to press the release button to
move from the first notch to the second,
in addition to the need to press it to
release the restraint from the second
notch to remove it, lessens the ease of
removal, thereby reducing the
likelihood of inadvertent removal and
increasing the chances that the occupant
will receive the benefits of a properly
positioned head restraint.
ii. The subject vehicle model can be
generally described as a mid-sized
sports-utility vehicle (SUV). The
roofline tends to slope downward
toward the rear of the vehicle, and the
distance between the top of the head
restraint and the headliner is less than
in other mid-sized SUV’s with a less
sloped roofline. The rear seat can be
manually adjusted forward and
rearward on the seat track for a distance
of 120mm from the front position to the
rear position. The nominal design seat
back position is approximately 27
degrees rearward to the vertical line,
and the seat back can be reclined an
additional 10 degrees. The seat back
folds forward from the nominal design
position. (See figure 6 of Toyota’s
petition).
Given the rear seat design, there are
a variety of combinations of seat track
and seat back positions that can be
attained. Typically, the seat would most
likely be placed in the mid-track
position or rearward for occupant
comfort and convenience. From the
mid-track position (60mm) rearward
there are 30 combinations of seat track/
seat back angle combinations for the
manually reclining seat back.3 Of these
3 Some models are equipped with a power
reclining seat back with the same adjustment range
E:\FR\FM\14MRN1.SGM
14MRN1
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 50 / Wednesday, March 14, 2018 / Notices
combinations there are 25 where there
would be some degree of interference
between the top of the head restraint
and the vehicle headliner if someone
intended to remove it. To completely
remove the restraint from the top of the
seat in these 25 combinations, there
must be a deliberate action to compress
the soft material of the restraint, because
it cannot be pulled directly out of the
seatback. In some cases, the seat back
angle would have to be adjusted or the
seat moved forward on the seat track
before the restraint can be removed
without headliner interference. (See
figure 7 of Toyota’s petition)
Together with the need to press the
release button to move the head
restraint when in either the first or
second notches, such further deliberate
actions in many seat adjustment
positions of either compressing the
restraint material, adjusting the seat
slide position, or adjusting the seat back
angle lessen the ease with which the
restraint can be removed, reduce the
chance of accidental removal, and
increase the chances that the occupant
will receive the benefits of a properly
positioned head restraint.
iii. Finally, in addition to the two
previously noted factors, it is unlikely
that the head restraint will be
inadvertently removed as there is
97.7mm of travel distance from the
second notch until the head restraint is
fully removed from the seat; this length
is much greater than the travel distance
between the fully stowed position and
second notch (37.5mm). The difference
is easily recognized by anyone
attempting to adjust the head restraint.
(See figure 8 of Toyota’s petition)
Therefore, the overall design and
operation of the rear head restraints in
the subject vehicles fulfill the purpose
and policy behind the S4.5 requirement.
2. The Design and performance of the
rear seat head restraints provide safety
benefits to a broad range of occupants
and pose no risk of exacerbating
whiplash injuries, making the
noncompliance inconsequential:
a. Toyota stated that NHTSA elected
not to mandate rear seat head restraints
in vehicles; however, certain
requirements for voluntarily installed
rear head restraints were adopted.
Toyota stated that the requirements for
rear outboard head restraints are
common in some respects with those of
front seat restraints, but that the rear
seat environment and usage resulted in
several differences. Toyota stated that
NHTSA analyzed the usage of rear seats
as the manual reclining seat back, but which can
be placed in positions between the 2 degree
increments of the manual seat back.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:17 Mar 13, 2018
Jkt 244001
and studied the various types of
occupants who typically occupy rear
seating positions. Toyota stated that
NHTSA found that 10 percent of all
occupants sit in rear outboard seats, and
that only 5.1 percent of those are people
who are 13 years or older. Toyota stated
that this justified a difference in the
minimum height requirement for front
and rear head restraints. The standard
requires front integral head restraints to
have a height of at least 800mm above
the H-point 4 to the top of the restraint;
the top of an adjustable restraint must
reach at least 800mm and cannot be
adjustable below 750mm. Rear outboard
head restraints must have a height not
less than 750mm in any position of
adjustment. Toyota quoted the agency as
stating: ‘‘The agency has estimated that
a 750mm head restraint height would
offer whiplash protection to nearly the
entire population of rear seat
occupants.’’
Toyota stated that the rear outboard
restraints in the subject vehicles meet or
surpass all the requirements in the
completely stowed position and in the
first notch position. Toyota stated that
there is nothing about the performance
of these restraints that poses a risk of
exacerbating whiplash injuries and that
the noncompliance does not create such
a risk.
b. Rear head restraint height well
surpasses the requirements of the
standard: Toyota stated that when
NHTSA established height requirements
for mandatory front head restraints, an
adjustment range was adopted that was
estimated to ensure that the top of the
head restraint exceeded the head center
of gravity for an estimated 93 percent of
all adults. Toyota stated that research
conducted since the implementation of
the previous height requirements has
shown that head restraints should be at
least as high as the center of gravity of
the occupant’s head to adequately
control motion of the head and neck
relative to the torso.
Toyota stated that the rear head
restraints in the subject vehicles not
only surpass the 750mm requirement for
voluntarily installed rear seat restraints,
but also can be adjusted to surpass the
800mm requirement applicable to
mandatory front seat head restraints. In
the fully stowed position, the rear
outboard head restraints measure
780mm above the H-point. In the first
notch position they are 797mm above
the H-point, and in the second notch
4 The H-point is defined by a test machine placed
in the vehicle seat. From the side, the H-point
represents the pivot point between the torso and
upper leg portions of the test machine, or roughly
like the hip joint of a 50th percentile male occupant
viewed laterally.
PO 00000
Frm 00124
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
11291
position they are 816mm above the Hpoint. (See figure 9 of Toyota’s petition)
Toyota stated that it evaluated the
height of the rear outboard head
restraints in the subject vehicles against
the center of gravity of various size
occupants. In the first notch position,
which can be attained by simply pulling
upward on the head restraint in a
manner compliant with S4.5, the center
of gravity of the head of an occupant the
size of a 95th percentile adult male
(AM95) is below the top of the head
restraint.5 (See figure 10 of Toyota’s
petition) Therefore, for virtually 100
percent of the female adult population
of the United States 6 and over 95
percent of the U.S. male adult
population, the rear outboard head
restraints can help ‘‘adequately control
motion of the head and neck relative to
the torso’’ in a position that can be
adjusted in compliance with the
standard. It can also protect occupants
larger than AM95 occupants when
adjusted to the second notch position.
c. Toyota stated that the rear outboard
head restraints in the subject vehicles
meet and surpass all other performance
requirements of the standard not only in
the fully stowed position, but also in
both the first and second notch
positions. These include energy
absorption (S4.2.5 and S5.2.5), backset
retention (S4.2.7 and S5.2.7), and height
retention (S4.2.6 and S5.2.6). Toyota
summarized the performance in tables
that can be found in its petition. It
contended that there is nothing about
the performance of the rear outboard
head restraints in the subject vehicles
that in relation to the additional criteria
set forth in these tables that poses a risk
of exacerbating whiplash injuries.
3. The occupancy rates and usage of
the Lexus RX model further supports
the conclusion that the noncompliance
with S4.5 is inconsequential to safety:
The rear seat vehicle environment has
unique aspects in terms of occupancy
rates and usage. This is why the agency
decided to specify different
requirements for front and rear seat
head restraints. As noted above, the
agency found that, in the general vehicle
population studied for the purpose of
adopting FMVSS 202a requirements, the
occupancy rate for the rear outboard
seating positions was about 10 percent.
5 NHTSA assumed during the rulemaking that the
center of gravity of the head of the AM95 was
105mm from the top of the head. See FRIA at page
44. See also 66 FR at page 975. Figure 10, below,
uses this value. The center of gravity of the head
of the BIORID III ATD is 110.5mm below the top
of the head.
6 ‘‘The center of gravity height of a 99th percentile
female reclined at 25 degrees is about 19mm below
a 750mm (29.5 inches) high head restraint at a
50mm (2 inch) backset.’’
E:\FR\FM\14MRN1.SGM
14MRN1
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
11292
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 50 / Wednesday, March 14, 2018 / Notices
Toyota undertook an analysis of the
National Automotive Sampling System
(NASS) General Estimates System (GES)
data to better understand the outboard
rear seat occupancy rate in the subject
vehicles. The subject vehicles are the
fourth generation of the Lexus RX model
series, which was introduced for
MY2016. Because the exposure of this
model year in the fleet is somewhat
limited, and NASS GES does not yet
contain MY2016 data, the three
previous generations of the RX model
going back to MY 1999 were used for
the analysis. While there are design
differences in each generation, all are
mid-size SUV’s, and it is expected that
the user demographics and rear seat
usage would be representative of the
subject vehicles.
Based on the analysis, the occupancy
rate for rear outboard seat occupants in
all types of crashes for the RX models
analyzed was 10 percent—meaning that
10 percent of the RX vehicles involved
in crashes have a rear outboard
passenger. This is the same as what
NHTSA found to be the occupancy rate
in the general vehicle population when
it undertook the FMVSS 202a
rulemaking. In a smaller subset of only
rear crashes, the occupancy rate in the
RX models is slightly higher, but still
small—only 13 percent.
The data analyzed were insufficient to
provide an understanding of the size of
the occupants who ride in the rear
outboard positions in the subject
vehicles. However, considering that the
occupancy rate is consistent with
NHTSA’s previous analyses, there is no
reason to believe that occupant sizes
would be significantly different from the
general vehicle population. In the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis, the agency
found that, of the small percentage of
occupants that ride in the rear of
vehicles generally, 83 percent of all rear
outboard occupants were 5’9’’ or less
and 17 percent were 5’10’’ and above.
The latter is the height of the average
U.S. male. As outlined in Section II,
above, the rear outboard head restraints
in the subject vehicles are designed so
that the center of gravity of the head of
the small percentage of large occupants
who may occasionally ride in the rear
seats of the subject vehicles is below the
top of the head restraint. Therefore, the
number of occupants who may actually
seek to adjust the rear outboard head
restraints in the subject vehicles is
insignificant, further justifying a finding
that the paragraph S4.5 noncompliance
is inconsequential to vehicle safety.
Toyota stated that it is unaware of any
consumer complaints, field reports,
accidents, or injuries that have occurred
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:17 Mar 13, 2018
Jkt 244001
as a result of this noncompliance as of
December 15, 2016.
Toyota concluded by expressing the
belief that the subject noncompliance is
inconsequential as it relates to motor
vehicle safety, and that its petition to be
exempted from providing notification of
the noncompliance, as required by 49
U.S.C. 30118, and a remedy for the
noncompliance, as required by 49
U.S.C. 30120, should be granted.
Public Comments: One comment was
received by an anonymous source and
they recommended that Toyota’s
petition be denied. They indicated that
this law was important because it works
to reduce whiplash injuries and that if
someone were trying to adjust their
head restraint, and accidentally
removed it, they would be at a greater
risk of injury if they were involved in
a crash trying to take it to a mechanic.
NHTSA’S Decision
NHTSA has reviewed the petition and
the anonymous comment and has made
its decision to grant the petition based
on the reasons described below.
NHTSA’s Analysis: In promulgating
the requirements related to head
restraint removability, it was the
agency’s desire to take reasonable steps
to increase the likelihood that a head
restraint is available when needed. We
stated the following in the 2004 final
rule:
‘‘If head restraints were too easily
removable, chances are greater that they will
be removed. That, in turn, increases the
chances that the restraints might not be
reinstalled correctly, if at all. By prohibiting
removability without the use of deliberate
action distinct from any act necessary for
adjustment, the likelihood of inadvertent
head restraint removal will be reduced, thus
increasing the chances that vehicle occupants
will receive the benefits of properly
positioned head restraints.’’ 7
We believe the rationale and
justification for this provision remains
sound. NHTSA’s decision in this matter,
in no way changes the agency’s position
about the general need for the
removability requirements specified in
S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a.
We find merit in the argument
presented by Toyota that when the head
restraint is in the stowed (full down),
first notch, and second notch position,
the head restraint ‘‘meet[s] and surpass
all other performance requirements of
the standard . . . .’’ Thus, when the
head restraint is not removed, all
benefits of the standard have been
preserved.
Toyota provided information
indicating that when the rear seat is
7 69
PO 00000
FR 74863.
Frm 00125
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
adjusted to a mid-track position, most
seat adjustment positions (25 of 30) are
such that there would be interference
during head restraint removal
necessitating compression of the head
restraint foam or readjustment of the
seat back to complete the removal.
However, Toyota did not provide
similar data for more forward seat track
positions. Based on the data presented,
it seems likely that the interference
during removal would be lessened or
eliminated in these more forward
positions. Nonetheless, NHTSA finds
some merit in the argument that this
mitigates to some degree the possibility
of inadvertent head restraint removal,
when the seat is at mid-track or more
rearward.
We do not agree with Toyota’s
contention that ‘‘the overall design and
operation of the rear head restraints in
the subject vehicles fulfills the purpose
and policy behind the S4.5
requirement.’’ However, we find merit
in the argument that the required 97mm
of travel beyond the second adjustment
position to remove the head restraint
may mitigate potential unintended
removal. This distance is greater than
the travel from the fully stowed to the
second adjustment position (37mm),
and this additional distance (without a
detent) may indicate to the operator that
the head restraint is being removed
rather than being adjusted to a higher
position.
Finally, although not required by
FMVSS No. 202a, NHTSA notes that the
head restraints, if removed, can be
reinstalled by the operator without the
assistance of a mechanic and without
any tools.
NHTSA’s Decision: In consideration
of the foregoing, NHTSA finds that
Toyota has met its burden of persuasion
that the FMVSS No. 202a
noncompliance is inconsequential as it
relates to motor vehicle safety.
Accordingly, Toyota’s petition is hereby
granted and Toyota is consequently
exempted from the obligation to provide
notification of, and remedy for, the
subject noncompliance in the affected
vehicles under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and
30120.
NHTSA notes that the statutory
provisions (49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and
30120(h)) that permit manufacturers to
file petitions for a determination of
inconsequentiality allow NHTSA to
exempt manufacturers only from the
duties found in sections 30118 and
30120, respectively, to notify owners,
purchasers, and dealers of a defect or
noncompliance and to remedy the
defect or noncompliance. Therefore, this
decision only applies to the subject
vehicles that Toyota no longer
E:\FR\FM\14MRN1.SGM
14MRN1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 50 / Wednesday, March 14, 2018 / Notices
controlled at the time it determined that
the noncompliance existed. However,
the granting of this petition does not
relieve vehicle distributors and dealers
of the prohibitions on the sale, offer for
sale, or introduction or delivery for
introduction into interstate commerce of
the noncompliant vehicles under their
control after Toyota notified them that
the subject noncompliance existed.
Authority: (49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120:
Delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.95 and
501.8)
Claudia Covell,
Acting Director, Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2018–05136 Filed 3–13–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In accordance with the
procedures governing the application
for, and the processing of, special
permits from the Department of
Transportation’s Hazardous Material
Regulations, notice is hereby given that
the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety
has received the application described
herein. Each mode of transportation for
which a particular special permit is
requested is indicated by a number in
the ‘‘Nature of Application’’ portion of
the table below as follows: 1—Motor
vehicle, 2—Rail freight, 3—Cargo vessel,
4—Cargo aircraft only, 5—Passengercarrying aircraft.
SUMMARY:
Comments must be received on
or before March 29, 2018.
DATES:
Record Center, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Washington, DC 20590.
Comments should refer to the
application number and be submitted in
triplicate. If confirmation of receipt of
comments is desired, include a self-
ADDRESSES:
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
Hazardous Materials: Notice of
Applications for Special Permits
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), DOT.
AGENCY:
Application
No.
List of applications for
modification of special permits.
ACTION:
Applicant
Regulation(s) affected
11293
addressed stamped postcard showing
the special permit number.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ryan Paquet, Director, Office of
Hazardous Materials Approvals and
Permits Division, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation, East Building, PHH–30,
1200 New Jersey Avenue Southeast,
Washington, DC 20590–0001, (202) 366–
4535.
Copies of
the applications are available for
inspection in the Records Center, East
Building, PHH–30, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue Southeast, Washington DC or at
https://regulations.gov.
This notice of receipt of applications
for special permit is published in
accordance with part 107 of the Federal
hazardous materials transportation law
(49 U.S.C. 5117(b); 49 CFR 1.53(b)).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 1,
2018.
Donald Burger,
Chief, General Approvals and Permits
Branch.
Nature of the special permits thereof
SPECIAL PERMITS DATA
ATK LAUNCH SYSTEMS INC
173.56(b) .................................
8009–M ........
FIBA TECHNOLOGIES, INC ..
8215–M ........
OLIN CORPORATION ............
173.302a(a)(4), 178.37(k)(1),
178.37(k)(2)(i).
172.320, 173.212, 173.62(c) ...
8451–M ........
KAMAN PRECISION PRODUCTS, INC.
9847–M ........
FIBA TECHNOLOGIES, INC ..
9847–M ........
FIBA TECHNOLOGIES, INC ..
10922–M ......
FIBA TECHNOLOGIES, INC ..
11110–M ......
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
6293–M ........
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
CO.
MIDLAND CUSTOM APPLICATORS LLC.
12412–M ......
12412–M ......
VerDate Sep<11>2014
RAGSDALE SERVICES INC ..
18:17 Mar 13, 2018
Jkt 244001
172.320, 173.54(a), 173.54(j),
173.56(b), 173.57, 173.58,
173.60.
173.213, 173.302a(b)(2),
173.302a(b)(3),
173.302a(b)(4),
173.302a(b)(5), 180.205(c),
180.205(f), 180.205(g),
180.205(i), 180.209(a).
173.213, 173.302a(b)(2),
173.302a(b)(3),
173.302a(b)(4),
173.302a(b)(5), 180.205(c),
180.205(f), 180.205(g),
180.205(i), 180.209(a).
172.302(c), 173.302(a),
180.205, 180.207(d)(1).
171.8, 175.75 ..........................
177.83(h), 172.203(a),
172.302(c).
177.83(h), 172.203(a),
172.302(c).
PO 00000
Frm 00126
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
To modify the special permit to authorize a change in water
volume of a spent mixed acid by reducing the minimum
water content to 16% by volume. (mode 1).
To modify the special permit to authorize additional permitted
cylinders to be used for tensile testing. (modes 1, 2, 3).
To modify the special permit to add wetted KDNBF with water
(approved as UN0473 under EX2010110501) to also be
transported under the terms of the special permit. (modes
1, 2).
To modify the permit authorization to include cargo only aircraft. (modes 1, 4).
To modify the special permit to authorize UE testing of approved Canadian cylinders. (modes 1, 3).
To modify the special permit to authorize neck thread inspections in accordance with latest revision of CGA C–23.
(modes 1, 3).
To modify the special permit to authorize UE testing of approved Canadian cylinders. (modes 1, 2, 3, 4).
To modify the special permit to authorize additional approved
air carriers. (mode 4).
To modify the special permit to authorize hoses to be attached to discharge outlets during transportation while on
private property. (mode 1).
To modify the special permit to authorize hoses to be attached to discharge outlets during transportation while on
private property. (mode 1).
E:\FR\FM\14MRN1.SGM
14MRN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 50 (Wednesday, March 14, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11289-11293]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-05136]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2016-0129; Notice 2]
Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc.,
Grant of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Grant of petition.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc.,
on behalf of Toyota Motor Corporation and certain other specified
Toyota manufacturing entities (collectively referred to as ``Toyota''),
has determined that certain model year (MY) 2016-2017 Lexus RX350 and
Lexus RX450H motor vehicles do not fully comply with Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 202a, Head Restraints. Toyota filed
a noncompliance information report dated November 29, 2016. Toyota also
petitioned NHTSA on December 21, 2016, for a decision that the subject
noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ed Chan, Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, NHTSA, telephone (202) 493-0335, facsimile (202) 366-3081.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Overview: Toyota, has determined that certain MY 2016-2017 Lexus
RX350 and RX450H motor vehicles do not fully comply with paragraph S4.5
of FMVSS No. 202a, Head Restraints (49
[[Page 11290]]
CFR 571.202a). Toyota filed a noncompliance information report dated
November 29, 2016, pursuant to 49 CFR part 573, Defect and
Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports. Toyota also petitioned NHTSA
on December 21, 2016, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h) and
49 CFR part 556, for an exemption from the notification and remedy
requirements of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 on the basis that this
noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
Notice of receipt of the petition was published with a 30-day
public comment period, on April 7, 2017, in the Federal Register (82 FR
17079). One comment was received. To view the petition and all
supporting documents log onto the Federal Docket Management System
(FDMS) website at: https://www.regulations.gov/. Then follow the online
search instructions to locate docket number ``NHTSA-2016-0129.''
II. Vehicles Involved: Approximately 120,748 MY 2016-2017 Lexus
RX350 and Lexus RX450H motor vehicles manufactured between September
28, 2016, and November 23, 2016, are potentially involved.
III. Noncompliance: Toyota explains that the rear seat outboard
head restraints are removable by utilizing the same action (i.e.,
depressing the lock release button while the headrest is being pulled
upward) that is used to adjust the head restraints from the first
adjustment position to the second. Therefore, the requirements of
paragraph S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a are not met.
IV. Rule Requirements: Paragraph S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a, titled
``Removability of Head Restraints'' includes the requirements relevant
to this petition:
The head restraint must not be removable without a
deliberate action distinct from any act necessary for upward
adjustment.
V. Summary of Toyota's Petition: Toyota described the subject
noncompliance and stated its belief that the noncompliance is
inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
In support of its petition, Toyota submitted the following
reasoning:
1. The rear outboard head restraints continue to meet the
underlying purpose of S4.5 of the standard:
a. Background of S4.5: Toyota referenced a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) that NHTSA issued in 2001 \1\ to upgrade FMVSS No.
202 and stated that its principal focus was to improve performance of
front and rear outboard head restraints to mitigate ``whiplash''
injuries, particularly in rear crashes. Toyota stated that the agency
recognized that existing adjustable head restraints could be manually
removed solely by hand, and not be replaced, thereby creating a greater
risk of injury. As a result, the proposed rule stated that removable
front seat head restraints would not be permitted, but that due to
concerns with rear visibility, removable restraints in the rear would
not be prohibited. Toyota stated that the draft rule did not contain
any requirement comparable to the one set forth in paragraph S4.5 of
FMVSS No. 202a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 66 FR 968 (January 4, 2001)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toyota further explained that when NHTSA issued the FMVSS No. 202
Final Rule in 2004,\2\ it made a variety of changes from the
requirements proposed in the NPRM. One of those was to not require rear
seat outboard head restraints, but to impose certain requirements on
head restraints that were voluntarily installed. Toyota noted that most
of the comments submitted on the NPRM favored removability of both
front and rear seat head restraints solely by hand, although some
supported a prohibition on removability at all positions, because a
removed restraint might not be replaced or correctly reinstalled.
Toyota stated that NHTSA ultimately decided to allow head restraint
removability for both front and rear restraints, but for both front and
rear optional head restraints, specified that removal must be by means
of a deliberate action that is distinct from any act necessary for
adjustment to ensure that head restraints are not accidentally removed
when being adjusted, thereby reducing the likelihood of inadvertent
head restraint removal and increasing the chances that vehicle
occupants will receive the benefits of properly positioned head
restraints. To implement this requirement, the agency added the text in
paragraph S4.5. In 2007, the agency amended the standard by adding the
word ``upward'' before ``adjustment'' to clarify the upward adjustment
and removability aspects of the requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 69 FR 74848 (December 14, 2004)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. The noncompliance is inconsequential because the rear outboard
head restraints meet the underlying purpose of S4.5: Toyota stated that
the rear seat head restraints in the subject vehicles allow manual
adjustment by sliding the head restraint in and out of the seat back on
stays attached to the head restraint. Position locking is achieved by
two notches in one of the stays, allowing for a detent mechanism.
Toyota stated that the posts go through plates on top of the seat back,
one of which contains a button which is pressed to allow the restraint
to be removed. To adjust the height of the head restraint from the
fully stowed position on top of the seatback to the first notch on the
stay, the restraint is simply pulled upward. To reach the second notch,
the button must first be pressed to allow the restraint to be lifted;
it then will lock in position. To remove the restraint, the button must
again be pressed before lifting it out of the seatback. Because the
button must be pressed to adjust the restraint from the first notch
position to the second, and the same action is required to start the
removal process, the restraint does not conform to paragraph S4.5 of
FMVSS No. 202a.
Toyota stated that there are three factors, when considered
together, that make this noncompliance inconsequential to motor
vehicles safety:
i. With the subject head restraints, the necessity to press the
release button to move from the first notch to the second, in addition
to the need to press it to release the restraint from the second notch
to remove it, lessens the ease of removal, thereby reducing the
likelihood of inadvertent removal and increasing the chances that the
occupant will receive the benefits of a properly positioned head
restraint.
ii. The subject vehicle model can be generally described as a mid-
sized sports-utility vehicle (SUV). The roofline tends to slope
downward toward the rear of the vehicle, and the distance between the
top of the head restraint and the headliner is less than in other mid-
sized SUV's with a less sloped roofline. The rear seat can be manually
adjusted forward and rearward on the seat track for a distance of 120mm
from the front position to the rear position. The nominal design seat
back position is approximately 27 degrees rearward to the vertical
line, and the seat back can be reclined an additional 10 degrees. The
seat back folds forward from the nominal design position. (See figure 6
of Toyota's petition).
Given the rear seat design, there are a variety of combinations of
seat track and seat back positions that can be attained. Typically, the
seat would most likely be placed in the mid-track position or rearward
for occupant comfort and convenience. From the mid-track position
(60mm) rearward there are 30 combinations of seat track/seat back angle
combinations for the manually reclining seat back.\3\ Of these
[[Page 11291]]
combinations there are 25 where there would be some degree of
interference between the top of the head restraint and the vehicle
headliner if someone intended to remove it. To completely remove the
restraint from the top of the seat in these 25 combinations, there must
be a deliberate action to compress the soft material of the restraint,
because it cannot be pulled directly out of the seatback. In some
cases, the seat back angle would have to be adjusted or the seat moved
forward on the seat track before the restraint can be removed without
headliner interference. (See figure 7 of Toyota's petition)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Some models are equipped with a power reclining seat back
with the same adjustment range as the manual reclining seat back,
but which can be placed in positions between the 2 degree increments
of the manual seat back.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Together with the need to press the release button to move the head
restraint when in either the first or second notches, such further
deliberate actions in many seat adjustment positions of either
compressing the restraint material, adjusting the seat slide position,
or adjusting the seat back angle lessen the ease with which the
restraint can be removed, reduce the chance of accidental removal, and
increase the chances that the occupant will receive the benefits of a
properly positioned head restraint.
iii. Finally, in addition to the two previously noted factors, it
is unlikely that the head restraint will be inadvertently removed as
there is 97.7mm of travel distance from the second notch until the head
restraint is fully removed from the seat; this length is much greater
than the travel distance between the fully stowed position and second
notch (37.5mm). The difference is easily recognized by anyone
attempting to adjust the head restraint. (See figure 8 of Toyota's
petition) Therefore, the overall design and operation of the rear head
restraints in the subject vehicles fulfill the purpose and policy
behind the S4.5 requirement.
2. The Design and performance of the rear seat head restraints
provide safety benefits to a broad range of occupants and pose no risk
of exacerbating whiplash injuries, making the noncompliance
inconsequential:
a. Toyota stated that NHTSA elected not to mandate rear seat head
restraints in vehicles; however, certain requirements for voluntarily
installed rear head restraints were adopted. Toyota stated that the
requirements for rear outboard head restraints are common in some
respects with those of front seat restraints, but that the rear seat
environment and usage resulted in several differences. Toyota stated
that NHTSA analyzed the usage of rear seats and studied the various
types of occupants who typically occupy rear seating positions. Toyota
stated that NHTSA found that 10 percent of all occupants sit in rear
outboard seats, and that only 5.1 percent of those are people who are
13 years or older. Toyota stated that this justified a difference in
the minimum height requirement for front and rear head restraints. The
standard requires front integral head restraints to have a height of at
least 800mm above the H-point \4\ to the top of the restraint; the top
of an adjustable restraint must reach at least 800mm and cannot be
adjustable below 750mm. Rear outboard head restraints must have a
height not less than 750mm in any position of adjustment. Toyota quoted
the agency as stating: ``The agency has estimated that a 750mm head
restraint height would offer whiplash protection to nearly the entire
population of rear seat occupants.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The H-point is defined by a test machine placed in the
vehicle seat. From the side, the H-point represents the pivot point
between the torso and upper leg portions of the test machine, or
roughly like the hip joint of a 50th percentile male occupant viewed
laterally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toyota stated that the rear outboard restraints in the subject
vehicles meet or surpass all the requirements in the completely stowed
position and in the first notch position. Toyota stated that there is
nothing about the performance of these restraints that poses a risk of
exacerbating whiplash injuries and that the noncompliance does not
create such a risk.
b. Rear head restraint height well surpasses the requirements of
the standard: Toyota stated that when NHTSA established height
requirements for mandatory front head restraints, an adjustment range
was adopted that was estimated to ensure that the top of the head
restraint exceeded the head center of gravity for an estimated 93
percent of all adults. Toyota stated that research conducted since the
implementation of the previous height requirements has shown that head
restraints should be at least as high as the center of gravity of the
occupant's head to adequately control motion of the head and neck
relative to the torso.
Toyota stated that the rear head restraints in the subject vehicles
not only surpass the 750mm requirement for voluntarily installed rear
seat restraints, but also can be adjusted to surpass the 800mm
requirement applicable to mandatory front seat head restraints. In the
fully stowed position, the rear outboard head restraints measure 780mm
above the H-point. In the first notch position they are 797mm above the
H-point, and in the second notch position they are 816mm above the H-
point. (See figure 9 of Toyota's petition)
Toyota stated that it evaluated the height of the rear outboard
head restraints in the subject vehicles against the center of gravity
of various size occupants. In the first notch position, which can be
attained by simply pulling upward on the head restraint in a manner
compliant with S4.5, the center of gravity of the head of an occupant
the size of a 95th percentile adult male (AM95) is below the top of the
head restraint.\5\ (See figure 10 of Toyota's petition) Therefore, for
virtually 100 percent of the female adult population of the United
States \6\ and over 95 percent of the U.S. male adult population, the
rear outboard head restraints can help ``adequately control motion of
the head and neck relative to the torso'' in a position that can be
adjusted in compliance with the standard. It can also protect occupants
larger than AM95 occupants when adjusted to the second notch position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ NHTSA assumed during the rulemaking that the center of
gravity of the head of the AM95 was 105mm from the top of the head.
See FRIA at page 44. See also 66 FR at page 975. Figure 10, below,
uses this value. The center of gravity of the head of the BIORID III
ATD is 110.5mm below the top of the head.
\6\ ``The center of gravity height of a 99th percentile female
reclined at 25 degrees is about 19mm below a 750mm (29.5 inches)
high head restraint at a 50mm (2 inch) backset.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Toyota stated that the rear outboard head restraints in the
subject vehicles meet and surpass all other performance requirements of
the standard not only in the fully stowed position, but also in both
the first and second notch positions. These include energy absorption
(S4.2.5 and S5.2.5), backset retention (S4.2.7 and S5.2.7), and height
retention (S4.2.6 and S5.2.6). Toyota summarized the performance in
tables that can be found in its petition. It contended that there is
nothing about the performance of the rear outboard head restraints in
the subject vehicles that in relation to the additional criteria set
forth in these tables that poses a risk of exacerbating whiplash
injuries.
3. The occupancy rates and usage of the Lexus RX model further
supports the conclusion that the noncompliance with S4.5 is
inconsequential to safety: The rear seat vehicle environment has unique
aspects in terms of occupancy rates and usage. This is why the agency
decided to specify different requirements for front and rear seat head
restraints. As noted above, the agency found that, in the general
vehicle population studied for the purpose of adopting FMVSS 202a
requirements, the occupancy rate for the rear outboard seating
positions was about 10 percent.
[[Page 11292]]
Toyota undertook an analysis of the National Automotive Sampling System
(NASS) General Estimates System (GES) data to better understand the
outboard rear seat occupancy rate in the subject vehicles. The subject
vehicles are the fourth generation of the Lexus RX model series, which
was introduced for MY2016. Because the exposure of this model year in
the fleet is somewhat limited, and NASS GES does not yet contain MY2016
data, the three previous generations of the RX model going back to MY
1999 were used for the analysis. While there are design differences in
each generation, all are mid-size SUV's, and it is expected that the
user demographics and rear seat usage would be representative of the
subject vehicles.
Based on the analysis, the occupancy rate for rear outboard seat
occupants in all types of crashes for the RX models analyzed was 10
percent--meaning that 10 percent of the RX vehicles involved in crashes
have a rear outboard passenger. This is the same as what NHTSA found to
be the occupancy rate in the general vehicle population when it
undertook the FMVSS 202a rulemaking. In a smaller subset of only rear
crashes, the occupancy rate in the RX models is slightly higher, but
still small--only 13 percent.
The data analyzed were insufficient to provide an understanding of
the size of the occupants who ride in the rear outboard positions in
the subject vehicles. However, considering that the occupancy rate is
consistent with NHTSA's previous analyses, there is no reason to
believe that occupant sizes would be significantly different from the
general vehicle population. In the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis,
the agency found that, of the small percentage of occupants that ride
in the rear of vehicles generally, 83 percent of all rear outboard
occupants were 5'9'' or less and 17 percent were 5'10'' and above. The
latter is the height of the average U.S. male. As outlined in Section
II, above, the rear outboard head restraints in the subject vehicles
are designed so that the center of gravity of the head of the small
percentage of large occupants who may occasionally ride in the rear
seats of the subject vehicles is below the top of the head restraint.
Therefore, the number of occupants who may actually seek to adjust the
rear outboard head restraints in the subject vehicles is insignificant,
further justifying a finding that the paragraph S4.5 noncompliance is
inconsequential to vehicle safety.
Toyota stated that it is unaware of any consumer complaints, field
reports, accidents, or injuries that have occurred as a result of this
noncompliance as of December 15, 2016.
Toyota concluded by expressing the belief that the subject
noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety,
and that its petition to be exempted from providing notification of the
noncompliance, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30118, and a remedy for the
noncompliance, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30120, should be granted.
Public Comments: One comment was received by an anonymous source
and they recommended that Toyota's petition be denied. They indicated
that this law was important because it works to reduce whiplash
injuries and that if someone were trying to adjust their head
restraint, and accidentally removed it, they would be at a greater risk
of injury if they were involved in a crash trying to take it to a
mechanic.
NHTSA'S Decision
NHTSA has reviewed the petition and the anonymous comment and has
made its decision to grant the petition based on the reasons described
below.
NHTSA's Analysis: In promulgating the requirements related to head
restraint removability, it was the agency's desire to take reasonable
steps to increase the likelihood that a head restraint is available
when needed. We stated the following in the 2004 final rule:
``If head restraints were too easily removable, chances are
greater that they will be removed. That, in turn, increases the
chances that the restraints might not be reinstalled correctly, if
at all. By prohibiting removability without the use of deliberate
action distinct from any act necessary for adjustment, the
likelihood of inadvertent head restraint removal will be reduced,
thus increasing the chances that vehicle occupants will receive the
benefits of properly positioned head restraints.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 69 FR 74863.
We believe the rationale and justification for this provision
remains sound. NHTSA's decision in this matter, in no way changes the
agency's position about the general need for the removability
requirements specified in S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a.
We find merit in the argument presented by Toyota that when the
head restraint is in the stowed (full down), first notch, and second
notch position, the head restraint ``meet[s] and surpass all other
performance requirements of the standard . . . .'' Thus, when the head
restraint is not removed, all benefits of the standard have been
preserved.
Toyota provided information indicating that when the rear seat is
adjusted to a mid-track position, most seat adjustment positions (25 of
30) are such that there would be interference during head restraint
removal necessitating compression of the head restraint foam or
readjustment of the seat back to complete the removal. However, Toyota
did not provide similar data for more forward seat track positions.
Based on the data presented, it seems likely that the interference
during removal would be lessened or eliminated in these more forward
positions. Nonetheless, NHTSA finds some merit in the argument that
this mitigates to some degree the possibility of inadvertent head
restraint removal, when the seat is at mid-track or more rearward.
We do not agree with Toyota's contention that ``the overall design
and operation of the rear head restraints in the subject vehicles
fulfills the purpose and policy behind the S4.5 requirement.'' However,
we find merit in the argument that the required 97mm of travel beyond
the second adjustment position to remove the head restraint may
mitigate potential unintended removal. This distance is greater than
the travel from the fully stowed to the second adjustment position
(37mm), and this additional distance (without a detent) may indicate to
the operator that the head restraint is being removed rather than being
adjusted to a higher position.
Finally, although not required by FMVSS No. 202a, NHTSA notes that
the head restraints, if removed, can be reinstalled by the operator
without the assistance of a mechanic and without any tools.
NHTSA's Decision: In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA finds
that Toyota has met its burden of persuasion that the FMVSS No. 202a
noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
Accordingly, Toyota's petition is hereby granted and Toyota is
consequently exempted from the obligation to provide notification of,
and remedy for, the subject noncompliance in the affected vehicles
under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.
NHTSA notes that the statutory provisions (49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and
30120(h)) that permit manufacturers to file petitions for a
determination of inconsequentiality allow NHTSA to exempt manufacturers
only from the duties found in sections 30118 and 30120, respectively,
to notify owners, purchasers, and dealers of a defect or noncompliance
and to remedy the defect or noncompliance. Therefore, this decision
only applies to the subject vehicles that Toyota no longer
[[Page 11293]]
controlled at the time it determined that the noncompliance existed.
However, the granting of this petition does not relieve vehicle
distributors and dealers of the prohibitions on the sale, offer for
sale, or introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of the noncompliant vehicles under their control after Toyota
notified them that the subject noncompliance existed.
Authority: (49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120: Delegations of authority at
49 CFR 1.95 and 501.8)
Claudia Covell,
Acting Director, Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2018-05136 Filed 3-13-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
