Civil Penalties, 95489-95492 [2016-31136]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
[FR Doc. 2016–31215 Filed 12–27–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
49 CFR Part 578
[Docket No. NHTSA–2016–0136]
RIN 2127–AL82
Civil Penalties
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; response to petition
for reconsideration; response to petition
for rulemaking.
AGENCY:
On July 5, 2016, NHTSA
published an interim final rule updating
the maximum civil penalty amounts for
violations of statutes and regulations
administered by NHTSA, pursuant to
the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act Improvements Act of
2015. This decision responds to a
petition for partial reconsideration of
that interim final rule. After carefully
considering the issues raised, the
Agency grants some aspects of the
petition, and denies other aspects. This
decision amends the relevant regulatory
text accordingly. This decision also
responds to a petition for rulemaking on
a similar topic.
DATES: Effective date: This rule is
effective January 27, 2017.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms.
Rebecca Yoon, Office of the Chief
Counsel, NHTSA, telephone (202) 366–
2992, facsimile (202) 366–3820, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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SUMMARY:
I. Background on CAFE Penalties and
Interim Final Rule
The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) administers
Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards under 49 U.S.C. 32901
et seq. Vehicle manufacturers that
produce passenger cars and light trucks
for sale in the United States are subject
to these standards,1 and are subject to
civil penalties for failure to meet the
standards.2 Manufacturers generally
meet the standards by applying
technology to their vehicles to improve
their fleet-wide fuel economy, but may
also apply credits earned from over1 49
2 49
U.S.C. 32911(b).
U.S.C. 32912(b).
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compliance with standards in another
year or purchased from another
manufacturer. If a manufacturer does
not have credits to apply, and does not
apply sufficient fuel economyimproving technologies to their vehicles
to meet their fleet-wide standards, then
that manufacturer is liable for civil
penalties.3
Congress has prescribed the formula
for calculating a civil penalty for
violation of a CAFE standard. That
formula multiplies the penalty rate
times the number of tenths-of-a-mileper-gallon by which a non-compliant
fleet falls short of an applicable CAFE
standard, times the number of vehicles
in that non-compliant fleet.4 For many
years, the penalty rate has been $5.50
per tenth-of-a-mile-per-gallon. As an
illustration, assume that Manufacturer A
produced 1,000,000 light trucks in
model year 2010. Assume further that A
has a light truck standard of 20 mpg for
MY 2010, and an achieved light truck
average fuel economy level of 19.7 mpg
in that model year. If A has no credits
to apply, then A’s assessed civil penalty
under this historical penalty rate would
be:
$5.50 (penalty rate) × 3 (tenths of an
mpg) × 1,000,000 (vehicles in
Manufacturer A’s light truck fleet) =
$16,500,000 due for A’s light truck
fleet for MY 2010.
To date, few manufacturers have
actually paid civil penalties, and the
amounts of CAFE penalties paid
generally have been relatively low.
Additionally, since the introduction of
credit trading and transfers for MY 2011
and after, many manufacturers have
taken advantage of those flexibilities
rather than paying civil penalties for
non-compliance.
The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act Improvements Act
(November 2, 2015) (the ‘‘Act’’)
prescribed an inflation adjustment for
many civil monetary penalties,
including CAFE’s civil penalty rate. In
that Act, Congress generally required
Federal agencies that administer civil
monetary penalties to make an initial
‘‘catch-up’’ adjustment for inflation
through an interim final rule by July 1,
2016, and then to make subsequent
annual adjustments for inflation (see
Pub. L. 114–74, Sec. 701). NHTSA
developed an interim final rule (IFR)
implementing the Agency’s
responsibilities under that Act, and that
IFR published in the Federal Register
on July 5, 2016. The NHTSA IFR
included adjustments for all civil
3 Civil
4 49
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penalties are remitted to the U.S. Treasury.
U.S.C. 32912(b).
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95489
monetary penalties administered by the
Agency, including those prescribed by
the CAFE program. In accordance with
the Act and OMB guidance, the updated
penalty rate increased from $5.50 per
tenth of a mile per gallon (mpg) to $14
per tenth of an mpg.5 NHTSA stated in
implementation guidance that it issued
following the IFR that the Agency
intended to apply the $14 rate to any
penalties assessed on and after August
4, 2016, beginning with penalties
applicable to violations for MY 2015,
and also applying to any violations from
prior model years that resulted from
recalculation of a manufacturer’s
previous CAFE levels.6
II. Industry Petition for
Reconsideration
The Auto Alliance and Global
Automakers jointly petitioned NHTSA
for reconsideration of the interim final
rule with regard to the inflation
adjustment for CAFE non-compliance
penalties (hereafter, the Alliance and
Global petition will be referred to as the
‘‘Industry Petition’’) on August 1, 2016.
The Industry Petition asked that NHTSA
not apply the penalty increase to noncompliances associated with ‘‘model
years that have already been completed
or for which a company’s compliance
plan has already been set.’’ Specifically,
the Industry Petition stated that:
Our most significant concern with the IFR
is that it would apply retroactively to the
2014 and 2015 Model Years (which have
been completed for all manufacturers but for
which the compliance files are not all
closed), to the 2016 Model Year (which is
complete for many manufacturers) and to the
2017 and 2018 Model Years (for which
manufacturers have already set compliance
plans based on guidance from NHTSA,
including the [historical penalty amounts of
$5.50 per tenth of an mpg]). Applying the
increased civil penalties in this manner is
profoundly unfair to manufacturers, does not
improve the effectiveness of this penalty, and
does nothing to further the policies
underlying the CAFE statute.
Industry Petition at 3.
In the alternative, the Industry
Petition requested that if NHTSA
decided to apply the penalty increase to
MYs 2014–2018, the Agency should
recalculate the adjusted penalty rate
5 NHTSA’s explanation of its process, including
reliance on OMB guidance for calculating the initial
adjustment required by the Act, is set forth in the
interim final rule at 81 FR 43524–26 (Jul. 5, 2016).
The interim final rule also discusses the ‘‘rounding
rule’’ under the prior version of the Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act, which
prevented NHTSA from raising the $5.50 rate after
1997.
6 Memorandum, ‘‘Implementation of the Federal
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act
Improvement Act of 2015 for the Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) Program,’’ July 18, 2016.
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using 2007 as the ‘‘base year’’ for
calculating the inflation adjustment. As
another alternative, the Industry
Petition sought a finding that
immediately increasing the penalty to
$14 would cause a ‘‘negative economic
impact,’’ thereby requiring a smaller
initial penalty increase. See Public Law
114–74, Sec. 701(c) (providing for an
exception to the otherwise-applicable
penalty increase, if the Agency finds
through a rulemaking proceeding that
the increase would cause a ‘‘negative
economic impact,’’ a term that the
statute does not define).7
III. Petition for Rulemaking To Raise
Civil Penalty Rate
The Center for Biological Diversity
(CBD) petitioned NHTSA on October 1,
2015, just over a month prior to passage
of the Act, to conduct a rulemaking to
raise the civil penalty rate for CAFE
standard violations under NHTSA’s
then-existing statutory authority. The
CBD petition stated correctly that
NHTSA had not adjusted the $5.50 civil
penalty rate for inflation since 1997, and
requested that the Agency follow the
procedure laid out at 49 U.S.C. 32912(c)
to undertake a rulemaking to raise the
amount to the maximum then allowed
by Congress, $10 per tenth-of-an-mpg. A
month later, Congress changed the
statutory landscape by enacting the
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act Improvements Act of
2015.
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IV. NHTSA Response to Petitions
Having carefully considered the
issues raised by the petitioners, NHTSA
will grant the Industry Petition in part
and deny it in part. Beginning with
model year 2019, NHTSA will apply the
full penalty prescribed by the Federal
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Improvements Act of 2015. NHTSA is
required by the Act to continue
adjusting the civil penalty for inflation
each year, so the penalty rate applicable
to MY 2019 and after fleets will be $14
per tenth-of-an-mpg, plus any
adjustment(s) for inflation that occur
between now and a violation’s
assessment. The Agency concludes that
this decision also effectively addresses
the issue raised by the CBD Petition.
The discussion below presents the
Agency’s analysis and conclusion.
A. Model Years 2014–2016
NHTSA agrees with the Industry
Petitioners that applying the $14 civil
7 Because the Agency is granting the Industry
Petition’s request to apply inflation-adjusted
penalties only to MY 2019 and after, the Agency
need not address the Industry Petition’s alternative
requests.
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penalty rate to violations of CAFE
standards in model years prior to the
enactment of the Act would not result
in additional fuel savings, and thus
would seem to impose retroactive
punishment without accomplishing
Congress’ specific intent in establishing
the civil penalty provision of the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (‘‘EPCA’’).
Model years typically begin prior to
their respective calendar year. By
November 2, 2015 (the date of
enactment of the civil penalties
adjustment Act), nearly all
manufacturers subject to the CAFE
standards had completed both model
years 2014 and 2015, and no further
vehicles in those model years were
being produced in significant numbers.
This argument is even stronger
considering that all manufacturers
would have completed these model
years prior to July 5, 2016, the date of
the IFR. If all the vehicles for a model
year have already been produced, then
there is no way for their manufacturers
to raise the fuel economy level of those
vehicles in order to avoid higher penalty
rates for non-compliance.
In the specific context of EPCA as
amended, the purpose of civil penalties
for non-compliance is to encourage
manufacturers to comply with the CAFE
standards. See 49 CFR 578.2 (section
addressing penalties states that a
‘‘purpose of this part is to effectuate the
remedial impact of civil penalties and to
foster compliance with the law’’); see
generally, 49 U.S.C. 32911–32912;
United States v. General Motors, 385
F.Supp. 598, 604 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (‘‘The policy of the Act with
regard to civil penalties is clearly to
discourage noncompliance’’). Assuming
that higher civil penalty rates are
intended, in the particular context of
CAFE, to provide greater incentives for
manufacturers to comply with
applicable standards, then raising
penalty rates for model years already
completed and thus unchangeable
would be not only retroactive,8 but
incapable of serving the purpose of
causing greater compliance with CAFE
standards. Based on the governing
statutory framework and the specific
CAFE regulatory scheme, NHTSA
8 Retroactivity is not favored in the law. The
Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘congressional
enactments . . . will not be construed to have
retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.’’ Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S.
244, 280 (1994), citing Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
NHTSA believes that in the specific context of the
CAFE program and the statutes that govern it,
Congress could not have intended to impose higher
civil penalty rates for time periods when they
would not incentivize increased fuel economy.
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believes that Congress would not have
intended retroactive application of an
inflation adjustment to overcome this
core substantive purpose and intent of
EPCA. This analysis compels the
conclusion that applying an increased
penalty rate to MYs 2014 and 2015
would not be appropriate, nor would
applying it to MY 2016, which was
underway by November 2, 2015 and
over halfway complete by July 5, 2016.9
B. Model Years 2017 and 2018
The Industry Petition asserts that
manufacturers have set their product
and compliance plans for MY 2017 and
2018 based on the CAFE penalty
provisions in place prior to July 2016,
and that it is too late at this juncture to
make significant changes to those plans
and avoid non-compliances (for the
manufacturers already intending not to
comply). The Agency determined above
that it is not appropriate to apply an
increased penalty rate to CAFE noncompliance in past model years, i.e.,
MY 2016 and before, which could not
be changed in response to a higher
penalty rate. The next question
presented by the Industry Petition is
how to address future model years’
vehicles whose fuel economy levels
cannot be changed at this juncture.
For immediate future model years
(i.e., 2017 and 2018), the theoretical
possibility exists that manufacturers
could respond to a higher penalty rate
by increasing their fleet fuel economy
and thus achieving CAFE compliance or
mitigating their non-compliance.
However, because of industry design,
development, and production cycles,
vehicle designs (including drivetrains,
which are where many fuel economy
improvements are made) are often fixed
years in advance, making adjustments to
fleet fuel economy difficult without a
lead time of multiple years.
Here, the Industry Petitioners assert
that their plans for what technology to
put on which MYs 2017 and 2018
vehicles are, at the point the IFR was
issued, fixed and inalterable. NHTSA
takes manufacturers’ product cycles into
account when NHTSA sets fuel
economy standards. For example,
9 The decision not to apply the increased
penalties retroactively is similar to the approach
taken by various other federal agencies in
implementing the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015. See,
e.g., Department of Justice, Interim final rule with
request for comments: Civil Monetary Penalties
Inflation Adjustment, 81 FR 42491 (June 30, 2016)
(applying increased penalties only to violations
after November 2, 2015, the date of the Act’s
enactment); Federal Aviation Administration,
Interim Final Rule: Revisions to Civil Penalty
Inflation Adjustment Tables, 81 FR 43463 (July 5,
2016) (applying increased penalties only to
violations after August 1, 2016).
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because NHTSA recognizes that
manufacturers’ product and compliance
plans are difficult to alter significantly
for years ahead of a given model year,10
the Agency includes product cadence in
its assessment of CAFE standards, by
limiting application of technology in its
analytical model to years in which
vehicles are refreshed or redesigned.
NHTSA believes that this approach
facilitates continued fuel economy
improvements over the longer term by
accounting for the fact that
manufacturers will seek to make
improvements when and where they are
most cost-effective.
In an analogous context, EPCA
provides that when DOT amends a fuel
economy standard to make it more
stringent, that new standard must be
promulgated ‘‘at least 18 months before
the beginning of the model year to
which the amendment applies.’’ 49
U.S.C. 32902(a)(2). The 18 months’
notice requirement for increases in fuel
economy standards represents a
congressional acknowledgement of the
importance of advance notice to vehicle
manufacturers to allow them the lead
time necessary to adjust their product
plans, designs, and compliance plans to
address changes in fuel economy
standards. Similarly here, affording
manufacturers lead time to adjust their
products and compliance plans helps
them to account for such an increase in
the civil penalty amount. In this unique
case, the 18-month lead time for
increases in the stringency of fuel
economy standards provides a
reasonable proxy for appropriate
advance notice of the application of
substantially increased—here nearly
tripled—civil penalties.
Given that NHTSA issued the IFR in
July 2016, 18 months from that date
would be January 2018, which would
encompass MY 2017 for most
manufacturers and models and part of
MY 2018. Based on the Industry
Petition, comments, and agency
expertise, NHTSA believes that, in this
instance, applying the adjusted
penalties only for MY 2019 and after
provides a reasonable amount of lead
time for manufacturers to adjust their
plans and products to take into account
the substantial change in penalty level.
For future model years for which the
vehicles to be produced and their
technologies are essentially fixed (i.e.,
MYs 2017–2018), it is conceivable that
some manufacturers might be able to
change production volumes of certain
10 One
of the Industry Petitioners, the Alliance,
submitted supplemental materials describing the
activities and events that make up product cycles,
which support this point. See Docket No. NHTSA–
2016–0136.
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lower- or higher-fuel-economy models,
which could help them to reduce or
avoid CAFE non-compliance penalties.
However, in this particular instance,
compelling such a result through the
immediate application of higher penalty
rates to product design decisions that
have already been made and cannot be
changed would be contrary to a
fundamental congressional purpose of
the CAFE program. The Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA)
amendments of 2007 required that fuel
economy standards be attribute-based,
demonstrating congressional intent that
the CAFE program be responsive to
consumer demand. See 49 U.S.C.
32902(b)(3). Applying higher civil
penalty rates in a way that would force
manufacturers to disregard consumer
demand (e.g., by restricting the
availability of vehicles that consumers
want) would be inconsistent with that
fundamental statutory command.
Providing some lead time, as here,
mitigates that concern.
In order to reconcile competing
statutory objectives in the unique
context of multi-year vehicle product
cycles, NHTSA will grant the Industry
Petition insofar as it seeks to apply the
penalty increase only for model years
2019 and after. For CAFE standard noncompliances that occur(ed) for model
years 2014–2018, NHTSA intends to
assess civil penalties at the rate of $5.50
per tenth of an mpg. Beginning with
model year 2019, NHTSA will apply the
full penalty prescribed by the Federal
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Improvements Act of 2015. NHTSA is
required by the Act to continue
adjusting the civil penalty for inflation
each year, so the penalty rate applicable
to MY–2019-and-after fleets will be $14
per tenth-of-an-mpg, plus any
adjustment(s) for inflation that occur
between now and then. See Public Law
114–74, Sec. 701(b)(2).
NHTSA believes this approach
appropriately harmonizes the two
congressional directives of adjusting
civil penalties to account for inflation
and maintaining attribute-based,
consumer-demand-focused standards,
applied in the context of the
presumption against retroactive
application of statutes. See, e.g., Bowen
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 208. This decision increases civil
penalties starting with the model year
that manufacturers, in this particular
instance, are reasonably able to design
and produce vehicles in response to the
increased penalties. See Industry
Petition at 4–6 (seeking application of
the adjusted civil penalties only to MY
2019 and after).
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95491
In summary, NHTSA partially grants
the Industry Petition for
Reconsideration insofar as it seeks
implementation of the civil penalties
adjustment only to MY 2019 and after,
and denies the Industry Petition in all
other respects.
This action also effectively responds
to the petition for rulemaking from CBD
to increase the civil penalty rate as
permitted by EPCA/EISA. The civil
penalty rate beginning in MY 2019 will
be substantially higher than the CBD
petition requested, and NHTSA believes
that the increased penalty will
accomplish CBD’s goal of encouraging
manufacturers to apply more fuel-saving
technologies to their vehicles in those
future model years. To the extent that
the CBD Petition requests an earlier
penalty rate increase, it is denied for the
reasons set forth in this decision.
V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866, Executive
Order 13563, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures
NHTSA has considered the impact of
this rulemaking action under Executive
Order 12866, Executive Order 13563,
and the Department of Transportation’s
regulatory policies and procedures. This
rulemaking document was not reviewed
under Executive Order 12866 or
Executive Order 13563, and has been
determined not to be ‘‘significant’’
under the Department of
Transportation’s regulatory policies and
procedures and the policies of the Office
of Management and Budget.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
NHTSA has also considered the
impacts of this rule under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. I certify that
this rule will not have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The following provides the
factual basis for this certification under
5 U.S.C. 605(b). The amendments only
affect manufacturers of motor vehicles.
Low-volume manufacturers can petition
NHTSA for an alternate CAFE standard
under 49 CFR part 525, which lessens
the impacts of this rulemaking on small
businesses by allowing them to avoid
liability for potential penalties under 49
CFR 578.6(h)(2). Small organizations
and governmental jurisdictions will not
be significantly affected as the price of
motor vehicles and equipment ought not
change as the result of this rule.
C. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
Executive Order 13132 requires
NHTSA to develop an accountable
process to ensure ‘‘meaningful and
timely input by State and local officials
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in the development of regulatory
policies that have federalism
implications.’’ ‘‘Policies that have
federalism implications’’ is defined in
the Executive Order to include
regulations that have ‘‘substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and
the States, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.’’ Under
Executive Order 13132, the agency may
not issue a regulation with Federalism
implications, that imposes substantial
direct compliance costs, and that is not
required by statute, unless the Federal
government provides the funds
necessary to pay the direct compliance
costs incurred by State and local
governments, or the agency consults
with State and local governments early
in the process of developing the
proposed regulation.
This rule will not have substantial
direct effects on the States, on the
relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, as specified in
Executive Order 13132. The reason is
that this rule applies to motor vehicle
manufacturers. Thus, the requirements
of Section 6 of the Executive Order do
not apply.
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D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 (UMRA)
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, Public Law 104–4, requires
agencies to prepare a written assessment
of the cost, benefits, and other effects of
proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of more than $100
million annually. Because NHTSA does
not believe that this rule will
necessarily have a $100 million effect,
no Unfunded Mandates assessment will
be prepared.
E. Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice
Reform)
This rule does not have a retroactive
or preemptive effect. Judicial review of
this rule may be obtained pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 702. That section does not
require that a petition for
reconsideration be filed prior to seeking
judicial review.
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980, we state that
there are no requirements for
information collection associated with
this rulemaking action.
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G. Privacy Act
Please note that anyone is able to
search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review DOT’s complete
Privacy Act statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000
(65 FR 19477–78) or you may visit
https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.
Issued on: December 21, 2016.
Mark R. Rosekind,
Administrator.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 578
Fuel economy, Motor vehicles,
Penalties.
In consideration of the foregoing, 49
CFR part 578 is amended as set forth
below.
RIN 0648–XF074
PART 578—CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
PENALTIES
AGENCY:
1. The authority citation for 49 CFR
part 578 is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: Pub. L. 101–410, Pub. L. 104–
134, Pub. L. 109–59, Pub. L. 114–74, Pub L.
114–94, 49 U.S.C. 32902 and 32912;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.81, 1.95.
2. Section 578.6 is amended by
revising paragraph (h) to read as
follows:
■
§ 578.6 Civil penalties for violations of
specified provisions of Title 49 of the United
States Code.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) Automobile fuel economy. (1) A
person that violates 49 U.S.C. 32911(a)
is liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty of not
more than $40,000 for each violation. A
separate violation occurs for each day
the violation continues.
(2) Except as provided in 49 U.S.C.
32912(c), beginning with model year
2019, a manufacturer that violates a
standard prescribed for a model year
under 49 U.S.C. 32902 is liable to the
United States Government for a civil
penalty of $14, plus any adjustments for
inflation that occurred or may occur (for
model years before model year 2019, the
civil penalty is $5.50), multiplied by
each .1 of a mile a gallon by which the
applicable average fuel economy
standard under that section exceeds the
average fuel economy—
(i) Calculated under 49 U.S.C.
32904(a)(1)(A) or (B) for automobiles to
which the standard applies produced by
the manufacturer during the model year;
(ii) Multiplied by the number of those
automobiles; and
(iii) Reduced by the credits available
to the manufacturer under 49 U.S.C.
32903 for the model year.
*
*
*
*
*
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[FR Doc. 2016–31136 Filed 12–27–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
50 CFR Part 648
Fisheries of the Northeastern United
States; Northeast Multispecies
Fishery; Possession and Trip Limit
Modifications for the Common Pool
Fishery
National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Commerce.
ACTION: Temporary rule; inseason
adjustment.
This action increases the
possession and trip limits for Southern
New England/Mid-Atlantic yellowtail
flounder and reduces the possession
and trip limits for Georges Bank cod in
place for Northeast multispecies
common pool vessels for the remainder
of the 2016 fishing year. The Regional
Administrator is authorized to adjust
possession and trip limits for common
pool vessels to facilitate harvesting, or
prevent exceeding, the pertinent
common pool quotas during the fishing
year. Increasing the possession and trip
limits on Southern New England/MidAtlantic yellowtail flounder is intended
to provide additional fishing
opportunities and help allow the
common pool fishery to catch its
allowable quota for the stock, while
reducing the possession and trip limits
for Georges Bank cod is necessary to
prevent overharvest of the common pool
quota for that stock.
DATES: The action increasing the
possession and trip limits for Southern
New England/Mid-Atlantic yellowtail
flounder is effective December 22, 2016,
through April 30, 2017. The action
decreasing the possession and trip
limits for Georges Bank cod is effective
January 1, 2017, through April 30, 2017.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kyle
Molton, Fishery Management Specialist,
978–281–9236.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
regulations at 50 CFR 648.86(o)
authorize the Regional Administrator to
adjust the possession and trip limits for
common pool vessels in order to
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\28DER1.SGM
28DER1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 249 (Wednesday, December 28, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 95489-95492]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-31136]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 578
[Docket No. NHTSA-2016-0136]
RIN 2127-AL82
Civil Penalties
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; response to petition for reconsideration; response
to petition for rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: On July 5, 2016, NHTSA published an interim final rule
updating the maximum civil penalty amounts for violations of statutes
and regulations administered by NHTSA, pursuant to the Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015. This
decision responds to a petition for partial reconsideration of that
interim final rule. After carefully considering the issues raised, the
Agency grants some aspects of the petition, and denies other aspects.
This decision amends the relevant regulatory text accordingly. This
decision also responds to a petition for rulemaking on a similar topic.
DATES: Effective date: This rule is effective January 27, 2017.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Rebecca Yoon, Office of the Chief
Counsel, NHTSA, telephone (202) 366-2992, facsimile (202) 366-3820,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background on CAFE Penalties and Interim Final Rule
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
administers Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards under 49
U.S.C. 32901 et seq. Vehicle manufacturers that produce passenger cars
and light trucks for sale in the United States are subject to these
standards,\1\ and are subject to civil penalties for failure to meet
the standards.\2\ Manufacturers generally meet the standards by
applying technology to their vehicles to improve their fleet-wide fuel
economy, but may also apply credits earned from over-compliance with
standards in another year or purchased from another manufacturer. If a
manufacturer does not have credits to apply, and does not apply
sufficient fuel economy-improving technologies to their vehicles to
meet their fleet-wide standards, then that manufacturer is liable for
civil penalties.\3\
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\1\ 49 U.S.C. 32911(b).
\2\ 49 U.S.C. 32912(b).
\3\ Civil penalties are remitted to the U.S. Treasury.
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Congress has prescribed the formula for calculating a civil penalty
for violation of a CAFE standard. That formula multiplies the penalty
rate times the number of tenths-of-a-mile-per-gallon by which a non-
compliant fleet falls short of an applicable CAFE standard, times the
number of vehicles in that non-compliant fleet.\4\ For many years, the
penalty rate has been $5.50 per tenth-of-a-mile-per-gallon. As an
illustration, assume that Manufacturer A produced 1,000,000 light
trucks in model year 2010. Assume further that A has a light truck
standard of 20 mpg for MY 2010, and an achieved light truck average
fuel economy level of 19.7 mpg in that model year. If A has no credits
to apply, then A's assessed civil penalty under this historical penalty
rate would be:
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\4\ 49 U.S.C. 32912(b).
$5.50 (penalty rate) x 3 (tenths of an mpg) x 1,000,000 (vehicles in
Manufacturer A's light truck fleet) = $16,500,000 due for A's light
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truck fleet for MY 2010.
To date, few manufacturers have actually paid civil penalties, and the
amounts of CAFE penalties paid generally have been relatively low.
Additionally, since the introduction of credit trading and transfers
for MY 2011 and after, many manufacturers have taken advantage of those
flexibilities rather than paying civil penalties for non-compliance.
The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements
Act (November 2, 2015) (the ``Act'') prescribed an inflation adjustment
for many civil monetary penalties, including CAFE's civil penalty rate.
In that Act, Congress generally required Federal agencies that
administer civil monetary penalties to make an initial ``catch-up''
adjustment for inflation through an interim final rule by July 1, 2016,
and then to make subsequent annual adjustments for inflation (see Pub.
L. 114-74, Sec. 701). NHTSA developed an interim final rule (IFR)
implementing the Agency's responsibilities under that Act, and that IFR
published in the Federal Register on July 5, 2016. The NHTSA IFR
included adjustments for all civil monetary penalties administered by
the Agency, including those prescribed by the CAFE program. In
accordance with the Act and OMB guidance, the updated penalty rate
increased from $5.50 per tenth of a mile per gallon (mpg) to $14 per
tenth of an mpg.\5\ NHTSA stated in implementation guidance that it
issued following the IFR that the Agency intended to apply the $14 rate
to any penalties assessed on and after August 4, 2016, beginning with
penalties applicable to violations for MY 2015, and also applying to
any violations from prior model years that resulted from recalculation
of a manufacturer's previous CAFE levels.\6\
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\5\ NHTSA's explanation of its process, including reliance on
OMB guidance for calculating the initial adjustment required by the
Act, is set forth in the interim final rule at 81 FR 43524-26 (Jul.
5, 2016). The interim final rule also discusses the ``rounding
rule'' under the prior version of the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act, which prevented NHTSA from raising the
$5.50 rate after 1997.
\6\ Memorandum, ``Implementation of the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act Improvement Act of 2015 for the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Program,'' July 18, 2016.
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II. Industry Petition for Reconsideration
The Auto Alliance and Global Automakers jointly petitioned NHTSA
for reconsideration of the interim final rule with regard to the
inflation adjustment for CAFE non-compliance penalties (hereafter, the
Alliance and Global petition will be referred to as the ``Industry
Petition'') on August 1, 2016. The Industry Petition asked that NHTSA
not apply the penalty increase to non-compliances associated with
``model years that have already been completed or for which a company's
compliance plan has already been set.'' Specifically, the Industry
Petition stated that:
Our most significant concern with the IFR is that it would apply
retroactively to the 2014 and 2015 Model Years (which have been
completed for all manufacturers but for which the compliance files
are not all closed), to the 2016 Model Year (which is complete for
many manufacturers) and to the 2017 and 2018 Model Years (for which
manufacturers have already set compliance plans based on guidance
from NHTSA, including the [historical penalty amounts of $5.50 per
tenth of an mpg]). Applying the increased civil penalties in this
manner is profoundly unfair to manufacturers, does not improve the
effectiveness of this penalty, and does nothing to further the
policies underlying the CAFE statute.
Industry Petition at 3.
In the alternative, the Industry Petition requested that if NHTSA
decided to apply the penalty increase to MYs 2014-2018, the Agency
should recalculate the adjusted penalty rate
[[Page 95490]]
using 2007 as the ``base year'' for calculating the inflation
adjustment. As another alternative, the Industry Petition sought a
finding that immediately increasing the penalty to $14 would cause a
``negative economic impact,'' thereby requiring a smaller initial
penalty increase. See Public Law 114-74, Sec. 701(c) (providing for an
exception to the otherwise-applicable penalty increase, if the Agency
finds through a rulemaking proceeding that the increase would cause a
``negative economic impact,'' a term that the statute does not
define).\7\
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\7\ Because the Agency is granting the Industry Petition's
request to apply inflation-adjusted penalties only to MY 2019 and
after, the Agency need not address the Industry Petition's
alternative requests.
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III. Petition for Rulemaking To Raise Civil Penalty Rate
The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) petitioned NHTSA on
October 1, 2015, just over a month prior to passage of the Act, to
conduct a rulemaking to raise the civil penalty rate for CAFE standard
violations under NHTSA's then-existing statutory authority. The CBD
petition stated correctly that NHTSA had not adjusted the $5.50 civil
penalty rate for inflation since 1997, and requested that the Agency
follow the procedure laid out at 49 U.S.C. 32912(c) to undertake a
rulemaking to raise the amount to the maximum then allowed by Congress,
$10 per tenth-of-an-mpg. A month later, Congress changed the statutory
landscape by enacting the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Act Improvements Act of 2015.
IV. NHTSA Response to Petitions
Having carefully considered the issues raised by the petitioners,
NHTSA will grant the Industry Petition in part and deny it in part.
Beginning with model year 2019, NHTSA will apply the full penalty
prescribed by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Improvements Act of 2015. NHTSA is required by the Act to continue
adjusting the civil penalty for inflation each year, so the penalty
rate applicable to MY 2019 and after fleets will be $14 per tenth-of-
an-mpg, plus any adjustment(s) for inflation that occur between now and
a violation's assessment. The Agency concludes that this decision also
effectively addresses the issue raised by the CBD Petition. The
discussion below presents the Agency's analysis and conclusion.
A. Model Years 2014-2016
NHTSA agrees with the Industry Petitioners that applying the $14
civil penalty rate to violations of CAFE standards in model years prior
to the enactment of the Act would not result in additional fuel
savings, and thus would seem to impose retroactive punishment without
accomplishing Congress' specific intent in establishing the civil
penalty provision of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (``EPCA'').
Model years typically begin prior to their respective calendar year. By
November 2, 2015 (the date of enactment of the civil penalties
adjustment Act), nearly all manufacturers subject to the CAFE standards
had completed both model years 2014 and 2015, and no further vehicles
in those model years were being produced in significant numbers. This
argument is even stronger considering that all manufacturers would have
completed these model years prior to July 5, 2016, the date of the IFR.
If all the vehicles for a model year have already been produced, then
there is no way for their manufacturers to raise the fuel economy level
of those vehicles in order to avoid higher penalty rates for non-
compliance.
In the specific context of EPCA as amended, the purpose of civil
penalties for non-compliance is to encourage manufacturers to comply
with the CAFE standards. See 49 CFR 578.2 (section addressing penalties
states that a ``purpose of this part is to effectuate the remedial
impact of civil penalties and to foster compliance with the law''); see
generally, 49 U.S.C. 32911-32912; United States v. General Motors, 385
F.Supp. 598, 604 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 527 F.2d 853
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (``The policy of the Act with regard to civil
penalties is clearly to discourage noncompliance''). Assuming that
higher civil penalty rates are intended, in the particular context of
CAFE, to provide greater incentives for manufacturers to comply with
applicable standards, then raising penalty rates for model years
already completed and thus unchangeable would be not only
retroactive,\8\ but incapable of serving the purpose of causing greater
compliance with CAFE standards. Based on the governing statutory
framework and the specific CAFE regulatory scheme, NHTSA believes that
Congress would not have intended retroactive application of an
inflation adjustment to overcome this core substantive purpose and
intent of EPCA. This analysis compels the conclusion that applying an
increased penalty rate to MYs 2014 and 2015 would not be appropriate,
nor would applying it to MY 2016, which was underway by November 2,
2015 and over halfway complete by July 5, 2016.\9\
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\8\ Retroactivity is not favored in the law. The Supreme Court
has stated that ``congressional enactments . . . will not be
construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires
this result.'' Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280
(1994), citing Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S.
204, 208 (1988). NHTSA believes that in the specific context of the
CAFE program and the statutes that govern it, Congress could not
have intended to impose higher civil penalty rates for time periods
when they would not incentivize increased fuel economy.
\9\ The decision not to apply the increased penalties
retroactively is similar to the approach taken by various other
federal agencies in implementing the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015. See, e.g.,
Department of Justice, Interim final rule with request for comments:
Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 81 FR 42491 (June 30,
2016) (applying increased penalties only to violations after
November 2, 2015, the date of the Act's enactment); Federal Aviation
Administration, Interim Final Rule: Revisions to Civil Penalty
Inflation Adjustment Tables, 81 FR 43463 (July 5, 2016) (applying
increased penalties only to violations after August 1, 2016).
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B. Model Years 2017 and 2018
The Industry Petition asserts that manufacturers have set their
product and compliance plans for MY 2017 and 2018 based on the CAFE
penalty provisions in place prior to July 2016, and that it is too late
at this juncture to make significant changes to those plans and avoid
non-compliances (for the manufacturers already intending not to
comply). The Agency determined above that it is not appropriate to
apply an increased penalty rate to CAFE non-compliance in past model
years, i.e., MY 2016 and before, which could not be changed in response
to a higher penalty rate. The next question presented by the Industry
Petition is how to address future model years' vehicles whose fuel
economy levels cannot be changed at this juncture.
For immediate future model years (i.e., 2017 and 2018), the
theoretical possibility exists that manufacturers could respond to a
higher penalty rate by increasing their fleet fuel economy and thus
achieving CAFE compliance or mitigating their non-compliance. However,
because of industry design, development, and production cycles, vehicle
designs (including drivetrains, which are where many fuel economy
improvements are made) are often fixed years in advance, making
adjustments to fleet fuel economy difficult without a lead time of
multiple years.
Here, the Industry Petitioners assert that their plans for what
technology to put on which MYs 2017 and 2018 vehicles are, at the point
the IFR was issued, fixed and inalterable. NHTSA takes manufacturers'
product cycles into account when NHTSA sets fuel economy standards. For
example,
[[Page 95491]]
because NHTSA recognizes that manufacturers' product and compliance
plans are difficult to alter significantly for years ahead of a given
model year,\10\ the Agency includes product cadence in its assessment
of CAFE standards, by limiting application of technology in its
analytical model to years in which vehicles are refreshed or
redesigned. NHTSA believes that this approach facilitates continued
fuel economy improvements over the longer term by accounting for the
fact that manufacturers will seek to make improvements when and where
they are most cost-effective.
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\10\ One of the Industry Petitioners, the Alliance, submitted
supplemental materials describing the activities and events that
make up product cycles, which support this point. See Docket No.
NHTSA-2016-0136.
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In an analogous context, EPCA provides that when DOT amends a fuel
economy standard to make it more stringent, that new standard must be
promulgated ``at least 18 months before the beginning of the model year
to which the amendment applies.'' 49 U.S.C. 32902(a)(2). The 18 months'
notice requirement for increases in fuel economy standards represents a
congressional acknowledgement of the importance of advance notice to
vehicle manufacturers to allow them the lead time necessary to adjust
their product plans, designs, and compliance plans to address changes
in fuel economy standards. Similarly here, affording manufacturers lead
time to adjust their products and compliance plans helps them to
account for such an increase in the civil penalty amount. In this
unique case, the 18-month lead time for increases in the stringency of
fuel economy standards provides a reasonable proxy for appropriate
advance notice of the application of substantially increased--here
nearly tripled--civil penalties.
Given that NHTSA issued the IFR in July 2016, 18 months from that
date would be January 2018, which would encompass MY 2017 for most
manufacturers and models and part of MY 2018. Based on the Industry
Petition, comments, and agency expertise, NHTSA believes that, in this
instance, applying the adjusted penalties only for MY 2019 and after
provides a reasonable amount of lead time for manufacturers to adjust
their plans and products to take into account the substantial change in
penalty level.
For future model years for which the vehicles to be produced and
their technologies are essentially fixed (i.e., MYs 2017-2018), it is
conceivable that some manufacturers might be able to change production
volumes of certain lower- or higher-fuel-economy models, which could
help them to reduce or avoid CAFE non-compliance penalties. However, in
this particular instance, compelling such a result through the
immediate application of higher penalty rates to product design
decisions that have already been made and cannot be changed would be
contrary to a fundamental congressional purpose of the CAFE program.
The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) amendments of 2007
required that fuel economy standards be attribute-based, demonstrating
congressional intent that the CAFE program be responsive to consumer
demand. See 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3). Applying higher civil penalty rates
in a way that would force manufacturers to disregard consumer demand
(e.g., by restricting the availability of vehicles that consumers want)
would be inconsistent with that fundamental statutory command.
Providing some lead time, as here, mitigates that concern.
In order to reconcile competing statutory objectives in the unique
context of multi-year vehicle product cycles, NHTSA will grant the
Industry Petition insofar as it seeks to apply the penalty increase
only for model years 2019 and after. For CAFE standard non-compliances
that occur(ed) for model years 2014-2018, NHTSA intends to assess civil
penalties at the rate of $5.50 per tenth of an mpg. Beginning with
model year 2019, NHTSA will apply the full penalty prescribed by the
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Improvements Act of 2015.
NHTSA is required by the Act to continue adjusting the civil penalty
for inflation each year, so the penalty rate applicable to MY-2019-and-
after fleets will be $14 per tenth-of-an-mpg, plus any adjustment(s)
for inflation that occur between now and then. See Public Law 114-74,
Sec. 701(b)(2).
NHTSA believes this approach appropriately harmonizes the two
congressional directives of adjusting civil penalties to account for
inflation and maintaining attribute-based, consumer-demand-focused
standards, applied in the context of the presumption against
retroactive application of statutes. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208. This decision increases civil penalties
starting with the model year that manufacturers, in this particular
instance, are reasonably able to design and produce vehicles in
response to the increased penalties. See Industry Petition at 4-6
(seeking application of the adjusted civil penalties only to MY 2019
and after).
In summary, NHTSA partially grants the Industry Petition for
Reconsideration insofar as it seeks implementation of the civil
penalties adjustment only to MY 2019 and after, and denies the Industry
Petition in all other respects.
This action also effectively responds to the petition for
rulemaking from CBD to increase the civil penalty rate as permitted by
EPCA/EISA. The civil penalty rate beginning in MY 2019 will be
substantially higher than the CBD petition requested, and NHTSA
believes that the increased penalty will accomplish CBD's goal of
encouraging manufacturers to apply more fuel-saving technologies to
their vehicles in those future model years. To the extent that the CBD
Petition requests an earlier penalty rate increase, it is denied for
the reasons set forth in this decision.
V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures
NHTSA has considered the impact of this rulemaking action under
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and the Department of
Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures. This rulemaking
document was not reviewed under Executive Order 12866 or Executive
Order 13563, and has been determined not to be ``significant'' under
the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures
and the policies of the Office of Management and Budget.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
NHTSA has also considered the impacts of this rule under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. I certify that this rule will not have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The
following provides the factual basis for this certification under 5
U.S.C. 605(b). The amendments only affect manufacturers of motor
vehicles. Low-volume manufacturers can petition NHTSA for an alternate
CAFE standard under 49 CFR part 525, which lessens the impacts of this
rulemaking on small businesses by allowing them to avoid liability for
potential penalties under 49 CFR 578.6(h)(2). Small organizations and
governmental jurisdictions will not be significantly affected as the
price of motor vehicles and equipment ought not change as the result of
this rule.
C. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
Executive Order 13132 requires NHTSA to develop an accountable
process to ensure ``meaningful and timely input by State and local
officials
[[Page 95492]]
in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism
implications.'' ``Policies that have federalism implications'' is
defined in the Executive Order to include regulations that have
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.'' Under
Executive Order 13132, the agency may not issue a regulation with
Federalism implications, that imposes substantial direct compliance
costs, and that is not required by statute, unless the Federal
government provides the funds necessary to pay the direct compliance
costs incurred by State and local governments, or the agency consults
with State and local governments early in the process of developing the
proposed regulation.
This rule will not have substantial direct effects on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government, as specified in Executive Order 13132. The reason
is that this rule applies to motor vehicle manufacturers. Thus, the
requirements of Section 6 of the Executive Order do not apply.
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Public Law 104-4,
requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the cost,
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more
than $100 million annually. Because NHTSA does not believe that this
rule will necessarily have a $100 million effect, no Unfunded Mandates
assessment will be prepared.
E. Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice Reform)
This rule does not have a retroactive or preemptive effect.
Judicial review of this rule may be obtained pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 702.
That section does not require that a petition for reconsideration be
filed prior to seeking judicial review.
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, we state
that there are no requirements for information collection associated
with this rulemaking action.
G. Privacy Act
Please note that anyone is able to search the electronic form of
all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the
individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted
on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT's complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 578
Fuel economy, Motor vehicles, Penalties.
In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR part 578 is amended as
set forth below.
PART 578--CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES
0
1. The authority citation for 49 CFR part 578 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 101-410, Pub. L. 104-134, Pub. L. 109-59,
Pub. L. 114-74, Pub L. 114-94, 49 U.S.C. 32902 and 32912; delegation
of authority at 49 CFR 1.81, 1.95.
0
2. Section 578.6 is amended by revising paragraph (h) to read as
follows:
Sec. 578.6 Civil penalties for violations of specified provisions of
Title 49 of the United States Code.
* * * * *
(h) Automobile fuel economy. (1) A person that violates 49 U.S.C.
32911(a) is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty
of not more than $40,000 for each violation. A separate violation
occurs for each day the violation continues.
(2) Except as provided in 49 U.S.C. 32912(c), beginning with model
year 2019, a manufacturer that violates a standard prescribed for a
model year under 49 U.S.C. 32902 is liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty of $14, plus any adjustments for
inflation that occurred or may occur (for model years before model year
2019, the civil penalty is $5.50), multiplied by each .1 of a mile a
gallon by which the applicable average fuel economy standard under that
section exceeds the average fuel economy--
(i) Calculated under 49 U.S.C. 32904(a)(1)(A) or (B) for
automobiles to which the standard applies produced by the manufacturer
during the model year;
(ii) Multiplied by the number of those automobiles; and
(iii) Reduced by the credits available to the manufacturer under 49
U.S.C. 32903 for the model year.
* * * * *
Issued on: December 21, 2016.
Mark R. Rosekind,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2016-31136 Filed 12-27-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P