Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, and Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education Grant Program, 75926-76089 [2016-25448]
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75926
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 211 / Tuesday, November 1, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
34 CFR Parts 30, 668, 674, 682, 685,
and 686
RIN 1840–AD19
[Docket ID ED–2015–OPE–0103]
Student Assistance General
Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan
Program, Federal Family Education
Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal
Direct Loan Program, and Teacher
Education Assistance for College and
Higher Education Grant Program
Office of Postsecondary
Education, Department of Education.
ACTION: Final regulations.
AGENCY:
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Summary
The Secretary establishes new
regulations governing the William D.
Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan)
Program to establish a new Federal
standard and a process for determining
whether a borrower has a defense to
repayment on a loan based on an act or
omission of a school. We also amend the
Direct Loan Program regulations to
prohibit participating schools from
using certain contractual provisions
regarding dispute resolution processes,
such as predispute arbitration
agreements or class action waivers, and
to require certain notifications and
disclosures by schools regarding their
use of arbitration. We amend the Direct
Loan Program regulations to codify our
current policy regarding the impact that
discharges have on the 150 percent
Direct Subsidized Loan Limit. We
amend the Student Assistance General
Provisions regulations to revise the
financial responsibility standards and
add disclosure requirements for schools.
Finally, we amend the discharge
provisions in the Federal Perkins Loan
(Perkins Loan), Direct Loan, Federal
Family Education Loan (FFEL), and
Teacher Education Assistance for
College and Higher Education (TEACH)
Grant programs. The changes will
provide transparency, clarity, and ease
of administration to current and new
regulations and protect students, the
Federal government, and taxpayers
against potential school liabilities
resulting from borrower defenses.
DATES: These regulations are effective
July 1, 2017. Implementation date: For
the implementation dates of the
included regulatory provisions, see the
Implementation Date of These
Regulations section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
further information related to borrower
defenses, Barbara Hoblitzell at (202)
453–7583 or by email at:
Barbara.Hoblitzell@ed.gov. For further
SUMMARY:
information related to false certification
and closed school loan discharges, Brian
Smith at (202) 453–7440 or by email at:
Brian.Smith@ed.gov. For further
information regarding institutional
accountability, John Kolotos or Greg
Martin at (202) 453–7646 or (202) 453–
7535 or by email at: John.Kolotos@
ed.gov or Gregory.Martin@ed.gov.
If you use a telecommunications
device for the deaf (TDD) or a text
telephone (TTY), call the Federal Relay
Service (FRS), toll free, at 1–800–877–
8339.
Purpose of This Regulatory Action:
The purpose of the borrower defense
regulations is to protect student loan
borrowers from misleading, deceitful,
and predatory practices of, and failures
to fulfill contractual promises by,
institutions participating in the
Department’s student aid programs.
Most postsecondary institutions provide
a high-quality education that equips
students with new knowledge and skills
and prepares them for their careers.
However, when postsecondary
institutions make false and misleading
statements to students or prospective
students about school or career
outcomes or financing needed to pay for
those programs, or fail to fulfill specific
contractual promises regarding program
offerings or educational services,
student loan borrowers may be eligible
for discharge of their Federal loans.
The final regulations give students
access to consistent, clear, fair, and
transparent processes to seek debt relief;
protect taxpayers by requiring that
financially risky institutions are
prepared to take responsibility for losses
to the government for discharges of and
repayments for Federal student loans;
provide due process for students and
institutions; and warn students in
advertising and promotional materials,
using plain language issued by the
Department, about proprietary schools
at which the typical student experiences
poor loan repayment outcomes—
defined in these final regulations as a
proprietary school at which the median
borrower has not repaid in full, or made
loan payments sufficient to reduce by at
least one dollar the outstanding balance
of, the borrower’s loans received at the
institution—so that students can make
more informed enrollment and
financing decisions.
Section 455(h) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965, as amended
(HEA), 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h), authorizes
the Secretary to specify in regulation
which acts or omissions of an
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institution of higher education a
borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment of a Direct Loan. Section
685.206(c), governing defenses to
repayment, has been in place since 1995
but, until recently, has rarely been used.
Those final regulations specify that a
borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment any ‘‘act or omission of the
school attended by the student that
would give rise to a cause of action
against the school under applicable
State law.’’
In response to the collapse of
Corinthian Colleges (Corinthian) and the
flood of borrower defense claims
submitted by Corinthian students
stemming from the school’s misconduct,
the Secretary announced in June 2015
that the Department would develop new
regulations to establish a more
accessible and consistent borrower
defense standard and clarify and
streamline the borrower defense process
to protect borrowers and improve the
Department’s ability to hold schools
accountable for actions and omissions
that result in loan discharges.
These final regulations specify the
conditions and processes under which a
borrower may assert a defense to
repayment of a Direct Loan, also
referred to as a ‘‘borrower defense.’’ The
current standard allows borrowers to
assert a borrower defense if a cause of
action would have arisen under
applicable State law. In contrast, these
final regulations establish a new Federal
standard that will allow a borrower to
assert a borrower defense on the basis of
a substantial misrepresentation, a
breach of contract, or a favorable,
nondefault contested judgment against
the school, for its act or omission
relating to the making of the borrower’s
Direct Loan or the provision of
educational services for which the loan
was provided. The new standard will
apply to loans made after the effective
date of the proposed regulations. The
final regulations establish a process for
borrowers to assert a borrower defense
that will be implemented both for
claims that fall under the existing
standard and for later claims that fall
under the new, proposed standard. In
addition, the final regulations establish
the conditions or events upon which an
institution is or may be required to
provide to the Department financial
protection, such as a letter of credit, to
help protect students, the Federal
government, and taxpayers against
potential institutional liabilities.
These final regulations also prohibit a
school participating in the Direct Loan
Program from obtaining, through the use
of contractual provisions or other
agreements, a predispute agreement for
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arbitration to resolve claims brought by
a borrower against the school that could
also form the basis of a borrower
defense under the Department’s
regulations. The final regulations also
prohibit a school participating in the
Direct Loan Program from obtaining an
agreement, either in an arbitration
agreement or in another form, that a
borrower waive his or her right to
initiate or participate in a class action
lawsuit regarding such claims and from
requiring students to engage in internal
dispute processes before contacting
accrediting or government agencies with
authority over the school regarding such
claims. In addition, the final regulations
impose certain notification and
disclosure requirements on a school
regarding claims that are the subject of
a lawsuit filed in court or that are
voluntarily submitted to arbitration after
a dispute has arisen.
Summary of the Major Provisions of
This Regulatory Action: For the Direct
Loan Program, the final regulations—
• Clarify that borrowers with loans
first disbursed prior to July 1, 2017, may
assert a defense to repayment under the
current borrower defense State law
standard;
• Establish a new Federal standard
for borrower defenses, and limitation
periods applicable to the claims asserted
under that standard, for borrowers with
loans first disbursed on or after July 1,
2017;
• Establish a process for the assertion
and resolution of borrower defense
claims made by individuals;
• Establish a process for group
borrower defense claims with respect to
both open and closed schools, including
the conditions under which the
Secretary may allow a claim to proceed
without receiving an application;
• Provide for remedial actions the
Secretary may take to collect losses
arising out of successful borrower
defense claims for which an institution
is liable; and
• Add provisions to schools’ Direct
Loan Program participation agreements
(PPAs) that, for claims that may form
the basis for borrower defenses—
D Prevent schools from requiring that
students first engage in a school’s
internal complaint process before
contacting accrediting and government
agencies about the complaint;
D Prohibit the use of predispute
arbitration agreements by schools;
D Prohibit the use of class action
lawsuit waivers;
D To the extent schools and borrowers
engage in arbitration in a manner
consistent with applicable law and
regulation, require schools to disclose to
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and notify the Secretary of arbitration
filings and awards; and
D Require schools to disclose to and
notify the Secretary of certain judicial
filings and dispositions.
The final regulations also revise the
Student Assistance General Provisions
regulations to—
• Amend the definition of a
misrepresentation to include omissions
of information and statements with a
likelihood or tendency to mislead under
the circumstances. The definition would
be amended for misrepresentations for
which the Secretary may impose a fine,
or limit, suspend, or terminate an
institution’s participation in title IV,
HEA programs. This definition is also
adopted as a basis for alleging borrower
defense claims for Direct Loans first
disbursed after July 1, 2017;
• Clarify that a limitation may
include a change in an institution’s
participation status in title IV, HEA
programs from fully certified to
provisionally certified;
• Amend the financial responsibility
standards to include actions and events
that would trigger a requirement that a
school provide financial protection,
such as a letter of credit, to insure
against future borrower defense claims
and other liabilities to the Department;
• Require proprietary schools at
which the median borrower has not
repaid in full, or paid down by at least
one dollar the outstanding balance of,
the borrower’s loans to provide a
Department-issued plain language
warning in promotional materials and
advertisements; and
• Require a school to disclose on its
Web site and to prospective and
enrolled students if it is required to
provide financial protection, such as a
letter of credit, to the Department.
The final regulations also—
• Expand the types of documentation
that may be used for the granting of a
discharge based on the death of the
borrower (‘‘death discharge’’) in the
Perkins, FFEL, Direct Loan, and TEACH
Grant programs;
• Revise the Perkins, FFEL, and
Direct Loan closed school discharge
regulations to ensure borrowers are
aware of and able to benefit from their
ability to receive the discharge;
• Expand the conditions under which
a FFEL or Direct Loan borrower may
qualify for a false certification
discharge;
• Codify the Department’s current
policy regarding the impact that a
discharge of a Direct Subsidized Loan
has on the 150 percent Direct
Subsidized Loan limit; and
• Make technical corrections to other
provisions in the FFEL and Direct Loan
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program regulations and to the
regulations governing the Secretary’s
debt compromise authority.
Costs and Benefits: As noted in the
NPRM, the primary potential benefits of
these regulations are: (1) An updated
and clarified process and a Federal
standard to improve the borrower
defense process and usage of the
borrower defense process to increase
protections for students; (2) increased
financial protections for taxpayers and
the Federal government; (3) additional
information to help students,
prospective students, and their families
make informed decisions based on
information about an institution’s
financial soundness and its borrowers’
loan repayment outcomes; (4) improved
conduct of schools by holding
individual institutions accountable and
thereby deterring misconduct by other
schools; (5) improved awareness and
usage, where appropriate, of closed
school and false certification discharges;
and (6) technical changes to improve the
administration of the title IV, HEA
programs. Costs associated with the
regulations will fall on a number of
affected entities including institutions,
guaranty agencies, the Federal
government, and taxpayers. These costs
include changes to business practices,
review of marketing materials,
additional employee training, and
unreimbursed claims covered by
taxpayers. The largest quantified impact
of the regulations is the transfer of funds
from the Federal government to
borrowers who succeed in a borrower
defense claim, a significant share of
which will be offset by the recovery of
funds from institutions whose conduct
gave rise to the claims.
On June 16, 2016, the Secretary
published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) for these parts in
the Federal Register (81 FR 39329). The
final regulations contain changes from
the NPRM, which are fully explained in
the Analysis of Comments and Changes
section of this document.
Implementation Date of These
Regulations: Section 482(c) of the HEA
requires that regulations affecting
programs under title IV of the HEA be
published in final form by November 1,
prior to the start of the award year (July
1) to which they apply. However, that
section also permits the Secretary to
designate any regulation as one that an
entity subject to the regulations may
choose to implement earlier and the
conditions for early implementation.
The Secretary is exercising his
authority under section 482(c) to
designate the following new regulations
included in this document for early
implementation beginning on November
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1, 2016, at the discretion of each lender
or guaranty agency:
(1) Section 682.211(i)(7).
(2) Section 682.410(b)(6)(viii).
Additionally, the Secretary intends to
exercise his authority under section
482(c) of the HEA to permit the
Secretary and guaranty agencies to
implement the new and amended
regulations specific to automatic closed
school discharges in §§ 674.33(g)(3)(ii),
682.402(d)(8)(ii) and 685.214(c)(2)(ii) as
soon as operationally possible after the
publication date of these final
regulations. We will publish a separate
Federal Register notice to announce this
implementation date.
The Secretary has not designated any
of the remaining provisions in these
final regulations for early
implementation. Therefore, the
remaining final regulations included in
this document are effective July 1, 2017.
Public Comment: In response to our
invitation in the June 16, 2016, NPRM,
more than 50,000 parties submitted
comments on the proposed regulations.
We discuss substantive issues under
the sections of the proposed regulations
to which they pertain. Generally, we do
not address technical or other minor
changes or recommendations that are
out of the scope of this regulatory action
or that would require statutory changes
in this preamble.
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Analysis of Comments and Changes
An analysis of the comments and of
any changes in the regulations since
publication of the NPRM follows.
General
Comments: Many commenters
supported the Department’s proposals to
improve the borrower defense
regulations by establishing a Federal
standard for permissible defenses to
borrower repayment, standardizing the
defense to repayment claim processes
for both borrowers and institutions, and
strengthening the financial
responsibility standards for institutions.
The commenters also supported
granting automatic closed school
discharges in certain instances and
ending the use of mandatory, predispute
arbitration agreements at schools that
receive Federal financial aid.
Other commenters expressed support
for the proposed regulations, but felt
that the Department should further
strengthen them. For example, these
commenters believed that the final
regulations should provide full loan
relief to all defrauded students,
eliminate the six-year time limit to
recover amounts that borrowers have
already paid on loans for which they
have a borrower defense based on a
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breach of contract or substantial
misrepresentation, and allow automatic
group discharges without an application
in cases where there is sufficient
evidence of a school’s wrongdoing.
Many commenters agreed with the
Department’s proposed objectives, but
believed that the proposed regulations
would have the unintended
consequences of creating a ‘‘cottage
industry’’ of opportunistic attorneys and
agents attempting to capitalize on
students who have been, or believe they
have been, victims of wrongdoing by
schools and unleashing a torrent of
frivolous and costly lawsuits, which
would tarnish the reputation of many
institutions. The commenters also
believed that the proposed Federal
standard is so broad that borrowers will
have nothing to lose by claiming a
borrower defense even if they are
employed and happy with their college
experience.
Many commenters did not support the
proposed regulations and stated that the
Department should completely revise
them and issue another NPRM and 30day comment period, or that the
proposed regulations should be
withdrawn completely. The commenters
were concerned that the projected net
budget impact provided in the NPRM
would undermine the integrity of the
Direct Loan Program and that neither
American taxpayers, nor schools that
have successfully educated students,
could cover these costs if thousands of
students or graduates start requesting
discharges of their loans. Other
commenters stated that the proposed
regulations would create unneeded
administrative and financial burdens for
institutions that work hard to comply
with the Department’s regulations and
establish new substantive standards of
liability, new procedural issues, new
burdens of proof, widespread and
unwarranted ‘‘triggering’’ of the
financial responsibility requirements,
and the abolition of a ‘‘Congressionally
favored’’ arbitration remedy, that are
unnecessary or counterproductive.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenters’ support. In response to the
commenters requesting that the
proposed regulations be strengthened,
completely revised, or withdrawn, we
believe these final regulations strike the
right balance between our goals of
providing transparency, clarity, and
ease of administration to the current and
new regulations while at the same time
protecting students, the Federal
government, and taxpayers against
potential liabilities resulting from
borrower defenses. In response to
commenters’ concerns that the proposed
regulations will create a ‘‘cottage
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industry’’ of opportunistic attorneys
attempting to capitalize on victimized
students and unleash a torrent of
frivolous lawsuits, the individual
borrower defense process described in
§ 685.222(e) is intended to be a simple
process that a borrower may access
without the aid of counsel. Similarly, by
providing that only a designated
Department official may present group
borrower claims in the group processes
described in § 685.222(f) to (h), the
Department believes that the potential
for frivolous suits in the borrower
defense process will be limited. To date,
Department staff have generally not
received borrower defense claims
submitted by attorneys, opportunistic or
otherwise, and we have not observed
the filing of frivolous lawsuits against
schools. We will monitor both situations
going forward. We note that we address
commenters’ arguments with respect to
specific provisions of the regulations in
the sections of this preamble specific to
those provisions.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter
contended that the proposed regulations
run contrary to Article III (separation of
powers) and the Seventh Amendment
(right to jury trial) of the Constitution,
in that it would vest the Department
with exclusive judicial powers to
determine private causes of action in the
absence of a jury.
The commenter contended that the
proposed regulations do not ensure
Constitutional due process because they
do not ensure that schools would have
the right to receive notice of all the
evidence presented by a borrower in the
new borrower defense proceedings. The
commenter stated that the lack of due
process also affects the process for
deciding claims, under which the
Department is effectively the prosecutor,
the judge, the only source of appeal, and
the entity tasked with executing
judgment.
The commenter also contended that a
breach of contract or a
misrepresentation determination are
determinations that normally arise in
common law claims and defenses and
are subject to the expertise of the courts,
rather than a particular government
agency. The commenter believes that
these determinations are not matters of
public right, but are instead matters of
‘‘private right, that is, of the liability of
one individual to another under the law
as defined,’’ which cannot be delegated
outside the judiciary. Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011) (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50
(1932).
Discussion: The rights adjudicated in
borrower defense proceedings are rights
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of the Direct Loan borrower against the
government regarding the borrower’s
obligation to repay a loan made by the
government, and rights of the
government to recover from the school
for losses incurred as a result of the act
or omission of the school in
participating in the Federal loan
program. The terms of these rights are
governed (for loans disbursed prior to
July 1, 2017) by common law or State
law, but in each instance the rights are
asserted against or by a Federal agency,
with respect to obligations incurred by
the borrower and the school in the
course of their voluntary participation
in the Federal loan program. Those facts
give the rights adjudicated in these
proceedings, both the individual
borrower adjudications and the
adjudications of group claims against
the school, the character of public
rights, even if the resolution of those
rights turns on application of common
law and State law (for current loans),
and thus giving them some of the
characteristics of private rights as well.
Even if these common law rights of
the borrower and the school were to be
considered simply private rights,
Congress could properly consign their
adjudication to the Department, as it did
in committing purely private rights of
the investor and broker asserted in its
reparations program to the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission for
adjudication. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986). In Schor, the competing claims
asserted were not creations of Federal
law, nor were the rights asserted by or
against a Federal agency. Nevertheless,
the Court ruled that Congress properly
assigned adjudication of those private
rights to the agency. Like the claimants
in Schor, both parties—the Direct Loan
borrower, by filing the claim for relief,
and the Direct Loan-participant school,
by entering into the Direct Loan
Participation Agreement—have
consented to adjudications of their
respective rights by the Federal
agency—the Department. Moreover,
these rights are adjudicated in this
context precisely because Congress
directed the Department to establish by
regulation which acts or omissions of a
school would be recognized by the
Department as defenses to repayment of
the Direct Loan; by so doing, and by
further requiring the Department to
conduct a predeprivation hearing before
credit bureau reporting, Federal offset,
wage garnishment, of Federal salary
offset, Congress necessarily committed
adjudication of these claims to the
Department. 20 U.S.C. 1080a(c)(4), 31
U.S.C. 3711(e) (credit bureau reporting);
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5 U.S.C. 5514 (Federal salary offset); 20
U.S.C. 1095, 31 U.S.C. 3720D (wage
garnishment); 31 U.S.C. 3716, 3720B
(Federal payment offset). Similarly, by
recognizing that acts or omissions of the
school in participating in the title IV,
HEA programs would give rise to a
claim by the Department against the
school that arises not by virtue of any
statutory requirement, but under
common law as discussed elsewhere
and by requiring the Department to
provide a hearing for a school that
disputes that common law claim for
damages, Congress necessarily
committed adjudication of that common
law claim to the Department. 20 U.S.C.
1094(b) (administrative hearing on
appeal of audit or program review
liability claim). In each of these
instances, judicial review of these
agency adjudications by an Article III
court is available under the APA. 5
U.S.C. 706. The fact that the borrower,
the school, and the Department might
have pursued their claims solely in a
judicial forum instead of an
administrative forum does not preclude
assignment of their adjudication to the
Department: ‘‘(T)he Congress, in
exercising the powers confided to it may
establish ‘legislative’ courts . . . to
serve as special tribunals ‘to examine
and determine various matters, arising
between the government and others,
which from their nature do not require
judicial determination and yet are
susceptible of it.’ ’’ Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 452 (1977)
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
50 (1932)).
As to the assertion that committing
adjudication of these claims to the
Department deprives a party of the right
to trial by jury, the Court has long
rejected that argument, as it stated in
Atlas Roofing, on which the commenter
relies:
. . . the Seventh Amendment is generally
inapplicable in administrative proceedings,
where jury trials would be incompatible with
the whole concept of administrative
adjudication. . . . This is the case even if the
Seventh Amendment would have required a
jury where the adjudication of those rights is
assigned instead to a federal court of law
instead of an administrative agency.
Atlas Roofing Co, 430 U.S. at 454–55
(quoting Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416
U.S. 363, 383 (1974)).
We address the comment with respect
to ensuring due process in the sections
of this preamble specific to the
framework for the borrower defense
claims process.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters
asserted that the Department lacks
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authority to recover from the institution
losses incurred by reason of borrower
defenses to repayment. A commenter
asserted that nothing in section 455(h)
of the HEA (20 U.S.C. 1087e(h)) permits
the Department to seek recoupment
from any institution related to defenses
to repayment. In contrast, the
commenter asserted, section 437(c)(1) of
the HEA (20 U.S.C. 1087) explicitly
provides that, in the case of closed
school discharges, the Secretary shall
pursue any claim ‘‘available to the
borrower’’ against the institution to
recover the amounts discharged. The
commenter contended that this clear
grant of authority to pursue claims to
recoup funds associated with closed
school discharges and false certification
discharges indicates that Congress
intended no grant of authority to recover
for borrower defense losses. The
commenter noted that the Department
conditions discharge on the borrower
transferring any claim she has against
the institution to the Department. The
commenter asserted that this assignment
does not empower the Department to
enforce the borrower’s claim, because
the Secretary does not have the ability
to acquire a claim from the borrower on
which it may seek recoupment from a
school. The commenter based this
position on section 437(c) of the HEA,
which provides that a borrower who
obtains a closed school or false
certification discharge is ‘‘deemed to
have assigned to the United States the
right to a loan refund,’’ and the absence
of any comparable provision in section
455 of the HEA, which authorizes the
Secretary to determine which acts or
omissions of the institution may
constitute defenses to repayment of a
Direct Loan. Given that Congress
indicated clear intent that the Secretary
pursue claims related to closed school
and false certification discharges, and
explicitly provided for an assignment of
claims, the commenter considered the
failure of Congress to give any
indication it wanted the Department to
pursue claims of recoupment against
institutions for section 455(h) loan
discharges, or to acquire any claims
from borrowers related to section 455(h)
discharges, to show congressional intent
to preclude a recoupment remedy
against institutions.
Another commenter questioned
whether the Department would have a
valid right to enforce a collection
against an institution in the absence of
what the commenter called a ‘‘thirdparty adjudication’’ of the loan
discharge.
A commenter stated that the
Department could not recover from the
institution losses incurred from
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borrower defense claims because the
commenter considered those losses to
be incurred voluntarily by the
Department. The commenter based this
view on common law, under which a
person who voluntarily pays another
with full knowledge of the facts will not
be entitled to restitution. The
commenter asserted that the Department
is further barred from recovery from the
institution under a theory of indemnity
or equitable subrogation because, under
either theory, a party that voluntarily
makes a payment or discharges a debt
may not seek reimbursement.
Discussion: We address under ‘‘Group
Process for Borrower Defenses—
Statutory Authority’’ comments
regarding whether the Department has
authority to assert against the school
claims that borrowers may have, and
discuss here only the comments that
dispute whether the Department has a
legal right to recover from a school the
amount of loss incurred by the
Department upon the recognition of a
borrower defense and corresponding
discharge of some or all of a Direct Loan
obtained to attend the school.
Applicable law gives the Department
the right to recover from the school
losses incurred on Direct Loans for
several reasons. First, section 437(c) of
the HEA gives the Department explicit
authority to recover certain losses on
Direct and FFEL loans. Section 437(c)
provides that, upon discharge of a FFEL
Loan for a closed school discharge, false
certification discharge, or unpaid
refund, the Secretary is authorized to
pursue any claim of the borrower
against the school, its principals, or
other source, and the borrower is
deemed to have assigned his or her
claim against the school to the
Secretary. 20 U.S.C. 1087(c). Section
487(c)(3)(ii) authorizes the Secretary to
deduct the amount of any civil penalty,
or fine, imposed under that section from
any amounts owed to the institution,
but any claim for recovery is not based
on authority to fine under that section.
Section 432(a)(6) authorizes the
Secretary to enforce any claim, however
acquired, but does not describe what
those claims may be. 20 U.S.C.
1082(a)(6) (applicable to Direct Loan
claims by virtue of section 455(a)(1), 20
U.S.C. 1078e(a)(1)). In addition, section
498(c)(1)(C) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c)(1)(C), implies that the
Secretary has claims that the Secretary
is expected to enforce and recover
against the institution for ‘‘liabilities
and debts’’—the ‘‘liabilities of such
institution to the Secretary for funds
under this title, including loan
obligations discharged pursuant to
section 437.’’ 20 U.S.C. 1099c(c)(3)(A)
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(emphasis added).1 These provisions are
meaningless if the Secretary can enforce
claims against institutions only if the
HEA or another statute explicitly
authorizes such recoveries.
There are two distinct, and
overlapping, lines of authority that
empower the Secretary to recover from
the school the amount of losses incurred
due to borrower defense claims. The
first relies on the Secretary’s
longstanding interpretation of the HEA
as authorizing such recovery. The
second relies on the government’s rights
under common law.
In both the Direct Loan and FFEL
programs, the institution plays a central
role in determining which individuals
receive loans, the amount of loan an
individual receives, and the Federal
interest subsidy, if any, that an
individual qualifies to receive on the
loan, a determination based on
assessment of financial need. In the
Direct Loan Program, the institution
determines whether and to whom the
Department makes a loan; in the FFEL
Program, the institution determines
whether and to whom a private lender
may make a loan that will be federally
reinsured.
In Chauffeur’s Training School v.
Spellings, 478 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2007),
the court addressed a challenge by an
institution to the Department’s asserted
right to hold the school liable through
an administrative procedure for losses
incurred and to be incurred on FFEL
Loans that were made by private lenders
and federally reinsured and subsidized,
after the school had wrongly determined
that the borrowers had proven eligibility
for these loans. The court noted that no
provision of the HEA expressly
authorized the Department to determine
and recover these losses on student
loans (as opposed to recovery of losses
of grant funds, expressly authorized by
20 U.S.C. 1234a)). However, the court
looked to whether the Department’s
interpretation of the HEA as authorizing
the Department to assess a liability for
loan program violations was reasonable.
478 F.3d at 129. The court concluded
that the Department had reasonably
interpreted the HEA’s grant of authority
to administer the FFEL program to
empower the Department to ‘‘assess
liability to recover its guarantee
payments’’ on loans made as a result of
1 The Secretary can require the institution to
submit ‘‘third-party financial guarantees’’ which
third-party financial guarantees shall equal not less
than one-half of the annual potential liabilities of
such institution to the Secretary for funds under
this title, including loan obligations discharged
pursuant to section 437 [20 U.S.C. 1087], and to
students for refunds of institutional charges,
including funds under this title.’’ 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c)(3)(A).
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the school’s ‘‘improper documentation.’’
Id.
Similarly, the Department is
authorized under the HEA to administer
the Direct Loan Program. The HEA
directs that, generally, Direct Loans are
made under the same ‘‘terms,
conditions, and benefits’’ as FFEL
Loans. 20 U.S.C. 1087a(b)(2),
1087e(a)(1). In 1994 and 1995, the
Department interpreted that Direct Loan
authority as giving the Department
authority to hold schools liable for
borrower defenses under both the FFEL
and Direct Loan programs, and stated
that, for this reason, it was not pursuing
more explicit regulatory authority to
govern the borrower defense process.
Thus, in Dear Colleague Letter Gen
95–8 (Jan. 1995), the Department stated
(emphasis in original):
Finally, some parties warn that Direct Loan
schools will face potential liability from
claims raised by borrowers that FFEL schools
will not face. . . . The liability of any
school—whether a Direct Loan or FFEL
participant—for conduct that breaches a duty
owed to its students is already established
under law other than the HEA—usually state
law. In fact, borrowers will have no legal
claims against Direct Loan schools that FFEL
borrowers do not already have against FFEL
schools. The potential legal liability of
schools under both programs for those claims
is the same, and the Department proposes to
develop procedures and standards to ensure
that in the future schools in both programs
will face identical actual responsibility for
borrower claims based on grievances against
schools.
The Direct Loan statute creates NO NEW
LIABILITIES for schools; the statute permits
the Department to recognize particular claims
students have against schools as defenses to
the repayment of Direct Loans held by the
Department. Current Direct Loan regulations
allow a borrower to assert as a defense any
claim that would stand as a valid claim
against the school under State law.
. . . Congress intended that schools
participating in either FFEL or Direct Loan
programs should receive parallel treatment
on important issues, and the Department has
already committed during negotiated
rulemaking to apply the same borrower
defense provisions to BOTH the Direct Loan
and FFEL programs. Therefore, schools that
cause injury to student borrowers that give
rise to legitimate claims should and, under
these proposals, will bear the risk of loss,
regardless of whether the loans are from the
Direct Loan or FFEL Program.
The Department reiterated this
position in a notice published in the
Federal Register on July 21, 1995 (60 FR
37768, 37769–37770):
Some members of the FFEL industry have
asserted that there will be greater liabilities
for institutions participating in the Direct
Loan Program than for institutions
participating in the FFEL Program as a
consequence of differences in borrower
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defenses between the Direct Loan and FFEL
Programs. These assertions are inaccurate.
The Department has consistently stated
that the potential legal liability resulting from
borrower defenses for institutions
participating in the Direct Loan Program will
not be significantly different from the
potential liability for institutions
participating in the FFEL Program. (59 FR
61671, December 1, 1994, and Dear Colleague
Letter GEN 95–8 January 1995) That potential
liability usually results from causes of action
allowed to borrowers under various State
laws, not from the HEA or any of its
implementing regulations. Institutions have
expressed some concern that there is a
potential for greater liability for institutions
in the Direct Loan Program than in the FFEL
Program under 34 CFR 685.206. The
Secretary believes that this concern is based
on a misunderstanding of current law and the
intention of the Direct Loan regulations. The
Direct Loan regulations are intended to
ensure that institutions participating in the
FFEL and Direct Loan programs have a
similar potential liability. Since 1992, the
FFEL Program regulations have provided that
an institution may be liable if a FFEL
Program loan is legally unenforceable. (34
CFR 682.609) The Secretary intended to
establish a similar standard in the Direct
Loan Program by issuing 34 CFR 685.206(c).
Consistent with that intent, the Secretary
does not plan to initiate any proceedings
against schools in the Direct Loan Program
unless an institution participating in the
FFEL Program would also face potential
liability. . . .
Thus, the Secretary will initiate
proceedings to establish school liability for
borrower defenses in the same manner and
based on the same reasons for a school that
participates in the Direct Loan Program or the
FFEL Program. . . .
Thus, applying the Chauffeur’s
Training analysis, this history and
formal interpretation shows that the
Department has, from the inception of
the Direct Loan Program, considered its
administrative authority under the HEA
for the Direct Loan Program to authorize
the Department to hold schools liable
for losses incurred through borrower
defenses, and to adopt administrative
procedures to determine and liquidate
those claims.
Alternatively, common law provides
the Department a legal right to recover
from the school the losses it incurs due
to recognition of borrower defenses on
Direct Loans. Courts have long
recognized that the government has the
same rights under common law as any
other party. U.S. v. Kearns, 595 F.2d 729
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Even when Congress
expressly provides a remedy by statute,
the government has the remedies that
‘‘normally arise out of the relationships
authorized by the statutory scheme.’’
U.S. v. Bellard, 674 F.2d 330 (5th Cir.
1982) (finding the Department had a
common law right to recover as would
any other guarantor regardless of an
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HEA provision describing the
Department as assignee/subrogor to
rights of the private lender whom it
insured).2 In fact, as noted by the
Bellard court, statutes must be read to
preserve common law rights unless the
intent to limit those rights is ‘‘clearly
and plainly expressed by the
legislature.’’ Id. The Bellard court found
no such limiting language in the HEA,
nor does any exist that is relevant to the
Direct Loan issue presented here.
The school enters into a PPA with the
Department in order to participate in the
Direct Loan Program. 20 U.S.C. 1087(a).
The PPA is a contract. San Juan City
College Inc. v. U.S., 74 Fed. Cl. 448
(2006); Chauffeurs Training School v.
Riley, 967 F.Supp. 719, 727 (N.D. N.Y.
1997). In executing the contract, the
school ‘‘assume[s] a fiduciary
relationship with the title IV, HEA
Programs.’’ Chauffeurs Training School
v. Paige, C.A. No. 01–CV–02–08 (N.D.
N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003), at 7; 34 CFR
682.82(a). An institution must ‘‘act with
the competency and integrity necessary
to qualify as a fiduciary’’ on behalf of
taxpayers, ‘‘in accordance with the
highest standard of care and diligence in
administering the program and in
accounting to the Secretary for the funds
received under [title IV HEA]
programs.’’ Id.; see 34 CFR 668.82.
Specifically, under the Direct Loan
Program, the HEA describes the
institution pursuant to its agreement
with the Department as ‘‘originating’’
Direct Loans, 20 U.S.C. 1087c(a),
1087d(b), and accepting ‘‘responsibility
and financial liability stemming from its
failure to perform its functions pursuant
to the agreement.’’ 20 U.S.C.
1087d(a)(3), 34 CFR 685.300(b)(8). The
regulations describe the role of the
institution as ‘‘originating’’ Direct
Loans. 34 CFR 685.300(c), 685.301.
As a loan ‘‘originator’’ for the
Department, the school is the authorized
agent of the Department: The school acts
pursuant to Department direction, the
school manifests its intent to act as
agent by entering into the PPA, and
most importantly, the school has power
to alter the legal relationships between
the principal (the Department) and third
parties (the students). But for the
school’s act in originating the loan,
there would be no lender-borrower
relationship.
The interests of the Department as
lender and principal in this Direct Loan
Program relationship with the
institution are simple: To enable
2 See: U.S. v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)
(courts may take it as a given that Congress has
legislated with an expectation that the [common
law] principle will apply except ‘when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ’’).
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75931
students and parents to obtain Federal
loans to pay for postsecondary
education. 20 U.S.C. 1087a. Congress
selected the vehicle—a loan, not a
grant—under which the borrower repays
the loan, made with public funds,
which in turn enables the making of
new loans to future borrowers. Acts or
omissions by an agent of the Department
that frustrate repayment by the borrower
of the amount the Department lends are
contrary to the Department’s benefit and
interest. Acts or omissions by the
institution, as the Department’s loanmaking agent, that harm the
Department’s interests in achieving the
objectives of the loan program violate
the duty of loyalty owed by the
institution as the Department’s loan
originator, or agent. The Department
made clear at the inception of the Direct
Loan relationship with the institution
that the institution would be liable for
losses caused by its acts and omissions,
in 1994 and 1995, when the Department
publicly and unequivocally adopted the
‘‘borrower defense to repayment’’
regulation, 34 CFR 685.206, and, in the
Federal Register and other statements
described earlier, stated the
consequences for the institution that
caused such losses.
The government has the same
protections against breach of fiduciary
duty that extend under common law to
any principal against its agent. U.S. v.
Kearns, at 348; see also U.S. v. York, 890
F.Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1995) (breach of
fiduciary duty to government by
contractor, loan servicing dealings
constituting conflict of interest). The
remedies available for breach of
fiduciary duty are damages resulting
from the breach of that duty. ‘‘One
standing in a fiduciary relation with
another is subject to liability to the other
for harm resulting from a breach of duty
imposed by the relation.’’ Restatement
Second, Torts § 874.
Applying this common law analysis
to the relationship between the
Department and the Direct Loan
participating institution as it bears on
the Department’s right to recover, we
note, first, that the Department has the
rights available under common law to
any other party, without regard to
whether any statute explicitly confers
such rights. Second, the institution
enters into a contract with the
Department pursuant to which the
institution acts as the Department’s
agent in the making of Direct Loans. The
school is the loan ‘‘originator’’ for the
Department. Third, under common law,
an agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all
matters connected with the agency.
Fourth, under common law, an agent’s
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breach of its fiduciary duty makes the
agent liable to the principal for the loss
that the breach of duty causes the
principal. And last, a school that
commits an act or omission that gives a
Direct Loan borrower a defense to
repayment that causes the Department
loss thereby violates its common law
fiduciary duty to act loyally for the
interests of the Department, and is liable
to the Department for losses caused by
that breach of duty.
The commenter who argued that the
Secretary incurs the loss by honoring
the borrower defense ‘‘voluntarily,’’ and
is barred by that fact from recovery
against the institution, misconceives the
nature of the claim. As early as Bellard,
the courts have consistently recognized
that in its capacity as a loan guarantor
under the FFEL Program, the
Department pays the lender under its
contractual obligation as loan guarantor,
and not as a volunteer. The Department
guarantees FFELP loans at the request of
the borrower who applied for the
guaranteed loan, as well as the lender.
By virtue of payment of the guarantee,
the Department acquired an implied-inlaw right against the borrower for
reimbursement of the losses it incurred
in honoring the guarantee—a claim
distinct from its claim as assignee from
the lender of the defaulted loan.
Similarly, where the Department incurs
a loss under a statutory obligation to
discharge by reason of closure of the
school or false certification, the
Department does not incur that loss
voluntarily, but rather under legal
obligation imposed by the statute, as
well as the terms of the federally
prescribed promissory note. Regardless
of whether the HEA explicitly
authorized the Secretary to recover for
that loss, or deemed the borrower’s
claim against the school to be assigned
to the Secretary, common law gives the
Secretary the right to recover from the
school for the loss incurred as a result
of the act or omission of the school.
Section 455(h) of the HEA, by directing
that the Secretary determine by
regulation which acts or omissions of
the school constitute defenses to
repayment, requires the Department to
discharge the borrower’s obligation to
repay when the borrower establishes
such a defense. 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h). To
the extent that the borrower proves that
the act or omission of the school gave
the borrower a defense, the amount not
recoverable from the borrower was a
loss incurred because of the
Department’s legal obligation to honor
that defense. That loss, like the loss on
payment of a loan guarantee on a FFEL
Loan, is not one incurred voluntarily,
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but rather is incurred, like the loss on
the loan guarantee, by legal obligation.
By honoring the proven defense of the
Direct Loan borrower, like honoring the
claim of the lender on the government
guarantee, the Secretary acquires by
subrogation the claim of the Direct Loan
borrower or FFEL lender, as well as a
claim for reimbursement from the party
that caused the loss—the borrower, on
the defaulted FFEL Loan, or the school,
on the Direct Loan defense.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
stated that the HEA does not authorize,
or even contemplate, the sweeping
regulatory framework set forth in the
Department’s borrower defense
proposals. The commenters questioned
the three HEA provisions cited by the
Department as the source of its statutory
authority: Section 455(h), which allows
the Secretary to identify ‘‘acts or
omissions . . . a borrower may assert as
a defense to repayment of a loan;’’
Section 487, which outlines certain
consequences for an institution’s
‘‘substantial misrepresentation of the
nature of its educational program, its
financial charges, or the employability
of its graduates;’’ and Section 454(a)(6),
which permits the Department to
‘‘include such . . . provisions as the
Secretary determines are necessary to
protect the interests of the United States
and to promote the purposes of’’ the
Direct Loan Program in each
institution’s PPA. The commenters
believed that section 455(h) of the HEA
only empowers the Department to
define those ‘‘acts or omissions’’ that an
individual borrower may assert as a
defense in a loan collection proceeding
and noted that none of the provisions
allows the Department to create a novel
cause of action for a borrower to levy
against her school, which the
Department would both prosecute and
adjudicate in its own ‘‘court.’’
Accordingly, the commenters believed
that the Department should
substantially revise the rule to be
consistent with the regulatory authority
granted to the Department by Congress.
Other commenters stated that the
Department should withdraw the
proposed regulations and instead work
jointly with Congress to address the
issues in the proposed regulations as
part of the reauthorization of the HEA.
The commenters believed that borrower
defense policy proposals are so
substantive and commit such an
enormous amount of taxpayer dollars
that careful consideration by Congress is
required so that all of the available
options are weighed in the overall
context of comprehensive program
changes.
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Discussion: We disagree with the
commenters who contended that the
HEA does not authorize the regulatory
framework proposed in the
Department’s borrower defense
proposals. As explained above, common
law and the HEA as interpreted by the
Department in adopting the Direct Loan
regulations, give the Department the
right to recover losses incurred due to
borrower defense claims. The
commenters rightly identify sections
455(h), 487, and 454(a)(6) of the HEA as
some of the sources of the Department’s
statutory authority for these regulations
as they relate to identification of causes
of action that are recognized as defenses
to repayment, as well as procedures for
receipt and adjudication of these claims.
In addition, the HEA authorizes the
Secretary to include in Direct Loan
PPAs with institutions any provisions
that are necessary to protect the
interests of the United States and to
promote the purposes of the Direct Loan
Program. In becoming a party to a Direct
Loan PPA, the institution accepts
responsibility and financial liability
stemming from its failure to perform its
functions pursuant to the agreement.
And, as a result, students and parents
are able to obtain Federal loans to pay
for postsecondary education. Far from
exceeding its statutory authority in
developing procedures for adjudicating
these claims, section 455(h) presumes
that the Department must recognize in
its existing administrative collection
and enforcement proceedings the very
defenses that section directs the
Department to establish, or create new
procedures to better address these
claims, as we do here.
In addition, section 410 of the General
Education Provisions Act (GEPA)
provides the Secretary with authority to
make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and
amend rules and regulations governing
the manner of operations of, and
governing the applicable programs
administered by, the Department. 20
U.S.C. 1221e–3. Further, under section
414 of the Department of Education
Organization Act, the Secretary is
authorized to prescribe such rules and
regulations as the Secretary determines
necessary or appropriate to administer
and manage the functions of the
Secretary or the Department. 20 U.S.C.
3474. These general provisions, together
with the provisions in the HEA and
common law explained earlier, noted
above, authorize the Department to
promulgate regulations that govern
defense to repayment standards,
process, and institutional liability.
With regard to the commenters who
believe that the Department’s proposals
are so substantive and commit such an
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enormous amount of taxpayer dollars
that the Department should work with
Congress, or defer to Congress, in terms
of the development of such
comprehensive program changes, we do
not agree that the Department should
not take, or should defer, regulatory
action on this basis until Congress acts.
Since the collapse of Corinthian, the
Department has received a flood of
borrower defense claims stemming from
the school’s misconduct. In order to
streamline and strengthen this process,
we believe it is critical that the
Department proceed now in accordance
with its statutory authority, as delegated
by Congress, to finalize regulations that
protect student loan borrowers while
also protecting the Federal and taxpayer
interests.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
stated that the proposed regulations
were arbitrary and capricious and
therefore violate the APA. Commenters
raised this concern both generally and
with respect to specific elements of the
proposed regulations. For example,
several commenters argued that the
Department withheld substantive detail
regarding its expansion of the loan
repayment defenses into offensive
causes of action and on the process by
which borrower defense claims and
Department proceedings to collect claim
liabilities from institutions will be
adjudicated, thereby depriving
institutions and affected parties the
opportunity to offer meaningful
comment on critical parts of the rule.
Discussion: We address commenters’
arguments with respect to specific
provisions of the regulations in the
sections of this preamble specific to
those provisions. However, as a general
matter, in taking this regulatory action,
we have considered relevant data and
factors, considered and responded to
comments and articulated a reasoned
basis for our actions. Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378
(1989); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc.
v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 988 F.2d 186,
197 (D.C. Cir. 1993); PPL Wallingford
Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194,
1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
stated that the negotiated rulemaking
process, by which the proposed rules
were developed, was flawed.
One commenter stated that input from
representatives of publicly held
proprietary institutions was not
included in the public comment process
prior to the establishment of a
negotiated rulemaking committee. This
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commenter also stated that only
representatives from private, proprietary
institutions were represented on the
negotiated rulemaking committee and
that those representatives had no
expertise in the active management of
an institution. The commenter also
stated that the NPRM 45-day public
comment process was too short.
Several commenters contended that
the Department failed to provide
adequate notice to the public of the
scope of issues to be discussed at the
negotiated rulemaking. The commenters
stated that the issues of financial
responsibility and arbitration clauses
were not included in the Federal
Register notices announcing the
establishment of a negotiated
rulemaking committee or the
solicitation of negotiators and that, had
the higher education community known
these issues were within the scope of
the rulemaking, negotiators more
familiar with these issues would have
been nominated. The commenters
believed that the Department failed to
carry out its statutory mandate under 20
U.S.C. 1098 to engage the public and
receive input on the issues to be
negotiated. One commenter also
expressed dismay at the Department’s
accelerated timetable and intent to
publish final regulations one week
before the general election. The
commenter felt that the ‘‘rush to
regulate’’ resulted in a public comment
period that did not give the public
enough time to fully consider the
proposals and a timeline that did not
afford the Department enough time to
develop an effective, cost-effective rule.
Discussion: The negotiated
rulemaking process ensures that a broad
range of interests is considered in the
development of regulations.
Specifically, negotiated rulemaking
seeks to enhance the rulemaking process
through the involvement of all parties
who will be significantly affected by the
topics for which the regulations will be
developed. Accordingly, section
492(b)(1) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1098a(b)(1), requires the Department to
choose negotiators from groups
representing many different
constituencies. The Department selects
individuals with demonstrated expertise
or experience in the relevant subjects
under negotiation, reflecting the
diversity of higher education interests
and stakeholder groups, large and small,
national, State, and local. In addition,
the Department selects negotiators with
the goal of providing adequate
representation for the affected parties
while keeping the size of the committee
manageable. The statute does not
require the Department to select specific
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75933
entities or individuals to be on the
committee. As there was both a primary
and an alternate committee member
representing proprietary institutions, we
believe that this group was adequately
represented on the committee.
We note that the Department received
several nominations to seat
representatives from proprietary schools
on the committee after publication of
our October 20, 2015, Federal Register
notice. The Department considered each
applicant to determine their
qualifications to serve on the committee.
This process did not result in
proprietary sector nominees with the
requisite qualifications, so we published
a second Federal Register notice on
December 21, 2015, seeking further
nominations for the negotiated
rulemaking committee, including
representation from the proprietary
sector. Dennis Cariello, Shareholder,
Hogan Marren Babbo & Rose, Ltd., and
Chris DeLuca, Founder, DeLuca Law,
were selected following this second
notice. Given the topics under
discussion, we believe Mr. Cariello and
Mr. DeLuca adequately represented the
proprietary sector.
We disagree with the commenters
who contended that the Department
failed to provide adequate public notice
and failed to engage and receive input
from the public on the scope of issues
to be discussed at the negotiated
rulemaking, in particular the issues of
financial responsibility and arbitration
clauses. On August 20, 2015, the
Department published a notice in the
Federal Register announcing our
intention to establish a negotiated
rulemaking committee. We also
announced our intention to accept
written comments from and hold two
public hearings (September 10, 2015
and September 16, 2015, in Washington,
DC and San Francisco, respectively) at
which interested parties could comment
on the topics suggested by the
Department and suggest additional
topics that should be considered for
action by the committee. Lastly, we
announced our intent to develop
proposed regulations for determining
which acts or omissions of an
institution of higher education a
borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment of a loan made under the
Direct Loan Program and the
consequences of such borrower defenses
for borrowers, institutions, and the
Secretary. We specifically stated that we
would address the issues of defense to
repayment procedures; the criteria that
constitute a defense to repayment; the
standards and procedures that the
Department would use to determine
institutional liability for amounts based
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on borrower defenses; and, the effect of
borrower defenses on institutional
capability assessments. No
representatives of the proprietary sector
testified at the hearings. One proprietary
association representing 1,100
cosmetology schools submitted written
testimony stating that the association
was interested in working with the
Department to determine the
institutional liability and capability
assessments associated with borrower
defense claims. In addition, we
presented issue papers prior to the first
day of the first of the three negotiating
sessions in which we outlined the
particular questions to be addressed.3
These included Issue Paper No. 5,
which explicitly addresses financial
responsibility and letters of credit.4
Negotiators who had any question about
the scope of issues we intended to cover
were thus given very explicit notice
before the first day of negotiations, and
were free to obtain then, or at any other
time during the nine days of hearings
over three months, any expert advisors
they wished to engage to inform their
deliberations.
We received written testimony from
other parties that supported both
holding institutions financially
accountable for the costs associated
with borrower defenses and limiting a
school’s use of certain dispute
resolution procedures.
We disagree with the commenter who
contended that the Department’s
timetable for developing borrower
defense regulations was rushed and that
the comment period did not give the
public enough time to fully consider the
proposals. We believe that the 45-day
public comment period provided
sufficient time for interested parties to
submit comments, particularly given
that prior to issuing the proposed
regulations, the Department conducted
two public hearings and three
3 https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/
hearulemaking/2016/.
4 The paper states—
Questions to be considered by the negotiating
committee include:
1. Should the Department take additional steps to
protect students and taxpayers from (a) potential
borrower defense to repayment (DTR) claims, (b)
liabilities stemming from closed school discharges,
and (c) other conditions that may be detrimental to
students?
D If so, what conditions, triggering events, metricbased standards, or other risk factors should the
Department consider indicative of failing financial
responsibility, administrative capability, or other
standards?
D What should the consequences be for a
violation? Letter of credit or other financial
guarantee? Disclosure requirements and student
warnings? Other consequences?
• If a letter of credit or other financial guarantee
is required, how should the amount be determined?
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negotiated rulemaking sessions, where
stakeholders and members of the public
had an opportunity to weigh in on the
development of much of the language
reflected in the proposed regulations. In
addition, the Department also posted
the NPRM on its Web site several days
before publication in the Federal
Register, providing stakeholders
additional time to view the proposed
regulations and consider their
viewpoints on the NPRM.
Changes: None.
Comments: Although the regulations
will affect all schools, many
commenters expressed frustration at
their perception that the regulations
target proprietary schools in particular.
The commenters noted several
provisions of the regulations—for
example, financial protection triggers
related to publicly traded institutions,
distributions of equity, the 90/10
regulations, and the Gainful
Employment regulations, and disclosure
provisions regarding loan repayment
rates—as unfairly targeting only
proprietary schools with no justification
or rationale. The commenters noted that
that there are many private sector career
schools and colleges that play a vital
role in the country’s higher education
system by providing distinctive, careerfocused programs and that the
Department should develop rules that
are applied uniformly across all
educational institutions that offer title
IV, HEA funding. Another commenter
appreciated the distinction made in the
NPRM between nonprofit/public
institutions and proprietary schools as
the basis for restricting the loan
repayment rate disclosure to proprietary
schools. The commenter suggested that
the fundamental differences in the
governance structures and missions of
the public and non-profit sectors versus
the for-profit sector provide a
substantive basis for differentiating this
regulation among the sectors.
Several commenters urged the
Department to reconsider the changes to
the financial responsibility standards to
include actions and events that would
trigger a requirement that a school
provide financial protection, such as a
letter of credit, to insure against future
borrower defense claims and other
liabilities, given their sweeping scope
and potentially damaging financial
impact on historically black colleges
and universities (HBCUs). The
commenters contended that these
provisions could lead to the closure of
HBCUs that are not financially robust
but provide quality educational
opportunities to students and noted that
HBCUs have not been the focus of
Federal and State investigations nor
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have they defrauded students or had
false claims lawsuits filed against them.
These commenters expressed concern
about a number of the specific financial
protection triggers, including, but not
limited to, the triggers relating to
lawsuits, actions by accrediting
agencies, and cohort default rate.
Discussion: We agree that there are
many proprietary career schools and
colleges that play a vital role in the
country’s higher education system. We
do not agree, however, that either the
financial protection triggers or the loan
repayment rate disclosure unfairly target
proprietary institutions. We apply the
financial protection triggers related to
publicly traded institutions, the
distribution of equity, and the 90/10
regulations only to proprietary
institutions because, as another
commenter noted, of the fundamental
differences in the governance structures
and missions of the public and nonprofit sectors and the unique nature of
the business model under which these
institutions operate. These triggers
identify events or conditions that signal
impending financial problems at
proprietary institutions that warrant
action by the Department. We apply the
loan repayment rate disclosure only to
the for-profit sector primarily because
the frequency of poor repayment
outcomes is greatest in this sector. We
appreciate the support of the commenter
who agreed with this approach.
We note that we address commenters’
arguments with respect to specific
provisions of the regulations in the
sections of this preamble specific to
those provisions.
We also note that HBCUs play a vital
role in the Nation’s higher education
system. We recognize the concerns
commenters raised regarding the
financial protection provisions of the
proposed regulations, which they argue
would have a damaging financial impact
on HBCUs. We note that the triggers are
designed to identify signs, and to
augment the Department’s tools for
detection, of impending financial
difficulties. If an institution is subject to
material actions or events that are likely
to have an adverse impact on the
financial condition or operations of an
institution, we believe that the Federal
government and taxpayers should be
protected from any resulting losses
incurred by requiring a letter or credit,
regardless of the institution’s sector. As
commenters mentioned, our recent
experience suggests that HBCUs have
not been the subject of government
agency suits or other litigation by
students or others, or of administrative
enforcement actions. Institutions that do
not experience these kinds of claims,
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including HBCUs, will not experience
adverse impacts under these triggers. In
addition, institutions, including HBCUs,
will retain their existing rights of due
process and continue to have the ability
to present to the Secretary if there is any
factual objection to the grounds for the
required financial protection.
Accordingly, the Secretary can consider
additional information provided by an
institution before requiring a letter of
credit. Even in instances where the
Department still requires a letter of
credit over a school’s objection, the
school could raise such issues to the
Department’s Office of Hearing and
Appeals.
Finally, we have made a number of
changes to the proposed triggers that
address the commenters’ specific
objections to particular triggers, to more
sharply focus the automatic triggers on
actions and events that are likely to
affect a school’s financial stability. For
instance, as we stated in other sections
of this preamble, in light of the
significant comments received regarding
the potential for serious unintended
consequences if the accreditation action
triggers were automatic, we are revising
the accreditation trigger so that
accreditation actions such as show
cause and probation or equivalent
actions are discretionary. We note that
we address commenters’ arguments
with respect to additional specific
financial protection triggers, and any
changes we have made in the final
regulations, in the sections of this
preamble specific to those provisions.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested
that the Department ensure that its
contractors are aware of the basis for
borrower defense discharge claims and
the accompanying process. The
commenter noted that inconsistent
servicing and debt collection standards
impede borrowers’ access to the benefit
and other forms of relief. The
commenters also suggested that the
Department update its borrower-facing
materials to reflect the availability and
scope of the borrower defense discharge.
Discussion: We are committed to
ensuring that our contractors and any
borrower-facing material published by
the Department provide accurate and
timely information on the discharge
standards and processes associated with
a borrower defense to repayment. We
have begun the process of updating
applicable materials to reflect these final
regulations and will continue working
closely with our contractors to help
ensure that they have the information
they need to assist borrowers
expeditiously and accurately.
Changes: None.
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Comments: Several commenters
requested that the Department make
information available to the public on
the number of borrowers who submitted
borrower defense applications, the
number of borrowers who received a
discharge, the amount of loans
discharged, the basis or standard
applied by the Department in a
successful discharge claim, discharged
amounts collected from schools, a list of
institutions against which successful
borrower defense claims are made, and
any reports relevant to the process. The
commenters believed that this
information would provide
transparency and facilitate a better
understanding of how the process is
working as well.
Discussion: We are committed to
transparency, clarity and ease of
administration and will give careful
consideration to this request as we
refine our borrower defense process.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters noted
that they, as student loan borrowers, are
taxpayers like every American citizen
and that paying student loans that were
fraudulently made on top of paying
taxes is a double penalty. The
commenters also requested that the
Department permit a borrower to
include all types of student loans—
private student loans, FFEL, Perkins,
Parent Plus—they received to finance
the cost of higher education in a
borrower defense claim.
Discussion: The Department is
committed to protecting student loan
borrowers from misleading, deceitful,
and predatory practices of, and failure
to fulfill contractual promises by,
institutions participating in the Federal
student aid programs. These final
regulations permit a borrower to
consolidate loans listed in § 685.220(b),
including nursing loans made under
part E of title VIII of the Public Health
Service Act, to pursue borrower defense
relief by consolidating those loans, as
provided in proposed § 685.212(k). The
Department does not have the authority
to include private student loans in a
Direct Loan consolidation.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
stated that, in order to avoid another
failure as serious as that of Corinthian,
the Department should implement
strong compliance and enforcement
policies to proactively prevent
institutions that engage in fraudulent
activity from continuing to receive title
IV, HEA funding. The commenters
believe that institutions that do not meet
statutory, regulatory or accreditor
standards and that burden students with
debt without providing a quality
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75935
education should be identified early and
subjected to greater scrutiny and
sanctions so that a borrower defense is
a last resort.
Discussion: The Department is
committed to strong compliance and
enforcement policies to proactively
prevent institutions that engage in
fraudulent activity from continuing to
receive title IV, HEA funding. These
final regulations establish the definitive
conditions or events upon which an
institution is or may be required to
provide to the Department with
financial protection, such as a letter of
credit, to help protect students, the
Federal government, and taxpayers
against potential institutional liabilities.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter requested
that the Department and the Internal
Revenue Service develop a
determination on the tax treatment of
discharges of indebtedness for students
with successful defense to repayment
claims. While acknowledging that the
Department does not administer tax law,
the commenter stated that the
Department should question, or at least
weigh in on the matter, of the Internal
Revenue Service’s ‘‘decline to assert’’
policy on successful defense to
repayment claims that currently applies
to loans for students who attend schools
owned by Corinthian, but not to loans
for students who attend other schools.
Discussion: As noted by the
commenter, the tax treatment of
discharges that result from a successful
borrower defense is outside of the
Department’s jurisdiction. However, the
Department recognizes the commenter’s
concern and will pursue the issue in the
near future.
Changes: None.
Borrower Defenses (Sections 668.71,
685.205, 685.206, and 685.222)
Federal Standard
Support for Standard
Comments: A group of commenters
fully supported the Department’s intent
to produce clear and fair regulations
that protect student borrowers and
taxpayers and hold schools accountable
for acts and omissions that deceive or
defraud students. However, these
commenters suggested that the
Department has not fully availed
ourselves of existing consumer
protection remedies and have, instead,
engaged in overreach to expand our
enforcement options.
Another group of commenters noted
that the proposed Federal standard is a
positive complement to consumer
protections already provided by State
law. Another group of commenters
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offered support for the Federal standard
specifically because it addresses
complexities and inequities between
borrowers in different States.
One commenter explicitly endorsed
our position that general HEA eligibility
or compliance violations by schools
could not be used a basis for a borrower
defense.
Another group of commenters noted
that the proposed Federal standard
provides an efficient, transparent, and
fair process for borrowers to pursue
relief. According to these commenters,
the Federal standard eliminates the
potential for disparate application of
this borrower benefit inherent with the
current rule’s State-based standard, and
enables those who are providing
training and support to multiple
institutions to develop standardized
guidance.
A different group of commenters
expressed support for the Federal
standard, noting that it would be
challenging for us to adjudicate claims
based on 50 States’ laws. Yet another
group of commenters requested that the
new Federal standard be applied
retroactively when a borrower makes a
successful borrower defense claim and
has loans that were disbursed both
before and after July 1, 2017.
Discussion: We appreciate the support
of these commenters.
However, we do not agree with the
commenters’ contention that we are
engaging in overreach to expand our
enforcement options, nor have we
disregarded existing consumer
protection remedies. The HEA provides
specific authority to the Secretary to
conduct institutional oversight and
enforcement of the title IV regulations.
The borrower defense regulations do not
supplant consumer protections available
to borrowers. Rather, the borrower
defense regulations describe the
circumstances under which the
Secretary exercises his or her longstanding authority to relieve a borrower
of the obligation to repay a loan on the
basis of an act or omission of the
borrower’s school. The Department’s
borrower defense process is distinct
from borrowers’ rights under State law.
State consumer protection laws
establish causes of action an individual
may bring in a State’s courts; nothing in
the Department’s regulation prevents
borrowers from seeking relief through
State law in State courts. As noted in the
NPRM, 81 FR 39338, the limitations of
the borrower defense process should not
be taken to represent any view regarding
other issues and causes of action under
other laws and regulations that are not
within the Department’s authority.
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As to the request to make the new
Federal standard available to all Direct
Loan borrowers, we cannot apply the
new Federal standard retroactively
when a borrower makes a successful
borrower defense claim and has loans
that were disbursed both before and
after July 1, 2017. Loans made before
July 1, 2017 are governed by the
contractual rights expressed in the
existing Direct Loan promissory notes.
These promissory notes incorporate the
current borrower defense standard,
which is based on an act or omission of
the school attended by the student that
would give rise to a cause of action
against the school under applicable
State law. Promissory notes for loans
made after July 1, 2017 will include a
discussion of the new Federal standard
for borrower defense claims.
Changes: None.
Evidentiary Standard
Comments: A number of commenters
and an individual commenter remarked
that the proposed Federal standard
increases the risk to institutions by
granting loan discharges when the
borrower’s case is substantiated by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Another commenter expanded on this
position, asserting that the evidentiary
standard in most States for fraudulent
misrepresentation is clear and
convincing evidence. A few commenters
echoed these viewpoints and suggested
that the perceived minimal burden of
proof may encourage bad actors to
entice borrowers into filing false claims.
A couple of other commenters wrote
that the standard is not clear enough to
preclude students from asserting claims
of misrepresentation without supporting
evidence. These commenters suggested
that the proposed regulations presume
that all proprietary schools engage in
deliberate misrepresentation.
Discussion: We do not agree that the
‘‘preponderance of the evidence’’
standard will result in greater risk to
institutions. We believe this evidentiary
standard is appropriate as it is the
typical standard in most civil
proceedings. Additionally, the
Department uses a preponderance of the
evidence standard in other proceedings
regarding borrower debt issues. See 34
CFR 34.14(b), (c) (administrative wage
garnishment); 34 CFR 31.7(e) (Federal
salary offset). We believe that this
evidentiary standard strikes a balance
between ensuring that borrowers who
have been harmed are not subject to an
overly burdensome evidentiary standard
and protecting the Federal government,
taxpayers, and institutions from
unsubstantiated claims. Under the
standard, the designated Department
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official may determine whether the
elements of the borrower’s cause of
action under the Federal standard for
borrower defenses have been
sufficiently alleged and shown. If the
official determines that the elements
have not been alleged or have not met
the preponderance of evidence
standard, the claim will be denied.
The Department is aware of
unscrupulous businesses that prey upon
distressed borrowers, charging
exorbitant fees to enroll them in Federal
loan repayment plans that are freely
available. On January 28, 2016, the
Department sent cease and desist letters
to two third-party ‘‘debt relief’’
companies that were using the
Department’s official seal without
authorization. The misuse of the
Department’s Seal is part of a worrying
trend. Some of these companies are
charging large up-front or monthly fees
for Federal student aid services offered
by the Department of Education and its
student loan servicers for free. In April
of 2016, the Department launched
several informational efforts to direct
borrowers to the Department’s free
support resources, as well as to share
information regarding State and Federal
entities that have the authority to act
against companies that engage in
deceptive or unfair practices. Although
these or similar opportunists may seek
to profit from filing false claims, the
Department will be aggressive in
curtailing this activity, and will remain
vigilant to help ensure that bad actors
do not profit from this process.
We do not agree that the Federal
standard will incent borrowers to assert
claims of misrepresentation without
sufficient evidence to substantiate their
claims. As explained in more detail
under ‘‘Process for Individual
Borrowers,’’ under § 685.222(a)(2), a
borrower in the individual process in
§ 685.222(e) bears the burden of proof in
establishing that the elements of his or
her claim have been met. In a group
process under § 685.222(f) to (h), this
burden falls on the designated
Department official. Borrower defense
claims that do not meet the evidentiary
standard will be denied. We also
disagree with the commenters’
interpretation of the borrower defense
regulations as based on a presumption
that all proprietary institutions engage
in deliberate misrepresentation. These
borrower defense regulations are
applicable to and designed to address
all institutions of postsecondary
education participating in the Direct
Loan Program; further, they contain no
presumption regarding the activities of
any institution, but instead provide a
fair process for determining whether
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acts or omissions by any particular
institution give rise to a borrower
defense. We also discuss this issue in
more detail under ‘‘Substantial
Misrepresentation.’’
Changes: None.
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Educational Malpractice
Comments: A group of commenters
asked that we clarify the difference
between educational malpractice and a
school’s failure to provide the necessary
aspects of an education (such as
qualified instructors, appropriately
equipped laboratories, etc.).
Discussion: We do not believe that the
regulations should differentiate between
educational malpractice and a school’s
failure to provide the necessary aspects
of an education, such as might be
asserted in a claim of substantial
misrepresentation or breach of contract.
State law does not recognize claims
characterized as educational
malpractice, and we do not intend to
create a different legal standard for such
claims in these regulations. Claims
relating to the quality of a student’s
education or matters regarding academic
and disciplinary disputes within the
judgment and discretion of a school are
outside the scope of the borrower
defense regulations. We recognize that
there may be instances where a school
has made specific misrepresentations
about its facilities, financial charges,
programs, or the employability of its
graduates, and these misrepresentations
may function as the basis of a borrower
defense, as opposed to a claim regarding
educational quality. Similarly, a
borrower defense claim based on a
breach of contract may be raised where
a school has failed to deliver specific
obligations, such as programs and
services, it has committed to by
contract.
Changes: None.
Intent
Comments: A number of commenters
expressed concern that the proposed
Federal standard does not require intent
on the part of the institution. These
commenters were concerned that
inadvertent errors by an institution or
its employees could serve as the basis
for a borrower defense claim. Some
commenters cited an example of an
employee misstating or omitting
information that is available to the
borrower in a complete and correct form
in publications or electronic media. One
of these commenters noted that the sixyear statute of limitations may
exacerbate this issue, by permitting
borrowers to present claims relying on
distant memories of oral conversations
that may have been misunderstood.
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Discussion: Gathering evidence of
intent would likely be nearly impossible
for borrowers. Information asymmetry
between borrowers and institutions,
which are likely in control of the best
evidence of intentionality of
misrepresentations, would render
borrower defense claims implausible for
most borrowers.
As explained in more detail under
‘‘Substantial Misrepresentation,’’ we do
not believe it is necessary to incorporate
an element of intent or knowledge into
the substantial misrepresentation
standard. This reflects the Department’s
longstanding position that a
misrepresentation does not require
knowledge or intent on the part of the
institution. The Department will
continue to operate within a rule of
reasonableness and will evaluate
available evidence of extenuating,
mitigating, and aggravating factors prior
to issuing any sanctions pursuant to 34
CFR part 668, subpart F. We will also
consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding any
misrepresentation for borrower defense
determinations. However, an institution
will generally be responsible for harm to
borrowers caused by its
misrepresentations, even if they are not
intentional. We continue to believe that
this is more reasonable and fair than
having the borrower (or taxpayers) bear
the cost of such injuries. It also reflects
the consumer protection laws of many
States.
Similarly, we do not believe it is
necessary or appropriate to adopt an
intent element for the breach of contract
standard. Generally, intent is not a
required element for breach of contract,
and we do not see a need to depart from
that general legal principle here.
Regardless of the point in time within
the statute of limitations at which a
borrower defense claim is made, the
borrower will be required to present a
case that meets or exceeds the
preponderance of the evidence
standard.
Changes: None.
State Law Bases for the Federal
Standard
Comments: A number of commenters
advocated the continuation of Statebased standards for future borrower
defense claims. These commenters put
forward several arguments in support of
their position.
Several commenters suggested that
the proposed Federal standard
effectively reduces, preempts, or repeals
borrowers’ current rights under the
current, State law-based standard.
According to another commenter, the
proposed acceptance of favorable,
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75937
nondefault, contested judgments based
on State law suggests that allegations of
State law violations should provide
sufficient basis for a borrower defense
claim. Another group of commenters
contended that, when a Federal law or
regulation intends to provide broad
consumer protections, it generally does
not supplant all State laws, but rather,
replaces only those that provide less
protection to consumers.
A group of commenters noted that the
HEA’s State authorization regulations
require States to regulate institutions
and protect students from abusive
conduct. According to these
commenters, the laws States enact
under this authority would not be
covered by the Federal standard unless
the borrower obtained a favorable,
nondefault, contested judgment.
Additionally, one commenter
believed that providing a path to
borrower defense based on act or
omission of the school attended by the
student that would give rise to a cause
of action under applicable State law
would preserve the relationship
between borrower defense, defense to
repayment, and the ‘‘Holder in Due
Course’’ rule of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).5
These commenters stated that the
Department has not provided sufficient
evidence to support its assertions that
borrower defense determinations based
on a cause of action under applicable
State law results or would result in
inequitable treatment for borrowers, or
that the complexity of adjudicating
State-based claims has increased due to
the expansion of distance education.
Further, these commenters also stated
that the Department has not provided
any examples of cases that would meet
the standard required to base a borrower
defense claim on a nondefault,
contested judgement based on State law.
A group of commenters contended
that State law provides the most
comprehensive consumer protections to
borrowers. Other commenters
contended that State law provides
clarity to borrowers and schools, as
precedents have been established that
elucidate what these laws mean with
respect to the rights and responsibilities
of the parties.
5 The FTC’s ‘‘Holder Rule’’ or ‘‘Holder in Due
Course Rule’’ is also formally known as the ‘‘Trade
Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of
Consumers’ Claims and Defenses,’’ 16 CFR part 433.
The Holder Rule requires certain credit contracts to
include a contractual provision that establishes that
the holder of such a contract is subject to all claims
and defenses which the debtor could assert against
the seller of the goods or services obtained with the
proceeds of the contract, with recovery by the
debtor being limited to the amounts paid by the
debtor under the contract.
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Another commenter suggested that
providing borrowers comprehensive
options to claim a borrower defense,
including claims based on violation of
State law, should be an essential precept
of borrower relief.
One commenter contended that the
elimination of the State standard is at
odds with the proposed ban on
mandatory arbitration, as this ban will
clear the way for borrowers to pursue
claims against their schools in State
court.
Several commenters noted that the
Department will continue to apply State
law standards to borrower defense
claims for loans disbursed prior to July
2017, necessitating the continued
understanding and application of State
laws regardless of whether or not they
remain a basis for borrower defense
claims for loans disbursed after July
2017.
A group of commenters expressed
concern that borrowers with loans
disbursed before July 2017 can access
the Federal standard by consolidating
their loans; however, borrowers with
loans disbursed after July 2017 can only
avail themselves of the State standard
by obtaining a nondefault, contested
judgment. They contended that
Department should not introduce this
inequity into the Federal student loan
programs.
Another group of commenters
asserted that defining bases for future
borrower defense claims based on past
institutional misconduct may limit the
prosecution of future forms of
misconduct that are unforeseeable.
Several commenters noted that many
borrowers lack the resources necessary
to obtain a nondefault, contested
judgment based on State law. Moreover,
these borrowers would not have access
to the breadth of data and evidence
available to the Department.
Several commenters contended that
borrowers whose schools have violated
State law should not have to rely upon
their State’s Attorney General (AG) to
access Federal loan relief.
One commenter wrote that creating
multiple paths a borrower may use to
pursue a borrower defense claim is
unnecessarily complex.
A group of commenters remarked that
the proposed Federal standard is both
too complex and the evidentiary
standard too low, suggesting that the
prior State standard was more
appropriate for borrower defense claims.
Discussion: We disagree that the
Federal standard effectively reduces,
preempts, or repeals borrowers’ current
rights under the State standard.
Borrowers may still submit a claim
based on violation of any State or
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Federal law, whether obtained in a court
or an administrative tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. As also
explained in the ‘‘Claims Based on NonDefault, Contested Judgments’’ section
of this document, the Department’s
borrower defense process is distinct
from borrowers’ rights to pursue judicial
remedies in other State or Federal
contexts and nothing in the
Department’s regulation prevents
borrowers from seeking relief through
State law in State courts.
We agree, as proposed in the NPRM
and reflected in these final regulations,
that the acceptance of favorable,
nondefault, contested judgments based
on State or Federal law violations may
serve as a sufficient basis for a borrower
defense claim. We believe it is
important to enable borrowers to bring
borrower defense claims based on those
judgments, but we do not think this
means that we should maintain the
State-based standard.
We acknowledge that the HEA’s State
authorization regulations require States
to regulate institutions and protect
students from abusive conduct and that
the laws States have enacted in this role
would only be covered by the Federal
standard where the borrower obtained a
favorable, nondefault, contested
judgment. However, we do not view this
as a compelling reason to maintain an
exclusively State-based standard, or a
standard that also incorporates State law
in addition to the Federal standard, for
borrower defense.
We disagree that the Federal standard
for borrower defense should incorporate
the FTC’s Holder Rule. We acknowledge
that the current borrower defense
regulation’s basis in applicable State
law has its roots in the Department’s
history with borrower defense.6
However, we have decided that it is
appropriate that the Department
exercise its authority under section
455(h) of the HEA to specify ‘‘which
acts or omissions’’ may serve as the
basis of a borrower defense and
establish a Federal standard that is not
6 As explained in the ‘‘Expansion of Borrower
Rights’’ section, before the Department enacted the
borrower defense regulations in 1994 as part of its
Direct Loan Program regulations, 59 FR 61664, the
Department had preserved borrowers’ rights under
the FFEL Program to bring any claims a borrower
may have against a school as defenses against the
holder of the loan if the school had a referral or
affiliation relationship with the lender. This was
done by adopting a version of the FTC’s Holder
Rule language in the FFEL Master Promissory Note
in 1994, and was later formalized in regulation at
34 CFR 682.209(g) in 2008. As further explained
under ‘‘General,’’ in 1995, the Department clarified
that the borrower defense Direct Loan Program
regulation was meant to create rights for borrowers,
and as to liabilities for schools corresponding to
those that would arise under the FFEL Program.
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based in State law, for loans made after
the effective date of these final
regulations.
We have acknowledged that potential
disparities may exist as students in one
State may receive different relief than
students in another State, despite
having common facts and claims. This
concern is substantiated, in part, by
comments made by non-Federal
negotiators and members of the public
in response to the NPRM, asserting that
consumer protections laws vary greatly
from State to State.
We have also described how the
complexity of adjudicating State-based
claims for borrower defense has
increased due to the expansion of
distance education. As noted in the
NPRM (81 FR 39335 to 39336), while a
determination might be made as to
which State’s laws would provide
protection from school misconduct for
borrowers who reside in one State but
are enrolled via distance education in a
program based in another State, some
States have extended their rules to
protect these students, while others
have not.
Additionally, we have discussed the
administrative burden to the
Department and difficulties Department
has experienced in determining which
States’ laws apply to any borrower
defense claim and the inherent
uncertainties in interpreting another
authorities’ laws. 81 FR 39339.
We agree that borrower relief should
include comprehensive options,
including claims based on violations of
State law. While we believe that the
proposed standards will capture much
of the behavior that can and should be
recognized as the basis for borrower
defenses, it is possible that some State
laws may offer borrowers important
protections that do not fall within the
scope of the Department’s Federal
standard. To account for these
situations, the final regulations provide
that nondefault, contested judgments
obtained against a school based on any
State or Federal law, may be a basis for
a borrower defense claim, whether
obtained in a court or an administrative
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
Under these regulations, a borrower may
use such a judgment as the basis for a
borrower defense if the borrower was
personally affected by the judgment,
that is, the borrower was a party to the
case in which the judgment was
entered, either individually or as a
member of a class. To support a
borrower defense claim, the judgment
would be required to pertain to the
making of a Direct Loan or the provision
of educational services to the borrower.
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While State law may provide clarity
to borrowers and schools regarding the
rights and responsibilities of the parties
under established precedents, we
believe that the Federal standard for
borrower defenses more clearly and
efficiently captures the full scope of acts
and omissions that may result in a
borrower defense claim.
We disagree that the elimination of
the State standard is at odds with the
ban on predispute arbitration clauses.
Rather, we assert that prohibiting
predispute arbitration clauses will
enable more borrowers to seek redress
in court and, as appropriate, to submit
a nondefault, contested judgment in
support of their borrower defense claim,
including a claim based on State law.
We concur that the Department’s
continued application of State law
standards to borrower defense claims for
loans disbursed prior to July 2017, will
require the continued interpretation of
State law. However, the number of loans
subject to the State standard will
diminish over time, enabling the
Department to transition to a more
effective and efficient borrower defense
standard and process.
We understand the commenters’
concern that borrowers may be treated
inequitably based on when their loans
were disbursed. However, while it is
true that borrowers with loans disbursed
prior to July 2017 may consolidate those
loans, as discussed in the NPRM (81 FR
39357), the standard that would apply
would depend upon the date on which
the first Direct Loan to which a claim is
asserted was made. Therefore, the
standard applied to these loans does not
change by virtue of their consolidation.
We do not agree that the Federal
standard supplants all State consumer
protection laws, as borrowers may still
pursue relief based on these laws by
obtaining a nondefault, contested
judgment by a court or administrative
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
We do not agree that the three bases
for borrower defenses under the Federal
standard limit the prosecution of future
unforeseeable forms of misconduct. We
expect that many of the borrower
defense claims that the Department
anticipates receiving will be addressed
through the categories of substantial
misrepresentation, breach of contract, or
violations of State or Federal law that
are confirmed through a nondefault,
contested judgment by a court or
administrative tribunal of competent
jurisdiction. Additionally, the
Department’s borrower defense process
is distinct from borrowers’ rights or
other Federal, State, or oversight
agencies’ authorities to prosecute or
initiate claims against schools for
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wrongful conduct in State or other
Federal tribunals. We recognize that,
while the attainment of a favorable
judgment can be an effective and
efficient means of adjudicating a
borrower’s claim of wrongdoing by an
institution, it can also be prohibitively
time-consuming or expensive for some
borrowers. The regulation includes a
provision that enables a borrower to
show that a judgment obtained by a
governmental agency, such as a State
AG or a Federal agency, that relates to
the making of the borrower’s Direct
Loan or the provision of educational
services to the borrower, may also serve
as a basis for a borrower defense under
the standard, whether the judgment is
obtained in court or in an administrative
tribunal. We do not agree that borrowers
whose schools have violated State law
will have to rely upon their State’s AG
to access Federal loan relief. These
borrowers are still able to file borrower
defense claims under the substantial
misrepresentation or breach of contract
standards, even if a nondefault,
contested judgment is not obtained by
the government entity. Moreover, the
prohibition against predispute
arbitration clauses and class action
waivers will enable more borrowers to
pursue a determination of wrongdoing
on the part of an institution individually
or as part of a class.
We do not agree that the State
standard is less complex than the new
Federal standard. As discussed, the
current State law-based standard
necessarily involves complicated
questions relating to which State’s laws
apply to a specific case and to the
proper and accurate interpretation of
those laws. We believe the elements of
the Federal standard and the bases for
borrower defense claims provide
sufficient clarity as to what may or may
not constitute an actionable act or
omission on the part of an institution.
As discussed earlier, we also disagree
that the State standard provides a higher
evidentiary standard. Preponderance of
the evidence is the typical standard in
most civil proceedings. Additionally,
the Department uses a preponderance of
the evidence standard in other processes
regarding borrower debt issues.
Changes: None.
Federal Standard as a Minimum
Requirement
Comments: Several groups of
commenters recommended that we
establish a Federal standard that serves
as a floor, or minimum requirement, to
provide additional consumer safeguards
to borrowers in States that have less
robust consumer protection laws. One
group of commenters suggested that this
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could assure consistency with the FTC
Holder Rule. These commenters opined
that expansion of the Federal standard
to include Unfair, Deceptive or Abusive
Acts and Practices (UDAP)7 violations
and breaches of contract would benefit
borrowers and simplify borrower
defense claim adjudication, as very few
States would provide more robust
consumer protections.
Another commenter opined that a
strong Federal standard as a more robust
minimum requirement, i.e., one that
requires only reasonable reliance to
prove substantial misrepresentation and
includes UDAP violations, would
eliminate the need to maintain a State
law standard.
Discussion: We disagree that the
Federal standard requires expansion to
include UDAP violations in order to
ensure borrowers are protected or that
the Federal standard should be
established as a minimum requirement
for borrower defense. As noted in the
NPRM, reliance upon State law not only
presents a significant burden for
Department officials who must apply
and interpret various State laws, but
also for borrowers who must make the
threshold determination as to whether
they may have a claim. We believe that
many of the claims the Department will
receive will be covered by the standards
proposed by the Department and that
those standards will streamline the
administration of the borrower defense
regulations. The Department’s
substantial misrepresentation
regulations (34 CFR part 668 subpart F)
were informed by the FTC’s Policy
Guidelines on Deception, and we
believe they are more tailored to, and
suitable for, use in the borrower defense
context. Under the borrower defense
regulations, certain factors addressing
specific problematic conduct may be
considered to determine whether a
misrepresentation has been relied upon
to a borrower’s detriment, thus making
the misrepresentation ‘‘substantial.’’
With regard to unfair and abusive
conduct, we considered the available
precedent and determined that it is
unclear how such principles would
apply in the borrower defense context as
stand-alone standards. Such practices
are often alleged in combination with
misrepresentations and are not often
addressed on their own by the courts.
With this lack of guidance, it is unclear
7 Each State has consumer protection laws that
prohibit certain unfair and deceptive conduct,
which are commonly known as ‘‘unfair and
deceptive trade acts and practices’’ or ‘‘UDAP’’
laws. The FTC also enforces prohibitions against
unfair and deceptive conduct in certain contexts
under section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, which
may also be described as Federal ‘‘UDAP’’ law.
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how such principles would apply in the
borrower defense context.
Moreover, many of the borrower
defense claims the Department has
addressed or is considering have
involved misrepresentations by schools.
We believe that the standard established
in these regulations will address much
of the behavior arising in the borrower
defense context, and that this standard
appropriately addresses the
Department’s goals of accurately
identifying and providing relief to
borrowers for misconduct by schools;
providing clear standards for borrowers,
schools, and the Department to use in
resolving claims; and avoiding for all
parties the burden of interpreting other
Federal agencies’ and States’ authorities
in the borrower defense context. As a
result, we decline to adopt standards for
relief based on UDAP.
As discussed earlier, we also disagree
that the Federal standard for borrower
defense should incorporate the FTC’s
Holder Rule, 16 CFR part 433, and
believe that it is appropriate for the
reasons discussed that the Department
exercise its authority to establish a
Federal standard that is not based in
State law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing
discussion, we appreciate that State law
provides important protections for
students and borrowers. Nothing in the
borrower defense regulations prevents a
borrower from seeking relief under State
law in State court. Moreover,
§ 685.222(b) provides that if a borrower
has obtained a nondefault, favorable
contested judgment against the school
under State or other Federal law, the
judgment may serve as a basis for
borrower defense. As explained further
under ‘‘Claims Based on Non-Default,
Contested Judgments,’’ we believe this
strikes the appropriate balance between
providing relief to borrowers and the
Department’s administrative burden in
accurately evaluating the merits of such
claims.
Changes: None.
Additional Grounds
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State AGs
Comments: A number of commenters
requested that the final regulations
include a process for State AGs to
petition the Secretary to grant relief
based on State law violations. One
group of commenters expanded on this
request, suggesting that other law
enforcement agencies and entities also
be permitted to bring forward evidence
in support of group claims, and to
receive from the Department a formal
response regarding its determination of
the claim. Another group of commenters
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contended that State AGs uncover
institutional wrongdoing before others
do, and, accordingly, their direct
participation in the borrower defense
process would provide affected
borrowers more timely access to relief.
Discussion: The group process for
borrower defenses in § 685.222(f)
provides for a process by which
evidence for determinations of
substantial misrepresentation, breach of
contract, or judgments, might come from
submissions to the Department by
claimants, State AGs or other officials,
or advocates for claimants, as well as
from the Department’s investigations.
We recognize that these entities may
uncover institutional wrongdoing early
and may have relevant evidence in
support of group claims.
The Department always welcomes
cooperation and input from other
Federal and State enforcement entities,
as well as legal assistance organizations
and advocacy groups. In our experience,
such cooperation is more effective when
it is conducted through informal
communication and contact.
Accordingly, we have not incorporated
a provision requiring formal written
responses from the Secretary, but plan
to create a point of contact for State AGs
to allow for active communication
channels. We also reiterate that we
welcome a continuation of cooperation
and communication with other
interested groups and parties. As
indicated above, the Department is fully
prepared to receive and make use of
evidence and input from other
stakeholders, including advocates and
State and Federal agencies. We also
discuss this issue in more detail under
‘‘Group Process for Borrower Defense.’’
Changes: None.
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
(UDAP)
Comments: Several groups of
commenters advocated the inclusion of
State UDAP laws as a stand-alone basis
for borrower defense claims.
One group of commenters opined that
UDAP laws, which include prohibitions
against misrepresentation, along with
unfair, fraudulent, and unlawful
business acts, have been refined by
decades of judicial decisions, while the
proposed substantial misrepresentation
basis for borrower defense claims
remains untested.
Another group of commenters argued
that State UDAP laws incorporate the
prohibitions and deterrents that the
Department seeks to achieve and offer
the flexibility needed to deter and
rectify institutional acts or omissions
that would be presented as borrower
defenses under the Department’s
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substantial misrepresentation and
breach of contract standards. Another
group of commenters noted that some
acts that may violate State laws
intended to protect borrowers may not
constitute a breach of contract or
misrepresentation.
Another commenter noted that
multiple State AGs have investigated
schools and provided the Department
with their findings of wrongdoing based
on their States’ UDAP laws.
One group of commenters suggested
that, if the Department did not opt to
restore the State standard, the inclusion
of a similar UDAP law provision would
become even more important. These
commenters assert that the additional
factors that would favor a finding of a
substantial misrepresentation would not
close the gap between the Federal
standard and States’ UDAP laws. They
recommend using State UDAP laws as
the additional factors that would elevate
a misrepresentation to substantial
misrepresentation.
Discussion: As discussed above, we
disagree that the inclusion of UDAP
violations as a basis for a borrower
defense claims is required to assure
borrowers are protected by the Federal
standard.
We believe that the Federal standard
appropriately addresses the
Department’s interests in accurately
identifying and providing relief to
borrowers for misconduct by schools;
providing clear standards for borrowers,
schools, and the Department to use in
resolving claims; and avoiding for all
parties the burden of interpreting other
Federal agencies’ and States’ authorities
in the borrower defense context. While
UDAP laws may play an important role
in State consumer protection and in
State AGs’ enforcement actions, we
believe the Federal standard addresses
much of the same conduct, while being
more appropriately tailored and readily
administrable in the borrower defense
context. As a result, we decline to
include UDAP violations as a basis for
borrower defense claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated
that by foreclosing HEA violations from
serving as a basis for borrower defense
claims, the proposed regulations would
effectively preempt State UDAP laws,
which the commenter argued often use
violations of other laws as a basis for
determining that a practice is unfair or
deceptive.
Discussion: The Department’s
borrower defense process is distinct
from borrowers’ rights under State law.
State UDAP laws establish causes of
action an individual may bring in a
State’s courts; nothing in the
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Department’s regulations prevents
borrowers from seeking relief through
State law in State courts. As noted in the
NPRM, the specifics of the borrower
defense process should not be taken to
represent any view regarding other
issues and causes of action under other
laws and regulations that are not within
the Department’s authority.
Changes: None.
HEA Violations
Comments: One commenter requested
that the regulations make clear that
borrower defense claims do not include
claims based on noncompliance with
the HEA or sexual or racial harassment
allegations, as described in the preamble
to the NPRM. One commenter suggested
that the explicit exclusion of sexual or
racial harassment as the basis of a
borrower defense claim is intended to
protect public and non-profit schools.
Another commenter believed the
current regulations would allow
borrowers to base a claim for a borrower
defense on an institution’s violations of
the HEA where those violations also
constitute violations under State UDAP
law. The commenter viewed the
Department’s position in the NPRM that
a violation of the HEA is not, in itself,
a basis for a borrower defense as a
retroactive change to the standard
applicable to loans made before July
2017. The commenter rejected the
Department’s assertion that this
limitation is in fact based on a
longstanding interpretation of the bases
for borrower defense claims.
Discussion: It is indeed the
Department’s longstanding position that
an act or omission by the school that
violates an eligibility or compliance
requirement in the HEA or its
implementing regulations does not
necessarily affect the enforceability of a
Federal student loan obtained to attend
the school, and is not, therefore,
automatically a basis for a borrower
defense. With limited exceptions not
relevant here, the case law is unanimous
that the HEA contains no implied
private right of action for an individual
to assert a claim for relief. 8 The HEA
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8 As
stated by the Department in 1993:
[The Department] considers the loss of
institutional eligibility to affect directly only the
liability of the institution for Federal subsidies and
reinsurance paid on those loans. . . . [T]he
borrower retains all the rights with respect to loan
repayment that are contained in the terms of the
loan agreements, and [the Department] does not
suggest that these loans, whether held by the
institution or the lender, are legally unenforceable
merely because they were made after the effective
date of the loss of institutional eligibility.
58 FR 13,337. See, e.g. Armstrong v. Accrediting
Council for Continuing Educ. & Training, 168 F.3d
1362 (D.C. Cir. 1999), opinion amended on denial
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vests the Department with the sole
authority to determine and apply the
appropriate sanction for HEA violations.
A school’s act or omission that
violates the HEA may, of course, give
rise to a cause of action under other law,
and that cause of action may also
independently constitute a borrower
defense claim under § 685.206(c) or
§ 685.222. For example, advertising that
makes untruthful statements about
placement rates violates section
487(a)(8) of the HEA, but may also give
rise to a cause of action under common
law based on misrepresentation or
constitute a substantial
misrepresentation under the Federal
standard and, therefore, constitute a
basis for a borrower defense claim.
However, this has always been the case,
and is not a retroactive change to the
current borrower defense standard
under § 685.206(c).
As explained in more detail under
‘‘Federal Standard,’’ it has been the
Department’s longstanding position that
sexual and racial harassment claims do
not directly relate to the making of a
loan or provision of educational services
and are not within the scope of
borrower defense. 60 FR 37769. We also
note, moreover, that sexual and racial
harassment are explicitly excluded as
bases for borrower defense claims in
recognition of other entities, both within
and outside of the Department, with the
authority to investigate and resolve
these complaints, and not in an effort to
protect public and non-profit schools.
Changes: None.
Claims Based on Non-Default,
Contested Judgments
Comments: A group of commenters
requested that the Department explain
how, if continuing to operate under the
State standard results in potentially
inequitable treatment for borrowers, it is
still reasonable to rely upon State law
when judgments have been obtained,
thereby providing borrower protections
that vary by State.
Several commenters suggested that a
borrower should be required to obtain a
favorable judgment under State law in
order to obtain a loan discharge. One
commenter suggested that borrowers
pursuing State law judgments receive
forbearance on their Direct Loans while
their cases are proceeding.
Discussion: When the Department
relies upon a nondefault, contested
judgment to affirm a borrower defense,
it is not required to interpret State law.
of reh’g, 177 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting
claim of mistake of fact regarding institutional
accreditation as grounds for rescinding loan
agreements); McCullough v. PNC Bank, 298 F.3d
1362, 1369 (11th Cir. 2002)(collecting cases).
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Rather, it relies upon the findings of a
court or administrative tribunal of
competent jurisdiction.
Although we expect that the
prohibition against certain mandatory
arbitration clauses will enable more
borrowers to pursue a determination of
wrongdoing on the part of an
institution, we do not agree that it is
appropriate to require borrowers to
obtain a favorable judgment in order to
obtain a loan discharge.
While the attainment of a favorable
judgment can be an effective and
efficient means of adjudicating a
borrower’s claim of wrongdoing by an
institution, it can also be prohibitively
time-consuming or expensive for some
borrowers. We have included a
provision under which a judgment
obtained by a governmental agency,
such as a State AG or a Federal agency,
that relates to the making of the
borrower’s Direct Loan or the provision
of educational services to the borrower,
may also serve as a basis for a borrower
defense under the standard, whether the
judgment is obtained in court or in an
administrative tribunal.
We agree that borrowers should
receive forbearance on their Direct
Loans while their cases are proceeding.
Borrowers may use the General
Forbearance Request form to apply for
forbearance in these circumstances; we
would grant the borrower’s request, and
the final regulations also will require
FFEL Program loan holders to do the
same upon notification by the Secretary.
In addition, a borrower defense loan
discharge based on a nondefault,
contested judgment may provide relief
for remaining payments due on the loan
and recovery of payments already made.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
stated that the Department’s proposal to
allow borrower defenses on the basis of
‘‘nondefault, favorable contested
judgments’’ was unrealistic, and argued
that such judgments are unlikely to
occur. These commenters argued that
both plaintiffs (either government
agencies or students themselves) as well
as institutions are under substantial
pressure to settle lawsuits, and pointed
to the lack of any current judgments
against institutions that would meet this
standard. One commenter argued that
the lack of such nondefault favorable
contested judgments effectively barred
State causes of action and would force
borrowers to rely on the Department’s
Federal standard as the only basis for
relief.
Discussion: The Department
recognizes that nondefault, favorable
contested judgments may not be
common, relative to the number of
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lawsuits that are filed. The Department
includes this basis for relief as a way for
borrowers to avoid having to re-litigate
claims actually decided on the merits. If
no such determination against the
institution has yet occurred, borrowers
may bring claims to the Department for
evaluation that satisfy the standards
described for a substantial
misrepresentation under § 685.222(d) or
breach of contract under § 685.222(c).
The Department will thus continue to
recognize State law causes of action
under § 685.222(b), but will require a
tribunal of competent jurisdiction to
decide the legal and factual basis for the
claim.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
stated that the proposed standard for
nondefault, favorable contested
judgments effectively narrows State law
causes of action by putting what the
commenters argued was a significant
and unrealistic burden on borrowers to
litigate claims to judgment. These
commenters argued that the Department
should not effectively remove these
bases for relief. One of the commenters
asked that the Department recognize
settlements with the institution as a
basis for relief, while another proposed
that the Department recognize class
action settlements in which the
settlement has been approved by a judge
or in which the plaintiff(s) have
survived a motion for summary
judgment. Another asked that claim
preclusive court judgments and findings
of fact and admissions in settlements
should likewise serve as a basis for
relief.
Discussion: As stated in the NPRM, 81
FR 39340, we decline to adopt a
standard based on applicable State law
due, in part, to the burden to borrowers
and the Department in interpreting and
applying States’ laws. However, we
recognize that State law may provide
important protections for borrowers and
students. We believe that a standard
recognizing nondefault, favorable,
contested judgments strikes a balance
between recognizing causes of action
under State or other Federal law and
minimizing the Department’s
administrative burden in accurately
evaluating the merits of such claims. For
the reasons discussed here and in the
NPRM, we decline to recognize
settlements as a way to satisfy the
standard in § 685.222(b). However, we
welcome the submission of, and will
consider, any orders, court filings,
admissions, or other evidence from a
borrower for consideration in the
borrower defense process.
Changes: None.
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Comments: One commenter stated
that the Department’s proposed
language leaves it unclear whether the
judgment against the institution must
include a specific determination
regarding the act or omission forming
the basis of the borrower defense, and
urged the Department to explicitly
require such a determination. Another
commenter argued that the carve-outs of
certain claims that the Department
would not consider to be borrower
defenses are not explicitly included for
judgments obtained against an
institution, and urged that the
Department include such carve-outs.
Discussion: For a judgment to form
the basis of a borrower defense, it must
include a determination that an act or
omission that would constitute a
defense to repayment under State or
Federal law occurred and that the
borrower would be entitled to relief
under such applicable law. That said,
the overarching principles established
in § 685.222(a) apply to claims under all
the standards established in § 685.222,
including to judgments under
§ 685.222(b). Thus, under
§ 685.222(a)(3), the Department will not
recognize a violation by the school of an
eligibility or compliance requirement in
the HEA or its implementing regulations
as a basis for borrower defense under
§ 685.222 or § 685.206(c) unless the
violation would otherwise constitute a
basis for borrower defense. Similarly,
borrower defense claims must be based
upon an act or omission of the school
attended by the student that relates to
the making of a Direct Loan or the
provision of educational services for
which the loan was provided, under
§ 685.222(a)(5).
If a borrower, a class of consumers, or
a government agency made a claim
against a school regarding the provision
of educational services and receives a
favorable judgment that entitles the
borrower to restitution or damages, but
the borrower only obtained a partial
recovery from the school on this
judgment, under § 685.222(i)(8), we
would recognize any unpaid amount of
the judgment in calculating the total
amount of relief that could be provided
on the Direct Loan. If the borrower, a
class of consumers, or a government
agency obtained a judgment holding
that the school engaged in wrongful acts
or omissions regarding the provision of
private loans, the borrower could
demonstrate to the Department whether
the findings of fact on which the
judgment rested also established acts or
omissions relating to the educational
services provided to the borrower or the
making of the borrower’s Direct Loan
that could be the basis of a borrower
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defense claim under these regulations.
This borrower defense claim would be
a basis for relief independent of the
judgment that related exclusively to the
private loans, and such relief would be
calculated without reference to any
relief obtained through that private loan
judgment.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
raised concerns about a student’s ability
to bring a borrower defense claim based
on judgments obtained by government
agencies. One of the commenters stated
that it is not always clear when an
agency is acting on behalf of the
students.
Discussion: The final regulation
recognizes that judgments obtained by
governmental agencies may not be
brought on the behalf of specific
students, as opposed to having been
brought, for example, on the behalf of a
State or on the behalf of the United
States. As described in the final
regulation, a judgment under the
standard brought by a governmental
agency must be a favorable contested
judgment obtained against the school.
As discussed previously, such
judgments must also meet the
requirements of § 685.222(a).
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter argued
that the Department’s judgment
standard should only apply with respect
to loans disbursed, or judgments
obtained, after July 1, 2017.
Discussion: We believe that the
standard does not represent any change
from current practice. If a borrower
submitted a nondefault, contested
judgment from a court or administrative
tribunal of competent jurisdiction
deciding a cause of action under
applicable State law for a loan first
disbursed before July 1, 2017, the
Department would apply principles of
collateral estoppel to determine if the
judgment would bar a school from
disputing the cause of action forming
the basis of the borrower’s claim under
34 CFR 685.206(c).
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter urged the
Department to specify that the
judgments referenced in § 685.222(b)
must be obtained in court cases and not
merely through administrative
proceedings.
Discussion: As set forth in in
§ 685.222(b), the judgment must be
obtained ‘‘in a court or administrative
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.’’ The
Department continues to believe that
administrative adjudications serve an
important role in determining the
factual and legal basis for claims that
could serve as borrower defenses. We do
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not believe further clarification is
necessary on this point.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated
that the Department should add
language to the final regulations stating
that it will also respect judgments in
favor of the school as precluding a
borrower defense claim.
Discussion: We will not incorporate
an absolute bar on borrower defense
claims where the borrower has already
lost in a State proceeding because
different underlying legal or factual
bases may have been involved in the
prior litigation. For example, a student
might lose a breach of contract suit in
State court premised on an institution’s
failure to provide job placement
services, but have a valid claim that the
institution misrepresented whether
credits would be transferrable. The
Department will, however, follow
established principles of collateral
estoppel in its determination of
borrower defense claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated
that the Department’s proposed
regulatory language would disrupt the
adversarial process because institutions
would be more likely to settle cases than
risk a judgment that could lead to
borrower defense liabilities, and also
that institutions may be forced not to
settle if the opposing party insists on
admission of liability in the settlement
that could form the basis of borrower
defense liabilities. The commenter also
argued that it would be unfair for the
Department to consider past settlements
retroactively. Another commenter
argued that the Department should
recognize default judgments against
institutions obtained by a law
enforcement agency such as the FTC,
the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), or a State AG.
Discussion: We appreciate the
concern that the new standard may
cause disruptions to the strategy and
risk calculus in other litigation by
private parties as well as government
agencies. The Department’s purpose in
this rulemaking is to create a Federal
standard that will more efficiently and
fairly determine whether a borrower is
entitled to relief, and we consider this
purpose to outweigh the concern raised
about altering litigation strategies. We
do not intend either to dissuade or
encourage settlements between
borrowers and institutions, and will
give settlements and admissions in
previous litigation the weight to which
they are entitled. That said, a default
judgment does not involve any
determination of the merits, and
therefore will require the Department to
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make an independent assessment of the
underlying factual and legal basis for
the claim. Settlements prior to July 1,
2017 will not be considered under this
standard.
Changes: None.
Claims Based on Breach of Contract
Comments: Several commenters
questioned why the Department would
permit a breach of contract claim, but
not any other State law claims. One
commenter noted that evaluation of a
breach of contract claim would require
substantial Department resources,
including choice-of-law decisions that
may be especially complicated in cases
of distance education. One commenter
said that other contract-related causes of
action should be open to borrowers,
such as lack of consideration, lack of
formation due to lack of capacity, and
contract contrary to public policy,
among others. Another commenter said
that borrowers should be able to assert
contract-related claims under State
UDAP laws for signing forms saying
they received materials that they never
received.
Discussion: The comments suggest
some confusion about the Department’s
standard for evaluating breach of
contract claims. For loans first
disbursed prior to July 1, 2017, the
Department will continue to recognize
any applicable State-law causes of
action, in accordance with the State of
the law prior to these regulations. That
standard requires the Department to
evaluate State law questions, including
choice-of-law questions. For loans first
disbursed after July 1, 2017, however,
the Department will move to a Federal
standard for misrepresentation and
breach of contract claims, and will cease
to recognize State-law bases that may
exist for those causes of action. Some
commenters appeared to question why
the Department drew the line at
accepting breach of contract claims but
rejecting other traditional State law
contract-related causes of action. As we
explained in the NPRM, 81 FR 39341,
breach of contract is a common
allegation against schools, and the
underlying facts for a breach of contract
claim may very well not fit into the
Department’s substantial
misrepresentation standard.
Furthermore, breach of contract is a
cause of action established in common
law recognized across all States, and its
basic elements are likewise uniform
across the States. Developing a Federal
standard in the particularized area of
student-institution contracts will
ultimately lead to better consistency and
greater predictability in this area. That
said, the Department will continue to
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recognize a borrower defense based on
any applicable State law cause of action,
provided that such a claim is litigated
to a non-default, favorable contested
judgment under § 685.222(b). Thus, we
believe the final regulations strike an
appropriate balance between the
efficiency and predictability of a Federal
standard, while still providing sufficient
bases upon which a borrower entitled to
debt relief may seek it.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters asked
the Department to incorporate the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing
when evaluating breach of contract
claims. One commenter argued that
these doctrines could be used to prevent
institutions from relying on fine print
disclaimers, ‘‘job placement assistance’’
that does not provide any targeted
advice for students but instead refers
them to Internet job-posting sites, and
other tactics the commenter believes are
unfair to students. Another commenter
attached examples of current
institutional agreements that seek to
disclaim any promises beyond what are
made in the enrollment agreement, and
urged the Department not to honor such
disclaimers.
Discussion: The Department’s
position on this issue is that it will rely
on general, widely accepted principles
of contract law in developing a Federal
standard in this area. We decline to
elaborate further on what specific types
of contract claims might or might not be
successful at this time. We believe that
a Federal standard for breach of contract
cases within the education context will
ultimately be more helpful if developed
on a case-by-case basis.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
weighed in on the Department’s
position that documents beyond the
enrollment agreement might serve as
part of the contract. Some of these
commenters noted that this position
may lead to inconsistent results, since
different State laws and circumstances
may or may not allow a student to rely
on other documents beyond the
enrollment agreement. Some of the
commenters argued for more clarity
from the Department on which materials
we would consider to constitute the
contract, and one of these commenters
pointed to cases varying on the
treatment of such materials. One
commenter invited us to specify that a
contract would include any promise the
borrower reasonably believed would be
the institution’s commitment to them.
Other commenters argued that, by
raising the possibility that a student
might be able to point to course
catalogues and similar documents as
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part of the ‘‘contract,’’ the Department’s
rule would have the effect of limiting
the information schools provide to
students. These commenters said that
the uncertainty could pose practical
obstacles for large institutions in
particular, and asked the Department to
explicitly exclude such material from
the definition of contract. One
commenter said that the ultimate effect
of the current uncertainty might be to
reduce recruitment from under-served
student populations.
Discussion: We understand the
concerns from both the student
advocates and the institutional
advocates regarding the lack of certainty
in the NPRM language. However, the
Department is unable to draw a bright
line on what materials would be
included as part of a contract because
that determination is necessarily a factintensive determination best made on a
case-by-case basis. The Department
intends to make these determinations
consistent with generally recognized
principles applied by courts in
adjudicating breach of contract claims.9
To the extent that Federal and State case
law has resolved these issues, we will
be guided by that precedent.
Application of the standard will thus be
guided but not controlled by State law.
Moreover, the Department will continue
to evaluate claims as they are received
and may issue further guidance on this
topic as necessary.
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter argued that
allowing breach of contract as a basis for
borrower defense claims will not be
effective. The commenter said that most
contracts in the for-profit education
sector are written to bind the student
and not the institution. The commenter
also argued that the NPRM preamble
failed to cite any successful breach of
contract suits students have made
against schools, arguing that the
Department’s citation to Vurimindi v.
Fuqua Sch. Of Business, 435 F. App’x
129 (3d Cir. 2011) is inapposite.
Discussion: The Department
appreciates this concern, and intends to
follow general fairness and contract
principles in its analysis of whether
other promises made to a student
beyond the enrollment agreement
should be considered.
Changes: None.
9 Section 455(h)of the HEA clearly gives the
Secretary the power to create legal defenses, which
until now has been done by adopting State law; this
rulemaking adopts a Federal standard, the
interpretation and application of which will require
consideration of principles developed by Federal
and State courts in deciding cases brought on
claims for breach of contract or misrepresentation,
as distilled, for example, in the restatements of the
law.
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Comments: A commenter argued that
the Department should not refer to
‘‘specific obligations’’ in its preamble
discussion of how a borrower could
make out a breach of contract theory,
saying it was unnecessarily confusing in
light of well-developed State law on
what kind of promises are sufficient to
make out a breach of contract claim.
Discussion: We believe the phrase
‘‘specific obligations’’ is consistent with
general contract principles that a breach
of contract cannot be based on promises
that are so abstract as to be
unenforceable, and believe that
determinations regarding an
institution’s obligations under a contract
with a student will be highly factspecific. Given that many borrowers
may not be legally sophisticated
regarding what constitutes an
enforceable promise, we do not believe
that any modification to the language is
necessary.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters were
concerned that the proposed rule did
not include a ‘‘materiality’’ element that
a borrower would need to show in order
to make out a breach of contract claim,
which they worried might lead to
numerous, frivolous claims as well as
wide uncertainty as to potential future
liabilities. One commenter further
invited the Department to explain in the
final rule what would constitute a ‘‘de
minimis’’ claim that would lead a judge
to dismiss a case. Other commenters
asked that the Department focus on
systemic problems and material
breaches, and identify the standards it
will use to make determinations. A
group of commenters suggested the
Department adopt the standards used
for such cases in New York.
Discussion: We appreciate the
concerns, first raised during the
negotiated rulemaking, about the lack of
a materiality element in the standard for
a breach of contract borrower defense.
As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR
39341, we believe it is appropriate that
the regulations allow borrowers to assert
a borrower defense based on any breach
of contract that would entitle them to
any relief—including relatively minor
breaches—and thus do not include a
materiality requirement. The
Department will consider whether any
alleged breach of contract by an
institution is material in its assessment
of whether the borrower would be
entitled to relief, as well as whether
such relief would be full or partial.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern that the proposed
regulation contains an exception to the
bar on using HEA violations for
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borrower defense claims if ‘‘the
violation would otherwise constitute a
basis for a borrower defense.’’ These
commenters stated that this exception
could swallow the rule to the extent a
compliance violation could be restated
as a borrower defense, and further noted
that the HEA does not contain a private
right of action. These commenters urged
the Department to bar compliance
violations asserted as breach of contract.
Discussion: We agree that the HEA
does not itself contain a private right of
action, but note that the underlying
conduct constituting a violation of the
HEA may also be a cognizable borrower
defense. For example, the Department
has the authority to prohibit and
penalize substantial misrepresentations
under the HEA, but such
misrepresentations may also serve as the
basis for a borrower defense which a
borrower is undoubtedly entitled to
pursue with the Department if the
borrower can demonstrate proof of
substantial misrepresentation under
§ 685.222(d), which also requires that a
borrower demonstrate actual, reasonable
reliance to their detriment for relief. For
that reason, the final regulations strike
a balance between allowing borrowers
to pursue defenses based on misconduct
that might also constitute HEA
violations, but only so long as the
underlying misconduct also satisfies a
standard under which borrower defense
claims may be brought as noted at
§ 685.222(a)(3).
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter argued that
the lack of a reliance element on a
contractual promise could lead to
borrower relief that is unwarranted.
Other commenters argued the same for
lack of an injury element.
Discussion: The Department will
analyze breach of contract defenses
under general and well established
contract principles shared by State law.
At this time, the Department has not set
forth more fulsome details for what
elements a borrower must show in the
Federal standard to allow the standard
to develop on a case-by-case basis. We
believe that the Federal standard will
ultimately be more useful if developed
in light of actual student claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters urged
the Department to exclude any claims
related to academic considerations, such
as the quality of instructional materials,
because such matters should be left to
the institution or the institution’s
accreditor or State licensing agency.
Discussion: We do not see any present
need for categorical exemptions. The
Department will evaluate claims in
accordance with well-established
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principles of contract law. Claims
related to academic consideration may
well be beyond the scope of a
cognizable borrower defense or even the
Department’s jurisdiction, but that is
something the Department will consider
on a case-by-case basis in evaluating the
borrower defense applications.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter argued
that the Department should recognize
defenses an institution could raise, such
as compliance with contract terms,
economic hardship, or that the borrower
not be entitled to refund of monies
already paid.
Discussion: The final regulations, like
the proposed regulations, do not put
limits on the defenses an institution can
make in a proceeding before the
Department.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter noted
that the Department’s proposed
language was ambiguous as to whether
the act or omission must give rise to the
breach of contract or itself constitute a
breach of contract.
Discussion: Consistent with the
Department’s interpretation of its
authorizing statute, the act or omission
by the school must be the breach of
contract itself. We believe, however,
that this reading is clear from the
language in the final rule.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter asked the
Department to clarify what kinds of
actions it would consider to be within
the scope of a borrower defense based
on a breach of contract.
Discussion: We do not believe further
detail or elaboration is necessary of
helpful at this time, given the wide
variety of allegations the Department
expects to receive. Under the
regulations, the Department will
recognize as a borrower defense any
breach of contract claim that reasonably
relates to the student loan.
Changes: None.
Claims Based on Substantial
Misrepresentation
Comments: A group of commenters
expressed concern that the Department’s
substantial misrepresentation standard
is too narrow. These commenters
believed that the standard would allow
schools to engage in problematic
behavior, so long as they did not make
untrue statements.
Discussion: We appreciate the
concerns that the substantial
misrepresentation standard does not
capture all actions that may form causes
of action under standards in State or
other Federal law. However, as noted in
the NPRM, 81 FR 39340, we believe that
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the standard appropriately addresses the
Department’s interests in accurately
identifying and providing relief for
borrowers and in providing clear
standards for borrowers, schools, and
the Department in resolving claims. We
believe that § 668.71(c), which is
referenced in § 685.222(d), will address
much of the behavior the Department
anticipates arising in the borrower
defense context.
We disagree that the substantial
misrepresentation standard would not
necessarily capture institutional
misconduct that did not involve untrue
statements. As revised in these final
regulations, § 668.71(c) defines a
‘‘misrepresentation’’ as including not
only false or erroneous statements, but
also misleading statements that have the
likelihood or tendency to mislead under
the circumstances. The definition also
notes that omissions of information are
also considered misrepresentations.
Thus, a statement may still be
misleading, even if it is true on its face.
As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR
39342, we revised the definition of
‘‘misrepresentation’’ to add the words
‘‘under the circumstances’’ to clarify
that the Department will consider the
totality of the circumstances in which a
statement occurred, to determine
whether it constitutes a substantial
misrepresentation. We believe the
Department has the ability to properly
evaluate whether a statement is
misleading, but otherwise truthful, to a
degree that it becomes an actionable
borrower defense claim.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern that the substantial
misrepresentation standard would apply
only to proprietary institutions. One
commenter stated that the standard
should apply to all institutions of higher
education, stating that many public
colleges and universities also
misrepresent the benefits and outcomes
of the education provided. Another
commenter stated that the proposed
addition of misrepresentation through
omissions would target only borrower
defense claims that would be made by
students attending proprietary
institutions, and not students at
traditional schools.
Other commenters stated that by
limiting the subject matter covered by
the substantial misrepresentation
standard to just those related to loans,
in their view, the standard would target
only proprietary schools and exclude
issues facing students at traditional
colleges, such as campus safety or
sexual discrimination in violation of
title IX of the HEA.
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Discussion: There appears to be some
confusion about the institutions covered
under the scope of both 34 CFR part
668, subpart F and proposed
§ 685.222(d). Even prior to the proposed
changes in the NPRM, § 668.71 was
applicable to all institutions, whether
proprietary, public, or private nonprofit. Similarly, the current borrower
defense regulation at § 685.206(c) does
not distinguish between types of
schools. The proposed and final
regulations do not represent a change in
these positions.
As discussed under the ‘‘Making of a
Loan and Provision of Educational
Services’’ section of this document, the
Department’s long-standing
interpretation has been that a borrower
defense must be related to the making
of a loan or to the educational services
for which the loan was provided. As a
result, the Department has stated
consistently since 1995 that it does not
does not recognize as a defense against
repayment of the loan a cause of action
that is not directly related to the loan or
to the provision of educational services,
such as personal injury tort claims or
actions based on allegations of sexual or
racial harassment. 60 FR 37768, 37769.
Such issues are outside of the scope of
these regulations, and we note that other
avenues and processes exist to process
such claims. We also disagree with
commenters that such issues are the
only types of issues that may be faced
by students at public and private nonprofit institutions. While the
Department acknowledges that the
majority of claims presently before it are
in relation to misconduct by Corinthian,
we believe that scope of claims that may
be brought as substantial
misrepresentations that relate to either
the making of a borrower’s loan, or to
the provision of educational services, is
objectively broad in a way that will
capture borrower defense claims from
any type of institution.
Changes: None.
Comments: A few commenters
opposed the proposed changes and
argued that the proposed substantial
misrepresentation standard either
exceeds the Secretary’s authority under
the law or is contrary to Congressional
intent. One commenter argued that the
Department’s proposal to use § 668.71 as
the basis for borrower defense exceeds
the Department’s statutory authority
under section 487 of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1094(c)(3)(A), which authorizes the
Department to bring an enforcement
action for a substantial
misrepresentation for a suspension,
limitation, termination, or fine action.
The commenter also argued that the
HEA does not authorize the Department
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to seek recoupment from schools for
relief granted for a borrower defense
claim based on substantial
misrepresentation. Another commenter
suggested that the borrower defense
standard should be based only on
contract law.
Other commenters stated that the
substantial misrepresentation standard
was in violation of the Congressional
intent in the HEA, as proposed. One
commenter said that, in its view,
Congress’ intent in Section 455(h) was
that borrower defenses should be
allowed only for acts or omissions that
are fundamental to the student’s ability
to benefit from the educational program
and at a level of materiality that would
justify the rescission of the borrower’s
loan obligation. In discussing the use of
§ 668.71 for borrower defense purposes,
another commenter acknowledged that,
while misrepresentation is not defined
in the HEA, the penalties assigned to
misrepresentation by statute are severe.
From its perspective, the commenter
stated that this indicates that Congress
did not intend for the misrepresentation
standard to be as low as negligence and
suggested keeping the original language
of § 668.71.
A few commenters argued that the
Department lacks justification for the
proposed changes to § 668.71, given that
the Department last changed the
definition in a previous rulemaking.
Discussion: We disagree that the
Department lacks the statutory authority
to designate what acts or omissions may
form the basis of a borrower defense.
Section 455(h) of the HEA clearly
authorizes the Secretary to ‘‘specify in
regulations which act or omissions of an
institution of higher education a
borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment under this part,’’ without any
limitation as to what acts or omissions
may be so specified. As explained
previously, we believe that the
substantial misrepresentation standard,
with the added requirements listed in
§ 685.222(d), will address not only
much of the behavior that we anticipate
arising in the borrower defense context,
but also our concerns in accurately
identifying and providing relief for
borrowers. We believe it is within the
Department’s discretion to adopt the
substantial misrepresentation standard
for loans first disbursed after July 1,
2017 in § 685.222(d), with the added
requirements of that section, to address
borrower defense claims. No
modification has been proposed to
§ 668.71(a), which establishes that the
Department may bring an enforcement
action for a substantial
misrepresentation for a suspension,
limitation, termination, or fine action.
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We discuss the Department’s authority
to recover from schools on the basis of
borrower defense under ‘‘General.’’
We do not agree that the Department
lacks authority to similarly specify the
scope of the acts or omissions that may
form the basis of a borrower defense.
The Department understands that,
generally, the rescission of a contract
refers to the reversal of a transaction
whereby the parties restore all of the
property received from the other,10
usually as a remedy for a material or
significant breach of contract.11
However, in stating that ‘‘in no event
may a borrower recover . . . an amount
in excess of the amount such borrower
has repaid on the loan,’’ section 455(h)
clearly contemplates that an amount
may be recovered for a borrower defense
that is less than the amount of a
borrower’s loan, as opposed to a
complete rescission of a borrower’s total
loan obligation. This position also
echoes the Department’s consistent
approach to borrower defenses to
repayment. The Direct Loan borrower
defense regulation that was promulgated
in 1994 clearly established that a
borrower may assert a borrower defense
claim based upon ‘‘any act or omission
of the school. . .that would give rise to
a cause of action against the school
under applicable State law,’’ without
qualification as to whether the act or
omission warrants a rescission of the
borrower’s loans. 34 CFR 685.206(c)(1).
The regulation also stated that relief
may be awarded as either ‘‘all or part of
the loan.’’ Id. at § 685.206(c)(2). As
explained by the Department in 1995,
the Direct Loan borrower defense
regulations were intended to continue
the same treatment for borrowers and
the same potential liability for
institutions that existed in the FFEL
Program. 60 FR 37769–37770. Under the
FFEL Program at the time, a borrower
was allowed to assert a defense to
repayment on the ground that all or part
of his or her FFEL Loan was
unenforceable. Id. at 37770.
We also disagree that the HEA does
not give the Department the discretion
to define ‘‘substantial
misrepresentation,’’ whether for the
10 See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment § 54 (2011).
11 See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment § 37, comment c (2011) (‘‘Any
breach of contract that results in quantifiable injury
gives the plaintiff a remedy in damages, but the
remedy of rescission is available only in cases of
significant default. Short of a repudiation, the
defendant’s breach must be ‘material,’ ‘substantial,’
‘essential,’ or ‘vital’; it must ‘go to the root’ of the
defendant’s obligation, or be ‘tantamount to a
repudiation.’ To replace this familiar catalogue of
adjectives, both Restatements of Contracts employ
the expression ‘total breach.’ ’’).
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Department’s enforcement purposes in
§ 668.71 or for use for the borrower
defense process. As noted, the HEA
does not define ‘‘substantial
misrepresentation,’’ thus giving the
Secretary discretion to define the term.
With regard to the commenter who
expressed concern that the proposed
revisions to the definition of
‘‘misrepresentation’’ constitute a
lessening of the standard to
negligence,12 we note that even absent
the proposed revisions, a
misrepresentation under § 668.71 does
not look to the actor’s intent or the
materiality of the statement, but
considers whether the statement is false,
erroneous, or misleading.
We disagree that there is no
justification for the changes to 34 CFR
part 668, subpart F. Since the
Department’s last negotiated rulemaking
in 2010 on 34 CFR part 668, subpart F,
the Department utilized its authority in
2015 under the substantial
misrepresentation enforcement
regulations to issue a finding that
Corinthian had misrepresented its job
placement rates. The subsequent closure
of Corinthian led to thousands of claims
relating to the misrepresentations at
issue by Corinthian borrowers under
borrower defense. These claims
prompted, in part, this effort by the
Department to establish rules and
procedures for borrower defense, which
in turn led to a review of and the
proposed changes to the Department’s
regulations at 34 CFR part 668, subpart
F. These changes were discussed
extensively as part of the negotiated
rulemaking process for borrower
defense where reasons for each specific
change to § 668.71 were explained and
discussed.
Changes: None.
Comments: Many commenters
generally stated that the proposed
standard for substantial
misrepresentation is vague and
suggested that the regulation include an
element of intent or distinguish between
intentional and unintentional acts.
These commenters expressed concern
that inadvertent and innocent, but
erroneous, statements or mistakes
would lead to a large number of
frivolous claims by borrowers and result
in significant financial liabilities for
schools. Another commenter stated that
the standard, absent intent, is
unconstitutionally vague and does not
give fair notice of the conduct that is
being required or prohibited.
12 Generally, ‘‘negligence’’ refers to a failure to
exercise a reasonable duty of care and does not
consider whether the failure was intentional. See
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm
§ 3 (2010).
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Other commenters stated that
students’ own misunderstandings may
lead to claims, even for schools that
provide training and inspections to
ensure compliance with pertinent
guidelines, regulations, and standards.
One commenter expressed concern that
unavoidable changes to instructional
policies and practices could lead to
borrower defense claims for substantial
misrepresentation. Another commenter
expressed concern that the proposed
standard would lead to allegations of
substantial misrepresentation by
students, even where a variety of
reasons unrelated to the alleged
misrepresentation may have contributed
to a student outcome, which may not
yet be apparent.
Several commenters supported using
§ 668.71 as a basis for borrower defense,
but objected to the proposed changes to
the definition in § 668.71(c), that would
change the word ‘‘deceive’’ in the
sentence, ‘‘A misleading statement
includes any statement that has the
likelihood or tendency to deceive,’’ to
‘‘mislead under the circumstances.’’
These commenters stated that the
proposed change would give the same
weight to inadvertent or unintentional
misrepresentations as to a willful
deception by a school. Some such
commenters appeared to believe that,
without the revisions reflected in
proposed subpart F of part 668, the
standard for substantial
misrepresentation is a standard for fraud
and requires proof of intentional
deception.
One commenter stated that the
borrower defense process does not
provide for a contextualized analysis of
whether a statement is misleading in the
same manner as the FTC, and argued
that this would lead to significant
consequences for schools and would
undercut FTC precedent.
Several commenters agreed with the
Department that the standard should not
require an element of institutional
intent generally, stating that the
Department’s approach is consistent
with existing State and other Federal
law, citing the FTC’s definition of
deception as an example. One
commenter stated that institutions
should be responsible for the harm to
borrowers caused by
misrepresentations, even absent intent,
and that proving intent would be very
difficult for borrowers.
Other commenters supported the
specific amendment of the definition to
include ‘‘mislead under the
circumstances.’’ One commenter stated
that the amendment was appropriate to
provide more context as to whether a
statement is misleading. Another
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commenter stated that the Department’s
amendments are consistent with State
consumer protection law and cited
examples of States where courts
consider an individual’s or the target
audience’s circumstances in assessing
whether an act is deceptive or unfair.
The commenter also noted that the
amendments are in keeping with the
approaches used by other Federal
agencies, such as the FTC, the CFPB,
and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency. The commenter noted that in
its experience working with student
loan borrowers, consideration of the
circumstances of a misrepresentation is
important, because many schools target
borrowers in specific circumstances
who may be more likely to trust a
school’s representations and rely upon
promises tailored to such students.
Another commenter noted that the
Department’s proposed rule is in
keeping with well-established consumer
protection legal precedent under State
law, which is that schools are liable for
deceptive and unfair trade practices,
including a failure to deliver
educational services of the nature and
quality claimed. This commenter
supported the Department’s preamble
statement, 81 FR 39337 to 39338, that
educational malpractice is not a tort
recognized by State law, but also stated
that educational malpractice is to be
narrowly construed.
One commenter supported the
Department’s reasoning for including
omissions among misrepresentations for
borrower defense purposes, but stated
that intent should be a factor for the
Department’s enforcement actions based
upon § 668.71. The commenter agreed
that a school should be responsible for
even an unintentional error that harms
borrowers, but believed that that intent
or knowledge of the school should be a
required factor for the purposes of
institutional eligibility and penalties.
One commenter stated that substantial
misrepresentation should be limited to
false and erroneous statements, and not
include true but misleading statements.
The commenter raised concerns about
the adequacy of the Department’s
process for gathering evidence and the
Department’s experience and expertise
in making such determinations.
Discussion: We disagree with the
commenters who opined that the
proposed regulations are broad, vague or
subjective. As explained previously,
section 455(h) of the HEA provides that
the Secretary shall specify in regulations
which acts or omissions of an
institution of higher education a
borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment of a loan made under this
part. The regulations in § 685.222(d),
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75947
which adopt the regulations in subpart
F of part 668 and establish certain other
requirements, set forth the types of
activities that constitute
misrepresentation by an institution and
describe the process and procedure by
which borrowers may receive relief
based upon a substantial
misrepresentation by a school. The
regulations in § 685.222 also set forth
the process by which the Secretary will
evaluate borrower defenses and recover
such losses from the institutions at
issue. The proposed changes to the
regulations strengthen the Department’s
regulatory authority to evaluate and
determine borrower defense claims.
Further, they not only establish what
constitutes a misrepresentation for
borrower defense claims, but they also
clarify the definition for the
Department’s enforcement purposes
under part 668, subpart F. We believe
that aligning the definition and types of
substantial misrepresentations for
borrower defense with the Department’s
long-held authority to bring
enforcement actions under part 668,
subpart F, will provide more clarity for
schools and reduce their burden in
having to interpret and adjust for the
new borrower defense standards.
There appears to be some confusion
as to whether the definition for
misrepresentation in part 668, subpart
F, requires a demonstration of intent, as
would be required in common law
fraud. In proposing to replace the word
‘‘deceive’’ with ‘‘mislead under the
circumstances’’ in § 668.71(c), the
Department is not seeking to remove
any intent element, but rather to clarify
the definition to more accurately reflect
the position it expressed in 2010 as to
part 668, subpart F. As noted in the
NPRM, 81 FR 39342, the word
‘‘deceive’’ may be viewed as implying
knowledge or intent. However, in the
Department’s 2010 rulemaking on part
668, subpart F, we explicitly declined to
require that a substantial
misrepresentation under the regulation
require knowledge or intent by the
school. 75 FR 66915. We believe that an
institution is responsible for the harm to
borrowers caused by its
misrepresentations, even if such
misrepresentations cannot be attributed
to institutional intent or knowledge and
are the result of inadvertent or innocent
mistakes. Similarly, we believe this is
the case even for statements that are
true, but misleading. We believe this is
more reasonable and fair than having
the borrower, or the Federal government
and taxpayers, bear the cost of such
injuries. As noted by some commenters,
this approach is in accord with other
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Federal and State consumer protection
law regarding misrepresentation, and
we believe it is appropriate for not only
the Department’s enforcement purposes,
but also for borrower defense. As
explained later in this preamble, we
believe that we have the capability to
evaluate borrower defense claims based
upon substantial misrepresentations and
anticipate establishing procedural rules
that will provide schools with the
opportunity to present evidence and
arguments in accordance with due
process, similar to what is available in
the Department’s proceeding in part
668, subparts G and H.
In 2010, the Department stated that, in
deciding to bring an enforcement action
under part 668, subpart F, it would
operate within a rule of reasonableness
and consider the circumstances
surrounding any misrepresentation
before determining an appropriate
response. 75 FR 66914. In response to
the comment that the proposed standard
does not view the misrepresentation in
context, the Department’s addition of
the words ‘‘under the circumstances’’ is
intended to clarify and make explicit
the Department’s long-standing position
that misrepresentations should be
viewed in light of all of the available
underlying facts. As explained in the
NPRM, 81 FR 39342 to 39343, this also
echoes the approach taken by the FTC
with regard to deceptive acts and
practices.13 In determining whether a
statement is a misrepresentation, the
Department will consider the totality of
the circumstances in which the
statement occurred, including the
specific group at which the statement or
omission was targeted. The Department
will also consider whether the situation
was such that the borrower would have
had reason to believe he or she could
rely on the information being given to
the borrower’s detriment, such as
because the statement was made by an
individual by whom the borrower
believed could be trusted to give
accurate information, such as a school
admissions officer.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters
supported the proposed inclusion of
omissions in the definition under
§ 668.71. One commenter stated that the
inclusion of omissions, as well as the
additional factors listed in
§ 685.222(d)(2), would improve the
information provided to students. One
commenter stated that, in their
experience, the inclusion of omissions
13 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 103
F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) (appended to Cliffdale
Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984)), available at
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.
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was needed, to prevent schools from
taking advantage of the asymmetry of
information and bargaining power
between themselves and students. This
commenter emphasized that omissions
should be considered in the context of
the specific audience targeted and cited
schools that may target immigrants with
little experience with the United States’
higher education system and limited
English ability as an example. Another
commenter emphasized that the
amendment would benefit first
generation and low income students,
who may not know what information is
important or what questions to ask prior
to enrolling at an institution. One
commenter specifically supported the
proposed language providing that a
misrepresentation include omissions of
‘‘information’’ in such a way as to make
a statement false, erroneous, or
misleading.
Other commenters disagreed with the
inclusion of omissions of information as
part of the definition of substantial
misrepresentation. One commenter
stated that such language provides
assistance to students attending career
colleges, but not students attending
traditional schools. One commenter
stated that amending the standard to
include omissions would create a strict
liability standard that would not
account for a school’s actions or intent,
and that the standard should distinguish
minor and unintentional claims from
material and purposeful
misrepresentations.
Other commenters stated that the
inclusion of omissions would not
benefit students. One commenter stated
that amending the definition of
misrepresentation to include omissions
could cause schools to provide students
with numerous and confusing
qualifications or to provide students
with minimal information to avoid
making misrepresentations. Another
commenter stated that the inclusion of
omissions would hinder the flow of
advice to students and cause schools to
expend time and money reviewing
materials for misrepresentations.
One commenter stated that the
Department’s proposal to amend the
definition to include omissions runs
counter to the position the Department
expressed in its 2010 rulemaking on 34
CFR part 668, subpart F, when it
rejected commenters’ suggestions that
omissions be included in the definition.
One commenter stated that the
Department’s proposed amendment to
include omissions, absent an intent
element, runs counter to the limit
established by the D.C. Circuit in the
case Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. &
Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 452
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(D.C. Cir. 2012) that a substantial
misrepresentation under part 668,
subpart F cannot include true and
nondeceitful statements that have only
the tendency or likelihood to confuse.
One commenter requested
clarification regarding the effect of
disclosures posted on the school’s Web
site or in printed materials. The
commenter inquired about whether the
school needed to disclose information
about investigations, pending civil
rights or legal matters; information
about the qualifications and availability
of faculty to teach certain courses or
levels of students; and how a school’s
compliance with a State’s required
disclosures would be evaluated. This
commenter also asked whether the
Department would consider limiting the
application of the new standard to only
schools governed by States without a
reasonable oversight mechanism. This
commenter also asked for clarification
as to what constitutes ‘‘information,’’
and asked whether information would
include aspirational goals or speculative
plans; subjective beliefs or internal
questions about the school’s educational
programs, financial charges, or the
employability of its graduates; concerns
about, the possibility, or existence of an
upcoming audit; items listed in a title IV
Audit Corrective Action Plan; items
identified by the institution or an
accreditor for improvement; or an
institution’s efforts to seek voluntary
accreditation.
One commenter expressed concern
that the inclusion of omissions in the
standard would place schools with high
default rates at risk. The commenter
cited news articles calling for schools
with default rates higher than
graduation rates, which would include
some HBCUs and community colleges,
to lose their title IV eligibility. The
commenter stated that students could
argue that a failure to disclose such a
measure constitutes a substantial
misrepresentation under the proposed
standard.
Discussion: We appreciate the support
received from some commenters and
agree with these commenters who stated
that the inclusion of omissions will
improve the information provided by
schools.
As discussed earlier in this section,
the commenters who stated that the
revision to § 668.71 would apply only to
proprietary institutions are incorrect.
The final regulation applies to all
schools. We also discuss our reasons for
not including an intent element earlier
in this section and our reasons for not
including a materiality element later in
this section.
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We disagree that the revision is
contrary to the Department’s purpose in
revising part 668, subpart F, in its 2010
rulemaking. We believe that amending
the definition to include ‘‘any statement
that omits information in such a way as
to make the statement false, erroneous,
or misleading’’ merely clarifies the
Department’s original intent, aligns the
definition of misrepresentation used for
the Department’s enforcement actions
with the standard to be used in
evaluating borrower defense claims, and
is appropriate given the Department’s
experiences since 2010.
In 2010, the Department declined to
include omissions in the definition of
misrepresentation during its rulemaking
on part 668, subpart F, on the basis that
the Department’s regulations require
schools to provide accurate disclosures
of certain information. 75 FR 66917 to
66918. The Department emphasized that
the purpose of the regulations was to
ensure that all statements made by an
institution are truthful, id., and that
whether such a statement was a
misrepresentation would be viewed in
context of the circumstances. Id. at
66914. As noted earlier, however, the
Department has had more experience
with omissions in the context of its
substantial misrepresentation
regulations at part 668, subpart F, since
that 2010 rulemaking. In 2014, the
Department issued a fine of $29,665,000
to Heald College, of the Corinthian
Colleges, in part, as a result of a finding
that Heald College had omitted essential
and material information concerning the
methodology used to calculate job
placement rates.14 This same finding,
concerning omissions, has resulted in
thousands of borrower defense claims
filed with the Department. As noted by
some commenters, given the close
connection between borrower defense
and the Department’s purpose of
ensuring truthful statements by schools
when viewed in the entirety of a
situation, we believe it is appropriate to
adopt the regulations at part 668,
subpart F, with some added
requirements, for the borrower defense
regulations and to revise the definition
at § 668.71 to better meet that purpose
and enact the Department’s longstanding purpose for part 668, subpart
F, enforcement actions.
We disagree with the commenter that
the inclusion of omissions in the
definition, absent an intent element,
runs counter to the limit established by
the D.C. Circuit in Ass’n of Private
14 See Dept. of Educ., Notice of Intent to Fine
Heald College, OPE–ID: 00723400 (Apr. 14, 2015),
available at www2.ed.gov/documents/pressreleases/heald-fine-action-placement-rate.pdf.
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Sector Colls. & Univs., 681 F.3d 427. In
that case, the court held that a
substantial misrepresentation under part
668, subpart F, cannot include true and
non-deceitful statements that have only
the tendency or likelihood to confuse.
However, the court also stated that it
agreed with the Department that a
misrepresentation can be a true
statement that is deceitful, and
specifically disagreed with the appellant
that an intent element should be a
required part of the definition. Id. We
believe that the inclusion of omissions
of information that may make a
statement false, erroneous, or
misleading clarifies the context under
which a misrepresentation may be a true
statement that is deceitful and does not
infringe upon the court’s ruling
regarding statements with a likelihood
to confuse. We also note that it is our
understanding that many States’ laws
and other Federal consumer protection
law also include omissions of
information within prohibitions on
deceptive acts and practices, and the
proposed revision is in keeping with
such precedent.
With respect to the commenters who
expressed concern about how these
regulations may affect schools’
behaviors in their provision of certain
types of information to students and
prospective students, including
information regarding investigations,
pending civil rights or legal matters,
faculty qualifications or availability, the
school’s compliance with State law, or
a school’s default rates, among others,
the final regulation explicitly states that
the Department will consider whether
the statement omitting any such
information is misleading ‘‘under the
circumstances.’’ As noted earlier, the
Department will consider the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether
a statement is misleading—including
whether the school is or is not under an
affirmative legal obligation to disclose
such information, or whether concerns
such as privacy requirements prevent
the disclosure or disclosure in full of
such information. For borrower defense,
§ 685.222(d) also requires that the
Department consider the reasonableness
of the borrower’s detrimental reliance
on the misrepresentation.
We note, however, that it should not
matter where or how a
misrepresentation, whether as an
omission or an affirmative statement,
takes place, particularly as it pertains to
the nature of a school’s educational
program, its financial charges, or the
employability of its graduates. As we
stated in 2010, 75 FR 66918, what is
important is to curb the practice of
misleading students regarding an
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eligible institution. We continue to
strongly believe that institutions should
be able to find a way to operate in
compliance with these regulations. As
discussed later in this section,
disclosures made by a school in
publications or on the Internet may be
probative evidence as to the
reasonableness of a borrower’s reliance
on an alleged misrepresentation,
depending on the totality of the
circumstances.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter argued
that it would be inappropriate to apply
the FTC Policy Statement on Deception
to cases of misrepresentation in higher
education. The commenter stated that
the FTC policy focuses specifically on
deception perpetrated through
advertising and is not aimed at
establishing individual claims. The
commenter noted that borrowers have
more extensive interactions with their
schools that may constitute fraud, and
that absent the elements of materiality,
reliance, and harm, the proposed
Federal standard would fail to provide
adequate protection.
Discussion: We disagree that the
substantial misrepresentation standard
in either part 668, subpart F, or in
§ 685.222(d) is the same as the FTC’s
prohibition on deceptive acts and
practices. We considered a wide variety
of both State and Federal legal
precedents in developing the
‘‘substantial misrepresentation’’
definition in § 668.71 and have added
specific elements, such as a reasonable
reliance requirement, to address specific
borrower defense claims in § 685.222(d).
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters stated
that, for borrower defense purposes, the
standard should specify that
misrepresentations must be material, in
order to avoid frivolous claims or claims
based upon inadvertent errors or
omissions. One commenter stated that
such a materiality standard should not
capture small deviations from the truth.
Another commenter stated that the
standard should allow only claims at a
level of materiality that would justify
the rescission of the loan at issue. One
commenter expressed concern that
under the standard without an
accompanying materiality requirement,
inadvertent or partial omissions of
information would give rise to borrower
claims.
One commenter stated that the
Department should incorporate an
express materiality requirement,
emphasizing that the lack of such a
standard is of particular concern
because the standard does not
incorporate an element of intent. The
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commenter also stated that the need for
a materiality standard is enhanced,
because the Department’s proposed
standard does not seem to require proof
of detriment to a student as a result of
his or her actual, reasonable reliance.
The commenter stated that the
definition in § 668.71 only requires that
an individual show that he or she could
have relied on a misrepresentation and
expressed concern about the
Department’s proposal to include a
presumption of reliance for group
claims, in the absence of a materiality
requirement.
Several commenters stated that the
inclusion of omissions, related to the
provision of any educational service, is
too broad without an accompanying
materiality requirement in the
regulation. These commenters expressed
concern that students would be able to
present claims for substantial
misrepresentation by claiming that
schools had failed to provide contextual
information, such as how facultystudent ratio information works.
Discussion: As discussed in the
NPRM, 81 FR 39344, we do not believe
that a materiality element is required in
either the proposed amendments to the
definition for the Department’s
enforcement authority under § 668.71 or
as the definition is adopted for the
substantial misrepresentation borrower
defense standard under § 685.222(d).
We believe that the regulatory definition
of ‘‘substantial misrepresentation’’ is
clear and can be easily used to evaluate
alleged violations of the regulations. See
75 FR 66916; 81 FR 39344. Generally,
under both Federal deceptive conduct
prohibitions and common law,
information is considered material if it
would be important to the recipient, or
likely to affect the recipient’s choice or
conduct.15 By noting specifically in
section 487(c)(3) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1094(c)(3), that the Department may
bring an enforcement action against a
school for a substantial
misrepresentation of the nature of its
educational program, its financial
charges, or the employability of its
graduates, Congress indicated its intent
that information regarding the nature of
a school’s educational program, its
financial charges, or the employability
of its graduates should be viewed as
15 See, e.g., F.T.C. Policy Statement on Deception,
103 F.T.C. at 182; see also Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 538 (1977) (‘‘The matter is material if (a) a
reasonable man would attach importance to its
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice
of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the
maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard
the matter as important in determining his choice
of action, although a reasonable man would not so
regard it.’’).
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material information of certain
importance to students. See Suarez v.
Eastern Int’l Coll., 50 A.3d 75, 89–90
(N.J. Super. 2012).
As also noted in the NPRM, 81 FR
39344, we believe that by requiring that
students demonstrate actual, reasonable
reliance to the borrower’s detriment
under § 685.222(d), the borrower
defense regulations incorporate similar
concepts to materiality. As discussed,
materiality refers to whether the
information in question was information
to which a reasonable person would
attach importance in making the
decision at issue. By requiring
reasonable reliance to the borrower’s
detriment, the Department would
consider whether the misrepresentation
related to information to which the
borrower would reasonably attach
importance in making the decision to
enroll or continue enrollment at the
school and whether this reliance was to
the borrower’s detriment. This would be
the case both for individual claims, and
for the presumption of reliance applied
in the process for group claims under
§ 685.222(f)(3). We discuss the
rebuttable presumption of reasonable
reliance in greater detail in the ‘‘Group
Process’’ section of this document. As a
result, we disagree it should include a
materiality element in the standard.
Changes: None.
Comments: Many commenters
expressed concerns about the
requirement for borrowers to assert
reliance under the substantial
misrepresentation standard. One
commenter expressed concern that a
borrower could establish that a
substantial misrepresentation had
occurred by providing evidence of the
misrepresentation and showing that he
or she could have reasonably relied
upon it to his or her detriment,
notwithstanding the requirement in
§ 685.222(d) that the borrower
demonstrate actual reasonable reliance
upon the misrepresentation.
One commenter supported the use of
a reasonable reliance standard, given
that the standard may allow claims for
statements, particularly unintentional
statements, that are not accurate or
complete.
A couple of commenters suggested
that the Department should not require
that borrowers actually and reasonably
rely upon misrepresentations to obtain
relief for borrower defense purposes, but
rather that borrowers should be entitled
to relief so long as actual reliance is
demonstrated without regard for the
reasonableness of that reliance.
Alternatively, one commenter suggested
that if a reasonable reliance standard
were maintained, then the
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reasonableness of the reliance should be
judged according to the circumstances
of the misrepresentation and the
characteristics of the audience targeted
by the misrepresentation, which the
commenter stated would be in keeping
with State consumer protection law.
One group of commenters suggested
that the Department use the same
standard for reliance for the
Department’s enforcement activities
under § 668.71, as for borrower defenses
under § 685.222(d), so that a borrower
may assert a claim for borrower defense
without having to show that he or she
actually relied on the misrepresentation
at issue. These commenters stated that
neither State nor Federal consumer
protection law typically requires actual
reliance and that requiring actual
reliance would increase the burden on
both the borrower and the trier of fact
without serving the purpose of deterring
misrepresentations. The commenters
also stated that actual reliance is not
needed to protect schools from frivolous
claims given the fact-finding process
and separate proceedings that would be
initiated by the Department to recover
from schools under the proposed rule.
Another commenter also supported
using a standard that did not require
actual reliance, as opposed to showing
that a borrower could have reasonably
relied upon the misrepresentation.
However, the commenter stated that in
the alternative, borrowers should only
be required to certify that they relied
upon the misrepresentation, without
any further proof, to satisfy the reliance
requirement of the standard.
Discussion: There appears to be some
confusion as to whether the substantial
misrepresentation standard for borrower
defense would require actual,
reasonable reliance to a borrower’s
detriment. Although the definition of
substantial misrepresentation in
§ 668.71 requires that, for a
misrepresentation to be substantial, it
must be one upon which a person
‘‘could reasonably be expected to rely,
or has reasonably relied, to that person’s
detriment,’’ the standard for substantial
misrepresentation under § 685.222(d)
requires that the borrower show that he
or she ‘‘reasonably relied on’’ the
misrepresentation at issue—in other
words, that the borrower actually and
reasonably relied upon the
misrepresentation. As discussed later in
this section, the Department
acknowledges that the language of
§ 685.222(d) is confusing as to whether
the borrower must also prove that he or
she actually relied upon the
misrepresentation to his or her
detriment. As a result, we will to modify
the language of proposed § 685.222(d) to
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clarify that actual, reasonable reliance to
the borrower’s detriment must be
demonstrated under the borrower
defense substantial misrepresentation
standard.
We disagree that the purpose of the
borrower defense regulations would be
served if an actual reliance standard
(without a reasonableness component)
or a standard that did not require actual
reliance was adopted. As explained in
the NPRM, 81 FR 39343, a standard that
does not require actual reliance serves
the Department’s interest in the public
enforcement of its regulations: The
Department requires title IVparticipating institutions not to make
false statements on which borrowers
could reasonably rely to their detriment,
and the Department appropriately will
impose consequences where an
institution fails to meet that standard.
However, the Department will grant
borrower defenses to provide relief to
borrowers who have been harmed by an
institution’s misrepresentation, not
borrowers who could have been harmed
but were not; and an actual, reasonable
reliance requirement is the mechanism
by which borrowers demonstrate that
they were indeed actually reasonably
relied upon the misrepresentation to
their detriment. The requirement also
allows the Department to consider the
context and facts surrounding the
misrepresentation to determine whether
other similar students and prospective
students would have acted similarly.16
We believe that the actual, reasonable
reliance requirement for a borrower
defense based upon a substantial
misrepresentation enables the
Department to provide relief for
borrowers while properly avoiding
16 It is our understanding that several other
Federal agencies charged with consumer protection,
such as the FTC and the CFPB, when bringing
enforcement actions for violations of prohibitions of
deceptive acts and practices, are not required to
prove actual reliance by consumers upon alleged
misrepresentations. However, we note that such
agencies have prosecutorial discretion in bringing
such cases, and are not charged with evaluating and
deciding individual claims for relief by consumers
as the Department is seeking to do with these
regulations. Furthermore, such agencies obtain
relief for consumers from the culpable actor, while
the Department will be providing relief through
public resources, with a possibility of recovery from
the actor in some cases. In contrast to the laws these
other Federal agencies enforce, many, if not all,
States allow consumers to bring private actions
under their consumer protection laws. However, it
is the Department’s understanding that the
requirements as to whether reliance is required at
all, or if the courts will consider the reasonableness
of such reliance, varies. See, e.g., National
Consumer Law Center, Consumer Protection in the
States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices Statutes, at 20, 22 (2009);
Schwartz & Silverman, Commonsense Construction
of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1,
18–19 (Oct. 2005).
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discharges and payments by the Federal
government, taxpayers, and institutions.
What may be deemed sufficient
evidence to prove whether a borrower
has reasonably relied upon a
misrepresentation to his or her
detriment will differ from case to case.
As a result, we reject the suggestion that
a certification of reliance should
necessarily and in all cases by itself be
found to be adequate proof of reliance
for all borrower defense claims the
Department may receive in the future.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(d) to clarify that a borrower
must have relied upon a substantial
misrepresentation to his or her
detriment.
Comments: One commenter expressed
concern that the Department’s proposed
standard does not require that the
borrower allege injury or damages as a
requirement to assert substantial
misrepresentation. Another commenter
stated that students should be required
to establish the extent of their injuries
or damages, so that discharges are not
granted where students received what
they bargained for and so that claims are
not filed for harmless errors by schools.
Another commenter stated that the
standard should require the borrower to
show proof of detriment sufficient to
deprive the student of the intended
benefits of the tuition funded by the
loan at issue.
Discussion: To assert a borrower
defense under proposed § 685.222(d),
the borrower must demonstrate that
they reasonably relied upon a
substantial misrepresentation in
accordance with 34 CFR part 668,
subpart F, in deciding to attend, or
continue attending, the school. A
‘‘substantial misrepresentation’’ is
defined in § 668.71 as a
misrepresentation on which the person
to whom it was made could reasonably
be expected to rely, or has reasonably
relied, to that person’s detriment.
The Department understands that,
generally, ‘‘detriment’’ refers to any loss,
harm, or injury suffered by a person or
property.17 When §§ 668.71 and
685.222(d) are read together, a borrower
may assert a borrower defense for a
misrepresentation, if also in accordance
with the other requirements of 34 CFR
part 668, subpart F, if he or she can
demonstrate that the misrepresentation
was one on which the borrower actually
reasonably relied, to the borrower’s
detriment, in deciding to attend, or
continue attending, the school at issue.
However, we acknowledge that the
language of § 685.222(d) may be
confusing. For this reason, we are
17 See
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75951
clarifying in § 685.222(d) that the
borrower must show reasonable
detrimental reliance.
In contrast to detriment, ‘‘damages’’
refers to money claimed by, or ordered
to be paid to, a person as compensation
for loss or injury.18 We do not believe
that the term ‘‘damages’’ is appropriate
in the context of borrower defense,
because the Department is limited by
statute to providing relief to the
borrower on his or her Direct Loan and
may not provide a borrower with the
complete amount or types of
compensation that might traditionally
be considered to be damages at law.
There is no quantum or minimum
amount of detriment required to have a
borrower defense claim, and the denial
of any identifiable element or quality of
a program that is promised but not
delivered due to a misrepresentation
can constitute such a detriment. In
contrast, proposed § 685.222(i) provides
that the trier-of-fact, who may be a
designated Department official for
borrower defenses determined through
the process in § 685.222(i) or a hearing
official for borrower defenses decided
through the processes in § 685.222(f) to
(h), will determine the appropriate
amount of relief that should be afforded
the borrower under any of the standards
described in § 685.222 and § 685.206(c),
including substantial misrepresentation.
We explain the considerations for triersof-fact for relief determinations under
the ‘‘Borrower Relief’’ section of this
document.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(d) to clarify that a borrower
must have relied upon a substantial
misrepresentation to his or her
detriment.
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern about the factors
listed in proposed § 685.222(d)(2). A
couple of commenters suggested that all
of the additional factors listed in
§ 685.222(d)(2) should be removed. One
commenter argued that the factors do
not establish the falsity or misleading
nature of a substantial
misrepresentation claim. Another
commenter stated that the factors are
subjective and would be difficult to
prove or disprove and thus should be
removed in their entirety.
A couple of commenters disagreed
with specific factors listed in proposed
§ 685.222(d)(2). One commenter stated
that the factor pertaining to failure to
respond to information was
unnecessary, because passive and
requested disclosures are already
enforceable through existing consumer
compliance requirements. Another
18 See
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commenter stated that the factors
should not include failures to respond
to information, or that this factor should
be revised to include only purposeful
failures to provide requested
information. The commenter argued that
a failure to respond promptly may be
due to routine events or extraneous
factors, such as an enrollment officer’s
vacation or workload issues, or a
student’s own delay of enrollment. A
commenter also requested clarification
as to the ‘‘unreasonable emphasis on
unfavorable consequences of delay’’
language. This commenter argued that
under this factor, routine, truthful
provisions of information regarding
timelines and possible late fees or other
consequences as a result of actions such
as late enrollment or making late
housing arrangements may be viewed as
improper conduct.
One commenter expressed support for
the factors listed in § 685.222(d)(2),
stating that it agreed with the
Department that misrepresentations
should be viewed in the context of
circumstances, including the possible
use of high pressure enrollment tactics.
One commenter expressed concern
that decision makers would expect to
see one or more of the newly added
factors before finding that a substantial
misrepresentation exists. This
commenter suggested that the
Department clarify that a borrower need
not show the factors to have a claim for
substantial misrepresentation under
borrower defense.
Several commenters stated that the
factors listed in proposed
§ 685.222(d)(2) were insufficient as part
of the standard for substantial
misrepresentation, as many problematic
practices relating to high pressure and
abusive sales practices do not
necessarily involve misrepresentations
as opposed to puffery or abusive or
unfair practices.
Discussion: We disagree with the
commenters’ suggestion to remove the
non-exhaustive list of factors in
§ 685.222(d)(2). We appreciate the
concerns that the factors do not
necessarily prove whether a statement
was erroneous, false, or misleading.
However, as explained in the NPRM, 81
FR 39343, we believe it is appropriate
to consider factors that may have
influenced whether a borrower’s or
student’s reliance upon a
misrepresentation to his or her
detriment is reasonable, thus elevating
the misrepresentation to a substantial
misrepresentation under § 668.71 and
§ 685.222(d) for the purposes of
evaluating a borrower defense claim. We
recognize that such factors consider the
viewpoint of the borrower as to his or
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her reliance on a misrepresentation and
may be subjective. However, in
evaluating whether a statement is a
misrepresentation, the Department will
consider whether the statement is a
misrepresentation ‘‘under the
circumstances’’ and consider the totality
of the situation, in addition to the
reasonable reliance factors listed in
§ 685.222(d)(2). We also disagree with
commenters that the factors are
insufficient as part of the substantial
misrepresentation standard. As
discussed earlier in this section, we
decline to include standards such as
unfair or abusive acts or practices,
which some commenters have stated
would address issues such as puffery
and abusive sales practices that may
occur absent a misrepresentation,
because of a lack of clear precedent and
guidance. We believe that consideration
of the factors, if the trier-of-fact
determines that they are warranted
under § 685.222(d)(2), strikes a balance
between the Department’s interests in
establishing consistent standards by
which the Department may evaluate
borrower defenses; providing borrowers
and schools with clear guidance as to
conduct that may form the basis of a
borrower defense claim, and providing
appropriate relief to borrowers who
have been harmed.
We understand the concern raised by
commenters that a failure to respond to
a borrower’s requests for more
information, including regarding the
cost of the program and the nature of
any financial aid, 34 CFR 685.222(d)(iv),
may be due to unintentional and routine
events such as an employee’s oversight
and vacation schedule. However, as
discussed earlier in this section, we
disagree that the substantial
misrepresentation standard should
include an element of intent. We also
disagree that the factor is unnecessary,
as different States and oversight entities
may have differing disclosure standards
and institutions’ compliance with such
standards may vary.
Section 685.222(d)(2)(ii) notes that in
considering whether a borrower’s
reliance was reasonable, that an
‘‘unreasonable’’ emphasis on the
unfavorable consequence of a delay may
be considered. Generally, we do not
believe that routine and truthful
provisions of information such as
timelines and fees to a borrower are
unreasonable. However, as discussed,
the standard requires that a
consideration of any of the factors listed
in § 685.222(d)(2) also include
consideration of whether a statement is
a misrepresentation under the
circumstances or, in other words, in the
context of the situation.
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We also disagree that further
modification of the regulations is
needed to clarify that the factors do not
need to exist for a borrower to have a
borrower defense under § 685.222(d).
We believe that in stating that the
Secretary ‘‘may consider, if warranted’’
whether any of the factors listed in
§ 685.222(d)(2) were present, that the
Department’s intent is clear that the
factors do not need to be alleged for a
substantial misrepresentation to be
established.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated
that the preponderance of evidence
standard established in the regulation,
combined with the lower proof standard
of preponderance of the evidence for
misrepresentation, would open the door
to frivolous claims. One commenter
expanded on this position, asserting that
the evidentiary standard in most States
for fraudulent misrepresentation is clear
and convincing evidence.
One commenter requested
clarification regarding the reasonable
reliance and the preponderance of
evidence standard for the purposes of
the substantial misrepresentation,
raising as an example, that an error or
oversight in one publication should not
satisfy the preponderance of the
evidence standard for substantial
misrepresentation, if the statement was
otherwise correct and complete in all of
the school’s other publications.
Discussion: We disagree that a
‘‘preponderance of the evidence’’ is a
lesser standard of proof than what is
used currently. As explained in the
NPRM, 81 FR 39337, we believe that
this evidentiary standard is appropriate
as it is both the typical standard in most
civil proceedings, as well as the
standard used by the Department in
other processes regarding borrower debt
issues. See 34 CFR 34.14(b), (c)
(administrative wage garnishment); 34
CFR 31.7(e) (Federal salary offset).
We understand that some commenters
have concerns about baseless charges
and frivolous claims that may be
brought by borrowers as borrower
defenses and lead to liabilities for
schools. However, as established in
§ 685.222(e)(7) and (h), in determining
whether a school may face liability for
a borrower defense claim or a group of
borrower defense claims, the school will
have the opportunity to present
evidence and arguments in a factfinding process in accordance with due
process. If, for example, during the
course of such a fact-finding process,
the school provides proof that a
misstatement or oversight in one
publication was otherwise correct and
complete in the school’s other
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publications, such evidence may be
determinative as to whether a
borrower’s reliance on the original
misrepresentation was reasonable under
the circumstances, as required under
§ 668.71 and § 685.222(d). However, the
probative value of such evidence will
vary depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case. We also
discuss comments relating to the
evidentiary standard under ‘‘General.’’
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
suggested that we provide schools with
specific safe harbors or defenses to
substantial misrepresentation borrower
defense claims. One commenter
suggested such safe harbors could
include a demonstration that an alleged
misstatement is found to be true and not
misleading when made; proof that a
student participated in Student Loan
Entrance counseling despite a claim that
the student did not understand
repayment requirements; proof that a
borrower failed to obtain a professional
license due to his or her own behavior
despite having been provided with
information on professional licensing
requirements; a showing that the
student has been made whole by the
school; proof that the student has signed
acknowledgements as to the information
about which the student is claiming to
have been misled; or underlying
circumstances that are based on
standard operational or institutional
changes.
Another commenter stated that
schools should be provided with
defenses in the form of proof that the
misrepresentation had been
subsequently corrected by the school or
that the institution had policies,
procedures, or training in place to
prevent the misrepresentation at issue.
Discussion: We disagree with
commenters that specific defenses or
safe harbors should be included in the
regulations. Many of the factors listed
by commenters, such as whether a
student participated in entrance or exit
counseling, proof of the availability of
or receipts of accurate information by a
student, or proof of underlying
circumstances that are based on
standard operational or institutional
changes that should have been apparent
to the borrower or student may be
important evidence in the Department’s
consideration of whether a borrower’s
reliance upon an alleged
misrepresentation is reasonable, as
required by § 685.222(d). However,
determinations as to the impact of such
factors may vary significantly
depending on the type of allegations
made and the facts and circumstances at
issue. As a result, we do not believe that
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the inclusion of such factors is
appropriate.
Similarly, other factors noted by
commenters, such as a showing that a
student has already been made whole by
the school may, depending on the
specific circumstances, be important
considerations for the Department in its
determination of whether a borrower
may be entitled to relief or to the
determination of the amount of relief
under § 685.222(i), which in turn will
affect the amount of liability a school
may face in either the separate
proceeding for recovery under
§ 685.222(e)(7) or in the group process
described in § 685.222(h). Given that the
importance of such factors will vary
depending on the circumstances of each
case, we also do not believe that the
inclusion of such factors is appropriate
for the regulations.
Section 668.71 defines a
‘‘misrepresentation’’ as any false,
erroneous, or misleading statement. If
an alleged misstatement can be proven
to be true statement of fact when made,
not false or erroneous, and it is not
misleading when made, then such
statements would not be actionable
misrepresentations under the standard.
However, as explained previously in
this section, to determine whether a
statement that was true at the time of its
making was misleading, the Department
will consider the totality of the situation
to determine whether the statement had
‘‘the likelihood or tendency to mislead
under the circumstances’’ or whether it
‘‘omit[ted] information in a way as to
make the statement false, erroneous, or
misleading.’’ The Department will also
look to whether the reliance by the
borrower was reasonable. This would
include a consideration of whether a
misrepresentation has been corrected by
the school in such a way or in a
timeframe so that the borrower’s
reliance was not reasonable. This would
also mean that, generally, claims based
only on the speaker’s opinion would not
form the basis of a borrower defense
claim under the standard, if it can be
determined that under the
circumstances borrowers would
understand the source and limitations of
the opinion.19 For the same reason, it is
our understanding that claims based on
exaggerated opinion claims, also known
as ‘‘puffery,’’ would also generally not
19 It should be noted, however, that a claim
phrased as an opinion may still form the basis of
a substantial misrepresentation, if the borrower
reasonably interpreted the statement as an implied
statement of fact, see, e.g., FTC Policy Statement on
Deception, 103 F.T.C. at 184, or if any of the factors
listed in § 685.222(d)(2) existed so as to affect the
reasonableness of the borrower’s reliance on the
misrepresentation.
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be able to form the basis of a
misrepresentation under State or
Federal consumer protection law.20
However, the determination of whether
a statement is an actionable
misrepresentation will necessarily
involve consideration of the
circumstances under which the
representation was made and the
reasonableness of the borrower’s
reliance on the statement.
We do not believe that the existence
of policies, procedures, or training to be
a defense to the existence of a
substantial misrepresentation. As
discussed earlier in this section, the
Department does not consider intent in
determining whether a substantial
misrepresentation was made and
believes that a borrower should receive
relief if the borrower reasonably relied
upon a misrepresentation to his or her
detriment.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concerns regarding the
subject matter or topics upon which a
substantial misrepresentation may be
based. A few commenters expressed
concerns that the substantial
misrepresentation standard narrows the
scope of borrower defenses by not
including claims relating to campus
safety and security, as well as those for
sexual or racial harassment. One
commenter expressed the view that not
including such non-loan related issues
is inconsistent with the purpose of the
HEA and the borrower defense
regulations. Another commenter said
that by excluding such topics, the
substantial misrepresentation standard
targets just proprietary institutions and
excludes traditional colleges.
Another commenter asked whether
statements about topics such as cafeteria
menu items, speakers hosted by a
school, or opponents on a team’s
athletic schedule would be considered
substantial misrepresentations.
One commenter supported using 34
CFR part 668, subpart F, as the basis for
borrower defense claims, including
limiting substantial misrepresentation
claims to the categories listed in subpart
F.
Discussion: We explain earlier our
reasons for why subjects that do not
relate the making of a borrower’s loan or
the provision of educational services for
which the loan was provided, such as
sexual or racial harassment and campus
safety or security, are included within
the scope of the borrower defense
regulations.
20 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Apple Inc., 27 F. Supp.
3d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2014); FTC Policy Statement on
Deception, 103 F.T.C. 110.
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As also discussed earlier in this
section, we disagree that the substantial
misrepresentation standard targets
proprietary institutions and excludes
issues facing public and private nonprofit schools.
In response to questions about
whether misrepresentations on specific
topics may form the basis of a borrower
defense, we note such determinations
will necessarily be fact and situation
specific-dependent inquiries. As
proposed, the substantial
misrepresentation standard considers a
number of factors in determining
whether a borrower defense claim may
be sustained. Proposed § 685.222(d)
specifies that the borrower defense
asserted by the borrower must be a
substantial misrepresentation in
accordance with 34 CFR part 668,
subpart F, that the borrower reasonably
relied on when the borrower decided to
attend, or to continue attending, the
school. 34 CFR part 668, subpart F,
specifically limits the scope of
substantial misrepresentation to
misrepresentations concerning the
nature of an eligible institution’s
educational program, 34 CFR 668.72;
the nature of an eligible institution’s
financial charges, id. at § 668.73; and
the employability of an eligible
institution’s graduates, id. at § 668.74. If
a misrepresentation falls within one of
these categories, then it may be a
misrepresentation upon which a
borrower may assert a borrower defense
claim. However, as required by the
revised language of § 668.71, the
Department would consider the totality
of the situation to determine whether
the statement was false, erroneous, or
misleading ‘‘under the circumstances.’’
Additionally, the borrower would have
to show that he or she reasonably relied
upon the misrepresentation to his or her
detriment in deciding to attend the
school or in continuing his or her
attendance at the institution under
proposed § 685.222(d). If such
requirements are met, then it is possible
that a substantial misrepresentation may
form the basis of a borrower defense
claim.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern that the standard
would result in schools being held
liable for misrepresentations of
contractors and others acting on their
behalf. According to one commenter,
this standard is acceptable for
enforcement activities conducted by and
guided by the Department in its
discretion, but is not suitable for
borrower defense. Another commenter
stated that, as proposed, § 685.222 is
unclear, because under § 685.222(a), a
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borrower defense is limited to the act or
omission of the school, whereas under
§ 685.222(d), it does not appear to be
clear that the act or omission may be by
the school’s representatives.
Discussion: In response to concerns in
2010 that institutions may be held
accountable for false or misleading
statements made by persons with no
official connection to a school, the
Department narrowed the scope of
substantial misrepresentation to
statements made by the school, the
school’s representatives, or any
ineligible institution, organization, or
person with whom the eligible
institution has an agreement to provide
educational programs or those that
provide marketing, advertising,
recruiting, or admissions services. 75 FR
66916. As explained in 2010, such
persons actually either represent the
school or have an agreement with the
school for the specific purposes of
providing educational programs,
marketing, advertising, recruiting, or
admissions services. Section
§ 685.222(d) similarly names the
persons and entities making a
substantial misrepresentation upon
which a borrower may assert a claim
and echoes the official relationships in
§ 668.71. We believe the definition
provided in proposed § 685.222(d) does
not need further clarification. We also
believe that the specific persons and
entities identified in § 685.222(d) upon
whose substantial misrepresentation a
borrower may assert a borrower defense
claim is appropriate for the same
reasons stated in 2010 as to their
appropriateness for § 668.71 and decline
to make any changes in this regard.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter requested
that borrower defense claims extend to
guaranty agencies and, specifically,
suggested that § 685.222(d)(2) be revised
to enable the Secretary to consider
certain factors, listed in § 685.222(d)(2),
to determine whether a guaranty
agency’s reliance on a substantial
misrepresentation is reasonable.
Discussion: The Department’s
authority to regulate borrower defenses
arises from Section 455(h) of the HEA,
which describes borrower defenses that
may be asserted by a borrower to the
Department for loans made under the
Direct Loan Program. We do not believe
that it is appropriate to include guaranty
agencies, which are not participants in
the Direct Loan Program, in the
borrower defense regulations and
decline the commenter’s suggestion.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter
concurred with the Department’s goal of
deterring misrepresentations, but
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requested that the Department exempt
foreign institutions with relatively small
numbers of American students from the
regulation. The commenter stated that
eligible foreign institutions are governed
by different countries’ laws and
oversight regimes, and that there are no
indicators that the issues giving rise to
borrower defense claims have affected
Americans enrolled in foreign
institutions.
Discussion: We do not agree that it
would be appropriate to ignore any
potential harm to students that may
constitute the basis of a borrower
defense from schools participating in
the Direct Loan Program, whether such
institutions are foreign or domestic. The
standards proposed in § 685.222 for
borrower defense were drafted for the
purpose of ensuring that students
receive consistent and uniform
treatment for borrower defense claims,
regardless of the type of institution.
Exempting some institutions from the
borrower defense process, whether
partially or fully, would undermine the
effectiveness of the regulation in
providing relief for borrowers and
providing the Department with
information on misconduct forming the
basis of borrower defenses among
institutions participating the Direct
Loan Program.
Changes: None.
Limitations on Department Actions To
Recover
Comments: Commenters objected to
the proposal to remove the limitations
period in current § 685.206(c) to
Department action to recover from the
school for losses arising from borrower
defense claims on both loans made
before July 1, 2017, and those made
thereafter. Section 685.206(c) refers to
§ 685.309(c), which in turn refers to the
three-year record retention requirement
in § 668.24. The current regulations also
provide that the three-year limitation
would not apply if the school received
actual notice of the claim within the
three-year period. Commenters objected
for a variety of reasons.
Several commenters argued that it
would be unduly burdensome and
expensive for institutions to retain
records beyond the mandatory threeyear record retention period. These
commenters also argued that it would be
unfair for an institution to have to
defend itself if it no longer has records
from the time period in question. One
commenter also noted that it would be
difficult for the Department to assess
claims in the absence of records. One
commenter disagreed with the
Department’s statements in the NPRM
that institutions have not previously
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relied on the three-year limitations
period and student-specific files are
likely unnecessary to a borrower
defense claim. A commenter asserted
that the records to which the current
record retention rule applies—including
the Student Aid Report (SAR),
documentation of each borrower’s loan
eligibility, documentation of each
borrower’s receipt of funds,
documentation of exit counseling,
documentation of the school’s
completion rates, among numerous
other categories of documents—would
be relevant and that the Department had
failed to demonstrate that resolution of
borrower defense claims would rarely, if
ever, turn on the records to which the
three-year record retention rule now
applies. The commenter contended that
these records will likely go to the heart
of borrower claims concerning
misrepresentation regarding student
loans.
Some commenters stated that schools
have tied their general record retention
policies to the three-year student aid
record retention regulation. Other
commenters contended that the
proposal would place an unfair, and
unnecessary burden on schools by
requiring them to retain records
indefinitely, even though a borrower
would reasonably be expected to know
within a few years after attendance
whether the student had a claim
regarding the training he or she had
received. Some commenters argued that
due process requires a defined
limitations period so that borrowers and
schools would know how long to retain
relevant records. These commenters also
suggested that a defined limitation
period would promote early awareness
of claims, and proposed a six-year
period for recovery actions on both
misrepresentation and contract claims.
A commenter asserted that periods of
limitation are enacted not merely to
reduce the risk of failing memories and
stale evidence, but to promote finality of
transactions and an understanding of
the possible risks that may arise from
transactions. This proposed change, the
commenter asserts, frustrates these
objectives served by periods of
limitation. One commenter contended
that an unlimited record retention
period would increase the risk that data
security lapses could occur.
One commenter suggested that the
limitation period for recovery actions
should be tied to the rule adopted by the
school’s accreditor, or to the statute of
limitations in the State, as even nonstudent specific records, such as
catalogs (which the Department noted
are likely be the basis of borrower
defense claims), are likely to be
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destroyed at the end of these retention
periods. Another commenter viewed the
proposal as an impermissible retroactive
regulation, by converting what was
enacted as defense to repayment into an
affirmative recovery claim, available to
the Department for recovery for losses
from actions of the school that occurred
before the new regulation took effect.
Discussion: We fully address in the
NPRM at 81 FR 39358 the contention
that removing or extending a limitation
period is unconstitutional and beyond
the power of the Department.21 As to the
objections that the change would be
unfair because schools in fact relied on
the record retention rules, we note first
that these record retention rules require
the school to retain specific, particular
student-aid related records. We include
the specific records that must be
maintained in order to provide the
context in which to address the
commenters’ assertion that these records
would go to the heart of borrower
defense claims. 34 CFR 668.24. The
commenters identify no lawsuits in
which resolution of the dispute actually
turned on any of the records listed here
and, with minor exceptions, we are
aware of no lawsuits against schools by
borrowers or government entities, or
borrower defense claims presented to
the Department, in which the records
described here are dispositive. In a
handful of instances, recognition of
borrower defenses under § 685.206
turned on records showing whether
refunds owed to students had in fact
been made, a requirement ordinarily
examined in the routine required
compliance audit and in Department
program reviews. In a few other cases,
Department reviews have identified
instances in which the school falsified
determinations of satisfactory academic
progress, another matter commonly
examined in routine audits and program
reviews, and we are amending the false
certification discharge provisions to
ensure that the Department can
implement relief when this particular
failure is identified. In contrast, even a
cursory review of claims raised by
students and student borrowers over the
years that would constitute potential
21 We add only that statutes of limitation
applicable to government actions to collect these
claims affect only the ability to recover by a
particular action, and do not extinguish claims.
Thus, a suit by the government to collect a liability
arising in title IV, HEA program remains governed
by the limitation periods in 28 U.S.C. 2415(a), while
actions to collect by Federal offset have not, since
subsection (i) was added to § 2415 by the 1982 Debt
Collection Act to exempt actions to collect by
administrative offset under 31 U.S.C. 3716, which
originally imposed a 10-year statute of limitations,
until amended in 2008 to remove any limitation
period from collection by Federal offset.
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borrower defense claims have turned
not on the individualized aid-specific
records itemized in the Department’s
record retention regulations, but on
broadly disseminated claims regarding
such matters as placement rates,22
accreditation status,23 and employment
prospects.24
Whether a school actually retains
records relevant to the borrower’s claim
does not determine the outcome of any
claim, because the borrower—and in
group claims, the Department—bears
the burden of proving that the claim is
valid. The borrower, or the Department,
must therefore have evidence to
establish the merit of the claim, a
prospect that becomes more unlikely as
time passes. If the borrower or the
Department were to assert a claim
against the school, the school has the
opportunity to challenge the evidence
proffered to support the claim, whether
or not the school itself retains
contradictory records.
We acknowledge, however, that
institutions might well have considered
their potential exposure to direct suits
by students in devising their record
retention policies for records that may
in fact be relevant to borrower defense
type claims. Although we consider
applicable law to support collection of
claims by offset without regard to any
previously applicable limitation period,
we recognize that the burden of doing
so may be unwarranted after the
limitation period otherwise applicable
had expired and the institution had no
reason to expect that claims would arise
later. Under current regulations, there is
no limit on the time in which the
Department could take recovery action
if the institution received notice of a
claim within the three-year period.
Under the current regulation, an
institution must have ‘‘actual notice of
a claim’’ to toll the three-year period.
An institution would in fact have ample
warning that the claims may arise from
other events besides receipt of a claim
from an individual, such as lawsuits
22 See Armstrong v. Accrediting Council for
Continuing Educ. & Training, Inc., 168 F.3d 1362,
1369 (D.C. Cir. 1999), opinion amended on denial
of reh’g, 177 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
23 California v. Heald Coll., No. CGC–13–534793,
Sup. Ct. Cty of San Francisco (March 23, 2016);
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Corinthian Colls.,
Inc., No. 1:14–CV–07194, 2015 WL 10854380 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 27, 2015); Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls.,
Inc., 733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013); Moy v. Adelphi
Inst., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 696, 706 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(upholding claim of common law misrepresentation
based on false statements regarding placement
rates.); Lilley v. Career Educ. Corp., 2012 IL App
(5th) 100614–U (Oct. 25, 2012); Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. DeVry Educ.Group, Inc., C.A. No. 15–CF–00758
(S.D. Ind. Filed Jan. 17, 2016).
24 Suarez v. E. Int’l Coll., 428 N.J. Super. 10, 50
A.3d 75 (App. Div. 2012).
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involving the same kind of claim, law
enforcement agency investigations, or
Department actions. State law,
moreover, already commonly recognizes
that the running of limitation periods
may be suspended for periods during
which the claimant had not yet
discovered the facts that would support
a claim, and may impose no limit on the
length of the suspension, effectively
allowing a claim to be asserted long
after the otherwise applicable limitation
period had run. The limitation period
applicable to a particular recovery claim
will thus depend—for current loans—on
the limitation period State law would
impose on an action by the student
against the institution for the cause of
action on which the borrower seeks
relief, as that period may be affected by
a discovery rule, as well as whether an
event has occurred within that period to
give the institution notice. The current
three-year limit would be retained,
subject to the notice provisions, if that
limit exceeded the applicable State law
limitation. For new loans, the applicable
periods would be those in
§ 685.222(e)(7) and § 685.222(h)(5); for
actions based on judgments, no
limitation would apply.
We recognize that the retention of
records containing personally
identifiable information poses data
security risks. However, the school
already faces the need to secure such
information, and we expect the school
to have already adopted steps needed to
do so. The regulation does not impose
any new record retention requirement.
Changes: We have amended
§ 685.206(c) to remove the provision
that the Secretary does not initiate a
recovery action later than three years
after the last year of attendance, and we
have modified § 685.206(c)(3) to provide
that the Department may bring a
recovery action against the school
within the limitation period that would
apply to the cause of action on which
the borrower defense is based, unless
within that period the school received
notice of the borrower’s claim. We have
further modified the regulations to state
that notice of the borrower’s claim
includes actual notice from the
borrower, a representative of the
borrower, or the Department, of a claim,
including notice of an application filed
pursuant to § 685.222 or § 685.206(c);
receipt of a class action complaint
asserting relief for a class that may
include the borrower for underlying
facts that may form the basis of the
borrower defense claim; and notice,
including a civil investigative demand
or other written demand for
information, from a Federal or State
agency that it is initiating an
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investigation into conduct of the school
relating to specific programs, periods, or
practices that may affect the student for
underlying facts that may form the basis
of the borrower defense claim.
We have also revised § 685.222(h)(5)
and (e)(7) to provide that the
Department may bring a recovery action
against the school for recovery of claims
brought under § 685.222(b) at any time,
and may bring a recovery action for
recovery of claims brought under
§ 685.222(c) or (d) within the limitation
period that would apply to the cause of
action on which the borrower defense is
brought, unless within that period the
school received notice of the borrower’s
claim. The Department further modifies
§ 685.222(h)(5) to include the same
description of events that constitute
notice as described above.
Comments: One commenter requested
that the Department continue the threeyear statute of limitations period for
loans disbursed prior to July 1, 2017.
Another commenter suggested it would
be unfair for the Department to hold an
institution accountable for claims going
back more than ten years.
Discussion: As noted in the NPRM,
the Department will continue to apply
the applicable State statute of
limitations to claims relating to loans
disbursed prior to July 1, 2017. We also
note that we will apply all aspects of
relevant State law related to the statute
of limitations as appropriate, including
discovery rules and equitable tolling.
However, these comments may reflect a
drafting error in the NPRM that
suggested loans disbursed prior to July
1, 2017, would be subject to the new
limitations period established by the
final regulations.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(a)(5) to make clear that the
six-year statute of limitations period
established under that section does not
apply to claims under § 685.206(c).
Expansion of Borrower Rights
Comments: A number of commenters
noted that the regulations in proposed
§ 685.206(c) expand the rights of
borrowers by allowing borrowers to
assert defenses regardless of when the
loan was disbursed. Under the current
regulations, a defense to repayment is
available only when collection on a
Direct Loan has been initiated against a
borrower, such as wage garnishment or
tax offset proceedings. The commenters
asserted that the revisions to the
borrower defense regulations have
reconstituted current defenses to
collection, so they now serve as the
bases for expanded borrower rights to
initiate an action for affirmative debt
relief at any time.
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Discussion: We disagree that proposed
§ 685.206(c) would be an expansion of
borrowers’ rights as to the context in
which a borrower defense may be
raised. As explained by the Department
in 1995, 60 FR 37769–37770, the Direct
Loan borrower defense regulations were
intended to continue the same treatment
for borrowers and the same potential
liability for institutions that existed in
the FFEL Program—which allowed
borrowers to assert both claims and
defenses to repayment, without regard
as to whether such claims or defenses
could only be brought in the context of
debt collection proceedings.
Specifically, FFEL borrowers’ ability to
raise such a claim was pursuant the
Department’s 1994 inclusion in the
FFEL master promissory note for all
FFEL Loans a loan term 25—that remains
in FFEL master promissory notes to this
day—stating that for loans provided to
pay the tuition and charges for a forprofit school, ‘‘any lender holding [the]
loan is subject to all the claims and
defenses that [the borrower] could assert
against the school with respect to [the]
loan’’ (emphasis added).26 See also Dept.
of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter Gen 95–
8 (Jan. 1995) (stating the Department’s
position that borrower defense claims
would receive the same treatment as
they were given in the FFEL program,
which allowed borrowers to not only
assert defenses but also claims under
applicable law).
We also disagree that the revisions to
§ 685.206(c) expand any timeframe for a
borrower to assert a borrower defense.
As explained above, the Department’s
borrower defense regulation at
§ 685.206(c) was based upon the right of
FFEL borrowers to bring claims and
defenses, which in turn was adopted
from the FTC’s Holder Rule provision.
The FTC has stated that applicable State
law principles, such as statutes of
limitations as well as any principles that
would permit otherwise time-barred
claims or defenses against the loan
holder, apply to claims and defenses
brought pursuant to a Holder Rule
provision.27 The Department’s position
on the application of any applicable
statutes of limitation or principles that
25 This loan term was adapted from a similar
contract provision, also known as the Holder Rule,
required by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in
certain credit contracts. See 40 FR 533506.
26 The substance of this loan term was also
adopted as part of the FFEL Program regulations at
34 CFR 682.209(g) in 2009.
27 Letter from Stephanie Rosenthal, Chief of Staff,
Division of Financial Practices, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, FTC to Jeff Appel, Deputy Under
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t. of Educ. (April 7, 2016),
available at www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions/
letter-stephanie-rosenthal-chief-staff-divisionfinancial-practices-bureau.
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may permit otherwise time-barred
claims is the same as the FTC’s. We do
not seek to change this position in
revising § 685.206(c), which would
apply to loans first disbursed before July
1, 2017.
Changes: None.
Administrative Burden
Comments: A group of commenters
questioned the validity of the
Department’s argument that maintaining
a State-based standard would be
administratively burdensome. The
commenters suggested that the
Department could establish a system for
determining which State’s laws would
pertain to students enrolled in distance
education programs.
Several commenters criticized the
Federal standard as being too broad and
vague to provide sufficient
predictability to institutions. One of
these commenters asserted that the
proposed regulations could encourage
borrowers to file unsubstantiated
claims. Many commenters noted that
borrowers have existing avenues to
resolve issues with their schools, using
the complaint systems provided by
institutions, accrediting agencies, and
States, as well as judicial remedies.
One commenter suggested that the
implementation of the proposed
regulations would hamper interactions
between school employees and students
by creating an environment where any
interaction could be misconstrued and
used as a basis for borrower defense.
The commenter concluded that this
dynamic would increase the burden on
schools as they seek to implement
means of communicating to and
interacting with borrowers that mitigate
risk.
Several commenters recommend that
the Federal standard describe the
specific acts and omissions that would
and would not substantiate a borrower
defense claim. Another commenter
suggested that the final rule include
examples of serious and egregious
misconduct that would violate the
Federal standard.
Discussion: Reliance upon State law
not only presents a significant burden
for Department officials who must apply
and interpret various State laws, but
also for borrowers who must make the
threshold determination as to whether
they may have a claim. Contrary to the
commenter’s assertion, this challenge
cannot be resolved through the
Department’s determination as to which
State’s laws would provide protection
from school misconduct for borrowers
who reside in one State but are enrolled
via distance education in a program
based in another State. Some States
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have extended their rules to protect
these students, while others have not.
We agree with commenters that the
Federal standard does not provide
significant predictability to institutions
regarding the number or type of
borrower defense claims that may be
filed or the number of those claims that
will be granted. However, the purpose
of the Federal standard is not to provide
predictability, but rather, to streamline
the administration of the borrower
defense regulations and to increase
protections for students as well as
taxpayers and the Federal government.
That being said, the bases for borrower
defense claims under the new Federal
standard—substantial
misrepresentation, breach of contracts,
and nondefault, contested judgments by
a court or administrative tribunal of
competent jurisdiction for relief—do
provide specific and sufficient
information to guide institutions
regarding acts or omissions pertaining to
the provision of Direct Loan or
educational services that could result in
a borrower defense claim against the
institution.
We do not agree that implementation
of the Federal standard will hamper
interactions between school personnel
and students. Institutions that are
providing clear, complete, and accurate
information to prospective and enrolled
students are exceedingly unlikely to
generate successful borrower defense
claims. While individuals may continue
to misunderstand or misconstrue the
information they are provided, a
successful borrower defense claim
requires the borrower to demonstrate by
a preponderance of the evidence that a
substantial misrepresentation or breach
of contract has occurred.
We decline to describe the specific
acts and omissions that would and
would not substantiate a borrower
defense claim, as each claim will be
evaluated according to the specific
circumstances of the case, making any
such description illustrative, at best. We
believe the elements of the Federal
standard and the bases for borrower
defense claims provide sufficient clarity
as to what may or may not constitute an
actionable act or omission on the part of
an institution.
Changes: None.
Authority
Comments: A group of commenters
expressed concern that the proposed
Federal standard exceeds the
Department’s statutory authority. This
same group of commenters opined that
the proposed Federal standard violates
the U.S. Constitution.
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Two commenters suggested that the
proposed regulations have exceeded the
Department’s authority to promulgate
regulations for borrowers’ defenses to
repayment on their Federal student
loans when advanced collection activity
has been initiated. One of these
commenters suggested that loan
discharges based on institutional
misconduct should be pursued only
when the Department has court
judgments against a school, final
Department program review and audit
determinations, or final actions taken by
other State or Federal regulatory
agencies, after the school has been
afforded its due process opportunities.
Discussion: The Department’s
authority for this regulatory action is
derived primarily from Sections 454,
455, 487, and 498 of the Higher
Education Act, as discussed in more
detail in the NPRM. Section 454 of the
HEA authorizes the Department to
establish the terms of the Direct Loan
Program Participation Agreement, and
section 455(h) of the HEA authorizes the
Secretary to specify in regulation which
acts or omissions of an institution of
higher education a borrower may assert
as a defense to repayment of a Direct
Loan. Sections 487 and 498 authorize
the adoption of regulations to assess
whether an institution has the
administrative capability and financial
resources needed to participate in the
title IV, HEA programs.28
Support for regulating in particular
areas is also found in Section 432(a) of
the HEA, which authorizes the Secretary
to issue regulations for the FFEL
program, enforce or compromise a claim
under the FFEL Program; section 451(b)
provides that Direct Loans are made
under the same terms and conditions as
FFEL Loans; and section 468(2)
authorizes the Secretary to enforce or
compromise a claim on a Perkins Loan.
Section 452(j) of the GEPA authorizes
certain compromises under Department
programs, and the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act, 31 U.S.C. 3711,
authorizes a Federal agency to
compromise or terminate collection of a
debt, subject to certain conditions.
The increased debt resolution
authority is provided in Public Law
101–552 and authorizes the Department
to resolve debts up to $100,000 without
approval from the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
The HEA vests the Department with
the sole authority to determine and
28 This discussion addresses the Department’s
authority to issue regulations in the areas described
below. As discussed earlier, the Department’s
authority to recoup losses rests on common law as
well as HEA provisions included among those cited
here.
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apply the appropriate sanction for HEA
violations. The Department’s authority
for the regulations is also informed by
the legislative history of the provisions
of the HEA, as discussed in the NPRM.
Changes: None.
Making of a Loan and Provision of
Educational Services
Comments: Several commenters
expressed support for the Department’s
efforts to limit the scope of borrower
defense claims by focusing the proposed
regulations on acts or omissions that
pertain to the provision of educational
services. However, these commenters
also suggested that the phrase,
‘‘provision of educational services’’ was
open to interpretation and, as such, may
not effectively constrain potential
claims. One commenter suggested
revising the phrase to read, ‘‘provision
of educational services related to the
program of study.’’
A number of commenters requested
that the clarification included in the
preamble to the NPRM, explaining that
claims pertaining to personal injury,
allegations of harassment, educational
malpractice, and academic or
disciplinary actions are not related to
the making of a borrower’s Direct loan
or the provision of educational services
be included in the regulatory text, as
they viewed these specific examples as
particularly helpful clarifications.
Two commenters listed a number of
specific circumstances that may or may
not fall within the scope of providing
educational services, and requested that
the Department provide an analysis of
these acts and omissions.
Another commenter remarked that the
Department’s efforts to limit the scope
of borrower defense claims by focusing
the proposed regulations on acts or
omissions that pertain to the provision
of educational services fell short of its
objective. Similar to other commenters,
this commenter requested that the
Department provide explicit
descriptions of the claims that would
and would not meet the proposed
standard.
Another commenter who shared this
view suggested the Department include
in the final regulations a discussion of
the factors that would be considered in
determining whether a borrower defense
claim pertained to the provision of
educational services.
Discussion: We appreciate the support
for our efforts to appropriately limit the
scope of borrower defense claims to
those that are related specifically to the
provision of educational services or the
making of a Direct Loan. We understand
the commenters’ interest in further
clarification. However, we do not
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believe it is appropriate to provide
detailed institutional-borrower
scenarios, or a hypothetical discussion
of the analytic process the Department
would undertake to ascertain whether a
specific borrower’s claim related to the
provision of educational services or the
making of a Direct Loan at this time. As
is often the case in matters that address
an individual’s experience as part of the
Federal Student Aid process, the
Department’s determination of whether
a claim pertains to the provision of
educational services or the making of a
Direct Loan will depend greatly upon
the specific elements of that claim.
For example, while it may appear to
be a relatively straightforward clarifying
change to amend the regulatory
language to read, ‘‘provision of
educational services related to the
program of study,’’ such a change could
be interpreted to mean that claims
related to more general concerns
associated with the institution’s
provision of educational services would
not be considered. That is not our
intent, and we believe the regulatory
language as proposed best captures the
intended scope of borrower defense
claims.
Similarly, we do not believe that
including in the regulatory language
specific examples of acts or omissions
that would not be considered in a
borrower defense is appropriate at this
time. These circumstances may evolve
over time, necessitating a re-evaluation
of their relevance. The Department can
provide additional clarification, as
needed, through other documents, such
as a Dear Colleague Letter, Electronic
Announcement, or the FSA Handbook.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter
recommended that the phrase ‘‘making
of a Direct Loan’’ be revised to include
the phrase ‘‘for enrollment at the
school,’’ to ensure consistency with the
proposed regulatory language in
§ 685.222(a)(5). The commenter
suggested that this modification would
be required to ensure that all Direct
Loans a borrower has obtained attend a
school are covered by the regulation.
Discussion: We agree with the
commenter that such a change would
ensure consistency throughout the
regulation.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.206(c) to include the qualifying
phrase, ‘‘for enrollment at the school’’
when referring to the ‘‘making of the
loan.’’
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern that the proposed
borrower defense regulations would
limit borrower defense claims to acts or
omissions that occurred during the same
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academic year in which the borrower
obtained a Direct Loan for which he or
she is now seeking a loan discharge.
One commenter suggested this concern
could be ameliorated by amending the
regulatory language in § 685.222(a)(5) to
include acts and omissions that occur
prior to enrollment (e.g., marketing,
recruitment) and after the borrower has
left the school (e.g., career placement).
Another commenter expressed
concern that the limitation of scope
would create of discrepancy between
loan proceeds that were used to pay for
tuition and loan proceeds used to pay
for other elements of the institution’s
cost of attendance.
Discussion: The preamble to the
NPRM explicitly acknowledged that the
proposed standard described in
§ 685.206(c) and § 685.222(b), (c), and
(d), would include periods of time prior
to the borrower’s enrollment, such as
when the borrower was being recruited
by the school, and periods of time after
the borrower’s enrollment, such as
when the borrower was seeking career
advising or placement services. 81 FR
39337.
The regulatory language in
§ 685.222(a)(5) refers to the making of a
Direct Loan that was obtained in
conjunction with enrollment at the
school. This would include all eligible
elements of the school’s cost of
attendance for which a Direct Loan can
be obtained. The language in § 685.222
does not restrict potential borrower
relief to the portion of a Direct Loan
used to pay for tuition.
Changes: None.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing
proposed § 685.222(a)(6), the
Department has determined that
including an affirmative duty upon the
Department to notify the borrower of the
order in which his or her objections, if
he or she asserts other objections in
addition to borrower defense, to his or
her loan will be determined is too
burdensome because it would require
the expenditure of administrative
resources and time, even if not desired
by the borrower. The borrower may
contact the Department to find out the
status of his or her objections, including
borrower defense, if desired.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(a)(6) to remove the
requirement that the Department notify
the borrower of the order in which his
or her objections to a loan will be
determined.
Limitation Periods (Statute of
Limitations)
Comments: Several commenters
requested that the Department allow
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students to recoup loan funds already
paid beyond the proposed six-year
statute of limitations. These commenters
argued that students often do not know
that they are entitled to relief for many
years. Some commenters stated that the
beginning of the time limit would be
difficult for borrowers to determine,
since it could vary depending on the
specifics of the alleged misconduct.
Another commenter stated that some
institutions have been defrauding
borrowers for decades. One commenter
stated that since there is no time limit
for false certification discharges, there
should not be a time limit for borrower
defenses. A group of commenters argued
that since there is no limit on the
Department’s ability to collect student
debt, there should not be a limit on the
ability of borrowers to recover. Other
commenters pointed to the relatively
smaller number of borrower
applications, as opposed to numbers of
borrower estimated to be eligible for
relief, from Corinthian as evidence that
many borrowers do not know they have
claims.
Discussion: As noted in the NPRM,
the six-year statute 29 of limitations is
only applicable to students’ claims for
amounts already paid on student loans.
A borrower may assert a defense to
repayment at any time. This rule
comports with the FTC Holder Rule 30
and general State law principles, as well
as general principles relating to the
defense of recoupment. See, e.g., Bull v.
United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935)
(‘‘Recoupment is in the nature of a
defense arising out of some feature of a
transaction upon which the plaintiff’s
action is grounded. Such a defense is
never barred by the statute of limitations
so long as the main action itself is
timely.’’) We understand that students
may not always be in a position to bring
borrower defense claims immediately,
but believe the final regulations strike a
balance between allowing borrowers
sufficient time to bring their claims and
ensuring that the claims are brought
while there is still evidence available to
assess the claims.
Changes: None.
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General Process
Comments: Many commenters and
groups of commenters expressed
29 In the NPRM, we explain our reasoning for
establishing a six-year statute of limitations for the
breach of contract and substantial
misrepresentation standards under § 685.222(c) and
(d). Further, we note that six-year period echoes the
period applicable to non-tort claims against the
United States under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a). See also 31
U.S.C. 3702.
30 The FTC Holder Rule is explained in more
detail elsewhere in the ‘‘State Standard’’ and
‘‘Expansion of Borrower Rights’’ sections.
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concerns about potential due process
issues with the process proposed in
§ 685.222(e) for individual borrowers to
pursue borrower defense claims. These
commenters asserted that the
Department should allow institutions to
actively participate in all aspects of the
process, starting with a right to be
notified of the claim and an opportunity
to review the claimant’s assertions and
supporting documentation. These
commenters further proposed that the
Department’s hearing official should
advise the institution about the specific
arguments and documents used in the
fact-finding process. Some commenters
offered proposed timeframes for each
step in the review process, while
emphasizing that most determinations
should be made based solely on
document review.
Some of these commenters
acknowledged the value of not
establishing a purely adversarial
process, but emphasized the need to
balance the interests of providing relief
to students who were treated unfairly
with the rights of schools to defend
themselves, especially in light of the
possible financial and legal exposure to
institutions and potentially taxpayers.
Several commenters also contended
that the exclusion of school
participation in the individual process
is especially problematic because of the
fact-specific nature of such claims.
These commenters expressed their
belief that most individual cases cannot
be thoroughly investigated without
school input. Some commenters
suggested that the proposed regulations
flip the presumption of innocence that
applies in many processes on its head
and unfairly burdens institutions
without an adequate process to
vindicate their claims.
While many commenters emphasized
that the proposed process tilts too
favorably toward claimants, a few
commenters asserted that it may not
always fully protect the rights of
adversely affected borrowers.
Additionally, they noted that the
Department’s proposal removed not
only the option of arbitration, but also
the borrower’s choice in the makeup of
and the representation for the group.
These commenters asserted that the
rights of an individual claimant could
be adversely affected because of some
defect in a group claim that the
Department interprets will cover the
affected individual. They further stated
that borrowers have no recourse to
challenge the Department official’s
determination, who they allege will be
acting under a set of obtuse and poorly
defined rules, resulting in
determinations benefitting borrowers
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who were not wronged and possibly
denying relief to deserving claimants.
Discussion: Schools will not be held
liable for borrower defense claims until
after an administrative proceeding that
provides them due process. The
Department already runs such
proceedings in its Office of Hearings
and Appeals on matters such as
assessing a school’s liability to the
Department or limiting, suspending, or
terminating a school’s title IV
participation.
We disagree that moving a claimant
from the individual process into the
group process negatively impacts the
borrower. In fact, we believe the
borrower may receive a faster decision
using the group process. Additionally,
the borrower maintains the ability to
request reconsideration if there is new
evidence that was not previously
considered. Finally, the borrower
retains the right to ‘‘opt-out’’ of the
group process.
The Department will outline specific
procedures, including other details
requested by the commenters, in a
separate procedural rule. We believe
this is the most appropriate place for
such detail.
Changes: None.
Comments: Many commenters
expressed concerns relating to proposed
§ 685.222(e)(3), which provides for a
Department official to administer the
individual borrower process. Many of
these commenters were concerned that
these officials would have too much
authority in deciding what evidence to
review and use in decision making.
Some of these commenters also argued
that giving the Department’s official the
sole discretion over disposition of the
claims actually denies borrowers certain
rights.
Several commenters claimed that the
Department official would be subject to
political influence and not necessarily
the unbiased, independent, and
impartial party needed in this role.
Discussion: Department officials make
independent decisions daily regarding
the merit of objections to loan
enforcement raised by borrowers who
default on their loans, and borrower
defense would be no different.
Department officials also make
decisions regarding institutional
liabilities to the Department and
enforcement actions against institutions.
These officials do so in accordance with
established standards in the APA for
such decisions made by administrative
agencies, such as ensuring that decision
makers do not report to individuals
responsible for managing or protecting
the funds of an agency.
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As discussed during negotiated
rulemaking, the Department also plans
to outline more specific details about
the process for schools and borrowers in
forthcoming procedural rules.
Changes: None.
Comments: Commenters argued that
the Department’s proposed structure in
§ 685.222(e) places too much authority
with the Department and its officials,
creating a conflict of interest. These
commenters had misgivings about
designating an official who would have
the ability to perform multiple
functions, including adjudicating cases,
creating groups from individual claims,
as well as advocating on behalf of the
group. Several commenters called for
separation between the investigative
and adjudicative functions.
Many of these commenters expressed
concern that the entire process created
conditions that would inevitably lead to
unfair treatment of schools. This
argument is based on the hypothesis
that the inherent conflicts in the
proposed investigative and adjudication
processes will result in a high number
of vindicated claims and the cost
associated with high levels of loan
forgiveness will force the Department to
seek indemnification from schools
regardless of the legitimacy of the
claims.
Numerous commenters also expressed
concerns that some of the Department
officials hearing cases may not have the
requisite experience to properly and
dispassionately evaluate and decide
these cases. Several commenters
specifically offered alternatives to the
Department’s officials, including using
independent hearing officials,
administrative law judges, or a third
party such as a member of the American
Arbitration Association to decide cases.
Some commenters specifically
suggested this separation to ensure the
decision maker would be more insolated
form political pressures.
One commenter also noted that the
proposed rule does not provide for
review of determinations by the
Secretary, which specifically limits the
Secretary’s authority.
Discussion: As we make clear
elsewhere here, the Department will
undertake any action to recover against
a school under specific procedures that
are being developed and will ensure an
opportunity for the school to present its
defenses and be heard. The process will
be comparable to that provided under
part 668, subpart G for actions to fine,
or to limit, suspend or terminate
participation of, a school, and under
part 668, subpart H for audit and
program review appeals. The hearing
will be conducted by a Department
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official who is independent of the
component of the Department bringing
the action. This is currently done for
appeals under subparts G and H, and
like those procedures, the new
procedures would include an
opportunity for an appeal to the
Secretary. Any final decision reached in
these proceedings would be reviewable
under section 706 of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
706, as are final decisions under
subparts G and H. The separation of
functions under those subparts fully
complies with the requirements that
would apply under the APA, to which
some commenters have alluded, and
would be mirrored in the procedure
used for recoveries against schools.
However, neither the APA nor other
applicable law requires the Department
to provide an appeal from an
administrative decision maker to the
Secretary or other senior authority, and
the decision of the official designated
the authority to adjudicate individual
claims is final agency action, similarly
reviewable in an action brought under
section 706 of the APA. The Department
has conducted a great number of such
individual adjudications of borrower
objections to Federal payment offset and
wage garnishment over the past
decades, and neither those procedures,
nor those used for Federal salary offset,
include any provision for an appeal
from the decision of the designated
official to the Secretary. 34 CFR 30.33,
34 CFR part 31, 34 CFR part 34.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter expressed
support for restricting borrowers from
receiving relief where relief was already
granted for the same complaint through
a separate source. Conversely, another
commenter requested additional legal
recourse to collect damages beyond the
borrower defense to repayment process.
Discussion: The individual
application process in
§ 685.222(e)(1)(i)(C) requires the
borrower to inform the Department of
any other claim based on the same
information and any payments or
credits received resulting from such a
claim. The NPRM included performance
bond holders and tuition recovery
programs as examples of sources of
these payments or credits. The statutory
authority in section 455(h) of the HEA
provides for defense to repayment of a
Direct Loan. The Department’s ability to
provide relief for borrowers is
predicated upon the existence of the
borrower’s Direct Loan, and that relief is
limited to the extent of the Department’s
authority to take action on such a loan.
By providing relief appropriate to the
borrower’s loss, and based on the
amount borrowed, the Department
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would provide relief under the relevant
statutory authority. A borrower may
pursue the payment of other damages
for costs not covered by the Direct Loan
in court or via other available avenues
without restriction.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern for frivolous, false,
exaggerated, or politically driven claims
and the accompanying administrative
burden and cost this process will place
on institutions and the Department.
Commenters suggested a firm statute of
limitations for filing claims, increasing
the burden of proof for the student,
limiting opportunities to reopen cases,
and a prominently stated penalty for
filing false claims on the application
form to prevent false or exaggerated
claims.
Discussion: We believe the
commenters’ suggestions, though well
intentioned, would do little to reduce
any potential frivolous claims. As
outlined earlier, we believe we have
established a strong position for the
limitations periods and the burden of
proof in these regulations.
Additionally, an individual borrower
may only request reconsideration of an
application when he or she introduces
new information not previously
considered. The borrower defense
application form includes a certification
statement that the borrower must sign
indicating that the information
contained on the application is true and
that making false or misleading
statements subjects the borrower to
penalties of perjury. We believe these
protections against false or frivolous
claims are sufficient.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters and
groups of commenters contended that
the Department should provide equal
relief to Direct Loan and FFEL
borrowers. These commenters objected
to the Department’s proposed process in
§ 685.206, which would require FFEL
borrowers who want to apply for a
borrower defense to consolidate their
FFEL Loans into the Direct
Consolidation Loans. These commenters
noted that over 40 percent of borrowers
with outstanding Federal loans have
FFEL Loans and conveyed that
borrowers were typically not able to
choose among Federal loan programs.
One commenter noted the inequities
pertain not only to borrowers, but also
to schools. Institutions with significant
FFEL volume face reduced risk of
Department efforts to recover funds.
One commenter specifically indicated
that requiring FFEL borrowers to
consolidate obliterates the use of the
group process because FFEL borrowers
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cannot be automatically included in the
group without further action on their
part.
These commenters also noted
inequities in relief for FFEL borrowers,
which includes no mechanism to seek
refund of amounts already paid by the
borrower. Thus, the commenters asked
the Department to stop all collection
activities upon receipt of a FFEL
borrower’s application to at least reduce
the amount the borrower pays on the
loan. Additionally, these commenters
requested that the Department apply
forbearance to FFEL borrowers in the
same manner as with Direct Loan
borrowers.
While expressing a strong preference
for identical treatment of Direct Loan
and FFEL borrowers, one commenter
also recognized that this might not be
possible, and suggested that the
Department could lessen the imbalance
by specifying that a referral relationship
existed between lenders and institutions
when a large number of borrowers at a
school had the same lender. Another
commenter suggested that the
Department make findings of groups of
borrowers entitled to discharge of their
loans and require FFEL lenders to
comply with them.
One commenter articulated that the
Department could take additional steps
to assist FFEL borrowers in multiple
ways. First, the commenter suggested
that the Department could compel a
lender or guaranty agency to discharge
a loan. This commenter further
suggested that borrowers who dispute a
FFEL Loan who are denied can appeal
a lender or guaranty agency’s decision
to the Secretary, giving the Department
final authority in each case. Finally, the
commenter indicated that the
Department could move groups of loans
under the Department’s responsibility as
it would in cases where a guaranty
agency closes. The commenter claimed
that the Department previously took
such action for false certification and
closed school discharges.
Discussion: We seek to provide an
effective process for all borrowers
within the Department’s ability under
applicable laws and regulations.
Current regulations do not require a
FFEL lender to grant forbearance under
these circumstances except with regard
to a FFEL borrower who seeks to pay off
that FFEL Loan with a Consolidation
Loan, and that requirement provides a
time-limited option. 34 CFR
682.211(f)(11). Because the Secretary
has designated that section of the final
regulations for early implementation,
lenders may implement this provision
before it becomes a requirement on July
1, 2017. Thus, when these borrower
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defense regulations take effect on July 1,
2017, FFEL Program lenders must grant
administrative forbearance when the
Department makes a request on behalf of
a borrower defense claimant, pursuant
to § 682.211(i)(7).
We also do not believe we have
adequate data to identify those lenders
and schools that established a referral
relationship.
We believe we have outlined the best
possible path to relief for the remaining
FFEL borrowers within our legal
abilities. We appreciate the commenters’
suggestions for other ways to assist
FFEL borrowers in pursuing borrower
defenses, but do not believe those
suggestions are practicable. We
recognize that this process requires
additional steps for FFEL borrowers. To
mitigate this, as described in the
preamble to the NPRM, we will provide
FFEL borrowers with a preliminary
determination as to whether they would
be eligible for relief on their borrower
defense claims under the Direct Loan
regulations, were they to consolidate
their FFEL Loans into a Direct
Consolidation Loan. FFEL borrowers
may receive such a determination
without having to establish a referral
relationship between the lender of the
underlying FFEL Program Loan and the
school. The notice of preliminary
determination will provide information
on the Loan Consolidation process and
instructions on how to begin the
process. As described in § 685.212(k),
after the borrower consolidates into the
Direct Loan program, he or she may
receive an appropriate amount of relief
on the principal balance.
Changes: None.
Process for Individual Borrowers
(§ 685.222(e))
Comments: Multiple commenters and
groups of commenters suggested that the
Department unfairly limited the rights
of institutions and exceeded its
authority to recoup funds resulting from
borrower defense claims. They noted
that they believe that the HEA grants no
such authority. Moreover, these
commenters pointed out the difference
between such silence and the specific
authority in the HEA regarding closed
school discharges, false certification
discharges, and regarding Perkins
Loans.
The same commenters who asserted
that the Department exceeded its
authority with recoupment of successful
borrower defense claims stated that the
Department should outline the details of
its process if it proves it has such
authority. Several commenters
requested more information about the
recovery process from schools, focusing
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on the institution’s involvement in the
process. Furthermore, some commenters
requested a specific appeal process for
attempts to recover funds from schools.
Discussion: As discussed more fully
elsewhere in this preamble, the
Department has ample legal authority to
recover losses on borrower defenses
from schools, and the absence of
explicit statutory provision authorizing
such recovery does not affect its
authority. We are developing specific
procedures for conducting such
recovery actions that will reflect current
regulations for appeals of audit and
program review claims and actions to
fine the school, or to limit, suspend, or
terminate its participation.
Changes: None.
Comments: Multiple groups of
commenters supported the
preponderance of evidence standard in
the Department’s individual process
proposed in § 685.222(e) and
appreciated that borrowers would not
need legal counsel to pursue a borrower
defense. Multiple commenters also
commented on the desire that the
process not penalize borrowers for the
absence of written documentation. They
noted that many borrowers may not
have items such as enrollment
agreements or other items that might
assist the Department in reviewing their
claims. The commenters added that this
should not be held against the
borrowers, as schools frequently do not
provide borrowers with copies of such
documents, and borrowers may
encounter difficulties in obtaining them.
One commenter suggested that, when
documents are not available because of
the school’s failure to provide the
borrower with proper documentation,
the burden should shift to the school to
disprove the claims from the borrower’s
attestation.
Another commenter suggested that
the Department specify that it will
accept a student’s sworn testimony,
absent independent corroborating
evidence contradicting it, as fulfilling
the preponderance of the evidence
standard (which requires the borrower
to persuade the decision maker that it is
more likely than not that events
happened or did not happen as
claimed). In other words, the
commenter suggested that, when a
borrower submits sworn testimony but
does not submit corroborating evidence,
the Department should not take this to
mean that there was no substantial
misrepresentation or breach of contract.
Another group of commenters suggested
that the Department track similar claims
and consider those claims as evidence
when reviewing applications.
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Another group of commenters
recommended that the Department
accept information on the application
form as sufficient for the claim,
requesting additional information only
when necessary. This group of
commenters pointed out that
misrepresentations were often from oral
statements made to the borrower that
did not include any written evidence.
Furthermore, this group of commenters
requested that the Department fully use
all available information it and other
Federal agencies possess, rather than
requesting it from borrowers.
Discussion: We disagree that the final
regulations should specify what weight
might be given to different types of
evidence, such as borrower testimony or
statements, under the preponderance of
the evidence standard specified in
§ 685.222(a)(2) for borrower defenses
under the Federal standard for loans
first disbursed after July 1, 2017. Under
§ 685.222(a)(2), the borrower has the
burden of demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that it is
more likely than not that the facts on
which his or her borrower defense claim
rests have been met. However,
§ 685.222(e)(3) provides that for
individually filed borrower defense
applications, the designated Department
official will also consider other
information as part of his or her review
of the borrower’s claim. As noted in the
NPRM, 81 FR 39337, in practice, the
decision maker in a borrower defense
proceeding would assess the value, or
weight, of all of the evidence relating to
the borrower’s claim that has been
produced to prove that the borrower
defense claim as alleged is true. The
kind of evidence that may satisfy this
burden will necessarily depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case,
including factors such as whether the
claimant’s assertions are corroborated
by other evidence. Accordingly, we
decline to elaborate further on what
specific types of evidence may or may
not be viewed as satisfying the
preponderance of evidence standard.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several groups of
commenters encouraged the Department
to adopt a simple, accessible, and
transparent process for borrowers. These
commenters indicated support for a
process that reduces inequities in
resources so that borrowers interact only
with the Department, even when
additional information is needed from
the school. In particular, numerous
commenters expressed appreciation
that, under the proposed regulations,
borrowers would not be pitted against
institutions, which generally possess
significantly more resources.
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While generally supportive of the
Department’s process, another group of
commenters expressed concern for the
potentially overwhelming number of
applications that would be filed in
connection with potential borrower
defense claims and questioned the
Department’s capacity to employ
enough capable staff to handle the large
workload. The same group noted the
benefits of specifying timeframes for
actions within the process, despite
recognizing the difficulty in doing so.
Discussion: With these regulations,
the Department works toward evening
the playing field for students. Individual
claims will be decided in a nonadversarial process managed by a
Department official, and group claims
would be brought by the Department
against the school, not by students.
Thus, the process does not require
students to directly oppose schools. We
appreciate the support that some
commenters expressed for these
processes.
As we discussed in the NPRM, the
Department may incur administrative
costs and may need to reallocate
resources depending on the volume of
applications and whether a hearing is
required.
After having received only a few
borrower defense claims in over 20
years, the Department has now received
more than 80,000 claims in just over
two years. We responded by building an
entirely new process and hiring a new
team to resolve these claims. Our ability
to resolve claims quickly and efficiently
has grown and will continue to grow.
Particularly because we are still growing
our capacity, we are unable to establish
specific timeframes at this point for
processing claims. Additionally,
processing time is considerably affected
by the varied types and complexities of
claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: One group of commenters
strongly supported the Department’s
pledge to provide written
determinations to borrowers who
submit borrower defense claims.
Discussion: We appreciate the support
of these commenters.
Changes: None.
Comments: Another group of
commenters noted the difficulty that
many borrowers face in completing even
seemingly simple forms and in
explaining wrongdoing in a way that
clearly makes a complex legal argument.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenters’ concern and do not expect
borrowers to submit a complicated,
lengthy narrative requiring any legal
analysis by the borrower to apply for
relief. We specifically set out to design
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a process that would not be onerous for
borrowers and that would not require
third-party assistance, such as but not
limited to an attorney.
Changes: None.
Comments: Two commenters
suggested using existing school
complaint processes to resolve borrower
defense claims prior to a Department
review to reduce administrative burden
on the Department and on institutions.
Discussion: Nothing in these
regulations prohibits a borrower from
directly contacting an institution to
resolve a complaint. Additionally, a
borrower may pursue other paths to
relief, such as filing a claim with a State
consumer bureau or filing a lawsuit.
However, at the point where a borrower
approaches the Department for
assistance, we take seriously the
obligation to review the claim and to
respond to the borrower. We believe this
process provides the best avenue for
relief when a borrower applies for a
borrower defense claim. In addition to
using data collected from the
Department’s ‘‘FSA Feedback System,’’
the Department will also continue to
partner with other Federal agencies that
are engaged in the important work
aimed of protecting the rights of
students. Depending on the specifics of
the case, these agencies may include the
CFPB, DOJ, FTC, the SEC, and the
Department of Defense among others.
The Department will also look to State
officials and agencies responsible for
education quality, student financial
assistance, law enforcement, civil rights,
and consumer protection.
Changes: None.
Comments: Multiple commenters
expressed support for the proposed
prohibition on capitalization of interest
when the Department suspends
collection activity following receipt of a
borrower defense application. However,
one of these commenters objected to the
Department prohibiting interest
capitalization when collection resumes
as a result of the borrower’s failure to
submit appropriate documentation. The
commenter believed this could lead to
false claims by borrowers seeking to
avoid repayment.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenters’ support for the prohibition
of interest capitalization and believe it
is in line with our concept of the
appropriate use of capitalization, as the
borrower is not newly entering
repayment. Accordingly, we disagree
with the commenter who objected to
prohibiting capitalization upon
resumption of collection activity where
a borrower did not submit appropriate
documentation. We believe more
legitimate avenues exist for struggling
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borrowers to postpone or reduce
payment rather than filing false
borrower defense claims, and do not
believe that the prohibition of interest
capitalization in this narrow
circumstance provides significant
incentive for borrowers to incur the
significant risks associated with filing
false claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: One group of commenters
noted the importance of reconsideration
of borrower defense claims, especially
for borrowers completing applications
without assistance. This group,
however, encouraged the Department to
clearly explain the borrower’s right to
reconsideration, rather than merely
allowing borrowers to request
reconsideration with the Department
having discretion on whether to
consider the application.
Multiple commenters and groups of
commenters expressed concern with the
borrower’s ability to introduce new
evidence for reconsideration in
proposed § 685.222(e)(5). Specifically,
these commenters noted concerns that
individual claims could continue
indefinitely. These commenters
indicated that the Department should
include reasonable time limitations for
reconsideration of claims.
Another commenter suggested that
the Department official who made the
determination of the original claim
should not be permitted to review a
request for reconsideration and
suggested using a panel or board for
such claims.
Discussion: We highlight the
distinction between reconsideration of
an application and an appeal process. A
borrower must submit new evidence in
order for the Department to reconsider
an application, and there is no appeal
process. We believe it is important to
allow a borrower to submit new
evidence, which he or she may have
only recently acquired. We do not
intend to limit borrowers’ rights.
However, there needs to be finality in
the borrower defense process as well,
and we do not believe it is appropriate
to consider applications regarding
claims that have already been decided
unless there is clear demonstration that
new evidence warrants that
reconsideration. We will consider the
commenters’ suggestions regarding the
explanation of the reconsideration
process in our communications with
borrowers.
We believe the limitations periods for
borrower defense claims adequately
address the concern about time limits
and do not agree with imposing an
artificial limitation on borrower
applications for reconsideration for new
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evidence based on a specific number or
time period.
We see no basis for requiring this
evaluation of new evidence to be made
by an individual other than the original
decision maker. This is a
reconsideration, not an appeal, and the
original decision maker is in a position
to efficiently make that decision.31
Therefore, we do not prohibit the same
official from hearing the reconsideration
claim.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter asked
that we restrict a borrower’s ability to
present new evidence in support of a
claim already rejected. The commenter
said that borrowers should be required
to show good cause for why the
evidence was not previously available.
Discussion: We disagree that
borrowers should be required to show
good cause for why evidence was not
previously available. We recognize that
borrowers may not have the same access
to information that the Department or
the school may have. Furthermore, we
believe that the requirements for ‘‘new
evidence’’ provide clear guidelines for
what is required. Section
685.222(e)(5)(i) specifies that ‘‘new
evidence’’ must be evidence that the
borrower did not previously provide,
but also must be relevant to the
borrower’s claim, and was not identified
by the decision-maker as being relied
upon for the final decision. For ‘‘new
evidence’’ to meet this standard, the
evidence cannot just be cumulative of
other evidence in the record at the time,
but must also be relevant and probative
evidence that might change the outcome
of the decision being reconsidered.
Changes: None.
Comments: Multiple commenters
suggested that the Department
specifically permit schools to appeal
decisions on any individual claim. One
commenter added that schools would
not file frivolous appeals, as the
resulting workload is too timeconsuming. The commenter further
suggested that if schools are not
provided with an appeal process, that
the Department should provide schools
with an opportunity to challenge the
Department official’s decision during
any related recoupment action.
Discussion: We do not include an
appeals procedure in the individual
31 This is hardly unusual: Under Social Security
regulations, the hearing officer who conducts the
disability hearing ordinarily conducts the
reconsideration determination. 20 CFR 404.917(a).
In addition, requests for relief from judgments—a
somewhat comparable plea to the request for
reconsideration at issue here are routinely
considered by the judge that issued the original
decision. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.
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borrower claim process. We believe the
reconsideration process adequately
allows borrowers to submit new
evidence. However, as one commenter
requested, the regulations do afford an
opportunity to present a defense when
the Department seeks to hold a school
liable and recover funds in both the
individual and group claim processes.
Changes: None.
Comments: Although the Department
outlined a separate process to recover
funds from an institution, a group of
commenters stated that the Department
needed to include the borrower to
ensure a fair process for the institution.
Discussion: We believe that using a
separate proceeding to determine
whether a group of borrowers have
meritorious claims, and if so, to recover
from the school for losses on those
claims, is an appropriate method to
achieve a fair result. The procedure will
accord the institution the right to
confront witnesses on whom the
Department would rely, and to call
witnesses on its own, as it currently has
under procedures under subpart G of
part 668. We also note that under
§ 685.222(j), borrowers are required to
reasonably cooperate with the Secretary
in any such separate proceeding.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested
that borrowers should not be permitted
to bring individual claims when the
facts and circumstances have already
been considered by hearing official in a
group claim. The commenter expressed
concern that proposed § 685.222(h)
would allow for this to happen,
effectively providing borrowers a
second bite at the apple and violating
the legal principle of res judicata.
Discussion: We discuss the treatment
of individual claims from a student who
opted out of a group proceeding, or who
disputes the outcome of the group
proceeding decision as it pertains to his
or her claim, in our discussion of the
group process.
Changes: None.
Comments: A group of commenters
suggested that the Department modify
language in proposed
§ 685.222(e)(1)(i)(A) so that references to
the school more clearly emphasize that
we mean the school named on the
borrower defense to repayment
application.
Discussion: We agree that the
commenter’s suggested change clarifies
the intent of the regulation.
Changes: We revised
§ 685.222(e)(1)(i)(A) to reference ‘‘the’’
named school.
Comments: One commenter suggested
that the Department make available on
an annual basis a list of all borrower
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defense applications submitted (minus
any personally identifiable information)
along with outcome of the request. The
goal of this list would be to provide
transparent information to borrowers.
Discussion: We support transparency
in this process and will consider this
suggestion as we move forward with
implementation of the individual and
group processes.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested
that the Department proactively conduct
a review of all federally guaranteed
loans back to 1995 (when the
commenter considers the regulations to
have been last considered) to determine
potentially eligible loans for a defense to
repayment. The commenter
recommended that the Department
identify loans for which there is a high
likelihood of granting a discharge
stemming from lawsuits, investigations,
etc.
Discussion: We do not believe that the
Department possesses adequate
information to accurately identify
potentially eligible loans on such a large
scale. As borrowers have had the ability
to bring borrower defense claims under
the current regulations for some time,
we do not believe a review of data over
more than 20 years is warranted.
Additionally, the Department cannot
determine through such a review
whether specific students were
subjected to misrepresentation, for
example, whether they relied on such
misrepresentations, and how they were
affected if they did so. The Department
must determine if relief is warranted,
and merely obtaining a loan to attend an
institution is not adequate to suggest
relief is due.
Changes: None.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing
proposed § 685.222(e)(3)(ii), we have
determined that including an
affirmative duty upon the Department to
identify to the borrower records that
may be relevant to the borrower’s
borrower defense claim is too
burdensome because it would require
the expenditure of administrative
resources and time, even if not desired
by the borrower. As a result, we have
revised the § 685.222(e)(3)(ii) to provide
that the Department will identify
records upon the borrower’s request.
We note that we expect that
consideration of individual borrower
defense claims will lead to information
gathering as part of enforcement
investigations. When such an
investigation is ongoing, we may defer
release of records obtained in that
investigation to individual claimants to
protect the integrity of the investigation.
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If requested, records will be made
available to individual claimants after
the investigation is complete and prior
to the borrower defense decision. We
may defer consideration of individual
claims where we determine that
releasing potentially relevant records
prior to the completion of the
investigation would be undesirable.
We have also determined that the
parallel identification of records to
schools, which under the proposed
regulations was permissive, would also
cause unnecessary administrative delay,
given that the fact-finding process
described in § 685.222(e) will not decide
any amounts schools must pay the
Secretary for losses due to the borrower
defense at issue. The school will have
the right and opportunity to obtain such
evidence, and present evidence and
arguments, in the separate proceeding
initiated by the Secretary under
§ 685.222(e)(7) to collect the amount of
relief resulting from the individually
filed borrower defense claim.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(e)(3)(ii) to provide that the
designated Department official will
identify to the borrower the records the
Department official considers relevant
to the borrower defense upon request.
We have also revised § 685.222(e)(3)(ii)
to remove the identification of records
to schools.
Comments: One commenter expressed
support for the Department’s proposal to
allow claims made by individuals as
well as groups. However, the
commenter suggested that a right of
appeal for both institutions and
borrowers be provided in the individual
claims process as to open schools.
Discussion: During the negotiated
rulemaking sessions, the Department
heard from negotiators as to the
importance of a timely and streamlined
process for borrower defense claims. In
consideration of such concerns, the
Department believes that it is
appropriate that decisions made by the
designated Department official
presiding over the fact-finding process
for individually filed applications be
final agency decisions to avoid delays
that may be caused by an appeals
process. Borrowers are able to seek
judicial review of final agency decisions
in Federal court if desired. See 5 U.S.C.
702 & 704. Additionally, the borrower
will also be able to request that the
Secretary reconsider his or her claim
upon the identification of new evidence
under § 685.222(e)(5).
Although the fact-finding process
described in § 685.222(e) provides
schools with an opportunity to submit
information and a response, as
discussed in the NPRM, 81 FR 39347,
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the fact-finding process for individually
filed applications do not determine the
merits of any resulting claim by the
Department for recovery from the
school. Rather, § 685.222(e)(7) provides
that the Secretary may bring a separate
proceeding for recovery, in which the
school will be afforded due process
similar to what schools receive in the
Department’s other administrative
adjudications for schools. Given that the
institution’s potential liability for the
Department’s recovery is to be
adjudicated in this separate process, the
Department does not believe that an
appeal right for schools should be
included in the § 685.222(e) fact-finding
process. As discussed earlier in this
section, the Department is developing
rules of agency practice and procedure
for borrower defenses that will be
informed by the Department’s rules and
protections for its other administrative
adjudications.
Changes: None.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing
proposed § 685.222(e)(5), the
Department has determined that if a
borrower defense application is under
review because a request for
reconsideration by the Secretary has
been granted under § 685.222(e)(5)(i) or
because a borrower defense application
has been reopened by the Secretary
under § 685.222(e)(5)(ii), the borrower
should be granted forbearance or, if the
borrower is in default on the loan at
issue, then the procedure for a defaulted
loan should be followed, as when the
borrower filed an initial borrower
defense to repayment application.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(e)(5) to provide that the
forbearance and defaulted loan
procedures will be followed when the
Secretary has granted a request for
reconsideration or has reopened a
borrower defense application.
Group Process for Borrower Defenses
Statutory Authority
Comments: Some commenters argued
that the Department’s proposed group
borrower defense process would violate
the HEA. These commenters stated that
section 455(h) of the HEA specifically
limits the Department’s authority to
specifying acts or omissions that an
individual borrower, as opposed to a
group, may assert as a defense to
repayment. These commenters argued
that the creation of a process that would
award relief to a borrower who has not
asserted a defense to repayment exceeds
the Department’s statutory authority. A
few commenters also stated that the
HEA does not authorize the Department
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to act as a class action attorney, and
stated that such authority requires
specific statutory authorization. One
commenter suggested that any provision
providing that the Secretary may
identify borrowers who have not filed a
borrower defense application as part of
a group process for borrower defense
should be removed.
One commenter stated a recent
recommendation from the
Administrative Conference of the
United States found that, while the APA
does not specifically provide for
aggregate adjudication, it does not
foreclose the possibility of such
procedures. The recommendation also
stated that agencies generally have
broad discretion in formal and informal
adjudications to aggregate claims.
Discussion: We disagree with
commenters’ assertion that the proposed
group process is in violation of the HEA.
The Department’s statutory authority to
enact borrower defense regulations is
derived from section 455(h) of the HEA,
20 U.S.C. 1087e(h), which states that
‘‘the Secretary shall specify in
regulations which acts or omissions of
an institution of higher education a
borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment of a loan. . . .’’ While the
language of the statute refers to a
borrower in the singular, it is common
default rule of statutory interpretation
that a term includes both the singular
and the plural, absent a contrary
indication in the statute. See 1 U.S.C. 1.
We believe that, in giving the Secretary
the discretion to ‘‘specify which acts or
omissions’’ may be asserted as a defense
to repayment of loan, Congress also gave
the Department the authority to
determine such subordinate questions of
procedure, such as the scope of what
acts or omissions alleged by borrowers
meet the Department’s requirements,
how such claims by borrowers should
be determined, and whether such claims
should be heard contemporaneously as
a group or successively, as well as other
procedural issues. See FCC v. Pottsville
Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
We believe that this discretion
afforded the Secretary under the statute
not only allows it to determine borrower
defense claims on a group basis and to
establish such processes and
procedures, but also authorizes the
Department to proactively identify and
contact borrowers who may qualify for
relief under the borrower defense
regulations based upon information in
its possession. As described in
§ 685.222(f), the Department would
notify such borrowers of the
opportunity to participate in the group
process, and inform such borrowers that
by opting out, the borrower may choose
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to not assert a borrower defense. By
such notice and opt-out, borrowers who
had not previously filed an application
for borrower relief may assert a
borrower defense for resolution in the
group borrower defense process.
In response to comments that the
Department is not authorized to act as
a class action attorney, we note that, in
bringing cases before a hearing official
in the processes described in
§ 685.222(f), (g), and (h), the Department
would not be bringing claims as the
representative of the borrowers.
Although the Department would be
presenting borrower defense claims for
borrowers, with their consent as
described above, the Department official
would be bringing claims on its own
behalf as the administrator of the Direct
Loan Program, or alternatively as a
beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship
between the school and the Department
as explained earlier in ‘‘Borrower
Defenses—General.’’ See also
Chauffeur’s Training School v.
Spellings, 478 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2007).
We believe that the group process we
adopt here will facilitate the efficient
and timely adjudication of not only
borrower defense claims for large
numbers of borrowers with common
facts and claims, but will also conserve
the Department’s administrative
resources by also adjudicating any
contingent claim the Department may
have for recovery from an institution.
Changes: None.
Independence of Hearing Officials
Comments: Many commenters
expressed concerns that the group
borrower defense process would present
conflict of interest or separation of
powers issues and would be unfair,
given that the proposed process
involves a Department-designated
employee presenting evidence to a
hearing official who also has been
appointed by the Secretary, with
appeals to be decided by the Secretary.
Several commenters stated that this
issue was of particular concern, given
the limited or unclear role afforded to
institutions to participate in the
borrower defense process and to appeal
decisions proposed by the Department.
One commenter acknowledged that
while other Federal agencies, such as
the FTC, allow agencies to act as both
prosecutor and judge, such proceedings
are governed by the APA, 5 U.S.C. 554.
The commenter stated that the APA
provides statutory safeguards that
ensure fair proceedings, such as
prohibitions on ex parte
communications and prosecutorial
supervision of the employee presiding
over the proceeding. This commenter
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suggested that group borrower defense
claims be presided over by the
Department’s Office of Hearings and
Appeals.
One commenter stated that
determinations in the group process
should be made by a representative who
is not affiliated with the Department.
Another commenter stated that the
office responsible for presenting the
claim on behalf of a group in a group
borrower defense proceeding should not
be the same office that decides the
group claim. Several commenters
suggested specifically that
determinations be made by
administrative law judges or their
equivalent, who have a level of
expertise and independence from the
Department. One commenter stated that
the regulations should provide for
determinations in group borrower
defense processes to be made by an
administrative judge.
One commenter stated that the
Department should seek and use
independent hearing officials with
experience in handling complex
disputes, given the large numbers of
students that may be impacted by such
proceedings.
One commenter stated that the
Department’s proposed group borrower
defense process violates both the
separation of powers doctrine in Article
III and the jury trial requirement of the
Seventh Amendment of the
Constitution, by vesting in the
Department exclusive judicial power to
determine private causes of action
without a jury.
Discussion: The Department
understands the concerns raised by
commenters regarding the objectivity
and independence of the hearing official
in group borrower defense cases.
However, administrative agencies
commonly combine both investigatory
and adjudicative functions, see
Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975),
and due process does not require a strict
adherence to the separation of those
functions, see Hortonville Joint School
District No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ.
Ass’n., 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976). The
Department is no different and performs
both investigative and adjudicative
functions in other contexts, including
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those that involve borrower debts 32 and
institutional liabilities.33
We disagree that the regulations
should specify that the hearing official
presiding over the fact-finding processes
in § 685.222(f) to (h) must be an
administrative law judge or an
administrative judge. As explained in
the NPRM, 81 FR 39340, the Department
uses the term ‘‘hearing official’’ in its
other regulations, such as those at 34
CFR part 668, subparts G and H. In
those contexts, hearing officials make
decisions and determinations
independent of the Department
employees initiating and presenting
evidence and arguments in such
proceedings. Similarly, the Department
would structure the group borrower
defense fact-finding processes so that
they are presided over by hearing
officials that are independent of the
employees performing investigative and
prosecutorial functions for the
Department.
As stated in the NPRM, 81 FR 39349,
the group borrower defense process
involving an open school 34 under
§ 685.222(h) would be structured to
provide the substantive and procedural
due process protections both borrowers
and the school are entitled to under
applicable law, including any required
under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 554. The
Department is developing rules of
agency procedure and practice
governing the fact-finding processes
described in both § 685.222(e) and
§ 685.222(f) to (h), which will be
informed by the procedures and
protections established by the
Department in its other administrative
proceedings, such as 34 CFR part 668,
subparts G and H.
As explained under ‘‘General,’’ we
also disagree that the proposed
regulations violate Article III and the
Seventh Amendment of the
Constitution. The rights at issue in the
32 For example, the Department provides both
schools and borrowers the opportunity to request
and obtain an oral evidentiary hearing in both offset
and garnishment actions against a borrower and in
an offset action against a school. See 34 CFR 30.25
(administrative offset generally); 34 CFR 30.33
(federal payment offset); 34 CFR 34.9
(administrative wage garnishment).
33 See 34 CFR part 668, subparts G and H
(proceedings for limitation, suspension, termination
and fines, and appeal procedures for audit
determinations and program review
determinations).
34 As described in § 668.222(g), the ‘‘closed
school’’ group borrower defense process would
apply only when the school in question has both
closed and provided no financial protection
available to the Secretary from which to recover
losses arising from borrower defenses, and for
which there is no entity from which the Secretary
may recover such losses. Or, in other words, when
there is no entity from whom the Department may
obtain a recovery.
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proposed borrower defense proceedings
have the character of public rights,
which may be consigned by Congress to
the Department for adjudication.
Changes: None.
efficiency and of conserving agency
resources than individual borrower
defense determinations followed by
separate proceedings against the school.
Changes: None.
Single Fact-Finding Process
Comments: One commenter stated
that the Department’s proposed single
fact-finding process for group claims
described in § 685.222(f) to (h), where a
hearing official makes determinations as
to both institutional liability and relief
for borrower defense claims, is not
justified. This commenter stated that the
Department had not presented a factual
basis for the change from the approach
in § 685.206(c), which states that the
Department may initiate a proceeding to
require the school to pay the amount of
the loan to which a successful borrower
defense lies.
A group of commenters stated that the
Department should not engage in a
single fact-finding process for group
claims. These commenters suggested
that the Department should gather and
consider evidence regarding borrower
defenses, render a decision on borrower
relief, and then initiate a separate
proceeding for recovery from schools.
The commenters stated that this
approach would be similar to the
Department’s proceedings for group
borrower defense claims against closed
schools and for individually filed
applications, as well as the
Department’s proposed processes for
closed school and false certification
discharges.
Discussion: We disagree with
commenters that relief for borrower
defense claims should be determined in
a separate proceeding from the
Department’s right to recovery from
schools for the open school group
borrower defense process described in
§ 685.222(h). For borrower defenses
asserted as to an open school, the
Department is not only responsible for
making determinations on relief for
claims, but may also be entitled to
recover against the school. This right to
recover, which will also turn on the
facts of the borrower defense claim,
must be decided in a proceeding where
the school is afforded procedural and
substantive due process protections.
Particularly in situations where the
Department has determined that there
are multiple claims against a school
with common facts and claims, we
believe that a single fact-finding
proceeding to determine both
borrowers’ rights to relief, the amount of
relief to be provided, and the
Department’s contingent right of
recovery against an institution will
better serve the interests of adjudicative
Group Process: Bifurcation
Comments: One commenter suggested
that the Department use a bifurcated
process so that the group process is used
to resolve comment questions of fact
and law, and then require borrowers in
the putative group to file individual
claims to determine the appropriate
amount of relief. Such bifurcated
proceedings, argued the commenter,
would avoid windfalls to borrowers
who would not have otherwise sought
out relief and provide exact damages to
students seeking relief.
Discussion: Section 685.222(f)(1)
provides the Department with the
discretion to form groups that may be
composed only of borrowers who have
filed applications through the process in
§ 685.222(e) or who the Department has
identified from other sources, as well as
groups that may include borrowers with
common facts and claims who have not
filed applications. In situations when
groups may be composed only of
borrower defense applicants, or if the
hearing official determines that relief for
a group with non-applicants can be
ascertained without more
individualized evidence, bifurcated
proceedings may not be necessary or
suitable. However, we believe that the
regulations do not prevent a hearing
official from using his or her discretion
to structure a fact-finding process under
§ 685.222(g) or (h) as necessary based
upon the circumstances of each group
case, and including ordering a
bifurcated process if appropriate.
Changes: None.
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Meet and Confer Prior to Initiation of
Group Process
Comments: Several commenters
suggested the Department require or
allow borrowers to confer with
institutions to allow schools to remedy
claims, prior to a borrower’s
participation in the Department’s
borrower defense process.
Discussion: We acknowledge that
borrowers and schools may
communicate and confer outside of the
formal processes established for
borrower defense. However, we do not
believe it is necessary that the
regulations include a specific
requirement for schools and borrowers
to meet and confer prior to a borrower’s
participation in a group borrower
defense process under § 685.222(f) to
(h).
Changes: None.
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Initiation of Group Process: Secretarial
Discretion
Comments: Many commenters
supported the inclusion of a group
borrower defense process. However,
these commenters objected to the
Department’s proposal in § 685.222(f)
that the initiation of a group borrower
defense process be at the discretion of
the Secretary. Some commenters argued
that the discretion to initiate a group
borrower defense process should not be
given to the Secretary, whose decision
may be influenced by policy or political
considerations. These commenters also
objected to the Department’s proposal
that the decision to initiate a group
process would consider fiscal impact as
a possible factor for consideration,
stating that the decision to grant relief
to large numbers of students should not
be based upon cost.
Other commenters stated that the
Department should provide clear
guidelines, triggers, or conditions for
requiring the initiation of a group
process, particularly for groups of
borrowers who have not filed
applications with the Department (also
referred to as automatic group
discharges). A group of commenters
suggested that such conditions should
include petitions presenting plausible
prima facie cases, evidence found by the
Department that might present plausible
prima facie cases, or some threshold
number of cases. One commenter
suggested that the regulation include
provisions whereby multiple individual
claims would be grouped together if the
borrowers had attended the same school
or trigger an investigation by the
Department as the claims and the
feasibility of initiating a group process.
Another commenter suggested that the
regulation include a non-exhaustive list
of situations that would require the
initiation of a group process, absent a
written explanation from the
Department as to why such a group
process is not appropriate, or why
borrowers who had not filed an
application were not included if a group
process was initiated.
One commenter stated that borrowers
should be allowed to initiate group
borrower defense claims, either for
themselves or through representation by
consumer advocates, legal aid
organizations, or other entities, in
addition to the Secretary. This
commenter stated that possible concerns
that allowing independent
representation would give rise to an
industry seeking to take advantage of
borrowers, do not apply if claims are
submitted by entities such as legal aid
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organizations, consumer advocates, and
law enforcement agencies.
A few commenters stated that
borrowers should be allowed to access
borrower defense discharges as a group
on the bases of actions by local, State,
and Federal entities.
One commenter stated that to protect
taxpayers, group claims should be
initiated only in extreme cases, and
should only come after a final, nonappealable decision has been made by a
Federal or State agency or court in a
contested proceeding.
Discussion: We disagree with
commenters that factors or conditions
mandating the initiation of a group
process should be included in the
regulation. As explained in the NPRM,
81 FR 39348, we believe that the
Department is best positioned to make
a determination as to whether the
circumstances at hand would warrant
the initiation of a group process. We
also believe that it is also appropriate
for the Department to consider the
factors listed in § 685.222(f), such as the
existence of common facts and claims
among a putative group of borrowers,
fiscal impact, and the promotion of
compliance. As explained earlier in this
section and elsewhere in this preamble,
the group process will not only
determine relief for borrower defenses
for the group, but will also serve as the
method by which the Department will
receive an adjudication as to its right of
recovery against a school on the basis of
its losses from any relief awarded to
borrowers in the group. We believe that
it is important that the Department
retain the discretion to decide if the
circumstances warrant the initiation of
a group process to decide its right of
recovery from a school. However, we do
not believe that the initiation of the
group process will prevent borrowers
from being able to proactively seek
relief. Borrowers may choose to file
individual applications for relief under
§ 685.222(e) or, even if their
applications are identified by a
designated Department official for a
group process, choose to opt-out of the
group process and receive
determinations through the individual
application process if desired. As noted
in the NPRM, 81 FR 39348, the
Department welcomes information from
any source, including State and other
Federal enforcement agencies, as well as
legal aid organizations, that may assist
it in deciding whether to initiate group
borrower defense process under
§ 685.222(f), (g), and (h).
We explain our reasoning as to the
different standards that may form the
basis of a borrower defense in the
respective sections for those standards.
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We believe it is appropriate that group
proceedings should be initiated for
claims based upon any of the allowed
standards, as opposed to just one of the
standards or standards outside of those
described in the regulations.
Changes: None.
Third-Party Petitions for Initiation of
Group Process
Comments: Many commenters stated
that outside entities, such as student
advocates, State AGs, and legal aid
attorneys should be given a formal role
in the group borrower defense process.
Some of these commenters urged the
Department to adopt language proposed
at the third session of negotiated
rulemaking in March 2016, which
would have explicitly established that
State or Federal enforcement agencies,
or legal aid organization, may submit a
written request to the Department
identifying a group of borrowers for the
initiation of a group borrower defense
process. Under this proposed language,
the Department would have responded
to such requests in writing. These
commenters argued that such entities
have direct contact with borrowers and
are likely to have necessary information
for proving borrower defense claims.
Commenters also stated that allowing
third party petitions is important, given
that the borrower defense process only
allows an individual borrower to
dispute a group borrower defense
decision in the proposed regulation by
filing an individual application. One
commenter stated that allowing such
third party requests will result in faster
adjudications for borrowers and
administrative cost-savings for
taxpayers. Another commenter stated
that a formal referral process would
recognize both the states’ role in the
triad of higher education oversight and
the States’ efforts to protect consumers
through State general consumer
protection laws.
A group of commenters argued that a
right for such outside entities should be
included given that group
determinations will result in the most
widespread relief, will be the easiest
way for borrowers to access relief, and
are the only proposed method by which
borrowers who have not filed
applications may access relief.
In response to the Department’s
reasoning in the NPRM, 81 FR 39348,
that informal communication facilitates
cooperation with such entities, one
commenter stated that providing such
third parties with a formal petition in
the regulation would not preclude
informal contact and communication,
but would rather increase transparency
and efficiency. The commenter also
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suggested that, to address any concerns
that parties that may take advantage of
borrowers, that the final rule should
allow the Secretary to decline to
respond to a petition if the organization
does not appear to be a bona fide
organization that represents borrowers.
Discussion: We disagree that a formal
right of petition for entities such as State
AGs, advocacy groups, or legal aid
organizations should be included in the
regulations. As explained in the NPRM,
81 FR 39348, in the Department’s
experience, cooperation with such
outside entities has been best facilitated
through informal communication,
which allows for more candor and
flexibility between the Department and
interested groups and parties. The
Department always welcomes
cooperation and input from other
Federal and State enforcement entities,
as well as legal assistance organizations
and advocacy groups. To this end, the
Department anticipates creating a
designated point of contact for State
AGs to allow for active communication
on borrower defense issues and also
actively encourages a continuation of
cooperation and communication with
other interested groups and parties. As
also reiterated in the NPRM, id., the
Department is ready to receive and
make use of evidence and input from
any interested party, including
advocates and State and Federal
agencies.
We also reiterate our position that the
determinations arising from the
borrower defense process should not
viewed as having any binding effect on
issues, such as causes of actions that
borrowers may have against schools
under State or other Federal law, that
are not properly within the purview of
the Department. We also encourage
borrowers and their representatives to
weigh all available avenues for relief,
whether it is through the borrower
defense process or through avenues
outside of the Department.
Changes: None.
Challenges to the Initiation of a Group
Process
Comments: Many commenters
expressed concern that the group
borrower defense process would not
include an opportunity for schools to
dispute the initiation of a group process
and the formation of the group. One
commenter stated that the lack of a
provision for schools to contest the
formation of the group was in violation
of due process. Several commenters
expressed concern that schools are not
given a right to contest the Department’s
decision as to whether there are
‘‘common facts and claims’’ to initiate a
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group process and requested
clarification of that factor. Several
commenters stated that the
Department’s proposal effectively would
allow the Department to certify a class,
without any of the procedural
protections available to defendants in a
class proceeding under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23. One commenter
expressed concern that the proposed
regulation does not require that the
Department initiate a group process
only where common facts and claims
are found among the borrowers in the
group, but rather gives the Secretary
discretion to consider a nonexclusive
list of factors. One commenter stated
that the Department should define the
sources of information the Department
would use to identify borrowers for
inclusion in a group process.
One commenter stated that by not
providing a review of the Department’s
initiation or group certification decision
by the hearing official or allowing a
challenge by the school, and by
proposing that the Department’s
decision to initiate a group process may
consider the factor of ‘‘compliance by
the school or other Title IV
participants,’’ that the purpose of the
group borrower defense process is to
hold schools accountable and make
them examples to the industry, and not
to efficiently handle claims before the
Department.
Discussion: We disagree that the
regulations should include an explicit
step by which an institution may
dispute the formation or composition of
a group under § 685.222(f). As discussed
previously in this section, the
Department is developing agency rules
of practice and procedure for borrower
defense, which will be informed by the
legal requirements for administrative
adjudications and the due process
protections provided in the
Department’s other administrative
adjudications. For instance, we will
consider the proceedings including
those under 34 CFR part 668, subparts
G and H, which allow for standard
motion practice and interlocutory
appeals. We believe that, as proposed,
§ 685.222(f), (g), and (h) provides
hearing officials with the flexibility and
discretion to allow motions by parties as
is deemed appropriate.
We believe that it is appropriate that
§ 685.222(f) notes that the Department
may generally consider a nonexhaustive
list of factors in deciding to initiate a
group claim. As described earlier, we
believe it is important for the
Department to retain discretion in
deciding whether to initiate a
proceeding to adjudicate its right of
recovery from a school, as a contingent
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claim to a hearing official’s relief
determination for the borrower defense
claims of a group of borrowers in the
same process. Similarly, we believe that
it is important for the Department to
retain the flexibility to bring groups of
varying sizes or types before a hearing
official in a group process, including
groups that are formed in a manner
more akin to a joinder of parties under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 than
to a class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.
Regarding the sources of information
the Department will use to identify
borrowers for inclusion in a group
process, as explained in the NPRM, in
addition to applications submitted
through the process in § 685.222(e), the
Department also may identify borrowers
from records within its possession or
from information that may be provided
to the Department by outside sources.
We do not believe further clarification
as to such sources of the information is
necessary.
We disagree that consideration of the
compliance impact of a group borrower
defense claim is inappropriate for the
initiation of a group process and also
disagree that this factor lends an
appearance of bias or unfairness to the
fact-finding processes described in
§ 685.222(f), (g), and (h). As discussed
above, the procedure we will use for the
group process will provide the
institution with due process protections
very similar to those that the
Department now uses when it fines an
institution or terminates the eligibility
of an institution to participate in the
title IV, HEA programs, which are found
in current subpart G of part 668. These
rules do not preclude motion practice,
nor will the rules we develop.
Moreover, given that such proceedings
will involve the Department’s right of
recovery against schools, we believe that
is appropriate for the regulations to
reflect that the Department will consider
a number of factors in its decision
whether to initiate a process for the
adjudication of such recovery by the
Department. As stated in the NPRM, the
group borrower defense process is
intended to provide simple, accessible,
and fair avenues to relief for borrowers,
and to promote greater efficiency and
expediency in the resolution of
borrower defense claims, and we believe
this structure furthers that goal.
Changes: None.
Members of the Group
Comments: Many commenters
supported the Department’s proposal
under § 685.222(f)(1)(ii) that borrowers
who may not have filed an application
for borrower defense may be included as
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members of a group for a determination
of relief. Such commenters urged the
Department to establish criteria
requiring the initiation of such a group
process.
A number of other commenters
opposed the proposal and suggested that
only borrowers who have filed an
individual claim be included in the
group process. These commenters stated
that limiting group members to
applicants would ensure that only
borrowers who have actually been
harmed would receive relief. Other
commenters also argued that nonapplicants should not be included in the
group process, due to concerns about
the use of borrowers’ personal
information and consent.
Other commenters stated that
borrowers should only be allowed to
participate in the group process if they
affirmatively opt-in to the process.
Several of these commenters also cited
concerns about the use of borrowers’
personal information and consent if an
opt-out method is used.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenters’ support for the use of a
group process to resolve claims for a
group with non-applicant borrowers as
described in § 685.222(f)(1)(ii).
However, as discussed earlier in this
section, we believe that it is appropriate
that the Department retain the
discretion to initiate the group process,
given that the Department will have the
most information regarding the
circumstances and the Department’s
contingent interest in the proceedings.
We disagree with the commenters that
suggested that the group processes
described in § 685.222(f), (g), and (h)
should only include borrower defense
applicants or that we should require
borrowers to affirmatively opt-in to the
process. We believe that, where the
Department has decided to bring a
group borrower defense proceeding and
non-applicant borrowers with common
facts and claims can be identified, such
borrowers should also be entitled to the
benefits of the designated Department
official’s advocacy and the opportunity
to obtain relief and findings in such
proceedings. Additionally, providing
such borrowers with an opportunity to
opt-out of the proceedings, given
sufficiency of the notice to be provided
by the Department to such borrowers,
follows well-established precedent in
class action law. See, e.g., Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985).
The Department will continue to
safeguard borrowers’ personal
information in this process, according to
its established procedures.
Changes: None.
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Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing
proposed § 685.222(f)(2), the
Department has determined that if a
group process for borrower defense is
initiated, and the Secretary has
identified a borrower who has not filed
a borrower defense application pursuant
to § 685.222(f)(1)(ii), the borrower
should be granted forbearance or, if the
borrower is in default on the loan at
issue, then the procedure for a defaulted
loan should be followed, as if the
borrower had filed a borrower defense
to repayment application under
§ 685.222(e)(2).
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(f)(2) to provide that the
forbearance and defaulted loan
procedures will be followed for
members of a group identified by the
Secretary who have not filed a borrower
defense application.
Opt-Out for Group Discharge;
Reopening by the Secretary After
Determination Is Made
Comments: A number of commenters
objected to the Department’s proposal in
§ 685.222(i)(2) that borrowers would be
given an opportunity to opt-out of a
group determination of relief. One
commenter stated that providing
borrowers with an opt-out would
provide borrowers with the ability to
bring successive, identical claims in the
group and individual processes, and
would create unpredictability and
administrative inefficiencies. The
commenter stated that borrowers who
have agreed to be part of the group
process should be bound by any
resulting decision. One commenter
stated that allowing only one
opportunity for a borrower to opt-out of
the group process would be consistent
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
prevent uncertainty and inconsistency,
and would further the purpose of the
group borrower defense process to
promote efficiency and expediency in
the resolution of claims.
Other commenters stated that
allowing borrowers to opt-out of a
denial of a group claim, to file an
individual claim, would place an undue
burden on schools to defend the same
claim multiple times. Some of these
commenters stated that this situation
would deprive schools of protection
from double jeopardy. These
commenters expressed concern that the
financial resources schools would have
to expend to defend such claims would
lead to tuition increases for students.
Several commenters stated that allowing
such an opt-out would allow students to
file multiple, unjustified claims for the
purpose of delaying repayment.
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One commenter also suggested that a
time limit be imposed upon the
Secretary’s ability to reopen a
borrower’s application is bound by any
applicable limitation periods. Several
commenters stated that relief in the
group process should be opt-out only.
Discussion: We appreciate the
concern raised by commenters that
allowing an opt-out for borrowers after
a determination for relief has been made
will subject schools to continuing
litigation risk and uncertainty. As a
result, we will modify § 685.222(i) to
remove the post-determination opt-out
opportunity for borrowers in group
proceedings.
We disagree that a time limit should
be placed on the Secretary’s ability to
reopen a borrower’s application. We
believe that if the Department becomes
aware of new evidence that would
entitle a borrower to relief under the
regulations, then the borrower is
entitled to relief regardless of the
passage of time.
Changes: We have revised § 685.222(i)
to remove the opportunity for a
borrower to opt-out of the proceedings
after a determination for relief has been
made in a group proceeding.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing
proposed § 685.222(g)(4) and (h)(4), the
Department has determined that if a
borrower defense application is under
review because a borrower defense
application has been reopened by the
Secretary under § 685.222(e)(5)(ii), the
borrower should be granted forbearance
or, if the borrower is in default on the
loan at issue, then the procedure for a
defaulted loan should be followed, as
when the borrower filed an initial
borrower defense to repayment
application.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(g)(4) and (h)(4) to provide that
the forbearance and defaulted loan
procedures will be followed when the
Secretary has reopened a borrower
defense application.
Due Process Proceedings
Comments: Several commenters
stated that the proposed regulations do
not provide details of how and what
schools may dispute in the group
borrower defense fact-finding process,
and requested clarification in the final
regulations. Other commenters
expressed concern that the proposed
group fact-finding process does not
provide sufficient due process
protections for schools. These
commenters emphasized that
participation by schools would create a
more fair process and increase the
reliability of the results.
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One commenter stated that the
limited protections in the proposed
group borrower defense process does
not provide schools with an opportunity
to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses and thus does not satisfy the
due process requirements established in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); and Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474 (1959) for depriving schools of their
property rights to funds already
received. Several commenters suggested
that the Department use the procedures
in 34 CFR part 668, subpart H, to ensure
due process protections for schools.
Commenters expressed concern about
institutions’ opportunities to receive
notice and evidence in the proposed
group borrower defense process. Many
of these commenters expressed concern
and requested clarification regarding the
Department’s proposal in
§ 685.222(f)(2)(iii) that notice to the
school of the group process would occur
‘‘as practicable.’’ One commenter
suggested that we include language
specifying that no notice will be
provided if notice is impossible or
irrelevant due to a school’s closure.
Other commenters expressed concern
that the proposed regulations do not
specify whether the scope of a group
will be disclosed to schools and stated
that schools must be aware of the
members of the group in order to be able
to raise a defense. Another commenter
expressed concern that the proposed
regulations do not require the
Department to notify the school as to the
basis of the group; the initiation of the
borrower defense process; of any
procedure or timeline for requesting
records, providing information to the
Department, or making responses; or
provide schools with an opportunity to
appear at a hearing.
Several commenters stated that
institutions should be provided with
notice and copies of all the evidence
presented underlying the borrower
defense claims in a group process.
Another commenter stated that the
proposed regulation gives the
Department complete discretion as to
what evidence the trier of fact will use
to make decisions. This commenter
stated that, when combined with the
proposal that the persons advocating for
students, as well as the persons making
decisions, in the group borrower
defense process are all chosen by the
Department, this discretion appears to
favor students over schools in the group
process.
Several commenters also stated that
institutions should be given an
opportunity to provide a written
response to the substance of the group
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borrower defense claim within a certain
number of days (45 or 60) after the
resolution of any appeal on the
Department’s basis for a group claim or
of the notification to the school of the
group process if no challenge to the
group is filed, provided with copies of
any evidence and records to be
considered or deemed relevant by the
hearing official, be allowed to present
oral argument before the hearing
official, and provided with a copy of the
hearing official’s decision in the group
process. One commenter emphasized
that the decision should identify the
calculation used by the hearing official
for the amount of relief given by the
decision. These commenters also stated
that institutions should be provided
with a right of appeal to the hearing
official’s decision in both the closed and
open school group processes. One
commenter expressed concern that the
proposed process does not include any
process for how an appeal may be filed.
Several commenters expressed
concerns that the process does not
appear to provide to any opportunities
for schools to conduct discovery or to
cross-examine witnesses. Some of these
commenters expressed the view that, in
cases where the rebuttable presumption
proposed in § 685.222(f)(3) applies,
schools will need to be able to question
borrowers in order to rebut the
presumption.
One commenter stated that the group
borrower defense process should allow
for both students to present their own
claims and institutions to have the same
opportunity to present a defense,
including any affirmative defenses, and
to appeal adverse decisions. The
commenter stated that both the school
and the borrower should have such
opportunities to present evidence and
arguments in any proceeding or process
to determine claims, not just
proceedings where recovery against the
school is determined. The commenter
emphasized that permitting school
participation would lead to correct
results, since schools often have
information as to any alleged
wrongdoing.
Discussion: The Department
understands commenters’ concerns
regarding the broad guidelines for the
group fact-finding process established in
§ 685.222(f), (g), and (h). As noted
throughout this section, the group
borrower defense process involving an
open school 35 in § 685.222(h) would be
35 As described in § 668.222(g), the ‘‘closed
school’’ group borrower defense process would
apply only when the school has both closed and
provided no financial protection available to the
Secretary from which to recover losses arising from
borrower defenses, and for which there is no entity
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structured to provide the substantive
and procedural due process protections
both borrowers and schools are entitled
to under applicable law, including those
provided under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 554,
and under the Department’s other
administrative proceedings. Such
protections would include those
regarding notice; the opportunity for an
oral evidentiary hearing where the
parties may confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses if warranted,); or
those for the submission and exchange
written material, as provided under
enforcement procedures at 34 CFR part
668, subpart G. The Department is
developing procedural rules to govern
the fact-finding processes described in
both § 685.222(e) and (f) to (h), which
will establish these details more firmly
and be informed by the procedures and
protections established by the
Department in its other administrative
proceedings, such as 34 CFR part 668,
subparts G and H.
We appreciate the concern that
§ 685.222(f)(2)(iii) is not clear as to the
Department’s intent that notice of a
group proceeding will occur unless
there is no party available to receive
such notice—in other words, as would
be the case under the closed school
group borrower defense process
described in § 685.222(g). We are
revising § 685.222(f)(2)(iii) to clarify that
no notice will be provided if notice is
impossible or irrelevant due to a
school’s closure.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.222(f)(2)(iii) to clarify that no
notice will be provided if notice is
impossible or irrelevant due to a
school’s closure.
Rebuttable Presumption of Reliance
Comments: A number of commenters
objected to § 685.222(f)(3), which
provides that a rebuttable presumption
of reasonable reliance by members of
the group applies if a group borrower
defense claim involves a substantial
misrepresentation that has been widely
disseminated. One commenter stated
that reliance cannot be presumed any
more than the occurrence of a
misrepresentation can be presumed, and
that such an approach does not comply
with general legal principles. Another
commenter expressed concern that the
rebuttable presumption of reasonable
reliance would impermissibly preclude
schools from presenting evidence as to
the main fact of a group borrower
defense case. These commenters
expressed concern that the presumption
from which the Secretary may recover such losses.
Or, in other words, when there is no entity from
whom the Department may obtain a recovery.
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would be difficult or impossible for
schools to rebut. One commenter
expressed concern that a school would
be unable to rebut the presumption for
borrowers who are unknown or not
named as being part of the group for the
group borrower defense process. One
commenter expressed concern that the
rebuttable presumption of reliance
would be difficult for schools to
disprove, particularly in situations
where disproving a claim would require
documentation that falls outside of the
record retention requirements.
One commenter stated that the
presumption would set up a system by
which omissions by school employees
or agents or misunderstandings by
students may be considered substantial
misrepresentations, without the
Department needing to show reliance or
that the misconduct caused the harm at
issue. The commenter expressed general
concern that the Department has
proposed a negligence standard that is
not contemplated by the HEA, and that
this expansion in the standard has not
been justified by the Department. The
commenter argued that the presumption
would allow claims based on
accusations of omissions or
misunderstandings on which the
borrower did not rely.
One commenter stated that the
presumption would threaten
institutions with high liability and
impose high costs on taxpayers. A
couple commenters stated that the
presumption is unfair, absent an intent
or materiality requirement.
One commenter stated that it objected
to the establishment of the rebuttable
presumption generally, but requested
clarification as to what the Department
means by ‘‘widely disseminated,’’
specifically the size of the audience that
would be required for a statement to be
considered to have been widely
disseminated and methods of
dissemination that would trigger the
presumption.
Several commenters supported the
inclusion of a presumption of
reasonable reliance on a widely
disseminated misrepresentation is
consistent with existing consumer
protection law. One commenter stated
that the presumption recognizes that it
is unfair and inefficient to require
cohorts of borrowers to individually
assert claims against an actor engage in
a well-documented pattern of
misconduct.
Discussion: We disagree that the
presumption established in
§ 685.222(f)(3) does not comport with
general legal principles. It is a wellestablished principle that administrative
agencies may establish evidentiary
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presumptions, as long as there is a
rational nexus between the proven facts
and the presumed facts. Cole v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 33 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th
Cir. 1994); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Transp., 105 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir.
1997). As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR
39348, we believe that if a
representation that is reasonably likely
to induce a recipient to act is made to
a broad audience, it is logical to
presume that those audience members
did in fact rely on that representation.
We believe that there is a rational nexus
between the wide dissemination of the
misrepresentation and the likelihood of
reliance by the audience, which justifies
the rebuttable presumption of
reasonable reliance upon the
misrepresentation established in
§ 685.222(f)(3). A similar presumption
exists in Federal consumer law. See,
e.g., F.T.C. v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc.,
401 F.3d 1192, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005);
F.T.C. v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp.,
931 F.2d 1312, 1315–16 (8th Cir. 1991).
We disagree that the rebuttable
presumption establishes a different
standard than what is required under
the current regulations. As explained
under ‘‘Substantial Misrepresentation,’’
the Department’s standard at part 668,
subpart F, has never required intent or
knowledge as an element of the
substantial misrepresentation standard.
Additionally, the current standard for
borrower defense allows ‘‘any act or
omission of the school . . . that would
give rise to a cause of action under
applicable State law.’’ 34 CFR
685.206(c)(1). As explained under
‘‘Federal Standard’’ and ‘‘Substantial
Misrepresentation,’’ under many States’
consumer protection laws, knowledge or
intent is not a required element of proof
for relief as to an unfair or deceptive
trade practice or act. Moreover, we
disagree with any characterization that
the rebuttable presumption would
remove the reliance requirement for
substantial misrepresentation in group
proceedings. The rebuttable
presumption does not change the
burden of persuasion, which would still
be on the Department. As § 685.222(f)(3)
states, the Department would initially
have to demonstrate that the substantial
misrepresentation had been ‘‘widely
disseminated.’’ Only upon such a
demonstration and finding would the
rebuttable presumption act to shift the
evidentiary burden to the school,
requiring the school to demonstrate that
individuals in the identified group did
not in fact rely on the misrepresentation
at issue. This echoes the operation of
the similar presumption of reliance for
widely disseminated misrepresentations
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under Federal consumer law described
above. See Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401
F.3d at 1206. A school would be entitled
to introduce any relevant evidence to
rebut the presumption and what may
constitute relevant evidence may vary
depending on the facts of each case.
Similarly, what may be viewed as ‘‘wide
dissemination’’ may also vary from case
to case.
There appears to be confusion as to
whether schools would be required to
rebut the presumption of reliance as to
‘‘unknown’’ or ‘‘unidentified’’ members
of the group. Under § 685.222(f)(1)(ii),
the Department will identify all
members of the group. Although the
group may include borrowers who did
not file an application through the
process in § 685.222(e), the members of
the group will be known in the group
process.
We appreciate the support of
commenters supporting the
establishment of a rebuttable
presumption. As discussed earlier, one
of the reasons we are establishing a
rebuttable presumption in cases of a
widely disseminated substantial
misrepresentation is that we believe that
there is a rational nexus between a welldocumented pattern of misconduct in
the instance of a wide dissemination of
the misrepresentation and the
likelihood of reliance by the audience.
We also disagree that a materiality or
intent element is necessary, as
explained earlier under ‘‘Claims Based
on Substantial Misrepresentation.’’
Changes: None.
Representation in the Group Process
Comments: Many commenters
expressed concern that the Department
would designate a Department official to
present borrower claims in the group
borrower defense fact-finding process,
when schools would be permitted to
obtain their own representation in the
process. These commenters stated that
they should be allowed to obtain their
own outside representation. Some
commenters stated that such outside
representation should be either paid for
by the Department, or that schools
should not be allowed to participate in
the group process until after the school’s
liability has been determined.
One commenter stated that borrowers
should be allowed to have their own
representatives in the group borrower
defense process, either at their own
expense or pro bono. This commenter
stated that borrowers should at least be
allowed to act as ‘‘intervenors’’ in a
group borrower defense process, with
separate representation, to protect their
interests.
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One commenter suggested that the
Department establish procedures for
individual borrowers and their legal
representatives to petition the
Department to initiate a group
proceeding or, in the alternative,
establish a point of contact for
borrowers to notify the Department of
potential candidates for group claims.
The commenter also suggested that
borrowers be allowed to file appeals to
the Secretary in group proceedings,
given borrowers’ vested interest in
obtaining favorable adjudications that
will make obtaining relief easier for
borrowers.
Discussion: We disagree that
borrowers should be allowed to initiate
group borrower defense claims or be
able to retain their own counsel and
present evidence and arguments before
a hearing official in a group borrower
defense process. As explained earlier in
this section, we acknowledge that the
designated Department official
responsible for presenting the group
borrower defense claim and initiating a
group borrower defense process would
not be the borrower’s legal
representative. However, as the holder
of a claim to recovery that is contingent
upon the relief awarded to a group’s
borrower defense claims, we believe
that the Department is the appropriate
party to present both the group’s
borrower defense claims and the
Department’s claim for recovery against
the institution in question. As explained
in the NPRM, 81 FR 39348, we also
believe that the Department’s fulfillment
of this role will reduce the likelihood of
predatory third parties seeking to take
advantage of borrowers unfamiliar with
the borrower defense process.
Additionally, we note that, under
§ 685.222(f)(2)(ii), borrowers may also
choose to opt-out of a group process and
participate in the process established in
§ 685.222(e), if they are not satisfied
with the Department’s role in the group
proceeding. Borrowers may also reach
out to the designated Department
official if they have questions about the
process.
As discussed earlier in this section, in
consideration of borrowers’ desire for
timely and efficient adjudications, we
disagree that borrowers should be
provided with a right of appeal to the
Secretary. However, we note that
borrowers may also seek judicial review
in Federal court of the Department’s
final decisions or request a
reconsideration of their claims by the
Department upon the identification of
new evidence under § 685.222(e)(5).
Changes: None.
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Appeals
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern that, in the group
borrower defense process, liability will
be automatically assigned to a school,
and that schools will have no
opportunity to dispute the liability. One
commenter stated this is unfair to
school owners, and to principals and
affiliates of schools, from whom the
Department proposes to seek repayment
in certain situations.
Discussion: The commenters are
incorrect. Section 685.222(h)(2)
provides both schools and the
designated Department official in the
open school group hearing process with
the opportunity to file an appeal with
the Secretary from a hearing official’s
decision. Further, § 685.222(g), which
does not provide for such an appeal,
applies only if a school has closed and
has provided no financial protection
available to the Secretary from which to
recover losses arising from borrower
defenses, and for which there is no
other entity from which the Secretary
can otherwise practicably recover such
losses. If the Secretary seeks to recover
borrower defense losses from the
principal or affiliate of a ‘‘closed
school,’’ the open school process in
§ 685.222(h) would apply.
Changes: None.
Open and Closed School Group
Processes
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern about schools’
participation in the closed school group
process. One commenter expressed
concern that in the group process for
closed schools described in proposed
§ 685.222(g), that the hearing official
deciding the claims at issue may
consider additional information or
responses from the school that the
designated Department official
considers to be necessary. This
commenter stated that if there are
persons affiliated with the school who
are prepared to participate, then those
persons should be given full rights of
participation in the closed school group
borrower defense process. One
commenter stated that institutions
should be provided with a right of
appeal to the hearing official’s decision
in both the closed and open school
group processes.
One commenter requested
clarification as to claims filed by
borrowers who have attended a school
that has since closed, but where the
school has posted a letter of credit or
other surety with the Department.
Another commenter supported the
distinction between the open school and
closed school group processes.
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Discussion: The commenters are
incorrect about the nature of the closed
school borrower defense group process
described in § 685.222(g). As described,
the standard provides that § 685.222(g)
will apply only if a school is closed,
there is no financial protection available
to the Secretary from which to recover
losses from borrower defense claims,
and there is no other entity from which
the Secretary may recover. If there is a
letter of credit or some other surety that
the school has posted to the Department
and that is currently available to pay
losses from borrower defense claims, the
open school, borrower defense group
process under § 685.222(h) will apply. If
there is no ability for the Department to
recover on any losses resulting from an
award of relief in the closed school,
group borrower defense process, then
the Department will be unable to
exercise its right to recovery against a
school and the school will not face any
possible deprivation of property. As a
result, we believe it is appropriate that
schools do not receive a right of
administrative appeal in the closed
school group process. If there are
persons affiliated with the school who
disagree with the final decision
resulting from the process, however,
such persons may still seek judicial
review in Federal court under 5 U.S.C.
702 and § 704.
Changes: None.
Public Databases
Comments: A group of commenters
suggested that decision makers be
required to document decisions so that
they may be appealed and reviewed in
Federal court. These commenters and
others also requested that the
regulations require public reporting of
borrower defense adjudications and that
the Department maintain a public,
online database of decisions resulting
from any group process or individual
application. The commenters stated that
such public reporting would allow
political representatives and advocates
to review such decisions, suggest
improvements, and ensure consistency
in the Department’s decision making.
One commenter also stated that the
Department should develop a publicly
available information infrastructure,
such as a docketing system, to allow
users to identify and track cases that
may be candidates for group
proceedings or informal aggregation and
to allow users to learn from
Departmental decisions.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenters’ concerns regarding
transparency and consistency in the
borrower defense process, and will
consider their suggestions as we move
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forward with the implementation of
these regulations. All of the
Department’s administrative
determinations are presumptively
available for public disclosure, subject
to privacy concerns. We will
contemplate and evaluate appropriate
methods for the release of information
about borrower defense claims on an
ongoing basis as the processes and
procedures in the regulations take effect.
Changes: None.
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Informal Aggregation
Comments: One commenter suggested
that, in addition to the group borrower
defense process, the Department allow
hearing officials to informally aggregate,
or to allow borrowers to petition for
informal aggregation of, separate but
related cases to be heard in front of the
same trier of fact. The commenter stated
that such informal aggregation would
expedite the resolution of similar
claims, enhance consistency, and
conserve resources.
Discussion: We appreciate the
suggestion by the commenter, but do not
believe it is necessary to modify the
regulations to provide for informal
aggregation. Such aggregation would be
within the discretion of the hearing
officials presiding over the group
processes as part of their routine
caseload management responsibilities.
Changes: None.
FFEL Borrowers
Comments: Several commenters
stated that FFEL borrowers should be
included in any group discharges for
borrower defense. One commenter
suggested that the Department allow
FFEL borrowers to participate in the
group and individual borrower defense
processes without having to consolidate
FFEL Loans into Direct Consolidation
Loans or by having to prove any
relationship between the borrowers’
schools and lenders. This commenter
argued that not all FFEL borrowers are
eligible for Direct Consolidation Loans,
and that the proposed regulations do not
address the needs of such FFEL
borrowers.
Discussion: We disagree with the
suggestion that FFEL borrowers be
included in any group discharges for
borrower defense. As explained under
‘‘Expansion of Borrower Rights,’’ FFEL
Loans are governed by specific
contractual rights and the process
adopted here is not designed to address
those rights. We can address potential
relief under these procedures for only
those FFEL borrowers who consolidate
their FFEL Loans into Direct
Consolidation Loans. As cases are
received, the Department may consider
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whether to conduct outreach to FFEL
borrowers who may be eligible for
borrower defense relief by consolidating
their loans into Direct Consolidation
Loans under § 685.212(k) as appropriate.
Changes: None.
Abuse by Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Comments: Several commenters
expressed concern that the group
process would create opportunities for
plaintiffs’ attorneys. The commenters
stated that the proposed regulations
would encourage attorneys to have
borrowers file suspect claims with the
Department, while also bringing class
actions in court. The commenters stated
that this would result in the Department
initiating a group process, identifying
members of a putative class for the court
proceeding, and obtaining
determinations that class action
attorneys would then be able to use in
court to their advantage, while
collecting attorneys’ fees.
Discussion: We disagree that the
regulations will create opportunities for
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Under the
regulations, the Department has the
discretion to decide whether a group
borrower defense process will be
initiated, and the filing of individual
claims may not necessarily lead to the
initiation of a group borrower defense
process. Additionally, we recognize that
borrowers may seek to utilize other
avenues for relief outside of the
borrower defense process and provide
in § 685.222(k) that if the borrower has
received relief through other means, the
Department may reinstate the
borrower’s obligation to repay the loan
to protect the Federal fiscal interest and
avoid receipt by the borrower of
multiple recoveries for the same harm.
Changes: None.
Borrower Relief
Process Arbitrary and Outside the Scope
of Department Authority
Comments: Some commenters argued
that the proposal for calculation of
borrower relief is arbitrary and that the
Department is neither qualified nor
authorized to conduct this calculation.
According to one commenter,
implementation of the proposed
framework for calculating relief would
constitute arbitrary agency adjudication
under relevant case law. One
commenter cited 20 U.S.C. 3403(b) and
section 485(h)(2)(B) of the HEA as
imposing statutory limits on the
Department’s authority to direct or
control academic content and
programming, and argued that the
Department would be exceeding its
authority by attempting to assess the
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value of an education by including the
quality of academic programming
among the factors to be considered in
carrying out an adjudication on any
borrower defense claim.
Discussion: We disagree that the
Department’s proposal to adjudicate or
calculate borrower relief is arbitrary. By
directing the Secretary to designate acts
and omissions that constitute borrower
defenses to repayment in section 455(h)
of the HEA, Congress has explicitly
charged the Department, under the
current and new regulations, to
adjudicate the merits of claims brought
alleging such acts and omissions. Such
adjudications necessarily require the
Department to determine the relief
warranted by a proven claim against an
institution. If a court adjudicating a
borrower’s cause of action against the
institution would assess the value of the
education provided in order to
determine relief, section 455(h) requires
and authorizes the Department to do so
as well.
Further, we do not agree that the
Department’s adjudications on borrower
defense claims will involve an ‘‘exercise
[of] any direction, supervision, or
control over the curriculum, program of
instruction, administration, or
personnel of any educational
institution, school, or school system
. . . or over the selection or content of
library resources, textbooks, or other
instructional materials by any
educational institution or school
system, except to the extent authorized
by law.’’ 20 U.S.C. 3403(b). As described
above earlier, the Department’s
adjudications will determine whether a
school’s alleged misconduct constitutes
an ‘‘act[] or omission[] of an institution
of higher education a borrower may
assert as a defense to repayment of a
loan . . .’’, 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h), and
provide relief to borrowers and a right
of recovery to the Department from
schools, in a manner that is explicitly
authorized by statute. Notwithstanding,
we believe that the provision of relief,
as the result of and after any conduct by
the school, through the borrower
defense process is not the same as the
active ‘‘exercise [of] any direction,
supervision, or control’’ over any of the
prohibited areas.
Changes: None.
Presume Full Relief
Comments: A number of commenters
argued in favor of a presumption of full
relief for borrowers. These commenters
recommended that Appendix A be
either deleted or modified to eliminate
or alter the proposed partial relief
calculations. The commenters
contended that the proposed partial
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relief calculation process would be
complex and subjective and potentially
deny relief to deserving borrowers.
Multiple commenters argued that
calculating partial relief would be
excessively complicated, expensive, and
time consuming. According to these
commenters, the process of calculating
relief would lead to the waste of
Department resources and cause
unnecessary delays in the provision of
relief to borrowers. Additionally,
commenters were concerned about the
possibility that this process would be
confusing and difficult for borrowers to
navigate.
Some commenters argued that the
proposed partial relief calculation
process would unfairly subject
borrowers who had already succeeded
on the merits of their claims to a
burdensome secondary review process.
Commenters noted that, in the case of a
claim based on a school’s substantial
misrepresentation, borrowers would
have already demonstrated entitlement
to relief by meeting the substantial
misrepresentation standard.
Consequently, these commenters
suggested that the relief calculation
process would create an unnecessary
hurdle to the appropriate relief for these
borrowers. The commenters argued that,
after being defrauded by their schools,
student borrowers should not be
required to undergo an extensive
process of calculating the value of their
education. Further, these commenters
argued that the partial relief system
would be unfair because it affords a
culpable school the presumption that its
education was of some value to the
borrower.
Other commenters suggested that it
would be unfair for the borrower to bear
the burden of demonstrating eligibility
for full relief. Instead, these commenters
proposed that the Secretary should bear
the burden of demonstrating why full
relief is not warranted. The commenters
proposed that full relief be automatic for
borrowers when there is evidence of
wrongdoing by the school. These
commenters suggested either
eliminating partial relief or limiting it to
cases in which compelling evidence
exists that the borrower’s harm was
limited to some clearly delimited part of
their education.
Commenters suggested that, in
addition to being difficult to calculate,
partial relief would be insufficient to
make victimized borrowers whole. To
support the argument in favor of a
presumption of full relief, these
commenters asserted that many
Corinthian students never would have
enrolled had the institution truthfully
represented its job placement rates.
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Some commenters raised concerns
about the subjectivity of the process for
calculating partial relief for borrowers.
These commenters were concerned that
the methods proposed in Appendix A
for calculating relief are too vague,
afford excessive discretion to officials,
and could lead to potential
inconsistencies in the treatment of
borrowers. Some commenters suggested
that Appendix A should prescribe one
particular method for calculating relief,
rather than providing multiple options
in order to increase certainty and
consistency.
Some commenters raised concerns
about the potential impact of resource
inequities between schools and
borrowers on the partial relief
calculation process. Specifically, these
commenters argued that because schools
will be able to afford expensive legal
representation, schools would likely be
able to find technicalities in the relief
calculation process, potentially
resulting in the denial of relief to
deserving borrowers. These commenters
were particularly concerned about
disadvantages faced by borrowers who
cannot afford legal representation.
Commenters also noted that borrowers
may feel pressure to retain legal
counsel, which they contended would
frustrate the Department’s intent to
design a process under which borrowers
do not need legal representation, and
are shielded from predatory third-party
debt relief companies.
One commenter suggested that the
provision of partial relief would lead to
an excessive number of claims,
particularly when implemented in
conjunction with what was described as
a low threshold for qualified claims.
Several commenters also supported
the presumption of full relief by stating
that this approach would be consistent
with existing legal approaches to relief
for fraudulent inducement or deceptive
practices. Some commenters urged the
Department to adopt the approach used
for false certification and closed school
discharges—providing full discharges
for all meritorious claims, including
cancellation of outstanding balances
and refunds of amounts already paid.
As an alternative to fully eliminating
partial relief, some commenters
suggested limiting the availability of
partial relief to claims based on breach
of contract, based on the proposition
that when a school breaches a
contractual provision, it is possible that
a borrower nevertheless received at least
a partial benefit from his or her
education.
Several commenters argued that
Appendix A should be fully removed
because it adds confusion to the process
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and it is not clear when or how it should
be applied. Some commenters argued
that we should remove Appendix A and
revise proposed § 685.222(i) so that full
relief is provided upon approval of a
borrower defense, except where the
Department explains its reasoning and
affords the borrower the opportunity to
respond.
Discussion: As noted in the NPRM,
the Department has a responsibility to
protect the interests of Federal taxpayers
as well as borrowers. We discuss below
that while the borrowers’ cost of
attendance (COA), as defined in section
472 of the HEA, 20 U.S.C. 1087ll, is the
starting point in cases based on a
substantial misrepresentation for
determining relief, we do not believe, in
proceedings other than those brought
under § 685.222(h), that establishing a
legal presumption of full relief is
justified when losses from borrower
defenses may be borne by the taxpayer.
While the Department’s other loan
discharge processes for closed school
discharges, 34 CFR 685.214; false
certification, 34 CFR 685.215; and
unpaid refunds, 34 CFR 685.216, do
provide for full loan discharges and
recovery of funds paid on subject loans,
the factual premises for such discharges
are clearly established in statute and are
relatively straightforward. In contrast,
we anticipate that determinations for
borrower defense claims will involve
more complicated issues of law and fact.
Generally under civil law,
determinations as to whether the
elements of a cause of action have been
met so as to state a claim for relief and
then to establish liability are
determinations separate from those for
the amount or types of relief the
plaintiff may receive. To balance the
Department’s interest in protecting the
taxpayer with its interest in providing
fair outcomes to borrowers, when a
borrower defense based in
misrepresentation has been established,
the Department will determine the
appropriate relief by factoring in the
borrower’s COA to attend the school
and the value of the education provided
to the borrower by the school.
Importantly, the COA reflects the
amount the borrower was willing to pay
to attend the school based on the
information provided by the school
about the benefits or value of
attendance. The Department may also
consider any other relevant factors. In
determining value, the Department may
consider the value that the education
provided to the borrower, or would have
provided to a reasonable person in the
position of the borrower. Moreover, in
some circumstances, the Department
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will consider the actual value of the
education in comparison to the
borrower’s reasonable expectation, or to
what a reasonable person in the position
of the borrower would have expected
under the circumstances given the
information provided by the institution.
Accordingly, any expectations that are
not reasonable will not be incorporated
into the assessment of value.
We acknowledge commenters’
concerns that references to
‘‘calculations’’ or ‘‘methods’’ in the
regulations may be confusing. As a
result, we are revising § 685.222(i) to
remove such references. Additionally, to
address concerns that the proposed
relief determination requirements
appear complicated, we are also revising
§ 685.222(i) to directly establish the
factors to be considered by the trier-offact: The COA paid by the borrower to
attend the school; and the value of the
education. The Department will
incorporate these factors in a reasonable
and practicable manner. In addition, the
Department may consider any other
relevant factors. In response to concerns
that the proposed methods in Appendix
A are confusing, we have also replaced
the methods with conceptual examples
intended to serve as guidance to
borrowers, schools, and Department
employees as to what types of situations
may lead to different types of relief
determinations. As it receives and
evaluates borrower defense cases under
the Federal standard, the Department
may issue further guidance as to relief
as necessary.
The Department emphasizes that in
some cases the value of the education
may be sufficiently modest that full
relief is warranted, while in other cases,
partial relief will be appropriate. In
certain instances of full or substantial
value, no relief will be provided. Thus,
it is possible a borrower may be subject
to a substantial misrepresentation, but
because the education provided full or
substantial value, no relief may be
appropriate. As revised, § 685.222(i)
states that the starting point for any
relief determination for a substantial
misrepresentation claim is the full
amount of the borrower’s COA incurred
to attend the institution. As explained
later, the COA includes all expenses on
which the loan amount was based under
section 472 of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1087ll. Taken alone, these costs would
lead to a full discharge and refund of
amounts paid to the Secretary. Section
685.222(i) then provides that the
Department will consider the value of
the education in the determination of
relief and how it compares to the value
the borrower could have reasonably
expected based on the information
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provided by the school. In some cases,
the Department expects that this
analysis will not result in reduction of
the amount of relief awarded. This
could be because the evidence shows
that the school provided value that was
sufficiently modest to warrant full relief
or what the school provided was
substantially different from what was
promised such that the value would not
be substantially related to the value the
school represented it would provide.
The presence of some modest value
does not mean full relief is
inappropriate.
We also note that the revised
regulations require value to be factored
in to determinations for relief, but do
not prescribe any particular approach to
that process. Because there will be cases
where the determination of value will
be fact-specific to an individual or
group of individuals—and the
determination of value may pose more
significant difficulties in certain
situations than in others—the
Department believes that the official
needs substantial flexibility and
discretion in determining how to
incorporate established factors into the
assessment of value. The fact that the
case has reached the phase of relief
determination necessarily means that a
borrower has experienced some
detriment and that a school has engaged
in substantial misrepresentation or
breached a contract, or was found
culpable in court of some legal wrong.
At that point in the process, we intend
that the Official be able to employ a
practicable and efficient approach to
assessing value and determining
whether the borrower should be granted
relief and if so how much. Relief will be
determined in a reasonable and
practicable manner to ensure harmed
borrowers receive relief in a timely and
efficient manner.
We have also revised § 685.222(i) to
provide that in a group borrower
defense proceeding based on a
substantial misrepresentation brought
against an open school under
§ 685.222(h), the school has the burden
of proof as to showing any value or
benefit of the education. The
Department will promulgate a
procedural rule that will explain how
evidence will be presented and
considered in such proceedings, taking
full account of due process rights of any
parties. We believe that these revisions
address many of the concerns that
borrower defense relief determinations
may be confusing or complicated.
We also note that the process for
determining relief in a borrower defense
claim has no bearing on the
Department’s authority or processes in
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enforcing the prohibition against
misrepresentation under 34 CFR 668.71.
Schools may face an enforcement action
by the Department for making a
substantial misrepresentation under part
668, subpart F. As described under
‘‘Substantial Misrepresentation,’’ for the
purposes of borrower defense, absent
the presumption of reliance in a group
claim, actual, reasonable, detrimental
reliance is required to establish a
substantial misrepresentation under
§ 685.222(d). However, for the purposes
of the Department’s enforcement
authority under part 668, subpart F, the
scope of substantial misrepresentation is
broader in that it includes
misrepresentations that could have
reasonably been relied upon by any
person, as opposed to
misrepresentations that were actually
reasonably relied upon by a borrower. It
is also conceivable that there could be
a case in which a borrower did
experience detriment through
reasonably relying on a
misrepresentation—for example, by
having been induced to attend a school
he or she would not have otherwise—
yet the school provided sufficient value
to the borrower or would have provided
sufficient value to a reasonable student
in the position of the borrower so as to
merit less than full, or no, relief.
Nevertheless, the school in such a case
may still face fines or other enforcement
consequences by the Department under
its enforcement authority in part 668,
subpart F, because a borrower
reasonably relied on the school’s
misrepresentation to his or her
detriment.
We disagree that the relief
determination process would be
subjective. Agency tribunals and State
and Federal courts commonly make
determinations on relief. We do not
believe the process proposed provides a
presiding designated Department
official or hearing official presiding, as
applicable, with more discretion than
afforded triers-of-fact in other
adjudicative forums.
We also disagree with commenters
who expressed concerns that borrowers
may be disadvantaged due to resource
inequities between students and
schools. As discussed under ‘‘Process
for Individual Borrowers (§ 685.222(e)),’’
under the individual application
process, a borrower will not be involved
in an adversarial process against a
school. In the group processes described
in § 685.222(f) to (h), the Department
will designate a Department official to
present borrower claims, including
through any relief phase of the factfinding process. If a borrower does not
wish to have the Department official
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assert his or her claim in the group
borrower defense process, the borrower
may opt-out of the process and pursue
his or her claim under the individual
borrower defense process under
§ 685.222(e).
We note that, in determining relief for
a borrower defense based on a judgment
against the school, where the judgment
awards specific financial relief, the
relief will be the amount of the
judgment that remains unsatisfied,
subject to the limitation provided for in
§ 685.222(i)(8) and any other reasonable
considerations. Where the judgment
does not award specific financial relief,
the Department will rely on the holding
of the case and applicable law to
monetize the judgment, subject to the
limitation provided for in § 685.222(i)(8)
and any other reasonable
considerations. In determining relief for
a borrower defense based on a breach of
contract, relief in such a case will be
determined according to the common
law of contract subject to the limitation
provided for in § 685.222(i)(8) and any
other reasonable considerations.
Changes: We have revised § 685.222(i)
to remove references to methods or
calculations for relief. We have included
factors that will be incorporated by a
designated Department official or
hearing official deciding the claim,
including the COA paid by the borrower
to attend the school, as well as the value
of the education to the borrower. In
addition, the Department official or
hearing official deciding the claim may
consider any other relevant factors.
We have revised § 685.222(i) to clarify
how relief is determined for a borrower
defense based upon a judgment against
the school or a breach of contract by the
school.
We include that for group borrower
defense claims under § 685.222(h), the
school has the burden of proof as to any
value or benefit of the education.
We have also revised Appendix A to
describe conceptual examples for relief.
Calculation of Relief
Comments: Some commenters raised
concerns about the appropriateness of
the specific factors for consideration,
and methods to be applied, in
calculating partial relief. Specifically,
some commenters were concerned about
relying on student employment
outcomes to determine the value of a
borrower’s education. These
commenters noted that graduates
exercise substantial discretion in
determining what type of employment
to pursue after graduation, which would
likely impact relevant calculations.
These commenters also cited variations
in median income throughout the
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country as another factor that could
potentially complicate the calculation
process. One commenter objected to
consideration of the expected salary for
the field, because expected salaries in
certain professions are so low. These
commenters recommended that earnings
benchmarks not be considered in the
calculation of relief because of the risk
of discrepancies associated with those
considerations.
Some commenters were concerned
about the reliability of the proposed
methods for calculating relief in
Appendix A. Specifically, commenters
raised concerns about the method for
calculating relief in paragraph (A).
Under this method, relief would be
provided in an amount equivalent to the
difference between what the borrower
paid, and what a reasonable borrower
would have paid absent the
misrepresentation. These commenters
suggested that this assessment would be
unreliable because it would involve
speculation by the official tasked with
valuing a counterfactual.
In addition, some commenters
disapproved of the method in paragraph
(C), which would cap the amount of
economic loss at the COA. These
commenters suggested that legally
cognizable losses often exceed the COA.
Some commenters also disapproved of
the proposal to discount relief when a
borrower acquires transferrable credits
or secures a job in a related field.
According to these commenters, the
discounted relief would not reflect the
true harm experienced by the borrowers.
These commenters stated that
transferrable credits often lose their
value because they are either not used,
or used at another predatory or lowvalue school. These commenters also
argued that discounting relief based on
transferrable credits could penalize
borrowers with otherwise meritorious
defenses who opt to take a teach out.
Some commenters also argued that
discounting relief when a borrower
obtains a job in the field with typical
wages may penalize borrowers who
succeed at finding work despite the
failings of their programs. One
commenter was concerned that the
method in paragraph (C) may be read to
place a burden on the borrower to
produce evidence that the education he
or she received lacks value.
One commenter suggested minimizing
the potential for subjectivity by
replacing the proposed methods of
calculation with a system for scheduling
relief based on the nature of the claim.
This commenter recommended
providing a table outlining the
percentage of loan principal to be
relieved for each of a series of specific
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enumerated claims. Another commenter
suggested that the Department specify a
single theory for calculating damages
that would apply in each class of
borrower defense cases.
Some commenters requested
additional information about the
circumstances that may impact partial
relief determinations.
Discussion: We acknowledge
commenters’ concerns with the various
methods in proposed Appendix A, some
of which highlighted specific concerns
about different methods’ applicability to
various fact-specific scenarios. As
discussed earlier, we also appreciate
that references to calculations or
methods for relief may be confusing. As
a result, we have revised Appendix A to
reflect conceptual examples to provide
guidance to borrowers, schools, and
Department employees as to different
scenarios that might lead to full, partial,
or no relief. As stated in revised
§ 685.222(i), the examples are not
binding on the Department or hearing
official presiding over a borrower
defense claim. Rather, they are meant to
be simple, straight-forward examples
demonstrating possible relief scenarios,
and the outcomes of any borrower
defense case may vary from the
examples depending on the specific
facts and circumstances of each case.
Changes: We have revised Appendix
A to describe conceptual examples for
relief.
Comments: Some commenters were
concerned that the proposed regulations
would grant Department officials the
authority to make determinations for
which they are not qualified.
Specifically, commenters were
concerned that the proposed regulations
do not require the Department to rely on
expert witnesses for certain
calculations, despite the fact that they
may be necessary in some cases.
Commenters also stressed the
importance of ensuring the
independence of the officials involved
in making relief determinations.
Similarly, some commenters requested
more specificity and transparency
regarding who will be calculating relief
and how they will be conducting those
calculations.
Discussion: We believe that
Department officials designated to hear
individual claims, and the Department
hearing officials who preside over the
group claim proceedings have the
capability to evaluate borrower defense
claims based upon the Federal standard,
similar to how Department employees
perform determinations in other agency
adjudications.
As discussed under ‘‘General’’ and
‘‘Group Process for Borrower Defense,’’
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the Department will structure the
borrower defense proceedings in ways
to ensure the independence and
objectivity of the Department employees
presiding over such processes. With
regard to commenters’ concerns about
transparency and specificity, as
established in § 685.222(e), (g) and (h),
the decisions made in the proceedings
will be made available to involved
parties and will specify the basis of the
official’s determination. All of the
Department’s administrative
determinations are presumptively
available for public disclosure, subject
to privacy concerns.
Changes: None.
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Group Relief
Comments: Some commenters argued
that group relief should be limited to
situations in which a preponderance of
the evidence shows that no member of
the group received any identifiable
benefit from his or her education. These
commenters suggested that group relief
would frustrate the Department’s efforts
to ensure that borrowers receive only
the relief to which they are entitled.
These commenters suggested that in the
limited circumstances where group
relief is provided, the amount should be
determined based on a statistically valid
sample of students. Some commenters
also opposed the Department’s proposal
to consider potential cost to taxpayers in
making group relief determinations.
Discussion: Section 685.222(a)(2), for
loans first disbursed after July 1, 2017,
explicitly states that borrower defenses
must be established by a preponderance
of evidence. This requirement applies
regardless of whether the borrower
defenses at issue are raised in the
procedure for an individual borrower in
§ 685.222(e) or in the group processes
under § 685.222(f) to (h). However, for
group claims, § 685.222(f) establishes
that the group process may be initiated
upon the consideration of factors
including the existence of common facts
and claims among the members of the
group. How the preponderance of
evidence requirement may apply in
group borrower defenses cases may vary
from case to case. Additionally, as
discussed earlier, for cases of substantial
misrepresentation, the starting point for
any relief determination is the full
amount of the borrower’s costs incurred
to attend the institution. We have
revised § 685.222(i) to provide that in
such cases against an open school, the
burden shifts to the school to prove the
existence of any offsetting value to the
borrowers provided by the education
paid for with the proceeds of the loans
at issue.
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We disagree with commenters that the
regulation should specify that relief
should be based upon a statistically
valid sample of students at this time.
While a statistically valid sample may
be appropriate for some cases, we
believe the determination of what may
be the criteria for an appropriate sample
for group borrower defense cases should
be developed on a case by case basis.
We discuss our reasons for including
fiscal impact as a factor for
consideration in the initiation of group
processes under ‘‘Group Process for
Borrower Defense.’’ Section 685.222(i),
which pertains to the relief awarded for
either a group or individual borrower
defense claim, does not include a
consideration of fiscal impact.
Changes: We have revised § 685.222(i)
to provide that in group borrower
defense cases against an open school,
the burden shifts to the school to prove
the existence of any offsetting value to
the students provided by the education
paid for with the proceeds of the loans
at issue.
Expand the Scope of Available Relief
Comments: Some commenters argued
that full relief must extend beyond
loans, costs, and fees to account for
other expenses associated with school
attendance. These commenters cited
expenses such as travel expenses, costs
of not pursuing other opportunities,
child care expenses, consequential
losses, and nonfinancial harms
including pain and suffering.
Commenters also noted that borrowers
who attend fraudulent schools often
lose out on portions of their lifetime
Federal loan and grant eligibility,
effectively losing several thousands of
dollars in Pell grants that could be used
towards other educational
opportunities. To support the expansion
of relief, one commenter cited State
unfair and deceptive practices laws,
under which all types of harms—direct
and consequential, pecuniary and
emotional—may provide the basis for
relief.
Some commenters argued that relief
should include updates to consumer
reporting agencies to remove adverse
credit reports. Citing the impact of
negative credit reports on borrowers’
ability to find employment, own a
home, etc., commenters urged the
Department to adopt language clarifying
that any adverse credit history
pertaining to any loan discharged
through a borrower defense will be
deleted. Some commenters suggested
that the language in proposed
§ 685.222(i)(4)(ii) conform to the
language in proposed
§ 685.206(c)(2)(iii), which requires the
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Department to fix adverse credit reports
when it grants discharges. Additionally,
some commenters argued that relief
should include a determination that the
borrower is not in default on the loan
and is eligible to receive assistance
under title IV.
One commenter requested
simplification of the language
describing available relief, specifically,
removal of the portion of § 685.222(i)(5)
describing the unavailability of nonpecuniary relief on the basis that the
provision would cause confusion.
Discussion: The Department’s ability
to provide relief for borrowers is
predicated upon the existence of the
borrower’s Direct Loan, and the
Department’s ability to provide relief for
a borrower on a Direct Loan is limited
to the extent of the Department’s
authority to take action on such a loan.
Section 455(h) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1087e(h), gives the Department the
authority to allow borrowers to assert ‘‘a
defense to repayment of a [Direct
Loan],’’ and discharge outstanding
amounts to be repaid on the loan.
However, section 455(h) also provides
that ‘‘in no event may a borrower
recover from the Secretary . . . an
amount in excess of the amount the
borrower has repaid on such loan.’’ As
a result, the Department may not
reimburse a borrower for amounts in
excess of the payments that the
borrower has made on the loan to the
Secretary as the holder of the Direct
Loan.
Additionally, § 685.222(i)(8) also
clarifies that a borrower may not receive
non-pecuniary damages such as
damages for inconvenience, aggravation,
emotional distress, or punitive damages.
We recognize that, in certain civil
lawsuits, plaintiffs may be awarded
such damages by a court. However, such
damages are not easily calculable and
may be highly subjective. We believe
that excluding non-pecuniary damages
from relief under the regulations would
help produce more consistent and fair
results for borrowers.
The Department official or the hearing
official deciding the claim would afford
the borrower such further relief as the
Department official or the hearing
official determines is appropriate under
the circumstances. As specifically noted
in § 685.222(i)(7), that relief would
include, but not be limited to,
determining that the borrower is not in
default on the loan and is eligible to
receive assistance under title IV of the
HEA, and updating reports to consumer
reporting agencies to which the
Secretary previously made adverse
credit reports with regard to the
borrower’s Direct Loan. We do not
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believe a modification of this provision
to conform with § 685.206(c)(2)(iii) is
necessary.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters
suggested that the proposed regulations
could result in excessive institutional
liability. These commenters argued that
institutions should be liable under a
successful claim only for costs related to
tuition and fees, rather than all amounts
borrowed. Commenters supported
limiting claims for relief to the payment
of loans issued under title IV, and only
the portion of loans directly related to
the costs of the education. Some
commenters proposed that relief be
limited to funds actually received by the
institution. One commenter cited the
measure of student loan debt contained
in the Department’s Gainful
Employment regulations to support this
proposed cap on relief. In support of
this position, several commenters
argued that some students borrow
excessively, and institutions play a
limited role in determining the level or
purpose of student borrowing. These
commenters opposed holding
institutions liable for loans borrowed to
support a student’s living expenses
because of the attenuated nature of the
nexus between any act or omission
underlying a valid borrower defense
claim and a student’s living expenses
while enrolled. These commenters were
concerned that assigning responsibility
to schools in excess of tuition and fees
would constitute an unjustifiable,
unprecedented expansion of potential
institutional liability.
Discussion: Since their inception, the
Federal student loan programs were
designed to support both tuition and
fees and living expenses in recognition
of the fact that students need resources
such as food and housing when they are
pursuing their educations. Indeed, the
HEA’s definition of cost of attendance,
20 U.S.C. 1087ll, includes tuition, fees,
books, supplies, transportation,
miscellaneous personal expenses
including a reasonable allowance for the
documented rental or purchase of a
personal computer, room and board,
childcare, and expenses related to a
student’s disability if applicable. When
a student makes the choice to attend an
institution, he is also choosing to spend
his time in a way that may require him
to take out Federal loans for living
expenses, and very likely to forgo the
opportunity to work to defray those
costs from earnings. If he had not
chosen to attend the institution, he
would not have taken out such loans for
living expenses: His Federal aid
eligibility depends on his attendance at
the institution. Therefore we believe
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that an institution’s liability is not
limited to the loan amount that the
institution received, since it does not
represent the full Federal loan cost to
students for the time they spent at the
institution.36 Regarding comments
suggesting that some students borrow
excessively and that institutions play a
limited role in determining borrowing
levels, it is important to note that
institutions have the discretion to
determine a reasonable COA based on
information they have about their
students’ circumstances. Limiting
gainful employment measurements to
amounts borrowed for tuition and fees
was reasonable for the context in which
that approach was taken—measurement
of eligibility of an entire program, based
on borrowing decisions made by an
entire cohort of completers. That
context is not the paradigm for
considering actual loss to individual
borrowers. As discussed here, an
institution may already face exposure in
a private lawsuit for amounts greater
than the amount the institution charged
and received as tuition and fees, and the
commenter offers no reason, and we see
none, why a different rule should apply
to determining the extent of the
institution’s liability for the same kinds
of claims if successfully proven in the
borrower defense context.
Changes: None.
Fiscal Impact Considerations
Inappropriate
Comments: Commenters argued that
full relief should be provided without
consideration of fiscal concerns. Some
commenters were concerned that
consideration of fiscal impact would
lead to groups of borrowers being
denied relief to which they are entitled
because of financial concerns. These
commenters acknowledged taxpayer
interests, but stated that taxpayers
would benefit in the long term from a
presumption of full relief because the
presumption would deter fraud and
36 Common law recognizes that a party who may
rescind a transaction and obtain restitution from the
defendant of amounts paid to the defendant may
also assert a claim for related expenditures made in
reliance on the rescinded transaction.
Compensation of such loss by an award of
damages is a remedy different in kind from
rescission and restitution, but the remedies are not
necessarily inconsistent when the claimant’s basic
entitlement is to be restored to the status quo ante.
Damages measured by the claimant’s expenditure
can be included in the accounting that accompanies
rescission, in order to do complete justice in a
single proceeding. Recovery of what are commonly
called ‘‘incidental damages’’ may thus be allowed
in connection with rescission, consistent with the
remedial objective of restoring the claimant to the
precontractual position.
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, § 54 note (i).
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increase institutional accountability.
Some commenters also suggested that
partial relief would negatively impact
Department incentives and conduct by,
for example, reducing the Department’s
incentive to monitor schools
appropriately on the front end. One
commenter opposed consideration of
fiscal impact because of concerns about
the Department’s potential to profit off
of the student loan program.
Discussion: We discuss our reasons
for including fiscal impact as a factor for
consideration in the initiation of group
processes under ‘‘Group Process for
Borrower Defense.’’ Section 685.222(i),
which pertains to the relief awarded for
either a group or individual borrower
defense claim, does not include a
consideration of fiscal impact.
Changes: None.
Institutional Accountability
Financial Responsibility
General Standards § 668.171
Scope of Rulemaking
Retroactivity and Authority
Comments: Commenters argued that
the proposed financial protection
triggers exceeded the Department’s
authority under the HEA to assess
financial responsibility on the ground
that the proposed regulations would be
impermissibly retroactive. In particular,
commenters objected to the proposed
requirement in § 668.171(c)(3) that a
school is not financially responsible if it
has been required by its accreditor to
submit a teach-out plan because of a
Department action to limit, suspend, or
terminate the school, or if its accreditor
has taken certain actions due to failure
to meet accreditor standards and not
later notified the Department that the
failure has been cured.
Others objected that proposed
§ 668.171(c)(1)(i)(A) is also
impermissibly retroactive by providing
that a school that, currently or during
the three most recently completed
award years, is or was required to pay
a debt or liability arising from a Federal,
State, or other oversight entity audit or
investigation, based on claims related to
the making of a Federal loan or the
provision of educational services, or
that settles or resolves such an amount
that exceeds the stated threshold, is not
financially responsible. Under proposed
§ 668.175(f)(1)(i), an institution affected
by either § 668.171(c)(1)(i)(A) or (c)(3)
could continue to participate in the title
IV, HEA programs only under
provisional certification and by
providing financial protection in an
amount not less than 10 percent of the
amount of Direct Loan funds or title IV,
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HEA funds, respectively, received in the
most recently completed fiscal year.
Discussion: None of the litigation or
other provisions of the regulation are
impermissibly retroactive. They attach
no new liability to an event or
transaction that was permissible at the
time it occurred and that occurred prior
to the effective date of the regulations.
They simply address the risk that
certain events that occurred prior to the
effective date of the regulations create
risks that warrant protection now. The
risks in these instances are that these
suits, and the other events included in
§ 668.171(c), can cause the institution to
close or so substantially reduce
operations as to generate closed school
discharge claims, borrower defense
claims, or both, from the students who
are directly affected by the action at
issue. The school is liable for borrower
defense claims and closed school
discharge claims; the requirement that
the school provide financial protection
does not increase any liability that
would otherwise attach, but merely
provides a resource that the Department
may access to meet liabilities that would
already arise if borrowers were to seek
discharges on either ground. In either
case, the Department would establish
any such liability in the same manner in
which it would were there no protection
provided, and would release or refund
any portion of the financial protection
that was not needed to satisfy any
claims established under those
procedures, in which the school would
have the same opportunity to object to
the claims and be heard on those
objections as it would have if no
protection had been provided.
Regulated parties have repeatedly
challenged Department rules that
attached particular new consequences to
actions that have already occurred.
Courts have regularly rejected claims
that regulations that operate like the
regulations adopted here are
impermissibly retroactive. A regulation
is unconstitutionally retroactive if it
‘‘alter[s] the past legal consequences of
past actions’’ 37 or, put another way, if
it ‘‘would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a
party’s liability for past conduct, or
impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed.’’ 38
37 Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities
v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 196 (D.D.C. 2015),
aff’d sub nom. Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges &
Universities v. Duncan, 640 F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (internal citations removed)
38 Ass’n of Proprietary Colleges v. Duncan, 107 F.
Supp. 3d 332, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (gainful
employment measured by using debt and earnings
incurred prior to effective date of new rule); see
also: Ass’n of Accredited Cosmetology Sch. v.
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Thus, whether a regulation ‘‘operates
retroactively’’ turns on ‘‘whether the
new provision attaches new legal
consequences to events completed
before its enactment.’’ 39 It is, however,
well settled that ‘‘[a] statute is not
rendered retroactive merely because the
facts or requisites upon which its
subsequent action depends, or some of
them, are drawn from a time antecedent
to the enactment.’’ 40 Nor is a statute
impermissibly retroactive simply
because it ‘‘upsets expectations based in
prior law.’’ 41 Like each of the
regulations challenged in these cases,
the present regulations in some
instances would attach prospectively
consequences for certain actions that
occurred prior to the effective date of
the regulations, but would not attach
any new liability to those actions or
transactions that were permissible when
the events occurred.
Moreover, we have clarified that the
regulations apply to any triggering
events that occur on or after July 1,
2017. We have also removed the two
triggers highlighted by these
commenters as looking to certain past
events in a way that mitigates almost all
of the commenters’ concerns. First, we
modified the accrediting agency actions
trigger substantially, to assess as an
automatic trigger 42 only the effect of a
closure of a school or location pursuant
to a teach-out requirement, and consider
other accreditor actions occurring in the
past three years only as a discretionary
trigger. There is no three-year look-back
in the automatic trigger. For this and
other discretionary triggers, there is an
opportunity for further review of the
impact of those events. We have
removed the three-year look-back in the
lawsuits and other actions trigger. These
Alexander, 774 F. Supp. 655, 659 (D.D.C. 1991),
aff’d, 979 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and order
vacated in part sub nom. Delta Jr. Coll., Inc. v.
Riley, 1 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993) and Ass’n of
Accredited Cosmetology Sch. v. Alexander, 979
F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (application of cohort
default rate to eligibility using pre-rule data).
39 Id.
40 Ass’n of Proprietary Colleges v. Duncan, 107 F.
Supp. 3d at 356.
41 Id.
42 Under the proposed regulations, an institution
would not be financially responsible for at least one
year if it was subject to a triggering event that
exceeded a materiality threshold or for a State or
accrediting agency action, three years after that
action. In these final regulations, an institution is
not financially responsible if an automatic
triggering event such as a lawsuit or loss of GE
program eligibility produces a recalculated
composite score of less than 1.0 or for a 90/10 or
CDR violation or SEC action, the occurrence of that
violation or action. In both the NPRM and these
final regulations, discretionary triggers refer to
actions, conditions, or events that are evaluated by
the Department on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether they have a material adverse impact on the
financial condition or operations of the institution.
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75979
changes are described in more detail in
the sections specific to these triggers.
Finally, as we have described, the final
regulations permit an institution to
demonstrate, either when it reports the
occurrence of a triggering event or in an
action for failure to provide a required
letter of credit or other financial
protection, that an event or condition no
longer exists or has been resolved or
that it has insurance that will cover the
debts and liabilities that arise at any
time from that triggering event.
Changes: We have revised
§§ 668.90(a)(iii) and 668.171(h) to
include consideration of insurance; we
have removed the three-year period for
review from § 668.171(c); we have
revised the teach-out provisions in
§ 668.171(c)(1)(iii) to consider only the
effect on the overall institutional
financial capability of closures of
locations or institutions as determined
by recalculating the institution’s
composite score, as discussed more
fully under the heading ‘‘Teach-out
Plan’’; and we have revised § 668.171(b)
to provide that the regulations address
only those triggering events or
conditions listed in § 668.171(c) through
(g) that occur after July 1, 2017.
Comments: Several commenters
contended that the proposed triggers in
§ 668.171(c) fail to take into account the
provisions in section 498(c)(3) of the
HEA that require the Secretary to
determine that an institution is
financially responsible if the school can
show, based on an audited and certified
financial statement, that it has sufficient
resources to ensure against precipitous
closure, including the ability to meet all
of its financial obligations. To support
this contention, the commenters stated
that the proposed regulations do not
provide a process or procedural
mechanism for an institution to make
this statutory showing before the
Department would require the
institution to submit a letter of credit in
response to running afoul of an
automatic trigger.
Similarly, some commenters stated
that requiring financial protection by
reason of the occurrence of a single
triggering event was contrary to the
requirement in section 498(c)(1) of the
HEA that the Department assess the
financial responsibility of the institution
in light of the total financial
circumstances of the institution.
Other commenters stated that section
498(c) of the HEA requires the
Department to assess financial
responsibility based solely on the
audited financial statements provided
by the institution under section 487(c)
of the HEA.
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Discussion: Section 498(c) of the HEA
directs the Secretary to determine
whether the institution ‘‘is able . . . to
meet all of its financial obligations,
including (but not limited to) refunds of
institutional charges and repayments to
the Secretary for liabilities and debts
incurred in programs administered by
the Secretary.’’ 20 U.S.C. 1099c(c)(1).
The statute uses the present tense to
direct the Secretary to assess the ability
of the institution to meet current
obligations. The statute then provides
that the Secretary shall also develop
criteria based on financial ratios, which
are to be measured and reported in
audited financial statements. 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c)(2), (5). Obligations that accrued
in the past may be reflected in financial
statements showing the institution’s
financial status as of the close of the
most recent institutional fiscal year,
which are to be submitted to the
Department ‘‘no later than six months
after the last day of the institution’s
fiscal year.’’ 34 CFR 668.23(a)(4).
Obligations that accrue after the close of
that fiscal year are not included in those
statements, and those losses that are
considered probable may receive
limited recognition in those statements.
Potential losses from pending litigation
that are not yet considered probable are
not included in those statements.
Thus, as the commenters state, the
statute directs the Secretary to take into
account ‘‘an institution’s total financial
circumstances in making a
determination of its ability to meet the
standards herein required.’’ 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c)(2). Far from precluding the
Secretary from giving controlling weight
to a single significant occurrence in
making this determination, the statute
recognizes that the Secretary may do so
if certain enumerated single adverse
events have occurred in the past two to
five years (e.g., audit liabilities
exceeding five percent of the
institution’s prior year title IV, HEA
funding, or a limitation, suspension or
termination action or settlement of such
an action). 20 U.S.C. 1099c(e). The
Secretary has since, at least the 1994
regulations, consistently considered
even one such ‘‘past performance’’ event
as sufficient grounds to render an
institution not financially responsible
even if it met or exceeded the requisite
composite financial score, and if the
Secretary nevertheless permitted the
institution to participate, the institution
was required to do so under provisional
certification with financial protection.
34 CFR 668.174(a), 668.175(f), (g). The
current regulations have also considered
an institution not financially
responsible if the institution is currently
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delinquent by at least 120 days on trade
debt, and at least one creditor has sued.
34 CFR 668.171(b)(3). Thus, in
considering the institution’s total
financial circumstances, the Secretary
has consistently regarded a single such
occurrence as a sufficient threat to the
institution’s ability ‘‘to meet . . . its
financial obligations’’ as to make the
institution not financially responsible.
In so doing, the current regulations do
not delegate to the suing creditor, or to
the guarantor that brought the
limitation, suspension, or termination
action, the determination of the
financial responsibility of the
institution. To the contrary, the current
regulations already identify particular
past or present events as raising
significant threats to the institution’s
ability to meet current obligations to
creditors, to students, and to the
taxpayer. The changes to the financial
responsibility regulations articulate a
more comprehensive list of adverse
events that similarly call into question
the institution’s ability to meet current
and impending obligations.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters argued
that under the APA, the Department
cannot enact regulations applicable to
time periods prior to the enactment of
those regulations and therefore should
remove the proposed § 668.171(c)(3),
which would impose penalties on an
institution that is currently, or was any
time during the three most recently
completed award years, subject to an
action by its accrediting agency.
Discussion: As discussed above, in
response to the commenters’ objection
that the rules are impermissibly
retroactive, they are not because they
affect only future participation. In light
of the adoption of the composite score
methodology, in this section, we
evaluate risks under that methodology
as they affect the current financial
responsibility of the institution. We
evaluate on a three-year look-back
period, as a discretionary triggering
event, only certain accreditor actions.
Changes: We have revised
§ 668.171(c)(1)(i) so that it does not
include events that occurred in the prior
three years, we have revised § 668.171
to apply to events occurring on or after
July 1, 2017, and we have relocated
accreditor actions regarding probation
and show cause to § 668.171(g)(5) as
discretionary triggers.
Penalty-Financial Protection
Comments: A commenter stated that
requiring the institution to provide
financial protection constituted a
penalty on the institution, and that
requiring the institution to provide such
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protection from its own funds
constituted a deprivation of the
institution’s property interest in those
institutional funds. The commenter
stated that the requirement would also
deprive the institution of its liberty
interest by stigmatizing it. The
commenter stated that the proposed
requirement offered the institution no
opportunity to dispute the requirement
prior to the deprivation of these
interests, and thus the deprivation
would be imposed without the due
process required by applicable law. The
commenter stated that Congress requires
the Department to provide schools with
meaningful procedures before the
imposition of a significant penalty.
Specifically, the commenter stated that
section 487 of the HEA requires the
Department to afford schools
‘‘reasonable notice and opportunity for
hearing’’ before imposing a ‘‘civil
penalty.’’ This requirement applies
when the Department seeks to limit,
suspend, or terminate the school’s
participation in any title IV, HEA
program; determine that a school has
made a substantial misrepresentation; or
determine that a school has violated
statutes or regulations concerning the
title IV, HEA programs, each of which
carry severe penalties. The commenter
asserted that the required financial
protection under this rule constitutes a
civil penalty under the HEA, and is in
fact far more onerous than the other
examples in the HEA. Accordingly, the
commenter contended that the
Department must afford parties the same
process that Congress contemplated in
analogous circumstances.
Discussion: The requirement that the
school provide financial protection is
not a ‘‘penalty’’ under the HEA, which
clearly labels as ‘‘civil penalties’’ what
the regulations refer to as ‘‘fines.’’ 20
U.S.C. 1094(c)(3)(B); 34 CFR 668.84. In
contrast, section 498(c) of the HEA
refers to financial protections using
completely different terms: ‘‘third party
guarantees,’’ ‘‘performance bonds,’’ and
‘‘letters of credit.’’ The fact that the
financial protections may
inconvenience or burden the school in
no way makes their requirement a
‘‘penalty.’’ However, current regulations
already require the Department to
provide the school with the procedural
protections that the commenter seeks.
34 CFR 668.171(e) requires that the
Department enforce financial
responsibility standards and obligations
using the procedures pertinent to the
school’s participation status; for fully
certified schools, the regulations require
the Department to use termination or
limitation actions under subpart G of
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part 668 to enforce the requirement that
the school’s participation be terminated
for lack of financial responsibility, or
that the school’s continued participation
be reduced to provisional participation
status and further conditioned on the
provision of financial protection.
Current regulations already assure that
the school will receive all the
procedural protections to which the
HEA entitles it, not because the
Department would deprive the school of
its property right in its funds (which the
financial standards would not do), but
because the method of enforcing the
financial responsibility obligation is
through a termination or limitation
action, subject to the procedural
protections of an administrative hearing.
34 CFR part 668, subpart G. These
requirements will not change under the
new regulations.
Section 668.90(a) affords the school
the opportunity to demonstrate, in the
administrative proceeding, that a
proposed limitation or termination is
‘‘unwarranted.’’ That same regulation,
however, includes some 14 specific
circumstances in which the hearing
official has no discretion but to find that
the proposed action is ‘‘warranted’’ if
certain predicate facts are proven.
Among these restrictions is a provision
that, in a proposed enforcement action
based on failure to provide ‘‘surety’’ in
an amount demanded, the hearing
official must find the action warranted
unless the hearing official concludes
that the amount demanded is
‘‘unreasonable.’’ In addition, § 668.174
provides explicit, detailed, curative or
exculpatory conditions that must be met
for a school subject to a past
performance issue to participate.
However, these substantive
requirements are not incorporated in
subpart G of part 668, the regulations
regarding the conduct of limitation or
termination proceedings. This may have
created the impression that an
institution subject to the requirements
of § 668.174 could raise a challenge to
those requirements in an administrative
action to terminate or limit the
institution that does not meet the
requirements of § 668.174. This was
never the intent of the Department. We
therefore revise the regulations in
§ 668.90 governing hearing procedures
to make clear that the requirements in
current § 668.174 that limit the type and
amount of permitted curative or
exculpatory matters apply in any
administrative proceeding brought to
enforce those requirements. As for the
restriction in the final regulations on
challenges to a requirement that the
school provide the ‘‘surety’’ or other
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protection, the Department is updating
and expanding one of the existing 14
provisions in which an action must be
found warranted if a predicate fact is
proven—in this case, the occurrence of
certain triggering events, established
through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, that pose significant risk
warranting the provision of adequate
financial protection, in a minimum
amount also established as sufficient
through this same notice-and-comment
rulemaking, with any added amount
demanded and justified on a case-bycase basis. The Department is
significantly revising the triggers
proposed in the NPRM to simplify and
reduce the number of conditions or
occurrences that qualify as automatic
triggers. As we discuss in adopting the
composite score methodology, we
measure the effect of most of the
triggering events not in isolation, but
only as each may affect the overall
financial strength of the institution, as
that strength was most recently assessed
under the financial ratio analysis
adopted in current regulations.
§ 668.172. And, for all discretionary
triggers, the Department undertakes to
assert a demand for protection only on
a case-by-case basis, with full
articulation of the reasons for the
requirement.43 For these discretionary
triggers, a school may contest not only
whether the predicate facts have
actually occurred, but also whether the
demanded ‘‘surety’’—financial
protection—is reasonable.
Changes: We have revised
§ 668.90(a)(3) to incorporate the
limitations contained in current
§ 668.174, as well as the limits on
challenges to demands for financial
protection based on the automatic
triggers in § 668.171(c)–(f) as modified
in these final regulations.
Composite Score and Triggering Events
General
Comments: Some commenters
believed that the Department should not
promulgate new financial responsibility
requirements, or have otherwise
43 As discussed with regard to determining the
appropriate amount of financial protection,
ordinarily the expected result of closure or a
significant reduction in operations is closed school
discharge claims. We recognize that in some
instances financial protection may be warranted for
an institution that does not participate in a title IV,
HEA loan program, and its closure thus cannot
generate closed school claims. Such an institution
remains subject to a demand based on a
discretionary assessment of other potential losses,
and we have revised § 668.90(a)(3) to ensure that
such an institution can object to a demand for
financial protection if that demand was based solely
on the 10 percent minimum requirement generally
applicable.
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engaged in a rulemaking to do so,
without reviewing and making changes
to the composite score methodology
used in the current financial
responsibility standards in subpart L of
part 668, particularly in view of
changing accounting standards, and the
manner in which the Department
applies, calculates, and makes
adjustments to the composite score.
Similarly, other commenters
contrasted the process used to develop
these financial responsibility
amendments with the process used by
the Department to develop the subpart
L standards. The commenters noted
that, in developing the subpart L
standards, the Department engaged in
systematic, sustained efforts to study the
issue and develop its methodology
through the formal engagement and aid
of KPMG, an expert auditing firm, with
significant community involvement.
That process took approximately two
years, and began with empirical studies
by KPMG into the potential impact of
the rule over a year before the issuance
of any proposed language. The
commenters stated that, in this case, the
Department is rushing out these
revisions without the necessary and
appropriate analysis. Commenters noted
that the Department produced draft
language on the triggers and letter of
credit requirements in the second
negotiated rulemaking session, but with
no significant accompanying analysis or
basis for its proposal, and did not
consult effectively or sufficiently with
affected parties or prepare sufficient
information and documentation to
convey, or for the negotiated rulemaking
panel to understand, the impact of this
portion of the proposed regulations.
Some commenters were concerned
that the Department did not harmonize
the proposed financial responsibility
provisions with the current composite
score requirements and questioned
whether it was reasonable for the
Department to require an institution
with the highest composite score of 3.0
to secure one or more letters of credit
based on triggering events. The
commenters further questioned why the
Department proposed numerous and
overlapping requirements, if the
Department believes that the current
composite score is a valid indicator of
an institution’s financial health.
Overlapping Triggers
Some commenters argued that it
would be unnecessarily punitive to list
as separate triggering events, and
thereby impose stacking letter of credit
requirements for, items that may be
connected to the same underlying facts
or allegations. For example, a lawsuit or
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administrative proceeding settled with a
government oversight agency for an
amount exceeding a set threshold could
lead an institution’s accrediting agency
to place the institution on probation, or
an institution that fails the 90/10
revenue requirement might thereby
violate a loan covenant.
As another example, commenters
noted that an institution could be
subject to a lawsuit or multiple lawsuits
about the same underlying allegations,
an accrediting agency may take action
against the institution in connection
with the same allegations, and a State
agency may cite the institution for
failing State requirements that relate to
those same allegations. The commenters
stated that multiple triggering events
did not necessarily warrant additional
financial protection and believed that
this ‘‘stacking’’ of triggers is especially
punitive to publicly traded institutions,
which may be required to or voluntarily
elect to disclose certain triggering
events, such as lawsuits in reports to the
SEC where making such disclosures is
then itself an independent trigger. In
this case, the commenters believed it
was unfair to penalize a publicly traded
institution twice, while any other
institution with fewer shareholders or
one that opts to raise capital privately
would be subject to only one letter of
credit requirement.
Commenters objected that it would be
theoretically possible that a school
could be required to post letters of
credit exceeding 100 percent of the title
IV, HEA funds the school receives,
effectively crippling the school. The
commenters cautioned that the
Department should not require multiple
letters of credit stemming from the same
underlying facts or allegations—rather,
the rules should reflect a more refined
approach for setting an appropriate level
of financial protection for each unique
set of facts or allegations. The
commenters suggested that to ensure
that an institution provides the amount
of financial protection that relates
specifically to its ability to satisfy its
obligations, the Department should
evaluate each triggering event that
occurs to determine whether any
additional financial protection is
needed.
A few commenters suggested that,
rather than applying the proposed
triggering events in a one-size-fits-all
manner, the Department should
consider other institutional metrics that
serve to mitigate concerns about
institutional viability and title IV, HEA
program risks. For example, the
commenters suggested that the
Department could presumptively
exclude from many of the new triggers
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those institutions that have low and
stable cohort default rates, consistently
low 90/10 ratios, a general lack of
accrediting or State agency actions, or
any combination of these items. The
commenters reasoned that, in the
context of the NPRM, these attributes
would generally indicate strong student
outcomes and less likelihood of
borrower defense claims arising from
the institution. Or, the Department
could provide that institutions with
cohort default rates and 90/10 ratios
below specified thresholds would not be
required to post cumulative letters of
credit under the new general standards
of financial responsibility. Similarly, the
commenters urged the Department to
assess the circumstances of each
triggering event to determine whether
any additional protection is needed
rather than requiring cumulative letters
of credit for each of the triggering
events. The commenters believed that
by taking these alternate approaches, the
financial responsibility regulations
could be tailored to assess institutional
risk profiles on a more holistic basis,
rather than in the generally nondiscerning manner reflected by the
NPRM.
Other commenters requested that the
Department specify in the final
regulations the duration of each letter of
credit for each triggering event, noting
that in the preamble to the NPRM, the
Department stated that schools subject
to an automatic trigger would not be
financially responsible for at least one
year based on that trigger, and in some
instances, for as long as three years after
the event.
A commenter asserted that the
institution should be provided the
opportunity to demonstrate by audited
financial statements that it had the
resources to ensure against precipitous
closure pursuant to section 498(c)(3)(C)
of the HEA.
Discussion: After carefully
considering the comments, the objective
of the changes that we proposed, and
the availability of other measures, we
are changing the method of assessing
the effect of many of the triggering
events. We explain here briefly the
composite methodology currently used
to evaluate financial strength, and how
we will use the composite score
methodology to evaluate whether, and
how much, those triggering events
actually affect the financial capability of
the particular institution. In addition, as
discussed later in this preamble, we are
revising and refining the triggers to
consider as discretionary triggering
events several of the events included as
automatic triggers in the NPRM.
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The composite score methodology in
subpart L used under current
regulations is the product of a
comprehensive study of the issue and of
numerous financial statements of
affected institutions, as well as
substantial industry involvement. The
1997 rulemaking that adopted this
method established a basic model for
evaluating financial responsibility that
was intended to serve as the core of the
Department’s evaluation process for
proprietary and private non-profit
institutions, replacing a piecemeal
approach still reflected in § 668.15(b)(7),
(8), and (9). The regulations in subpart
L were adopted to replace the prior
structure, in which an institution was
required to satisfy a minimum standard
in each of three independent tests. The
Department replaced that with ‘‘a ratio
methodology under which an institution
need only satisfy a single standard—the
composite score standard. This new
approach is more informative and
allows a relative strength in one
measure to mitigate a relative weakness
in another measure.’’ 62 FR 62831 (Nov.
25, 1997).44 However, we note that even
the prior financial responsibility
standards considered whether the
school was subject to a pending
administrative action or suit by a
Federal agency or State entity.
§ 668.15(d)(2)(ii)(C). Section 668.15
contained, and still contains, provisions
addressing matters that may well occur
after the audited period—for example,
delinquency on an existing debt
obligation, and a suit by at least one
creditor, § 668.15(b)(4)(ii), as well as the
same familiar past performance
standards regarding parties with
substantial control over the institution
or the institution itself. 34 CFR
668.15(c).45
Although the 1997 regulations
replaced the three independent
financial ratio tests with the new
composite score methodology as the
core measure of financial responsibility,
44 The composite score methodology assesses
three aspects of financial strength but, unlike the
prior method, assigns relative weights to each of the
three assessments to produce a single, ‘‘composite’’
score.
45 The 1994 financial responsibility regulations
implemented the provision of section 498(c)(3)(C)
of the HEA that would have allowed an institution
that failed other financial responsibility to
demonstrate by audited financial statements that it
would not pose a risk of ‘‘precipitous closure.’’
§ 668.15(d)(2)(ii). The 1997 regulations supplanted
the standards in § 668.15 with new subpart L,
which centered the assessment of financial
responsibility on the composite score methodology.
The Department there adopted the ‘‘zone’’
assessment to assess ‘‘precipitous closing’’ rather
than the separate audited financial statement
showing previously permitted. 62 FR 62860–62862
(1997).
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those regulations retained most of the
accompanying provisions dealing with
examples of financial risks that would
not necessarily or even ordinarily be
reflected in the audited financial
statements on which the composite
score rests. The Department made clear
in the NPRM that, despite requests to
revisit or modify the composite score
component of the financial
responsibility regulations, we were not
doing so. 81 FR 31359. Thus, we retain
here unchanged the methodology that
the commenters laud as the product of
careful, comprehensive, and engaged
development.
In these final regulations the
Department addresses the significance
of new events that occur after the close
of an audited period, or that are not
recognized, or not fully recognized, and
reflected in audited financial
statements, to assess whether the
school, regardless of its composite score,
‘‘is able to provide the services
described in its publications and
statements, to provide the
administrative resources necessary to
comply with the requirements of this
title [title IV of the HEA], and to meet
all its financial obligations. . . .’’ 20
U.S.C. 1099c(c)(1). In doing so, we are
expanding the consideration of events
that would make a school not
financially responsible in the near
term—from the single example in
current regulations (commercial creditor
lawsuits) to other major lawsuits and
other events that pose a potential
material adverse risk to the financial
viability of the school. In the negotiated
rulemaking meetings, and in the NPRM,
we articulated the adverse events that
recent history indicates pose a
significant risk to the continued ability
of an institution to meet these several
obligations. We address elsewhere in
this preamble comments directed at
events that pose particular risks, but
discuss here the manner in which these
events will be evaluated.
The composite score methodology, as
commenters stressed and as we
acknowledge, is designed to measure
the viability of an institution from three
different aspects and develop a score
that assigns relative weight to each
aspect to produce a score showing the
relative financial health and viability of
the institution. In general, institutions
with a composite score of 1.5 or more
are financially responsible; those with a
score between 1.0 and 1.5 are in the
‘‘zone’’ and subject to increased
reporting and monitoring; those with a
score below 1.0 are not financially
responsible, and may participate only
on conditions that include providing
financial protection to the Department.
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However, the limitations of the existing
composite score methodology are twofold: The score is calculated based on
the audited financial statements for the
most recent fiscal year of the institution,
and the audited financial statements
recognize threatened risks only if
accounting rules require the institution
to recognize those events. If those events
are recognized, however, the composite
score can readily assess their effect on
the viability of the institution, with due
regard for the actual financial resources
of the institution, including its ability to
meet exigencies with internal resources
and to borrow to meet them. The
institution’s composite score in each
instance has already been calculated; to
assess the effect of a threat or event
identified in these regulations, the
institution’s financial statements on
which that composite score was
calculated will be adjusted to reflect the
amount of loss attributed to, and other
impacts of, that threat, and based on the
adjusted statements, the Department
will recalculate the institution’s
composite score. This recalculation will
occur regularly as threats or events
identified in these regulations are
identified. By adopting this approach,
the final regulations provide an
individualized assessment rather than
the one-size-fits-all method proposed in
the NPRM that commenters found
unrealistic. Unless other conditions
apply, under the current regulations, an
institution that undergoes a routine
assessment of financial responsibility
and achieves a composite score of 1.5 or
greater may continue to participate
without providing financial protection;
an institution with a score between 1.0
and 1.5 may participate subject to
heightened reporting and scrutiny; and
an institution with a composite score
below 1.0 is not financially responsible
and may participate only with financial
protection.46 §§ 668.171(b)(1),
668.175(c), 668.175(f). Under the
approach we adopt here, where the
recognition of the triggering event
produces a recalculated composite score
of 1.0 or greater, we will regard the
event as not posing a risk that makes or
is likely to make the institution not
financially responsible, and will
therefore not require financial
protection. If the recognition of the
46 As provided under § 668.175(f)(3), an
institution that has a composite score of less than
1.0 is not financially responsible until it achieves
a composite score of 1.5 or higher. In other words,
if an institution with a composite score of less than
1.0 has in the following year a composite score
between 1.0 and 1.5, the institution is still subject
to the requirements under the provisional
certification alternative, including the letter of
credit provisions, even though it scores in the zone.
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event or risk produces a failing
composite score—less than 1.0—the
institution is required to provide
financial protection.47
For the purpose of recalculating an
institution’s composite score, as
detailed in Appendix C to these
regulations, the Department will make
the following adjusting entries to the
financial statements used to calculate an
institution’s most recent composite
score. For clarity, the adjusting entries
refer to the line items in the balance
sheet and income statements illustrated
in Appendix A for proprietary
institutions and Appendix B for nonprofit institutions.
For a proprietary institution, for
events relating to borrower-defense
lawsuits, other litigation, or debts
incurred as a result of a judicial or
administrative proceeding or
determination, or for a withdrawal of
owner’s equity, the Department will
debit Total Expenses, line item #32, and
credit Total Assets, line item #13, for
the amount of the loss—the amount of
relief claimed, the debt incurred, the
amount withdrawn, or other amount as
determined under § 668.171(c)(2).
Except for the withdrawal of owner’s
equity, the corresponding entries for a
non-profit institution are a debit to Total
Expenses, line item 38b (unrestricted),
and a credit to Total Assets, line item
#12, for the amount of the loss.
For a proprietary institution, for
events relating to a closed location or
institution or the potential loss of
eligibility for GE programs, the
Department will debit Total Income,
line item #27, and credit Total Assets,
line item #13, for the amount of the loss.
The loss is the amount of title IV, HEA
funds the institution received in the
most recently completed fiscal year for
the location or institution that is closing
or for the GE programs that are in
jeopardy of losing their eligibility for
title IV, HEA funds in the next year. In
addition, the Department will debit
Total Assets, line #13, and credit Total
Expenses, line #32, for an amount that
approximates the educational costs that
the institution would not have incurred
if the programs at the closing location or
the affected GE programs were not
offered. We believe it is reasonable that
this reduction in costs is proportional to
the ratio of Cost of Goods Sold (line
item #28) to Operating Income (line
item #25)—that is, the amount it cost
the institution to provide all of its
47 As the Department stated in the 1997
rulemaking, ‘‘However, an analysis of data of closed
institutions indicates that institutions that fail the
ratio test should not be allowed to continue to
participate without some additional surety to
protect the Federal interest.’’
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educational programs divided by the
revenue derived from offering those
programs.
The corresponding entries for a nonprofit institution are, for the loss, a debit
to Total Revenue, line item #31b, and a
credit to Total Assets, line item #12. The
reduction in costs is calculated by
dividing Operating Expenses, line item
#32, by Tuition and Fees, line item #27,
and multiplying the result by the
amount of the loss, the amount of title
IV, HEA funds received by the location
or affected GE programs. To account for
the reduction in costs, the Department
will debit Total Assets, line item #12,
and credit Total Expenses, line item
38b.
Recognition of recent or threatened
events can be appropriately measured
under the composite score methodology
if the event causes or is likely to cause
a loss that can be quantified. All but two
of the events that we retain as automatic
triggers pose risks that we can quantify
in order to assess their impact on the
institution’s composite score. Lawsuits,
new debts of any kind, borrower defense
discharge claims, closure of a location,
loss of eligibility of gainful employment
programs, and withdrawal of owner
equity all have effects that may be
quantified so that their effects can be
assessed using the composite score
methodology.
In at least two instances, there is no
need to attempt to quantify the loss,
because the loss is self-evident. An
institution that fails the requirement to
derive at least 10 percent of its revenues
from non-title IV sources is so
dependent on title IV, HEA funds as to
make the loss of those funds almost
certainly fatal, and we see no need to
quantify that amount through the
composite score methodology. That risk
requires financial protection regardless
of the most recent composite score
achieved by the institution. Similarly,
an institution whose cohort default rate
exceeds 30 percent in two consecutive
years is at risk of losing title IV, HEA
eligibility the following year and
requires no composite score calculation.
These risks require financial protection
regardless of the most recent composite
score achieved by the institution.
An action taken by the SEC to
suspend trading in, or delist, an
institution’s stock directly impairs an
institution’s ability to raise funds—
creditors may call in loans or the
institution’s credit rating may by
downgraded. However, unlike lawsuits
and other threats, it is difficult to
quantify readily the amount of risk
caused by that action and assess that
new risk using the prior year’s
financials and the composite score
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derived from those statements.
Nevertheless, because the impaired
ability to raise funds caused by these
actions is potentially significant, that
risk warrants financial protection
without the reassessment of financial
health that can be readily performed for
more quantifiable risks. Nevertheless,
because the impaired ability to raise
funds caused by these actions is
potentially significant, that risk
warrants financial protection without
the reassessment of financial health that
can be readily performed for more
quantifiable risks.
We recognize that the institution’s
current year financial strength may
differ from that reported and analyzed
for the prior fiscal year. That difference,
however, can be favorable or
unfavorable, and would be difficult to
reliably determine in real time. Given
that uncertainty, we consider it a
reasonable path to use as the baseline
the data in the most recent audited
financials for which we have computed
a composite score, and adjust that data
to reflect the new debt or pending
threat. Any disadvantage this may cause
an institution will be temporary,
because the baseline will be corrected
with submission, evaluation, and
scoring of the current year’s audited
financial statements. In assessing the
composite score of the new financial
statements for purposes of these
standards, we will continue to
recognize, for purposes of requiring
financial protection, any threats from
triggering events that would not yet be
fully recognized under accounting
standards. However, improvements in
positions demonstrated in the new
audited financials may offset the losses
recognized under these regulations. If
those improved positions produce a
composite score of 1.0 or more, despite
the loss recognized under these
regulations, the institution may no
longer be required to provide financial
protection.
With regard to the suggestion by the
commenters that the Department allow
an institution to submit new month-end
or partial-year audited financial
statements from which the composite
score would be recalculated, we believe
that doing so would be costly and
unworkable, because those financial
statements do not reflect a full year’s
transactions, and would potentially
recognize only new debts, or partially
recognize new litigation or other claims
for which the institution determines
that a loss is probable. We note that the
composite score methodology was
designed to measure the financial
performance of an institution over an
entire 12-month operating cycle, the
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institution’s fiscal year, and believe that
attempting to calculate a composite
score for a partial year would produce
anomalous results. In addition, it is not
clear how an institution could produce
audited financial statements by the end
of the month in which a triggering event
occurred. Further, the suggestion does
not appear to offer a realistic approach
because separate actual or threatened
losses may occur throughout the year,
and for each event, this proposal would
require a new set of financial
statements.
This approach will affect only
institutions that have a recalculated
composite score of less than 1.0. If
recognition of the event produces a
recalculated composite score of between
1.0 and 1.5 for an institution that had a
routine composite score of 1.5 or more,
the recalculated score does not change
the existing score to a zone score, so the
institution is not required to comply
with the zone requirements.
§ 668.175(d). For some institutions, a
single event or threat may produce a
failing composite score, while for
others, a series of actions or events may
together place the institution at
substantial risk. Using the composite
score methodology to assess new or
threatened risks, instead of using a
dollar- or percentage-based materiality
threshold for individual triggering
events, allows the Department to assess
the cumulative effect on the institution
of individual threats or events
regardless. Thus, we will require
financial protection only when the
recalculated composite score is failing
and the cumulative effect produces a
failing score.
In response to the commenters who
objected that the proposed triggering
scheme would arbitrarily ‘‘stack’’
protection requirements, the composite
score methodology distinguishes among
levels of financial strength, and as we
explain below, permits the Department
to align the amount of protection
required with the relative risk or
weakness posed by successive triggering
events or conditions. We agree with the
commenters that an institution should
not be required to provide financial
protection for every automatic triggering
event for which the underlying facts or
circumstances are the same or where a
direct causal relationship exists between
two or more events, like the
circumstance noted by the commenters
where a 90/10 violation causes a loan
agreement violation, or a settlement
generates an accreditor sanction.
In response to the objection that these
regulations could require financial
protection equal to all of the title IV,
HEA funds received in the prior year,
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we adopt here an approach that tailors
the amount of protection required to a
minimum amount we consider
sufficient to cover the losses to the
government reasonably likely to occur
upon closure, plus any additional
amount that we estimate is reasonable to
expect based on the circumstances
presented by the risks posed for the
particular institution. Under current
regulations, an institution that does not
meet financial responsibility standards
may participate under provisional
certification requirements by providing
a letter of credit equal to at least 10
percent of the prior fiscal year title IV,
HEA program funds received.
§ 668.175(f)(2)(i). This restriction
applies to any institution that no longer
qualifies for continued participation in
the zone, or, as particularly pertinent
here, achieves anything less than a score
of 1.0—for example, a score of .90.
Because the composite score makes
these kinds of distinctions among
scores, current regulations give
dispositive weight to its results in
critical determinations regarding an
institution’s ability to participate. Thus
current regulations have long attached
controlling significance to what may be
relatively slight differences in
composite score outcomes. We adopt
here a rule that an institution that
receives an adjusted composite score of
less than 1.0 must provide financial
protection in an amount not less than 10
percent of the prior fiscal year’s title IV,
HEA funding, and, as the composite
score decreases, the institution may be
required to provide an added amount of
protection where supported by the
particular facts and circumstances—
including the history of the institution,
the nature of the risks posed, the
presence of existing liabilities to the
Department, the presence, amount, and
rate at which borrower defense claims
are being filed, and the likelihood that
the risk will result in increases in
borrower defense claims.
The requirement to provide at least a
10 percent letter of credit is rooted in
the 1994 regulations regarding
provisional certification of institutions
that did not meet generally applicable
financial responsibility standards. 34
CFR 668.13(d)(1)(ii)(1994). We adopt
here this 10 percent as a minimum
requirement because we consider
financial protection in the amount of 10
percent of prior year title IV, HEA
funding to be the minimum amount
needed to protect the taxpayer from
losses reasonably expected from an
institution’s closing. These losses
include, at a minimum, costs of closed
school discharges. Closed school
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discharges can affect all loans—
including PLUS loans—obtained to
finance attendance at the closing
institution. This includes any loans
obtained for enrollment in years before
the year in which the institution closes,
not merely those loans received by
students for attendance at the institution
in the year in which it closes. Thus, a
closure could, in some instances,
generate closed school discharge losses
in amounts exceeding the total amount
of Direct Loan funds that the institution
received in the year preceding the year
of that closure.
Liabilities of an institution could also
include liabilities for funds
unaccounted for by audit, because the
institution as a fiduciary is liable for the
costs of title IV, HEA funds it received
unless it affirmatively demonstrates by
the required compliance audit that it
spent those funds properly. An
institution that closes may have neither
the resources nor the incentive to secure
an audit of its expenditures of these
funds. The liability of an institution that
fails to account for those funds includes
the full amount of Pell Grant funds
received, and, for loans that are received
for that period and are not discharged,
the subsidy costs for those loans, which
varies from year to year among loan
types.48 An institution that closes may
also owe liabilities to the Department
for debts arising from audits, program
reviews, or fine actions, or from
borrower defense claims. Closure of the
institution would also jeopardize
recovery of all these liabilities, and the
risk to the taxpayer in those instances is
considerably greater than the costs of
closed school discharges.
We have already experienced closed
school discharge claim losses in one of
the most recent and significant school
closures, that of Corinthian, that permits
development of estimates of liabilities.
Corinthian was composed of three
chains of some 37 separate institutions,
operating at 107 campuses, with 65,000
students enrolled in 2014. It received
48 Because every institution must affirmatively
account for the title IV, HEA funds it has caused
to be awarded during an entire fiscal year as
properly spent, an institution receiving funds on
the cash monitoring or reimbursement method does
not meet this obligation simply by having payments
approved under the requirements applicable to
funding under those methods, which do not
necessarily involve the comprehensive examination
conducted in an audit. Similarly, because the
institution must make this accounting on a fiscal
year basis, the fact that an institution may offer
short programs several of which may be completed
within a fiscal year does not limit the potential loss
in the case of a precipitous closure to the amount
of funds received for a program that may be
curtailed by such a closure, rather than all the funds
for which it was responsible for the entire fiscal
year.
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$1.439 billion in title IV, HEA funding
in FY 2013, the last full fiscal year
preceding its closure. During the year
preceding its closure, Corinthian sold 50
campuses, with some 30,000 students
enrolled, to a new entity, a transaction
that allowed a major portion of
Corinthian students to complete their
training. In addition, under agreement
with the Department, Corinthian
continued training at the campuses it
retained until its closure in April 2015.
The Department has to date granted
closed school discharges of some $103.1
million for some 7,858 Corinthian
borrowers, with the average discharge
some $13,114.49 Additionally, the
Department has thus far approved 3,787
borrower defense discharges, totaling
$73.1 million. Together, Corinthian’s
liabilities through both closed school
and borrower defense total more than
$176 million, with additional claims
expected to be approved later. A letter
of credit at the level of 10 percent of
prior year title IV, HEA funding would
have been $143 million—enough to
cover the estimated total closed school
discharges and far too little to cover the
school’s total liabilities on individual
student loan losses.50
From this history, we estimate that an
institution that closes in an orderly
wind down, under which the majority
of the students are able to continue their
education by transfer or otherwise, will
generate closed school discharge claims
of at least 10 percent of the amount of
all title IV, HEA funding received in the
last complete fiscal year prior to the
year in which the institution finally
closes. Therefore, we adopt 10 percent
of prior year title IV, HEA funding as the
minimum amount of financial
protection required of an institution that
achieves a recalculated composite score
of less than 1, or otherwise faces the
risks (90/10, cohort default rates, SEC
action) for which we do not recalculate
a composite score. This is consistent
with many years of Department practice.
Obviously, not all closures will arise
in such fortuitous situations. It is
realistic to expect that for other
closures, including those that are more
precipitous, a far greater percentage of
borrowers will qualify for closed school
discharges. Moreover, these regulations
are expected to increase the number of
instances in which we will give a closed
school discharge by providing relief
without an application where we have
sufficient information to determine
eligibility. In addition, based on the
Corinthian experience, we expect that
49 As
of October 2016.
Department also fined Corinthian $30
million.
50 The
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the law enforcement agency actions that
can constitute triggering events will
generate borrower defense claims as
well.51 Other liabilities to the
Department may already exist or are
expected to arise. Under these
regulations, therefore, the Department
demands greater financial protection in
cases in which these risks are identified,
in addition to the minimum 10 percent.
We include other conditions as
discretionary triggering events, but in
particular circumstances, those
conditions can separately indicate that
the potential losses that may arise
warrant levels of financial protection
greater than 10 percent. If the
Department demands greater financial
protection than the 10 percent level, the
Department articulates the bases on
which that added protection is needed,
which can include any of the
considerations discussed here. If an
institution has already arranged
financial protection, the Department
credits the amount of protection already
provided toward the amount demanded,
if the protection already provided has
the same terms and extends for the
duration of the period for which
protection is required pursuant to these
regulations. In determining the proper
amount of financial protection, then, we
intend to look closely at any evidence
that these kinds of liabilities may ensue
from the risk posed by adverse events to
a particular institution. We note, in
particular, that section 498(e)(4) of the
HEA, by indicating which specific
histories of compliant behavior are
enough to bar the Department from
requiring personal guarantees from
owners or institutions, has identified
those histories that indicate future risk.
20 U.S.C. 1099c(e). Since 1994, the
Department has implemented the statute
in precisely this way, by adopting these
histories as per se financial
responsibility failures, warranting
surety and provisional certification.
§§ 668.174(a), 668.175(f)(1)(ii).
Similarly, section 498(c)(1)(C) of the
HEA specifically directs the Secretary to
consider whether the institution is able
51 These losses can be very substantial. The
Department has already granted $73 million in
borrower defense discharge relief to some 3800
Corinthian Direct Loan borrowers under § 685.206,
and thousands of Corinthian borrower claims are
pending. The average amount of loan indebtedness
discharged for these 3800 was $19,300; many
thousands of other Corinthian borrowers may have
valid claims for relief, and the Department has been
reaching out to some 335,000 of these individuals.
See: United States Department of Education Fourth
Report of the Special Master for Borrower Defense
to the Under Secretary, June 29, 2016. If even 20
percent of these other borrowers qualify for relief,
the loss to the Federal taxpayer would add another
billion dollars to the $73 million in losses already
experienced.
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to meet its refund obligations to
students and the Department. 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c)(1)(C). The Department has
implemented this provision by requiring
an institution that has a performance
rate of less than 95 percent in either of
the two most recently completed fiscal
years to provide surety in an amount of
25 percent of the amount of refunds
owed during the most recently
completed fiscal year. § 668.173(d). We
intend to apply these long-standing and
statutorily sanctioned predictors of
potential liabilities in determining the
amount of financial protection that we
may require over and above that
minimum amount to cover the costs of
closed school discharges. Thus, we may
determine that the potential loss to the
taxpayer of the closure or substantial
reduction in operations of an institution
that has failed the 95 percent refund
performance standard to be 25 percent
of refund obligations in the prior year,
in addition to the 10 percent of prior
year title IV, HEA funding needed to
cover closed school discharges. We may
determine that the potential loss to the
taxpayer of the closure or substantial
reduction in operations of an institution
that has had audit or program liabilities
in either of the two preceding fiscal
years of five percent or more of its title
IV, HEA funds to present a potential
loss of that same percent of its most
recent title IV, HEA funding, in addition
to the 10 percent of funding needed to
defray closed school discharge losses.
We may determine that the closure or
substantial reduction in operations of an
institution that has been cited in any of
the preceding five years for failure to
submit in a timely fashion required
acceptable compliance and financial
statement audits presents a potential
loss of the full amount of title IV, HEA
funds for which an audit is required but
not provided, in addition to any other
potential loss identified using these
predictors.
Relying on the composite score
methodology also helps clarify how long
financial protection for risks or
conditions should be maintained,
because some events have already
occurred, and will necessarily be
assessed in the next audited financial
statements and the composite score,
which is routinely calculated. Others,
such as pending suits or borrower
defense claims, will not be reflected in
the new financial statements, and those
risks may still warrant continuing the
financial protection already in place.
Along these lines, we will maintain the
full amount of the financial protection
provided by the institution until the
Department determines that the
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institution has (1) a composite score of
1.0 or greater based on the review of the
audited financial statements for the
fiscal year in which all losses from any
triggering event on which the financial
protection was required have been fully
recognized, or (2) a recalculated
composite score of 1.0 or greater, and
that any triggering event or condition
that gave rise to the financial protection
no longer applies.
We believe it is reasonable to require
an institution to maintain its financial
protection to the Department as noted
above until the consequences of those
events are reflected in the institution’s
audited financial statements or until the
institution is no longer subject to those
events or conditions. If the institution is
not financially responsible based on
those audited statements, or the
triggering events continue to apply, then
the financial protection on hand can be
used to cover all or part of the amount
of protection that would otherwise be
required. Doing so minimizes the risks
to the Federal interests by having
financial protection in place in the
event that an institution does not
sufficiently recover from the impact of
a triggering event—any cash or letter of
credit on hand would be retained and
any funds under a set-aside arrangement
would reduce or eliminate the need to
offset current draws of the title IV, HEA
funds.
With regard to the comment that a
letter of credit could exceed 100 percent
of the title IV, HEA funds received by
an institution, we note that the
regulations adopted here set 10 percent
of prior year title IV, HEA funding as the
minimum financial protection required
for an institution that achieves a
recalculated score below a 1, or fails the
90/10, cohort default rate, or SEC
triggers, and permit the Department to
demand greater protection when the
Department demonstrates that the risk
to the Department is greater.
Changes: We have revised
§ 668.171(c)(1) to provide that losses
from events or risks listed as triggering
events are generally evaluated by
determining whether the amount of loss
recognized for this purpose, if included
in the financial statements for which a
composite score was most recently
calculated under § 668.172, would
produce a composite score less than 1.0.
In § 668.171(c)(2) we have specified that
the actual or potential losses from the
actions or events in § 668.171(c)(1) are
accounted for by revising an
institution’s most recent audited
financial statements and that the
Secretary recalculates the institution’s
composite score based on the revised
statements regularly. If the recalculated
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composite score is less than 1.0, the
institution is not financially responsible
and must provide financial protection.
Triggering Events
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Comment: Some commenters objected
that the Department had produced no
data to support the assertion that the
triggering events in fact pose the risks
that would warrant their use. Other
commenters stated that the requirement
to provide financial protection based on
the mere filing of a lawsuit seeking the
proposed recoveries was speculative,
not based on actual data showing that
an adverse result was reasonably
expected to result from that suit and
was thus arbitrary and lacked a
reasonable basis. Another commenter
asserted that the Department’s reference
to the Corinthian situation does not
support adopting the rule proposed
here, and that current regulations were
sufficient to enable the Department to
obtain from Corinthian the protections
needed to mitigate or eliminate the risks
now cited to justify the new rules. The
commenter asserted that Corinthian
failed financial responsibility tests in
FY 2011, could have been required to
post a letter of credit, but was not
required to do so, nor was it required to
post a letter of credit for FY 2014, when
Corinthian again failed the tests.
Discussion: As discussed for each of
the triggers, each reflects a new
financial obligation already incurred
and not yet reflected in the composite
score for the institution, or a new
financial risk that is realistically
imminent, whether or not yet
recognized in the audited financial
statements. Current regulations permit
the Department to demand 10 percent or
more financial protection, but provide
no structured scheme to assess whether
a particular event actually jeopardizes
the institution, and if so, by how much,
and what amount of protection is
needed beyond that 10 percent
minimum described in the regulations.
We described in the NPRM the history
of Corinthian’s evaluation under the
existing financial responsibility
scheme.52 Even if Corinthian’s financial
statements had been accurate when
presented, they would not have
accounted for the risk posed by the
pending California attorney general
action, that ended in a judgment for $1.1
52 Applying the routine tests under current
regulations did not result in financial protection,
because Corinthian appeared at the time it provided
the Department with its audited financial
statements to pass those tests. Only later—too late
to secure financial protection—did further
investigation reveal that Corinthian in fact had
failed the financial tests in current regulations. 81
FR 39361.
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billion, and the LOC that would likely
have been demanded—a small fraction
of the title IV, HEA funding for the prior
year—would barely have covered the
liabilities already established by the
Department against Corinthian. The
Corinthian experience highlighted the
need to identify events that posed
realistic jeopardy in the short term, and
to secure financial protection before the
loss was incurred and the institution on
account that that loss no longer had the
ability to provide that protection.
Similarly, current standards would not
require protection where an institution
was on the very cusp of loss of title IV,
HEA eligibility, as with cohort default
rate and 90/10 sanctions.
Changes: None.
Automatic Triggering Events
Lawsuits and Other Actions
§ 668.171(c)(1)(i)
Lawsuits Settlements/Resolutions
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(1)(i)(B), (ii), and (iii), a
school may not be financially
responsible if it is currently being sued
by a State, Federal, or other oversight
entity, or by private litigants in actions,
including qui tam suits under the False
Claims Act, that have survived a motion
for summary judgment.
Some commenters objected that
requiring financial protection based on
suits by private parties was
unreasonable because the commenters
considered those suits to have no
bearing on the financial responsibility
and administrative capability of the
institution. Others considered reliance
on the filing of suits that had not yet
resulted in judgments against the
institution to constitute an unreasonable
standard that deprived the institution of
its due process rights to contest the
lawsuits. A commenter objected to the
inclusion of government suits because
the commenter considered proprietary
institutions to often be the target of illplanned and discriminatory suits by
State and Federal agencies. A
commenter stated that suits filed by
State AGs have been shown in some
cases to be politically motivated and
argued that such suits should not be the
basis for a letter of credit as they may
unfairly target unpopular members of
the higher education industry,
depending on the party affiliation of the
AG. The commenter stated that the suits
are not required to be based in fact and
rarely lead to a finding, that the judicial
process should be allowed to follow its
usual course, and that requiring schools
to post letters of credit prior to a judicial
ruling in the case amounts to finding a
school guilty and requiring the school to
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prove innocence. The commenter stated
that the risk posed by the filing of a suit
cannot be determined simply from the
complaint filed in the suit, and the
actual risk posed by such suits, some
commenters urged, could be reasonably
determined only after determining the
merits of the suit.
Commenters objected that these
triggering events would require a school
to submit a letter of credit before there
was any determination of merit or
wrongdoing by an independent arbiter,
and stated that such suits should not be
taken into account until judgment. The
commenters stated that they believed
that, contrary to the Department’s
statement in the preamble that suits by
State and Federal agencies are likely to
be successful, most cases settle due to
the outsized leverage of the government,
despite their merits. In addition, the
commenters believed that suits filed by
State AGs should not be the basis for a
letter of credit because these suits have
been shown in some cases to be
politically motivated and to unfairly
target institutions.
Another commenter urged the
Department to remove the lawsuit
triggers, arguing that the mere filing of
an enforcement action by a State,
Federal, or other oversight entity based
on the provision of educational services
should not be considered a trigger. The
commenter stated that lawsuits are easy
to file, allegations are not facts, and,
even assuming good faith on the part of
State and Federal regulatory agencies,
sometimes mistakes are made. The
commenter contended that the litigation
process creates the incentive for
sweeping allegations that may or may
not be verifiable, or there may be cases
filed by an agency in the hope of making
new law or establishing a new standard
for liability or mode of recovery beyond
that applied by courts in ruling on such
claims. A commenter was concerned
that an ‘‘other oversight agency’’ could
refer to a town or county zoning board
or land use agency that could threaten
to file a multi-million dollar suit for
pollution, or a nuisance suit like a
violation of a local sign ordinance, or
failure to recycle soda cans, as a way to
leverage concession from the institution
for other reasons. These suits would be
covered under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(1)(ii) even though they
have nothing to do with the educational
mission of the school. The commenter
contended that giving such unbridled
power to non-State, non-Federal, noneducation-related oversight entities
would effectively place the ‘‘sword of
Damocles’’ over the head of every
college president who needs to negotiate
a dorm or a new parking facility.
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Many commenters objected to
consideration of settlements with
government agencies under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(1). As proposed, the
regulation might make a school not
financially responsible if during the
current or three most recently
completed award years it was required
to pay a debt to a government agency,
including a debt incurred under a
settlement. Commenters viewed this
provision as overly broad and punitive,
and suggested that settlements be
excluded from this provision. A
commenter believed that an institution
under investigation will have a strong
incentive to avoid a settlement that
would precipitate the triggering event in
proposed § 668.171(c)(1)(i)(A), which
would require it to provide the
Department a potentially expensive or
unobtainable letter of credit. A
commenter noted that bringing suit can
be an important tool in facilitating
settlement, and cited a case where a
State AG filed a consumer fraud suit
against an institution. The parties were
able to negotiate a settlement that
provided $2.1 million in loan
forgiveness and $500,000 in refunds for
students. Imposing a letter of credit in
such situations would deter such
favorable settlements. Commenters
asserted that many businesses settle
claims with the government due to the
cost of litigation and the outsized
leverage of the government, regardless
of the merits of the underlying claims.
Commenters objected to consideration
of debts already paid, asserting that if a
school pays a liability as a result of an
agency action, the school has already
paid an amount that was deemed
appropriate by the agency and should
not be subject to the additional punitive
requirement of posting a letter of credit.
The commenters argued that this is
especially true if the school’s payment
resulted in repayments to students such
that a letter of credit is no longer
necessary to provide for possible
student claims.
Similarly, other commenters claimed
that lawsuit triggers would create every
incentive for borrowers who get behind
in their loan payments to file claims or
suits against an institution, regardless of
how frivolous those suits or claims may
be, and therefore these triggers should
not be part of the borrower defense
rulemaking.
Evaluation
A commenter urged the Department to
make the lawsuit and investigation
triggers in § 668.171(c)(1) evaluative
instead of automatic, so that the
Department would evaluate the type of
suit, the merit of the claims, the amount
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of money at stake, and the likelihood of
success. With this system in place, only
institutions with a serious financial risk
would be required to obtain a letter of
credit, leaving other institutions room to
negotiate with State AGs or other
enforcement entities.
Other commenters objected to
assessing the value of the lawsuits (in
proposed § 668.171(c)(v)) by using ‘‘the
tuition and fees the institution received
from every student who was enrolled at
the institution during the period for
which the relief is sought’’ as wrongly
presuming that every student in the
period (or three years if none is stated)
would receive a full refund, and may
have no relation to the event on which
suit was brought. While the commenters
do not suggest using the damages
proposed in any complaint, which they
claim are often speculative and
designed to grab media attention rather
than reflect a true damage calculation, a
better way to assess value would be an
analysis of the merits of the specific
litigation at issue, guided by past
recoveries and settlements for similar
actions. Some commenters objected that
State AGs and private litigants will
likely include demands for relief in
pleadings that equal or exceed the
thresholds set by the Department in
order to gain additional leverage over an
institution. Other commenters objected
that State AG suits will also exceed the
thresholds because they will state no
dollar amount of relief, and thus be
deemed to seek restitution in the
amount of all tuition received for a
period.
Some commenters believed that an
institution should be afforded the
opportunity to demonstrate, by an
independent analysis, that the actual
amount at issue is below the thresholds
set for the applicable action and
therefore the action is not material.
Some commenters suggested that the
Department allow an institution to seek
an independent appraisal from a law
firm, accounting firm, or economist that
would state the actual amount at issue
in the lawsuit. Others stated that this
analysis could be accomplished as part
of an appeal process with a hearing
official deciding the amount based on
evidence from the institution and the
Department.
Threshold
Some commenters stated that it is
common for plaintiffs suing colleges
and universities to allege damages far
exceeding any amount that could
feasibly be obtained in either a
settlement or final judgment, as a tactic
to maximize any final settlement
amount and contingency fees to the
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attorney. For this reason, the
commenters argued that requiring a
letter of credit based solely on a claim
exceeding 10 percent of an institution’s
assets is arbitrary and unwarranted, as
the claimed amounts often have little
factual basis or legal support. Further,
the commenters were concerned that
enacting this new standard would lead
to plaintiffs’ attorneys stating claims in
excess of the 10 percent threshold to
create negotiating leverage.
Other commenters believed that the
$750,000 and 10 percent of current
assets thresholds were arbitrary because
they do not take into account that the
size of schools varies significantly and,
as such, their exposure may vary
significantly. The commenters reasoned
that a larger school that serves a greater
number of students may be subject to a
larger liability, but may also be able to
adequately withstand that liability. For
these reasons, the commenters
suggested that the triggering events in
§ 668.171(c)(1) should be removed
entirely, but if they are not removed, the
commenters urged the Department to
exclude the settlement provisions and
the $750,000 threshold because debts of
that size are not indicative of the
financial stability of the school.
Some commenters noted that Federal
and State settlements are often very
small, and therefore believed those
settlement amounts would not likely
reach or exceed the proposed threshold
of 10 percent of current assets. The
commenters urged the Department to
eliminate the 10 percent threshold in
the final regulations, arguing that a
settlement, in and of itself, should be
sufficient to trigger a letter of credit.
Other commenters believed that the
threshold of $750,000 for the lawsuit
triggers was so low that an auditor
would not consider that amount to be
material and therefore would not
include the lawsuit in the footnotes of
an institution’s financial statements.
They suggested that the Department set
the materiality threshold as the higher,
rather than the lesser, of $750,000 or 10
percent of current assets. The
commenters reasoned that the lesser
amount would almost always be the
audit threshold ($750,000) which, in the
case of any large school, will not be
material. Alternatively, the commenters
suggested that the Department remove
the audit-based threshold and simply
rely on the 10 percent of current assets
threshold.
No Amount Claimed
Objecting to the method of calculating
a claim in a suit in which the plaintiff
does not state a dollar amount of relief,
a commenter noted that in a number of
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State courts—in New York, Maryland,
and Maine, for example—a specific
dollar-amount demand is not permitted
in many civil actions. In such cases,
proposed § 688.171(c)(1)(v)(A) would
require that the amount be calculated
‘‘by totaling the tuition and fees the
institution received from every student
who was enrolled at the institution
during the period for which relief was
sought, or if no period is stated, the
three award years preceding. . . .’’ The
commenter feared that applying this
principle would result in a ‘‘deemed’’
ad damnum of at least three years’ total
revenue—and it would be a fortunate
institution that maintained sufficient
current assets to keep the made-up
‘‘deemed’’ ad damnum below 10 percent
of current assets. In addition, the
commenter notes that other States, like
Virginia, do not permit recovery in
excess of the written ad damnum,
regardless of what a jury may award—
for example, if the demand is $10,000
and the jury awards ten million dollars,
only the demanded amount is awarded.
The commenter opined that in those
States, the incentive is to massively
over-plead the value of the case, so that
an attorney’s client is not forced to
accept less money after encountering a
generous jury. The underlying point is
the same: Neither a stated ad damnum
in any lawsuit nor the ‘‘deemed’’ ad
damnum of proposed
§ 688.171(c)(1)(v)(A) bears any
necessary relationship to the actual
value of the suit, to the likely range of
recovery, or to the effect of the suit on
the financial responsibility of the
educational institution.
Second, the commenter argued that a
pending private lawsuit seeking large
damages should not be considered a
trigger event, as proposed in
§ 688.171(c)(1)(iii). The commenter
cautioned that considering filed-but-notdecided litigation to impair the financial
responsibility of an institution would
overly empower opportunistic or
idealistic members of the plaintiff’s bar.
The commenter asserted that the
proposed position would give every
lawyer with a draft lawsuit containing
enormous damage claims a chokehold
on any school. The commenter noted
that although proposed
§ 688.171(c)(1)(iii)(A) is intended to
restrict this triggering event to only
those claims that survive summary
judgment, the commenter asserted that
in some States, this restriction would be
ineffective. The commenter asserted
that, for example, in New York State
courts, a plaintiff can file a ‘‘Motion For
Summary Judgment in Lieu of
Complaint,’’ under CPLR Section 3213,
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to initiate the case. A plaintiff can
demand a response on the date an
answer would otherwise be due; if the
defendant were to file a cross-motion for
summary judgment as a response, the
court ostensibly would deny both and
treat the cross-motions as an answer and
complaint, and the case would go
forward. But the case would have
‘‘survived a motion for summary
judgment by the institution,’’ and would
then constitute a trigger event at its
outset.
The commenter further asserted that
California State courts permit not only
summary judgment, but also a separate
procedure for resolution of entire claims
by ‘‘summary disposition.’’ Cal. Code of
Civ. Pro. Section 437c. The grant of
judgment to the institution on any
relevant claim by summary disposition
would not seem to affect whether a
trigger event has occurred, even if the
only relevant claim was disposed of.
The commenter asserted as well that in
Virginia, summary judgment is
technically available, but, as a practical
matter, the commenter states that it is
never granted because a motion for
summary judgment cannot procedurally
be supported by documents, affidavits,
depositions, or other similar evidence.
Moreover, the real effect of this
provision would be to deter institutions
from ever moving for summary
judgment, fearing that the motion would
be denied therefore generating a
triggering event.
For these reasons, the commenter
concluded that institutions would have
to bring every covered private case to
trial, at much greater financial and
emotional expense not only to the
school but also to the opposing parties.
The commenter expressed concern that
the proprietary school sector was a
target for enterprising trial lawyers, and
that because of the heightened scrutiny
faced by financial institutions making
lending decisions, it would be
impossible for many institutions facing
one of these triggering events to obtain
a sufficient letter of credit to comply
with the regulations. The commenter
cautioned that an institution in such a
circumstance would have little choice
but to cease operations, even if its
financial basis remained fundamentally
sound—and even if the claims
represented by the proposed triggering
events were insubstantial or frivolous.
Similarly, another commenter stated
that in litigation, plaintiffs are able to
survive a motion for summary judgment
due to a variety of factors. The
commenter said that judges may decline
to dispose of a case on summary
judgment because there remains an
issue of material fact that may have little
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to do with the underlying false claim or
provision of educational services. The
commenter offered that a final judgment
requires a higher level of proof than a
motion for summary judgment and
would therefore be a fairer threshold. In
addition, the commenter noted that
private rights of action are
fundamentally different than agency or
government actions that are subject to
well-established policies and
procedures. Further, the commenter
anticipated that private parties will
likely request relief in excess of the
proposed thresholds of $750,000 or 10
percent of current assets to gain
additional leverage in seeking a
settlement.
With regard to proposed
§ 668.171(c)(1)(iii), some commenters
asked the Department to clarify whether
the mere filing of a False Claims Act
case is a triggering event or if
paragraphs (A) and (B) apply to that
case (as well as private litigation). The
commenters offered that the mere filing
of a False Claims Act case should not
subject an institution to a letter of
credit. While the commenters
recognized the seriousness of a False
Claims Act case, they stated that these
cases do not garner intervention from
the Federal government and are
typically settled for amounts that are
dramatically less than the stated
damages in the complaint. Further,
while the commenters appreciated the
Department’s attempt to ensure it was
only capturing meritorious private
litigation under § 668.171(c)(1), they
believed that the provision would
penalize an institution for settling a case
for nuisance value or harming a school
for filing a motion for summary
judgment which it ultimately loses.
Discussion: Proposed § 668.171(c)(1)
included a range of governmental
actions and certain actions by private
parties, and proposed § 668.171(c)(6)(ii)
included any other litigation that the
institution was required to report in a
filing with the SEC. Regardless of the
substantive basis or motivation of the
party suing, each of these suits could
pose a serious potential threat to the
continued existence and operation of
the school, and as such, they affect the
assessment of the school’s ability to
meet its financial obligations. We see no
basis for ignoring that risk simply
because some suits in each of these
types may in fact be frivolous, assert
exaggerated demands, rest on attempts
to make new law, or attempt to extract
concessions from the school in what the
commenter calls areas unrelated to the
school’s educational mission. We
consider pending suits under these
regulations for two reasons. First, a
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judgment entered in any of these suits
may significantly jeopardize the
existence or continued operations of the
institution, and that threat bears directly
on the statutory requirement that the
Secretary determine whether the
institution for the present and near
future, the period for which the
assessment is made, ‘‘is able to meet
. . . all its financial obligations.’’ 20
U.S.C. 1098c(c)(1)(C). Second, that
consideration looks not merely at
obligations already incurred, but looks
as well to the ability of the institution
to meet ‘‘potential liabilities’’—whether
the institution has the resources to
‘‘ensure against precipitous closure’’—
and thus demands that we assess threats
posed by suits not yet reduced to
judgments that would be recognized in
the financial statements submitted
annually and evaluated under the
current composite score methodology.
In response to the comment regarding
treatment of qui tam suits under the
False Claims Act, we confirm that those
actions are evaluated like any other
litigation not brought by a Federal or
State agency enforcing claims that may
relate to borrower defenses. They are
evaluated under the summary judgment
test.
Responding to the objection that we
should consider only claims reduced to
judgment, we stress that ignoring the
threat until judgment is entered would
produce a seriously deficient
assessment of ability to meet financial
obligations, and worse, would delay any
attempt by the Department to secure
financial protection against losses until
a point at which the institution, by
reason of the judgment debt, may be far
less able to supply or borrow the funds
needed to provide that protection. We
reject this suggestion as contrary to the
discharge of the duty imposed on the
Department by section 498 of the HEA.
Similarly, we see no basis for the
contention that taking into account risk
posed by pending suits somehow
deprives an institution of its due
process right to contest the suit. If the
risk posed is within the statutory
mandate to assess, as we show above,
taking that risk into account in
determining whether an institution
qualifies to participate in the title IV,
HEA programs cannot deprive the
institution of any constitutionally
protected right. The institution remains
free to respond to the suit in any way
it chooses; it is frivolous to contend that
we are barred from considering whether
that risk warrants financial protection
for the taxpayer as a condition for the
continued participation by that
institution in this Federal program.
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Besides these general objections to the
consideration of pending suits, the
comments we received addressed
several distinct aspects of the proposed
consideration. These included
comments addressed to the inclusion of
suits by an oversight entity, which may
include a local government component,
in the category of government suits; the
proposal that suits be evaluated on their
merits by a third party, by Department
officials, or by a Department hearing
official; objections to inclusion of debts
arising from settlements; objections that
the thresholds in the proposed rule were
unrealistic or arbitrary; objections to the
proposed method of calculating the
amount claimed where the institution
contends that the amount claimed
exceeds the amount that applicable law
would support; objections to the
proposed calculation of the amount in
actions that did not seek a stated
amount of relief; objections to the
proposed use of summary judgment as
a test of the potential risk posed by the
suit; and objections to consideration of
debts already incurred and paid in prior
years. We discuss each in turn and, as
discussed earlier explaining the use of
an adapted composite score
methodology, we are modifying the
proposed regulations in several regards
that we intend and expect to assess the
risk posed by pending suits in a manner
that alleviates several of major concerns
raised by commenters.
We address first the changes to the
proposed thresholds, because adoption
of the composite score methodology of
assessing risk affects the response to
those objections and other concerns as
well. Each institution is well aware of
its most recent composite score, and as
explained above, the amount of risk
posed by each suit considered under the
regulations will be assessed by
recognizing that loss in the financial
statements on which that composite
score was based, and determining
whether that recognition will produce a
failing composite score. Any institution
can readily evaluate that effect and take
that result into account in responding to
the suit. A pending suit that produces
a failing score will be recognized as a
threat until the suit is resolved and that
result produces a score of 1.0 or more,
whether by favorable judgment or
settlement. Second, we include an
opportunity for an institution to
demonstrate that loss from any pending
suit is covered by insurance.
Commenters advised that we should not
treat lawsuits as potential triggering
events because the risks posed by these
suits are commonly covered by
insurance. If the institution
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demonstrates that insurance fully covers
the risk, the suit is simply not
considered under these financial
responsibility standards. The institution
can demonstrate that insurance fully or
partially covers risk by presenting the
Department with a statement from the
insurer that the institution is covered for
the full or partial amount of the liability
in question.
In response to the proposal that the
regulations should provide for an
evaluation of the merit of a suit by a
third party, by a Department official, or
by a Department hearing official, we see
no practical way to implement such a
procedure. Litigants already have the
ability to engage in court-sponsored or
independent mediation, in which both
parties can adequately present their
positions; if both parties are amenable to
such a two-party assessment, the parties
can readily pursue that course through
mediation, and we see no need for the
Department to undertake that role. We
see little or no value in entertaining and
evaluating a presentation solely from a
defendant institution, whether that
evaluation were to be performed by a
Department official or an administrative
hearing official in a Department
proceeding. As noted, a party whose
defense is financed by insurance may
find the insurer conducting precisely
such an evaluation in conducting the
litigation, and that assessment will
influence the conduct of the litigation.
In addition, the proposal that the
Department or a third party assess the
merit of an action by a government
agency would require the Department or
a third party to interpret the statutes and
regulations on which that agency based
its actions as well as assess whether the
action was a reasonable exercise of the
agency’s authority. We have no
authority to second guess the actions of
another agency in the exercise of its
authority, and we would neither
presume to do so nor adopt a procedure
in which we would credit such secondguessing by a third party.
The proposed regulation would treat
‘‘oversight authority’’ actions like
actions of Federal or State agencies. By
this term, we include local government
entities with power to assert and recover
on financial claims. This consideration
applies only to affirmative government
financial claims against the institution,
not to government actions that deny
approvals or suits that seek only
injunctive or other curative relief but
make no demand for payment. Local
authorities can take enforcement actions
that can pose a serious financial risk to
the institution, and we see no basis for
disregarding that risk or undertaking
any internal or third-party assessment of
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the merit of the claim. Given the wide
range of such government actions, we
agree that those that do not directly seek
relief that affects or relates to borrower
defenses under this regulation might
warrant a different assessment of risk
than those closely related to borrower
defenses. Generally the risks posed by
the events deemed automatic triggers
are events that threaten the viability of
the institution, and the risks to the
taxpayer posed by those threats include
risks posed by closed school discharges
and unaccounted-for Federal grant and
loan funds. Federal or State agency suits
asserting claims related to the making of
a Direct Loan or the provision of
educational services, as the latter term
is considered under Department
regulations, pose an additional risk and
warrant a different assessment of risk,
because these Federal or State actions
not only pose a threat to the viability of
the institution but are also reasonably
expected to give rise to, and support,
borrower defense claims. For those
suits, we continue to consider it
reasonable to treat the amount claimed
in the suit or discernable from the scope
of the allegations to quantify the
potential loss from these suits.53
However, we acknowledge the value of
having the obligation to require
financial protection depend on
something more than the mere filing of
a lawsuit if delaying surety does not
jeopardize our ability to obtain
appropriate financial protection. The
summary judgment scheme we adopt for
all other litigation may result in
significant delay before protection is
required for borrower defense-related
suits, which may impair our ability to
obtain adequate surety. Rather than
delaying protection requirements until
summary judgment or even a point close
to trial, or creating some third-party
evaluation of the merit of government
agency suits involving borrower
defense-related claims, we will rely on
the outcome of the initial opportunity
available in the litigation process itself
for an institution to challenge the
viability of the suit—the motion to
dismiss. Thus, under these regulations,
a government suit related to potential
borrower defenses is a potential
triggering event only if the suit remains
pending 120 days after the institution is
served with the complaint. This change
provides the institution with ample time
53 The most prominent recent example of such
government actions that have resulted in
judgments—those against Corinthian—does not
suggest that assigning this level of risk to a
government borrower defense-related suit is
unreasonable, and, for that reason, as well, we
decline the proposal to consider claims that such
suits should be discounted.
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to move to dismiss the suit on any
ground, including failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.54
For suits by a Federal or State agency
not directly implicating borrower
defenses, and suits by other government
agencies, we consider the summary
judgment test applicable to private party
lawsuits—not a motion to dismiss test—
to provide a reasonable basis for testing
the degree of risk posed.55 Moreover, the
threat posed by any of these suits may
have no substantial effect on the
composite score of the institution; as
explained above, threats evaluated here
require financial protection only if the
threats together produce a failing
composite score under these
regulations.
We recognize that settlements may
well achieve highly desirable outcomes,
and that regulations should not create a
disincentive to settlements. Regardless
of the position taken in these
regulations, a debt actually incurred
under a settlement entered into in the
current fiscal year will be recognized in
the financial statements of the
institution eventually submitted for the
current year, and will be part of the
financial information on which the
institution’s composite score will be
calculated for the current year. The
concerns raised about treatment of
settlement obligations are therefore
concerns only about how the regulations
treat during the current fiscal year those
settlement debts incurred during the
current year, not their subsequent
treatment. A settlement debt that the
institution can meet will likely not
jeopardize its financial score when
actually evaluated, and we approach
such debts from the same perspective by
assessing their effect when incurred
using the composite score method as
54 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require an
answer or motion to dismiss to be filed within 20
days of service of the complaint, and also allow a
defendant to move at any time for summary
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(a), (b); 56(b).
55 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for
almost 50 years authorized motions for summary
judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a
genuine, triable issue of material fact. Summary
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which
are designed ‘‘to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action.’’ . . .
Before the shift to ‘‘notice pleading’’ accomplished
by the Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a
complaint or to strike a defense were the principal
tools by which factually insufficient claims or
defenses could be isolated and prevented from
going to trial with the attendant unwarranted
consumption of public and private resources. But
with the advent of ‘‘notice pleading,’’ the motion to
dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and
its place has been taken by the motion for summary
judgment.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106
S. Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
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adopted here. We do not expect that an
institution will enter into a settlement
that jeopardizes its viability, and by
removing the thresholds and assessing
that debt in a holistic manner, we
believe that the regulation will remove
any disincentive to enter into
settlement. If an adjusted composite
score includes a potential liability from
a suit or oversight action that eventually
results in a settlement, the previously
recorded risk will be accordingly
adjusted downward to the settlement
amount.
We are retaining the summary
judgment test for all non-governmental
suits, because awaiting a final judgment
that may cripple the institution would
substantially frustrate our objective to
acquire financial protection at a time
when a significant threat is posed and
while the institution is far more likely
to be able to afford to provide that
coverage. That alternative is
unacceptable for those reasons, and
those who object to use of a summary
judgment standard pose no alternative
judicial test that avoids these problems.
We recognize that a complaint that lacks
substantive merit may avoid dismissal if
sufficiently well pled, but that such a
suit survives summary judgment only
with a showing of some evidence
sufficient to support recovery.56 The
56 As one writer has observed, ‘‘summary
judgment stands as the only viable postpleading
protector against unnecessary trials.’’ Martin H.
Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing
Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix (2005),
57 Stan. L. Rev. 1329. The comments that some
States adopt summary judgment or summary
adjudication procedures that differ either in labels
(e.g., California) or in some detail from the Federal
standard do not show that the test is not available
or sufficient to meet this objective. Where a plaintiff
asserts several causes of action, a summary
adjudication under Cal.C.C.P. § 437c(f) or similar
law, or partial summary judgment that disposes of
some but not all causes of action, those claims not
disposed of remain pending and proceeding to trial,
and therefore continue to pose risk. Furthermore,
the regulations treat a failure to file for summary
disposition by a defendant as a concession that the
plaintiff has sufficient evidence to withstand a
motion, and therefore that the claim has sufficient
support to merit presentation to a jury. The fact that
a State permits a plaintiff to seek summary
judgment immediately upon commencement of the
action (e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R., rule 3213, 28 U.S.C.A.
(McKinney) does not frustrate use of this summary
judgment test by a defendant institution; the
institution is required merely to answer the
plaintiff’s motion. N.Y. Uniform Dist. Ct. Act § 1004
(McKinney). The institution is not required to make
a cross motion for summary judgment, and may
move later for summary judgment. N.Y. C.P.L.R.,
rule 3212, 28 U.S.C.A. (McKinney). The comment
cites Virginia law as restricting the defendant’s use
of declarations and affidavits as making summary
judgment less effective a test there. Even if this
support is disfavored, the defendant is free to
support the motion with ‘‘admissions,
interrogatories, and documents produced’’ in
discovery. Nicoll v. City of Norfolk Wetlands Bd.,
90 Va. Cir. 169 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2015). The tool,
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obvious inference from a choice not to
file for summary judgment is that a
defendant fears that such a motion
would not be well-founded, an
assessment that implies a concession
that the suit does pose a risk. Such a suit
is at that point hardly frivolous, and
constitutes a significant threat to the
viability of the institution. Summary
judgment is available in Federal court
litigation, in which we expect a
significant amount of even private party
litigation to be brought, such as qui tam
actions under the False Claims Act. As
to the shortcomings of the summary
judgment test under particular State law
as asserted by the commenter, we note
that the commenter pointed to only a
few States in which the commenter
asserted that summary judgment (or
summary disposition) is less effectively
available than in Federal courts.
Institutions are already subject to those
limitations, and face scrutiny by any
party from whom the institution seeks
investment or loans for the risks posed
by such suits. The consideration we
undertake here is no different in kind.
In response to the commenters who
raised concerns about assessing the
potential recovery sought in an action
that articulates no specific financial
recovery, we cannot ignore the threats
posed by such suits. The fact that a
particular suit may avoid stating a dollar
amount of damages in the complaint in
no way affects whether the suit poses a
significant risk to the school. The
potential recovery in such suits may not
be obvious from a complaint, but will
ordinarily be articulated in a number of
different ways, at least one of which
would be routinely available. For
example, the plaintiff may have
articulated a specific financial demand
in a written demand made prior to suit.
Second, a plaintiff may have offered to
settle the claim for a specific amount.57
Third, defendants engage in discovery,
the amount of financial relief claimed is
highly relevant to the handling of the
suit, and we expect that a defendant
would invariably seek such information
in discovery. We recognize that suits
therefore, remains substantially available to test
meritless cases.
57 We recognize the settlement negotiations are
privileged, and this option does not in any way
diminish that privileged status. Private parties
commonly disclose voluntarily to government
agencies material that is privileged without risk of
losing that privilege, and parties that share a
settlement proposal with the Department under this
option would not lose that protection, Thus, the
Department would not disclose, in response to a
Freedom of Information Act request, material
regarding settlements if that material fell within
exemption 4 of that Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). 34 CFR
5.11. Such information includes commercial or
financial information provided voluntarily and not
customarily disclosed by the party to the public.
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brought by Federal and State authorities
may and commonly do seek
‘‘rescission,’’ ‘‘restitution,’’ and
‘‘disgorgement’’ in unspecified amounts
from the school, with civil penalties, for
patterns and practices affecting students
enrolled for years up to the filing.58 The
institution may be able to demonstrate
that the complaint seeks unstated
financial relief that as pled, pertains
only to students enrolled in a particular
program, location, or period of
enrollment, and not all students
enrolled at the institution, and may
calculate the maximum recovery sought
using data for that cohort.
Together, these changes are expected
and designed to enable a school faced
with the kinds of suits the commenters
describe to either vigorously contest the
suits as the school sees fit or to settle
them. In either case, even a suit or
settlement that might warrant financial
protection in one year, that protection
would be required only until the
institution later may achieve a passing
composite score despite recognition of
the settlement obligation.
Changes: We have revised
§ 668.171(c)(1) to remove both the
$750,000 and 10 percent of current asset
threshold amounts for events that
constitute an automatic trigger. Section
668.171(c) is revised to consider
government actions unrelated to
borrower defense claim subjects, and
any private party lawsuits, to constitute
a triggering event only if the suit has
survived a motion for summary
judgment or disposition, or the
institution has not attempted to move
for summary judgment and the suit
progresses to a pretrial conference or
trial. Section 668.171(c)(2) is revised to
identify the sources from which an
institution may discern the amount of
financial recovery sought if that amount
is not stated in the complaint.
Accrediting Agency Actions
Teach-Out Plan § 668.171(c)(1)(iii)
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(3)(i), an institution is not
financially responsible if it is currently
or was at any time during the three most
recently completed award years
required by its accrediting agency to
submit a teach-out plan, for a reason
described in § 602.24(c)(1), that covers
58 We derive the default recovery amount of three
years of tuition and fees from actions such as
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Corinthian Colleges,
Inc., No. 1:14–CV–07194, 2015 WL 10854380 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 27, 2015) (claims for actions over three year
period); see also California v. Heald College, No.
CGC–13–534793, Sup. Ct. Cty of San Francisco
(March 23, 2016). (claims based on actions of
varying duration). An institution may demonstrate
that lesser amounts are applicable.
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the institution or any of its branches or
additional locations.
Some commenters suggested making
the submission of a teach-out plan
under 34 CFR 602.24(c) a separate,
automatic trigger. The commenters
argued that, unlike accreditor sanctions,
the teach-out provisions are clearer
circumstances that suggest the
institution may imminently close.
Commenters argued that a letter of
credit for institutions that trigger the
teach-out provision is unnecessary and
duplicative of existing protections in the
regulations. The commenters stated that
in the scenario of a closing institution,
it is highly unlikely that the school will
be able to obtain a letter of credit, and
argued that, as a result, requiring the
closing school to submit a letter of
credit could convert a planned, orderly
closing into a sudden shut down, thus
leaving students stranded and harming
taxpayers.
Some commenters warned that
including the voluntary closure as a
trigger would have unwanted effects.
The commenters argued that this trigger
would incent schools to keep locations
open, despite the fact that the locations
may no longer be serving its purpose
and its continued presence may
constitute a drain on institutional
resources. Forced to choose between a
location that is running slightly in the
red and a letter of credit calculated
against the entire institution’s title IV
expenditures, the commenters believed
institutions may have no choice but to
keep the doors open.
Moreover, the commenters argued
that requiring a letter of credit makes
little sense in the circumstance in which
a school closes one or more locations,
but the institution remains open. The
commenters offered that in any scenario
involving the closure of a location but
not the main campus, the Department
may pursue derivative student claims
against an institution when those
students receive a loan discharge
pursuant to proposed § 685.214.
Some commenters also contended
that the closure of locations is typically
designed to increase the financial
soundness of an institution and believed
that the Department’s records would
show that most individual locations are
closed only after an orderly teach-out
and without triggering many (or any)
closed school discharges. They argued
that the closing of one or more locations
of a school does not necessarily signal
financial instability of a school; it may
signal prudent fiscal controls. Closing
locations that are not profitable or that
cannot effectively serve students makes
the institution as a whole more
financially responsible and better able
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to serve its remaining students.
Consequently, the commenters
cautioned that schools should not be
punished for making reasonable
business decisions to conduct an
orderly wind down of an additional
location. The commenters
recommended that no letter of credit be
imposed in the circumstance of the
proposed closure of individual
locations, and that the Department
address on a case-by-case basis the
appropriateness of requiring a letter of
credit from a school that announces a
teach out of the entire school.
Alternatively, if the Department
maintains the letter of credit
requirement based on a school’s
intention to close a location, the
commenters suggested that the letter of
credit should only apply to locations
that service 25 percent or more of the
institution’s students.
Similarly, other commenters
suggested that the Department adopt a
materiality threshold, such as the
number of students enrolled or affected
or the title IV dollar amount associated
with those students, because the closure
of an additional location may have no
adverse effect on an institution.
In response to the Department’s
request for comment on whether a
threshold should be established below
which the closure of a branch or
additional location would not trigger the
letter of credit requirement, as noted
previously, commenters urged the
Department to eliminate the closure of
a branch or additional location as a
triggering event, or at minimum, make
the trigger discretionary rather than
mandatory. If the Department does not
do so, the commenters asserted that a
threshold is then both necessary and
appropriate, but the commenters
believed that a letter of credit should be
required only if the closure of a branch
or additional location would have a
material financial impact on the school
as a whole. The commenters offered that
the Department could request a letter of
credit if the closure of a branch or
additional location:
• Would reduce total school
enrollment by 30 percent or more;
• Would reduce total school title IV
receipts by 30 percent or more; or
• Would reduce total school tuition
revenues by 30 percent.
Other commenters suggested that the
Department extend the 10 percent
materiality concept to this situation and
apply the letter of credit requirement
only if the closure of a location involves
more than 10 percent of the school’s
population.
Some commenters noted that
locations are often part of campus
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models that, among other things, bring
postsecondary education to areas that
might otherwise have none, and
believed that institutions may elect to
forgo these innovative efforts if they are
unable to close a location without
incurring a significant financial penalty.
Other commenters suggested that the
Department clarify whether the letter of
credit provisions would be applied
based on the title IV, HEA funds
received by the main or branch campus,
and how the letter of credit provisions
would apply to teach-out plans that
might be submitted for a branch campus
instead of the entire main campus.
Discussion: Under the teach-out
provisions in 34 CFR 602.24(c)(1), an
accrediting agency must require an
institution to submit a teach-out plan
whenever (1) the Department initiates
an emergency action or an action to
limit, suspend, or terminate the
institution’s participation in the title IV,
HEA programs, (2) the accrediting
agency acts to withdraw, terminate, or
suspend the institution’s accreditation,
(3) the institution notifies the
accrediting agency that it intends to
cease operations entirely or close a
location that provides 100 percent of a
program, or (4) a State licensing or
authorizing agency notifies the
accrediting agency that the institution’s
license or authority to provide an
educational program has been or will be
revoked. The occurrence of any of these
actions may call into question an
institution’s ability to continue, placing
at risk the welfare of students attending
the institution. However, in keeping
with our treatment for other automatic
triggering events, instead of using a
materiality threshold, the Department
will recalculate the institution’s
composite score (1) based on the loss of
title IV, HEA funds received by students
attending the closed location during the
most recently completed fiscal year, and
(2) by reducing the expenses associated
with providing programs to those
students, as specified in Appendix C to
these regulations. We believe that this
approach will corroborate the position
of some of the commenters that closing
an unprofitable location was a good
business decision in cases where the
recalculated composite score is higher
but not less than the original score.
Otherwise, a failing recalculated
composite score shows that closing the
location had an adverse impact on the
institution’s financial condition.
Changes: We have added a new
§ 668.171(c)(1)(iii) to provide that an
institution is not financially responsible
if it is required by its accrediting agency
to submit a teach-out plan under
§ 602.24(c) that covers the institution or
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any of its branches or additional
locations if, as a result of closing that
institution or location, the institution’s
recalculated composite score is less than
1.0. In addition, we provide in
Appendix C to subpart L, the
adjustments to the financial statements
that are needed to recalculate the
composite score.
Show Cause or Probation § 668.171(g)(5)
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(3)(ii), an institution is not
financially responsible if it is currently,
or was at any time during the three most
recently completed award years, placed
on probation or issued a show-cause
order, or placed on an accreditation
status that poses an equivalent or greater
risk to its accreditation by its
accrediting agency for failing to meet
one or more of the agency’s standards,
and the accrediting agency does not
notify the Secretary within six months
of taking that action that it has
withdrawn that action because the
institution has come into compliance
with the agency’s standards.
Some commenters were concerned
that the scope of the proposed
accrediting agency triggering events is
too broad because it includes matters
that do not necessarily pose any
existential threat to the viability of an
institution. The commenters stated that
an institution placed on probation or
show-cause status does not, in all cases,
signal an imminent threat to the
continued viability of the institution
that should automatically require a
letter of credit; in the tradition of
accreditation, while these designations
are meant to identify and make public
areas of concern at an institution, the
goal remains that of self-improvement
and correction.
Other commenters agreed that an
institution placed on show cause by
most accrediting agencies is typically at
substantial risk of losing its
accreditation, and loss of accreditation
would likely have some impact on its
finances and operations. However, the
commenters noted that, in many cases,
the agency placed the institution on
show cause because it had demonstrated
significant financial and operational
deficiencies that were already having an
impact on its business and educational
outcomes. Therefore, the commenters
cautioned that in many cases, it is the
reason behind the show cause order
(i.e., concerns about the financial and
operational capacity of the institution),
and not the show-cause status itself, that
suggests an institution is not financially
responsible.
Some commenters stated that in many
cases, an accrediting agency places an
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institution on probation for issues of
academic quality or dysfunction at the
governance level even while the
institution’s operations and finances
remain strong. The commenters stated
that, while the issues that lead to the
probation are certainly not minimal, it
would take an institution longer than
six months to correct them. In addition,
the agency will need time to evaluate
the changes and determine that the
institution is now in compliance.
Moreover, the commenters maintain
that there is no clear evidence that
institutions on probation routinely or
uniformly experience operational or
financial outcomes as a result of being
on probation, particularly when the
issues leading to the probation are
unrelated to finance or operations.
Again, the commenters cautioned that
uniformly concluding that all
institutions on probation that cannot
correct non-compliance issues in six
months are not financially responsible
is overly broad. In addition, the
commenters noted that it effectively
punishes an institution that is on
probation for issues not related to
financial and operational deficiencies
by requiring the institution to provide a
letter of credit and participate in the
title IV, HEA programs under a
provisional certification.
The commenters believed that if the
Department intends to rely on
accrediting actions to determine
financial responsibility, then the
Department must review the content of
the accrediting actions and act based on
the reasons for those actions. As a
matter of due process, each accrediting
agency action imposing probation
makes highly individualized findings of
non-compliance that provide clear
indicators regarding the institution’s
risk, as determined by the agency. For
these reasons, the commenters
suggested that the Department revise the
show cause and probation provisions to
refer specifically to agency standards
related to finances, operations, or
institutional ethics or integrity or
related areas.
Other commenters supported tying
accrediting agency actions to financial
or operational issues but, in the
alternative, would also support the
Department’s suggestion during the
negotiated rulemaking process that there
be a way for an accrediting agency to
inform the Department as to why its
probation or show-cause action will not
have an adverse effect on the
institution’s financial or operating
condition (see 81 FR 39364). Along
somewhat similar lines, other
commenters believed that, if an
accrediting agency takes an action
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against a school based on financial
responsibility concerns, that action
should not supplant the Department’s
own analysis under subpart L of the
regulations.
Other commenters stated that
accreditors do not consider a showcause order a negative action—to the
contrary, accreditors routinely use it as
a mechanism to promote institutional
change and compliance. The
commenters argued the Department
itself has not previously taken the view
that a show-cause order or probation
was a significant threat to an
institution’s financial health by noting
that a recent report listing the
institutions the Department required to
submit letters of credit did not identify
an accrediting agency action as the basis
for requiring any of those letters of
credit. The commenters also noted that
the Department’s recent spreadsheet
listing the institutions on heightened
cash monitoring indicates that 13 of the
513 institutions were placed there for
Accreditation Problems, which the
Department defined as ‘‘accreditation
actions such as the school’s
accreditation has been revoked and is
under appeal, or the school has been
placed on probation.’’ The commenters
asserted the spreadsheet establishes (1)
that the Department already has a
mechanism for seeking financial
protection from institutions
experiencing accreditation problems,
and (2) that a mere show cause order
historically has not been viewed as
posing the same risk as revocation or
probation. In addition, the regulations
governing recognized accreditors permit
an accreditor to afford an institution up
to two years to remedy a show-cause
before it must take action, and the
commenters believe that this allowable
timeframe effectively codifies the notion
that a show-cause order is neither a sign
of impending financial failure, nor a
matter than an institution would expect
to resolve in six months’ time. See 34
CFR 602.20.
Other commenters agreed with the
Department that actions taken by an
accreditor could be a sign that the
institution may imminently lose access
to Federal financial aid. In those cases,
the commenters believed that asking for
additional funds upfront would be a
sensible step as an advance protection
for taxpayers. However, the commenters
point to recent review of accreditor
actions over the last five years showing
that the current sanctions system is
highly inconsistent. The commenters
stated this inconsistency was true with
respect to terminology, the frequency
with which actions happen, and how
long an institution stays on a negative
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status. (Antoinette Flores’s ‘‘Watching
the Watchdogs,’’ published in June
2016). Given this inconsistency, the
commenters recommend making the
following changes to the proposed
accrediting triggering events.
Commenters suggested that the
Department make accreditor actions a
discretionary trigger because, given the
inconsistency among accreditors,
establishing an automatic trigger tied to
negative sanctions may be difficult.
They stated that accreditors do not
interpret what it means to be on
probation or show cause in the same
way. In addition, the commenters stated
that making sanctions by accreditors an
automatic trigger also risks making them
unlikely to take action when they
should.
The commenters note that a clear
finding from the research, ‘‘Watching
the Watchdogs,’’ is that many
accreditors put institutions on a
negative status for a very short period of
time, while other accreditors required
institutions facing a sanction to stay in
that status for at least a year. The
commenters were concerned that setting
a clear threshold of six months would
give an institution too much leverage to
argue that its accreditor should
withdraw the sanctions sooner than the
accreditor otherwise would.
Discussion: In view of the significant
number of comments that a probation or
show cause action taken by an
accrediting agency may not be tied to a
financial reason or have financial
repercussions, and could have serious
unintended consequences as an
automatic trigger, we are revising this
trigger to make it discretionary. As such,
we will work with accrediting agencies
to determine the nature and gravity of
the reasons that a probation or show
cause action was taken and assess
whether that action is material or would
otherwise have an adverse impact on an
institution’s financial condition or
operations. Moreover, under this
approach, the proposed six-month
waiting period for an institution to come
into compliance with accrediting agency
standards is no longer necessary.
Changes: We have reclassified and
relocated the automatic probation and
show-cause trigger in proposed
§ 668.171(c)(3)(ii) as a discretionary
trigger under § 668.171(g)(5) and revised
the trigger by removing the six-month
compliance provision.
Gainful Employment § 668.171(c)(1)(iv)
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(7), an institution would not
be financially responsible if, as
determined annually by the Secretary,
the number of title IV recipients
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enrolled in gainful employment (GE)
programs that are failing or in the zone
under the D/E rates measure in
§ 668.403(c) is more than 50 percent of
the total number of title IV recipients
who are enrolled in all the GE programs
at the institution. An institution is
exempt from this provision if fewer than
50 percent of its title IV recipients are
enrolled in GE programs.
Some commenters noted that many
institutions subject to the GE regulations
have limited program offerings, and in
some cases offer only one program. For
those institutions, a single program
scoring in the zone will result in more
than 50 percent of its students being
enrolled in zone-scoring programs. The
commenters further noted that the GE
regulations provide for a runway for
institutions to bring programs into
compliance, and institutions do so
through cost reductions that are passed
along to students. The commenters
reasoned that imposing a letter of credit
requirement on such an institution
would deprive it of curative resources
and ultimately lead to a closure of the
program, rather than its remediation.
In response to the Department’s
request for comment on whether the
majority of students who enroll in zone
or failing GE programs is an appropriate
threshold, commenters offered several
observations and recommendations.
First, the commenters believed that a
simple tally of the number of GE
programs that may be failing or in the
zone at a given point in time will not
produce a consistently accurate
assessment of an institution’s current or
future financial stability. The first set of
debt-to-earnings rates, for example, are
based on debt and earnings information
for students who graduated between the
2008–09 and 2011–12 award years
(assuming an expanded cohort). See
generally 34 CFR 668.404. By the time
the associated debt-to-earnings ratio for
these programs are released (likely early
2017), many institutions will be offering
new or different programs that are
designed to perform favorably under the
GE framework. Though, as of 2017, a
significant number of the students may
still be enrolled in the institution’s older
GE programs, these programs will no
longer be integral to the institution’s
business model, and indeed, may be in
a stage of phase-out. For this reason, the
commenters suggested that any
reasonable assessment of an institution’s
financial health would need to account
for the phase-out of older GE programs
and the strength of the newer ones.
Second, the commenters
recommended that the Department
exclude from this determination any GE
programs that are in the zone, or at a
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minimum, GE programs that have only
been in the zone for two or fewer years.
The commenters argued that, because a
GE program must be in the zone for four
consecutive years for which rates are
calculated before it loses eligibility, the
inclusion of a zone program prior to this
point does not justify the presumption
that the program may lose eligibility.
Finally, the commenters suggested
that, rather than exempting institutions
where fewer than 50 percent of the title
IV recipients are enrolled in GE
programs, the regulations should simply
compare the number of students who
receive title IV, HEA funds and are
enrolled in failing GE programs to the
total number of students. The
commenters believed this approach
would be a better and more
straightforward measure of the risk of
financial failure posed to the entire
institution.
Discussion: We appreciate the
concerns and suggestions made by the
commenters regarding the GE trigger
and are persuaded that the trigger
should be revised to (1) account for the
time that an institution has to improve
a GE program in the zone, and (2) focus
more on the financial impact of failing
programs instead of the percentage of
students enrolled in GE programs.
We proposed including zone
programs in the GE trigger because there
are no assurances that an institution
will attempt to improve or succeed in
improving those programs. However, we
agree that the proposed trigger could
influence an institution to discontinue
an improving program prematurely or
hold an institution accountable for
poorly performing programs that it
voluntarily discontinues. In proposing
the 50 percent threshold, we were
attempting to limit this trigger to those
situations where the potential loss of
program eligibility would have a
material financial impact on an
institution. But, as alluded to by the
commenters, the percentage threshold
based on title IV recipients may not
apply to situations where an institution
discontinues a zone program, or cases
where 50 percent of the title IV
recipients enrolled at an institution
account for a small fraction of (1) the
total number of students enrolled, or (2)
institutional revenue.
To address these concerns, we are
revising the GE trigger by considering
only those programs that are one year
away from losing their eligibility for
title IV, HEA program funds and
assessing the impact of that program’s
closure and any potential loss under the
recalculated composite score approach.
Specifically, the Department will use
the amount of title IV, HEA program
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funds the institution received for those
programs during its most recently
completed fiscal year as the potential
loss and recalculate the composite score
based on that amount and an allowance
for reductions in expenses that would
occur if those programs were
discontinued.
Changes: We have revised the GE
trigger as described above. We have also
revised the GE trigger in
§ 668.171(c)(1)(iv) to provide that the
loss used in recalculating the
institution’s composite score under
§ 668.171(c)(2) is the amount of title IV,
HEA program funds the institution
received for affected programs during
the most recently completed fiscal year.
Lastly, we specify in Appendix C to
subpart L, the changes needed to reflect
that loss of funding and the reduction in
educational expenses associated with
discontinuing those programs.
Withdrawal of Owner’s Equity
§ 668.171(c)(1)(v)
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(8), an institution whose
composite score is less than 1.5 is not
financially responsible if there is any
withdrawal of owner’s equity from the
institution by any means, including by
declaring a dividend.
Some commenters appreciated the
provision in § 668.171(d)(2) that would
allow an institution whose composite
score is based on the consolidated
financial statements of a group of
institutions, to report that an amount
withdrawn from one institution was
transferred to another entity within that
group. However, the commenters argued
that, since the Department is aware of
the institutions whose composite scores
are calculated based on consolidated
financial statements, requiring those
institutions to report every
intercompany funds transfer imposes an
unnecessary burden because the
reporting provides little if any benefit to
the Department. Therefore, the
commenters recommend amending
proposed § 668.171(c)(8) to expressly
exclude any withdrawal of equity that
falls within the circumstances described
in § 668.171(d)(2).
Other commenters assumed that this
provision is intended to apply only to
proprietary institutions because
nonprofits do not have owners.
However, because in financial reporting,
the term ‘‘equity’’ is often used
conceptually to refer both to owner’s
equity for businesses or net assets for
nonprofits, the commenters
recommended that the Department
clarify in the final regulations that this
provision applies only to proprietary
institutions.
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Discussion: We agree that, where a
composite score is calculated based on
the consolidated financial statements of
a group of institutions, funds transfers
between institutions in the group
should not be reported as withdrawals
of owner’s equity. The trigger for the
withdrawal of owner’s equity was based
on the reporting requirement under the
zone alternative in current
§ 668.175(d)(2)(ii)(E), which applies
only to proprietary institutions. We
agree to clarify in the regulations that as
a triggering event under § 668.171(c),
the withdrawal of owner’s equity
applies only to proprietary institutions.
In addition, by recalculating the
composite score we capture the impact
of withdrawals of owner’s equity in
cases where the withdrawals were not
made solely to meet tax liabilities.
Changes: We have revised the
withdrawal of owner’s equity trigger
now in § 668.171(c)(1)(v) to specify that
it applies only to a proprietary
institution and that it does not include
transfers to an entity included in the
affiliated entity group on whose basis
the institution’s composite score was
calculated. In addition, we specify in
§ 668.171(c)(2)(iv)(B) that except for a
withdrawal used solely to meet tax
liabilities, as provided under
§ 668.171(h)(3)(ii), the Secretary will
recalculate the institution’s composite
score to account for that withdrawal.
Cohort Default Rates § 668.171(f)
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(9), an institution is not
financially responsible if its two most
recent official cohort default rates are 30
percent or greater, unless the institution
files a challenge, request for adjustment,
or appeal with respect to its rates for
one or both of those fiscal years and that
action remains pending, results in
reducing below 30 percent the official
cohort default rate for either or both
years, or precludes the rates from either
or both years from resulting in a loss of
eligibility or provisional certification.
Some commenters urged the
Department to remove the cohort default
rate trigger, citing concerns that this
trigger would have unintended
consequences. The commenters
believed that, because of the
corresponding letter of credit
requirements, it is likely that banks
would curtail their lending to affected
institutions making it more difficult for
those institutions to initiate, or continue
with, innovative educational efforts that
are often capital-intensive.
In response to the Department’s
request for comment on whether a
cohort default rate of 30 percent or more
for a single year should be a triggering
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event, some commenters believed that
the proposed two-year trigger should
not be changed. One commenter
suggested that this trigger should apply
to any institution whose most recent
cohort default rate is 30 percent or
higher, arguing that keeping default
rates below 30 percent is a very low
standard for an institution to meet—
only 3.2 percent of institutions have a
default rate of 30 percent or higher. The
commenter noted that, among all
students attending institutions of higher
education where the default rate is 30
percent or higher, 85 percent attend
public institutions and just 11 percent
attend proprietary institutions. The
commenter urged the Department not to
exempt public institutions from this
trigger if the Department’s goal is to
protect as many students as possible.
Discussion: We wish to make clear
that the Department will not apply the
cohort default rate trigger until any
challenge, request for adjustment, or
appeal that an institution qualifies to
file, under subpart N of the General
Provisions regulations, is resolved. If
that action is resolved in favor of the
institution, the Department will take no
further action and make no further
requests of the institution with regard to
this trigger. Otherwise, after the
challenge, request, or appeal is resolved,
the Department will apply the cohort
default rate trigger and request the
corresponding financial protection from
the institution.
We disagree with the notion that a
bank will curtail its lending to an
institution solely because the
Department requests financial
protection under this trigger. Like other
creditors, a bank would assess the risks
inherent in making a lending decision,
including regulatory risks. In this case,
under the statutory provisions in section
435(a)(2) of the HEA, pending any
appeal for, or adjustment to, its cohort
default rates the institution is one year
away from losing its eligibility for title
IV, HEA funds. Although an
institution’s intention to initiate or
continue innovative educational efforts
are laudable, we believe it is
questionable that a bank would
jeopardize funds requested by the
institution after having assessed the
risks of whether the institution could
repay those funds in the event that the
institution’s eligibility under the title
IV, HEA programs is terminated in the
near term.
With regard to the Department’s
request for comment, we are persuaded
to maintain the proposed two-year
threshold.
With respect to the comment that, to
protect as many students as possible,
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the Department should not exempt a
public institution from the cohort
default rate trigger, we note that while
cohort default rates for all institutions
are publicly available and can be used
by students and parents in making
enrollment decisions for particular
institutions, the purpose of this trigger
is to protect the Federal interest in the
event an institution loses its eligibility
for title IV, HEA funds in the coming
year. In that circumstance for a public
institution, we already have financial
protection in the form of full faith and
credit of the State to cover any liabilities
that may arise (see the discussion under
the heading ‘‘Public Domestic and
Foreign Institutions’’).
Changes: None.
Non-Title IV Revenue (90/10)
§ 668.171(d)
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(5), a proprietary institution
is not financially responsible if it does
not derive at least 10 percent of its
revenue from sources other than title IV,
HEA program funds during its most
recently completed fiscal year.
Some commenters believed this
trigger was unjustified, arguing that an
institution’s eligibility to participate in
the title IV, HEA programs is not at risk
after a one-year failure. The commenters
stated that section 487(d)(2) of the HEA
provides that no penalties are imposed
on an institution until it loses title IV
eligibility by failing the 90/10 revenue
test for two consecutive years, and that
the sanctions that are specified do not
include the financial responsibility
consequences proposed under this
trigger. For these reasons, the
commenters concluded that, lacking
specific statutory authority, the
Department should remove this trigger
from the final regulations.
Other commenters were concerned
that institutions actively game the 90/10
requirements by (1) delaying title IV
disbursements until the next fiscal year;
(2) combining locations that exceed the
90 percent revenue limit with those that
do not, and (3) raising tuition, which
forces students to take out private loans
that increase revenue from non-title IV
sources. The commenters believed that
these gaming strategies are the reason
that only a few institutions fail the 90/
10 revenue test each year (14
institutions for the 2013–14 reporting
period) and urged the Department to
limit the use of these strategies,
recommending for example, that
Department track for three years the 90/
10 compliance for each location
included at the institution’s request
under a single PPA or that the
Department should not grant those
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requests when institutional 90/10
compliance is in question.
Discussion: As we noted in the
preamble to the NPRM, an institution
that fails the 90/10 revenue test for one
year, is one year away from losing its
title IV eligibility. Under § 668.28(c)(3),
an institution that fails the revenue test
must notify the Department of that
failure no later 45 days after the end of
its fiscal year. If the institution fails
again in the subsequent fiscal year, it
loses its eligibility for title IV, HEA
funds on the day following the end of
its fiscal year, not at the end of the 45day reporting period. After the end of its
fiscal year, the institution’s ability to
continue to make disbursements to
enrolled students is severely limited
under the provisions in § 668.26.
Consequently, in view of the
institution’s dependence on revenues
from title IV, HEA funds that it is no
longer eligible to receive, it is likely that
the institution would close, possibly
precipitously, leading to closed school
discharges and program liabilities owed
to the Department. These are the same
outcomes that would result from an
existential threat, such as a crippling
lawsuit or loss of accreditation, for
which financial protection is authorized
under the financial responsibility
provisions in section 498(c) of the HEA.
Contrary to the commenters’ assertion
that there is no risk to an institution’s
eligibility after a one-year failure, the
HEA contemplates that risk under
section 487(d)(2)(B) by providing that
after a one year failure, the institution
automatically becomes provisionally
certified and remains on that status for
the following two years, unless it fails
the 90/10 revenue test in the subsequent
year and loses eligibility. Moreover, the
Department’s authority to establish 90/
10 as a basis for determining whether an
institution is financially responsible is
anchored under the provisions in
section 498(c)(1) of the HEA, not the
provisions governing the institution’s
eligibility under the 90/10 revenue
provisions.
With regard to the comments about
institutions evading the 90/10
requirements, we note that changes to
these requirements are beyond the scope
of this rulemaking. Administratively
however, the Department will continue
to diligently enforce the 90/10
requirements and work closely with the
Office of the Inspector General to help
ensure that institutions properly
calculate their 90/10 rates.
Changes: None.
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Publicly Traded Institutions § 668.171(e)
General
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(6), a publicly traded
institution is not financially responsible
if the SEC warns the institution that it
may suspend trading on the institution’s
stock, the institution’s stock is delisted
involuntarily from the exchange on
which it was traded, the institution
disclosed in a report to the SEC that it
is subject to a judicial or administrative
proceeding, the institution failed to file
timely a required report with the SEC,
or the exchange on which the
institution’s stock is traded notifies the
institution that it is not in compliance
with exchange requirements.
Commenters believed that the NPRM
did not provide meaningful rationale for
some of the provisions that the
Department asserts require financial
protection, pointing for example to an
institution’s failure to file a timely
report with the SEC, or noncompliance
with exchange requirements, and noting
that the Department only suggested that
such events could lead to institutional
failure. In response to the Department’s
request for comment regarding how
these triggers could be more narrowly
tailored to capture only those
circumstances that could pose a risk to
an institution’s financial health, the
commenters offered that the final
regulations should provide that in every
instance where an SEC action occurs,
the Department will only take action
after it affords the institution a notice
and hearing and thereafter makes a
reasoned determination that the event is
likely to result in a material adverse
effect. The commenters further stated
that, to be a triggering event, any SEC
action should be a final, non-appealable
judgment or suspension and not merely
a warning or notification. The
commenters also stated that because
many companies inadvertently and
regularly miss a periodic filing deadline,
the final regulations should require a
finding of materiality, as applied to the
delinquency of the filing, and the
Department should consider whether
the filing failure is an isolated incident
or part of a pattern of conduct, and
whether the missed filing was the fault
of the institution.
Similarly, in response to the
Department’s request for comment,
other commenters identified the
following situations that they believed
would provide for a more appropriate
set of triggers for publicly traded
institutions:
(1) The institution is in default on an
obligation to make payments under a
credit facility, or other debt instrument,
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and the default involves an amount in
excess of 10 percent of the institution’s
current assets, and the default is not
cured within 30 days;
(2) An event of default has been
declared by the relevant lender or
trustee under any outstanding credit
facility or debt instrument of the
institution or its parent, including any
bond indenture, and the default is not
cured within 30 days; or
(3) The institution or its parent
declares itself insolvent, files a petition
for reorganization or bankruptcy under
any Federal bankruptcy statute, or
makes an assignment for the benefit of
creditors.
The commenters believed that
adopting the recommended triggers
would enable the Department to
efficiently identify those cases in which
a publicly traded institution is in
financial trouble, and would avoid
conflating investor-facing disclosures or
nonmaterial administrative matters (e.g.,
failure to timely file a required report,
notification of non-compliance with
exchange requirements) with reliable
indicators of financial distress.
Discussion: With regard to the
suggestion that the Department apply
these triggering events only when an
SEC action is what the commenter
describes as a final, non-appealable
judgment or suspension, and not a
warning or notification, doing so would
further distance these events as early
but significant indicators of serious
financial distress. We understand that
the warning is issued by the SEC only
after repeated efforts have already been
made to alert the delinquent party of the
need to file, and despite these attempts,
the registrant continues to fail to
respond. We understand that the
consequences of failure to file timely
required reports after this warning
include significant burdens should the
institution wish to raise capital, and that
not uncommonly, the reason a registrant
becomes so delinquent as to be issued
this warning is that the registrant has
ceased operations. We are not capturing,
or requiring contemporaneous reporting
of, the actions and circumstances that
give rise to an SEC or exchange action—
information that may at an early stage
forecast operational or financial
difficulties—because that would be
unmanageable and could lead to
erroneous conclusions. Instead, we are
relying on the conclusions reached by
the SEC and the stock exchange that the
actions taken by the institution warrant
a significant and corresponding
reaction.
With regard to the proposal that the
Department take action to impose
financial protection based on an SEC or
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exchange action only after providing the
institution an opportunity for a hearing
and a case-by-case evaluation of the
significance of the particular event on
which the SEC or exchange acted, we
note that § 668.171(h)(3)(iv) provides
the institution with an opportunity at
the time it reports the event to
demonstrate that the condition no
longer exists, has been cured or, that it
has insurance that will cover any and all
debts and liabilities that arise at any
time from that triggering event. The
liabilities referred to here are those that
arise from a precipitous closure of an
institution, including, but not limited to
losses from closed school discharges,
and liabilities for grant and loan funds
not accounted for as properly spent by
the statutorily required compliance
audit. If the Department takes an
enforcement action based on this trigger,
or any other automatic triggering events,
to condition the continuing
participation of the institution on
providing the required financial
protection, § 668.90(a)(3)(iii)(A)
provides the institution a more formal
opportunity to demonstrate these
defenses. The event itself is of such
significance that the Department
considers only these defenses, and not
contentions that the event itself is not
grounds for requiring protection.
While we appreciate the suggestions
made by the commenters to streamline
the triggers for publicly traded
institutions, particularly with regard to
making payments under a credit facility,
as discussed more thoroughly under the
heading ‘‘Violation of Loan Agreement,’’
we have made these provisions
discretionary and they apply to all
institutions. While we agree that some
of the situations described would signal
serious distress, under these regulations
we will make those determinations on a
case-by-case basis. As previously noted,
if the lender files suit as a result of the
delinquency, that suit would be
considered under the private litigation
assessment in § 668.171(c)(1)(ii).
Changes: None.
Delisting
Comments: With regard to the triggers
pertaining to a warning from the SEC
that it may suspend trading and the
involuntary delisting of an institution’s
stock, some commenters found the
correlation the Department was
attempting to make between an
institution’s failure to comply with
exchange requirements and its ability to
meet its financial obligations
troublesome.
The commenters argued that, while a
delisting is significant, correlating an
institution’s financial health to its
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delisting incorrectly assumes that the
delisting is generated as a result of
financial problems and the delisting
will materially impact the institution’s
financial health. Even where the
delisting is itself related to something
that is measured in dollars, like a
minimum bid price, that measure is not
necessarily indicative of the health of an
institution, as opposed to the market
value of a share of the institution.
Discussion: While the commenters are
technically correct that an involuntary
delisting does not necessarily mean that
an institution has financial problems, it
could equally or more likely mean that
it does. Even worse, the delisting may
be a prelude to bankruptcy. Generally
speaking, financially healthy
institutions are not involuntarily
delisted. As discussed in the preceding
comment, the regulations provide the
institution ample informal and formal
opportunities to show that the risks that
the triggering event may cause have
been removed by curing the event itself.
These liabilities are those that ensue
from a precipitous closure, as described
above. An institution’s financial
viability under the Department’s
composite score methodology assesses,
as explained earlier, the ability of the
institution to borrow and access capital
as needed. Delisting and SEC actions
directly affect the ability of a publiclytraded institution to access capital. An
institution may contend that the event
on which the action was premised does
not portend closure, but the action by
the exchange or SEC unquestionably
affects the ability of the institution to
obtain financing, a critical aspect of
financial viability. While the negative
effect of that impairment may be
difficult to quantify, and cannot
immediately be assessed under the
composite score methodology, that
impairment warrants requiring financial
protection.
Changes: None.
SEC Filings Regarding Judicial or
Administrative Proceeding
Comments: With regard to judicial or
administrative proceedings, some
commenters noted that the SEC’s
requirements are designed to encourage
disclosure of information to potential
investors and cautioned that the
proposed regulations may discourage
those disclosures. The commenters
believed that although the proposed
reporting requirements under
§ 668.171(d)(i) would permit an
institution to explain why a particular
litigation or suit does not constitute a
material adverse event that would pose
an actual risk to its financial health, a
publicly traded institution that elects to
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make broad disclosures to the SEC and
potential investors would be dependent
on the Department agreeing with the
institution’s position. If the Department
disagrees, the commenters opined that
the institution would face a financial
penalty (i.e., be required to submit a
letter of credit) for a situation where the
disclosure may not have been required
by the SEC in the first place. Along
similar lines, other commenters noted
that the reporting provisions do not
require the Department to act on any
evidence provided by the institution,
and do not specify what opportunity, if
any, the institution would have to
discuss these events with the
Department. For these reasons, the
commenters suggested that the
Department should not implement
regulations that would interfere with the
primary purpose of SEC disclosures—to
permit potential investors to make their
own decisions about whether to invest
in the institution.
Similarly, other commenters believed
this triggering event would run counter
to the long-standing practice of publicly
traded institutions generally erring on
the side of disclosing legal and
regulatory events to the public and their
shareholders. More specifically, the
commenters asserted that publicly
traded institutions tend to over-disclose
these events, particularly since the
materiality of those events often cannot
be reasonably determined at their onset.
Discussion: We acknowledge that a
judicial or administrative proceeding
reported by an institution to the SEC
may or may not be material. We believe
that proceedings reported in SEC filings
that seek substantial recovery but may
not be meritorious pose a risk similar to
the risk posed by non-governmental
actions. The institution may succeed in
dismissing such a suit, or at least testing
its merit by moving for summary
judgment or disposition. The institution
may also have insurance that fully
protects the institution from loss from
the suit.
Changes: We have added a new
§ 668.171(c)(1)(ii) to treat all private
party litigation as a triggering event only
if the action survives a motion for
summary judgment or disposition, or
the institution has chosen not to file for
summary judgment, and have amended
§ 668.171(h) to enable the institution to
demonstrate that all actual and potential
losses stemming from that litigation are
covered by insurance.
SEC Reports Filed Timely
Comments: With respect to the trigger
for filing timely SEC reports under
proposed § 668.171(c)(6)(iii), some
commenters warned that the
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Department should not assume that an
institution is unable to meet its financial
or administrative obligations and
impose punitive actions based on a
failure to meet SEC filing requirements.
As an initial matter, the commenters
argued that the proposed trigger is more
stringent than the SEC’s rules, which
allow an institution to file a notification
of late filing, that enables the institution
to file the report by an extended
deadline, and once filed the institution
would be deemed to have timely filed
the report. In addition, the commenters
stated that an institution’s failure to file
a report may not necessarily reflect that
the institution is unable to meet its
financial or administrative obligations,
because the report could be late for
many reasons outside of financial
problems at an institution, including the
unavailability of an individual required
to sign the report, an unforeseen
circumstance with an institution’s
auditors, or the need to address a
financial restatement done for technical
reasons. Similarly, other commenters
urged the Department to apply this
trigger only where the filing would be
considered late under SEC rules. The
commenters explained that pursuant to
SEC rules, an institution that fails to
timely file a report must file a Form
12b–25, reporting the failure to file no
later than one business day after the
report was due. If the Form 12b–25 is
properly filed, the institution will have
15 additional calendar days to file an
annual report or five additional calendar
days to file a quarterly report. If the
institution files the late report within
the extended deadline, the SEC
considers that the report was timely
filed.
Discussion: A late SEC filing, or
failure to file, may precipitate an
adverse action against an institution by
the SEC or a stock exchange. For
example, an AMEX or Nasdaq-listed
institution that files a late SEC report is
cited for failing to meet exchange
requirements and will be required by
the exchange to submit a plan for
regaining compliance with listing
requirements. The exchange may
suspend trading on the institution’s
stock if it does not come into
compliance with those requirements.
Or, a late filing may limit the
institution’s ability to conduct certain
types of registered securities offerings.
In addition, capital markets tend to react
negatively in response to late filings. All
told, the consequences of late SEC filing
may impact the institution’s capital
position or its ability to raise capital,
and we believe that it remains a
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significant event to include as an
automatic trigger.
Changes: None.
Discretionary Triggering Events
§ 668.171(g)
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(10), an institution is not
financially responsible if the Secretary
determines that there is an event or
condition that is reasonably likely to
have a material adverse effect on the
financial condition, business, or results
of operations of the institution,
including but not limited to whether (1)
there is a significant fluctuation in the
amount of Direct Loan or Pell Grant
funds received by the institution that
cannot be accounted for by changes in
those programs, (2) the institution is
cited by a State licensing or authorizing
agency for failing State or agency
requirements, (3) the institution fails a
financial stress test developed or
adopted by the Secretary to evaluate
whether the institution has sufficient
capital to absorb losses that may be
incurred as a result of adverse
conditions, or (4) the institution or its
corporate parent has a non-investment
grade bond or credit rating.
Commenters believed that the
proposed discretionary triggers were
unreasonable for several reasons. First,
the commenters noted that the
discretionary provisions do not afford
institutions any opportunity to
communicate with the Department
regarding a possible materiality
determination. Instead, it appeared to
the commenters that the Department
may determine unilaterally, and without
engaging the school, that there is an
event or condition that is reasonably
likely to have a material adverse effect
and proceed to demand financial
protection, violating the school’s due
process. Moreover, the commenters
argued that any standard of financial
responsibility that does not permit the
receipt and review of information from
the school cannot produce consistent
and accurate results and, as such, fails
to satisfy the reasonability standard put
into place by Congress.
Second, the commenters noted that
the Department did not define the term
‘‘material adverse effect’’ and made no
mention of the concept in the preamble
to the proposed regulations. The
commenters asserted that the
Department must define this term to
ensure that the regulations are
consistently applied, particularly where
an institution could be significantly
penalized (required to submit a letter of
credit) pending the result of the
determination.
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75999
Third, the commenters argued that by
requiring under proposed § 668.171(d)
that an institution must report any
automatic or discretionary trigger within
10 days, the proposed regulations are
unworkable—because the discretionary
triggers are not exhaustive, an
institution would have an obligation to
speculate as to the types of events the
Department might determine would
have a material adverse effect and report
those events. Conversely, the
commenters were concerned that the
Department could argue that an
institution’s failure to report an event,
that the Department might deem likely
to have material adverse effect, is a
failure to provide timely notice under
§ 668.171(d), and grounds to initiate a
proceeding.
Fourth, the commenters argued that
the six examples of events that the
Department might consider ‘‘reasonably
likely’’ to have a material adverse effect
on an institution are vague, and asserted
that the Department offered no factual
support in the preamble for the notion
that these events regularly, or even more
often than not, lead to financial
instability at an institution. The
commenters stated that the only
rationale the Department offers for
including these six events is that each
could, in theory, signal financial stress.
For example, they noted that a citation
from a State-authorizing agency for
failing a State requirement could
concern almost any aspect of an
institution’s operations. The
commenters contended that routine
citations occur with great frequency in
annual visit reports and routine audits.
Therefore, under the proposed
regulations, an institution would be
required to report every citation,
without regard to materiality, frequency,
or the relationship to the institution’s
financial health. According to the
commenters, events such as ‘‘high
annual dropout rates,’’ a ‘‘significant
fluctuation’’ in the amount of Federal
financial aid funds received by an
institution, an undisclosed stress test,
and an adverse event reported on a
Form 8–K with the SEC are equally
problematic and vague. Commenters
stated that it was unclear what these
thresholds or events represent, how they
would be evaluated, or how an
institution would know that one has
occurred and report it to the
Department.
Other commenters believed that the
Secretary should not have open-ended
discretion to determine which
categories of events or conditions would
be financial responsibility triggers. Like
other commenters, these commenters
argued that as a practical matter it
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would likely be impossible for an
institution to comply with the reporting
requirements in proposed § 668.171(d)
for any event or condition that is not
specifically identified by the Secretary
because the institution would have to
guess which additional events or
conditions might be of interest.
Similarly, some commenters believed
the discretionary triggers should be
exhaustive with established parameters
so that institutions know the events they
must comply with and report to the
Department.
Some commenters believed that the
discretionary triggers constitute an open
invitation for litigation by anyone with
an ‘‘axe to grind’’ with any school. The
commenters were concerned that the
Secretary could use the expanded
authority under the discretionary
triggers to take actions against
institutions for any reason.
Discussion: As a general matter, the
discretionary triggers are intended to
identify factors or events that are
reasonably likely to, but would not in
every case, have an adverse financial
impact on an institution. Compared to
the automatic triggers, where the impact
of an action or event can be reasonably
and readily assessed (e.g., claims,
liabilities, and potential losses are
reflected in the recalculated composite
score), the materiality or impact of the
discretionary triggers is not as apparent.
The Department will have to conduct a
case-by-case review and analysis of the
factors or events applicable to an
institution to determine whether one or
more of those factors or events has an
adverse financial impact. In so doing,
the Department may request additional
information or clarification from the
institution about the circumstances
surrounding the factors or events under
review. If the Department determines
that the factors or events have a material
adverse effect on the institution’s
financial condition or operations, the
Department notifies the institution of
the reasons for, and consequences of,
that determination. As for the comment
that we should define ‘‘material adverse
effect,’’ we do not intend to adopt a
specific measure here, because
identification of those events that cause
such an effect is a particularized
judgment.59 We disagree with the notion
59 Accounting rules do not set a specific figure for
such effects. However, SEC regulations require the
registrant to disclose resources the loss of which
would have a material adverse effect on the
registrant, and in that rule explicitly require the
registrant to disclose an investment of 10 percent
or more of company resources in an entity, 17 CFR
210.1–02(w), and identify any customer or revenue
source that accounts for 10 percent or more of the
registrant’s consolidated revenues, if the loss of that
revenue would constitute a material adverse effect.
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that it is inappropriate for the
Department to determine which factors
or events may be used as discretionary
triggers, or that the list of factors and
events in the regulations should be
exhaustive. Each discretionary trigger
rests on a particularized judgment that
a factor or event has or demonstrates
such a substantial negative condition or
impact on the institution as to place
continued operations in jeopardy.60 In
this regard, as explained more fully
under the heading ‘‘Reporting
Requirements,’’ an institution is
17 CFR 229.101(c)(1)(i), (vii). While not defining
material adverse effect, the selection of this
threshold supports an inference that loss of this
magnitude can be expected to constitute a material
adverse effect. A popular characterization of the
significance of such a loss states that material
adverse effect is a term that commonly denotes an
effect that
. . . usually signals a severe decline in
profitability and/or the possibility that the
company’s operations and/or financial position may
be seriously compromised. This is a clear signal to
investors that there is something wrong . . .
Material adverse effect is not an early warning
signal, but rather a sign that a situation has already
deteriorated to a very bad stage. Investopedia
www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/
112702.asp#ixzz4JKIpsbwk.
60 The assessment would look to the factors
identified in recent revisions to Financial
Accounting Standards Board rules regarding the
expectations regarding whether the entity’s ability
to continue as a going concern. FASB Standards
Update, No. 2014–15, Presentation of Financial
Statements—Going Concern (Subtopic 205–40):
205–40–55–2 The following are examples of
adverse conditions and events that may raise
substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to
continue as a going concern. The examples are not
all-inclusive. The existence of one or more of these
conditions or events does not determine that there
is substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to
continue as a going concern. Similarly, the absence
of those conditions or events does not determine
that there is no substantial doubt about an entity’s
ability to continue as a going concern. Determining
whether there is substantial doubt depends on an
assessment of relevant conditions and events, in the
aggregate, that are known and reasonably knowable
at the date that the financial statements are issued
(or at the date the financial statements are available
to be issued when applicable). An entity should
weigh the likelihood and magnitude of the potential
effects of the relevant conditions and events, and
consider their anticipated timing. a. Negative
financial trends, for example, recurring operating
losses, working capital deficiencies, negative cash
flows from operating activities, and other adverse
key financial ratios. b. Other indications of possible
financial difficulties, for example, default on loans
or similar agreements, arrearages in dividends,
denial of usual trade credit from suppliers, a need
to restructure debt to avoid default, noncompliance
with statutory capital requirements, and a need to
seek new sources or methods of financing or to
dispose of substantial assets. c. Internal matters, for
example, work stoppages or other labor difficulties,
substantial dependence on the success of a
particular project, uneconomic long-term
commitments, and a need to significantly revise
operations. d. External matters, for example, legal
proceedings, legislation, or similar matters that
might jeopardize the entity’s ability to operate; loss
of a key franchise, license, or patent; loss of a
principal customer or supplier; and an uninsured
or underinsured catastrophe such as a hurricane,
tornado, earthquake, or flood.
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responsible for reporting only the
actions and events specified in these
regulations.
We address specific concerns and
suggestions about the discretionary
triggers in the following discussion for
each factor or event. In addition, we
have added pending borrower defense
claims as a discretionary trigger because
it is possible that an administrative
action could cause an influx of borrower
defense claims that we can expect to be
successful, though that will vary on a
case-by-case basis.
Changes: None.
Discretionary Triggering Events
Bond or Credit Rating, Proposed
§ 668.171(c)(11)
Comments: Commenters argued that a
non-investment grade bond or credit
rating is not a reliable indicator of
financial problems. The commenters
stated that, because the rating assigned
by a rating agency is a measure designed
for the benefit of creditors concerned
solely with pricing the institution’s
debt, a rating below investment grade
does not necessarily mean that an
institution cannot meet its financial
obligations. Moreover, the commenters
questioned how the Department would
determine that an institution or its
corporate parent had a non-investment
grade rating, since there are multiple
rating agencies and the agencies may
not necessarily assign the same rating to
a particular institution or in the case
where the institution or its corporate
parent have multiple ratings, some of
which are investment grade. The
commenters stated that this financial
structuring is not unusual and has no
impact on the ability of the institution
to meet its obligations. For these
reasons, the commenters suggested that,
if the Department retains bond or credit
ratings as a triggering event, it should
specify how those ratings are
determined. In addition, the
commenters were concerned that
applying this trigger could potentially
increase costs to institutions because, in
an effort to avoid this risk of a noninvestment grade rating, an institution
may seek not to have a credit rating in
the first place, so obtaining alternate
financing could increase its costs of
capital.
Other commenters argued that
assuming that schools with
noninvestment grade bond ratings are
somehow deficient is unwarranted. The
commenters noted that the majority of
nonprofit colleges and universities do
not have a bond rating at all, since they
have not issued public debt, citing the
data provided by the Department in the
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NPRM that shows that only 275 private
institutions have been rated by Moody’s
(some others likely have used other
rating agencies like Fitch or Standards
& Poor). The commenters contended
that institutions that have a rating are
arguably in better financial condition
than those that do not, so rather than
being a trigger for additional scrutiny,
the existence of a credit rating and
outstanding public debt would, in itself,
be an indication of financial
responsibility. Further, the commenters
noted that a bond rating seeks to assess
the creditworthiness and risk of
nonpayment over an extended time
period—typically 20 to 30 years—that is
well beyond the much shorter
timeframe contemplated by the financial
responsibility regulations.
Discussion: In considering the
complexities and difficulties noted by
the commenters in using and relying on
bond or credit ratings, we are removing
this triggering event.
Changes: We have removed bond or
credit ratings as a discretionary trigger.
Adverse Events Reported on Form 8–K,
Proposed § 668.171(c)(11)
Comments: Commenters believed that
the trigger regarding the reporting of
adverse events on the SEC’s Form 8–K
is too narrow since it is not used to
identify adverse events at non-publicly
traded institutions and too broad since
it would capture events reported on
Form 8–K that are not indicative of an
institution’s financial health. Although
the commenters acknowledged that it
may be efficient to use existing
disclosure channels to identify potential
issues of concern, they nevertheless
believed that it was unfair for the
Department to impose burdens on
publicly traded institutions, but not on
other institutions that may be
experiencing adverse events. In
addition, the commenters stated that
many events listed on Form 8–K have
no bearing on an institution’s ability to
meet its financial obligations, so the
Department should identify the events it
considers to be adverse. Once identified,
the commenters suggested that the
Department could develop a broader list
of adverse events that would be
applicable to all institutions.
Also, the commenters believed that,
because of the proposed trigger, publicly
traded institutions would have an
incentive not to report events on Form
8–K that could potentially be adverse
events, but in the ordinary course would
have provided useful information to
investors. In conclusion, the
commenters feared that, without clear
guidelines from the Department about
what constitutes an adverse event,
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publicly traded institutions would have
to make their own decisions as to
whether to treat something as an
adverse event. Commenters were
concerned that, even where institutions
make that decision in good faith, they
could potentially be exposing
themselves later to an action by the
Department if the Department exercises
its own judgment in hindsight.
Similarly, other commenters believed
that a number of events on Form 8–K
have little or no relationship to the
institution’s continued capacity to
operate or to administer the title IV,
HEA programs. Instead of using a trigger
based on Form 8–K reporting, the
commenters suggested that the financial
responsibility regulations should be
focused on potential risks to the title IV,
HEA programs and, as a related matter,
institutional outcomes that are
indicative of that risk.
Discussion: While we are not
convinced that some of the reportable
items on Form 8–K will not have an
adverse financial impact on an
institution, we will not require an
institution to report any Form–8K event
because that information is otherwise
publicly available to the Department.
We may, however, evaluate the effect of
an event reported in a Form 8–K as if
it were a discretionary triggering event,
on a case by case basis, or in light of the
effect on an institution’s composite
score as applied under these
regulations.
Changes: We have removed the
discretionary trigger regarding an
adverse event reported by an institution
on a Form 8–K under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(10)(vii).
High Drop-Out Rates and Fluctuations
in Title IV, HEA Funding
Drop-Out Rates § 668.171(g)(4)
Comments: Some commenters urged
the Department to define how it will
calculate high annual dropout rates and
provide an opportunity for the pubic to
comment on the methodology
employed. The commenters noted that
in the preamble to the NPRM, the
Department stated that it uses high
dropout rates to select institutions for
program reviews, as described in 20
U.S.C. 1099c–1(a), and that ‘‘high
dropout rates may signal that an
institution is employing high-pressure
sales tactics or is not providing adequate
educational services, either of which
may indicate financial difficulties and
result in enrolling students who will not
benefit from the training offered and
will drop out, leading to financial
hardship and borrower defense claims’’
(81 FR 39366 (emphasis added)).
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Although the commenters agreed that
those statements may be true, they
argued that when the Department
conducts a program review, it
investigates whether high dropout rates
are in fact signs of financial difficulties.
Under the NPRM, the commenters
surmised that the Department would
have the discretion to impose a
requirement to provide a letter of credit
or other financial protection without
any review of institutional practice or
other investigation to find a causal
connection between high dropout rates
and financial difficulties, thus depriving
the institution of fair process.
Other commenters were concerned
that this trigger is arbitrary because it is
unlikely that a high dropout rate is
related to a school’s financial stability.
The commenters pointed to a study
published in December 2009 by Public
Agenda showing that the most common
reason students dropped out of school is
because they needed to work. Other
reasons cited in the study include:
Needing a break from school, inability
to afford the tuition and fees, and
finding the classes boring or not useful.
Based on this study and survey results
from the Pew Research Center, the
commenters concluded that the reasons
students drop out of school typically
have very little to do with school itself,
and therefore suggested that the
Department remove this triggering
event.
Some commenters argued that the use
of the dropout rate as a trigger fails to
account for the various missions that
title IV institutions represent, or the
extended time to graduation that many
contemporary students face as they
balance career, family and higher
education. The commenters believed
that establishing a dropout rate as a
trigger for a letter of credit creates a
perverse incentive for institutions to
enroll and educate only those students
who are most likely to succeed, instead
of continuing to extend access to higher
education to the broader population. In
addition, the commenters believed that
measures of academic quality are best
left to accreditors, but if the Department
chooses to take on this role, it should
consider instead triggering a letter of
credit if an institution’s persistence rate
decreases significantly between
consecutive award years, or over a
period of award years. The commenters
believed this approach would account
for the significant variances in mission
and student body across higher
education without potentially limiting
access.
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Fluctuations in Funding § 668.171(g)(1)
Commenters believed the proposed
trigger for a significant fluctuation
between consecutive award years, or a
period of award years, in the amount of
Pell Grant and Direct Loan funds
received by an institution, is overly
vague. The commenters noted that yearover-year fluctuations can occur when
an institution decides to discontinue
individual programs or close campus
locations, often because those campuses
or programs are under-performing
financially even where the overall
institution is financially strong and
argued that because these are sound
business decisions made in the longterm interests of the institution, they
should not give rise to a letter of credit
requirement.
Some commenters believed that a
decrease in total title IV expenditures
should not trigger a letter of credit
requirement because the decreases in
the amount of title IV, HEA funds
disbursed puts the Department at less
risk of financial loss. In addition, the
commenters stated that a decrease in
title IV, HEA funding to a school is
largely out of the school’s control—it is
usually a result of decreased
enrollments or the Department’s
rulemaking actions.
Other commenters agreed that big
changes in the amount of financial aid
received by an institution could be a
sign that growth that is too fast, or an
enrollment decline may signal a school
is in serious trouble. The commenters
argued, however, that at small schools,
big percentage changes could simply be
the result of small changes in the
number of students. While the
commenters were confident that the
actual implementation of this rule
would not result in the Department
holding a small school accountable for
what is a minor change, they believed
the Department should clarify that the
change in Federal aid would need to be
large both in percentage and dollar
terms as a way of proactively assuaging
this concern.
One commenter noted that the phrase
‘‘significant fluctuation’’ was not
defined, but that the Department
implied on page 39393 of its NPRM that
it believes a reasonable standard would
be a 25 percent or greater change in the
amount of title IV, HEA funds a school
receives from year to year, after
accounting for changes in the title IV,
HEA programs. The commenter urged
the Department to clarify in the final
regulations precisely what this phrase
means so that institutions would know
how to comply. Moreover, the
commenter argued that the Department
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may be evaluating institutions by the
wrong metric, stating that the for-profit
sector has seen six-fold enrollment
growth over the past 25 years where
significant fluctuations in title IV, HEA
program volume may be a reflection of
that expansion. Said another way, a
significant fluctuation in title IV, HEA
program volume, without looking at
important contextual clues, is
insufficient to determine whether there
is questionable conduct at the
institution. In addition, the commenter
warned that including significant
fluctuation as a trigger may serve to
deter institutional growth, since a large
increase in enrollment would trigger the
financial protection requirement even if
that increase was perfectly legitimate.
In addition, the commenter believed
that, while the Department has a
compelling interest in ensuring that
institutions do not raise tuition
unnecessarily to take advantage of title
IV, HEA aid, the Department should try
to address this problem in a way that
does not discourage institutions from
expanding their enrollment.
For these reasons, the commenter
suggested revising the trigger so it refers
to a significant fluctuation in title IV,
HEA program volume per aid recipient,
not program volume overall. The
commenters believed this approach
would guard against increases in tuition
designed to take advantage of the title
IV, HEA programs while not penalizing
institutions with rapid enrollment
growth.
Discussion: We intend to use the high
drop-out rate and fluctuations in
funding triggers only when we make a
careful, reasoned analysis of the effect of
any of these events or conditions on a
particular institution, and conclude that
the condition or event is likely to have
a material adverse effect on the
institution. An institution that
challenges this determination may
present an argument disputing this
determination. If we are not persuaded,
we will take enforcement action under
34 CFR part 668, subpart G to limit the
institution’s participation to condition
further participation on supplying the
financial protection demanded. The
institution may obtain an administrative
hearing to dispute the determination,
and unlike with the automatic triggers,
the institution may present and have
considered both evidence and argument
in opposition to the determination that
the condition may constitute a material
adverse effect, but also whether the
amount of financial protection
demanded is warranted.
As noted in the introductory
discussion of this section and noted by
some commenters, the materiality or
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relevance of factors like dropout rates
and fluctuations in funding must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis in
view of the circumstances surrounding
or causes giving rise to what may appear
to be excessive or alarming outcomes. In
other words, what may be a high
dropout rate or significant fluctuation in
funding at one institution may not be
relevant at another institution. In this
regard, we appreciate the suggestions
made by the commenters for how the
Department could view or determine
whether or the extent to which these
factors are significant.
While a case-by-case approach argues
against setting bright-line thresholds, to
mitigate some of the anxiety expressed
by the commenters as to what may be
a high dropout rate or fluctuation in
funding, we may consider issuing
guidance or providing examples of
actual cases where the Department
made an affirmative determination.
Changes: None.
State or Agency Citations
§ 668.171(g)(2)
Comments: With respect to the
discretionary trigger under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(10)(ii), some commenters
noted that because State agencies may
issue citations for minor violations of
State requirements and not subject an
institution to any penalties, the
Department should remove this
triggering event. The commenters
believed this triggering event would
unnecessarily capture citations for
minor violations, such as failure to
update the institution’s contact
information. It would also capture
violations for which the State agency
has decided no penalty is necessary.
The commenters questioned why the
Department should substitute its
judgment for that of the State agency
and determine that an otherwise nonpunitive citation is indicative of
financial problems. In the alternative,
the commenters suggested that the final
regulations should provide that this
trigger would only be invoked if an
institution’s failure to comply with State
or agency requirements was material. In
addition, the commenters suggested that
the final regulations should define
‘‘State licensing or authorizing’’ agency
in this context to mean only the primary
State agency responsible for State
authorization, not specialized State
agencies, such as boards of nursing, that
have responsibility for professional
licensure and other matters that would
not have a material impact on the
overall financial condition of the
institution.
Other commenters recommend that
the Department apply the State agency-
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based trigger only if the citation by the
State authorizing agency is final and
relates to the same bases that can
support a borrower defense claim. Or,
because State agencies frequently cite
institutions for findings of
noncompliance that are remedied
appropriately and timely, the
commenters supported applying the
trigger only if the State agency has
initiated an action to suspend or
terminate its authorization of the
institution.
Some commenters were concerned
that the Department did not provide any
evidence that would support that an
institution that chooses to discontinue
State approval for a single program at a
single location would implicate the
financial stability of an entire
institution, much less a large institution
with a wide range of programming and
multi-million dollar endowment.
Discussion: The State agency-based
trigger and other discretionary triggers
are intentionally broad to capture events
that may have an adverse financial
impact on an institution. With regard to
the comments that the Department
should not require an institution to
report State agency actions for events or
violations (1) that the institution
considers minor, (2) for which the
agency did not penalize the institution,
or (3) that are remedied timely, we
believe that doing so under any of these
circumstances defeats the purpose of the
trigger. There is little or no reporting
burden on an institution that is
sporadically cited for a violation by a
State agency, but where the institution
is cited repeatedly the reporting burden
is warranted because even if individual
violations are minor, collectively those
violations may signal a serious issue at
the institution.
A State licensing or authorizing
agency, for the purpose of this trigger,
includes any agency or entity in the
State that regulates or governs (1)
whether an institution may operate or
offer postsecondary educational
programs in the State, (2) the nature or
delivery of those educational programs,
or (3) the certification or licensure of
students who complete those programs.
In this regard, we disagree with the
assertion that actions by a State agency
responsible for professional licensure
would never have a material impact on
the financial condition of the
institution. To the contrary, because the
State agency enforces standards that
restrict professional practice to
individuals who, in part, satisfy
rigorous educational qualifications, a
citation or finding by the agency could
impact how an institution offers or
delivers an educational program.
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Finally, with regard to the comment
about an institution voluntarily
discontinuing State approval for a
program at a particular location, we note
that, unless the State cited the
institution for discontinuing the
program, this is not a reportable event.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters
believed that considering ‘‘claims of any
kind’’ against an institution, in
proposed § 668.171(c)(1)(ii), would
invite a broad set of claims that may not
cause financial damages. Others
objected to the apparent ability under
proposed § 668.171(c)(10) to add other
events or conditions as it wished
without public comment. Commenters
believed that proposed triggers do not
focus just on fiscal solvency; rather,
they assert, the proposed triggers
include events not related to financial
solvency: Accrediting agency actions,
cohort default rates, and dropout rates.
The commenters opined that the
Department was inappropriately
attempting to shift the emphasis of these
regulations from financial oversight into
much broader accountability measures
and to insert the Federal government
into institutional decision-making.
Discussion: To the extent that the
proposed regulations would have
included events other than explicit
claims, we are revising the regulations
to include only events that pose an
imminent risk of very serious financial
impact. An institution that could lose
institutional eligibility in the next year
is indeed at serious risk of severe
financial distress. Other events cited
here we agree pose a risk only under
particular circumstances, and should
not be viewed as per se risks.
Changes: Section 668.171 has been
revised to make clear that accreditor
sanctions and government citations, are
considered, like high dropout rates, as
triggering events only on a reasoned,
case-by-case basis under § 668.171(g)(2)
and (5).
Stress Test § 668.171(g)(3)
Comments: Commenters believed that
a trigger based on the proposed stress
test is redundant because the
Department uses the existing composite
score methodology as the primary
means of evaluating the financial health
of an institution. In addition, the
commenters were concerned that the
Department did not provide schools
with enough information regarding what
the financial stress test will be and if it
will be developed through negotiated
rulemaking. The commenters suggested
removing the stress test as a trigger, but
if the Department does implement a
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stress test, it should first be developed
through negotiated rulemaking.
Other commenters echoed the
suggestion to develop the stress test
through negotiated rulemaking, arguing
that developing a test would not only be
time consuming and complex, but have
serious implications for institutions—all
the reasons why institutions and other
stakeholders should have an
opportunity to provide their views and
analyses.
Some commenters argued that it was
premature and unreasonable to include
reference to a stress test, which has yet
to be developed, and which schools
have not had a chance to review and
offer comment on.
Discussion: We do not intend to
replace the composite score
methodology with a financial stress test.
The stress test could be used to assess
an institution’s ability to deal with an
economic crisis or adverse event under
a scenario-based model, whereas the
composite score methodology focuses
primarily on actual financial
performance over a fiscal year operating
cycle.
We certainly understand the
community’s desire to participate in any
process the Department undertakes to
develop a stress test, or evaluate
adopting an existing stress test, but
cannot at this time commit to a
particular process. However, we wish to
assure institutions and other affected
parties that we will seek their input in
whatever process is used.
Changes: None.
Violation of Loan Agreement
§ 668.171(g)(6)
Comments: Under proposed
§ 668.171(c)(4), an institution is not
financially responsible if it violated a
provision or requirement in a loan
agreement with the creditor with the
largest secured extension of credit to the
institution, failed to make a payment for
more than 120 days with that creditor,
or that creditor imposes more stringent
loan terms or sanctions as a result of a
default or delinquency event.
Some commenters noted that because
the largest secured extension of credit
may be for a very small dollar amount,
the Department should specify a
minimum threshold below which a
violation of a loan agreement is not a
triggering event.
Other commenters believed that a
school that satisfies the composite score
requirements should not be required to
post a letter of credit relating to
violations of loan agreements. The
commenters cautioned that this
provision could have the unintended
impact of altering the relationship
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between schools and their creditors
because creditors would have additional
leverage in negotiations regarding
violations of loan agreements. The
commenters believed that, because this
additional leverage could potentially
place a school’s financial stability at risk
where it otherwise was not, this
triggering event should be deleted.
Along the same lines, other
commenters warned that the proposed
loan agreement triggers would create
significant leverage for banks that does
not presently exist. The commenters
opined that a bank potentially could
threaten to trigger a violation of a loan
agreement or obligation, thereby
exercising inappropriate leverage over
the institution and its operations to the
detriment of its educational mission,
students, and employees. The
commenters believed this outcome
would be a significant threat that the
Department must consider this
‘‘countervailing evidence’’ in
rationalizing the reasonableness of this
proposed trigger. See Am. Fed’n of
Labor & Cong. of Indus. Organizations v.
Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 965 F.2d 962, 970
(11th Cir. 1992) (quoting AFL–CIO v.
Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 n. 44 (D.C.
Cir. 1979)).
Other commenters agreed that, in
certain circumstances, the violation of a
loan agreement or other financial
obligation may signal the need for
financial protection. However, the
commenters believed the proposed
triggering events were overly broad and
could result in financially sound
institutions being regularly penalized.
The commenters recommended that the
Department revise the triggering events
in two ways.
First, the Department should include
a materiality threshold in proposed
§ 668.171(c)(4)(i) so that this provision
is only triggered when a default is
material and adverse to the institution.
In addition, the commenters suggested
that this provision should apply only to
any undisputed amounts and issues that
are determined by a final order after all
applicable cure periods and remedies
have expired. With regard to proposed
§ 668.171(c)(4)(ii), because crossdefaults are prevalent in most material
loan agreements, commenters suggested
that the Department should focus on
defaults that are material and adverse to
the institution as a going concern, as
opposed to narrowing the trigger to the
institution’s largest secured creditor.
Second, commenters suggested that
the language in proposed
§ 668.171(c)(4)(iii) should be revised to
exclude events where the institution it
permitted to cure the violation in a
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timely manner in accordance with the
loan agreement. They noted that this
type of ‘‘curing’’ is a common
occurrence and specifically
contemplated in the agreements
between the parties.
Other commenters believed that the
Department should include allowances
for instances in which the creditor
waives any action regarding a violation
of a provision in a loan agreement, or
the creditor does not consider the
violation to be material. The
commenters note that although the
reporting requirements under proposed
§ 668.171(d)(3) permit an institution to
notify the Department that a loan
violation was waived by the creditor, it
does not explicitly state that such a
waiver would make the institution
financially responsible. The
commenters urged the Department to
revise this provision to clearly state that
a waiver of a term or condition granted
by a creditor cures the triggering event
so that financial protection is not
required. According to the commenters,
certified public accountants use this
standard when assessing a school’s
ability to continue as a going concern—
if a waiver is issued or granted by the
creditor the certified public accountant
does not mention this event in the
school’s audited financial statements
because it is no longer an issue for the
debtor.
Some commenters believed that the
proposed loan agreement provisions
were too broad and would unnecessarily
impact institutions that pose no risk.
The commenters stated that loan
agreements may include a number of
events that are not related to the failure
of the institution to make payments that
trigger changes to the terms of the
agreement, and in that case the
proposed provisions would seem to
capture the change in terms as a
reportable event. The commenters noted
that nonprofit institutions have access
to and use variable rate loans, and that
some nonprofit institutions have
synthetically converted their variable
rate interest borrowings into fixed rate
debt by entering into an interest rate
swap agreement. The commenters
believed that, under these
circumstances, it would be incorrect to
assume that changes to the interest rates
negatively impact the institution.
Further, while the loan provision in the
proposed regulations is narrower than
the current one since it only applies to
an institution’s largest secured creditor,
rather than all creditors, the
commenters believed the Department
should establish a materiality threshold
and/or make a determination that any
changes to the interest rate or other
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terms would have a material impact on
the institution. In addition, the
commenters noted that the exception
provided under § 668.171(d)(3),
allowing the institution to show that
penalties or constraints imposed by a
creditor will not impact the institution’s
ability to meet its financial obligations,
only applies if the creditor waived a
violation and questioned whether the
end result would be the same if the
creditor did not waive the violation, but
the penalties or changes to the loan
nevertheless would not have an adverse
impact.
Discussion: In considering the
comments regarding the materiality of
loan violations, and whether the
sanctions or terms imposed by a creditor
as a result of a default or delinquency
event are relevant or adverse, we are
making the provisions in proposed
§ 668.171(c)(4) discretionary triggers
under § 668.171(g)(6). We believe that
evaluating a delinquency or default on
a loan obligation under the
discretionary triggers addresses the
commenters’ concerns that the
Department should review or assess a
loan violation on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether that violation is
material and sufficiently adverse to
warrant financial protection. This caseby-case review eliminates the need to
qualify or limit the scope of loan
violations to the largest secured
creditor. Moreover, making these
discretionary triggers maintains the
Department’s objective of identifying
and acting on early warning signs of
financial distress. We expect that
making the proposed provisions
discretionary will abate the concerns
raised by the commenters that an
automatic action by the Department in
response to a loan violation would
prompt or create an unfair advantage for
creditors, because that action is no
longer certain. In addition, we note that
if a creditor files suit in response to a
loan violation, that suit is covered under
the provisions in § 668.171(c)(1)(ii) as
an automatic triggering event.
Changes: We have relocated the
proposed loan agreement provision to
§ 668.171(g)(6), reclassified those
provisions as discretionary events, and
removed the qualifier that the loan
violation is for the largest secured
creditor.
Borrower Defense Claims
§ 668.171(g)(7)
Comments: None.
Discussion: After further
consideration, the Department
concluded that, in instances in which
the Department can expect an influx of
successful borrower defense claims as a
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result of a lawsuit, settlement,
judgment, or finding from a State or
Federal administrative proceeding, we
may wish to require additional
protection. However, since such
instances are fact-specific, we have
decided to make such a trigger
discretionary.
Changes: We have added a new
discretionary trigger in § 668.171(g)(8)
relating to claims for borrower relief as
a result of a lawsuit, settlement,
judgment, or finding from a State or
Federal administrative proceeding.
Reporting Requirements § 668.171(h)
Comments: Some commenters
believed that the proposed mandatory
reporting requirements under
§ 668.171(d) are outside the scope of the
Department’s authority. The
commenters argued that statutory
provisions cited by the Department, that
the Secretary has authority ‘‘to make,
promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend
rules and regulations governing the
manner of operation of, and governing
the applicable programs administered
by, the Department,’’ and that the
Secretary is authorized ‘‘to prescribe
such rules and regulations as the
Secretary determines necessary or
appropriate to administer and manage
the functions of the Secretary or the
Department’’ (20 U.S.C. 1221e–3), are
‘‘implementary rather than substantive,’’
meaning that they ‘‘can only be
implemented consistently with the
provisions and purposes of the
legislation.’’ New England Power Co. v.
Fed. Power Comm’n., 467 F.2d 425, 430
(D.C. Cir. 1972), aff’d, 415 U.S. 345
(1974) (citation omitted).
Discussion: The Secretary cited 20
U.S.C. 1221e–3 as authority for
revisions to 34 CFR 30.70, 81 FR 39407,
and the repayment rate disclosures
proposed as new § 668.41(h). 81 FR
39371. As pertinent here, the
Department cited as authority for the
proposed changes to § 668.171, which
includes the new reporting
requirements under § 668.171(h),
sections 487 and 498(c) of the HEA, 20
U.S.C. 1094 and 1099c. Section 487
states that the Secretary
‘‘notwithstanding any other provision of
this title (title IV of the HEA), shall
prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary to provide . . . in matters not
governed by specific program
regulations, the establishment of
reasonable standards of financial
responsibility . . . including any matter
the Secretary deems necessary to the
sound administration of the financial
aid programs, such as the pertinent
actions of any owner, shareholder, or
person exercising control over an
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eligible institution.’’ 20 U.S.C.
1094(c)(1)(B). Section 498 states that the
Secretary is to determine whether an
institution is able to meet its financial
obligations to all parties, including
students and the Secretary, including
adopting financial criteria ratios. 20
U.S.C. 1099c(c). These provisions give
the Secretary ample substantive
authority to adopt regulations that
require the institution to provide
audited financial statements and other
records needed to evaluate the financial
capability of the institution. This
authority is direct and specifically
authorizes the required reporting by
participating institutions, unlike the
charge imposed by the Federal Power
Commission in New England Power Co.
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, cited by the
commenter to support its view. The
court there concluded that the
Commission lacked authority to impose
that charge on the industry member for
costs incurred not for the benefit of the
member but for the general public. New
England Power Co. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 467 F.2d 425, 427 (D.C. Cir.
1972), aff’d, 415 U.S. 345 (1974). Here,
the HEA expressly authorizes the
Secretary to adopt regulations governing
the conditions for participation in the
title IV, HEA programs, and in
particular, the assessment of the
institution’s financial capability.
Changes: None.
Comments: Under the reporting
requirements in proposed § 668.171(d),
an institution must report any action or
event identified as a trigger under
§ 668.171(c) no later than 10 days after
the action or event occurs. For three of
the reportable actions or events—
disclosure of a judicial or administrative
proceeding, withdrawal of owner’s
equity, and violations of loan
agreements—the institution may show
that those actions or events are not
material or relevant.
Commenters were concerned that the
Department would not be bound to act
or consider any evidence an institution
would provide under proposed
§ 668.171(d)(2) regarding the waiver of a
violation of a loan agreement, or provide
any opportunity to the institution to
discuss the waiver. Moreover, the
commenters were concerned that the
waiver reporting provisions would
permit the Department to disregard any
such evidence if the creditor imposes
additional constraints or requirements
as a condition of waiving the violation,
or imposes penalties or requirements.
Absent a materiality modifier, the
commenters believed that the waiver
‘‘carve out’’ would become meaningless.
Ostensibly, the commenters feared that
the Department could proceed to
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demand financial protection even if a
creditor waived the underlying violation
and the institution effectively
demonstrated that the additional
requirements imposed would only have
a negligible impact on the institution’s
ability to meet current and future
financial obligations. The commenters
recommended that at a minimum,
proposed § 668.171(d)(2) should be
modified to require a material adverse
effect on the institution’s financial
condition.
Other commenters believed that
requiring institutions to report the
widely disparate events reflected in the
proposed triggering events within 10
days is unreasonable, particularly for
large, decentralized organizations. The
commenters believed that it was one
thing to demand that type of prompt
reporting on a limited number of items
from institutions that already have been
placed on heightened monitoring but
quite different to require hypervigilance from all institutions. The
commenters argued that various offices
across the institution might be involved
and have contemporaneous knowledge
of the triggering events, but the
individuals dealing with an unrelated
agency action, a lawsuit, or a
renegotiation of debt are unlikely to
have a Department reporting deadline
on the top of minds. Moreover, the
commenters believed that individuals at
an institution who are charged with
maintaining compliance with
Department regulations are unlikely to
learn about some of these events within
such a short period of time.
Discussion: In view of these
comments and other comments
discussing the triggering events, we
clarify in these final regulations the
reporting requirement that applies to
each triggering event. As shown below,
an institution must notify the
Department no later than:
1. For the lawsuits and other actions
or events in § 668.171(c)(1)(i), 10 days
after a payment was required, a liability
was incurred, or a suit was filed, and for
suits, 10 days after the suit has been
pending for 120 days;
2. For lawsuits in § 668.171(c)(1)(ii),
10 days after the suit was filed and the
deadlines for filing summary judgment
motions established, and 10 days after
the earliest of the events for the
summary judgments described in that
paragraph;
3. For accrediting agency actions
under § 668.171(c)(1)(iii), 10 days after
the institution is notified by its
accrediting agency that it must submit a
teach-out plan.
4. For the withdrawal of owner’s
equity in § 668.171(c)(1)(v), 10 days
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after the withdrawal is made. 5. For the
non-title IV revenue provision in
§ 668.171(d), 45 days after the end of the
institution’s fiscal year, as provided in
§ 668.28(c)(3).
6. For the SEC and exchange
provisions for publicly traded
institutions under § 668.171(e), 10 days
after the SEC or stock exchange notifies
or takes action against the institution, or
10 days after any extension granted by
SEC.
7. For State or agency actions in
paragraph (g)(2), 10 days after the
institution is cited for violating a State
or agency requirement;
8. For probation or show cause
actions under paragraph (g)(5), 10 days
after the institution’s accrediting agency
places the institution on that status; or
9. For the loan agreement provisions
in paragraph (g)(6), 10 days after a loan
violation occurs, the creditor waives the
violation, or imposes sanctions or
penalties in exchange or as a result of
the waiver. We note that the proposed
loan agreement provisions are
discretionary triggers in these final
regulations, and as such facilitate a
more thorough dialogue with the
institution about waivers of loan
violations and creditor actions tied to
those waivers.
We also are providing that an
institution may show that a reportable
event no longer applies or is resolved or
that it has insurance that will cover the
debts and liabilities that arise at any
time from that triggering event.
In addition, we are providing that an
institution may demonstrate at the time
it reports a State or Federal lawsuit
under § 668.171(c)(1)(i)(B) that the
amount claimed under that lawsuit
exceeds the potential recovery. We
stress that this option does not include
any consideration of the merit of the
government suit. It addresses only the
situation in which the government
agency asserts a claim that the facts
alleged, if accepted as true, and the legal
claims asserted, if fully accepted, could
still not produce a recovery of the
deemed or claimed amount for reasons
totally distinct from the merit of the
government suit. Thus, the regulations
in some instances deem a suit to seek
recovery of all tuition received by an
institution, but the allegations of the
complaint describe only a limited
period, or a given location, or specific
programs, and the institution can prove
that the total amount of tuition received
for that identified program, location, or
period is smaller than the amount
claimed or the amount of recover
deemed to be sought.
Changes: We have revised
§ 668.171(h)(1) to specify the reporting
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requirements that apply to a triggering
event, as described above. We have also
provided in revised paragraph (g)(3) that
an institution may show (1) that a
reportable event no longer exists, has
been resolved, or that it has insurance
that will cover debts and liabilities that
arise at any time from that triggering
event; or (2) that the amount claimed in
a lawsuit under § 668.171(c)(1)(i)(B)
exceeds the potential recovery the
claimant may receive.
Public Domestic and Foreign
Institutions § 668.171(i)
Domestic Public Institutions
Comments: Commenters were
concerned that the proposed regulations
would unfairly target private
institutions, noting that public
institutions would be exempt from the
triggering events requiring letters of
credit, even as recent events have
shown that public institutions are not
necessarily more financially stable than
other institutions.
Other commenters believed that the
Department intended to exempt public
institutions, as it currently does, from
the financial responsibility standards,
including the proposed triggering
events, but the Department did not
explicitly do so in the NPRM.
Discussion: We rely, and have for
nearly 20 years relied, on the full-faith
and credit of the State to cover any
debts and liabilities that a public
institution may incur in participating in
the title IV, HEA programs. Under the
current regulations in §§ 668.171(b) and
(c), a public institution is not subject to
the general standards of financial
responsibility and is considered
financially responsible as long as it does
not violate any past performance
provision in § 668.174. The Department
has on occasion placed public
institutions on heightened cash
monitoring for failing to file required
audits in a timely manner, but even then
has never required a public institution
to provide financial protection of any
type because we already have it in the
form of full-faith and credit. We would
like to clarify that we are not changing
long-standing policy for public
institutions with these final regulations.
In other words, the triggering events in
§ 668.171(c) through (g) of these
regulations do not apply to public
institutions.
Changes: None.
Foreign Institutions
Comments: Commenters believed that
the actions and events that could trigger
a letter of credit under § 668.171(c) are
not applicable to foreign institutions,
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and requested that foreign institutions
be exempted from these regulations, at
least until the composite score
methodology is revised. In addition, the
commenters reasoned that a foreign
institution with thousands of students
from the institution’s home country and
perhaps a few dozen U.S. students
should not be required to post warnings
for all of its students based on this U.S.
regulatory compliance issue.
Discussion: While we agree that some
triggering events in §§ 668.171(c)
through (g) may not apply to foreign
institutions, that circumstance does not
justify exempting those institutions
from the triggering events that do apply.
In addition, we see no reason to grant
a temporary exemption until the
composite score methodology is revised
because it is unlikely that accountingbased revisions to a financial statementcentered methodology will affect
triggering events like lawsuits that are
applied contemporaneously, or title IV,
HEA program compliance requirements
like cohort default rate and gainful
employment. We note that foreign
public institutions, like U.S.-based
public institutions, are currently
exempt, and continue to be exempt in
these final regulations, from most of the
general standards of financial
responsibility, including the composite
score.
Changes: None.
Alternative Standards and
Requirements § 668.175
Provisional Certification Alternative
§ 668.175(f)
Amount of Financial Protection
§ 668.175(f)(4)
Cost of Letter of Credit
Comments: One commenter stated
that, years ago, letters of credit were
both widely available and very
inexpensive; it was not unusual for a
bank to issue a small letter of credit on
behalf of a client for no charge and
without any collateral. However, the
commenter stated that the bursting of
the stock bubble in the late 1990s and
the new rules regulating banks after the
financial crisis has had a tremendous
effect on the ability of banks to issue
letters of credit, the price charged for
them, and the amount of collateral
required to issue one.
According to the commenter, a
$1,000,000 letter of credit that might
have cost $5,000 to issue with no
collateral 30 years ago now costs
$10,000–$20,000 and requires $500,000
to $1,000,000 of cash to collateralize it.
The commenter opined that while this
is still relatively easy for the wealthiest
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schools with the largest endowments to
meet, it would place a tremendous
burden on smaller schools, vocational
schools, and schools that serve the
poorest students in the poorest areas
because it will tie up a significant
portion of their cash as collateral. For
these reasons the commenter urged the
Department to accept alternatives to
bank-issued letters of credit, noting that
performance bonds are used widely in
business to guarantee satisfactory
performance of construction, services,
and delivery of goods. The commenter
stated that most States that have
regulations to protect students from
poorly run schools allow performance
bonds already.
According to the commenter, a
performance bond guarantees the
performance of a task on behalf of the
client. In the case of a borrower defense,
the Department is using the letter of
credit to guarantee to successful
completion of the education for which
the Department issued title IV loans. By
allowing performance bonds, according
to the commenter, the Department could
protect itself from poorly run schools
that harm students without harming
thinly capitalized schools by forcing
them to purchase more expensive
products. The commenter stated that a
typical surety bond for $1,000,000 might
cost $5,000–$15,000 and only require 25
percent collateral or less. This means
that the schools get to keep more of their
cash to better deliver education to
students and the Department is still
adequately protected against a claim
from a closed school.
Some commenters noted that the
Department has the statutory authority
under section 498(c)(3)(A) of the HEA to
accept performance bonds and should
use that authority because surety bonds
cost far less than letters of credit and are
equally secure.
Other commenters were concerned
that the cost of securing required letters
of credit could be prohibitive and cause
some schools to close. These and other
commenters believed that schools are
finding that it is increasingly more
difficult to secure letters of credit
because of high cost and the regulatory
uncertainties facing the higher
education sector. The commenters noted
that these costs include fees to the
lenders and attorneys each time the
underlying credit facility is negotiated
to expand the letters of credit (schools
are required to pay their attorney’s fees
as well as lender attorney fees for these
transactions). Moreover, the
commenters stated that because of the
Department’s compliance actions
against proprietary schools, many
lenders will no longer lend to
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proprietary institutions. Therefore, if
schools are forced to obtain large letters
of credit they will need to turn to
second or third tier lenders, or lenders
who offer crisis loans, who will charge
significant fees for these letters of credit.
In view of the cost and financial
resources needed to secure a letter of
credit, some commenters believed that
the Department should apply a cap of 25
percent on the amount of the
cumulative letters of credit that a
provisionally certified institution could
be required to post under the revised
regulations.
Other commenters suggested that if a
letter of credit is imposed for an
accrediting agency trigger relating to
closing a location, the letter of credit
should be based on a percentage of the
amount of title IV, HEA funds the
closing location received, not a
percentage of title IV, HEA funds
received by the entire institution. The
commenters reasoned that if the
financial impact of the closing of the
branch or additional location will have
a material negative impact on the
school, then the Department should set
the letter of credit amount based on 10
percent of the branch or additional
location’s title IV, HEA funds, arguing
that this approach is straight-forward:
Any liabilities that the school may incur
resulting from the closure of a branch or
additional location would relate only to
the students attending the closing
location. In contrast, the commenter
believed that imposing the letter of
credit based on the total title IV, HEA
funds received by the school would be
disproportionate to the financial impact
of the potential student issues to which
a letter of credit may relate. The
commenters noted that the NPRM
expressly recognized the cost of
securing letters of credit and the
difficulties a school may have in
obtaining a letter of credit within 30
days. 81 FR 39368. If a school cannot
secure a letter of credit within that
timeframe, the Department would set
aside title IV, HEA funds, which
according to the commenters would
almost assuredly have a catastrophic
financial impact on the institution.
Therefore, the commenters concluded
that imposing a larger letter of credit on
the school than is necessary will impose
cost and financial burden on the school
far greater than any possible benefits
that the Department could obtain from
the larger letter of credit, and will
negatively impact students in the
process.
Discussion: With regard to the
comment that the Department cap any
cumulative letters of credit to 25 percent
of amount that would otherwise be
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required, we believe setting an
inflexible cap would defeat the purpose
of requiring financial protection that is
commensurate with the risks posed by
one or more of the triggering events. The
Secretary currently has the discretion to
establish the amount of financial
protection required for a particular
institution, starting at 10 percent of the
amount the title IV, HEA program funds
the institution received in the prior
award year, and that discretion is not
limited by these regulations. As noted
previously in this preamble under the
heading ‘‘Composite Score and
Triggering Events,’’ the amount of the
financial protection required is based on
a recalculated composite score of less
than 1.0—the total amount of financial
protection required is, at a minimum, 10
percent of the title IV, HEA funds the
institution received during its most
recently completed fiscal year, and such
added amount as the Secretary
demonstrates is warranted by the risk of
liabilities with regard to that institution.
We do not disagree with the general
notion that the costs associated with a
letter of credit have increased over time
and that some institutions may not be
able to secure, or may have difficulty
securing, a letter of credit. We
acknowledged this in the preamble to
the NPRM and offered the set-aside as
an alternative to the letter of credit.
With regard to other alternatives, we are
not aware of any surety instruments that
are as secure as bank-issued letters of
credit and that can be negotiated easily
by the Department to meet the demands
of protecting the Federal interests in a
dependable and efficient manner.
However, if surety instruments come to
light, or are developed, that are more
affordable to institutions than letters of
credit but that offer the same benefits to
the Department, we will consider
accepting those instruments. To leave
open this possibility, we are amending
the financial protection requirements in
§ 668.175(f)(2)(i) to provide that the
Department may, in a notice published
in the Federal Register, identify
acceptable surety alternatives or other
forms of financial protection. We wish
to make clear that the Department will
not accept, or entertain in any way,
surety instruments or other forms of
financial protection that are not
specified in these final regulations or
that are not subsequently identified in
the Federal Register. In this vein, the
Department is continuing to examine
generally the alternatives to a letter of
credit to ensure that such alternatives
strike a reasonable balance between
protecting the interests of the taxpayers
and the Federal Government and
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providing flexibility to institutions, and
is revising the regulations to provide
that all alternatives to a letter of credit
or a set-aside arrangement, including
cash, will be permitted only in the
Secretary’s discretion.
Lastly, as discussed previously
throughout this preamble, an institution
that can prove that it has sufficient
insurance to cover immediate and
potential debts, liabilities, claims, or
financial obligations stemming from
each triggering event, will not be
required to provide financial protection
of any kind.
With regard to the amount of financial
protection stemming from the teach-out
trigger for closed locations under
§ 668.171(c)(iv), by considering only
closures of locations that cause the
composite score to fall below a 1.0, we
identify those events that pose a
significant risk to the continued
viability of the institution as a whole,
and the financial protection needed
should be based on the risk of closure
and attendant costs to the taxpayer, not
merely the expected costs of closed
school discharges to students enrolled at
the closed location.
Finally, the Department has long had
discretion, under current regulations, in
setting the amount of the required
financial protection, and we are revising
§ 668.175(f)(4) to memorialize our
existing discretion to require financial
protection in amounts beyond the
minimum 10 percent where appropriate.
Changes: We have revised
§ 668.175(f)(2)(i) to provide that the
Secretary may identify acceptable surety
instruments or other forms of financial
protection in a notice published in the
Federal Register. In each place in the
regulations where we address
acceptable forms of financial protection,
we have revised the regulations to
provide that alternatives to letters of
credit and set-aside arrangements will
be permitted in the Secretary’s
discretion. In addition, we have revised
§ 668.175(f)(4) to provide the minimum
amount of financial protection required,
specifically to set 10 percent of prior
year title IV, HEA funding as the
minimum required protection amount,
with a minor exception for institutions
that do not participate in the loan
program, and to authorize the setting of
such larger added amount as the
Secretary determines is needed to
ensure that the total amount of financial
protection provided is sufficient to fully
cover any estimated losses, provided
that the Secretary may reduce this
added amount only if an institution
demonstrates that this added amount is
unnecessary to protect, or is contrary to,
the Federal interest. We made a
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conforming change to
§ 668.90(a)(3)(iii)(D).
Set-Aside § 668.175(h)
Comments: Commenters believed that
the set-aside under proposed
§ 668.175(h) as an alternative a letter of
credit or cash would not be a viable
option. The commenters argued that
most schools rely on title IV, HEA funds
for cash flow purposes, so
administratively offsetting a portion of
those funds would likely force many
schools to close. Similarly, if a school is
placed on Heightened Cash Monitoring
2 (HCM2) or reimbursement because it
cannot secure a letter of credit, the
commenters asserted that the school
would likely close because historically
the Department and institutions have
not been able to timely process funds
under HCM2.
Other commenters acknowledged the
Department’s concern about getting
financial protection into place quickly,
but believed that 90 days would be a
more reasonable timeframe. The
commenters stated that under current
conditions in the financial markets,
even with the best efforts it is almost
impossible to get a letter of credit
approved within the proposed 30-day
timeframe. Also, the commenters
suggested that if the Department
implements the set-aside because of a
school’s delay in providing the letter of
credit, this section needs to allow for
the set-aside agreement to be terminated
once the school is able to provide the
letter of credit.
Other commenters agreed that the
Department needs some way to obtain
funds from institutions that fail to
provide a letter of credit. The
commenters believed, however, that the
proposed set-aside provisions are overly
generous in terms of time and amount.
In particular, the commenters suggested
the following changes:
(1) Make set-aside amounts larger
than letter of credit requests. An
institution’s inability to obtain a letter of
credit may in and of itself be a warning
sign that private investors do not trust
the institution enough to be involved
with it. Therefore, the commenters
suggested that any amounts covered by
the set-aside provision should be set at
1.5 times the size of a letter of credit.
This would both encourage colleges to
obtain letters of credit and also send a
strong message that the set-aside is a last
resort action.
(2) Implement other limitations on
colleges that cover letters of credit
through set asides. According to the
commenters, the set-aside is not the
ideal way to get institutions to provide
their financial commitments.
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Accordingly, they proposed that this
provision should come with greater
protections for students and taxpayers
or, at the very least, include some sort
of limitation on Federal financial aid
that prevents the institution from
increasing the number of Federal aid
recipients at the school and potentially
even considers not allowing for new
enrollment of federally aided students.
Absent such protections, commenters
noted that schools may face perverse
incentives where they are encouraged to
grow enrollment as a way of meeting the
set-aside conditions.
(3) Lessen the time period for
collecting set-aside amounts.
Commenters noted that nine months is
a long period of time for collecting
amounts that an institution would
otherwise be expected to provide in 30
days through a letter of credit. Nine
months is also a long time in general—
almost an entire academic year.
Commenters stated that collecting the
funds in this amount of time makes it
possible for institutions to still enroll a
large number of students and then run
the risk of shutting down, and suggested
that the Department shorten this time
period to no more than half an academic
year.
Discussion: While a set-aside may not
be an option for an institution that is
unable to compensate for a temporary
loss of a percentage of its title IV, HEA
funding, either by using its own
resources or obtaining some form of
financing, it is unlikely that the
institution has any other options. For
other institutions with at least some
resources, we believe the set-aside is a
viable alternative.
We disagree with the assertion that an
institution is likely to close if it is
placed on HCM2. Based on data
available on the Department’s Web site
at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/
data-center/school/hcm, approximately
60 percent of the institutions on HCM2
as of March 2015 were still on that
status as of June 2016.
With regard to extending the time
within which an institution must
submit a letter of credit, we adopt in
these regulations the Department’s
current practice of allowing an
institution 45 days.
In addition, we are providing in the
final regulations that when an
institution submits a letter of credit, the
Department will terminate the
corresponding set-aside agreement and
return any funds held under that
agreement. With regard to the comments
that the Department should increase the
amount of the set-aside or shorten the
time within which the set-aside must be
fully funded, we see no justification for
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either action. The Department proposed
the set-aside as an alternative for an
institution that is unable to timely
secure a letter of credit, so that inability
cannot be used as a reason to increase
the amount of financial protection
under the set-aside arrangement. For the
funding timeframe, the Department
proposed nine months, roughly the
length of an academic year, as a
reasonable compromise between having
financial protection fully in place in the
short term and minimizing the
consequences of reducing an
institution’s cash flow. We believe that
shortening the funding timeframe may
put unnecessary financial stress on an
institution that would otherwise fulfill
its obligations to students and the
Department. We continue to analyze,
and will publish in the Federal
Register, the terms on which an
institution may provide financial
protection other than a letter of credit or
set-aside arrangement.
Changes: We have revised
§ 668.175(h) to increase from 30 to 45
days the time within which an
institution must provide a letter of
credit to the Department and provide
that the Secretary will release any funds
held under a set-aside if the institution
subsequently provides the letter of
credit or other financial protection
required under the zone or provisional
certification alternatives in § 668.175(d)
or (f).
Provisional Certification (Section
668.175(f)(1)(i))
Comments: Some commenters were
concerned that the Department would
place a school on provisional
certification simply because of a
triggering event in § 668.171(c), such as
the school’s cohort default rate, 90/10
ratio, or D/E rates under the GE
regulations. The commenters argued
that the regulations covering these
measures did not intend or contemplate
their use as reasons for placing an
institution on provisional certification,
so schools should not be subject to
additional penalties.
Other commenters questioned
whether the Department made a change
in the applicability of the provisional
certification alternative in § 668.175(f)
that was not discussed in the NPRM.
The commenters stated that it was
unclear whether excluding the measures
in § 668.171(b)(2) and (b)(3) from either
zone alternative or the provisional
certification alternatives in proposed
§ 668.175(d) and (f) was intentional or if
the reference to § 668.171(b)(1) should
just be § 668.171(b). In addition, the
commenters noted that only the
provisional certification alternative in
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proposed § 668.175(f) refers to the
proposed substitutes for a letter of credit
(cash and the set-aside), whereas both
the NPRM and proposed § 668.175(h),
by cross-reference to § 668.175(d), refer
to the substitutes as applicable to the
zone alternative.
One commenter noted that the current
regulations create multiple options for
institutions with a failing financial
responsibility score, but the terms
between the zone and provisional
certification alternatives are not
sufficiently equal. The commenter also
contended that the time limits
associated with the alternatives are
unclear. To address this, the commenter
recommended the following changes to
the current regulations.
(1) Increase the minimum size of the
initial letter of credit for institutions on
provisional status.
Currently, an institution choosing this
option only has to provide a letter of
credit for an amount that in general is,
at a minimum, 10 percent of the amount
of title IV, HEA funds received by the
institution during its most recently
completed fiscal year, while an
institution that chooses to avoid
provisional certification must submit a
50 percent letter of credit. The
commenter recognized that part of this
difference reflects the bigger risks to an
institution that come with being
provisionally certified but believed the
current gap in letters of credit is too
large. The commenter recommended
that the Department increase the
minimum letter of credit required from
provisionally certified institutions that
enter this status after the final
regulations take effect to 25 percent.
(2) Automatically increase the letter of
credit for institutions that renew their
provisional status.
The commenter stated that
§ 668.175(f)(1) of the current regulations
suggests that an institution may
participate under the provisional
certification alternative for no more than
three consecutive years, whereas
§ 668.175(f)(3) suggests that the
Secretary may allow the institution to
renew this provisional certification and
may require additional financial
protection.
The commenter requested that the
Department clarify the terms on which
it will renew a provisional status. In
particular, the commenter
recommended that we require the
institution, as part of any renewal, to
increase the size of the letter of credit
to 50 percent of the institution’s Federal
financial aid. This amount would align
with the current requirements for an
institution with a failing composite
score that does not choose the
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provisional certification alternative and,
according to the commenter, would
reflect that an institution has already
spent a great deal of time in a status that
suggests financial concerns.
(3) Limit how long an institution may
renew its provisional status.
The commenter stated that
§ 668.175(f)(3) of the current regulations
suggests an institution could potentially
stay in provisional status forever. The
commenter asked the Department to
place a time limit on these renewals that
would ideally be no longer than the
period during which institutions can
continue to participate in the title IV,
HEA programs while subject to other
conditions under the Department’s
regulations, which tends to be three
years. However, the commenter believed
that even six years in provisional status
may be an unacceptably long amount of
time.
Discussion: Contrary to the comments
that the current cohort default rate, 90/
10, and GE regulations do not
contemplate provisional certification,
we note the 90/10 and cohort default
rate provisions do just that after a oneor two-year violation of those standards.
In addition, we clarify that an
institution under either the zone or
provisional certification alternative may
provide a letter of credit or, in the
Secretary’s discretion, provide another
form of financial protection in a form or
under terms or arrangements that will
be specified by the Secretary or enter
into a set-aside arrangement. The setaside arrangement is not available to an
institution that seeks to participate for
the first time in the title IV, HEA
programs or that failed the financial
responsibility standards but seeks to
participate as a financially responsible
institution, because in either case the
institution must show that it is
financially responsible. That is, the
institution must show that it has the
financial resources to secure, or a bank
is willing to commit the necessary
resources on behalf of the institution to
provide, a letter of credit. For the
references to the general standards and
triggering events, an institution that fails
the general standards under
§ 668.171(b)(1) or (3), as reflected in the
composite score or the triggering events
under § 668.171(c), or no longer
qualifies under the zone alternative, is
subject to the minimum financial
protection required under § 668.175(f).
With respect to the numerous changes
the commenter proposed for how the
Department should treat institutions on
provisional certification, since we did
not propose any changes to the
provisional certification requirements
under § 668.175(f) or § 668.13(c), or to
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the long-standing minimum letter of
credit requirements, the suggested
changes are beyond the scope of these
regulations.
Changes: None.
Financial Protection Disclosure
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General
Comments: One commenter asserted
that the proposed financial protection
disclosure requirements exceed the
Department’s statutory authority
because the financial responsibility
provisions in the HEA, unlike other
provisions of the Act, do not mention
disclosures. The commenter maintained
that such omissions must be presumed
to be intentional, since Congress
generally acts intentionally when it uses
particular language in one section of the
statute but omits it from another.
Discussion: We do not agree with the
commenter. The financial protection
disclosure requirements do not conflict
with the financial responsibility
provisions in the HEA. Furthermore, the
lack of specific mention of such
disclosures in the provisions of the HEA
related to financial responsibility does
not preclude the Department’s
regulating in this area. Courts have
recognized that the Department under
its general rulemaking authority may
require disclosures of information
reasonably considered useful for student
consumers.61
As noted above, the Department
continues to assert both its authority to
require disclosures related to financial
responsibility and the usefulness of
those disclosures for student consumers.
However, in the interest of clarity and
ensuring that disclosures are as
meaningful as possible, we have made
several changes to proposed § 668.41(i).
Under the proposed regulations,
institutions required to provide
financial protection to the Secretary
must disclose information about that
financial protection to enrolled and
prospective students. These final
regulations state that the Department
will rely on consumer testing to inform
the identification of events for which a
disclosure is required. Specifically, the
Secretary will consumer test each of the
61 See, e.g., Ass’n of Private Colleges &
Universities v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C.
2012)(Department has broad authority ‘‘to make,
promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and
regulations governing the manner of operation of,
and governing the applicable programs
administered by, the Department.’’ 20 U.S.C.
1221e–3 (2006); see also id. § 3474 (‘‘The Secretary
is authorized to prescribe such rules and
regulations as the Secretary determines necessary or
appropriate to administer and manage the functions
of the Secretary or the Department.’’). The financial
protection disclosures fall comfortably within that
regulatory power.
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events identified in § 668.171(c)–(g), as
well as other events that result in an
institution being required to provide
financial protection to the Department,
to determine which of these events are
most meaningful to students in their
educational decision-making. The
Department expects that not all events
will be demonstrated to be critical to
students; however, events like lawsuits
or settlements that require financial
protection under § 668.171(c)(1)(i) and
(ii); borrower defense claims that
require financial protection under
§ 668.171(g)(7); and two consecutive
years of cohort default rates of at least
30 percent, requiring financial
protection under § 668.171(f) are likely
to be of more relevance to students.
Findings resulting from the
Department’s administrative
proceedings are included among these
triggering events. The issue of students
being ill-informed about ongoing
lawsuits or settlements with their
institutions was raised by students,
particularly Corinthian students, during
negotiated rulemaking, as well as by
commenters during the public comment
period. We also believe that students
will have a particular interest in, and
deserve to be made aware of, instances
in which an institution has a large
volume of borrower defense claims; this
may inform their future enrollment
decisions, as well as notify them of a
potential claim to borrower defense they
themselves may have. Finally, we
believe that cohort default rate is an
important accountability metric
established in the HEA, and that ability
to repay student loans is of personal
importance to many students. Any or all
of these items may be identified through
consumer testing as important
disclosures.
Changes: We have revised § 668.41(i)
to clarify that all actions and triggering
events that require an institution to
provide financial protection to the
Department will be subject to consumer
testing before being required for
institutional disclosures to prospective
and enrolled students.
Comments: A few commenters
expressed strong overall support for
requiring disclosures to prospective and
enrolled students of any financial
protection an institution must provide
under proposed § 668.175(d), (f), or (h).
The commenters cited the significant
financial stake an institution’s students
have in its continued viability, and a
resulting right to be apprised of
financially related actions that might
affect that viability.
However, some commenters who
supported the proposed requirements
raised the concern that unscrupulous
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institutions might intentionally attempt
to undermine the disclosures by burying
or disguising them. Accordingly, those
commenters suggested that the
Department should prescribe the
wording, format, and labeling of the
disclosures. Other commenters
expressed disappointment that the
proposed regulations do not require
institutions to deliver financial
protection disclosures to prospective
students at the first contact with those
students, and strongly supported
including such a requirement in the
final regulations. Though
acknowledging several negotiators’
objections that establishing a point of
first contact would prove too difficult,
one commenter was unconvinced, and
asserted the importance of requiring
delivery of critical student warnings at
a point when they matter most. The
same commenter found the proposed
regulatory language on financial
protection disclosures to be vague, and
requested clarification as to whether
proposed § 668.41(h)(7) (requiring
institutions to deliver loan repayment
warnings in a form and manner
prescribed by the Secretary) applies to
financial protection disclosures as well.
The commenter further asserted that
information regarding financial
protection is even more important to
consumers than repayment rates, and
therefore institutions’ promotional
materials should be required to contain
financial protection disclosures in the
same way that the proposed regulations
require such material to contain
repayment rate warnings.
Finally, some commenters urged that,
notwithstanding the proposed financial
protection disclosures required of
institutions, the Department should
itself commit to disclosing certain
information about institutions that are
subject to enhanced financial
responsibility requirements.
Specifically, the commenters suggested
that the Department disclose the amount
of any letter of credit submitted and the
circumstances that triggered the
enhanced financial responsibility
requirement.
For several reasons described in this
section, many commenters opposed
either the concept of requiring
institutions to make financial protection
disclosures, or the way in which such
disclosures are prescribed under the
proposed regulations. One commenter
suggested removing financial protection
disclosure requirements solely on the
grounds that students will neither take
notice of nor care about this
information. The commenter expressed
the belief that most people do not really
know what a letter of credit is, and that
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therefore informing them of an
institution’s obligation to secure such an
instrument would only cause confusion.
Discussion: We thank those
commenters who wrote in support of
the proposed financial protection
disclosures. In response to the
commenter who raised concerns about
unscrupulous institutions attempting to
undermine the proposed disclosures
and warnings, including by burying or
disguising them, we share those
concerns and drafted the applicable
regulatory language accordingly. Section
668.41(i)(1) of the final regulations
requires that an institution disclose
information about certain actions and
triggering events (subject to and
identified through consumer testing) it
has experienced to enrolled and
prospective students in the manner
described in paragraphs (i)(4) and (5) of
that section, and that the form of the
disclosure will be prescribed by the
Secretary in a notice published in the
Federal Register. Before publishing that
notice, the Secretary will also conduct
consumer testing to help ensure the
warning is meaningful and helpful to
students. This approach both holds
institutions accountable and creates
flexibility for the Department to update
warning requirements, including
specific language and labels, as
appropriate in the future. Based on
these comments, and the comment
expressing confusion as to which of the
delivery requirements in this section
apply to financial protection
disclosures, we have revised § 668.41(i)
to make the requirements that apply to
the actions and triggering events
disclosure and the process by which the
language of the disclosure will be
developed and disseminated more
explicit.
While mindful of the potential benefit
to prospective students of receiving
disclosures early, we are not convinced
that requiring institutions to deliver
such disclosures at first contact with a
student is necessary or efficacious. In
many cases and at certain types of
institutions, it is impractical if not
impossible to isolate the initial point of
contact between a student and an
institutional representative. Such a
requirement would place a significant
burden on compliance officials and
auditors as well as on institutions.
Section 668.41(i)(5) of the final
regulations requires institutions to
provide disclosures to prospective
students before they enroll, register, or
enter into a financial obligation with the
institution. We believe this provides
prospective students with adequate
advance notice.
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Regarding whether requirements in
the proposed regulations pertaining to
the delivery of loan repayment warnings
to prospective and enrolled students
apply to financial protection disclosures
as well, we are revising the regulations
to separately state the requirements for
loan repayment warnings and financial
protection disclosures. Section
§ 668.41(i) states that, subject to
consumer testing as to which events are
most relevant to students, an institution
subject to one or more of the actions or
triggering events identified in
§ 668.171(c)–(g) must disclose
information about that action or
triggering event to enrolled and
prospective students in the manner
prescribed in paragraphs (i)(4) and (5).
However, the actions and triggering
events disclosures are not required to be
included in an institution’s advertising
and promotional materials. We concur
with the commenter that such financial
protection disclosures will provide
critical information to students, but
maintain that delivery of those
disclosures to students through the
means prescribed in revised
§ 668.41(i)(4) and (5), and posting of the
disclosures to the institution’s Web site
as included in revised § 668.41(i)(6), are
most appropriate for this purpose. The
loan repayment warning provides
information on the outcomes of all
borrowers at the institution, whereas the
financial protection disclosure pertains
directly to the institution’s compliance
and other matters of financial risk. We
believe this type of disclosure is better
provided on an individual basis,
directly to students, and that it may
require a longer-form disclosure than is
practicable in advertising and
promotional materials.
Regarding the commenters’ suggestion
that the Department itself disclose
certain information about institutions
subject to enhanced financial
responsibility requirements, we
understand the value of this approach,
especially with respect to uniformity
and limiting the opportunity for
unscrupulous institutions to circumvent
the regulations. However, we remain
convinced that schools, as the primary
and on-the-ground communicators with
their students, and the source of much
of the information students receive
about financial aid, are well-placed to
reach their students and notify them of
the potential risks of attending that
institution. We do not believe there are
any practical means through which the
Department might similarly convey to
individual students the volume of
information suggested by commenters.
Nevertheless, we intend to closely
monitor the way in which institutions
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comply with the actions and triggering
events disclosure requirements, and
may consider at some point in the future
whether the Department should assume
responsibility for making some or all of
the required disclosures. Additionally,
the Department may, in the future,
consider requiring these disclosures to
be placed on the Disclosure Template
under the Gainful Employment
regulations, to streamline the
information flow to those prospective
and enrolled students.
We respectfully disagree with the
commenter who suggested removing the
financial protection disclosure
requirements on the grounds that
students will neither take notice of nor
care about this information. Some of the
information conveyed in the disclosures
would undoubtedly be of a complex
nature. We also recognize that many
people have limited familiarity with
financial instruments such as letters of
credit. For that reason, and to minimize
confusion, we proposed consumer
testing of the disclosure language itself,
in addition to consumer testing of the
actions and triggering events that
require financial protection, to ensure
that the disclosures are meaningful and
helpful to students. As discussed above,
in the final regulations we are revising
proposed § 668.41(i) to require
consumer testing prior to identifying the
actions and/or triggering events for
financial protection that require
disclosures. We believe this change will
result in disclosures that are more
relevant to students, and that relate
directly to actions and/or events that
potentially affect the viability of
institutions they attend or are planning
to attend. In keeping with the intent of
the proposed regulations to ensure that
disclosures are meaningful and helpful
to students, the final regulations retain
the use of consumer testing, not only in
determining the language to be used in
such disclosures but also the specific
actions and triggering events to be
disclosed.
Changes: We have revised § 668.41(i)
to require consumer testing of
disclosures of the actions and triggering
events that require financial protection
under § 668.171(c)–(g).
Comments: Several commenters
contended that the proposed regulations
inappropriately equate financial
weakness with lack of viability, and
would require institutions to make
disclosures that are misleading or
untrue. For example, an institution that
is financially responsible may
experience a triggering event that
nevertheless requires the institution to
disclose to students that it is financially
at risk. In the opinion of one
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commenter, this constitutes compelling
untrue speech and violates the First
Amendment.
Echoing this overall concern, one
commenter expressed the belief that
warnings based on triggering events that
have not been rigorously proven to
demonstrate serious financial danger
would destroy an institution’s
reputation based on insinuation, not
fact. The commenter proposed that an
institution should have the opportunity
to demonstrate that it is not in danger
of closing before requiring disclosures.
Strenuously objecting to financial
protection disclosures, one commenter
described the relationship between
some of the triggering events listed in
§ 668.171(c) and the institution’s value
to students or its financial standing as
tenuous. The commenter further argued
that the ‘‘zone alternative’’ found in
current § 668.175(d) recognizes the
potential for an institution to be viable
in spite of financial weakness; and that
the proposed regulations weaken the
zone alternative.
A commenter, although
acknowledging that students should be
made aware of some triggering events,
took particular exception to the
Department’s assertion that students are
entitled to know about any event
significant enough to warrant
disclosures to investors, suggesting that
SEC-related disclosures are not a
reliable basis on which to require
disclosures to students. In support of
this position, the commenter noted that
SEC disclosure requirements may or
may not indicate that a publicly traded
institution will have difficulty meeting
its financial obligations to the
Department, because such disclosures
serve a different purpose, namely to
assist potential investors in pricing the
publicly traded institution’s securities.
The commenter stated that linking
financial protection disclosures to SEC
reporting may create false alarms for
students and cause them to react
impulsively.
Discussion: We do not agree that the
proposed regulations either
inappropriately equate financial
weakness with lack of viability, or
require institutions to issue misleading
or untrue disclosures.
Under the regulations, an institution
is required to provide financial
protection, such as an irrevocable letter
of credit, only if that institution is
deemed to be not financially responsible
because of an action or event described
in § 668.171(b). As described in the
NPRM, we believe that the factors
necessitating an institution to provide
financial protection could have a
significant impact on a student’s ability
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to complete his or her education at an
institution.
However, we recognize that not all of
the actions and triggering events for
financial protection will be relevant to
students. Therefore, we have revised the
requirement to clarify that the Secretary
will select particular actions and events
from the new triggers specified in
§ 668.171(c)–(g), as well as other events
that result in an institution being
required to provide financial protection
to the Department, based on consumer
testing. The events that are
demonstrated to be most relevant to
students will be published by the
Secretary, and schools subject to
financial protection requirements for
those events will be required to make a
disclosure, with language to be
determined by the Secretary, to
prospective and enrolled students about
the event. In addition to making
required disclosures more useful and
understandable to students, while
accurately reflecting concerns about the
institution’s financial viability, this
change will ensure that the action or
triggering events behind the disclosure
are relevant to students.
As the actions and triggering events
identified in proposed § 668.171(c) may
affect an institution’s ability to exist as
a going concern or continue to deliver
educational services, we continue to
believe that, having made a substantial
investment in their collective
educations, students have an absolute
interest in being apprised of at least
several of these actions and events. This
is not, as the commenter suggests,
destruction of an institution’s reputation
by insinuation in place of facts, but
rather the providing of factual
information to students on which they
can make a considered decision whether
to attend or continue to attend that
institution.
We agree with the commenter that
noted that the purposes of disclosures to
investors required by the SEC and these
proposed disclosures are different in
some respects. As discussed under
‘‘Automatic Triggering Events,’’ we are
revising the triggers in § 668.171(c) to
ensure that the triggers, including the
proposed triggers that were drawn from
SEC disclosure requirements, are
tailored to capture events that are most
relevant to an institution’s ability to
provide educational services to its
students. With these changes, we
believe that each of these triggers and
the related disclosure will serve the
Department’s stated purpose.
We understand the commenters’
concern that some students may draw
undesirable or even erroneous
conclusions from the disclosures or act
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impulsively as a result of the
disclosures. As students must decide for
themselves the value of any institution
and the extent to which that value is
affected by the event or condition that
triggered the disclosure, there might
always be some subjectivity inherent to
an individual’s reading of the required
disclosure. However, we believe the
benefit to those students in being
apprised of actions or events that might
affect an institution’s viability
outweighs this potential concern.
Moreover, as previously discussed, the
Department will conduct consumer
testing to ensure that both the events
that result in institutions being required
to provide financial protection to the
Department, as well as the language
itself, is meaningful and helpful to
students before requiring disclosures of
those events. Our intent is for the
required disclosures to convey accurate,
important information.
Finally, with regard to the suggestion
made by one commenter that
institutions be afforded the opportunity
to demonstrate that they are not in
imminent danger of closing before
having to provide financial protection
and the accompanying financial
protection disclosures, as discussed
above under ‘‘Reporting Requirements,’’
we are revising § 668.171(h) to permit
an institution to demonstrate, at the
time it reports a triggering event, that
the event or condition no longer exists,
has been resolved or that it has
insurance that will cover any and all
debts and liabilities that arise at any
time from that triggering event. If such
a demonstration is successfully made,
the institution will not be required to
provide financial protection, and will
not be subject to the financial protection
disclosure requirement.
We agree with the commenter who
pointed out that the ‘‘zone alternative’’
in current § 668.175(d) recognizes the
potential for an institution to be viable
in spite of financial weakness, but we
do not concur with the assertion that the
regulations would weaken the zone
alternative. The zone alternative is
specific to an institution that is not
financially responsible solely because
the Secretary determines its composite
score is less than 1.5 but at least 1.0.
Such an institution may nevertheless
participate in the title IV, HEA programs
as a financially responsible institution
under the provisions of the zone. We are
not proposing to change current
regulations related to the zone
alternative. Participation under the zone
alternative is not an action or triggering
event and would, therefore, not result in
an institution having to make a
disclosure.
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Changes: We have revised § 668.41(i)
to require consumer testing of
disclosures of the actions and triggering
events that require financial protection
under § 668.171(c)–(g).
Scope of the Disclosure Requirement
Comments: Several commenters
requested clarification as to the scope of
the financial protection disclosure
requirements. One commenter
expressed concern about proposed
§ 668.41(i), which stated that an
institution required to provide financial
protection to the Secretary such as an
irrevocable letter of credit under
§ 668.175(d, or to establish a set-aside
under § 668.175(h), must provide the
disclosures described in § 668.41(i)(1)–
(3). The commenter contended that it is
not clear whether the disclosure
requirement pertains only to financial
protections resulting from the new
triggers in the proposed regulations, or
whether the disclosures would be
required for any financial protections,
including those required under existing
financial responsibility standards, such
as the 50 percent letter of credit
provided under current § 668.175(c).
The commenter added that when an
institution provides a letter of credit
pursuant to current § 668.175(b) and (c),
it qualifies as a financially responsible
institution, and thus there should be no
need for disclosures in these situations.
However, the commenter asserted that
the Department’s frequent use of the
undefined phrase ‘‘financial
protection,’’ throughout § 668.175, has
resulted in a lack of clarity. The
commenter asked that the Department
limit financial protection disclosures to
the new triggers in § 668.171.
Another commenter noted that the
zone alternative under § 668.175(d) does
not include a requirement to provide
financial protection to the Department
and therefore should not be referenced
in the disclosure requirement.
Discussion: We thank the commenter
who brought to our attention the
unintentional reference in § 668.41(i) to
financial protection provided to the
Secretary under § 668.175(d). As the
commenter pointed out, § 668.175(d)
relates to the zone alternative and does
not include a requirement to provide
financial protection. Proposed
§ 668.41(i) is intended to reference only
financial protection provided to the
Secretary under § 668.175(f), or the setaside under § 668.175(h).
To clarify the scope of proposed
§ 668.41(i), that section would have
required disclosures for any financial
protection an institution is required to
provide under § 668.175(f) or for any
set-aside under § 668.175(h), not just
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financial protection provided as a result
of the new triggering actions and events
established in these regulations.
However, as described above, we are
revising the financial protection
disclosures so that the Secretary will
conduct consumer testing to identify
which actions and triggering events
should be disclosed. Institutions will be
required to disclose information about
those events only if it is found to be
relevant to students.
Changes: As described above, we have
revised § 668.41(i) to require consumer
testing of disclosures of the actions and
triggering events that require financial
protection under § 668.171(c)–(g).
Harm to Institutions
Comments: Several commenters
addressed the potential harm to
institutions they believe will result from
the proposed financial protection
disclosures. These commenters warned
of irreparable damage to an institution’s
reputation that could drive away
students, alarm potential donors,
diminish access to capital, and unfairly
brand an unknown number of
institutions as untrustworthy. One
commenter envisioned a cascading
series of events in which declining
enrollment and alumni and donor
support forces tuition hikes, which in
turn lead to further declines in
enrollment and the institution’s
eventual closure.
Underlying the commenters’ concern
over potential negative outcomes was
the opinion that the required
disclosures are based on flawed
financial standards that are not truly
indicative of whether an institution is
carrying out its educational mission.
One commenter suggested that the
Department might cause lasting and
perhaps grave harm to institutions not
currently at risk of failure, turning
disagreements about accounting issues
into existential enrollment threats.
Another commenter pointed out that
some nonprofit institutions operate
close to the margin of sustainability
because of their mission, or a charitable
commitment to supporting needy
students. The proposed financial
protection disclosures would, in the
opinion of the commenter, thrust such
institutions into a cycle of failure.
Discussion: We understand the
concern regarding the potential for the
financial protection disclosures that
were initially proposed, as well as the
financial protection disclosures in these
final regulations, to damage an
institution’s reputation. However, we do
not believe that the possibility of harm
to an institution’s reputation is reason
enough to withhold from students, who
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in many cases have borrowed heavily to
finance their educations, information on
the financial viability of the institutions
they attend. Regarding the catastrophic
series of events predicted by some
commenters, we believe such
occurrences are unlikely. However, in
the event that some institutions do fall
into what one commenter termed a
cycle of failure, we believe that is more
appropriately attributable to the actions
or failures of the institutions themselves
than to the financial protection
disclosures.
We address earlier in this section the
commenters’ contention that the
financial responsibility standards on
which the actions and triggering events
disclosure requirements are based are
flawed and not indicative of
institutions’ actual financial positions.
We do not agree with the observation of
one commenter that the proposed
regulations require financial protection
disclosures for what are essentially
disagreements about accounting issues.
As discussed under ‘‘Triggering
Events,’’ our analysis and assessment of
the triggering actions and events which
necessitate providing financial
protection indicates they would have a
demonstrable effect on an institution’s
financial position.
Lastly, with regard to the point made
by one commenter that some nonprofit
institutions operate close to the margin
in adherence to a mission or particular
commitment to funding needy students,
the Department commends the efforts of
such institutions. We do not believe that
for the most part, such institutions have
a heightened risk of experiencing a
triggering action or event. The financial
stress on institutions operating close to
the margin of sustainability for the
reasons noted above is most likely to
reflect in a lower composite score than
might otherwise be the case. Those
institutions are frequently able to
operate as financially responsible
institutions under the zone alternative,
and would not be subject to financial
protection disclosures.
Changes: None.
Warnings to Students—General
Comments: Some commenters
contended that the proposed provisions
related to mandatory warnings to
students are not consistent with the
provisions and purposes of the HEA.
They noted that the HEA enumerates an
extensive list of information that
institutions must ‘‘produce . . . and
[make] readily available upon request’’
to current and prospective students (20
U.S.C. 1092(a)(1)), which includes,
among other things, graduation rates
and crime statistics, but makes no
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reference to any requirement to disclose
information that bears on the
institution’s financial viability or its
need to provide financial protection.
See id. §§ 1092(a)–(m). Moreover, the
commenters opined that the mandatory
warning requirements run afoul of the
First Amendment, arguing that
compelled speech, as included in the
proposed regulation’s required
warnings, is subject to strict scrutiny
and permissible only if ‘‘reasonably
related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.’’
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696
F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Discussion: Section 668.41(h)(3) and
(i)(4) and (5) requires the institution to
provide what are described as
‘‘warnings’’ to students, regarding the
repayment rate of its alumni, through
advertising and promotional materials,
and ‘‘disclosures’’ regarding the actions
and triggering events for any financial
protection, identified pursuant to
consumer testing, directly to
prospective and enrolled students. The
repayment rate provision requires the
institution to state in its disclosure that:
‘‘A majority of recent student loan
borrowers at this school are not paying
down their loans’’—a statement that
will rest squarely on factual
determinations of repayment patterns
demonstrated by a recent cohort of
student borrowers from that institution,
derived from data validated through a
challenge process in which the
institution may contest the accuracy of
the data elements. The statement does
not, unlike the warning criticized in a
prior court ruling, state that the
prospective student should expect
difficulty in repayment.62 It merely
provides a factually accurate statement
that ascribes no adverse quality to the
institution itself as the cause of this
pattern.63 The regulation does not
compel the institution to articulate a
government position on the cause of
that pattern, or to engage in or
disseminate as true what is ‘‘uncertain,
speculative estimates.’’ Association of
Private Sector Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 199
62 ‘‘[A] student who enrolls or continues to enroll
in the program should expect to have difficulty
repaying his or her student loans.’’ Debt Measure
Rule, 76 Fed.Reg. at 34,432. . . . the court doubts
that the statement that every student in a program
‘‘should expect to have difficulty repaying his or
her student loans’’ is a purely factual one.
Association of Private Colleges and Universities v.
Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 155 (D.D.C. 2012).
63 Similarly, the statement simply describes
whether borrowers are paying ‘‘down’’ their loans,
a readily understood term meaning that the
payments made are not reducing the loan amount—
not whether they are repaying under whichever
repayment plan they chose, or are in default.
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(D.D.C. 2015), aff’d 640 Fed.Appx. 5
(D.C. Cir. 2016). Rather, the repayment
rate provision simply requires
disclosure of a factual statement that the
Department considers valuable
information to the consumer. The
institution is free to explain, if it wishes,
why it believes that pattern exists, or
why it believes that the pattern does not
indicate that it is unable to deliver a
quality education. The statement falls
well within the grounds upheld for
other required disclosures.
Furthermore, the form, place, and
even the actual language of this warning
may change based on consumer testing
or other factors to help ensure that the
warning is meaningful and helpful to
students, and if so, the Department will
publish those matters in a notice in the
Federal Register. § 668.41(h)(3). For the
financial protection disclosures, the
Secretary will also conduct consumer
testing to determine precisely which
actions and triggering events that
require financial protection would be
most relevant and important for
prospective and enrolled students to
know, and to determine the appropriate
language for a disclosure. § 668.41(i).
We note first that the governmental
interest in compelling speech is not
limited to ‘‘preventing deception,’’ as
the commenter appears to suggest.64
This follows from the nature of the test
applied to First Amendment challenges
to compelled speech, as demonstrated
in recent litigation challenging
disclosures mandated by the
Department’s GE regulations. Because
the required disclosures/warnings are
commercial speech, the government
may require the commercial disclosure
of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial
information’ as long as there is a
rational justification for the means of
disclosure and it is intended to prevent
consumer confusion.’’ Ass’n of Private
Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 870
F. Supp. 2d 133, 155 (D.D.C. 2012). As
that court noted in upholding a
requirement that an institution offering
GE programs make disclosures about its
programs, costs, and student outcomes:
. . . The Department has broad authority ‘‘to
make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend
rules and regulations governing the manner
of operation of, and governing the applicable
programs administered by, the Department.’’
20 U.S.C. 1221e–3 (2006); see also id. § 3474
(‘‘The Secretary is authorized to prescribe
such rules and regulations as the Secretary
determines necessary or appropriate to
administer and manage the functions of the
Secretary or the Department.’’). The
64 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d
18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding country of origin
labelling requirements; overruling prior opinions of
that court that limited requirements to those aimed
at preventing deception).
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disclosures mandated here fall comfortably
within that regulatory power, and are
therefore within the Department’s authority
under the Higher Education Act.
Ass’n of Private Colleges &
Universities v. Duncan, 870 156.65 The
regulations accord the institution a
challenge process regarding the
calculation of the repayment rate itself,
as well as an opportunity for a hearing
to consider challenges to a requirement
to provide financial protection. These
procedures will produce a factual
outcome; the factual outcome—like the
disclosures about costs, placements,
completion rate and repayment rate
mandated in the GE regulations already
upheld—may themselves also be
‘‘vanilla’’ disclosures of unpleasant, but
factually accurate determinations. How
alumni are repaying their loans, and
whether the school has experienced
actions or triggering events that pose
financial risk to the government (and
students), are of direct interest to
consumers. We believe disclosures—
and warnings—that convey
determinations on those matters fall
well with the kind of disclosures the
courts have upheld.
Changes: None.
Proprietary Institution Loan
Repayment Warning
General: Repayment Rate
Comments: A number of commenters
supported requiring warnings for
prospective and enrolled students at
proprietary institutions with poor
repayment rates. They argued that the
warnings will provide useful
information for students as they make
educational and borrowing decisions.
One group of commenters urged the
Department to release all loan
repayment rates publicly, including for
65 In contrast, the court there doubted that the
language of the warning also required under those
regulations (that every student in a program
‘‘should expect to have difficulty repaying his or
her student loans’’) would have been ‘‘purely
factual and uncontroversial information.’’ Ass’n of
Private Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 870 F.
Supp. 2d 155. When that regulation was reissued
and later challenged on First Amendment grounds,
this same court upheld the disclosures required in
the new rule, and in doing so contrasted the
‘‘graphic, compelled speech’’ challenged by tobacco
advertisers in R.J. Reynolds, on which the
commenters relay, with ‘‘the vanilla, estimated-cost
disclosures at issue’’ in the Department regulation.
Id. Moreover, the court further noted that even ‘‘R.J.
Reynolds acknowledged that the Zauderer standard
applies not just to purely factual and
uncontroversial information, but also to ‘accurate
statement[s].’ . . . The ‘total cost’ estimates
contemplated here certainly meet that description.’’
Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 200 n.12 (D.D.C.
2015), aff’d sub nom. Ass’n of Private Sector
Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 640 F. App’x 5
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
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institutions that are not required to
deliver loan repayment warnings under
§ 668.41(h).
However, several commenters argued
that, because repayment behavior is not
controllable by the institution, the
repayment rate is not an appropriate
institutional performance measure.
Another argued that loan repayment rate
reflects financial circumstances, but not
educational quality, so it is not
appropriate to require institutions to
issue warnings based on their loan
repayment rate.
Several commenters also raised
concerns that § 668.41(h) would place
an undue burden on institutions and
duplicates other established disclosure
requirements. They contended that the
requirement is unnecessary, particularly
because the proprietary institutions
required to comply with § 668.41(h) are
already subject to the GE reporting and
disclosure requirements, including a
repayment rate disclosure if specified by
the Secretary; and because the
Department already publishes both
cohort default rates and institutional
repayment rates on the College
Scorecard. Other commenters suggested
that the measure would increase costs of
higher education due to higher
administrative burden, and contended
that the disclosures were not likely to
make much impact, given the large
number of mandated disclosures already
in place.
Discussion: We appreciate the
comments supporting the repayment
rate warning provision. We agree that
this provision will provide critical
information for students that will help
them to make well-informed decisions
about where to go to college and their
financial aid use. Repayment rates
provide a key indicator of students’
post-college repayment outcomes,
which are of vital interest to students
considering their families’ personal
financial circumstances, as well as to
taxpayers and policymakers. The
Department has already worked to
promote greater access to such
information through the GE regulations
and the College Scorecard; we believe
that the repayment rate warning
requirement in these regulations will
provide an important complement to
those other efforts.
We do not agree with the commenters
who stated that repayment does not
constitute a measure of educational
quality, or the commenter who argued
that repayment rate is a measure of
students’ financial backgrounds and not
academic quality. We believe that all
students deserve to have information
about their prospective outcomes after
leaving the institution. Particularly for
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students who expect to borrow Federal
loans to attend college, it is critical to
know whether other students have been
able to repay their debts incurred at the
institution.
However, while we believe that this
information is very important for
prospective students to be aware of and
to consider, we agree with the concerns
that creating a new rate could confuse
the borrowers who will also receive the
GE program-level repayment rate
disclosures using a different calculation
and different cohorts for measuring
borrower outcomes. While not decisive,
we also recognize and understand the
comments from those who raised
concerns that the requirement may be
overly burdensome because of the
differences with the data used in the GE
calculation. Requiring a separate data
corrections process for proprietary
institutions, which are already subject
to reporting requirements for repayment
rate under GE for virtually all of their
borrowers, may be needlessly
burdensome given the virtually
complete overlap in students covered.
To avoid any confusion resulting from
a new repayment rate calculation, as
well as to limit burden on institutions,
we are revising the repayment rate
provision. Under this revised provision,
the repayment rate data that proprietary
institutions report at the program level
will be used to calculate a comparable
repayment rate at the institution level.
Specifically, the Department will
calculate, for those borrowers who
entered repayment during a particular
two-year cohort period, the repayment
rate as follows: The number of
borrowers in GE programs who are paid
in full or who are in active repayment
(defined as the number of borrowers
who entered repayment and, during the
most recently completed award year,
made loan payments sufficient to reduce
the outstanding balance of loans
received for enrollment in the program
by at least one dollar), divided by the
number of borrowers reported in GE
programs who entered repayment.
Institutions with a repayment rate
showing that the median borrower has
not either fully repaid the borrower’s
loans by the end of the third year after
entering repayment, or reduced their
outstanding balance by at least one
dollar, over the third year of repayment
(which, under the calculation
methodology, is equivalent to a loan
repayment rate of less than 0.5) will be
subject to a requirement that they
include a warning, to be prescribed in
a later Federal Register notice by the
Secretary, in advertising and
promotional materials. We are also
removing the proposed requirement for
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direct delivery of repayment rate
warnings to prospective and enrolled
students, recognizing that the GE
regulations already require those
proprietary institutions to deliver a
program-level disclosure template that
includes repayment rate to those
students. We believe that these changes
will reduce administrative burden on
institutions considerably, and help to
ensure that increased administrative
burden is not passed on by institutions
in greater costs to students.
We disagree with the commenters
who argued that the disclosures would
not make much impact. A large and
growing body of research suggests that
in many cases, students and families
react to information about the costs and
especially the value of higher education,
including by making different
decisions.66 To maximize the potential
for effective warnings to students, the
Department has revised the regulatory
language about the warnings that must
be included in advertising and
promotional materials to maximize the
likelihood that such information will be
well presented in a timely manner. We
believe that this information will build
upon, and not conflict with, other
disclosures that institutions currently
make. In particular, we believe that the
institutional warning requirement in
advertising and promotional materials
will provide a valuable caution to
students in their early stages of
considering which colleges to attend.
We also believe that the institutional
warning requirement will act as a
complement to other disclosure
requirements, including the disclosure
template required to be provided under
the GE regulations and the Department’s
own efforts to promote greater
transparency and better-informed
decision-making through the College
Scorecard and the Financial Aid
Shopping Sheet. The Department will
also promote this information through
its own channels to reach students,
including through the College Scorecard
or the FAFSA, after consideration of the
most effective and efficient ways to do
so.
66 Wiswall, M., and Zafar, B. (2015). How Do
College Students Respond to Public Information
about Earnings? Journal of Human Capital, 9(2),
117–169. DOI: 10.1086/681542. Retrieved from ;
Hastings, J., Neilson, C.A., and Zimmerman, S.D.
(June 2015). The Effects of Earnings Disclosure on
College Enrollment Decisions. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER
Working Papers 21300. Retrieved from
www.nber.org/papers/w21300; and Hoxby, C. and
Turner, S. (2015). What High-Achieving LowIncome Students Know About College. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER
Working Paper No. 20861. Retrieved from
www.nber.org/papers/w20861.pdf.
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Changes: We have revised the loan
repayment rate calculation in
§ 668.41(h), altered the loan repayment
rate issuing process to reflect that any
corrections will occur under the GE
regulations, and provided that
proprietary institutions with a
sufficiently large number of borrowers
who are not covered under GE reporting
may be exempt from the warning
requirement (as described in more detail
later in this section). We have made
conforming changes to separate the loan
repayment warning delivery provisions,
which require a warning to be included
in advertising and promotional
materials but no individual disclosure
to students, from the delivery provisions
for the financial protection disclosure
required under § 668.41(i) of the final
regulations, which require delivery of
the disclosure to prospective and
enrolled students.
Legal/Process Concerns
Comments: Noting that the proposed
loan repayment warning was not
included in the Department’s notice
announcing its intent to establish a
negotiated rulemaking committee
published in the Federal Register on
August 20, 2015 (80 FR 50588), one
commenter contended that the
requirement falls outside the scope of
the rulemaking process.
Discussion: The first session of
negotiated rulemaking, held January 12–
14, 2016, included a discussion of the
potential consequences for ‘‘conditions
that may be detrimental to students,’’
including the possibility of disclosure
requirements and student warnings. The
Department proposed regulatory text
concerning a repayment rate warning at
the second negotiated rulemaking
session (February 17–19, 2016), and the
committee discussed the proposal
during the second and third sessions.
Moreover, the negotiated rulemaking
process ensures that a broad range of
interests and qualifications are
considered in the development of
regulations. We believe that sufficient
notice was provided about the potential
for inclusion of the repayment rate
warning, and that the negotiators
involved in developing these
regulations were well-qualified to
explore the option.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter argued
that the loan repayment rate provision
does not constitute ‘‘reasoned decisionmaking,’’ because the Department did
not explain the evaluation of repayment
on an individualized basis; the use of a
median, rather than an average,
borrower to determine the school’s rate;
the zero percent threshold; the length of
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the measurement window; and the
exemption of in-school and military
deferments only in the final year.
Another commenter asserted that the
requirement is arbitrary and capricious
because several points in the preamble
(such as the level of the calculation and
the data challenge process) were
unclear.
Discussion: We disagree with the
commenters who stated that the
repayment rate warning provision is
arbitrary and capricious, and that it does
not constitute reasoned decisionmaking. The repayment rate measure
identified in the proposed regulations,
while different from other repayment
rate measures the Department has used
in other contexts, was designed to
measure repayment outcomes in greater
detail than existing measures do (for
instance, by looking at the percentage of
the balance repaid rather than the share
of borrowers who met a binary
threshold of paying down at least one
dollar in principal).
However, as described earlier, the
Department has revised the repayment
rate provision in the final regulations to
mirror the program-level rates used
under the GE regulations. Those rates
calculate the share of borrowers who
have made progress in repaying their
loans, and will rely exclusively on data
reported already under the GE
regulations. We believe that these
changes address the concerns of the
commenters.
Changes: We have revised the
calculation of the loan repayment rate in
§ 668.41(h), as previously described.
Proprietary Sector Requirement
Comments: Several commenters wrote
that limiting the repayment rate
provision to proprietary institutions is
reasonable, given the differences in
structure between those institutions and
other sectors and the data that indicate
poor repayment outcomes are
widespread in the for-profit sector.
However, many commenters
disagreed with the Department’s
proposal to limit the requirement to
proprietary institutions. One commenter
questioned the validity of the
Department’s argument that limiting the
applicability of § 668.41(h) to
proprietary institutions reduces the
burden on institutions because only
certain institutions benefit from the
reduced burden. Noting that there is no
similar limitation applicable to financial
protection disclosures, one commenter
suggested that the Department’s
limitation of the repayment rate
provision to proprietary institutions was
inconsistent. Some commenters argued
that the Department was ignoring the
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needs of students at the estimated 30
percent of public and private nonprofit
institutions with similarly low
repayment rates that are not subject to
the warning requirement, particularly
because a majority of Federal student
loan borrowers attend public
institutions. Others stated that a
repayment rate warning requirement for
public and private nonprofit institutions
is necessary to help students understand
their choices and contextualize the
information available to them. Several
of these commenters proposed that
public and private nonprofit institutions
be required to disclose that the
Department had not calculated a loan
repayment rate for the institution and
that it is therefore not possible to know
whether the institution’s repayment rate
is acceptable.
Some commenters contended that
there is no rationale for limiting the
warning requirement to the proprietary
sector. Other commenters stated that the
Department lacked sufficient research to
support the proposed regulations.
Several commenters argued that the
information cited as justification for
limiting the repayment rate warning
requirement to the proprietary sector
was overstated or invalid. One
commenter suggested that the
Department cited inaccurate data from
the College Scorecard. Several
commenters noted that they could not
replicate their Scorecard repayment
rates due to inconsistencies in the
National Student Loan Data System
(NSLDS) data underlying the measure.
Another commenter suggested that the
cohort used to support the analysis did
not reflect typical cohorts, since those
students entered repayment during a
recession. Several other commenters
contended that the decision to limit the
warning requirement to proprietary
institutions violates GEPA and has no
basis in the HEA.
A number of commenters suggested
removing the loan repayment warning
provision entirely, while several
proposed expanding its application to
all institutions with low repayment
rates, regardless of sector. Several
commenters suggested limiting the
repayment rate warning requirement to
institutions at which a majority of
students are enrolled in programs
subject to the Department’s GE
regulations, because, according to the
commenters, students at career-oriented
institutions frequently have
misconceptions about their likely
earnings. Alternatively, commenters
suggested limiting the requirement to
schools with ‘‘financially interested
boards’’ to include proprietary
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institutions that have converted to
nonprofit status.
Discussion: We appreciate the
comments supporting the limitation of
the repayment rate warning to
proprietary institutions in light of the
concentration of poor repayment
outcomes in the proprietary sector and
the risk of excessive and unnecessary
burden to institutions with a far lower
likelihood of poor repayment rates. As
discussed in both the NPRM 67 and in
the Gainful Employment final
regulations,68 a wide body of evidence
demonstrates that student debt and loan
repayment outcomes are worse for
students in the proprietary sector than
students in other sectors.
Most students in the proprietary
sector borrow Federal loans, while
borrowing rates among public and
private nonprofit institutions are far
lower; and debt levels are often higher.
For instance, as also noted in the final
Gainful Employment regulations, in
2011–2012, 60 percent of certificate
students who were enrolled at for-profit
two-year institutions took out Federal
student loans during that year,
compared with 10 percent at public
two-year institutions. Of those who
borrowed, the median amount borrowed
by students enrolled in certificate
programs at two-year for-profit
institutions was $6,629, as opposed to
$4,000 at public two-year institutions.
Additionally, in 2011–12, 66 percent of
associate degree students who were
enrolled at for-profit institutions took
out student loans, while only 20 percent
of associate degree students who were
enrolled at public two-year institutions
did so. Of those who borrowed in that
year, for-profit two-year associate degree
enrollees had a median amount
borrowed during that year of $7,583,
compared with $4,467 for students at
public two-year institutions.69
In addition to higher rates of
borrowing, students at proprietary
schools also default at higher rates than
borrowers who attend schools in other
sectors. Proprietary institutions have
higher three-year cohort default rates
than other sectors (15.0 percent,
compared with 7.0 percent at private
nonprofit institutions and 11.3 percent
at public institutions in fiscal year
2013), and enroll a disproportionate
67 www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015OPE-0103-0221.
68 www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2014OPE-0039-2390.
69 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
(NPSAS) 2012. Unpublished analysis of restricteduse data using the NCES PowerStats tool.
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share of students who default relative to
all borrowers in the repayment cohort.70
In the final regulations, the
Department seeks to reduce confusion
among students and families by using
rates that parallel the Gainful
Employment program-level repayment
rate, including using the same cohorts of
students as the GE rates do. As a result
of these changes, the repayment rate
will be calculated using data that
institutions already report to the
Department through the GE regulations,
rather than through a distinct data
reporting and corrections process. This
eliminates many of the concerns raised
by commenters and discussed in the
NPRM about the burden to institutions
of complying with the repayment rate
calculation provision.
However, the Department believes
that, because of the changes, it would be
inappropriate to apply an institutional
warning to sectors other than the
proprietary sector, because public and
private nonprofit institutions are not
typically comprised solely of GE
programs and the repayment rate
warning may not be representative of all
borrowers at the school. Federal student
loan borrowers also typically represent
a relatively small proportion of the
student population in the public sector,
whereas borrowing rates are much
higher, on average, at proprietary
institutions (for instance, among fulltime undergraduates enrolled in 2011–
12, 19.7 percent borrowed Stafford loans
at public less-than-two-year institutions,
compared with 82.9 percent at for-profit
less-than-two-year institutions and 83.3
percent at for-profit two-year-and-above
institutions).71 Moreover, the mix of
programs at public and private
nonprofit institutions may shift from
year to year, changing the share of GE
borrowers at the institution on an
annual basis; including such
institutions in the repayment rate
requirement would require the
Department to expend annual efforts to
identify schools that are comprised
entirely of GE programs for a relatively
small number of schools. Therefore, this
requirement is limited only to
proprietary institutions. We recognize
that some proprietary institutions may
have Federal student loan borrowers in
70 ‘‘Comparison of FY 2013 Official National
Cohort Default Rates to Prior Two Official Cohort
Default Rates.’’ U.S. Department of Education.
Calculated August 6, 2016: https://www2.ed.gov/
offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/
schooltyperates.pdf.
71 U.S. Department of Education, National Center
for Education Statistics, 2007–08 and 2011–12
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
(NPSAS:08 and NPSAS:12). (This table was
prepared July 2014.) https://nces.ed.gov/programs/
digest/d15/tables/dt15_331.90.asp?current=yes.
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non-GE programs under section
102(b)(1)(ii) of the HEA. Accordingly,
the final regulations specify that
proprietary institutions with a failing
repayment rate may appeal to the
Secretary for an exemption from the
warning requirement if they can
demonstrate that including non-GE
borrowers in the rate would increase the
rate to passing.
With these changes, we believe that
the Department’s decision to limit the
repayment rate warning to proprietary
institutions is well-founded and does
not raise concerns about excessive
burden or inaccurate representation of
student outcomes, and we disagree with
the commenters who stated that the
limitation to proprietary schools is not
appropriate.
In response to the commenter who
asserted that requiring only proprietary
institutions to disclose repayment rates
is inconsistent, as noted earlier, we
decided to limit the repayment rate
warning requirement to the sector of
institutions where the frequency of poor
repayment outcomes is greatest. Also as
described earlier, the Department’s
analysis of data shows the financial risk
to students to be far more severe in the
proprietary sector; and data suggest that
an institution-wide warning about
borrower outcomes is more appropriate
in the proprietary sector, given higher
rates of borrowing among students
(particularly in GE programs).
While we recognize some users’
concerns with specific elements of the
data cited in the NPRM, we believe that
the data corrections process that will be
established through the GE regulations
will ensure the accuracy of the
information on which the warning in
advertisements and promotional
materials is based. We recognize the
concerns of the commenter who stated
that the data cited in the NPRM reflect
a cohort that entered repayment during
the recession, but believe that this
regulation will appropriately capture
the actual outcomes of students, given
that even students who enter repayment
during a recession will be required to
repay their loans in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the Federal
student loan programs. The provision of
GEPA to which the commenter refers
requires uniform application of
regulations throughout the United
States. 20 U.S.C. 1232(a). The HEA
authorizes the Department to adopt
disclosure regulations as does the
general authority of the Secretary in 20
U.S.C. 1221e–3 and 20 U.S.C. 3474.
Assn. of Private Coll. and Univs. v.
Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 156. We
believe that our analysis of the
outcomes provides a reasonable basis on
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which to focus this requirement on forprofit schools.
We disagree with the commenters
who propose to remove the repayment
rate warning provision from the
regulations. The Department believes
that this information is critical to ensure
students and families have the
information they need to make wellinformed decisions about where to go to
college. Given the concerns discussed
earlier about the inaccuracy of applying
a warning to an entire institution based
on data that do not necessarily represent
all borrowers at the school, and the
added burden both on public and
private nonprofit institutions and on the
Department to identify the relatively
few institutions that might be accurately
represented by such a rate, we believe
it is appropriate to maintain the
repayment rate warning provision only
for proprietary schools. We appreciate
the comments from those who suggested
tying the repayment rate warning
requirement to those institutions with a
significant proportion of students in GE
programs, and have adopted a version of
that requirement (i.e., the warning
requirement applies only to those
institutions at which a majority of GE
borrowers are not in active repayment or
repaid in full; and only at proprietary
institutions, where effectively all
programs are subject to the GE
requirements). While we appreciate the
comments from those who proposed
instead limiting the requirement to
‘‘financially interested boards’’ to
prevent certain institutions from
avoiding the requirements, we believe
that the requirements as stated in the
final regulations will cover the vast
majority of students at institutions with
such boards, and that the added burden
of identifying those institutions in
another way would not yield much
additional coverage for the requirement.
Changes: We have revised § 668.41(h)
to provide that, if a proprietary
institution has a repayment rate that
shows that the median borrower has not
either fully repaid, or made loan
payments sufficient to reduce by at least
one dollar, the outstanding balance of
the borrower’s loans, it may seek to
demonstrate to the Secretary’s
satisfaction that it has borrowers in nonGE programs who would increase the
school’s repayment rate above the
threshold for the warning requirement if
they were included in the calculation. If
an institution demonstrates this to the
Secretary’s satisfaction, it will receive
an exemption from the warning
requirement.
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Income-Driven Repayment (IDR)
Enrollment
Comments: A number of commenters
asserted that § 668.41(h) conflicts with
the Administration’s income-based
repayment plan enrollment campaigns.
One commenter pointed to a Council of
Economic Advisers report that states
that borrowers on IDR plans are from
more disadvantaged backgrounds than
those on the standard repayment plans,
suggesting that borrowers’ investments
in higher education pay off over time.
That commenter contended that
measuring borrowers’ repayment
behavior in the first five years is not
appropriate because of the long-term
payoff of postsecondary education.
Other commenters argued that
institutions would be unfairly—and
retroactively—penalized for
encouraging students to sign up for IDR
plans.
Several commenters proposed to
remove from the repayment rate
calculation any borrower making
payments under any Federal repayment
plan, including IDR plans.
Alternatively, one of the commenters
proposed that the Department should
allow institutions to include in the
warning to students that the negative
amortization of its borrowers occurred
because of federally authorized
repayment plans where that is the case.
Discussion: We disagree with the
commenters’ statements that incomedriven repayment plans conflict with
the loan repayment warning provision.
The IDR plans that Congress and the
Department provide to borrowers were
created to act as a safety net for
struggling borrowers—those whose
debts are sufficiently high, or incomes
are sufficiently low, to make repaying
them on the expected timeline
exceedingly difficult. However, a postcollege safety net program for borrowers
does not eliminate the responsibility the
institution has to provide a high-quality
education that ensures borrowers are
able to, at a minimum, afford to pay
down their loans, even in the first years
after entering repayment. Moreover, the
Department agrees with the commenter
who noted that many of the borrowers
currently enrolled in income-driven
repayment (IDR) plans would otherwise
be in distress on their loans, and may
thus be in negative amortization
regardless of whether they were on an
IDR plan or may have defaulted. For
instance, a recent report from the
Council of Economic Advisers found
that over 40 percent of borrowers who
entered repayment in fiscal year 2011
and later enrolled in income-driven
repayment had defaulted, had an
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unemployment or economic hardship
deferment, or had a single forbearance
of more than two months in length
before entering their first income-driven
repayment plan.72 While the report
shows that measurements of short-term
distress were mitigated for the
borrowers who enrolled in incomedriven repayment plans, the Department
believes that the fact that such
borrowers experienced types of
financial distress—whether failure to
pay down the outstanding balance of the
loans or deferments, forbearances, and
defaults that suggest acute problems in
repaying in the initial several years after
leaving school—constitute critical
information that prospective students
and potential borrowers should be
aware of prior to making enrollment or
financial aid decisions. To that point,
we do not agree with the commenters
who stated that enrollment in IDR plans
among students would unfairly penalize
institutions; on the contrary, borrowers
who enroll in IDR plans and still do not
have sufficiently high incomes or low
debts to pay down the balance on their
loans are experiencing precisely the
negative post-college outcomes about
which students, taxpayers, and the
Department should have concerns. This
argument is especially relevant for
institutions that are eligible for title IV,
HEA aid on the basis of providing
educational programs that prepare
students for gainful employment in a
recognized occupation. Students
considering such programs should be
warned if the majority of borrowers do
not have sufficient income to pay down
their Federal student debt, even if those
borrowers are protected from default by
enrolling in IDR plans.
Changes: None.
Inconsistency of Rates
Comments: Several commenters noted
that the Department has considered
many variations of a repayment rate
calculation in recent years. They stated
that none of these rates has been subject
to peer-review research and that the
Department has not sufficiently
supported its proposal with research.
Several commenters raised concerns
that the use of multiple repayment rates
would lead to significant confusion.
These commenters urged the
Department to use an existing definition
of repayment rate, or to remove the
provision entirely.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenters’ concerns that multiple
72 ‘‘Investing in Higher Education: Benefits,
Challenges, and the State of Student Debt.’’ Council
of Economic Advisers. July 2016:
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20160718_cea_student_debt.pdf.
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repayment rates, particularly where
provided to the same students, may lead
to confusion. While we believe that this
is important information for students
and families to consider while deciding
where to apply and enroll in college, we
do not wish to create confusion for
borrowers.
To that end, as described earlier, the
Department has revised the repayment
rate provision in the final regulations to
mirror the program-level rates used
under the GE regulations. Those rates
calculate the share of borrowers who
have made progress in repaying their
loans; and will rely exclusively on data
already reported under the GE
regulations. We believe that these
changes address the commenters’
concerns. Moreover, the GE definition of
‘‘repayment rate’’ has been subjected to
research, analysis, and consumer testing
by the field.
Changes: We have revised the
calculation of the loan repayment rate in
§ 668.41(h), as described in more detail
earlier in this section.
Technical Comments About the
Calculation
Comments: A number of commenters
suggested specific changes to the
repayment rate. One commenter
disagreed with the Department’s
proposed use of a median repayment
rate, rather than a mean. Several others
argued that an institutional median is
not appropriate because post-college
repayment outcomes may vary
significantly by program. One
commenter was confused as to whether
the loan repayment rate would be
calculated on a per-borrower or a perloan basis. Another commenter
proposed to separate out, and create
distinct loan repayment rates and
warnings for graduate, undergraduate,
and Parent PLUS Loan debts. Several
commenters stated that the treatment of
consolidation loans was unclear. One
commenter suggested changing
treatment of payments on consolidation
loans by attributing the same payments
to loans at multiple institutions, rather
than attributing payments based on the
share of debt from each institution.
One commenter expressed confusion
over the use of ‘‘accrued interest’’ in the
definition of ‘‘original outstanding
balance,’’ and the use of ‘‘capitalized
interest’’ in the definition of current
outstanding balance for the repayment
measure. Another commenter proposed
that, for graduate programs that prepare
students for medical residencies, the
original outstanding balance should be
defined as the principal balance after
the medical residency forbearance
period.
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Other commenters suggested minor
changes to the proposed calculation.
One commenter argued that the
Department proposed inconsistent
treatment of borrowers who default on
their loans. This commenter urged the
Department to ensure that all defaulters
appear as a zero percent repayment rate,
or that defaulters are given no distinct
treatment. Another commenter
proposed that, under § 668.41(h)(6)(i),
there should be a minimum of 30
students in the cohort, rather than 10,
before requiring a loan repayment
warning.
As noted earlier, several commenters
argued that the zero percent repayment
rate threshold was not supported by any
evidence or analysis, and one contended
that it is legally unsupportable.
Several commenters raised concerns
about the five-year window for
measuring borrowers’ repayment. Some
argued that the five-year measurement
period is not predictable because of
insufficient data. Some commenters
argued that a two- or three-year
measurement period would be better
supported; or alternatively, proposed to
use a 10-year window. Another
commenter stated that analysis of data
from the College Scorecard found that
three- or seven-year repayment rates
would be more reliable. One commenter
argued that the repayment rate window
for medical schools should be seven
years, as in the Gainful Employment
regulations; while another commenter
proposed that repayment rates for
graduate programs that prepare students
for medical residencies should be
measured five years from the end of
their medical residency forbearance
period.
Several commenters raised concerns
about excluding from the measurement
only those students who are in certain
deferments during the measurement
year. One commenter proposed to
extend the measurement window of
borrowers who spend several years in
in-school deferments, while others
proposed to exclude any borrower who
entered an in-school or military
deferment at any point during the
measurement period.
Several commenters argued that
borrowers’ backgrounds affect their
repayment rates; one commenter
asserted that when borrowers’
backgrounds are taken into
consideration, repayment rates of lowincome students and students enrolled
at proprietary institutions are similar to
those of their higher-income peers. One
commenter suggested that the
Department should revise the loan
repayment rate methodology to exclude
all borrowers with an Expected Family
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Contribution of zero dollars in any year
of attendance. Another proposed to
disclose the percentage of Pell Grant
recipients or adjust the threshold at
institutions with a high enrollment of
Pell Grant recipients.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenters’ concerns about the specific
calculation of the repayment rate. We
have made changes to the calculation of
the repayment rate, as described earlier,
that address or eliminate many of the
concerns raised, including clarifying
that the median rate over a mean is
comparable to a proportion of
borrowers; the use of program-level data
to calculate an institution-level rate,
ensuring that borrowers in GE programs
receive warnings if either or both rates
raise cause for concern; and whether the
rate would be calculated on a perborrower or per-loan basis (because the
rate was replaced by a proportion of
borrowers who have not repaid at least
one dollar in outstanding balance). We
disagree with the commenter who
suggested that creating distinct
repayment rates and warning
requirements for particular programs is
necessary, because such rates will
already be made available at the
educational program level through the
GE regulations; this warning
requirement is designed to complement
and supplement that rate with a broader
measure of the entire institution.
We believe that we have clarified the
treatment of consolidation loans, which
will mirror the treatment of such loans
in the GE regulations. We also believe
that additional clarification of the
definitions of ‘‘accrued’’ and
‘‘capitalized’’ interest, and one
commenter’s proposed change to the
definition for graduate programs that
prepare students for medical
residencies, is not necessary because the
repayment rate will instead rely on data
already reported under the GE
regulations. Similarly, the treatment of
defaulted student loans will mirror the
GE data that are already reported to the
Department. We will continue to use a
minimum cohort size of 10, rather than
30 as one commenter proposed, because
10 is a sufficiently large size to meet
both minimum requirements and best
practices for the protection of student
privacy; a minimum count of 10
borrowers is also the standard already
used in the GE regulations for
repayment rate and other metrics. With
respect to concerns from several
commenters about the use of negative
amortization as a threshold for requiring
warnings, we disagree that there is no
support in research for doing so. Based
on internal analysis of data from the
National Student Loan Data System
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(NSLDS), the typical borrower in
negative amortization—more than half
of those who have made no or negative
repayment progress in the third year
after entering repayment—experienced
long-term repayment hardship such as
default. Those borrowers are especially
unlikely to satisfy their loan debt in the
long term.73 Additionally, several
public comments received and papers
published during the negotiations for
the Department’s GE regulations include
reference to negative-amortization
thresholds for student loan repayment
rates.74 Moreover, we believe this will
be an understandable measure to help
inform consumer choice.
We agree with commenters who
stated that a measurement three years
after entering repayment (e.g.,
examining borrowers’ outcomes three
years after they enter repayment) is well
supported. Given the other changes to
the repayment rate calculation made to
mirror the GE repayment rate metric, we
will use this period, rather than the fiveyear period included in the proposed
regulations, to calculate the institutions’
rate. We believe that a 10-year window,
as some commenters proposed, would
be too long to provide relevant and
timely data; such long-term outcomes
would fail to incorporate improvement
in quality or other changes at the
institution since those borrowers
entered repayment, and would likely
fail to capture many of the signs of
short-term financial distress that some
borrowers experience. We agree with
the commenter who stated that the
repayment rate window should be
lengthened for medical schools; we are
revising the provision to provide that
the same period will be used for this
requirement as is used in the GE
regulations.
With respect to comments raised
about students who use in-school or
military deferments, we will again
mirror the provisions outlined in the GE
regulations. Because that calculation
measures active repayment during the
most recently completed award year, we
believe that we have addressed concerns
about borrowers who may have used
73 Analysis of NSLDS data was based on a
statistical sample of two cohorts of borrowers with
FFEL Loans and Direct Loans entering repayment
in 1999 and 2004, respectively. The repayment
statuses of the loans were tracked at 10 and 15 years
after entry into repayment, depending on the age of
the cohort.
74 For instance, ‘‘TICAS Detailed Comments on
Proposed Gainful Employment Rule,’’ The Institute
for College Access and Success. May 27, 2014.
https://ticas.org/content/pub/ticas-detailedcomments-proposed-gainful-employment-rule; and
Miller, Ben. ‘‘Improving Gainful Employment:
Suggestions for Better Accountability.’’ New
America. www.newamerica.org/education-policy/
policy-papers/improving-gainful-employment/.
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deferments in the interim. For the
purposes of this calculation, the
Department plans to rely on the data
reporting and data corrections under the
GE regulations for the purposes of
calculating repayment rates.
We disagree with the commenters
who stated that borrowers’ backgrounds
drive their ability to repay, and that
institutions should therefore not be held
accountable for their repayment rates.
One of the central missions of
institutions of higher education is to
ensure low-income students receive an
education that will help them to earn a
living and successfully repay their
loans. At institutions where more than
half of borrowers do not successfully
pay down the balance on their loans, the
Department believes that students have
the right to know—before they enroll or
borrow financial aid—that the majority
of borrowers have not repaid even one
dollar in outstanding balance three
years out of school.
Changes: We have revised § 668.41(h)
as described earlier in this section.
Challenge Process
Comments: One commenter asked the
Department to clarify whether
institutions will have an opportunity to
challenge the Department’s studentlevel data. Another commenter
recommended that the Department use
a 20.8 percent borrowing rate in place
of the proposed two-step borrowing rate
calculation in order to simplify the
calculation and reduce the associated
burden.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenter’s concern for the accuracy of
the data. Given the changes to the rate
described earlier, there will be no
additional data corrections process
beyond the one already provided for in
the GE regulations. Institutions will
already be responsible for reporting
accurate data under the GE regulations,
and for making any necessary
corrections to the data. The Department
will use those already-corrected data to
derive the institution-level repayment
rate. However, a proprietary institution
at which the median borrower has not
repaid in full, or paid down the
outstanding balance of, the borrower’s
loans may receive an exemption from
the warning requirement if the
institution demonstrates that not all of
its programs constitute GE programs and
that if the borrowers in the non-GE
programs were included in the
calculation of the loan repayment rate,
the loan repayment rate would be equal
to or greater than 0.5, meaning that the
median borrower had paid down the
outstanding balance of the borrower’s
loans by at least one dollar.
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Additionally, we do not believe the
participation rate index (i.e., the index
comparable to the 20.8 percent
borrowing rate percentage) appeal is
still necessary under this revised
version of the repayment rate. The GE
repayment rate calculation does not
include such an exception, and limiting
the warning requirement only to
proprietary institutions means that the
rates will cover all borrowers at the
institution, accurately representing the
universe of students with Federal loan
debt. In the interest of ensuring
consistency between the GE repayment
rates and this one, and of reducing
burden on both institutions and the
Department, we have removed the
participation rate index appeal.
Changes: We have revised § 668.41(h)
to remove the data corrections process
and the participation rate index appeal.
We have also added § 668.41(h)(4)(ii),
which creates an exemption to the
warning requirement for institutions
that demonstrate that they have
borrowers in non-GE programs and that,
if those borrowers were included in the
loan repayment rate calculation, the
loan repayment rate would meet the
threshold.
Warnings
Comments: Several commenters
supported using a plain-language
warning that has been tested with
consumers, and that is timely for
students. One commenter supported
incorporating those warnings into
institutional promotional materials, and
suggested expanding the definition of
‘‘promotional materials’’ to include all
materials and services for which an
institution has paid or contracted.
Several commenters requested that we
further clarify how the warning must be
presented, so that it is not difficult for
the public to see. Other commenters
expressed disappointment that the
proposed regulations do not require
institutions to deliver repayment rate
warnings to prospective students at the
first contact with those students, when
the information may be most valuable to
students, and strongly supported
including such a requirement in the
final regulations.
However, several commenters
suggested that the loan repayment
warning raises First Amendment
concerns. Some commenters believed
that the requirement would both target
institutions at which borrowers are
appropriately using IDR plans and
excuse private nonprofit and public
institutions with similarly poor loan
repayment rates. One commenter raised
concerns that the specific language
provided for illustrative purposes in the
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NPRM did not accurately describe the
loan repayment rate.
One commenter believed that the
warning would be most effective if it
were included within other loan and
borrowing information, rather than
delivered separately along with other
disclosures. The commenter also stated
that institutions should not be required
to provide the warning to students who
do not intend to borrow Federal student
loans.
Several commenters argued that
requiring institutions to include the
entire content of the warning in
advertising and promotional materials
would be cost-prohibitive. Instead,
commenters proposed that institutions
provide a briefer statement, similar to
the requirements in the Gainful
Employment regulations.
Discussion: We appreciate the support
of commenters who stated that they
agreed with the Department’s proposed
use of a plain-language, consumer-tested
warning. We also agree with
commenters who supported
incorporating warnings into a wider
range of promotional materials, and
have strengthened the definitions for
warnings and promotional materials
accordingly. We recognize and agree
with the concerns of commenters who
suggested additional clarity around the
presentation of the warning to prevent
obfuscation. To that end, we have
clarified the requirements for
promotional materials to ensure the
warning will be prominent, clear, and
conspicuous, including a variety of
conditions both for advertising and
promotional materials. The Secretary
may require the institution to modify its
materials if the Department determines
that the warning is not sufficiently
prominent or conspicuous. The
Secretary may also issue guidance
describing form, place, and manner
criteria that would make the warning
sufficiently prominent, clear, and
conspicuous.
We also appreciate the perspective of
commenters who supported handdelivered warnings at early stages in a
student’s college search. However, we
recognize that many of these goals will
be accomplished under the GE
regulations, which require that programlevel data be provided on a GE
disclosure template to students. To that
end, we have removed the requirement
that an institution-level warning also be
provided directly to prospective and
enrolled students, and instead will
require that the warnings be provided
through advertising and promotional
materials. This also resolves the
concerns of the commenter who
believed that the warning would be
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most effective if accompanied by other
loan and borrowing information; and
the commenter who argued that
institutions should be required to
provide the warning directly to only
those students who intend to borrow
Federal student loans.
While we recognize that some
institutions believe providing these
warnings in advertising and
promotional materials would be costprohibitive, we believe that this is
important information to help students
themselves make critical cost-benefit
analyses prior to investing their time
and money in an institution.
We address the First Amendment
concerns above in the section
‘‘Warnings’’ and do not repeat them
here. We also remind commenters that
the warning language included in the
final regulations may be subject to
consumer testing and may change in
accordance with the results of that
testing. The precise warning language, if
revised, will be published in the
Federal Register by the Secretary.
Changes: We have revised § 668.41(h)
to remove the delivery of a repayment
rate warning to prospective and enrolled
students. Instead, we have strengthened
the requirements under § 668.41(h)(3) to
ensure the materials are appropriately
provided in advertising and
promotional materials.
Agreements Between an Eligible School
and the Secretary for Participation in
the Direct Loan Program (Section
685.300)
Legal Authority and Basis for Regulating
Class Action Waivers and Arbitration
Agreements
Comments: Several commenters
objected that the Department lacks the
legal authority to ban either mandatory
predispute arbitration agreements or
class action waivers. These commenters
strongly believed that by this regulation,
the Department would be
inappropriately interfering with
institutional operations, violating
established Federal law, and interfering
with parties’ freedom to contract.
Commenters suggested that the
Department has ignored clear messages
from both Congress and the Supreme
Court indicating Federal policy favoring
arbitration.
Many commenters argued that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) precludes
the Department from restricting the use
of arbitration agreements. Commenters
noted that the FAA makes arbitration
agreements ‘‘valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable as written,’’ reflecting a
national preference for resolving
disputes by arbitration. These
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commenters believed that the proposed
regulations run counter to public policy
and violate the FAA. According to
commenters, the prohibition on
arbitration in the proposed regulations
is precisely the type of agency action
that Congress sought to curtail with the
FAA.
The commenters asserted that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly
demonstrated its support for the FAA
and for arbitration as an effective
method of dispute resolution.
Commenters cited cases in which they
view the Supreme Court as having
struck down regulations and statutes
that are inconsistent with the proarbitration policy established by the
FAA, such as DirecTV v. Imburgia, 136
S.Ct. 463 (2015). Commenters further
cited to a line of Supreme Court
precedent favoring arbitration,
including Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), and
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
According to these commenters, the
Department’s proposed regulations are
contrary to well-established law.
Commenters contended that, under
the FAA, the Department may not issue
the proposed regulations absent a clear
congressional command, which they
argued the Department lacks. According
to commenters, when Federal law is
silent as to whether Congress intended
to override the FAA for a claim, the
FAA requires that an arbitration
agreement be enforced according to its
terms. Here, in the absence of explicit
congressional command, commenters
believed that the Department is not
authorized to restrict arbitration. To
support this position, commenters noted
that Congress has granted the necessary
authority to other agencies in other
circumstances. Commenters suggested
that because Congress has granted
agencies this authority in the past, but
has not granted this authority to the
Department, this silence means that
Congress did not intend for the
Department to exercise such authority.
Specifically, commenters stated that
the HEA does not authorize the
Department to supersede the FAA. As a
result, commenters contended that the
proposed ban on arbitration must yield
to the FAA. Specifically, commenters
noted that sections 454(a)(6) and 455(h)
of the HEA, which the Department cites
in the proposed regulations, provide no
indication that the Department is
authorized to override the FAA. One
commenter contended that the
Department has misinterpreted its
statutory mandate by relying on these
provisions to justify the proposed
arbitration ban. Specifically, this
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commenter asserted that, unlike other
sections of the HEA, section 454(a)(6)
does not contain a provision that
expressly makes the FAA inapplicable.
According to the commenter, the
Department should interpret this
distinction to mean that the Department
may not disregard the FAA in its actions
pursuant to this provision.
Further, another commenter stated
that section 454(a) of the HEA does not
relate to contracts between students and
schools and that none of the current
regulatory requirements governing PPAs
regulate contracts between students and
the institution. These commenters
objected that the Department is acting
outside the scope of its statutory
authority by attempting to become
involved in contractual relationships
between students and institutions.
Other commenters, in contrast,
asserted that the Department has
authority to regulate the use of
arbitration. One commenter stated that
the FAA does not limit the Department’s
ability to require schools to remove
forced arbitration clauses and class
action waivers from enrollment
contracts. The commenter noted that the
FAA legal analysis is not triggered in
the absence of an arbitration clause and
that the FAA does not preclude laws or
regulations preventing parties from
placing arbitration provisions in their
contracts. This commenter asserted that
the history of the FAA and judicial
treatment of arbitration provisions does
not suggest an absolute right to impose
an arbitration agreement.
Another commenter strongly asserted
that the Department may condition
Federal funding on a school’s agreement
not to use forced arbitration clauses
without violating the FAA. This
commenter cited to section 2 of the
FAA, stating that agreements to arbitrate
are ‘‘valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable,’’ except where grounds
‘‘exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.’’ This
commenter suggested that the proposed
regulations would not interfere with
existing arbitration agreements and that
students would still have the ability to
arbitrate if they chose to do so. One
commenter noted that the Department’s
authority to adopt stand-alone
conditions on funding as part of its
PPAs is broad with respect to the Direct
Loan Program, and stated that barring
predispute arbitration agreements is
within the scope of this authority. The
commenter noted that including this
restriction in PPAs would force schools
to internalize the cost of their
misconduct and minimize costs
imposed on the public.
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Another commenter cited the
Spending Clause of the Constitution in
support of its position that the
Department is authorized to impose
conditions of this nature on Federal
funding recipients. The commenter
stated that the Supreme Court has
recognized the constitutionality of such
conditional funding in South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). In addition to
citing this holding, the commenter
noted that other agencies, such as the
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) place
similar conditions on recipients of their
funding.
Discussion: Addressing the comment
that the Department lacks legal
authority to ban either class action
waivers or predispute arbitration
agreements regarding borrower-defense
type claims, we repeat the position and
rationale for each as stated in the
NPRM. As we stressed there, the HEA
gives the Department the authority to
impose conditions on schools that wish
to participate in a Federal benefit
program. In this regulation, the
Department is exercising its broad
authority, as provided under the HEA,
to impose conditions on schools that
wish to participate in the Federal Direct
Loan Program. Section 452(b) of the
HEA states, ‘‘No institution of higher
education shall have a right to
participate in the [Direct Loan]
programs authorized under this part
[part D of title IV of the HEA].’’ 20
U.S.C. 1087b(b). If a school chooses to
participate in the Direct Loan Program,
it must enter into a Direct Loan Program
participation agreement (PPA). 20
U.S.C. 1087d. Section 454(a)(6) of the
HEA authorizes the Department to
include in that PPA ‘‘provisions that the
Secretary determines are necessary to
protect the interests of the United States
and to promote the purposes of’’ the
Direct Loan Program. 20 U.S.C.
1087d(a)(6); 81 FR 39385.
This regulation addresses class action
waivers and predispute arbitration
agreements separately, because the
proscriptions adopted here are distinct
and apply to each separately. As we
explained in the NPRM, recent
experience with class action waivers
demonstrates that some institutions,
notably Corinthian, aggressively used
class action waivers to thwart actions by
students for the very same abusive
conduct that government agencies,
including this Department, eventually
pursued. Corinthian used these waivers
to avoid the publicity that might have
triggered more timely enforcement
agency action, which came too late for
Corinthian to provide relief to affected
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students. 81 FR 39383.75 Corinthian’s
widespread use of these waivers and
mandatory arbitration agreements
resulted in grievances against
Corinthian being asserted not against
the now-defunct Corinthian, but as
defenses to repayment of taxpayerfinanced Direct Loans, with no other
party from which the Federal
government may recover any losses. As
noted, Corinthian was not alone in this
practice. The absence of class action risk
coincided with the use of deceptive
practices in the industry during this
same period, as recounted in the NPRM
and in the earlier NPRM for Program
Integrity: Gainful Employment. 79 FR
16426 (March 24, 2014). We infer that
from the continued misconduct and
from the extensive use of class action
waivers that the waivers effectively
removed any deterrent effect that the
risk of such lawsuits would have
provided. These claims, thus, ended up
as defenses to repayment of Direct
Loans. This experience demonstrates
that class action waivers for these
claims substantially harm the financial
interest of the United States and thwart
achievement of the purpose of the Direct
Loan Program. Accordingly, section
454(a)(6) of the HEA authorizes the
Department to ban Direct Loan
participant institutions from securing
class action waivers of borrower-defense
type claims.
Separately, we considered the effect
of predispute arbitration agreements on
the achievement of Direct Loan Program
objectives and the Federal interest, as
evidenced during the same period. A
major objective of the program is
protecting the taxpayer investment in
Direct Loans. That objective includes
preventing the institutions empowered
to arrange Direct Loans for their
students from insulating themselves
from direct and effective accountability
for their misconduct, from deterring
publicity that would prompt
government oversight agencies to react,
and from shifting the risk of loss for that
misconduct to the taxpayer. Predispute
arbitration agreements, like class action
waivers, do each of these, and thus
jeopardize the taxpayer investment in
Direct Loans. Aligned with these steps
75 As one commenter noted, during the period in
question—2011 to 2015—very few Corinthian
students pursued arbitration, according to records
maintained by the American Arbitration
Association, and even fewer received any award.
www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015-OPE0103-10723, citing Consumer Arbitration Statistics,
Provider Organization Report, available at
www.adr.org. This data supports our conclusion
that widespread use of mandatory arbitration
agreements effectively masked serious misconduct
later uncovered in government enforcement actions,
while providing minimal relief for students.
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to protect the taxpayer investment in
Direct Loans, we note that these
regulations replace, for new loans, the
State law cause of action standard with
a new Federal standard. Negotiators had
objected to that change, and we retained
the State law option for those State law
claims reduced to judgment. Mandatory
predispute arbitration agreements
would have made this standard a null
option.
For all these reasons, as explained in
the NPRM, we concluded that
agreements barring individual or joint
actions by students frustrate Federal
interests and Direct Loan Program
objectives for the same reasons as did
class action waivers. Therefore, we
concluded that section 454(a)(6) of the
HEA authorizes the Department to
regulate the use of predispute
arbitration agreements.
As explained in the NPRM, we
acknowledge that the FAA assures that
agreements to arbitrate shall be valid,
and may not be invalidated ‘‘save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.’’ 9
U.S.C. 2. Contrary to the commenters’
assertion, none of the case authority to
which the commenters cite addresses
Federal regulations that may affect
arbitration, and the disputes addressed
in that case authority appear to involve
litigation between private parties
regarding rights arising under Federal,
State, or local law or contracts between
those parties.
As we also stated in the NPRM, the
Department does not have the authority,
and does not propose, to displace or
diminish the effect of the FAA. 81 FR
39385. These regulations do not
invalidate any arbitration agreement,
whether already in existence or
obtained in the future. Moreover, the
Department does not have the authority
to invalidate any arbitration agreement,
did not propose to do, and does not in
this final rule attempt to do so.
However, as we explained in the
NPRM, and repeat under ‘‘Class Action
Waivers’’ here, the Department
considers the regulation of class action
waivers and predispute arbitration
agreements to be justified because they
affect Direct Loan borrowing.76 The
arguments that, by these regulations, the
Department attempts to override,
displace, or disregard the FAA
mischaracterize the regulations. The
regulations do not control the conduct
of purely private transactions between
private parties, transactions unrelated to
the Direct Loan Program.77 Direct Loans
76 81
FR 39382–39383.
private transactions are the kinds of
relationships that the CFPB may regulate under
77 Purely
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are not purely private transactions; but
for the Direct Loan, the student may
very likely not have enrolled at all in a
chosen school. The terms of enrollment
agreements between the institution and
the student loan recipient, and the
school’s performance with respect to the
education financed by that loan, directly
affect the Direct Loan program. These
regulations impose a condition on the
participation by a school in this specific
Federal program, a Federal program in
which Congress explicitly stated that
‘‘no institution shall have a right to
participate . . .’’ 20 U.S.C. 1087b(b).
The final regulations do not bar schools
from using any kind of predispute
arbitration agreements, or class action
waivers, so long as they pertain only to
grievances unrelated to the Direct Loan
Program. The regulations merely require
that a school that participates in the
Direct Loan program cannot enter into a
predispute arbitration agreement
regarding borrower defense-type claims
with a student who benefits from aid
under that program.
These requirements are well within
the kind of regulation upheld by courts
that address the authority of the
government to impose conditions that
limit the exercise of constitutional rights
by beneficiaries. That case law gives
strong support for the position that the
Department has authority to impose
limits of the kind adopted here on the
use of class action waivers and
predispute arbitration agreements. For
example, the government may impose a
restriction on the exercise of a
recipient’s First Amendment rights so
long as that restriction does not extend
beyond the recipient’s participation in
the Federal program:
Our ‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases
involve situations in which the Government
has placed a condition on the recipient of the
subsidy rather than on a particular program
or service, thus effectively prohibiting the
recipient from engaging in the protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally
funded program.
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open
Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330–
31 (2013), quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 197 (1991).78 Here, the scope
section 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
5518(b) (authority to regulate the use of agreements
between covered persons and consumers).
78 The Spending Clause of the Federal
Constitution grants Congress the power ‘‘[t]o lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States.’’ U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The clause provides Congress
broad discretion to tax and spend for the ‘‘general
Welfare,’’ including by funding particular State or
private programs or activities. That power includes
the authority to impose limits on the use of such
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of the federally funded program—the
Direct Loan Program—extends far
beyond the simple act of originating the
loan on behalf of the Department; the
HEA itself regulates a broad range of
school actions as they relate to Direct
Loan participation, from advertising and
recruiting practices that lead to
enrollment to refunding tuition
payments after a student drops out. See,
e.g., 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(20) (incentive
compensation); 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(22)
(refund requirements). Section 454 of
the HEA provides that under the Direct
Loan program, the school acts as the
Department’s loan originator, and
accepts responsibility and financial
liability for failure to perform its
functions pursuant to the Direct Loan
PPA. 20 U.S.C. 1087d(a)(3). The HEA
gives the Secretary the authority to
modify the terms of the PPA as needed
to protect Federal interests and promote
the objectives of the program. 20 U.S.C.
1087d(a)(6). The Department issues
these regulations pursuant to that
authority, to regulate conduct well
within the ‘‘scope of the federally
funded program’’ at issue here. As we
explained in the NPRM and earlier in
this discussion, the restrictions involve
terms, conditions, and practices that
directly and closely affect the objectives
of the Federal Direct Loan Program.79
For several reasons, the fact that
Congress gave certain agencies power to
regulate arbitration, or outright banned
mandatory arbitration, supports no
inference that Congress considered
other agencies, such as the Department,
to lack the power to regulate.80 First,
these enactments regulate purely private
transactions between private parties. As
such, transactions in these contexts fall
squarely within the terms of the FAA,
a Federal statute, and arbitration clauses
in these transactions would be deemed
valid and enforceable if Congress had
not, by Federal legislation, barred or
nullified their use, or explicitly
funds to ensure they are used in the manner
Congress intends. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
195, n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991)
(‘‘Congress’ power to allocate funds for public
purposes includes an ancillary power to ensure that
those funds are properly applied to the prescribed
use.’’). Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y
Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327–28, (2013).
79 See 81 FR 39383–84.
80 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 987(f)(4), (h) (authorizing
the DoD to regulate use of mandatory arbitration in
extensions of credit to servicemembers); 12 U.S.C.
5518 (authorizing the CFPB to regulate use of
arbitration in consumer financial services); 15
U.S.C. 78o (authorizing the SEC to regulate use of
mandatory arbitration in certain investment
relationships); 15 U.S.C. 1639c(e) (barring
mandatory arbitration in extensions of credit
secured on the principal dwelling of a consumer);
and 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e) (prohibiting use of
arbitration in regard to certain whistleblower
proceedings regarding securities).
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authorized a Federal agency to do so by
regulation. Federal legislation was
therefore essential to achieve the
intended restriction of arbitration in that
context. None of the situations cited
involve the terms and conditions of
participation in a Federal benefit
program.81 Second, these latter
enactments offer no legislative
interpretation of the 1993 amendment to
the 1965 Higher Education Act, which
enacted section 454, because they deal
with different subject matters. Thus,
courts interpret statutes with similar
language, and which address the same
general subject matter, ‘‘as if they were
one law.’’ See Erlenbaugh v. United
States, 409 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1972). In
such a case, a ‘‘later act can . . . be
regarded as a legislative interpretation
of (an) earlier act . . .’’ United States v.
Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1940)
(construing two statutes that both
address the scope of the tax exemption
afforded farm loan bonds).
Here, newer enactments addressing
arbitration provide no ‘‘legislative
interpretation’’ of the HEA, because they
share neither language nor subject
matter with the 1965 Higher Education
Act in general or the 1993 Direct Loan
Program statute in particular. To the
contrary, Congress has generally
rejected any inference that other Federal
law regulating consumer lending, most
prominently, the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), operates on ‘‘the same general
subject matter’’ as Federal education
loans financed under the HEA. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. 1603(7) (exempting from TILA
those loans made, insured, or
guaranteed pursuant to a program
authorized by title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965). Section 454
itself—the statutory basis for adopting
‘‘other provisions’’ needed to protect
Federal interests evidences this
distinction in subject matter by
repeatedly referencing not other Federal
laws addressing consumer lending, but
specific disclosure requirements in the
HEA itself, as well as provisions barring
the school from charging fees for
arranging Direct Loans. 20 U.S.C.
1087d(a)(1)(E). This context compels the
conclusion that the scope of the power
to regulate under section 454 was to be
governed by reference to the Federal
objectives stated in this very statute, not
by inferences drawn from subsequent
legislation addressing very different
objectives in transactions involving
different—private—participants. The
objection that section 454(a)(6) of the
HEA does not authorize the Department
81 Congress’s power to regulate in these matters
rests, thus, on the Commerce Clause, not the
Spending Clause.
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to involve itself in the contractual
relationships—or impair its freedom to
contract with others and exercise rights
under existing contracts—ignores a host
of HEA provisions that regulate the
‘‘contractual relationships’’ between the
school and other parties. These
provisions restrict, and in some
instances ban, the exercise of rights that
the school may already have under
existing contracts or wish to include in
future contracts. The HEA thus regulates
contractual relationships with students:
The qualifications for enrollment of
students who may become borrowers,
20 U.S.C. 1091(a), (d); the manner in
which the school must determine
whether the student borrower is making
academic progress while enrolled, 20
U.S.C. 1091(c); banning the school from
imposing penalties and late fees on
students whose tuition payments may
be delayed for various reasons, 20
U.S.C. 1094(a)(19); and determining
when that student has ceased
enrollment and whether and how much
the school must refund to the student
and the Department of tuition payments
the school has already received for that
student, 20 U.S.C. 1091b. The HEA,
moreover, imposes significant
prohibitions that ban the institution
from the exercise of rights it may have
under its existing contracts with its
employees and third parties, or may
wish to include in future contracts with
those employees and with third parties.
Thus, an institution cannot compensate
its employees on the basis of success in
securing enrollments (‘‘incentive
compensation’’). 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(20).
More recently, section 487 of the HEA
was amended by Public Law 110–315,
the Higher Education Opportunity Act
of 2008, to impose significant new
restrictions on the exercise by
institutions and affiliated entities of
rights under existing contracts with
lenders that provided financing for their
students. That act mandated adoption
and compliance by institutions with a
code of conduct governing their
relationships with lenders that made
both Federal loans and private loans for
their students, and banned numerous
practices in widespread use at the time
under arrangements between the
institution, affiliated entities, its own
employees and their family members,
and lenders. 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(25), (e).
These amendments were effective on
the date of enactment. Public Law 110–
3110–315, § 3, August 14, 2008, 122 Stat
3078. Thus, the HEA itself repeatedly
conditions participation in title IV, HEA
programs on an institution’s refraining
from exercising rights the institution
may already have under existing
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contracts or may acquire under new
contracts. These regulations similarly
operate within the very scope of the
Federal program in which these HEA
provisions operate, to bar the institution
from exercising certain rights it may
have already acquired or wished to
acquire by contract. In doing so, neither
the HEA nor these regulations
improperly infringe on the institution’s
freedom of contract or freedom of
expression.
Changes: None.
Comments: A few commenters
suggested that the proposed regulations
may violate the rights of institutions
under the First Amendment, by
compelling speech, and under the
Takings and Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment by interfering with or
depriving the institution of its
contractual rights in arbitration and
class action waiver agreements. Several
commenters objected that by applying to
existing contracts, the regulations are
impermissibly retroactive.
Discussion: The regulations effect
neither a deprivation of a property right
of an institution in agreements it already
has with students, nor an impairment of
those contracts. The regulation affects
the terms on which an institution may
continue to participate in a Federal
program. The institution has no
property right to continue to participate
on the terms under which the
institution previously participated. See
Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges &
Universities v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d
at 198. Rights acquired by the
institution under agreements already
executed with students remain fully
enforceable on their own terms.
Like any new regulations, these
regulations impose requirements on the
future conduct of institutions that
intend to continue to participate in the
Direct Loan Program. Regulations
commonly change the future
consequences of permissible acts that
occurred prior to adoption of the
regulations, and such regulations are not
retroactive, much less impermissibly
retroactive, if they affect only future
conduct, and impose no fine or other
liability on a school for lawful conduct
that occurred prior to the adoption of
the regulations. The regulations do not
make an institution prospectively
ineligible because it has already entered
into contracts with arbitration
provisions. The regulations impose no
fine or liability on a school that has
already obtained such agreements. The
regulations address only future conduct
by the institution, and only as that
conduct is related to the institution’s
participation in the Federal Direct Loan
Program. The institution is not obligated
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to continue to participate in the Direct
Loan program. If it chooses to continue
to participate, it agrees to do so under
rules such as these that change—
prospectively—the conduct in which it
can engage. These rules thereafter bar
the institution that chooses to continue
to participate from exercising rights
acquired by the institution under
agreements already executed with
students. The regulations abrogate none
of those agreements; an institution that
chooses not to continue to participate is
free to rely on those agreements.
In response to the assertion that
requiring the institution to include
provisions in any arbitration agreement
it has obtained or obtains in the future
violates the First Amendment, we note
that the regulations compel action, not
merely speech. The requirements of
§ 685.300(e)(1) and (2) and (f)(1) and (2)
are different than the warnings required
under § 668.41, and those warnings and
disclosures regarding gainful
employment programs that were
challenged and upheld in Ass’n of
Private Sector Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 182
(D.D.C. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Ass’n of
Private Sector Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 640 Fed. Appx 5 (D.C. Cir.
2016). Section 685.300(e) and (f)
requires an institution that has obtained
a class action waiver or predispute
arbitration agreement that included
borrower defense-type claims to, most
importantly, take no action to enforce
that waiver or agreement and, secondly,
to notify the affected student that it does
not intend to enforce the agreement. The
regulations further require the
institution to avoid certain actions, or to
conduct those actions in a particular
manner, which include adding a clause
to new agreements to advise the student
of its commitment. To the extent that
the regulations compel speech, they
compel commercial speech, like other
communications with students required
by Department regulations, and the
content of the speech is limited to
stating that the institution agrees to
comply with a particular Federal
regulation. The regulations do not
require the institution to express the
viewpoint of any other party on the
value of arbitration, much less to
disparage arbitration. Nor do they
prevent the institution from advocating
in its communications with students its
opinion of the benefits of arbitration and
the disadvantages of litigation, or from
encouraging students who have a
grievance with the institution from
agreeing to arbitration. To the extent
that the regulations compel speech,
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therefore, they compel only factual,
non-controversial speech.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters
considered the Department’s proposed
arbitration and class action waiver bans
to be arbitrary and capricious agency
actions, adopted without proper,
reasoned decision-making. Some
commenters contended that the
Department did not gather sufficient
evidence to support its positions in the
NPRM. Commenters also believed that
the Department relied too heavily on a
CFPB study that they believed was not
relevant to the public student loan
context at issue. Additionally,
commenters believed that the
Department did not sufficiently
consider conflicting evidence, such as
the benefits of arbitration and the
drawbacks of class actions. A
commenter cited to literature and
academic studies that the commenter
asserts demonstrate the merits of
arbitration.
Discussion: As discussed elsewhere,
we do not deny the merits of arbitration,
and the regulations do not ban
arbitration. The Department gathered
substantial evidence to support the
position taken in the regulations, as
described in detail in the NPRM. That
evidence showed that the widespread
and aggressive use of class action
waivers and predispute arbitration
agreements coincided with widespread
abuse by schools over recent years, and
effects of that abuse on the Direct Loan
Program. It is undisputable that the
abuse occurred, that a great many
students were injured by the abuse, that
the abusive parties aggressively used
waivers and arbitration agreements to
thwart timely efforts by students to
obtain relief from the abuse, and that the
ability of the school to continue that
abuse unhindered by lawsuits from
consumers has already cost the
taxpayers many millions of dollars in
losses and can be expected to continue
to do so.
Regarding the commenter that
objected to our reliance on the CFPB
study because that study may not be
relevant to the Federal student loan
market, the CFPB’s study did analyze
the prevalence of arbitration agreements
for private student loans as well as
disputes concerning those loans.
Schools participating in the Direct Loan
Program not infrequently provide or
arrange private student loans to their
students; these private loan borrowers
may also have Direct Loans, and in any
case can be expected often to share
characteristics with Direct Loan
borrowers.
Changes: None.
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Comments: One commenter stated
that the arbitration ban falls outside the
scope of topics the Department
announced that it would be addressing
in development of these regulations and
therefore the Department is not
authorized to address the issue.
Discussion: The proposal to include
consideration of arbitration agreements
and class action waivers was presented
in writing by at least one negotiator
during the negotiated rulemaking
proceedings, and was the subject of
significant discussion during the final
negotiated rulemaking session. The
issue was highly relevant to the
consideration of borrower defense
claims, the core of the rulemaking
exercise, and was duly and properly
considered.
Changes: None.
Class Action Waivers
Comments: Commenters offered
opposing views on the treatment of class
action waivers under the regulations.
Several commenters approved of the
Department’s proposal to prohibit the
use of class action waivers, noting the
government’s obligation to protect
taxpayers and students from misuse of
funds dispensed through the Direct
Loan Program. One commenter cited
research from the CFPB showing that
class actions are more effective at
securing relief for consumers than
individual arbitrations. This commenter
suggested that arbitration agreements
prevented Corinthian students from
receiving relief from the institution, and
that class actions are essential to
safeguarding taxpayer money. This
commenter asserted that the provisions
in the proposed regulations addressing
class action waivers are narrowly
tailored, consistent with precedent
established in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991).
Another commenter suggested that
class actions are beneficial to students
because they minimize resource
obstacles often faced by students.
According to this commenter, class
actions are powerful tools that can
rectify wrongs and create incentives for
industries to change behavior. Further,
this commenter noted that class actions
enable students to band together to seek
relief, rather than bringing such
grievances to the Department as
defenses to repayment of taxpayerfunded Direct Loans.
Other commenters disapproved of the
Department’s proposed ban on class
action waivers. These commenters
contended that class actions only
benefit lawyers and are not helpful to
students. A few commenters noted that
an individual participant in a class
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action often receives only nominal
returns for his or her claim, while
attorneys receive disproportionately
large returns. One commenter suggested
that class actions cannot be effective
because the needs and particular
circumstances of individuals within the
class cannot be properly considered, so
students cannot receive the appropriate
tailored relief.
Another commenter criticized class
actions as being incredibly time
consuming and yielding minimal public
benefit. The commenter stated that
attorneys are less likely to represent
students from small schools in class
actions because of the lower potential
rewards, leaving injured students at
small schools without adequate
recourse.
One commenter rejected the
Department’s position that class actions
are likely to have a deterrence effect,
contending that plaintiffs’ lawyers often
pursue frivolous claims for which
institutions could not anticipate liability
and therefore could not effectively
monitor their own behavior.
One commenter stated that the ban on
class action waivers would be harmful
to schools, particularly private
institutions that lack the legal
protections afforded to public
institutions. A commenter contended
that the rule would expose institutions
to frivolous lawsuits and thus would
divert funds needed for educational
expenses to pay the costs of litigation.
Discussion: In the NPRM, we
described in detail the actual effect that
class action waivers have had in the
postsecondary education field on
students and Federal taxpayers. 81 FR
39382. Nothing in the comments
opposing the regulation demonstrates
that these effects are exaggerated or
mischaracterized, that the substantial
problems created by the use of class
action waivers can be reduced or
eliminated by more modest measures,
that the disadvantages and burdens the
regulation would place on schools
outweigh the costs and harm that use of
class action waivers has already caused,
or that there is any reason to expect that
this pattern will change so that such
waivers will not cause these same
problems in the future. It is possible that
banning class action waivers may
increase legal expenses and could divert
funds from educational services, or lead
to tuition increases.82 We expect that
82 It is probable that institutions against whom
arbitrations have been filed are already incurring
legal costs for arbitration. The CFPB study found
that on the average, over 90 percent of the
companies involved in the arbitrations it surveyed
were represented by counsel in those proceedings.
CFPB, Arbitration Study, § 5.5.3.
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the potential exposure to class actions
will motivate institutions to provide
value and treat their student consumers
fairly in order to reduce the likelihood
of suits in the first place.83
We expect that institutions, like other
parties that provide consumer services,
already monitor, and will continue to
monitor, court rulings to guide these
efforts. By strengthening the incentive
for all institutions to serve consumers
fairly, and thereby reduce both
grievances by students and attendant
scrutiny by the Department (and other
enforcement agencies), we expect that
the limits we adopt here will tend to
reduce the likelihood that an institution
that neglects these efforts will enjoy a
competitive advantage over those that
engage in these efforts. Although it is
possible that frivolous lawsuits may be
brought, and that institutions will incur
costs to defend such suits, institutions
already face that risk and expense. We
do not dismiss this risk, but we have no
basis from which to speculate how
much this regulation might increase that
risk and attendant expense. We see that
risk as outweighed by the benefits to
students and the taxpayer in allowing
those students who wish to seek relief
in court the option to do so.
Commenters who oppose the
regulations on the ground that class
actions benefit lawyers more than
consumers, and may result in modest
returns for an individual member of the
class, disregard the need for this
regulation in this field. Contrary to the
assertion that class actions provide only
modest returns, we note that the CFPB
found, in its study, that the 419
consumer finance class actions during
the five-year period it studied produced
some $2.2 billion in net cash or in kind
relief to consumers in those markets.84
Whether or not consumer class actions
have produced minimal or no actual
benefit to the consumers who comprise
the class, there is little evidence that
this has happened in the postsecondary
education industry.85 Rather, precisely
83 ‘‘[C]lass actions increase negative publicity of
for-profits and draw attention to deceptive
recruiting in a much more public fashion than
bilateral arbitration. ’’ Blake Shinoda, Enabling
Class Litigation As an Approach to Regulating forProfit Colleges, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1085 (2014).
84 81 FR 32858.
85 It appears that at least in the postsecondary
education market, the claim is unfounded; in one
of the few class actions to proceed to trial, a class
of students obtained two million dollars in relief
from a for-profit school. Jamieson v. Vatterott
Educational Centers, Inc., 259 FRD. 520 (D. Kan.
2009); Nick DeSantis, Missouri Court Upholds ExStudent’s Win in Suit Against Vatterott College,
Chronicle of Higher Education, The Ticker (Aug. 27,
2014), available at www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/
mo-appeals-court-upholds-ex-students-win-in-suitagainst-vatterott-college/84777.
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because of schools’ widespread and
aggressive use of class action waivers,
and even opposition to class arbitration,
as described in the NPRM, there appears
to be no history of such minimal
benefits in this market.
We do not suggest that class actions
are a panacea, and the criticisms of class
actions in other markets may also apply
to class actions in the postsecondary
education market if such suits were
available. We stress that class actions
have significant effects beyond financial
recovery for the particular class
members, including deterring
misconduct by the institution, deterring
misconduct by other industry members,
and publicizing claims of misconduct
that law enforcement authorities might
otherwise have never been aware of, or
may have discovered only much later.
The CFPB described these effects in its
proposed rule,86 and as we
demonstrated in the NPRM, recent
history shows the significant
consequences for students and
taxpayers in an industry that has
effectively barred consumers from using
the class action tool. As to the comment
that class actions would harm private
non-profit institutions, we note that
these institutions are already subject to
that risk, and nevertheless, only a small
percentage of non-profit institutions
currently use arbitration agreements
with their students.87 This suggests that
institutions in this sector have generally
felt no need for such protection, and we
see no reason to expect that this
regulation will change the exposure of
non-profit institutions to class actions or
other suits.
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter objected
that the proposed regulations would
improperly restrict borrowers’ choices
regarding how they are represented.
This commenter expressed concern that
borrowers from small schools would be
overlooked under the proposed
regulations because they would not be
able to share the costs of litigation with
a larger group. Another commenter
objected that the regulations would
adversely affect students who could not
successfully pursue class actions
because their claims would not meet the
commonality and predominance
requirements for class actions. This
commenter asserted that alternative
forms of aggregate litigation other than
class action suits are essential to
ensuring that students are able to obtain
86 See,
e.g., 81 FR 32861–32865.
Habash and Robert Shireman, How
College Enrollment Contracts Limit Students’
Rights, The Century Foundation, (April 28, 2016),
available at https://tcf.org/content/report/howcollege-enrollment-contracts-limit-students-rights/.
87 Tariq
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judicial relief, and found the regulations
insufficient to enable those actions.
Discussion: The objective of
§ 685.300(e) is to ensure that those
students who choose to pursue their
claims against a voluntarily
participating school by a class action are
not prevented from doing so by
agreements they are compelled to enter
in order to enroll at the school. The
Department cannot change the rules and
practical consequences of class action
litigation so that groups of students
would be spared the costs and risks
incurred by class action litigants, and
did not intend to do so in these
regulations. Similarly, the Department
has neither the mandate nor the
authority to create alternative forms of
aggregate litigation in other forums, but
the regulations, by ensuring that
individuals are free to retain the right to
sue for relief, necessarily enable those
individuals to enjoy the benefits of
joinder under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 20 or
comparable State rules, as an alternative
to class actions.
Changes: None.
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Arbitration Agreements
Comments: Several commenters urged
the Department to bar the use of any
predispute arbitration agreements by
schools. Commenters asserted that
limiting the regulation to mandatory
predispute agreements would prove
ineffective for several reasons: The
agreement could be presented to the
student as part of a packet of enrollment
materials, or included as another term
in a mandatory enrollment agreement
with merely an opportunity to agree or
decline; the agreement could be
required as a condition of other benefits,
even if not a condition of enrollment; or
the clause could be included, with an
‘‘opt-out’’ provision. The commenters
stressed that for a student to understand
the significance of the agreement, the
school would have to explain its
significance, a duty that the proposed
rule did not impose. The commenters
further contended that even if the
student were to be aware of the clause,
it is reasonable to expect that the
student would not understand the
significance of entering into such an
agreement. A commenter stated that
numerous student consumers
represented by the commenter had
agreed to arbitration, stating that they
did so even, in some instances, where
the agreement was labeled voluntary,
because they did not understand the
significance of the agreement itself or
their ability to opt out, or because they
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relied on misstatements by recruiters.88
Other commenters stressed that the
literature is replete with evidence that
consumers do not understand the terms
of agreements governing the consumer
financial transactions in which they
engage, making it unlikely that the
student would fully understand either
the significance of the agreement itself
or a warning that the student need not
agree to arbitration in order to
enrollment. A commenter provided
declarations and statements from
students attesting to their lack of
understanding either that they had
executed agreements to arbitrate, or
what arbitration meant, or both.89
Commenters also addressed the issue
of ‘‘opt-out’’ clauses with similar
concerns. A comment signed by sixteen
attorneys general urged that the
regulation ban the use of ‘‘opt-out’’
clauses, which they viewed as unfair as
mandatory arbitration clauses. They
asserted that predatory for-profit
schools, in particular, have a history of
using arbitration clauses to violate the
rights of their students, and that in their
experience, students often do not
consider the consequences of an
arbitration agreement, or the value of
opting out, until they have a legitimate
complaint against the school, at which
point it is too late to opt out of any
arbitration agreement that may have
appeared in the student’s enrollment
agreement. Other commenters strongly
believed that arbitration agreements
containing opt-out clauses should still
be considered mandatory, and should be
prohibited under § 685.300(f).
According to these commenters, opt-out
provisions are highly ineffective
because students misunderstand the
provisions or choose not to accept them
to avoid being disagreeable.
Commenters also asserted that recruiters
at proprietary institutions are trained to
manipulate students and may be able to
convince them to sign agreements even
if students are apprehensive about the
meaning and consequences. Some
commenters noted that students are
unable to make informed decisions
about whether to accept these optional
agreements because students must
understand and exercise the option well
before any disputes arise. One
commenter cited to a CFPB study that
found that, even when consumers are
afforded the opportunity to opt-out of
arbitration clauses, many are either
unaware of this option or do not
exercise this right. Another commenter
88 www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015OPE-0103-10729.
89 www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015OPE-0103-10723.
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cited to examples from court records
indicating that students who receive an
opt-out provision rarely take advantage.
Based on these concerns, commenters
recommended that the Department
prohibit schools from entering into any
predispute arbitration agreements, even
those containing opt-out provisions.
Commenters cautioned that the
Department’s failure to explicitly
prohibit these agreements would create
an exception that swallows the
Department’s proposed rule on forced
arbitration. Some commenters suggested
that failure to ban opt-out clauses would
actually make students worse off than if
the agreements had no such option.
According to these commenters,
students who unknowingly sign
arbitration agreements containing optout provisions may face greater hurdles
in any efforts to circumvent them by
demonstrating their unconscionability,
as is generally required for challenges to
arbitration agreements. Additionally,
commenters suggested that, as
proposed, it would be more difficult for
the Department to take enforcement
actions against schools that take
advantage of loopholes in the
regulations.
Another commenter believed that
allowing the enforcement of arbitration
agreements containing opt-out
provisions would be highly beneficial to
both students and the Department. This
commenter believed that these
provisions afford students a higher
degree of choice and control over their
situations. Additionally, this commenter
believed that allowing such provisions
would relieve the Department of a
potential influx of claims.
Discussion: The Department solicited
comments on how the regulations
should treat agreements that would
mandate arbitration of borrower defense
claims but that contain opt-out clauses.
We have considered the comments
received, as well as the findings of the
CFPB cited by the commenter as
relevant to this question. We have
considered as well the comments about
students’ lack of awareness either that
they were executing an agreement to
arbitrate, or that doing so had significant
consequences that they did not
understand, or both. The same
considerations that apply to opt-out
clauses apply as well to our proposal in
the NPRM that would ban only
mandatory predispute arbitration.
Our proposal in the NPRM to bar only
mandatory ‘‘take it or leave it’’
predispute arbitration agreements rested
on the expectation that a student
consumer could make an informed
choice prior to a dispute to agree to
arbitrate such a dispute, and that this
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objective could realistically be
accomplished by having the agreement
presented to the student in a manner
that would separate the agreement from
the bulk of enrollment material
presented to the borrower on or at the
beginning of class, with a clearlyworded notice that the student was free
not to sign the agreement. These
comments have persuaded us that the
steps we proposed in the NPRM would
not produce an informed decision,
because even if the agreement were to
be presented to students in this manner,
it is unrealistic to expect the students to
understand what arbitration is and thus
what they would be relinquishing by
agreeing to arbitrate. The submissions
from commenters provide specific
evidence of this lack of understanding
in the postsecondary education market
among students enrolled in the very
sector of that market that far more
commonly uses predispute arbitration
agreements.90 They are not alone. The
literature regarding use of arbitration
agreements in consumer transactions
provides repeated anecdotal and
empirical evidence that consumers
commonly lack understanding of the
consequences of arbitration
agreements.91 In its survey of credit card
users, the CFPB found generally that
‘‘consumers generally lack awareness
regarding the effects of arbitration
agreements’’ and specifically that
‘‘[r]espondents were also generally
unaware of any opt-out opportunities
afforded by their issuer.’’ CFPB,
90 Indeed, a commenter noted testimony in one
case that the school official shared her students’
lack of understanding: None of [the students] knew
what arbitration was or asked any questions about
the arbitration provision. Ms. Dennison testified
that, although she interviews hundreds of
applicants each year, she has never been asked a
question about the arbitration provision and she has
not mentioned it when meeting with prospective
students. In fact, Ms. Dennison testified that she did
not understand the arbitration provision herself.
Rude v. NUCO Edn. Corp., 2011 WL 6931516
Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2011.
91 See: Jeff Sovern, et al., ‘‘Whimsy Little
Contracts’’ with Unexpected Consequences, 75 Md.
L. Rev. 1, at 21 (2015): The degree of literacy
required to comprehend the average disclosure form
and key contract terms simply is not within reach
of the majority of American adults.’’ Judge Posner
has explained ‘‘not all persons are capable of being
careful readers.’’ Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben
S. Bernanke, whose agency was responsible for
administering the Truth in Lending disclosures,
among others, has said that ‘‘not even the best
disclosures are always adequate. . . . [S]ome
aspects of increasingly complex products simply
cannot be adequately understood or evaluated by
most consumers, no matter how clear the
disclosure.’’ And noted scholar and now-Senator
Elizabeth Warren . . . has been quoted as saying
about a credit card contract: ‘‘I teach contract law
at Harvard, and I can’t understand half of what it
says.’’
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Arbitration Agreements, 81 FR 32843
(May 24, 2016).92
We see no reason to expect that
students who are now enrolled or will
enroll in the future will be different
than those described or included in the
comments. We see no realistic way to
improve this awareness, and thus, we
do not believe that the use of predispute
agreements to arbitrate will result in
well-informed choices, particularly by
students in the sector of the market in
which such agreements are most
commonly used. Based on the lack of
understanding of the consequences of
these agreements evidenced in the CFPB
survey of credit card users, in the
literature dealing with credit cards and
other financial products, and in the
examples of individual postsecondary
students’ lack of awareness, we consider
predispute arbitration agreements,
whether voluntary or mandatory, and
whether or not they contain opt-out
clauses, to frustrate achievement of the
goal of the regulation—to ensure that
students who choose to enter into an
agreement to arbitrate their borrower
defense type claims do so freely and
knowingly.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.300(f)(1) to delete the words ‘‘will
not compel a student’’; we have revised
§ 685.300(f)(1), (2), and (3)(i) and (ii) to
remove the word ‘‘mandatory’’ each
time it appears; we have revised
§ 685.300(g)(1)(ii) to delete the word
‘‘predispute’’; and we have revised
§ 685.300(i) to delete paragraph (i)(4).
We also have removed the definition of
a ‘‘voluntary agreement’’ from
§ 685.300(f)(1)(ii) and revised the
definition of ‘‘predispute arbitration
agreement’’ in § 685.300(i).
Comments: Several commenters
believed that the proposed regulations
would unfairly deny students the
opportunity to seek relief through
arbitration. Commenters suggested that
if given the option, many students
would choose to seek relief through
arbitration, rather than litigation.
Multiple commenters suggested that
limiting the availability of arbitration
would be highly burdensome for
students, particularly those from lowincome backgrounds who are less likely
to be able to afford attorneys and fees
associated with litigation. These
commenters suggested that without
arbitration, many low-income students
may be prevented from actively
pursuing relief. These commenters
contended that arbitration is beneficial
92 The CFPB stated that it focused on use of credit
card users, a subset of the financial products
included in its Study, because ‘‘credit cards offer
strong market penetration across the nation.’’ Id.
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to students and should remain available
to those students who would like to
pursue it as a means of obtaining relief.
Some commenters lauded arbitration
as fair and legally sound. One
commenter noted that under a particular
arbitration agreement, students received
a fair and impartial hearing,
comprehensive review of evidence, and
an impartial ruling by an independent
arbitrator. This commenter also noted
that the arbitration agreement in
question is governed by State law,
which the commenter believes provides
sufficient legal oversight.
Other commenters noted that
arbitrators generally have more subject
area expertise than judges, which makes
them more qualified to issue an
informed decision on a particular
matter. One commenter suggested that
students benefit from widespread
arbitration because administrators learn
to run more effective and serviceoriented schools by participating in
arbitration proceedings. One commenter
noted that the benefits of arbitration are
particularly profound in smaller
institutions with closer relationships
between students and administrators.
Further, commenters suggested that
arbitration is more efficient than
litigation, and suggested that limiting
the availability of arbitration would
unduly delay provision of relief to
students. Some commenters suggested
that students benefit from the flexibility
afforded by arbitration agreements.
According to a few commenters, the
flexibility available in arbitration
proceedings allows participants to
schedule events around their
availability. Additionally, commenters
believed that parties benefit from not
being restricted by requirements that
they adhere to traditional rules of
evidence or civil procedure.
One commenter asserted that
arbitrators are generally very fair to
students. This commenter opined that
the consumer arbitration rules are
particularly friendly to plaintiffs,
particularly because of lower fees
associated with proceedings. Another
commenter asserted that plaintiffs
prevail in arbitration proceedings at
least as frequently as they do in court.
Some commenters believed that the
arbitration process often facilitates more
positive outcomes because both
students and institutions participate
fully in the process, and are more
invested in the outcomes.
Additionally, some commenters
suggested that in the absence of
widespread arbitration, legal fees
associated with litigation would take
money away from institutions that
could be used towards resources that
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would improve educational outcomes
for students. Several commenters
suggested that the arbitration ban may
ultimately lead to tuition increases as
institutions are required to spend more
money on litigation. These commenters
also noted that the arbitration ban will
be particularly harmful to smaller
institutions that lack the resources
necessary to hire robust legal teams.
One commenter believed that some
smaller institutions may be forced to
close if responsible for funding costly
litigation. This commenter also worried
about ‘‘ambulance chasing’’ attorneys
encouraging students to bring frivolous
suits.
On the other hand, a number of
commenters supported the proposed
ban on mandatory predispute arbitration
agreements for various reasons. Several
commenters suggested that arbitration
systems create structures that the
commenters view as inherently biased
against students. Commenters noted that
arbitrators are often paid on a case-bycase or hour-by-hour basis, which can
create incentives for them to rule in
favor of institutions, which are more
likely than individuals to be able to
produce repeat business for them. One
commenter cited to empirical evidence
that the commenter viewed as
supporting its position that arbitration is
harmful to consumers. Additionally,
commenters noted that because
arbitrators are not bound by adhering to
precedent, their decisions are less
predictable and reliable.
Further, commenters stated that
arbitration can be extremely costly.
Commenters attributed the high costs of
arbitration to the private nature of the
system, noting that individual parties
are often responsible for paying costs
associated with arbitration, which may
include high fees that arbitrators may
tack on to total costs without sufficient
notice. One commenter also cited the
procedural limitations of arbitration as
another detriment. This commenter
stated that students may miss out on the
opportunity for discovery in arbitration
because the discovery process is not
formalized in the same manner as civil
lawsuits. According to the commenter,
students are often denied access to
information that is essential to their
claims. Additionally, the commenter
noted that there is a lack of oversight in
arbitration proceedings, which may
result in a lack of accountability among
arbitrators for following by their own
established procedures. This commenter
also believed that the appeal process
under arbitration is inadequate and that
the narrow grounds and limited time
frame for appeals ultimately harms
students. Several commenters also
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suggested that the lack of transparency
in the arbitration system works to the
detriment of students. These
commenters believed that the public
and parties benefit from the
transparency offered by civil litigation.
Unlike civil litigation, arbitration is
generally not public, transcripts are not
provided to the public at large, and
some proceedings include gag clauses to
maintain privacy.
One commenter believed that forced
arbitration impedes the Department’s
ability to effectively oversee Federal
assistance programs and ensure proper
use of taxpayer dollars. This commenter
also suggested that forced arbitration is
unfair to students and deprives them of
the opportunity to receive an education
in a well-regulated system. Several
commenters lauded the Department for
taking measures to ensure that students
who are wronged by unscrupulous
schools receive their day in court. These
commenters were particularly
concerned that many students have
been signing their rights away upon
enrollment and urged the Department to
prevent the continuation of that
practice.
Discussion: We appreciate the support
for the proposed regulations from many
of the commenters. For those
commenters that did not support
§ 685.300(f), many of their objections
incorrectly suggested the regulations
pose an outright ban or effectively
preclude any use of arbitration. The
regulations do not bar the use of
arbitration and therefore do not deny
students the benefits that the
commenters ascribe to arbitration.
Rather, consistent with the scope of our
statutory authority, the regulations ban
predispute arbitration agreements for
borrower defense-type claims.
The regulations do not bar the school
from seeking to persuade students to
agree to arbitrate, so long as the attempt
is made after the dispute arises. The
regulations, moreover, extend only to
predispute agreements to arbitrate
borrower defense-type grievances. They
do not prohibit a school from requiring
the student, as a condition of enrollment
or continuing in a program, to agree to
arbitrate claims that are not borrower
defense-related grievances. Consistent
with our statutory authority to regulate
Direct Loan participation terms, the
regulations address only predispute
arbitration agreements for claims related
to borrower defenses and not for other
claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter suggested
that the private nature of arbitration
affords a level of protection to parties.
According to this commenter, because
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arbitration proceedings are not public,
parties need not be concerned about
private information being revealed
during proceedings.
Discussion: The regulations do not
ban arbitration entirely, but only
arbitration achieved through predispute
arbitration agreements for borrower
defense-type claims. Students and
institutions are free under this rule to
agree to arbitration if privacy is an
important consideration to the student.
We expect that a student who chooses
to litigate rather than pursue arbitration
is already aware that generally litigation
is a public proceeding, or becomes
aware of that fact very quickly, and
accepts that fact voluntarily. The
regulations simply assure that a student
will have the option to choose that
forum.
Changes: None.
Comments: A few commenters
addressed the effect of delegation
clauses within arbitration agreements—
provisions that assign, or delegate, to
the arbitrator, not a court, the power to
decide whether a particular claim or
grievance falls within the agreement to
arbitrate. The commenters considered
such delegation clauses problematic
because they allow arbitrators who,
according to the commenters, may have
financial incentives that impact their
neutrality, to make decisions regarding
whether a claim belongs in court or
arbitration. The commenters suggested
that if the Department does not address
delegation provisions, the proposed
regulations may not fulfill their
intended purpose. The commenters
urged the Department to prohibit the
use of delegation clauses to ensure that
any questions about the enforceability
or scope of predispute arbitration
agreements are resolved by a court
rather than an arbitrator, so that schools
cannot force students into timeconsuming arbitration proceedings to
resolve threshold questions about
enforceability.
Discussion: The commenters identify
an important issue, one made
particularly significant because
§ 685.300(e) and (f) distinguish between
borrower defense-type claims or
grievances, which the regulations
address, and other student claims,
which it does not. The commenters
rightly argue that the objective of the
regulation may be frustrated if the
school resists a suit by moving to
compel arbitration and the arbitrator,
not the court, were to have authority
under the agreement to decide whether
the claim is one that the student must
arbitrate. In the NPRM, we described the
recent history of aggressive actions to
compel arbitration of student claims,
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and consider it reasonable to expect that
schools will continue to oppose
lawsuits by moving to compel
arbitration, and would rely on
delegation clauses in arbitration
agreements to support these efforts. We
did not explicitly address in the NPRM
the use of delegation clauses, but we
proposed there to preclude attempts,
where the student had agreed to a class
action waiver, to ‘‘seek[ ] dismissal,
deferral or stay’’ of ‘‘any aspect of a
class action,’’ § 685.300(e)(2)(i), or, if the
student had entered into a mandatory
predispute arbitration agreement, to
‘‘seek[ ] dismissal, deferral or stay’’ of
‘‘any aspect of a judicial action filed by
the student.’’ § 685.300(f)(2)(i).93 These
prohibited actions could rest on an
express delegation clause committing to
the arbitrator the determination whether
the claim was a borrower-defense type
claim. We did not intend to allow that
action, and in response to the
commenters who stressed the
significance of this issue, we are adding
language making it clear that the court,
not the arbitrator, is to decide the scope
of any arbitration agreement or class
action waiver. Of course, if the student
has in fact agreed to arbitrate some or
all claims in a post-dispute agreement,
then the school has every right,
pursuant to these terms of its Direct
Loan agreement with the Department, to
oppose litigation by relying on that
arbitration agreement. However, the
regulation is intended to protect the
rights of students who agree, predispute,
only to arbitration of other kinds of
claims, to have their borrower defense
claims heard by a court. To ensure that
goal is achieved, we believe that any
arbitration agreement with a Direct Loan
borrower should place power to decide
the scope of the agreement in the court,
not the arbitrator.
Changes: We have modified
§§ 685.300(e)(3) and 685.300(f)(3) to add
to the required provisions and notices
the statement that ‘‘we agree that only
the court is to decide whether a claim
asserted in the lawsuit is a claim
regarding the making of the Direct Loan
or the provision of educational services
for which the loan was obtained.’’
Comments: A few commenters
recommended alternatives to proposed
§ 685.300(f). One commenter
recommended that the Department
eliminate its ban and instead provide
93 Indeed, in at least two of the cases cited in the
NPRM, an essential element of the ruling turned on
whether the student had agreed to arbitration of
issues about the arbitrability of the claims at issue.
Eakins v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. E058330,
2015 WL 758286 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2015);
Kimble v. Rhodes College, No. C–10–5786, 2011 WL
2175249 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011).
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suggested best practices to facilitate
dispute resolution. Another commenter
recommended that the Department
develop rules to govern arbitration
proceedings rather than banning them
entirely. Some rules proposed by the
commenter included: (1) A neutral
arbitrator, (2) more than minimal
discovery, (3) a written arbitration
award, (4) all forms of relief available in
court available in arbitration, and (5)
prohibition on imposing unreasonable
costs in arbitration. Another commenter
suggested that the Department establish
an annual threshold for the number of
arbitration settlements for all
institutions. Under this proposal,
institutions would only be held
accountable if their number of
arbitration proceedings exceeded this
threshold.
Discussion: The regulations do not
ban arbitration entirely, as suggested by
some of the commenters. Rather, the
regulations ban predispute arbitration
agreements for borrower defense-type
claims. We discussed at some length in
the last negotiated rulemaking session
the proposal to regulate the conduct of
arbitration, rather than banning
compelled predispute arbitration
agreements, but in issuing this final
rule, we conclude that limiting
agreements to arbitrate borrower defense
claims to those entered into after a
dispute has arisen will achieve the goal
of an informed decision by the
borrower. Therefore, we have no reason
to set a limit on the number of such
arbitrations a school may conduct. The
regulations do, however, require
information from the school about the
substance and outcomes of arbitration.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested
that eliminating mandatory arbitration
would be overly burdensome on our
judicial system because many claims
that otherwise would have gone to
arbitration will wind up in court.
Discussion: The regulations allow
students who agree to arbitration to use
that method, rather than pursuing relief
through a lawsuit, and we have no
expertise or experience from which to
estimate the effect of the regulation on
judicial filings.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter
contended that the Department’s
position is logically inconsistent,
because the commenter viewed the
Department as simultaneously asserting
that courts do not provide adequate
relief for students, while also asserting
that access to the judicial system is
essential for students to obtain relief.
Discussion: We do not believe, and
did not state, that the judicial system
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provides inadequate relief for students;
to the contrary, we noted that recent
history shows that access to the judicial
system was denied by widespread use of
mandatory predispute arbitration
agreements and class action waivers. Far
from implying that the judicial system
did not or could not provide relief, we
included in the new borrower defense
Federal standard, for new loans, an
alternative that rests entirely on a court
judgment on a borrower defense claim
based on State law.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated
that permitting only post-dispute
arbitration agreements would be entirely
ineffective and cautioned the
Department against allowing only postdispute arbitration as an option to
students. Another commenter urged the
Department to implement additional
safeguards to protect students under
post-dispute arbitration agreements.
This commenter was concerned that
schools could potentially force students
to sign post-dispute arbitration
agreements with prohibitions limiting
their ability to seek relief and urged the
Department to take measures to prevent
schools from engaging in this activity.
Discussion: Section 685.300(f) does
not limit the ability of the school to
enter into a post-dispute arbitration
agreement, even one that would include
arbitration of a borrower defense-type
claim. A student with an actual claim
has every reason to question the
consequences of agreeing to arbitrate the
claim, as opposed to filing suit, and at
that point we expect such a decision to
be an informed choice by the student.
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter noted that
some students would have difficulty
joining in a class action for various
reasons, and would lack the resources to
pursue an individual suit, but that
recently consumers have had success by
participating in aggregate litigation. The
commenter feared that the NPRM by
barring class action waivers would not
have barred the institution from
attempting to force an individual
student to pursue litigation alone and
not as part of a combined suit.
Discussion: The regulation as
proposed would bar an institution from
relying on a mandatory predispute
arbitration agreement by ‘‘dismissal,
deferral, or stay of any aspect of a
judicial action filed by the student.’’
§ 685.300(f)(2)(i). We consider that
language to include the action described
by the commenter, such as actions to
challenge the student’s joinder in a
single suit under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 20
or a similar rule by which individual
litigants may consolidate their actions.
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We clarify that in this final regulation.
An institution remains free to seek relief
on grounds other than that the
individual is barred from joinder in an
action by reason of the terms of the
arbitration agreement.
Changes: Section 685.300(f)(2)(i) is
revised to include opposing joinder in a
single action.
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Internal Dispute Processes
Comments: One commenter expressed
strong approval for § 685.300(d), which
would ban schools from requiring
students to use the school’s internal
complaint process before seeking
remedies from accrediting agencies or
government agencies. However, a few
commenters strongly believed that
students should exhaust internal
grievance procedures before seeking
relief externally. These commenters
noted that internal grievance procedures
offer students adequate opportunities to
seek relief. A few of these commenters
touted the transparency and
collaboration between students and
institutions that results from engaging in
these proceedings.
Discussion: The regulations do not
discourage the use and promotion of
internal grievance procedures, and we
encourage schools to adopt those
procedures in order to remedy
grievances before they become claims
that lead to litigation or arbitration. The
regulations also do not bar the
institution from addressing the
grievance as fully as it may wish
immediately, whether or not the student
chooses to raise the complaint to
authorities. The institution may succeed
in resolving the matter. However, if the
student believes that the grievance is
significant enough to warrant the
attention of law enforcement officials or
bodies empowered to evaluate academic
matters, we believe that the benefit of
bringing that complaint to their
attention outweighs the benefits of
attempting to compel the student to
delay. The regulations do not impose
any duty on an authority or accreditor
to take any particular action, and they
may choose to defer or delay
consideration of the complaint until
completion of the institutional process.
However, the regulations would help
those authorities better monitor
institutional performance by making
timely notice of complaints more likely.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested
that proposed § 685.300(d) conflicts
with State law that requires that
students exhaust internal dispute
resolution procedures prior to seeking
other relief.
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Discussion: State law may require a
consumer to make a written demand on
a merchant before filing suit, and the
regulations do not supersede such a law.
Some State laws or case law may also
require a student to exhaust a school’s
administrative appeal process before
filing suit on a grievance.94 Section
685.300(d) addresses not the filing of a
lawsuit, but rather a very different
matter: Seeking redress from the State
agency with authority to address the
complaint, or the accreditor for the
school. If those authorities decline to
intervene, the student is left in effect
with the need to pursue any internal
grievance process. The regulations in no
way require those authorities to exercise
their independent judgment. The
regulations simply bar the school from
attempting to block the student from
seeking redress from those authorities.
The regulations leave the school free to
respond to a student’s lawsuit by
contending that applicable law
precludes judicial review of the claim or
requires the litigant to first exhaust
available internal procedures.
Changes: None.
Forbearance (Sections 685.205(b)(6)
and 682.211)
Comments: Several commenters
expressed support for the Department’s
proposal to grant an administrative
forbearance to a Direct Loan borrower
who applies for relief under the
borrower defense provisions.
Commenters were also supportive of the
proposal to grant FFEL borrowers the
same type of administrative forbearance
that Direct Loan borrowers would
receive.
Multiple comments supported the
Department’s proposed use of
forbearance (along with information
about how to decline forbearance and
providing information about incomedriven repayment plans). One
commenter, however, recommended
that the Department require borrowers
to request forbearance instead of
expecting borrowers to decline
forbearance (opting-in rather than
opting-out). Commenters also expressed
the view that forbearance should apply
to all loan types.
Another commenter suggested that
the use of administrative forbearance or
the suspension of collection activity
would lead to frivolous claims intended
to delay repayment.
A group of commenters recommended
that forbearance for a borrower who files
a borrower defense claim be granted in
yearly increments, or for some other
94 See, e.g., Susan M. v. New York Law Sch., 76
N.Y.2d 241, 556 NE.2d 1104 (1990).
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explicit time frame designated by the
Department, during which the
Department will make a determination
of eligibility for a borrower defense
claim. These commenters noted that
servicing systems generally require
periods of forbearance to have explicit
begin and end dates. The commenters
believed that the proposed change
would resolve the servicing requirement
and permit the Department to designate
an explicit time frame for servicers
(such as one to three years) during
which the Department would make a
determination of eligibility for relief
under a borrower defense claim.
Under the commenters’ proposal,
upon receiving the notification of the
Department’s determination of
eligibility for relief under borrower
defenses, FFEL Loan servicers would
either end the forbearance and resume
servicing or maintain the forbearance
until the borrower’s loans are
consolidated into a Direct Consolidation
loan. A group of commenters
recommended that, if the Department
plans to begin the process for
prequalification or consolidation before
the effective date of the final
regulations, the Department consider
permitting early implementation of the
new mandatory administrative
forbearance under § 682.211(i)(7). The
commenters noted that without the new
authority to grant mandatory
administrative forbearance,
discretionary forbearance can be used to
suspend servicing and collection.
However, these commenters pointed out
that discretionary forbearance requires a
borrower’s request and agreement to the
terms of the forbearance. A
discretionary forbearance may also be
subject to a borrower’s cumulative
maximum forbearance limit. If a
borrower has reached his or her
maximum forbearance limit, the loan
holder would have no other remedy but
to provide a borrower relief during the
review period. The commenters
believed that early implementation of
§ 682.211(i)(7) would be more efficient
and provide a necessary benefit for
borrowers that have reached their
cumulative maximum forbearance limit
while the Department makes a discharge
eligibility determination.
One commenter noted that, under the
proposed regulation, a borrower who
files a defense to repayment claim will
experience immediate relief due to
forbearance or suspension of collection.
However, any interest that is not paid
during forbearance will be capitalized.
This commenter suggested that a
borrower should not be discouraged
from mounting a defense to repayment
that could involve extended
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investigation by having accrued interest
capitalized if the claim is rejected. The
commenter recommended that the
Department set a limit on the interest
that can be capitalized or limit the
length of time for which accrued
interest can be capitalized.
A group of commenters recommended
a conforming change to § 682.410(b) to
address defaulted loans held by a
guaranty agency. In such cases, a
guaranty agency is the holder of a loan
for which the Department is making a
determination of eligibility, not a
lender. Under the conforming change,
when the guarantor is the holder of a
loan, the Department will notify the
guarantor to suspend collection efforts,
comparably to when a lender is notified
by the Department under § 682.211(i)(7)
of a borrower defense claim. Upon
receiving notification of the
Department’s determination, a guarantor
would either resume collection efforts
or maintain the suspension until the
borrower’s loans are consolidated into a
Direct Consolidation loan.
Discussion: We appreciate the
commenters’ support for granting
forbearance and providing information
about alternatives and believe it will aid
borrowers while the Department
reviews their applications. Forbearance
is available to Direct Loan borrowers
and administered by the loan servicers.
The Department will allow lenders
and loan holders to implement
§ 682.211(i)(7) early, so that they may
grant the forbearance prior to July 1,
2017. Lenders and loan holders will be
required to grant such forbearance as of
July 1, 2017, the effective date of these
regulations.
We disagree that forbearance should
be an opt-in process, as we believe that
the majority of borrowers will want to
receive the forbearance, making an optout process both more advantageous to
borrowers and more efficient.
We also disagree that providing
forbearance and suspending collection
activities will lead to substantial
numbers of frivolous claims. Borrowers
experiencing difficulty with their
monthly loan obligations may avail
themselves of income-driven repayment
plans, loan deferment, and voluntary
forbearance upon request. Additionally,
because applicants for forbearance are
required to sign a certification statement
that the information contained on their
application is true and that false
statements are subject to penalties of
perjury, we do not expect a sizeable
increase in fraudulent claims.
We disagree with the
recommendation that the Department
set a limit on the amount of accrued
interest that may be capitalized, or the
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length of time that interest may be
allowed to accrue, during the
administrative forbearance. We have
seen no evidence that capitalization of
interest that accrues during a
forbearance period while a discharge
claim is being reviewed discourages
borrowers from applying for loan
discharges. Even in situations when the
suspension of collection activity may be
for an extended period of time—such as
during bankruptcy proceedings—
interest that accrues during the
suspension of collection activity is
capitalized. We see no justification for
limiting capitalization of interest during
the period in which a borrower defenses
claim is being evaluated by the
Department.
We agree with the commenters that it
is preferable to have a set time period
for mandatory forbearances granted
during the period that the Department is
reviewing a borrower defense claim. In
addition to resolving the systems issues
raised by the commenters, it would help
borrowers to have precise begin and end
dates for the forbearance. Granting these
forbearances in yearly increments, with
the option to end the forbearance earlier
if the borrower does not qualify, would
be consistent with most of the other
mandatory forbearances in the FFEL
Program, which are granted in yearly
increments, or a lesser period equal to
the actual period of time for which the
borrower is eligible for the forbearance.
In most cases, we do not believe that the
full year for the forbearance will be
required.
We also agree to make the conforming
changes that would address defaulted
loans held by a guaranty agency.
Changes: We have modified
§ 682.211(i)(7) to specify that the
administrative forbearance is granted in
yearly increments, until the loan is
consolidated or the Department notifies
the loan holder to discontinue the
forbearance.
We have added a new
§ 682.410(b)(6)(viii), requiring a
guaranty agency to suspend collection
activities on a FFEL Loan held by the
guaranty agency for borrowers seeking
relief under § 682.212(k) upon
notification by the Department.
Closed School Discharges (Sections
674.33, 682.402 and 685.214)
General
Comments: Several commenters
supported the proposed closed school
discharge regulations. These
commenters appreciated the
Department’s proposal to provide more
closed school discharge information to
borrowers and to increase access to
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closed school discharges. One
commenter strongly supported the
proposed changes to the closed school
discharge regulations that would require
greater outreach and provision of
information to students at schools that
close, and would automatically
discharge the loans of students from
closed schools who do not re-enroll
within three years. This commenter
believed that too many students at
schools that close neither receive a
closed school discharge nor complete
their program at another school.
A group of commenters also felt that
too few eligible borrowers apply for
closed school discharges, primarily
because these borrowers are unaware of
their eligibility. These commenters
believed that amending the regulations
to provide additional closed school
discharge information to borrowers, to
make relief automatic and mandatory
for borrowers who do not re-enroll
within one year, and to provide for
review of guaranty agency denials,
would ensure that eligible students get
relief.
One commenter supported
strengthening regulations to hold
institutions accountable and protect
student borrowers from fraudulent and
predatory conduct. This commenter
applauded the Department’s efforts on
behalf of Latino students who are
overrepresented in institutions that
engage in this conduct, while suggesting
that more must be done to ensure the
success of these students.
A group of commenters recommended
that the Department broaden the scope
of the proposed regulation to apply to
any planned school closures, rather than
only school closures for which schools
submit teach-out plans. These
commenters noted that very few closing
schools arrange for teach-outs at other
schools, and that many of the recent
school closures did not involve teachouts. These commenters believed that
the proposed regulations would fail to
ensure that students at closing schools
that do not submit teach-out plans
receive accurate, complete, and
unbiased information about their rights
prior to the school closure.
One commenter recommended that
the Department require institutions to
facilitate culturally responsive outreach
and counseling to students who opt-in
to teach-out plans to ensure that they
understand the benefits and
consequences of their decision.
Discussion: We thank the commenters
for their support. We agree that these are
important provisions, and note that
through our intended early
implementation of the automatic closed
school discharge provisions, students
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affected by the recent closure of
Corinthian will be able to benefit from
a more streamlined, automatic process
for relief sooner. However, we do not
believe that it is necessary to broaden
the scope of the regulations to apply to
‘‘any planned school closures’’ because
the current regulations already cover all
planned school closures. Current 34
CFR 668.14(a)(31) requires a school to
submit a teach-out plan under several
conditions, including a school intending
to close a location that ‘‘provides at least
100 percent of at least one program’’ or
if the school ‘‘otherwise intends to cease
operations.’’ 34 CFR 668.14(a)(31)(iv)
and (v). Therefore, the provision of the
teach-out plan triggers the provision of
the closed school disclosures and
application form.
Although we agree that schools
should provide culturally responsive
outreach and counseling to students
who opt-in to teach-out plans, we
believe that it would be difficult to
establish standards for such outreach
and counseling or to define ‘‘culturally
responsive’’ through regulation.
However, we expect institutions to be
cognizant of the needs of their student
population, and to provide appropriate
outreach and counseling for their
students. At a future date, the
Department may consider providing
resources, guidance, or technical
assistance to institutions to facilitate a
culturally responsive dissemination of
information.
Changes: None.
Availability of Disclosures
Comments: Many commenters
supported the Department’s proposed
regulations that increase disclosure
requirements for schools that are
closing. These commenters shared the
Department’s concern that many
borrowers are unaware of their
eligibility for a closed school discharge
because of insufficient outreach and
information. These commenters noted
that, in some instances, closing schools
inform borrowers of the option to
complete their program through a teachout, but either fail to advise them of the
option for a closed school discharge, or
advise them of the option in a way that
discourages them from pursuing a
discharge. According to these
commenters, students often receive a
closed school loan discharge application
from the Department after deciding
whether to enroll in teach-out programs.
The commenters believe that students
must receive clear, accurate, and
complete information much earlier in
the process when they are making major
decisions. The commenters speculated
that students who have enrolled in, but
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have not completed, a teach-out
program may not realize they are still
eligible for a closed school discharge,
and may feel committed to pursuing the
teach-out even though it is not in their
best interest to do so.
A group of commenters urged the
Department to clarify that closed school
discharges may be available to eligible
students who have re-enrolled in
another institution. These commenters
argued that relief should not be limited
to students who do not re-enroll in a
title IV-eligible institution. Commenters
stated that the HEA and current
regulations provide that a borrower is
eligible for closed school discharge if
the borrower did not complete a
program due to school closure and did
not subsequently complete the program
through a teach-out or credit transfer.
Students who participate in a teach-out
or who transfer credits but do not
complete their program remain eligible
for a closed school discharge, as do
students who re-enroll in a different
institution but do not transfer credits or
transfer some credits to an entirely
different program. According to these
commenters, this clarification is
particularly important because students
attending closing institutions have
reported frequent instances of having
been misled by closing institutions and
recruiters from proprietary schools.
In these commenters’ view, the low
application rate for closed school
discharges is due to a lack of
understandable and accessible
information about closed school
discharges.
A group of commenters noted that in
some cases it may be unclear when loan
discharge information should be
provided because the 60-day
forbearance or suspension of collection
activity period may expire while the
borrower is still within the six-month
grace period before collection begins.
Therefore collection activities will not
be resumed by the guaranty agency or
lender under § 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(H), or
by the Department under § 685.214(f)(4).
These commenters urged the
Department to revise the regulations to
clarify that the closed school discharge
information must be provided either
when collection first begins (when a
borrower enters repayment after the
grace period and will be more inclined
to exercise their discharge rights) or
when collection is resumed, whichever
is applicable.
A group of commenters supported the
Department’s proposal to require closing
schools to provide discharge
information to students. When schools
announce that they are closing, they
currently have no obligation to inform
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their students about their loan discharge
rights and options. According to these
commenters, students feel compelled to
continue their educations in ways that
may not be in their best interests
because they lack sufficient information.
For example, commenters contended
that when a teach-out is offered,
students often believe they are obligated
to participate, even though they have a
right to opt for a closed school discharge
instead. Alternatively, although
instruction may be seriously
deteriorating, students may feel
compelled to complete the program at
the closing school, unaware that they
have a right to withdraw within 120
days of the closure and receive a closed
school discharge. These commenters
also suggested that students may feel
compelled to accept another school’s
offer to accept their credits, without
understanding that by accepting the
offer they may become ineligible for a
closed school discharge.
Because of the issues discussed above,
these commenters supported the
Department’s proposal to require
schools to provide borrowers with a
notice about closed school discharge
rights when they submit a teach-out
plan after the Department initiates an
action to terminate title IV eligibility or
other specified events.
A group of commenters recommended
that we revise the regulations to require
that whenever a school notifies the
Department of its intent to close, it must
provide a written notice to students
about the expected date of closure and
their closed school discharge rights,
including their right to a discharge if
they withdraw within 120 days prior to
closure.
One commenter stated that the
proposed regulations would require the
dissemination of a closed school
discharge application to students who
are not and will not be eligible for
discharge. The commenter
recommended that the Department
revise proposed § 668.14(b)(32) so that
an institution would not be required to
disseminate a closed school discharge
application if the institution’s teach-out
plan provides that the school or location
will close only after all students have
graduated or withdrawn. According to
this commenter, if a school that plans to
close remains open until all students
have graduated or withdrawn, few if any
students would be eligible for a loan
discharge.
The commenter believed that the
proposed regulations create incentives
to withdraw that are contrary to public
policy favoring program completion.
The commenter recommended that
proposed § 668.14(b)(32) be revised to
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provide that when an institution
arranges a teach-out opportunity that
would permit a student to complete his
or her program, the institution would
only be required to provide the
discharge application and
accompanying disclosure if the student
declines the teach-out opportunity. The
commenter suggested that the
Department require that institutions
inform students of their opportunity to
discharge their loans before the school
closes and before the student makes any
decision as to whether to participate in
the teach-out. The commenter believed
that it is unrealistic to assume that
students will not take advantage of the
opportunity to discharge their loan debt,
particularly when students can simply
enroll in another institution and
complete their program after receiving a
discharge.
Another commenter disagreed with
the inclusion of voluntary school
closures in § 668.14(b)(31)(iv) where the
institution intends to close a location
that provides 100 percent of at least one
program. The commenter stated that
when a school decides that a particular
location is no longer desirable or viable,
and makes plans to responsibly teachout the enrolled students itself, the
school should not be treated like a
school which has lost State approval,
accreditation, or Federal eligibility. The
commenter believed that the proposed
regulation would discourage schools
from acting responsibly and undertaking
the considerable expense to voluntarily
teach-out a location because after
receiving a discharge application,
students would be more likely to
withdraw and seek a discharge rather
than finishing their education. This
commenter recommended limiting the
requirement that closing schools
provide a discharge application and a
written disclosure to situations
described in § 668.14(b)(31)(ii) and (iii),
where there is some likelihood that the
school’s behavior may have
disadvantaged students.
Some commenters urged the
Department to locate the provision
requiring closing schools to provide a
discharge application and written
disclosures in § 668.26, rather than
§ 668.14, the section of the regulations
pertaining to the PPA. These
commenters asserted that placing this
provision in the PPA could lead to
potential False Claims Act liability
centered around disputes of fact that
cannot be resolved absent undergoing
discovery in a court proceeding.
According to these commenters, schools
would face the risk of costly litigation
to address issues of fact regarding
whether students received proper
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notice, even where schools have
documented the proper provision of
notice.
One commenter recommended a
technical change for non-defaulted
loans, by moving the proposed
requirement to provide a second
application from guarantor
responsibilities in § 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(J)
to lender responsibilities in
§ 682.402(d)(7)(ii).
Discussion: We appreciate the support
of the commenters who agreed with our
proposed changes to the disclosure
requirements. The commenters are
correct that a borrower may receive a
closed school discharge even if the
borrower re-enrolls at another
institution of higher education. Under
current § 685.214(c)(1)(C), an otherwise
eligible borrower who re-enrolled at
another institution may qualify for a
closed school discharge if the borrower
did not complete the program of study
at another school, or by transferring
credits earned at the closed school at
another school.
With regard to the recommendation
that the Department revise the
regulations to specify that closed school
discharge information be provided
either when collection first begins, or
when collection resumes, whichever is
applicable, we do not believe that a
lender in the FFEL program would find
the use of the term ‘‘resume’’ confusing.
We note that current regulations in
§ 682.402(d)(7)(i) use the term
‘‘resume.’’ We are not aware of any
cases in which a FFEL lender failed to
meet the requirements in the current
regulations to ‘‘resume’’ collections
activities because the lender had not yet
begun collection activities.
We disagree with the
recommendation that a school that
plans to keep a closing location open
until all of the students have either
graduated or withdrawn should be
exempted from the requirement to
provide its students with the closed
school disclosures or the application.
Because all students at such a school or
location are entitled to the option of a
closed school discharge, we believe that
all such borrowers should receive this
information, so that they have full
knowledge of their options. While many
of the students at such a school location
may plan to take advantage of the teachout, not all necessarily will.
We disagree with the
recommendation that the closed school
discharge form only be provided to
borrowers who decline the teach-out. As
other commenters pointed out, students
may accept a teach-out not realizing that
they have other options. The disclosure
information and the information on the
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discharge application form will apprise
borrowers of their options, and help the
borrower to make an informed decision
based on full knowledge of the
borrower’s options.
We disagree with the comment
suggesting that the proposed regulations
create an incentive to withdraw that is
contrary to public policy. Although
public policy generally favors higher
rates of program completion, it is not
always in the individual borrower’s best
interest to continue a program through
graduation. In a closed school situation,
the value of the degree the borrower
obtains may be degraded, depending on
the reasons for the school closure.
Borrowers at closing schools may incur
unmanageable amounts of debt in
exchange for relatively low-value
degrees. We do not believe that it is
good public policy to require these
borrowers to repay that debt if they
cannot or choose not to complete the
program and are eligible for a closed
school discharge.
Similarly, we disagree with the
recommendation that voluntary school
closures be exempted from the
requirements. As noted earlier, the
teach-out requirements in 34 CFR
668.14(a)(31) apply whether the school
is forced to close or voluntarily closes.
We see no basis for exempting schools
that voluntarily close from the closed
school discharge requirements
promulgated in these final regulations.
With regard to schools being
discouraged from acting responsibly and
voluntarily providing teach-outs, as
noted above, closing schools are
required to provide teach-outs. A school
that declines to provide teach-outs as a
result of these final regulations would
be in violation of the requirements
specified in the school’s PPA.
We do not agree with the
recommendation that a school be
required to provide disclosures
whenever a school notifies the
Department of its intent to close. The
regulations as proposed require a school
to provide disclosures as result of any
of the events in section
668.14(b)(31)(ii)–(v), which includes
‘‘an institution otherwise intends to
cease operations.’’ We disagree with the
recommendation that the provision in
§ 668.14 be moved to § 668.26. We
believe the provision is more
appropriately included in § 668.14,
which enumerates the requirements of a
school’s PPA. We do not agree that
schools are at greater risk of costly
litigation if the provision is located in
§ 668.14 than they would be if the
provision were located in § 668.26. To
the extent that a closed school would
face potential liability under the False
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Claims Act for claims for Federal funds
made after the school failed to comply
with this requirement, we see little
difference in the risk based on where
the regulatory requirement is located in
the Code of Federal Regulations.
We agree with the recommended
technical change that, for non-defaulted
FFEL Program loans, the regulations
should include the requirement to
provide a borrower a second closed
school application under lender
responsibilities in § 682.402(d)(7).
Changes: We have revised
§ 682.402(d)(7)(ii) to require a lender to
provide a borrower another closed
school discharge application upon
resuming collection.
Content of Disclosures
Comments: Under the proposed
regulations, institutions are responsible
for providing written disclosures to
students to inform them of the benefits
and consequences of a closed school
discharge. A group of commenters made
recommendations for the content of the
written materials that schools would be
required to provide to students under
proposed § 668.14(b)(32). Specifically,
these commenters suggested that the
written disclosure describing the
benefits and consequences of a closed
school discharge as an alternative to
program completion through a teach-out
should encourage program completion,
because earning a degree can lead to
employment. These commenters
encouraged the Department to work
with the postsecondary education
community to draft discharge
applications and disclosures that
encourage program completion.
This group of commenters also
recommended modifications to the
closed school discharge regulations, to
proscribe the content of the disclosures.
These commenters believed that if the
Department provided or approved the
written disclosures, it would help
ensure that borrowers are able to make
better-informed choices over how they
proceed with their higher education.
These commenters believed that the
Department should not rely on failing
schools to ensure that students receive
this information prior to closure.
According to these commenters, because
these schools can be liable for the closed
school discharges, closing schools often
provide inaccurate closed school
discharge information or provide
information in a format that students are
unlikely to read or notice.
To prevent misleading disclosures,
which would defeat the purpose of the
proposed regulation, these commenters
recommend that the Department amend
proposed § 668.14(b)(32) to require that
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the written disclosure the school gives
to its students be in a form provided or
approved by the Secretary.
This group of commenters
recommended that the closed school
disclosures also include the expected
closure date. These commenters
asserted that when schools announce
that they are closing, but plan on
teaching out all the existing programs
themselves, they currently have no
obligation to inform their students about
the expected date of closure. These
commenters suggest that, as a result,
students who experience a deterioration
in the level of instruction are hesitant to
withdraw and in many cases do not
know they have the right to withdraw.
These commenters contend that even
students who are aware of their right to
withdraw do not know when they can
withdraw while remaining eligible for a
closed school discharge.
To provide borrowers with more
choice over how they proceed with their
higher education, these commenters
recommended that, upon notifying the
Department of its intent to close and
teach-out all existing students, the
regulations require a school to provide
a written notice to students about the
expected date of closure and their right
to a discharge if they withdraw within
120 days prior to closure.
One commenter contended that
schools required to post letters of credit
before closing have a strong financial
incentive to minimize the number of
students who choose to take a closed
school discharge, regardless of what is
in each student’s best interest. In
addition, this commenter suggested that
unscrupulous schools often aggressively
recruit students from closed schools.
This commenter recommended that, to
ensure students at closing schools
receive clear, accurate, and complete
information about their options, the
Department should require schools to
use standard language and/or a standard
fact sheet approved by the Department
in their disclosures.
This group of commenters
recommended that the disclosures
clearly explain the student’s closed
school discharge rights. The
commenters asserted that closing
schools often obfuscate a borrower’s
discharge rights and options. In the
commenters’ view, the Department’s
proposal would only encourage
continued obfuscation. Under the
proposed regulations, a school must
provide a disclosure that describes the
benefits and consequences of a closed
school discharge as an alternative to a
teach-out agreement. The commenters
believe that a school could comply with
this proposed requirement by providing
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a long, complicated disclosure about
benefits and consequences, while
burying a borrower’s right to obtain a
closed school discharge instead of
participating in a teach-out. To prevent
obfuscation and confusion the
commenters recommended that the
Department revise proposed
§ 668.14(b)(32) to require a clear and
conspicuous written disclosure
informing students of their right to seek
a closed school discharge as an
alternative to a teach-out.
Discussion: We do not have plans to
develop written closed school discharge
disclosure materials for schools to use,
although we may develop such
materials in the future if warranted. In
addition, we may provide technical
assistance to schools required to
develop school discharge disclosure
materials. We note that the Department
already provides information on closed
school discharges on our studentaid.gov
Web site.
The current closed school discharge
form provided to borrowers, Loan
Discharge Application: School Closure,
is a Department form. The Department
has developed this form in consultation
with the student financial aid
community. The form is due to expire
on August 31, 2017. In the coming
months, we will revise the form to
reflect the changes in the closed school
discharge regulations. The revised
version of the form will go through two
public comment periods before it is
implemented.
We disagree with the
recommendation that we require
schools to provide students with the
expected date of a school closure. The
expected date of closure may not be the
actual closure date, and the school may
actually close earlier or later than that
date. Providing a date that may or not
be accurate could be confusing to
borrowers. It may also discourage
borrowers from continuing in their
education programs when, in some
cases, it may be beneficial for them to
complete their programs at that
institution.
Changes: None.
Procedures for Providing Disclosures
Comments: A group of commenters
expressed support for the Department’s
closed school discharge proposal, but
strongly recommended several
modifications to further the
Department’s goal of increasing the
numbers of eligible students who
receive closed school discharges. Under
current § 685.214(f)(2), after the
Department confirms the date of a
school closure, the Department mails a
closed school discharge application to
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borrowers affected by the closure. The
Department suspends collection efforts
on applicable loans for 60 days. If the
borrower does not submit the closed
school discharge application within that
timeframe, the Department resumes
collection on the loan, and grants
forbearance for the 60-day period as
provided for under § 685.214(f)(4).
These commenters noted that, currently,
after a school closes, the Department or
guaranty agency is required to provide
discharge applications to borrowers who
appear to have been enrolled at the time
of the school’s closure or to have
withdrawn not more the 120 days prior
to closure. The Department or guaranty
agency often sends this information one
to six months after the school has
closed. Then, the Department or
guaranty agency must refrain from
collecting on the loans obtained to
attend the closed school for 60 days. If
the borrower does not apply for a closed
school discharge during that time, the
Department or guaranty agency is
required to resume collection on their
loans if the loans are not still within the
six-month grace period that begins
when a borrower ceases to be enrolled
at an eligible school on at least a halftime basis, as provided for under
§§ 685.207(b)(2)(i) and 685.207(c)(2)(i).
Some commenters believed that many
borrowers do not respond to the notice
regarding closed school discharge
because it is typically provided within
the six-month grace period. At that time
the borrower is focused on his or her
school closure rather than debt burden.
These commenters contend that
providing another closed school
discharge application when the loan is
actually being collected, and the
borrower faces the burden of loan
payments, is likely to increase the
borrower response rate.
Another group of commenters
proposed that after one year, the
Department or guaranty agency should
provide a closed school discharge
application and information to
borrowers who have re-enrolled in a
title IV institution, noting that
borrowers who have re-enrolled may
still qualify for a closed school
discharge.
These commenters also recommended
requiring that closed school discharge
information be provided with the
borrower’s monthly payment statement
upon beginning or resuming collection,
or the appropriate entity if the borrower
is in default. These commenters
contended that many closed school
borrowers receive fraudulent
solicitations containing inaccurate
information. These commenters asserted
that many borrowers are confused about
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which notifications are legitimate and
which are not, and are most likely to
trust and pay attention to the monthly
payment statement from their loan
servicer.
This group of commenters
recommended that the Department take
measures to ensure that disclosures are
provided on a timely basis. In the
commenters’ view, the Department’s
proposal does not address a situation in
which the school fails to provide the
required information. The commenters
noted that most schools close due to
financial problems, and that by the time
they submit teach-out plans (if they do
submit such plans), most schools have
lost significant personnel and their
operations are in disarray. As a result,
commenters suggested that some
schools are likely to fail to provide the
required notices. The commenters
recommended that the Department
clarify that, if a school fails to provide
the notice required under proposed
§ 668.14(b)(32) within five days after
submission of a teach-out plan, the
Secretary would be required to provide
timely disclosures before any student
may take steps toward participation in
a teach-out plan that may impact his or
her discharge eligibility.
Similarly to teach-outs, a group of
commenters recommended that
whenever a school notifies the
Department of its intent to close, the
Department provide a written notice to
students about the expected date of
closure and their closed school
discharge rights, including their right to
a discharge if they withdraw within 120
days prior to closure, if the school fails
to do so within five days of informing
the Department of closure.
Discussion: Although we agree that
providing the disclosures with the
monthly payment statement would be
an effective way of providing the
disclosures to students, there are a
variety of methods in which a loan
holder can provide such disclosures to
borrowers, and we do not believe that
the Department should specify which
method to use through regulation.
However, nothing in the regulations
prevents a loan holder from providing
the closed school discharge disclosures
in this manner.
We have concerns with the
recommendation that a second closed
school discharge application be
provided to the borrower when payment
resumes, either after the six-month grace
period has elapsed or after the end of
the 60-day forbearance period. We also
have concerns about the
recommendation that a second closed
school discharge application be
provided after one year if the borrower
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has re-enrolled. Borrowers are often
overwhelmed with information that is
provided to them related to their
student loans, either by the Department
or other sources. Providing multiple
copies of the discharge form to
borrowers at different points in time
would likely add to the information
overload that student loan borrowers
currently experience. We also point out
that the Department’s current closed
school discharge form is easily available
on the Department’s studentaid.gov Web
site.
We disagree with the
recommendation that the Department
provide the required disclosures if the
school does not provide them within
five days of submission of the teach-out
plan. We do not believe that the
commenters’ suggestion is feasible or
practical. The Department expects
regulated parties to comply with
regulatory requirements, and typically
reviews for such compliance in program
reviews or audits. It would be difficult
for the Department to determine
whether the school has provided the
disclosures within five days of
submission of the teach-out plan
without such a review or audit.
Changes: None.
Discharge Without An Application
Comments: The Department proposed
revisions to § 674.33(g)(3),
§ 682.402(d)(8), and § 685.214(c)(2) that
would permit the Department to
discharge loans of borrowers who do not
re-enroll in a title IV-eligible institution
within three years of their school’s
closure. Several commenters supported
the Department’s proposal to grant a
closed school discharge without a
borrower application, based on
information in its possession indicating
that the borrower did not subsequently
re-enroll in any title IV-eligible
institution within three years after the
date the school closed.
One commenter applauded this
proposal, noting that 47 percent of all
Direct Loan borrowers at schools that
closed from 2008–2011 did not receive
a closed school discharge or title IV,
HEA aid to enroll elsewhere in the three
years following the school’s closure.
The commenter asserted that students
were left with debt but no degree,
putting them at great risk of default. The
commenter asserted that research has
consistently shown that students who
do not complete their programs are
among the most likely to default on
their loans, leaving them worse off than
when they enrolled. The commenter
recommended that the final preamble
clearly state that after three years, an
eligible borrower’s loans shall be
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discharged without an application and
any amounts paid shall be refunded.
This commenter believed that the
preamble to the NPRM suggested
discharge of loans without an
application for students who have not
re-enrolled within three years is
optional, not required.
One of the commenters supportive of
the proposal noted that the proposed
regulations would not discharge the
loans of students who enroll in a teachout program but do not complete it and
are not still enrolled within three years
of a school’s closure. The commenter
noted that these borrowers may be
unaware of their eligibility for a closed
school discharge. The commenter
recommended that the Department use
available data on program completion
among students receiving title IV, HEA
aid to automatically discharge the loans
of students who did not complete and
are not enrolled in a comparable
program within three years of their
school closing.
A commenter recommended that the
final regulation provide for automatic
discharges of the loans, to the extent
that data are available to identify them,
for borrowers who:
• Transfer credits from a closed
school and enroll in, but do not
complete, a comparable program, and
• Transfer credits to enroll in a
completely different program.
Several commenters did not support
the automatic discharge provision of the
proposed rule. One group of
commenters contended that under the
proposed regulations, the Department
would discharge the loan absent any
evidence that the failure of the student
to re-enroll in another school was a
result of the closed school or that the
student did not receive any value for the
education received from the closed
school. This group of commenters
believed the proposed rule would not
serve the public interest, as it would
minimize borrowers’ incentives to
continue educational pursuits. These
commenters recommended that the
automatic discharge provision be
deleted from the final rule. These
commenters further recommended that
if the automatic discharge provision is
not removed, that schools should not be
held liable for loans that have been
automatically discharged due to a
student’s failure to re-enroll in another
school.
Another commenter believed that it
would not be appropriate for the
Department to grant a closed school
discharge without a borrower
application. In this commenter’s view, a
loan servicer may easily provide a
borrower with the information
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necessary to apply for a closed school
discharge. This commenter noted that in
many instances a student may have
completed his or her education under a
teach-out agreement without necessarily
receiving any additional title IV, HEA
aid, and NSLDS may not indicate that
the student enrolled in another
institution.
A group of commenters that
supported the Department’s proposal to
allow loan holders to grant closed
school discharges without applications
to borrowers who do not re-enroll in a
new institution within three years of
their schools’ closures noted that,
although the disclosures discussed
earlier in this section will increase the
number of closed school discharge
applications submitted by eligible
borrowers, many borrowers will still not
likely respond to the disclosures. These
commenters noted that borrowers in
closed school situations, even students
who receive information about their
rights from State agencies and the
Department, are often confused by
contradictory information from their
schools, as well as aggressive
solicitations from other proprietary
schools and fraudulent student loan
debt relief companies.
The commenters also urged the
Department to make additional
revisions in the final regulations. They
recommended that the Department
make automatic discharges mandatory
for borrowers who have not re-enrolled
in a title IV-eligible institution within
three years of their schools’ closures.
These commenters believed that
discharges under the proposed rule
would be entirely discretionary, noting
that under the proposed rule, loan
holders ‘‘may’’ grant discharges in
certain circumstances. The commenters
expressed concern that, given that the
Department and guaranty agencies have
conflicting duties and motivations to
collect on loans, the discretionary
language could make this regulation
meaningless. These commenters also
noted that the proposed regulations lack
a mechanism for allowing an
organization, borrower, or attorney
general to demand that the Department
or guaranty agency implement the
automatic discharge provision. These
commenters recommended that the
Department make automatic discharge
mandatory, noting that the Department
proposed to make this provision
mandatory during the negotiated
rulemaking sessions.
This group of commenters also
recommended shortening the reenrollment period from three years to
one year. These commenters stated that
the vast majority of closed school
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borrowers who are able to transfer their
credits do so within several weeks to
several months after a school closes.
They noted that other schools often
market their programs to affected
students immediately following a school
closure. They also claimed that that
other schools, including community
colleges, often reach out to students
within the first few weeks after a school
closure, and that students actively
search for a new school to accept their
closed school credits.
Commenters contended that because
very few students transfer their closed
school credits after one year, all closed
school borrowers who do not re-enroll
in a title IV institution within one year
should be granted a closed school
discharge without any application.
These commenters believed that it
would be unfair to require these
borrowers to wait three years for a
closed school discharge, during which
time they will make payments and may
face burdensome involuntary debt
collection tactics if they default.
This group of commenters anticipated
that the vast majority of eligible
borrowers would likely want a closed
school discharge. However, these
commenters asserted that some
borrowers may not want a discharge.
These commenters propose addressing
this potential issue through an opt-out
procedure, in which students receive
notice of the consequences of the
discharge and are afforded the
opportunity to opt-out of a discharge
within 60 days of receiving the notice.
One commenter raised concerns that
the proposal to discharge loans without
an application from a borrower would
deny institutions due process. This
commenter proposed revising the
regulations to clarify whether there is a
presumption that the borrower did not
re-enroll absent evidence to the
contrary, or whether the Department
must have in its possession evidence
that the borrower did not re-enroll in
another institution. The commenter also
recommended that the regulation be
revised to afford the closed school with
notice and the opportunity to contest
the student’s eligibility for a loan
discharge (e.g., whether the borrower
was enrolled within 120 days of the
closure or whether the borrower was
enrolled at another institution or
participated in a teach-out).
In the commenter’s view, the
procedures the Department follows to
discharge a student loan and make a
determination regarding amounts owed
by an institution constitute informal
agency adjudication, and even in the
context of informal adjudication, an
agency must provide fundamental due
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process. The commenter contended that
due process requires that a participant
in an agency adjudication must receive
adequate notice and ‘‘the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’’ Though the
Department has flexibility in the way it
provides such due process, the
Department may not deny closed
institutions the opportunity to
communicate with the Department prior
to a discharge and recovery action. The
commenter also expressed the view that,
as a matter of public policy, it would
benefit the Department to involve closed
schools before discharging any loans in
order to ensure that discharges are only
granted to eligible borrowers.
Another group of commenters
recommended eliminating the automatic
discharge provision. These commenters
expressed concern with the concept of
an automatic closed school discharge,
especially if the Department intends to
rely on the school’s NSLDS enrollment
reporting process for information about
student re-enrollment. In the school
enrollment reporting process for
NSLDS, schools are only required to
include title IV recipients. Therefore,
NSLDS may not identify students who
re-enrolled but did not receive title IV,
HEA aid. As a result, commenters
suggested that borrowers who received
credit from attending the closed school
for the same or similar program of study
could be improperly identified as
eligible to receive a discharge.
Under proposed
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3), if the
Department determines that the
borrower meets the requirements for a
closed school discharge, the guaranty
agency, within 30 days of being
informed that the borrower qualifies,
will take the actions described under
§ 682.402(d)(6) and (7). Section
682.402(d)(6) and (7) specifies the
responsibilities of a guaranty agency. A
group of commenters expressed the
view that the cross-reference to
§ 682.402(d)(6) is too broad. Theses
commenters believed that
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(E) and
§ 682.402(d)(6)(H)(1) more specifically
describe the required action by the
guarantor and should replace
§ 682.402(d)(6) in the cross-reference.
These commenters also stated that if the
Department determines that the
borrower is eligible for a discharge, the
guaranty agency will pay the claim and
the lender actions in § 682.402(d)(7)(iv)
do not change.
These commenters also recommended
changes to the regulations to provide
that the guarantor pay the claim if the
Department determines a borrower is
eligible for a discharge. This change
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would not impact lender actions in
§ 682.402(d)(7)(iv).
These commenters also recommended
that, if the Department continues using
NSLDS and providing an automatic
discharge after three years, the
Department should be responsible for
monitoring identified borrowers during
this period, and notifying the applicable
guarantor when a closed school
discharge must be processed.
Discussion: We agree with the
commenters who recommended that the
Department clarify the final regulations
to provide that closed school discharges
for Perkins, FFEL and Direct Loan
borrowers who have not re-enrolled in
a title IV-eligible institution within
three years of their schools’ closures are
not discretionary. We have revised
§§ 674.33(g)(3), 682.402(d)(8), and
685.214(c)(2) to clearly delineate the
circumstances under which a closed
school discharge is discretionary as
opposed to required.
We recognize that some borrowers
will qualify for closed school
discharges, but will not receive an
automatic closed school discharge
because they re-enrolled in a title IV
school within the three-year timeframe.
If the borrower is not participating in a
teach-out, or transferring credits from
the closed school to a comparable
program at the new school, the borrower
would still be eligible for a closed
school discharge. We do not agree,
however, that the Department should
automatically grant closed school
discharges in these situations. A
borrower in this type of situation still
has access to a closed school discharge;
however, the borrower must apply
directly for the discharge. The
provisions for discharges without an
application are intended to provide
closed school discharges to borrowers
that the Department can readily
determine qualify for the discharge,
based on information in our possession.
A borrower who re-enrolled within the
three-year time period may or may not
qualify for a closed school discharge,
depending on whether the borrower
transferred credits from the closed
school to a comparable program. A
borrower who re-enrolled, but still
qualifies for a closed school discharge,
would have to provide more detailed
information to the Department through
the closed school application process to
allow for a determination of the
borrower’s eligibility for a closed school
discharge. However, the Department has
continued to increase and improve the
quality of data reporting by institutions,
including beginning the collection of
program-level data for borrowers
through recently implemented Gainful
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Employment regulations and through
recent Subsidized Stafford Loan
reporting requirements. While current
data limitations make it challenging to
definitively identify a borrower who has
enrolled in a comparable program or
who has successfully transferred credits,
in future years, the Department may be
able to identify those eligible borrowers
who did re-enroll, but not in a
comparable program. In that case, the
Department may revisit its ability to
provide closed school discharges
automatically to those borrowers, using
the discretion available to the Secretary
and mirroring the three-year provision
set forth in these regulations. This will
help to ensure that as many eligible
borrowers as possible receive the
discharges for which they qualify.
We disagree with the commenters
who recommended eliminating
automatic closed school discharges from
the final regulations. We note that the
current regulations already provide for a
closed school discharge without an
application, and believe that this is an
important benefit to borrowers. We also
believe that the final regulations provide
sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse,
such as the three-year period before an
automatic closed school discharge is
granted. Therefore, we also decline to
accept the recommendation that we
reduce the three-year time period to one
year.
With regard to the three-year time
period, we note that the discharge of a
loan is a significant benefit to a
borrower, with potentially significant
fiscal impacts. Absent a closed school
discharge application from a borrower,
we do not believe that a one-year period
of non-enrollment would be sufficient to
discharge a borrower’s debt.
We see no basis for exempting schools
from liability for closed school
discharges when the discharge is
granted without an application.
We do not believe an opt-out notice
for the automatic discharge without an
application is necessary. It is unlikely
that a sufficient number of borrowers
will choose not to have their loans
discharged to justify the administrative
burden involved in sending the
borrower an opt-out notice. We are also
concerned that an opt-out notice could
be confusing, and result in ‘‘false
positives’’—borrowers inadvertently
choosing to opt out of the discharge.
We acknowledge that the automatic
discharge process could result in
discharges being granted to some
borrowers who were able to complete
their programs but we believe this
would be a negligible number of
borrowers. Even a borrower who does
not receive title IV, HEA aid to attend
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another school, may still receive an inschool deferment. Both receipt of
additional title IV, HEA aid and
receiving an in-school deferment would
be reported to NSLDS. Unless the
borrower is attending in a less-than-halftime status, the Department will be able
to determine whether a borrower has reenrolled at another title IV eligible
institution during the three-year period.
We believe that the likely minimal
potential cost of granting discharges to
a very small number of borrowers who
do not qualify is counterbalanced by the
benefit of granting closed school
discharges to large numbers of
borrowers who qualify for them, but do
not receive them under our current
procedures.
The comment regarding the
Department monitoring borrowers
during the three-year period relates to
operationalization of the final
regulations. The Department will
develop procedures for determining
whether borrowers qualify for a closed
school discharge without an
application, and the appropriate method
of notifying guaranty agencies if the
Department makes such a
determination. We note, however, that
the final regulations in
§ 682.402(d)(8)(iii) give guaranty
agencies the authority to grant closed
school discharges without an
application based on information in the
guaranty agency’s possession.
We disagree with commenters who
stated that closed school discharge
procedures may deny schools of due
process. The closed school discharge
procedures do not currently involve the
school in the determination process.
The Department currently pursues
recovery of the amounts lost through
closed school and other discharges
under section 437(c) of the HEA through
the ordinary audit and program review
process. Thus, in the final audit
determination or the final program
review determination issued upon
closure of a school or one of its
locations, the Department asserts a
claim for recovery of the amounts
discharged. The school may challenge
that claim in an appeal under Subpart
L of Part 668, as it can with any other
audit or program review liability.95
Changes: We have revised
§§ 674.33(g)(3), 682.402(d)(8), and
685.214(c)(2) to clearly delineate the
circumstances under which a closed
95 See, e.g., In the Matter of Coll. of Visual Arts,
Respondent, Docket No.: 15–05–SP, 2015 WL
6396241, at *1 (July 20, 2015); In the Matter of
Pennsylvania Sch. of Bus., Respondent, Docket No.
15–04–SA, 2015 WL 10459890, at *1 (Oct. 27,
2015).
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school discharge is discretionary, as
opposed to required.
Comments: None.
Discussion: Upon further review, the
Department determined that the
proposed regulations related to
automatic closed school discharges
needed to specify the period of time for
which borrowers from closed schools
would be evaluated to determine
whether they would qualify for
automatic discharges. The Department
concluded that it would be
administratively feasible to conduct
such an evaluation for borrowers at
schools that closed on or after
November 1, 2013.
Changes: We have revised
§§ 674.33(g)(3)(ii), 682.402(d)(8)(ii), and
685.214(c)(2)(ii) to specify that they
apply with respect to schools that
closed on or after November 1, 2013.
Review of Guaranty Agency Denials
Comments: Some commenters
expressed strong support for the
proposed regulation that would allow
borrowers the right to appeal to the
Department when guaranty agencies
deny closed school discharges. One
commenter noted that the right to
appeal is paramount to due process.
This commenter stated that the right to
appeal provides qualified borrowers
with a safety net for obtaining debt relief
and also provides a framework for
accountability in guaranty agency
decisions.
These commenters noted that the
guarantor in this case would need to
notify the lender to resubmit the closed
school claim for reimbursement.
A group of commenters recommended
that the Department retain current
language requiring the guaranty agency
to state the reasons for its denial. The
group of commenters supported the
Department’s proposal to provide for the
review of guaranty agency denials of
closed school discharge applications for
FFEL Loans. These commenters averred
that FFEL borrowers, whose loans are
held by guaranty agencies, should have
the same right to challenge an erroneous
unpaid refund or closed school
discharge denial as Direct Loan and
FFEL Loan borrowers whose loans are
held by the Department. The
commenters noted that current FFEL
Loan regulations do not provide
borrowers with any right to seek review
of guaranty agency denials of closed
school discharges. The commenters also
noted that, even when FFEL borrowers
are entitled to administrative review,
their right to seek further review in
court is not clear, unlike Direct Loan
borrowers. Commenters noted that the
APA does not provide for judicial
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review of decisions by private, nongovernmental entities such as guaranty
agencies, nor is there any explicit right
to judicial review of guaranty agency
decisions in the HEA.
As a result, commenters said that
FFEL borrowers whose loans are held by
guaranty agencies have no clear way to
challenge an erroneous closed school
discharge decision from a guaranty
agency. Only Direct Loan and FFEL
Loan borrowers whose loans are held by
the Department may seek judicial
review of administrative unpaid refund
or closed school discharge denials.
These commenters believe that the
Department’s proposed rule would
address what the commenters consider
an arbitrary denial of borrower due
process.
This group of commenters
recommended one modification to the
proposed regulations. Under current
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F), if a guaranty
agency denies a closed school discharge
application, it must notify the borrower
in writing of its determination and the
reasons for the determination. Under the
proposed regulation, a guaranty agency
would still be required to notify the
borrower of its determination, but
would not be required to notify the
borrower of its reasons for the
determination. These commenters
believed that removing this requirement
would frustrate the purpose of the
review process and urged the
Department not to remove the
notification requirement.
Multiple groups of commenters noted
that the proposed regulations do not
provide a time frame during which a
borrower can request an appeal of a
denied closed school discharge by the
guarantor. These commenters
recommended a 30-day timeframe,
which would align with the timeframe
allowed for an appeal of a false
certification discharge denial. These
commenters also proposed language that
would allow a borrower to submit a
request after the 30-day period.
One group of commenters proposed
that the guarantor would still submit the
appeal to the Department; however,
collection of the loan would continue
during the Department’s review.
Another group of commenters also
recommended additional language to
address situations in which a borrower
submits a request after the 30-day
period. The commenters suggested that
in this case, the guarantor would still
submit the appeal to the Secretary;
however, unlike with a timely request,
collection of the loan (nondefaulted or
defaulted) would continue during the
Secretary’s review.
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This group of commenters stated that
the proposed regulations are not clear
on the availability of an appeal option
for non-defaulted borrowers. These
commenters recommended adding
language to clarify that non-defaulted
borrowers should be afforded the same
opportunity to appeal. Under the
proposed regulations, a guarantor would
be responsible for notifying a defaulted
borrower of the option for review by the
Secretary. For consistency, the
commenters believed it would be
reasonable for the guarantor to utilize
this same process for non-defaulted
borrowers.
These commenters also believed that
it would be less confusing for a
borrower for the guarantor to retain the
loan until 30 days after the agency’s
notification to the borrower of the right
to appeal. Commenters proposed that if
the borrower appeals within 30 days,
the loan should remain with the
guarantor until the Secretary renders a
final determination on the borrower’s
appeal. These commenters
recommended that the guarantor should
be responsible for notifying defaulted
and non-defaulted borrowers of the
option for review by the Secretary.
Under proposed
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3), if the
Department determines that the
borrower meets the requirements for a
closed school discharge, the guaranty
agency, within 30 days of being
informed that the borrower qualifies,
will take the actions described under
§ 682.402(d)(6) and § 682.402(d)(7).
Section 682.402(d)(6) specifies the
responsibilities of a guaranty agency
and 682.402(d)(7) specifies the
responsibilities of a lender.
A group of commenters expressed the
view that the cross-reference to
§ 682.402(d)(6) is too broad. These
commenters believed that
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(E) and
682.402(d)(6)(ii)(H)(1) more specifically
describe the required action by the
guarantor and should replace
§ 682.402(d)(6) in the cross-reference.
These commenters also recommended
that we clarify under
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3) if the
Department determines that the
borrower is eligible for a discharge, the
guaranty agency will pay the claim and
the lender will be required to take the
actions specified in § 682.402(d)(7)(iv).
Discussion: We do not believe that a
30-day timeframe for appealing a denial
of a closed school discharge claim by a
guaranty agency is sufficient. We have
retained the language in the NPRM,
which did not provide a timeframe for
such an appeal.
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We agree with the commenters who
recommended that proposed
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F) be revised to
specify that, when a guaranty agency
notifies a borrower of the denial of a
closed school discharge claim and of the
opportunity to appeal the denial to the
Department, that the notification from
the guaranty agency should state the
reasons for the denial. Since the
proposed revision to the regulation is
intended to provide borrowers an
opportunity to appeal a negative
decision, a borrower should have the
opportunity to address the issues that
led to the denial during the appeal
process.
We agree with the commenters that
the regulations should provide for an
appeal process for non-defaulted FFEL
borrowers (whose loans are held by
lenders) as well as for defaulted FFEL
borrowers (whose loans are held by
guaranty agencies). Although the NPRM
only addressed an appeal process for
FFEL Program loans held by a guaranty
agency, our intent was to provide an
appeal process for FFEL Program loans
held by either a lender or a guaranty
agency.
We agree that the cross-references to
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3) should be
written more narrowly, and have made
additional technical corrections to the
FFEL regulations, based on the
recommendations relating to the process
for granting discharges in the FFEL
Program. These technical corrections are
identified in the ‘‘Changes’’ section,
below.
Changes: We have revised
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F) to stipulate that a
guaranty agency that denies a
borrower’s closed school discharge
request must notify the borrower of the
reasons for the denial.
We have revised the cross-references
in § 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3), to more
specifically describe the guarantor’s
action. We have also changed the crossreference from (d)(7) to (d)(7)(iv),
clarifying that after the guaranty agency
pays the claim the lender actions in
(d)(7)(iv) do not change.
We have made a technical correction
to § 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(H), deleting the
reference to a guaranty agency
exercising a forbearance during the
suspension of collection activity.
We have revised § 682.402(d)(7)(iii) to
clarify that a borrower whose FFEL
Loan is held by a lender, has the same
appeal rights as a borrower whose loan
is held by a guaranty agency if the
guaranty agency denies the closed
school discharge request.
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Miscellaneous Recommendations
Comments: One commenter
supported the proposed changes to the
closed school discharge regulations, but
believed that the proposal did not go far
enough to provide displaced students
with comprehensive assistance and an
explanation of their right to debt relief.
This commenter urged the Department
to ensure that a clearly identifiable,
knowledgeable, and accessible
representative is made available on
campus immediately after
announcement of an impending closure,
to provide in-person, meaningful
assistance to displaced students.
In addition, this commenter
recommended that the Department offer
ongoing assistance through the creation
of a student loan discharge hotline and/
or on-line computer chat, and hyperlinks on the Department’s Web site
directing students to assistance in their
local communities. The commenter
averred that assistance should be made
available in multiple formats
(telephone, smartphone apps, mail, in
person, and on-line), as many students
at closing or closed schools do not own
or have limited access to computers.
A group of commenters recommended
that the discharge regulations for
Perkins and Direct Loans be amended to
extend the 120-day look back period by
the number of days between the
expected and actual date of closure
whenever the actual closure date is later
than the expected and disclosed closure
date.
Another commenter recommended
prohibiting the capitalization of interest
when the collections process has been
suspended because a student is filing for
a closed school discharge.
A group of commenters recommended
that the terminology throughout
§ 682.402(d) be updated for consistency
with current § 682.402 regulations for
other discharges types. Specifically,
commenters suggested replacing
references to written and sworn
statements with references to
applications.
Discussion: We appreciate the
recommendations for additional steps
the Department may take to assist
borrowers in closed school situations.
Many of these recommendations relate
to activities that are not governed by
regulations, or are out of the scope of
this regulatory action.
With regard to the comment
recommending that we extend the lookback period beyond 120 days if the
expected closure date is different than
the actual closure date, we do not
believe such a change is necessary.
Under current regulations in
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§ 685.214(c)(1)(B), the Department has
the authority to extend the look-back
period due to ‘‘exceptional
circumstances.’’ We believe that this
provision provides appropriate
flexibility to the Department in cases
where it may be necessary to extend the
look-back period.
Under § 682.202(b)(2)(ii) and (iii) a
lender may capitalize interest that
accrues during a period of authorized
deferment or forbearance. We see no
justification for exempting the 60-day
forbearance period from this practice.
We agree with the recommendation to
update the terminology throughout
§ 682.402(d) for consistency with
current § 682.402 for other discharges
types, and will make those changes in
the final regulations.
Changes: In §§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(B)(1),
(d)(6)(ii)(B)(2), (d)(6)(ii)(F)(5),
(d)(6)(ii)(G), and (d)(6)(ii)(H) of the FFEL
closed school discharge regulations, we
have replaced the terms ‘‘sworn
statement’’ or ‘‘written request’’ with the
term ‘‘application’’, to conform the
regulations with the current closed
school discharge application process.
Data Requests
Comments: A group of commenters
recommended that the Department
disclose, at the school level, information
about closed school discharges,
including information about the
Department’s outreach to borrowers, the
number of applicants, the number of
applicants who receive a discharge, the
total amount discharged, and the
amount collected from schools to offset
the discharged amounts. Similarly, this
group of commenters requested that the
Department disclose, at the school and
discharge type level, information about
false certification discharges, including
the number of applicants, the number of
applicants who receive a discharge, and
total amount discharged and related
offsets. In addition, this group of
commenters recommended that the
Department disclose the number of
borrowers for whom a death discharge
has been requested, the number of
borrowers for whom a death discharge
has been granted, and the total
discharged amount.
Discussion: We thank the commenters
for their thoughtful reporting
recommendations; however, we do not
have plans to provide such information
at this time. We note that publication of
data at this level may require providing
the school with the opportunity to
review and challenge or correct
inaccurate information. However, the
Department may be able to publish more
aggregated versions of these data for
public review at a later date. The
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Department is not prepared to
implement such processes at this time,
but will consider releasing these data
moving forward.
Changes: None.
False Certification Discharges (Section
685.215)
High School Diploma
Comments: Commenters generally
supported the proposed improvements
to the false certification process. Some
commenters noted that broadening the
reasons that loans may be discharged
due to false certification may provide a
simpler process for loan discharge than
borrower defense to repayment for many
borrowers.
A group of commenters expressed
support for the proposed regulatory
changes that would provide a false
certification loan discharge to borrowers
whose schools have falsely reported that
they earned a high school diploma,
including schools that have facilitated
the borrower’s attainment of a fabricated
high school diploma. The commenters
noted that that proposed
§ 685.215(a)(1)(ii) would allow for
discharge of a borrower’s loan if the
school falsified the borrower’s high
school graduation status; falsified the
borrower’s high school diploma; or
referred the borrower to a third party to
obtain a falsified high school diploma.
The commenters viewed this proposed
regulation as a critical improvement
over the current false certification
regulations.
However, several commenters
expressed concern that some otherwise
eligible borrowers may be denied
discharges because their financial aid
applications, which were completed by
the school, indicate that they reported
having earned a high school diploma.
A group of commenters recommended
revisions to the final regulations
regarding what they referred to as
‘‘unfair’’ evidentiary burdens. These
commenters recommended that the
Department clarify that students whose
schools falsely certified that they have
high school diplomas, including schools
that do so by falsely certifying financial
aid applications, are eligible for false
certification discharges.
One group of commenters
recommended that the Department
further modify the regulatory language
to clarify that borrowers who report to
their school that they earned a high
school diploma are ineligible for a false
certification loan discharge, but that
borrowers whose FAFSA falsely
indicates the borrower had earned a
high school diploma may be eligible for
a false certification loan discharge.
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Another group of commenters
believed that the Department should
revise the proposed regulations to
ensure that a borrower will qualify for
a false certification discharge only if the
borrower can fulfill the bases for
discharge. These commenters
recommended that the Department
revise proposed § 685.215(c) to require
borrowers to demonstrate each element
of the bases for discharge under
proposed § 685.215(a)(l) in order to
qualify for a discharge. The commenters
also recommended that the Department
provide guidance regarding acceptable
online high schools.
These commenters observed that the
Department’s intent, as stated in the
preamble to the NPRM, is that
borrowers who provide false
information to postsecondary schools
regarding high school graduation status
will not obtain a false certification
discharge. Proposed § 685.215(a)(l)
(‘‘Basis for Discharge’’) states that a false
certification discharge is available if a
borrower reported to the postsecondary
school that the borrower did not have a
high school diploma. The commenters
believed that the section of the proposed
regulation regarding borrower
qualifications for discharge does not
reflect the Department’s intent.
Proposed § 685.215(c) (‘‘Borrower
qualification for discharge’’) does not
require a borrower to demonstrate that
the borrower presented accurate
information regarding the borrower’s
high school graduation status to the
postsecondary school.
These commenters believe that under
the proposed regulations, taxpayers may
be forced to pay for false certification
discharges for borrowers who did not
meet the test in proposed § 685.215(a)(l)
and yet qualified under proposed
§ 685.215(c)(1). The commenters noted
that the Department can seek recovery
from institutions for certain losses
determined under proposed
§ 685.2125(a)(l). However, if borrowers
are granted discharges under the weaker
standard at proposed § 685.215(c)(1),
then in many cases the Department will
be unable to collect from institutions
under the stronger standard at proposed
§ 685.215(a)(l).
The commenters believed that schools
should be able to rely on the fact that
a high school is accredited by a
reputable accrediting agency, absent a
list of high schools that provide
instruction to adult students and that
are acceptable to the Department.
Another commenter requested that the
Department provide schools with a
reliable source of information regarding
appropriately accredited high school
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diploma programs available to adults,
including those that are offered online.
A group of commenters expressed
concerns that the proposed false
certification and unauthorized payment
discharge rule would penalize
institutions for the false certification of
the student or the independent actions
of a third party.
In addition, these commenters
recommended that, under the
evidentiary standards articulated in
proposed § 685.215(c)(1), a borrower
requesting a false certification loan
discharge should be required to certify
that, at the time of enrollment, he or she
did not represent to the school, either
orally or in writing, that he or she had
a high school diploma. The commenters
believed that this evidentiary
requirement would help deter frivolous
false certification claims.
Some commenters observed that,
pursuant to proposed § 685.215(a)(l)(ii),
a borrower would be eligible for a false
certification loan discharge if the school
the borrower attended certified the
eligibility of a student who is not a high
school graduate based on ‘‘[a] high
school diploma falsified by the school
or a third party to which the school
referred the borrower.’’ The commenters
recommended that the regulation be
revised to clarify that a school is only
penalized if it referred a student to a
third party for the purpose of having the
third party falsify the high school
diploma. These commenters believed
that it is not uncommon for a school to
refer a student to a third-party servicer
to verify the diploma, particularly in the
case of students who graduated from
foreign high schools. The commenters
believed that institutions should not be
penalized if a third-party verification
entity falsified the legitimacy of the
foreign credential without the school’s
knowledge.
Discussion: We thank the commenters
who are supportive of the proposed
revisions of the false certification of
high school graduation status regulatory
provisions. However, we do not agree
that the regulations need further
modification to address situations in
which a borrower who is not a high
school graduate states on the FAFSA
that the borrower is a high school
graduate. If a borrower falsely stated on
the FAFSA that they were a high school
graduate, but also reported to the school
that they were not a high school
graduate, and the school certified the
eligibility of the borrower based on the
FAFSA, the school would still have
falsely certified the eligibility of the
borrower. In this situation, the borrower
would qualify for a false certification
discharge—assuming the borrower did
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not meet the alternative to high school
graduation status in effect at the time—
regardless of the information on the
student’s FAFSA. The same would hold
true whether the FAFSA was actually
completed by the borrower, or
completed by the school. We note that,
while a school may assist a student in
completing a FAFSA, a school may
never complete a FAFSA for a student.
Conversely, if a borrower falsified the
FAFSA on their own initiative, did not
inform the school that they were not a
high school graduate, and the school did
not receive any discrepant information
indicating that the borrower was not a
high school graduate, the borrower
would not qualify for a false
certification discharge. Borrowers who
deliberately provide misleading or false
information in order to obtain Federal
student loans do not qualify for false
certification discharges based on the
false or misleading information that the
borrower provided to the school.
We agree with the commenters who
noted a discrepancy between the
language in proposed § 685.215(a)(l) and
proposed § 685.215(c)(l). Section
685.215(a)(l) provides the basic
eligibility criteria for a false certification
discharge based on false certification of
a borrower’s high school graduation
status. Section 685.215(c)(1) describes
how a borrower qualifies for a
discharge. The two sections are
intended to mirror each other, not to
establish slightly different standards for
the discharge. If a borrower, in applying
for the discharge, is only required to
state that the borrower ‘‘did not have a
valid high school diploma at the time
the loan was certified,’’ the question of
whether the borrower ‘‘reported not
having a high school diploma or its
equivalent’’ would not be addressed.
We also agree that the standards
under which the Department may seek
recovery for losses under § 685.215(a)(1)
should not be different from the
standards under which a borrower may
receive a false certification discharge
under § 685.215(c)(1).
The commenter who recommended
that schools be able to rely on a high
school’s accreditation status by a
‘‘reputable accrediting agency’’ did not
specify what criteria would be used to
determine if an agency accrediting a
high school is reputable, and does not
suggest a process for making such
determinations. Moreover, even if it
were feasible for the Department to
provide a list of acceptable high schools
for title IV student financial assistance
purposes or guidance regarding
acceptable schools, there is no guarantee
that a diploma purporting to come from
such a school is legitimate.
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We do not share the concern of
commenters that the proposed
regulations may penalize a school for
relying on the independent actions of a
third party. If a school is relying on a
third party to verify the high school
graduation status of a borrower, it is
incumbent on the school to ensure that
the third-party is providing legitimate
verifications. We note that high school
graduation status, or its approved
equivalent, is a fundamental borrower
eligibility criterion for title IV federal
student assistance. Any school that
wishes to participate in the title IV, HEA
programs and outsources the
determination of high school graduation
status to a third party without ensuring
that the third party is trustworthy, is
acting irresponsibly.
We also note, in response to this
comment, that the Department is not
proposing revisions to the regulations
governing false certification discharges
due to unauthorized payment.
We also disagree with the comment
recommending that a school should
only be penalized if it referred a student
to a third-party ‘‘for the purpose of
having the third party falsify the highschool diploma.’’ This commenter
raised this issue in particular with
regard to students who graduated from
foreign high schools. The commenter
stated that schools often use third
parties to verify the legitimacy of a
foreign credential. We do not believe
that the Department must demonstrate
intent on the part of a school when
assessing liabilities against a school due
to false certification of borrower
eligibility. We do not believe that a
school that routinely certifies eligibility
of borrowers who graduated from
foreign high schools can credibly claim
to be ignorant of the legitimacy of a
third-party verification entity that the
school uses for verification purposes.
We agree with the comment that the
false certification loan discharge
application should include a
certification from the borrower that the
borrower did not report to the school
that the borrower had a high school
diploma. The current form, Loan
Discharge Application: False
Certification (Ability to Benefit), expires
on August 31, 2017. After these final
regulations are published, we will revise
the form to make it consistent with
these final regulations. The revised
version of the form will go through two
public comment periods, with the intent
of being finalized by the time these
regulations become effective on July 1,
2017.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.215(c)(1) to clarify that the
borrower must have reported to the
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school that the borrower did not have a
high school diploma or its equivalent.
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Disqualifying Condition
Comments: Current regulations under
§ 685.215(a)(1)(iii) provide for a
discharge if a school certified the
eligibility of a borrower who would not
meet requirements for employment in
the occupation for which the training
program supported by the loan was
intended. The proposed regulations
would modify this provision to clarify
that the relevant ‘‘requirements for
employment’’ are ‘‘State requirements
for employment’’ in the student’s State
of residence at the time the loan was
originated.
A group of commenters sought
confirmation that, while a borrower may
be eligible for a false certification
discharge due to a condition that
disqualified them for employment in the
field for which postsecondary education
was pursued, the postsecondary
institution would not be financially
liable for the discharged loan. These
commenters believed that this is the
Department’s intent because the
remedial action provision at proposed
§ 685.308 does not list the disqualifying
condition discharge provision at
proposed § 685.215(a)(l)(iv) as a basis
for institutional liability. These
commenters observed that the current
version of § 685.308 states the
Department may seek recoupment if the
loan certification resulted in whole or in
part from the school’s violation of a
Federal statute or regulation or from the
school’s negligent or willful false
certification.
These commenters averred that antidiscrimination laws limit schools’
ability to deny admission to a
prospective student, even when the
individual would be disqualified for
employment in the career field for
which the program prepares students.
The commenters recommended that the
Department state explicitly in the
preamble to the final regulations that
disqualifying condition discharges will
not result in institutional liabilities.
Another commenter asserted that it
would be administratively burdensome
for institutions to maintain the
knowledge necessary to determine what
conditions would disqualify a
prospective student for employment in
a specific field. This commenter
suggested that this would be
particularly challenging for distance
education programs that serve students
remotely, since these institutions would
only be aware of potentially
disqualifying conditions that the
student discloses.
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A group of commenters echoed this
concern, stating that it would be
administratively burdensome for
distance education programs to comply
with proposed § 685.215(c)(2). In these
commenters’ view, a primarily distance
education institution may not have
occasion to become aware of a student’s
disqualifying physical or mental
condition unless and until the student
voluntarily discloses such information.
In addition, for institutions that operate
in numerous States, the commenters
stated that it would be administratively
burdensome and near impossible for an
institution to remain constantly vigilant
about potential changes to State statutes,
State regulations, or other limitations
established by the States that may affect
a student’s eligibility for employment.
Since institutions must comply with
various anti-discrimination laws when
admitting students, several commenters
argued that institutions should not be
held liable for discharges based on
disqualifying conditions unless it can be
shown that the institution engaged in
substantial misrepresentation. Another
commenter stated that there are
legitimate reasons why institutions—
including, but not limited to, distance
education institutions—may not be
aware of a student’s disqualifying
physical or mental condition or criminal
record. The commenter claimed that,
under applicable Department
regulations, an institution may not make
a preadmission inquiry as to whether an
applicant has a disability. The
commenter cited regulations at 34 CFR
104.42(b)(2) limiting schools’ ability to
determine whether applicants have a
disability.
Another commenter referenced the
Department’s publication Beyond the
Box: Increasing Access to Higher
Education for Justice-Involved
Individuals, which encourages
alternatives to inquiring about criminal
histories during college admissions and
provides recommendations to support a
holistic review of applicants.
A commenter asked why the
regulation does not specify that the
institution knew about or could be
expected to have known about the
disqualifying condition. The commenter
questioned whether a student who
intentionally concealed a disqualifying
condition should obtain a discharge.
The commenter also raised the issue of
a borrower whose disqualifying
impairment occurs after the fact, but
does not qualify for a disability
discharge. In such situations, the
commenter recommended that the
Department clearly state that the school
would not be subject to any penalty
under § 685.308.
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Another group of commenters
recommended that the Department
expand the regulation pertaining to
disqualifying conditions to include
certifications not provided by the State,
such as those referenced in the Gainful
Employment regulations such as
professional licensure and certification
requirements, including meeting the
requirements to sit for any required
licensure or certification exam.
A group of commenters noted their
opposition to the Department’s proposal
which, in their view, narrows discharge
eligibility for students whose schools
falsely certify that they meet the
requirements for employment in the
occupations for which their programs
are intended to train. These commenters
asserted that some schools frequently
recruit students they know will be
barred from employment in their field
after program completion.
These commenters objected to the
proposed regulatory language, which
addresses requirements imposed by the
State, not by the profession. To the
extent that this discharge provision is
intended to provide relief to students
whose schools recruit and enroll them
despite the fact that they cannot benefit
from the program, the commenters
believed that the Department should not
limit the scope of this protection. The
commenters observed that while most
professional licensing is found in State
law and regulation, others—such as
those from trade-specific entities—are
not. In the commenters’ view, the
proposed change would unnecessarily
restrict relief to students who are
unemployable because they are
ineligible for certifications not provided
by a State.
The commenters also believed that
this change would be inconsistent with
the Department’s Gainful Employment
regulations, which requires schools to
certify that each of their career
education programs ‘‘satisfies the
applicable educational prerequisites for
professional licensure or certification
requirements in that State so that the
student who completes the program and
seeks employment in that State qualifies
to take any licensure or certification
exam that is needed for the student to
practice or find employment in an
occupation that the program prepares
students to enter.’’ 34 CFR
668.414(d)(3). As the Department noted
in the preamble to the NPRM for the
Gainful Employment regulations, a
student’s enrollment in a program
intended to prepare them for a career for
which they cannot be certified ‘‘can
have grave consequences for students’
ability to find jobs and repay their loans
after graduation.’’ 79 FR 16478.
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The commenters believed that the
consequences are equally grave for
students who are unwittingly enrolled
in programs that they personally can
never benefit from, though their
classmates might. In the view of these
commenters, it is therefore unnecessary
and unfair to narrow this standard for
relief.
Discussion: The proposed regulations
were not intended to absolve schools of
financial liability in the case of false
certification due to a disqualifying
condition. The commenters point to
proposed § 685.308, which
inadvertently omitted a cross-reference
to § 685.215(a)(1)(iv) in identifying
provisions under which the Secretary
‘‘collects from the school the amount of
the losses the Secretary incurs and
determines that the institution is liable
to repay.’’ We note that the proposed
regulations include cross-references to
the provisions covering false
certification due to high school
graduation status and unauthorized
signature. We believe that discharge due
to false certification of disqualifying
status should be treated the same as the
other types of false certification
discharges, as it is under current
regulations in § 685.308(a)(2).
The commenter who suggested that it
would be administratively burdensome
for schools to maintain the knowledge
necessary to determine what conditions
would disqualify a prospective student
from employment in a specific field
appears to be unaware of the current
regulatory requirements. Under current
§ 685.215(a)(1)(iii), the Department
considers a school to have falsely
certified a borrower’s eligibility for a
title IV loan if the school ‘‘certified the
eligibility of a student who, because of
a physical or mental condition, age,
criminal record, or other reason
accepted by the Secretary would not
meet the requirements for employment
(in the student’s State of residence when
loan was originated) in the occupation
for which the training program
supported by the loan was intended.’’
The final regulations revise this
provision to refer to ‘‘State
requirements,’’ but make no additional
changes to this provision. The change is
consistent with our interpretation set
forth in Dear Colleague Letter (DCL)
GEN–95–42, dated September 1995. In
that DCL, we clarified that for a
borrower to qualify for a false
certification discharge due to a
disqualifying condition, a borrower
must provide evidence that the
borrower had a disqualifying condition
at the time of enrollment and of ‘‘a State
prohibition (in that student’s State of
residence) against employment’’ in that
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occupation based on the borrower’s
status.
We note in response to the
commenters who were concerned about
the administrative burden associated
with compliance for distance education
programs that these schools have been
subject to this regulatory requirement
for over 20 years. Neither the proposed
regulations nor these final regulations
would change the basic requirements
regarding false certification due to a
disqualifying condition.
The regulation at 34 CFR 104.42 refers
to general postsecondary education
admission procedures, not eligibility for
title IV student financial assistance.
While the requirements in § 685.215 do
not apply to a school’s evaluation of
whether to admit a student to a
particular program, they do apply to its
certification of that student’s eligibility
for title IV student financial assistance
for that program. Therefore, we do not
believe that the further limitation
suggested by the commenter is
necessary.
The Department of Education Beyond
The Box publication cited by
commenters specifically addresses
career-training programs. Further, the
publication does not advise schools to
ignore disqualifying characteristics, but
rather not to be overbroad in their
preclusion of otherwise eligible
applicants:
Tailor questions about CJI [‘‘Criminal
Justice Information’’] to avoid unnecessarily
precluding applicants from entering training
programs, and thus employment, for which
they might be eligible. For career-oriented
training programs, institutions should limit
CJI inquiries to criminal convictions that
pose barriers to certification and licensing.
For example, if a State teacher’s board will
not grant a license to anyone with a felony
conviction for sexual assault or rape, the
teaching program could specifically ask,
‘‘Have you ever been convicted of felony
sexual assault or rape?’’ instead of broadly
asking, ‘‘Have you ever been convicted of a
crime?’’ This specificity would enable the
institution to adequately assess whether a
student could face occupational licensing
and credentialing barriers (Beyond the Box:
Increasing Access to Higher Education for
Justice-Involved Individuals, p. 25).
As stated in the Beyond the Box
publication, we expect schools to be
aware of disqualifying conditions for
employment in the fields for which the
schools are providing training. Schools
that offer career-training programs need
to be proactive in determining whether
borrowers who are training for fields
that have such employment restrictions
do not have a disqualifying condition
for that career.
In response to the comment regarding
a student intentionally misleading a
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school, if the school could demonstrate
that a student intentionally misled the
school about a disqualifying condition,
we would take that into account in
determining the amount that the school
is liable to repay under § 685.308(a).
However, in our view, it seems unlikely
that a borrower would knowingly go
through the time, effort, and expense of
enrolling in an education program that
trains the borrower for an occupation for
which the borrower is unemployable. A
far more common scenario is
unscrupulous schools recruiting
students with disqualifying conditions
who cannot possibly benefit from the
training programs that the school offers.
With regard to borrowers who do not
have a disqualifying condition at the
time of enrollment, the regulations
specify that a borrower qualifies for the
discharge only if the borrower had a
disqualifying condition that ‘‘would
have’’ disqualified the borrower from
employment in the occupation, and that
the borrower ‘‘did not meet’’ State
requirements for employment in the
career. A condition that arose after the
borrower was no longer enrolled at the
school would not qualify the borrower
for a false certification discharge due to
a disqualifying condition.
We addressed the question of
expanding the scope of this provision to
include non-State requirements for
employment in certain fields, such as
employment standards established by
professional associations during the
negotiated rulemaking sessions and in
the NPRM. As we noted earlier,
employment standards established by
professional associations could vary,
and it would not be practical to require
schools to determine which professional
association standards to use. The
reference to the Gainful Employment
requirements is inapplicable here, as the
Gainful Employment requirements
relate to the quality of a school’s
program.
Changes: We have revised
§ 685.308(a) to clarify that Department
assesses liabilities to schools for false
certification due to disqualifying
condition or identity theft.
Satisfactory Academic Progress
Comments: A group of commenters
supported the proposed regulation that
would provide automatic false
certification loan discharges for students
whose satisfactory academic progress
(SAP) was falsified by an institution.
While the regulation specifies that these
loan discharges are initiated by the
Department, these commenters
requested that borrowers be permitted to
submit an application for false
certification loan discharge due to the
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falsification of satisfactory academic
progress by an institution.
The commenters urged the
Department to clarify that students may
also apply for a discharge on this basis,
rather than wait for the Department to
grant discharges without applications.
The commenters observed that there are
often False Claims Act and government
cases involving false certification of
SAP, and that many students also know
when their academic progress was
falsified by schools, but are not covered
by such cases.
The commenters suggested that
information provided by students in
discharge applications would also allow
the Department to identify bad-acting
schools and prevent abuse of title IV,
HEA funding. These commenters
recommended that the Department
revise the proposed rules to provide a
means for students to individually
apply for discharge when their SAP is
falsely certified by their school.
Discussion: We continue to believe
that allowing individual borrowers to
apply for false certification discharges
due to falsification of SAP is not
practical. As we discussed in the NPRM,
schools have a great deal of flexibility
both in determining and in
implementing SAP standards. There are
a number of exceptions under which a
borrower who fails to meet SAP can
continue to receive title IV loans.
Borrowers who are in danger of losing
title IV eligibility due to a failure to
meet SAP standards often request
reconsideration of the SAP
determination. Schools often work with
borrowers in good faith efforts to
attempt to resolve the situation without
cutting off the borrower’s access to title
IV assistance.
We do not believe that a school
should be penalized for legitimate
attempts to help a student who is not
meeting SAP standards, nor do we
believe a student who has successfully
appealed a SAP determination should
be able to use that initial SAP
determination to obtain a false
certification discharge on his or her
student loans. In addition, we continue
to believe that it would be very difficult
for an individual borrower to
sufficiently demonstrate that a school
violated its own SAP procedures.
Given these considerations, the final
regulations continue to limit false
certification discharges based on
falsification of SAP to discharges based
on information in the Secretary’s
possession.
Changes: None.
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Ability To Benefit
Comments: A group of commenters
requested that the Department
reconsider the evidentiary standard for
false certification of a borrower’s ability
to benefit. In these commenters’ view,
the requirement for additional
corroborating evidence beyond the selfcertification of the borrower is
unreasonable. The commenters
suggested that borrowers who are
unable to obtain corroborating evidence
should be able to submit a sworn
statement in support of their false
certification application.
These commenters referenced two
DCLs the Department issued in
connection with false certification of
ability to benefit: DCL GEN–95–42
(dated September 1995) and DCL FP–
07–09 (dated September 2009). The
commenters characterized the DCLs as
establishing a presumption that students
who claim ability to benefit fraud are
not telling the truth unless they submit
independent corroborating evidence to
support their discharge application. To
support this claim, these commenters
quoted the statement in DCL GEN–95–
42 that the absence of findings of
improper ability to benefit practices by
authorities with oversight powers
‘‘raises an inference that no improper
practices were reported because none
were taking place.’’
The commenters asserted that many
borrowers cannot provide proof of
Federal or State investigations of
particular schools because enforcement
has been lenient in this area. They
asserted that, in 1992, Congress
provided for the false certification
discharge and overhauled the student
loan system because oversight of
schools was inadequate.
A group of commenters criticized the
Department’s current approach, and
noted that statements that a borrower
makes on the current Loan Discharge
Application: False Certification (Ability
to Benefit) are made under penalty of
perjury. According to commenters, if a
borrower is unable to provide
investigative findings supporting the
borrower’s claim, the Department or the
guaranty agency will deny the discharge
unless the borrower submits additional
corroborating evidence (such as
statements by school officials or
statements made in other borrower
claims for discharge relief).
The commenters noted that DCL FP–
07–09 discusses guaranty agencies’
consideration of ‘‘the incidence of
discharge applications filed regarding
that school by students who attended
the school during the same time frame
as the applicant,’’ and suggested that
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76045
students have no way of knowing
whether a guaranty agency has done so
in evaluating their applications.
The commenters asserted that
students do not have access to school
employee statements and do not know
whether other borrowers have filed
similar claims for relief. When
borrowers are able to find attorneys to
help them, attorneys are often unable to
obtain the required evidence through
Freedom of Information Act requests.
The commenters also asserted that the
Department does not have possession of
all false certification discharge
applications and does not ensure that
copies are retained when guaranty
agencies go out of business or retain all
potentially corroborating evidence. In
addition, if the student has carried the
debt for years before learning of their
right to a false certification discharge,
the school may have closed. At that
point, key documents and corroborating
evidence may no longer be available.
The commenters recommended that
the Department revise its proposed
regulations to specify that a student may
establish a right to a false certification
discharge through a ‘‘preponderance of
the evidence,’’ as it has proposed for
borrower defense claims. In addition,
the commenters recommended that
borrowers be presumptively eligible for
discharge after application in the
following circumstances:
• The school’s academic and
financial aid files do not include a copy
of test answers and results showing that
the borrower obtained a passing score
on an ability-to-benefit test approved by
the Secretary;
• No testing agency has registered a
passing score on an ability-to-benefit
test approved by the Secretary for the
borrower; or
• The school directed the borrower to
take an online test to obtain a high
school degree, the borrower believed the
test to be legitimate, and the high school
diploma is invalid.
Discussion: In the NPRM, we removed
the references to ‘‘ability to benefit’’
from the Direct Loan false certification
regulatory language and replaced it with
a cross-reference to section 484(d) of the
HEA, and have retained that change in
the final regulations. Section 484(d)
establishes the current borrower
eligibility requirements for students
who are not high school graduates. The
current alternative to graduation from
high school requirements are
substantially different from the earlier
ability to benefit requirements. We have
provided guidance describing the
current alternative to high school
graduation requirements in DCL GEN–
16–09.
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We disagree with the
recommendation to revise the
regulations pertaining to the evidentiary
standards for false certification of ability
to benefit. Any modifications to these
regulations could only be applied
prospectively. Schools can be held
liable for false certification discharges,
and we cannot impose retroactive
requirements on schools.
We also disagree with the
commenters’ characterization of the
guidance in DCL GEN–95–42 and DCL
FP–07–09. DCL FP–07–09 does not
require a borrower to provide additional
corroborating evidence if the borrower
is unable to do so. That DCL provides
examples of ‘‘credible evidence’’ that
would provide a guaranty agency with
‘‘an adequate basis for granting a
discharge application’’ when there is no
borrower-specific evidence that the
borrower qualifies for a discharge due to
false certification of ability to benefit.
We believe the two DCLs still provide
an accurate description of the legal
requirements for false certification, so
we do not have plans to update them in
the near future.
Changes: None.
negotiated. The commenter requested
that the Department clarify in the final
regulations that the changes to the FFEL
Program regulations prohibiting the
capitalization of interest following loan
rehabilitation are amendments to the
current rules, consistent with the
commenters’ understanding of what was
agreed to during the negotiations. Based
on that understanding, the commenters
stated that FFEL Program guarantors,
lenders, and servicers are planning to
implement the changes for loans that go
into default on or after the effective date
of the regulations and are subsequently
rehabilitated.
Discussion: We thank the commenters
for their support of the changes to
prohibit interest capitalization following
loan rehabilitation. In response to the
group of commenters who requested
confirmation that the changes in
§§ 682.202(b)(1), 682.405, and
682.410(b)(4) represent amendments to
the current regulations and are to be
applied only prospectively, we confirm
that this is the intent.
Changes: None.
Interest Capitalization (Sections
682.202(b)(1), 682.405, and
682.410(b)(4))
Comments: Several commenters
supported the proposed changes in
§§ 682.202(b)(1), 682.405, and
682.410(b)(4), providing that a guaranty
agency may not capitalize unpaid
interest after a defaulted FFEL Loan has
been rehabilitated, and that a lender
may not capitalize unpaid interest when
purchasing a rehabilitated FFEL Loan.
A group of commenters noted that in
the preamble to the NPRM, the
Department characterized these changes
as clarifications of existing regulations.
The commenters disagreed with this
characterization, stating that during the
negotiated rulemaking sessions,
negotiators representing guaranty
agencies, lenders, and servicers did not
agree that current regulations prohibit
the capitalization of interest following
loan rehabilitation. The commenters
further stated that the negotiating
committee agreed to add this issue to
the negotiating agenda after an
agreement was reached with the
Department that the proposed changes
represented a change in policy for
prospective implementation. The
commenters added that when the
Department was asked by another
member of the negotiating committee
whether the proposed changes would
have any retroactive impact, the
Department responded that retroactive
application was not the issue being
Regulatory Impact Analysis
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Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
Under Executive Order 12866, it must
be determined whether this regulatory
action is ‘‘significant’’ and, therefore,
subject to the requirements of the
Executive order and subject to review by
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Section 3(f) of Executive Order
12866 defines a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ as an action likely to result in
a rule that may—
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more, or
adversely affect a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or
communities in a material way (also
referred to as an ‘‘economically
significant’’ rule);
(2) Create serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impacts of entitlement grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles
stated in the Executive order.
This final regulatory action will have
an annual effect on the economy of
more than $100 million because
regulations would have annual federal
budget impacts of approximately $1.9
billion in the low impact scenario to
$3.5 billion in the high impact scenario
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at 3 percent discounting and $1.8 billion
and $3.4 billion at 7 percent
discounting, additional transfers from
affected institutions to student
borrowers via reimbursements to the
Federal government, and annual
quantified costs of $9.8 million related
to paperwork burden. Therefore, this
final action is ‘‘economically
significant’’ and subject to review by
OMB under section 3(f)(1) of Executive
Order 12866. Notwithstanding this
determination, we have assessed the
potential costs and benefits, both
quantitative and qualitative, of this final
regulatory action and have determined
that the benefits justify the costs.
We have also reviewed these
regulations under Executive Order
13563, which supplements and
explicitly reaffirms the principles,
structures, and definitions governing
regulatory review established in
Executive Order 12866. To the extent
permitted by law, Executive Order
13563 requires that an agency—
(1) Propose or adopt regulations only
on a reasoned determination that their
benefits justify their costs (recognizing
that some benefits and costs are difficult
to quantify);
(2) Tailor its regulations to impose the
least burden on society, consistent with
obtaining regulatory objectives and
taking into account—among other things
and to the extent practicable—the costs
of cumulative regulations;
(3) In choosing among alternative
regulatory approaches, select those
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety,
and other advantages; distributive
impacts; and equity);
(4) To the extent feasible, specify
performance objectives, rather than the
behavior or manner of compliance a
regulated entity must adopt; and
(5) Identify and assess available
alternatives to direct regulation,
including economic incentives—such as
user fees or marketable permits—to
encourage the desired behavior, or
provide information that enables the
public to make choices.
Executive Order 13563 also requires
an agency ‘‘to use the best available
techniques to quantify anticipated
present and future benefits and costs as
accurately as possible.’’ The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of
OMB has emphasized that these
techniques may include ‘‘identifying
changing future compliance costs that
might result from technological
innovation or anticipated behavioral
changes.’’
We are issuing these final regulations
only on a reasoned determination that
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their benefits justify their costs. In
choosing among alternative regulatory
approaches, we selected those
approaches that maximize net benefits.
Based on the analysis that follows, the
Department believes that these
regulations are consistent with the
principles in Executive Order 13563.
We also have determined that this
regulatory action does not unduly
interfere with State, local, or tribal
governments in the exercise of their
governmental functions.
In accordance with both Executive
Orders, the Department has assessed the
potential costs and benefits, both
quantitative and qualitative, of this
regulatory action. The potential costs
associated with this regulatory action
are those resulting from statutory
requirements and those we have
determined as necessary for
administering the Department’s
programs and activities.
In this Regulatory Impact Analysis
(RIA) we discuss the need for regulatory
action, the comments about the NPRM
analysis and significant changes from
the NPRM, the potential costs and
benefits, net budget impacts,
assumptions, limitations, and data
sources, as well as regulatory
alternatives we considered. Although
the majority of the costs related to
information collection are discussed
within this RIA, elsewhere in this notice
under Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, we also identify and further
explain burdens specifically associated
with information collection
requirements.
1. Need for Regulatory Action
These final regulations address
several topics related to the
administration of title IV, HEA student
aid programs and benefits and options
for borrowers.
As detailed in the NPRM, the
Department last revised the borrower
defense regulations over two decades
ago, and until recently, use of borrower
defense has been very limited. The lack
of clarity in the current regulations has
led to much confusion among borrowers
regarding what protections and actions
for recourse are available to them when
dealing with cases of wrongdoing by
their institutions. The Department
received comments addressing this lack
of clarity during the public comment
period.
The need for a clearer and more
efficient process was also highlighted
when the collapse of Corinthian
generated an unprecedented level of
borrower defense claims activity. As
detailed extensively in the NPRM,
Corinthian, a publicly traded for-profit
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higher education company that in 2014
enrolled over 70,000 students at more
than 100 campuses nationwide, filed for
bankruptcy in 2015 after being the
subject of multiple investigations and
actions by Federal and State
governments. The Department
committed itself to ensuring that
students harmed by Corinthian’s
misrepresentations receive the relief to
which they are entitled, and realized
that the existing regulations made this
process burdensome, both for borrowers
and for the Department. Under the
current process, the Department would
be required to devote significant
resources to reviewing individual State
laws to determine which law to apply
to each borrower’s claim. The
Department appointed a Special Master
in June of 2015 to create and oversee the
process of providing debt relief for these
Corinthian students. As of October
2016, approximately 3,787 borrower
defense discharges totaling $73.1
million had been completed and
another 7,858 closed school discharges
totaling approximately $103.1 million
have been processed. Moreover, the
Department has received thousands
more claims—both from former
Corinthian students and from students
at a number of other institutions—that
are pending a full review, and expects
to receive more as the Department
continues to conduct outreach to
potentially affected students.
The Department remains committed
to ensuring that borrowers with a valid
defense to repayment are able to benefit
from this option. Research has shown
that large sums of student debt can
reduce levels of participation in the
economy, especially if borrowers are
unable to obtain adequate income to
repay their debts.96 If the borrower is
harmed such as by being provided with
educational credentials worth
significantly less than an institution’s
misrepresentation has led him or her to
believe, the borrower may be entitled to
some relief from the loans associated
with such education. The changes to the
borrower defense provisions in these
final regulations will update the process
and standard for determining relief and
allow the Department to effectively
address claims that arise in the modern
postsecondary educational system.
The landscape of higher education
has changed significantly over the past
20 years, including a substantial
96 The Economics of Student Loan Borrowing and
Repayment, Wen Li, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, available at https://
philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/
publications/business-review/2013/q3/brq313_
economics-of-student-loan-borrowing-andrepayment.pdf.
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increase in the number of students
enrolled in distance education. Because
distance education allows students to
enroll in courses and programs based in
other States and jurisdictions, it has
created additional challenges as it
relates to the Department’s current
borrower defense regulations.
The current regulations require an
analysis of State law to determine the
validity of a borrower defense claim.
This approach creates complexities in
determining which State law applies
and may give rise to potential
inequities, as students in one State may
receive different relief than students in
another State, despite common
underlying facts and claims.
The expansion of distance education
has also impacted the Department’s
ability to apply its borrower defense
regulations. The current borrower
defense regulations do not identify
which State’s law is considered the
‘‘applicable’’ State law on which the
borrower’s claim can be based.97
Generally, the regulation was assumed
to refer to the laws of the State in which
the institution was located; we did not
have much occasion to address
differences in protection for borrowers
in States that offer little protection from
school misconduct or borrowers who
reside in one State but are enrolled via
distance education in a program based
in another State. Some States have
extended their rules to protect these
students, while others have not.
The final regulations give students
access to consistent, clear, fair, and
transparent processes to seek debt relief.
The new Federal standard will allow a
borrower to assert a borrower defense on
the basis of a substantial
misrepresentation, a breach of contract,
or a favorable, nondefault contested
judgment against the school for its act
or omission relating to the making of the
borrower’s Direct Loan or the provision
of educational services for which the
loan was provided. Additionally, the
final regulations separately address
predispute arbitration clauses, another
possible obstacle to borrowers pursuing
a borrower defense claim. These final
regulations also prohibit a school
participating in the Direct Loan Program
from obtaining, through the use of
contractual provisions or other
agreements, a predispute agreement for
arbitration to resolve claims brought by
a borrower against the school that could
also form the basis of a borrower
defense under the Department’s
97 In the few instances prior to 2015 in which
claims have been recognized under current
regulations, borrowers and the school were
typically located in the same State.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 211 / Tuesday, November 1, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
regulations. The final regulations also
prohibit a school participating in the
Direct Loan Program from obtaining an
agreement, either in an arbitration
agreement or in another form, that a
borrower waive his or her right to
initiate or participate in a class action
lawsuit regarding such claims and from
requiring students to engage in internal
dispute processes before contacting
accrediting or government agencies with
authority over the school regarding such
claims. In addition, the final regulations
establish the conditions or events upon
which an institution is or may be
required to provide to the Department
financial protection, such as a letter of
credit, to help protect students, the
Federal government, and taxpayers
against potential institutional liabilities.
Additionally, to enhance and clarify
other existing protections for students,
these regulations update the basis for
obtaining a false certification discharge,
clarify the processes for false
certification and closed school
discharges, require institutions to
provide applications and explain the
benefits and consequences of a closed
school discharge, and establish a
process for a closed school discharge
without an application for students who
do not re-enroll in a title IVparticipating institution within three
years of an institution’s closure. These
regulations also codify the Department’s
practice that a discharge based on
school closure, false certification,
unpaid refund, or defense to repayment
will result in the elimination or
recalculation of the subsidized usage
period associated with the loan
discharged.
These regulations also amend the
regulations governing the consolidation
of Nursing Student Loans and Nurse
Faculty Loans so that they align with
the statutory requirements of section
428C(a)(4)(E) of the HEA; clarify rules
regulating the capitalization of interest
on defaulted FFEL Loans; require that
proprietary schools at which the median
borrower has not repaid in full, or paid
down the balance of, the borrower’s
loans include a warning in advertising
and promotional materials about those
repayment rate outcomes; require that a
school disclose on its Web site and to
prospective and enrolled students about
events for which it is required to
provide financial protection to the
Department; clarify the treatment of
spousal income in the PAYE and
REPAYE plans; and make other changes
that we do not expect to have a
significant economic impact.
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2. Summary of Comments and Changes
From the NPRM
A number of commenters expressed
that the RIA in the NPRM was
inadequate and did not support
proceeding with the regulations without
further study. Commenters noted that
the accuracy of several of the
Department’s past budget estimates had
been questioned by Congressional
committees and other outside reviewers.
Several commenters pointed out that the
wide range in the estimate, from $646
million up to $41.3 billion over the 2017
to 2026 loan cohorts, indicated that the
Department does not know the potential
budget impact of the regulation. Other
commenters noted that if the impact is
at the higher end of the range, the
analysis does not quantify benefits
greater than the costs to justify the
decision to proceed with the
regulations.
Another set of comments focused on
the impact of the regulations on higher
education, the costs to institutions, and
the potential for institutional closures.
A number of commenters expressed
concern that institutional closures
related to the regulations, especially the
financial responsibility provisions, will
reduce access to higher education for
low-income and minority students.
Materials included with the comments
analyzed National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study 2012 (NPSAS 2012)
data to demonstrate that students at forprofit institutions are, on average, more
likely to be older, racial minorities,
veterans, part-time, financially
independent, responsible for
dependents, and Pell Grant recipients. A
number of commenters suggested that
the costs of providing financial
protection would result in increased
costs for students and potentially limit
access to higher education. Other
commenters were concerned with a lack
of analysis about the costs of the
financial protection or the possibility
that schools would be unable to obtain
a letter of credit and would lose access
to title IV, HEA funding and be forced
to close. Several commenters suggested
that the regulations would open the
floodgates to frivolous claims that
would overwhelm the Department and
institutions, exacerbating the harmful
effects on higher education.
One commenter argued that the
proposed regulations would result in a
large number of disappointed borrowers
filing borrower defense claims without
merit. Several commenters were
concerned that the projected net budget
impact referred to in the NPRM of as
much as $42.698 billion during the
coming decade would undermine the
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integrity of the Direct Loan Program and
that neither American taxpayers, nor
schools that have successfully educated
students, could cover these costs if
thousands of students or graduates start
requesting discharges of their loans. The
commenters argued that the regulations
lack any quality control measure to
ensure that the Department would not
be hit with an influx of fraudulent
claims. They cited a recent lawsuit in
which a former law student
unsuccessfully sued her law school for
false advertising.
Finally, a number of commenters
suggested the high cost estimate was
overstated because schools would
change their practices and limit
behavior that would result in valid
borrower defense claims. Another
commenter questioned the
characterization of the net budget
impact as a cost based on the idea that
the Department should not collect on
loans established fraudulently. Several
commenters noted that the potential
fiscal impact should not factor into
decisions about whether borrowers are
eligible for relief.
We appreciate the comments about
the RIA in the NPRM. As discussed in
the NPRM, given the limited history of
borrower defense claims and the
limitations of available data, there is
uncertainty about the potential impact
of the regulations. Per OMB Circular A–
4, in some cases, uncertainty may be
addressed by presenting discrete
alternative scenarios without addressing
the likelihood of each scenario
quantitatively. The uncertainty about
borrower defense was acknowledged
and reflected in the wide range of
scenario estimates in the NPRM. The
Department presented the range of
scenarios and discussion of sources of
uncertainty in the estimates in order to
be transparent and encourage comments
that might aid the Department in
refining the estimates for the final
regulations.
We do not agree that the analysis was
inadequate to support proceeding with
the regulations. Under Executive Orders
12866 and 13563, the Department must
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that its benefits justify its
cost. The Executive Orders recognize
that some benefits and costs are difficult
to quantify, and provide that costs and
benefits include both quantifiable
measures—to the fullest extent that they
can be usefully estimated—as well as
qualitative measures of costs and
benefits that are difficult to quantify but
‘‘essential to consider.’’ OMB Circular
A–4 provides that in cases where benefit
and cost estimates are uncertain, benefit
and cost estimates that reflect the full
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probability distribution of potential
consequences should be reported.
Where possible, the analysis should
present probability distributions of
benefits and costs and include the upper
and lower bound estimates as
complements to central tendency and
other estimates. If a lack of knowledge
prevents construction of a scientifically
defensible probability distribution, the
Department should describe benefits or
costs under plausible scenarios and
characterize the evidence and
assumptions underlying each alternative
scenario. The Department took this
approach in the NPRM and presents the
analysis with relevant revisions for the
final regulations.
OMB Circular A–4 suggests that in
some instances when uncertainty has
significant effects on the final
conclusion about net benefits, the
agency should consider additional
research prior to rulemaking. For
example, when the uncertainty is due to
a lack of data, the agency might consider
deferring rulemaking, pending further
study to obtain sufficient data. Delaying
a decision will also have costs, as will
further efforts at data gathering and
analysis. The Department has weighed
the benefits of delay against these costs
in making the decision to proceed with
the regulation. With respect to borrower
defense, if the Department did not
proceed with the final regulations, the
existing borrower defense provisions
would remain in effect and some of the
costs associated with potential claims
would be incurred whether or not the
final regulations go into effect. The final
regulations build in more clarity and
add accountability and transparency
provisions that are designed to shift risk
from the taxpayers to institutions.
Moreover, if the Department were to
delay implementation of the final
regulations to obtain further information
about the scope of institutional behavior
that could give rise to claims, it is not
clear when a significant amount of
relevant data would become available.
Borrower responses in absence of the
process established in the final
76049
regulations do not necessarily reflect the
level of claims that will be processed
under the final regulations. Delaying the
regulations would delay the improved
clarity and accountability from the
regulations without developing
additional data within a definite
timeframe, and we do not believe the
benefits of such a delay outweigh the
costs. As with any regulation, additional
data that becomes available will be
taken into account in the ongoing reestimates of the title IV, HEA aid
programs.
We have considered the other
comments received. Revisions to the
analysis in response to those comments
and our internal review of the analysis
are incorporated into the Discussion of
Costs, Benefits, and Transfers and Net
Budget Impacts sections of this RIA as
applicable. Table 1 summarizes
significant changes made from the
NPRM in response to comments and the
Department’s ongoing development of
the final regulations.
TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF KEY CHANGES IN THE FINAL REGULATIONS
Reg section
Description of change
Financial Responsibility Triggers:
§ 668.171(c)(1) ................................
§ 668.171(h) ....................................
As detailed in Table 2, eliminates the $750,000 or 10 percent of current assets materiality threshold. Instead, losses from all of the automatic triggers except 90/10, cohort default rate (CDR), SEC delisting,
and SEC warning, are used to recalculate the composite score. If the recalculated score is less than 1.0,
the school is not financially responsible and must provide financial protection.
Removes Form 8–K trigger from proposed § 668.171(c)(10)(vii).
Eliminates discretionary trigger based on bond or credit ratings from proposed § 668.171(c)(10)(iv).
Reclassifies proposed automatic triggers including those related to accreditor probation and show-cause
actions, pending borrower defense claims, and violations of loan agreements as discretionary triggers.
Specifies that in its notice reporting a triggering event, an institution may demonstrate mitigating factors
about the event, including that the reported action or event no longer exists or has been resolved or the
institution has insurance that will cover part or all of the debts and liabilities that arise at any time from
that action or event.
Financial Protection Disclosures:
§ 668.41(i) .......................................
Revised to clarify that the Secretary will conduct consumer testing prior to establishing the actions and triggering events that require financial disclosures.
Further clarifies the requirements for testing with consumers before publishing the content of the disclosure, as well as the disclosure delivery requirements to prospective and enrolled students.
Financial Responsibility:
§ 668.175(f)(5) .................................
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§ 668.175(f)(2)(i) ..............................
§ 668.175(h) ....................................
Clarifies how long an institution must maintain the financial protection associated with a triggering event in
§ 668.171.
Provides that the Secretary may identify other acceptable forms of financial protection.
Provides that the Secretary will release any funds held under a set-aside if the institution subsequently
provides cash, the letter of credit, or other financial protection required under the zone or provisional certification alternatives in § 668.175(d) or (f).
Repayment Rate:
§ 668.41(h)(3) ..................................
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Clarifies that the Secretary will calculate a repayment rate based on the proportion of students who have
repaid at least one dollar in outstanding balance, measured in the third year after entering repayment,
using data reported and validated through the Gainful Employment program-level repayment rate calculation.
Removes the requirement that repayment rate warnings be delivered individually to all prospective and enrolled students. Enhances the requirement as to how repayment rate warnings must be presented in advertising and promotional materials.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 211 / Tuesday, November 1, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF KEY CHANGES IN THE FINAL REGULATIONS—Continued
Reg section
Description of change
Closed School Discharge:
§ 682.402(d)(7)(ii) ............................
§§ 674.33(g)(3), 682.402(d)(8), and
685.214(c)(2).
§ 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F) .......................
§ 682.402(d) ....................................
Requires a lender to provide a borrower another closed school discharge application upon resuming collection.
Revised to clearly delineate the circumstances under which a closed school discharge is discretionary, as
opposed to required.
Revised to stipulate that a guaranty agency that denies a borrower’s closed school discharge request must
notify the borrower of the reasons for the denial.
Updates wording in FFEL closed school discharge regulations to refer to application instead of sworn
statement or written request.
False Certification Discharge:
§ 685.215(c)(1) ................................
§ 685.308(a) ....................................
Clarifies that a borrower must have reported to the school that the borrower did not have a high school diploma or its equivalent.
Clarifies that the Department assesses liabilities to schools for false certification due to disqualifying condition or identity theft.
Predispute Agreements
§ 685.300 .........................................
Eliminates the use of predispute arbitration agreements, whether or not they are mandatory, to resolve
claims brought by a borrower against the school that could also form the basis of a borrower defense or
to prevent a student who has obtained or benefited from a Direct Loan from participating in a class action suit related to borrower defense claim.
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3. Discussion of Costs, Benefits, and
Transfers
In developing the final regulations,
the Department made some changes to
address concerns expressed by
commenters and to achieve the
objectives of the regulations while
acknowledging the potential costs of the
provisions to institutions and taxpayers.
As noted in the NPRM, the primary
potential benefits of these regulations
are: (1) An updated and clarified
process and a Federal standard to
improve the borrower defense process
and usage of the borrower defense
process to increase protections for
students; (2) increased financial
protections for taxpayers and the
Federal government; (3) additional
information to help students,
prospective students, and their families
make educated decisions based on
information about an institution’s
financial soundness and its borrowers’
loan repayment outcomes; (4) improved
conduct of schools by holding
individual institutions accountable and
thereby deterring misconduct by other
schools; (5) improved awareness and
usage, where appropriate, of closed
school and false certification discharges;
and (6) technical changes to improve the
administration of the title IV, HEA
programs. Costs associated with the
regulations will fall on a number of
affected entities including institutions,
guaranty agencies, the Federal
government, and taxpayers. These costs
include changes to business practices,
review of marketing materials,
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additional employee training, and
unreimbursed claims covered by
taxpayers. The largest quantified impact
of the regulations is the transfer of funds
from the Federal government to
borrowers who succeed in a borrower
defense claim, a significant share of
which will be offset by the recovery of
funds from institutions whose conduct
gave rise to the claims.
We have considered and determined
the primary costs and benefits of these
regulations for the following groups or
entities that we expect to be impacted
by the proposed regulations:
• Students and borrowers
• Institutions
• Guaranty agencies and loan
servicers
• Federal, State, and local
government
Borrower Defense, Closed School
Discharges, and False Certification
Discharges
Students and Borrowers
The fundamental underlying right of
borrowers to assert a defense to
repayment and obligation of institutions
to reimburse the Federal government for
such claims that are valid exist under
the current borrower defense
regulations. These final regulations aim
to establish processes that enable more
borrowers to pursue valid claims and
increase their likelihood of discharging
their loans as a result of institutional
actions generating such claims. As
detailed in the NPRM, borrowers will be
the primary beneficiaries of these
regulations as greater awareness of
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borrower defense, a common Federal
standard, and a better defined process
may encourage borrowers who may
have been unaware of the process, or
intimidated by its complexity in the
past, to file claims.
Furthermore, these changes could
reduce the number of borrowers who are
struggling to meet their student loan
obligations. During the public comment
periods of the negotiated rulemaking
sessions, many public commenters who
were borrowers mentioned that they felt
that they had been defrauded by their
institutions of higher education and
were unable to pay their student loans,
understand the borrower defense
process, or obtain debt relief for their
FFEL Loans under the current
regulations. We received many
comments on the NPRM echoing this
sentiment.
Through the financial responsibility
provisions, these final regulations
introduce far stronger incentives for
schools to avoid committing acts or
making omissions that could lead to a
valid borrower defense claim than
currently exist. In addition, through
clarification of circumstances that could
lead to a valid claim, institutions may
better avoid behavior that could result
in a valid claim and future borrowers
may be less likely to face such behavior.
Providing an automatic forbearance
with an option for the borrower to
decline the temporary relief and
continue making payments will reduce
the potential burden on borrowers
pursuing borrower defenses. These
borrowers will be able to focus on
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supplying the information needed to
process their borrower defense claims
without the pressure of continuing to
make payments on loans for which they
are currently seeking relief. When
claims are successful, there will be a
transfer between the Federal
government and affected student
borrowers as balances are forgiven and
some past payments are returned. In the
scenarios described in the Net Budget
Impacts section of this analysis, those
transfers range from $1.7 billion for the
minimum budget estimate to $3.3
billion in the maximum impact estimate
annually, with the primary budget
estimate at $2.5 billion annually.
Borrowers who ultimately have their
loans discharged will be relieved of
debts they may not have been able to
repay, and that debt relief can
ultimately allow them to become bigger
participants in the economy, possibly
buying a home, saving for retirement, or
paying for other expenses. Recent
literature related to student loans
suggests that high levels of student debt
may decrease the long-term probability
of marriage,98 increase the probability of
bankruptcy,99 reduce home ownership
rates,100 and increase credit constraints,
especially for students who drop out.101
Further, when borrowers default on
their loans, everyday activities like
signing up for utilities, obtaining
insurance, or renting an apartment can
become a challenge.102 Borrowers who
default might also be denied a job due
to poor credit, struggle to pay fees
necessary to maintain professional
licenses, or be unable open a new
checking account.103 While difficult to
quantify because of the multitude of
different potential borrowing profiles
and nature of the claims of those who
will seek relief through borrower
defense and the possibility of partial
relief, the discharge of loans for which
borrowers have valid borrower defenses
could have significant positive
consequences for affected borrowers and
associated spillover economic benefits.
Affected borrowers also will be able to
return into the higher education
marketplace and pursue credentials they
need for career advancement. To the
extent borrowers have subsidized loans,
the elimination or recalculation of the
borrowers’ subsidized usage period
could relieve them of their
responsibility for accrued interest and
make them eligible for additional
subsidized loans, which could make
returning to higher education a more
acceptable option.
These regulations will also give
borrowers more information with which
they can make informed decisions about
the institutions they choose to attend.
An institution will be required to
provide a disclosure for certain actions
and triggering events, to be determined
through consumer testing, for which it
was required to obtain a letter of credit.
Recent events involving closure of
several large proprietary institutions
have shown the need for lawmakers,
regulatory bodies, State authorizers,
taxpayers, and students to be more
broadly aware of circumstances that
could affect the continued existence of
an institution. This disclosure, the
content of which will be prescribed by
the Secretary in a notice published in
the Federal Register, will allow
borrowers to receive early warning signs
about an institution’s risk for students,
and therefore borrowers may be able to
select a different college, or withdraw or
transfer to an institution in better
standing in lieu of continuing to work
towards earning credentials that may
have limited value.
Proprietary institutions will also be
required to provide a warning through
advertising and promotional materials if
their loan repayment rate, based on the
proportion of students who have repaid
at least one dollar in outstanding
balance and measured in the third year
after entering repayment, using data
reported and validated through the
Gainful Employment repayment rate
calculation, shows that the median
borrower has not paid down his balance
by at least one dollar. To estimate the
effect of the repayment rate warning on
institutions, the Department analyzed
program-level repayment rate data
prepared for the Gainful Employment
regulation 104 and aggregated the
proprietary institutions data to the 6-
98 Gicheva, D. ‘‘In Debt and Alone? Examining the
Causal Link between Student Loans and Marriage.’’
Working Paper (2013).
99 Gicheva, D., and U. N. C. Greensboro. ‘‘The
Effects of Student Loans on Long-Term Household
Financial Stability.’’ Working Paper (2014).
100 Shand, J. M. (2007). ‘‘The Impact of Early-Life
Debt on the Homeownership Rates of Young
Households: An Empirical Investigation.’’ Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Center for Financial
Research.
101 Id.
102 https://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/default.
103 www.asa.org/in-default/consequences/.
104 A privacy-protected version of the data is
available at https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/
reg/hearulemaking/2012/2013-repayment-ratedata.xls. The Department aggregated all program
numerators and denominators to each unique sixdigit OPEID and calculated how many institutions
had aggregate rates under the negative amortization
threshold and at least 10 borrowers in the
denominator. Note that these data reflect students
who entered repayment in 2007 and 2008; analysis
of later cohorts (those who entered repayment in
2011 and 2012) published through the College
Scorecard, which calculate a similar repayment
rate, showed 501 institutions with repayment rates
below the negative amortization threshold.
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digit OPEID level and found that 972 of
1,345 institutions in the 2012 Gainful
Employment data had a repayment rate
that showed the median borrower had
not paid down the balance of the
borrower’s loans by at least one dollar.
A number of commenters pointed to
the Department’s failure to quantify the
benefits of the proposed regulations in
the NPRM as an indication that the
analysis did not support the
implementation of the final regulations.
As mentioned throughout the RIA, the
extent of the private and public benefit
from the regulations is difficult to
quantify. We have limited experience
with borrower defense claims to draw
upon in generating a profile of those
likely to make successful claims. There
are different potential profiles of student
loan borrowers in terms of loan
amounts, loan type composition,
likelihood of default, fields of
employment, degree level, and other
factors. We do not have a basis in the
data from existing claims to know how
borrower profiles and the distribution
and nature of claims will intersect. The
economic and psychological benefits of
debt relief may vary for a graduate
student with high income potential
receiving partial relief on a high level of
debt and a student who dropped out of
a certificate program with a lower level
of debt and lower earnings potential
from that program of education. While
we do not quantify the amount, we
expect the benefits associated with the
substantial transfers to students from
successful borrower defense claims will
be significant. Several commenters
noted that students may face costs or
other negative impacts from these final
regulations. In particular, commenters
expressed concern that the closure of
institutions, especially proprietary
institutions that serve many lowincome, minority, first-generation, and
non-traditional students, will hurt
access to higher education, especially
for those groups. The Department
acknowledges that some institutions
may close if their actions mean that they
are required to provide a substantial
amount of financial protection, or that a
large number of successful claims are
made against them. However, as the
regulation comes into effect and
examples of conduct that generates
claims are better understood, we expect
institutions will limit such behavior and
compete for students without such
conduct, and that closures will be
reduced over time. The Department also
believes that institutions that do not
face significant claims will be able to
provide opportunities for students in
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the event of closures of other
institutions that do.
Another possible impact on students
mentioned by some commenters is that
the costs of financial protection or other
compliance measures will be passed on
to students in tuition and fee increases.
We believe potential tuition increases
will be constrained by loan limits and
other initiatives, such as the
Department’s Gainful Employment
regulations, where institutions would be
negatively affected by such increases.
Institutions
Institutions will bear many of this
regulation’s costs, which fall into three
categories: Paperwork costs associated
with compliance with the regulations;
other compliance costs that may be
incurred as institutions adapt their
business practices and training to
ensure compliance with the regulations;
and costs associated with obtaining
letters of credit or suitable equivalents
if required by the institution’s
performance under a variety of triggers.
Additionally, there may be a potentially
significant amount of funds transferred
between institutions and the Federal
government as reimbursement for
successful claims. Some institutions
may close some or all of their programs
if their activities generate large numbers
of borrower defense claims.
A key consideration in evaluating the
effect on institutions is the distribution
of the impact. While all institutions
participating in title IV loan programs
are subject to the possibility of borrower
defense, closed school, and false
certification claims and the reporting
requirements in these final regulations,
the Department expects that fewer
institutions will engage in conduct that
generates borrower defense claims. Over
time, the Department expects the
number of schools that would face the
most significant costs to come into
compliance, the amount of transfers to
reimburse the government for successful
claims, costs to obtain required letters of
credit, and disclosure of borrower
defense claims against the schools to be
reduced as some offenders are
eliminated and other institutions adjust
their practices. In the primary budget
scenario described in the Net Budget
Impacts section of this analysis, the
annual transfers from institutions to
students, via the Federal government, as
reimbursement for successful claims are
estimated at $994 million. On the other
hand, it is possible that high-quality,
compliant institutions, especially in the
for-profit sector, will see benefits if the
overall reputation of the sector improves
as a result of (1) more trust that
enforcement against bad actors will be
effective, and (2) the removal of bad
schools from the higher education
marketplace, freeing up market share for
the remaining schools.
The accountability framework in the
regulations requiring institutions to
provide financial protection in response
to various triggers would generate costs
for institutions. Some of the triggering
provisions would affect institutions
differently depending upon their type
and control, as, for example, only
publicly traded institutions are subject
to delisting or SEC suspension of
trading, only proprietary institutions are
subject to the 90/10 rule, and public
institutions are not subject to the
financial protection requirements. To
the extent data were available, we
evaluated the financial protection
triggers to analyze the expected impact
on institutions. Several of the triggers
are based on existing performance
measures and are aimed at identifying
institutions that may face sanctions and
experience difficulty meeting their
financial obligations. The triggers and,
where available, data about their
potential impact are discussed in Table
2. The consequences of an institution
being found to be not financially
responsible are set out in § 668.175 and
include providing financial protection
through a letter of credit, a set-aside of
title IV, HEA funds, or other forms of
financial protection specified by the
Secretary in a notice published in the
Federal Register. Alternatively, an
institution that can prove it has
insurance that covers the triggering risk
is not considered to be not financially
responsible and does not need to
provide financial protection to the
Department.
The Department will review the
triggering events before determining
whether to require separate financial
protection for a triggering event that
occurs with other triggering events.
Another change from the NPRM
concerns those triggers that include a
materiality threshold. Instead of being
evaluated separately, lawsuits, borrower
protection repayments to the Secretary,
losses from gainful employment and
campus closures, withdrawal of owner’s
equity, and other triggers with a
materiality threshold will be evaluated
by their effect on the institution’s most
recent composite score, which will
allow the cumulative effect of violation
of multiple triggers to be taken into
account. If the recalculated composite
score is a failing score, institutions
would be required to provide financial
protection. For the triggers evaluated
through the revised composite score
approach, the required financial
protection is 10 percent or more, as
determined by the Secretary, of the total
amount of title IV, HEA program
received by the institution during its
most recently completed fiscal year. For
the other triggers, the amount of
financial protection required remains 10
percent or more, as determined by the
Secretary, of the total amount of title IV,
HEA program received by the institution
during its most recently completed
fiscal year, unless the Department
determines that based on the facts of
that particular case, the potential losses
are greater.
TABLE 2—FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TRIGGERS
Description
Impact
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Automatic Triggers Evaluated through Revised Composite Score Calculation
Institution found to be not financially responsible under § 668.171 and must qualify under an alternative standard if the addition of the triggering
liability to the institution’s most recently calculated composite score causes it to fail the composite score. Triggering liabilities that occur during
the period between the fiscal year for which the Secretary last calculated the institution’s composite score under § 668.172 and the next following fiscal year for which the Secretary calculates a composite score are evaluated. Requires financial protection of no less than 10 percent
of prior year’s title IV, HEA aid and such additional amount as the Secretary demonstrates is needed to protect from other losses that may
arise within the next 18 months.
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TABLE 2—FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TRIGGERS—Continued
Description
Impact
Lawsuits and Other Actions: § 668.171(c)(1)(i) and (ii)
Triggered if an institution is required to pay any debt or incur any liability arising from a final judgment in a judicial proceeding, or from an
administrative proceeding or determination, or from a settlement.
Triggered if the institution is being sued in an action brought on or after
July 1, 2017 by a Federal or State authority for financial relief on
claims related to the making of the Direct Loan for enrollment at the
school or the provision of educational services and the suit has been
pending for 120 days.
Triggered if the institution is being sued in a lawsuit other than by a
Federal or State authority related to the making of a Direct Loan or
provision of educational services which has survived a motion for
summary judgment or the time for such motion has passed.
If claims do not state a dollar amount and no amount has been set in a
court ruling: (1) For Federal and State borrower defense-related action, the Department will calculate loss by considering claim to seek
the amount set by a court ruling, or if no ruling has been issued, in a
written demand or settlement offer by the agency, or the amount of
all tuition and fees for the period in the suit, for the program or location described in the allegations. Institution allowed to show suit is
limited to a smaller portion of the school and that tuition and fees for
that portion should be used; and (2) For all other suits the potential
loss (if none is stated in the complaint or in a court ruling) is the
amount in a written demand pre-suit, the amount offered by the
plaintiff to settle, or the amount stated in discovery leading up to a
trial.
Since 2010, at least 25 institutions have been investigated or reached
settlements with State AGs, with some being involved in actions by
multiple States. Federal agencies, including the Department, DOJ,
FTC, CFPB, and the SEC have been involved in actions against at
least 20 institutions, with multiple actions against some schools.
Accreditor Actions: (Teach-Outs) § 668.171(c)(1)(iii)
Triggered if institution required by its accrediting agency to submit a
teach-out plan that covers the closing of the institution or any of its
branches or additional locations.
The amount of title IV, HEA aid allocated in the previous year to the
closed locations will be used to recalculate the composite score.
Gainful Employment: § 668.171(c)(1)(iv)
Triggered if the potential loss from the closure of programs that are
one year away from losing their eligibility for title IV, HEA program
funds causes the recalculated composite score to fall below 1.0.
The amount of title IV, HEA aid allocated in the previous year to programs that could lose eligibility in the next year will be used to recalculate the composite score.
Withdrawal of Owner’s Equity: § 668.171(c)(1)(v)
The amount of equity withdrawn will be used to recalculate the composite score. Applies only to proprietary institutions and provides that
funds transferred between institutions in a group that have a common composite score are not considered withdrawals of owner’s equity.
Automatic Triggers Not Evaluated through Revised Composite Score Calculation
Institution found to be not financially responsible under § 668.171 and must qualify under an alternative standard if the triggering events occur.
Non-Title IV Revenue: § 668.171(d)
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If an institution fails the 90/10 revenue test in its most recently completed fiscal year. Applies to proprietary institutions only.
In the most recent 90/10 report, 14 institutions received 90 percent or
more of their revenues from title IV, HEA funds. The total title IV,
HEA funding for those institutions in award year (AY) 2013–14 was
$56.4 million.
Publicly Traded Institutions—SEC or Exchange Actions: § 668.171(e)
The SEC warns the institution that it may suspend trading on the institution’s stock.
The institution failed to file a required annual or quarterly report with
the SEC within the time period prescribed for that report or by any
extended due date under 17 CFR 240.12b–25.
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TABLE 2—FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TRIGGERS—Continued
Description
Impact
The exchange on which the institution’s stock is traded notifies the institution that it is not in compliance with exchange requirements, or
its stock is delisted.
Cohort Default Rates: § 668.171(f)
Triggered if institution’s two most recent official cohort default rates are
30 percent or above after any challenges or appeals.
From the most recently released official CDR rates, for FY2013 and
FY2012, 20 of 3,058 non-public institutions that had CDR rates in
both years were over 30 percent in both years. Title IV, HEA aid received by these institutions in AY2015–16 totaled $12.8 million.
Discretionary Triggers
Institution found to be not financially responsible under § 668.171 and must qualify under an alternative standard if the Secretary determines
that there is an event or condition that is reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the financial condition, business, or results of
operations of the institution.
§ 668.171(g)(1): Significant fluctuations in title IV, HEA program funds ..
§ 668.171(g)(2): Citation for failing State licensing or authorizing agency
requirements.
§ 668.171(g)(3): Failing financial stress test developed or adopted by
the Secretary.
§ 668.171(g)(4): High annual dropout rates, as calculated by the Secretary.
§ 668.171(g)(5): The institution was placed on probation or issued a
show-cause order or a status that poses equivalent or greater risk to
accreditation.
The Department looked at fluctuations in Direct Loan amounts and
found that 1,113 of 3,534 non-public institutions had an absolute
change in Direct Loan volume of 25 percent or more between the
2014–15 and 2015–16 award years and 350 had a change of 50
percent or more.
The Department analyzed College Scorecard data to develop a withdrawal rate within six years. Of 928 proprietary institutions with data,
482 had rates from 0 to 20 percent, 415 from 20 to 40 percent, 30
from 40 to 60 percent, and 1 from 60 to 80 percent. Of 1,058 private
not-for-profit institutions with data, 679 had rates from 0 to 20 percent, 328 from 20 to 40 percent, 51 from 40 to 60 percent, and none
above 60 percent. Of 1,476 public institutions with data, 857 had
rates from 0 to 20 percent, 587 from 20 to 40 percent, 32 from 40 to
60 percent, and none above 60 percent.
In the March 2015 accreditation report available at https://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/GetDownLoadFile.aspx, 278 of 33,956 programs were on
probation and 5 were in the resigned under show cause status. Of
the 283 programs in those statuses in the March 2015 accreditation
report, 9 were closed by institutions or had their accreditation terminated and 147 remained in the same status for at least 6 consecutive months.
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§ 668.171(g)(6): Institution violates a provision or requirement in a loan
agreement that enables a creditor to require an increase in collateral,
a change in contractual obligations, an increase in interest rates or
payments, or other sanctions, penalties, or fees.
§ 668.171(g)(7): The institution has pending claims borrower relief discharge under § 685.206 or § 685.222.
§ 668.171(g)(8): The Secretary expects to receive a significant number
of claims for borrower relief discharge under § 685.206 or § 685.222
as a result of a lawsuit, settlement, judgement, or finding from a
State or Federal administrative proceeding.
In addition to any resources
institutions would devote to training or
changes in business practices to
improve compliance with the final
regulations, institutions would incur
costs associated with the reporting and
disclosure requirements of the final
regulations. This additional workload is
discussed in more detail under
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. In
total, the final regulations are estimated
to increase burden on institutions
participating in the title IV, HEA
programs by 251,049 hours. The
monetized cost of this burden on
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institutions, using wage data developed
using BLS data available at
www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is
$9,175,841. This cost was based on an
hourly rate of $36.55.
Guaranty Agencies and Loan Servicers
Several provisions may impose a cost
on guaranty agencies or lenders,
particularly the limits on interest
capitalization. Loan servicers may have
to update their process to accept
electronic death certificates, but
increased use of electronic documents
should be more efficient over the long
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term. As indicated in the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 section of this
preamble, the final regulations are
estimated to increase burden on
guaranty agencies and loan servicers by
7,622 hours related to the mandatory
forbearance for FFEL borrowers
considering consolidation for a
borrower defense claim and reviews of
denied closed school claims. The
monetized cost of this burden on
guaranty agencies and loan servicers,
using wage data developed using BLS
data available at www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/
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sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is $278,584. This cost
was based on an hourly rate of $36.55.
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Federal, State, and Local Governments
In addition to the costs detailed in the
Net Budget Impacts section of this
analysis, the final regulations will affect
the Federal government’s administration
of the title IV, HEA programs. The
borrower defense process in the final
regulations will provide a framework for
handling claims in the event of
significant institutional wrongdoing.
The Department may incur some
administrative costs or shifting of
resources from other activities if the
number of applications increases
significantly and a large number of
claims require hearings. Additionally, to
the extent borrower defense claims are
not reimbursed by institutions, Federal
government resources that could have
been used for other purposes will be
transferred to affected borrowers.
Taxpayers will bear the burden of these
unreimbursed claims. In the scenarios
presented in the Net Budget Impacts
section of this analysis, annualized
unreimbursed claims range from $923
million to $2.1 billion.
The accountability framework and
financial protection triggers will provide
some protection for taxpayers as well as
potential direction for the Department
and other Federal and State
investigatory agencies to focus their
enforcement efforts. The financial
protection triggers may potentially assist
the Department as it seeks to identify,
and take action regarding, material
actions and events that are likely to
have an adverse impact on the financial
condition or operations of an
institution. In addition to the current
process where, for the most part, the
Department determines annually
whether an institution is financially
responsible based on its audited
financial statements, under these final
regulations the Department may
determine at the time a material action
or event occurs that the institution is
not financially responsible.
Other Provisions
The technical corrections and
additional changes in the final
regulations will benefit student
borrowers and the Federal government’s
administration of the title IV, HEA
programs. Updates to the acceptable
forms of certification for a death
discharge will be more convenient for
borrowers’ families or estates and the
Department. The provision for
consolidation of Nurse Faculty Loans
reflects current practice and gives those
borrowers a way to combine the
servicing of all their loans. Many of
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these technical corrections and changes
involve relationships between the
student borrowers and the Federal
government, such as the clarification in
the REPAYE treatment of spousal
income and debt, and they are not
expected to significantly impact
institutions.
4. Net Budget Impacts
The final regulations are estimated to
have a net budget impact in costs over
the 2017–2026 loan cohorts of $16.6
billion in the primary estimate scenario,
including a $381 million modification
to cohorts 2014–2016 for the 3-year
automatic closed school discharge. A
cohort reflects all loans originated in a
given fiscal year. Consistent with the
requirements of the Credit Reform Act
of 1990, budget cost estimates for the
student loan programs reflect the
estimated net present value of all future
non-administrative Federal costs
associated with a cohort of loans.
As noted by many commenters, in the
NPRM we presented a number of
scenarios that generated a wide range of
potential budget impacts from $1.997
billion in the lowest impact scenario to
$42.698 billion in the highest impact
scenario. As described in the NPRM,
this range reflected the uncertainty
related to the borrower defense
provisions in the regulations and our
intent to be transparent about the
estimates to generate discussion and
information that could help to refine the
estimates. In response to comments and
our own internal review, we have made
a number of revisions to the borrower
defense budget impact estimate that are
described in the discussion of the
impact of those provisions.
The provisions with the greatest
impact on the net budget impact of the
regulations are those related to the
discharge of borrowers’ loans, especially
the changes to borrower defense and
closed school discharges. As noted in
the NPRM, borrowers may pursue
closed school, false certification, or
borrower defense discharges depending
on the circumstances of the institution’s
conduct and the borrower’s claim. If the
institution does not close, the borrower
cannot or does not pursue closed school
or false certification discharges, or the
Secretary determines the borrower’s
claim is better suited to a borrower
defense group process, the borrower
may pursue a borrower defense claim.
The precise split among the types of
claims will depend on the borrower’s
eligibility and ease of pursuing the
different claims. While we recognize
that some claims may be fluid in
classification between borrower defense
and the other discharges, in this
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analysis any estimated effect from
borrower defense related claims are
described in that estimate, and the net
budget impact in the closed school
estimate focuses on the process changes
and disclosures related to that
discharge.
Borrower Defense Discharges
As the Department will eventually
have to incorporate the borrower
defense provisions of these final
regulations into its ongoing budget
estimates, we have moved closer to that
goal in refining the estimated impact of
the regulations to reflect a primary
scenario. The uncertainty inherent in
the borrower defense estimate given the
limited history of borrower defense
claims and other factors described in the
NPRM is reflected in the additional
sensitivity runs that demonstrate the
effect of changes in the specific
assumption being tested. Another
change from the NPRM is the
specification of an estimated baseline
scenario for the impact of borrower
defense claims if these final regulations
did not go into effect and borrowers had
to pursue claims under the existing
borrower defense regulation. Similar to
the NPRM, the estimated net budget
impact of $14.9 billion attributes all
borrower defense activity for the 2017 to
2026 cohorts to these final regulations,
but with the baseline scenario, we
present an estimate of the subset of
those costs that could be incurred under
the existing borrower defense
regulation.
These final regulations establish a
Federal standard for borrower defense
claims related to loans first disbursed on
or after July 1, 2017, as well as describe
the process for the assertion and
resolution of all borrower defense
claims—both those made for Direct
Loans first disbursed prior to July 1,
2017, and for those made under the
regulations after that date. As indicated
in this preamble, while regulations
governing borrower defense claims have
existed since 1995, those regulations
have rarely been used. Therefore, we
have used the limited data available on
borrower defense claims, especially
information about the results of the
collapse of Corinthian, projected loan
volumes, Departmental expertise, the
discussions at negotiated rulemaking,
comments on the NPRM analysis, and
information about past investigations
into the type of institutional acts or
omissions that would give rise to
borrower defense claims to refine the
primary estimate and sensitivity
scenarios that we believe will capture
the range of net budget impacts
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associated with the borrower defense
regulations.
While we have refined the
assumptions used to estimate the impact
of the borrower defense provisions, the
ultimate method of estimating the
impact remains entering a level of net
borrower defense claims into the
student loan model (SLM) by risk group,
loan type, and cohort. The net present
value of the reduced stream of cash
flows compared to what the Department
would have expected from a particular
cohort, risk group, and loan type
generates the expected cost of the
regulations. Similar to the NPRM, we
applied an assumed level of school
misconduct, borrower claims success,
and recoveries from institutions
(respectively labeled as Conduct
Percent, Borrower Percent, and
Recovery Percent in Tables 3–A and 3–
B) to the President’s Budget 2017
(PB2017) loan volume estimates to
generate the estimated net borrower
defense claims for each cohort, loan
type, and sector.
The limited history of borrower
defense claims and other factors that
lead the Department to the range of
scenarios described in the NPRM are
still in effect. These factors include the
level of school misconduct that could
give rise to claims and institutions’
reaction to the regulation to cut back on
such activities, borrowers’ response to
the regulations including the
consolidation of FFEL and Perkins
borrowers to access the Direct Loan
borrower defense process, the level of
group versus individual claims, and the
extent of full or partial relief applied to
claims. Additionally, other regulatory
and enforcement initiatives such as the
Gainful Employment regulations,
creation of the Student Aid Enforcement
Unit, and greater rigor in the
Department’s review of accrediting
agencies may have overlapping effects
and may affect loan volumes and
potential exposure to borrower defense
claims at some institutions. To
demonstrate the effect of the uncertainty
about these factors, we estimated several
scenarios to test the sensitivity of the
various assumptions.
In refining our approach and
estimating a primary scenario with
several sensitivity runs, we also
changed the assumptions from the
NPRM in response to comments and our
own review. The development of the
estimated baseline scenario described in
Table 3–B is one of the changes.
Another major change is the
incorporation of a deterrent effect of the
borrower defense provisions on
institutional behavior. In the NPRM,
there was no change across cohorts in
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the level of school misconduct giving
rise to claims. Upon review, we believe
it is more likely that the borrower
defense provision will have an impact
like that of other title IV policies such
as the cohort default rate or 90/10 in
that institutions will make efforts to
comply as the rule comes into effect and
the precedents for what constitutes
behavior resulting in successful claims
are developed. In the past, when
provisions targeting specific
institutional activities or performance
have been introduced, there has
generally been a period of several years
while the worst performers are removed
from the system and while other
institutions adapt to the new
requirements and a lower steady state is
established. We expect a similar pattern
to develop with respect to borrower
defense, as reflected in the Conduct
Percent in Table 3–A. Another change
reflected by the Conduct Percent is an
increase in maximum level of claims
from public and private non-profit
institutions to 3 percent. Many
commenters expressed concern about
the effect of the regulations on these
sectors or questions about the type of
misconduct leading to claims that exist
in those sectors. A number of
commenters pointed to graduate
programs, especially law programs, as a
potential source of claims. Graduate
students took out approximately 36
percent of all Direct Loans in 2015–
16.105 Given the history of court
decisions related to law school debt, the
presumed greater sophistication of
graduate borrowers, and the possibility
of partial relief due to the value of the
education received, we still do not
expect many successful claims to come
from these sectors but did increase the
level to account for the possibility. The
other major change is the introduction
of a ramp-up in the Borrower Percent
and the Recovery Percent to reflect an
increase in borrower awareness and the
effectiveness of the financial
responsibility protections over time.
There are a number of other potential
mitigating factors that we did not
explicitly adjust in our estimates in
order to avoid underestimating the
potential cost of the borrower defense
provisions. Several commenters
expressed concern about the effect of
the regulations on access to higher
education, especially for low-income,
minority, or first-generation students. It
is possible that the mix of financial aid
received by students could shift if they
105 Federal Student Aid, Student Aid Data: Title
IV Program Volume by School, available at https://
studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/
title-iv.
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attend different institutions than they
would if the rule were not in place, but
we believe that students whose choice
of schools may have been affected by an
institution’s wrongdoing will find an
alternative and receive similar amounts
of title IV, HEA aid. Some students who
may not have pursued higher education
without the institution’s act or omission
may not enter the system, reducing the
amount of Pell Grants or loans taken
out, but we do not expect this to be a
substantial portion of affected student
borrowers. In the case of Pell Grants in
particular, we do not want to estimate
savings from potential reductions in aid
related to borrower defense until such
an effect is demonstrated in relevant
data. Similarly, default discharges may
decrease as borrowers seek discharge
under the borrower defense provisions
of these final regulations. If borrowers
with valid borrower defense claims
differ in their payment profile from the
overall portfolio, the effect on the level
of defaults, especially in some risk
groups, could be substantial.
Table 3–A presents the assumptions
for the primary budget estimate with the
budget estimate for each scenario
presented in Table 4. As in the NPRM,
we also estimated the impact if the
Department received no recoveries from
institutions, the results of which are
discussed after Table 4. As in the
NPRM, we do not specify how many
institutions are represented in the
estimate, as the scenario could represent
a substantial number of institutions
engaging in acts giving rise to borrower
defense claims or could represent a
small number of institutions with
significant loan volume subject to a
large number of claims. According to
Federal Student Aid data center loan
volume reports, the five largest
proprietary institutions in loan volume
received 26 percent of Direct Loans
disbursed in the proprietary sector in
award year 2014–15 and the 50 largest
represent 69 percent.106
As was done in the NPRM, the
PB2017 loan volumes by sector were
multiplied by the Conduct Percent that
represents the share of loan volume
estimated to be affected by institutional
behavior that results in a borrower
defense claim and the Borrower Percent
that captures the percent of loan volume
associated with potentially eligible
borrowers who successfully pursue a
claim to generate gross claims. The
106 Federal Student Aid, Student Aid Data: Title
IV Program Volume by School Direct Loan Program
AY2015–16, Q4, available at https://
studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/
title-iv accessed August 22, 2016. https://
studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/
title-iv accessed August 22, 2016.
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Recovery Percent was then applied to
the gross claims to calculate the net
claims that were processed in the
Student Loan Model as increased
discharges. The numbers in Tables 3–A
and 3–B are the percentages applied for
76057
the primary estimate and baseline
scenarios for each assumption.
TABLE 3–A—ASSUMPTIONS FOR PRIMARY BUDGET ESTIMATE
Cohort
2Yr pub
2Yr priv
2Yr prop
4Yr pub
4Yr priv
4Yr prop
Conduct Percent
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
3.0
2.4
2.0
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
3.0
2.4
2.0
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
20
16
13.6
11.6
9.8
8.8
8.4
8
7.8
7.7
3.0
2.4
2.0
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
3.0
2.4
2.0
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
20
16
13.6
11.6
9.8
8.8
8.4
8
7.8
7.7
45
47.3
49.6
54.6
60
63
65
65
65
65
35
36.8
38.6
42.4
46.7
50
50
50
50
50
35
36.8
38.6
42.4
46.7
50
50
50
50
50
45
47.3
49.6
54.6
60
63
65
65
65
65
23.8
23.8
26.18
28.80
31.68
33.26
34.93
36.67
37.4
37.4
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
23.8
23.8
26.18
28.80
31.68
33.26
34.93
36.67
37.4
37.4
23.8
23.8
26.18
28.80
31.68
33.26
34.93
36.67
37.4
37.4
Borrower Percent
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
35
36.8
38.6
42.4
46.7
50
50
50
50
50
35
36.8
38.6
42.4
46.7
50
50
50
50
50
Recovery Percent
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2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
.........................................................
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
23.8
23.8
26.18
28.80
31.68
33.26
34.93
36.67
37.4
37.4
We also estimated a baseline scenario
for the potential impact of borrower
defense in recognition that many claims
could be pursued under the existing
State standards. The publicity and
increased awareness of borrower
defense could lead to increased activity
under the existing regulations. In
addition to the Corinthian claims, as of
October 2016, the Department had
received nearly 4,400 claims from
borrowers of at least 20 institutions. The
Federal standard in the final regulations
will provide a unified standard across
all States but is based on elements of
relevant consumer protection law from
the various States. We estimate that the
final regulations could increase claims
beyond those that could be pursued
without it by an average of
approximately 10 percent for the
FY2017 cohort. This is based on our
initial review of claims presented that
does not reveal significant differences
between the State and Federal
standards, limiting the expected
increase in claims from the adoption of
the Federal standard. The baseline
school conduct percentage does
improve over time, but at a slower rate
than occurs under the regulation. The
borrower claim percentage for the
baseline is based on the history of
limited claims, informational
sessions 107 during which during which
5 to 10 percent was presented as a
reasonable rate when borrowers have to
submit applications or otherwise initiate
107 Conference calls with the Department, nonFederal negotiators, and Professor Adam
Zimmerman were held on March 9, 2016 and March
10, 2016 from 12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.
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the process, and the level of effort used
by the Department and advocates to get
the Corinthian claims into the system.
The recovery percentage reflects the fact
that public institutions are not subject to
the changes in the financial
responsibility provisions because of
their presumed backing by their
respective States. Therefore, the
baseline and primary recovery scenarios
are the same for public institutions and
set at a high level to reflect the
Department’s confidence in recovering
the expected low level of claims against
public institutions. Table 3–B presents
the assumptions used to generate the
share of the total net budget impact that
we believe could have occurred even in
the absence of these final regulations.
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TABLE 3–B—ASSUMPTIONS FOR ESTIMATED BASELINE SCENARIO
Cohort
All sectors
2Yr pub
2Yr priv
2Yr prop
4Yr pub
4Yr priv
4Yr prop
Conduct Percent
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.7
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.7
18.0
17.1
16.2
15.4
14.7
13.9
13.2
12.6
11.9
11.3
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.7
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.7
18.0
17.1
16.2
15.4
14.7
13.9
13.2
12.6
11.9
11.3
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Borrower Percent
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
8
8.4
8.8
9.3
9.7
10.2
10.7
11.3
11.8
12.4
Recovery Pct
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
As noted in the NPRM, and
throughout this RIA, the Department
recognizes the uncertainty associated
with the factors contributing to the
primary budget assumptions presented
in Table 3–A. The baseline scenario
defined by the assumptions in Table 3–
B indicates the net costs of claims the
Department assumes could occur in
absence of these final regulations. The
$4.9 billion estimated cost for the
baseline scenario is provided for
illustrative purposes and, as discussed
above, is included in the $14.9 billion
total estimated cost for the borrower
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
defense provisions. To demonstrate the
effect of a change in any of the
assumptions, the Department designed
the following scenarios to isolate each
assumption and adjust it by 15 percent
in the direction that would increase
costs, increasing the Conduct or
Borrower percentages and decreasing
recoveries. As the gross claims are
generated by multiplying the PB2017
estimated volumes by the Conduct
Percent and the Borrower Percent, the
Con15 scenario demonstrates the effect
of the change in either assumption. The
recovery percentage is applied to the
gross claims to generate the net claims,
so the REC15 scenario reduces
recoveries by 15 percent to demonstrate
the impact of that assumption. The final
two runs adjust all the assumptions
simultaneously to present a maximum
and minimum expected budget impact.
These sensitivity runs are identified as
Con15, Rec15, All15, and Min15
respectively. The results of the various
scenarios range from $14.9 billion to
$21.2 billion and are presented in Table
4.
TABLE 4—BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR BORROWER DEFENSE SENSITIVITY RUNS
Estimated costs for cohorts
2017–2026
(Budget Authority in $mns)
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Scenario
Primary Estimate ...........................................
Baseline Scenario Estimate ...........................
Con15 ............................................................
Rec15 .............................................................
All15 ...............................................................
Min15 .............................................................
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Annualized cost to Federal
Gov’t
(3% discounting)
$14,867
4,899
16,770
16,092
21,246
9,459
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$1,471
485
1,659
1,592
2,102
936
E:\FR\FM\01NOR2.SGM
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Annualized cost to Federal
Gov’t
(7% discounting)
$1,452
478
1,638
1,571
2,075
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76059
approximately $2.414 billion for the
primary budget estimate, $628 million
for the baseline scenario, $2.699 billion
for the Con15 scenario, $3.213 billion
for the All15 scenario, and $1.627
billion for the Min15 scenario. This
potential increase in costs demonstrates
the significant effect that recoveries
from institutions have on the net budget
impact of the borrower defense
provisions.
In addition to the provisions
previously discussed, the final
regulations also would make changes to
the closed school discharge process,
which are estimated to cost $1.732
billion, of which $381 million is a
modification to cohorts 2014–2016
related to the extension of the automatic
3-year discharge and $1.351 billion is
for cohorts 2017–2026. The final
regulations include requirements to
inform students of the consequences,
benefits, requirements, and procedures
of the closed school discharge option,
including providing students with an
application form, and establish a
Secretary-led discharge process for
borrowers who qualify but do not apply
and, according to the Department’s
information, did not subsequently reenroll in any title IV-eligible institution
within three years from the date the
school closed. The increased
information about and automatic
application of the closed school
discharge option and possible increase
in school closures related to the
institutional accountability provisions
in the proposed regulations are likely to
increase closed school claims. Chart 1
provides the history of closed schools,
which totals 12,666 schools or campus
locations through September 2016.
In order to estimate the effect of the
changes to the discharge process that
would grant relief without an
application after a three-year period, the
Department looked at all Direct Loan
borrowers at schools that closed from
2008–2011 to see what percentage of
them had not received a closed school
discharge and had no NSLDS record of
title-IV aided enrollment in the three
years following their school’s closure.
Of 2,287 borrowers in the file, 47
percent had no record of a discharge or
subsequent title IV, HEA aid. This does
not necessarily mean they did not reenroll at a title IV institution, so this
assumption may overstate the potential
effect of the three-year discharge
provision. The Department used this
information and the high end of closed
school claims in recent years to estimate
the effect of the final regulations related
to closed school discharges. The
resulting estimated cost to the Federal
government of the closed school
provisions is $1.732 billion, of which
$381 million is a modification related to
extending the 3-year automatic
discharge to cohorts 2014 through 2016
and $1.351 billion relates to the 2017 to
2026 loan cohorts.
The final regulations will also change
the false certification discharge process
to include instances in which schools
certified the eligibility of a borrower
who is not a high school graduate (and
does not meet applicable alternative to
high school graduate requirements)
where the borrower would qualify for a
false certification discharge if the school
falsified the borrower’s high school
graduation status; falsified the
borrower’s high school diploma; or
referred the borrower to a third party to
obtain a falsified high school diploma.
Under existing regulations, false
certification discharges represent a very
low share of discharges granted to
borrowers. The final regulations will
replace the explicit reference to ability
to benefit requirements in the false
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asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
The transfers among the Federal
government and affected borrowers and
institutions associated with each
scenario above are included in Table 5,
with the difference in amounts
transferred to borrowers and received
from institutions generating the budget
impact in Table 4. The amounts in Table
4 assume the Federal Government will
recover some portion of claims from
institutions. In the absence of any
recovery from institutions, taxpayers
would bear the full cost of successful
claims from affected borrowers. At a 3
percent discount rate, the annualized
costs with no recovery are
approximately $2.465 billion for the
primary budget estimate, $637 million
for the baseline scenario, $2.758 billion
for the Con15 scenario, $3.279 billion
for the All15 scenario, and $1.666
billion for the Min15 scenario. At a 7
percent discount rate, the annualized
costs with no recovery are
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 211 / Tuesday, November 1, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
certification discharge regulations with
a more general reference to
requirements for admission without a
high school diploma as applicable when
the individual was admitted, and
specify how an institution’s certification
of the eligibility of a borrower who is
not a high school graduate (and does not
meet applicable alternative to high
school graduate requirements) could
give rise to a false certification discharge
claim. However, we do not expect an
increase in false certification discharge
claims to result in a significant budget
impact from this change. We believe
that schools that comply with the
current ability to benefit assessment
requirement and that honor the current
high school graduation requirements
will continue to comply in the manner
they now do, and we have no basis to
believe that changing the terminology or
adding false certification of SAP as an
example of a reason the Secretary may
grant a false certification discharge
without an application will lead to an
increase in claims that will result in a
significant net budget impact.
Other Provisions
As indicated in the NPRM, there are
a number of additional provisions in
these final regulations that are not
expected to have a significant net
budget impact. These provisions
include a number of technical changes
related to the PAYE and REPAYE
repayment plans and the consolidation
of Nurse Faculty Loans, updates to the
regulations describing the Department’s
authority to compromise debt, and
updates to the acceptable forms of
verification of death for discharge of
title IV loans or TEACH Grant
obligations. The technical changes to
the REPAYE and PAYE plans were
already reflected in the Department’s
budget estimates for those regulations,
so no additional budget effects are
included here. Some borrowers may be
eligible for additional subsidized loans
and no longer be responsible for accrued
interest on their subsidized loans as a
result of their subsidized usage period
being eliminated or recalculated
because of a closed school, false
certification, unpaid refund, or defense
to repayment discharge. However, we
believe the institutions primarily
affected by the 150 percent subsidized
usage regulation are not those expected
to generate many of the applicable
discharges, so this reflection of current
practice is not expected to have a
significant budget impact. Allowing
death discharges based on death
certificates submitted or verified
through additional means is convenient
for borrowers, but is not estimated to
substantially change the amount of
death discharges. These updates to the
debt compromise limits reflect statutory
changes and the Secretary’s existing
authority to compromise debt, so we do
not estimate a significant change in
current practices. Revising the
regulations to expressly permit the
consolidation of Nurse Faculty Loans is
not expected to have a significant
budget impact, as this technical change
reflects current practices. According to
Department of Health and Human
Services budget documents,
approximately $26.5 million 108 in
grants are available annually for schools
to make Nurse Faculty Loans, and
borrowers would lose access to generous
forgiveness terms if they choose to
consolidate those loans. Therefore, we
would expect the volume of
consolidation to be very small, and do
not anticipate any significant budget
impact from this provision.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Data
Sources
In developing these estimates, we
used a wide range of data sources,
including data from the NSLDS;
operational and financial data from
Department systems; and data from a
range of surveys conducted by the
National Center for Education Statistics
such as the 2012 National
Postsecondary Student Aid Survey. We
also used data from other sources, such
as the U.S. Census Bureau.
5. Accounting Statement
As required by OMB Circular A–4
(available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/
a004/a-4.pdf), in the following table we
have prepared an accounting statement
showing the classification of the
expenditures associated with the
provisions of these final regulations.
This table provides our best estimate of
the changes in annual monetized costs,
benefits, and transfers as a result of the
final regulations based on the
assumptions described in the Net
Budget Impacts and Paperwork
Reduction Act sections of this preamble.
TABLE 5—ACCOUNTING STATEMENT
Category
Benefits
Updated and clarified borrower defense process and Federal standard to
increase protection for student borrowers and taxpayers.
Improved awareness and usage of closed school and false certification
discharges.
Improved consumer information about institutions’ performance and practices.
not quantified
not quantified
not quantified
Category
Costs
3%
Costs of obtaining LOCs or equivalents .....................................................
7%
not quantified
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Costs of compliance with paperwork requirements ....................................
9.87
9.84
3%
7%
Primary ...........................................
2,465
2,414
Baseline .........................................
637
628
Category
Transfers
Borrower Defense claims from the Federal government to affected borrowers (partially borne by affected institutions, via reimbursements.
108 Department of Health and Human Services, FY
2017 Health Resources and Services Administration
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Committees. Available at www.hrsa.gov/about/
budget/budgetjustification2017.pdf.
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76061
TABLE 5—ACCOUNTING STATEMENT—Continued
2,758
2484
3,279
1,666
2,699
2,434
3,213
1,627
Baseline .........................................
CON15 ...........................................
REC15 ...........................................
ALL15 .............................................
MIN15 ............................................
Reimbursements of borrower defense claims from affected institutions to
affected student borrowers, via the Federal government.
Con15 ............................................
REC15 ...........................................
ALL15 .............................................
MIN15 ............................................
Primary.
152
1,099
891
1,176
730
178
150
1,061
862
1,138
704
185
Closed school discharges from the Federal government to affected students.
6. Regulatory Alternatives Considered
In response to comments received and
the Department’s further internal
consideration of these final regulations,
the Department reviewed and
considered various changes to the
proposed regulations detailed in the
NPRM. The changes made in response
to comments are described in the
Analysis of Comments and Changes
section of this preamble. We summarize
below the major proposals that we
considered but which we ultimately
declined to implement in these
regulations.
In particular, the Department
extensively reviewed the financial
responsibility provisions and related
disclosures, the repayment rate warning,
and the arbitration provisions of these
final regulations. In developing these
final regulations, the Department
considered the budgetary impact,
administrative burden, and effectiveness
of the options it considered.
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Description of the Reasons That Action
by the Agency Is Being Considered
The Secretary is amending the
regulations governing the Direct Loan
Program to establish a new Federal
standard, limitation periods, and a
process for determining whether a
borrower has a borrower defense based
on an act or omission of a school. We
are also amending the Student
Assistance General Provisions
regulations to revise the financial
responsibility standards and add
disclosure requirements for schools.
Finally, we are amending the discharge
provisions in the Perkins Loan, Direct
Loan, FFEL Program, and TEACH Grant
programs. These changes will provide
transparency, clarity, and ease of
administration to current and new
regulations and protect students, the
Federal government, and taxpayers
against potential school liabilities
resulting from borrower defenses.
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The U.S. Small Business
Administration Size Standards define
‘‘for-profit institutions’’ as ‘‘small
businesses’’ if they are independently
owned and operated and not dominant
in their field of operation with total
annual revenue below $7,000,000. The
standards define ‘‘non-profit
institutions’’ as ‘‘small organizations’’ if
they are independently owned and
operated and not dominant in their field
of operation, or as ‘‘small entities’’ if
they are institutions controlled by
governmental entities with populations
below 50,000. Under these definitions,
an estimated 4,365 institutions of higher
education subject to the paperwork
compliance provisions of the proposed
regulations are small entities.
Accordingly, we have prepared this
final regulatory flexibility analysis to
present an estimate of the effect of these
regulations on small entities.
Succinct Statement of the Objectives of,
and Legal Basis for, the Final
Regulations
Section 455(h) of the HEA authorizes
the Secretary to specify in regulation
which acts or omissions of an
institution of higher education a
borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment of a Direct Loan. Current
regulations in § 685.206(c) governing
defenses to repayment have been in
place since 1995, but have rarely been
used. Those regulations specify that a
borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment any ‘‘act or omission of the
school attended by the student that
would give rise to a cause of action
against the school under applicable
State law.’’ In response to the collapse
of Corinthian, the Secretary announced
in June of 2015 that the Department
would develop new regulations to
clarify and streamline the borrower
defense process, in a manner that would
protect borrowers and allow the
Department to hold schools accountable
for actions that result in loan discharges.
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Description of and, Where Feasible, an
Estimate of the Number of Small
Entities To Which the Regulations Will
Apply
These final regulations will affect
institutions of higher education that
participate in the Federal Direct Loan
Program and borrowers. Approximately
60 percent of institutions of higher
education qualify as small entities, even
though the range of revenues at the nonprofit institutions varies greatly. Using
data from the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System, the Department
estimates that approximately 4,365
institutions of higher education qualify
as small entities—1,891 are not-forprofit institutions, 2,196 are for-profit
institutions with programs of two years
or less, and 278 are for-profit
institutions with four-year programs.
Description of the Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements of the Regulations,
Including an Estimate of the Classes of
Small Entities That Will Be Subject to
the Requirement and the Type of
Professional Skills Necessary for
Preparation of the Report or Record
Table 6 relates the estimated burden
of each information collection
requirement to the hours and costs
estimated in the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 section of the preamble.
This additional workload is discussed
in more detail under the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 section of the
preamble. Additional workload is
expected to result in estimated costs
associated with either the hiring of
additional employees or opportunity
costs related to the reassignment of
existing staff from other activities. In
total, these changes are estimated to
increase burden on small entities
participating in the title IV, HEA
programs by 109,351 hours. The
monetized cost of this additional burden
on institutions, using wage data
developed using BLS data available at
www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is
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$3,996,777. This cost was based on an
hourly rate of $36.55.
TABLE 6—PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT FOR SMALL ENTITIES
Reg section
Program Participation Agreement—requires school to provide enrolled students a closed school discharge application and written
disclosure of the benefits of consequences of the discharge as an
alternative to completing their educational program through a
teach-out.
Advertising warning of repayment rate outcomes; and disclosure to
prospective and enrolled students of actions and triggering events
for financial protection.
Financial Responsibility—reporting of certain actions or triggering
events in 668.171(c)–(g) no later than the time specified in
668.171(h).
Alternative Standards and Requirements—requires an institution to
provide the Secretary financial protection, such as an irrevocable
letter of credit, upon the occurrence of an action or triggering
event described in § 668.171(c)–(g) if that event warrants protection as determined under § 668.175(f)(4).
Borrower defense process—provides a framework for the borrower
defense process. Institutions could engage in fact-finding, provide
evidence related to claims and appeal decisions.
Agreements between an eligible school and the Secretary for participation in the Direct Loan Program—prohibits predispute arbitration
agreements for borrower defense claims, specifies required
agreement and notification language, and requires schools to provide copies of arbitral and judicial filings to the Secretary.
Identification, to the Extent Practicable,
of All Relevant Federal Regulations
That May Duplicate, Overlap, or
Conflict With the Regulations
The final regulations are unlikely to
conflict with or duplicate existing
Federal regulations.
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Alternatives Considered
As described above, the Department
participated in negotiated rulemaking
and reviewed a large number of
comments when developing the
regulations, and considered a number of
options for some of the provisions. We
considered multiple issues, including
the group discharge process for
borrower defense claims, the limitation
periods, the appropriate procedure for
considering borrower defense claims
including the role of State AGs, the
Department, borrowers, and institutions,
and the continued use of State standards
for borrower defense claims. While no
alternatives were aimed specifically at
small entities, limiting repayment rate
warnings to affected proprietary
institutions will reduce the burden on
the private not-for-profit institutions
that are a significant portion of small
entities that would be affected by the
final regulations. The additional options
to provide financial protection may also
benefit small entities, even though the
changes were not specifically directed at
them.
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OMB control No.
OMB 1845–0022 .......
985
$36,004
668.41
OMB 1845–0004 .......
2,138
78,159
668.171
OMB 1845–0022 .......
1,617
59,094
668.175
OMB 1845–0022 .......
32,336
1,181,881
685.222
OMB 1845–0142 .......
530
19,372
685.300
OMB 1845–0143 .......
71,745
2,622,268
As part of its continuing effort to
reduce paperwork and respondent
burden, the Department provides the
general public and Federal agencies
with an opportunity to comment on
proposed and continuing collections of
information in accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA)
(44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)). This helps
ensure that: The public understands the
Department’s collection instructions,
respondents can provide the requested
data in the desired format, reporting
burden (time and financial resources) is
minimized, collection instruments are
clearly understood, and the Department
can properly assess the impact of
collection requirements on respondents.
Sections 668.14, 668.41, 668.171,
668.175, 682.211, 682.402, 685.222, and
685.300 contain information collection
requirements. Under the PRA, the
Department has submitted a copy of
these sections and an Information
Collections Request to OMB for its
review.
A Federal agency may not conduct or
sponsor a collection of information
unless OMB approves the collection
under the PRA and the corresponding
information collection instrument
displays a currently valid OMB control
number. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no person is required
to comply with, or is subject to penalty
for failure to comply with, a collection
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Cost
668.14
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
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Hours
Sfmt 4700
of information if the collection
instrument does not display a currently
valid OMB control number.
In these final regulations, we have
displayed the control numbers assigned
by OMB to any information collection
requirements in this NPRM and adopted
in the final regulations.
Discussion
Section 668.14—Program Participation
Agreement
Requirements: Section 668.14(b)(32)
of the final regulations will require, as
part of the program participation
agreement, a school to provide all
enrolled students with a closed school
discharge application and a written
disclosure, describing the benefits and
the consequences of a closed school
discharge as an alternative to
completing their educational program
through a teach-out plan after the
Department initiates any action to
terminate the participation of the school
in any title IV, HEA program or after the
occurrence of any of the events
specified in § 668.14(b)(31) that would
require the institution to submit a teachout plan.
Burden Calculation: From the Award
Years 2011–12 to 2014–15 there were
182 institutions that closed (30 private,
150 proprietary, and two public). The
number of students who were enrolled
at the institutions at the time of the
closure was 43,299 (5,322 at the private
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institutions, 37,959 at the proprietary
institutions, and 18 at the public
institutions). With these figures as a
base, we estimate that there could be 46
schools closing in a given award year
(182 institutions divided by 4 = 45.5)
with an average 238 students per
institution (43,299 divided by 182 =
237.9).
We estimate that an institution will
require two hours to prepare the
required written disclosure to be sent
with a copy of the closed school
discharge application and the necessary
mailing list for currently enrolled
students. We anticipate that most
schools will provide this information
electronically to their students, thus
decreasing burden and cost.
On average, we estimate that it will
take the estimated eight private
institutions 16 hours to prepare the
written disclosure information required
(8 institutions × 2 hours).
On average, we estimate that it will
take the estimated eight private
institutions that will close a total of 324
hours (1,904 students × .17 (10
minutes)) to process the required
written disclosure with a copy of the
closed school discharge application
based on the mailing list for the
estimated 1,904 enrolled students.
The burden for this process for private
institutions is 340 hours.
On average, we estimate that it will
take the estimated 38 proprietary
institutions 76 hours to prepare the
written disclosure information required
(38 institutions × 2 hours).
On average, we estimate that it will
take the estimated 38 proprietary
institutions that will close a total of
1,537 hours (9,044 students × .17 (10
minutes)) to process the required
written disclosure with a copy of the
closed school discharge application
based on the mailing list for the
estimated 9,044 enrolled students.
The burden for this process for
proprietary institutions is 1,613 hours.
For § 668.14, the total increase in
burden is 1,953 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0022.
Section 668.41—Reporting and
Disclosure of Information
Requirements: Section 668.41(h) of
the final regulations Loan repayment
warning for proprietary institutions will
expand the disclosure requirements
under § 668.41 to provide that, for any
award year in which a proprietary
institution’s loan repayment rate as
reported to it by the Secretary shows
that the median borrower has not paid
down the balance of the borrower’s
loans by at least $1, the institution must
provide a loan repayment warning in
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advertising and promotional materials.
An institution with fewer than 10
borrowers, or that demonstrates to the
Secretary’s satisfaction that it has
borrowers in non-Gainful Employment
programs who would increase the
institution’s repayment rate to meet the
negative amortization threshold if
included in the calculation, would not
be required to provide the warning.
The process through which a
proprietary institution will be informed
of its repayment rate, and provided the
opportunity to appeal that rate, is
included in § 668.41(h)(2) of the final
regulations. The Department notifies the
institution of its repayment rate. Upon
receipt of the rate the institution has 15
days to submit an appeal based on the
two conditions in § 668.41(h)(2)(ii) to
the Secretary.
Additionally, § 668.41(h)(3) of the
final regulations stipulates the treatment
of required disclosures in advertising
and promotional materials. Under the
provision, all advertising and
promotional materials made available
by or on behalf of an institution that
identify the institution by name must
include a warning about loan repayment
outcomes as prescribed by the Secretary.
The Secretary may conduct consumer
testing to ensure meaningful and helpful
language is provided to the students. All
promotional materials, including
printed materials, about an institution
must be accurate and current at the time
they are published, approved by a State
agency, or broadcast. The warning must
be prominent, clear and conspicuous,
easily heard or read. The Secretary may
require modifications to such materials
if the warning does not meet the
regulatory conditions.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on schools to review the
repayment rate identified in
§ 668.41(h)(1) and to submit an appeal
to the accuracy of the information, as
provided in § 668.41(h)(2). Additionally,
there will be burden for those
institutions that are required to include
the necessary loan repayment warning
in their promotional materials.
Based on an analysis of Departmental
data, 972 of the 1,345 proprietary
institutions with reported repayment
rate data would not meet the negative
amortization threshold for the
repayment rate calculation.
We estimate that it will take the 972
institutions 30 minutes (.50 hours) or
486 hours to review the institutional
repayment rate and determine if it meets
one of the conditions to submit an
appeal to the Secretary (972 institutions
× .50 hours = 486 hours).
Of the 972 institutions that would not
meet the negative amortization loan
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76063
repayment threshold, we anticipate that
one percent or 10 institutions could
meet the appeal criteria identified in
668.41(h)(2)(ii)(A).
We estimate that it will take the 10
institutions another 2 hours to produce
the required evidence to submit with
the appeal (10 institutions × 2 hours =
20 hours). We estimate it will take the
approximate 10 institutions an
additional 30 minutes (.50 hours) to
submit the appeal to the Secretary (10
institutions × .50 hours = 5 hours) for a
total of 25 hours.
We estimate that 5 institutions will be
successful in their appeal, leaving 967
institutions that are required to include
the necessary loan repayment warning
in their promotional materials.
We estimate it will take each of the
approximate 967 proprietary
institutions a total of 5 hours to update
their promotional materials (967
institutions × 5 hours = 4,835 hours).
For § 668.41(h), the total increase in
burden is 5,346 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0004.
Requirements: Revised § 668.41(i)
Financial protection disclosures
clarified the disclosure requirements
regarding triggering events to both
enrolled and prospective students, as
well as on the institution’s Web site.
The Secretary will conduct consumer
testing to determine which actions and
triggering events will require
disclosures; and will publish the
prescribed content of the disclosures in
a Federal Register notice after
conducting consumer testing to ensure
that it is meaningful and helpful to
students. Institutions must provide the
required disclosures to enrolled and
prospective students and post the
disclosure to their Web sites within 30
days of notifying the Secretary of the
relevant triggering event. Institutions
may hand-deliver the disclosure
notification, or may send the disclosure
notification to the primary email
address or other electronic
communication method used by the
institution for communicating with the
enrolled or prospective student. In all
cases, the institution must ensure that
the disclosure notification is the only
substantial content in the message.
Prospective students must receive the
disclosure before enrolling, registering,
or entering into a financial obligation
with the institution.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on schools to deliver the
disclosures required by the Secretary to
enrolled and prospective students and
post it on the institution’s Web site
under this final regulation. However, as
§ 668.41(i) commits to consumer testing
of both the specific actions and events
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that will require a disclosure, and of the
required disclosure itself, to be
published by the Secretary in a Federal
Register notice, burden will not be
included here. Instead, the consumer
testing procedures will follow
information clearance review
requirements. Prior to the
implementation of the regulatory
requirements under § 668.41(i) there
will be an information clearance review
package submitted to allow the public to
comment.
The total increase in burden is 5,346
hours for OMB Control Number 1845–
0004.
Section 668.171—Financial
Responsibility—General
Requirements: We added a new
paragraph 668.171(h) under which, in
accordance with procedures to be
established by the Secretary, an
institution will notify the Secretary of
any action or triggering event described
in § 668.171(c) through (g) in the
specified number of days after that
action or event occurs.
In that notice, the institution may
show that certain actions or events are
not material or that those actions are
resolved. Specifically the institution
may demonstrate that:
• The amount claimed in a lawsuit by
a State or Federal authority for financial
relief on a claim related to the making
of a Direct Loan for enrollment at the
school or the provision of educational
services exceeds the potential recovery.
• The withdrawal of owner’s equity
was used solely to meet tax liabilities of
the institution or its owners.
• The creditor waived a violation of
a loan agreement. If the creditor imposes
additional constraints or requirements
as a condition of waiving the violation
and continuing with the loan, the
institution must identify and describe
those constraints or requirements but
would be permitted to show why these
actions would not have an adverse
financial impact on the institution.
• The reportable action or event no
longer exists, has been resolved, or there
is insurance to cover the liabilities that
arise from the action or event.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on schools to provide the notice
to the Secretary when one of the actions
or triggering events identified in
§ 668.171(c)–(g) occurs. We estimate
that an institution will take two hours
per action or triggering event to prepare
the appropriate notice and provide it to
the Secretary. We estimate that 169
private institutions may have two events
annually to report for a total burden of
676 hours (169 institutions × 2 events ×
2 hours). We estimate that 392
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proprietary institutions may have three
events annually to report for total
burden of 2,352 hours (392 institutions
× 3 events × 2 hours). For § 668.171, the
total increase in burden is 3,028 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845–0022.
Section 668.175—Alternative Standards
and Requirements
Requirements: Under the provisional
certification alternative in § 668.175(f),
we added a new paragraph (f)(4) that
requires an institution to provide the
Secretary financial protection, such as
an irrevocable letter of credit, upon the
occurrence of an action or triggering
event described in § 668.171(c)–(g) if
that event warrants protection as
determined under § 668.175(f)(4).
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on schools to provide the
required financial protection, such as a
letter of credit, to the Secretary to utilize
the provisional certifications
alternatives. We estimate that an
institution will take 40 hours per action
or triggering event to obtain the required
financial protections and provide it to
the Secretary. We estimate that 169
private not-for-profit institutions may
have two events annually to report for
a total burden of 13,520 hours (169
institutions × 2 events × 40 hours). We
estimate that 392 proprietary
institutions may have three events
annually to report for total burden of
47,040 hours (392 institutions × 3 events
× 40 hours).
For § 668.175, the total increase in
burden is 60,560 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0022.
The combined total increase in
burden for §§ 668.14, 668.171, and
668.175 is 65,541 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0022.
Section 682.211—Mandatory
Administrative Forbearance for FFEL
Program Borrowers
Requirements: The final regulations
add a new paragraph § 682.211(i)(7) that
requires a lender to grant a mandatory
administrative forbearance to a borrower
upon being notified by the Secretary
that the borrower has submitted an
application for a borrower defense
discharge related to a FFEL Loan that
the borrower intends to pay off through
a Direct Loan Program Consolidation
Loan for the purpose of obtaining relief
under § 685.212(k) of the final
regulations. The administrative
forbearance will be granted in yearly
increments or for a period designated by
the Secretary until the Secretary notifies
the lender that the loan has been
consolidated or that the forbearance
should be discontinued. If the Secretary
notifies the borrower that the borrower
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will qualify for a borrower defense
discharge if the borrower were to
consolidate, the borrower will then be
able to consolidate the loan(s) to which
the defense applies and, if the borrower
were to do so, the Secretary will
recognize the defense and discharge that
portion of the Consolidation Loan that
paid off the FFEL loan in question.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden for the current 1,446 FFEL
lenders to track the required mandatory
administrative forbearance when they
are notified by the Secretary of the
borrower’s intention to enter their FFEL
loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan
to obtain relief under a borrower
defenses claim. We estimate that it will
take each lender approximately four
hours to develop and program the
needed tracking into their current
systems. There will be an estimated
burden of 5,480 hours on the 1,370 forprofit lenders (1,370 × 4 = 5,480 hours).
There will be an estimated burden of
304 hours on the 76 not-for-profit
lenders (76 × 4 = 304 hours).
For § 682.211, the total increase in
burden is 5,784 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0020.
Section 682.402—Closed School
Discharges
Requirements: Section
682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F) of the final
regulations provides a second level of
Departmental review for denied closed
school discharge claims in the FFEL
program. The final regulations require a
guaranty agency that denies a closed
school discharge request to inform the
borrower in writing of the reasons for
the denial, the opportunity for a review
of the guaranty agency’s decision by the
Secretary, and how the borrower may
request such a review.
Section 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(I) of the final
regulations requires the lender or
guaranty agency, upon resuming
collection, to provide a FFEL borrower
with another closed school discharge
application, and an explanation of the
requirements and procedures for
obtaining the discharge.
Section 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K) of the
final regulations describes the
responsibilities of the guaranty agency if
the borrower requests such a review.
Section 682.402(d)(8)(ii) of the final
regulations authorizes the Department,
or a guaranty agency with the
Department’s permission, to grant a
closed school discharge to a FFEL
borrower without a borrower
application based on information in the
Department’s or guaranty agency’s
possession that the borrower did not
subsequently re-enroll in any title IV-
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eligible institution within a period of
three years after the school closed.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on guaranty agencies to provide
information to borrowers denied closed
school discharge regarding the
opportunity for further review of the
discharge request by the Secretary. We
estimate that it will take the 27 guaranty
agencies 4 hours to update their
notifications and establish a process for
forwarding any requests for escalated
reviews to the Secretary. There will be
an estimated burden of 68 hours on the
17 public guaranty agencies (17 × 4
hours = 68 hours). There will be an
estimated burden of 40 hours on the 10
not-for-profit guaranty agencies (10 × 4
hours = 40 hours).
There is an increase in burden of 108
hours under OMB Control Number
1845–0020.
There will be burden on guaranty
agencies, upon receipt of the request for
escalated review from the borrower, to
forward to the Secretary the discharge
form and any relevant documents. For
the period between 2011 and 2015 there
were 43,268 students attending closed
schools, of which 9,606 students
received a closed school discharge. It is
estimated that 5 percent of the 43,268,
or 2,163 closed school applications were
denied. We estimate that 10 percent or
216 of those borrowers whose
application was denied will request
escalated review by the Secretary. We
estimate that the process to forward the
discharge request and any relevant
documentation to the Secretary will take
.5 hours (30 minutes) per request. There
will be an estimated burden of 58 hours
on the 17 public guaranty agencies
based on an estimated 116 requests (116
× .5 hours = 58 hours). There will be an
estimated burden of 50 hours on the 10
not-for-profit guaranty agencies (100 × .5
hours = 50 hours). There is an increase
in burden of 108 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0020.
The guaranty agencies will have
burden assessed based on these final
regulations to provide another discharge
application to a borrower upon
resuming collection activities with
explanation of process and requirements
for obtaining a discharge. We estimate
that for the 2,163 closed school
applications that were denied, it will
take the guaranty agencies .5 hours (30
minutes) to provide the borrower with
another discharge application and
instructions for filing the application
again. There will be an estimated
burden of 582 hours on the 17 public
guaranty agencies based on an estimated
1,163 borrowers (1,163 × .5 hours = 582
hours). There will be an estimated
burden of 500 hours on the 10 not-for-
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profit guaranty agencies (1,000 × .5
hours = 500 hours). There is an increase
in burden of 1,082 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0020.
There will be burden on the guaranty
agencies to determine the eligibility of
a borrower for a closed school discharge
without the borrower submitting such
an application. This determination
requires a review of those borrowers
who attended a closed school but did
not apply for a closed school discharge
to determine if the borrower re-enrolled
in any other institution within three
years of the school closure. We estimate
that 20 hours of programming will be
necessary to enable a guaranty agency to
establish a process to review its records
for borrowers who attended a closed
school and to determine if any of those
borrowers reenrolled in a title IV
eligible institution within three years.
There will be an estimated burden of
340 hours on the 17 public guaranty
agencies for this programming (17 × 20
hours = 340 hours). There will be an
estimated burden of 200 hours on the
not-for-profit guaranty agencies for this
programming (10 × 20 hours = 200
hours). There is an increase in burden
of 540 hours under OMB Control
Number 1845–0020.
For § 682.402, the total increase in
burden is 1,838 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0020.
The combined total increase in
burden for §§ 682.211 and 682.402 is
7,622 hours under OMB Control
Number 1845–0020.
Section 685.222(e)—Process for
Individual Borrowers
Requirements: Section 685.222(e)(1)
of the final regulations describes the
steps an individual borrower must take
to initiate a borrower defense claim.
First, an individual borrower will
submit an application to the Secretary,
on a form approved by the Secretary. In
the application, the borrower will
certify that he or she received the
proceeds of a loan to attend a school;
may provide evidence that supports the
borrower defense; and will indicate
whether he or she has made a claim
with respect to the information
underlying the borrower defense with
any third party, and, if so, the amount
of any payment received by the
borrower or credited to the borrower’s
loan obligation. The borrower will also
be required to provide any other
information or supporting
documentation reasonably requested by
the Secretary.
While the decision of the Department
official will be final as to the merits of
the claim and any relief that may be
warranted on the claim, if the borrower
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defense is denied in full or in part, the
borrower will be permitted to request
that the Secretary reconsider the
borrower defense upon the
identification of new evidence in
support of the borrower’s claim. ‘‘New
evidence’’ will be defined as relevant
evidence that the borrower did not
previously provide and that was not
identified by the Department official as
evidence that was relied upon for the
final decision.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden associated with the filing of the
Departmental form by the borrower
asserting a borrower defense claim.
There is a separate information
collection being processed to put the
final form through the information
collection review process to provide for
public comment on the form as well as
the estimated burden. A separate
information collection review package
will be published in the Federal
Register and available through
Regulations.gov for review and
comment.
Additionally there will be burden on
any borrower whose borrower defense
claim is denied, if they elect to request
reconsideration from the Secretary
based on new evidence in support of the
borrower’s claim. We estimate that two
percent of borrower defense claims
received will be denied and those
borrowers will then request
reconsideration by presenting new
evidence to support their claim. As of
April 27, 2016, 18,688 borrower defense
claims had been received. Of that
number, we estimate that 467 borrowers
including those that opted out of a
successful Borrower Defense group
relief would require .5 hours (30
minutes) to submit the request for
reconsideration to the Secretary for a
total of 234 burden hours (467 × .5
hours) under OMB Control Number
1845–0142.
Section 685.222(f)—Group Process for
Borrower Defenses—General
Requirements: Section 685.222(f) of
the final regulations provides a
framework for the borrower defense
group process, including descriptions of
the circumstances under which group
borrower defense claims could be
considered, and the process the
Department will follow for borrower
defenses for a group.
Once a group of borrowers with
common facts and claims has been
identified, the Secretary will designate a
Department official to present the
group’s common borrower defense in
the fact-finding process, and will
provide each identified member of the
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group with notice that allows the
borrower to opt out of the proceeding.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on any borrower who elects to
opt out of the group process after the
Secretary has identified them as a
member of a group for purposes of
borrower defense. We estimate that one
percent of borrowers who are identified
as part of a group process for borrower
defense claims would opt out of the
group claim process. As of April 27,
2016, 18,688 borrower defense claims
had been received. Of that number, we
estimate that 187 borrowers would
require .08 hours (5 minutes) to submit
the request to opt out of the group
process to the Secretary for a total of 15
burden hours (187 × .08 hours) under
OMB Control Number 1845–0142.
Section 685.222(g)—Group Process for
Borrower Defense—Closed School
Requirements: Section 685.222(g) of
the final regulations establishes a
process for review and determination of
a borrower defense for groups identified
by the Secretary for which the borrower
defense is made with respect to Direct
Loans to attend a school that has closed
and has provided no financial
protection currently available to the
Secretary from which to recover any
losses based on borrower defense
claims, and for which there is no
appropriate entity from which the
Secretary can otherwise practicably
recover such losses.
Under § 685.222(g)(1) of the final
regulations, a hearing official will
review the Department official’s basis
for identifying the group and resolve the
claim through a fact-finding process. As
part of that process, the hearing official
will consider any evidence and
argument presented by the Department
official on behalf of the group and on
behalf of individual members of the
group. The hearing official will consider
any additional information the
Department official considers necessary,
including any Department records or
response from the school or a person
affiliated with the school as described
§ 668.174(b) as reported to the
Department or as recorded in the
Department’s records if practicable.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on any school that elects to
provide records or response to the
hearing official’s fact finding. We
anticipate that each group will represent
a single institution. We estimate that
there will be four potential groups
involving closed schools. We estimate
that the fact-finding process would
require 50 hours from one private closed
school or persons affiliated with that
closed school (1 private institution × 50
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hours). We estimate that the fact-finding
process will require 150 hours from
three proprietary closed schools or
persons affiliated with that closed
school (3 proprietary institutions × 50
hours). We estimate the burden to be
200 hours (4 institutions × 50 hours)
under OMB Control Number 1845–0142.
Section 685.222(h)—Group Borrower for
Defense—Open School
Requirements: Section 685.222(h) of
the final regulations establishes the
process for groups identified by the
Secretary for which the borrower
defense is asserted with respect to
Direct Loans to attend an open school.
A hearing official will resolve the
borrower defense and determine any
liability of the school through a factfinding process. As part of the process,
the hearing official will consider any
evidence and argument presented by the
school and the Department official on
behalf of the group and, as necessary,
any evidence presented on behalf of
individual group members.
The hearing official will issue a
written decision. If the hearing official
approves the borrower defense, that
decision will describe the basis for the
determination, notify the members of
the group of the relief provided on the
basis of the borrower defense, and notify
the school of any liability to the
Secretary for the amounts discharged
and reimbursed.
If the hearing official denies the
borrower defense in full or in part, the
written decision will state the reasons
for the denial, the evidence that was
relied upon, the portion of the loans that
are due and payable to the Secretary,
and whether reimbursement of amounts
previously collected is granted, and will
inform the borrowers that their loans
will return to their statuses prior to the
group borrower defense process. It also
will notify the school of any liability to
the Secretary for any amounts
discharged. The Secretary will provide
copies of the written decision to the
members of the group, the Department
official and the school.
The hearing official’s decision will
become final as to the merits of the
group borrower defense claim and any
relief that may be granted within 30
days after the decision is issued and
received by the Department official and
the school unless, within that 30-day
period, the school or the Department
official appeals the decision to the
Secretary. A decision of the hearing
official will not take effect pending the
appeal. The Secretary will render a final
decision following consideration of any
appeal.
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After a final decision has been issued,
if relief for the group has been denied
in full or in part, a borrower may file an
individual claim for relief for amounts
not discharged in the group process. In
addition, the Secretary may reopen a
borrower defense application at any
time to consider new evidence, as
discussed above.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on any school which provides
evidence and responds to any argument
made to the hearing official’s fact
finding and if the school elects to appeal
the final decision of the hearing official
regarding the group claim. We
anticipate that each group will represent
claims from a single institution. We
estimate that there will be six potential
groups involving open schools. We
estimate that the fact-finding process
will require 150 hours from the three
open private institutions or persons
affiliated with that school (3 institutions
× 50 hours). We estimate that the factfinding process will require 150 hours
from the three open proprietary
institutions or persons affiliated with
that school (3 institutions × 50 hours).
We estimate the burden to be 300 hours
(6 institutions × 50 hours).
We further estimate that the appeal
process will require 150 hours from the
three open private institutions or
persons affiliated with that school (3
institutions × 50 hours). We estimate
that the appeal process will require 150
hours from the three open proprietary
institutions or persons affiliated with
that school (3 institutions × 50 hours).
We estimate the burden to be 300 hours
(6 institutions × 50 hours). The total
estimated burden for this section will be
600 hours assessed under OMB Control
Number 1845–0142.
Additionally, any borrower whose
borrower defense claim is denied under
the group claim may request
reconsideration based on new evidence
to support the individual claim. We
believe that the estimate for the total
universe of denied claims in
§ 685.222(e) includes these borrowers.
The combined total increase in
burden for § 685.222 is 1,049 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845–0142.
Section 685.300—Agreements Between
an Eligible School and the Secretary for
Participation in the Direct Loan Program
Requirements: Section 685.300(e) of
the final regulations requires
institutions who, after the effective date
of the final regulations, incorporate a
predispute arbitration agreement or any
other predispute agreement addressing
class actions in any agreements with
Direct Loan program borrowers to
include specific language regarding a
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borrower’s right to file or be a member
of a class action suit against the
institution when the class action
concerns acts or omissions surrounding
the making of the Direct Loan or
provision of educational services
purchased with the Direct Loan.
Additionally, institutions that
incorporated a predispute arbitration
agreement or any other predispute
agreement addressing class actions in
any agreements with Direct Loan
program borrowers prior to the effective
date of the final regulations must
provide borrowers with agreements or
notices containing specific language
regarding their right to file or be a
member of a class action suit against the
institution when the class action
concerns acts or omissions surrounding
the making of the Direct Loan or
provision of educational services
purchased with the Direct Loan.
Institutions must provide this notice to
borrowers no later than the date of the
loan exit counseling for current students
or the date the school files an initial
response to an arbitration demand or
complaint suit from a student who has
not received such notice.
Section 685.300(f) of the final
regulations requires institutions who,
after the effective date of the final
regulations, incorporate predispute
arbitration agreements with Direct Loan
program borrowers to include specific
language regarding a borrower’s right to
file a lawsuit against the institution
when it concerns acts or omissions
surrounding the making of the Direct
Loan or provision of educational
services purchased with the Direct
Loan. Additionally, institutions that
incorporated predispute arbitration
agreements with Direct Loan program
borrowers prior to the effective date of
the final regulations must provide
borrowers with agreements or notices
containing specific language regarding a
borrower’s right to file a lawsuit against
the institution when the class action
concerns acts or omissions surrounding
the making of the Direct Loan or
provision of educational services
purchased with the Direct. Institutions
must provide this notice to such
borrowers no later than the date of the
loan exit counseling for current students
or the date the school files an initial
response to an arbitration demand or
complaint suit from a student who
hasn’t received such notice.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on any school that meets the
conditions for supplying students with
the changes to any agreements. Based on
the Academic Year 2014–2015 Direct
Loan information available, there were
1,528,714 Unsubsidized Direct Loan
recipients at proprietary institutions.
Assuming 66 percent of these students
will continue to be enrolled at the time
these regulations become effective,
1,008,951 students will be required to
receive the agreements or notices
required in § 685.300(e) or (f). We
anticipate that it will take proprietary
institutions .17 hours (10 minutes) per
student to develop these agreements or
notices, research who is required to
receive them, and forward the
information accordingly for an increase
in burden of 171,522 hours (1,008,951
students × .17 hours) under OMB
Control Number 1845–0143.
Requirements: Section 685.300(g) of
the final regulations requires
institutions to provide to the Secretary,
copies of specified records connected to
a claim filed in arbitration by or against
the school regarding a borrower defense
claim. The school must submit any
records within 60 days of the filing by
the school of such records to an
arbitrator or upon receipt by the school
of such records that were filed by
someone other than the school, such as
an arbitrator or student regarding a
claim.
Section 685.300(h) of the final
regulations requires institutions to
provide to the Secretary, copies of
specified records connected to a claim
filed in lawsuit by the school by a
76067
student or any party against the school
regarding a borrower defense claim. The
school must submit any records within
30 days of the filing or receipt of the
complaint by the school or upon receipt
by the school of rulings on a dipositive
motion or final judgement.
Burden Calculation: There will be
burden on any school that meets the
conditions for supplying students with
the changes to any agreements. We
estimate that 5 percent of the 1,959
proprietary schools, or 98 schools
would be required to submit
documentation to the Secretary to
comply with the final regulations. We
anticipate that each of the 98 schools
will have an average of four filings there
will be an average of four submissions
for each filing. Because these are copies
of documents required to be submitted
to other parties we anticipate 5 burden
hours to produce the copies and submit
to the Secretary for an increase in
burden of 7,840 hours (98 institutions ×
4 filings × 4 submissions/filing × 5
hours) under OMB Control Number
1845–0143.
The combined total increase in
burden for § 685.300 is 179,362 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845–0143.
Consistent with the discussion above,
the following chart describes the
sections of the final regulations
involving information collections, the
information being collected, the
collections that the Department will
submit to OMB for approval and public
comment under the PRA, and the
estimated costs associated with the
information collections. The monetized
net costs of the increased burden on
institutions, lenders, guaranty agencies,
and borrowers, using wage data
developed using BLS data, available at
www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is
$9,458,484 as shown in the chart below.
This cost was based on an hourly rate
of $36.55 for institutions, lenders, and
guaranty agencies and $16.30 for
borrowers.
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
Information collection
OMB Control No. and estimated burden
[change in burden]
§ 668.14—Program
participation agreement.
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Regulatory section
The final regulation requires, as part of the program participation agreement, a school to provide to all enrolled students with a closed school discharge application and a
written disclosure, describing the benefits and the consequences of a closed school discharge as an alternative
to completing their educational program through a teachout plan after the Department initiates any action to terminate the participation of the school in any title IV, HEA
program or after the occurrence of any of the events specified in § 668.14(b)(31) that require the institution to submit
a teach-out plan.
1845–0022—This would be a revised
collection. We estimate burden would
increase by 1,953 hours.
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Estimated
costs
$71,382
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COLLECTION OF INFORMATION—Continued
Regulatory section
Information collection
OMB Control No. and estimated burden
[change in burden]
§ 668.41—Reporting
and disclosure of
information.
The final regulation clarifies in § 668.41(h) reporting and disclosure requirements to provide that, for any fiscal year in
which the median borrower of a proprietary institution had
not paid down the balance of the borrower’s loans by at
least one dollar, the institution must include a warning
about that institution’s repayment outcomes in advertising
and promotional materials.
Additionally, the final regulation clarifies that certain actions
and triggering events for financial protection may, under
§ 668.41(i), require disclosure to prospective and enrolled
students. Both the actions and triggering events and the
disclosure language are subject to consumer testing.
The final regulations add a new paragraph 668.171(h) under
which, in accordance with procedures to be established by
the Secretary, an institution will notify the Secretary of any
action or triggering event described in § 668.171(c)
through (g) in the specified number of days after that action or event occurs.
The final regulations add a new paragraph (f)(4) that requires an institution to provide the Secretary financial protection, such as an irrevocable letter of credit, upon the
occurrence of an action or triggering event described in
§ 668.171(c)–(g) if that event warrants protection as determined under § 668.175(f)(4).
The final regulations add a new paragraph § 682.211(i)(7)
that requires a lender to grant a mandatory administrative
forbearance to a borrower upon being notified by the Secretary that the borrower has submitted an application for a
borrower defense discharge related to a FFEL Loan that
the borrower intends to pay off through a Direct Loan Program Consolidation Loan for the purpose of obtaining relief under § 685.212(k) of the final regulations.
The final regulations provide a second level of Departmental
review for denied closed school discharge claims in the
FFEL program. The final language requires a guaranty
agency that denies a closed school discharge request to
inform the borrower of the opportunity for a review of the
guaranty agency’s decision by the Department, and an explanation of how the borrower may request such a review.
The final regulations require the guaranty agency or the Department, upon resuming collection, to provide a FFEL
borrower with another closed school discharge application,
and an explanation of the requirements and procedures
for obtaining the discharge.
The final regulations describe the responsibilities of the guaranty agency if the borrower requests such a review.
The final regulations authorize the Department, or a guaranty agency with the Department’s permission, to grant a
closed school discharge to a FFEL borrower without a borrower application based on information in the Department’s or guaranty agency’s possession that the borrower
did not subsequently re-enroll in any title IV-eligible institution within a period of three years after the school closed.
1845–0004—This would be a revised
collection. We estimate burden would
increase by 5,346 hours.
195,396
1845–0022—This is a revised collection.
We estimate burden will increase by
3,028 hours.
110,673
1845–0022—This is a revised collection.
We estimate burden would increase
by 60,560 hours.
2,213,468
1845–0020—This is a revised collection.
We estimate burden will increase by
5,784 hours.
211,405
1845–0020—This is a revised collection.
We estimate burden will increase by
1,838 hours.
67,179
§ 668.171—Financial
responsibility—
General.
§ 668.175—Alternative standards
and requirements.
§ 682.211—Forbearance.
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§ 682.402—Death,
disability, closed
school, false certification, unpaid
refunds, and bankruptcy payments.
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costs
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 211 / Tuesday, November 1, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
76069
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION—Continued
Regulatory section
Information collection
OMB Control No. and estimated burden
[change in burden]
§ 685.222—Borrower
Defenses.
The final regulation describes the steps an individual borrower must take to initiate a borrower defense claim. The
final regulations also provide a framework for the borrower
defense group process, including descriptions of the circumstances under which group borrower defense claims
could be considered, and the process the Department will
follow for borrower defenses for a group. The final regulations establish a process for review and determination of a
borrower defense for groups identified by the Secretary for
which the borrower defense is made with respect to Direct
Loans to attend a school that has closed and has provided
no financial protection currently available to the Secretary
from which to recover any losses based on borrower defense claims, and for which there is no appropriate entity
from which the Secretary can otherwise practicably recover such losses. The final regulations establish the process for groups identified by the Secretary for which the
borrower defense is asserted with respect to Direct Loans
to attend an open school.
The final regulations require institutions, following the effective date of the regulations, to incorporate language into
agreements allowing participation by Direct Loan students
in class action lawsuits as well as predispute arbitration
agreements. There is required agreement and notification
language to be provided to affected students. Additionally,
the final regulations require institutions to submit to the
Secretary copies of arbitral records and judicial records
within specified timeframes when the actions concern a
borrower defense claim.
1845–0142—This is a new collection.
We estimate burden will increase by
1,049 hours (249 Individual hours 800
Institutional hours).
33,299
1845–0143—This is a new collection.
We estimate burden will increase by
179,362 hours.
6,555,681
§ 685.300 Agreements between an
eligible school and
the Secretary for
participation in the
Direct Loan Program.
necessary to ensure that institutions
provide financial protection, for the
benefit of students and taxpayers,
against actions or events that threaten
an institution’s ability to (1) meet its
Final
current and future financial obligations,
Total final
change in
(2) continue as a going concern or
Control No.
burden
burden
hours
continue to participate in the title IV,
hours
HEA programs, and (3) continue to
1845–0004 ........
24,016
+5,346 deliver educational services.
1845–0020 ........
8,249,520
+7,622
Accessible Format: Individuals with
1845–0022 ........
2,281,511
+65,541 disabilities can obtain this document in
1845–0142 ........
1,049
+1,049 an accessible format (e.g., braille, large
1845–0143 ........
179,362
+179,362
print, audiotape, or compact disc) on
Total ..............
10,735,458
+258,920 request to the person listed under FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
Electronic Access to This Document:
Assessment of Educational Impact
The official version of this document is
the document published in the Federal
Under § 668.171(h) of the final
Register. Free Internet access to the
regulations, institutions are required to
official edition of the Federal Register
report to the Department certain events
and the Code of Federal Regulations is
or occurrences that they may also be
available via the Federal Digital System
required to report to the SEC. Under
at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys. At this site you
SEC rules and regulations, institutions
can view this document, as well as all
are generally required to report
other documents of this Department
information that would be material to
published in the Federal Register, in
stockholders, including certain
text or Portable Document Format
specified information, whereas the
(PDF). To use PDF you must have
Department has identified events and
Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is
occurrences unique to institutions of
available free at the site.
higher education that it believes could
threaten an institution’s financial
You may also access documents of the
viability and for which it requires
Department published in the Federal
specific and perhaps more timely
Register by using the article search
reporting. We believe this reporting is
feature at: www.federalregister.gov.
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The total burden hours and change in
burden hours associated with each OMB
Control number affected by the final
regulations follows:
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Estimated
costs
Specifically, through the advanced
search feature at this site, you can limit
your search to documents published by
the Department.
List of Subjects
34 CFR Part 30
Claims, Income taxes.
34 CFR Part 668
Administrative practice and
procedure, Colleges and universities,
Consumer protection, Grant programs—
education, Loan programs—education,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Selective Service System,
Student aid, Vocational education.
34 CFR Part 674
Loan programs—education, Reporting
and recordkeeping, Student aid.
34 CFR Parts 682 and 685
Administrative practice and
procedure, Colleges and universities,
Loan programs—education, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements,
Student aid, Vocational education.
34 CFR Parts 686
Administrative practice and
procedure, Colleges and universities,
Education, Elementary and Secondary
education, Grant programs—education,
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 211 / Tuesday, November 1, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Student aid.
Dated: October 17, 2016.
John B. King, Jr.,
Secretary of Education.
For the reasons discussed in the
preamble, the Secretary of Education
amends parts 30, 668, 674, 682, 685, and
686 of title 34 of the Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 30—DEBT COLLECTION
1. The authority citation for part 30
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1221e–3(a)(1), and
1226a–1, 31 U.S.C. 3711(e), 31 U.S.C. 3716(b)
and 3720A, unless otherwise noted.
2. Section 30.70 is revised to read as
follows:
■
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§ 30.70 How does the Secretary exercise
discretion to compromise a debt or to
suspend or terminate collection of a debt?
(a)(1) The Secretary uses the
standards in the FCCS, 31 CFR part 902,
to determine whether compromise of a
debt is appropriate if the debt arises
under a program administered by the
Department, unless compromise of the
debt is subject to paragraph (b) of this
section.
(2) If the amount of the debt is more
than $100,000, or such higher amount as
the Department of Justice may prescribe,
the Secretary refers a proposed
compromise of the debt to the
Department of Justice for approval,
unless the compromise is subject to
paragraph (b) of this section or the debt
is one described in paragraph (e) of this
section.
(b) Under the provisions in 34 CFR
81.36, the Secretary may enter into
certain compromises of debts arising
because a recipient of a grant or
cooperative agreement under an
applicable Department program has
spent some of these funds in a manner
that is not allowable. For purposes of
this section, neither a program
authorized under the Higher Education
Act of 1965, as amended (HEA), nor the
Impact Aid Program is an applicable
Department program.
(c)(1) The Secretary uses the
standards in the FCCS, 31 CFR part 903,
to determine whether suspension or
termination of collection action on a
debt is appropriate.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph
(e), the Secretary—
(i) Refers the debt to the Department
of Justice to decide whether to suspend
or terminate collection action if the
amount of the debt outstanding at the
time of the referral is more than
$100,000 or such higher amount as the
Department of Justice may prescribe; or
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(ii) May suspend or terminate
collection action if the amount of the
debt outstanding at the time of the
Secretary’s determination that
suspension or termination is warranted
is less than or equal to $100,000 or such
higher amount as the Department of
Justice may prescribe.
(d) In determining the amount of a
debt under paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of
this section, the Secretary deducts any
partial payments or recoveries already
received, and excludes interest,
penalties, and administrative costs.
(e)(1) Subject to paragraph (e)(2) of
this section, under the provisions of 31
CFR part 902 or 903, the Secretary may
compromise a debt in any amount, or
suspend or terminate collection of a
debt in any amount, if the debt arises
under the Federal Family Education
Loan Program authorized under title IV,
part B, of the HEA, the William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program authorized
under title IV, part D of the HEA, or the
Perkins Loan Program authorized under
title IV, part E, of the HEA.
(2) The Secretary refers a proposed
compromise, or suspension or
termination of collection, of a debt that
exceeds $1,000,000 and that arises
under a loan program described in
paragraph (e)(1) of this section to the
Department of Justice for review. The
Secretary does not compromise, or
suspend or terminate collection of, a
debt referred to the Department of
Justice for review until the Department
of Justice has provided a response to
that request.
(f) The Secretary refers a proposed
resolution of a debt to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) for review
and approval before referring the debt to
the Department of Justice if—
(1) The debt arose from an audit
exception taken by GAO to a payment
made by the Department; and
(2) The GAO has not granted an
exception from the GAO referral
requirement.
(g) Nothing in this section
precludes—
(1) A contracting officer from
exercising his authority under
applicable statutes, regulations, or
common law to settle disputed claims
relating to a contract; or
(2) The Secretary from redetermining
a claim.
(h) Nothing in this section authorizes
the Secretary to compromise, or
suspend or terminate collection of, a
debt—
(1) Based in whole or in part on
conduct in violation of the antitrust
laws; or
(2) Involving fraud, the presentation
of a false claim, or misrepresentation on
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the part of the debtor or any party
having an interest in the claim.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1082(a) (5) and (6),
1087a, 1087hh, 1221e–3(a)(1), 1226a–1, and
1234a, 31 U.S.C. 3711)
PART 668—STUDENT ASSISTANCE
GENERAL PROVISIONS
3. The authority citation for part 668
is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1001–1003, 1070g,
1085, 1088, 1091, 1092, 1094, 1099c, 1099c–
1, 1221–3, and 1231a, unless otherwise
noted.
4. Section 668.14 is amended:
A. In paragraph (b)(30)(ii)(C), by
removing the word ‘‘and’’.
■ B. In paragraph (b)(31)(v), by
removing the period and adding in its
place ‘‘; and’’.
■ C. By adding paragraph (b)(32).
The addition reads as follows:
■
■
§ 668.14
Program participation agreement.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(32) The institution will provide all
enrolled students with a closed school
discharge application and a written
disclosure, describing the benefits and
consequences of a closed school
discharge as an alternative to
completing their educational program
through a teach-out agreement, as
defined in 34 CFR 602.3, immediately
upon submitting a teach-out plan after
the occurrence of any of the following
events:
(i) The initiation by the Secretary of
an action under 34 CFR 600.41 or
subpart G of this part or the initiation
of an emergency action under § 668.83,
to terminate the participation of an
institution in any title IV, HEA program.
(ii) The occurrence of any of the
events in paragraph (b)(31)(ii) through
(v) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 5. Section 668.41 is amended by
adding paragraphs (h) and (i) and
revising the authority citation to read as
follows:
§ 668.41 Reporting and disclosure of
information.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) Loan repayment warning for
proprietary institutions—(1) Calculation
of loan repayment rate. For each award
year, the Secretary calculates a
proprietary institution’s loan repayment
rate, for the cohort of borrowers who
entered repayment on their FFEL or
Direct Loans at any time during the twoyear cohort period, using the
methodology in § 668.413(b)(3),
provided that, for the purpose of this
paragraph (h)—
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(i) The reference to ‘‘program’’ in
§ 668.413(b)(3)(vi) is read to refer to
‘‘institution’’;
(ii) ‘‘Award year’’ means the 12month period that begins on July 1 of
one year and ends on June 30 of the
following year;
(iii) ‘‘Borrower’’ means a student who
received a FFEL or Direct Loan for
enrolling in a gainful employment
program at the institution; and
(iv) ‘‘Two-year cohort period’’ is
defined as set forth in § 668.402.
(2) Issuing and appealing loan
repayment rates. (i) For each award
year, the Secretary notifies an
institution of its final loan repayment
rate.
(ii) If an institution’s final loan
repayment rate shows that the median
borrower has not either fully repaid all
FFEL or Direct Loans received for
enrollment in the institution or made
loan payments sufficient to reduce by at
least one dollar the outstanding balance
of each of the borrower’s FFEL or Direct
Loans received for enrollment in the
institution—
(A) Using the calculation described in
paragraph (h)(4)(ii) of this section, the
institution may submit an appeal to the
Secretary within 15 days of receiving
notification of its final loan repayment
rate; and
(B) The Secretary will notify the
institution if the appeal is—
(1) Granted and the institution
qualifies for an exemption from the
warning requirement under paragraph
(h)(4) of this section; or
(2) Not granted, and the institution
must comply with the warning
requirement under paragraph (h)(3) of
this section.
(3) Loan repayment warning—(i)
Promotional materials. (A) Except as
provided in paragraph (h)(4) of this
section, for any award year in which the
institution’s loan repayment rate shows
that the median borrower has not either
fully repaid, or made loan payments
sufficient to reduce by at least one
dollar the outstanding balance of, each
of the borrower’s FFEL or Direct Loans
received for enrollment in the
institution, the institution must, in all
promotional materials that are made
available to prospective or enrolled
students by or on behalf of the
institution, include a loan repayment
warning in a form, place, and manner
prescribed by the Secretary in a notice
published in the Federal Register. The
warning language must read: ‘‘U.S.
Department of Education Warning: A
majority of recent student loan
borrowers at this school are not paying
down their loans,’’ unless stated
otherwise by the Secretary in a notice
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published in the Federal Register.
Before publishing that notice, the
Secretary may conduct consumer testing
to help ensure that the warning is
meaningful and helpful to students.
(B) Promotional materials include, but
are not limited to, an institution’s Web
site, catalogs, invitations, flyers,
billboards, and advertising on or
through radio, television, video, print
media, social media, or the Internet.
(C) The institution must ensure that
all promotional materials, including
printed materials, about the institution
are accurate and current at the time they
are published, approved by a State
agency, or broadcast.
(ii) Clarity of warning. The institution
must ensure that the warning is
prominent, clear, and conspicuous. The
warning is not prominent, clear, and
conspicuous if it is difficult to read or
hear, or placed where it can be easily
overlooked. In written materials,
including email, Internet advertising
and promotional materials, print media,
and other advertising or hard-copy
promotional materials, the warning
must be included on the cover page or
home page and any other pages with
information on a program of study and
any pages with information on costs and
financial aid. For television and video
materials, the warning must be both
spoken and written simultaneously. The
Secretary may require the institution to
modify its promotional materials,
including its Web site, if the warning is
not prominent, clear, and conspicuous.
(4) Exemptions. An institution is not
required to provide a warning under
paragraph (h)(3) of this section based on
a final loan repayment rate for that
award year if—
(i) That rate is based on fewer than 10
borrowers in the cohort described in
paragraph (h)(1) of this section; or
(ii) The institution demonstrates to
the Secretary’s satisfaction that not all of
its programs constitute GE programs and
that if the borrowers in the non-GE
programs were included in the
calculation of the loan repayment rate,
the loan repayment rate would show
that the median borrower has made loan
payments sufficient to reduce by at least
one dollar the outstanding balance of
each of the borrower’s FFEL or Direct
Loans received for enrollment in the
institution.
(i) Financial protection disclosures—
(1) General. An institution must deliver
a disclosure to enrolled and prospective
students in the form and manner
described in paragraph (i)(3), (4), and (5)
of this section, and post that disclosure
to its Web site as described in paragraph
(i)(6) of this section, within 30 days of
notifying the Secretary under
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§ 668.171(h) of the occurrence of a
triggering event or events identified
pursuant to paragraph (i)(2) of this
section. The requirements in this
paragraph (i) apply for the 12-month
period following the date the institution
notifies the Secretary under § 668.171(h)
of a triggering event or events identified
under paragraph (i)(2).
(2) Triggering events. The Secretary
will conduct consumer testing to inform
the identification of events for which a
disclosure is required. The Secretary
will consumer test each of the events
identified in § 668.171(c) through (g), as
well as other events that result in an
institution being required to provide
financial protection to the Department,
to determine which of these events are
most meaningful to students in their
educational decision-making. The
Secretary will identify the triggering
events for which a disclosure is required
under paragraph (i)(1) in a document
published in the Federal Register.
(3) Form of disclosure. The Secretary
will conduct consumer testing to ensure
the form of the disclosure is meaningful
and helpful to students. The Secretary
will specify the form and placement of
the disclosure in a notice published in
the Federal Register following the
consumer testing.
(4) Delivery to enrolled students. An
institution must deliver the disclosure
required under this paragraph (i) to each
enrolled student in writing by—
(i) Hand-delivering the disclosure as a
separate document to the student
individually or as part of a group
presentation; or
(ii)(A) Sending the disclosure to the
student’s primary email address or
delivering the disclosure through the
electronic method used by the
institution for communicating with the
student about institutional matters; and
(B) Ensuring that the disclosure is the
only substantive content in the message
sent to the student under this paragraph
unless the Secretary specifies
additional, contextual language to be
included in the message.
(5) Delivery to prospective students.
An institution must deliver the
disclosure required under this
paragraph (i) to a prospective student
before that student enrolls, registers, or
enters into a financial obligation with
the institution by—
(i) Hand-delivering the disclosure as a
separate document to the student
individually, or as part of a group
presentation; or
(ii)(A) Sending the disclosure to the
student’s primary email address or
delivering the disclosure through the
electronic method used by the
institution for communicating with
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prospective students about institutional
matters; and
(B) Ensuring that the disclosure is the
only substantive content in the message
sent to the student under this paragraph
unless the Secretary specifies
additional, contextual language to be
included in the message.
(6) Institutional Web site. An
institution must prominently provide
the disclosure required under this
paragraph (i) in a simple and
meaningful manner on the home page of
the institution’s Web site.
*
*
*
*
*
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1092, 1094, 1099c)
6. Section 668.71 is amended in
paragraph (c), in the second sentence of
the definition of ‘‘Misrepresentation’’,
by removing the word ‘‘deceive’’ and
adding in its place the words ‘‘mislead
under the circumstances’’ and by adding
a fourth sentence.
The addition reads as follows:
■
§ 668.71
Scope and special definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
Misrepresentation: * * *
Misrepresentation includes any
statement that omits information in
such a way as to make the statement
false, erroneous, or misleading.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 7. Section 668.90 is amended by
revising paragraph (a)(3) to read as
follows:
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§ 668.90
Initial and final decisions.
(a) * * *
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph (a)(2) of this section—
(i) If, in a termination action against
an institution, the hearing official finds
that the institution has violated the
provisions of § 668.14(b)(18), the
hearing official also finds that
termination of the institution’s
participation is warranted;
(ii) If, in a termination action against
a third-party servicer, the hearing
official finds that the servicer has
violated the provisions of § 668.82(d)(1),
the hearing official also finds that
termination of the institution’s
participation or servicer’s eligibility, as
applicable, is warranted;
(iii) In an action brought against an
institution or third-party servicer that
involves its failure to provide a letter of
credit or other financial protection
under § 668.15 or § 668.171(c) through
(g), the hearing official finds that the
amount of the letter of credit or other
financial protection established by the
Secretary under § 668.175(f)(4) is
appropriate, unless the institution can
demonstrate that the amount was not
warranted because—
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(A) For financial protection
demanded based on events or
conditions described in § 668.171(c)
through (f), the events or conditions no
longer exist or have been resolved or the
institution demonstrates that it has
insurance that will cover the debts and
liabilities that arise from the triggering
event or condition, or, for a condition or
event described in § 668.171(c)(1)(iii)
(teach out) or (iv) (gainful employment
eligibility loss), the amount of
educationally related expenses
reasonably attributable to the programs
or location is greater than the amount
calculated in accordance with Appendix
C of subpart L of this part. The
institution can demonstrate that
insurance covers risk by presenting the
Department with a statement from the
insurer that the institution is covered for
the full or partial amount of the liability
in question;
(B) For financial protection demanded
based on a suit described in
§ 668.171(c)(1)(i) that does not state a
specific amount of relief and on which
the court has not ruled on the amount
of relief, the institution demonstrates
that, accepting the facts alleged as true,
and assuming the claims asserted are
fully successful, the action pertains to a
period, program, or location for which
the maximum potential relief is less
than the amount claimed or the amount
determined under § 668.171(c)(2)(ii);
(C) For financial protection demanded
based on the ground identified in
§ 668.171(g), the factor or event does not
and will not have a material adverse
effect on the financial condition,
business, or results of operations of the
institution;
(D)(1) For financial protection
demanded under § 668.175(f)(4)(i), the
institution does not participate and has
not participated for the prior fiscal year
in a title IV, HEA loan program; and
(2) For any financial protection
demanded of an institution described in
paragraph (a)(3)(iii)(D)(1) of this section,
and any portion of financial protection
demanded of any other institution
greater than 10 percent of the amount of
title IV, HEA funds received by the
institution in its most recently
completed fiscal year—
(i) The risk of loss to the Secretary on
the grounds demonstrated by the
Secretary does not exist;
(ii) The loss as demonstrated by the
Secretary is not reasonably likely to
arise within the next 18 months; or
(iii) The amount is unnecessary to
protect, or contrary to, the Federal
interest;
(E) The institution has proffered
alternative financial protection that
provides students and the Department
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adequate protection against losses
resulting from the risks identified by the
Secretary. In the Secretary’s discretion,
adequate protection may consist of one
or more of the following—
(1) An agreement with the Secretary
that a portion of the funds due to the
institution under a reimbursement or
heightened cash monitoring funding
arrangement will be temporarily
withheld in such amounts as will meet,
no later than the end of a nine-month
period, the amount of the required
financial protection demanded; or
(2) Other form of financial protection
specified by the Secretary in a notice
published in the Federal Register.
(iv) In a termination action taken
against an institution or third-party
servicer based on the grounds that the
institution or servicer failed to comply
with the requirements of § 668.23(c)(3),
if the hearing official finds that the
institution or servicer failed to meet
those requirements, the hearing official
finds that the termination is warranted;
(v)(A) In a termination action against
an institution based on the grounds that
the institution is not financially
responsible under § 668.15(c)(1), the
hearing official finds that the
termination is warranted unless the
institution demonstrates that all
applicable conditions described in
§ 668.15(d)(4) have been met; and
(B) In a termination or limitation
action against an institution based on
the grounds that the institution is not
financially responsible—
(1) Upon proof of the conditions in
§ 668.174(a), the hearing official finds
that the limitation or termination is
warranted unless the institution
demonstrates that all the conditions in
§ 668.175(f) have been met; and
(2) Upon proof of the conditions in
§ 668.174(b)(1), the hearing official finds
that the limitation or termination is
warranted unless the institution
demonstrates that all applicable
conditions described in § 668.174(b)(2)
or § 668.175(g) have been met.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 8. Section 668.93 is amended by
redesignating paragraphs (h) and (i) as
paragraphs (i) and (j), respectively, and
adding a new paragraph (h) to read as
follows:
§ 668.93
Limitation.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) A change in the participation
status of the institution from fully
certified to participate to provisionally
certified to participate under
§ 668.13(c).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 9. Section 668.171 is revised to read
as follows:
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§ 668.171
General.
(a) Purpose. To begin and to continue
to participate in any title IV, HEA
program, an institution must
demonstrate to the Secretary that it is
financially responsible under the
standards established in this subpart. As
provided under section 498(c)(1) of the
HEA, the Secretary determines whether
an institution is financially responsible
based on the institution’s ability to—
(1) Provide the services described in
its official publications and statements;
(2) Meet all of its financial
obligations; and
(3) Provide the administrative
resources necessary to comply with title
IV, HEA program requirements.
(b) General standards of financial
responsibility. Except as provided under
paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section, the
Secretary considers an institution to be
financially responsible if the Secretary
determines that—
(1) The institution’s Equity, Primary
Reserve, and Net Income ratios yield a
composite score of at least 1.5, as
provided under § 668.172 and
appendices A and B to this subpart;
(2) The institution has sufficient cash
reserves to make required returns of
unearned title IV, HEA program funds,
as provided under § 668.173;
(3) The institution is able to meet all
of its financial obligations and
otherwise provide the administrative
resources necessary to comply with title
IV, HEA program requirements. An
institution may not be able to meet its
financial or administrative obligations if
it is subject to an action or event
described in paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f),
or (g) of this section. The Secretary
considers those actions or events in
determining whether the institution is
financially responsible only if they
occur on or after July 1, 2017; and
(4) The institution or persons
affiliated with the institution are not
subject to a condition of past
performance under § 668.174(a) or (b).
(c) Debts, liabilities, and losses. (1)
Except as provided under paragraph
(h)(3) of this section, an institution is
not able to meet its financial or
administrative obligations under
paragraph (b)(3) of this section if, after
the end of the fiscal year for which the
Secretary has most recently calculated
an institution’s composite score, the
institution is subject to one or more of
the following actions or triggering
events, and as a result of the actual or
potential debts, liabilities, or losses that
have stemmed or may stem from those
actions or events, the institution’s
recalculated composite score is less than
1.0, as determined by the Secretary
under paragraph (c)(2) of this section:
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(i) Debts and borrower defense-related
lawsuits. (A) The institution is required
to pay any debt or incur any liability
arising from a final judgment in a
judicial proceeding or from an
administrative proceeding or
determination, or from a settlement; or
(B) The institution is being sued in an
action brought on or after July 1, 2017
by a Federal or State authority for
financial relief on claims related to the
making of the Direct Loan for
enrollment at the school or the
provision of educational services and
the suit has been pending for 120 days.
(ii) Other litigation. The institution is
being sued in an action brought on or
after July 1, 2017 that is not described
in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(B) of this section
and—
(A) The institution has filed a motion
for summary judgment or summary
disposition and that motion has been
denied or the court has issued an order
reserving judgment on the motion;
(B) The institution has not filed a
motion for summary judgment or
summary disposition by the deadline set
for such motions by the court or
agreement of the parties; or
(C) If the court did not set a deadline
for filing a motion for summary
judgment and the institution did not file
such a motion, the court has set a
pretrial conference date or trial date and
the case is pending on the earlier of
those two dates.
(iii) Accrediting agency actions. The
institution was required by its
accrediting agency to submit a teach-out
plan, for a reason described in
§ 602.24(c)(1), that covers the closing of
the institution or any of its branches or
additional locations.
(iv) Gainful employment. As
determined annually by the Secretary,
the institution has gainful employment
programs that, under § 668.403, could
become ineligible based on their final D/
E rates for the next award year.
(v) Withdrawal of owner’s equity. For
a proprietary institution whose
composite score is less than 1.5, any
withdrawal of owner’s equity from the
institution by any means, including by
declaring a dividend, unless the transfer
is to an entity included in the affiliated
entity group on whose basis the
institution’s composite score was
calculated.
(2) Recalculating the composite
score—(i) General. Unless the
institution demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that the
event or condition has had or will have
no effect on the assets and liabilities of
the institution under paragraph (g)(3)(iv)
of this section, as specified in Appendix
C of this subpart, the Secretary
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recognizes and accounts for the actual
or potential losses associated with the
actions or events under paragraph (c)(1)
of this section and, based on that
accounting, recalculates the institution’s
most recent composite score. The
recalculation will occur regularly after
associated actions or events are reported
to the Secretary. The Secretary
recalculates the composite score under
this paragraph using the financial
statements on which the institution’s
composite score has been calculated
under § 668.172.
(ii) Calculation of potential loss—
debts and borrower defense-related
lawsuits. For a debt or a suit described
in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, the
amount of loss is—
(A) The amount of debt;
(B) For a suit, the amount set by a
court ruling, or, in the absence of a court
ruling—
(1) The amount of relief claimed in
the complaint;
(2) If the complaint demands no
specific amount of relief, the amount
stated in any final written demand
issued by the agency to the institution
prior to the suit or a lesser amount that
the agency offers to accept in settlement
of any financial demand in the suit; or
(3) If the agency stated no specific
demand in the complaint, in a pre-filing
demand, or in a written offer of
settlement, the amount of tuition and
fees received by the institution during
the period, and for the program or
location, described in the allegations in
the complaint.
(iii) Calculation of potential loss—
other litigation. For any suit described
in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section, the
amount of loss is the amount set by a
court ruling, or, in the absence of a court
ruling—
(A) The amount of relief claimed in
the complaint;
(B) If the complaint demands no
specific amount of relief, the amount
stated in any final written demand by
the claimant to the institution prior to
the suit or a lesser amount that the
plaintiff offers to accept in settlement of
any financial demand in the suit; or
(C) If the complainant stated no
specific demand in the complaint, in a
pre-filing demand, or in a written offer
of settlement, the amount of the claim
as stated in a response to a discovery
request, including an expert witness
report.
(iv) Calculation of potential loss—
other events. (A) For a closed location
or institution, or the potential loss of
eligibility for gainful employment
programs, as described in paragraph
(c)(1)(iii) or (iv), the amount of loss is
the amount of title IV, HEA program
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funds the institution received in its
most recently completed fiscal year for
that location or institution, or for those
GE programs.
(B) For the withdrawal of owner’s
equity, described in paragraph (c)(1)(v)
of this section, the amount of loss is the
amount transferred to any entity other
than the institution.
(d) Non-title IV revenue. Except as
provided under paragraph (h)(3) of this
section, a proprietary institution is not
able to meet its financial or
administrative obligations under
paragraph (b)(3) of this section if, for its
most recently completed fiscal year, the
institution did not derive at least 10
percent of its revenue from sources
other than title IV, HEA program funds,
as provided under § 668.28(c).
(e) Publicly traded institutions. Except
as provided under paragraph (h)(3) of
this section, a publicly traded
institution is not able to meet its
financial or administrative obligations
under paragraph (b)(3) of this section if
the institution is currently subject to
one or more of the following actions or
events:
(1) SEC actions. The SEC warns the
institution that it may suspend trading
on the institution’s stock.
(2) SEC reports. The institution failed
to file a required annual or quarterly
report with the SEC within the time
period prescribed for that report or by
any extended due date under 17 CFR
240.12b–25.
(3) Exchange actions. The exchange
on which the institution’s stock is
traded notifies the institution that it is
not in compliance with exchange
requirements, or its stock is delisted.
(f) Cohort default rates. Except as
provided under paragraph (h)(3) of this
section, an institution is not able to
meet its financial or administrative
obligations under paragraph (b)(3) of
this section if the institution’s two most
recent official cohort default rates are 30
percent or greater, as determined under
subpart N of this part, unless—
(1) The institution files a challenge,
request for adjustment, or appeal under
that subpart with respect to its rates for
one or both of those fiscal years; and
(2) That challenge, request, or appeal
remains pending, results in reducing
below 30 percent the official cohort
default rate for either or both years, or
precludes the rates from either or both
years from resulting in a loss of
eligibility or provisional certification.
(g) Discretionary factors or events.
Except as provided under paragraph
(h)(3) of this section, an institution is
not able to meet its financial or
administrative obligations under
paragraph (b)(3) of this section if the
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Secretary demonstrates that there is an
event or condition that is reasonably
likely to have a material adverse effect
on the financial condition, business, or
results of operations of the institution,
including but not limited to whether—
(1) There is a significant fluctuation
between consecutive award years, or a
period of award years, in the amount of
Direct Loan or Pell Grant funds, or a
combination of those funds, received by
the institution that cannot be accounted
for by changes in those programs;
(2) The institution is cited by a State
licensing or authorizing agency for
failing State or agency requirements;
(3) The institution fails a financial
stress test developed or adopted by the
Secretary to evaluate whether the
institution has sufficient capital to
absorb losses that may be incurred as a
result of adverse conditions and
continue to meet its financial
obligations to the Secretary and
students;
(4) As calculated by the Secretary, the
institution has high annual dropout
rates;
(5) The institution is or was placed on
probation or issued a show-cause order,
or placed on an accreditation status that
poses an equivalent or greater risk to its
accreditation, by its accrediting agency
for failing to meet one or more of the
agency’s standards;
(6)(i) The institution violated a
provision or requirement in a loan
agreement; and
(ii) As provided under the terms of a
security or loan agreement between the
institution and the creditor, a monetary
or nonmonetary default or delinquency
event occurs, or other events occur, that
trigger, or enable the creditor to require
or impose on the institution, an increase
in collateral, a change in contractual
obligations, an increase in interest rates
or payments, or other sanctions,
penalties, or fees;
(7) The institution has pending claims
for borrower relief discharge under
§ 685.206 or § 685.222; or
(8) The Secretary expects to receive a
significant number of claims for
borrower relief discharge under
§ 685.206 or § 685.222 as a result of a
lawsuit, settlement, judgement, or
finding from a State or Federal
administrative proceeding.
(h) Reporting requirements. (1) In
accordance with procedures established
by the Secretary, an institution must
notify the Secretary of any of the
following actions or events identified in
paragraphs (c) through (g) of this section
no later than—
(i) For lawsuits and for other actions
or events described in paragraph (c)(1)(i)
of this section—
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(A) For lawsuits, 10 days after the
institution is served with the complaint
and 10 days after the suit has been
pending for 120 days; and
(B) For debts arising from lawsuits
and for other actions or events, 10 days
after a payment was required or a
liability was incurred.
(ii) For lawsuits described in
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section—
(A) Ten days after the institution is
served with the complaint;
(B) Ten days after the court sets the
dates for the earliest of the events
described in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this
section, provided that, if the deadline is
set by procedural rules, notice of the
applicable deadline must be included
with notice of the service of the
complaint; and
(C) Ten days after the earliest of the
applicable events occurs;
(iii) For an accrediting agency action
described in paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of this
section, 10 days after the institution is
notified by its accrediting agency that it
must submit a teach-out plan;
(iv) For a withdrawal of owner’s
equity described in paragraph (c)(1)(v)
of this section, 10 days after the
withdrawal is made;
(v) For the non-title IV revenue
provision in paragraph (d) of this
section, 45 days after the end of the
institution’s fiscal year, as provided in
§ 668.28(c)(3);
(vi) For the SEC and stock exchange
provisions for publicly traded
institutions in paragraph (e), 10 days
after the SEC or exchange warns,
notifies, or takes an action against the
institution, or 10 days after any
extension granted by the SEC;
(vii) For State or agency actions in
paragraph (g)(2) of this section, 10 days
after the institution is cited for violating
a State or agency requirement;
(viii) For probation or show cause
actions under paragraph (g)(5) of this
section, 10 days after the institution’s
accrediting agency places the institution
on that status; or
(ix) For the loan agreement provisions
in paragraph (g)(6) of this section, 10
days after a loan violation occurs, the
creditor waives the violation, or the
creditor imposes sanctions or penalties
in exchange or as a result of the waiver.
(2) The Secretary may take an
administrative action under paragraph
(k) of this section against the institution
if it fails to provide timely notice under
this paragraph (h).
(3) In its notice to the Secretary, the
institution may demonstrate that—
(i) For a suit by a Federal or State
agency described in paragraph
(c)(1)(i)(B) of this section, the amount
claimed in the complaint or determined
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under paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section
exceeds the potential recovery because
the allegations in the complaint, if
accepted as true, and the claims
asserted, if fully successful, cannot
produce relief in the amount claimed or,
if no amount was claimed, the amount
deemed under paragraph (c)(2)(ii)
because they pertain to a period,
program, or location for which the full
recovery possible is a lesser amount;
(ii) The reported withdrawal of
owner’s equity under paragraph (c)(1)(v)
of this section was used exclusively to
meet tax liabilities of the institution or
its owners for income derived from the
institution;
(iii) The reported violation of a
provision or requirement in a loan
agreement under paragraph (g)(6) of this
section was waived by the creditor.
However, if the creditor imposes
additional constraints or requirements
as a condition of waiving the violation,
or imposes penalties or requirements
under paragraph (g)(6)(ii) of this section,
the institution must identify and
describe those penalties, constraints, or
requirements and may demonstrate that
complying with those actions will not
adversely affect the institution’s ability
to meet its current and future financial
obligations; or
(iv) The action or event reported
under this paragraph (h) no longer exists
or has been resolved or the institution
has insurance that will cover part or all
of the debts and liabilities that arise at
any time from that action or event.
(i) Public institutions. (1) The
Secretary considers a domestic public
institution to be financially responsible
if the institution—
(i)(A) Notifies the Secretary that it is
designated as a public institution by the
State, local, or municipal government
entity, tribal authority, or other
government entity that has the legal
authority to make that designation; and
(B) Provides a letter from an official
of that State or other government entity
confirming that the institution is a
public institution; and
(ii) Is not subject to a condition of past
performance under § 668.174.
(2) The Secretary considers a foreign
public institution to be financially
responsible if the institution—
(i)(A) Notifies the Secretary that it is
designated as a public institution by the
country or other government entity that
has the legal authority to make that
designation; and
(B) Provides documentation from an
official of that country or other
government entity confirming that the
institution is a public institution and is
backed by the full faith and credit of the
country or other government entity; and
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(ii) Is not subject to a condition of past
performance under § 668.174.
(j) Audit opinions. Even if an
institution satisfies all of the general
standards of financial responsibility
under paragraph (b) of this section, the
Secretary does not consider the
institution to be financially responsible
if, in the institution’s audited financial
statements, the opinion expressed by
the auditor was an adverse, qualified, or
disclaimed opinion, or the auditor
expressed doubt about the continued
existence of the institution as a going
concern, unless the Secretary
determines that a qualified or
disclaimed opinion does not
significantly bear on the institution’s
financial condition.
(k) Administrative actions. If the
Secretary determines that an institution
is not financially responsible under the
standards and provisions of this section
or under an alternative standard in
§ 668.175, or the institution does not
submit its financial and compliance
audits by the date and in the manner
required under § 668.23, the Secretary
may—
(1) Initiate an action under subpart G
of this part to fine the institution, or
limit, suspend, or terminate the
institution’s participation in the title IV,
HEA programs; or
(2) For an institution that is
provisionally certified, take an action
against the institution under the
procedures established in § 668.13(d).
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1094 and 1099c and
section 4 of Pub. L. 95–452, 92 Stat. 1101–
1109)
10. Section 668.175 is amended by:
A. Revising paragraphs (c) and (d).
B. Removing and reserving paragraph
(e).
■ C. Revising paragraph (f).
■ D. Adding paragraph (h).
■ E. Revising the authority citation.
The revisions and addition read as
follows:
■
■
■
§ 668.175 Alternative standards and
requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Letter of credit alternative for
participating institutions. A
participating institution that is not
financially responsible either because it
does not satisfy one or more of the
standards of financial responsibility
under § 668.171(b) through (g), or
because of an audit opinion described
under § 668.171(j), qualifies as a
financially responsible institution by
submitting an irrevocable letter of credit
or other form of financial protection
specified by the Secretary in a notice
published in the Federal Register, that
is acceptable and payable to the
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76075
Secretary, for an amount determined by
the Secretary that is not less than onehalf of the title IV, HEA program funds
received by the institution during its
most recently completed fiscal year.
(d) Zone alternative. (1) A
participating institution that is not
financially responsible solely because
the Secretary determines that its
composite score under § 668.172 is less
than 1.5 may participate in the title IV,
HEA programs as a financially
responsible institution for no more than
three consecutive years, beginning with
the year in which the Secretary
determines that the institution qualifies
under this alternative.
(i)(A) An institution qualifies initially
under this alternative if, based on the
institution’s audited financial statement
for its most recently completed fiscal
year, the Secretary determines that its
composite score is in the range from 1.0
to 1.4; and
(B) An institution continues to qualify
under this alternative if, based on the
institution’s audited financial statement
for each of its subsequent two fiscal
years, the Secretary determines that the
institution’s composite score is in the
range from 1.0 to 1.4.
(ii) An institution that qualified under
this alternative for three consecutive
years, or for one of those years, may not
seek to qualify again under this
alternative until the year after the
institution achieves a composite score of
at least 1.5, as determined by the
Secretary.
(2) Under the zone alternative, the
Secretary—
(i) Requires the institution to make
disbursements to eligible students and
parents, and to otherwise comply with
the provisions, under either the
heightened cash monitoring or
reimbursement payment method
described in § 668.162;
(ii) Requires the institution to provide
timely information regarding any of the
following oversight and financial
events—
(A) Any event that causes the
institution, or related entity as defined
in Accounting Standards Codification
(ASC) 850, to realize any liability that
was noted as a contingent liability in the
institution’s or related entity’s most
recent audited financial statement; or
(B) Any losses that are unusual in
nature or infrequently occur, or both, as
defined in accordance with Accounting
Standards Update (ASU) No. 2015–01
and ASC 225;
(iii) May require the institution to
submit its financial statement and
compliance audits earlier than the time
specified under § 668.23(a)(4); and
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(iv) May require the institution to
provide information about its current
operations and future plans.
(3) Under the zone alternative, the
institution must—
(i) For any oversight or financial event
described in paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this
section for which the institution is
required to provide information, in
accordance with procedures established
by the Secretary, notify the Secretary no
later than 10 days after that event
occurs; and
(ii) As part of its compliance audit,
require its auditor to express an opinion
on the institution’s compliance with the
requirements under the zone alternative,
including the institution’s
administration of the payment method
under which the institution received
and disbursed title IV, HEA program
funds.
(4) If an institution fails to comply
with the requirements under paragraph
(d)(2) or (3) of this section, the Secretary
may determine that the institution no
longer qualifies under this alternative.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) Provisional certification
alternative. (1) The Secretary may
permit an institution that is not
financially responsible to participate in
the title IV, HEA programs under a
provisional certification for no more
than three consecutive years if, as
determined annually by the Secretary—
(i) The institution is not financially
responsible because it does not satisfy
the general standards under
§ 668.171(b)(1) or (3), its recalculated
composite score under § 668.171(c)(2) is
less than 1.0, is subject to an action or
event under § 668.171(d), (e), (f),or (g) or
because of an audit opinion described in
§ 668.171(i); or
(ii) The institution is not financially
responsible because of a condition of
past performance, as provided under
§ 668.174(a), and the institution
demonstrates to the Secretary that it has
satisfied or resolved that condition.
(2) Under this alternative, the
institution must—
(i) Provide to the Secretary an
irrevocable letter of credit that is
acceptable and payable to the Secretary,
agree to a set-aside under paragraph (h)
of this section, or, at the Secretary’s
discretion, provide another form of
financial protection specified by the
Secretary in a notice published in the
Federal Register, for an amount
determined by the Secretary under
paragraph (f)(4) of this section, except
that this requirement does not apply to
a public institution; and
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(ii) Comply with the provisions under
the zone alternative, as provided under
paragraph (d)(2) and (3).
(3) If at the end of the period for
which the Secretary provisionally
certified the institution, the institution
is still not financially responsible, the
Secretary—
(i) May permit the institution to
participate under a provisional
certification, but—
(A) May require the institution, or one
or more persons or entities that exercise
substantial control over the institution,
as determined under § 668.174(b)(1) and
(c), or both, to provide to the Secretary
financial protection for an amount
determined by the Secretary under
paragraph (f)(4) of this section; and
(B) May require one or more of the
persons or entities that exercise
substantial control over the institution,
as determined under § 668.174(b)(1) and
(c), to be jointly or severally liable for
any liabilities that may arise from the
institution’s participation in the title IV,
HEA programs; and
(ii) May permit the institution to
continue to participate under a
provisional certification but requires the
institution to provide, or continue to
provide, the financial protection
resulting from an event described in
§ 668.171(c) through (g) until the
institution meets the requirements of
paragraph (f)(5) of this section.
(4)(i) The institution must provide to
the Secretary the financial protection
described under paragraph (f)(2)(i) in an
amount that, together with the amount
of any financial protection that the
institution has already provided if that
protection covers the period described
in paragraph (f)(5) of this section,
equals, for a composite score calculated
under § 668.172, a composite score
recalculated under § 668.171(c)(2), or for
any other reason that the institution is
not financially responsible—
(A) Ten percent of the total amount of
title IV, HEA program funds received by
the institution during its most recently
completed fiscal year; and
(B) Any additional amount that the
Secretary demonstrates is needed under
paragraph (f)(4)(ii) of this section.
(ii) The Secretary determines the
amount specified in paragraph
(f)(4)(i)(B) of this section that must be
provided by the institution in addition
to the amount specified in paragraph
(f)(4)(i)(A) of this section, and must
ensure that the total amount of financial
protection provided under paragraph
(f)(4)(i) of this section is sufficient to
fully cover any estimated losses. The
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Secretary may reduce the amount
required under paragraph (f)(4)(i)(B)
only if an institution demonstrates that
this amount is unnecessary to protect, or
is contrary to, the Federal interest.
(5) The Secretary maintains the full
amount of the financial protection
provided by the institution under
paragraph (f)(4) of this section until the
Secretary first determines that the
institution has—
(i) A composite score of 1.0 or greater
based on the review of the audited
financial statements for the fiscal year in
which all losses from any event
described in § 668.171(c), (d), (e), (f), or
(g) on which financial protection was
required have been fully recognized; or
(ii) A recalculated composite score of
1.0 or greater, and any event or
condition described in § 668.171(d), (e),
(f), or (g) has ceased to exist.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) Set-aside. If an institution does not
provide a letter of credit or financial
protection acceptable to the Secretary
for the amount required under
paragraph (d) or (f) of this section
within 45 days of the Secretary’s
request, the Secretary offsets the amount
of title IV, HEA program funds that an
institution is eligible to receive in a
manner that ensures that, no later than
the end of a nine-month period, the total
amount offset equals the amount of
financial protection the institution
would otherwise provide. The Secretary
uses the funds to satisfy the debt and
liabilities owed to the Secretary that are
not otherwise paid directly by the
institution, and provides to the
institution any funds not used for this
purpose during the period for which the
financial protection was required, or
provides the institution any remaining
funds if the institution subsequently
submits the financial protection
originally required under paragraph (d)
or (f) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1094 and 1099c)
11. Section 668.176 is added to
subpart L to read as follows:
■
§ 668.176
Severability.
If any provision of this subpart or its
application to any person, act, or
practice is held invalid, the remainder
of the subpart or the application of its
provisions to any person, act, or practice
will not be affected thereby.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1094, 1099c)
12. Appendix C to subpart L of part
668 is added to read as follows:
■
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76077
Appendix C to Subpart L of Part 668- Balance Sheet and Income Statement Adjustments for Recalculating Composite
Expenses
Owners
Expenses
Equity
#13, Total
#13, Total
Assets
Assets
Adjusting Entries
NA
NA
#32, Total
based on the changes to #27 Total Income and Line #32 Total expenses, the
#32, Total
Expenses
(expense
allowance)
allowance)
Expenses
(expense
items may be recalculated: #34 Net Income
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#36 Net Income After Taxes, #38 Net Income, #22 Retained Earnings, #23 Tota I Owner's Equity, and #24 Tota I Liabilities and Owner's Equity
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13. The authority citation for part 674
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1070g, 1087aa—
1087hh, unless otherwise noted.
14. Section 674.33 is amended by:
A. Revising paragraph (g)(3).
B. Redesignating paragraphs (g)(8)(vi)
through (ix) as paragraphs (g)(8)(vii)
through (x), respectively.
■ C. Adding a new paragraph (g)(8)(vi).
The revision and addition read as
follows:
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■
■
■
§ 674.33
Repayment.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) * * *
(3) Determination of borrower
qualification for discharge by the
Secretary. (i) The Secretary may
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discharge the borrower’s obligation to
repay an NDSL or Federal Perkins Loan
without an application if the Secretary
determines that—
(A) The borrower qualified for and
received a discharge on a loan pursuant
to 34 CFR 682.402(d) (Federal Family
Education Loan Program) or 34 CFR
685.214 (Federal Direct Loan Program),
and was unable to receive a discharge
on an NDSL or Federal Perkins Loan
because the Secretary lacked the
statutory authority to discharge the loan;
or
(B) Based on information in the
Secretary’s possession, the borrower
qualifies for a discharge.
(ii) With respect to schools that closed
on or after November 1, 2013, the
Secretary will discharge the borrower’s
obligation to repay an NDSL or Federal
Perkins Loan without an application
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from the borrower if the Secretary
determines that the borrower did not
subsequently re-enroll in any title IVeligible institution within a period of
three years from the date the school
closed.
*
*
*
*
*
(8) * * *
(vi) Upon resuming collection on any
affected loan, the Secretary provides the
borrower another discharge application
and an explanation of the requirements
and procedures for obtaining a
discharge.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 15. Section 674.61 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 674.61
Discharge for death or disability.
(a) Death. (1) An institution must
discharge the unpaid balance of a
borrower’s Defense, NDSL, or Federal
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PART 674—FEDERAL PERKINS LOAN
PROGRAM
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 211 / Tuesday, November 1, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
Perkins loan, including interest, if the
borrower dies. The institution must
discharge the loan on the basis of—
(i) An original or certified copy of the
death certificate;
(ii) An accurate and complete
photocopy of the original or certified
copy of the death certificate;
(iii) An accurate and complete
original or certified copy of the death
certificate that is scanned and submitted
electronically or sent by facsimile
transmission; or
(iv) Verification of the borrower’s
death through an authoritative Federal
or State electronic database approved
for use by the Secretary.
(2) Under exceptional circumstances
and on a case-by-case basis, the chief
financial officer of the institution may
approve a discharge based upon other
reliable documentation of the
borrower’s death.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 682—FEDERAL FAMILY
EDUCATION LOAN (FFEL) PROGRAM
16. The authority citation for part 682
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1071–1087–4, unless
otherwise noted.
§ 682.202
[Amended]
17. Section 682.202 is amended in
paragraph (b)(1) by removing the words
‘‘A lender’’ and adding in their place
‘‘Except as provided in § 682.405(b)(4),
a lender’’.
■ 18. Section 682.211 is amended by
adding paragraph (i)(7) to read as
follows:
■
§ 682.211
Forbearance.
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*
*
*
*
*
(i) * * *
(7) The lender must grant a mandatory
administrative forbearance to a borrower
upon being notified by the Secretary
that the borrower has made a borrower
defense claim related to a loan that the
borrower intends to consolidate into the
Direct Loan Program for the purpose of
seeking relief in accordance with
§ 685.212(k). The mandatory
administrative forbearance shall be
granted in yearly increments or for a
period designated by the Secretary until
the loan is consolidated or until the
lender is notified by the Secretary to
discontinue the forbearance.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 19. Section 682.402 is amended:
■ A. By revising paragraphs (b)(2) and
(d)(3).
■ B. In paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(B)(1) and (2),
by removing the words ‘‘sworn
statement (which may be combined)’’
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and adding in their place the word
‘‘application’’.
■ C. By revising paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(F)
introductory text.
■ D. In paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(F)(5)
removing the words ‘‘and sworn
statement’’.
■ E. In paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(G)
introductory text, by removing the
words ‘‘request and supporting sworn
statement’’ and adding, in their place,
the words ‘‘completed application’’.
■ F. By revising paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(H).
■ G. By redesignating paragraph
(d)(6)(ii)(I) as paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(J).
■ H. By adding new paragraph
(d)(6)(ii)(I) and paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(K).
■ I. By revising paragraphs (d)(7)(ii) and
(iii) and (d)(8).
■ J. In paragraph (e)(6)(iii), by removing
the last sentence.
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
§ 682.402 Death, disability, closed school,
false certification, unpaid refunds, and
bankruptcy payments.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2)(i) A discharge of a loan based on
the death of the borrower (or student in
the case of a PLUS loan) must be based
on—
(A) An original or certified copy of the
death certificate;
(B) An accurate and complete
photocopy of the original or certified
copy of the death certificate;
(C) An accurate and complete original
or certified copy of the death certificate
that is scanned and submitted
electronically or sent by facsimile
transmission; or
(D) Verification of the borrower’s or
student’s death through an authoritative
Federal or State electronic database
approved for use by the Secretary.
(ii) Under exceptional circumstances
and on a case-by-case basis, the chief
executive officer of the guaranty agency
may approve a discharge based upon
other reliable documentation of the
borrower’s or student’s death.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(3) Borrower qualification for
discharge. Except as provided in
paragraph (d)(8) of this section, in order
to qualify for a discharge of a loan under
paragraph (d) of this section, a borrower
must submit a completed closed school
discharge application on a form
approved by the Secretary. By signing
the application, the borrower certifies—
*
*
*
*
*
(6) * * *
(ii) * * *
(F) If the guaranty agency determines
that a borrower identified in paragraph
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76079
(d)(6)(ii)(C) or (D) of this section does
not qualify for a discharge, the agency
shall notify the borrower in writing of
that determination and the reasons for
it, the opportunity for review by the
Secretary, and how to request such a
review within 30 days after the date the
agency—
*
*
*
*
*
(H) If a borrower described in
paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(E) or (F) of this
section fails to submit the completed
application within 60 days of being
notified of that option, the lender or
guaranty agency shall resume collection.
(I) Upon resuming collection on any
affected loan, the lender or guaranty
agency provides the borrower another
discharge application and an
explanation of the requirements and
procedures for obtaining a discharge.
*
*
*
*
*
(K)(1) Within 30 days after receiving
the borrower’s request for review under
paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(F) of this section,
the agency shall forward the borrower’s
discharge request and all relevant
documentation to the Secretary for
review.
(2) The Secretary notifies the agency
and the borrower of the determination
upon review. If the Secretary determines
that the borrower is not eligible for a
discharge under paragraph (d) of this
section, within 30 days after being so
informed, the agency shall take the
actions described in paragraph
(d)(6)(ii)(H) or (I) of this section, as
applicable.
(3) If the Secretary determines that the
borrower meets the requirements for a
discharge under paragraph (d) of this
section, the agency shall, within 30 days
after being so informed, take actions
required under paragraphs (d)(6)(ii)(E)
and (d)(6)(ii)(G)(1) of this section, and
the lender shall take the actions
described in paragraph (d)(7)(iv) of this
section, as applicable.
*
*
*
*
*
(7) * * *
(i) * * *
(ii) If the borrower fails to submit a
completed application described in
paragraph (d)(3) of this section within
60 days of being notified of that option,
the lender shall resume collection and
shall be deemed to have exercised
forbearance of payment of principal and
interest from the date the lender
suspended collection activity. The
lender may capitalize, in accordance
with § 682.202(b), any interest accrued
and not paid during that period. Upon
resuming collection, the lender provides
the borrower with another discharge
application and an explanation of the
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requirements and procedures for
obtaining a discharge.
(iii) The lender shall file a closed
school claim with the guaranty agency
in accordance with § 682.402(g) no later
than 60 days after the lender receives a
completed application described in
paragraph (d)(3) of this section from the
borrower, or notification from the
agency that the Secretary approved the
borrower’s appeal in accordance with
paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(K)(3) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
(8) Discharge without an application.
(i) A borrower’s obligation to repay a
FFEL Program loan may be discharged
without an application from the
borrower if the—
(A) Borrower received a discharge on
a loan pursuant to 34 CFR 674.33(g)
under the Federal Perkins Loan
Program, or 34 CFR 685.214 under the
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program; or
(B) Secretary or the guaranty agency,
with the Secretary’s permission,
determines that the borrower qualifies
for a discharge based on information in
the Secretary or guaranty agency’s
possession.
(ii) With respect to schools that closed
on or after November 1, 2013, a
borrower’s obligation to repay a FFEL
Program loan will be discharged
without an application from the
borrower if the Secretary or guaranty
agency determines that the borrower did
not subsequently re-enroll in any title
IV-eligible institution within a period of
three years after the school closed.
*
*
*
*
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■ 20. Section 682.405 is amended by
redesignating paragraph (b)(4) as
paragraph (b)(4)(i) and adding paragraph
(b)(4)(ii).
The addition reads as follows:
§ 682.405
Loan rehabilitation agreement.
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
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*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) The lender must not consider the
purchase of a rehabilitated loan as entry
into repayment or resumption of
repayment for the purposes of interest
capitalization under § 682.202(b).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 21. Section 682.410 is amended:
■ A. In paragraph (b)(4) by adding, after
the words ‘‘to the lender’’, the words
and punctuation ‘‘, but shall not
capitalize any unpaid interest
thereafter’’.
■ B. By adding paragraph (b)(6)(viii).
The addition reads as follows:
§ 682.410 Fiscal, administrative, and
enforcement requirements.
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(b) * * *
(6) * * *
(viii) Upon notification by the
Secretary that the borrower has made a
borrower defense claim related to a loan
that the borrower intends to consolidate
into the Direct Loan Program for the
purpose of seeking relief in accordance
with § 685.212(k), the guaranty agency
must suspend all collection activities on
the affected loan for the period
designated by the Secretary.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 685—WILLIAM D. FORD
FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM
22. The authority citation for part 685
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1070g, 1087a, et seq.,
unless otherwise noted.
23. Section 685.200 is amended by
adding paragraphs (f)(3)(v) and (f)(4)(iii)
to read as follows:
24. Section 685.205 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(6) to read as
follows:
■
§ 685.205
Forbearance.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(6) Periods necessary for the Secretary
to determine the borrower’s eligibility
for discharge—
(i) Under § 685.206(c);
(ii) Under § 685.214;
(iii) Under § 685.215;
(iv) Under § 685.216;
(v) Under § 685.217;
(vi) Under § 685.222; or
(vii) Due to the borrower’s or
endorser’s (if applicable) bankruptcy;
*
*
*
*
*
■ 25. Section 685.206 is amended by
revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
■
§ 685.200
Borrower eligibility.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(3) * * *
(v) A borrower who receives a closed
school, false certification, unpaid
refund, or defense to repayment
discharge that results in a remaining
eligibility period greater than zero is no
longer responsible for the interest that
accrues on a Direct Subsidized Loan or
on the portion of a Direct Consolidation
Loan that repaid a Direct Subsidized
Loan unless the borrower once again
becomes responsible for the interest that
accrues on a previously received Direct
Subsidized Loan or on the portion of a
Direct Consolidation Loan that repaid a
Direct Subsidized Loan, for the life of
the loan, as described in paragraph
(f)(3)(i) of this section.
(4) * * *
(iii) For a first-time borrower who
receives a closed school, false
certification, unpaid refund, or defense
to repayment discharge on a Direct
Subsidized Loan or a portion of a Direct
Consolidation Loan that is attributable
to a Direct Subsidized Loan, the
Subsidized Usage Period is reduced. If
the Direct Subsidized Loan or a portion
of a Direct Consolidation Loan that is
attributable to a Direct Subsidized Loan
is discharged in full, the Subsidized
Usage Period of those loans is zero
years. If the Direct Subsidized Loan or
a portion of a Direct Consolidation Loan
that is attributable to a Direct
Subsidized Loan is discharged in part,
the Subsidized Usage Period may be
reduced if the discharge results in the
inapplicability of paragraph (f)(4)(i) of
this section.
*
*
*
*
*
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§ 685.206 Borrower responsibilities and
defenses.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Borrower defenses. (1) For loans
first disbursed prior to July 1, 2017, the
borrower may assert a borrower defense
under this paragraph. A ‘‘borrower
defense’’ refers to any act or omission of
the school attended by the student that
relates to the making of the loan for
enrollment at the school or the
provision of educational services for
which the loan was provided that would
give rise to a cause of action against the
school under applicable State law, and
includes one or both of the following:
(i) A defense to repayment of amounts
owed to the Secretary on a Direct Loan,
in whole or in part.
(ii) A claim to recover amounts
previously collected by the Secretary on
the Direct Loan, in whole or in part.
(2) The order of objections for
defaulted Direct Loans are as described
in § 685.222(a)(6). A borrower defense
claim under this section must be
asserted, and will be resolved, under the
procedures in § 685.222(e) to (k).
(3) For an approved borrower defense
under this section, except as provided
in paragraph (c)(4) of this section, the
Secretary may initiate an appropriate
proceeding to collect from the school
whose act or omission resulted in the
borrower defense the amount of relief
arising from the borrower defense,
within the later of—
(i) Three years from the end of the last
award year in which the student
attended the institution; or
(ii) The limitation period that State
law would apply to an action by the
borrower to recover on the cause of
action on which the borrower defense is
based.
(4) The Secretary may initiate a
proceeding to collect at any time if the
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institution received notice of the claim
before the end of the later of the periods
described in paragraph (c)(3) of this
section. For purposes of this paragraph,
notice includes receipt of—
(i) Actual notice from the borrower,
from a representative of the borrower, or
from the Department;
(ii) A class action complaint asserting
relief for a class that may include the
borrower; and
(iii) Written notice, including a civil
investigative demand or other written
demand for information, from a Federal
or State agency that has power to
initiate an investigation into conduct of
the school relating to specific programs,
periods, or practices that may have
affected the borrower.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 685.209
[Amended]
26. Section 685.209 is amended:
A. In paragraph (a)(1)(ii), by adding ‘‘,
for purposes of determining whether a
borrower has a partial financial
hardship in accordance with paragraph
(a)(1)(v) of this section or adjusting a
borrower’s monthly payment amount in
accordance with paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of
this section,’’ after the words ‘‘Eligible
loan’’.
■ B. In paragraph (c)(1)(ii), by adding ‘‘,
for purposes of adjusting a borrower’s
monthly payment amount in accordance
with paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section,’’
after the words ‘‘Eligible loan’’.
■ C. In paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(B)
introductory text, by removing the word
‘‘Both’’ and adding in its place the
words ‘‘Except in the case of a married
borrower filing separately whose
spouse’s income is excluded in
accordance with paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A)
or (B) of this section, both’’.
■ D. In paragraph (c)(2)(v), by removing
the words ‘‘or the Secretary determines
the borrower does not have a partial
financial hardship’’.
■ E. In paragraph (c)(4)(iii)(B), by
removing the citations ‘‘(c)(2)(iv),
(c)(4)(v), and (c)(4)(vi)’’ and adding, in
their place, the citations ‘‘(c)(2)(iv) and
(c)(4)(v)’’.
■ 27. Section 685.212 is amended by
revising paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) and
adding paragraph (k) to read as follows:
■
■
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
§ 685.212
Discharge of a loan obligation.
(a) Death. (1) If a borrower (or a
student on whose behalf a parent
borrowed a Direct PLUS Loan) dies, the
Secretary discharges the obligation of
the borrower and any endorser to make
any further payments on the loan based
on—
(i) An original or certified copy of the
death certificate;
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(ii) An accurate and complete
photocopy of the original or certified
copy of the death certificate;
(iii) An accurate and complete
original or certified copy of the death
certificate that is scanned and submitted
electronically or sent by facsimile
transmission; or
(iv) Verification of the borrower’s or
student’s death through an authoritative
Federal or State electronic database
approved for use by the Secretary.
(2) Under exceptional circumstances
and on a case-by-case basis, the
Secretary discharges a loan based upon
other reliable documentation of the
borrower’s or student’s death that is
acceptable to the Secretary.
*
*
*
*
*
(k) Borrower defenses. (1) If a
borrower defense is approved under
§ 685.206(c) or § 685.222—
(i) The Secretary discharges the
obligation of the borrower in whole or
in part in accordance with the
procedures in §§ 685.206(c) and
685.222, respectively; and
(ii) The Secretary returns to the
borrower payments made by the
borrower or otherwise recovered on the
loan that exceed the amount owed on
that portion of the loan not discharged,
if the borrower asserted the claim not
later than—
(A) For a claim subject to § 685.206(c),
the limitation period under applicable
law to the claim on which relief was
granted; or
(B) For a claim subject to § 685.222,
the limitation period in § 685.222(b), (c),
or (d), as applicable.
(2) In the case of a Direct
Consolidation Loan, a borrower may
assert a borrower defense under
§ 685.206(c) or § 685.222 with respect to
a Direct Loan, FFEL Program Loan,
Federal Perkins Loan, Health
Professions Student Loan, Loan for
Disadvantaged Students under subpart
II of part A of title VII of the Public
Health Service Act, Health Education
Assistance Loan, or Nursing Loan made
under part E of the Public Health
Service Act that was repaid by the
Direct Consolidation Loan.
(i) The Secretary considers a borrower
defense claim asserted on a Direct
Consolidation Loan by determining—
(A) Whether the act or omission of the
school with regard to the loan described
in paragraph (k)(2) of this section, other
than a Direct Subsidized, Unsubsidized,
or PLUS Loan, constitutes a borrower
defense under § 685.206(c), for a Direct
Consolidation Loan made before July 1,
2017, or under § 685.222, for a Direct
Consolidation Loan made on or after
July 1, 2017; or
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76081
(B) Whether the act or omission of the
school with regard to a Direct
Subsidized, Unsubsidized, or PLUS
Loan made on after July 1, 2017 that was
paid off by the Direct Consolidation
Loan, constitutes a borrower defense
under § 685.222.
(ii) If the borrower defense is
approved, the Secretary discharges the
appropriate portion of the Direct
Consolidation Loan.
(iii) The Secretary returns to the
borrower payments made by the
borrower or otherwise recovered on the
Direct Consolidation Loan that exceed
the amount owed on that portion of the
Direct Consolidation Loan not
discharged, if the borrower asserted the
claim not later than—
(A) For a claim asserted under
§ 685.206(c), the limitation period under
the law applicable to the claim on
which relief was granted; or
(B) For a claim asserted under
§ 685.222, the limitation period in
§ 685.222(b), (c), or (d), as applicable.
(iv) The Secretary returns to the
borrower a payment made by the
borrower or otherwise recovered on the
loan described in paragraph (k)(2) of
this section only if—
(A) The payment was made directly to
the Secretary on the loan; and
(B) The borrower proves that the loan
to which the payment was credited was
not legally enforceable under applicable
law in the amount for which that
payment was applied.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 28. Section 685.214 is amended by:
■ A. Revising paragraphs (c)(2) and
(f)(4).
■ B. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(5) and
(6) as paragraphs (f)(6) and (7),
respectively.
■ C. Adding a new paragraph (f)(5).
The revisions and addition read as
follows:
§ 685.214
Closed school discharge.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(2) If the Secretary determines, based
on information in the Secretary’s
possession, that the borrower qualifies
for the discharge of a loan under this
section, the Secretary—
(i) May discharge the loan without an
application from the borrower; and
(ii) With respect to schools that closed
on or after November 1, 2013, will
discharge the loan without an
application from the borrower if the
borrower did not subsequently re-enroll
in any title IV-eligible institution within
a period of three years from the date the
school closed.
*
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*
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(f) * * *
(4) If a borrower fails to submit the
application described in paragraph (c) of
this section within 60 days of the
Secretary’s providing the discharge
application, the Secretary resumes
collection and grants forbearance of
principal and interest for the period in
which collection activity was
suspended. The Secretary may
capitalize any interest accrued and not
paid during that period.
(5) Upon resuming collection on any
affected loan, the Secretary provides the
borrower another discharge application
and an explanation of the requirements
and procedures for obtaining a
discharge.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 29. Section 685.215 is amended by:
■ A. Revising paragraph (a)(1).
■ B. Revising paragraph (c) introductory
text.
■ C. Revising paragraph (c)(1).
■ D. Redesignating paragraphs (c)(2)
through (7) as paragraphs (c)(3) through
(8), respectively.
■ E. Adding a new paragraph (c)(2).
■ F. Revising redesignated paragraph
(c)(8).
■ G. Revising paragraph (d).
The revisions and addition read as
follows:
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
§ 685.215 Discharge for false certification
of student eligibility or unauthorized
payment.
(a) Basis for discharge—(1) False
certification. The Secretary discharges a
borrower’s (and any endorser’s)
obligation to repay a Direct Loan in
accordance with the provisions of this
section if a school falsely certifies the
eligibility of the borrower (or the
student on whose behalf a parent
borrowed) to receive the proceeds of a
Direct Loan. The Secretary considers a
student’s eligibility to borrow to have
been falsely certified by the school if the
school—
(i) Certified the eligibility of a student
who—
(A) Reported not having a high school
diploma or its equivalent; and
(B) Did not satisfy the alternative to
graduation from high school
requirements under section 484(d) of
the Act that were in effect at the time
of certification;
(ii) Certified the eligibility of a
student who is not a high school
graduate based on—
(A) A high school graduation status
falsified by the school; or
(B) A high school diploma falsified by
the school or a third party to which the
school referred the borrower;
(iii) Signed the borrower’s name on
the loan application or promissory note
without the borrower’s authorization;
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(iv) Certified the eligibility of the
student who, because of a physical or
mental condition, age, criminal record,
or other reason accepted by the
Secretary, would not meet State
requirements for employment (in the
student’s State of residence when the
loan was originated) in the occupation
for which the training program
supported by the loan was intended; or
(v) Certified the eligibility of a student
for a Direct Loan as a result of the crime
of identity theft committed against the
individual, as that crime is defined in
paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Borrower qualification for
discharge. To qualify for discharge
under this section, the borrower must
submit to the Secretary an application
for discharge on a form approved by the
Secretary. The application need not be
notarized but must be made by the
borrower under penalty of perjury; and
in the application, the borrower’s
responses must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that the
requirements in paragraph (c)(1)
through (7) of this section have been
met. If the Secretary determines the
application does not meet the
requirements, the Secretary notifies the
applicant and explains why the
application does not meet the
requirements.
(1) High school diploma or equivalent.
In the case of a borrower requesting a
discharge based on not having had a
high school diploma and not having met
the alternative to graduation from high
school eligibility requirements under
section 484(d) of the Act applicable at
the time the loan was originated, and
the school or a third party to which the
school referred the borrower falsified
the student’s high school diploma, the
borrower must state in the application
that the borrower (or the student on
whose behalf a parent received a PLUS
loan)—
(i) Reported not having a valid high
school diploma or its equivalent at the
time the loan was certified; and
(ii) Did not satisfy the alternative to
graduation from high school statutory or
regulatory eligibility requirements
identified on the application form and
applicable at the time the institution
certified the loan.
(2) Disqualifying condition. In the
case of a borrower requesting a
discharge based on a condition that
would disqualify the borrower from
employment in the occupation that the
training program for which the borrower
received the loan was intended, the
borrower must state in the application
that the borrower (or student for whom
a parent received a PLUS loan)—
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(i) Did not meet State requirements for
employment (in the student’s State of
residence) in the occupation that the
training program for which the borrower
received the loan was intended because
of a physical or mental condition, age,
criminal record, or other reason
accepted by the Secretary.
(ii) [Reserved]
*
*
*
*
*
(8) Discharge without an application.
The Secretary discharges all or part of
a loan as appropriate under this section
without an application from the
borrower if the Secretary determines,
based on information in the Secretary’s
possession, that the borrower qualifies
for a discharge. Such information
includes, but is not limited to, evidence
that the school has falsified the
Satisfactory Academic Progress of its
students, as described in § 668.34.
(d) Discharge procedures. (1) If the
Secretary determines that a borrower’s
Direct Loan may be eligible for a
discharge under this section, the
Secretary provides the borrower an
application and an explanation of the
qualifications and procedures for
obtaining a discharge. The Secretary
also promptly suspends any efforts to
collect from the borrower on any
affected loan. The Secretary may
continue to receive borrower payments.
(2) If the borrower fails to submit the
application described in paragraph (c) of
this section within 60 days of the
Secretary’s providing the application,
the Secretary resumes collection and
grants forbearance of principal and
interest for the period in which
collection activity was suspended. The
Secretary may capitalize any interest
accrued and not paid during that period.
(3) If the borrower submits the
application described in paragraph (c) of
this section, the Secretary determines
whether the available evidence supports
the claim for discharge. Available
evidence includes evidence provided by
the borrower and any other relevant
information from the Secretary’s records
and gathered by the Secretary from
other sources, including guaranty
agencies, other Federal agencies, State
authorities, test publishers, independent
test administrators, school records, and
cognizant accrediting associations. The
Secretary issues a decision that explains
the reasons for any adverse
determination on the application,
describes the evidence on which the
decision was made, and provides the
borrower, upon request, copies of the
evidence. The Secretary considers any
response from the borrower and any
additional information from the
borrower, and notifies the borrower
whether the determination is changed.
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(4) If the Secretary determines that the
borrower meets the applicable
requirements for a discharge under
paragraph (c) of this section, the
Secretary notifies the borrower in
writing of that determination.
(5) If the Secretary determines that the
borrower does not qualify for a
discharge, the Secretary notifies the
borrower in writing of that
determination and the reasons for the
determination.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 685.220
[Amended]
30. Section 685.220 is amended by:
A. Removing the words ‘‘subpart II of
part B’’ from paragraph (b)(21) and
adding in their place the words ‘‘part
E’’.
■ B. Removing paragraph (d)(1)(i).
■ C. Redesignating paragraph (d)(1)(ii)
and (iii) as paragraphs (d)(1)(i) and (ii).
■ 31. Section 685.222 is added to
subpart B to read as follows:
■
■
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
§ 685.222
Borrower defenses.
(a) General. (1) For loans first
disbursed prior to July 1, 2017, a
borrower asserts and the Secretary
considers a borrower defense in
accordance with the provisions of
§ 685.206(c), unless otherwise noted in
§ 685.206(c).
(2) For loans first disbursed on or after
July 1, 2017, a borrower asserts and the
Secretary considers a borrower defense
in accordance with this section. To
establish a borrower defense under this
section, a preponderance of the
evidence must show that the borrower
has a borrower defense that meets the
requirements of this section.
(3) A violation by the school of an
eligibility or compliance requirement in
the Act or its implementing regulations
is not a basis for a borrower defense
under either this section or § 685.206(c)
unless the violation would otherwise
constitute a basis for a borrower defense
under this section or § 685.206(c), as
applicable.
(4) For the purposes of this section
and § 685.206(c), ‘‘borrower’’ means—
(i) The borrower; and
(ii) In the case of a Direct PLUS Loan,
any endorsers, and for a Direct PLUS
Loan made to a parent, the student on
whose behalf the parent borrowed.
(5) For the purposes of this section
and § 685.206(c), a ‘‘borrower defense’’
refers to an act or omission of the school
attended by the student that relates to
the making of a Direct Loan for
enrollment at the school or the
provision of educational services for
which the loan was provided, and
includes one or both of the following:
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(i) A defense to repayment of amounts
owed to the Secretary on a Direct Loan,
in whole or in part; and
(ii) A right to recover amounts
previously collected by the Secretary on
the Direct Loan, in whole or in part.
(6) If the borrower asserts both a
borrower defense and any other
objection to an action of the Secretary
with regard to that Direct Loan, the
order in which the Secretary will
consider objections, including a
borrower defense, will be determined as
appropriate under the circumstances.
(b) Judgment against the school. The
borrower has a borrower defense if the
borrower, whether as an individual or as
a member of a class, or a governmental
agency, has obtained against the school
a nondefault, favorable contested
judgment based on State or Federal law
in a court or administrative tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. A borrower may
assert a borrower defense under this
paragraph at any time.
(c) Breach of contract by the school.
The borrower has a borrower defense if
the school the borrower received the
Direct Loan to attend failed to perform
its obligations under the terms of a
contract with the student. A borrower
may assert a defense to repayment of
amounts owed to the Secretary under
this paragraph at any time after the
breach by the school of its contract with
the student. A borrower may assert a
right to recover amounts previously
collected by the Secretary under this
paragraph not later than six years after
the breach by the school of its contract
with the student.
(d) Substantial misrepresentation by
the school. (1) A borrower has a
borrower defense if the school or any of
its representatives, or any institution,
organization, or person with whom the
school has an agreement to provide
educational programs, or to provide
marketing, advertising, recruiting, or
admissions services, made a substantial
misrepresentation in accordance with
34 CFR part 668, subpart F, that the
borrower reasonably relied on to the
borrower’s detriment when the borrower
decided to attend, or to continue
attending, the school or decided to take
out a Direct Loan. A borrower may
assert, at any time, a defense to
repayment under this paragraph (d) of
amounts owed to the Secretary. A
borrower may assert a claim under this
paragraph (d) to recover funds
previously collected by the Secretary
not later than six years after the
borrower discovers, or reasonably could
have discovered, the information
constituting the substantial
misrepresentation.
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(2) For the purposes of this section, a
designated Department official pursuant
to paragraph (e) of this section or a
hearing official pursuant to paragraph
(f), (g), or (h) of this section may
consider, as evidence supporting the
reasonableness of a borrower’s reliance
on a misrepresentation, whether the
school or any of the other parties
described in paragraph (d)(1) engaged in
conduct such as, but not limited to:
(i) Demanding that the borrower make
enrollment or loan-related decisions
immediately;
(ii) Placing an unreasonable emphasis
on unfavorable consequences of delay;
(iii) Discouraging the borrower from
consulting an adviser, a family member,
or other resource;
(iv) Failing to respond to the
borrower’s requests for more
information including about the cost of
the program and the nature of any
financial aid; or
(v) Otherwise unreasonably
pressuring the borrower or taking
advantage of the borrower’s distress or
lack of knowledge or sophistication.
(e) Procedure for an individual
borrower. (1) To assert a borrower
defense under this section, an
individual borrower must—
(i) Submit an application to the
Secretary, on a form approved by the
Secretary—
(A) Certifying that the borrower
received the proceeds of a loan, in
whole or in part, to attend the named
school;
(B) Providing evidence that supports
the borrower defense; and
(C) Indicating whether the borrower
has made a claim with respect to the
information underlying the borrower
defense with any third party, such as
the holder of a performance bond or a
tuition recovery program, and, if so, the
amount of any payment received by the
borrower or credited to the borrower’s
loan obligation; and
(ii) Provide any other information or
supporting documentation reasonably
requested by the Secretary.
(2) Upon receipt of a borrower’s
application, the Secretary—
(i) If the borrower is not in default on
the loan for which a borrower defense
has been asserted, grants forbearance
and—
(A) Notifies the borrower of the option
to decline the forbearance and to
continue making payments on the loan;
and
(B) Provides the borrower with
information about the availability of the
income-contingent repayment plans
under § 685.209 and the income-based
repayment plan under § 685.221; or
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(ii) If the borrower is in default on the
loan for which a borrower defense has
been asserted—
(A) Suspends collection activity on
the loan until the Secretary issues a
decision on the borrower’s claim;
(B) Notifies the borrower of the
suspension of collection activity and
explains that collection activity will
resume if the Secretary determines that
the borrower does not qualify for a full
discharge; and
(C) Notifies the borrower of the option
to continue making payments under a
rehabilitation agreement or other
repayment agreement on the defaulted
loan.
(3) The Secretary designates a
Department official to review the
borrower’s application to determine
whether the application states a basis
for a borrower defense, and resolves the
claim through a fact-finding process
conducted by the Department official.
(i) As part of the fact-finding process,
the Department official notifies the
school of the borrower defense
application and considers any evidence
or argument presented by the borrower
and also any additional information,
including—
(A) Department records;
(B) Any response or submissions from
the school; and
(C) Any additional information or
argument that may be obtained by the
Department official.
(ii) Upon the borrower’s request, the
Department official identifies to the
borrower the records the Department
official considers relevant to the
borrower defense. The Secretary
provides to the borrower any of the
identified records upon reasonable
request of the borrower.
(4) At the conclusion of the factfinding process, the Department official
issues a written decision as follows:
(i) If the Department official approves
the borrower defense in full or in part,
the Department official notifies the
borrower in writing of that
determination and of the relief provided
as described in paragraph (i) of this
section.
(ii) If the Department official denies
the borrower defense in full or in part,
the Department official notifies the
borrower of the reasons for the denial,
the evidence that was relied upon, any
portion of the loan that is due and
payable to the Secretary, and whether
the Secretary will reimburse any
amounts previously collected, and
informs the borrower that if any balance
remains on the loan, the loan will return
to its status prior to the borrower’s
submission of the application. The
Department official also informs the
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borrower of the opportunity to request
reconsideration of the claim based on
new evidence pursuant to paragraph
(e)(5)(i) of this section.
(5) The decision of the Department
official is final as to the merits of the
claim and any relief that may be granted
on the claim. Notwithstanding the
foregoing—
(i) If the borrower defense is denied
in full or in part, the borrower may
request that the Secretary reconsider the
borrower defense upon the
identification of new evidence in
support of the borrower’s claim. ‘‘New
evidence’’ is relevant evidence that the
borrower did not previously provide
and that was not identified in the final
decision as evidence that was relied
upon for the final decision. If accepted
for reconsideration by the Secretary, the
Secretary follows the procedure in
paragraph (e)(2) of this section for
granting forbearance and for defaulted
loans; and
(ii) The Secretary may reopen a
borrower defense application at any
time to consider evidence that was not
considered in making the previous
decision. If a borrower defense
application is reopened by the
Secretary, the Secretary follows the
procedure paragraph (e)(2) of this
section for granting forbearance and for
defaulted loans.
(6) The Secretary may consolidate
applications filed under this paragraph
(e) that have common facts and claims,
and resolve the borrowers’ borrower
defense claims as provided in
paragraphs (f), (g), and (h) of this
section.
(7) The Secretary may initiate a
proceeding to collect from the school
the amount of relief resulting from a
borrower defense under this section—
(i) Within the six-year period
applicable to the borrower defense
under paragraph (c) or (d) of this
section;
(ii) At any time, for a borrower
defense under paragraph (b) of this
section; or
(iii) At any time if during the period
described in paragraph (e)(7)(i) of this
section, the institution received notice
of the claim. For purposes of this
paragraph, notice includes receipt of—
(A) Actual notice from the borrower,
a representative of the borrower, or the
Department of a claim, including notice
of an application filed pursuant to this
section or § 685.206(c);
(B) A class action complaint asserting
relief for a class that may include the
borrower for underlying facts that may
form the basis of a claim under this
section or § 685.206(c);
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(C) Written notice, including a civil
investigative demand or other written
demand for information, from a Federal
or State agency that has power to
initiate an investigation into conduct of
the school relating to specific programs,
periods, or practices that may have
affected the borrower, for underlying
facts that may form the basis of a claim
under this section or § 685.206(c).
(f) Group process for borrower
defense, generally. (1) Upon
consideration of factors including, but
not limited to, common facts and
claims, fiscal impact, and the promotion
of compliance by the school or other
title IV, HEA program participant, the
Secretary may initiate a process to
determine whether a group of
borrowers, identified by the Secretary,
has a borrower defense.
(i) The members of the group may be
identified by the Secretary from
individually filed applications pursuant
to paragraph (e)(6) of this section or
from any other source.
(ii) If the Secretary determines that
there are common facts and claims that
apply to borrowers who have not filed
an application under paragraph (e) of
this section, the Secretary may identify
such borrowers as members of a group.
(2) Upon the identification of a group
of borrowers under paragraph (f)(1) of
this section, the Secretary—
(i) Designates a Department official to
present the group’s claim in the factfinding process described in paragraph
(g) or (h) of this section, as applicable;
(ii) Provides each identified member
of the group with notice that allows the
borrower to opt out of the proceeding;
(iii) If identified members of the group
are borrowers who have not filed an
application under paragraph (f)(1)(ii) of
this section, follows the procedures in
paragraph (e)(2) of this section for
granting forbearance and for defaulted
loans for such identified members of the
group, unless an opt-out by such a
member of the group is received; and
(iv) Notifies the school of the basis of
the group’s borrower defense, the
initiation of the fact-finding process
described in paragraph (g) or (h) of this
section, and of any procedure by which
the school may request records and
respond. No notice will be provided if
notice is impossible or irrelevant due to
a school’s closure.
(3) For a group of borrowers identified
by the Secretary, for which the Secretary
determines that there may be a borrower
defense under paragraph (d) of this
section based upon a substantial
misrepresentation that has been widely
disseminated, there is a rebuttable
presumption that each member
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reasonably relied on the
misrepresentation.
(g) Procedures for group process for
borrower defenses with respect to loans
made to attend a closed school. For
groups identified by the Secretary under
paragraph (f) of this section, for which
the borrower defense is asserted with
respect to a Direct Loan to attend a
school that has closed and has provided
no financial protection currently
available to the Secretary from which to
recover any losses arising from borrower
defenses, and for which there is no
appropriate entity from which the
Secretary can otherwise practicably
recover such losses—
(1) A hearing official resolves the
borrower defense through a fact-finding
process. As part of the fact-finding
process, the hearing official considers
any evidence and argument presented
by the Department official on behalf of
the group and, as necessary to
determine any claims at issue, on behalf
of individual members of the group. The
hearing official also considers any
additional information the Department
official considers necessary, including
any Department records or response
from the school or a person affiliated
with the school as described in
§ 668.174(b), if practicable. The hearing
official issues a written decision as
follows:
(i) If the hearing official approves the
borrower defense in full or in part, the
written decision states that
determination and the relief provided
on the basis of that claim as determined
under paragraph (i) of this section.
(ii) If the hearing official denies the
borrower defense in full or in part, the
written decision states the reasons for
the denial, the evidence that was relied
upon, the portion of the loans that are
due and payable to the Secretary, and
whether reimbursement of amounts
previously collected is granted, and
informs the borrowers that if any
balance remains on the loan, the loan
will return to its status prior to the
group claim process.
(iii) The Secretary provides copies of
the written decision to the members of
the group and, as practicable, to the
school.
(2) The decision of the hearing official
is final as to the merits of the group
borrower defense and any relief that
may be granted on the group claim.
(3) After a final decision has been
issued, if relief for the group has been
denied in full or in part pursuant to
paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this section, an
individual borrower may file a claim for
relief pursuant to paragraph (e)(5)(i) of
this section.
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(4) The Secretary may reopen a
borrower defense application at any
time to consider evidence that was not
considered in making the previous
decision. If a borrower defense
application is reopened by the
Secretary, the Secretary follows the
procedure in paragraph (e)(2) of this
section for granting forbearance and for
defaulted loans.
(h) Procedures for group process for
borrower defenses with respect to loans
made to attend an open school. For
groups identified by the Secretary under
paragraph (f) of this section, for which
the borrower defense is asserted with
respect to Direct Loans to attend a
school that is not covered by paragraph
(g) of this section, the claim is resolved
in accordance with the procedures in
this paragraph (h).
(1) A hearing official resolves the
borrower defense and determines any
liability of the school through a factfinding process. As part of the factfinding process, the hearing official
considers any evidence and argument
presented by the school and the
Department official on behalf of the
group and, as necessary to determine
any claims at issue, on behalf of
individual members of the group. The
hearing official issues a written decision
as follows:
(i) If the hearing official approves the
borrower defense in full or in part, the
written decision establishes the basis for
the determination, notifies the members
of the group of the relief as described in
paragraph (i) of this section, and notifies
the school of any liability to the
Secretary for the amounts discharged
and reimbursed.
(ii) If the hearing official denies the
borrower defense for the group in full or
in part, the written decision states the
reasons for the denial, the evidence that
was relied upon, the portion of the loans
that are due and payable to the
Secretary, and whether reimbursement
of amounts previously collected is
granted, and informs the borrowers that
their loans will return to their statuses
prior to the group borrower defense
process. The decision notifies the school
of any liability to the Secretary for any
amounts discharged or reimbursed.
(iii) The Secretary provides copies of
the written decision to the members of
the group, the Department official, and
the school.
(2) The decision of the hearing official
becomes final as to the merits of the
group borrower defense and any relief
that may be granted on the group
borrower defense within 30 days after
the decision is issued and received by
the Department official and the school
unless, within that 30-day period, the
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76085
school or the Department official
appeals the decision to the Secretary. In
the case of an appeal—
(i) The decision of the hearing official
does not take effect pending the appeal;
and
(ii) The Secretary renders a final
decision.
(3) After a final decision has been
issued, if relief for the group has been
denied in full or in part pursuant to
paragraph (h)(1)(ii) of this section, an
individual borrower may file a claim for
relief pursuant to paragraph (e)(5)(i) of
this section.
(4) The Secretary may reopen a
borrower defense application at any
time to consider evidence that was not
considered in making the previous
decision. If a borrower defense
application is reopened by the
Secretary, the Secretary follows the
procedure in paragraph (e)(2) of this
section for granting forbearance and for
defaulted loans.
(5)(i) The Secretary collects from the
school any liability to the Secretary for
any amounts discharged or reimbursed
to borrowers under this paragraph (h).
(ii) For a borrower defense under
paragraph (b) of this section, the
Secretary may initiate a proceeding to
collect at any time.
(iii) For a borrower defense under
paragraph (c) or (d) of this section, the
Secretary may initiate a proceeding to
collect within the limitation period that
would apply to the borrower defense,
provided that the Secretary may bring
an action to collect at any time if, within
the limitation period, the school
received notice of the borrower’s
borrower defense claim. For purposes of
this paragraph, the school receives
notice of the borrower’s claim by receipt
of—
(A) Actual notice of the claim from
the borrower, a representative of the
borrower, or the Department, including
notice of an application filed pursuant
to this section or § 685.206(c);
(B) A class action complaint asserting
relief for a class that may include the
borrower for underlying facts that may
form the basis of a claim under this
section or § 685.206(c); or
(C) Written notice, including a civil
investigative demand or other written
demand for information, from a Federal
or State agency that has power to
initiate an investigation into conduct of
the school relating to specific programs,
periods, or practices that may have
affected the borrower, of underlying
facts that may form the basis of a claim
under this section or § 685.206(c).
(i) Relief. If a borrower defense is
approved under the procedures in
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paragraph (e), (g), or (h) of this section,
the following procedures apply:
(1) The Department official or the
hearing official deciding the claim
determines the appropriate amount of
relief to award the borrower, which may
be a discharge of all amounts owed to
the Secretary on the loan at issue and
may include the recovery of amounts
previously collected by the Secretary on
the loan, or some lesser amount.
(2) For a borrower defense brought on
the basis of—
(i) A substantial misrepresentation,
the Department official or the hearing
official will factor the borrower’s cost of
attendance to attend the school, as well
as the value of the education the
borrower received, the value of the
education that a reasonable borrower in
the borrower’s circumstances would
have received, and/or the value of the
education the borrower should have
expected given the information
provided by the institution, into the
determination of appropriate relief. A
borrower may be granted full, partial, or
no relief. Value will be assessed in a
manner that is reasonable and
practicable. In addition, the Department
official or the hearing official deciding
the claim may consider any other
relevant factors;
(ii) A judgment against the school—
(A) Where the judgment awards
specific financial relief, relief will be the
amount of the judgment that remains
unsatisfied, subject to the limitation
provided for in § 685.222(i)(8) and any
other reasonable considerations; and
(B) Where the judgment does not
award specific financial relief, the
Department will rely on the holding of
the case and applicable law to monetize
the judgment; and
(iii) A breach of contract, relief will be
determined according to the common
law of contracts, subject to the
limitation provided for in § 685.222(i)(8)
and any other reasonable
considerations.
(3) In a fact-finding process brought
against an open school under paragraph
(h) of this section on the basis of a
substantial misrepresentation, the
school has the burden of proof as to any
value of the education.
(4) In determining the relief, the
Department official or the hearing
official deciding the claim may
consider—
(i) Information derived from a sample
of borrowers from the group when
calculating relief for a group of
borrowers; and
(ii) The examples in Appendix A to
this subpart.
(5) In the written decision described
in paragraphs (e), (g), and (h) of this
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section, the designated Department
official or hearing official deciding the
claim notifies the borrower of the relief
provided and—
(i) Specifies the relief determination;
(ii) Advises that there may be tax
implications; and
(iii) Advises the borrower of the
requirements to file a request for
reconsideration upon the identification
of new evidence.
(6) Consistent with the determination
of relief under paragraph (i)(1) of this
section, the Secretary discharges the
borrower’s obligation to repay all or part
of the loan and associated costs and fees
that the borrower would otherwise be
obligated to pay and, if applicable,
reimburses the borrower for amounts
paid toward the loan voluntarily or
through enforced collection.
(7) The Department official or the
hearing official deciding the case, or the
Secretary as applicable, affords the
borrower such further relief as
appropriate under the circumstances.
Such further relief includes, but is not
limited to, one or both of the following:
(i) Determining that the borrower is
not in default on the loan and is eligible
to receive assistance under title IV of the
Act.
(ii) Updating reports to consumer
reporting agencies to which the
Secretary previously made adverse
credit reports with regard to the
borrower’s Direct Loan.
(8) The total amount of relief granted
with respect to a borrower defense
cannot exceed the amount of the loan
and any associated costs and fees and
will be reduced by the amount of any
refund, reimbursement,
indemnification, restitution,
compensatory damages, settlement, debt
forgiveness, discharge, cancellation,
compromise, or any other financial
benefit received by, or on behalf of, the
borrower that was related to the
borrower defense. The relief to the
borrower may not include nonpecuniary damages such as
inconvenience, aggravation, emotional
distress, or punitive damages.
(j) Cooperation by the borrower. To
obtain relief under this section, a
borrower must reasonably cooperate
with the Secretary in any proceeding
under paragraph (e), (g), or (h) of this
section. The Secretary may revoke any
relief granted to a borrower who fails to
satisfy his or her obligations under this
paragraph (j).
(k) Transfer to the Secretary of the
borrower’s right of recovery against third
parties. (1) Upon the granting of any
relief under this section, the borrower is
deemed to have assigned to, and
relinquished in favor of, the Secretary
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any right to a loan refund (up to the
amount discharged) that the borrower
may have by contract or applicable law
with respect to the loan or the contract
for educational services for which the
loan was received, against the school, its
principals, its affiliates, and their
successors, its sureties, and any private
fund. If the borrower asserts a claim to,
and recovers from, a public fund, the
Secretary may reinstate the borrower’s
obligation to repay on the loan an
amount based on the amount recovered
from the public fund, if the Secretary
determines that the borrower’s recovery
from the public fund was based on the
same borrower defense and for the same
loan for which the discharge was
granted under this section.
(2) The provisions of this paragraph
(k) apply notwithstanding any provision
of State law that would otherwise
restrict transfer of those rights by the
borrower, limit or prevent a transferee
from exercising those rights, or establish
procedures or a scheme of distribution
that would prejudice the Secretary’s
ability to recover on those rights.
(3) Nothing in this paragraph (k)
limits or forecloses the borrower’s right
to pursue legal and equitable relief
against a party described in this
paragraph (k) for recovery of any portion
of a claim exceeding that assigned to the
Secretary or any other claims arising
from matters unrelated to the claim on
which the loan is discharged.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq.; 28 U.S.C.
2401; 31 U.S.C. 3702)
32. Section 685.223 is added to
subpart B to read as follows:
■
§ 685.223
Severability.
If any provision of this subpart or its
application to any person, act, or
practice is held invalid, the remainder
of the subpart or the application of its
provisions to any person, act, or practice
shall not be affected thereby.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq.)
33. Appendix A to subpart B of part
685 is added to read as follows:
■
Appendix A to Subpart B of Part 685—
Examples of Borrower Relief
The Department official or the hearing
official deciding a borrower defense claim
determines the amount of relief to award the
borrower, which may be a discharge of all
amounts owed to the Secretary on the loan
at issue and may include the recovery of
amounts previously collected by the
Secretary on the loan, or some lesser amount.
The following are some conceptual examples
demonstrating relief. The actual relief
awarded will be determined by the
Department official or the hearing official
deciding the claim, who shall not be bound
by these examples.
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1. A school represents to prospective
students, in widely disseminated materials,
that its educational program will lead to
employment in an occupation that requires
State licensure. The program does not in fact
meet minimum education requirements to
enable its graduates to sit for the exam
necessary for them to obtain licensure. The
claims are adjudicated in a group process.
Appropriate relief: Borrowers who enrolled
in this program during the time that the
misrepresentation was made should receive
full relief. As a result of the schools’
misrepresentation, the borrowers cannot
work in the occupation in which they
reasonably expected to work when they
enrolled. Accordingly, borrowers received
limited or no value from this educational
program because they did not receive the
value that they reasonably expected.
2. A school states to a prospective student
that its medical assisting program has a
faculty composed of skilled nurses and
physicians and offers internships at a local
hospital. The borrower enrolls in the school
in reliance on that statement. In fact, none of
the teachers at the school other than the
Director is a nurse or physician. The school
has no internship program. The teachers at
the school are not qualified to teach medical
assisting and the student is not qualified for
medical assistant jobs based on the education
received at the school.
Appropriate relief: This borrower should
receive full relief. None of the teachers at the
school are qualified to teach medical
assisting, and there was no internship. In
contrast to reasonable students’ expectations,
based on information provided by the school,
the typical borrower received no value from
the program.
3. An individual interested in becoming a
registered nurse meets with a school’s
admissions counselor who explains that the
school does not have a nursing program but
that completion of a medical assisting
program is a prerequisite for any nursing
program. Based on this information, the
borrower enrolls in the school’s medical
assisting program rather than searching for
another nursing program, believing that
completing a medical assisting program is a
necessary step towards becoming a nurse.
After one year in the program, the borrower
realizes that it is not necessary to become a
medical assistant before entering a nursing
program. The borrower’s credits are not
transferrable to a nursing program.
Appropriate relief: This borrower should
receive full relief. Because it is not necessary
to become a medical assistant prior to
entering a nursing program, she has made no
progress towards the career she sought, and
in fact has received an education that cannot
be used for its intended purpose.
4. A school tells a prospective student,
who is actively seeking an education, that the
cost of the program will be $20,000. Relying
on that statement, the borrower enrolls. The
student later learns the cost for that year was
$25,000. There is no evidence of any other
misrepresentations in the enrollment process
or of any deficiency in value in the school’s
education.
Appropriate relief: This borrower should
receive partial relief of $5,000. The borrower
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received precisely the value that she
expected. The school provides the education
that the student was seeking but
misrepresented the price.
5. A school represents in its marketing
materials that three of its undergraduate
faculty members in a particular program have
received the highest award in their field. A
borrower choosing among two comparable,
selective programs enrolls in that program in
reliance on the representation about its
faculty. However, although the program
otherwise remains the same, the school had
failed to update the marketing materials to
reflect the fact that the award-winning
faculty had left the school.
Appropriate relief: Although the borrower
reasonably relied on a misrepresentation
about the faculty in deciding to enroll at this
school, she still received the value that she
expected. Therefore, no relief is appropriate.
6. An individual wishes to enroll in a
selective, regionally accredited liberal arts
school. The school gives inflated data to a
well-regarded school ranking organization
regarding the median grade point average of
recent entrants and also includes that
inflated data in its own marketing materials.
This inflated data raises the place of the
school in the organization’s rankings in
independent publications. The individual
enrolls in the school and graduates. Soon
after graduating, the individual learns from
the news that the school falsified admissions
data. Notwithstanding this issue, degrees
from the school continue to serve as effective,
well-regarded liberal arts credentials.
The Department also determines that the
school violated the title IV requirement that
it not make substantial misrepresentations
pursuant to 34 CFR 668.71, which constitutes
an enforceable violation separate and apart
from any borrower defense relief.
Appropriate Relief: The borrower relied on
the misrepresentation about the admissions
data to his detriment, because the
misrepresentation factored into the
borrower’s decision to choose the school over
others. However, the borrower received a
selective liberal arts education which
represents the value that he could reasonably
expect, and gets no relief.
34. Section 685.300 is amended by:
A. Redesignating paragraph (b)(11) as
paragraph (b)(12).
■ B. Adding a new paragraph (b)(11).
■ C. Adding paragraphs (d) through (i).
The additions read as follows:
■
■
§ 685.300 Agreements between an eligible
school and the Secretary for participation in
the Direct Loan Program.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(11) Comply with the provisions of
paragraphs (d) through (i) of this section
regarding student claims and disputes.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) Borrower defense claims in an
internal dispute process. The school
will not compel any student to pursue
a complaint based on a borrower
defense claim through an internal
dispute process before the student
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presents the complaint to an accrediting
agency or government agency
authorized to hear the complaint.
(e) Class action bans. (1) The school
will not seek to rely in any way on a
predispute arbitration agreement or on
any other predispute agreement with a
student who has obtained or benefited
from a Direct Loan, with respect to any
aspect of a class action that is related to
a borrower defense claim, including to
seek a stay or dismissal of particular
claims or the entire action, unless and
until the presiding court has ruled that
the case may not proceed as a class
action and, if that ruling may be subject
to appellate review on an interlocutory
basis, the time to seek such review has
elapsed or the review has been resolved.
(2) Reliance on a predispute
arbitration agreement, or on any other
predispute agreement, with a student,
with respect to any aspect of a class
action includes, but is not limited to,
any of the following:
(i) Seeking dismissal, deferral, or stay
of any aspect of a class action.
(ii) Seeking to exclude a person or
persons from a class in a class action.
(iii) Objecting to or seeking a
protective order intended to avoid
responding to discovery in a class
action.
(iv) Filing a claim in arbitration
against a student who has filed a claim
on the same issue in a class action.
(v) Filing a claim in arbitration against
a student who has filed a claim on the
same issue in a class action after the
trial court has denied a motion to certify
the class but before an appellate court
has ruled on an interlocutory appeal of
that motion, if the time to seek such an
appeal has not elapsed or the appeal has
not been resolved.
(vi) Filing a claim in arbitration
against a student who has filed a claim
on the same issue in a class action after
the trial court in that class action has
granted a motion to dismiss the claim
and, in doing so, the court noted that
the consumer has leave to refile the
claim on a class basis, if the time to
refile the claim has not elapsed.
(3) Required provisions and notices.
(i) The school must include the
following provision in any agreements
with a student recipient of a Direct Loan
for attendance at the school, or, with
respect to a Parent PLUS Loan, a student
for whom the PLUS loan was obtained,
that include any agreement regarding
predispute arbitration or any other
predispute agreement addressing class
actions and that are entered into after
the effective date of this regulation: ‘‘We
agree that neither we nor anyone else
will use this agreement to stop you from
being part of a class action lawsuit in
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court. You may file a class action
lawsuit in court or you may be a
member of a class action lawsuit even
if you do not file it. This provision
applies only to class action claims
concerning our acts or omissions
regarding the making of the Direct Loan
or the provision by us of educational
services for which the Direct Loan was
obtained. We agree that only the court
is to decide whether a claim asserted in
the lawsuit is a claim regarding the
making of the Federal Direct Loan or the
provision of educational services for
which the loan was obtained.’’
(ii) When a predispute arbitration
agreement or any other predispute
agreement addressing class actions has
been entered into before the effective
date of this regulation and does not
contain a provision described in
paragraph (e)(3)(i) of this section, the
school must either ensure the agreement
is amended to contain the provision
specified in paragraph (e)(3)(iii)(A) of
this section or provide the student to
whom the agreement applies with the
written notice specified in paragraph
(e)(3)(iii)(B) of this section.
(iii) The school must ensure the
agreement described in paragraph
(e)(3)(ii) of this section is amended to
contain the provision specified in
paragraph (e)(3)(iii)(A) or must provide
the notice specified in paragraph
(e)(3)(iii)(B) to students no later than the
exit counseling required under
§ 685.304(b), or the date on which the
school files its initial response to a
demand for arbitration or service of a
complaint from a student who has not
already been sent a notice or
amendment.
(A) Agreement provision. ‘‘We agree
that neither we nor anyone else who
later becomes a party to this agreement
will use it to stop you from being part
of a class action lawsuit in court. You
may file a class action lawsuit in court
or you may be a member of a class
action lawsuit in court even if you do
not file it. This provision applies only
to class action claims concerning our
acts or omissions regarding the making
of the Federal Direct Loan or the
provision by us of educational services
for which the Federal Direct Loan was
obtained. We agree that only the court
is to decide whether a claim asserted in
the lawsuit is a claim regarding the
making of the Federal Direct Loan or the
provision of educational services for
which the loan was obtained.’’
(B) Notice provision. ‘‘We agree not to
use any predispute agreement to stop
you from being part of a class action
lawsuit in court. You may file a class
action lawsuit in court or you may be
a member of a class action lawsuit even
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21:23 Oct 31, 2016
Jkt 241001
if you do not file it. This provision
applies only to class action claims
concerning our acts or omissions
regarding the making of the Federal
Direct Loan or the provision by us of
educational services for which the
Federal Direct Loan was obtained. We
agree that only the court is to decide
whether a claim asserted in the lawsuit
is a claim regarding the making of the
Federal Direct Loan or the provision of
educational services for which the loan
was obtained.’’
(f) Predispute arbitration agreements.
(1)(i) The school will not enter into a
predispute agreement to arbitrate a
borrower defense claim, or rely in any
way on a predispute arbitration
agreement with respect to any aspect of
a borrower defense claim.
(ii) A student may enter into a
voluntary post-dispute arbitration
agreement with a school to arbitrate a
borrower defense claim.
(2) Reliance on a predispute
arbitration agreement with a student
with respect to any aspect of a borrower
defense claim includes, but is not
limited to, any of the following:
(i) Seeking dismissal, deferral, or stay
of any aspect of a judicial action filed
by the student, including joinder with
others in an action;
(ii) Objecting to or seeking a
protective order intended to avoid
responding to discovery in a judicial
action filed by the student; and
(iii) Filing a claim in arbitration
against a student who has filed a suit on
the same claim.
(3) Required provisions and notices.
(i) The school must include the
following provision in any predispute
arbitration agreements with a student
recipient of a Direct Loan for attendance
at the school, or, with respect to a
Parent PLUS Loan, a student for whom
the PLUS loan was obtained, that
include any agreement regarding
arbitration and that are entered into
after the effective date of this regulation:
‘‘We agree that neither we nor anyone
else will use this agreement to stop you
from bringing a lawsuit concerning our
acts or omissions regarding the making
of the Federal Direct Loan or the
provision by us of educational services
for which the Federal Direct Loan was
obtained. You may file a lawsuit for
such a claim or you may be a member
of a class action lawsuit for such a claim
even if you do not file it. This provision
does not apply to lawsuits concerning
other claims. We agree that only the
court is to decide whether a claim
asserted in the lawsuit is a claim
regarding the making of the Federal
Direct Loan or the provision of
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educational services for which the loan
was obtained.’’
(ii) When a predispute arbitration
agreement has been entered into before
the effective date of this regulation that
did not contain the provision specified
in paragraph (f)(3)(i) of this section, the
school must either ensure the agreement
is amended to contain the provision
specified in paragraph (f)(3)(iii)(A) of
this section or provide the student to
whom the agreement applies with the
written notice specified in paragraph
(f)(3)(iii)(B) of this section.
(iii) The school must ensure the
agreement described in paragraph
(f)(3)(ii) of this section is amended to
contain the provision specified in
paragraph (f)(3)(iii)(A) of this section or
must provide the notice specified in
paragraph (f)(3)(iii)(B) of this section to
students no later than the exit
counseling required under § 685.304(b),
or the date on which the school files its
initial response to a demand for
arbitration or service of a complaint
from a student who has not already been
sent a notice or amendment.
(A) Agreement provision. ‘‘We agree
that neither we nor anyone else who
later becomes a party to this predispute
arbitration agreement will use it to stop
you from bringing a lawsuit concerning
our acts or omissions regarding the
making of the Federal Direct Loan or the
provision by us of educational services
for which the Federal Direct Loan was
obtained. You may file a lawsuit for
such a claim or you may be a member
of a class action lawsuit for such a claim
even if you do not file it. This provision
does not apply to other claims. We agree
that only the court is to decide whether
a claim asserted in the lawsuit is a claim
regarding the making of the Federal
Direct Loan or the provision of
educational services for which the loan
was obtained.’’
(B) Notice provision. ‘‘We agree not to
use any predispute arbitration
agreement to stop you from bringing a
lawsuit concerning our acts or
omissions regarding the making of the
Federal Direct Loan or the provision by
us of educational services for which the
Federal Direct Loan was obtained. You
may file a lawsuit regarding such a
claim or you may be a member of a class
action lawsuit regarding such a claim
even if you do not file it. This provision
does not apply to any other claims. We
agree that only the court is to decide
whether a claim asserted in the lawsuit
is a claim regarding the making of the
Direct Loan or the provision of
educational services for which the loan
was obtained.’’
(g) Submission of arbitral records. (1)
A school must submit a copy of the
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following records to the Secretary, in
the form and manner specified by the
Secretary, in connection with any claim
filed in arbitration by or against the
school concerning a borrower defense
claim:
(i) The initial claim and any
counterclaim.
(ii) The arbitration agreement filed
with the arbitrator or arbitration
administrator.
(iii) The judgment or award, if any,
issued by the arbitrator or arbitration
administrator.
(iv) If an arbitrator or arbitration
administrator refuses to administer or
dismisses a claim due to the school’s
failure to pay required filing or
administrative fees, any communication
the school receives from the arbitrator or
arbitration administrator related to such
a refusal.
(v) Any communication the school
receives from an arbitrator or an
arbitration administrator related to a
determination that a predispute
arbitration agreement regarding
educational services provided by the
school does not comply with the
administrator’s fairness principles,
rules, or similar requirements, if such a
determination occurs.
(2) A school must submit any record
required pursuant to paragraph (g)(1) of
this section within 60 days of filing by
the school of any such record with the
arbitrator or arbitration administrator
and within 60 days of receipt by the
school of any such record filed or sent
by someone other than the school, such
as the arbitrator, the arbitration
administrator, or the student.
(h) Submission of judicial records. (1)
A school must submit a copy of the
following records to the Secretary, in
the form and manner specified by the
Secretary, in connection with any claim
concerning a borrower defense claim
filed in a lawsuit by the school against
the student or by any party, including
a government agency, against the
school:
(i) The complaint and any
counterclaim.
(ii) Any dispositive motion filed by a
party to the suit; and
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(iii) The ruling on any dispositive
motion and the judgment issued by the
court.
(2) A school must submit any record
required pursuant to paragraph (h)(1) of
this section within 30 days of filing or
receipt, as applicable, of the complaint,
answer, or dispositive motion, and
within 30 days of receipt of any ruling
on a dispositive motion or a final
judgment.
(i) Definitions. For the purposes of
paragraphs (d) through (h) of this
section, the term—
(1) ‘‘Borrower defense claim’’ means a
claim that is or could be asserted as a
borrower defense as defined in
§ 685.222(a)(5), including a claim other
than one based on § 685.222(c) or (d)
that may be asserted under § 685.222(b)
if reduced to judgment;
(2) ‘‘Class action’’ means a lawsuit in
which one or more parties seek class
treatment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 or any State process
analogous to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23;
(3) ‘‘Dispositive motion’’ means a
motion asking for a court order that
entirely disposes of one or more claims
in favor of the party who files the
motion without need for further court
proceedings;
(4) ‘‘Predispute arbitration agreement’’
means any agreement, regardless of its
form or structure, between a school or
a party acting on behalf of a school and
a student providing for arbitration of
any future dispute between the parties.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 35. Section 685.308 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 685.308
Remedial actions.
(a) The Secretary collects from the
school the amount of the losses the
Secretary incurs and determines that the
institution is liable to repay under
§ 685.206, § 685.214, § 685.215(a)(1)(i),
(ii), (iii), (iv) or (v), § 685.216, or
§ 685.222 or that were disbursed—
(1) To an individual, because of an act
or omission of the school, in amounts
that the individual was not eligible to
receive; or
(2) Because of the school’s violation of
a Federal statute or regulation.
*
*
*
*
*
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36. Section 685.310 is added to
subpart C to read as follows:
■
§ 685.310
Severability.
If any provision of this subpart or its
application to any person, act, or
practice is held invalid, the remainder
of the subpart or the application of its
provisions to any person, act, or practice
shall not be affected thereby.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq.)
PART 686—TEACHER EDUCATION
ASSISTANCE FOR COLLEGE AND
HIGHER EDUCATION (TEACH) GRANT
PROGRAM
37. The authority citation for part 686
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1070g, et seq., unless
otherwise noted.
38. Section 686.42 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
■
§ 686.42
serve.
Discharge of an agreement to
(a) Death. (1) If a grant recipient dies,
the Secretary discharges the obligation
to complete the agreement to serve
based on—
(i) An original or certified copy of the
death certificate;
(ii) An accurate and complete
photocopy of the original or certified
copy of the death certificate;
(iii) An accurate and complete
original or certified copy of the death
certificate that is scanned and submitted
electronically or sent by facsimile
transmission; or
(iv) Verification of the grant
recipient’s death through an
authoritative Federal or State electronic
database approved for use by the
Secretary.
(2) Under exceptional circumstances
and on a case-by-case basis, the
Secretary discharges the obligation to
complete the agreement to serve based
on other reliable documentation of the
grant recipient’s death that is acceptable
to the Secretary.
*
*
*
*
*
[FR Doc. 2016–25448 Filed 10–31–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 211 (Tuesday, November 1, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 75926-76089]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-25448]
[[Page 75925]]
Vol. 81
Tuesday,
No. 211
November 1, 2016
Part II
Department of Education
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34 CFR Parts 30, 668, 674, et al.
Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program,
Federal Family Education Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal Direct
Loan Program, and Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher
Education Grant Program; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 81 , No. 211 / Tuesday, November 1, 2016 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 75926]]
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
34 CFR Parts 30, 668, 674, 682, 685, and 686
RIN 1840-AD19
[Docket ID ED-2015-OPE-0103]
Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan
Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal
Direct Loan Program, and Teacher Education Assistance for College and
Higher Education Grant Program
AGENCY: Office of Postsecondary Education, Department of Education.
ACTION: Final regulations.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Secretary establishes new regulations governing the
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program to establish
a new Federal standard and a process for determining whether a borrower
has a defense to repayment on a loan based on an act or omission of a
school. We also amend the Direct Loan Program regulations to prohibit
participating schools from using certain contractual provisions
regarding dispute resolution processes, such as predispute arbitration
agreements or class action waivers, and to require certain
notifications and disclosures by schools regarding their use of
arbitration. We amend the Direct Loan Program regulations to codify our
current policy regarding the impact that discharges have on the 150
percent Direct Subsidized Loan Limit. We amend the Student Assistance
General Provisions regulations to revise the financial responsibility
standards and add disclosure requirements for schools. Finally, we
amend the discharge provisions in the Federal Perkins Loan (Perkins
Loan), Direct Loan, Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL), and Teacher
Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) Grant
programs. The changes will provide transparency, clarity, and ease of
administration to current and new regulations and protect students, the
Federal government, and taxpayers against potential school liabilities
resulting from borrower defenses.
DATES: These regulations are effective July 1, 2017. Implementation
date: For the implementation dates of the included regulatory
provisions, see the Implementation Date of These Regulations section of
this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information related to
borrower defenses, Barbara Hoblitzell at (202) 453-7583 or by email at:
Barbara.Hoblitzell@ed.gov. For further information related to false
certification and closed school loan discharges, Brian Smith at (202)
453-7440 or by email at: Brian.Smith@ed.gov. For further information
regarding institutional accountability, John Kolotos or Greg Martin at
(202) 453-7646 or (202) 453-7535 or by email at: John.Kolotos@ed.gov or
Gregory.Martin@ed.gov.
If you use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or a text
telephone (TTY), call the Federal Relay Service (FRS), toll free, at 1-
800-877-8339.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Summary
Purpose of This Regulatory Action: The purpose of the borrower
defense regulations is to protect student loan borrowers from
misleading, deceitful, and predatory practices of, and failures to
fulfill contractual promises by, institutions participating in the
Department's student aid programs. Most postsecondary institutions
provide a high-quality education that equips students with new
knowledge and skills and prepares them for their careers. However, when
postsecondary institutions make false and misleading statements to
students or prospective students about school or career outcomes or
financing needed to pay for those programs, or fail to fulfill specific
contractual promises regarding program offerings or educational
services, student loan borrowers may be eligible for discharge of their
Federal loans.
The final regulations give students access to consistent, clear,
fair, and transparent processes to seek debt relief; protect taxpayers
by requiring that financially risky institutions are prepared to take
responsibility for losses to the government for discharges of and
repayments for Federal student loans; provide due process for students
and institutions; and warn students in advertising and promotional
materials, using plain language issued by the Department, about
proprietary schools at which the typical student experiences poor loan
repayment outcomes--defined in these final regulations as a proprietary
school at which the median borrower has not repaid in full, or made
loan payments sufficient to reduce by at least one dollar the
outstanding balance of, the borrower's loans received at the
institution--so that students can make more informed enrollment and
financing decisions.
Section 455(h) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended
(HEA), 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h), authorizes the Secretary to specify in
regulation which acts or omissions of an institution of higher
education a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment of a Direct
Loan. Section 685.206(c), governing defenses to repayment, has been in
place since 1995 but, until recently, has rarely been used. Those final
regulations specify that a borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment any ``act or omission of the school attended by the student
that would give rise to a cause of action against the school under
applicable State law.''
In response to the collapse of Corinthian Colleges (Corinthian) and
the flood of borrower defense claims submitted by Corinthian students
stemming from the school's misconduct, the Secretary announced in June
2015 that the Department would develop new regulations to establish a
more accessible and consistent borrower defense standard and clarify
and streamline the borrower defense process to protect borrowers and
improve the Department's ability to hold schools accountable for
actions and omissions that result in loan discharges.
These final regulations specify the conditions and processes under
which a borrower may assert a defense to repayment of a Direct Loan,
also referred to as a ``borrower defense.'' The current standard allows
borrowers to assert a borrower defense if a cause of action would have
arisen under applicable State law. In contrast, these final regulations
establish a new Federal standard that will allow a borrower to assert a
borrower defense on the basis of a substantial misrepresentation, a
breach of contract, or a favorable, nondefault contested judgment
against the school, for its act or omission relating to the making of
the borrower's Direct Loan or the provision of educational services for
which the loan was provided. The new standard will apply to loans made
after the effective date of the proposed regulations. The final
regulations establish a process for borrowers to assert a borrower
defense that will be implemented both for claims that fall under the
existing standard and for later claims that fall under the new,
proposed standard. In addition, the final regulations establish the
conditions or events upon which an institution is or may be required to
provide to the Department financial protection, such as a letter of
credit, to help protect students, the Federal government, and taxpayers
against potential institutional liabilities.
These final regulations also prohibit a school participating in the
Direct Loan Program from obtaining, through the use of contractual
provisions or other agreements, a predispute agreement for
[[Page 75927]]
arbitration to resolve claims brought by a borrower against the school
that could also form the basis of a borrower defense under the
Department's regulations. The final regulations also prohibit a school
participating in the Direct Loan Program from obtaining an agreement,
either in an arbitration agreement or in another form, that a borrower
waive his or her right to initiate or participate in a class action
lawsuit regarding such claims and from requiring students to engage in
internal dispute processes before contacting accrediting or government
agencies with authority over the school regarding such claims. In
addition, the final regulations impose certain notification and
disclosure requirements on a school regarding claims that are the
subject of a lawsuit filed in court or that are voluntarily submitted
to arbitration after a dispute has arisen.
Summary of the Major Provisions of This Regulatory Action: For the
Direct Loan Program, the final regulations--
Clarify that borrowers with loans first disbursed prior to
July 1, 2017, may assert a defense to repayment under the current
borrower defense State law standard;
Establish a new Federal standard for borrower defenses,
and limitation periods applicable to the claims asserted under that
standard, for borrowers with loans first disbursed on or after July 1,
2017;
Establish a process for the assertion and resolution of
borrower defense claims made by individuals;
Establish a process for group borrower defense claims with
respect to both open and closed schools, including the conditions under
which the Secretary may allow a claim to proceed without receiving an
application;
Provide for remedial actions the Secretary may take to
collect losses arising out of successful borrower defense claims for
which an institution is liable; and
Add provisions to schools' Direct Loan Program
participation agreements (PPAs) that, for claims that may form the
basis for borrower defenses--
[ssquf] Prevent schools from requiring that students first engage
in a school's internal complaint process before contacting accrediting
and government agencies about the complaint;
[ssquf] Prohibit the use of predispute arbitration agreements by
schools;
[ssquf] Prohibit the use of class action lawsuit waivers;
[ssquf] To the extent schools and borrowers engage in arbitration
in a manner consistent with applicable law and regulation, require
schools to disclose to and notify the Secretary of arbitration filings
and awards; and
[ssquf] Require schools to disclose to and notify the Secretary of
certain judicial filings and dispositions.
The final regulations also revise the Student Assistance General
Provisions regulations to--
Amend the definition of a misrepresentation to include
omissions of information and statements with a likelihood or tendency
to mislead under the circumstances. The definition would be amended for
misrepresentations for which the Secretary may impose a fine, or limit,
suspend, or terminate an institution's participation in title IV, HEA
programs. This definition is also adopted as a basis for alleging
borrower defense claims for Direct Loans first disbursed after July 1,
2017;
Clarify that a limitation may include a change in an
institution's participation status in title IV, HEA programs from fully
certified to provisionally certified;
Amend the financial responsibility standards to include
actions and events that would trigger a requirement that a school
provide financial protection, such as a letter of credit, to insure
against future borrower defense claims and other liabilities to the
Department;
Require proprietary schools at which the median borrower
has not repaid in full, or paid down by at least one dollar the
outstanding balance of, the borrower's loans to provide a Department-
issued plain language warning in promotional materials and
advertisements; and
Require a school to disclose on its Web site and to
prospective and enrolled students if it is required to provide
financial protection, such as a letter of credit, to the Department.
The final regulations also--
Expand the types of documentation that may be used for the
granting of a discharge based on the death of the borrower (``death
discharge'') in the Perkins, FFEL, Direct Loan, and TEACH Grant
programs;
Revise the Perkins, FFEL, and Direct Loan closed school
discharge regulations to ensure borrowers are aware of and able to
benefit from their ability to receive the discharge;
Expand the conditions under which a FFEL or Direct Loan
borrower may qualify for a false certification discharge;
Codify the Department's current policy regarding the
impact that a discharge of a Direct Subsidized Loan has on the 150
percent Direct Subsidized Loan limit; and
Make technical corrections to other provisions in the FFEL
and Direct Loan program regulations and to the regulations governing
the Secretary's debt compromise authority.
Costs and Benefits: As noted in the NPRM, the primary potential
benefits of these regulations are: (1) An updated and clarified process
and a Federal standard to improve the borrower defense process and
usage of the borrower defense process to increase protections for
students; (2) increased financial protections for taxpayers and the
Federal government; (3) additional information to help students,
prospective students, and their families make informed decisions based
on information about an institution's financial soundness and its
borrowers' loan repayment outcomes; (4) improved conduct of schools by
holding individual institutions accountable and thereby deterring
misconduct by other schools; (5) improved awareness and usage, where
appropriate, of closed school and false certification discharges; and
(6) technical changes to improve the administration of the title IV,
HEA programs. Costs associated with the regulations will fall on a
number of affected entities including institutions, guaranty agencies,
the Federal government, and taxpayers. These costs include changes to
business practices, review of marketing materials, additional employee
training, and unreimbursed claims covered by taxpayers. The largest
quantified impact of the regulations is the transfer of funds from the
Federal government to borrowers who succeed in a borrower defense
claim, a significant share of which will be offset by the recovery of
funds from institutions whose conduct gave rise to the claims.
On June 16, 2016, the Secretary published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) for these parts in the Federal Register (81 FR
39329). The final regulations contain changes from the NPRM, which are
fully explained in the Analysis of Comments and Changes section of this
document.
Implementation Date of These Regulations: Section 482(c) of the HEA
requires that regulations affecting programs under title IV of the HEA
be published in final form by November 1, prior to the start of the
award year (July 1) to which they apply. However, that section also
permits the Secretary to designate any regulation as one that an entity
subject to the regulations may choose to implement earlier and the
conditions for early implementation.
The Secretary is exercising his authority under section 482(c) to
designate the following new regulations included in this document for
early implementation beginning on November
[[Page 75928]]
1, 2016, at the discretion of each lender or guaranty agency:
(1) Section 682.211(i)(7).
(2) Section 682.410(b)(6)(viii).
Additionally, the Secretary intends to exercise his authority under
section 482(c) of the HEA to permit the Secretary and guaranty agencies
to implement the new and amended regulations specific to automatic
closed school discharges in Sec. Sec. 674.33(g)(3)(ii),
682.402(d)(8)(ii) and 685.214(c)(2)(ii) as soon as operationally
possible after the publication date of these final regulations. We will
publish a separate Federal Register notice to announce this
implementation date.
The Secretary has not designated any of the remaining provisions in
these final regulations for early implementation. Therefore, the
remaining final regulations included in this document are effective
July 1, 2017.
Public Comment: In response to our invitation in the June 16, 2016,
NPRM, more than 50,000 parties submitted comments on the proposed
regulations.
We discuss substantive issues under the sections of the proposed
regulations to which they pertain. Generally, we do not address
technical or other minor changes or recommendations that are out of the
scope of this regulatory action or that would require statutory changes
in this preamble.
Analysis of Comments and Changes
An analysis of the comments and of any changes in the regulations
since publication of the NPRM follows.
General
Comments: Many commenters supported the Department's proposals to
improve the borrower defense regulations by establishing a Federal
standard for permissible defenses to borrower repayment, standardizing
the defense to repayment claim processes for both borrowers and
institutions, and strengthening the financial responsibility standards
for institutions. The commenters also supported granting automatic
closed school discharges in certain instances and ending the use of
mandatory, predispute arbitration agreements at schools that receive
Federal financial aid.
Other commenters expressed support for the proposed regulations,
but felt that the Department should further strengthen them. For
example, these commenters believed that the final regulations should
provide full loan relief to all defrauded students, eliminate the six-
year time limit to recover amounts that borrowers have already paid on
loans for which they have a borrower defense based on a breach of
contract or substantial misrepresentation, and allow automatic group
discharges without an application in cases where there is sufficient
evidence of a school's wrongdoing.
Many commenters agreed with the Department's proposed objectives,
but believed that the proposed regulations would have the unintended
consequences of creating a ``cottage industry'' of opportunistic
attorneys and agents attempting to capitalize on students who have
been, or believe they have been, victims of wrongdoing by schools and
unleashing a torrent of frivolous and costly lawsuits, which would
tarnish the reputation of many institutions. The commenters also
believed that the proposed Federal standard is so broad that borrowers
will have nothing to lose by claiming a borrower defense even if they
are employed and happy with their college experience.
Many commenters did not support the proposed regulations and stated
that the Department should completely revise them and issue another
NPRM and 30-day comment period, or that the proposed regulations should
be withdrawn completely. The commenters were concerned that the
projected net budget impact provided in the NPRM would undermine the
integrity of the Direct Loan Program and that neither American
taxpayers, nor schools that have successfully educated students, could
cover these costs if thousands of students or graduates start
requesting discharges of their loans. Other commenters stated that the
proposed regulations would create unneeded administrative and financial
burdens for institutions that work hard to comply with the Department's
regulations and establish new substantive standards of liability, new
procedural issues, new burdens of proof, widespread and unwarranted
``triggering'' of the financial responsibility requirements, and the
abolition of a ``Congressionally favored'' arbitration remedy, that are
unnecessary or counterproductive.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenters' support. In response to
the commenters requesting that the proposed regulations be
strengthened, completely revised, or withdrawn, we believe these final
regulations strike the right balance between our goals of providing
transparency, clarity, and ease of administration to the current and
new regulations while at the same time protecting students, the Federal
government, and taxpayers against potential liabilities resulting from
borrower defenses. In response to commenters' concerns that the
proposed regulations will create a ``cottage industry'' of
opportunistic attorneys attempting to capitalize on victimized students
and unleash a torrent of frivolous lawsuits, the individual borrower
defense process described in Sec. 685.222(e) is intended to be a
simple process that a borrower may access without the aid of counsel.
Similarly, by providing that only a designated Department official may
present group borrower claims in the group processes described in Sec.
685.222(f) to (h), the Department believes that the potential for
frivolous suits in the borrower defense process will be limited. To
date, Department staff have generally not received borrower defense
claims submitted by attorneys, opportunistic or otherwise, and we have
not observed the filing of frivolous lawsuits against schools. We will
monitor both situations going forward. We note that we address
commenters' arguments with respect to specific provisions of the
regulations in the sections of this preamble specific to those
provisions.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter contended that the proposed regulations run
contrary to Article III (separation of powers) and the Seventh
Amendment (right to jury trial) of the Constitution, in that it would
vest the Department with exclusive judicial powers to determine private
causes of action in the absence of a jury.
The commenter contended that the proposed regulations do not ensure
Constitutional due process because they do not ensure that schools
would have the right to receive notice of all the evidence presented by
a borrower in the new borrower defense proceedings. The commenter
stated that the lack of due process also affects the process for
deciding claims, under which the Department is effectively the
prosecutor, the judge, the only source of appeal, and the entity tasked
with executing judgment.
The commenter also contended that a breach of contract or a
misrepresentation determination are determinations that normally arise
in common law claims and defenses and are subject to the expertise of
the courts, rather than a particular government agency. The commenter
believes that these determinations are not matters of public right, but
are instead matters of ``private right, that is, of the liability of
one individual to another under the law as defined,'' which cannot be
delegated outside the judiciary. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489
(2011) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
Discussion: The rights adjudicated in borrower defense proceedings
are rights
[[Page 75929]]
of the Direct Loan borrower against the government regarding the
borrower's obligation to repay a loan made by the government, and
rights of the government to recover from the school for losses incurred
as a result of the act or omission of the school in participating in
the Federal loan program. The terms of these rights are governed (for
loans disbursed prior to July 1, 2017) by common law or State law, but
in each instance the rights are asserted against or by a Federal
agency, with respect to obligations incurred by the borrower and the
school in the course of their voluntary participation in the Federal
loan program. Those facts give the rights adjudicated in these
proceedings, both the individual borrower adjudications and the
adjudications of group claims against the school, the character of
public rights, even if the resolution of those rights turns on
application of common law and State law (for current loans), and thus
giving them some of the characteristics of private rights as well.
Even if these common law rights of the borrower and the school were
to be considered simply private rights, Congress could properly consign
their adjudication to the Department, as it did in committing purely
private rights of the investor and broker asserted in its reparations
program to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission for adjudication.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). In
Schor, the competing claims asserted were not creations of Federal law,
nor were the rights asserted by or against a Federal agency.
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that Congress properly assigned
adjudication of those private rights to the agency. Like the claimants
in Schor, both parties--the Direct Loan borrower, by filing the claim
for relief, and the Direct Loan-participant school, by entering into
the Direct Loan Participation Agreement--have consented to
adjudications of their respective rights by the Federal agency--the
Department. Moreover, these rights are adjudicated in this context
precisely because Congress directed the Department to establish by
regulation which acts or omissions of a school would be recognized by
the Department as defenses to repayment of the Direct Loan; by so
doing, and by further requiring the Department to conduct a
predeprivation hearing before credit bureau reporting, Federal offset,
wage garnishment, of Federal salary offset, Congress necessarily
committed adjudication of these claims to the Department. 20 U.S.C.
1080a(c)(4), 31 U.S.C. 3711(e) (credit bureau reporting); 5 U.S.C. 5514
(Federal salary offset); 20 U.S.C. 1095, 31 U.S.C. 3720D (wage
garnishment); 31 U.S.C. 3716, 3720B (Federal payment offset).
Similarly, by recognizing that acts or omissions of the school in
participating in the title IV, HEA programs would give rise to a claim
by the Department against the school that arises not by virtue of any
statutory requirement, but under common law as discussed elsewhere and
by requiring the Department to provide a hearing for a school that
disputes that common law claim for damages, Congress necessarily
committed adjudication of that common law claim to the Department. 20
U.S.C. 1094(b) (administrative hearing on appeal of audit or program
review liability claim). In each of these instances, judicial review of
these agency adjudications by an Article III court is available under
the APA. 5 U.S.C. 706. The fact that the borrower, the school, and the
Department might have pursued their claims solely in a judicial forum
instead of an administrative forum does not preclude assignment of
their adjudication to the Department: ``(T)he Congress, in exercising
the powers confided to it may establish `legislative' courts . . . to
serve as special tribunals `to examine and determine various matters,
arising between the government and others, which from their nature do
not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it.' ''
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442, 452 (1977) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50
(1932)).
As to the assertion that committing adjudication of these claims to
the Department deprives a party of the right to trial by jury, the
Court has long rejected that argument, as it stated in Atlas Roofing,
on which the commenter relies:
. . . the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in
administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible
with the whole concept of administrative adjudication. . . . This is
the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury
where the adjudication of those rights is assigned instead to a
federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.
Atlas Roofing Co, 430 U.S. at 454-55 (quoting Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974)).
We address the comment with respect to ensuring due process in the
sections of this preamble specific to the framework for the borrower
defense claims process.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters asserted that the Department lacks
authority to recover from the institution losses incurred by reason of
borrower defenses to repayment. A commenter asserted that nothing in
section 455(h) of the HEA (20 U.S.C. 1087e(h)) permits the Department
to seek recoupment from any institution related to defenses to
repayment. In contrast, the commenter asserted, section 437(c)(1) of
the HEA (20 U.S.C. 1087) explicitly provides that, in the case of
closed school discharges, the Secretary shall pursue any claim
``available to the borrower'' against the institution to recover the
amounts discharged. The commenter contended that this clear grant of
authority to pursue claims to recoup funds associated with closed
school discharges and false certification discharges indicates that
Congress intended no grant of authority to recover for borrower defense
losses. The commenter noted that the Department conditions discharge on
the borrower transferring any claim she has against the institution to
the Department. The commenter asserted that this assignment does not
empower the Department to enforce the borrower's claim, because the
Secretary does not have the ability to acquire a claim from the
borrower on which it may seek recoupment from a school. The commenter
based this position on section 437(c) of the HEA, which provides that a
borrower who obtains a closed school or false certification discharge
is ``deemed to have assigned to the United States the right to a loan
refund,'' and the absence of any comparable provision in section 455 of
the HEA, which authorizes the Secretary to determine which acts or
omissions of the institution may constitute defenses to repayment of a
Direct Loan. Given that Congress indicated clear intent that the
Secretary pursue claims related to closed school and false
certification discharges, and explicitly provided for an assignment of
claims, the commenter considered the failure of Congress to give any
indication it wanted the Department to pursue claims of recoupment
against institutions for section 455(h) loan discharges, or to acquire
any claims from borrowers related to section 455(h) discharges, to show
congressional intent to preclude a recoupment remedy against
institutions.
Another commenter questioned whether the Department would have a
valid right to enforce a collection against an institution in the
absence of what the commenter called a ``third-party adjudication'' of
the loan discharge.
A commenter stated that the Department could not recover from the
institution losses incurred from
[[Page 75930]]
borrower defense claims because the commenter considered those losses
to be incurred voluntarily by the Department. The commenter based this
view on common law, under which a person who voluntarily pays another
with full knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution.
The commenter asserted that the Department is further barred from
recovery from the institution under a theory of indemnity or equitable
subrogation because, under either theory, a party that voluntarily
makes a payment or discharges a debt may not seek reimbursement.
Discussion: We address under ``Group Process for Borrower
Defenses--Statutory Authority'' comments regarding whether the
Department has authority to assert against the school claims that
borrowers may have, and discuss here only the comments that dispute
whether the Department has a legal right to recover from a school the
amount of loss incurred by the Department upon the recognition of a
borrower defense and corresponding discharge of some or all of a Direct
Loan obtained to attend the school.
Applicable law gives the Department the right to recover from the
school losses incurred on Direct Loans for several reasons. First,
section 437(c) of the HEA gives the Department explicit authority to
recover certain losses on Direct and FFEL loans. Section 437(c)
provides that, upon discharge of a FFEL Loan for a closed school
discharge, false certification discharge, or unpaid refund, the
Secretary is authorized to pursue any claim of the borrower against the
school, its principals, or other source, and the borrower is deemed to
have assigned his or her claim against the school to the Secretary. 20
U.S.C. 1087(c). Section 487(c)(3)(ii) authorizes the Secretary to
deduct the amount of any civil penalty, or fine, imposed under that
section from any amounts owed to the institution, but any claim for
recovery is not based on authority to fine under that section. Section
432(a)(6) authorizes the Secretary to enforce any claim, however
acquired, but does not describe what those claims may be. 20 U.S.C.
1082(a)(6) (applicable to Direct Loan claims by virtue of section
455(a)(1), 20 U.S.C. 1078e(a)(1)). In addition, section 498(c)(1)(C) of
the HEA, 20 U.S.C. 1099c(c)(1)(C), implies that the Secretary has
claims that the Secretary is expected to enforce and recover against
the institution for ``liabilities and debts''--the ``liabilities of
such institution to the Secretary for funds under this title, including
loan obligations discharged pursuant to section 437.'' 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).\1\ These provisions are meaningless if
the Secretary can enforce claims against institutions only if the HEA
or another statute explicitly authorizes such recoveries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Secretary can require the institution to submit ``third-
party financial guarantees'' which third-party financial guarantees
shall equal not less than one-half of the annual potential
liabilities of such institution to the Secretary for funds under
this title, including loan obligations discharged pursuant to
section 437 [20 U.S.C. 1087], and to students for refunds of
institutional charges, including funds under this title.'' 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c)(3)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are two distinct, and overlapping, lines of authority that
empower the Secretary to recover from the school the amount of losses
incurred due to borrower defense claims. The first relies on the
Secretary's longstanding interpretation of the HEA as authorizing such
recovery. The second relies on the government's rights under common
law.
In both the Direct Loan and FFEL programs, the institution plays a
central role in determining which individuals receive loans, the amount
of loan an individual receives, and the Federal interest subsidy, if
any, that an individual qualifies to receive on the loan, a
determination based on assessment of financial need. In the Direct Loan
Program, the institution determines whether and to whom the Department
makes a loan; in the FFEL Program, the institution determines whether
and to whom a private lender may make a loan that will be federally
reinsured.
In Chauffeur's Training School v. Spellings, 478 F.3d 117 (2d Cir.
2007), the court addressed a challenge by an institution to the
Department's asserted right to hold the school liable through an
administrative procedure for losses incurred and to be incurred on FFEL
Loans that were made by private lenders and federally reinsured and
subsidized, after the school had wrongly determined that the borrowers
had proven eligibility for these loans. The court noted that no
provision of the HEA expressly authorized the Department to determine
and recover these losses on student loans (as opposed to recovery of
losses of grant funds, expressly authorized by 20 U.S.C. 1234a)).
However, the court looked to whether the Department's interpretation of
the HEA as authorizing the Department to assess a liability for loan
program violations was reasonable. 478 F.3d at 129. The court concluded
that the Department had reasonably interpreted the HEA's grant of
authority to administer the FFEL program to empower the Department to
``assess liability to recover its guarantee payments'' on loans made as
a result of the school's ``improper documentation.'' Id.
Similarly, the Department is authorized under the HEA to administer
the Direct Loan Program. The HEA directs that, generally, Direct Loans
are made under the same ``terms, conditions, and benefits'' as FFEL
Loans. 20 U.S.C. 1087a(b)(2), 1087e(a)(1). In 1994 and 1995, the
Department interpreted that Direct Loan authority as giving the
Department authority to hold schools liable for borrower defenses under
both the FFEL and Direct Loan programs, and stated that, for this
reason, it was not pursuing more explicit regulatory authority to
govern the borrower defense process.
Thus, in Dear Colleague Letter Gen 95-8 (Jan. 1995), the Department
stated (emphasis in original):
Finally, some parties warn that Direct Loan schools will face
potential liability from claims raised by borrowers that FFEL
schools will not face. . . . The liability of any school--whether a
Direct Loan or FFEL participant--for conduct that breaches a duty
owed to its students is already established under law other than the
HEA--usually state law. In fact, borrowers will have no legal claims
against Direct Loan schools that FFEL borrowers do not already have
against FFEL schools. The potential legal liability of schools under
both programs for those claims is the same, and the Department
proposes to develop procedures and standards to ensure that in the
future schools in both programs will face identical actual
responsibility for borrower claims based on grievances against
schools.
The Direct Loan statute creates NO NEW LIABILITIES for schools;
the statute permits the Department to recognize particular claims
students have against schools as defenses to the repayment of Direct
Loans held by the Department. Current Direct Loan regulations allow
a borrower to assert as a defense any claim that would stand as a
valid claim against the school under State law.
. . . Congress intended that schools participating in either
FFEL or Direct Loan programs should receive parallel treatment on
important issues, and the Department has already committed during
negotiated rulemaking to apply the same borrower defense provisions
to BOTH the Direct Loan and FFEL programs. Therefore, schools that
cause injury to student borrowers that give rise to legitimate
claims should and, under these proposals, will bear the risk of
loss, regardless of whether the loans are from the Direct Loan or
FFEL Program.
The Department reiterated this position in a notice published in
the Federal Register on July 21, 1995 (60 FR 37768, 37769-37770):
Some members of the FFEL industry have asserted that there will
be greater liabilities for institutions participating in the Direct
Loan Program than for institutions participating in the FFEL Program
as a consequence of differences in borrower
[[Page 75931]]
defenses between the Direct Loan and FFEL Programs. These assertions
are inaccurate.
The Department has consistently stated that the potential legal
liability resulting from borrower defenses for institutions
participating in the Direct Loan Program will not be significantly
different from the potential liability for institutions
participating in the FFEL Program. (59 FR 61671, December 1, 1994,
and Dear Colleague Letter GEN 95-8 January 1995) That potential
liability usually results from causes of action allowed to borrowers
under various State laws, not from the HEA or any of its
implementing regulations. Institutions have expressed some concern
that there is a potential for greater liability for institutions in
the Direct Loan Program than in the FFEL Program under 34 CFR
685.206. The Secretary believes that this concern is based on a
misunderstanding of current law and the intention of the Direct Loan
regulations. The Direct Loan regulations are intended to ensure that
institutions participating in the FFEL and Direct Loan programs have
a similar potential liability. Since 1992, the FFEL Program
regulations have provided that an institution may be liable if a
FFEL Program loan is legally unenforceable. (34 CFR 682.609) The
Secretary intended to establish a similar standard in the Direct
Loan Program by issuing 34 CFR 685.206(c). Consistent with that
intent, the Secretary does not plan to initiate any proceedings
against schools in the Direct Loan Program unless an institution
participating in the FFEL Program would also face potential
liability. . . .
Thus, the Secretary will initiate proceedings to establish
school liability for borrower defenses in the same manner and based
on the same reasons for a school that participates in the Direct
Loan Program or the FFEL Program. . . .
Thus, applying the Chauffeur's Training analysis, this history and
formal interpretation shows that the Department has, from the inception
of the Direct Loan Program, considered its administrative authority
under the HEA for the Direct Loan Program to authorize the Department
to hold schools liable for losses incurred through borrower defenses,
and to adopt administrative procedures to determine and liquidate those
claims.
Alternatively, common law provides the Department a legal right to
recover from the school the losses it incurs due to recognition of
borrower defenses on Direct Loans. Courts have long recognized that the
government has the same rights under common law as any other party.
U.S. v. Kearns, 595 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Even when Congress
expressly provides a remedy by statute, the government has the remedies
that ``normally arise out of the relationships authorized by the
statutory scheme.'' U.S. v. Bellard, 674 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding the Department had a common law right to recover as would any
other guarantor regardless of an HEA provision describing the
Department as assignee/subrogor to rights of the private lender whom it
insured).\2\ In fact, as noted by the Bellard court, statutes must be
read to preserve common law rights unless the intent to limit those
rights is ``clearly and plainly expressed by the legislature.'' Id. The
Bellard court found no such limiting language in the HEA, nor does any
exist that is relevant to the Direct Loan issue presented here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See: U.S. v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (courts may
take it as a given that Congress has legislated with an expectation
that the [common law] principle will apply except `when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The school enters into a PPA with the Department in order to
participate in the Direct Loan Program. 20 U.S.C. 1087(a). The PPA is a
contract. San Juan City College Inc. v. U.S., 74 Fed. Cl. 448 (2006);
Chauffeurs Training School v. Riley, 967 F.Supp. 719, 727 (N.D. N.Y.
1997). In executing the contract, the school ``assume[s] a fiduciary
relationship with the title IV, HEA Programs.'' Chauffeurs Training
School v. Paige, C.A. No. 01-CV-02-08 (N.D. N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003), at 7;
34 CFR 682.82(a). An institution must ``act with the competency and
integrity necessary to qualify as a fiduciary'' on behalf of taxpayers,
``in accordance with the highest standard of care and diligence in
administering the program and in accounting to the Secretary for the
funds received under [title IV HEA] programs.'' Id.; see 34 CFR 668.82.
Specifically, under the Direct Loan Program, the HEA describes the
institution pursuant to its agreement with the Department as
``originating'' Direct Loans, 20 U.S.C. 1087c(a), 1087d(b), and
accepting ``responsibility and financial liability stemming from its
failure to perform its functions pursuant to the agreement.'' 20 U.S.C.
1087d(a)(3), 34 CFR 685.300(b)(8). The regulations describe the role of
the institution as ``originating'' Direct Loans. 34 CFR 685.300(c),
685.301.
As a loan ``originator'' for the Department, the school is the
authorized agent of the Department: The school acts pursuant to
Department direction, the school manifests its intent to act as agent
by entering into the PPA, and most importantly, the school has power to
alter the legal relationships between the principal (the Department)
and third parties (the students). But for the school's act in
originating the loan, there would be no lender-borrower relationship.
The interests of the Department as lender and principal in this
Direct Loan Program relationship with the institution are simple: To
enable students and parents to obtain Federal loans to pay for
postsecondary education. 20 U.S.C. 1087a. Congress selected the
vehicle--a loan, not a grant--under which the borrower repays the loan,
made with public funds, which in turn enables the making of new loans
to future borrowers. Acts or omissions by an agent of the Department
that frustrate repayment by the borrower of the amount the Department
lends are contrary to the Department's benefit and interest. Acts or
omissions by the institution, as the Department's loan-making agent,
that harm the Department's interests in achieving the objectives of the
loan program violate the duty of loyalty owed by the institution as the
Department's loan originator, or agent. The Department made clear at
the inception of the Direct Loan relationship with the institution that
the institution would be liable for losses caused by its acts and
omissions, in 1994 and 1995, when the Department publicly and
unequivocally adopted the ``borrower defense to repayment'' regulation,
34 CFR 685.206, and, in the Federal Register and other statements
described earlier, stated the consequences for the institution that
caused such losses.
The government has the same protections against breach of fiduciary
duty that extend under common law to any principal against its agent.
U.S. v. Kearns, at 348; see also U.S. v. York, 890 F.Supp. 1117 (D.D.C.
1995) (breach of fiduciary duty to government by contractor, loan
servicing dealings constituting conflict of interest). The remedies
available for breach of fiduciary duty are damages resulting from the
breach of that duty. ``One standing in a fiduciary relation with
another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a
breach of duty imposed by the relation.'' Restatement Second, Torts
Sec. 874.
Applying this common law analysis to the relationship between the
Department and the Direct Loan participating institution as it bears on
the Department's right to recover, we note, first, that the Department
has the rights available under common law to any other party, without
regard to whether any statute explicitly confers such rights. Second,
the institution enters into a contract with the Department pursuant to
which the institution acts as the Department's agent in the making of
Direct Loans. The school is the loan ``originator'' for the Department.
Third, under common law, an agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally
for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency.
Fourth, under common law, an agent's
[[Page 75932]]
breach of its fiduciary duty makes the agent liable to the principal
for the loss that the breach of duty causes the principal. And last, a
school that commits an act or omission that gives a Direct Loan
borrower a defense to repayment that causes the Department loss thereby
violates its common law fiduciary duty to act loyally for the interests
of the Department, and is liable to the Department for losses caused by
that breach of duty.
The commenter who argued that the Secretary incurs the loss by
honoring the borrower defense ``voluntarily,'' and is barred by that
fact from recovery against the institution, misconceives the nature of
the claim. As early as Bellard, the courts have consistently recognized
that in its capacity as a loan guarantor under the FFEL Program, the
Department pays the lender under its contractual obligation as loan
guarantor, and not as a volunteer. The Department guarantees FFELP
loans at the request of the borrower who applied for the guaranteed
loan, as well as the lender. By virtue of payment of the guarantee, the
Department acquired an implied-in-law right against the borrower for
reimbursement of the losses it incurred in honoring the guarantee--a
claim distinct from its claim as assignee from the lender of the
defaulted loan. Similarly, where the Department incurs a loss under a
statutory obligation to discharge by reason of closure of the school or
false certification, the Department does not incur that loss
voluntarily, but rather under legal obligation imposed by the statute,
as well as the terms of the federally prescribed promissory note.
Regardless of whether the HEA explicitly authorized the Secretary to
recover for that loss, or deemed the borrower's claim against the
school to be assigned to the Secretary, common law gives the Secretary
the right to recover from the school for the loss incurred as a result
of the act or omission of the school. Section 455(h) of the HEA, by
directing that the Secretary determine by regulation which acts or
omissions of the school constitute defenses to repayment, requires the
Department to discharge the borrower's obligation to repay when the
borrower establishes such a defense. 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h). To the extent
that the borrower proves that the act or omission of the school gave
the borrower a defense, the amount not recoverable from the borrower
was a loss incurred because of the Department's legal obligation to
honor that defense. That loss, like the loss on payment of a loan
guarantee on a FFEL Loan, is not one incurred voluntarily, but rather
is incurred, like the loss on the loan guarantee, by legal obligation.
By honoring the proven defense of the Direct Loan borrower, like
honoring the claim of the lender on the government guarantee, the
Secretary acquires by subrogation the claim of the Direct Loan borrower
or FFEL lender, as well as a claim for reimbursement from the party
that caused the loss--the borrower, on the defaulted FFEL Loan, or the
school, on the Direct Loan defense.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters stated that the HEA does not
authorize, or even contemplate, the sweeping regulatory framework set
forth in the Department's borrower defense proposals. The commenters
questioned the three HEA provisions cited by the Department as the
source of its statutory authority: Section 455(h), which allows the
Secretary to identify ``acts or omissions . . . a borrower may assert
as a defense to repayment of a loan;'' Section 487, which outlines
certain consequences for an institution's ``substantial
misrepresentation of the nature of its educational program, its
financial charges, or the employability of its graduates;'' and Section
454(a)(6), which permits the Department to ``include such . . .
provisions as the Secretary determines are necessary to protect the
interests of the United States and to promote the purposes of'' the
Direct Loan Program in each institution's PPA. The commenters believed
that section 455(h) of the HEA only empowers the Department to define
those ``acts or omissions'' that an individual borrower may assert as a
defense in a loan collection proceeding and noted that none of the
provisions allows the Department to create a novel cause of action for
a borrower to levy against her school, which the Department would both
prosecute and adjudicate in its own ``court.'' Accordingly, the
commenters believed that the Department should substantially revise the
rule to be consistent with the regulatory authority granted to the
Department by Congress. Other commenters stated that the Department
should withdraw the proposed regulations and instead work jointly with
Congress to address the issues in the proposed regulations as part of
the reauthorization of the HEA. The commenters believed that borrower
defense policy proposals are so substantive and commit such an enormous
amount of taxpayer dollars that careful consideration by Congress is
required so that all of the available options are weighed in the
overall context of comprehensive program changes.
Discussion: We disagree with the commenters who contended that the
HEA does not authorize the regulatory framework proposed in the
Department's borrower defense proposals. As explained above, common law
and the HEA as interpreted by the Department in adopting the Direct
Loan regulations, give the Department the right to recover losses
incurred due to borrower defense claims. The commenters rightly
identify sections 455(h), 487, and 454(a)(6) of the HEA as some of the
sources of the Department's statutory authority for these regulations
as they relate to identification of causes of action that are
recognized as defenses to repayment, as well as procedures for receipt
and adjudication of these claims. In addition, the HEA authorizes the
Secretary to include in Direct Loan PPAs with institutions any
provisions that are necessary to protect the interests of the United
States and to promote the purposes of the Direct Loan Program. In
becoming a party to a Direct Loan PPA, the institution accepts
responsibility and financial liability stemming from its failure to
perform its functions pursuant to the agreement. And, as a result,
students and parents are able to obtain Federal loans to pay for
postsecondary education. Far from exceeding its statutory authority in
developing procedures for adjudicating these claims, section 455(h)
presumes that the Department must recognize in its existing
administrative collection and enforcement proceedings the very defenses
that section directs the Department to establish, or create new
procedures to better address these claims, as we do here.
In addition, section 410 of the General Education Provisions Act
(GEPA) provides the Secretary with authority to make, promulgate,
issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of
operations of, and governing the applicable programs administered by,
the Department. 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3. Further, under section 414 of the
Department of Education Organization Act, the Secretary is authorized
to prescribe such rules and regulations as the Secretary determines
necessary or appropriate to administer and manage the functions of the
Secretary or the Department. 20 U.S.C. 3474. These general provisions,
together with the provisions in the HEA and common law explained
earlier, noted above, authorize the Department to promulgate
regulations that govern defense to repayment standards, process, and
institutional liability.
With regard to the commenters who believe that the Department's
proposals are so substantive and commit such an
[[Page 75933]]
enormous amount of taxpayer dollars that the Department should work
with Congress, or defer to Congress, in terms of the development of
such comprehensive program changes, we do not agree that the Department
should not take, or should defer, regulatory action on this basis until
Congress acts. Since the collapse of Corinthian, the Department has
received a flood of borrower defense claims stemming from the school's
misconduct. In order to streamline and strengthen this process, we
believe it is critical that the Department proceed now in accordance
with its statutory authority, as delegated by Congress, to finalize
regulations that protect student loan borrowers while also protecting
the Federal and taxpayer interests.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters stated that the proposed regulations
were arbitrary and capricious and therefore violate the APA. Commenters
raised this concern both generally and with respect to specific
elements of the proposed regulations. For example, several commenters
argued that the Department withheld substantive detail regarding its
expansion of the loan repayment defenses into offensive causes of
action and on the process by which borrower defense claims and
Department proceedings to collect claim liabilities from institutions
will be adjudicated, thereby depriving institutions and affected
parties the opportunity to offer meaningful comment on critical parts
of the rule.
Discussion: We address commenters' arguments with respect to
specific provisions of the regulations in the sections of this preamble
specific to those provisions. However, as a general matter, in taking
this regulatory action, we have considered relevant data and factors,
considered and responded to comments and articulated a reasoned basis
for our actions. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360,
378 (1989); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Fed.
Aviation Admin., 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993); PPL Wallingford
Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters stated that the negotiated rulemaking
process, by which the proposed rules were developed, was flawed.
One commenter stated that input from representatives of publicly
held proprietary institutions was not included in the public comment
process prior to the establishment of a negotiated rulemaking
committee. This commenter also stated that only representatives from
private, proprietary institutions were represented on the negotiated
rulemaking committee and that those representatives had no expertise in
the active management of an institution. The commenter also stated that
the NPRM 45-day public comment process was too short.
Several commenters contended that the Department failed to provide
adequate notice to the public of the scope of issues to be discussed at
the negotiated rulemaking. The commenters stated that the issues of
financial responsibility and arbitration clauses were not included in
the Federal Register notices announcing the establishment of a
negotiated rulemaking committee or the solicitation of negotiators and
that, had the higher education community known these issues were within
the scope of the rulemaking, negotiators more familiar with these
issues would have been nominated. The commenters believed that the
Department failed to carry out its statutory mandate under 20 U.S.C.
1098 to engage the public and receive input on the issues to be
negotiated. One commenter also expressed dismay at the Department's
accelerated timetable and intent to publish final regulations one week
before the general election. The commenter felt that the ``rush to
regulate'' resulted in a public comment period that did not give the
public enough time to fully consider the proposals and a timeline that
did not afford the Department enough time to develop an effective,
cost-effective rule.
Discussion: The negotiated rulemaking process ensures that a broad
range of interests is considered in the development of regulations.
Specifically, negotiated rulemaking seeks to enhance the rulemaking
process through the involvement of all parties who will be
significantly affected by the topics for which the regulations will be
developed. Accordingly, section 492(b)(1) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1098a(b)(1), requires the Department to choose negotiators from groups
representing many different constituencies. The Department selects
individuals with demonstrated expertise or experience in the relevant
subjects under negotiation, reflecting the diversity of higher
education interests and stakeholder groups, large and small, national,
State, and local. In addition, the Department selects negotiators with
the goal of providing adequate representation for the affected parties
while keeping the size of the committee manageable. The statute does
not require the Department to select specific entities or individuals
to be on the committee. As there was both a primary and an alternate
committee member representing proprietary institutions, we believe that
this group was adequately represented on the committee.
We note that the Department received several nominations to seat
representatives from proprietary schools on the committee after
publication of our October 20, 2015, Federal Register notice. The
Department considered each applicant to determine their qualifications
to serve on the committee.
This process did not result in proprietary sector nominees with the
requisite qualifications, so we published a second Federal Register
notice on December 21, 2015, seeking further nominations for the
negotiated rulemaking committee, including representation from the
proprietary sector. Dennis Cariello, Shareholder, Hogan Marren Babbo &
Rose, Ltd., and Chris DeLuca, Founder, DeLuca Law, were selected
following this second notice. Given the topics under discussion, we
believe Mr. Cariello and Mr. DeLuca adequately represented the
proprietary sector.
We disagree with the commenters who contended that the Department
failed to provide adequate public notice and failed to engage and
receive input from the public on the scope of issues to be discussed at
the negotiated rulemaking, in particular the issues of financial
responsibility and arbitration clauses. On August 20, 2015, the
Department published a notice in the Federal Register announcing our
intention to establish a negotiated rulemaking committee. We also
announced our intention to accept written comments from and hold two
public hearings (September 10, 2015 and September 16, 2015, in
Washington, DC and San Francisco, respectively) at which interested
parties could comment on the topics suggested by the Department and
suggest additional topics that should be considered for action by the
committee. Lastly, we announced our intent to develop proposed
regulations for determining which acts or omissions of an institution
of higher education a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment of
a loan made under the Direct Loan Program and the consequences of such
borrower defenses for borrowers, institutions, and the Secretary. We
specifically stated that we would address the issues of defense to
repayment procedures; the criteria that constitute a defense to
repayment; the standards and procedures that the Department would use
to determine institutional liability for amounts based
[[Page 75934]]
on borrower defenses; and, the effect of borrower defenses on
institutional capability assessments. No representatives of the
proprietary sector testified at the hearings. One proprietary
association representing 1,100 cosmetology schools submitted written
testimony stating that the association was interested in working with
the Department to determine the institutional liability and capability
assessments associated with borrower defense claims. In addition, we
presented issue papers prior to the first day of the first of the three
negotiating sessions in which we outlined the particular questions to
be addressed.\3\ These included Issue Paper No. 5, which explicitly
addresses financial responsibility and letters of credit.\4\
Negotiators who had any question about the scope of issues we intended
to cover were thus given very explicit notice before the first day of
negotiations, and were free to obtain then, or at any other time during
the nine days of hearings over three months, any expert advisors they
wished to engage to inform their deliberations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2016/.
\4\ The paper states--
Questions to be considered by the negotiating committee include:
1. Should the Department take additional steps to protect
students and taxpayers from (a) potential borrower defense to
repayment (DTR) claims, (b) liabilities stemming from closed school
discharges, and (c) other conditions that may be detrimental to
students?
[ssquf] If so, what conditions, triggering events, metric-based
standards, or other risk factors should the Department consider
indicative of failing financial responsibility, administrative
capability, or other standards?
[ssquf] What should the consequences be for a violation? Letter
of credit or other financial guarantee? Disclosure requirements and
student warnings? Other consequences?
If a letter of credit or other financial guarantee is
required, how should the amount be determined?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We received written testimony from other parties that supported
both holding institutions financially accountable for the costs
associated with borrower defenses and limiting a school's use of
certain dispute resolution procedures.
We disagree with the commenter who contended that the Department's
timetable for developing borrower defense regulations was rushed and
that the comment period did not give the public enough time to fully
consider the proposals. We believe that the 45-day public comment
period provided sufficient time for interested parties to submit
comments, particularly given that prior to issuing the proposed
regulations, the Department conducted two public hearings and three
negotiated rulemaking sessions, where stakeholders and members of the
public had an opportunity to weigh in on the development of much of the
language reflected in the proposed regulations. In addition, the
Department also posted the NPRM on its Web site several days before
publication in the Federal Register, providing stakeholders additional
time to view the proposed regulations and consider their viewpoints on
the NPRM.
Changes: None.
Comments: Although the regulations will affect all schools, many
commenters expressed frustration at their perception that the
regulations target proprietary schools in particular. The commenters
noted several provisions of the regulations--for example, financial
protection triggers related to publicly traded institutions,
distributions of equity, the 90/10 regulations, and the Gainful
Employment regulations, and disclosure provisions regarding loan
repayment rates--as unfairly targeting only proprietary schools with no
justification or rationale. The commenters noted that that there are
many private sector career schools and colleges that play a vital role
in the country's higher education system by providing distinctive,
career-focused programs and that the Department should develop rules
that are applied uniformly across all educational institutions that
offer title IV, HEA funding. Another commenter appreciated the
distinction made in the NPRM between nonprofit/public institutions and
proprietary schools as the basis for restricting the loan repayment
rate disclosure to proprietary schools. The commenter suggested that
the fundamental differences in the governance structures and missions
of the public and non-profit sectors versus the for-profit sector
provide a substantive basis for differentiating this regulation among
the sectors.
Several commenters urged the Department to reconsider the changes
to the financial responsibility standards to include actions and events
that would trigger a requirement that a school provide financial
protection, such as a letter of credit, to insure against future
borrower defense claims and other liabilities, given their sweeping
scope and potentially damaging financial impact on historically black
colleges and universities (HBCUs). The commenters contended that these
provisions could lead to the closure of HBCUs that are not financially
robust but provide quality educational opportunities to students and
noted that HBCUs have not been the focus of Federal and State
investigations nor have they defrauded students or had false claims
lawsuits filed against them. These commenters expressed concern about a
number of the specific financial protection triggers, including, but
not limited to, the triggers relating to lawsuits, actions by
accrediting agencies, and cohort default rate.
Discussion: We agree that there are many proprietary career schools
and colleges that play a vital role in the country's higher education
system. We do not agree, however, that either the financial protection
triggers or the loan repayment rate disclosure unfairly target
proprietary institutions. We apply the financial protection triggers
related to publicly traded institutions, the distribution of equity,
and the 90/10 regulations only to proprietary institutions because, as
another commenter noted, of the fundamental differences in the
governance structures and missions of the public and non-profit sectors
and the unique nature of the business model under which these
institutions operate. These triggers identify events or conditions that
signal impending financial problems at proprietary institutions that
warrant action by the Department. We apply the loan repayment rate
disclosure only to the for-profit sector primarily because the
frequency of poor repayment outcomes is greatest in this sector. We
appreciate the support of the commenter who agreed with this approach.
We note that we address commenters' arguments with respect to
specific provisions of the regulations in the sections of this preamble
specific to those provisions.
We also note that HBCUs play a vital role in the Nation's higher
education system. We recognize the concerns commenters raised regarding
the financial protection provisions of the proposed regulations, which
they argue would have a damaging financial impact on HBCUs. We note
that the triggers are designed to identify signs, and to augment the
Department's tools for detection, of impending financial difficulties.
If an institution is subject to material actions or events that are
likely to have an adverse impact on the financial condition or
operations of an institution, we believe that the Federal government
and taxpayers should be protected from any resulting losses incurred by
requiring a letter or credit, regardless of the institution's sector.
As commenters mentioned, our recent experience suggests that HBCUs have
not been the subject of government agency suits or other litigation by
students or others, or of administrative enforcement actions.
Institutions that do not experience these kinds of claims,
[[Page 75935]]
including HBCUs, will not experience adverse impacts under these
triggers. In addition, institutions, including HBCUs, will retain their
existing rights of due process and continue to have the ability to
present to the Secretary if there is any factual objection to the
grounds for the required financial protection. Accordingly, the
Secretary can consider additional information provided by an
institution before requiring a letter of credit. Even in instances
where the Department still requires a letter of credit over a school's
objection, the school could raise such issues to the Department's
Office of Hearing and Appeals.
Finally, we have made a number of changes to the proposed triggers
that address the commenters' specific objections to particular
triggers, to more sharply focus the automatic triggers on actions and
events that are likely to affect a school's financial stability. For
instance, as we stated in other sections of this preamble, in light of
the significant comments received regarding the potential for serious
unintended consequences if the accreditation action triggers were
automatic, we are revising the accreditation trigger so that
accreditation actions such as show cause and probation or equivalent
actions are discretionary. We note that we address commenters'
arguments with respect to additional specific financial protection
triggers, and any changes we have made in the final regulations, in the
sections of this preamble specific to those provisions.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested that the Department ensure that
its contractors are aware of the basis for borrower defense discharge
claims and the accompanying process. The commenter noted that
inconsistent servicing and debt collection standards impede borrowers'
access to the benefit and other forms of relief. The commenters also
suggested that the Department update its borrower-facing materials to
reflect the availability and scope of the borrower defense discharge.
Discussion: We are committed to ensuring that our contractors and
any borrower-facing material published by the Department provide
accurate and timely information on the discharge standards and
processes associated with a borrower defense to repayment. We have
begun the process of updating applicable materials to reflect these
final regulations and will continue working closely with our
contractors to help ensure that they have the information they need to
assist borrowers expeditiously and accurately.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters requested that the Department make
information available to the public on the number of borrowers who
submitted borrower defense applications, the number of borrowers who
received a discharge, the amount of loans discharged, the basis or
standard applied by the Department in a successful discharge claim,
discharged amounts collected from schools, a list of institutions
against which successful borrower defense claims are made, and any
reports relevant to the process. The commenters believed that this
information would provide transparency and facilitate a better
understanding of how the process is working as well.
Discussion: We are committed to transparency, clarity and ease of
administration and will give careful consideration to this request as
we refine our borrower defense process.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters noted that they, as student loan
borrowers, are taxpayers like every American citizen and that paying
student loans that were fraudulently made on top of paying taxes is a
double penalty. The commenters also requested that the Department
permit a borrower to include all types of student loans--private
student loans, FFEL, Perkins, Parent Plus--they received to finance the
cost of higher education in a borrower defense claim.
Discussion: The Department is committed to protecting student loan
borrowers from misleading, deceitful, and predatory practices of, and
failure to fulfill contractual promises by, institutions participating
in the Federal student aid programs. These final regulations permit a
borrower to consolidate loans listed in Sec. 685.220(b), including
nursing loans made under part E of title VIII of the Public Health
Service Act, to pursue borrower defense relief by consolidating those
loans, as provided in proposed Sec. 685.212(k). The Department does
not have the authority to include private student loans in a Direct
Loan consolidation.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters stated that, in order to avoid another
failure as serious as that of Corinthian, the Department should
implement strong compliance and enforcement policies to proactively
prevent institutions that engage in fraudulent activity from continuing
to receive title IV, HEA funding. The commenters believe that
institutions that do not meet statutory, regulatory or accreditor
standards and that burden students with debt without providing a
quality education should be identified early and subjected to greater
scrutiny and sanctions so that a borrower defense is a last resort.
Discussion: The Department is committed to strong compliance and
enforcement policies to proactively prevent institutions that engage in
fraudulent activity from continuing to receive title IV, HEA funding.
These final regulations establish the definitive conditions or events
upon which an institution is or may be required to provide to the
Department with financial protection, such as a letter of credit, to
help protect students, the Federal government, and taxpayers against
potential institutional liabilities.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter requested that the Department and the
Internal Revenue Service develop a determination on the tax treatment
of discharges of indebtedness for students with successful defense to
repayment claims. While acknowledging that the Department does not
administer tax law, the commenter stated that the Department should
question, or at least weigh in on the matter, of the Internal Revenue
Service's ``decline to assert'' policy on successful defense to
repayment claims that currently applies to loans for students who
attend schools owned by Corinthian, but not to loans for students who
attend other schools.
Discussion: As noted by the commenter, the tax treatment of
discharges that result from a successful borrower defense is outside of
the Department's jurisdiction. However, the Department recognizes the
commenter's concern and will pursue the issue in the near future.
Changes: None.
Borrower Defenses (Sections 668.71, 685.205, 685.206, and 685.222)
Federal Standard
Support for Standard
Comments: A group of commenters fully supported the Department's
intent to produce clear and fair regulations that protect student
borrowers and taxpayers and hold schools accountable for acts and
omissions that deceive or defraud students. However, these commenters
suggested that the Department has not fully availed ourselves of
existing consumer protection remedies and have, instead, engaged in
overreach to expand our enforcement options.
Another group of commenters noted that the proposed Federal
standard is a positive complement to consumer protections already
provided by State law. Another group of commenters
[[Page 75936]]
offered support for the Federal standard specifically because it
addresses complexities and inequities between borrowers in different
States.
One commenter explicitly endorsed our position that general HEA
eligibility or compliance violations by schools could not be used a
basis for a borrower defense.
Another group of commenters noted that the proposed Federal
standard provides an efficient, transparent, and fair process for
borrowers to pursue relief. According to these commenters, the Federal
standard eliminates the potential for disparate application of this
borrower benefit inherent with the current rule's State-based standard,
and enables those who are providing training and support to multiple
institutions to develop standardized guidance.
A different group of commenters expressed support for the Federal
standard, noting that it would be challenging for us to adjudicate
claims based on 50 States' laws. Yet another group of commenters
requested that the new Federal standard be applied retroactively when a
borrower makes a successful borrower defense claim and has loans that
were disbursed both before and after July 1, 2017.
Discussion: We appreciate the support of these commenters.
However, we do not agree with the commenters' contention that we
are engaging in overreach to expand our enforcement options, nor have
we disregarded existing consumer protection remedies. The HEA provides
specific authority to the Secretary to conduct institutional oversight
and enforcement of the title IV regulations. The borrower defense
regulations do not supplant consumer protections available to
borrowers. Rather, the borrower defense regulations describe the
circumstances under which the Secretary exercises his or her long-
standing authority to relieve a borrower of the obligation to repay a
loan on the basis of an act or omission of the borrower's school. The
Department's borrower defense process is distinct from borrowers'
rights under State law. State consumer protection laws establish causes
of action an individual may bring in a State's courts; nothing in the
Department's regulation prevents borrowers from seeking relief through
State law in State courts. As noted in the NPRM, 81 FR 39338, the
limitations of the borrower defense process should not be taken to
represent any view regarding other issues and causes of action under
other laws and regulations that are not within the Department's
authority.
As to the request to make the new Federal standard available to all
Direct Loan borrowers, we cannot apply the new Federal standard
retroactively when a borrower makes a successful borrower defense claim
and has loans that were disbursed both before and after July 1, 2017.
Loans made before July 1, 2017 are governed by the contractual rights
expressed in the existing Direct Loan promissory notes. These
promissory notes incorporate the current borrower defense standard,
which is based on an act or omission of the school attended by the
student that would give rise to a cause of action against the school
under applicable State law. Promissory notes for loans made after July
1, 2017 will include a discussion of the new Federal standard for
borrower defense claims.
Changes: None.
Evidentiary Standard
Comments: A number of commenters and an individual commenter
remarked that the proposed Federal standard increases the risk to
institutions by granting loan discharges when the borrower's case is
substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence.
Another commenter expanded on this position, asserting that the
evidentiary standard in most States for fraudulent misrepresentation is
clear and convincing evidence. A few commenters echoed these viewpoints
and suggested that the perceived minimal burden of proof may encourage
bad actors to entice borrowers into filing false claims.
A couple of other commenters wrote that the standard is not clear
enough to preclude students from asserting claims of misrepresentation
without supporting evidence. These commenters suggested that the
proposed regulations presume that all proprietary schools engage in
deliberate misrepresentation.
Discussion: We do not agree that the ``preponderance of the
evidence'' standard will result in greater risk to institutions. We
believe this evidentiary standard is appropriate as it is the typical
standard in most civil proceedings. Additionally, the Department uses a
preponderance of the evidence standard in other proceedings regarding
borrower debt issues. See 34 CFR 34.14(b), (c) (administrative wage
garnishment); 34 CFR 31.7(e) (Federal salary offset). We believe that
this evidentiary standard strikes a balance between ensuring that
borrowers who have been harmed are not subject to an overly burdensome
evidentiary standard and protecting the Federal government, taxpayers,
and institutions from unsubstantiated claims. Under the standard, the
designated Department official may determine whether the elements of
the borrower's cause of action under the Federal standard for borrower
defenses have been sufficiently alleged and shown. If the official
determines that the elements have not been alleged or have not met the
preponderance of evidence standard, the claim will be denied.
The Department is aware of unscrupulous businesses that prey upon
distressed borrowers, charging exorbitant fees to enroll them in
Federal loan repayment plans that are freely available. On January 28,
2016, the Department sent cease and desist letters to two third-party
``debt relief'' companies that were using the Department's official
seal without authorization. The misuse of the Department's Seal is part
of a worrying trend. Some of these companies are charging large up-
front or monthly fees for Federal student aid services offered by the
Department of Education and its student loan servicers for free. In
April of 2016, the Department launched several informational efforts to
direct borrowers to the Department's free support resources, as well as
to share information regarding State and Federal entities that have the
authority to act against companies that engage in deceptive or unfair
practices. Although these or similar opportunists may seek to profit
from filing false claims, the Department will be aggressive in
curtailing this activity, and will remain vigilant to help ensure that
bad actors do not profit from this process.
We do not agree that the Federal standard will incent borrowers to
assert claims of misrepresentation without sufficient evidence to
substantiate their claims. As explained in more detail under ``Process
for Individual Borrowers,'' under Sec. 685.222(a)(2), a borrower in
the individual process in Sec. 685.222(e) bears the burden of proof in
establishing that the elements of his or her claim have been met. In a
group process under Sec. 685.222(f) to (h), this burden falls on the
designated Department official. Borrower defense claims that do not
meet the evidentiary standard will be denied. We also disagree with the
commenters' interpretation of the borrower defense regulations as based
on a presumption that all proprietary institutions engage in deliberate
misrepresentation. These borrower defense regulations are applicable to
and designed to address all institutions of postsecondary education
participating in the Direct Loan Program; further, they contain no
presumption regarding the activities of any institution, but instead
provide a fair process for determining whether
[[Page 75937]]
acts or omissions by any particular institution give rise to a borrower
defense. We also discuss this issue in more detail under ``Substantial
Misrepresentation.''
Changes: None.
Educational Malpractice
Comments: A group of commenters asked that we clarify the
difference between educational malpractice and a school's failure to
provide the necessary aspects of an education (such as qualified
instructors, appropriately equipped laboratories, etc.).
Discussion: We do not believe that the regulations should
differentiate between educational malpractice and a school's failure to
provide the necessary aspects of an education, such as might be
asserted in a claim of substantial misrepresentation or breach of
contract. State law does not recognize claims characterized as
educational malpractice, and we do not intend to create a different
legal standard for such claims in these regulations. Claims relating to
the quality of a student's education or matters regarding academic and
disciplinary disputes within the judgment and discretion of a school
are outside the scope of the borrower defense regulations. We recognize
that there may be instances where a school has made specific
misrepresentations about its facilities, financial charges, programs,
or the employability of its graduates, and these misrepresentations may
function as the basis of a borrower defense, as opposed to a claim
regarding educational quality. Similarly, a borrower defense claim
based on a breach of contract may be raised where a school has failed
to deliver specific obligations, such as programs and services, it has
committed to by contract.
Changes: None.
Intent
Comments: A number of commenters expressed concern that the
proposed Federal standard does not require intent on the part of the
institution. These commenters were concerned that inadvertent errors by
an institution or its employees could serve as the basis for a borrower
defense claim. Some commenters cited an example of an employee
misstating or omitting information that is available to the borrower in
a complete and correct form in publications or electronic media. One of
these commenters noted that the six-year statute of limitations may
exacerbate this issue, by permitting borrowers to present claims
relying on distant memories of oral conversations that may have been
misunderstood.
Discussion: Gathering evidence of intent would likely be nearly
impossible for borrowers. Information asymmetry between borrowers and
institutions, which are likely in control of the best evidence of
intentionality of misrepresentations, would render borrower defense
claims implausible for most borrowers.
As explained in more detail under ``Substantial
Misrepresentation,'' we do not believe it is necessary to incorporate
an element of intent or knowledge into the substantial
misrepresentation standard. This reflects the Department's longstanding
position that a misrepresentation does not require knowledge or intent
on the part of the institution. The Department will continue to operate
within a rule of reasonableness and will evaluate available evidence of
extenuating, mitigating, and aggravating factors prior to issuing any
sanctions pursuant to 34 CFR part 668, subpart F. We will also consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding any misrepresentation for
borrower defense determinations. However, an institution will generally
be responsible for harm to borrowers caused by its misrepresentations,
even if they are not intentional. We continue to believe that this is
more reasonable and fair than having the borrower (or taxpayers) bear
the cost of such injuries. It also reflects the consumer protection
laws of many States.
Similarly, we do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to
adopt an intent element for the breach of contract standard. Generally,
intent is not a required element for breach of contract, and we do not
see a need to depart from that general legal principle here.
Regardless of the point in time within the statute of limitations
at which a borrower defense claim is made, the borrower will be
required to present a case that meets or exceeds the preponderance of
the evidence standard.
Changes: None.
State Law Bases for the Federal Standard
Comments: A number of commenters advocated the continuation of
State-based standards for future borrower defense claims. These
commenters put forward several arguments in support of their position.
Several commenters suggested that the proposed Federal standard
effectively reduces, preempts, or repeals borrowers' current rights
under the current, State law-based standard.
According to another commenter, the proposed acceptance of
favorable, nondefault, contested judgments based on State law suggests
that allegations of State law violations should provide sufficient
basis for a borrower defense claim. Another group of commenters
contended that, when a Federal law or regulation intends to provide
broad consumer protections, it generally does not supplant all State
laws, but rather, replaces only those that provide less protection to
consumers.
A group of commenters noted that the HEA's State authorization
regulations require States to regulate institutions and protect
students from abusive conduct. According to these commenters, the laws
States enact under this authority would not be covered by the Federal
standard unless the borrower obtained a favorable, nondefault,
contested judgment.
Additionally, one commenter believed that providing a path to
borrower defense based on act or omission of the school attended by the
student that would give rise to a cause of action under applicable
State law would preserve the relationship between borrower defense,
defense to repayment, and the ``Holder in Due Course'' rule of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).\5\
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\5\ The FTC's ``Holder Rule'' or ``Holder in Due Course Rule''
is also formally known as the ``Trade Regulation Rule Concerning
Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses,'' 16 CFR part 433.
The Holder Rule requires certain credit contracts to include a
contractual provision that establishes that the holder of such a
contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor
could assert against the seller of the goods or services obtained
with the proceeds of the contract, with recovery by the debtor being
limited to the amounts paid by the debtor under the contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These commenters stated that the Department has not provided
sufficient evidence to support its assertions that borrower defense
determinations based on a cause of action under applicable State law
results or would result in inequitable treatment for borrowers, or that
the complexity of adjudicating State-based claims has increased due to
the expansion of distance education. Further, these commenters also
stated that the Department has not provided any examples of cases that
would meet the standard required to base a borrower defense claim on a
nondefault, contested judgement based on State law.
A group of commenters contended that State law provides the most
comprehensive consumer protections to borrowers. Other commenters
contended that State law provides clarity to borrowers and schools, as
precedents have been established that elucidate what these laws mean
with respect to the rights and responsibilities of the parties.
[[Page 75938]]
Another commenter suggested that providing borrowers comprehensive
options to claim a borrower defense, including claims based on
violation of State law, should be an essential precept of borrower
relief.
One commenter contended that the elimination of the State standard
is at odds with the proposed ban on mandatory arbitration, as this ban
will clear the way for borrowers to pursue claims against their schools
in State court.
Several commenters noted that the Department will continue to apply
State law standards to borrower defense claims for loans disbursed
prior to July 2017, necessitating the continued understanding and
application of State laws regardless of whether or not they remain a
basis for borrower defense claims for loans disbursed after July 2017.
A group of commenters expressed concern that borrowers with loans
disbursed before July 2017 can access the Federal standard by
consolidating their loans; however, borrowers with loans disbursed
after July 2017 can only avail themselves of the State standard by
obtaining a nondefault, contested judgment. They contended that
Department should not introduce this inequity into the Federal student
loan programs.
Another group of commenters asserted that defining bases for future
borrower defense claims based on past institutional misconduct may
limit the prosecution of future forms of misconduct that are
unforeseeable.
Several commenters noted that many borrowers lack the resources
necessary to obtain a nondefault, contested judgment based on State
law. Moreover, these borrowers would not have access to the breadth of
data and evidence available to the Department.
Several commenters contended that borrowers whose schools have
violated State law should not have to rely upon their State's Attorney
General (AG) to access Federal loan relief.
One commenter wrote that creating multiple paths a borrower may use
to pursue a borrower defense claim is unnecessarily complex.
A group of commenters remarked that the proposed Federal standard
is both too complex and the evidentiary standard too low, suggesting
that the prior State standard was more appropriate for borrower defense
claims.
Discussion: We disagree that the Federal standard effectively
reduces, preempts, or repeals borrowers' current rights under the State
standard. Borrowers may still submit a claim based on violation of any
State or Federal law, whether obtained in a court or an administrative
tribunal of competent jurisdiction. As also explained in the ``Claims
Based on Non-Default, Contested Judgments'' section of this document,
the Department's borrower defense process is distinct from borrowers'
rights to pursue judicial remedies in other State or Federal contexts
and nothing in the Department's regulation prevents borrowers from
seeking relief through State law in State courts.
We agree, as proposed in the NPRM and reflected in these final
regulations, that the acceptance of favorable, nondefault, contested
judgments based on State or Federal law violations may serve as a
sufficient basis for a borrower defense claim. We believe it is
important to enable borrowers to bring borrower defense claims based on
those judgments, but we do not think this means that we should maintain
the State-based standard.
We acknowledge that the HEA's State authorization regulations
require States to regulate institutions and protect students from
abusive conduct and that the laws States have enacted in this role
would only be covered by the Federal standard where the borrower
obtained a favorable, nondefault, contested judgment. However, we do
not view this as a compelling reason to maintain an exclusively State-
based standard, or a standard that also incorporates State law in
addition to the Federal standard, for borrower defense.
We disagree that the Federal standard for borrower defense should
incorporate the FTC's Holder Rule. We acknowledge that the current
borrower defense regulation's basis in applicable State law has its
roots in the Department's history with borrower defense.\6\ However, we
have decided that it is appropriate that the Department exercise its
authority under section 455(h) of the HEA to specify ``which acts or
omissions'' may serve as the basis of a borrower defense and establish
a Federal standard that is not based in State law, for loans made after
the effective date of these final regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ As explained in the ``Expansion of Borrower Rights''
section, before the Department enacted the borrower defense
regulations in 1994 as part of its Direct Loan Program regulations,
59 FR 61664, the Department had preserved borrowers' rights under
the FFEL Program to bring any claims a borrower may have against a
school as defenses against the holder of the loan if the school had
a referral or affiliation relationship with the lender. This was
done by adopting a version of the FTC's Holder Rule language in the
FFEL Master Promissory Note in 1994, and was later formalized in
regulation at 34 CFR 682.209(g) in 2008. As further explained under
``General,'' in 1995, the Department clarified that the borrower
defense Direct Loan Program regulation was meant to create rights
for borrowers, and as to liabilities for schools corresponding to
those that would arise under the FFEL Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have acknowledged that potential disparities may exist as
students in one State may receive different relief than students in
another State, despite having common facts and claims. This concern is
substantiated, in part, by comments made by non-Federal negotiators and
members of the public in response to the NPRM, asserting that consumer
protections laws vary greatly from State to State.
We have also described how the complexity of adjudicating State-
based claims for borrower defense has increased due to the expansion of
distance education. As noted in the NPRM (81 FR 39335 to 39336), while
a determination might be made as to which State's laws would provide
protection from school misconduct for borrowers who reside in one State
but are enrolled via distance education in a program based in another
State, some States have extended their rules to protect these students,
while others have not.
Additionally, we have discussed the administrative burden to the
Department and difficulties Department has experienced in determining
which States' laws apply to any borrower defense claim and the inherent
uncertainties in interpreting another authorities' laws. 81 FR 39339.
We agree that borrower relief should include comprehensive options,
including claims based on violations of State law. While we believe
that the proposed standards will capture much of the behavior that can
and should be recognized as the basis for borrower defenses, it is
possible that some State laws may offer borrowers important protections
that do not fall within the scope of the Department's Federal standard.
To account for these situations, the final regulations provide that
nondefault, contested judgments obtained against a school based on any
State or Federal law, may be a basis for a borrower defense claim,
whether obtained in a court or an administrative tribunal of competent
jurisdiction. Under these regulations, a borrower may use such a
judgment as the basis for a borrower defense if the borrower was
personally affected by the judgment, that is, the borrower was a party
to the case in which the judgment was entered, either individually or
as a member of a class. To support a borrower defense claim, the
judgment would be required to pertain to the making of a Direct Loan or
the provision of educational services to the borrower.
[[Page 75939]]
While State law may provide clarity to borrowers and schools
regarding the rights and responsibilities of the parties under
established precedents, we believe that the Federal standard for
borrower defenses more clearly and efficiently captures the full scope
of acts and omissions that may result in a borrower defense claim.
We disagree that the elimination of the State standard is at odds
with the ban on predispute arbitration clauses. Rather, we assert that
prohibiting predispute arbitration clauses will enable more borrowers
to seek redress in court and, as appropriate, to submit a nondefault,
contested judgment in support of their borrower defense claim,
including a claim based on State law.
We concur that the Department's continued application of State law
standards to borrower defense claims for loans disbursed prior to July
2017, will require the continued interpretation of State law. However,
the number of loans subject to the State standard will diminish over
time, enabling the Department to transition to a more effective and
efficient borrower defense standard and process.
We understand the commenters' concern that borrowers may be treated
inequitably based on when their loans were disbursed. However, while it
is true that borrowers with loans disbursed prior to July 2017 may
consolidate those loans, as discussed in the NPRM (81 FR 39357), the
standard that would apply would depend upon the date on which the first
Direct Loan to which a claim is asserted was made. Therefore, the
standard applied to these loans does not change by virtue of their
consolidation.
We do not agree that the Federal standard supplants all State
consumer protection laws, as borrowers may still pursue relief based on
these laws by obtaining a nondefault, contested judgment by a court or
administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
We do not agree that the three bases for borrower defenses under
the Federal standard limit the prosecution of future unforeseeable
forms of misconduct. We expect that many of the borrower defense claims
that the Department anticipates receiving will be addressed through the
categories of substantial misrepresentation, breach of contract, or
violations of State or Federal law that are confirmed through a
nondefault, contested judgment by a court or administrative tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. Additionally, the Department's borrower defense
process is distinct from borrowers' rights or other Federal, State, or
oversight agencies' authorities to prosecute or initiate claims against
schools for wrongful conduct in State or other Federal tribunals. We
recognize that, while the attainment of a favorable judgment can be an
effective and efficient means of adjudicating a borrower's claim of
wrongdoing by an institution, it can also be prohibitively time-
consuming or expensive for some borrowers. The regulation includes a
provision that enables a borrower to show that a judgment obtained by a
governmental agency, such as a State AG or a Federal agency, that
relates to the making of the borrower's Direct Loan or the provision of
educational services to the borrower, may also serve as a basis for a
borrower defense under the standard, whether the judgment is obtained
in court or in an administrative tribunal. We do not agree that
borrowers whose schools have violated State law will have to rely upon
their State's AG to access Federal loan relief. These borrowers are
still able to file borrower defense claims under the substantial
misrepresentation or breach of contract standards, even if a
nondefault, contested judgment is not obtained by the government
entity. Moreover, the prohibition against predispute arbitration
clauses and class action waivers will enable more borrowers to pursue a
determination of wrongdoing on the part of an institution individually
or as part of a class.
We do not agree that the State standard is less complex than the
new Federal standard. As discussed, the current State law-based
standard necessarily involves complicated questions relating to which
State's laws apply to a specific case and to the proper and accurate
interpretation of those laws. We believe the elements of the Federal
standard and the bases for borrower defense claims provide sufficient
clarity as to what may or may not constitute an actionable act or
omission on the part of an institution. As discussed earlier, we also
disagree that the State standard provides a higher evidentiary
standard. Preponderance of the evidence is the typical standard in most
civil proceedings. Additionally, the Department uses a preponderance of
the evidence standard in other processes regarding borrower debt
issues.
Changes: None.
Federal Standard as a Minimum Requirement
Comments: Several groups of commenters recommended that we
establish a Federal standard that serves as a floor, or minimum
requirement, to provide additional consumer safeguards to borrowers in
States that have less robust consumer protection laws. One group of
commenters suggested that this could assure consistency with the FTC
Holder Rule. These commenters opined that expansion of the Federal
standard to include Unfair, Deceptive or Abusive Acts and Practices
(UDAP)\7\ violations and breaches of contract would benefit borrowers
and simplify borrower defense claim adjudication, as very few States
would provide more robust consumer protections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Each State has consumer protection laws that prohibit
certain unfair and deceptive conduct, which are commonly known as
``unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices'' or ``UDAP'' laws.
The FTC also enforces prohibitions against unfair and deceptive
conduct in certain contexts under section 5 of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. 45, which may also be described as Federal ``UDAP'' law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another commenter opined that a strong Federal standard as a more
robust minimum requirement, i.e., one that requires only reasonable
reliance to prove substantial misrepresentation and includes UDAP
violations, would eliminate the need to maintain a State law standard.
Discussion: We disagree that the Federal standard requires
expansion to include UDAP violations in order to ensure borrowers are
protected or that the Federal standard should be established as a
minimum requirement for borrower defense. As noted in the NPRM,
reliance upon State law not only presents a significant burden for
Department officials who must apply and interpret various State laws,
but also for borrowers who must make the threshold determination as to
whether they may have a claim. We believe that many of the claims the
Department will receive will be covered by the standards proposed by
the Department and that those standards will streamline the
administration of the borrower defense regulations. The Department's
substantial misrepresentation regulations (34 CFR part 668 subpart F)
were informed by the FTC's Policy Guidelines on Deception, and we
believe they are more tailored to, and suitable for, use in the
borrower defense context. Under the borrower defense regulations,
certain factors addressing specific problematic conduct may be
considered to determine whether a misrepresentation has been relied
upon to a borrower's detriment, thus making the misrepresentation
``substantial.'' With regard to unfair and abusive conduct, we
considered the available precedent and determined that it is unclear
how such principles would apply in the borrower defense context as
stand-alone standards. Such practices are often alleged in combination
with misrepresentations and are not often addressed on their own by the
courts. With this lack of guidance, it is unclear
[[Page 75940]]
how such principles would apply in the borrower defense context.
Moreover, many of the borrower defense claims the Department has
addressed or is considering have involved misrepresentations by
schools. We believe that the standard established in these regulations
will address much of the behavior arising in the borrower defense
context, and that this standard appropriately addresses the
Department's goals of accurately identifying and providing relief to
borrowers for misconduct by schools; providing clear standards for
borrowers, schools, and the Department to use in resolving claims; and
avoiding for all parties the burden of interpreting other Federal
agencies' and States' authorities in the borrower defense context. As a
result, we decline to adopt standards for relief based on UDAP.
As discussed earlier, we also disagree that the Federal standard
for borrower defense should incorporate the FTC's Holder Rule, 16 CFR
part 433, and believe that it is appropriate for the reasons discussed
that the Department exercise its authority to establish a Federal
standard that is not based in State law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, we appreciate that State
law provides important protections for students and borrowers. Nothing
in the borrower defense regulations prevents a borrower from seeking
relief under State law in State court. Moreover, Sec. 685.222(b)
provides that if a borrower has obtained a nondefault, favorable
contested judgment against the school under State or other Federal law,
the judgment may serve as a basis for borrower defense. As explained
further under ``Claims Based on Non-Default, Contested Judgments,'' we
believe this strikes the appropriate balance between providing relief
to borrowers and the Department's administrative burden in accurately
evaluating the merits of such claims.
Changes: None.
Additional Grounds
State AGs
Comments: A number of commenters requested that the final
regulations include a process for State AGs to petition the Secretary
to grant relief based on State law violations. One group of commenters
expanded on this request, suggesting that other law enforcement
agencies and entities also be permitted to bring forward evidence in
support of group claims, and to receive from the Department a formal
response regarding its determination of the claim. Another group of
commenters contended that State AGs uncover institutional wrongdoing
before others do, and, accordingly, their direct participation in the
borrower defense process would provide affected borrowers more timely
access to relief.
Discussion: The group process for borrower defenses in Sec.
685.222(f) provides for a process by which evidence for determinations
of substantial misrepresentation, breach of contract, or judgments,
might come from submissions to the Department by claimants, State AGs
or other officials, or advocates for claimants, as well as from the
Department's investigations. We recognize that these entities may
uncover institutional wrongdoing early and may have relevant evidence
in support of group claims.
The Department always welcomes cooperation and input from other
Federal and State enforcement entities, as well as legal assistance
organizations and advocacy groups. In our experience, such cooperation
is more effective when it is conducted through informal communication
and contact. Accordingly, we have not incorporated a provision
requiring formal written responses from the Secretary, but plan to
create a point of contact for State AGs to allow for active
communication channels. We also reiterate that we welcome a
continuation of cooperation and communication with other interested
groups and parties. As indicated above, the Department is fully
prepared to receive and make use of evidence and input from other
stakeholders, including advocates and State and Federal agencies. We
also discuss this issue in more detail under ``Group Process for
Borrower Defense.''
Changes: None.
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP)
Comments: Several groups of commenters advocated the inclusion of
State UDAP laws as a stand-alone basis for borrower defense claims.
One group of commenters opined that UDAP laws, which include
prohibitions against misrepresentation, along with unfair, fraudulent,
and unlawful business acts, have been refined by decades of judicial
decisions, while the proposed substantial misrepresentation basis for
borrower defense claims remains untested.
Another group of commenters argued that State UDAP laws incorporate
the prohibitions and deterrents that the Department seeks to achieve
and offer the flexibility needed to deter and rectify institutional
acts or omissions that would be presented as borrower defenses under
the Department's substantial misrepresentation and breach of contract
standards. Another group of commenters noted that some acts that may
violate State laws intended to protect borrowers may not constitute a
breach of contract or misrepresentation.
Another commenter noted that multiple State AGs have investigated
schools and provided the Department with their findings of wrongdoing
based on their States' UDAP laws.
One group of commenters suggested that, if the Department did not
opt to restore the State standard, the inclusion of a similar UDAP law
provision would become even more important. These commenters assert
that the additional factors that would favor a finding of a substantial
misrepresentation would not close the gap between the Federal standard
and States' UDAP laws. They recommend using State UDAP laws as the
additional factors that would elevate a misrepresentation to
substantial misrepresentation.
Discussion: As discussed above, we disagree that the inclusion of
UDAP violations as a basis for a borrower defense claims is required to
assure borrowers are protected by the Federal standard.
We believe that the Federal standard appropriately addresses the
Department's interests in accurately identifying and providing relief
to borrowers for misconduct by schools; providing clear standards for
borrowers, schools, and the Department to use in resolving claims; and
avoiding for all parties the burden of interpreting other Federal
agencies' and States' authorities in the borrower defense context.
While UDAP laws may play an important role in State consumer protection
and in State AGs' enforcement actions, we believe the Federal standard
addresses much of the same conduct, while being more appropriately
tailored and readily administrable in the borrower defense context. As
a result, we decline to include UDAP violations as a basis for borrower
defense claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated that by foreclosing HEA violations
from serving as a basis for borrower defense claims, the proposed
regulations would effectively preempt State UDAP laws, which the
commenter argued often use violations of other laws as a basis for
determining that a practice is unfair or deceptive.
Discussion: The Department's borrower defense process is distinct
from borrowers' rights under State law. State UDAP laws establish
causes of action an individual may bring in a State's courts; nothing
in the
[[Page 75941]]
Department's regulations prevents borrowers from seeking relief through
State law in State courts. As noted in the NPRM, the specifics of the
borrower defense process should not be taken to represent any view
regarding other issues and causes of action under other laws and
regulations that are not within the Department's authority.
Changes: None.
HEA Violations
Comments: One commenter requested that the regulations make clear
that borrower defense claims do not include claims based on
noncompliance with the HEA or sexual or racial harassment allegations,
as described in the preamble to the NPRM. One commenter suggested that
the explicit exclusion of sexual or racial harassment as the basis of a
borrower defense claim is intended to protect public and non-profit
schools.
Another commenter believed the current regulations would allow
borrowers to base a claim for a borrower defense on an institution's
violations of the HEA where those violations also constitute violations
under State UDAP law. The commenter viewed the Department's position in
the NPRM that a violation of the HEA is not, in itself, a basis for a
borrower defense as a retroactive change to the standard applicable to
loans made before July 2017. The commenter rejected the Department's
assertion that this limitation is in fact based on a longstanding
interpretation of the bases for borrower defense claims.
Discussion: It is indeed the Department's longstanding position
that an act or omission by the school that violates an eligibility or
compliance requirement in the HEA or its implementing regulations does
not necessarily affect the enforceability of a Federal student loan
obtained to attend the school, and is not, therefore, automatically a
basis for a borrower defense. With limited exceptions not relevant
here, the case law is unanimous that the HEA contains no implied
private right of action for an individual to assert a claim for
relief.[hairsp]\8\ The HEA vests the Department with the sole authority
to determine and apply the appropriate sanction for HEA violations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ As stated by the Department in 1993:
[The Department] considers the loss of institutional eligibility
to affect directly only the liability of the institution for Federal
subsidies and reinsurance paid on those loans. . . . [T]he borrower
retains all the rights with respect to loan repayment that are
contained in the terms of the loan agreements, and [the Department]
does not suggest that these loans, whether held by the institution
or the lender, are legally unenforceable merely because they were
made after the effective date of the loss of institutional
eligibility.
58 FR 13,337. See, e.g. Armstrong v. Accrediting Council for
Continuing Educ. & Training, 168 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1999), opinion
amended on denial of reh'g, 177 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(rejecting claim of mistake of fact regarding institutional
accreditation as grounds for rescinding loan agreements); McCullough
v. PNC Bank, 298 F.3d 1362, 1369 (11th Cir. 2002)(collecting cases).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A school's act or omission that violates the HEA may, of course,
give rise to a cause of action under other law, and that cause of
action may also independently constitute a borrower defense claim under
Sec. 685.206(c) or Sec. 685.222. For example, advertising that makes
untruthful statements about placement rates violates section 487(a)(8)
of the HEA, but may also give rise to a cause of action under common
law based on misrepresentation or constitute a substantial
misrepresentation under the Federal standard and, therefore, constitute
a basis for a borrower defense claim. However, this has always been the
case, and is not a retroactive change to the current borrower defense
standard under Sec. 685.206(c).
As explained in more detail under ``Federal Standard,'' it has been
the Department's longstanding position that sexual and racial
harassment claims do not directly relate to the making of a loan or
provision of educational services and are not within the scope of
borrower defense. 60 FR 37769. We also note, moreover, that sexual and
racial harassment are explicitly excluded as bases for borrower defense
claims in recognition of other entities, both within and outside of the
Department, with the authority to investigate and resolve these
complaints, and not in an effort to protect public and non-profit
schools.
Changes: None.
Claims Based on Non-Default, Contested Judgments
Comments: A group of commenters requested that the Department
explain how, if continuing to operate under the State standard results
in potentially inequitable treatment for borrowers, it is still
reasonable to rely upon State law when judgments have been obtained,
thereby providing borrower protections that vary by State.
Several commenters suggested that a borrower should be required to
obtain a favorable judgment under State law in order to obtain a loan
discharge. One commenter suggested that borrowers pursuing State law
judgments receive forbearance on their Direct Loans while their cases
are proceeding.
Discussion: When the Department relies upon a nondefault, contested
judgment to affirm a borrower defense, it is not required to interpret
State law. Rather, it relies upon the findings of a court or
administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
Although we expect that the prohibition against certain mandatory
arbitration clauses will enable more borrowers to pursue a
determination of wrongdoing on the part of an institution, we do not
agree that it is appropriate to require borrowers to obtain a favorable
judgment in order to obtain a loan discharge.
While the attainment of a favorable judgment can be an effective
and efficient means of adjudicating a borrower's claim of wrongdoing by
an institution, it can also be prohibitively time-consuming or
expensive for some borrowers. We have included a provision under which
a judgment obtained by a governmental agency, such as a State AG or a
Federal agency, that relates to the making of the borrower's Direct
Loan or the provision of educational services to the borrower, may also
serve as a basis for a borrower defense under the standard, whether the
judgment is obtained in court or in an administrative tribunal.
We agree that borrowers should receive forbearance on their Direct
Loans while their cases are proceeding. Borrowers may use the General
Forbearance Request form to apply for forbearance in these
circumstances; we would grant the borrower's request, and the final
regulations also will require FFEL Program loan holders to do the same
upon notification by the Secretary. In addition, a borrower defense
loan discharge based on a nondefault, contested judgment may provide
relief for remaining payments due on the loan and recovery of payments
already made.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters stated that the Department's proposal
to allow borrower defenses on the basis of ``nondefault, favorable
contested judgments'' was unrealistic, and argued that such judgments
are unlikely to occur. These commenters argued that both plaintiffs
(either government agencies or students themselves) as well as
institutions are under substantial pressure to settle lawsuits, and
pointed to the lack of any current judgments against institutions that
would meet this standard. One commenter argued that the lack of such
nondefault favorable contested judgments effectively barred State
causes of action and would force borrowers to rely on the Department's
Federal standard as the only basis for relief.
Discussion: The Department recognizes that nondefault, favorable
contested judgments may not be common, relative to the number of
[[Page 75942]]
lawsuits that are filed. The Department includes this basis for relief
as a way for borrowers to avoid having to re-litigate claims actually
decided on the merits. If no such determination against the institution
has yet occurred, borrowers may bring claims to the Department for
evaluation that satisfy the standards described for a substantial
misrepresentation under Sec. 685.222(d) or breach of contract under
Sec. 685.222(c). The Department will thus continue to recognize State
law causes of action under Sec. 685.222(b), but will require a
tribunal of competent jurisdiction to decide the legal and factual
basis for the claim.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters stated that the proposed standard for
nondefault, favorable contested judgments effectively narrows State law
causes of action by putting what the commenters argued was a
significant and unrealistic burden on borrowers to litigate claims to
judgment. These commenters argued that the Department should not
effectively remove these bases for relief. One of the commenters asked
that the Department recognize settlements with the institution as a
basis for relief, while another proposed that the Department recognize
class action settlements in which the settlement has been approved by a
judge or in which the plaintiff(s) have survived a motion for summary
judgment. Another asked that claim preclusive court judgments and
findings of fact and admissions in settlements should likewise serve as
a basis for relief.
Discussion: As stated in the NPRM, 81 FR 39340, we decline to adopt
a standard based on applicable State law due, in part, to the burden to
borrowers and the Department in interpreting and applying States' laws.
However, we recognize that State law may provide important protections
for borrowers and students. We believe that a standard recognizing
nondefault, favorable, contested judgments strikes a balance between
recognizing causes of action under State or other Federal law and
minimizing the Department's administrative burden in accurately
evaluating the merits of such claims. For the reasons discussed here
and in the NPRM, we decline to recognize settlements as a way to
satisfy the standard in Sec. 685.222(b). However, we welcome the
submission of, and will consider, any orders, court filings,
admissions, or other evidence from a borrower for consideration in the
borrower defense process.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated that the Department's proposed
language leaves it unclear whether the judgment against the institution
must include a specific determination regarding the act or omission
forming the basis of the borrower defense, and urged the Department to
explicitly require such a determination. Another commenter argued that
the carve-outs of certain claims that the Department would not consider
to be borrower defenses are not explicitly included for judgments
obtained against an institution, and urged that the Department include
such carve-outs.
Discussion: For a judgment to form the basis of a borrower defense,
it must include a determination that an act or omission that would
constitute a defense to repayment under State or Federal law occurred
and that the borrower would be entitled to relief under such applicable
law. That said, the overarching principles established in Sec.
685.222(a) apply to claims under all the standards established in Sec.
685.222, including to judgments under Sec. 685.222(b). Thus, under
Sec. 685.222(a)(3), the Department will not recognize a violation by
the school of an eligibility or compliance requirement in the HEA or
its implementing regulations as a basis for borrower defense under
Sec. 685.222 or Sec. 685.206(c) unless the violation would otherwise
constitute a basis for borrower defense. Similarly, borrower defense
claims must be based upon an act or omission of the school attended by
the student that relates to the making of a Direct Loan or the
provision of educational services for which the loan was provided,
under Sec. 685.222(a)(5).
If a borrower, a class of consumers, or a government agency made a
claim against a school regarding the provision of educational services
and receives a favorable judgment that entitles the borrower to
restitution or damages, but the borrower only obtained a partial
recovery from the school on this judgment, under Sec. 685.222(i)(8),
we would recognize any unpaid amount of the judgment in calculating the
total amount of relief that could be provided on the Direct Loan. If
the borrower, a class of consumers, or a government agency obtained a
judgment holding that the school engaged in wrongful acts or omissions
regarding the provision of private loans, the borrower could
demonstrate to the Department whether the findings of fact on which the
judgment rested also established acts or omissions relating to the
educational services provided to the borrower or the making of the
borrower's Direct Loan that could be the basis of a borrower defense
claim under these regulations. This borrower defense claim would be a
basis for relief independent of the judgment that related exclusively
to the private loans, and such relief would be calculated without
reference to any relief obtained through that private loan judgment.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters raised concerns about a student's
ability to bring a borrower defense claim based on judgments obtained
by government agencies. One of the commenters stated that it is not
always clear when an agency is acting on behalf of the students.
Discussion: The final regulation recognizes that judgments obtained
by governmental agencies may not be brought on the behalf of specific
students, as opposed to having been brought, for example, on the behalf
of a State or on the behalf of the United States. As described in the
final regulation, a judgment under the standard brought by a
governmental agency must be a favorable contested judgment obtained
against the school. As discussed previously, such judgments must also
meet the requirements of Sec. 685.222(a).
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter argued that the Department's judgment
standard should only apply with respect to loans disbursed, or
judgments obtained, after July 1, 2017.
Discussion: We believe that the standard does not represent any
change from current practice. If a borrower submitted a nondefault,
contested judgment from a court or administrative tribunal of competent
jurisdiction deciding a cause of action under applicable State law for
a loan first disbursed before July 1, 2017, the Department would apply
principles of collateral estoppel to determine if the judgment would
bar a school from disputing the cause of action forming the basis of
the borrower's claim under 34 CFR 685.206(c).
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter urged the Department to specify that the
judgments referenced in Sec. 685.222(b) must be obtained in court
cases and not merely through administrative proceedings.
Discussion: As set forth in in Sec. 685.222(b), the judgment must
be obtained ``in a court or administrative tribunal of competent
jurisdiction.'' The Department continues to believe that administrative
adjudications serve an important role in determining the factual and
legal basis for claims that could serve as borrower defenses. We do
[[Page 75943]]
not believe further clarification is necessary on this point.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated that the Department should add
language to the final regulations stating that it will also respect
judgments in favor of the school as precluding a borrower defense
claim.
Discussion: We will not incorporate an absolute bar on borrower
defense claims where the borrower has already lost in a State
proceeding because different underlying legal or factual bases may have
been involved in the prior litigation. For example, a student might
lose a breach of contract suit in State court premised on an
institution's failure to provide job placement services, but have a
valid claim that the institution misrepresented whether credits would
be transferrable. The Department will, however, follow established
principles of collateral estoppel in its determination of borrower
defense claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated that the Department's proposed
regulatory language would disrupt the adversarial process because
institutions would be more likely to settle cases than risk a judgment
that could lead to borrower defense liabilities, and also that
institutions may be forced not to settle if the opposing party insists
on admission of liability in the settlement that could form the basis
of borrower defense liabilities. The commenter also argued that it
would be unfair for the Department to consider past settlements
retroactively. Another commenter argued that the Department should
recognize default judgments against institutions obtained by a law
enforcement agency such as the FTC, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), or a State AG.
Discussion: We appreciate the concern that the new standard may
cause disruptions to the strategy and risk calculus in other litigation
by private parties as well as government agencies. The Department's
purpose in this rulemaking is to create a Federal standard that will
more efficiently and fairly determine whether a borrower is entitled to
relief, and we consider this purpose to outweigh the concern raised
about altering litigation strategies. We do not intend either to
dissuade or encourage settlements between borrowers and institutions,
and will give settlements and admissions in previous litigation the
weight to which they are entitled. That said, a default judgment does
not involve any determination of the merits, and therefore will require
the Department to make an independent assessment of the underlying
factual and legal basis for the claim. Settlements prior to July 1,
2017 will not be considered under this standard.
Changes: None.
Claims Based on Breach of Contract
Comments: Several commenters questioned why the Department would
permit a breach of contract claim, but not any other State law claims.
One commenter noted that evaluation of a breach of contract claim would
require substantial Department resources, including choice-of-law
decisions that may be especially complicated in cases of distance
education. One commenter said that other contract-related causes of
action should be open to borrowers, such as lack of consideration, lack
of formation due to lack of capacity, and contract contrary to public
policy, among others. Another commenter said that borrowers should be
able to assert contract-related claims under State UDAP laws for
signing forms saying they received materials that they never received.
Discussion: The comments suggest some confusion about the
Department's standard for evaluating breach of contract claims. For
loans first disbursed prior to July 1, 2017, the Department will
continue to recognize any applicable State-law causes of action, in
accordance with the State of the law prior to these regulations. That
standard requires the Department to evaluate State law questions,
including choice-of-law questions. For loans first disbursed after July
1, 2017, however, the Department will move to a Federal standard for
misrepresentation and breach of contract claims, and will cease to
recognize State-law bases that may exist for those causes of action.
Some commenters appeared to question why the Department drew the line
at accepting breach of contract claims but rejecting other traditional
State law contract-related causes of action. As we explained in the
NPRM, 81 FR 39341, breach of contract is a common allegation against
schools, and the underlying facts for a breach of contract claim may
very well not fit into the Department's substantial misrepresentation
standard. Furthermore, breach of contract is a cause of action
established in common law recognized across all States, and its basic
elements are likewise uniform across the States. Developing a Federal
standard in the particularized area of student-institution contracts
will ultimately lead to better consistency and greater predictability
in this area. That said, the Department will continue to recognize a
borrower defense based on any applicable State law cause of action,
provided that such a claim is litigated to a non-default, favorable
contested judgment under Sec. 685.222(b). Thus, we believe the final
regulations strike an appropriate balance between the efficiency and
predictability of a Federal standard, while still providing sufficient
bases upon which a borrower entitled to debt relief may seek it.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters asked the Department to incorporate
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when evaluating breach of
contract claims. One commenter argued that these doctrines could be
used to prevent institutions from relying on fine print disclaimers,
``job placement assistance'' that does not provide any targeted advice
for students but instead refers them to Internet job-posting sites, and
other tactics the commenter believes are unfair to students. Another
commenter attached examples of current institutional agreements that
seek to disclaim any promises beyond what are made in the enrollment
agreement, and urged the Department not to honor such disclaimers.
Discussion: The Department's position on this issue is that it will
rely on general, widely accepted principles of contract law in
developing a Federal standard in this area. We decline to elaborate
further on what specific types of contract claims might or might not be
successful at this time. We believe that a Federal standard for breach
of contract cases within the education context will ultimately be more
helpful if developed on a case-by-case basis.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters weighed in on the Department's
position that documents beyond the enrollment agreement might serve as
part of the contract. Some of these commenters noted that this position
may lead to inconsistent results, since different State laws and
circumstances may or may not allow a student to rely on other documents
beyond the enrollment agreement. Some of the commenters argued for more
clarity from the Department on which materials we would consider to
constitute the contract, and one of these commenters pointed to cases
varying on the treatment of such materials. One commenter invited us to
specify that a contract would include any promise the borrower
reasonably believed would be the institution's commitment to them.
Other commenters argued that, by raising the possibility that a student
might be able to point to course catalogues and similar documents as
[[Page 75944]]
part of the ``contract,'' the Department's rule would have the effect
of limiting the information schools provide to students. These
commenters said that the uncertainty could pose practical obstacles for
large institutions in particular, and asked the Department to
explicitly exclude such material from the definition of contract. One
commenter said that the ultimate effect of the current uncertainty
might be to reduce recruitment from under-served student populations.
Discussion: We understand the concerns from both the student
advocates and the institutional advocates regarding the lack of
certainty in the NPRM language. However, the Department is unable to
draw a bright line on what materials would be included as part of a
contract because that determination is necessarily a fact-intensive
determination best made on a case-by-case basis. The Department intends
to make these determinations consistent with generally recognized
principles applied by courts in adjudicating breach of contract
claims.\9\ To the extent that Federal and State case law has resolved
these issues, we will be guided by that precedent. Application of the
standard will thus be guided but not controlled by State law. Moreover,
the Department will continue to evaluate claims as they are received
and may issue further guidance on this topic as necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Section 455(h)of the HEA clearly gives the Secretary the
power to create legal defenses, which until now has been done by
adopting State law; this rulemaking adopts a Federal standard, the
interpretation and application of which will require consideration
of principles developed by Federal and State courts in deciding
cases brought on claims for breach of contract or misrepresentation,
as distilled, for example, in the restatements of the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter argued that allowing breach of contract as a
basis for borrower defense claims will not be effective. The commenter
said that most contracts in the for-profit education sector are written
to bind the student and not the institution. The commenter also argued
that the NPRM preamble failed to cite any successful breach of contract
suits students have made against schools, arguing that the Department's
citation to Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. Of Business, 435 F. App'x 129 (3d
Cir. 2011) is inapposite.
Discussion: The Department appreciates this concern, and intends to
follow general fairness and contract principles in its analysis of
whether other promises made to a student beyond the enrollment
agreement should be considered.
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter argued that the Department should not refer
to ``specific obligations'' in its preamble discussion of how a
borrower could make out a breach of contract theory, saying it was
unnecessarily confusing in light of well-developed State law on what
kind of promises are sufficient to make out a breach of contract claim.
Discussion: We believe the phrase ``specific obligations'' is
consistent with general contract principles that a breach of contract
cannot be based on promises that are so abstract as to be
unenforceable, and believe that determinations regarding an
institution's obligations under a contract with a student will be
highly fact-specific. Given that many borrowers may not be legally
sophisticated regarding what constitutes an enforceable promise, we do
not believe that any modification to the language is necessary.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters were concerned that the proposed rule
did not include a ``materiality'' element that a borrower would need to
show in order to make out a breach of contract claim, which they
worried might lead to numerous, frivolous claims as well as wide
uncertainty as to potential future liabilities. One commenter further
invited the Department to explain in the final rule what would
constitute a ``de minimis'' claim that would lead a judge to dismiss a
case. Other commenters asked that the Department focus on systemic
problems and material breaches, and identify the standards it will use
to make determinations. A group of commenters suggested the Department
adopt the standards used for such cases in New York.
Discussion: We appreciate the concerns, first raised during the
negotiated rulemaking, about the lack of a materiality element in the
standard for a breach of contract borrower defense. As explained in the
NPRM, 81 FR 39341, we believe it is appropriate that the regulations
allow borrowers to assert a borrower defense based on any breach of
contract that would entitle them to any relief--including relatively
minor breaches--and thus do not include a materiality requirement. The
Department will consider whether any alleged breach of contract by an
institution is material in its assessment of whether the borrower would
be entitled to relief, as well as whether such relief would be full or
partial.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed
regulation contains an exception to the bar on using HEA violations for
borrower defense claims if ``the violation would otherwise constitute a
basis for a borrower defense.'' These commenters stated that this
exception could swallow the rule to the extent a compliance violation
could be restated as a borrower defense, and further noted that the HEA
does not contain a private right of action. These commenters urged the
Department to bar compliance violations asserted as breach of contract.
Discussion: We agree that the HEA does not itself contain a private
right of action, but note that the underlying conduct constituting a
violation of the HEA may also be a cognizable borrower defense. For
example, the Department has the authority to prohibit and penalize
substantial misrepresentations under the HEA, but such
misrepresentations may also serve as the basis for a borrower defense
which a borrower is undoubtedly entitled to pursue with the Department
if the borrower can demonstrate proof of substantial misrepresentation
under Sec. 685.222(d), which also requires that a borrower demonstrate
actual, reasonable reliance to their detriment for relief. For that
reason, the final regulations strike a balance between allowing
borrowers to pursue defenses based on misconduct that might also
constitute HEA violations, but only so long as the underlying
misconduct also satisfies a standard under which borrower defense
claims may be brought as noted at Sec. 685.222(a)(3).
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter argued that the lack of a reliance element on
a contractual promise could lead to borrower relief that is
unwarranted. Other commenters argued the same for lack of an injury
element.
Discussion: The Department will analyze breach of contract defenses
under general and well established contract principles shared by State
law. At this time, the Department has not set forth more fulsome
details for what elements a borrower must show in the Federal standard
to allow the standard to develop on a case-by-case basis. We believe
that the Federal standard will ultimately be more useful if developed
in light of actual student claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters urged the Department to exclude any
claims related to academic considerations, such as the quality of
instructional materials, because such matters should be left to the
institution or the institution's accreditor or State licensing agency.
Discussion: We do not see any present need for categorical
exemptions. The Department will evaluate claims in accordance with
well-established
[[Page 75945]]
principles of contract law. Claims related to academic consideration
may well be beyond the scope of a cognizable borrower defense or even
the Department's jurisdiction, but that is something the Department
will consider on a case-by-case basis in evaluating the borrower
defense applications.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter argued that the Department should recognize
defenses an institution could raise, such as compliance with contract
terms, economic hardship, or that the borrower not be entitled to
refund of monies already paid.
Discussion: The final regulations, like the proposed regulations,
do not put limits on the defenses an institution can make in a
proceeding before the Department.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter noted that the Department's proposed
language was ambiguous as to whether the act or omission must give rise
to the breach of contract or itself constitute a breach of contract.
Discussion: Consistent with the Department's interpretation of its
authorizing statute, the act or omission by the school must be the
breach of contract itself. We believe, however, that this reading is
clear from the language in the final rule.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter asked the Department to clarify what kinds
of actions it would consider to be within the scope of a borrower
defense based on a breach of contract.
Discussion: We do not believe further detail or elaboration is
necessary of helpful at this time, given the wide variety of
allegations the Department expects to receive. Under the regulations,
the Department will recognize as a borrower defense any breach of
contract claim that reasonably relates to the student loan.
Changes: None.
Claims Based on Substantial Misrepresentation
Comments: A group of commenters expressed concern that the
Department's substantial misrepresentation standard is too narrow.
These commenters believed that the standard would allow schools to
engage in problematic behavior, so long as they did not make untrue
statements.
Discussion: We appreciate the concerns that the substantial
misrepresentation standard does not capture all actions that may form
causes of action under standards in State or other Federal law.
However, as noted in the NPRM, 81 FR 39340, we believe that the
standard appropriately addresses the Department's interests in
accurately identifying and providing relief for borrowers and in
providing clear standards for borrowers, schools, and the Department in
resolving claims. We believe that Sec. 668.71(c), which is referenced
in Sec. 685.222(d), will address much of the behavior the Department
anticipates arising in the borrower defense context.
We disagree that the substantial misrepresentation standard would
not necessarily capture institutional misconduct that did not involve
untrue statements. As revised in these final regulations, Sec.
668.71(c) defines a ``misrepresentation'' as including not only false
or erroneous statements, but also misleading statements that have the
likelihood or tendency to mislead under the circumstances. The
definition also notes that omissions of information are also considered
misrepresentations. Thus, a statement may still be misleading, even if
it is true on its face. As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR 39342, we
revised the definition of ``misrepresentation'' to add the words
``under the circumstances'' to clarify that the Department will
consider the totality of the circumstances in which a statement
occurred, to determine whether it constitutes a substantial
misrepresentation. We believe the Department has the ability to
properly evaluate whether a statement is misleading, but otherwise
truthful, to a degree that it becomes an actionable borrower defense
claim.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern that the substantial
misrepresentation standard would apply only to proprietary
institutions. One commenter stated that the standard should apply to
all institutions of higher education, stating that many public colleges
and universities also misrepresent the benefits and outcomes of the
education provided. Another commenter stated that the proposed addition
of misrepresentation through omissions would target only borrower
defense claims that would be made by students attending proprietary
institutions, and not students at traditional schools.
Other commenters stated that by limiting the subject matter covered
by the substantial misrepresentation standard to just those related to
loans, in their view, the standard would target only proprietary
schools and exclude issues facing students at traditional colleges,
such as campus safety or sexual discrimination in violation of title IX
of the HEA.
Discussion: There appears to be some confusion about the
institutions covered under the scope of both 34 CFR part 668, subpart F
and proposed Sec. 685.222(d). Even prior to the proposed changes in
the NPRM, Sec. 668.71 was applicable to all institutions, whether
proprietary, public, or private non-profit. Similarly, the current
borrower defense regulation at Sec. 685.206(c) does not distinguish
between types of schools. The proposed and final regulations do not
represent a change in these positions.
As discussed under the ``Making of a Loan and Provision of
Educational Services'' section of this document, the Department's long-
standing interpretation has been that a borrower defense must be
related to the making of a loan or to the educational services for
which the loan was provided. As a result, the Department has stated
consistently since 1995 that it does not does not recognize as a
defense against repayment of the loan a cause of action that is not
directly related to the loan or to the provision of educational
services, such as personal injury tort claims or actions based on
allegations of sexual or racial harassment. 60 FR 37768, 37769. Such
issues are outside of the scope of these regulations, and we note that
other avenues and processes exist to process such claims. We also
disagree with commenters that such issues are the only types of issues
that may be faced by students at public and private non-profit
institutions. While the Department acknowledges that the majority of
claims presently before it are in relation to misconduct by Corinthian,
we believe that scope of claims that may be brought as substantial
misrepresentations that relate to either the making of a borrower's
loan, or to the provision of educational services, is objectively broad
in a way that will capture borrower defense claims from any type of
institution.
Changes: None.
Comments: A few commenters opposed the proposed changes and argued
that the proposed substantial misrepresentation standard either exceeds
the Secretary's authority under the law or is contrary to Congressional
intent. One commenter argued that the Department's proposal to use
Sec. 668.71 as the basis for borrower defense exceeds the Department's
statutory authority under section 487 of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1094(c)(3)(A), which authorizes the Department to bring an enforcement
action for a substantial misrepresentation for a suspension,
limitation, termination, or fine action. The commenter also argued that
the HEA does not authorize the Department
[[Page 75946]]
to seek recoupment from schools for relief granted for a borrower
defense claim based on substantial misrepresentation. Another commenter
suggested that the borrower defense standard should be based only on
contract law.
Other commenters stated that the substantial misrepresentation
standard was in violation of the Congressional intent in the HEA, as
proposed. One commenter said that, in its view, Congress' intent in
Section 455(h) was that borrower defenses should be allowed only for
acts or omissions that are fundamental to the student's ability to
benefit from the educational program and at a level of materiality that
would justify the rescission of the borrower's loan obligation. In
discussing the use of Sec. 668.71 for borrower defense purposes,
another commenter acknowledged that, while misrepresentation is not
defined in the HEA, the penalties assigned to misrepresentation by
statute are severe. From its perspective, the commenter stated that
this indicates that Congress did not intend for the misrepresentation
standard to be as low as negligence and suggested keeping the original
language of Sec. 668.71.
A few commenters argued that the Department lacks justification for
the proposed changes to Sec. 668.71, given that the Department last
changed the definition in a previous rulemaking.
Discussion: We disagree that the Department lacks the statutory
authority to designate what acts or omissions may form the basis of a
borrower defense. Section 455(h) of the HEA clearly authorizes the
Secretary to ``specify in regulations which act or omissions of an
institution of higher education a borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment under this part,'' without any limitation as to what acts or
omissions may be so specified. As explained previously, we believe that
the substantial misrepresentation standard, with the added requirements
listed in Sec. 685.222(d), will address not only much of the behavior
that we anticipate arising in the borrower defense context, but also
our concerns in accurately identifying and providing relief for
borrowers. We believe it is within the Department's discretion to adopt
the substantial misrepresentation standard for loans first disbursed
after July 1, 2017 in Sec. 685.222(d), with the added requirements of
that section, to address borrower defense claims. No modification has
been proposed to Sec. 668.71(a), which establishes that the Department
may bring an enforcement action for a substantial misrepresentation for
a suspension, limitation, termination, or fine action. We discuss the
Department's authority to recover from schools on the basis of borrower
defense under ``General.''
We do not agree that the Department lacks authority to similarly
specify the scope of the acts or omissions that may form the basis of a
borrower defense. The Department understands that, generally, the
rescission of a contract refers to the reversal of a transaction
whereby the parties restore all of the property received from the
other,\10\ usually as a remedy for a material or significant breach of
contract.\11\ However, in stating that ``in no event may a borrower
recover . . . an amount in excess of the amount such borrower has
repaid on the loan,'' section 455(h) clearly contemplates that an
amount may be recovered for a borrower defense that is less than the
amount of a borrower's loan, as opposed to a complete rescission of a
borrower's total loan obligation. This position also echoes the
Department's consistent approach to borrower defenses to repayment. The
Direct Loan borrower defense regulation that was promulgated in 1994
clearly established that a borrower may assert a borrower defense claim
based upon ``any act or omission of the school. . .that would give rise
to a cause of action against the school under applicable State law,''
without qualification as to whether the act or omission warrants a
rescission of the borrower's loans. 34 CFR 685.206(c)(1). The
regulation also stated that relief may be awarded as either ``all or
part of the loan.'' Id. at Sec. 685.206(c)(2). As explained by the
Department in 1995, the Direct Loan borrower defense regulations were
intended to continue the same treatment for borrowers and the same
potential liability for institutions that existed in the FFEL Program.
60 FR 37769-37770. Under the FFEL Program at the time, a borrower was
allowed to assert a defense to repayment on the ground that all or part
of his or her FFEL Loan was unenforceable. Id. at 37770.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment Sec. 54 (2011).
\11\ See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment Sec. 37, comment c (2011) (``Any breach of contract that
results in quantifiable injury gives the plaintiff a remedy in
damages, but the remedy of rescission is available only in cases of
significant default. Short of a repudiation, the defendant's breach
must be `material,' `substantial,' `essential,' or `vital'; it must
`go to the root' of the defendant's obligation, or be `tantamount to
a repudiation.' To replace this familiar catalogue of adjectives,
both Restatements of Contracts employ the expression `total breach.'
'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also disagree that the HEA does not give the Department the
discretion to define ``substantial misrepresentation,'' whether for the
Department's enforcement purposes in Sec. 668.71 or for use for the
borrower defense process. As noted, the HEA does not define
``substantial misrepresentation,'' thus giving the Secretary discretion
to define the term. With regard to the commenter who expressed concern
that the proposed revisions to the definition of ``misrepresentation''
constitute a lessening of the standard to negligence,\12\ we note that
even absent the proposed revisions, a misrepresentation under Sec.
668.71 does not look to the actor's intent or the materiality of the
statement, but considers whether the statement is false, erroneous, or
misleading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Generally, ``negligence'' refers to a failure to exercise a
reasonable duty of care and does not consider whether the failure
was intentional. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot.
Harm Sec. 3 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We disagree that there is no justification for the changes to 34
CFR part 668, subpart F. Since the Department's last negotiated
rulemaking in 2010 on 34 CFR part 668, subpart F, the Department
utilized its authority in 2015 under the substantial misrepresentation
enforcement regulations to issue a finding that Corinthian had
misrepresented its job placement rates. The subsequent closure of
Corinthian led to thousands of claims relating to the
misrepresentations at issue by Corinthian borrowers under borrower
defense. These claims prompted, in part, this effort by the Department
to establish rules and procedures for borrower defense, which in turn
led to a review of and the proposed changes to the Department's
regulations at 34 CFR part 668, subpart F. These changes were discussed
extensively as part of the negotiated rulemaking process for borrower
defense where reasons for each specific change to Sec. 668.71 were
explained and discussed.
Changes: None.
Comments: Many commenters generally stated that the proposed
standard for substantial misrepresentation is vague and suggested that
the regulation include an element of intent or distinguish between
intentional and unintentional acts. These commenters expressed concern
that inadvertent and innocent, but erroneous, statements or mistakes
would lead to a large number of frivolous claims by borrowers and
result in significant financial liabilities for schools. Another
commenter stated that the standard, absent intent, is
unconstitutionally vague and does not give fair notice of the conduct
that is being required or prohibited.
[[Page 75947]]
Other commenters stated that students' own misunderstandings may
lead to claims, even for schools that provide training and inspections
to ensure compliance with pertinent guidelines, regulations, and
standards. One commenter expressed concern that unavoidable changes to
instructional policies and practices could lead to borrower defense
claims for substantial misrepresentation. Another commenter expressed
concern that the proposed standard would lead to allegations of
substantial misrepresentation by students, even where a variety of
reasons unrelated to the alleged misrepresentation may have contributed
to a student outcome, which may not yet be apparent.
Several commenters supported using Sec. 668.71 as a basis for
borrower defense, but objected to the proposed changes to the
definition in Sec. 668.71(c), that would change the word ``deceive''
in the sentence, ``A misleading statement includes any statement that
has the likelihood or tendency to deceive,'' to ``mislead under the
circumstances.'' These commenters stated that the proposed change would
give the same weight to inadvertent or unintentional misrepresentations
as to a willful deception by a school. Some such commenters appeared to
believe that, without the revisions reflected in proposed subpart F of
part 668, the standard for substantial misrepresentation is a standard
for fraud and requires proof of intentional deception.
One commenter stated that the borrower defense process does not
provide for a contextualized analysis of whether a statement is
misleading in the same manner as the FTC, and argued that this would
lead to significant consequences for schools and would undercut FTC
precedent.
Several commenters agreed with the Department that the standard
should not require an element of institutional intent generally,
stating that the Department's approach is consistent with existing
State and other Federal law, citing the FTC's definition of deception
as an example. One commenter stated that institutions should be
responsible for the harm to borrowers caused by misrepresentations,
even absent intent, and that proving intent would be very difficult for
borrowers.
Other commenters supported the specific amendment of the definition
to include ``mislead under the circumstances.'' One commenter stated
that the amendment was appropriate to provide more context as to
whether a statement is misleading. Another commenter stated that the
Department's amendments are consistent with State consumer protection
law and cited examples of States where courts consider an individual's
or the target audience's circumstances in assessing whether an act is
deceptive or unfair. The commenter also noted that the amendments are
in keeping with the approaches used by other Federal agencies, such as
the FTC, the CFPB, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
The commenter noted that in its experience working with student loan
borrowers, consideration of the circumstances of a misrepresentation is
important, because many schools target borrowers in specific
circumstances who may be more likely to trust a school's
representations and rely upon promises tailored to such students.
Another commenter noted that the Department's proposed rule is in
keeping with well-established consumer protection legal precedent under
State law, which is that schools are liable for deceptive and unfair
trade practices, including a failure to deliver educational services of
the nature and quality claimed. This commenter supported the
Department's preamble statement, 81 FR 39337 to 39338, that educational
malpractice is not a tort recognized by State law, but also stated that
educational malpractice is to be narrowly construed.
One commenter supported the Department's reasoning for including
omissions among misrepresentations for borrower defense purposes, but
stated that intent should be a factor for the Department's enforcement
actions based upon Sec. 668.71. The commenter agreed that a school
should be responsible for even an unintentional error that harms
borrowers, but believed that that intent or knowledge of the school
should be a required factor for the purposes of institutional
eligibility and penalties.
One commenter stated that substantial misrepresentation should be
limited to false and erroneous statements, and not include true but
misleading statements. The commenter raised concerns about the adequacy
of the Department's process for gathering evidence and the Department's
experience and expertise in making such determinations.
Discussion: We disagree with the commenters who opined that the
proposed regulations are broad, vague or subjective. As explained
previously, section 455(h) of the HEA provides that the Secretary shall
specify in regulations which acts or omissions of an institution of
higher education a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment of a
loan made under this part. The regulations in Sec. 685.222(d), which
adopt the regulations in subpart F of part 668 and establish certain
other requirements, set forth the types of activities that constitute
misrepresentation by an institution and describe the process and
procedure by which borrowers may receive relief based upon a
substantial misrepresentation by a school. The regulations in Sec.
685.222 also set forth the process by which the Secretary will evaluate
borrower defenses and recover such losses from the institutions at
issue. The proposed changes to the regulations strengthen the
Department's regulatory authority to evaluate and determine borrower
defense claims. Further, they not only establish what constitutes a
misrepresentation for borrower defense claims, but they also clarify
the definition for the Department's enforcement purposes under part
668, subpart F. We believe that aligning the definition and types of
substantial misrepresentations for borrower defense with the
Department's long-held authority to bring enforcement actions under
part 668, subpart F, will provide more clarity for schools and reduce
their burden in having to interpret and adjust for the new borrower
defense standards.
There appears to be some confusion as to whether the definition for
misrepresentation in part 668, subpart F, requires a demonstration of
intent, as would be required in common law fraud. In proposing to
replace the word ``deceive'' with ``mislead under the circumstances''
in Sec. 668.71(c), the Department is not seeking to remove any intent
element, but rather to clarify the definition to more accurately
reflect the position it expressed in 2010 as to part 668, subpart F. As
noted in the NPRM, 81 FR 39342, the word ``deceive'' may be viewed as
implying knowledge or intent. However, in the Department's 2010
rulemaking on part 668, subpart F, we explicitly declined to require
that a substantial misrepresentation under the regulation require
knowledge or intent by the school. 75 FR 66915. We believe that an
institution is responsible for the harm to borrowers caused by its
misrepresentations, even if such misrepresentations cannot be
attributed to institutional intent or knowledge and are the result of
inadvertent or innocent mistakes. Similarly, we believe this is the
case even for statements that are true, but misleading. We believe this
is more reasonable and fair than having the borrower, or the Federal
government and taxpayers, bear the cost of such injuries. As noted by
some commenters, this approach is in accord with other
[[Page 75948]]
Federal and State consumer protection law regarding misrepresentation,
and we believe it is appropriate for not only the Department's
enforcement purposes, but also for borrower defense. As explained later
in this preamble, we believe that we have the capability to evaluate
borrower defense claims based upon substantial misrepresentations and
anticipate establishing procedural rules that will provide schools with
the opportunity to present evidence and arguments in accordance with
due process, similar to what is available in the Department's
proceeding in part 668, subparts G and H.
In 2010, the Department stated that, in deciding to bring an
enforcement action under part 668, subpart F, it would operate within a
rule of reasonableness and consider the circumstances surrounding any
misrepresentation before determining an appropriate response. 75 FR
66914. In response to the comment that the proposed standard does not
view the misrepresentation in context, the Department's addition of the
words ``under the circumstances'' is intended to clarify and make
explicit the Department's long-standing position that
misrepresentations should be viewed in light of all of the available
underlying facts. As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR 39342 to 39343, this
also echoes the approach taken by the FTC with regard to deceptive acts
and practices.\13\ In determining whether a statement is a
misrepresentation, the Department will consider the totality of the
circumstances in which the statement occurred, including the specific
group at which the statement or omission was targeted. The Department
will also consider whether the situation was such that the borrower
would have had reason to believe he or she could rely on the
information being given to the borrower's detriment, such as because
the statement was made by an individual by whom the borrower believed
could be trusted to give accurate information, such as a school
admissions officer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 110, 174
(1984) (appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984)),
available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters supported the proposed inclusion of
omissions in the definition under Sec. 668.71. One commenter stated
that the inclusion of omissions, as well as the additional factors
listed in Sec. 685.222(d)(2), would improve the information provided
to students. One commenter stated that, in their experience, the
inclusion of omissions was needed, to prevent schools from taking
advantage of the asymmetry of information and bargaining power between
themselves and students. This commenter emphasized that omissions
should be considered in the context of the specific audience targeted
and cited schools that may target immigrants with little experience
with the United States' higher education system and limited English
ability as an example. Another commenter emphasized that the amendment
would benefit first generation and low income students, who may not
know what information is important or what questions to ask prior to
enrolling at an institution. One commenter specifically supported the
proposed language providing that a misrepresentation include omissions
of ``information'' in such a way as to make a statement false,
erroneous, or misleading.
Other commenters disagreed with the inclusion of omissions of
information as part of the definition of substantial misrepresentation.
One commenter stated that such language provides assistance to students
attending career colleges, but not students attending traditional
schools. One commenter stated that amending the standard to include
omissions would create a strict liability standard that would not
account for a school's actions or intent, and that the standard should
distinguish minor and unintentional claims from material and purposeful
misrepresentations.
Other commenters stated that the inclusion of omissions would not
benefit students. One commenter stated that amending the definition of
misrepresentation to include omissions could cause schools to provide
students with numerous and confusing qualifications or to provide
students with minimal information to avoid making misrepresentations.
Another commenter stated that the inclusion of omissions would hinder
the flow of advice to students and cause schools to expend time and
money reviewing materials for misrepresentations.
One commenter stated that the Department's proposal to amend the
definition to include omissions runs counter to the position the
Department expressed in its 2010 rulemaking on 34 CFR part 668, subpart
F, when it rejected commenters' suggestions that omissions be included
in the definition.
One commenter stated that the Department's proposed amendment to
include omissions, absent an intent element, runs counter to the limit
established by the D.C. Circuit in the case Ass'n of Private Sector
Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 452 (D.C. Cir. 2012) that a
substantial misrepresentation under part 668, subpart F cannot include
true and nondeceitful statements that have only the tendency or
likelihood to confuse.
One commenter requested clarification regarding the effect of
disclosures posted on the school's Web site or in printed materials.
The commenter inquired about whether the school needed to disclose
information about investigations, pending civil rights or legal
matters; information about the qualifications and availability of
faculty to teach certain courses or levels of students; and how a
school's compliance with a State's required disclosures would be
evaluated. This commenter also asked whether the Department would
consider limiting the application of the new standard to only schools
governed by States without a reasonable oversight mechanism. This
commenter also asked for clarification as to what constitutes
``information,'' and asked whether information would include
aspirational goals or speculative plans; subjective beliefs or internal
questions about the school's educational programs, financial charges,
or the employability of its graduates; concerns about, the possibility,
or existence of an upcoming audit; items listed in a title IV Audit
Corrective Action Plan; items identified by the institution or an
accreditor for improvement; or an institution's efforts to seek
voluntary accreditation.
One commenter expressed concern that the inclusion of omissions in
the standard would place schools with high default rates at risk. The
commenter cited news articles calling for schools with default rates
higher than graduation rates, which would include some HBCUs and
community colleges, to lose their title IV eligibility. The commenter
stated that students could argue that a failure to disclose such a
measure constitutes a substantial misrepresentation under the proposed
standard.
Discussion: We appreciate the support received from some commenters
and agree with these commenters who stated that the inclusion of
omissions will improve the information provided by schools.
As discussed earlier in this section, the commenters who stated
that the revision to Sec. 668.71 would apply only to proprietary
institutions are incorrect. The final regulation applies to all
schools. We also discuss our reasons for not including an intent
element earlier in this section and our reasons for not including a
materiality element later in this section.
[[Page 75949]]
We disagree that the revision is contrary to the Department's
purpose in revising part 668, subpart F, in its 2010 rulemaking. We
believe that amending the definition to include ``any statement that
omits information in such a way as to make the statement false,
erroneous, or misleading'' merely clarifies the Department's original
intent, aligns the definition of misrepresentation used for the
Department's enforcement actions with the standard to be used in
evaluating borrower defense claims, and is appropriate given the
Department's experiences since 2010.
In 2010, the Department declined to include omissions in the
definition of misrepresentation during its rulemaking on part 668,
subpart F, on the basis that the Department's regulations require
schools to provide accurate disclosures of certain information. 75 FR
66917 to 66918. The Department emphasized that the purpose of the
regulations was to ensure that all statements made by an institution
are truthful, id., and that whether such a statement was a
misrepresentation would be viewed in context of the circumstances. Id.
at 66914. As noted earlier, however, the Department has had more
experience with omissions in the context of its substantial
misrepresentation regulations at part 668, subpart F, since that 2010
rulemaking. In 2014, the Department issued a fine of $29,665,000 to
Heald College, of the Corinthian Colleges, in part, as a result of a
finding that Heald College had omitted essential and material
information concerning the methodology used to calculate job placement
rates.\14\ This same finding, concerning omissions, has resulted in
thousands of borrower defense claims filed with the Department. As
noted by some commenters, given the close connection between borrower
defense and the Department's purpose of ensuring truthful statements by
schools when viewed in the entirety of a situation, we believe it is
appropriate to adopt the regulations at part 668, subpart F, with some
added requirements, for the borrower defense regulations and to revise
the definition at Sec. 668.71 to better meet that purpose and enact
the Department's long-standing purpose for part 668, subpart F,
enforcement actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Dept. of Educ., Notice of Intent to Fine Heald College,
OPE-ID: 00723400 (Apr. 14, 2015), available at www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/heald-fine-action-placement-rate.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We disagree with the commenter that the inclusion of omissions in
the definition, absent an intent element, runs counter to the limit
established by the D.C. Circuit in Ass'n of Private Sector Colls. &
Univs., 681 F.3d 427. In that case, the court held that a substantial
misrepresentation under part 668, subpart F, cannot include true and
non-deceitful statements that have only the tendency or likelihood to
confuse. However, the court also stated that it agreed with the
Department that a misrepresentation can be a true statement that is
deceitful, and specifically disagreed with the appellant that an intent
element should be a required part of the definition. Id. We believe
that the inclusion of omissions of information that may make a
statement false, erroneous, or misleading clarifies the context under
which a misrepresentation may be a true statement that is deceitful and
does not infringe upon the court's ruling regarding statements with a
likelihood to confuse. We also note that it is our understanding that
many States' laws and other Federal consumer protection law also
include omissions of information within prohibitions on deceptive acts
and practices, and the proposed revision is in keeping with such
precedent.
With respect to the commenters who expressed concern about how
these regulations may affect schools' behaviors in their provision of
certain types of information to students and prospective students,
including information regarding investigations, pending civil rights or
legal matters, faculty qualifications or availability, the school's
compliance with State law, or a school's default rates, among others,
the final regulation explicitly states that the Department will
consider whether the statement omitting any such information is
misleading ``under the circumstances.'' As noted earlier, the
Department will consider the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a statement is misleading--including whether the school is or
is not under an affirmative legal obligation to disclose such
information, or whether concerns such as privacy requirements prevent
the disclosure or disclosure in full of such information. For borrower
defense, Sec. 685.222(d) also requires that the Department consider
the reasonableness of the borrower's detrimental reliance on the
misrepresentation.
We note, however, that it should not matter where or how a
misrepresentation, whether as an omission or an affirmative statement,
takes place, particularly as it pertains to the nature of a school's
educational program, its financial charges, or the employability of its
graduates. As we stated in 2010, 75 FR 66918, what is important is to
curb the practice of misleading students regarding an eligible
institution. We continue to strongly believe that institutions should
be able to find a way to operate in compliance with these regulations.
As discussed later in this section, disclosures made by a school in
publications or on the Internet may be probative evidence as to the
reasonableness of a borrower's reliance on an alleged
misrepresentation, depending on the totality of the circumstances.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter argued that it would be inappropriate to
apply the FTC Policy Statement on Deception to cases of
misrepresentation in higher education. The commenter stated that the
FTC policy focuses specifically on deception perpetrated through
advertising and is not aimed at establishing individual claims. The
commenter noted that borrowers have more extensive interactions with
their schools that may constitute fraud, and that absent the elements
of materiality, reliance, and harm, the proposed Federal standard would
fail to provide adequate protection.
Discussion: We disagree that the substantial misrepresentation
standard in either part 668, subpart F, or in Sec. 685.222(d) is the
same as the FTC's prohibition on deceptive acts and practices. We
considered a wide variety of both State and Federal legal precedents in
developing the ``substantial misrepresentation'' definition in Sec.
668.71 and have added specific elements, such as a reasonable reliance
requirement, to address specific borrower defense claims in Sec.
685.222(d).
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters stated that, for borrower defense
purposes, the standard should specify that misrepresentations must be
material, in order to avoid frivolous claims or claims based upon
inadvertent errors or omissions. One commenter stated that such a
materiality standard should not capture small deviations from the
truth. Another commenter stated that the standard should allow only
claims at a level of materiality that would justify the rescission of
the loan at issue. One commenter expressed concern that under the
standard without an accompanying materiality requirement, inadvertent
or partial omissions of information would give rise to borrower claims.
One commenter stated that the Department should incorporate an
express materiality requirement, emphasizing that the lack of such a
standard is of particular concern because the standard does not
incorporate an element of intent. The
[[Page 75950]]
commenter also stated that the need for a materiality standard is
enhanced, because the Department's proposed standard does not seem to
require proof of detriment to a student as a result of his or her
actual, reasonable reliance. The commenter stated that the definition
in Sec. 668.71 only requires that an individual show that he or she
could have relied on a misrepresentation and expressed concern about
the Department's proposal to include a presumption of reliance for
group claims, in the absence of a materiality requirement.
Several commenters stated that the inclusion of omissions, related
to the provision of any educational service, is too broad without an
accompanying materiality requirement in the regulation. These
commenters expressed concern that students would be able to present
claims for substantial misrepresentation by claiming that schools had
failed to provide contextual information, such as how faculty-student
ratio information works.
Discussion: As discussed in the NPRM, 81 FR 39344, we do not
believe that a materiality element is required in either the proposed
amendments to the definition for the Department's enforcement authority
under Sec. 668.71 or as the definition is adopted for the substantial
misrepresentation borrower defense standard under Sec. 685.222(d). We
believe that the regulatory definition of ``substantial
misrepresentation'' is clear and can be easily used to evaluate alleged
violations of the regulations. See 75 FR 66916; 81 FR 39344. Generally,
under both Federal deceptive conduct prohibitions and common law,
information is considered material if it would be important to the
recipient, or likely to affect the recipient's choice or conduct.\15\
By noting specifically in section 487(c)(3) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1094(c)(3), that the Department may bring an enforcement action against
a school for a substantial misrepresentation of the nature of its
educational program, its financial charges, or the employability of its
graduates, Congress indicated its intent that information regarding the
nature of a school's educational program, its financial charges, or the
employability of its graduates should be viewed as material information
of certain importance to students. See Suarez v. Eastern Int'l Coll.,
50 A.3d 75, 89-90 (N.J. Super. 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See, e.g., F.T.C. Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C.
at 182; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 538 (1977)
(``The matter is material if (a) a reasonable man would attach
importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the maker of
the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient
regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in
determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would
not so regard it.'').
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As also noted in the NPRM, 81 FR 39344, we believe that by
requiring that students demonstrate actual, reasonable reliance to the
borrower's detriment under Sec. 685.222(d), the borrower defense
regulations incorporate similar concepts to materiality. As discussed,
materiality refers to whether the information in question was
information to which a reasonable person would attach importance in
making the decision at issue. By requiring reasonable reliance to the
borrower's detriment, the Department would consider whether the
misrepresentation related to information to which the borrower would
reasonably attach importance in making the decision to enroll or
continue enrollment at the school and whether this reliance was to the
borrower's detriment. This would be the case both for individual
claims, and for the presumption of reliance applied in the process for
group claims under Sec. 685.222(f)(3). We discuss the rebuttable
presumption of reasonable reliance in greater detail in the ``Group
Process'' section of this document. As a result, we disagree it should
include a materiality element in the standard.
Changes: None.
Comments: Many commenters expressed concerns about the requirement
for borrowers to assert reliance under the substantial
misrepresentation standard. One commenter expressed concern that a
borrower could establish that a substantial misrepresentation had
occurred by providing evidence of the misrepresentation and showing
that he or she could have reasonably relied upon it to his or her
detriment, notwithstanding the requirement in Sec. 685.222(d) that the
borrower demonstrate actual reasonable reliance upon the
misrepresentation.
One commenter supported the use of a reasonable reliance standard,
given that the standard may allow claims for statements, particularly
unintentional statements, that are not accurate or complete.
A couple of commenters suggested that the Department should not
require that borrowers actually and reasonably rely upon
misrepresentations to obtain relief for borrower defense purposes, but
rather that borrowers should be entitled to relief so long as actual
reliance is demonstrated without regard for the reasonableness of that
reliance. Alternatively, one commenter suggested that if a reasonable
reliance standard were maintained, then the reasonableness of the
reliance should be judged according to the circumstances of the
misrepresentation and the characteristics of the audience targeted by
the misrepresentation, which the commenter stated would be in keeping
with State consumer protection law.
One group of commenters suggested that the Department use the same
standard for reliance for the Department's enforcement activities under
Sec. 668.71, as for borrower defenses under Sec. 685.222(d), so that
a borrower may assert a claim for borrower defense without having to
show that he or she actually relied on the misrepresentation at issue.
These commenters stated that neither State nor Federal consumer
protection law typically requires actual reliance and that requiring
actual reliance would increase the burden on both the borrower and the
trier of fact without serving the purpose of deterring
misrepresentations. The commenters also stated that actual reliance is
not needed to protect schools from frivolous claims given the fact-
finding process and separate proceedings that would be initiated by the
Department to recover from schools under the proposed rule.
Another commenter also supported using a standard that did not
require actual reliance, as opposed to showing that a borrower could
have reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation. However, the
commenter stated that in the alternative, borrowers should only be
required to certify that they relied upon the misrepresentation,
without any further proof, to satisfy the reliance requirement of the
standard.
Discussion: There appears to be some confusion as to whether the
substantial misrepresentation standard for borrower defense would
require actual, reasonable reliance to a borrower's detriment. Although
the definition of substantial misrepresentation in Sec. 668.71
requires that, for a misrepresentation to be substantial, it must be
one upon which a person ``could reasonably be expected to rely, or has
reasonably relied, to that person's detriment,'' the standard for
substantial misrepresentation under Sec. 685.222(d) requires that the
borrower show that he or she ``reasonably relied on'' the
misrepresentation at issue--in other words, that the borrower actually
and reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation. As discussed later in
this section, the Department acknowledges that the language of Sec.
685.222(d) is confusing as to whether the borrower must also prove that
he or she actually relied upon the misrepresentation to his or her
detriment. As a result, we will to modify the language of proposed
Sec. 685.222(d) to
[[Page 75951]]
clarify that actual, reasonable reliance to the borrower's detriment
must be demonstrated under the borrower defense substantial
misrepresentation standard.
We disagree that the purpose of the borrower defense regulations
would be served if an actual reliance standard (without a
reasonableness component) or a standard that did not require actual
reliance was adopted. As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR 39343, a standard
that does not require actual reliance serves the Department's interest
in the public enforcement of its regulations: The Department requires
title IV-participating institutions not to make false statements on
which borrowers could reasonably rely to their detriment, and the
Department appropriately will impose consequences where an institution
fails to meet that standard. However, the Department will grant
borrower defenses to provide relief to borrowers who have been harmed
by an institution's misrepresentation, not borrowers who could have
been harmed but were not; and an actual, reasonable reliance
requirement is the mechanism by which borrowers demonstrate that they
were indeed actually reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation to
their detriment. The requirement also allows the Department to consider
the context and facts surrounding the misrepresentation to determine
whether other similar students and prospective students would have
acted similarly.\16\ We believe that the actual, reasonable reliance
requirement for a borrower defense based upon a substantial
misrepresentation enables the Department to provide relief for
borrowers while properly avoiding discharges and payments by the
Federal government, taxpayers, and institutions. What may be deemed
sufficient evidence to prove whether a borrower has reasonably relied
upon a misrepresentation to his or her detriment will differ from case
to case. As a result, we reject the suggestion that a certification of
reliance should necessarily and in all cases by itself be found to be
adequate proof of reliance for all borrower defense claims the
Department may receive in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ It is our understanding that several other Federal agencies
charged with consumer protection, such as the FTC and the CFPB, when
bringing enforcement actions for violations of prohibitions of
deceptive acts and practices, are not required to prove actual
reliance by consumers upon alleged misrepresentations. However, we
note that such agencies have prosecutorial discretion in bringing
such cases, and are not charged with evaluating and deciding
individual claims for relief by consumers as the Department is
seeking to do with these regulations. Furthermore, such agencies
obtain relief for consumers from the culpable actor, while the
Department will be providing relief through public resources, with a
possibility of recovery from the actor in some cases. In contrast to
the laws these other Federal agencies enforce, many, if not all,
States allow consumers to bring private actions under their consumer
protection laws. However, it is the Department's understanding that
the requirements as to whether reliance is required at all, or if
the courts will consider the reasonableness of such reliance,
varies. See, e.g., National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Protection
in the States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices Statutes, at 20, 22 (2009); Schwartz & Silverman,
Commonsense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 1, 18-19 (Oct. 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(d) to clarify that a
borrower must have relied upon a substantial misrepresentation to his
or her detriment.
Comments: One commenter expressed concern that the Department's
proposed standard does not require that the borrower allege injury or
damages as a requirement to assert substantial misrepresentation.
Another commenter stated that students should be required to establish
the extent of their injuries or damages, so that discharges are not
granted where students received what they bargained for and so that
claims are not filed for harmless errors by schools. Another commenter
stated that the standard should require the borrower to show proof of
detriment sufficient to deprive the student of the intended benefits of
the tuition funded by the loan at issue.
Discussion: To assert a borrower defense under proposed Sec.
685.222(d), the borrower must demonstrate that they reasonably relied
upon a substantial misrepresentation in accordance with 34 CFR part
668, subpart F, in deciding to attend, or continue attending, the
school. A ``substantial misrepresentation'' is defined in Sec. 668.71
as a misrepresentation on which the person to whom it was made could
reasonably be expected to rely, or has reasonably relied, to that
person's detriment.
The Department understands that, generally, ``detriment'' refers to
any loss, harm, or injury suffered by a person or property.\17\ When
Sec. Sec. 668.71 and 685.222(d) are read together, a borrower may
assert a borrower defense for a misrepresentation, if also in
accordance with the other requirements of 34 CFR part 668, subpart F,
if he or she can demonstrate that the misrepresentation was one on
which the borrower actually reasonably relied, to the borrower's
detriment, in deciding to attend, or continue attending, the school at
issue. However, we acknowledge that the language of Sec. 685.222(d)
may be confusing. For this reason, we are clarifying in Sec.
685.222(d) that the borrower must show reasonable detrimental reliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast to detriment, ``damages'' refers to money claimed by,
or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or
injury.\18\ We do not believe that the term ``damages'' is appropriate
in the context of borrower defense, because the Department is limited
by statute to providing relief to the borrower on his or her Direct
Loan and may not provide a borrower with the complete amount or types
of compensation that might traditionally be considered to be damages at
law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no quantum or minimum amount of detriment required to have
a borrower defense claim, and the denial of any identifiable element or
quality of a program that is promised but not delivered due to a
misrepresentation can constitute such a detriment. In contrast,
proposed Sec. 685.222(i) provides that the trier-of-fact, who may be a
designated Department official for borrower defenses determined through
the process in Sec. 685.222(i) or a hearing official for borrower
defenses decided through the processes in Sec. 685.222(f) to (h), will
determine the appropriate amount of relief that should be afforded the
borrower under any of the standards described in Sec. 685.222 and
Sec. 685.206(c), including substantial misrepresentation. We explain
the considerations for triers-of-fact for relief determinations under
the ``Borrower Relief'' section of this document.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(d) to clarify that a
borrower must have relied upon a substantial misrepresentation to his
or her detriment.
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern about the factors
listed in proposed Sec. 685.222(d)(2). A couple of commenters
suggested that all of the additional factors listed in Sec.
685.222(d)(2) should be removed. One commenter argued that the factors
do not establish the falsity or misleading nature of a substantial
misrepresentation claim. Another commenter stated that the factors are
subjective and would be difficult to prove or disprove and thus should
be removed in their entirety.
A couple of commenters disagreed with specific factors listed in
proposed Sec. 685.222(d)(2). One commenter stated that the factor
pertaining to failure to respond to information was unnecessary,
because passive and requested disclosures are already enforceable
through existing consumer compliance requirements. Another
[[Page 75952]]
commenter stated that the factors should not include failures to
respond to information, or that this factor should be revised to
include only purposeful failures to provide requested information. The
commenter argued that a failure to respond promptly may be due to
routine events or extraneous factors, such as an enrollment officer's
vacation or workload issues, or a student's own delay of enrollment. A
commenter also requested clarification as to the ``unreasonable
emphasis on unfavorable consequences of delay'' language. This
commenter argued that under this factor, routine, truthful provisions
of information regarding timelines and possible late fees or other
consequences as a result of actions such as late enrollment or making
late housing arrangements may be viewed as improper conduct.
One commenter expressed support for the factors listed in Sec.
685.222(d)(2), stating that it agreed with the Department that
misrepresentations should be viewed in the context of circumstances,
including the possible use of high pressure enrollment tactics.
One commenter expressed concern that decision makers would expect
to see one or more of the newly added factors before finding that a
substantial misrepresentation exists. This commenter suggested that the
Department clarify that a borrower need not show the factors to have a
claim for substantial misrepresentation under borrower defense.
Several commenters stated that the factors listed in proposed Sec.
685.222(d)(2) were insufficient as part of the standard for substantial
misrepresentation, as many problematic practices relating to high
pressure and abusive sales practices do not necessarily involve
misrepresentations as opposed to puffery or abusive or unfair
practices.
Discussion: We disagree with the commenters' suggestion to remove
the non-exhaustive list of factors in Sec. 685.222(d)(2). We
appreciate the concerns that the factors do not necessarily prove
whether a statement was erroneous, false, or misleading. However, as
explained in the NPRM, 81 FR 39343, we believe it is appropriate to
consider factors that may have influenced whether a borrower's or
student's reliance upon a misrepresentation to his or her detriment is
reasonable, thus elevating the misrepresentation to a substantial
misrepresentation under Sec. 668.71 and Sec. 685.222(d) for the
purposes of evaluating a borrower defense claim. We recognize that such
factors consider the viewpoint of the borrower as to his or her
reliance on a misrepresentation and may be subjective. However, in
evaluating whether a statement is a misrepresentation, the Department
will consider whether the statement is a misrepresentation ``under the
circumstances'' and consider the totality of the situation, in addition
to the reasonable reliance factors listed in Sec. 685.222(d)(2). We
also disagree with commenters that the factors are insufficient as part
of the substantial misrepresentation standard. As discussed earlier in
this section, we decline to include standards such as unfair or abusive
acts or practices, which some commenters have stated would address
issues such as puffery and abusive sales practices that may occur
absent a misrepresentation, because of a lack of clear precedent and
guidance. We believe that consideration of the factors, if the trier-
of-fact determines that they are warranted under Sec. 685.222(d)(2),
strikes a balance between the Department's interests in establishing
consistent standards by which the Department may evaluate borrower
defenses; providing borrowers and schools with clear guidance as to
conduct that may form the basis of a borrower defense claim, and
providing appropriate relief to borrowers who have been harmed.
We understand the concern raised by commenters that a failure to
respond to a borrower's requests for more information, including
regarding the cost of the program and the nature of any financial aid,
34 CFR 685.222(d)(iv), may be due to unintentional and routine events
such as an employee's oversight and vacation schedule. However, as
discussed earlier in this section, we disagree that the substantial
misrepresentation standard should include an element of intent. We also
disagree that the factor is unnecessary, as different States and
oversight entities may have differing disclosure standards and
institutions' compliance with such standards may vary.
Section 685.222(d)(2)(ii) notes that in considering whether a
borrower's reliance was reasonable, that an ``unreasonable'' emphasis
on the unfavorable consequence of a delay may be considered. Generally,
we do not believe that routine and truthful provisions of information
such as timelines and fees to a borrower are unreasonable. However, as
discussed, the standard requires that a consideration of any of the
factors listed in Sec. 685.222(d)(2) also include consideration of
whether a statement is a misrepresentation under the circumstances or,
in other words, in the context of the situation.
We also disagree that further modification of the regulations is
needed to clarify that the factors do not need to exist for a borrower
to have a borrower defense under Sec. 685.222(d). We believe that in
stating that the Secretary ``may consider, if warranted'' whether any
of the factors listed in Sec. 685.222(d)(2) were present, that the
Department's intent is clear that the factors do not need to be alleged
for a substantial misrepresentation to be established.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated that the preponderance of evidence
standard established in the regulation, combined with the lower proof
standard of preponderance of the evidence for misrepresentation, would
open the door to frivolous claims. One commenter expanded on this
position, asserting that the evidentiary standard in most States for
fraudulent misrepresentation is clear and convincing evidence.
One commenter requested clarification regarding the reasonable
reliance and the preponderance of evidence standard for the purposes of
the substantial misrepresentation, raising as an example, that an error
or oversight in one publication should not satisfy the preponderance of
the evidence standard for substantial misrepresentation, if the
statement was otherwise correct and complete in all of the school's
other publications.
Discussion: We disagree that a ``preponderance of the evidence'' is
a lesser standard of proof than what is used currently. As explained in
the NPRM, 81 FR 39337, we believe that this evidentiary standard is
appropriate as it is both the typical standard in most civil
proceedings, as well as the standard used by the Department in other
processes regarding borrower debt issues. See 34 CFR 34.14(b), (c)
(administrative wage garnishment); 34 CFR 31.7(e) (Federal salary
offset).
We understand that some commenters have concerns about baseless
charges and frivolous claims that may be brought by borrowers as
borrower defenses and lead to liabilities for schools. However, as
established in Sec. 685.222(e)(7) and (h), in determining whether a
school may face liability for a borrower defense claim or a group of
borrower defense claims, the school will have the opportunity to
present evidence and arguments in a fact-finding process in accordance
with due process. If, for example, during the course of such a fact-
finding process, the school provides proof that a misstatement or
oversight in one publication was otherwise correct and complete in the
school's other
[[Page 75953]]
publications, such evidence may be determinative as to whether a
borrower's reliance on the original misrepresentation was reasonable
under the circumstances, as required under Sec. 668.71 and Sec.
685.222(d). However, the probative value of such evidence will vary
depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. We also discuss
comments relating to the evidentiary standard under ``General.''
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters suggested that we provide schools with
specific safe harbors or defenses to substantial misrepresentation
borrower defense claims. One commenter suggested such safe harbors
could include a demonstration that an alleged misstatement is found to
be true and not misleading when made; proof that a student participated
in Student Loan Entrance counseling despite a claim that the student
did not understand repayment requirements; proof that a borrower failed
to obtain a professional license due to his or her own behavior despite
having been provided with information on professional licensing
requirements; a showing that the student has been made whole by the
school; proof that the student has signed acknowledgements as to the
information about which the student is claiming to have been misled; or
underlying circumstances that are based on standard operational or
institutional changes.
Another commenter stated that schools should be provided with
defenses in the form of proof that the misrepresentation had been
subsequently corrected by the school or that the institution had
policies, procedures, or training in place to prevent the
misrepresentation at issue.
Discussion: We disagree with commenters that specific defenses or
safe harbors should be included in the regulations. Many of the factors
listed by commenters, such as whether a student participated in
entrance or exit counseling, proof of the availability of or receipts
of accurate information by a student, or proof of underlying
circumstances that are based on standard operational or institutional
changes that should have been apparent to the borrower or student may
be important evidence in the Department's consideration of whether a
borrower's reliance upon an alleged misrepresentation is reasonable, as
required by Sec. 685.222(d). However, determinations as to the impact
of such factors may vary significantly depending on the type of
allegations made and the facts and circumstances at issue. As a result,
we do not believe that the inclusion of such factors is appropriate.
Similarly, other factors noted by commenters, such as a showing
that a student has already been made whole by the school may, depending
on the specific circumstances, be important considerations for the
Department in its determination of whether a borrower may be entitled
to relief or to the determination of the amount of relief under Sec.
685.222(i), which in turn will affect the amount of liability a school
may face in either the separate proceeding for recovery under Sec.
685.222(e)(7) or in the group process described in Sec. 685.222(h).
Given that the importance of such factors will vary depending on the
circumstances of each case, we also do not believe that the inclusion
of such factors is appropriate for the regulations.
Section 668.71 defines a ``misrepresentation'' as any false,
erroneous, or misleading statement. If an alleged misstatement can be
proven to be true statement of fact when made, not false or erroneous,
and it is not misleading when made, then such statements would not be
actionable misrepresentations under the standard. However, as explained
previously in this section, to determine whether a statement that was
true at the time of its making was misleading, the Department will
consider the totality of the situation to determine whether the
statement had ``the likelihood or tendency to mislead under the
circumstances'' or whether it ``omit[ted] information in a way as to
make the statement false, erroneous, or misleading.'' The Department
will also look to whether the reliance by the borrower was reasonable.
This would include a consideration of whether a misrepresentation has
been corrected by the school in such a way or in a timeframe so that
the borrower's reliance was not reasonable. This would also mean that,
generally, claims based only on the speaker's opinion would not form
the basis of a borrower defense claim under the standard, if it can be
determined that under the circumstances borrowers would understand the
source and limitations of the opinion.\19\ For the same reason, it is
our understanding that claims based on exaggerated opinion claims, also
known as ``puffery,'' would also generally not be able to form the
basis of a misrepresentation under State or Federal consumer protection
law.\20\ However, the determination of whether a statement is an
actionable misrepresentation will necessarily involve consideration of
the circumstances under which the representation was made and the
reasonableness of the borrower's reliance on the statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ It should be noted, however, that a claim phrased as an
opinion may still form the basis of a substantial misrepresentation,
if the borrower reasonably interpreted the statement as an implied
statement of fact, see, e.g., FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 103
F.T.C. at 184, or if any of the factors listed in Sec.
685.222(d)(2) existed so as to affect the reasonableness of the
borrower's reliance on the misrepresentation.
\20\ See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Apple Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1027
(N.D. Cal. 2014); FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We do not believe that the existence of policies, procedures, or
training to be a defense to the existence of a substantial
misrepresentation. As discussed earlier in this section, the Department
does not consider intent in determining whether a substantial
misrepresentation was made and believes that a borrower should receive
relief if the borrower reasonably relied upon a misrepresentation to
his or her detriment.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters expressed concerns regarding the
subject matter or topics upon which a substantial misrepresentation may
be based. A few commenters expressed concerns that the substantial
misrepresentation standard narrows the scope of borrower defenses by
not including claims relating to campus safety and security, as well as
those for sexual or racial harassment. One commenter expressed the view
that not including such non-loan related issues is inconsistent with
the purpose of the HEA and the borrower defense regulations. Another
commenter said that by excluding such topics, the substantial
misrepresentation standard targets just proprietary institutions and
excludes traditional colleges.
Another commenter asked whether statements about topics such as
cafeteria menu items, speakers hosted by a school, or opponents on a
team's athletic schedule would be considered substantial
misrepresentations.
One commenter supported using 34 CFR part 668, subpart F, as the
basis for borrower defense claims, including limiting substantial
misrepresentation claims to the categories listed in subpart F.
Discussion: We explain earlier our reasons for why subjects that do
not relate the making of a borrower's loan or the provision of
educational services for which the loan was provided, such as sexual or
racial harassment and campus safety or security, are included within
the scope of the borrower defense regulations.
[[Page 75954]]
As also discussed earlier in this section, we disagree that the
substantial misrepresentation standard targets proprietary institutions
and excludes issues facing public and private non-profit schools.
In response to questions about whether misrepresentations on
specific topics may form the basis of a borrower defense, we note such
determinations will necessarily be fact and situation specific-
dependent inquiries. As proposed, the substantial misrepresentation
standard considers a number of factors in determining whether a
borrower defense claim may be sustained. Proposed Sec. 685.222(d)
specifies that the borrower defense asserted by the borrower must be a
substantial misrepresentation in accordance with 34 CFR part 668,
subpart F, that the borrower reasonably relied on when the borrower
decided to attend, or to continue attending, the school. 34 CFR part
668, subpart F, specifically limits the scope of substantial
misrepresentation to misrepresentations concerning the nature of an
eligible institution's educational program, 34 CFR 668.72; the nature
of an eligible institution's financial charges, id. at Sec. 668.73;
and the employability of an eligible institution's graduates, id. at
Sec. 668.74. If a misrepresentation falls within one of these
categories, then it may be a misrepresentation upon which a borrower
may assert a borrower defense claim. However, as required by the
revised language of Sec. 668.71, the Department would consider the
totality of the situation to determine whether the statement was false,
erroneous, or misleading ``under the circumstances.'' Additionally, the
borrower would have to show that he or she reasonably relied upon the
misrepresentation to his or her detriment in deciding to attend the
school or in continuing his or her attendance at the institution under
proposed Sec. 685.222(d). If such requirements are met, then it is
possible that a substantial misrepresentation may form the basis of a
borrower defense claim.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern that the standard
would result in schools being held liable for misrepresentations of
contractors and others acting on their behalf. According to one
commenter, this standard is acceptable for enforcement activities
conducted by and guided by the Department in its discretion, but is not
suitable for borrower defense. Another commenter stated that, as
proposed, Sec. 685.222 is unclear, because under Sec. 685.222(a), a
borrower defense is limited to the act or omission of the school,
whereas under Sec. 685.222(d), it does not appear to be clear that the
act or omission may be by the school's representatives.
Discussion: In response to concerns in 2010 that institutions may
be held accountable for false or misleading statements made by persons
with no official connection to a school, the Department narrowed the
scope of substantial misrepresentation to statements made by the
school, the school's representatives, or any ineligible institution,
organization, or person with whom the eligible institution has an
agreement to provide educational programs or those that provide
marketing, advertising, recruiting, or admissions services. 75 FR
66916. As explained in 2010, such persons actually either represent the
school or have an agreement with the school for the specific purposes
of providing educational programs, marketing, advertising, recruiting,
or admissions services. Section Sec. 685.222(d) similarly names the
persons and entities making a substantial misrepresentation upon which
a borrower may assert a claim and echoes the official relationships in
Sec. 668.71. We believe the definition provided in proposed Sec.
685.222(d) does not need further clarification. We also believe that
the specific persons and entities identified in Sec. 685.222(d) upon
whose substantial misrepresentation a borrower may assert a borrower
defense claim is appropriate for the same reasons stated in 2010 as to
their appropriateness for Sec. 668.71 and decline to make any changes
in this regard.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter requested that borrower defense claims
extend to guaranty agencies and, specifically, suggested that Sec.
685.222(d)(2) be revised to enable the Secretary to consider certain
factors, listed in Sec. 685.222(d)(2), to determine whether a guaranty
agency's reliance on a substantial misrepresentation is reasonable.
Discussion: The Department's authority to regulate borrower
defenses arises from Section 455(h) of the HEA, which describes
borrower defenses that may be asserted by a borrower to the Department
for loans made under the Direct Loan Program. We do not believe that it
is appropriate to include guaranty agencies, which are not participants
in the Direct Loan Program, in the borrower defense regulations and
decline the commenter's suggestion.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter concurred with the Department's goal of
deterring misrepresentations, but requested that the Department exempt
foreign institutions with relatively small numbers of American students
from the regulation. The commenter stated that eligible foreign
institutions are governed by different countries' laws and oversight
regimes, and that there are no indicators that the issues giving rise
to borrower defense claims have affected Americans enrolled in foreign
institutions.
Discussion: We do not agree that it would be appropriate to ignore
any potential harm to students that may constitute the basis of a
borrower defense from schools participating in the Direct Loan Program,
whether such institutions are foreign or domestic. The standards
proposed in Sec. 685.222 for borrower defense were drafted for the
purpose of ensuring that students receive consistent and uniform
treatment for borrower defense claims, regardless of the type of
institution. Exempting some institutions from the borrower defense
process, whether partially or fully, would undermine the effectiveness
of the regulation in providing relief for borrowers and providing the
Department with information on misconduct forming the basis of borrower
defenses among institutions participating the Direct Loan Program.
Changes: None.
Limitations on Department Actions To Recover
Comments: Commenters objected to the proposal to remove the
limitations period in current Sec. 685.206(c) to Department action to
recover from the school for losses arising from borrower defense claims
on both loans made before July 1, 2017, and those made thereafter.
Section 685.206(c) refers to Sec. 685.309(c), which in turn refers to
the three-year record retention requirement in Sec. 668.24. The
current regulations also provide that the three-year limitation would
not apply if the school received actual notice of the claim within the
three-year period. Commenters objected for a variety of reasons.
Several commenters argued that it would be unduly burdensome and
expensive for institutions to retain records beyond the mandatory
three-year record retention period. These commenters also argued that
it would be unfair for an institution to have to defend itself if it no
longer has records from the time period in question. One commenter also
noted that it would be difficult for the Department to assess claims in
the absence of records. One commenter disagreed with the Department's
statements in the NPRM that institutions have not previously
[[Page 75955]]
relied on the three-year limitations period and student-specific files
are likely unnecessary to a borrower defense claim. A commenter
asserted that the records to which the current record retention rule
applies--including the Student Aid Report (SAR), documentation of each
borrower's loan eligibility, documentation of each borrower's receipt
of funds, documentation of exit counseling, documentation of the
school's completion rates, among numerous other categories of
documents--would be relevant and that the Department had failed to
demonstrate that resolution of borrower defense claims would rarely, if
ever, turn on the records to which the three-year record retention rule
now applies. The commenter contended that these records will likely go
to the heart of borrower claims concerning misrepresentation regarding
student loans.
Some commenters stated that schools have tied their general record
retention policies to the three-year student aid record retention
regulation. Other commenters contended that the proposal would place an
unfair, and unnecessary burden on schools by requiring them to retain
records indefinitely, even though a borrower would reasonably be
expected to know within a few years after attendance whether the
student had a claim regarding the training he or she had received. Some
commenters argued that due process requires a defined limitations
period so that borrowers and schools would know how long to retain
relevant records. These commenters also suggested that a defined
limitation period would promote early awareness of claims, and proposed
a six-year period for recovery actions on both misrepresentation and
contract claims.
A commenter asserted that periods of limitation are enacted not
merely to reduce the risk of failing memories and stale evidence, but
to promote finality of transactions and an understanding of the
possible risks that may arise from transactions. This proposed change,
the commenter asserts, frustrates these objectives served by periods of
limitation. One commenter contended that an unlimited record retention
period would increase the risk that data security lapses could occur.
One commenter suggested that the limitation period for recovery
actions should be tied to the rule adopted by the school's accreditor,
or to the statute of limitations in the State, as even non-student
specific records, such as catalogs (which the Department noted are
likely be the basis of borrower defense claims), are likely to be
destroyed at the end of these retention periods. Another commenter
viewed the proposal as an impermissible retroactive regulation, by
converting what was enacted as defense to repayment into an affirmative
recovery claim, available to the Department for recovery for losses
from actions of the school that occurred before the new regulation took
effect.
Discussion: We fully address in the NPRM at 81 FR 39358 the
contention that removing or extending a limitation period is
unconstitutional and beyond the power of the Department.\21\ As to the
objections that the change would be unfair because schools in fact
relied on the record retention rules, we note first that these record
retention rules require the school to retain specific, particular
student-aid related records. We include the specific records that must
be maintained in order to provide the context in which to address the
commenters' assertion that these records would go to the heart of
borrower defense claims. 34 CFR 668.24. The commenters identify no
lawsuits in which resolution of the dispute actually turned on any of
the records listed here and, with minor exceptions, we are aware of no
lawsuits against schools by borrowers or government entities, or
borrower defense claims presented to the Department, in which the
records described here are dispositive. In a handful of instances,
recognition of borrower defenses under Sec. 685.206 turned on records
showing whether refunds owed to students had in fact been made, a
requirement ordinarily examined in the routine required compliance
audit and in Department program reviews. In a few other cases,
Department reviews have identified instances in which the school
falsified determinations of satisfactory academic progress, another
matter commonly examined in routine audits and program reviews, and we
are amending the false certification discharge provisions to ensure
that the Department can implement relief when this particular failure
is identified. In contrast, even a cursory review of claims raised by
students and student borrowers over the years that would constitute
potential borrower defense claims have turned not on the individualized
aid-specific records itemized in the Department's record retention
regulations, but on broadly disseminated claims regarding such matters
as placement rates,\22\ accreditation status,\23\ and employment
prospects.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ We add only that statutes of limitation applicable to
government actions to collect these claims affect only the ability
to recover by a particular action, and do not extinguish claims.
Thus, a suit by the government to collect a liability arising in
title IV, HEA program remains governed by the limitation periods in
28 U.S.C. 2415(a), while actions to collect by Federal offset have
not, since subsection (i) was added to Sec. 2415 by the 1982 Debt
Collection Act to exempt actions to collect by administrative offset
under 31 U.S.C. 3716, which originally imposed a 10-year statute of
limitations, until amended in 2008 to remove any limitation period
from collection by Federal offset.
\22\ See Armstrong v. Accrediting Council for Continuing Educ. &
Training, Inc., 168 F.3d 1362, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1999), opinion
amended on denial of reh'g, 177 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
\23\ California v. Heald Coll., No. CGC-13-534793, Sup. Ct. Cty
of San Francisco (March 23, 2016); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v.
Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-07194, 2015 WL 10854380 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 27, 2015); Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d
928 (9th Cir. 2013); Moy v. Adelphi Inst., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 696,
706 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding claim of common law misrepresentation
based on false statements regarding placement rates.); Lilley v.
Career Educ. Corp., 2012 IL App (5th) 100614-U (Oct. 25, 2012); Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. DeVry Educ.Group, Inc., C.A. No. 15-CF-00758 (S.D.
Ind. Filed Jan. 17, 2016).
\24\ Suarez v. E. Int'l Coll., 428 N.J. Super. 10, 50 A.3d 75
(App. Div. 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether a school actually retains records relevant to the
borrower's claim does not determine the outcome of any claim, because
the borrower--and in group claims, the Department--bears the burden of
proving that the claim is valid. The borrower, or the Department, must
therefore have evidence to establish the merit of the claim, a prospect
that becomes more unlikely as time passes. If the borrower or the
Department were to assert a claim against the school, the school has
the opportunity to challenge the evidence proffered to support the
claim, whether or not the school itself retains contradictory records.
We acknowledge, however, that institutions might well have
considered their potential exposure to direct suits by students in
devising their record retention policies for records that may in fact
be relevant to borrower defense type claims. Although we consider
applicable law to support collection of claims by offset without regard
to any previously applicable limitation period, we recognize that the
burden of doing so may be unwarranted after the limitation period
otherwise applicable had expired and the institution had no reason to
expect that claims would arise later. Under current regulations, there
is no limit on the time in which the Department could take recovery
action if the institution received notice of a claim within the three-
year period. Under the current regulation, an institution must have
``actual notice of a claim'' to toll the three-year period. An
institution would in fact have ample warning that the claims may arise
from other events besides receipt of a claim from an individual, such
as lawsuits
[[Page 75956]]
involving the same kind of claim, law enforcement agency
investigations, or Department actions. State law, moreover, already
commonly recognizes that the running of limitation periods may be
suspended for periods during which the claimant had not yet discovered
the facts that would support a claim, and may impose no limit on the
length of the suspension, effectively allowing a claim to be asserted
long after the otherwise applicable limitation period had run. The
limitation period applicable to a particular recovery claim will thus
depend--for current loans--on the limitation period State law would
impose on an action by the student against the institution for the
cause of action on which the borrower seeks relief, as that period may
be affected by a discovery rule, as well as whether an event has
occurred within that period to give the institution notice. The current
three-year limit would be retained, subject to the notice provisions,
if that limit exceeded the applicable State law limitation. For new
loans, the applicable periods would be those in Sec. 685.222(e)(7) and
Sec. 685.222(h)(5); for actions based on judgments, no limitation
would apply.
We recognize that the retention of records containing personally
identifiable information poses data security risks. However, the school
already faces the need to secure such information, and we expect the
school to have already adopted steps needed to do so. The regulation
does not impose any new record retention requirement.
Changes: We have amended Sec. 685.206(c) to remove the provision
that the Secretary does not initiate a recovery action later than three
years after the last year of attendance, and we have modified Sec.
685.206(c)(3) to provide that the Department may bring a recovery
action against the school within the limitation period that would apply
to the cause of action on which the borrower defense is based, unless
within that period the school received notice of the borrower's claim.
We have further modified the regulations to state that notice of the
borrower's claim includes actual notice from the borrower, a
representative of the borrower, or the Department, of a claim,
including notice of an application filed pursuant to Sec. 685.222 or
Sec. 685.206(c); receipt of a class action complaint asserting relief
for a class that may include the borrower for underlying facts that may
form the basis of the borrower defense claim; and notice, including a
civil investigative demand or other written demand for information,
from a Federal or State agency that it is initiating an investigation
into conduct of the school relating to specific programs, periods, or
practices that may affect the student for underlying facts that may
form the basis of the borrower defense claim.
We have also revised Sec. 685.222(h)(5) and (e)(7) to provide that
the Department may bring a recovery action against the school for
recovery of claims brought under Sec. 685.222(b) at any time, and may
bring a recovery action for recovery of claims brought under Sec.
685.222(c) or (d) within the limitation period that would apply to the
cause of action on which the borrower defense is brought, unless within
that period the school received notice of the borrower's claim. The
Department further modifies Sec. 685.222(h)(5) to include the same
description of events that constitute notice as described above.
Comments: One commenter requested that the Department continue the
three-year statute of limitations period for loans disbursed prior to
July 1, 2017. Another commenter suggested it would be unfair for the
Department to hold an institution accountable for claims going back
more than ten years.
Discussion: As noted in the NPRM, the Department will continue to
apply the applicable State statute of limitations to claims relating to
loans disbursed prior to July 1, 2017. We also note that we will apply
all aspects of relevant State law related to the statute of limitations
as appropriate, including discovery rules and equitable tolling.
However, these comments may reflect a drafting error in the NPRM that
suggested loans disbursed prior to July 1, 2017, would be subject to
the new limitations period established by the final regulations.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(a)(5) to make clear that the
six-year statute of limitations period established under that section
does not apply to claims under Sec. 685.206(c).
Expansion of Borrower Rights
Comments: A number of commenters noted that the regulations in
proposed Sec. 685.206(c) expand the rights of borrowers by allowing
borrowers to assert defenses regardless of when the loan was disbursed.
Under the current regulations, a defense to repayment is available only
when collection on a Direct Loan has been initiated against a borrower,
such as wage garnishment or tax offset proceedings. The commenters
asserted that the revisions to the borrower defense regulations have
reconstituted current defenses to collection, so they now serve as the
bases for expanded borrower rights to initiate an action for
affirmative debt relief at any time.
Discussion: We disagree that proposed Sec. 685.206(c) would be an
expansion of borrowers' rights as to the context in which a borrower
defense may be raised. As explained by the Department in 1995, 60 FR
37769-37770, the Direct Loan borrower defense regulations were intended
to continue the same treatment for borrowers and the same potential
liability for institutions that existed in the FFEL Program--which
allowed borrowers to assert both claims and defenses to repayment,
without regard as to whether such claims or defenses could only be
brought in the context of debt collection proceedings. Specifically,
FFEL borrowers' ability to raise such a claim was pursuant the
Department's 1994 inclusion in the FFEL master promissory note for all
FFEL Loans a loan term \25\--that remains in FFEL master promissory
notes to this day--stating that for loans provided to pay the tuition
and charges for a for-profit school, ``any lender holding [the] loan is
subject to all the claims and defenses that [the borrower] could assert
against the school with respect to [the] loan'' (emphasis added).\26\
See also Dept. of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter Gen 95-8 (Jan. 1995)
(stating the Department's position that borrower defense claims would
receive the same treatment as they were given in the FFEL program,
which allowed borrowers to not only assert defenses but also claims
under applicable law).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ This loan term was adapted from a similar contract
provision, also known as the Holder Rule, required by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in certain credit contracts. See 40 FR
533506.
\26\ The substance of this loan term was also adopted as part of
the FFEL Program regulations at 34 CFR 682.209(g) in 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also disagree that the revisions to Sec. 685.206(c) expand any
timeframe for a borrower to assert a borrower defense. As explained
above, the Department's borrower defense regulation at Sec. 685.206(c)
was based upon the right of FFEL borrowers to bring claims and
defenses, which in turn was adopted from the FTC's Holder Rule
provision. The FTC has stated that applicable State law principles,
such as statutes of limitations as well as any principles that would
permit otherwise time-barred claims or defenses against the loan
holder, apply to claims and defenses brought pursuant to a Holder Rule
provision.\27\ The Department's position on the application of any
applicable statutes of limitation or principles that
[[Page 75957]]
may permit otherwise time-barred claims is the same as the FTC's. We do
not seek to change this position in revising Sec. 685.206(c), which
would apply to loans first disbursed before July 1, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Letter from Stephanie Rosenthal, Chief of Staff, Division
of Financial Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC to Jeff
Appel, Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Dep't. of Educ. (April 7, 2016),
available at www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions/letter-stephanie-rosenthal-chief-staff-division-financial-practices-bureau.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Administrative Burden
Comments: A group of commenters questioned the validity of the
Department's argument that maintaining a State-based standard would be
administratively burdensome. The commenters suggested that the
Department could establish a system for determining which State's laws
would pertain to students enrolled in distance education programs.
Several commenters criticized the Federal standard as being too
broad and vague to provide sufficient predictability to institutions.
One of these commenters asserted that the proposed regulations could
encourage borrowers to file unsubstantiated claims. Many commenters
noted that borrowers have existing avenues to resolve issues with their
schools, using the complaint systems provided by institutions,
accrediting agencies, and States, as well as judicial remedies.
One commenter suggested that the implementation of the proposed
regulations would hamper interactions between school employees and
students by creating an environment where any interaction could be
misconstrued and used as a basis for borrower defense. The commenter
concluded that this dynamic would increase the burden on schools as
they seek to implement means of communicating to and interacting with
borrowers that mitigate risk.
Several commenters recommend that the Federal standard describe the
specific acts and omissions that would and would not substantiate a
borrower defense claim. Another commenter suggested that the final rule
include examples of serious and egregious misconduct that would violate
the Federal standard.
Discussion: Reliance upon State law not only presents a significant
burden for Department officials who must apply and interpret various
State laws, but also for borrowers who must make the threshold
determination as to whether they may have a claim. Contrary to the
commenter's assertion, this challenge cannot be resolved through the
Department's determination as to which State's laws would provide
protection from school misconduct for borrowers who reside in one State
but are enrolled via distance education in a program based in another
State. Some States have extended their rules to protect these students,
while others have not.
We agree with commenters that the Federal standard does not provide
significant predictability to institutions regarding the number or type
of borrower defense claims that may be filed or the number of those
claims that will be granted. However, the purpose of the Federal
standard is not to provide predictability, but rather, to streamline
the administration of the borrower defense regulations and to increase
protections for students as well as taxpayers and the Federal
government. That being said, the bases for borrower defense claims
under the new Federal standard--substantial misrepresentation, breach
of contracts, and nondefault, contested judgments by a court or
administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction for relief--do
provide specific and sufficient information to guide institutions
regarding acts or omissions pertaining to the provision of Direct Loan
or educational services that could result in a borrower defense claim
against the institution.
We do not agree that implementation of the Federal standard will
hamper interactions between school personnel and students. Institutions
that are providing clear, complete, and accurate information to
prospective and enrolled students are exceedingly unlikely to generate
successful borrower defense claims. While individuals may continue to
misunderstand or misconstrue the information they are provided, a
successful borrower defense claim requires the borrower to demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial misrepresentation
or breach of contract has occurred.
We decline to describe the specific acts and omissions that would
and would not substantiate a borrower defense claim, as each claim will
be evaluated according to the specific circumstances of the case,
making any such description illustrative, at best. We believe the
elements of the Federal standard and the bases for borrower defense
claims provide sufficient clarity as to what may or may not constitute
an actionable act or omission on the part of an institution.
Changes: None.
Authority
Comments: A group of commenters expressed concern that the proposed
Federal standard exceeds the Department's statutory authority. This
same group of commenters opined that the proposed Federal standard
violates the U.S. Constitution.
Two commenters suggested that the proposed regulations have
exceeded the Department's authority to promulgate regulations for
borrowers' defenses to repayment on their Federal student loans when
advanced collection activity has been initiated. One of these
commenters suggested that loan discharges based on institutional
misconduct should be pursued only when the Department has court
judgments against a school, final Department program review and audit
determinations, or final actions taken by other State or Federal
regulatory agencies, after the school has been afforded its due process
opportunities.
Discussion: The Department's authority for this regulatory action
is derived primarily from Sections 454, 455, 487, and 498 of the Higher
Education Act, as discussed in more detail in the NPRM. Section 454 of
the HEA authorizes the Department to establish the terms of the Direct
Loan Program Participation Agreement, and section 455(h) of the HEA
authorizes the Secretary to specify in regulation which acts or
omissions of an institution of higher education a borrower may assert
as a defense to repayment of a Direct Loan. Sections 487 and 498
authorize the adoption of regulations to assess whether an institution
has the administrative capability and financial resources needed to
participate in the title IV, HEA programs.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ This discussion addresses the Department's authority to
issue regulations in the areas described below. As discussed
earlier, the Department's authority to recoup losses rests on common
law as well as HEA provisions included among those cited here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Support for regulating in particular areas is also found in Section
432(a) of the HEA, which authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations
for the FFEL program, enforce or compromise a claim under the FFEL
Program; section 451(b) provides that Direct Loans are made under the
same terms and conditions as FFEL Loans; and section 468(2) authorizes
the Secretary to enforce or compromise a claim on a Perkins Loan.
Section 452(j) of the GEPA authorizes certain compromises under
Department programs, and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 31
U.S.C. 3711, authorizes a Federal agency to compromise or terminate
collection of a debt, subject to certain conditions.
The increased debt resolution authority is provided in Public Law
101-552 and authorizes the Department to resolve debts up to $100,000
without approval from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The HEA vests the Department with the sole authority to determine
and
[[Page 75958]]
apply the appropriate sanction for HEA violations. The Department's
authority for the regulations is also informed by the legislative
history of the provisions of the HEA, as discussed in the NPRM.
Changes: None.
Making of a Loan and Provision of Educational Services
Comments: Several commenters expressed support for the Department's
efforts to limit the scope of borrower defense claims by focusing the
proposed regulations on acts or omissions that pertain to the provision
of educational services. However, these commenters also suggested that
the phrase, ``provision of educational services'' was open to
interpretation and, as such, may not effectively constrain potential
claims. One commenter suggested revising the phrase to read,
``provision of educational services related to the program of study.''
A number of commenters requested that the clarification included in
the preamble to the NPRM, explaining that claims pertaining to personal
injury, allegations of harassment, educational malpractice, and
academic or disciplinary actions are not related to the making of a
borrower's Direct loan or the provision of educational services be
included in the regulatory text, as they viewed these specific examples
as particularly helpful clarifications.
Two commenters listed a number of specific circumstances that may
or may not fall within the scope of providing educational services, and
requested that the Department provide an analysis of these acts and
omissions.
Another commenter remarked that the Department's efforts to limit
the scope of borrower defense claims by focusing the proposed
regulations on acts or omissions that pertain to the provision of
educational services fell short of its objective. Similar to other
commenters, this commenter requested that the Department provide
explicit descriptions of the claims that would and would not meet the
proposed standard.
Another commenter who shared this view suggested the Department
include in the final regulations a discussion of the factors that would
be considered in determining whether a borrower defense claim pertained
to the provision of educational services.
Discussion: We appreciate the support for our efforts to
appropriately limit the scope of borrower defense claims to those that
are related specifically to the provision of educational services or
the making of a Direct Loan. We understand the commenters' interest in
further clarification. However, we do not believe it is appropriate to
provide detailed institutional-borrower scenarios, or a hypothetical
discussion of the analytic process the Department would undertake to
ascertain whether a specific borrower's claim related to the provision
of educational services or the making of a Direct Loan at this time. As
is often the case in matters that address an individual's experience as
part of the Federal Student Aid process, the Department's determination
of whether a claim pertains to the provision of educational services or
the making of a Direct Loan will depend greatly upon the specific
elements of that claim.
For example, while it may appear to be a relatively straightforward
clarifying change to amend the regulatory language to read, ``provision
of educational services related to the program of study,'' such a
change could be interpreted to mean that claims related to more general
concerns associated with the institution's provision of educational
services would not be considered. That is not our intent, and we
believe the regulatory language as proposed best captures the intended
scope of borrower defense claims.
Similarly, we do not believe that including in the regulatory
language specific examples of acts or omissions that would not be
considered in a borrower defense is appropriate at this time. These
circumstances may evolve over time, necessitating a re-evaluation of
their relevance. The Department can provide additional clarification,
as needed, through other documents, such as a Dear Colleague Letter,
Electronic Announcement, or the FSA Handbook.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter recommended that the phrase ``making of a
Direct Loan'' be revised to include the phrase ``for enrollment at the
school,'' to ensure consistency with the proposed regulatory language
in Sec. 685.222(a)(5). The commenter suggested that this modification
would be required to ensure that all Direct Loans a borrower has
obtained attend a school are covered by the regulation.
Discussion: We agree with the commenter that such a change would
ensure consistency throughout the regulation.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.206(c) to include the qualifying
phrase, ``for enrollment at the school'' when referring to the ``making
of the loan.''
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed
borrower defense regulations would limit borrower defense claims to
acts or omissions that occurred during the same academic year in which
the borrower obtained a Direct Loan for which he or she is now seeking
a loan discharge. One commenter suggested this concern could be
ameliorated by amending the regulatory language in Sec. 685.222(a)(5)
to include acts and omissions that occur prior to enrollment (e.g.,
marketing, recruitment) and after the borrower has left the school
(e.g., career placement).
Another commenter expressed concern that the limitation of scope
would create of discrepancy between loan proceeds that were used to pay
for tuition and loan proceeds used to pay for other elements of the
institution's cost of attendance.
Discussion: The preamble to the NPRM explicitly acknowledged that
the proposed standard described in Sec. 685.206(c) and Sec.
685.222(b), (c), and (d), would include periods of time prior to the
borrower's enrollment, such as when the borrower was being recruited by
the school, and periods of time after the borrower's enrollment, such
as when the borrower was seeking career advising or placement services.
81 FR 39337.
The regulatory language in Sec. 685.222(a)(5) refers to the making
of a Direct Loan that was obtained in conjunction with enrollment at
the school. This would include all eligible elements of the school's
cost of attendance for which a Direct Loan can be obtained. The
language in Sec. 685.222 does not restrict potential borrower relief
to the portion of a Direct Loan used to pay for tuition.
Changes: None.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing proposed Sec. 685.222(a)(6), the
Department has determined that including an affirmative duty upon the
Department to notify the borrower of the order in which his or her
objections, if he or she asserts other objections in addition to
borrower defense, to his or her loan will be determined is too
burdensome because it would require the expenditure of administrative
resources and time, even if not desired by the borrower. The borrower
may contact the Department to find out the status of his or her
objections, including borrower defense, if desired.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(a)(6) to remove the
requirement that the Department notify the borrower of the order in
which his or her objections to a loan will be determined.
Limitation Periods (Statute of Limitations)
Comments: Several commenters requested that the Department allow
[[Page 75959]]
students to recoup loan funds already paid beyond the proposed six-year
statute of limitations. These commenters argued that students often do
not know that they are entitled to relief for many years. Some
commenters stated that the beginning of the time limit would be
difficult for borrowers to determine, since it could vary depending on
the specifics of the alleged misconduct. Another commenter stated that
some institutions have been defrauding borrowers for decades. One
commenter stated that since there is no time limit for false
certification discharges, there should not be a time limit for borrower
defenses. A group of commenters argued that since there is no limit on
the Department's ability to collect student debt, there should not be a
limit on the ability of borrowers to recover. Other commenters pointed
to the relatively smaller number of borrower applications, as opposed
to numbers of borrower estimated to be eligible for relief, from
Corinthian as evidence that many borrowers do not know they have
claims.
Discussion: As noted in the NPRM, the six-year statute \29\ of
limitations is only applicable to students' claims for amounts already
paid on student loans. A borrower may assert a defense to repayment at
any time. This rule comports with the FTC Holder Rule \30\ and general
State law principles, as well as general principles relating to the
defense of recoupment. See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247,
262 (1935) (``Recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of
some feature of a transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is
grounded. Such a defense is never barred by the statute of limitations
so long as the main action itself is timely.'') We understand that
students may not always be in a position to bring borrower defense
claims immediately, but believe the final regulations strike a balance
between allowing borrowers sufficient time to bring their claims and
ensuring that the claims are brought while there is still evidence
available to assess the claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ In the NPRM, we explain our reasoning for establishing a
six-year statute of limitations for the breach of contract and
substantial misrepresentation standards under Sec. 685.222(c) and
(d). Further, we note that six-year period echoes the period
applicable to non-tort claims against the United States under 28
U.S.C. 2401(a). See also 31 U.S.C. 3702.
\30\ The FTC Holder Rule is explained in more detail elsewhere
in the ``State Standard'' and ``Expansion of Borrower Rights''
sections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
General Process
Comments: Many commenters and groups of commenters expressed
concerns about potential due process issues with the process proposed
in Sec. 685.222(e) for individual borrowers to pursue borrower defense
claims. These commenters asserted that the Department should allow
institutions to actively participate in all aspects of the process,
starting with a right to be notified of the claim and an opportunity to
review the claimant's assertions and supporting documentation. These
commenters further proposed that the Department's hearing official
should advise the institution about the specific arguments and
documents used in the fact-finding process. Some commenters offered
proposed timeframes for each step in the review process, while
emphasizing that most determinations should be made based solely on
document review.
Some of these commenters acknowledged the value of not establishing
a purely adversarial process, but emphasized the need to balance the
interests of providing relief to students who were treated unfairly
with the rights of schools to defend themselves, especially in light of
the possible financial and legal exposure to institutions and
potentially taxpayers.
Several commenters also contended that the exclusion of school
participation in the individual process is especially problematic
because of the fact-specific nature of such claims. These commenters
expressed their belief that most individual cases cannot be thoroughly
investigated without school input. Some commenters suggested that the
proposed regulations flip the presumption of innocence that applies in
many processes on its head and unfairly burdens institutions without an
adequate process to vindicate their claims.
While many commenters emphasized that the proposed process tilts
too favorably toward claimants, a few commenters asserted that it may
not always fully protect the rights of adversely affected borrowers.
Additionally, they noted that the Department's proposal removed not
only the option of arbitration, but also the borrower's choice in the
makeup of and the representation for the group. These commenters
asserted that the rights of an individual claimant could be adversely
affected because of some defect in a group claim that the Department
interprets will cover the affected individual. They further stated that
borrowers have no recourse to challenge the Department official's
determination, who they allege will be acting under a set of obtuse and
poorly defined rules, resulting in determinations benefitting borrowers
who were not wronged and possibly denying relief to deserving
claimants.
Discussion: Schools will not be held liable for borrower defense
claims until after an administrative proceeding that provides them due
process. The Department already runs such proceedings in its Office of
Hearings and Appeals on matters such as assessing a school's liability
to the Department or limiting, suspending, or terminating a school's
title IV participation.
We disagree that moving a claimant from the individual process into
the group process negatively impacts the borrower. In fact, we believe
the borrower may receive a faster decision using the group process.
Additionally, the borrower maintains the ability to request
reconsideration if there is new evidence that was not previously
considered. Finally, the borrower retains the right to ``opt-out'' of
the group process.
The Department will outline specific procedures, including other
details requested by the commenters, in a separate procedural rule. We
believe this is the most appropriate place for such detail.
Changes: None.
Comments: Many commenters expressed concerns relating to proposed
Sec. 685.222(e)(3), which provides for a Department official to
administer the individual borrower process. Many of these commenters
were concerned that these officials would have too much authority in
deciding what evidence to review and use in decision making. Some of
these commenters also argued that giving the Department's official the
sole discretion over disposition of the claims actually denies
borrowers certain rights.
Several commenters claimed that the Department official would be
subject to political influence and not necessarily the unbiased,
independent, and impartial party needed in this role.
Discussion: Department officials make independent decisions daily
regarding the merit of objections to loan enforcement raised by
borrowers who default on their loans, and borrower defense would be no
different. Department officials also make decisions regarding
institutional liabilities to the Department and enforcement actions
against institutions. These officials do so in accordance with
established standards in the APA for such decisions made by
administrative agencies, such as ensuring that decision makers do not
report to individuals responsible for managing or protecting the funds
of an agency.
[[Page 75960]]
As discussed during negotiated rulemaking, the Department also
plans to outline more specific details about the process for schools
and borrowers in forthcoming procedural rules.
Changes: None.
Comments: Commenters argued that the Department's proposed
structure in Sec. 685.222(e) places too much authority with the
Department and its officials, creating a conflict of interest. These
commenters had misgivings about designating an official who would have
the ability to perform multiple functions, including adjudicating
cases, creating groups from individual claims, as well as advocating on
behalf of the group. Several commenters called for separation between
the investigative and adjudicative functions.
Many of these commenters expressed concern that the entire process
created conditions that would inevitably lead to unfair treatment of
schools. This argument is based on the hypothesis that the inherent
conflicts in the proposed investigative and adjudication processes will
result in a high number of vindicated claims and the cost associated
with high levels of loan forgiveness will force the Department to seek
indemnification from schools regardless of the legitimacy of the
claims.
Numerous commenters also expressed concerns that some of the
Department officials hearing cases may not have the requisite
experience to properly and dispassionately evaluate and decide these
cases. Several commenters specifically offered alternatives to the
Department's officials, including using independent hearing officials,
administrative law judges, or a third party such as a member of the
American Arbitration Association to decide cases. Some commenters
specifically suggested this separation to ensure the decision maker
would be more insolated form political pressures.
One commenter also noted that the proposed rule does not provide
for review of determinations by the Secretary, which specifically
limits the Secretary's authority.
Discussion: As we make clear elsewhere here, the Department will
undertake any action to recover against a school under specific
procedures that are being developed and will ensure an opportunity for
the school to present its defenses and be heard. The process will be
comparable to that provided under part 668, subpart G for actions to
fine, or to limit, suspend or terminate participation of, a school, and
under part 668, subpart H for audit and program review appeals. The
hearing will be conducted by a Department official who is independent
of the component of the Department bringing the action. This is
currently done for appeals under subparts G and H, and like those
procedures, the new procedures would include an opportunity for an
appeal to the Secretary. Any final decision reached in these
proceedings would be reviewable under section 706 of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
706, as are final decisions under subparts G and H. The separation of
functions under those subparts fully complies with the requirements
that would apply under the APA, to which some commenters have alluded,
and would be mirrored in the procedure used for recoveries against
schools. However, neither the APA nor other applicable law requires the
Department to provide an appeal from an administrative decision maker
to the Secretary or other senior authority, and the decision of the
official designated the authority to adjudicate individual claims is
final agency action, similarly reviewable in an action brought under
section 706 of the APA. The Department has conducted a great number of
such individual adjudications of borrower objections to Federal payment
offset and wage garnishment over the past decades, and neither those
procedures, nor those used for Federal salary offset, include any
provision for an appeal from the decision of the designated official to
the Secretary. 34 CFR 30.33, 34 CFR part 31, 34 CFR part 34.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter expressed support for restricting borrowers
from receiving relief where relief was already granted for the same
complaint through a separate source. Conversely, another commenter
requested additional legal recourse to collect damages beyond the
borrower defense to repayment process.
Discussion: The individual application process in Sec.
685.222(e)(1)(i)(C) requires the borrower to inform the Department of
any other claim based on the same information and any payments or
credits received resulting from such a claim. The NPRM included
performance bond holders and tuition recovery programs as examples of
sources of these payments or credits. The statutory authority in
section 455(h) of the HEA provides for defense to repayment of a Direct
Loan. The Department's ability to provide relief for borrowers is
predicated upon the existence of the borrower's Direct Loan, and that
relief is limited to the extent of the Department's authority to take
action on such a loan. By providing relief appropriate to the
borrower's loss, and based on the amount borrowed, the Department would
provide relief under the relevant statutory authority. A borrower may
pursue the payment of other damages for costs not covered by the Direct
Loan in court or via other available avenues without restriction.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern for frivolous,
false, exaggerated, or politically driven claims and the accompanying
administrative burden and cost this process will place on institutions
and the Department. Commenters suggested a firm statute of limitations
for filing claims, increasing the burden of proof for the student,
limiting opportunities to reopen cases, and a prominently stated
penalty for filing false claims on the application form to prevent
false or exaggerated claims.
Discussion: We believe the commenters' suggestions, though well
intentioned, would do little to reduce any potential frivolous claims.
As outlined earlier, we believe we have established a strong position
for the limitations periods and the burden of proof in these
regulations.
Additionally, an individual borrower may only request
reconsideration of an application when he or she introduces new
information not previously considered. The borrower defense application
form includes a certification statement that the borrower must sign
indicating that the information contained on the application is true
and that making false or misleading statements subjects the borrower to
penalties of perjury. We believe these protections against false or
frivolous claims are sufficient.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters and groups of commenters contended
that the Department should provide equal relief to Direct Loan and FFEL
borrowers. These commenters objected to the Department's proposed
process in Sec. 685.206, which would require FFEL borrowers who want
to apply for a borrower defense to consolidate their FFEL Loans into
the Direct Consolidation Loans. These commenters noted that over 40
percent of borrowers with outstanding Federal loans have FFEL Loans and
conveyed that borrowers were typically not able to choose among Federal
loan programs. One commenter noted the inequities pertain not only to
borrowers, but also to schools. Institutions with significant FFEL
volume face reduced risk of Department efforts to recover funds. One
commenter specifically indicated that requiring FFEL borrowers to
consolidate obliterates the use of the group process because FFEL
borrowers
[[Page 75961]]
cannot be automatically included in the group without further action on
their part.
These commenters also noted inequities in relief for FFEL
borrowers, which includes no mechanism to seek refund of amounts
already paid by the borrower. Thus, the commenters asked the Department
to stop all collection activities upon receipt of a FFEL borrower's
application to at least reduce the amount the borrower pays on the
loan. Additionally, these commenters requested that the Department
apply forbearance to FFEL borrowers in the same manner as with Direct
Loan borrowers.
While expressing a strong preference for identical treatment of
Direct Loan and FFEL borrowers, one commenter also recognized that this
might not be possible, and suggested that the Department could lessen
the imbalance by specifying that a referral relationship existed
between lenders and institutions when a large number of borrowers at a
school had the same lender. Another commenter suggested that the
Department make findings of groups of borrowers entitled to discharge
of their loans and require FFEL lenders to comply with them.
One commenter articulated that the Department could take additional
steps to assist FFEL borrowers in multiple ways. First, the commenter
suggested that the Department could compel a lender or guaranty agency
to discharge a loan. This commenter further suggested that borrowers
who dispute a FFEL Loan who are denied can appeal a lender or guaranty
agency's decision to the Secretary, giving the Department final
authority in each case. Finally, the commenter indicated that the
Department could move groups of loans under the Department's
responsibility as it would in cases where a guaranty agency closes. The
commenter claimed that the Department previously took such action for
false certification and closed school discharges.
Discussion: We seek to provide an effective process for all
borrowers within the Department's ability under applicable laws and
regulations.
Current regulations do not require a FFEL lender to grant
forbearance under these circumstances except with regard to a FFEL
borrower who seeks to pay off that FFEL Loan with a Consolidation Loan,
and that requirement provides a time-limited option. 34 CFR
682.211(f)(11). Because the Secretary has designated that section of
the final regulations for early implementation, lenders may implement
this provision before it becomes a requirement on July 1, 2017. Thus,
when these borrower defense regulations take effect on July 1, 2017,
FFEL Program lenders must grant administrative forbearance when the
Department makes a request on behalf of a borrower defense claimant,
pursuant to Sec. 682.211(i)(7).
We also do not believe we have adequate data to identify those
lenders and schools that established a referral relationship.
We believe we have outlined the best possible path to relief for
the remaining FFEL borrowers within our legal abilities. We appreciate
the commenters' suggestions for other ways to assist FFEL borrowers in
pursuing borrower defenses, but do not believe those suggestions are
practicable. We recognize that this process requires additional steps
for FFEL borrowers. To mitigate this, as described in the preamble to
the NPRM, we will provide FFEL borrowers with a preliminary
determination as to whether they would be eligible for relief on their
borrower defense claims under the Direct Loan regulations, were they to
consolidate their FFEL Loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan. FFEL
borrowers may receive such a determination without having to establish
a referral relationship between the lender of the underlying FFEL
Program Loan and the school. The notice of preliminary determination
will provide information on the Loan Consolidation process and
instructions on how to begin the process. As described in Sec.
685.212(k), after the borrower consolidates into the Direct Loan
program, he or she may receive an appropriate amount of relief on the
principal balance.
Changes: None.
Process for Individual Borrowers (Sec. 685.222(e))
Comments: Multiple commenters and groups of commenters suggested
that the Department unfairly limited the rights of institutions and
exceeded its authority to recoup funds resulting from borrower defense
claims. They noted that they believe that the HEA grants no such
authority. Moreover, these commenters pointed out the difference
between such silence and the specific authority in the HEA regarding
closed school discharges, false certification discharges, and regarding
Perkins Loans.
The same commenters who asserted that the Department exceeded its
authority with recoupment of successful borrower defense claims stated
that the Department should outline the details of its process if it
proves it has such authority. Several commenters requested more
information about the recovery process from schools, focusing on the
institution's involvement in the process. Furthermore, some commenters
requested a specific appeal process for attempts to recover funds from
schools.
Discussion: As discussed more fully elsewhere in this preamble, the
Department has ample legal authority to recover losses on borrower
defenses from schools, and the absence of explicit statutory provision
authorizing such recovery does not affect its authority. We are
developing specific procedures for conducting such recovery actions
that will reflect current regulations for appeals of audit and program
review claims and actions to fine the school, or to limit, suspend, or
terminate its participation.
Changes: None.
Comments: Multiple groups of commenters supported the preponderance
of evidence standard in the Department's individual process proposed in
Sec. 685.222(e) and appreciated that borrowers would not need legal
counsel to pursue a borrower defense. Multiple commenters also
commented on the desire that the process not penalize borrowers for the
absence of written documentation. They noted that many borrowers may
not have items such as enrollment agreements or other items that might
assist the Department in reviewing their claims. The commenters added
that this should not be held against the borrowers, as schools
frequently do not provide borrowers with copies of such documents, and
borrowers may encounter difficulties in obtaining them.
One commenter suggested that, when documents are not available
because of the school's failure to provide the borrower with proper
documentation, the burden should shift to the school to disprove the
claims from the borrower's attestation.
Another commenter suggested that the Department specify that it
will accept a student's sworn testimony, absent independent
corroborating evidence contradicting it, as fulfilling the
preponderance of the evidence standard (which requires the borrower to
persuade the decision maker that it is more likely than not that events
happened or did not happen as claimed). In other words, the commenter
suggested that, when a borrower submits sworn testimony but does not
submit corroborating evidence, the Department should not take this to
mean that there was no substantial misrepresentation or breach of
contract. Another group of commenters suggested that the Department
track similar claims and consider those claims as evidence when
reviewing applications.
[[Page 75962]]
Another group of commenters recommended that the Department accept
information on the application form as sufficient for the claim,
requesting additional information only when necessary. This group of
commenters pointed out that misrepresentations were often from oral
statements made to the borrower that did not include any written
evidence. Furthermore, this group of commenters requested that the
Department fully use all available information it and other Federal
agencies possess, rather than requesting it from borrowers.
Discussion: We disagree that the final regulations should specify
what weight might be given to different types of evidence, such as
borrower testimony or statements, under the preponderance of the
evidence standard specified in Sec. 685.222(a)(2) for borrower
defenses under the Federal standard for loans first disbursed after
July 1, 2017. Under Sec. 685.222(a)(2), the borrower has the burden of
demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is more
likely than not that the facts on which his or her borrower defense
claim rests have been met. However, Sec. 685.222(e)(3) provides that
for individually filed borrower defense applications, the designated
Department official will also consider other information as part of his
or her review of the borrower's claim. As noted in the NPRM, 81 FR
39337, in practice, the decision maker in a borrower defense proceeding
would assess the value, or weight, of all of the evidence relating to
the borrower's claim that has been produced to prove that the borrower
defense claim as alleged is true. The kind of evidence that may satisfy
this burden will necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case, including factors such as whether the claimant's assertions
are corroborated by other evidence. Accordingly, we decline to
elaborate further on what specific types of evidence may or may not be
viewed as satisfying the preponderance of evidence standard.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several groups of commenters encouraged the Department to
adopt a simple, accessible, and transparent process for borrowers.
These commenters indicated support for a process that reduces
inequities in resources so that borrowers interact only with the
Department, even when additional information is needed from the school.
In particular, numerous commenters expressed appreciation that, under
the proposed regulations, borrowers would not be pitted against
institutions, which generally possess significantly more resources.
While generally supportive of the Department's process, another
group of commenters expressed concern for the potentially overwhelming
number of applications that would be filed in connection with potential
borrower defense claims and questioned the Department's capacity to
employ enough capable staff to handle the large workload. The same
group noted the benefits of specifying timeframes for actions within
the process, despite recognizing the difficulty in doing so.
Discussion: With these regulations, the Department works toward
evening the playing field for students. Individual claims will be
decided in a non-adversarial process managed by a Department official,
and group claims would be brought by the Department against the school,
not by students. Thus, the process does not require students to
directly oppose schools. We appreciate the support that some commenters
expressed for these processes.
As we discussed in the NPRM, the Department may incur
administrative costs and may need to reallocate resources depending on
the volume of applications and whether a hearing is required.
After having received only a few borrower defense claims in over 20
years, the Department has now received more than 80,000 claims in just
over two years. We responded by building an entirely new process and
hiring a new team to resolve these claims. Our ability to resolve
claims quickly and efficiently has grown and will continue to grow.
Particularly because we are still growing our capacity, we are unable
to establish specific timeframes at this point for processing claims.
Additionally, processing time is considerably affected by the varied
types and complexities of claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: One group of commenters strongly supported the
Department's pledge to provide written determinations to borrowers who
submit borrower defense claims.
Discussion: We appreciate the support of these commenters.
Changes: None.
Comments: Another group of commenters noted the difficulty that
many borrowers face in completing even seemingly simple forms and in
explaining wrongdoing in a way that clearly makes a complex legal
argument.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenters' concern and do not expect
borrowers to submit a complicated, lengthy narrative requiring any
legal analysis by the borrower to apply for relief. We specifically set
out to design a process that would not be onerous for borrowers and
that would not require third-party assistance, such as but not limited
to an attorney.
Changes: None.
Comments: Two commenters suggested using existing school complaint
processes to resolve borrower defense claims prior to a Department
review to reduce administrative burden on the Department and on
institutions.
Discussion: Nothing in these regulations prohibits a borrower from
directly contacting an institution to resolve a complaint.
Additionally, a borrower may pursue other paths to relief, such as
filing a claim with a State consumer bureau or filing a lawsuit.
However, at the point where a borrower approaches the Department for
assistance, we take seriously the obligation to review the claim and to
respond to the borrower. We believe this process provides the best
avenue for relief when a borrower applies for a borrower defense claim.
In addition to using data collected from the Department's ``FSA
Feedback System,'' the Department will also continue to partner with
other Federal agencies that are engaged in the important work aimed of
protecting the rights of students. Depending on the specifics of the
case, these agencies may include the CFPB, DOJ, FTC, the SEC, and the
Department of Defense among others. The Department will also look to
State officials and agencies responsible for education quality, student
financial assistance, law enforcement, civil rights, and consumer
protection.
Changes: None.
Comments: Multiple commenters expressed support for the proposed
prohibition on capitalization of interest when the Department suspends
collection activity following receipt of a borrower defense
application. However, one of these commenters objected to the
Department prohibiting interest capitalization when collection resumes
as a result of the borrower's failure to submit appropriate
documentation. The commenter believed this could lead to false claims
by borrowers seeking to avoid repayment.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenters' support for the
prohibition of interest capitalization and believe it is in line with
our concept of the appropriate use of capitalization, as the borrower
is not newly entering repayment. Accordingly, we disagree with the
commenter who objected to prohibiting capitalization upon resumption of
collection activity where a borrower did not submit appropriate
documentation. We believe more legitimate avenues exist for struggling
[[Page 75963]]
borrowers to postpone or reduce payment rather than filing false
borrower defense claims, and do not believe that the prohibition of
interest capitalization in this narrow circumstance provides
significant incentive for borrowers to incur the significant risks
associated with filing false claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: One group of commenters noted the importance of
reconsideration of borrower defense claims, especially for borrowers
completing applications without assistance. This group, however,
encouraged the Department to clearly explain the borrower's right to
reconsideration, rather than merely allowing borrowers to request
reconsideration with the Department having discretion on whether to
consider the application.
Multiple commenters and groups of commenters expressed concern with
the borrower's ability to introduce new evidence for reconsideration in
proposed Sec. 685.222(e)(5). Specifically, these commenters noted
concerns that individual claims could continue indefinitely. These
commenters indicated that the Department should include reasonable time
limitations for reconsideration of claims.
Another commenter suggested that the Department official who made
the determination of the original claim should not be permitted to
review a request for reconsideration and suggested using a panel or
board for such claims.
Discussion: We highlight the distinction between reconsideration of
an application and an appeal process. A borrower must submit new
evidence in order for the Department to reconsider an application, and
there is no appeal process. We believe it is important to allow a
borrower to submit new evidence, which he or she may have only recently
acquired. We do not intend to limit borrowers' rights. However, there
needs to be finality in the borrower defense process as well, and we do
not believe it is appropriate to consider applications regarding claims
that have already been decided unless there is clear demonstration that
new evidence warrants that reconsideration. We will consider the
commenters' suggestions regarding the explanation of the
reconsideration process in our communications with borrowers.
We believe the limitations periods for borrower defense claims
adequately address the concern about time limits and do not agree with
imposing an artificial limitation on borrower applications for
reconsideration for new evidence based on a specific number or time
period.
We see no basis for requiring this evaluation of new evidence to be
made by an individual other than the original decision maker. This is a
reconsideration, not an appeal, and the original decision maker is in a
position to efficiently make that decision.\31\ Therefore, we do not
prohibit the same official from hearing the reconsideration claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ This is hardly unusual: Under Social Security regulations,
the hearing officer who conducts the disability hearing ordinarily
conducts the reconsideration determination. 20 CFR 404.917(a). In
addition, requests for relief from judgments--a somewhat comparable
plea to the request for reconsideration at issue here are routinely
considered by the judge that issued the original decision. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter asked that we restrict a borrower's ability
to present new evidence in support of a claim already rejected. The
commenter said that borrowers should be required to show good cause for
why the evidence was not previously available.
Discussion: We disagree that borrowers should be required to show
good cause for why evidence was not previously available. We recognize
that borrowers may not have the same access to information that the
Department or the school may have. Furthermore, we believe that the
requirements for ``new evidence'' provide clear guidelines for what is
required. Section 685.222(e)(5)(i) specifies that ``new evidence'' must
be evidence that the borrower did not previously provide, but also must
be relevant to the borrower's claim, and was not identified by the
decision-maker as being relied upon for the final decision. For ``new
evidence'' to meet this standard, the evidence cannot just be
cumulative of other evidence in the record at the time, but must also
be relevant and probative evidence that might change the outcome of the
decision being reconsidered.
Changes: None.
Comments: Multiple commenters suggested that the Department
specifically permit schools to appeal decisions on any individual
claim. One commenter added that schools would not file frivolous
appeals, as the resulting workload is too time-consuming. The commenter
further suggested that if schools are not provided with an appeal
process, that the Department should provide schools with an opportunity
to challenge the Department official's decision during any related
recoupment action.
Discussion: We do not include an appeals procedure in the
individual borrower claim process. We believe the reconsideration
process adequately allows borrowers to submit new evidence. However, as
one commenter requested, the regulations do afford an opportunity to
present a defense when the Department seeks to hold a school liable and
recover funds in both the individual and group claim processes.
Changes: None.
Comments: Although the Department outlined a separate process to
recover funds from an institution, a group of commenters stated that
the Department needed to include the borrower to ensure a fair process
for the institution.
Discussion: We believe that using a separate proceeding to
determine whether a group of borrowers have meritorious claims, and if
so, to recover from the school for losses on those claims, is an
appropriate method to achieve a fair result. The procedure will accord
the institution the right to confront witnesses on whom the Department
would rely, and to call witnesses on its own, as it currently has under
procedures under subpart G of part 668. We also note that under Sec.
685.222(j), borrowers are required to reasonably cooperate with the
Secretary in any such separate proceeding.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested that borrowers should not be
permitted to bring individual claims when the facts and circumstances
have already been considered by hearing official in a group claim. The
commenter expressed concern that proposed Sec. 685.222(h) would allow
for this to happen, effectively providing borrowers a second bite at
the apple and violating the legal principle of res judicata.
Discussion: We discuss the treatment of individual claims from a
student who opted out of a group proceeding, or who disputes the
outcome of the group proceeding decision as it pertains to his or her
claim, in our discussion of the group process.
Changes: None.
Comments: A group of commenters suggested that the Department
modify language in proposed Sec. 685.222(e)(1)(i)(A) so that
references to the school more clearly emphasize that we mean the school
named on the borrower defense to repayment application.
Discussion: We agree that the commenter's suggested change
clarifies the intent of the regulation.
Changes: We revised Sec. 685.222(e)(1)(i)(A) to reference ``the''
named school.
Comments: One commenter suggested that the Department make
available on an annual basis a list of all borrower
[[Page 75964]]
defense applications submitted (minus any personally identifiable
information) along with outcome of the request. The goal of this list
would be to provide transparent information to borrowers.
Discussion: We support transparency in this process and will
consider this suggestion as we move forward with implementation of the
individual and group processes.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested that the Department proactively
conduct a review of all federally guaranteed loans back to 1995 (when
the commenter considers the regulations to have been last considered)
to determine potentially eligible loans for a defense to repayment. The
commenter recommended that the Department identify loans for which
there is a high likelihood of granting a discharge stemming from
lawsuits, investigations, etc.
Discussion: We do not believe that the Department possesses
adequate information to accurately identify potentially eligible loans
on such a large scale. As borrowers have had the ability to bring
borrower defense claims under the current regulations for some time, we
do not believe a review of data over more than 20 years is warranted.
Additionally, the Department cannot determine through such a review
whether specific students were subjected to misrepresentation, for
example, whether they relied on such misrepresentations, and how they
were affected if they did so. The Department must determine if relief
is warranted, and merely obtaining a loan to attend an institution is
not adequate to suggest relief is due.
Changes: None.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing proposed Sec. 685.222(e)(3)(ii),
we have determined that including an affirmative duty upon the
Department to identify to the borrower records that may be relevant to
the borrower's borrower defense claim is too burdensome because it
would require the expenditure of administrative resources and time,
even if not desired by the borrower. As a result, we have revised the
Sec. 685.222(e)(3)(ii) to provide that the Department will identify
records upon the borrower's request.
We note that we expect that consideration of individual borrower
defense claims will lead to information gathering as part of
enforcement investigations. When such an investigation is ongoing, we
may defer release of records obtained in that investigation to
individual claimants to protect the integrity of the investigation. If
requested, records will be made available to individual claimants after
the investigation is complete and prior to the borrower defense
decision. We may defer consideration of individual claims where we
determine that releasing potentially relevant records prior to the
completion of the investigation would be undesirable.
We have also determined that the parallel identification of records
to schools, which under the proposed regulations was permissive, would
also cause unnecessary administrative delay, given that the fact-
finding process described in Sec. 685.222(e) will not decide any
amounts schools must pay the Secretary for losses due to the borrower
defense at issue. The school will have the right and opportunity to
obtain such evidence, and present evidence and arguments, in the
separate proceeding initiated by the Secretary under Sec.
685.222(e)(7) to collect the amount of relief resulting from the
individually filed borrower defense claim.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(e)(3)(ii) to provide that
the designated Department official will identify to the borrower the
records the Department official considers relevant to the borrower
defense upon request. We have also revised Sec. 685.222(e)(3)(ii) to
remove the identification of records to schools.
Comments: One commenter expressed support for the Department's
proposal to allow claims made by individuals as well as groups.
However, the commenter suggested that a right of appeal for both
institutions and borrowers be provided in the individual claims process
as to open schools.
Discussion: During the negotiated rulemaking sessions, the
Department heard from negotiators as to the importance of a timely and
streamlined process for borrower defense claims. In consideration of
such concerns, the Department believes that it is appropriate that
decisions made by the designated Department official presiding over the
fact-finding process for individually filed applications be final
agency decisions to avoid delays that may be caused by an appeals
process. Borrowers are able to seek judicial review of final agency
decisions in Federal court if desired. See 5 U.S.C. 702 & 704.
Additionally, the borrower will also be able to request that the
Secretary reconsider his or her claim upon the identification of new
evidence under Sec. 685.222(e)(5).
Although the fact-finding process described in Sec. 685.222(e)
provides schools with an opportunity to submit information and a
response, as discussed in the NPRM, 81 FR 39347, the fact-finding
process for individually filed applications do not determine the merits
of any resulting claim by the Department for recovery from the school.
Rather, Sec. 685.222(e)(7) provides that the Secretary may bring a
separate proceeding for recovery, in which the school will be afforded
due process similar to what schools receive in the Department's other
administrative adjudications for schools. Given that the institution's
potential liability for the Department's recovery is to be adjudicated
in this separate process, the Department does not believe that an
appeal right for schools should be included in the Sec. 685.222(e)
fact-finding process. As discussed earlier in this section, the
Department is developing rules of agency practice and procedure for
borrower defenses that will be informed by the Department's rules and
protections for its other administrative adjudications.
Changes: None.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing proposed Sec. 685.222(e)(5), the
Department has determined that if a borrower defense application is
under review because a request for reconsideration by the Secretary has
been granted under Sec. 685.222(e)(5)(i) or because a borrower defense
application has been reopened by the Secretary under Sec.
685.222(e)(5)(ii), the borrower should be granted forbearance or, if
the borrower is in default on the loan at issue, then the procedure for
a defaulted loan should be followed, as when the borrower filed an
initial borrower defense to repayment application.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(e)(5) to provide that the
forbearance and defaulted loan procedures will be followed when the
Secretary has granted a request for reconsideration or has reopened a
borrower defense application.
Group Process for Borrower Defenses
Statutory Authority
Comments: Some commenters argued that the Department's proposed
group borrower defense process would violate the HEA. These commenters
stated that section 455(h) of the HEA specifically limits the
Department's authority to specifying acts or omissions that an
individual borrower, as opposed to a group, may assert as a defense to
repayment. These commenters argued that the creation of a process that
would award relief to a borrower who has not asserted a defense to
repayment exceeds the Department's statutory authority. A few
commenters also stated that the HEA does not authorize the Department
[[Page 75965]]
to act as a class action attorney, and stated that such authority
requires specific statutory authorization. One commenter suggested that
any provision providing that the Secretary may identify borrowers who
have not filed a borrower defense application as part of a group
process for borrower defense should be removed.
One commenter stated a recent recommendation from the
Administrative Conference of the United States found that, while the
APA does not specifically provide for aggregate adjudication, it does
not foreclose the possibility of such procedures. The recommendation
also stated that agencies generally have broad discretion in formal and
informal adjudications to aggregate claims.
Discussion: We disagree with commenters' assertion that the
proposed group process is in violation of the HEA. The Department's
statutory authority to enact borrower defense regulations is derived
from section 455(h) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h), which states that
``the Secretary shall specify in regulations which acts or omissions of
an institution of higher education a borrower may assert as a defense
to repayment of a loan. . . .'' While the language of the statute
refers to a borrower in the singular, it is common default rule of
statutory interpretation that a term includes both the singular and the
plural, absent a contrary indication in the statute. See 1 U.S.C. 1. We
believe that, in giving the Secretary the discretion to ``specify which
acts or omissions'' may be asserted as a defense to repayment of loan,
Congress also gave the Department the authority to determine such
subordinate questions of procedure, such as the scope of what acts or
omissions alleged by borrowers meet the Department's requirements, how
such claims by borrowers should be determined, and whether such claims
should be heard contemporaneously as a group or successively, as well
as other procedural issues. See FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S.
134, 138 (1940).
We believe that this discretion afforded the Secretary under the
statute not only allows it to determine borrower defense claims on a
group basis and to establish such processes and procedures, but also
authorizes the Department to proactively identify and contact borrowers
who may qualify for relief under the borrower defense regulations based
upon information in its possession. As described in Sec. 685.222(f),
the Department would notify such borrowers of the opportunity to
participate in the group process, and inform such borrowers that by
opting out, the borrower may choose to not assert a borrower defense.
By such notice and opt-out, borrowers who had not previously filed an
application for borrower relief may assert a borrower defense for
resolution in the group borrower defense process.
In response to comments that the Department is not authorized to
act as a class action attorney, we note that, in bringing cases before
a hearing official in the processes described in Sec. 685.222(f), (g),
and (h), the Department would not be bringing claims as the
representative of the borrowers. Although the Department would be
presenting borrower defense claims for borrowers, with their consent as
described above, the Department official would be bringing claims on
its own behalf as the administrator of the Direct Loan Program, or
alternatively as a beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship between
the school and the Department as explained earlier in ``Borrower
Defenses--General.'' See also Chauffeur's Training School v. Spellings,
478 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2007). We believe that the group process we adopt
here will facilitate the efficient and timely adjudication of not only
borrower defense claims for large numbers of borrowers with common
facts and claims, but will also conserve the Department's
administrative resources by also adjudicating any contingent claim the
Department may have for recovery from an institution.
Changes: None.
Independence of Hearing Officials
Comments: Many commenters expressed concerns that the group
borrower defense process would present conflict of interest or
separation of powers issues and would be unfair, given that the
proposed process involves a Department-designated employee presenting
evidence to a hearing official who also has been appointed by the
Secretary, with appeals to be decided by the Secretary. Several
commenters stated that this issue was of particular concern, given the
limited or unclear role afforded to institutions to participate in the
borrower defense process and to appeal decisions proposed by the
Department. One commenter acknowledged that while other Federal
agencies, such as the FTC, allow agencies to act as both prosecutor and
judge, such proceedings are governed by the APA, 5 U.S.C. 554. The
commenter stated that the APA provides statutory safeguards that ensure
fair proceedings, such as prohibitions on ex parte communications and
prosecutorial supervision of the employee presiding over the
proceeding. This commenter suggested that group borrower defense claims
be presided over by the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals.
One commenter stated that determinations in the group process
should be made by a representative who is not affiliated with the
Department. Another commenter stated that the office responsible for
presenting the claim on behalf of a group in a group borrower defense
proceeding should not be the same office that decides the group claim.
Several commenters suggested specifically that determinations be made
by administrative law judges or their equivalent, who have a level of
expertise and independence from the Department. One commenter stated
that the regulations should provide for determinations in group
borrower defense processes to be made by an administrative judge.
One commenter stated that the Department should seek and use
independent hearing officials with experience in handling complex
disputes, given the large numbers of students that may be impacted by
such proceedings.
One commenter stated that the Department's proposed group borrower
defense process violates both the separation of powers doctrine in
Article III and the jury trial requirement of the Seventh Amendment of
the Constitution, by vesting in the Department exclusive judicial power
to determine private causes of action without a jury.
Discussion: The Department understands the concerns raised by
commenters regarding the objectivity and independence of the hearing
official in group borrower defense cases. However, administrative
agencies commonly combine both investigatory and adjudicative
functions, see Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), and due process
does not require a strict adherence to the separation of those
functions, see Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville
Educ. Ass'n., 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976). The Department is no different
and performs both investigative and adjudicative functions in other
contexts, including
[[Page 75966]]
those that involve borrower debts \32\ and institutional
liabilities.\33\
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\32\ For example, the Department provides both schools and
borrowers the opportunity to request and obtain an oral evidentiary
hearing in both offset and garnishment actions against a borrower
and in an offset action against a school. See 34 CFR 30.25
(administrative offset generally); 34 CFR 30.33 (federal payment
offset); 34 CFR 34.9 (administrative wage garnishment).
\33\ See 34 CFR part 668, subparts G and H (proceedings for
limitation, suspension, termination and fines, and appeal procedures
for audit determinations and program review determinations).
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We disagree that the regulations should specify that the hearing
official presiding over the fact-finding processes in Sec. 685.222(f)
to (h) must be an administrative law judge or an administrative judge.
As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR 39340, the Department uses the term
``hearing official'' in its other regulations, such as those at 34 CFR
part 668, subparts G and H. In those contexts, hearing officials make
decisions and determinations independent of the Department employees
initiating and presenting evidence and arguments in such proceedings.
Similarly, the Department would structure the group borrower defense
fact-finding processes so that they are presided over by hearing
officials that are independent of the employees performing
investigative and prosecutorial functions for the Department.
As stated in the NPRM, 81 FR 39349, the group borrower defense
process involving an open school \34\ under Sec. 685.222(h) would be
structured to provide the substantive and procedural due process
protections both borrowers and the school are entitled to under
applicable law, including any required under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 554. The
Department is developing rules of agency procedure and practice
governing the fact-finding processes described in both Sec. 685.222(e)
and Sec. 685.222(f) to (h), which will be informed by the procedures
and protections established by the Department in its other
administrative proceedings, such as 34 CFR part 668, subparts G and H.
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\34\ As described in Sec. 668.222(g), the ``closed school''
group borrower defense process would apply only when the school in
question has both closed and provided no financial protection
available to the Secretary from which to recover losses arising from
borrower defenses, and for which there is no entity from which the
Secretary may recover such losses. Or, in other words, when there is
no entity from whom the Department may obtain a recovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As explained under ``General,'' we also disagree that the proposed
regulations violate Article III and the Seventh Amendment of the
Constitution. The rights at issue in the proposed borrower defense
proceedings have the character of public rights, which may be consigned
by Congress to the Department for adjudication.
Changes: None.
Single Fact-Finding Process
Comments: One commenter stated that the Department's proposed
single fact-finding process for group claims described in Sec.
685.222(f) to (h), where a hearing official makes determinations as to
both institutional liability and relief for borrower defense claims, is
not justified. This commenter stated that the Department had not
presented a factual basis for the change from the approach in Sec.
685.206(c), which states that the Department may initiate a proceeding
to require the school to pay the amount of the loan to which a
successful borrower defense lies.
A group of commenters stated that the Department should not engage
in a single fact-finding process for group claims. These commenters
suggested that the Department should gather and consider evidence
regarding borrower defenses, render a decision on borrower relief, and
then initiate a separate proceeding for recovery from schools. The
commenters stated that this approach would be similar to the
Department's proceedings for group borrower defense claims against
closed schools and for individually filed applications, as well as the
Department's proposed processes for closed school and false
certification discharges.
Discussion: We disagree with commenters that relief for borrower
defense claims should be determined in a separate proceeding from the
Department's right to recovery from schools for the open school group
borrower defense process described in Sec. 685.222(h). For borrower
defenses asserted as to an open school, the Department is not only
responsible for making determinations on relief for claims, but may
also be entitled to recover against the school. This right to recover,
which will also turn on the facts of the borrower defense claim, must
be decided in a proceeding where the school is afforded procedural and
substantive due process protections. Particularly in situations where
the Department has determined that there are multiple claims against a
school with common facts and claims, we believe that a single fact-
finding proceeding to determine both borrowers' rights to relief, the
amount of relief to be provided, and the Department's contingent right
of recovery against an institution will better serve the interests of
adjudicative efficiency and of conserving agency resources than
individual borrower defense determinations followed by separate
proceedings against the school.
Changes: None.
Group Process: Bifurcation
Comments: One commenter suggested that the Department use a
bifurcated process so that the group process is used to resolve comment
questions of fact and law, and then require borrowers in the putative
group to file individual claims to determine the appropriate amount of
relief. Such bifurcated proceedings, argued the commenter, would avoid
windfalls to borrowers who would not have otherwise sought out relief
and provide exact damages to students seeking relief.
Discussion: Section 685.222(f)(1) provides the Department with the
discretion to form groups that may be composed only of borrowers who
have filed applications through the process in Sec. 685.222(e) or who
the Department has identified from other sources, as well as groups
that may include borrowers with common facts and claims who have not
filed applications. In situations when groups may be composed only of
borrower defense applicants, or if the hearing official determines that
relief for a group with non-applicants can be ascertained without more
individualized evidence, bifurcated proceedings may not be necessary or
suitable. However, we believe that the regulations do not prevent a
hearing official from using his or her discretion to structure a fact-
finding process under Sec. 685.222(g) or (h) as necessary based upon
the circumstances of each group case, and including ordering a
bifurcated process if appropriate.
Changes: None.
Meet and Confer Prior to Initiation of Group Process
Comments: Several commenters suggested the Department require or
allow borrowers to confer with institutions to allow schools to remedy
claims, prior to a borrower's participation in the Department's
borrower defense process.
Discussion: We acknowledge that borrowers and schools may
communicate and confer outside of the formal processes established for
borrower defense. However, we do not believe it is necessary that the
regulations include a specific requirement for schools and borrowers to
meet and confer prior to a borrower's participation in a group borrower
defense process under Sec. 685.222(f) to (h).
Changes: None.
[[Page 75967]]
Initiation of Group Process: Secretarial Discretion
Comments: Many commenters supported the inclusion of a group
borrower defense process. However, these commenters objected to the
Department's proposal in Sec. 685.222(f) that the initiation of a
group borrower defense process be at the discretion of the Secretary.
Some commenters argued that the discretion to initiate a group borrower
defense process should not be given to the Secretary, whose decision
may be influenced by policy or political considerations. These
commenters also objected to the Department's proposal that the decision
to initiate a group process would consider fiscal impact as a possible
factor for consideration, stating that the decision to grant relief to
large numbers of students should not be based upon cost.
Other commenters stated that the Department should provide clear
guidelines, triggers, or conditions for requiring the initiation of a
group process, particularly for groups of borrowers who have not filed
applications with the Department (also referred to as automatic group
discharges). A group of commenters suggested that such conditions
should include petitions presenting plausible prima facie cases,
evidence found by the Department that might present plausible prima
facie cases, or some threshold number of cases. One commenter suggested
that the regulation include provisions whereby multiple individual
claims would be grouped together if the borrowers had attended the same
school or trigger an investigation by the Department as the claims and
the feasibility of initiating a group process. Another commenter
suggested that the regulation include a non-exhaustive list of
situations that would require the initiation of a group process, absent
a written explanation from the Department as to why such a group
process is not appropriate, or why borrowers who had not filed an
application were not included if a group process was initiated.
One commenter stated that borrowers should be allowed to initiate
group borrower defense claims, either for themselves or through
representation by consumer advocates, legal aid organizations, or other
entities, in addition to the Secretary. This commenter stated that
possible concerns that allowing independent representation would give
rise to an industry seeking to take advantage of borrowers, do not
apply if claims are submitted by entities such as legal aid
organizations, consumer advocates, and law enforcement agencies.
A few commenters stated that borrowers should be allowed to access
borrower defense discharges as a group on the bases of actions by
local, State, and Federal entities.
One commenter stated that to protect taxpayers, group claims should
be initiated only in extreme cases, and should only come after a final,
non-appealable decision has been made by a Federal or State agency or
court in a contested proceeding.
Discussion: We disagree with commenters that factors or conditions
mandating the initiation of a group process should be included in the
regulation. As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR 39348, we believe that the
Department is best positioned to make a determination as to whether the
circumstances at hand would warrant the initiation of a group process.
We also believe that it is also appropriate for the Department to
consider the factors listed in Sec. 685.222(f), such as the existence
of common facts and claims among a putative group of borrowers, fiscal
impact, and the promotion of compliance. As explained earlier in this
section and elsewhere in this preamble, the group process will not only
determine relief for borrower defenses for the group, but will also
serve as the method by which the Department will receive an
adjudication as to its right of recovery against a school on the basis
of its losses from any relief awarded to borrowers in the group. We
believe that it is important that the Department retain the discretion
to decide if the circumstances warrant the initiation of a group
process to decide its right of recovery from a school. However, we do
not believe that the initiation of the group process will prevent
borrowers from being able to proactively seek relief. Borrowers may
choose to file individual applications for relief under Sec.
685.222(e) or, even if their applications are identified by a
designated Department official for a group process, choose to opt-out
of the group process and receive determinations through the individual
application process if desired. As noted in the NPRM, 81 FR 39348, the
Department welcomes information from any source, including State and
other Federal enforcement agencies, as well as legal aid organizations,
that may assist it in deciding whether to initiate group borrower
defense process under Sec. 685.222(f), (g), and (h).
We explain our reasoning as to the different standards that may
form the basis of a borrower defense in the respective sections for
those standards. We believe it is appropriate that group proceedings
should be initiated for claims based upon any of the allowed standards,
as opposed to just one of the standards or standards outside of those
described in the regulations.
Changes: None.
Third-Party Petitions for Initiation of Group Process
Comments: Many commenters stated that outside entities, such as
student advocates, State AGs, and legal aid attorneys should be given a
formal role in the group borrower defense process. Some of these
commenters urged the Department to adopt language proposed at the third
session of negotiated rulemaking in March 2016, which would have
explicitly established that State or Federal enforcement agencies, or
legal aid organization, may submit a written request to the Department
identifying a group of borrowers for the initiation of a group borrower
defense process. Under this proposed language, the Department would
have responded to such requests in writing. These commenters argued
that such entities have direct contact with borrowers and are likely to
have necessary information for proving borrower defense claims.
Commenters also stated that allowing third party petitions is
important, given that the borrower defense process only allows an
individual borrower to dispute a group borrower defense decision in the
proposed regulation by filing an individual application. One commenter
stated that allowing such third party requests will result in faster
adjudications for borrowers and administrative cost-savings for
taxpayers. Another commenter stated that a formal referral process
would recognize both the states' role in the triad of higher education
oversight and the States' efforts to protect consumers through State
general consumer protection laws.
A group of commenters argued that a right for such outside entities
should be included given that group determinations will result in the
most widespread relief, will be the easiest way for borrowers to access
relief, and are the only proposed method by which borrowers who have
not filed applications may access relief.
In response to the Department's reasoning in the NPRM, 81 FR 39348,
that informal communication facilitates cooperation with such entities,
one commenter stated that providing such third parties with a formal
petition in the regulation would not preclude informal contact and
communication, but would rather increase transparency and efficiency.
The commenter also
[[Page 75968]]
suggested that, to address any concerns that parties that may take
advantage of borrowers, that the final rule should allow the Secretary
to decline to respond to a petition if the organization does not appear
to be a bona fide organization that represents borrowers.
Discussion: We disagree that a formal right of petition for
entities such as State AGs, advocacy groups, or legal aid organizations
should be included in the regulations. As explained in the NPRM, 81 FR
39348, in the Department's experience, cooperation with such outside
entities has been best facilitated through informal communication,
which allows for more candor and flexibility between the Department and
interested groups and parties. The Department always welcomes
cooperation and input from other Federal and State enforcement
entities, as well as legal assistance organizations and advocacy
groups. To this end, the Department anticipates creating a designated
point of contact for State AGs to allow for active communication on
borrower defense issues and also actively encourages a continuation of
cooperation and communication with other interested groups and parties.
As also reiterated in the NPRM, id., the Department is ready to receive
and make use of evidence and input from any interested party, including
advocates and State and Federal agencies.
We also reiterate our position that the determinations arising from
the borrower defense process should not viewed as having any binding
effect on issues, such as causes of actions that borrowers may have
against schools under State or other Federal law, that are not properly
within the purview of the Department. We also encourage borrowers and
their representatives to weigh all available avenues for relief,
whether it is through the borrower defense process or through avenues
outside of the Department.
Changes: None.
Challenges to the Initiation of a Group Process
Comments: Many commenters expressed concern that the group borrower
defense process would not include an opportunity for schools to dispute
the initiation of a group process and the formation of the group. One
commenter stated that the lack of a provision for schools to contest
the formation of the group was in violation of due process. Several
commenters expressed concern that schools are not given a right to
contest the Department's decision as to whether there are ``common
facts and claims'' to initiate a group process and requested
clarification of that factor. Several commenters stated that the
Department's proposal effectively would allow the Department to certify
a class, without any of the procedural protections available to
defendants in a class proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23. One commenter expressed concern that the proposed regulation does
not require that the Department initiate a group process only where
common facts and claims are found among the borrowers in the group, but
rather gives the Secretary discretion to consider a nonexclusive list
of factors. One commenter stated that the Department should define the
sources of information the Department would use to identify borrowers
for inclusion in a group process.
One commenter stated that by not providing a review of the
Department's initiation or group certification decision by the hearing
official or allowing a challenge by the school, and by proposing that
the Department's decision to initiate a group process may consider the
factor of ``compliance by the school or other Title IV participants,''
that the purpose of the group borrower defense process is to hold
schools accountable and make them examples to the industry, and not to
efficiently handle claims before the Department.
Discussion: We disagree that the regulations should include an
explicit step by which an institution may dispute the formation or
composition of a group under Sec. 685.222(f). As discussed previously
in this section, the Department is developing agency rules of practice
and procedure for borrower defense, which will be informed by the legal
requirements for administrative adjudications and the due process
protections provided in the Department's other administrative
adjudications. For instance, we will consider the proceedings including
those under 34 CFR part 668, subparts G and H, which allow for standard
motion practice and interlocutory appeals. We believe that, as
proposed, Sec. 685.222(f), (g), and (h) provides hearing officials
with the flexibility and discretion to allow motions by parties as is
deemed appropriate.
We believe that it is appropriate that Sec. 685.222(f) notes that
the Department may generally consider a nonexhaustive list of factors
in deciding to initiate a group claim. As described earlier, we believe
it is important for the Department to retain discretion in deciding
whether to initiate a proceeding to adjudicate its right of recovery
from a school, as a contingent claim to a hearing official's relief
determination for the borrower defense claims of a group of borrowers
in the same process. Similarly, we believe that it is important for the
Department to retain the flexibility to bring groups of varying sizes
or types before a hearing official in a group process, including groups
that are formed in a manner more akin to a joinder of parties under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 than to a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
Regarding the sources of information the Department will use to
identify borrowers for inclusion in a group process, as explained in
the NPRM, in addition to applications submitted through the process in
Sec. 685.222(e), the Department also may identify borrowers from
records within its possession or from information that may be provided
to the Department by outside sources. We do not believe further
clarification as to such sources of the information is necessary.
We disagree that consideration of the compliance impact of a group
borrower defense claim is inappropriate for the initiation of a group
process and also disagree that this factor lends an appearance of bias
or unfairness to the fact-finding processes described in Sec.
685.222(f), (g), and (h). As discussed above, the procedure we will use
for the group process will provide the institution with due process
protections very similar to those that the Department now uses when it
fines an institution or terminates the eligibility of an institution to
participate in the title IV, HEA programs, which are found in current
subpart G of part 668. These rules do not preclude motion practice, nor
will the rules we develop. Moreover, given that such proceedings will
involve the Department's right of recovery against schools, we believe
that is appropriate for the regulations to reflect that the Department
will consider a number of factors in its decision whether to initiate a
process for the adjudication of such recovery by the Department. As
stated in the NPRM, the group borrower defense process is intended to
provide simple, accessible, and fair avenues to relief for borrowers,
and to promote greater efficiency and expediency in the resolution of
borrower defense claims, and we believe this structure furthers that
goal.
Changes: None.
Members of the Group
Comments: Many commenters supported the Department's proposal under
Sec. 685.222(f)(1)(ii) that borrowers who may not have filed an
application for borrower defense may be included as
[[Page 75969]]
members of a group for a determination of relief. Such commenters urged
the Department to establish criteria requiring the initiation of such a
group process.
A number of other commenters opposed the proposal and suggested
that only borrowers who have filed an individual claim be included in
the group process. These commenters stated that limiting group members
to applicants would ensure that only borrowers who have actually been
harmed would receive relief. Other commenters also argued that non-
applicants should not be included in the group process, due to concerns
about the use of borrowers' personal information and consent.
Other commenters stated that borrowers should only be allowed to
participate in the group process if they affirmatively opt-in to the
process. Several of these commenters also cited concerns about the use
of borrowers' personal information and consent if an opt-out method is
used.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenters' support for the use of a
group process to resolve claims for a group with non-applicant
borrowers as described in Sec. 685.222(f)(1)(ii). However, as
discussed earlier in this section, we believe that it is appropriate
that the Department retain the discretion to initiate the group
process, given that the Department will have the most information
regarding the circumstances and the Department's contingent interest in
the proceedings.
We disagree with the commenters that suggested that the group
processes described in Sec. 685.222(f), (g), and (h) should only
include borrower defense applicants or that we should require borrowers
to affirmatively opt-in to the process. We believe that, where the
Department has decided to bring a group borrower defense proceeding and
non-applicant borrowers with common facts and claims can be identified,
such borrowers should also be entitled to the benefits of the
designated Department official's advocacy and the opportunity to obtain
relief and findings in such proceedings. Additionally, providing such
borrowers with an opportunity to opt-out of the proceedings, given
sufficiency of the notice to be provided by the Department to such
borrowers, follows well-established precedent in class action law. See,
e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
The Department will continue to safeguard borrowers' personal
information in this process, according to its established procedures.
Changes: None.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing proposed Sec. 685.222(f)(2), the
Department has determined that if a group process for borrower defense
is initiated, and the Secretary has identified a borrower who has not
filed a borrower defense application pursuant to Sec.
685.222(f)(1)(ii), the borrower should be granted forbearance or, if
the borrower is in default on the loan at issue, then the procedure for
a defaulted loan should be followed, as if the borrower had filed a
borrower defense to repayment application under Sec. 685.222(e)(2).
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(f)(2) to provide that the
forbearance and defaulted loan procedures will be followed for members
of a group identified by the Secretary who have not filed a borrower
defense application.
Opt-Out for Group Discharge; Reopening by the Secretary After
Determination Is Made
Comments: A number of commenters objected to the Department's
proposal in Sec. 685.222(i)(2) that borrowers would be given an
opportunity to opt-out of a group determination of relief. One
commenter stated that providing borrowers with an opt-out would provide
borrowers with the ability to bring successive, identical claims in the
group and individual processes, and would create unpredictability and
administrative inefficiencies. The commenter stated that borrowers who
have agreed to be part of the group process should be bound by any
resulting decision. One commenter stated that allowing only one
opportunity for a borrower to opt-out of the group process would be
consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, prevent uncertainty
and inconsistency, and would further the purpose of the group borrower
defense process to promote efficiency and expediency in the resolution
of claims.
Other commenters stated that allowing borrowers to opt-out of a
denial of a group claim, to file an individual claim, would place an
undue burden on schools to defend the same claim multiple times. Some
of these commenters stated that this situation would deprive schools of
protection from double jeopardy. These commenters expressed concern
that the financial resources schools would have to expend to defend
such claims would lead to tuition increases for students. Several
commenters stated that allowing such an opt-out would allow students to
file multiple, unjustified claims for the purpose of delaying
repayment.
One commenter also suggested that a time limit be imposed upon the
Secretary's ability to reopen a borrower's application is bound by any
applicable limitation periods. Several commenters stated that relief in
the group process should be opt-out only.
Discussion: We appreciate the concern raised by commenters that
allowing an opt-out for borrowers after a determination for relief has
been made will subject schools to continuing litigation risk and
uncertainty. As a result, we will modify Sec. 685.222(i) to remove the
post-determination opt-out opportunity for borrowers in group
proceedings.
We disagree that a time limit should be placed on the Secretary's
ability to reopen a borrower's application. We believe that if the
Department becomes aware of new evidence that would entitle a borrower
to relief under the regulations, then the borrower is entitled to
relief regardless of the passage of time.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(i) to remove the opportunity
for a borrower to opt-out of the proceedings after a determination for
relief has been made in a group proceeding.
Comments: None.
Discussion: In further reviewing proposed Sec. 685.222(g)(4) and
(h)(4), the Department has determined that if a borrower defense
application is under review because a borrower defense application has
been reopened by the Secretary under Sec. 685.222(e)(5)(ii), the
borrower should be granted forbearance or, if the borrower is in
default on the loan at issue, then the procedure for a defaulted loan
should be followed, as when the borrower filed an initial borrower
defense to repayment application.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(g)(4) and (h)(4) to provide
that the forbearance and defaulted loan procedures will be followed
when the Secretary has reopened a borrower defense application.
Due Process Proceedings
Comments: Several commenters stated that the proposed regulations
do not provide details of how and what schools may dispute in the group
borrower defense fact-finding process, and requested clarification in
the final regulations. Other commenters expressed concern that the
proposed group fact-finding process does not provide sufficient due
process protections for schools. These commenters emphasized that
participation by schools would create a more fair process and increase
the reliability of the results.
[[Page 75970]]
One commenter stated that the limited protections in the proposed
group borrower defense process does not provide schools with an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and thus
does not satisfy the due process requirements established in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
and Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) for depriving schools of
their property rights to funds already received. Several commenters
suggested that the Department use the procedures in 34 CFR part 668,
subpart H, to ensure due process protections for schools.
Commenters expressed concern about institutions' opportunities to
receive notice and evidence in the proposed group borrower defense
process. Many of these commenters expressed concern and requested
clarification regarding the Department's proposal in Sec.
685.222(f)(2)(iii) that notice to the school of the group process would
occur ``as practicable.'' One commenter suggested that we include
language specifying that no notice will be provided if notice is
impossible or irrelevant due to a school's closure. Other commenters
expressed concern that the proposed regulations do not specify whether
the scope of a group will be disclosed to schools and stated that
schools must be aware of the members of the group in order to be able
to raise a defense. Another commenter expressed concern that the
proposed regulations do not require the Department to notify the school
as to the basis of the group; the initiation of the borrower defense
process; of any procedure or timeline for requesting records, providing
information to the Department, or making responses; or provide schools
with an opportunity to appear at a hearing.
Several commenters stated that institutions should be provided with
notice and copies of all the evidence presented underlying the borrower
defense claims in a group process. Another commenter stated that the
proposed regulation gives the Department complete discretion as to what
evidence the trier of fact will use to make decisions. This commenter
stated that, when combined with the proposal that the persons
advocating for students, as well as the persons making decisions, in
the group borrower defense process are all chosen by the Department,
this discretion appears to favor students over schools in the group
process.
Several commenters also stated that institutions should be given an
opportunity to provide a written response to the substance of the group
borrower defense claim within a certain number of days (45 or 60) after
the resolution of any appeal on the Department's basis for a group
claim or of the notification to the school of the group process if no
challenge to the group is filed, provided with copies of any evidence
and records to be considered or deemed relevant by the hearing
official, be allowed to present oral argument before the hearing
official, and provided with a copy of the hearing official's decision
in the group process. One commenter emphasized that the decision should
identify the calculation used by the hearing official for the amount of
relief given by the decision. These commenters also stated that
institutions should be provided with a right of appeal to the hearing
official's decision in both the closed and open school group processes.
One commenter expressed concern that the proposed process does not
include any process for how an appeal may be filed.
Several commenters expressed concerns that the process does not
appear to provide to any opportunities for schools to conduct discovery
or to cross-examine witnesses. Some of these commenters expressed the
view that, in cases where the rebuttable presumption proposed in Sec.
685.222(f)(3) applies, schools will need to be able to question
borrowers in order to rebut the presumption.
One commenter stated that the group borrower defense process should
allow for both students to present their own claims and institutions to
have the same opportunity to present a defense, including any
affirmative defenses, and to appeal adverse decisions. The commenter
stated that both the school and the borrower should have such
opportunities to present evidence and arguments in any proceeding or
process to determine claims, not just proceedings where recovery
against the school is determined. The commenter emphasized that
permitting school participation would lead to correct results, since
schools often have information as to any alleged wrongdoing.
Discussion: The Department understands commenters' concerns
regarding the broad guidelines for the group fact-finding process
established in Sec. 685.222(f), (g), and (h). As noted throughout this
section, the group borrower defense process involving an open school
\35\ in Sec. 685.222(h) would be structured to provide the substantive
and procedural due process protections both borrowers and schools are
entitled to under applicable law, including those provided under the
APA, 5 U.S.C. 554, and under the Department's other administrative
proceedings. Such protections would include those regarding notice; the
opportunity for an oral evidentiary hearing where the parties may
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses if warranted,); or those
for the submission and exchange written material, as provided under
enforcement procedures at 34 CFR part 668, subpart G. The Department is
developing procedural rules to govern the fact-finding processes
described in both Sec. 685.222(e) and (f) to (h), which will establish
these details more firmly and be informed by the procedures and
protections established by the Department in its other administrative
proceedings, such as 34 CFR part 668, subparts G and H.
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\35\ As described in Sec. 668.222(g), the ``closed school''
group borrower defense process would apply only when the school has
both closed and provided no financial protection available to the
Secretary from which to recover losses arising from borrower
defenses, and for which there is no entity from which the Secretary
may recover such losses. Or, in other words, when there is no entity
from whom the Department may obtain a recovery.
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We appreciate the concern that Sec. 685.222(f)(2)(iii) is not
clear as to the Department's intent that notice of a group proceeding
will occur unless there is no party available to receive such notice--
in other words, as would be the case under the closed school group
borrower defense process described in Sec. 685.222(g). We are revising
Sec. 685.222(f)(2)(iii) to clarify that no notice will be provided if
notice is impossible or irrelevant due to a school's closure.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(f)(2)(iii) to clarify that
no notice will be provided if notice is impossible or irrelevant due to
a school's closure.
Rebuttable Presumption of Reliance
Comments: A number of commenters objected to Sec. 685.222(f)(3),
which provides that a rebuttable presumption of reasonable reliance by
members of the group applies if a group borrower defense claim involves
a substantial misrepresentation that has been widely disseminated. One
commenter stated that reliance cannot be presumed any more than the
occurrence of a misrepresentation can be presumed, and that such an
approach does not comply with general legal principles. Another
commenter expressed concern that the rebuttable presumption of
reasonable reliance would impermissibly preclude schools from
presenting evidence as to the main fact of a group borrower defense
case. These commenters expressed concern that the presumption
[[Page 75971]]
would be difficult or impossible for schools to rebut. One commenter
expressed concern that a school would be unable to rebut the
presumption for borrowers who are unknown or not named as being part of
the group for the group borrower defense process. One commenter
expressed concern that the rebuttable presumption of reliance would be
difficult for schools to disprove, particularly in situations where
disproving a claim would require documentation that falls outside of
the record retention requirements.
One commenter stated that the presumption would set up a system by
which omissions by school employees or agents or misunderstandings by
students may be considered substantial misrepresentations, without the
Department needing to show reliance or that the misconduct caused the
harm at issue. The commenter expressed general concern that the
Department has proposed a negligence standard that is not contemplated
by the HEA, and that this expansion in the standard has not been
justified by the Department. The commenter argued that the presumption
would allow claims based on accusations of omissions or
misunderstandings on which the borrower did not rely.
One commenter stated that the presumption would threaten
institutions with high liability and impose high costs on taxpayers. A
couple commenters stated that the presumption is unfair, absent an
intent or materiality requirement.
One commenter stated that it objected to the establishment of the
rebuttable presumption generally, but requested clarification as to
what the Department means by ``widely disseminated,'' specifically the
size of the audience that would be required for a statement to be
considered to have been widely disseminated and methods of
dissemination that would trigger the presumption.
Several commenters supported the inclusion of a presumption of
reasonable reliance on a widely disseminated misrepresentation is
consistent with existing consumer protection law. One commenter stated
that the presumption recognizes that it is unfair and inefficient to
require cohorts of borrowers to individually assert claims against an
actor engage in a well-documented pattern of misconduct.
Discussion: We disagree that the presumption established in Sec.
685.222(f)(3) does not comport with general legal principles. It is a
well-established principle that administrative agencies may establish
evidentiary presumptions, as long as there is a rational nexus between
the proven facts and the presumed facts. Cole v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
33 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 1994); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Dep't of
Transp., 105 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1997). As explained in the NPRM,
81 FR 39348, we believe that if a representation that is reasonably
likely to induce a recipient to act is made to a broad audience, it is
logical to presume that those audience members did in fact rely on that
representation. We believe that there is a rational nexus between the
wide dissemination of the misrepresentation and the likelihood of
reliance by the audience, which justifies the rebuttable presumption of
reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation established in Sec.
685.222(f)(3). A similar presumption exists in Federal consumer law.
See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Freecom Commc'ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1206 (10th
Cir. 2005); F.T.C. v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312,
1315-16 (8th Cir. 1991).
We disagree that the rebuttable presumption establishes a different
standard than what is required under the current regulations. As
explained under ``Substantial Misrepresentation,'' the Department's
standard at part 668, subpart F, has never required intent or knowledge
as an element of the substantial misrepresentation standard.
Additionally, the current standard for borrower defense allows ``any
act or omission of the school . . . that would give rise to a cause of
action under applicable State law.'' 34 CFR 685.206(c)(1). As explained
under ``Federal Standard'' and ``Substantial Misrepresentation,'' under
many States' consumer protection laws, knowledge or intent is not a
required element of proof for relief as to an unfair or deceptive trade
practice or act. Moreover, we disagree with any characterization that
the rebuttable presumption would remove the reliance requirement for
substantial misrepresentation in group proceedings. The rebuttable
presumption does not change the burden of persuasion, which would still
be on the Department. As Sec. 685.222(f)(3) states, the Department
would initially have to demonstrate that the substantial
misrepresentation had been ``widely disseminated.'' Only upon such a
demonstration and finding would the rebuttable presumption act to shift
the evidentiary burden to the school, requiring the school to
demonstrate that individuals in the identified group did not in fact
rely on the misrepresentation at issue. This echoes the operation of
the similar presumption of reliance for widely disseminated
misrepresentations under Federal consumer law described above. See
Freecom Commc'ns, Inc., 401 F.3d at 1206. A school would be entitled to
introduce any relevant evidence to rebut the presumption and what may
constitute relevant evidence may vary depending on the facts of each
case. Similarly, what may be viewed as ``wide dissemination'' may also
vary from case to case.
There appears to be confusion as to whether schools would be
required to rebut the presumption of reliance as to ``unknown'' or
``unidentified'' members of the group. Under Sec. 685.222(f)(1)(ii),
the Department will identify all members of the group. Although the
group may include borrowers who did not file an application through the
process in Sec. 685.222(e), the members of the group will be known in
the group process.
We appreciate the support of commenters supporting the
establishment of a rebuttable presumption. As discussed earlier, one of
the reasons we are establishing a rebuttable presumption in cases of a
widely disseminated substantial misrepresentation is that we believe
that there is a rational nexus between a well-documented pattern of
misconduct in the instance of a wide dissemination of the
misrepresentation and the likelihood of reliance by the audience.
We also disagree that a materiality or intent element is necessary,
as explained earlier under ``Claims Based on Substantial
Misrepresentation.''
Changes: None.
Representation in the Group Process
Comments: Many commenters expressed concern that the Department
would designate a Department official to present borrower claims in the
group borrower defense fact-finding process, when schools would be
permitted to obtain their own representation in the process. These
commenters stated that they should be allowed to obtain their own
outside representation. Some commenters stated that such outside
representation should be either paid for by the Department, or that
schools should not be allowed to participate in the group process until
after the school's liability has been determined.
One commenter stated that borrowers should be allowed to have their
own representatives in the group borrower defense process, either at
their own expense or pro bono. This commenter stated that borrowers
should at least be allowed to act as ``intervenors'' in a group
borrower defense process, with separate representation, to protect
their interests.
[[Page 75972]]
One commenter suggested that the Department establish procedures
for individual borrowers and their legal representatives to petition
the Department to initiate a group proceeding or, in the alternative,
establish a point of contact for borrowers to notify the Department of
potential candidates for group claims. The commenter also suggested
that borrowers be allowed to file appeals to the Secretary in group
proceedings, given borrowers' vested interest in obtaining favorable
adjudications that will make obtaining relief easier for borrowers.
Discussion: We disagree that borrowers should be allowed to
initiate group borrower defense claims or be able to retain their own
counsel and present evidence and arguments before a hearing official in
a group borrower defense process. As explained earlier in this section,
we acknowledge that the designated Department official responsible for
presenting the group borrower defense claim and initiating a group
borrower defense process would not be the borrower's legal
representative. However, as the holder of a claim to recovery that is
contingent upon the relief awarded to a group's borrower defense
claims, we believe that the Department is the appropriate party to
present both the group's borrower defense claims and the Department's
claim for recovery against the institution in question. As explained in
the NPRM, 81 FR 39348, we also believe that the Department's
fulfillment of this role will reduce the likelihood of predatory third
parties seeking to take advantage of borrowers unfamiliar with the
borrower defense process. Additionally, we note that, under Sec.
685.222(f)(2)(ii), borrowers may also choose to opt-out of a group
process and participate in the process established in Sec. 685.222(e),
if they are not satisfied with the Department's role in the group
proceeding. Borrowers may also reach out to the designated Department
official if they have questions about the process.
As discussed earlier in this section, in consideration of
borrowers' desire for timely and efficient adjudications, we disagree
that borrowers should be provided with a right of appeal to the
Secretary. However, we note that borrowers may also seek judicial
review in Federal court of the Department's final decisions or request
a reconsideration of their claims by the Department upon the
identification of new evidence under Sec. 685.222(e)(5).
Changes: None.
Appeals
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern that, in the group
borrower defense process, liability will be automatically assigned to a
school, and that schools will have no opportunity to dispute the
liability. One commenter stated this is unfair to school owners, and to
principals and affiliates of schools, from whom the Department proposes
to seek repayment in certain situations.
Discussion: The commenters are incorrect. Section 685.222(h)(2)
provides both schools and the designated Department official in the
open school group hearing process with the opportunity to file an
appeal with the Secretary from a hearing official's decision. Further,
Sec. 685.222(g), which does not provide for such an appeal, applies
only if a school has closed and has provided no financial protection
available to the Secretary from which to recover losses arising from
borrower defenses, and for which there is no other entity from which
the Secretary can otherwise practicably recover such losses. If the
Secretary seeks to recover borrower defense losses from the principal
or affiliate of a ``closed school,'' the open school process in Sec.
685.222(h) would apply.
Changes: None.
Open and Closed School Group Processes
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern about schools'
participation in the closed school group process. One commenter
expressed concern that in the group process for closed schools
described in proposed Sec. 685.222(g), that the hearing official
deciding the claims at issue may consider additional information or
responses from the school that the designated Department official
considers to be necessary. This commenter stated that if there are
persons affiliated with the school who are prepared to participate,
then those persons should be given full rights of participation in the
closed school group borrower defense process. One commenter stated that
institutions should be provided with a right of appeal to the hearing
official's decision in both the closed and open school group processes.
One commenter requested clarification as to claims filed by
borrowers who have attended a school that has since closed, but where
the school has posted a letter of credit or other surety with the
Department.
Another commenter supported the distinction between the open school
and closed school group processes.
Discussion: The commenters are incorrect about the nature of the
closed school borrower defense group process described in Sec.
685.222(g). As described, the standard provides that Sec. 685.222(g)
will apply only if a school is closed, there is no financial protection
available to the Secretary from which to recover losses from borrower
defense claims, and there is no other entity from which the Secretary
may recover. If there is a letter of credit or some other surety that
the school has posted to the Department and that is currently available
to pay losses from borrower defense claims, the open school, borrower
defense group process under Sec. 685.222(h) will apply. If there is no
ability for the Department to recover on any losses resulting from an
award of relief in the closed school, group borrower defense process,
then the Department will be unable to exercise its right to recovery
against a school and the school will not face any possible deprivation
of property. As a result, we believe it is appropriate that schools do
not receive a right of administrative appeal in the closed school group
process. If there are persons affiliated with the school who disagree
with the final decision resulting from the process, however, such
persons may still seek judicial review in Federal court under 5 U.S.C.
702 and Sec. 704.
Changes: None.
Public Databases
Comments: A group of commenters suggested that decision makers be
required to document decisions so that they may be appealed and
reviewed in Federal court. These commenters and others also requested
that the regulations require public reporting of borrower defense
adjudications and that the Department maintain a public, online
database of decisions resulting from any group process or individual
application. The commenters stated that such public reporting would
allow political representatives and advocates to review such decisions,
suggest improvements, and ensure consistency in the Department's
decision making.
One commenter also stated that the Department should develop a
publicly available information infrastructure, such as a docketing
system, to allow users to identify and track cases that may be
candidates for group proceedings or informal aggregation and to allow
users to learn from Departmental decisions.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenters' concerns regarding
transparency and consistency in the borrower defense process, and will
consider their suggestions as we move
[[Page 75973]]
forward with the implementation of these regulations. All of the
Department's administrative determinations are presumptively available
for public disclosure, subject to privacy concerns. We will contemplate
and evaluate appropriate methods for the release of information about
borrower defense claims on an ongoing basis as the processes and
procedures in the regulations take effect.
Changes: None.
Informal Aggregation
Comments: One commenter suggested that, in addition to the group
borrower defense process, the Department allow hearing officials to
informally aggregate, or to allow borrowers to petition for informal
aggregation of, separate but related cases to be heard in front of the
same trier of fact. The commenter stated that such informal aggregation
would expedite the resolution of similar claims, enhance consistency,
and conserve resources.
Discussion: We appreciate the suggestion by the commenter, but do
not believe it is necessary to modify the regulations to provide for
informal aggregation. Such aggregation would be within the discretion
of the hearing officials presiding over the group processes as part of
their routine caseload management responsibilities.
Changes: None.
FFEL Borrowers
Comments: Several commenters stated that FFEL borrowers should be
included in any group discharges for borrower defense. One commenter
suggested that the Department allow FFEL borrowers to participate in
the group and individual borrower defense processes without having to
consolidate FFEL Loans into Direct Consolidation Loans or by having to
prove any relationship between the borrowers' schools and lenders. This
commenter argued that not all FFEL borrowers are eligible for Direct
Consolidation Loans, and that the proposed regulations do not address
the needs of such FFEL borrowers.
Discussion: We disagree with the suggestion that FFEL borrowers be
included in any group discharges for borrower defense. As explained
under ``Expansion of Borrower Rights,'' FFEL Loans are governed by
specific contractual rights and the process adopted here is not
designed to address those rights. We can address potential relief under
these procedures for only those FFEL borrowers who consolidate their
FFEL Loans into Direct Consolidation Loans. As cases are received, the
Department may consider whether to conduct outreach to FFEL borrowers
who may be eligible for borrower defense relief by consolidating their
loans into Direct Consolidation Loans under Sec. 685.212(k) as
appropriate.
Changes: None.
Abuse by Plaintiffs' Attorneys
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern that the group
process would create opportunities for plaintiffs' attorneys. The
commenters stated that the proposed regulations would encourage
attorneys to have borrowers file suspect claims with the Department,
while also bringing class actions in court. The commenters stated that
this would result in the Department initiating a group process,
identifying members of a putative class for the court proceeding, and
obtaining determinations that class action attorneys would then be able
to use in court to their advantage, while collecting attorneys' fees.
Discussion: We disagree that the regulations will create
opportunities for plaintiffs' attorneys. Under the regulations, the
Department has the discretion to decide whether a group borrower
defense process will be initiated, and the filing of individual claims
may not necessarily lead to the initiation of a group borrower defense
process. Additionally, we recognize that borrowers may seek to utilize
other avenues for relief outside of the borrower defense process and
provide in Sec. 685.222(k) that if the borrower has received relief
through other means, the Department may reinstate the borrower's
obligation to repay the loan to protect the Federal fiscal interest and
avoid receipt by the borrower of multiple recoveries for the same harm.
Changes: None.
Borrower Relief
Process Arbitrary and Outside the Scope of Department Authority
Comments: Some commenters argued that the proposal for calculation
of borrower relief is arbitrary and that the Department is neither
qualified nor authorized to conduct this calculation. According to one
commenter, implementation of the proposed framework for calculating
relief would constitute arbitrary agency adjudication under relevant
case law. One commenter cited 20 U.S.C. 3403(b) and section
485(h)(2)(B) of the HEA as imposing statutory limits on the
Department's authority to direct or control academic content and
programming, and argued that the Department would be exceeding its
authority by attempting to assess the value of an education by
including the quality of academic programming among the factors to be
considered in carrying out an adjudication on any borrower defense
claim.
Discussion: We disagree that the Department's proposal to
adjudicate or calculate borrower relief is arbitrary. By directing the
Secretary to designate acts and omissions that constitute borrower
defenses to repayment in section 455(h) of the HEA, Congress has
explicitly charged the Department, under the current and new
regulations, to adjudicate the merits of claims brought alleging such
acts and omissions. Such adjudications necessarily require the
Department to determine the relief warranted by a proven claim against
an institution. If a court adjudicating a borrower's cause of action
against the institution would assess the value of the education
provided in order to determine relief, section 455(h) requires and
authorizes the Department to do so as well.
Further, we do not agree that the Department's adjudications on
borrower defense claims will involve an ``exercise [of] any direction,
supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction,
administration, or personnel of any educational institution, school, or
school system . . . or over the selection or content of library
resources, textbooks, or other instructional materials by any
educational institution or school system, except to the extent
authorized by law.'' 20 U.S.C. 3403(b). As described above earlier, the
Department's adjudications will determine whether a school's alleged
misconduct constitutes an ``act[] or omission[] of an institution of
higher education a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment of a
loan . . .'', 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h), and provide relief to borrowers and a
right of recovery to the Department from schools, in a manner that is
explicitly authorized by statute. Notwithstanding, we believe that the
provision of relief, as the result of and after any conduct by the
school, through the borrower defense process is not the same as the
active ``exercise [of] any direction, supervision, or control'' over
any of the prohibited areas.
Changes: None.
Presume Full Relief
Comments: A number of commenters argued in favor of a presumption
of full relief for borrowers. These commenters recommended that
Appendix A be either deleted or modified to eliminate or alter the
proposed partial relief calculations. The commenters contended that the
proposed partial
[[Page 75974]]
relief calculation process would be complex and subjective and
potentially deny relief to deserving borrowers.
Multiple commenters argued that calculating partial relief would be
excessively complicated, expensive, and time consuming. According to
these commenters, the process of calculating relief would lead to the
waste of Department resources and cause unnecessary delays in the
provision of relief to borrowers. Additionally, commenters were
concerned about the possibility that this process would be confusing
and difficult for borrowers to navigate.
Some commenters argued that the proposed partial relief calculation
process would unfairly subject borrowers who had already succeeded on
the merits of their claims to a burdensome secondary review process.
Commenters noted that, in the case of a claim based on a school's
substantial misrepresentation, borrowers would have already
demonstrated entitlement to relief by meeting the substantial
misrepresentation standard. Consequently, these commenters suggested
that the relief calculation process would create an unnecessary hurdle
to the appropriate relief for these borrowers. The commenters argued
that, after being defrauded by their schools, student borrowers should
not be required to undergo an extensive process of calculating the
value of their education. Further, these commenters argued that the
partial relief system would be unfair because it affords a culpable
school the presumption that its education was of some value to the
borrower.
Other commenters suggested that it would be unfair for the borrower
to bear the burden of demonstrating eligibility for full relief.
Instead, these commenters proposed that the Secretary should bear the
burden of demonstrating why full relief is not warranted. The
commenters proposed that full relief be automatic for borrowers when
there is evidence of wrongdoing by the school. These commenters
suggested either eliminating partial relief or limiting it to cases in
which compelling evidence exists that the borrower's harm was limited
to some clearly delimited part of their education.
Commenters suggested that, in addition to being difficult to
calculate, partial relief would be insufficient to make victimized
borrowers whole. To support the argument in favor of a presumption of
full relief, these commenters asserted that many Corinthian students
never would have enrolled had the institution truthfully represented
its job placement rates.
Some commenters raised concerns about the subjectivity of the
process for calculating partial relief for borrowers. These commenters
were concerned that the methods proposed in Appendix A for calculating
relief are too vague, afford excessive discretion to officials, and
could lead to potential inconsistencies in the treatment of borrowers.
Some commenters suggested that Appendix A should prescribe one
particular method for calculating relief, rather than providing
multiple options in order to increase certainty and consistency.
Some commenters raised concerns about the potential impact of
resource inequities between schools and borrowers on the partial relief
calculation process. Specifically, these commenters argued that because
schools will be able to afford expensive legal representation, schools
would likely be able to find technicalities in the relief calculation
process, potentially resulting in the denial of relief to deserving
borrowers. These commenters were particularly concerned about
disadvantages faced by borrowers who cannot afford legal
representation. Commenters also noted that borrowers may feel pressure
to retain legal counsel, which they contended would frustrate the
Department's intent to design a process under which borrowers do not
need legal representation, and are shielded from predatory third-party
debt relief companies.
One commenter suggested that the provision of partial relief would
lead to an excessive number of claims, particularly when implemented in
conjunction with what was described as a low threshold for qualified
claims.
Several commenters also supported the presumption of full relief by
stating that this approach would be consistent with existing legal
approaches to relief for fraudulent inducement or deceptive practices.
Some commenters urged the Department to adopt the approach used for
false certification and closed school discharges--providing full
discharges for all meritorious claims, including cancellation of
outstanding balances and refunds of amounts already paid.
As an alternative to fully eliminating partial relief, some
commenters suggested limiting the availability of partial relief to
claims based on breach of contract, based on the proposition that when
a school breaches a contractual provision, it is possible that a
borrower nevertheless received at least a partial benefit from his or
her education.
Several commenters argued that Appendix A should be fully removed
because it adds confusion to the process and it is not clear when or
how it should be applied. Some commenters argued that we should remove
Appendix A and revise proposed Sec. 685.222(i) so that full relief is
provided upon approval of a borrower defense, except where the
Department explains its reasoning and affords the borrower the
opportunity to respond.
Discussion: As noted in the NPRM, the Department has a
responsibility to protect the interests of Federal taxpayers as well as
borrowers. We discuss below that while the borrowers' cost of
attendance (COA), as defined in section 472 of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1087ll, is the starting point in cases based on a substantial
misrepresentation for determining relief, we do not believe, in
proceedings other than those brought under Sec. 685.222(h), that
establishing a legal presumption of full relief is justified when
losses from borrower defenses may be borne by the taxpayer. While the
Department's other loan discharge processes for closed school
discharges, 34 CFR 685.214; false certification, 34 CFR 685.215; and
unpaid refunds, 34 CFR 685.216, do provide for full loan discharges and
recovery of funds paid on subject loans, the factual premises for such
discharges are clearly established in statute and are relatively
straightforward. In contrast, we anticipate that determinations for
borrower defense claims will involve more complicated issues of law and
fact. Generally under civil law, determinations as to whether the
elements of a cause of action have been met so as to state a claim for
relief and then to establish liability are determinations separate from
those for the amount or types of relief the plaintiff may receive. To
balance the Department's interest in protecting the taxpayer with its
interest in providing fair outcomes to borrowers, when a borrower
defense based in misrepresentation has been established, the Department
will determine the appropriate relief by factoring in the borrower's
COA to attend the school and the value of the education provided to the
borrower by the school. Importantly, the COA reflects the amount the
borrower was willing to pay to attend the school based on the
information provided by the school about the benefits or value of
attendance. The Department may also consider any other relevant
factors. In determining value, the Department may consider the value
that the education provided to the borrower, or would have provided to
a reasonable person in the position of the borrower. Moreover, in some
circumstances, the Department
[[Page 75975]]
will consider the actual value of the education in comparison to the
borrower's reasonable expectation, or to what a reasonable person in
the position of the borrower would have expected under the
circumstances given the information provided by the institution.
Accordingly, any expectations that are not reasonable will not be
incorporated into the assessment of value.
We acknowledge commenters' concerns that references to
``calculations'' or ``methods'' in the regulations may be confusing. As
a result, we are revising Sec. 685.222(i) to remove such references.
Additionally, to address concerns that the proposed relief
determination requirements appear complicated, we are also revising
Sec. 685.222(i) to directly establish the factors to be considered by
the trier-of-fact: The COA paid by the borrower to attend the school;
and the value of the education. The Department will incorporate these
factors in a reasonable and practicable manner. In addition, the
Department may consider any other relevant factors. In response to
concerns that the proposed methods in Appendix A are confusing, we have
also replaced the methods with conceptual examples intended to serve as
guidance to borrowers, schools, and Department employees as to what
types of situations may lead to different types of relief
determinations. As it receives and evaluates borrower defense cases
under the Federal standard, the Department may issue further guidance
as to relief as necessary.
The Department emphasizes that in some cases the value of the
education may be sufficiently modest that full relief is warranted,
while in other cases, partial relief will be appropriate. In certain
instances of full or substantial value, no relief will be provided.
Thus, it is possible a borrower may be subject to a substantial
misrepresentation, but because the education provided full or
substantial value, no relief may be appropriate. As revised, Sec.
685.222(i) states that the starting point for any relief determination
for a substantial misrepresentation claim is the full amount of the
borrower's COA incurred to attend the institution. As explained later,
the COA includes all expenses on which the loan amount was based under
section 472 of the HEA, 20 U.S.C. 1087ll. Taken alone, these costs
would lead to a full discharge and refund of amounts paid to the
Secretary. Section 685.222(i) then provides that the Department will
consider the value of the education in the determination of relief and
how it compares to the value the borrower could have reasonably
expected based on the information provided by the school. In some
cases, the Department expects that this analysis will not result in
reduction of the amount of relief awarded. This could be because the
evidence shows that the school provided value that was sufficiently
modest to warrant full relief or what the school provided was
substantially different from what was promised such that the value
would not be substantially related to the value the school represented
it would provide. The presence of some modest value does not mean full
relief is inappropriate.
We also note that the revised regulations require value to be
factored in to determinations for relief, but do not prescribe any
particular approach to that process. Because there will be cases where
the determination of value will be fact-specific to an individual or
group of individuals--and the determination of value may pose more
significant difficulties in certain situations than in others--the
Department believes that the official needs substantial flexibility and
discretion in determining how to incorporate established factors into
the assessment of value. The fact that the case has reached the phase
of relief determination necessarily means that a borrower has
experienced some detriment and that a school has engaged in substantial
misrepresentation or breached a contract, or was found culpable in
court of some legal wrong. At that point in the process, we intend that
the Official be able to employ a practicable and efficient approach to
assessing value and determining whether the borrower should be granted
relief and if so how much. Relief will be determined in a reasonable
and practicable manner to ensure harmed borrowers receive relief in a
timely and efficient manner.
We have also revised Sec. 685.222(i) to provide that in a group
borrower defense proceeding based on a substantial misrepresentation
brought against an open school under Sec. 685.222(h), the school has
the burden of proof as to showing any value or benefit of the
education. The Department will promulgate a procedural rule that will
explain how evidence will be presented and considered in such
proceedings, taking full account of due process rights of any parties.
We believe that these revisions address many of the concerns that
borrower defense relief determinations may be confusing or complicated.
We also note that the process for determining relief in a borrower
defense claim has no bearing on the Department's authority or processes
in enforcing the prohibition against misrepresentation under 34 CFR
668.71. Schools may face an enforcement action by the Department for
making a substantial misrepresentation under part 668, subpart F. As
described under ``Substantial Misrepresentation,'' for the purposes of
borrower defense, absent the presumption of reliance in a group claim,
actual, reasonable, detrimental reliance is required to establish a
substantial misrepresentation under Sec. 685.222(d). However, for the
purposes of the Department's enforcement authority under part 668,
subpart F, the scope of substantial misrepresentation is broader in
that it includes misrepresentations that could have reasonably been
relied upon by any person, as opposed to misrepresentations that were
actually reasonably relied upon by a borrower. It is also conceivable
that there could be a case in which a borrower did experience detriment
through reasonably relying on a misrepresentation--for example, by
having been induced to attend a school he or she would not have
otherwise--yet the school provided sufficient value to the borrower or
would have provided sufficient value to a reasonable student in the
position of the borrower so as to merit less than full, or no, relief.
Nevertheless, the school in such a case may still face fines or other
enforcement consequences by the Department under its enforcement
authority in part 668, subpart F, because a borrower reasonably relied
on the school's misrepresentation to his or her detriment.
We disagree that the relief determination process would be
subjective. Agency tribunals and State and Federal courts commonly make
determinations on relief. We do not believe the process proposed
provides a presiding designated Department official or hearing official
presiding, as applicable, with more discretion than afforded triers-of-
fact in other adjudicative forums.
We also disagree with commenters who expressed concerns that
borrowers may be disadvantaged due to resource inequities between
students and schools. As discussed under ``Process for Individual
Borrowers (Sec. 685.222(e)),'' under the individual application
process, a borrower will not be involved in an adversarial process
against a school. In the group processes described in Sec. 685.222(f)
to (h), the Department will designate a Department official to present
borrower claims, including through any relief phase of the fact-finding
process. If a borrower does not wish to have the Department official
[[Page 75976]]
assert his or her claim in the group borrower defense process, the
borrower may opt-out of the process and pursue his or her claim under
the individual borrower defense process under Sec. 685.222(e).
We note that, in determining relief for a borrower defense based on
a judgment against the school, where the judgment awards specific
financial relief, the relief will be the amount of the judgment that
remains unsatisfied, subject to the limitation provided for in Sec.
685.222(i)(8) and any other reasonable considerations. Where the
judgment does not award specific financial relief, the Department will
rely on the holding of the case and applicable law to monetize the
judgment, subject to the limitation provided for in Sec. 685.222(i)(8)
and any other reasonable considerations. In determining relief for a
borrower defense based on a breach of contract, relief in such a case
will be determined according to the common law of contract subject to
the limitation provided for in Sec. 685.222(i)(8) and any other
reasonable considerations.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(i) to remove references to
methods or calculations for relief. We have included factors that will
be incorporated by a designated Department official or hearing official
deciding the claim, including the COA paid by the borrower to attend
the school, as well as the value of the education to the borrower. In
addition, the Department official or hearing official deciding the
claim may consider any other relevant factors.
We have revised Sec. 685.222(i) to clarify how relief is
determined for a borrower defense based upon a judgment against the
school or a breach of contract by the school.
We include that for group borrower defense claims under Sec.
685.222(h), the school has the burden of proof as to any value or
benefit of the education.
We have also revised Appendix A to describe conceptual examples for
relief.
Calculation of Relief
Comments: Some commenters raised concerns about the appropriateness
of the specific factors for consideration, and methods to be applied,
in calculating partial relief. Specifically, some commenters were
concerned about relying on student employment outcomes to determine the
value of a borrower's education. These commenters noted that graduates
exercise substantial discretion in determining what type of employment
to pursue after graduation, which would likely impact relevant
calculations. These commenters also cited variations in median income
throughout the country as another factor that could potentially
complicate the calculation process. One commenter objected to
consideration of the expected salary for the field, because expected
salaries in certain professions are so low. These commenters
recommended that earnings benchmarks not be considered in the
calculation of relief because of the risk of discrepancies associated
with those considerations.
Some commenters were concerned about the reliability of the
proposed methods for calculating relief in Appendix A. Specifically,
commenters raised concerns about the method for calculating relief in
paragraph (A). Under this method, relief would be provided in an amount
equivalent to the difference between what the borrower paid, and what a
reasonable borrower would have paid absent the misrepresentation. These
commenters suggested that this assessment would be unreliable because
it would involve speculation by the official tasked with valuing a
counterfactual.
In addition, some commenters disapproved of the method in paragraph
(C), which would cap the amount of economic loss at the COA. These
commenters suggested that legally cognizable losses often exceed the
COA. Some commenters also disapproved of the proposal to discount
relief when a borrower acquires transferrable credits or secures a job
in a related field. According to these commenters, the discounted
relief would not reflect the true harm experienced by the borrowers.
These commenters stated that transferrable credits often lose their
value because they are either not used, or used at another predatory or
low-value school. These commenters also argued that discounting relief
based on transferrable credits could penalize borrowers with otherwise
meritorious defenses who opt to take a teach out. Some commenters also
argued that discounting relief when a borrower obtains a job in the
field with typical wages may penalize borrowers who succeed at finding
work despite the failings of their programs. One commenter was
concerned that the method in paragraph (C) may be read to place a
burden on the borrower to produce evidence that the education he or she
received lacks value.
One commenter suggested minimizing the potential for subjectivity
by replacing the proposed methods of calculation with a system for
scheduling relief based on the nature of the claim. This commenter
recommended providing a table outlining the percentage of loan
principal to be relieved for each of a series of specific enumerated
claims. Another commenter suggested that the Department specify a
single theory for calculating damages that would apply in each class of
borrower defense cases.
Some commenters requested additional information about the
circumstances that may impact partial relief determinations.
Discussion: We acknowledge commenters' concerns with the various
methods in proposed Appendix A, some of which highlighted specific
concerns about different methods' applicability to various fact-
specific scenarios. As discussed earlier, we also appreciate that
references to calculations or methods for relief may be confusing. As a
result, we have revised Appendix A to reflect conceptual examples to
provide guidance to borrowers, schools, and Department employees as to
different scenarios that might lead to full, partial, or no relief. As
stated in revised Sec. 685.222(i), the examples are not binding on the
Department or hearing official presiding over a borrower defense claim.
Rather, they are meant to be simple, straight-forward examples
demonstrating possible relief scenarios, and the outcomes of any
borrower defense case may vary from the examples depending on the
specific facts and circumstances of each case.
Changes: We have revised Appendix A to describe conceptual examples
for relief.
Comments: Some commenters were concerned that the proposed
regulations would grant Department officials the authority to make
determinations for which they are not qualified. Specifically,
commenters were concerned that the proposed regulations do not require
the Department to rely on expert witnesses for certain calculations,
despite the fact that they may be necessary in some cases.
Commenters also stressed the importance of ensuring the
independence of the officials involved in making relief determinations.
Similarly, some commenters requested more specificity and transparency
regarding who will be calculating relief and how they will be
conducting those calculations.
Discussion: We believe that Department officials designated to hear
individual claims, and the Department hearing officials who preside
over the group claim proceedings have the capability to evaluate
borrower defense claims based upon the Federal standard, similar to how
Department employees perform determinations in other agency
adjudications.
As discussed under ``General'' and ``Group Process for Borrower
Defense,''
[[Page 75977]]
the Department will structure the borrower defense proceedings in ways
to ensure the independence and objectivity of the Department employees
presiding over such processes. With regard to commenters' concerns
about transparency and specificity, as established in Sec. 685.222(e),
(g) and (h), the decisions made in the proceedings will be made
available to involved parties and will specify the basis of the
official's determination. All of the Department's administrative
determinations are presumptively available for public disclosure,
subject to privacy concerns.
Changes: None.
Group Relief
Comments: Some commenters argued that group relief should be
limited to situations in which a preponderance of the evidence shows
that no member of the group received any identifiable benefit from his
or her education. These commenters suggested that group relief would
frustrate the Department's efforts to ensure that borrowers receive
only the relief to which they are entitled. These commenters suggested
that in the limited circumstances where group relief is provided, the
amount should be determined based on a statistically valid sample of
students. Some commenters also opposed the Department's proposal to
consider potential cost to taxpayers in making group relief
determinations.
Discussion: Section 685.222(a)(2), for loans first disbursed after
July 1, 2017, explicitly states that borrower defenses must be
established by a preponderance of evidence. This requirement applies
regardless of whether the borrower defenses at issue are raised in the
procedure for an individual borrower in Sec. 685.222(e) or in the
group processes under Sec. 685.222(f) to (h). However, for group
claims, Sec. 685.222(f) establishes that the group process may be
initiated upon the consideration of factors including the existence of
common facts and claims among the members of the group. How the
preponderance of evidence requirement may apply in group borrower
defenses cases may vary from case to case. Additionally, as discussed
earlier, for cases of substantial misrepresentation, the starting point
for any relief determination is the full amount of the borrower's costs
incurred to attend the institution. We have revised Sec. 685.222(i) to
provide that in such cases against an open school, the burden shifts to
the school to prove the existence of any offsetting value to the
borrowers provided by the education paid for with the proceeds of the
loans at issue.
We disagree with commenters that the regulation should specify that
relief should be based upon a statistically valid sample of students at
this time. While a statistically valid sample may be appropriate for
some cases, we believe the determination of what may be the criteria
for an appropriate sample for group borrower defense cases should be
developed on a case by case basis.
We discuss our reasons for including fiscal impact as a factor for
consideration in the initiation of group processes under ``Group
Process for Borrower Defense.'' Section 685.222(i), which pertains to
the relief awarded for either a group or individual borrower defense
claim, does not include a consideration of fiscal impact.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.222(i) to provide that in group
borrower defense cases against an open school, the burden shifts to the
school to prove the existence of any offsetting value to the students
provided by the education paid for with the proceeds of the loans at
issue.
Expand the Scope of Available Relief
Comments: Some commenters argued that full relief must extend
beyond loans, costs, and fees to account for other expenses associated
with school attendance. These commenters cited expenses such as travel
expenses, costs of not pursuing other opportunities, child care
expenses, consequential losses, and nonfinancial harms including pain
and suffering. Commenters also noted that borrowers who attend
fraudulent schools often lose out on portions of their lifetime Federal
loan and grant eligibility, effectively losing several thousands of
dollars in Pell grants that could be used towards other educational
opportunities. To support the expansion of relief, one commenter cited
State unfair and deceptive practices laws, under which all types of
harms--direct and consequential, pecuniary and emotional--may provide
the basis for relief.
Some commenters argued that relief should include updates to
consumer reporting agencies to remove adverse credit reports. Citing
the impact of negative credit reports on borrowers' ability to find
employment, own a home, etc., commenters urged the Department to adopt
language clarifying that any adverse credit history pertaining to any
loan discharged through a borrower defense will be deleted. Some
commenters suggested that the language in proposed Sec.
685.222(i)(4)(ii) conform to the language in proposed Sec.
685.206(c)(2)(iii), which requires the Department to fix adverse credit
reports when it grants discharges. Additionally, some commenters argued
that relief should include a determination that the borrower is not in
default on the loan and is eligible to receive assistance under title
IV.
One commenter requested simplification of the language describing
available relief, specifically, removal of the portion of Sec.
685.222(i)(5) describing the unavailability of non-pecuniary relief on
the basis that the provision would cause confusion.
Discussion: The Department's ability to provide relief for
borrowers is predicated upon the existence of the borrower's Direct
Loan, and the Department's ability to provide relief for a borrower on
a Direct Loan is limited to the extent of the Department's authority to
take action on such a loan. Section 455(h) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C.
1087e(h), gives the Department the authority to allow borrowers to
assert ``a defense to repayment of a [Direct Loan],'' and discharge
outstanding amounts to be repaid on the loan. However, section 455(h)
also provides that ``in no event may a borrower recover from the
Secretary . . . an amount in excess of the amount the borrower has
repaid on such loan.'' As a result, the Department may not reimburse a
borrower for amounts in excess of the payments that the borrower has
made on the loan to the Secretary as the holder of the Direct Loan.
Additionally, Sec. 685.222(i)(8) also clarifies that a borrower
may not receive non-pecuniary damages such as damages for
inconvenience, aggravation, emotional distress, or punitive damages. We
recognize that, in certain civil lawsuits, plaintiffs may be awarded
such damages by a court. However, such damages are not easily
calculable and may be highly subjective. We believe that excluding non-
pecuniary damages from relief under the regulations would help produce
more consistent and fair results for borrowers.
The Department official or the hearing official deciding the claim
would afford the borrower such further relief as the Department
official or the hearing official determines is appropriate under the
circumstances. As specifically noted in Sec. 685.222(i)(7), that
relief would include, but not be limited to, determining that the
borrower is not in default on the loan and is eligible to receive
assistance under title IV of the HEA, and updating reports to consumer
reporting agencies to which the Secretary previously made adverse
credit reports with regard to the borrower's Direct Loan. We do not
[[Page 75978]]
believe a modification of this provision to conform with Sec.
685.206(c)(2)(iii) is necessary.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters suggested that the proposed regulations
could result in excessive institutional liability. These commenters
argued that institutions should be liable under a successful claim only
for costs related to tuition and fees, rather than all amounts
borrowed. Commenters supported limiting claims for relief to the
payment of loans issued under title IV, and only the portion of loans
directly related to the costs of the education. Some commenters
proposed that relief be limited to funds actually received by the
institution. One commenter cited the measure of student loan debt
contained in the Department's Gainful Employment regulations to support
this proposed cap on relief. In support of this position, several
commenters argued that some students borrow excessively, and
institutions play a limited role in determining the level or purpose of
student borrowing. These commenters opposed holding institutions liable
for loans borrowed to support a student's living expenses because of
the attenuated nature of the nexus between any act or omission
underlying a valid borrower defense claim and a student's living
expenses while enrolled. These commenters were concerned that assigning
responsibility to schools in excess of tuition and fees would
constitute an unjustifiable, unprecedented expansion of potential
institutional liability.
Discussion: Since their inception, the Federal student loan
programs were designed to support both tuition and fees and living
expenses in recognition of the fact that students need resources such
as food and housing when they are pursuing their educations. Indeed,
the HEA's definition of cost of attendance, 20 U.S.C. 1087ll, includes
tuition, fees, books, supplies, transportation, miscellaneous personal
expenses including a reasonable allowance for the documented rental or
purchase of a personal computer, room and board, childcare, and
expenses related to a student's disability if applicable. When a
student makes the choice to attend an institution, he is also choosing
to spend his time in a way that may require him to take out Federal
loans for living expenses, and very likely to forgo the opportunity to
work to defray those costs from earnings. If he had not chosen to
attend the institution, he would not have taken out such loans for
living expenses: His Federal aid eligibility depends on his attendance
at the institution. Therefore we believe that an institution's
liability is not limited to the loan amount that the institution
received, since it does not represent the full Federal loan cost to
students for the time they spent at the institution.\36\ Regarding
comments suggesting that some students borrow excessively and that
institutions play a limited role in determining borrowing levels, it is
important to note that institutions have the discretion to determine a
reasonable COA based on information they have about their students'
circumstances. Limiting gainful employment measurements to amounts
borrowed for tuition and fees was reasonable for the context in which
that approach was taken--measurement of eligibility of an entire
program, based on borrowing decisions made by an entire cohort of
completers. That context is not the paradigm for considering actual
loss to individual borrowers. As discussed here, an institution may
already face exposure in a private lawsuit for amounts greater than the
amount the institution charged and received as tuition and fees, and
the commenter offers no reason, and we see none, why a different rule
should apply to determining the extent of the institution's liability
for the same kinds of claims if successfully proven in the borrower
defense context.
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\36\ Common law recognizes that a party who may rescind a
transaction and obtain restitution from the defendant of amounts
paid to the defendant may also assert a claim for related
expenditures made in reliance on the rescinded transaction.
Compensation of such loss by an award of damages is a remedy
different in kind from rescission and restitution, but the remedies
are not necessarily inconsistent when the claimant's basic
entitlement is to be restored to the status quo ante. Damages
measured by the claimant's expenditure can be included in the
accounting that accompanies rescission, in order to do complete
justice in a single proceeding. Recovery of what are commonly called
``incidental damages'' may thus be allowed in connection with
rescission, consistent with the remedial objective of restoring the
claimant to the precontractual position.
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Sec.
54 note (i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Fiscal Impact Considerations Inappropriate
Comments: Commenters argued that full relief should be provided
without consideration of fiscal concerns. Some commenters were
concerned that consideration of fiscal impact would lead to groups of
borrowers being denied relief to which they are entitled because of
financial concerns. These commenters acknowledged taxpayer interests,
but stated that taxpayers would benefit in the long term from a
presumption of full relief because the presumption would deter fraud
and increase institutional accountability. Some commenters also
suggested that partial relief would negatively impact Department
incentives and conduct by, for example, reducing the Department's
incentive to monitor schools appropriately on the front end. One
commenter opposed consideration of fiscal impact because of concerns
about the Department's potential to profit off of the student loan
program.
Discussion: We discuss our reasons for including fiscal impact as a
factor for consideration in the initiation of group processes under
``Group Process for Borrower Defense.'' Section 685.222(i), which
pertains to the relief awarded for either a group or individual
borrower defense claim, does not include a consideration of fiscal
impact.
Changes: None.
Institutional Accountability
Financial Responsibility
General Standards Sec. 668.171
Scope of Rulemaking
Retroactivity and Authority
Comments: Commenters argued that the proposed financial protection
triggers exceeded the Department's authority under the HEA to assess
financial responsibility on the ground that the proposed regulations
would be impermissibly retroactive. In particular, commenters objected
to the proposed requirement in Sec. 668.171(c)(3) that a school is not
financially responsible if it has been required by its accreditor to
submit a teach-out plan because of a Department action to limit,
suspend, or terminate the school, or if its accreditor has taken
certain actions due to failure to meet accreditor standards and not
later notified the Department that the failure has been cured.
Others objected that proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(i)(A) is also
impermissibly retroactive by providing that a school that, currently or
during the three most recently completed award years, is or was
required to pay a debt or liability arising from a Federal, State, or
other oversight entity audit or investigation, based on claims related
to the making of a Federal loan or the provision of educational
services, or that settles or resolves such an amount that exceeds the
stated threshold, is not financially responsible. Under proposed Sec.
668.175(f)(1)(i), an institution affected by either Sec.
668.171(c)(1)(i)(A) or (c)(3) could continue to participate in the
title IV, HEA programs only under provisional certification and by
providing financial protection in an amount not less than 10 percent of
the amount of Direct Loan funds or title IV,
[[Page 75979]]
HEA funds, respectively, received in the most recently completed fiscal
year.
Discussion: None of the litigation or other provisions of the
regulation are impermissibly retroactive. They attach no new liability
to an event or transaction that was permissible at the time it occurred
and that occurred prior to the effective date of the regulations. They
simply address the risk that certain events that occurred prior to the
effective date of the regulations create risks that warrant protection
now. The risks in these instances are that these suits, and the other
events included in Sec. 668.171(c), can cause the institution to close
or so substantially reduce operations as to generate closed school
discharge claims, borrower defense claims, or both, from the students
who are directly affected by the action at issue. The school is liable
for borrower defense claims and closed school discharge claims; the
requirement that the school provide financial protection does not
increase any liability that would otherwise attach, but merely provides
a resource that the Department may access to meet liabilities that
would already arise if borrowers were to seek discharges on either
ground. In either case, the Department would establish any such
liability in the same manner in which it would were there no protection
provided, and would release or refund any portion of the financial
protection that was not needed to satisfy any claims established under
those procedures, in which the school would have the same opportunity
to object to the claims and be heard on those objections as it would
have if no protection had been provided.
Regulated parties have repeatedly challenged Department rules that
attached particular new consequences to actions that have already
occurred. Courts have regularly rejected claims that regulations that
operate like the regulations adopted here are impermissibly
retroactive. A regulation is unconstitutionally retroactive if it
``alter[s] the past legal consequences of past actions'' \37\ or, put
another way, if it ``would impair rights a party possessed when he
acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new
duties with respect to transactions already completed.'' \38\ Thus,
whether a regulation ``operates retroactively'' turns on ``whether the
new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment.'' \39\ It is, however, well settled that ``[a]
statute is not rendered retroactive merely because the facts or
requisites upon which its subsequent action depends, or some of them,
are drawn from a time antecedent to the enactment.'' \40\ Nor is a
statute impermissibly retroactive simply because it ``upsets
expectations based in prior law.'' \41\ Like each of the regulations
challenged in these cases, the present regulations in some instances
would attach prospectively consequences for certain actions that
occurred prior to the effective date of the regulations, but would not
attach any new liability to those actions or transactions that were
permissible when the events occurred.
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\37\ Ass'n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan,
110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 196 (D.D.C. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Ass'n of
Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 640 F. App'x 5
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal citations removed)
\38\ Ass'n of Proprietary Colleges v. Duncan, 107 F. Supp. 3d
332, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (gainful employment measured by using debt
and earnings incurred prior to effective date of new rule); see
also: Ass'n of Accredited Cosmetology Sch. v. Alexander, 774 F.
Supp. 655, 659 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 979 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1992),
and order vacated in part sub nom. Delta Jr. Coll., Inc. v. Riley, 1
F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993) and Ass'n of Accredited Cosmetology Sch. v.
Alexander, 979 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (application of cohort
default rate to eligibility using pre-rule data).
\39\ Id.
\40\ Ass'n of Proprietary Colleges v. Duncan, 107 F. Supp. 3d at
356.
\41\ Id.
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Moreover, we have clarified that the regulations apply to any
triggering events that occur on or after July 1, 2017. We have also
removed the two triggers highlighted by these commenters as looking to
certain past events in a way that mitigates almost all of the
commenters' concerns. First, we modified the accrediting agency actions
trigger substantially, to assess as an automatic trigger \42\ only the
effect of a closure of a school or location pursuant to a teach-out
requirement, and consider other accreditor actions occurring in the
past three years only as a discretionary trigger. There is no three-
year look-back in the automatic trigger. For this and other
discretionary triggers, there is an opportunity for further review of
the impact of those events. We have removed the three-year look-back in
the lawsuits and other actions trigger. These changes are described in
more detail in the sections specific to these triggers. Finally, as we
have described, the final regulations permit an institution to
demonstrate, either when it reports the occurrence of a triggering
event or in an action for failure to provide a required letter of
credit or other financial protection, that an event or condition no
longer exists or has been resolved or that it has insurance that will
cover the debts and liabilities that arise at any time from that
triggering event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Under the proposed regulations, an institution would not be
financially responsible for at least one year if it was subject to a
triggering event that exceeded a materiality threshold or for a
State or accrediting agency action, three years after that action.
In these final regulations, an institution is not financially
responsible if an automatic triggering event such as a lawsuit or
loss of GE program eligibility produces a recalculated composite
score of less than 1.0 or for a 90/10 or CDR violation or SEC
action, the occurrence of that violation or action. In both the NPRM
and these final regulations, discretionary triggers refer to
actions, conditions, or events that are evaluated by the Department
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they have a material
adverse impact on the financial condition or operations of the
institution.
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Changes: We have revised Sec. Sec. 668.90(a)(iii) and 668.171(h)
to include consideration of insurance; we have removed the three-year
period for review from Sec. 668.171(c); we have revised the teach-out
provisions in Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iii) to consider only the effect on
the overall institutional financial capability of closures of locations
or institutions as determined by recalculating the institution's
composite score, as discussed more fully under the heading ``Teach-out
Plan''; and we have revised Sec. 668.171(b) to provide that the
regulations address only those triggering events or conditions listed
in Sec. 668.171(c) through (g) that occur after July 1, 2017.
Comments: Several commenters contended that the proposed triggers
in Sec. 668.171(c) fail to take into account the provisions in section
498(c)(3) of the HEA that require the Secretary to determine that an
institution is financially responsible if the school can show, based on
an audited and certified financial statement, that it has sufficient
resources to ensure against precipitous closure, including the ability
to meet all of its financial obligations. To support this contention,
the commenters stated that the proposed regulations do not provide a
process or procedural mechanism for an institution to make this
statutory showing before the Department would require the institution
to submit a letter of credit in response to running afoul of an
automatic trigger.
Similarly, some commenters stated that requiring financial
protection by reason of the occurrence of a single triggering event was
contrary to the requirement in section 498(c)(1) of the HEA that the
Department assess the financial responsibility of the institution in
light of the total financial circumstances of the institution.
Other commenters stated that section 498(c) of the HEA requires the
Department to assess financial responsibility based solely on the
audited financial statements provided by the institution under section
487(c) of the HEA.
[[Page 75980]]
Discussion: Section 498(c) of the HEA directs the Secretary to
determine whether the institution ``is able . . . to meet all of its
financial obligations, including (but not limited to) refunds of
institutional charges and repayments to the Secretary for liabilities
and debts incurred in programs administered by the Secretary.'' 20
U.S.C. 1099c(c)(1). The statute uses the present tense to direct the
Secretary to assess the ability of the institution to meet current
obligations. The statute then provides that the Secretary shall also
develop criteria based on financial ratios, which are to be measured
and reported in audited financial statements. 20 U.S.C. 1099c(c)(2),
(5). Obligations that accrued in the past may be reflected in financial
statements showing the institution's financial status as of the close
of the most recent institutional fiscal year, which are to be submitted
to the Department ``no later than six months after the last day of the
institution's fiscal year.'' 34 CFR 668.23(a)(4). Obligations that
accrue after the close of that fiscal year are not included in those
statements, and those losses that are considered probable may receive
limited recognition in those statements. Potential losses from pending
litigation that are not yet considered probable are not included in
those statements.
Thus, as the commenters state, the statute directs the Secretary to
take into account ``an institution's total financial circumstances in
making a determination of its ability to meet the standards herein
required.'' 20 U.S.C. 1099c(c)(2). Far from precluding the Secretary
from giving controlling weight to a single significant occurrence in
making this determination, the statute recognizes that the Secretary
may do so if certain enumerated single adverse events have occurred in
the past two to five years (e.g., audit liabilities exceeding five
percent of the institution's prior year title IV, HEA funding, or a
limitation, suspension or termination action or settlement of such an
action). 20 U.S.C. 1099c(e). The Secretary has since, at least the 1994
regulations, consistently considered even one such ``past performance''
event as sufficient grounds to render an institution not financially
responsible even if it met or exceeded the requisite composite
financial score, and if the Secretary nevertheless permitted the
institution to participate, the institution was required to do so under
provisional certification with financial protection. 34 CFR 668.174(a),
668.175(f), (g). The current regulations have also considered an
institution not financially responsible if the institution is currently
delinquent by at least 120 days on trade debt, and at least one
creditor has sued. 34 CFR 668.171(b)(3). Thus, in considering the
institution's total financial circumstances, the Secretary has
consistently regarded a single such occurrence as a sufficient threat
to the institution's ability ``to meet . . . its financial
obligations'' as to make the institution not financially responsible.
In so doing, the current regulations do not delegate to the suing
creditor, or to the guarantor that brought the limitation, suspension,
or termination action, the determination of the financial
responsibility of the institution. To the contrary, the current
regulations already identify particular past or present events as
raising significant threats to the institution's ability to meet
current obligations to creditors, to students, and to the taxpayer. The
changes to the financial responsibility regulations articulate a more
comprehensive list of adverse events that similarly call into question
the institution's ability to meet current and impending obligations.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters argued that under the APA, the Department
cannot enact regulations applicable to time periods prior to the
enactment of those regulations and therefore should remove the proposed
Sec. 668.171(c)(3), which would impose penalties on an institution
that is currently, or was any time during the three most recently
completed award years, subject to an action by its accrediting agency.
Discussion: As discussed above, in response to the commenters'
objection that the rules are impermissibly retroactive, they are not
because they affect only future participation. In light of the adoption
of the composite score methodology, in this section, we evaluate risks
under that methodology as they affect the current financial
responsibility of the institution. We evaluate on a three-year look-
back period, as a discretionary triggering event, only certain
accreditor actions.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(i) so that it does not
include events that occurred in the prior three years, we have revised
Sec. 668.171 to apply to events occurring on or after July 1, 2017,
and we have relocated accreditor actions regarding probation and show
cause to Sec. 668.171(g)(5) as discretionary triggers.
Penalty-Financial Protection
Comments: A commenter stated that requiring the institution to
provide financial protection constituted a penalty on the institution,
and that requiring the institution to provide such protection from its
own funds constituted a deprivation of the institution's property
interest in those institutional funds. The commenter stated that the
requirement would also deprive the institution of its liberty interest
by stigmatizing it. The commenter stated that the proposed requirement
offered the institution no opportunity to dispute the requirement prior
to the deprivation of these interests, and thus the deprivation would
be imposed without the due process required by applicable law. The
commenter stated that Congress requires the Department to provide
schools with meaningful procedures before the imposition of a
significant penalty. Specifically, the commenter stated that section
487 of the HEA requires the Department to afford schools ``reasonable
notice and opportunity for hearing'' before imposing a ``civil
penalty.'' This requirement applies when the Department seeks to limit,
suspend, or terminate the school's participation in any title IV, HEA
program; determine that a school has made a substantial
misrepresentation; or determine that a school has violated statutes or
regulations concerning the title IV, HEA programs, each of which carry
severe penalties. The commenter asserted that the required financial
protection under this rule constitutes a civil penalty under the HEA,
and is in fact far more onerous than the other examples in the HEA.
Accordingly, the commenter contended that the Department must afford
parties the same process that Congress contemplated in analogous
circumstances.
Discussion: The requirement that the school provide financial
protection is not a ``penalty'' under the HEA, which clearly labels as
``civil penalties'' what the regulations refer to as ``fines.'' 20
U.S.C. 1094(c)(3)(B); 34 CFR 668.84. In contrast, section 498(c) of the
HEA refers to financial protections using completely different terms:
``third party guarantees,'' ``performance bonds,'' and ``letters of
credit.'' The fact that the financial protections may inconvenience or
burden the school in no way makes their requirement a ``penalty.''
However, current regulations already require the Department to provide
the school with the procedural protections that the commenter seeks. 34
CFR 668.171(e) requires that the Department enforce financial
responsibility standards and obligations using the procedures pertinent
to the school's participation status; for fully certified schools, the
regulations require the Department to use termination or limitation
actions under subpart G of
[[Page 75981]]
part 668 to enforce the requirement that the school's participation be
terminated for lack of financial responsibility, or that the school's
continued participation be reduced to provisional participation status
and further conditioned on the provision of financial protection.
Current regulations already assure that the school will receive all the
procedural protections to which the HEA entitles it, not because the
Department would deprive the school of its property right in its funds
(which the financial standards would not do), but because the method of
enforcing the financial responsibility obligation is through a
termination or limitation action, subject to the procedural protections
of an administrative hearing. 34 CFR part 668, subpart G. These
requirements will not change under the new regulations.
Section 668.90(a) affords the school the opportunity to
demonstrate, in the administrative proceeding, that a proposed
limitation or termination is ``unwarranted.'' That same regulation,
however, includes some 14 specific circumstances in which the hearing
official has no discretion but to find that the proposed action is
``warranted'' if certain predicate facts are proven. Among these
restrictions is a provision that, in a proposed enforcement action
based on failure to provide ``surety'' in an amount demanded, the
hearing official must find the action warranted unless the hearing
official concludes that the amount demanded is ``unreasonable.'' In
addition, Sec. 668.174 provides explicit, detailed, curative or
exculpatory conditions that must be met for a school subject to a past
performance issue to participate. However, these substantive
requirements are not incorporated in subpart G of part 668, the
regulations regarding the conduct of limitation or termination
proceedings. This may have created the impression that an institution
subject to the requirements of Sec. 668.174 could raise a challenge to
those requirements in an administrative action to terminate or limit
the institution that does not meet the requirements of Sec. 668.174.
This was never the intent of the Department. We therefore revise the
regulations in Sec. 668.90 governing hearing procedures to make clear
that the requirements in current Sec. 668.174 that limit the type and
amount of permitted curative or exculpatory matters apply in any
administrative proceeding brought to enforce those requirements. As for
the restriction in the final regulations on challenges to a requirement
that the school provide the ``surety'' or other protection, the
Department is updating and expanding one of the existing 14 provisions
in which an action must be found warranted if a predicate fact is
proven--in this case, the occurrence of certain triggering events,
established through notice-and-comment rulemaking, that pose
significant risk warranting the provision of adequate financial
protection, in a minimum amount also established as sufficient through
this same notice-and-comment rulemaking, with any added amount demanded
and justified on a case-by-case basis. The Department is significantly
revising the triggers proposed in the NPRM to simplify and reduce the
number of conditions or occurrences that qualify as automatic triggers.
As we discuss in adopting the composite score methodology, we measure
the effect of most of the triggering events not in isolation, but only
as each may affect the overall financial strength of the institution,
as that strength was most recently assessed under the financial ratio
analysis adopted in current regulations. Sec. 668.172. And, for all
discretionary triggers, the Department undertakes to assert a demand
for protection only on a case-by-case basis, with full articulation of
the reasons for the requirement.\43\ For these discretionary triggers,
a school may contest not only whether the predicate facts have actually
occurred, but also whether the demanded ``surety''--financial
protection--is reasonable.
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\43\ As discussed with regard to determining the appropriate
amount of financial protection, ordinarily the expected result of
closure or a significant reduction in operations is closed school
discharge claims. We recognize that in some instances financial
protection may be warranted for an institution that does not
participate in a title IV, HEA loan program, and its closure thus
cannot generate closed school claims. Such an institution remains
subject to a demand based on a discretionary assessment of other
potential losses, and we have revised Sec. 668.90(a)(3) to ensure
that such an institution can object to a demand for financial
protection if that demand was based solely on the 10 percent minimum
requirement generally applicable.
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Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.90(a)(3) to incorporate the
limitations contained in current Sec. 668.174, as well as the limits
on challenges to demands for financial protection based on the
automatic triggers in Sec. 668.171(c)-(f) as modified in these final
regulations.
Composite Score and Triggering Events
General
Comments: Some commenters believed that the Department should not
promulgate new financial responsibility requirements, or have otherwise
engaged in a rulemaking to do so, without reviewing and making changes
to the composite score methodology used in the current financial
responsibility standards in subpart L of part 668, particularly in view
of changing accounting standards, and the manner in which the
Department applies, calculates, and makes adjustments to the composite
score.
Similarly, other commenters contrasted the process used to develop
these financial responsibility amendments with the process used by the
Department to develop the subpart L standards. The commenters noted
that, in developing the subpart L standards, the Department engaged in
systematic, sustained efforts to study the issue and develop its
methodology through the formal engagement and aid of KPMG, an expert
auditing firm, with significant community involvement. That process
took approximately two years, and began with empirical studies by KPMG
into the potential impact of the rule over a year before the issuance
of any proposed language. The commenters stated that, in this case, the
Department is rushing out these revisions without the necessary and
appropriate analysis. Commenters noted that the Department produced
draft language on the triggers and letter of credit requirements in the
second negotiated rulemaking session, but with no significant
accompanying analysis or basis for its proposal, and did not consult
effectively or sufficiently with affected parties or prepare sufficient
information and documentation to convey, or for the negotiated
rulemaking panel to understand, the impact of this portion of the
proposed regulations.
Some commenters were concerned that the Department did not
harmonize the proposed financial responsibility provisions with the
current composite score requirements and questioned whether it was
reasonable for the Department to require an institution with the
highest composite score of 3.0 to secure one or more letters of credit
based on triggering events. The commenters further questioned why the
Department proposed numerous and overlapping requirements, if the
Department believes that the current composite score is a valid
indicator of an institution's financial health.
Overlapping Triggers
Some commenters argued that it would be unnecessarily punitive to
list as separate triggering events, and thereby impose stacking letter
of credit requirements for, items that may be connected to the same
underlying facts or allegations. For example, a lawsuit or
[[Page 75982]]
administrative proceeding settled with a government oversight agency
for an amount exceeding a set threshold could lead an institution's
accrediting agency to place the institution on probation, or an
institution that fails the 90/10 revenue requirement might thereby
violate a loan covenant.
As another example, commenters noted that an institution could be
subject to a lawsuit or multiple lawsuits about the same underlying
allegations, an accrediting agency may take action against the
institution in connection with the same allegations, and a State agency
may cite the institution for failing State requirements that relate to
those same allegations. The commenters stated that multiple triggering
events did not necessarily warrant additional financial protection and
believed that this ``stacking'' of triggers is especially punitive to
publicly traded institutions, which may be required to or voluntarily
elect to disclose certain triggering events, such as lawsuits in
reports to the SEC where making such disclosures is then itself an
independent trigger. In this case, the commenters believed it was
unfair to penalize a publicly traded institution twice, while any other
institution with fewer shareholders or one that opts to raise capital
privately would be subject to only one letter of credit requirement.
Commenters objected that it would be theoretically possible that a
school could be required to post letters of credit exceeding 100
percent of the title IV, HEA funds the school receives, effectively
crippling the school. The commenters cautioned that the Department
should not require multiple letters of credit stemming from the same
underlying facts or allegations--rather, the rules should reflect a
more refined approach for setting an appropriate level of financial
protection for each unique set of facts or allegations. The commenters
suggested that to ensure that an institution provides the amount of
financial protection that relates specifically to its ability to
satisfy its obligations, the Department should evaluate each triggering
event that occurs to determine whether any additional financial
protection is needed.
A few commenters suggested that, rather than applying the proposed
triggering events in a one-size-fits-all manner, the Department should
consider other institutional metrics that serve to mitigate concerns
about institutional viability and title IV, HEA program risks. For
example, the commenters suggested that the Department could
presumptively exclude from many of the new triggers those institutions
that have low and stable cohort default rates, consistently low 90/10
ratios, a general lack of accrediting or State agency actions, or any
combination of these items. The commenters reasoned that, in the
context of the NPRM, these attributes would generally indicate strong
student outcomes and less likelihood of borrower defense claims arising
from the institution. Or, the Department could provide that
institutions with cohort default rates and 90/10 ratios below specified
thresholds would not be required to post cumulative letters of credit
under the new general standards of financial responsibility. Similarly,
the commenters urged the Department to assess the circumstances of each
triggering event to determine whether any additional protection is
needed rather than requiring cumulative letters of credit for each of
the triggering events. The commenters believed that by taking these
alternate approaches, the financial responsibility regulations could be
tailored to assess institutional risk profiles on a more holistic
basis, rather than in the generally non-discerning manner reflected by
the NPRM.
Other commenters requested that the Department specify in the final
regulations the duration of each letter of credit for each triggering
event, noting that in the preamble to the NPRM, the Department stated
that schools subject to an automatic trigger would not be financially
responsible for at least one year based on that trigger, and in some
instances, for as long as three years after the event.
A commenter asserted that the institution should be provided the
opportunity to demonstrate by audited financial statements that it had
the resources to ensure against precipitous closure pursuant to section
498(c)(3)(C) of the HEA.
Discussion: After carefully considering the comments, the objective
of the changes that we proposed, and the availability of other
measures, we are changing the method of assessing the effect of many of
the triggering events. We explain here briefly the composite
methodology currently used to evaluate financial strength, and how we
will use the composite score methodology to evaluate whether, and how
much, those triggering events actually affect the financial capability
of the particular institution. In addition, as discussed later in this
preamble, we are revising and refining the triggers to consider as
discretionary triggering events several of the events included as
automatic triggers in the NPRM.
The composite score methodology in subpart L used under current
regulations is the product of a comprehensive study of the issue and of
numerous financial statements of affected institutions, as well as
substantial industry involvement. The 1997 rulemaking that adopted this
method established a basic model for evaluating financial
responsibility that was intended to serve as the core of the
Department's evaluation process for proprietary and private non-profit
institutions, replacing a piecemeal approach still reflected in Sec.
668.15(b)(7), (8), and (9). The regulations in subpart L were adopted
to replace the prior structure, in which an institution was required to
satisfy a minimum standard in each of three independent tests. The
Department replaced that with ``a ratio methodology under which an
institution need only satisfy a single standard--the composite score
standard. This new approach is more informative and allows a relative
strength in one measure to mitigate a relative weakness in another
measure.'' 62 FR 62831 (Nov. 25, 1997).\44\ However, we note that even
the prior financial responsibility standards considered whether the
school was subject to a pending administrative action or suit by a
Federal agency or State entity. Sec. 668.15(d)(2)(ii)(C). Section
668.15 contained, and still contains, provisions addressing matters
that may well occur after the audited period--for example, delinquency
on an existing debt obligation, and a suit by at least one creditor,
Sec. 668.15(b)(4)(ii), as well as the same familiar past performance
standards regarding parties with substantial control over the
institution or the institution itself. 34 CFR 668.15(c).\45\
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\44\ The composite score methodology assesses three aspects of
financial strength but, unlike the prior method, assigns relative
weights to each of the three assessments to produce a single,
``composite'' score.
\45\ The 1994 financial responsibility regulations implemented
the provision of section 498(c)(3)(C) of the HEA that would have
allowed an institution that failed other financial responsibility to
demonstrate by audited financial statements that it would not pose a
risk of ``precipitous closure.'' Sec. 668.15(d)(2)(ii). The 1997
regulations supplanted the standards in Sec. 668.15 with new
subpart L, which centered the assessment of financial responsibility
on the composite score methodology. The Department there adopted the
``zone'' assessment to assess ``precipitous closing'' rather than
the separate audited financial statement showing previously
permitted. 62 FR 62860-62862 (1997).
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Although the 1997 regulations replaced the three independent
financial ratio tests with the new composite score methodology as the
core measure of financial responsibility,
[[Page 75983]]
those regulations retained most of the accompanying provisions dealing
with examples of financial risks that would not necessarily or even
ordinarily be reflected in the audited financial statements on which
the composite score rests. The Department made clear in the NPRM that,
despite requests to revisit or modify the composite score component of
the financial responsibility regulations, we were not doing so. 81 FR
31359. Thus, we retain here unchanged the methodology that the
commenters laud as the product of careful, comprehensive, and engaged
development.
In these final regulations the Department addresses the
significance of new events that occur after the close of an audited
period, or that are not recognized, or not fully recognized, and
reflected in audited financial statements, to assess whether the
school, regardless of its composite score, ``is able to provide the
services described in its publications and statements, to provide the
administrative resources necessary to comply with the requirements of
this title [title IV of the HEA], and to meet all its financial
obligations. . . .'' 20 U.S.C. 1099c(c)(1). In doing so, we are
expanding the consideration of events that would make a school not
financially responsible in the near term--from the single example in
current regulations (commercial creditor lawsuits) to other major
lawsuits and other events that pose a potential material adverse risk
to the financial viability of the school. In the negotiated rulemaking
meetings, and in the NPRM, we articulated the adverse events that
recent history indicates pose a significant risk to the continued
ability of an institution to meet these several obligations. We address
elsewhere in this preamble comments directed at events that pose
particular risks, but discuss here the manner in which these events
will be evaluated.
The composite score methodology, as commenters stressed and as we
acknowledge, is designed to measure the viability of an institution
from three different aspects and develop a score that assigns relative
weight to each aspect to produce a score showing the relative financial
health and viability of the institution. In general, institutions with
a composite score of 1.5 or more are financially responsible; those
with a score between 1.0 and 1.5 are in the ``zone'' and subject to
increased reporting and monitoring; those with a score below 1.0 are
not financially responsible, and may participate only on conditions
that include providing financial protection to the Department. However,
the limitations of the existing composite score methodology are two-
fold: The score is calculated based on the audited financial statements
for the most recent fiscal year of the institution, and the audited
financial statements recognize threatened risks only if accounting
rules require the institution to recognize those events. If those
events are recognized, however, the composite score can readily assess
their effect on the viability of the institution, with due regard for
the actual financial resources of the institution, including its
ability to meet exigencies with internal resources and to borrow to
meet them. The institution's composite score in each instance has
already been calculated; to assess the effect of a threat or event
identified in these regulations, the institution's financial statements
on which that composite score was calculated will be adjusted to
reflect the amount of loss attributed to, and other impacts of, that
threat, and based on the adjusted statements, the Department will
recalculate the institution's composite score. This recalculation will
occur regularly as threats or events identified in these regulations
are identified. By adopting this approach, the final regulations
provide an individualized assessment rather than the one-size-fits-all
method proposed in the NPRM that commenters found unrealistic. Unless
other conditions apply, under the current regulations, an institution
that undergoes a routine assessment of financial responsibility and
achieves a composite score of 1.5 or greater may continue to
participate without providing financial protection; an institution with
a score between 1.0 and 1.5 may participate subject to heightened
reporting and scrutiny; and an institution with a composite score below
1.0 is not financially responsible and may participate only with
financial protection.\46\ Sec. Sec. 668.171(b)(1), 668.175(c),
668.175(f). Under the approach we adopt here, where the recognition of
the triggering event produces a recalculated composite score of 1.0 or
greater, we will regard the event as not posing a risk that makes or is
likely to make the institution not financially responsible, and will
therefore not require financial protection. If the recognition of the
event or risk produces a failing composite score--less than 1.0--the
institution is required to provide financial protection.\47\
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\46\ As provided under Sec. 668.175(f)(3), an institution that
has a composite score of less than 1.0 is not financially
responsible until it achieves a composite score of 1.5 or higher. In
other words, if an institution with a composite score of less than
1.0 has in the following year a composite score between 1.0 and 1.5,
the institution is still subject to the requirements under the
provisional certification alternative, including the letter of
credit provisions, even though it scores in the zone.
\47\ As the Department stated in the 1997 rulemaking, ``However,
an analysis of data of closed institutions indicates that
institutions that fail the ratio test should not be allowed to
continue to participate without some additional surety to protect
the Federal interest.''
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For the purpose of recalculating an institution's composite score,
as detailed in Appendix C to these regulations, the Department will
make the following adjusting entries to the financial statements used
to calculate an institution's most recent composite score. For clarity,
the adjusting entries refer to the line items in the balance sheet and
income statements illustrated in Appendix A for proprietary
institutions and Appendix B for non-profit institutions.
For a proprietary institution, for events relating to borrower-
defense lawsuits, other litigation, or debts incurred as a result of a
judicial or administrative proceeding or determination, or for a
withdrawal of owner's equity, the Department will debit Total Expenses,
line item #32, and credit Total Assets, line item #13, for the amount
of the loss--the amount of relief claimed, the debt incurred, the
amount withdrawn, or other amount as determined under Sec.
668.171(c)(2). Except for the withdrawal of owner's equity, the
corresponding entries for a non-profit institution are a debit to Total
Expenses, line item 38b (unrestricted), and a credit to Total Assets,
line item #12, for the amount of the loss.
For a proprietary institution, for events relating to a closed
location or institution or the potential loss of eligibility for GE
programs, the Department will debit Total Income, line item #27, and
credit Total Assets, line item #13, for the amount of the loss. The
loss is the amount of title IV, HEA funds the institution received in
the most recently completed fiscal year for the location or institution
that is closing or for the GE programs that are in jeopardy of losing
their eligibility for title IV, HEA funds in the next year. In
addition, the Department will debit Total Assets, line #13, and credit
Total Expenses, line #32, for an amount that approximates the
educational costs that the institution would not have incurred if the
programs at the closing location or the affected GE programs were not
offered. We believe it is reasonable that this reduction in costs is
proportional to the ratio of Cost of Goods Sold (line item #28) to
Operating Income (line item #25)--that is, the amount it cost the
institution to provide all of its
[[Page 75984]]
educational programs divided by the revenue derived from offering those
programs.
The corresponding entries for a non-profit institution are, for the
loss, a debit to Total Revenue, line item #31b, and a credit to Total
Assets, line item #12. The reduction in costs is calculated by dividing
Operating Expenses, line item #32, by Tuition and Fees, line item #27,
and multiplying the result by the amount of the loss, the amount of
title IV, HEA funds received by the location or affected GE programs.
To account for the reduction in costs, the Department will debit Total
Assets, line item #12, and credit Total Expenses, line item 38b.
Recognition of recent or threatened events can be appropriately
measured under the composite score methodology if the event causes or
is likely to cause a loss that can be quantified. All but two of the
events that we retain as automatic triggers pose risks that we can
quantify in order to assess their impact on the institution's composite
score. Lawsuits, new debts of any kind, borrower defense discharge
claims, closure of a location, loss of eligibility of gainful
employment programs, and withdrawal of owner equity all have effects
that may be quantified so that their effects can be assessed using the
composite score methodology.
In at least two instances, there is no need to attempt to quantify
the loss, because the loss is self-evident. An institution that fails
the requirement to derive at least 10 percent of its revenues from non-
title IV sources is so dependent on title IV, HEA funds as to make the
loss of those funds almost certainly fatal, and we see no need to
quantify that amount through the composite score methodology. That risk
requires financial protection regardless of the most recent composite
score achieved by the institution. Similarly, an institution whose
cohort default rate exceeds 30 percent in two consecutive years is at
risk of losing title IV, HEA eligibility the following year and
requires no composite score calculation. These risks require financial
protection regardless of the most recent composite score achieved by
the institution.
An action taken by the SEC to suspend trading in, or delist, an
institution's stock directly impairs an institution's ability to raise
funds--creditors may call in loans or the institution's credit rating
may by downgraded. However, unlike lawsuits and other threats, it is
difficult to quantify readily the amount of risk caused by that action
and assess that new risk using the prior year's financials and the
composite score derived from those statements. Nevertheless, because
the impaired ability to raise funds caused by these actions is
potentially significant, that risk warrants financial protection
without the reassessment of financial health that can be readily
performed for more quantifiable risks. Nevertheless, because the
impaired ability to raise funds caused by these actions is potentially
significant, that risk warrants financial protection without the
reassessment of financial health that can be readily performed for more
quantifiable risks.
We recognize that the institution's current year financial strength
may differ from that reported and analyzed for the prior fiscal year.
That difference, however, can be favorable or unfavorable, and would be
difficult to reliably determine in real time. Given that uncertainty,
we consider it a reasonable path to use as the baseline the data in the
most recent audited financials for which we have computed a composite
score, and adjust that data to reflect the new debt or pending threat.
Any disadvantage this may cause an institution will be temporary,
because the baseline will be corrected with submission, evaluation, and
scoring of the current year's audited financial statements. In
assessing the composite score of the new financial statements for
purposes of these standards, we will continue to recognize, for
purposes of requiring financial protection, any threats from triggering
events that would not yet be fully recognized under accounting
standards. However, improvements in positions demonstrated in the new
audited financials may offset the losses recognized under these
regulations. If those improved positions produce a composite score of
1.0 or more, despite the loss recognized under these regulations, the
institution may no longer be required to provide financial protection.
With regard to the suggestion by the commenters that the Department
allow an institution to submit new month-end or partial-year audited
financial statements from which the composite score would be
recalculated, we believe that doing so would be costly and unworkable,
because those financial statements do not reflect a full year's
transactions, and would potentially recognize only new debts, or
partially recognize new litigation or other claims for which the
institution determines that a loss is probable. We note that the
composite score methodology was designed to measure the financial
performance of an institution over an entire 12-month operating cycle,
the institution's fiscal year, and believe that attempting to calculate
a composite score for a partial year would produce anomalous results.
In addition, it is not clear how an institution could produce audited
financial statements by the end of the month in which a triggering
event occurred. Further, the suggestion does not appear to offer a
realistic approach because separate actual or threatened losses may
occur throughout the year, and for each event, this proposal would
require a new set of financial statements.
This approach will affect only institutions that have a
recalculated composite score of less than 1.0. If recognition of the
event produces a recalculated composite score of between 1.0 and 1.5
for an institution that had a routine composite score of 1.5 or more,
the recalculated score does not change the existing score to a zone
score, so the institution is not required to comply with the zone
requirements. Sec. 668.175(d). For some institutions, a single event
or threat may produce a failing composite score, while for others, a
series of actions or events may together place the institution at
substantial risk. Using the composite score methodology to assess new
or threatened risks, instead of using a dollar- or percentage-based
materiality threshold for individual triggering events, allows the
Department to assess the cumulative effect on the institution of
individual threats or events regardless. Thus, we will require
financial protection only when the recalculated composite score is
failing and the cumulative effect produces a failing score.
In response to the commenters who objected that the proposed
triggering scheme would arbitrarily ``stack'' protection requirements,
the composite score methodology distinguishes among levels of financial
strength, and as we explain below, permits the Department to align the
amount of protection required with the relative risk or weakness posed
by successive triggering events or conditions. We agree with the
commenters that an institution should not be required to provide
financial protection for every automatic triggering event for which the
underlying facts or circumstances are the same or where a direct causal
relationship exists between two or more events, like the circumstance
noted by the commenters where a 90/10 violation causes a loan agreement
violation, or a settlement generates an accreditor sanction.
In response to the objection that these regulations could require
financial protection equal to all of the title IV, HEA funds received
in the prior year,
[[Page 75985]]
we adopt here an approach that tailors the amount of protection
required to a minimum amount we consider sufficient to cover the losses
to the government reasonably likely to occur upon closure, plus any
additional amount that we estimate is reasonable to expect based on the
circumstances presented by the risks posed for the particular
institution. Under current regulations, an institution that does not
meet financial responsibility standards may participate under
provisional certification requirements by providing a letter of credit
equal to at least 10 percent of the prior fiscal year title IV, HEA
program funds received. Sec. 668.175(f)(2)(i). This restriction
applies to any institution that no longer qualifies for continued
participation in the zone, or, as particularly pertinent here, achieves
anything less than a score of 1.0--for example, a score of .90. Because
the composite score makes these kinds of distinctions among scores,
current regulations give dispositive weight to its results in critical
determinations regarding an institution's ability to participate. Thus
current regulations have long attached controlling significance to what
may be relatively slight differences in composite score outcomes. We
adopt here a rule that an institution that receives an adjusted
composite score of less than 1.0 must provide financial protection in
an amount not less than 10 percent of the prior fiscal year's title IV,
HEA funding, and, as the composite score decreases, the institution may
be required to provide an added amount of protection where supported by
the particular facts and circumstances--including the history of the
institution, the nature of the risks posed, the presence of existing
liabilities to the Department, the presence, amount, and rate at which
borrower defense claims are being filed, and the likelihood that the
risk will result in increases in borrower defense claims.
The requirement to provide at least a 10 percent letter of credit
is rooted in the 1994 regulations regarding provisional certification
of institutions that did not meet generally applicable financial
responsibility standards. 34 CFR 668.13(d)(1)(ii)(1994). We adopt here
this 10 percent as a minimum requirement because we consider financial
protection in the amount of 10 percent of prior year title IV, HEA
funding to be the minimum amount needed to protect the taxpayer from
losses reasonably expected from an institution's closing. These losses
include, at a minimum, costs of closed school discharges. Closed school
discharges can affect all loans--including PLUS loans--obtained to
finance attendance at the closing institution. This includes any loans
obtained for enrollment in years before the year in which the
institution closes, not merely those loans received by students for
attendance at the institution in the year in which it closes. Thus, a
closure could, in some instances, generate closed school discharge
losses in amounts exceeding the total amount of Direct Loan funds that
the institution received in the year preceding the year of that
closure.
Liabilities of an institution could also include liabilities for
funds unaccounted for by audit, because the institution as a fiduciary
is liable for the costs of title IV, HEA funds it received unless it
affirmatively demonstrates by the required compliance audit that it
spent those funds properly. An institution that closes may have neither
the resources nor the incentive to secure an audit of its expenditures
of these funds. The liability of an institution that fails to account
for those funds includes the full amount of Pell Grant funds received,
and, for loans that are received for that period and are not
discharged, the subsidy costs for those loans, which varies from year
to year among loan types.\48\ An institution that closes may also owe
liabilities to the Department for debts arising from audits, program
reviews, or fine actions, or from borrower defense claims. Closure of
the institution would also jeopardize recovery of all these
liabilities, and the risk to the taxpayer in those instances is
considerably greater than the costs of closed school discharges.
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\48\ Because every institution must affirmatively account for
the title IV, HEA funds it has caused to be awarded during an entire
fiscal year as properly spent, an institution receiving funds on the
cash monitoring or reimbursement method does not meet this
obligation simply by having payments approved under the requirements
applicable to funding under those methods, which do not necessarily
involve the comprehensive examination conducted in an audit.
Similarly, because the institution must make this accounting on a
fiscal year basis, the fact that an institution may offer short
programs several of which may be completed within a fiscal year does
not limit the potential loss in the case of a precipitous closure to
the amount of funds received for a program that may be curtailed by
such a closure, rather than all the funds for which it was
responsible for the entire fiscal year.
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We have already experienced closed school discharge claim losses in
one of the most recent and significant school closures, that of
Corinthian, that permits development of estimates of liabilities.
Corinthian was composed of three chains of some 37 separate
institutions, operating at 107 campuses, with 65,000 students enrolled
in 2014. It received $1.439 billion in title IV, HEA funding in FY
2013, the last full fiscal year preceding its closure. During the year
preceding its closure, Corinthian sold 50 campuses, with some 30,000
students enrolled, to a new entity, a transaction that allowed a major
portion of Corinthian students to complete their training. In addition,
under agreement with the Department, Corinthian continued training at
the campuses it retained until its closure in April 2015.
The Department has to date granted closed school discharges of some
$103.1 million for some 7,858 Corinthian borrowers, with the average
discharge some $13,114.\49\ Additionally, the Department has thus far
approved 3,787 borrower defense discharges, totaling $73.1 million.
Together, Corinthian's liabilities through both closed school and
borrower defense total more than $176 million, with additional claims
expected to be approved later. A letter of credit at the level of 10
percent of prior year title IV, HEA funding would have been $143
million--enough to cover the estimated total closed school discharges
and far too little to cover the school's total liabilities on
individual student loan losses.\50\
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\49\ As of October 2016.
\50\ The Department also fined Corinthian $30 million.
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From this history, we estimate that an institution that closes in
an orderly wind down, under which the majority of the students are able
to continue their education by transfer or otherwise, will generate
closed school discharge claims of at least 10 percent of the amount of
all title IV, HEA funding received in the last complete fiscal year
prior to the year in which the institution finally closes. Therefore,
we adopt 10 percent of prior year title IV, HEA funding as the minimum
amount of financial protection required of an institution that achieves
a recalculated composite score of less than 1, or otherwise faces the
risks (90/10, cohort default rates, SEC action) for which we do not
recalculate a composite score. This is consistent with many years of
Department practice.
Obviously, not all closures will arise in such fortuitous
situations. It is realistic to expect that for other closures,
including those that are more precipitous, a far greater percentage of
borrowers will qualify for closed school discharges. Moreover, these
regulations are expected to increase the number of instances in which
we will give a closed school discharge by providing relief without an
application where we have sufficient information to determine
eligibility. In addition, based on the Corinthian experience, we expect
that
[[Page 75986]]
the law enforcement agency actions that can constitute triggering
events will generate borrower defense claims as well.\51\ Other
liabilities to the Department may already exist or are expected to
arise. Under these regulations, therefore, the Department demands
greater financial protection in cases in which these risks are
identified, in addition to the minimum 10 percent. We include other
conditions as discretionary triggering events, but in particular
circumstances, those conditions can separately indicate that the
potential losses that may arise warrant levels of financial protection
greater than 10 percent. If the Department demands greater financial
protection than the 10 percent level, the Department articulates the
bases on which that added protection is needed, which can include any
of the considerations discussed here. If an institution has already
arranged financial protection, the Department credits the amount of
protection already provided toward the amount demanded, if the
protection already provided has the same terms and extends for the
duration of the period for which protection is required pursuant to
these regulations. In determining the proper amount of financial
protection, then, we intend to look closely at any evidence that these
kinds of liabilities may ensue from the risk posed by adverse events to
a particular institution. We note, in particular, that section
498(e)(4) of the HEA, by indicating which specific histories of
compliant behavior are enough to bar the Department from requiring
personal guarantees from owners or institutions, has identified those
histories that indicate future risk. 20 U.S.C. 1099c(e). Since 1994,
the Department has implemented the statute in precisely this way, by
adopting these histories as per se financial responsibility failures,
warranting surety and provisional certification. Sec. Sec. 668.174(a),
668.175(f)(1)(ii).
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\51\ These losses can be very substantial. The Department has
already granted $73 million in borrower defense discharge relief to
some 3800 Corinthian Direct Loan borrowers under Sec. 685.206, and
thousands of Corinthian borrower claims are pending. The average
amount of loan indebtedness discharged for these 3800 was $19,300;
many thousands of other Corinthian borrowers may have valid claims
for relief, and the Department has been reaching out to some 335,000
of these individuals. See: United States Department of Education
Fourth Report of the Special Master for Borrower Defense to the
Under Secretary, June 29, 2016. If even 20 percent of these other
borrowers qualify for relief, the loss to the Federal taxpayer would
add another billion dollars to the $73 million in losses already
experienced.
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Similarly, section 498(c)(1)(C) of the HEA specifically directs the
Secretary to consider whether the institution is able to meet its
refund obligations to students and the Department. 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c)(1)(C). The Department has implemented this provision by
requiring an institution that has a performance rate of less than 95
percent in either of the two most recently completed fiscal years to
provide surety in an amount of 25 percent of the amount of refunds owed
during the most recently completed fiscal year. Sec. 668.173(d). We
intend to apply these long-standing and statutorily sanctioned
predictors of potential liabilities in determining the amount of
financial protection that we may require over and above that minimum
amount to cover the costs of closed school discharges. Thus, we may
determine that the potential loss to the taxpayer of the closure or
substantial reduction in operations of an institution that has failed
the 95 percent refund performance standard to be 25 percent of refund
obligations in the prior year, in addition to the 10 percent of prior
year title IV, HEA funding needed to cover closed school discharges. We
may determine that the potential loss to the taxpayer of the closure or
substantial reduction in operations of an institution that has had
audit or program liabilities in either of the two preceding fiscal
years of five percent or more of its title IV, HEA funds to present a
potential loss of that same percent of its most recent title IV, HEA
funding, in addition to the 10 percent of funding needed to defray
closed school discharge losses. We may determine that the closure or
substantial reduction in operations of an institution that has been
cited in any of the preceding five years for failure to submit in a
timely fashion required acceptable compliance and financial statement
audits presents a potential loss of the full amount of title IV, HEA
funds for which an audit is required but not provided, in addition to
any other potential loss identified using these predictors.
Relying on the composite score methodology also helps clarify how
long financial protection for risks or conditions should be maintained,
because some events have already occurred, and will necessarily be
assessed in the next audited financial statements and the composite
score, which is routinely calculated. Others, such as pending suits or
borrower defense claims, will not be reflected in the new financial
statements, and those risks may still warrant continuing the financial
protection already in place. Along these lines, we will maintain the
full amount of the financial protection provided by the institution
until the Department determines that the institution has (1) a
composite score of 1.0 or greater based on the review of the audited
financial statements for the fiscal year in which all losses from any
triggering event on which the financial protection was required have
been fully recognized, or (2) a recalculated composite score of 1.0 or
greater, and that any triggering event or condition that gave rise to
the financial protection no longer applies.
We believe it is reasonable to require an institution to maintain
its financial protection to the Department as noted above until the
consequences of those events are reflected in the institution's audited
financial statements or until the institution is no longer subject to
those events or conditions. If the institution is not financially
responsible based on those audited statements, or the triggering events
continue to apply, then the financial protection on hand can be used to
cover all or part of the amount of protection that would otherwise be
required. Doing so minimizes the risks to the Federal interests by
having financial protection in place in the event that an institution
does not sufficiently recover from the impact of a triggering event--
any cash or letter of credit on hand would be retained and any funds
under a set-aside arrangement would reduce or eliminate the need to
offset current draws of the title IV, HEA funds.
With regard to the comment that a letter of credit could exceed 100
percent of the title IV, HEA funds received by an institution, we note
that the regulations adopted here set 10 percent of prior year title
IV, HEA funding as the minimum financial protection required for an
institution that achieves a recalculated score below a 1, or fails the
90/10, cohort default rate, or SEC triggers, and permit the Department
to demand greater protection when the Department demonstrates that the
risk to the Department is greater.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.171(c)(1) to provide that losses
from events or risks listed as triggering events are generally
evaluated by determining whether the amount of loss recognized for this
purpose, if included in the financial statements for which a composite
score was most recently calculated under Sec. 668.172, would produce a
composite score less than 1.0. In Sec. 668.171(c)(2) we have specified
that the actual or potential losses from the actions or events in Sec.
668.171(c)(1) are accounted for by revising an institution's most
recent audited financial statements and that the Secretary recalculates
the institution's composite score based on the revised statements
regularly. If the recalculated
[[Page 75987]]
composite score is less than 1.0, the institution is not financially
responsible and must provide financial protection.
Triggering Events
Comment: Some commenters objected that the Department had produced
no data to support the assertion that the triggering events in fact
pose the risks that would warrant their use. Other commenters stated
that the requirement to provide financial protection based on the mere
filing of a lawsuit seeking the proposed recoveries was speculative,
not based on actual data showing that an adverse result was reasonably
expected to result from that suit and was thus arbitrary and lacked a
reasonable basis. Another commenter asserted that the Department's
reference to the Corinthian situation does not support adopting the
rule proposed here, and that current regulations were sufficient to
enable the Department to obtain from Corinthian the protections needed
to mitigate or eliminate the risks now cited to justify the new rules.
The commenter asserted that Corinthian failed financial responsibility
tests in FY 2011, could have been required to post a letter of credit,
but was not required to do so, nor was it required to post a letter of
credit for FY 2014, when Corinthian again failed the tests.
Discussion: As discussed for each of the triggers, each reflects a
new financial obligation already incurred and not yet reflected in the
composite score for the institution, or a new financial risk that is
realistically imminent, whether or not yet recognized in the audited
financial statements. Current regulations permit the Department to
demand 10 percent or more financial protection, but provide no
structured scheme to assess whether a particular event actually
jeopardizes the institution, and if so, by how much, and what amount of
protection is needed beyond that 10 percent minimum described in the
regulations. We described in the NPRM the history of Corinthian's
evaluation under the existing financial responsibility scheme.\52\ Even
if Corinthian's financial statements had been accurate when presented,
they would not have accounted for the risk posed by the pending
California attorney general action, that ended in a judgment for $1.1
billion, and the LOC that would likely have been demanded--a small
fraction of the title IV, HEA funding for the prior year--would barely
have covered the liabilities already established by the Department
against Corinthian. The Corinthian experience highlighted the need to
identify events that posed realistic jeopardy in the short term, and to
secure financial protection before the loss was incurred and the
institution on account that that loss no longer had the ability to
provide that protection. Similarly, current standards would not require
protection where an institution was on the very cusp of loss of title
IV, HEA eligibility, as with cohort default rate and 90/10 sanctions.
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\52\ Applying the routine tests under current regulations did
not result in financial protection, because Corinthian appeared at
the time it provided the Department with its audited financial
statements to pass those tests. Only later--too late to secure
financial protection--did further investigation reveal that
Corinthian in fact had failed the financial tests in current
regulations. 81 FR 39361.
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Changes: None.
Automatic Triggering Events
Lawsuits and Other Actions Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(i)
Lawsuits Settlements/Resolutions
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(i)(B), (ii), and
(iii), a school may not be financially responsible if it is currently
being sued by a State, Federal, or other oversight entity, or by
private litigants in actions, including qui tam suits under the False
Claims Act, that have survived a motion for summary judgment.
Some commenters objected that requiring financial protection based
on suits by private parties was unreasonable because the commenters
considered those suits to have no bearing on the financial
responsibility and administrative capability of the institution. Others
considered reliance on the filing of suits that had not yet resulted in
judgments against the institution to constitute an unreasonable
standard that deprived the institution of its due process rights to
contest the lawsuits. A commenter objected to the inclusion of
government suits because the commenter considered proprietary
institutions to often be the target of ill-planned and discriminatory
suits by State and Federal agencies. A commenter stated that suits
filed by State AGs have been shown in some cases to be politically
motivated and argued that such suits should not be the basis for a
letter of credit as they may unfairly target unpopular members of the
higher education industry, depending on the party affiliation of the
AG. The commenter stated that the suits are not required to be based in
fact and rarely lead to a finding, that the judicial process should be
allowed to follow its usual course, and that requiring schools to post
letters of credit prior to a judicial ruling in the case amounts to
finding a school guilty and requiring the school to prove innocence.
The commenter stated that the risk posed by the filing of a suit cannot
be determined simply from the complaint filed in the suit, and the
actual risk posed by such suits, some commenters urged, could be
reasonably determined only after determining the merits of the suit.
Commenters objected that these triggering events would require a
school to submit a letter of credit before there was any determination
of merit or wrongdoing by an independent arbiter, and stated that such
suits should not be taken into account until judgment. The commenters
stated that they believed that, contrary to the Department's statement
in the preamble that suits by State and Federal agencies are likely to
be successful, most cases settle due to the outsized leverage of the
government, despite their merits. In addition, the commenters believed
that suits filed by State AGs should not be the basis for a letter of
credit because these suits have been shown in some cases to be
politically motivated and to unfairly target institutions.
Another commenter urged the Department to remove the lawsuit
triggers, arguing that the mere filing of an enforcement action by a
State, Federal, or other oversight entity based on the provision of
educational services should not be considered a trigger. The commenter
stated that lawsuits are easy to file, allegations are not facts, and,
even assuming good faith on the part of State and Federal regulatory
agencies, sometimes mistakes are made. The commenter contended that the
litigation process creates the incentive for sweeping allegations that
may or may not be verifiable, or there may be cases filed by an agency
in the hope of making new law or establishing a new standard for
liability or mode of recovery beyond that applied by courts in ruling
on such claims. A commenter was concerned that an ``other oversight
agency'' could refer to a town or county zoning board or land use
agency that could threaten to file a multi-million dollar suit for
pollution, or a nuisance suit like a violation of a local sign
ordinance, or failure to recycle soda cans, as a way to leverage
concession from the institution for other reasons. These suits would be
covered under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(ii) even though they have
nothing to do with the educational mission of the school. The commenter
contended that giving such unbridled power to non-State, non-Federal,
non-education-related oversight entities would effectively place the
``sword of Damocles'' over the head of every college president who
needs to negotiate a dorm or a new parking facility.
[[Page 75988]]
Many commenters objected to consideration of settlements with
government agencies under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(1). As proposed,
the regulation might make a school not financially responsible if
during the current or three most recently completed award years it was
required to pay a debt to a government agency, including a debt
incurred under a settlement. Commenters viewed this provision as overly
broad and punitive, and suggested that settlements be excluded from
this provision. A commenter believed that an institution under
investigation will have a strong incentive to avoid a settlement that
would precipitate the triggering event in proposed Sec.
668.171(c)(1)(i)(A), which would require it to provide the Department a
potentially expensive or unobtainable letter of credit. A commenter
noted that bringing suit can be an important tool in facilitating
settlement, and cited a case where a State AG filed a consumer fraud
suit against an institution. The parties were able to negotiate a
settlement that provided $2.1 million in loan forgiveness and $500,000
in refunds for students. Imposing a letter of credit in such situations
would deter such favorable settlements. Commenters asserted that many
businesses settle claims with the government due to the cost of
litigation and the outsized leverage of the government, regardless of
the merits of the underlying claims.
Commenters objected to consideration of debts already paid,
asserting that if a school pays a liability as a result of an agency
action, the school has already paid an amount that was deemed
appropriate by the agency and should not be subject to the additional
punitive requirement of posting a letter of credit. The commenters
argued that this is especially true if the school's payment resulted in
repayments to students such that a letter of credit is no longer
necessary to provide for possible student claims.
Similarly, other commenters claimed that lawsuit triggers would
create every incentive for borrowers who get behind in their loan
payments to file claims or suits against an institution, regardless of
how frivolous those suits or claims may be, and therefore these
triggers should not be part of the borrower defense rulemaking.
Evaluation
A commenter urged the Department to make the lawsuit and
investigation triggers in Sec. 668.171(c)(1) evaluative instead of
automatic, so that the Department would evaluate the type of suit, the
merit of the claims, the amount of money at stake, and the likelihood
of success. With this system in place, only institutions with a serious
financial risk would be required to obtain a letter of credit, leaving
other institutions room to negotiate with State AGs or other
enforcement entities.
Other commenters objected to assessing the value of the lawsuits
(in proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(v)) by using ``the tuition and fees the
institution received from every student who was enrolled at the
institution during the period for which the relief is sought'' as
wrongly presuming that every student in the period (or three years if
none is stated) would receive a full refund, and may have no relation
to the event on which suit was brought. While the commenters do not
suggest using the damages proposed in any complaint, which they claim
are often speculative and designed to grab media attention rather than
reflect a true damage calculation, a better way to assess value would
be an analysis of the merits of the specific litigation at issue,
guided by past recoveries and settlements for similar actions. Some
commenters objected that State AGs and private litigants will likely
include demands for relief in pleadings that equal or exceed the
thresholds set by the Department in order to gain additional leverage
over an institution. Other commenters objected that State AG suits will
also exceed the thresholds because they will state no dollar amount of
relief, and thus be deemed to seek restitution in the amount of all
tuition received for a period.
Some commenters believed that an institution should be afforded the
opportunity to demonstrate, by an independent analysis, that the actual
amount at issue is below the thresholds set for the applicable action
and therefore the action is not material. Some commenters suggested
that the Department allow an institution to seek an independent
appraisal from a law firm, accounting firm, or economist that would
state the actual amount at issue in the lawsuit. Others stated that
this analysis could be accomplished as part of an appeal process with a
hearing official deciding the amount based on evidence from the
institution and the Department.
Threshold
Some commenters stated that it is common for plaintiffs suing
colleges and universities to allege damages far exceeding any amount
that could feasibly be obtained in either a settlement or final
judgment, as a tactic to maximize any final settlement amount and
contingency fees to the attorney. For this reason, the commenters
argued that requiring a letter of credit based solely on a claim
exceeding 10 percent of an institution's assets is arbitrary and
unwarranted, as the claimed amounts often have little factual basis or
legal support. Further, the commenters were concerned that enacting
this new standard would lead to plaintiffs' attorneys stating claims in
excess of the 10 percent threshold to create negotiating leverage.
Other commenters believed that the $750,000 and 10 percent of
current assets thresholds were arbitrary because they do not take into
account that the size of schools varies significantly and, as such,
their exposure may vary significantly. The commenters reasoned that a
larger school that serves a greater number of students may be subject
to a larger liability, but may also be able to adequately withstand
that liability. For these reasons, the commenters suggested that the
triggering events in Sec. 668.171(c)(1) should be removed entirely,
but if they are not removed, the commenters urged the Department to
exclude the settlement provisions and the $750,000 threshold because
debts of that size are not indicative of the financial stability of the
school.
Some commenters noted that Federal and State settlements are often
very small, and therefore believed those settlement amounts would not
likely reach or exceed the proposed threshold of 10 percent of current
assets. The commenters urged the Department to eliminate the 10 percent
threshold in the final regulations, arguing that a settlement, in and
of itself, should be sufficient to trigger a letter of credit. Other
commenters believed that the threshold of $750,000 for the lawsuit
triggers was so low that an auditor would not consider that amount to
be material and therefore would not include the lawsuit in the
footnotes of an institution's financial statements. They suggested that
the Department set the materiality threshold as the higher, rather than
the lesser, of $750,000 or 10 percent of current assets. The commenters
reasoned that the lesser amount would almost always be the audit
threshold ($750,000) which, in the case of any large school, will not
be material. Alternatively, the commenters suggested that the
Department remove the audit-based threshold and simply rely on the 10
percent of current assets threshold.
No Amount Claimed
Objecting to the method of calculating a claim in a suit in which
the plaintiff does not state a dollar amount of relief, a commenter
noted that in a number of
[[Page 75989]]
State courts--in New York, Maryland, and Maine, for example--a specific
dollar-amount demand is not permitted in many civil actions. In such
cases, proposed Sec. 688.171(c)(1)(v)(A) would require that the amount
be calculated ``by totaling the tuition and fees the institution
received from every student who was enrolled at the institution during
the period for which relief was sought, or if no period is stated, the
three award years preceding. . . .'' The commenter feared that applying
this principle would result in a ``deemed'' ad damnum of at least three
years' total revenue--and it would be a fortunate institution that
maintained sufficient current assets to keep the made-up ``deemed'' ad
damnum below 10 percent of current assets. In addition, the commenter
notes that other States, like Virginia, do not permit recovery in
excess of the written ad damnum, regardless of what a jury may award--
for example, if the demand is $10,000 and the jury awards ten million
dollars, only the demanded amount is awarded. The commenter opined that
in those States, the incentive is to massively over-plead the value of
the case, so that an attorney's client is not forced to accept less
money after encountering a generous jury. The underlying point is the
same: Neither a stated ad damnum in any lawsuit nor the ``deemed'' ad
damnum of proposed Sec. 688.171(c)(1)(v)(A) bears any necessary
relationship to the actual value of the suit, to the likely range of
recovery, or to the effect of the suit on the financial responsibility
of the educational institution.
Second, the commenter argued that a pending private lawsuit seeking
large damages should not be considered a trigger event, as proposed in
Sec. 688.171(c)(1)(iii). The commenter cautioned that considering
filed-but-not-decided litigation to impair the financial responsibility
of an institution would overly empower opportunistic or idealistic
members of the plaintiff's bar. The commenter asserted that the
proposed position would give every lawyer with a draft lawsuit
containing enormous damage claims a chokehold on any school. The
commenter noted that although proposed Sec. 688.171(c)(1)(iii)(A) is
intended to restrict this triggering event to only those claims that
survive summary judgment, the commenter asserted that in some States,
this restriction would be ineffective. The commenter asserted that, for
example, in New York State courts, a plaintiff can file a ``Motion For
Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint,'' under CPLR Section 3213, to
initiate the case. A plaintiff can demand a response on the date an
answer would otherwise be due; if the defendant were to file a cross-
motion for summary judgment as a response, the court ostensibly would
deny both and treat the cross-motions as an answer and complaint, and
the case would go forward. But the case would have ``survived a motion
for summary judgment by the institution,'' and would then constitute a
trigger event at its outset.
The commenter further asserted that California State courts permit
not only summary judgment, but also a separate procedure for resolution
of entire claims by ``summary disposition.'' Cal. Code of Civ. Pro.
Section 437c. The grant of judgment to the institution on any relevant
claim by summary disposition would not seem to affect whether a trigger
event has occurred, even if the only relevant claim was disposed of.
The commenter asserted as well that in Virginia, summary judgment is
technically available, but, as a practical matter, the commenter states
that it is never granted because a motion for summary judgment cannot
procedurally be supported by documents, affidavits, depositions, or
other similar evidence. Moreover, the real effect of this provision
would be to deter institutions from ever moving for summary judgment,
fearing that the motion would be denied therefore generating a
triggering event.
For these reasons, the commenter concluded that institutions would
have to bring every covered private case to trial, at much greater
financial and emotional expense not only to the school but also to the
opposing parties. The commenter expressed concern that the proprietary
school sector was a target for enterprising trial lawyers, and that
because of the heightened scrutiny faced by financial institutions
making lending decisions, it would be impossible for many institutions
facing one of these triggering events to obtain a sufficient letter of
credit to comply with the regulations. The commenter cautioned that an
institution in such a circumstance would have little choice but to
cease operations, even if its financial basis remained fundamentally
sound--and even if the claims represented by the proposed triggering
events were insubstantial or frivolous.
Similarly, another commenter stated that in litigation, plaintiffs
are able to survive a motion for summary judgment due to a variety of
factors. The commenter said that judges may decline to dispose of a
case on summary judgment because there remains an issue of material
fact that may have little to do with the underlying false claim or
provision of educational services. The commenter offered that a final
judgment requires a higher level of proof than a motion for summary
judgment and would therefore be a fairer threshold. In addition, the
commenter noted that private rights of action are fundamentally
different than agency or government actions that are subject to well-
established policies and procedures. Further, the commenter anticipated
that private parties will likely request relief in excess of the
proposed thresholds of $750,000 or 10 percent of current assets to gain
additional leverage in seeking a settlement.
With regard to proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iii), some commenters
asked the Department to clarify whether the mere filing of a False
Claims Act case is a triggering event or if paragraphs (A) and (B)
apply to that case (as well as private litigation). The commenters
offered that the mere filing of a False Claims Act case should not
subject an institution to a letter of credit. While the commenters
recognized the seriousness of a False Claims Act case, they stated that
these cases do not garner intervention from the Federal government and
are typically settled for amounts that are dramatically less than the
stated damages in the complaint. Further, while the commenters
appreciated the Department's attempt to ensure it was only capturing
meritorious private litigation under Sec. 668.171(c)(1), they believed
that the provision would penalize an institution for settling a case
for nuisance value or harming a school for filing a motion for summary
judgment which it ultimately loses.
Discussion: Proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(1) included a range of
governmental actions and certain actions by private parties, and
proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(6)(ii) included any other litigation that the
institution was required to report in a filing with the SEC. Regardless
of the substantive basis or motivation of the party suing, each of
these suits could pose a serious potential threat to the continued
existence and operation of the school, and as such, they affect the
assessment of the school's ability to meet its financial obligations.
We see no basis for ignoring that risk simply because some suits in
each of these types may in fact be frivolous, assert exaggerated
demands, rest on attempts to make new law, or attempt to extract
concessions from the school in what the commenter calls areas unrelated
to the school's educational mission. We consider pending suits under
these regulations for two reasons. First, a
[[Page 75990]]
judgment entered in any of these suits may significantly jeopardize the
existence or continued operations of the institution, and that threat
bears directly on the statutory requirement that the Secretary
determine whether the institution for the present and near future, the
period for which the assessment is made, ``is able to meet . . . all
its financial obligations.'' 20 U.S.C. 1098c(c)(1)(C). Second, that
consideration looks not merely at obligations already incurred, but
looks as well to the ability of the institution to meet ``potential
liabilities''--whether the institution has the resources to ``ensure
against precipitous closure''--and thus demands that we assess threats
posed by suits not yet reduced to judgments that would be recognized in
the financial statements submitted annually and evaluated under the
current composite score methodology. In response to the comment
regarding treatment of qui tam suits under the False Claims Act, we
confirm that those actions are evaluated like any other litigation not
brought by a Federal or State agency enforcing claims that may relate
to borrower defenses. They are evaluated under the summary judgment
test.
Responding to the objection that we should consider only claims
reduced to judgment, we stress that ignoring the threat until judgment
is entered would produce a seriously deficient assessment of ability to
meet financial obligations, and worse, would delay any attempt by the
Department to secure financial protection against losses until a point
at which the institution, by reason of the judgment debt, may be far
less able to supply or borrow the funds needed to provide that
protection. We reject this suggestion as contrary to the discharge of
the duty imposed on the Department by section 498 of the HEA.
Similarly, we see no basis for the contention that taking into account
risk posed by pending suits somehow deprives an institution of its due
process right to contest the suit. If the risk posed is within the
statutory mandate to assess, as we show above, taking that risk into
account in determining whether an institution qualifies to participate
in the title IV, HEA programs cannot deprive the institution of any
constitutionally protected right. The institution remains free to
respond to the suit in any way it chooses; it is frivolous to contend
that we are barred from considering whether that risk warrants
financial protection for the taxpayer as a condition for the continued
participation by that institution in this Federal program.
Besides these general objections to the consideration of pending
suits, the comments we received addressed several distinct aspects of
the proposed consideration. These included comments addressed to the
inclusion of suits by an oversight entity, which may include a local
government component, in the category of government suits; the proposal
that suits be evaluated on their merits by a third party, by Department
officials, or by a Department hearing official; objections to inclusion
of debts arising from settlements; objections that the thresholds in
the proposed rule were unrealistic or arbitrary; objections to the
proposed method of calculating the amount claimed where the institution
contends that the amount claimed exceeds the amount that applicable law
would support; objections to the proposed calculation of the amount in
actions that did not seek a stated amount of relief; objections to the
proposed use of summary judgment as a test of the potential risk posed
by the suit; and objections to consideration of debts already incurred
and paid in prior years. We discuss each in turn and, as discussed
earlier explaining the use of an adapted composite score methodology,
we are modifying the proposed regulations in several regards that we
intend and expect to assess the risk posed by pending suits in a manner
that alleviates several of major concerns raised by commenters.
We address first the changes to the proposed thresholds, because
adoption of the composite score methodology of assessing risk affects
the response to those objections and other concerns as well. Each
institution is well aware of its most recent composite score, and as
explained above, the amount of risk posed by each suit considered under
the regulations will be assessed by recognizing that loss in the
financial statements on which that composite score was based, and
determining whether that recognition will produce a failing composite
score. Any institution can readily evaluate that effect and take that
result into account in responding to the suit. A pending suit that
produces a failing score will be recognized as a threat until the suit
is resolved and that result produces a score of 1.0 or more, whether by
favorable judgment or settlement. Second, we include an opportunity for
an institution to demonstrate that loss from any pending suit is
covered by insurance. Commenters advised that we should not treat
lawsuits as potential triggering events because the risks posed by
these suits are commonly covered by insurance. If the institution
demonstrates that insurance fully covers the risk, the suit is simply
not considered under these financial responsibility standards. The
institution can demonstrate that insurance fully or partially covers
risk by presenting the Department with a statement from the insurer
that the institution is covered for the full or partial amount of the
liability in question.
In response to the proposal that the regulations should provide for
an evaluation of the merit of a suit by a third party, by a Department
official, or by a Department hearing official, we see no practical way
to implement such a procedure. Litigants already have the ability to
engage in court-sponsored or independent mediation, in which both
parties can adequately present their positions; if both parties are
amenable to such a two-party assessment, the parties can readily pursue
that course through mediation, and we see no need for the Department to
undertake that role. We see little or no value in entertaining and
evaluating a presentation solely from a defendant institution, whether
that evaluation were to be performed by a Department official or an
administrative hearing official in a Department proceeding. As noted, a
party whose defense is financed by insurance may find the insurer
conducting precisely such an evaluation in conducting the litigation,
and that assessment will influence the conduct of the litigation.
In addition, the proposal that the Department or a third party
assess the merit of an action by a government agency would require the
Department or a third party to interpret the statutes and regulations
on which that agency based its actions as well as assess whether the
action was a reasonable exercise of the agency's authority. We have no
authority to second guess the actions of another agency in the exercise
of its authority, and we would neither presume to do so nor adopt a
procedure in which we would credit such second-guessing by a third
party.
The proposed regulation would treat ``oversight authority'' actions
like actions of Federal or State agencies. By this term, we include
local government entities with power to assert and recover on financial
claims. This consideration applies only to affirmative government
financial claims against the institution, not to government actions
that deny approvals or suits that seek only injunctive or other
curative relief but make no demand for payment. Local authorities can
take enforcement actions that can pose a serious financial risk to the
institution, and we see no basis for disregarding that risk or
undertaking any internal or third-party assessment of
[[Page 75991]]
the merit of the claim. Given the wide range of such government
actions, we agree that those that do not directly seek relief that
affects or relates to borrower defenses under this regulation might
warrant a different assessment of risk than those closely related to
borrower defenses. Generally the risks posed by the events deemed
automatic triggers are events that threaten the viability of the
institution, and the risks to the taxpayer posed by those threats
include risks posed by closed school discharges and unaccounted-for
Federal grant and loan funds. Federal or State agency suits asserting
claims related to the making of a Direct Loan or the provision of
educational services, as the latter term is considered under Department
regulations, pose an additional risk and warrant a different assessment
of risk, because these Federal or State actions not only pose a threat
to the viability of the institution but are also reasonably expected to
give rise to, and support, borrower defense claims. For those suits, we
continue to consider it reasonable to treat the amount claimed in the
suit or discernable from the scope of the allegations to quantify the
potential loss from these suits.\53\ However, we acknowledge the value
of having the obligation to require financial protection depend on
something more than the mere filing of a lawsuit if delaying surety
does not jeopardize our ability to obtain appropriate financial
protection. The summary judgment scheme we adopt for all other
litigation may result in significant delay before protection is
required for borrower defense-related suits, which may impair our
ability to obtain adequate surety. Rather than delaying protection
requirements until summary judgment or even a point close to trial, or
creating some third-party evaluation of the merit of government agency
suits involving borrower defense-related claims, we will rely on the
outcome of the initial opportunity available in the litigation process
itself for an institution to challenge the viability of the suit--the
motion to dismiss. Thus, under these regulations, a government suit
related to potential borrower defenses is a potential triggering event
only if the suit remains pending 120 days after the institution is
served with the complaint. This change provides the institution with
ample time to move to dismiss the suit on any ground, including failure
to state a claim on which relief can be granted.\54\
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\53\ The most prominent recent example of such government
actions that have resulted in judgments--those against Corinthian--
does not suggest that assigning this level of risk to a government
borrower defense-related suit is unreasonable, and, for that reason,
as well, we decline the proposal to consider claims that such suits
should be discounted.
\54\ The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require an answer or
motion to dismiss to be filed within 20 days of service of the
complaint, and also allow a defendant to move at any time for
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(a), (b); 56(b).
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For suits by a Federal or State agency not directly implicating
borrower defenses, and suits by other government agencies, we consider
the summary judgment test applicable to private party lawsuits--not a
motion to dismiss test--to provide a reasonable basis for testing the
degree of risk posed.\55\ Moreover, the threat posed by any of these
suits may have no substantial effect on the composite score of the
institution; as explained above, threats evaluated here require
financial protection only if the threats together produce a failing
composite score under these regulations.
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\55\ The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50
years authorized motions for summary judgment upon proper showings
of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact. Summary
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal
Rules as a whole, which are designed ``to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action.'' . . . Before the
shift to ``notice pleading'' accomplished by the Federal Rules,
motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the
principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or defenses
could be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.
But with the advent of ``notice pleading,'' the motion to dismiss
seldom fulfills this function any more, and its place has been taken
by the motion for summary judgment.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
2555, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recognize that settlements may well achieve highly desirable
outcomes, and that regulations should not create a disincentive to
settlements. Regardless of the position taken in these regulations, a
debt actually incurred under a settlement entered into in the current
fiscal year will be recognized in the financial statements of the
institution eventually submitted for the current year, and will be part
of the financial information on which the institution's composite score
will be calculated for the current year. The concerns raised about
treatment of settlement obligations are therefore concerns only about
how the regulations treat during the current fiscal year those
settlement debts incurred during the current year, not their subsequent
treatment. A settlement debt that the institution can meet will likely
not jeopardize its financial score when actually evaluated, and we
approach such debts from the same perspective by assessing their effect
when incurred using the composite score method as adopted here. We do
not expect that an institution will enter into a settlement that
jeopardizes its viability, and by removing the thresholds and assessing
that debt in a holistic manner, we believe that the regulation will
remove any disincentive to enter into settlement. If an adjusted
composite score includes a potential liability from a suit or oversight
action that eventually results in a settlement, the previously recorded
risk will be accordingly adjusted downward to the settlement amount.
We are retaining the summary judgment test for all non-governmental
suits, because awaiting a final judgment that may cripple the
institution would substantially frustrate our objective to acquire
financial protection at a time when a significant threat is posed and
while the institution is far more likely to be able to afford to
provide that coverage. That alternative is unacceptable for those
reasons, and those who object to use of a summary judgment standard
pose no alternative judicial test that avoids these problems. We
recognize that a complaint that lacks substantive merit may avoid
dismissal if sufficiently well pled, but that such a suit survives
summary judgment only with a showing of some evidence sufficient to
support recovery.\56\ The
[[Page 75992]]
obvious inference from a choice not to file for summary judgment is
that a defendant fears that such a motion would not be well-founded, an
assessment that implies a concession that the suit does pose a risk.
Such a suit is at that point hardly frivolous, and constitutes a
significant threat to the viability of the institution. Summary
judgment is available in Federal court litigation, in which we expect a
significant amount of even private party litigation to be brought, such
as qui tam actions under the False Claims Act. As to the shortcomings
of the summary judgment test under particular State law as asserted by
the commenter, we note that the commenter pointed to only a few States
in which the commenter asserted that summary judgment (or summary
disposition) is less effectively available than in Federal courts.
Institutions are already subject to those limitations, and face
scrutiny by any party from whom the institution seeks investment or
loans for the risks posed by such suits. The consideration we undertake
here is no different in kind.
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\56\ As one writer has observed, ``summary judgment stands as
the only viable postpleading protector against unnecessary trials.''
Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix (2005), 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1329.
The comments that some States adopt summary judgment or summary
adjudication procedures that differ either in labels (e.g.,
California) or in some detail from the Federal standard do not show
that the test is not available or sufficient to meet this objective.
Where a plaintiff asserts several causes of action, a summary
adjudication under Cal.C.C.P. Sec. 437c(f) or similar law, or
partial summary judgment that disposes of some but not all causes of
action, those claims not disposed of remain pending and proceeding
to trial, and therefore continue to pose risk. Furthermore, the
regulations treat a failure to file for summary disposition by a
defendant as a concession that the plaintiff has sufficient evidence
to withstand a motion, and therefore that the claim has sufficient
support to merit presentation to a jury. The fact that a State
permits a plaintiff to seek summary judgment immediately upon
commencement of the action (e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R., rule 3213, 28
U.S.C.A. (McKinney) does not frustrate use of this summary judgment
test by a defendant institution; the institution is required merely
to answer the plaintiff's motion. N.Y. Uniform Dist. Ct. Act Sec.
1004 (McKinney). The institution is not required to make a cross
motion for summary judgment, and may move later for summary
judgment. N.Y. C.P.L.R., rule 3212, 28 U.S.C.A. (McKinney). The
comment cites Virginia law as restricting the defendant's use of
declarations and affidavits as making summary judgment less
effective a test there. Even if this support is disfavored, the
defendant is free to support the motion with ``admissions,
interrogatories, and documents produced'' in discovery. Nicoll v.
City of Norfolk Wetlands Bd., 90 Va. Cir. 169 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2015).
The tool, therefore, remains substantially available to test
meritless cases.
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In response to the commenters who raised concerns about assessing
the potential recovery sought in an action that articulates no specific
financial recovery, we cannot ignore the threats posed by such suits.
The fact that a particular suit may avoid stating a dollar amount of
damages in the complaint in no way affects whether the suit poses a
significant risk to the school. The potential recovery in such suits
may not be obvious from a complaint, but will ordinarily be articulated
in a number of different ways, at least one of which would be routinely
available. For example, the plaintiff may have articulated a specific
financial demand in a written demand made prior to suit. Second, a
plaintiff may have offered to settle the claim for a specific
amount.\57\ Third, defendants engage in discovery, the amount of
financial relief claimed is highly relevant to the handling of the
suit, and we expect that a defendant would invariably seek such
information in discovery. We recognize that suits brought by Federal
and State authorities may and commonly do seek ``rescission,''
``restitution,'' and ``disgorgement'' in unspecified amounts from the
school, with civil penalties, for patterns and practices affecting
students enrolled for years up to the filing.\58\ The institution may
be able to demonstrate that the complaint seeks unstated financial
relief that as pled, pertains only to students enrolled in a particular
program, location, or period of enrollment, and not all students
enrolled at the institution, and may calculate the maximum recovery
sought using data for that cohort.
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\57\ We recognize the settlement negotiations are privileged,
and this option does not in any way diminish that privileged status.
Private parties commonly disclose voluntarily to government agencies
material that is privileged without risk of losing that privilege,
and parties that share a settlement proposal with the Department
under this option would not lose that protection, Thus, the
Department would not disclose, in response to a Freedom of
Information Act request, material regarding settlements if that
material fell within exemption 4 of that Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). 34
CFR 5.11. Such information includes commercial or financial
information provided voluntarily and not customarily disclosed by
the party to the public.
\58\ We derive the default recovery amount of three years of
tuition and fees from actions such as Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v.
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-07194, 2015 WL 10854380 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 27, 2015) (claims for actions over three year period); see
also California v. Heald College, No. CGC-13-534793, Sup. Ct. Cty of
San Francisco (March 23, 2016). (claims based on actions of varying
duration). An institution may demonstrate that lesser amounts are
applicable.
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Together, these changes are expected and designed to enable a
school faced with the kinds of suits the commenters describe to either
vigorously contest the suits as the school sees fit or to settle them.
In either case, even a suit or settlement that might warrant financial
protection in one year, that protection would be required only until
the institution later may achieve a passing composite score despite
recognition of the settlement obligation.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.171(c)(1) to remove both the
$750,000 and 10 percent of current asset threshold amounts for events
that constitute an automatic trigger. Section 668.171(c) is revised to
consider government actions unrelated to borrower defense claim
subjects, and any private party lawsuits, to constitute a triggering
event only if the suit has survived a motion for summary judgment or
disposition, or the institution has not attempted to move for summary
judgment and the suit progresses to a pretrial conference or trial.
Section 668.171(c)(2) is revised to identify the sources from which an
institution may discern the amount of financial recovery sought if that
amount is not stated in the complaint.
Accrediting Agency Actions
Teach-Out Plan Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iii)
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(3)(i), an institution is
not financially responsible if it is currently or was at any time
during the three most recently completed award years required by its
accrediting agency to submit a teach-out plan, for a reason described
in Sec. 602.24(c)(1), that covers the institution or any of its
branches or additional locations.
Some commenters suggested making the submission of a teach-out plan
under 34 CFR 602.24(c) a separate, automatic trigger. The commenters
argued that, unlike accreditor sanctions, the teach-out provisions are
clearer circumstances that suggest the institution may imminently
close.
Commenters argued that a letter of credit for institutions that
trigger the teach-out provision is unnecessary and duplicative of
existing protections in the regulations. The commenters stated that in
the scenario of a closing institution, it is highly unlikely that the
school will be able to obtain a letter of credit, and argued that, as a
result, requiring the closing school to submit a letter of credit could
convert a planned, orderly closing into a sudden shut down, thus
leaving students stranded and harming taxpayers.
Some commenters warned that including the voluntary closure as a
trigger would have unwanted effects. The commenters argued that this
trigger would incent schools to keep locations open, despite the fact
that the locations may no longer be serving its purpose and its
continued presence may constitute a drain on institutional resources.
Forced to choose between a location that is running slightly in the red
and a letter of credit calculated against the entire institution's
title IV expenditures, the commenters believed institutions may have no
choice but to keep the doors open.
Moreover, the commenters argued that requiring a letter of credit
makes little sense in the circumstance in which a school closes one or
more locations, but the institution remains open. The commenters
offered that in any scenario involving the closure of a location but
not the main campus, the Department may pursue derivative student
claims against an institution when those students receive a loan
discharge pursuant to proposed Sec. 685.214.
Some commenters also contended that the closure of locations is
typically designed to increase the financial soundness of an
institution and believed that the Department's records would show that
most individual locations are closed only after an orderly teach-out
and without triggering many (or any) closed school discharges. They
argued that the closing of one or more locations of a school does not
necessarily signal financial instability of a school; it may signal
prudent fiscal controls. Closing locations that are not profitable or
that cannot effectively serve students makes the institution as a whole
more financially responsible and better able
[[Page 75993]]
to serve its remaining students. Consequently, the commenters cautioned
that schools should not be punished for making reasonable business
decisions to conduct an orderly wind down of an additional location.
The commenters recommended that no letter of credit be imposed in the
circumstance of the proposed closure of individual locations, and that
the Department address on a case-by-case basis the appropriateness of
requiring a letter of credit from a school that announces a teach out
of the entire school. Alternatively, if the Department maintains the
letter of credit requirement based on a school's intention to close a
location, the commenters suggested that the letter of credit should
only apply to locations that service 25 percent or more of the
institution's students.
Similarly, other commenters suggested that the Department adopt a
materiality threshold, such as the number of students enrolled or
affected or the title IV dollar amount associated with those students,
because the closure of an additional location may have no adverse
effect on an institution.
In response to the Department's request for comment on whether a
threshold should be established below which the closure of a branch or
additional location would not trigger the letter of credit requirement,
as noted previously, commenters urged the Department to eliminate the
closure of a branch or additional location as a triggering event, or at
minimum, make the trigger discretionary rather than mandatory. If the
Department does not do so, the commenters asserted that a threshold is
then both necessary and appropriate, but the commenters believed that a
letter of credit should be required only if the closure of a branch or
additional location would have a material financial impact on the
school as a whole. The commenters offered that the Department could
request a letter of credit if the closure of a branch or additional
location:
Would reduce total school enrollment by 30 percent or
more;
Would reduce total school title IV receipts by 30 percent
or more; or
Would reduce total school tuition revenues by 30 percent.
Other commenters suggested that the Department extend the 10
percent materiality concept to this situation and apply the letter of
credit requirement only if the closure of a location involves more than
10 percent of the school's population.
Some commenters noted that locations are often part of campus
models that, among other things, bring postsecondary education to areas
that might otherwise have none, and believed that institutions may
elect to forgo these innovative efforts if they are unable to close a
location without incurring a significant financial penalty.
Other commenters suggested that the Department clarify whether the
letter of credit provisions would be applied based on the title IV, HEA
funds received by the main or branch campus, and how the letter of
credit provisions would apply to teach-out plans that might be
submitted for a branch campus instead of the entire main campus.
Discussion: Under the teach-out provisions in 34 CFR 602.24(c)(1),
an accrediting agency must require an institution to submit a teach-out
plan whenever (1) the Department initiates an emergency action or an
action to limit, suspend, or terminate the institution's participation
in the title IV, HEA programs, (2) the accrediting agency acts to
withdraw, terminate, or suspend the institution's accreditation, (3)
the institution notifies the accrediting agency that it intends to
cease operations entirely or close a location that provides 100 percent
of a program, or (4) a State licensing or authorizing agency notifies
the accrediting agency that the institution's license or authority to
provide an educational program has been or will be revoked. The
occurrence of any of these actions may call into question an
institution's ability to continue, placing at risk the welfare of
students attending the institution. However, in keeping with our
treatment for other automatic triggering events, instead of using a
materiality threshold, the Department will recalculate the
institution's composite score (1) based on the loss of title IV, HEA
funds received by students attending the closed location during the
most recently completed fiscal year, and (2) by reducing the expenses
associated with providing programs to those students, as specified in
Appendix C to these regulations. We believe that this approach will
corroborate the position of some of the commenters that closing an
unprofitable location was a good business decision in cases where the
recalculated composite score is higher but not less than the original
score. Otherwise, a failing recalculated composite score shows that
closing the location had an adverse impact on the institution's
financial condition.
Changes: We have added a new Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iii) to provide
that an institution is not financially responsible if it is required by
its accrediting agency to submit a teach-out plan under Sec. 602.24(c)
that covers the institution or any of its branches or additional
locations if, as a result of closing that institution or location, the
institution's recalculated composite score is less than 1.0. In
addition, we provide in Appendix C to subpart L, the adjustments to the
financial statements that are needed to recalculate the composite
score.
Show Cause or Probation Sec. 668.171(g)(5)
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(3)(ii), an institution is
not financially responsible if it is currently, or was at any time
during the three most recently completed award years, placed on
probation or issued a show-cause order, or placed on an accreditation
status that poses an equivalent or greater risk to its accreditation by
its accrediting agency for failing to meet one or more of the agency's
standards, and the accrediting agency does not notify the Secretary
within six months of taking that action that it has withdrawn that
action because the institution has come into compliance with the
agency's standards.
Some commenters were concerned that the scope of the proposed
accrediting agency triggering events is too broad because it includes
matters that do not necessarily pose any existential threat to the
viability of an institution. The commenters stated that an institution
placed on probation or show-cause status does not, in all cases, signal
an imminent threat to the continued viability of the institution that
should automatically require a letter of credit; in the tradition of
accreditation, while these designations are meant to identify and make
public areas of concern at an institution, the goal remains that of
self-improvement and correction.
Other commenters agreed that an institution placed on show cause by
most accrediting agencies is typically at substantial risk of losing
its accreditation, and loss of accreditation would likely have some
impact on its finances and operations. However, the commenters noted
that, in many cases, the agency placed the institution on show cause
because it had demonstrated significant financial and operational
deficiencies that were already having an impact on its business and
educational outcomes. Therefore, the commenters cautioned that in many
cases, it is the reason behind the show cause order (i.e., concerns
about the financial and operational capacity of the institution), and
not the show-cause status itself, that suggests an institution is not
financially responsible.
Some commenters stated that in many cases, an accrediting agency
places an
[[Page 75994]]
institution on probation for issues of academic quality or dysfunction
at the governance level even while the institution's operations and
finances remain strong. The commenters stated that, while the issues
that lead to the probation are certainly not minimal, it would take an
institution longer than six months to correct them. In addition, the
agency will need time to evaluate the changes and determine that the
institution is now in compliance. Moreover, the commenters maintain
that there is no clear evidence that institutions on probation
routinely or uniformly experience operational or financial outcomes as
a result of being on probation, particularly when the issues leading to
the probation are unrelated to finance or operations. Again, the
commenters cautioned that uniformly concluding that all institutions on
probation that cannot correct non-compliance issues in six months are
not financially responsible is overly broad. In addition, the
commenters noted that it effectively punishes an institution that is on
probation for issues not related to financial and operational
deficiencies by requiring the institution to provide a letter of credit
and participate in the title IV, HEA programs under a provisional
certification.
The commenters believed that if the Department intends to rely on
accrediting actions to determine financial responsibility, then the
Department must review the content of the accrediting actions and act
based on the reasons for those actions. As a matter of due process,
each accrediting agency action imposing probation makes highly
individualized findings of non-compliance that provide clear indicators
regarding the institution's risk, as determined by the agency. For
these reasons, the commenters suggested that the Department revise the
show cause and probation provisions to refer specifically to agency
standards related to finances, operations, or institutional ethics or
integrity or related areas.
Other commenters supported tying accrediting agency actions to
financial or operational issues but, in the alternative, would also
support the Department's suggestion during the negotiated rulemaking
process that there be a way for an accrediting agency to inform the
Department as to why its probation or show-cause action will not have
an adverse effect on the institution's financial or operating condition
(see 81 FR 39364). Along somewhat similar lines, other commenters
believed that, if an accrediting agency takes an action against a
school based on financial responsibility concerns, that action should
not supplant the Department's own analysis under subpart L of the
regulations.
Other commenters stated that accreditors do not consider a show-
cause order a negative action--to the contrary, accreditors routinely
use it as a mechanism to promote institutional change and compliance.
The commenters argued the Department itself has not previously taken
the view that a show-cause order or probation was a significant threat
to an institution's financial health by noting that a recent report
listing the institutions the Department required to submit letters of
credit did not identify an accrediting agency action as the basis for
requiring any of those letters of credit. The commenters also noted
that the Department's recent spreadsheet listing the institutions on
heightened cash monitoring indicates that 13 of the 513 institutions
were placed there for Accreditation Problems, which the Department
defined as ``accreditation actions such as the school's accreditation
has been revoked and is under appeal, or the school has been placed on
probation.'' The commenters asserted the spreadsheet establishes (1)
that the Department already has a mechanism for seeking financial
protection from institutions experiencing accreditation problems, and
(2) that a mere show cause order historically has not been viewed as
posing the same risk as revocation or probation. In addition, the
regulations governing recognized accreditors permit an accreditor to
afford an institution up to two years to remedy a show-cause before it
must take action, and the commenters believe that this allowable
timeframe effectively codifies the notion that a show-cause order is
neither a sign of impending financial failure, nor a matter than an
institution would expect to resolve in six months' time. See 34 CFR
602.20.
Other commenters agreed with the Department that actions taken by
an accreditor could be a sign that the institution may imminently lose
access to Federal financial aid. In those cases, the commenters
believed that asking for additional funds upfront would be a sensible
step as an advance protection for taxpayers. However, the commenters
point to recent review of accreditor actions over the last five years
showing that the current sanctions system is highly inconsistent. The
commenters stated this inconsistency was true with respect to
terminology, the frequency with which actions happen, and how long an
institution stays on a negative status. (Antoinette Flores's ``Watching
the Watchdogs,'' published in June 2016). Given this inconsistency, the
commenters recommend making the following changes to the proposed
accrediting triggering events.
Commenters suggested that the Department make accreditor actions a
discretionary trigger because, given the inconsistency among
accreditors, establishing an automatic trigger tied to negative
sanctions may be difficult. They stated that accreditors do not
interpret what it means to be on probation or show cause in the same
way. In addition, the commenters stated that making sanctions by
accreditors an automatic trigger also risks making them unlikely to
take action when they should.
The commenters note that a clear finding from the research,
``Watching the Watchdogs,'' is that many accreditors put institutions
on a negative status for a very short period of time, while other
accreditors required institutions facing a sanction to stay in that
status for at least a year. The commenters were concerned that setting
a clear threshold of six months would give an institution too much
leverage to argue that its accreditor should withdraw the sanctions
sooner than the accreditor otherwise would.
Discussion: In view of the significant number of comments that a
probation or show cause action taken by an accrediting agency may not
be tied to a financial reason or have financial repercussions, and
could have serious unintended consequences as an automatic trigger, we
are revising this trigger to make it discretionary. As such, we will
work with accrediting agencies to determine the nature and gravity of
the reasons that a probation or show cause action was taken and assess
whether that action is material or would otherwise have an adverse
impact on an institution's financial condition or operations. Moreover,
under this approach, the proposed six-month waiting period for an
institution to come into compliance with accrediting agency standards
is no longer necessary.
Changes: We have reclassified and relocated the automatic probation
and show-cause trigger in proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(3)(ii) as a
discretionary trigger under Sec. 668.171(g)(5) and revised the trigger
by removing the six-month compliance provision.
Gainful Employment Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iv)
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(7), an institution would
not be financially responsible if, as determined annually by the
Secretary, the number of title IV recipients
[[Page 75995]]
enrolled in gainful employment (GE) programs that are failing or in the
zone under the D/E rates measure in Sec. 668.403(c) is more than 50
percent of the total number of title IV recipients who are enrolled in
all the GE programs at the institution. An institution is exempt from
this provision if fewer than 50 percent of its title IV recipients are
enrolled in GE programs.
Some commenters noted that many institutions subject to the GE
regulations have limited program offerings, and in some cases offer
only one program. For those institutions, a single program scoring in
the zone will result in more than 50 percent of its students being
enrolled in zone-scoring programs. The commenters further noted that
the GE regulations provide for a runway for institutions to bring
programs into compliance, and institutions do so through cost
reductions that are passed along to students. The commenters reasoned
that imposing a letter of credit requirement on such an institution
would deprive it of curative resources and ultimately lead to a closure
of the program, rather than its remediation.
In response to the Department's request for comment on whether the
majority of students who enroll in zone or failing GE programs is an
appropriate threshold, commenters offered several observations and
recommendations.
First, the commenters believed that a simple tally of the number of
GE programs that may be failing or in the zone at a given point in time
will not produce a consistently accurate assessment of an institution's
current or future financial stability. The first set of debt-to-
earnings rates, for example, are based on debt and earnings information
for students who graduated between the 2008-09 and 2011-12 award years
(assuming an expanded cohort). See generally 34 CFR 668.404. By the
time the associated debt-to-earnings ratio for these programs are
released (likely early 2017), many institutions will be offering new or
different programs that are designed to perform favorably under the GE
framework. Though, as of 2017, a significant number of the students may
still be enrolled in the institution's older GE programs, these
programs will no longer be integral to the institution's business
model, and indeed, may be in a stage of phase-out. For this reason, the
commenters suggested that any reasonable assessment of an institution's
financial health would need to account for the phase-out of older GE
programs and the strength of the newer ones.
Second, the commenters recommended that the Department exclude from
this determination any GE programs that are in the zone, or at a
minimum, GE programs that have only been in the zone for two or fewer
years. The commenters argued that, because a GE program must be in the
zone for four consecutive years for which rates are calculated before
it loses eligibility, the inclusion of a zone program prior to this
point does not justify the presumption that the program may lose
eligibility.
Finally, the commenters suggested that, rather than exempting
institutions where fewer than 50 percent of the title IV recipients are
enrolled in GE programs, the regulations should simply compare the
number of students who receive title IV, HEA funds and are enrolled in
failing GE programs to the total number of students. The commenters
believed this approach would be a better and more straightforward
measure of the risk of financial failure posed to the entire
institution.
Discussion: We appreciate the concerns and suggestions made by the
commenters regarding the GE trigger and are persuaded that the trigger
should be revised to (1) account for the time that an institution has
to improve a GE program in the zone, and (2) focus more on the
financial impact of failing programs instead of the percentage of
students enrolled in GE programs.
We proposed including zone programs in the GE trigger because there
are no assurances that an institution will attempt to improve or
succeed in improving those programs. However, we agree that the
proposed trigger could influence an institution to discontinue an
improving program prematurely or hold an institution accountable for
poorly performing programs that it voluntarily discontinues. In
proposing the 50 percent threshold, we were attempting to limit this
trigger to those situations where the potential loss of program
eligibility would have a material financial impact on an institution.
But, as alluded to by the commenters, the percentage threshold based on
title IV recipients may not apply to situations where an institution
discontinues a zone program, or cases where 50 percent of the title IV
recipients enrolled at an institution account for a small fraction of
(1) the total number of students enrolled, or (2) institutional
revenue.
To address these concerns, we are revising the GE trigger by
considering only those programs that are one year away from losing
their eligibility for title IV, HEA program funds and assessing the
impact of that program's closure and any potential loss under the
recalculated composite score approach. Specifically, the Department
will use the amount of title IV, HEA program funds the institution
received for those programs during its most recently completed fiscal
year as the potential loss and recalculate the composite score based on
that amount and an allowance for reductions in expenses that would
occur if those programs were discontinued.
Changes: We have revised the GE trigger as described above. We have
also revised the GE trigger in Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iv) to provide that
the loss used in recalculating the institution's composite score under
Sec. 668.171(c)(2) is the amount of title IV, HEA program funds the
institution received for affected programs during the most recently
completed fiscal year. Lastly, we specify in Appendix C to subpart L,
the changes needed to reflect that loss of funding and the reduction in
educational expenses associated with discontinuing those programs.
Withdrawal of Owner's Equity Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(v)
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(8), an institution whose
composite score is less than 1.5 is not financially responsible if
there is any withdrawal of owner's equity from the institution by any
means, including by declaring a dividend.
Some commenters appreciated the provision in Sec. 668.171(d)(2)
that would allow an institution whose composite score is based on the
consolidated financial statements of a group of institutions, to report
that an amount withdrawn from one institution was transferred to
another entity within that group. However, the commenters argued that,
since the Department is aware of the institutions whose composite
scores are calculated based on consolidated financial statements,
requiring those institutions to report every intercompany funds
transfer imposes an unnecessary burden because the reporting provides
little if any benefit to the Department. Therefore, the commenters
recommend amending proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(8) to expressly exclude
any withdrawal of equity that falls within the circumstances described
in Sec. 668.171(d)(2).
Other commenters assumed that this provision is intended to apply
only to proprietary institutions because nonprofits do not have owners.
However, because in financial reporting, the term ``equity'' is often
used conceptually to refer both to owner's equity for businesses or net
assets for nonprofits, the commenters recommended that the Department
clarify in the final regulations that this provision applies only to
proprietary institutions.
[[Page 75996]]
Discussion: We agree that, where a composite score is calculated
based on the consolidated financial statements of a group of
institutions, funds transfers between institutions in the group should
not be reported as withdrawals of owner's equity. The trigger for the
withdrawal of owner's equity was based on the reporting requirement
under the zone alternative in current Sec. 668.175(d)(2)(ii)(E), which
applies only to proprietary institutions. We agree to clarify in the
regulations that as a triggering event under Sec. 668.171(c), the
withdrawal of owner's equity applies only to proprietary institutions.
In addition, by recalculating the composite score we capture the
impact of withdrawals of owner's equity in cases where the withdrawals
were not made solely to meet tax liabilities.
Changes: We have revised the withdrawal of owner's equity trigger
now in Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(v) to specify that it applies only to a
proprietary institution and that it does not include transfers to an
entity included in the affiliated entity group on whose basis the
institution's composite score was calculated. In addition, we specify
in Sec. 668.171(c)(2)(iv)(B) that except for a withdrawal used solely
to meet tax liabilities, as provided under Sec. 668.171(h)(3)(ii), the
Secretary will recalculate the institution's composite score to account
for that withdrawal.
Cohort Default Rates Sec. 668.171(f)
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(9), an institution is not
financially responsible if its two most recent official cohort default
rates are 30 percent or greater, unless the institution files a
challenge, request for adjustment, or appeal with respect to its rates
for one or both of those fiscal years and that action remains pending,
results in reducing below 30 percent the official cohort default rate
for either or both years, or precludes the rates from either or both
years from resulting in a loss of eligibility or provisional
certification.
Some commenters urged the Department to remove the cohort default
rate trigger, citing concerns that this trigger would have unintended
consequences. The commenters believed that, because of the
corresponding letter of credit requirements, it is likely that banks
would curtail their lending to affected institutions making it more
difficult for those institutions to initiate, or continue with,
innovative educational efforts that are often capital-intensive.
In response to the Department's request for comment on whether a
cohort default rate of 30 percent or more for a single year should be a
triggering event, some commenters believed that the proposed two-year
trigger should not be changed. One commenter suggested that this
trigger should apply to any institution whose most recent cohort
default rate is 30 percent or higher, arguing that keeping default
rates below 30 percent is a very low standard for an institution to
meet--only 3.2 percent of institutions have a default rate of 30
percent or higher. The commenter noted that, among all students
attending institutions of higher education where the default rate is 30
percent or higher, 85 percent attend public institutions and just 11
percent attend proprietary institutions. The commenter urged the
Department not to exempt public institutions from this trigger if the
Department's goal is to protect as many students as possible.
Discussion: We wish to make clear that the Department will not
apply the cohort default rate trigger until any challenge, request for
adjustment, or appeal that an institution qualifies to file, under
subpart N of the General Provisions regulations, is resolved. If that
action is resolved in favor of the institution, the Department will
take no further action and make no further requests of the institution
with regard to this trigger. Otherwise, after the challenge, request,
or appeal is resolved, the Department will apply the cohort default
rate trigger and request the corresponding financial protection from
the institution.
We disagree with the notion that a bank will curtail its lending to
an institution solely because the Department requests financial
protection under this trigger. Like other creditors, a bank would
assess the risks inherent in making a lending decision, including
regulatory risks. In this case, under the statutory provisions in
section 435(a)(2) of the HEA, pending any appeal for, or adjustment to,
its cohort default rates the institution is one year away from losing
its eligibility for title IV, HEA funds. Although an institution's
intention to initiate or continue innovative educational efforts are
laudable, we believe it is questionable that a bank would jeopardize
funds requested by the institution after having assessed the risks of
whether the institution could repay those funds in the event that the
institution's eligibility under the title IV, HEA programs is
terminated in the near term.
With regard to the Department's request for comment, we are
persuaded to maintain the proposed two-year threshold.
With respect to the comment that, to protect as many students as
possible, the Department should not exempt a public institution from
the cohort default rate trigger, we note that while cohort default
rates for all institutions are publicly available and can be used by
students and parents in making enrollment decisions for particular
institutions, the purpose of this trigger is to protect the Federal
interest in the event an institution loses its eligibility for title
IV, HEA funds in the coming year. In that circumstance for a public
institution, we already have financial protection in the form of full
faith and credit of the State to cover any liabilities that may arise
(see the discussion under the heading ``Public Domestic and Foreign
Institutions'').
Changes: None.
Non-Title IV Revenue (90/10) Sec. 668.171(d)
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(5), a proprietary
institution is not financially responsible if it does not derive at
least 10 percent of its revenue from sources other than title IV, HEA
program funds during its most recently completed fiscal year.
Some commenters believed this trigger was unjustified, arguing that
an institution's eligibility to participate in the title IV, HEA
programs is not at risk after a one-year failure. The commenters stated
that section 487(d)(2) of the HEA provides that no penalties are
imposed on an institution until it loses title IV eligibility by
failing the 90/10 revenue test for two consecutive years, and that the
sanctions that are specified do not include the financial
responsibility consequences proposed under this trigger. For these
reasons, the commenters concluded that, lacking specific statutory
authority, the Department should remove this trigger from the final
regulations.
Other commenters were concerned that institutions actively game the
90/10 requirements by (1) delaying title IV disbursements until the
next fiscal year; (2) combining locations that exceed the 90 percent
revenue limit with those that do not, and (3) raising tuition, which
forces students to take out private loans that increase revenue from
non-title IV sources. The commenters believed that these gaming
strategies are the reason that only a few institutions fail the 90/10
revenue test each year (14 institutions for the 2013-14 reporting
period) and urged the Department to limit the use of these strategies,
recommending for example, that Department track for three years the 90/
10 compliance for each location included at the institution's request
under a single PPA or that the Department should not grant those
[[Page 75997]]
requests when institutional 90/10 compliance is in question.
Discussion: As we noted in the preamble to the NPRM, an institution
that fails the 90/10 revenue test for one year, is one year away from
losing its title IV eligibility. Under Sec. 668.28(c)(3), an
institution that fails the revenue test must notify the Department of
that failure no later 45 days after the end of its fiscal year. If the
institution fails again in the subsequent fiscal year, it loses its
eligibility for title IV, HEA funds on the day following the end of its
fiscal year, not at the end of the 45-day reporting period. After the
end of its fiscal year, the institution's ability to continue to make
disbursements to enrolled students is severely limited under the
provisions in Sec. 668.26. Consequently, in view of the institution's
dependence on revenues from title IV, HEA funds that it is no longer
eligible to receive, it is likely that the institution would close,
possibly precipitously, leading to closed school discharges and program
liabilities owed to the Department. These are the same outcomes that
would result from an existential threat, such as a crippling lawsuit or
loss of accreditation, for which financial protection is authorized
under the financial responsibility provisions in section 498(c) of the
HEA.
Contrary to the commenters' assertion that there is no risk to an
institution's eligibility after a one-year failure, the HEA
contemplates that risk under section 487(d)(2)(B) by providing that
after a one year failure, the institution automatically becomes
provisionally certified and remains on that status for the following
two years, unless it fails the 90/10 revenue test in the subsequent
year and loses eligibility. Moreover, the Department's authority to
establish 90/10 as a basis for determining whether an institution is
financially responsible is anchored under the provisions in section
498(c)(1) of the HEA, not the provisions governing the institution's
eligibility under the 90/10 revenue provisions.
With regard to the comments about institutions evading the 90/10
requirements, we note that changes to these requirements are beyond the
scope of this rulemaking. Administratively however, the Department will
continue to diligently enforce the 90/10 requirements and work closely
with the Office of the Inspector General to help ensure that
institutions properly calculate their 90/10 rates.
Changes: None.
Publicly Traded Institutions Sec. 668.171(e)
General
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(6), a publicly traded
institution is not financially responsible if the SEC warns the
institution that it may suspend trading on the institution's stock, the
institution's stock is delisted involuntarily from the exchange on
which it was traded, the institution disclosed in a report to the SEC
that it is subject to a judicial or administrative proceeding, the
institution failed to file timely a required report with the SEC, or
the exchange on which the institution's stock is traded notifies the
institution that it is not in compliance with exchange requirements.
Commenters believed that the NPRM did not provide meaningful
rationale for some of the provisions that the Department asserts
require financial protection, pointing for example to an institution's
failure to file a timely report with the SEC, or noncompliance with
exchange requirements, and noting that the Department only suggested
that such events could lead to institutional failure. In response to
the Department's request for comment regarding how these triggers could
be more narrowly tailored to capture only those circumstances that
could pose a risk to an institution's financial health, the commenters
offered that the final regulations should provide that in every
instance where an SEC action occurs, the Department will only take
action after it affords the institution a notice and hearing and
thereafter makes a reasoned determination that the event is likely to
result in a material adverse effect. The commenters further stated
that, to be a triggering event, any SEC action should be a final, non-
appealable judgment or suspension and not merely a warning or
notification. The commenters also stated that because many companies
inadvertently and regularly miss a periodic filing deadline, the final
regulations should require a finding of materiality, as applied to the
delinquency of the filing, and the Department should consider whether
the filing failure is an isolated incident or part of a pattern of
conduct, and whether the missed filing was the fault of the
institution.
Similarly, in response to the Department's request for comment,
other commenters identified the following situations that they believed
would provide for a more appropriate set of triggers for publicly
traded institutions:
(1) The institution is in default on an obligation to make payments
under a credit facility, or other debt instrument, and the default
involves an amount in excess of 10 percent of the institution's current
assets, and the default is not cured within 30 days;
(2) An event of default has been declared by the relevant lender or
trustee under any outstanding credit facility or debt instrument of the
institution or its parent, including any bond indenture, and the
default is not cured within 30 days; or
(3) The institution or its parent declares itself insolvent, files
a petition for reorganization or bankruptcy under any Federal
bankruptcy statute, or makes an assignment for the benefit of
creditors.
The commenters believed that adopting the recommended triggers
would enable the Department to efficiently identify those cases in
which a publicly traded institution is in financial trouble, and would
avoid conflating investor-facing disclosures or nonmaterial
administrative matters (e.g., failure to timely file a required report,
notification of non-compliance with exchange requirements) with
reliable indicators of financial distress.
Discussion: With regard to the suggestion that the Department apply
these triggering events only when an SEC action is what the commenter
describes as a final, non-appealable judgment or suspension, and not a
warning or notification, doing so would further distance these events
as early but significant indicators of serious financial distress. We
understand that the warning is issued by the SEC only after repeated
efforts have already been made to alert the delinquent party of the
need to file, and despite these attempts, the registrant continues to
fail to respond. We understand that the consequences of failure to file
timely required reports after this warning include significant burdens
should the institution wish to raise capital, and that not uncommonly,
the reason a registrant becomes so delinquent as to be issued this
warning is that the registrant has ceased operations. We are not
capturing, or requiring contemporaneous reporting of, the actions and
circumstances that give rise to an SEC or exchange action--information
that may at an early stage forecast operational or financial
difficulties--because that would be unmanageable and could lead to
erroneous conclusions. Instead, we are relying on the conclusions
reached by the SEC and the stock exchange that the actions taken by the
institution warrant a significant and corresponding reaction.
With regard to the proposal that the Department take action to
impose financial protection based on an SEC or
[[Page 75998]]
exchange action only after providing the institution an opportunity for
a hearing and a case-by-case evaluation of the significance of the
particular event on which the SEC or exchange acted, we note that Sec.
668.171(h)(3)(iv) provides the institution with an opportunity at the
time it reports the event to demonstrate that the condition no longer
exists, has been cured or, that it has insurance that will cover any
and all debts and liabilities that arise at any time from that
triggering event. The liabilities referred to here are those that arise
from a precipitous closure of an institution, including, but not
limited to losses from closed school discharges, and liabilities for
grant and loan funds not accounted for as properly spent by the
statutorily required compliance audit. If the Department takes an
enforcement action based on this trigger, or any other automatic
triggering events, to condition the continuing participation of the
institution on providing the required financial protection, Sec.
668.90(a)(3)(iii)(A) provides the institution a more formal opportunity
to demonstrate these defenses. The event itself is of such significance
that the Department considers only these defenses, and not contentions
that the event itself is not grounds for requiring protection.
While we appreciate the suggestions made by the commenters to
streamline the triggers for publicly traded institutions, particularly
with regard to making payments under a credit facility, as discussed
more thoroughly under the heading ``Violation of Loan Agreement,'' we
have made these provisions discretionary and they apply to all
institutions. While we agree that some of the situations described
would signal serious distress, under these regulations we will make
those determinations on a case-by-case basis. As previously noted, if
the lender files suit as a result of the delinquency, that suit would
be considered under the private litigation assessment in Sec.
668.171(c)(1)(ii).
Changes: None.
Delisting
Comments: With regard to the triggers pertaining to a warning from
the SEC that it may suspend trading and the involuntary delisting of an
institution's stock, some commenters found the correlation the
Department was attempting to make between an institution's failure to
comply with exchange requirements and its ability to meet its financial
obligations troublesome.
The commenters argued that, while a delisting is significant,
correlating an institution's financial health to its delisting
incorrectly assumes that the delisting is generated as a result of
financial problems and the delisting will materially impact the
institution's financial health. Even where the delisting is itself
related to something that is measured in dollars, like a minimum bid
price, that measure is not necessarily indicative of the health of an
institution, as opposed to the market value of a share of the
institution.
Discussion: While the commenters are technically correct that an
involuntary delisting does not necessarily mean that an institution has
financial problems, it could equally or more likely mean that it does.
Even worse, the delisting may be a prelude to bankruptcy. Generally
speaking, financially healthy institutions are not involuntarily
delisted. As discussed in the preceding comment, the regulations
provide the institution ample informal and formal opportunities to show
that the risks that the triggering event may cause have been removed by
curing the event itself. These liabilities are those that ensue from a
precipitous closure, as described above. An institution's financial
viability under the Department's composite score methodology assesses,
as explained earlier, the ability of the institution to borrow and
access capital as needed. Delisting and SEC actions directly affect the
ability of a publicly-traded institution to access capital. An
institution may contend that the event on which the action was premised
does not portend closure, but the action by the exchange or SEC
unquestionably affects the ability of the institution to obtain
financing, a critical aspect of financial viability. While the negative
effect of that impairment may be difficult to quantify, and cannot
immediately be assessed under the composite score methodology, that
impairment warrants requiring financial protection.
Changes: None.
SEC Filings Regarding Judicial or Administrative Proceeding
Comments: With regard to judicial or administrative proceedings,
some commenters noted that the SEC's requirements are designed to
encourage disclosure of information to potential investors and
cautioned that the proposed regulations may discourage those
disclosures. The commenters believed that although the proposed
reporting requirements under Sec. 668.171(d)(i) would permit an
institution to explain why a particular litigation or suit does not
constitute a material adverse event that would pose an actual risk to
its financial health, a publicly traded institution that elects to make
broad disclosures to the SEC and potential investors would be dependent
on the Department agreeing with the institution's position. If the
Department disagrees, the commenters opined that the institution would
face a financial penalty (i.e., be required to submit a letter of
credit) for a situation where the disclosure may not have been required
by the SEC in the first place. Along similar lines, other commenters
noted that the reporting provisions do not require the Department to
act on any evidence provided by the institution, and do not specify
what opportunity, if any, the institution would have to discuss these
events with the Department. For these reasons, the commenters suggested
that the Department should not implement regulations that would
interfere with the primary purpose of SEC disclosures--to permit
potential investors to make their own decisions about whether to invest
in the institution.
Similarly, other commenters believed this triggering event would
run counter to the long-standing practice of publicly traded
institutions generally erring on the side of disclosing legal and
regulatory events to the public and their shareholders. More
specifically, the commenters asserted that publicly traded institutions
tend to over-disclose these events, particularly since the materiality
of those events often cannot be reasonably determined at their onset.
Discussion: We acknowledge that a judicial or administrative
proceeding reported by an institution to the SEC may or may not be
material. We believe that proceedings reported in SEC filings that seek
substantial recovery but may not be meritorious pose a risk similar to
the risk posed by non-governmental actions. The institution may succeed
in dismissing such a suit, or at least testing its merit by moving for
summary judgment or disposition. The institution may also have
insurance that fully protects the institution from loss from the suit.
Changes: We have added a new Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(ii) to treat all
private party litigation as a triggering event only if the action
survives a motion for summary judgment or disposition, or the
institution has chosen not to file for summary judgment, and have
amended Sec. 668.171(h) to enable the institution to demonstrate that
all actual and potential losses stemming from that litigation are
covered by insurance.
SEC Reports Filed Timely
Comments: With respect to the trigger for filing timely SEC reports
under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(6)(iii), some commenters warned that
the
[[Page 75999]]
Department should not assume that an institution is unable to meet its
financial or administrative obligations and impose punitive actions
based on a failure to meet SEC filing requirements. As an initial
matter, the commenters argued that the proposed trigger is more
stringent than the SEC's rules, which allow an institution to file a
notification of late filing, that enables the institution to file the
report by an extended deadline, and once filed the institution would be
deemed to have timely filed the report. In addition, the commenters
stated that an institution's failure to file a report may not
necessarily reflect that the institution is unable to meet its
financial or administrative obligations, because the report could be
late for many reasons outside of financial problems at an institution,
including the unavailability of an individual required to sign the
report, an unforeseen circumstance with an institution's auditors, or
the need to address a financial restatement done for technical reasons.
Similarly, other commenters urged the Department to apply this trigger
only where the filing would be considered late under SEC rules. The
commenters explained that pursuant to SEC rules, an institution that
fails to timely file a report must file a Form 12b-25, reporting the
failure to file no later than one business day after the report was
due. If the Form 12b-25 is properly filed, the institution will have 15
additional calendar days to file an annual report or five additional
calendar days to file a quarterly report. If the institution files the
late report within the extended deadline, the SEC considers that the
report was timely filed.
Discussion: A late SEC filing, or failure to file, may precipitate
an adverse action against an institution by the SEC or a stock
exchange. For example, an AMEX or Nasdaq-listed institution that files
a late SEC report is cited for failing to meet exchange requirements
and will be required by the exchange to submit a plan for regaining
compliance with listing requirements. The exchange may suspend trading
on the institution's stock if it does not come into compliance with
those requirements. Or, a late filing may limit the institution's
ability to conduct certain types of registered securities offerings. In
addition, capital markets tend to react negatively in response to late
filings. All told, the consequences of late SEC filing may impact the
institution's capital position or its ability to raise capital, and we
believe that it remains a significant event to include as an automatic
trigger.
Changes: None.
Discretionary Triggering Events Sec. 668.171(g)
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(10), an institution is
not financially responsible if the Secretary determines that there is
an event or condition that is reasonably likely to have a material
adverse effect on the financial condition, business, or results of
operations of the institution, including but not limited to whether (1)
there is a significant fluctuation in the amount of Direct Loan or Pell
Grant funds received by the institution that cannot be accounted for by
changes in those programs, (2) the institution is cited by a State
licensing or authorizing agency for failing State or agency
requirements, (3) the institution fails a financial stress test
developed or adopted by the Secretary to evaluate whether the
institution has sufficient capital to absorb losses that may be
incurred as a result of adverse conditions, or (4) the institution or
its corporate parent has a non-investment grade bond or credit rating.
Commenters believed that the proposed discretionary triggers were
unreasonable for several reasons. First, the commenters noted that the
discretionary provisions do not afford institutions any opportunity to
communicate with the Department regarding a possible materiality
determination. Instead, it appeared to the commenters that the
Department may determine unilaterally, and without engaging the school,
that there is an event or condition that is reasonably likely to have a
material adverse effect and proceed to demand financial protection,
violating the school's due process. Moreover, the commenters argued
that any standard of financial responsibility that does not permit the
receipt and review of information from the school cannot produce
consistent and accurate results and, as such, fails to satisfy the
reasonability standard put into place by Congress.
Second, the commenters noted that the Department did not define the
term ``material adverse effect'' and made no mention of the concept in
the preamble to the proposed regulations. The commenters asserted that
the Department must define this term to ensure that the regulations are
consistently applied, particularly where an institution could be
significantly penalized (required to submit a letter of credit) pending
the result of the determination.
Third, the commenters argued that by requiring under proposed Sec.
668.171(d) that an institution must report any automatic or
discretionary trigger within 10 days, the proposed regulations are
unworkable--because the discretionary triggers are not exhaustive, an
institution would have an obligation to speculate as to the types of
events the Department might determine would have a material adverse
effect and report those events. Conversely, the commenters were
concerned that the Department could argue that an institution's failure
to report an event, that the Department might deem likely to have
material adverse effect, is a failure to provide timely notice under
Sec. 668.171(d), and grounds to initiate a proceeding.
Fourth, the commenters argued that the six examples of events that
the Department might consider ``reasonably likely'' to have a material
adverse effect on an institution are vague, and asserted that the
Department offered no factual support in the preamble for the notion
that these events regularly, or even more often than not, lead to
financial instability at an institution. The commenters stated that the
only rationale the Department offers for including these six events is
that each could, in theory, signal financial stress. For example, they
noted that a citation from a State-authorizing agency for failing a
State requirement could concern almost any aspect of an institution's
operations. The commenters contended that routine citations occur with
great frequency in annual visit reports and routine audits. Therefore,
under the proposed regulations, an institution would be required to
report every citation, without regard to materiality, frequency, or the
relationship to the institution's financial health. According to the
commenters, events such as ``high annual dropout rates,'' a
``significant fluctuation'' in the amount of Federal financial aid
funds received by an institution, an undisclosed stress test, and an
adverse event reported on a Form 8-K with the SEC are equally
problematic and vague. Commenters stated that it was unclear what these
thresholds or events represent, how they would be evaluated, or how an
institution would know that one has occurred and report it to the
Department.
Other commenters believed that the Secretary should not have open-
ended discretion to determine which categories of events or conditions
would be financial responsibility triggers. Like other commenters,
these commenters argued that as a practical matter it
[[Page 76000]]
would likely be impossible for an institution to comply with the
reporting requirements in proposed Sec. 668.171(d) for any event or
condition that is not specifically identified by the Secretary because
the institution would have to guess which additional events or
conditions might be of interest. Similarly, some commenters believed
the discretionary triggers should be exhaustive with established
parameters so that institutions know the events they must comply with
and report to the Department.
Some commenters believed that the discretionary triggers constitute
an open invitation for litigation by anyone with an ``axe to grind''
with any school. The commenters were concerned that the Secretary could
use the expanded authority under the discretionary triggers to take
actions against institutions for any reason.
Discussion: As a general matter, the discretionary triggers are
intended to identify factors or events that are reasonably likely to,
but would not in every case, have an adverse financial impact on an
institution. Compared to the automatic triggers, where the impact of an
action or event can be reasonably and readily assessed (e.g., claims,
liabilities, and potential losses are reflected in the recalculated
composite score), the materiality or impact of the discretionary
triggers is not as apparent. The Department will have to conduct a
case-by-case review and analysis of the factors or events applicable to
an institution to determine whether one or more of those factors or
events has an adverse financial impact. In so doing, the Department may
request additional information or clarification from the institution
about the circumstances surrounding the factors or events under review.
If the Department determines that the factors or events have a material
adverse effect on the institution's financial condition or operations,
the Department notifies the institution of the reasons for, and
consequences of, that determination. As for the comment that we should
define ``material adverse effect,'' we do not intend to adopt a
specific measure here, because identification of those events that
cause such an effect is a particularized judgment.\59\ We disagree with
the notion that it is inappropriate for the Department to determine
which factors or events may be used as discretionary triggers, or that
the list of factors and events in the regulations should be exhaustive.
Each discretionary trigger rests on a particularized judgment that a
factor or event has or demonstrates such a substantial negative
condition or impact on the institution as to place continued operations
in jeopardy.\60\ In this regard, as explained more fully under the
heading ``Reporting Requirements,'' an institution is responsible for
reporting only the actions and events specified in these regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Accounting rules do not set a specific figure for such
effects. However, SEC regulations require the registrant to disclose
resources the loss of which would have a material adverse effect on
the registrant, and in that rule explicitly require the registrant
to disclose an investment of 10 percent or more of company resources
in an entity, 17 CFR 210.1-02(w), and identify any customer or
revenue source that accounts for 10 percent or more of the
registrant's consolidated revenues, if the loss of that revenue
would constitute a material adverse effect. 17 CFR 229.101(c)(1)(i),
(vii). While not defining material adverse effect, the selection of
this threshold supports an inference that loss of this magnitude can
be expected to constitute a material adverse effect. A popular
characterization of the significance of such a loss states that
material adverse effect is a term that commonly denotes an effect
that
. . . usually signals a severe decline in profitability and/or
the possibility that the company's operations and/or financial
position may be seriously compromised. This is a clear signal to
investors that there is something wrong . . . Material adverse
effect is not an early warning signal, but rather a sign that a
situation has already deteriorated to a very bad stage. Investopedia
www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/112702.asp#ixzz4JKIpsbwk.
\60\ The assessment would look to the factors identified in
recent revisions to Financial Accounting Standards Board rules
regarding the expectations regarding whether the entity's ability to
continue as a going concern. FASB Standards Update, No. 2014-15,
Presentation of Financial Statements--Going Concern (Subtopic 205-
40):
205-40-55-2 The following are examples of adverse conditions and
events that may raise substantial doubt about an entity's ability to
continue as a going concern. The examples are not all-inclusive. The
existence of one or more of these conditions or events does not
determine that there is substantial doubt about an entity's ability
to continue as a going concern. Similarly, the absence of those
conditions or events does not determine that there is no substantial
doubt about an entity's ability to continue as a going concern.
Determining whether there is substantial doubt depends on an
assessment of relevant conditions and events, in the aggregate, that
are known and reasonably knowable at the date that the financial
statements are issued (or at the date the financial statements are
available to be issued when applicable). An entity should weigh the
likelihood and magnitude of the potential effects of the relevant
conditions and events, and consider their anticipated timing. a.
Negative financial trends, for example, recurring operating losses,
working capital deficiencies, negative cash flows from operating
activities, and other adverse key financial ratios. b. Other
indications of possible financial difficulties, for example, default
on loans or similar agreements, arrearages in dividends, denial of
usual trade credit from suppliers, a need to restructure debt to
avoid default, noncompliance with statutory capital requirements,
and a need to seek new sources or methods of financing or to dispose
of substantial assets. c. Internal matters, for example, work
stoppages or other labor difficulties, substantial dependence on the
success of a particular project, uneconomic long-term commitments,
and a need to significantly revise operations. d. External matters,
for example, legal proceedings, legislation, or similar matters that
might jeopardize the entity's ability to operate; loss of a key
franchise, license, or patent; loss of a principal customer or
supplier; and an uninsured or underinsured catastrophe such as a
hurricane, tornado, earthquake, or flood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We address specific concerns and suggestions about the
discretionary triggers in the following discussion for each factor or
event. In addition, we have added pending borrower defense claims as a
discretionary trigger because it is possible that an administrative
action could cause an influx of borrower defense claims that we can
expect to be successful, though that will vary on a case-by-case basis.
Changes: None.
Discretionary Triggering Events
Bond or Credit Rating, Proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(11)
Comments: Commenters argued that a non-investment grade bond or
credit rating is not a reliable indicator of financial problems. The
commenters stated that, because the rating assigned by a rating agency
is a measure designed for the benefit of creditors concerned solely
with pricing the institution's debt, a rating below investment grade
does not necessarily mean that an institution cannot meet its financial
obligations. Moreover, the commenters questioned how the Department
would determine that an institution or its corporate parent had a non-
investment grade rating, since there are multiple rating agencies and
the agencies may not necessarily assign the same rating to a particular
institution or in the case where the institution or its corporate
parent have multiple ratings, some of which are investment grade. The
commenters stated that this financial structuring is not unusual and
has no impact on the ability of the institution to meet its
obligations. For these reasons, the commenters suggested that, if the
Department retains bond or credit ratings as a triggering event, it
should specify how those ratings are determined. In addition, the
commenters were concerned that applying this trigger could potentially
increase costs to institutions because, in an effort to avoid this risk
of a non-investment grade rating, an institution may seek not to have a
credit rating in the first place, so obtaining alternate financing
could increase its costs of capital.
Other commenters argued that assuming that schools with
noninvestment grade bond ratings are somehow deficient is unwarranted.
The commenters noted that the majority of nonprofit colleges and
universities do not have a bond rating at all, since they have not
issued public debt, citing the data provided by the Department in the
[[Page 76001]]
NPRM that shows that only 275 private institutions have been rated by
Moody's (some others likely have used other rating agencies like Fitch
or Standards & Poor). The commenters contended that institutions that
have a rating are arguably in better financial condition than those
that do not, so rather than being a trigger for additional scrutiny,
the existence of a credit rating and outstanding public debt would, in
itself, be an indication of financial responsibility. Further, the
commenters noted that a bond rating seeks to assess the
creditworthiness and risk of nonpayment over an extended time period--
typically 20 to 30 years--that is well beyond the much shorter
timeframe contemplated by the financial responsibility regulations.
Discussion: In considering the complexities and difficulties noted
by the commenters in using and relying on bond or credit ratings, we
are removing this triggering event.
Changes: We have removed bond or credit ratings as a discretionary
trigger.
Adverse Events Reported on Form 8-K, Proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(11)
Comments: Commenters believed that the trigger regarding the
reporting of adverse events on the SEC's Form 8-K is too narrow since
it is not used to identify adverse events at non-publicly traded
institutions and too broad since it would capture events reported on
Form 8-K that are not indicative of an institution's financial health.
Although the commenters acknowledged that it may be efficient to use
existing disclosure channels to identify potential issues of concern,
they nevertheless believed that it was unfair for the Department to
impose burdens on publicly traded institutions, but not on other
institutions that may be experiencing adverse events. In addition, the
commenters stated that many events listed on Form 8-K have no bearing
on an institution's ability to meet its financial obligations, so the
Department should identify the events it considers to be adverse. Once
identified, the commenters suggested that the Department could develop
a broader list of adverse events that would be applicable to all
institutions.
Also, the commenters believed that, because of the proposed
trigger, publicly traded institutions would have an incentive not to
report events on Form 8-K that could potentially be adverse events, but
in the ordinary course would have provided useful information to
investors. In conclusion, the commenters feared that, without clear
guidelines from the Department about what constitutes an adverse event,
publicly traded institutions would have to make their own decisions as
to whether to treat something as an adverse event. Commenters were
concerned that, even where institutions make that decision in good
faith, they could potentially be exposing themselves later to an action
by the Department if the Department exercises its own judgment in
hindsight.
Similarly, other commenters believed that a number of events on
Form 8-K have little or no relationship to the institution's continued
capacity to operate or to administer the title IV, HEA programs.
Instead of using a trigger based on Form 8-K reporting, the commenters
suggested that the financial responsibility regulations should be
focused on potential risks to the title IV, HEA programs and, as a
related matter, institutional outcomes that are indicative of that
risk.
Discussion: While we are not convinced that some of the reportable
items on Form 8-K will not have an adverse financial impact on an
institution, we will not require an institution to report any Form-8K
event because that information is otherwise publicly available to the
Department. We may, however, evaluate the effect of an event reported
in a Form 8-K as if it were a discretionary triggering event, on a case
by case basis, or in light of the effect on an institution's composite
score as applied under these regulations.
Changes: We have removed the discretionary trigger regarding an
adverse event reported by an institution on a Form 8-K under proposed
Sec. 668.171(c)(10)(vii).
High Drop-Out Rates and Fluctuations in Title IV, HEA Funding
Drop-Out Rates Sec. 668.171(g)(4)
Comments: Some commenters urged the Department to define how it
will calculate high annual dropout rates and provide an opportunity for
the pubic to comment on the methodology employed. The commenters noted
that in the preamble to the NPRM, the Department stated that it uses
high dropout rates to select institutions for program reviews, as
described in 20 U.S.C. 1099c-1(a), and that ``high dropout rates may
signal that an institution is employing high-pressure sales tactics or
is not providing adequate educational services, either of which may
indicate financial difficulties and result in enrolling students who
will not benefit from the training offered and will drop out, leading
to financial hardship and borrower defense claims'' (81 FR 39366
(emphasis added)). Although the commenters agreed that those statements
may be true, they argued that when the Department conducts a program
review, it investigates whether high dropout rates are in fact signs of
financial difficulties. Under the NPRM, the commenters surmised that
the Department would have the discretion to impose a requirement to
provide a letter of credit or other financial protection without any
review of institutional practice or other investigation to find a
causal connection between high dropout rates and financial
difficulties, thus depriving the institution of fair process.
Other commenters were concerned that this trigger is arbitrary
because it is unlikely that a high dropout rate is related to a
school's financial stability. The commenters pointed to a study
published in December 2009 by Public Agenda showing that the most
common reason students dropped out of school is because they needed to
work. Other reasons cited in the study include: Needing a break from
school, inability to afford the tuition and fees, and finding the
classes boring or not useful. Based on this study and survey results
from the Pew Research Center, the commenters concluded that the reasons
students drop out of school typically have very little to do with
school itself, and therefore suggested that the Department remove this
triggering event.
Some commenters argued that the use of the dropout rate as a
trigger fails to account for the various missions that title IV
institutions represent, or the extended time to graduation that many
contemporary students face as they balance career, family and higher
education. The commenters believed that establishing a dropout rate as
a trigger for a letter of credit creates a perverse incentive for
institutions to enroll and educate only those students who are most
likely to succeed, instead of continuing to extend access to higher
education to the broader population. In addition, the commenters
believed that measures of academic quality are best left to
accreditors, but if the Department chooses to take on this role, it
should consider instead triggering a letter of credit if an
institution's persistence rate decreases significantly between
consecutive award years, or over a period of award years. The
commenters believed this approach would account for the significant
variances in mission and student body across higher education without
potentially limiting access.
[[Page 76002]]
Fluctuations in Funding Sec. 668.171(g)(1)
Commenters believed the proposed trigger for a significant
fluctuation between consecutive award years, or a period of award
years, in the amount of Pell Grant and Direct Loan funds received by an
institution, is overly vague. The commenters noted that year-over-year
fluctuations can occur when an institution decides to discontinue
individual programs or close campus locations, often because those
campuses or programs are under-performing financially even where the
overall institution is financially strong and argued that because these
are sound business decisions made in the long-term interests of the
institution, they should not give rise to a letter of credit
requirement.
Some commenters believed that a decrease in total title IV
expenditures should not trigger a letter of credit requirement because
the decreases in the amount of title IV, HEA funds disbursed puts the
Department at less risk of financial loss. In addition, the commenters
stated that a decrease in title IV, HEA funding to a school is largely
out of the school's control--it is usually a result of decreased
enrollments or the Department's rulemaking actions.
Other commenters agreed that big changes in the amount of financial
aid received by an institution could be a sign that growth that is too
fast, or an enrollment decline may signal a school is in serious
trouble. The commenters argued, however, that at small schools, big
percentage changes could simply be the result of small changes in the
number of students. While the commenters were confident that the actual
implementation of this rule would not result in the Department holding
a small school accountable for what is a minor change, they believed
the Department should clarify that the change in Federal aid would need
to be large both in percentage and dollar terms as a way of proactively
assuaging this concern.
One commenter noted that the phrase ``significant fluctuation'' was
not defined, but that the Department implied on page 39393 of its NPRM
that it believes a reasonable standard would be a 25 percent or greater
change in the amount of title IV, HEA funds a school receives from year
to year, after accounting for changes in the title IV, HEA programs.
The commenter urged the Department to clarify in the final regulations
precisely what this phrase means so that institutions would know how to
comply. Moreover, the commenter argued that the Department may be
evaluating institutions by the wrong metric, stating that the for-
profit sector has seen six-fold enrollment growth over the past 25
years where significant fluctuations in title IV, HEA program volume
may be a reflection of that expansion. Said another way, a significant
fluctuation in title IV, HEA program volume, without looking at
important contextual clues, is insufficient to determine whether there
is questionable conduct at the institution. In addition, the commenter
warned that including significant fluctuation as a trigger may serve to
deter institutional growth, since a large increase in enrollment would
trigger the financial protection requirement even if that increase was
perfectly legitimate.
In addition, the commenter believed that, while the Department has
a compelling interest in ensuring that institutions do not raise
tuition unnecessarily to take advantage of title IV, HEA aid, the
Department should try to address this problem in a way that does not
discourage institutions from expanding their enrollment.
For these reasons, the commenter suggested revising the trigger so
it refers to a significant fluctuation in title IV, HEA program volume
per aid recipient, not program volume overall. The commenters believed
this approach would guard against increases in tuition designed to take
advantage of the title IV, HEA programs while not penalizing
institutions with rapid enrollment growth.
Discussion: We intend to use the high drop-out rate and
fluctuations in funding triggers only when we make a careful, reasoned
analysis of the effect of any of these events or conditions on a
particular institution, and conclude that the condition or event is
likely to have a material adverse effect on the institution. An
institution that challenges this determination may present an argument
disputing this determination. If we are not persuaded, we will take
enforcement action under 34 CFR part 668, subpart G to limit the
institution's participation to condition further participation on
supplying the financial protection demanded. The institution may obtain
an administrative hearing to dispute the determination, and unlike with
the automatic triggers, the institution may present and have considered
both evidence and argument in opposition to the determination that the
condition may constitute a material adverse effect, but also whether
the amount of financial protection demanded is warranted.
As noted in the introductory discussion of this section and noted
by some commenters, the materiality or relevance of factors like
dropout rates and fluctuations in funding must be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis in view of the circumstances surrounding or causes giving
rise to what may appear to be excessive or alarming outcomes. In other
words, what may be a high dropout rate or significant fluctuation in
funding at one institution may not be relevant at another institution.
In this regard, we appreciate the suggestions made by the commenters
for how the Department could view or determine whether or the extent to
which these factors are significant.
While a case-by-case approach argues against setting bright-line
thresholds, to mitigate some of the anxiety expressed by the commenters
as to what may be a high dropout rate or fluctuation in funding, we may
consider issuing guidance or providing examples of actual cases where
the Department made an affirmative determination.
Changes: None.
State or Agency Citations Sec. 668.171(g)(2)
Comments: With respect to the discretionary trigger under proposed
Sec. 668.171(c)(10)(ii), some commenters noted that because State
agencies may issue citations for minor violations of State requirements
and not subject an institution to any penalties, the Department should
remove this triggering event. The commenters believed this triggering
event would unnecessarily capture citations for minor violations, such
as failure to update the institution's contact information. It would
also capture violations for which the State agency has decided no
penalty is necessary. The commenters questioned why the Department
should substitute its judgment for that of the State agency and
determine that an otherwise non-punitive citation is indicative of
financial problems. In the alternative, the commenters suggested that
the final regulations should provide that this trigger would only be
invoked if an institution's failure to comply with State or agency
requirements was material. In addition, the commenters suggested that
the final regulations should define ``State licensing or authorizing''
agency in this context to mean only the primary State agency
responsible for State authorization, not specialized State agencies,
such as boards of nursing, that have responsibility for professional
licensure and other matters that would not have a material impact on
the overall financial condition of the institution.
Other commenters recommend that the Department apply the State
agency-
[[Page 76003]]
based trigger only if the citation by the State authorizing agency is
final and relates to the same bases that can support a borrower defense
claim. Or, because State agencies frequently cite institutions for
findings of noncompliance that are remedied appropriately and timely,
the commenters supported applying the trigger only if the State agency
has initiated an action to suspend or terminate its authorization of
the institution.
Some commenters were concerned that the Department did not provide
any evidence that would support that an institution that chooses to
discontinue State approval for a single program at a single location
would implicate the financial stability of an entire institution, much
less a large institution with a wide range of programming and multi-
million dollar endowment.
Discussion: The State agency-based trigger and other discretionary
triggers are intentionally broad to capture events that may have an
adverse financial impact on an institution. With regard to the comments
that the Department should not require an institution to report State
agency actions for events or violations (1) that the institution
considers minor, (2) for which the agency did not penalize the
institution, or (3) that are remedied timely, we believe that doing so
under any of these circumstances defeats the purpose of the trigger.
There is little or no reporting burden on an institution that is
sporadically cited for a violation by a State agency, but where the
institution is cited repeatedly the reporting burden is warranted
because even if individual violations are minor, collectively those
violations may signal a serious issue at the institution.
A State licensing or authorizing agency, for the purpose of this
trigger, includes any agency or entity in the State that regulates or
governs (1) whether an institution may operate or offer postsecondary
educational programs in the State, (2) the nature or delivery of those
educational programs, or (3) the certification or licensure of students
who complete those programs. In this regard, we disagree with the
assertion that actions by a State agency responsible for professional
licensure would never have a material impact on the financial condition
of the institution. To the contrary, because the State agency enforces
standards that restrict professional practice to individuals who, in
part, satisfy rigorous educational qualifications, a citation or
finding by the agency could impact how an institution offers or
delivers an educational program.
Finally, with regard to the comment about an institution
voluntarily discontinuing State approval for a program at a particular
location, we note that, unless the State cited the institution for
discontinuing the program, this is not a reportable event.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters believed that considering ``claims of any
kind'' against an institution, in proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(ii),
would invite a broad set of claims that may not cause financial
damages. Others objected to the apparent ability under proposed Sec.
668.171(c)(10) to add other events or conditions as it wished without
public comment. Commenters believed that proposed triggers do not focus
just on fiscal solvency; rather, they assert, the proposed triggers
include events not related to financial solvency: Accrediting agency
actions, cohort default rates, and dropout rates. The commenters opined
that the Department was inappropriately attempting to shift the
emphasis of these regulations from financial oversight into much
broader accountability measures and to insert the Federal government
into institutional decision-making.
Discussion: To the extent that the proposed regulations would have
included events other than explicit claims, we are revising the
regulations to include only events that pose an imminent risk of very
serious financial impact. An institution that could lose institutional
eligibility in the next year is indeed at serious risk of severe
financial distress. Other events cited here we agree pose a risk only
under particular circumstances, and should not be viewed as per se
risks.
Changes: Section 668.171 has been revised to make clear that
accreditor sanctions and government citations, are considered, like
high dropout rates, as triggering events only on a reasoned, case-by-
case basis under Sec. 668.171(g)(2) and (5).
Stress Test Sec. 668.171(g)(3)
Comments: Commenters believed that a trigger based on the proposed
stress test is redundant because the Department uses the existing
composite score methodology as the primary means of evaluating the
financial health of an institution. In addition, the commenters were
concerned that the Department did not provide schools with enough
information regarding what the financial stress test will be and if it
will be developed through negotiated rulemaking. The commenters
suggested removing the stress test as a trigger, but if the Department
does implement a stress test, it should first be developed through
negotiated rulemaking.
Other commenters echoed the suggestion to develop the stress test
through negotiated rulemaking, arguing that developing a test would not
only be time consuming and complex, but have serious implications for
institutions--all the reasons why institutions and other stakeholders
should have an opportunity to provide their views and analyses.
Some commenters argued that it was premature and unreasonable to
include reference to a stress test, which has yet to be developed, and
which schools have not had a chance to review and offer comment on.
Discussion: We do not intend to replace the composite score
methodology with a financial stress test. The stress test could be used
to assess an institution's ability to deal with an economic crisis or
adverse event under a scenario-based model, whereas the composite score
methodology focuses primarily on actual financial performance over a
fiscal year operating cycle.
We certainly understand the community's desire to participate in
any process the Department undertakes to develop a stress test, or
evaluate adopting an existing stress test, but cannot at this time
commit to a particular process. However, we wish to assure institutions
and other affected parties that we will seek their input in whatever
process is used.
Changes: None.
Violation of Loan Agreement Sec. 668.171(g)(6)
Comments: Under proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(4), an institution is not
financially responsible if it violated a provision or requirement in a
loan agreement with the creditor with the largest secured extension of
credit to the institution, failed to make a payment for more than 120
days with that creditor, or that creditor imposes more stringent loan
terms or sanctions as a result of a default or delinquency event.
Some commenters noted that because the largest secured extension of
credit may be for a very small dollar amount, the Department should
specify a minimum threshold below which a violation of a loan agreement
is not a triggering event.
Other commenters believed that a school that satisfies the
composite score requirements should not be required to post a letter of
credit relating to violations of loan agreements. The commenters
cautioned that this provision could have the unintended impact of
altering the relationship
[[Page 76004]]
between schools and their creditors because creditors would have
additional leverage in negotiations regarding violations of loan
agreements. The commenters believed that, because this additional
leverage could potentially place a school's financial stability at risk
where it otherwise was not, this triggering event should be deleted.
Along the same lines, other commenters warned that the proposed
loan agreement triggers would create significant leverage for banks
that does not presently exist. The commenters opined that a bank
potentially could threaten to trigger a violation of a loan agreement
or obligation, thereby exercising inappropriate leverage over the
institution and its operations to the detriment of its educational
mission, students, and employees. The commenters believed this outcome
would be a significant threat that the Department must consider this
``countervailing evidence'' in rationalizing the reasonableness of this
proposed trigger. See Am. Fed'n of Labor & Cong. of Indus.
Organizations v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting AFL-CIO v. Marshall,
617 F.2d 636, 649 n. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
Other commenters agreed that, in certain circumstances, the
violation of a loan agreement or other financial obligation may signal
the need for financial protection. However, the commenters believed the
proposed triggering events were overly broad and could result in
financially sound institutions being regularly penalized. The
commenters recommended that the Department revise the triggering events
in two ways.
First, the Department should include a materiality threshold in
proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(4)(i) so that this provision is only
triggered when a default is material and adverse to the institution. In
addition, the commenters suggested that this provision should apply
only to any undisputed amounts and issues that are determined by a
final order after all applicable cure periods and remedies have
expired. With regard to proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(4)(ii), because
cross-defaults are prevalent in most material loan agreements,
commenters suggested that the Department should focus on defaults that
are material and adverse to the institution as a going concern, as
opposed to narrowing the trigger to the institution's largest secured
creditor.
Second, commenters suggested that the language in proposed Sec.
668.171(c)(4)(iii) should be revised to exclude events where the
institution it permitted to cure the violation in a timely manner in
accordance with the loan agreement. They noted that this type of
``curing'' is a common occurrence and specifically contemplated in the
agreements between the parties.
Other commenters believed that the Department should include
allowances for instances in which the creditor waives any action
regarding a violation of a provision in a loan agreement, or the
creditor does not consider the violation to be material. The commenters
note that although the reporting requirements under proposed Sec.
668.171(d)(3) permit an institution to notify the Department that a
loan violation was waived by the creditor, it does not explicitly state
that such a waiver would make the institution financially responsible.
The commenters urged the Department to revise this provision to clearly
state that a waiver of a term or condition granted by a creditor cures
the triggering event so that financial protection is not required.
According to the commenters, certified public accountants use this
standard when assessing a school's ability to continue as a going
concern--if a waiver is issued or granted by the creditor the certified
public accountant does not mention this event in the school's audited
financial statements because it is no longer an issue for the debtor.
Some commenters believed that the proposed loan agreement
provisions were too broad and would unnecessarily impact institutions
that pose no risk. The commenters stated that loan agreements may
include a number of events that are not related to the failure of the
institution to make payments that trigger changes to the terms of the
agreement, and in that case the proposed provisions would seem to
capture the change in terms as a reportable event. The commenters noted
that nonprofit institutions have access to and use variable rate loans,
and that some nonprofit institutions have synthetically converted their
variable rate interest borrowings into fixed rate debt by entering into
an interest rate swap agreement. The commenters believed that, under
these circumstances, it would be incorrect to assume that changes to
the interest rates negatively impact the institution. Further, while
the loan provision in the proposed regulations is narrower than the
current one since it only applies to an institution's largest secured
creditor, rather than all creditors, the commenters believed the
Department should establish a materiality threshold and/or make a
determination that any changes to the interest rate or other terms
would have a material impact on the institution. In addition, the
commenters noted that the exception provided under Sec. 668.171(d)(3),
allowing the institution to show that penalties or constraints imposed
by a creditor will not impact the institution's ability to meet its
financial obligations, only applies if the creditor waived a violation
and questioned whether the end result would be the same if the creditor
did not waive the violation, but the penalties or changes to the loan
nevertheless would not have an adverse impact.
Discussion: In considering the comments regarding the materiality
of loan violations, and whether the sanctions or terms imposed by a
creditor as a result of a default or delinquency event are relevant or
adverse, we are making the provisions in proposed Sec. 668.171(c)(4)
discretionary triggers under Sec. 668.171(g)(6). We believe that
evaluating a delinquency or default on a loan obligation under the
discretionary triggers addresses the commenters' concerns that the
Department should review or assess a loan violation on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether that violation is material and sufficiently
adverse to warrant financial protection. This case-by-case review
eliminates the need to qualify or limit the scope of loan violations to
the largest secured creditor. Moreover, making these discretionary
triggers maintains the Department's objective of identifying and acting
on early warning signs of financial distress. We expect that making the
proposed provisions discretionary will abate the concerns raised by the
commenters that an automatic action by the Department in response to a
loan violation would prompt or create an unfair advantage for
creditors, because that action is no longer certain. In addition, we
note that if a creditor files suit in response to a loan violation,
that suit is covered under the provisions in Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(ii) as
an automatic triggering event.
Changes: We have relocated the proposed loan agreement provision to
Sec. 668.171(g)(6), reclassified those provisions as discretionary
events, and removed the qualifier that the loan violation is for the
largest secured creditor.
Borrower Defense Claims Sec. 668.171(g)(7)
Comments: None.
Discussion: After further consideration, the Department concluded
that, in instances in which the Department can expect an influx of
successful borrower defense claims as a
[[Page 76005]]
result of a lawsuit, settlement, judgment, or finding from a State or
Federal administrative proceeding, we may wish to require additional
protection. However, since such instances are fact-specific, we have
decided to make such a trigger discretionary.
Changes: We have added a new discretionary trigger in Sec.
668.171(g)(8) relating to claims for borrower relief as a result of a
lawsuit, settlement, judgment, or finding from a State or Federal
administrative proceeding.
Reporting Requirements Sec. 668.171(h)
Comments: Some commenters believed that the proposed mandatory
reporting requirements under Sec. 668.171(d) are outside the scope of
the Department's authority. The commenters argued that statutory
provisions cited by the Department, that the Secretary has authority
``to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations
governing the manner of operation of, and governing the applicable
programs administered by, the Department,'' and that the Secretary is
authorized ``to prescribe such rules and regulations as the Secretary
determines necessary or appropriate to administer and manage the
functions of the Secretary or the Department'' (20 U.S.C. 1221e-3), are
``implementary rather than substantive,'' meaning that they ``can only
be implemented consistently with the provisions and purposes of the
legislation.'' New England Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n., 467 F.2d
425, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974) (citation
omitted).
Discussion: The Secretary cited 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3 as authority for
revisions to 34 CFR 30.70, 81 FR 39407, and the repayment rate
disclosures proposed as new Sec. 668.41(h). 81 FR 39371. As pertinent
here, the Department cited as authority for the proposed changes to
Sec. 668.171, which includes the new reporting requirements under
Sec. 668.171(h), sections 487 and 498(c) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C. 1094
and 1099c. Section 487 states that the Secretary ``notwithstanding any
other provision of this title (title IV of the HEA), shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to provide . . . in matters not
governed by specific program regulations, the establishment of
reasonable standards of financial responsibility . . . including any
matter the Secretary deems necessary to the sound administration of the
financial aid programs, such as the pertinent actions of any owner,
shareholder, or person exercising control over an eligible
institution.'' 20 U.S.C. 1094(c)(1)(B). Section 498 states that the
Secretary is to determine whether an institution is able to meet its
financial obligations to all parties, including students and the
Secretary, including adopting financial criteria ratios. 20 U.S.C.
1099c(c). These provisions give the Secretary ample substantive
authority to adopt regulations that require the institution to provide
audited financial statements and other records needed to evaluate the
financial capability of the institution. This authority is direct and
specifically authorizes the required reporting by participating
institutions, unlike the charge imposed by the Federal Power Commission
in New England Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, cited by the commenter
to support its view. The court there concluded that the Commission
lacked authority to impose that charge on the industry member for costs
incurred not for the benefit of the member but for the general public.
New England Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 467 F.2d 425, 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), aff'd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974). Here, the HEA expressly
authorizes the Secretary to adopt regulations governing the conditions
for participation in the title IV, HEA programs, and in particular, the
assessment of the institution's financial capability.
Changes: None.
Comments: Under the reporting requirements in proposed Sec.
668.171(d), an institution must report any action or event identified
as a trigger under Sec. 668.171(c) no later than 10 days after the
action or event occurs. For three of the reportable actions or events--
disclosure of a judicial or administrative proceeding, withdrawal of
owner's equity, and violations of loan agreements--the institution may
show that those actions or events are not material or relevant.
Commenters were concerned that the Department would not be bound to
act or consider any evidence an institution would provide under
proposed Sec. 668.171(d)(2) regarding the waiver of a violation of a
loan agreement, or provide any opportunity to the institution to
discuss the waiver. Moreover, the commenters were concerned that the
waiver reporting provisions would permit the Department to disregard
any such evidence if the creditor imposes additional constraints or
requirements as a condition of waiving the violation, or imposes
penalties or requirements. Absent a materiality modifier, the
commenters believed that the waiver ``carve out'' would become
meaningless. Ostensibly, the commenters feared that the Department
could proceed to demand financial protection even if a creditor waived
the underlying violation and the institution effectively demonstrated
that the additional requirements imposed would only have a negligible
impact on the institution's ability to meet current and future
financial obligations. The commenters recommended that at a minimum,
proposed Sec. 668.171(d)(2) should be modified to require a material
adverse effect on the institution's financial condition.
Other commenters believed that requiring institutions to report the
widely disparate events reflected in the proposed triggering events
within 10 days is unreasonable, particularly for large, decentralized
organizations. The commenters believed that it was one thing to demand
that type of prompt reporting on a limited number of items from
institutions that already have been placed on heightened monitoring but
quite different to require hyper-vigilance from all institutions. The
commenters argued that various offices across the institution might be
involved and have contemporaneous knowledge of the triggering events,
but the individuals dealing with an unrelated agency action, a lawsuit,
or a renegotiation of debt are unlikely to have a Department reporting
deadline on the top of minds. Moreover, the commenters believed that
individuals at an institution who are charged with maintaining
compliance with Department regulations are unlikely to learn about some
of these events within such a short period of time.
Discussion: In view of these comments and other comments discussing
the triggering events, we clarify in these final regulations the
reporting requirement that applies to each triggering event. As shown
below, an institution must notify the Department no later than:
1. For the lawsuits and other actions or events in Sec.
668.171(c)(1)(i), 10 days after a payment was required, a liability was
incurred, or a suit was filed, and for suits, 10 days after the suit
has been pending for 120 days;
2. For lawsuits in Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(ii), 10 days after the suit
was filed and the deadlines for filing summary judgment motions
established, and 10 days after the earliest of the events for the
summary judgments described in that paragraph;
3. For accrediting agency actions under Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iii),
10 days after the institution is notified by its accrediting agency
that it must submit a teach-out plan.
4. For the withdrawal of owner's equity in Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(v),
10 days
[[Page 76006]]
after the withdrawal is made. 5. For the non-title IV revenue provision
in Sec. 668.171(d), 45 days after the end of the institution's fiscal
year, as provided in Sec. 668.28(c)(3).
6. For the SEC and exchange provisions for publicly traded
institutions under Sec. 668.171(e), 10 days after the SEC or stock
exchange notifies or takes action against the institution, or 10 days
after any extension granted by SEC.
7. For State or agency actions in paragraph (g)(2), 10 days after
the institution is cited for violating a State or agency requirement;
8. For probation or show cause actions under paragraph (g)(5), 10
days after the institution's accrediting agency places the institution
on that status; or
9. For the loan agreement provisions in paragraph (g)(6), 10 days
after a loan violation occurs, the creditor waives the violation, or
imposes sanctions or penalties in exchange or as a result of the
waiver. We note that the proposed loan agreement provisions are
discretionary triggers in these final regulations, and as such
facilitate a more thorough dialogue with the institution about waivers
of loan violations and creditor actions tied to those waivers.
We also are providing that an institution may show that a
reportable event no longer applies or is resolved or that it has
insurance that will cover the debts and liabilities that arise at any
time from that triggering event.
In addition, we are providing that an institution may demonstrate
at the time it reports a State or Federal lawsuit under Sec.
668.171(c)(1)(i)(B) that the amount claimed under that lawsuit exceeds
the potential recovery. We stress that this option does not include any
consideration of the merit of the government suit. It addresses only
the situation in which the government agency asserts a claim that the
facts alleged, if accepted as true, and the legal claims asserted, if
fully accepted, could still not produce a recovery of the deemed or
claimed amount for reasons totally distinct from the merit of the
government suit. Thus, the regulations in some instances deem a suit to
seek recovery of all tuition received by an institution, but the
allegations of the complaint describe only a limited period, or a given
location, or specific programs, and the institution can prove that the
total amount of tuition received for that identified program, location,
or period is smaller than the amount claimed or the amount of recover
deemed to be sought.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.171(h)(1) to specify the
reporting requirements that apply to a triggering event, as described
above. We have also provided in revised paragraph (g)(3) that an
institution may show (1) that a reportable event no longer exists, has
been resolved, or that it has insurance that will cover debts and
liabilities that arise at any time from that triggering event; or (2)
that the amount claimed in a lawsuit under Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(i)(B)
exceeds the potential recovery the claimant may receive.
Public Domestic and Foreign Institutions Sec. 668.171(i)
Domestic Public Institutions
Comments: Commenters were concerned that the proposed regulations
would unfairly target private institutions, noting that public
institutions would be exempt from the triggering events requiring
letters of credit, even as recent events have shown that public
institutions are not necessarily more financially stable than other
institutions.
Other commenters believed that the Department intended to exempt
public institutions, as it currently does, from the financial
responsibility standards, including the proposed triggering events, but
the Department did not explicitly do so in the NPRM.
Discussion: We rely, and have for nearly 20 years relied, on the
full-faith and credit of the State to cover any debts and liabilities
that a public institution may incur in participating in the title IV,
HEA programs. Under the current regulations in Sec. Sec. 668.171(b)
and (c), a public institution is not subject to the general standards
of financial responsibility and is considered financially responsible
as long as it does not violate any past performance provision in Sec.
668.174. The Department has on occasion placed public institutions on
heightened cash monitoring for failing to file required audits in a
timely manner, but even then has never required a public institution to
provide financial protection of any type because we already have it in
the form of full-faith and credit. We would like to clarify that we are
not changing long-standing policy for public institutions with these
final regulations. In other words, the triggering events in Sec.
668.171(c) through (g) of these regulations do not apply to public
institutions.
Changes: None.
Foreign Institutions
Comments: Commenters believed that the actions and events that
could trigger a letter of credit under Sec. 668.171(c) are not
applicable to foreign institutions, and requested that foreign
institutions be exempted from these regulations, at least until the
composite score methodology is revised. In addition, the commenters
reasoned that a foreign institution with thousands of students from the
institution's home country and perhaps a few dozen U.S. students should
not be required to post warnings for all of its students based on this
U.S. regulatory compliance issue.
Discussion: While we agree that some triggering events in
Sec. Sec. 668.171(c) through (g) may not apply to foreign
institutions, that circumstance does not justify exempting those
institutions from the triggering events that do apply. In addition, we
see no reason to grant a temporary exemption until the composite score
methodology is revised because it is unlikely that accounting-based
revisions to a financial statement-centered methodology will affect
triggering events like lawsuits that are applied contemporaneously, or
title IV, HEA program compliance requirements like cohort default rate
and gainful employment. We note that foreign public institutions, like
U.S.-based public institutions, are currently exempt, and continue to
be exempt in these final regulations, from most of the general
standards of financial responsibility, including the composite score.
Changes: None.
Alternative Standards and Requirements Sec. 668.175
Provisional Certification Alternative Sec. 668.175(f)
Amount of Financial Protection Sec. 668.175(f)(4)
Cost of Letter of Credit
Comments: One commenter stated that, years ago, letters of credit
were both widely available and very inexpensive; it was not unusual for
a bank to issue a small letter of credit on behalf of a client for no
charge and without any collateral. However, the commenter stated that
the bursting of the stock bubble in the late 1990s and the new rules
regulating banks after the financial crisis has had a tremendous effect
on the ability of banks to issue letters of credit, the price charged
for them, and the amount of collateral required to issue one.
According to the commenter, a $1,000,000 letter of credit that
might have cost $5,000 to issue with no collateral 30 years ago now
costs $10,000-$20,000 and requires $500,000 to $1,000,000 of cash to
collateralize it. The commenter opined that while this is still
relatively easy for the wealthiest
[[Page 76007]]
schools with the largest endowments to meet, it would place a
tremendous burden on smaller schools, vocational schools, and schools
that serve the poorest students in the poorest areas because it will
tie up a significant portion of their cash as collateral. For these
reasons the commenter urged the Department to accept alternatives to
bank-issued letters of credit, noting that performance bonds are used
widely in business to guarantee satisfactory performance of
construction, services, and delivery of goods. The commenter stated
that most States that have regulations to protect students from poorly
run schools allow performance bonds already.
According to the commenter, a performance bond guarantees the
performance of a task on behalf of the client. In the case of a
borrower defense, the Department is using the letter of credit to
guarantee to successful completion of the education for which the
Department issued title IV loans. By allowing performance bonds,
according to the commenter, the Department could protect itself from
poorly run schools that harm students without harming thinly
capitalized schools by forcing them to purchase more expensive
products. The commenter stated that a typical surety bond for
$1,000,000 might cost $5,000-$15,000 and only require 25 percent
collateral or less. This means that the schools get to keep more of
their cash to better deliver education to students and the Department
is still adequately protected against a claim from a closed school.
Some commenters noted that the Department has the statutory
authority under section 498(c)(3)(A) of the HEA to accept performance
bonds and should use that authority because surety bonds cost far less
than letters of credit and are equally secure.
Other commenters were concerned that the cost of securing required
letters of credit could be prohibitive and cause some schools to close.
These and other commenters believed that schools are finding that it is
increasingly more difficult to secure letters of credit because of high
cost and the regulatory uncertainties facing the higher education
sector. The commenters noted that these costs include fees to the
lenders and attorneys each time the underlying credit facility is
negotiated to expand the letters of credit (schools are required to pay
their attorney's fees as well as lender attorney fees for these
transactions). Moreover, the commenters stated that because of the
Department's compliance actions against proprietary schools, many
lenders will no longer lend to proprietary institutions. Therefore, if
schools are forced to obtain large letters of credit they will need to
turn to second or third tier lenders, or lenders who offer crisis
loans, who will charge significant fees for these letters of credit.
In view of the cost and financial resources needed to secure a
letter of credit, some commenters believed that the Department should
apply a cap of 25 percent on the amount of the cumulative letters of
credit that a provisionally certified institution could be required to
post under the revised regulations.
Other commenters suggested that if a letter of credit is imposed
for an accrediting agency trigger relating to closing a location, the
letter of credit should be based on a percentage of the amount of title
IV, HEA funds the closing location received, not a percentage of title
IV, HEA funds received by the entire institution. The commenters
reasoned that if the financial impact of the closing of the branch or
additional location will have a material negative impact on the school,
then the Department should set the letter of credit amount based on 10
percent of the branch or additional location's title IV, HEA funds,
arguing that this approach is straight-forward: Any liabilities that
the school may incur resulting from the closure of a branch or
additional location would relate only to the students attending the
closing location. In contrast, the commenter believed that imposing the
letter of credit based on the total title IV, HEA funds received by the
school would be disproportionate to the financial impact of the
potential student issues to which a letter of credit may relate. The
commenters noted that the NPRM expressly recognized the cost of
securing letters of credit and the difficulties a school may have in
obtaining a letter of credit within 30 days. 81 FR 39368. If a school
cannot secure a letter of credit within that timeframe, the Department
would set aside title IV, HEA funds, which according to the commenters
would almost assuredly have a catastrophic financial impact on the
institution. Therefore, the commenters concluded that imposing a larger
letter of credit on the school than is necessary will impose cost and
financial burden on the school far greater than any possible benefits
that the Department could obtain from the larger letter of credit, and
will negatively impact students in the process.
Discussion: With regard to the comment that the Department cap any
cumulative letters of credit to 25 percent of amount that would
otherwise be required, we believe setting an inflexible cap would
defeat the purpose of requiring financial protection that is
commensurate with the risks posed by one or more of the triggering
events. The Secretary currently has the discretion to establish the
amount of financial protection required for a particular institution,
starting at 10 percent of the amount the title IV, HEA program funds
the institution received in the prior award year, and that discretion
is not limited by these regulations. As noted previously in this
preamble under the heading ``Composite Score and Triggering Events,''
the amount of the financial protection required is based on a
recalculated composite score of less than 1.0--the total amount of
financial protection required is, at a minimum, 10 percent of the title
IV, HEA funds the institution received during its most recently
completed fiscal year, and such added amount as the Secretary
demonstrates is warranted by the risk of liabilities with regard to
that institution.
We do not disagree with the general notion that the costs
associated with a letter of credit have increased over time and that
some institutions may not be able to secure, or may have difficulty
securing, a letter of credit. We acknowledged this in the preamble to
the NPRM and offered the set-aside as an alternative to the letter of
credit. With regard to other alternatives, we are not aware of any
surety instruments that are as secure as bank-issued letters of credit
and that can be negotiated easily by the Department to meet the demands
of protecting the Federal interests in a dependable and efficient
manner. However, if surety instruments come to light, or are developed,
that are more affordable to institutions than letters of credit but
that offer the same benefits to the Department, we will consider
accepting those instruments. To leave open this possibility, we are
amending the financial protection requirements in Sec.
668.175(f)(2)(i) to provide that the Department may, in a notice
published in the Federal Register, identify acceptable surety
alternatives or other forms of financial protection. We wish to make
clear that the Department will not accept, or entertain in any way,
surety instruments or other forms of financial protection that are not
specified in these final regulations or that are not subsequently
identified in the Federal Register. In this vein, the Department is
continuing to examine generally the alternatives to a letter of credit
to ensure that such alternatives strike a reasonable balance between
protecting the interests of the taxpayers and the Federal Government
and
[[Page 76008]]
providing flexibility to institutions, and is revising the regulations
to provide that all alternatives to a letter of credit or a set-aside
arrangement, including cash, will be permitted only in the Secretary's
discretion.
Lastly, as discussed previously throughout this preamble, an
institution that can prove that it has sufficient insurance to cover
immediate and potential debts, liabilities, claims, or financial
obligations stemming from each triggering event, will not be required
to provide financial protection of any kind.
With regard to the amount of financial protection stemming from the
teach-out trigger for closed locations under Sec. 668.171(c)(iv), by
considering only closures of locations that cause the composite score
to fall below a 1.0, we identify those events that pose a significant
risk to the continued viability of the institution as a whole, and the
financial protection needed should be based on the risk of closure and
attendant costs to the taxpayer, not merely the expected costs of
closed school discharges to students enrolled at the closed location.
Finally, the Department has long had discretion, under current
regulations, in setting the amount of the required financial
protection, and we are revising Sec. 668.175(f)(4) to memorialize our
existing discretion to require financial protection in amounts beyond
the minimum 10 percent where appropriate.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.175(f)(2)(i) to provide that the
Secretary may identify acceptable surety instruments or other forms of
financial protection in a notice published in the Federal Register. In
each place in the regulations where we address acceptable forms of
financial protection, we have revised the regulations to provide that
alternatives to letters of credit and set-aside arrangements will be
permitted in the Secretary's discretion. In addition, we have revised
Sec. 668.175(f)(4) to provide the minimum amount of financial
protection required, specifically to set 10 percent of prior year title
IV, HEA funding as the minimum required protection amount, with a minor
exception for institutions that do not participate in the loan program,
and to authorize the setting of such larger added amount as the
Secretary determines is needed to ensure that the total amount of
financial protection provided is sufficient to fully cover any
estimated losses, provided that the Secretary may reduce this added
amount only if an institution demonstrates that this added amount is
unnecessary to protect, or is contrary to, the Federal interest. We
made a conforming change to Sec. 668.90(a)(3)(iii)(D).
Set-Aside Sec. 668.175(h)
Comments: Commenters believed that the set-aside under proposed
Sec. 668.175(h) as an alternative a letter of credit or cash would not
be a viable option. The commenters argued that most schools rely on
title IV, HEA funds for cash flow purposes, so administratively
offsetting a portion of those funds would likely force many schools to
close. Similarly, if a school is placed on Heightened Cash Monitoring 2
(HCM2) or reimbursement because it cannot secure a letter of credit,
the commenters asserted that the school would likely close because
historically the Department and institutions have not been able to
timely process funds under HCM2.
Other commenters acknowledged the Department's concern about
getting financial protection into place quickly, but believed that 90
days would be a more reasonable timeframe. The commenters stated that
under current conditions in the financial markets, even with the best
efforts it is almost impossible to get a letter of credit approved
within the proposed 30-day timeframe. Also, the commenters suggested
that if the Department implements the set-aside because of a school's
delay in providing the letter of credit, this section needs to allow
for the set-aside agreement to be terminated once the school is able to
provide the letter of credit.
Other commenters agreed that the Department needs some way to
obtain funds from institutions that fail to provide a letter of credit.
The commenters believed, however, that the proposed set-aside
provisions are overly generous in terms of time and amount. In
particular, the commenters suggested the following changes:
(1) Make set-aside amounts larger than letter of credit requests.
An institution's inability to obtain a letter of credit may in and of
itself be a warning sign that private investors do not trust the
institution enough to be involved with it. Therefore, the commenters
suggested that any amounts covered by the set-aside provision should be
set at 1.5 times the size of a letter of credit. This would both
encourage colleges to obtain letters of credit and also send a strong
message that the set-aside is a last resort action.
(2) Implement other limitations on colleges that cover letters of
credit through set asides. According to the commenters, the set-aside
is not the ideal way to get institutions to provide their financial
commitments. Accordingly, they proposed that this provision should come
with greater protections for students and taxpayers or, at the very
least, include some sort of limitation on Federal financial aid that
prevents the institution from increasing the number of Federal aid
recipients at the school and potentially even considers not allowing
for new enrollment of federally aided students. Absent such
protections, commenters noted that schools may face perverse incentives
where they are encouraged to grow enrollment as a way of meeting the
set-aside conditions.
(3) Lessen the time period for collecting set-aside amounts.
Commenters noted that nine months is a long period of time for
collecting amounts that an institution would otherwise be expected to
provide in 30 days through a letter of credit. Nine months is also a
long time in general--almost an entire academic year. Commenters stated
that collecting the funds in this amount of time makes it possible for
institutions to still enroll a large number of students and then run
the risk of shutting down, and suggested that the Department shorten
this time period to no more than half an academic year.
Discussion: While a set-aside may not be an option for an
institution that is unable to compensate for a temporary loss of a
percentage of its title IV, HEA funding, either by using its own
resources or obtaining some form of financing, it is unlikely that the
institution has any other options. For other institutions with at least
some resources, we believe the set-aside is a viable alternative.
We disagree with the assertion that an institution is likely to
close if it is placed on HCM2. Based on data available on the
Department's Web site at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/school/hcm, approximately 60 percent of the institutions on HCM2
as of March 2015 were still on that status as of June 2016.
With regard to extending the time within which an institution must
submit a letter of credit, we adopt in these regulations the
Department's current practice of allowing an institution 45 days.
In addition, we are providing in the final regulations that when an
institution submits a letter of credit, the Department will terminate
the corresponding set-aside agreement and return any funds held under
that agreement. With regard to the comments that the Department should
increase the amount of the set-aside or shorten the time within which
the set-aside must be fully funded, we see no justification for
[[Page 76009]]
either action. The Department proposed the set-aside as an alternative
for an institution that is unable to timely secure a letter of credit,
so that inability cannot be used as a reason to increase the amount of
financial protection under the set-aside arrangement. For the funding
timeframe, the Department proposed nine months, roughly the length of
an academic year, as a reasonable compromise between having financial
protection fully in place in the short term and minimizing the
consequences of reducing an institution's cash flow. We believe that
shortening the funding timeframe may put unnecessary financial stress
on an institution that would otherwise fulfill its obligations to
students and the Department. We continue to analyze, and will publish
in the Federal Register, the terms on which an institution may provide
financial protection other than a letter of credit or set-aside
arrangement.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.175(h) to increase from 30 to 45
days the time within which an institution must provide a letter of
credit to the Department and provide that the Secretary will release
any funds held under a set-aside if the institution subsequently
provides the letter of credit or other financial protection required
under the zone or provisional certification alternatives in Sec.
668.175(d) or (f).
Provisional Certification (Section 668.175(f)(1)(i))
Comments: Some commenters were concerned that the Department would
place a school on provisional certification simply because of a
triggering event in Sec. 668.171(c), such as the school's cohort
default rate, 90/10 ratio, or D/E rates under the GE regulations. The
commenters argued that the regulations covering these measures did not
intend or contemplate their use as reasons for placing an institution
on provisional certification, so schools should not be subject to
additional penalties.
Other commenters questioned whether the Department made a change in
the applicability of the provisional certification alternative in Sec.
668.175(f) that was not discussed in the NPRM. The commenters stated
that it was unclear whether excluding the measures in Sec.
668.171(b)(2) and (b)(3) from either zone alternative or the
provisional certification alternatives in proposed Sec. 668.175(d) and
(f) was intentional or if the reference to Sec. 668.171(b)(1) should
just be Sec. 668.171(b). In addition, the commenters noted that only
the provisional certification alternative in proposed Sec. 668.175(f)
refers to the proposed substitutes for a letter of credit (cash and the
set-aside), whereas both the NPRM and proposed Sec. 668.175(h), by
cross-reference to Sec. 668.175(d), refer to the substitutes as
applicable to the zone alternative.
One commenter noted that the current regulations create multiple
options for institutions with a failing financial responsibility score,
but the terms between the zone and provisional certification
alternatives are not sufficiently equal. The commenter also contended
that the time limits associated with the alternatives are unclear. To
address this, the commenter recommended the following changes to the
current regulations.
(1) Increase the minimum size of the initial letter of credit for
institutions on provisional status.
Currently, an institution choosing this option only has to provide
a letter of credit for an amount that in general is, at a minimum, 10
percent of the amount of title IV, HEA funds received by the
institution during its most recently completed fiscal year, while an
institution that chooses to avoid provisional certification must submit
a 50 percent letter of credit. The commenter recognized that part of
this difference reflects the bigger risks to an institution that come
with being provisionally certified but believed the current gap in
letters of credit is too large. The commenter recommended that the
Department increase the minimum letter of credit required from
provisionally certified institutions that enter this status after the
final regulations take effect to 25 percent.
(2) Automatically increase the letter of credit for institutions
that renew their provisional status.
The commenter stated that Sec. 668.175(f)(1) of the current
regulations suggests that an institution may participate under the
provisional certification alternative for no more than three
consecutive years, whereas Sec. 668.175(f)(3) suggests that the
Secretary may allow the institution to renew this provisional
certification and may require additional financial protection.
The commenter requested that the Department clarify the terms on
which it will renew a provisional status. In particular, the commenter
recommended that we require the institution, as part of any renewal, to
increase the size of the letter of credit to 50 percent of the
institution's Federal financial aid. This amount would align with the
current requirements for an institution with a failing composite score
that does not choose the provisional certification alternative and,
according to the commenter, would reflect that an institution has
already spent a great deal of time in a status that suggests financial
concerns.
(3) Limit how long an institution may renew its provisional status.
The commenter stated that Sec. 668.175(f)(3) of the current
regulations suggests an institution could potentially stay in
provisional status forever. The commenter asked the Department to place
a time limit on these renewals that would ideally be no longer than the
period during which institutions can continue to participate in the
title IV, HEA programs while subject to other conditions under the
Department's regulations, which tends to be three years. However, the
commenter believed that even six years in provisional status may be an
unacceptably long amount of time.
Discussion: Contrary to the comments that the current cohort
default rate, 90/10, and GE regulations do not contemplate provisional
certification, we note the 90/10 and cohort default rate provisions do
just that after a one- or two-year violation of those standards. In
addition, we clarify that an institution under either the zone or
provisional certification alternative may provide a letter of credit
or, in the Secretary's discretion, provide another form of financial
protection in a form or under terms or arrangements that will be
specified by the Secretary or enter into a set-aside arrangement. The
set-aside arrangement is not available to an institution that seeks to
participate for the first time in the title IV, HEA programs or that
failed the financial responsibility standards but seeks to participate
as a financially responsible institution, because in either case the
institution must show that it is financially responsible. That is, the
institution must show that it has the financial resources to secure, or
a bank is willing to commit the necessary resources on behalf of the
institution to provide, a letter of credit. For the references to the
general standards and triggering events, an institution that fails the
general standards under Sec. 668.171(b)(1) or (3), as reflected in the
composite score or the triggering events under Sec. 668.171(c), or no
longer qualifies under the zone alternative, is subject to the minimum
financial protection required under Sec. 668.175(f). With respect to
the numerous changes the commenter proposed for how the Department
should treat institutions on provisional certification, since we did
not propose any changes to the provisional certification requirements
under Sec. 668.175(f) or Sec. 668.13(c), or to
[[Page 76010]]
the long-standing minimum letter of credit requirements, the suggested
changes are beyond the scope of these regulations.
Changes: None.
Financial Protection Disclosure
General
Comments: One commenter asserted that the proposed financial
protection disclosure requirements exceed the Department's statutory
authority because the financial responsibility provisions in the HEA,
unlike other provisions of the Act, do not mention disclosures. The
commenter maintained that such omissions must be presumed to be
intentional, since Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses
particular language in one section of the statute but omits it from
another.
Discussion: We do not agree with the commenter. The financial
protection disclosure requirements do not conflict with the financial
responsibility provisions in the HEA. Furthermore, the lack of specific
mention of such disclosures in the provisions of the HEA related to
financial responsibility does not preclude the Department's regulating
in this area. Courts have recognized that the Department under its
general rulemaking authority may require disclosures of information
reasonably considered useful for student consumers.\61\
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\61\ See, e.g., Ass'n of Private Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012)(Department has broad
authority ``to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and
regulations governing the manner of operation of, and governing the
applicable programs administered by, the Department.'' 20 U.S.C.
1221e-3 (2006); see also id. Sec. 3474 (``The Secretary is
authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as the Secretary
determines necessary or appropriate to administer and manage the
functions of the Secretary or the Department.''). The financial
protection disclosures fall comfortably within that regulatory
power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, the Department continues to assert both its
authority to require disclosures related to financial responsibility
and the usefulness of those disclosures for student consumers. However,
in the interest of clarity and ensuring that disclosures are as
meaningful as possible, we have made several changes to proposed Sec.
668.41(i). Under the proposed regulations, institutions required to
provide financial protection to the Secretary must disclose information
about that financial protection to enrolled and prospective students.
These final regulations state that the Department will rely on consumer
testing to inform the identification of events for which a disclosure
is required. Specifically, the Secretary will consumer test each of the
events identified in Sec. 668.171(c)-(g), as well as other events that
result in an institution being required to provide financial protection
to the Department, to determine which of these events are most
meaningful to students in their educational decision-making. The
Department expects that not all events will be demonstrated to be
critical to students; however, events like lawsuits or settlements that
require financial protection under Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(i) and (ii);
borrower defense claims that require financial protection under Sec.
668.171(g)(7); and two consecutive years of cohort default rates of at
least 30 percent, requiring financial protection under Sec. 668.171(f)
are likely to be of more relevance to students. Findings resulting from
the Department's administrative proceedings are included among these
triggering events. The issue of students being ill-informed about
ongoing lawsuits or settlements with their institutions was raised by
students, particularly Corinthian students, during negotiated
rulemaking, as well as by commenters during the public comment period.
We also believe that students will have a particular interest in, and
deserve to be made aware of, instances in which an institution has a
large volume of borrower defense claims; this may inform their future
enrollment decisions, as well as notify them of a potential claim to
borrower defense they themselves may have. Finally, we believe that
cohort default rate is an important accountability metric established
in the HEA, and that ability to repay student loans is of personal
importance to many students. Any or all of these items may be
identified through consumer testing as important disclosures.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.41(i) to clarify that all
actions and triggering events that require an institution to provide
financial protection to the Department will be subject to consumer
testing before being required for institutional disclosures to
prospective and enrolled students.
Comments: A few commenters expressed strong overall support for
requiring disclosures to prospective and enrolled students of any
financial protection an institution must provide under proposed Sec.
668.175(d), (f), or (h). The commenters cited the significant financial
stake an institution's students have in its continued viability, and a
resulting right to be apprised of financially related actions that
might affect that viability.
However, some commenters who supported the proposed requirements
raised the concern that unscrupulous institutions might intentionally
attempt to undermine the disclosures by burying or disguising them.
Accordingly, those commenters suggested that the Department should
prescribe the wording, format, and labeling of the disclosures. Other
commenters expressed disappointment that the proposed regulations do
not require institutions to deliver financial protection disclosures to
prospective students at the first contact with those students, and
strongly supported including such a requirement in the final
regulations. Though acknowledging several negotiators' objections that
establishing a point of first contact would prove too difficult, one
commenter was unconvinced, and asserted the importance of requiring
delivery of critical student warnings at a point when they matter most.
The same commenter found the proposed regulatory language on financial
protection disclosures to be vague, and requested clarification as to
whether proposed Sec. 668.41(h)(7) (requiring institutions to deliver
loan repayment warnings in a form and manner prescribed by the
Secretary) applies to financial protection disclosures as well. The
commenter further asserted that information regarding financial
protection is even more important to consumers than repayment rates,
and therefore institutions' promotional materials should be required to
contain financial protection disclosures in the same way that the
proposed regulations require such material to contain repayment rate
warnings.
Finally, some commenters urged that, notwithstanding the proposed
financial protection disclosures required of institutions, the
Department should itself commit to disclosing certain information about
institutions that are subject to enhanced financial responsibility
requirements. Specifically, the commenters suggested that the
Department disclose the amount of any letter of credit submitted and
the circumstances that triggered the enhanced financial responsibility
requirement.
For several reasons described in this section, many commenters
opposed either the concept of requiring institutions to make financial
protection disclosures, or the way in which such disclosures are
prescribed under the proposed regulations. One commenter suggested
removing financial protection disclosure requirements solely on the
grounds that students will neither take notice of nor care about this
information. The commenter expressed the belief that most people do not
really know what a letter of credit is, and that
[[Page 76011]]
therefore informing them of an institution's obligation to secure such
an instrument would only cause confusion.
Discussion: We thank those commenters who wrote in support of the
proposed financial protection disclosures. In response to the commenter
who raised concerns about unscrupulous institutions attempting to
undermine the proposed disclosures and warnings, including by burying
or disguising them, we share those concerns and drafted the applicable
regulatory language accordingly. Section 668.41(i)(1) of the final
regulations requires that an institution disclose information about
certain actions and triggering events (subject to and identified
through consumer testing) it has experienced to enrolled and
prospective students in the manner described in paragraphs (i)(4) and
(5) of that section, and that the form of the disclosure will be
prescribed by the Secretary in a notice published in the Federal
Register. Before publishing that notice, the Secretary will also
conduct consumer testing to help ensure the warning is meaningful and
helpful to students. This approach both holds institutions accountable
and creates flexibility for the Department to update warning
requirements, including specific language and labels, as appropriate in
the future. Based on these comments, and the comment expressing
confusion as to which of the delivery requirements in this section
apply to financial protection disclosures, we have revised Sec.
668.41(i) to make the requirements that apply to the actions and
triggering events disclosure and the process by which the language of
the disclosure will be developed and disseminated more explicit.
While mindful of the potential benefit to prospective students of
receiving disclosures early, we are not convinced that requiring
institutions to deliver such disclosures at first contact with a
student is necessary or efficacious. In many cases and at certain types
of institutions, it is impractical if not impossible to isolate the
initial point of contact between a student and an institutional
representative. Such a requirement would place a significant burden on
compliance officials and auditors as well as on institutions. Section
668.41(i)(5) of the final regulations requires institutions to provide
disclosures to prospective students before they enroll, register, or
enter into a financial obligation with the institution. We believe this
provides prospective students with adequate advance notice.
Regarding whether requirements in the proposed regulations
pertaining to the delivery of loan repayment warnings to prospective
and enrolled students apply to financial protection disclosures as
well, we are revising the regulations to separately state the
requirements for loan repayment warnings and financial protection
disclosures. Section Sec. 668.41(i) states that, subject to consumer
testing as to which events are most relevant to students, an
institution subject to one or more of the actions or triggering events
identified in Sec. 668.171(c)-(g) must disclose information about that
action or triggering event to enrolled and prospective students in the
manner prescribed in paragraphs (i)(4) and (5).
However, the actions and triggering events disclosures are not
required to be included in an institution's advertising and promotional
materials. We concur with the commenter that such financial protection
disclosures will provide critical information to students, but maintain
that delivery of those disclosures to students through the means
prescribed in revised Sec. 668.41(i)(4) and (5), and posting of the
disclosures to the institution's Web site as included in revised Sec.
668.41(i)(6), are most appropriate for this purpose. The loan repayment
warning provides information on the outcomes of all borrowers at the
institution, whereas the financial protection disclosure pertains
directly to the institution's compliance and other matters of financial
risk. We believe this type of disclosure is better provided on an
individual basis, directly to students, and that it may require a
longer-form disclosure than is practicable in advertising and
promotional materials.
Regarding the commenters' suggestion that the Department itself
disclose certain information about institutions subject to enhanced
financial responsibility requirements, we understand the value of this
approach, especially with respect to uniformity and limiting the
opportunity for unscrupulous institutions to circumvent the
regulations. However, we remain convinced that schools, as the primary
and on-the-ground communicators with their students, and the source of
much of the information students receive about financial aid, are well-
placed to reach their students and notify them of the potential risks
of attending that institution. We do not believe there are any
practical means through which the Department might similarly convey to
individual students the volume of information suggested by commenters.
Nevertheless, we intend to closely monitor the way in which
institutions comply with the actions and triggering events disclosure
requirements, and may consider at some point in the future whether the
Department should assume responsibility for making some or all of the
required disclosures. Additionally, the Department may, in the future,
consider requiring these disclosures to be placed on the Disclosure
Template under the Gainful Employment regulations, to streamline the
information flow to those prospective and enrolled students.
We respectfully disagree with the commenter who suggested removing
the financial protection disclosure requirements on the grounds that
students will neither take notice of nor care about this information.
Some of the information conveyed in the disclosures would undoubtedly
be of a complex nature. We also recognize that many people have limited
familiarity with financial instruments such as letters of credit. For
that reason, and to minimize confusion, we proposed consumer testing of
the disclosure language itself, in addition to consumer testing of the
actions and triggering events that require financial protection, to
ensure that the disclosures are meaningful and helpful to students. As
discussed above, in the final regulations we are revising proposed
Sec. 668.41(i) to require consumer testing prior to identifying the
actions and/or triggering events for financial protection that require
disclosures. We believe this change will result in disclosures that are
more relevant to students, and that relate directly to actions and/or
events that potentially affect the viability of institutions they
attend or are planning to attend. In keeping with the intent of the
proposed regulations to ensure that disclosures are meaningful and
helpful to students, the final regulations retain the use of consumer
testing, not only in determining the language to be used in such
disclosures but also the specific actions and triggering events to be
disclosed.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.41(i) to require consumer
testing of disclosures of the actions and triggering events that
require financial protection under Sec. 668.171(c)-(g).
Comments: Several commenters contended that the proposed
regulations inappropriately equate financial weakness with lack of
viability, and would require institutions to make disclosures that are
misleading or untrue. For example, an institution that is financially
responsible may experience a triggering event that nevertheless
requires the institution to disclose to students that it is financially
at risk. In the opinion of one
[[Page 76012]]
commenter, this constitutes compelling untrue speech and violates the
First Amendment.
Echoing this overall concern, one commenter expressed the belief
that warnings based on triggering events that have not been rigorously
proven to demonstrate serious financial danger would destroy an
institution's reputation based on insinuation, not fact. The commenter
proposed that an institution should have the opportunity to demonstrate
that it is not in danger of closing before requiring disclosures.
Strenuously objecting to financial protection disclosures, one
commenter described the relationship between some of the triggering
events listed in Sec. 668.171(c) and the institution's value to
students or its financial standing as tenuous. The commenter further
argued that the ``zone alternative'' found in current Sec. 668.175(d)
recognizes the potential for an institution to be viable in spite of
financial weakness; and that the proposed regulations weaken the zone
alternative.
A commenter, although acknowledging that students should be made
aware of some triggering events, took particular exception to the
Department's assertion that students are entitled to know about any
event significant enough to warrant disclosures to investors,
suggesting that SEC-related disclosures are not a reliable basis on
which to require disclosures to students. In support of this position,
the commenter noted that SEC disclosure requirements may or may not
indicate that a publicly traded institution will have difficulty
meeting its financial obligations to the Department, because such
disclosures serve a different purpose, namely to assist potential
investors in pricing the publicly traded institution's securities. The
commenter stated that linking financial protection disclosures to SEC
reporting may create false alarms for students and cause them to react
impulsively.
Discussion: We do not agree that the proposed regulations either
inappropriately equate financial weakness with lack of viability, or
require institutions to issue misleading or untrue disclosures.
Under the regulations, an institution is required to provide
financial protection, such as an irrevocable letter of credit, only if
that institution is deemed to be not financially responsible because of
an action or event described in Sec. 668.171(b). As described in the
NPRM, we believe that the factors necessitating an institution to
provide financial protection could have a significant impact on a
student's ability to complete his or her education at an institution.
However, we recognize that not all of the actions and triggering
events for financial protection will be relevant to students.
Therefore, we have revised the requirement to clarify that the
Secretary will select particular actions and events from the new
triggers specified in Sec. 668.171(c)-(g), as well as other events
that result in an institution being required to provide financial
protection to the Department, based on consumer testing. The events
that are demonstrated to be most relevant to students will be published
by the Secretary, and schools subject to financial protection
requirements for those events will be required to make a disclosure,
with language to be determined by the Secretary, to prospective and
enrolled students about the event. In addition to making required
disclosures more useful and understandable to students, while
accurately reflecting concerns about the institution's financial
viability, this change will ensure that the action or triggering events
behind the disclosure are relevant to students.
As the actions and triggering events identified in proposed Sec.
668.171(c) may affect an institution's ability to exist as a going
concern or continue to deliver educational services, we continue to
believe that, having made a substantial investment in their collective
educations, students have an absolute interest in being apprised of at
least several of these actions and events. This is not, as the
commenter suggests, destruction of an institution's reputation by
insinuation in place of facts, but rather the providing of factual
information to students on which they can make a considered decision
whether to attend or continue to attend that institution.
We agree with the commenter that noted that the purposes of
disclosures to investors required by the SEC and these proposed
disclosures are different in some respects. As discussed under
``Automatic Triggering Events,'' we are revising the triggers in Sec.
668.171(c) to ensure that the triggers, including the proposed triggers
that were drawn from SEC disclosure requirements, are tailored to
capture events that are most relevant to an institution's ability to
provide educational services to its students. With these changes, we
believe that each of these triggers and the related disclosure will
serve the Department's stated purpose.
We understand the commenters' concern that some students may draw
undesirable or even erroneous conclusions from the disclosures or act
impulsively as a result of the disclosures. As students must decide for
themselves the value of any institution and the extent to which that
value is affected by the event or condition that triggered the
disclosure, there might always be some subjectivity inherent to an
individual's reading of the required disclosure. However, we believe
the benefit to those students in being apprised of actions or events
that might affect an institution's viability outweighs this potential
concern. Moreover, as previously discussed, the Department will conduct
consumer testing to ensure that both the events that result in
institutions being required to provide financial protection to the
Department, as well as the language itself, is meaningful and helpful
to students before requiring disclosures of those events. Our intent is
for the required disclosures to convey accurate, important information.
Finally, with regard to the suggestion made by one commenter that
institutions be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that they are
not in imminent danger of closing before having to provide financial
protection and the accompanying financial protection disclosures, as
discussed above under ``Reporting Requirements,'' we are revising Sec.
668.171(h) to permit an institution to demonstrate, at the time it
reports a triggering event, that the event or condition no longer
exists, has been resolved or that it has insurance that will cover any
and all debts and liabilities that arise at any time from that
triggering event. If such a demonstration is successfully made, the
institution will not be required to provide financial protection, and
will not be subject to the financial protection disclosure requirement.
We agree with the commenter who pointed out that the ``zone
alternative'' in current Sec. 668.175(d) recognizes the potential for
an institution to be viable in spite of financial weakness, but we do
not concur with the assertion that the regulations would weaken the
zone alternative. The zone alternative is specific to an institution
that is not financially responsible solely because the Secretary
determines its composite score is less than 1.5 but at least 1.0. Such
an institution may nevertheless participate in the title IV, HEA
programs as a financially responsible institution under the provisions
of the zone. We are not proposing to change current regulations related
to the zone alternative. Participation under the zone alternative is
not an action or triggering event and would, therefore, not result in
an institution having to make a disclosure.
[[Page 76013]]
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.41(i) to require consumer
testing of disclosures of the actions and triggering events that
require financial protection under Sec. 668.171(c)-(g).
Scope of the Disclosure Requirement
Comments: Several commenters requested clarification as to the
scope of the financial protection disclosure requirements. One
commenter expressed concern about proposed Sec. 668.41(i), which
stated that an institution required to provide financial protection to
the Secretary such as an irrevocable letter of credit under Sec.
668.175(d, or to establish a set-aside under Sec. 668.175(h), must
provide the disclosures described in Sec. 668.41(i)(1)-(3). The
commenter contended that it is not clear whether the disclosure
requirement pertains only to financial protections resulting from the
new triggers in the proposed regulations, or whether the disclosures
would be required for any financial protections, including those
required under existing financial responsibility standards, such as the
50 percent letter of credit provided under current Sec. 668.175(c).
The commenter added that when an institution provides a letter of
credit pursuant to current Sec. 668.175(b) and (c), it qualifies as a
financially responsible institution, and thus there should be no need
for disclosures in these situations. However, the commenter asserted
that the Department's frequent use of the undefined phrase ``financial
protection,'' throughout Sec. 668.175, has resulted in a lack of
clarity. The commenter asked that the Department limit financial
protection disclosures to the new triggers in Sec. 668.171.
Another commenter noted that the zone alternative under Sec.
668.175(d) does not include a requirement to provide financial
protection to the Department and therefore should not be referenced in
the disclosure requirement.
Discussion: We thank the commenter who brought to our attention the
unintentional reference in Sec. 668.41(i) to financial protection
provided to the Secretary under Sec. 668.175(d). As the commenter
pointed out, Sec. 668.175(d) relates to the zone alternative and does
not include a requirement to provide financial protection. Proposed
Sec. 668.41(i) is intended to reference only financial protection
provided to the Secretary under Sec. 668.175(f), or the set-aside
under Sec. 668.175(h).
To clarify the scope of proposed Sec. 668.41(i), that section
would have required disclosures for any financial protection an
institution is required to provide under Sec. 668.175(f) or for any
set-aside under Sec. 668.175(h), not just financial protection
provided as a result of the new triggering actions and events
established in these regulations.
However, as described above, we are revising the financial
protection disclosures so that the Secretary will conduct consumer
testing to identify which actions and triggering events should be
disclosed. Institutions will be required to disclose information about
those events only if it is found to be relevant to students.
Changes: As described above, we have revised Sec. 668.41(i) to
require consumer testing of disclosures of the actions and triggering
events that require financial protection under Sec. 668.171(c)-(g).
Harm to Institutions
Comments: Several commenters addressed the potential harm to
institutions they believe will result from the proposed financial
protection disclosures. These commenters warned of irreparable damage
to an institution's reputation that could drive away students, alarm
potential donors, diminish access to capital, and unfairly brand an
unknown number of institutions as untrustworthy. One commenter
envisioned a cascading series of events in which declining enrollment
and alumni and donor support forces tuition hikes, which in turn lead
to further declines in enrollment and the institution's eventual
closure.
Underlying the commenters' concern over potential negative outcomes
was the opinion that the required disclosures are based on flawed
financial standards that are not truly indicative of whether an
institution is carrying out its educational mission. One commenter
suggested that the Department might cause lasting and perhaps grave
harm to institutions not currently at risk of failure, turning
disagreements about accounting issues into existential enrollment
threats. Another commenter pointed out that some nonprofit institutions
operate close to the margin of sustainability because of their mission,
or a charitable commitment to supporting needy students. The proposed
financial protection disclosures would, in the opinion of the
commenter, thrust such institutions into a cycle of failure.
Discussion: We understand the concern regarding the potential for
the financial protection disclosures that were initially proposed, as
well as the financial protection disclosures in these final
regulations, to damage an institution's reputation. However, we do not
believe that the possibility of harm to an institution's reputation is
reason enough to withhold from students, who in many cases have
borrowed heavily to finance their educations, information on the
financial viability of the institutions they attend. Regarding the
catastrophic series of events predicted by some commenters, we believe
such occurrences are unlikely. However, in the event that some
institutions do fall into what one commenter termed a cycle of failure,
we believe that is more appropriately attributable to the actions or
failures of the institutions themselves than to the financial
protection disclosures.
We address earlier in this section the commenters' contention that
the financial responsibility standards on which the actions and
triggering events disclosure requirements are based are flawed and not
indicative of institutions' actual financial positions. We do not agree
with the observation of one commenter that the proposed regulations
require financial protection disclosures for what are essentially
disagreements about accounting issues. As discussed under ``Triggering
Events,'' our analysis and assessment of the triggering actions and
events which necessitate providing financial protection indicates they
would have a demonstrable effect on an institution's financial
position.
Lastly, with regard to the point made by one commenter that some
nonprofit institutions operate close to the margin in adherence to a
mission or particular commitment to funding needy students, the
Department commends the efforts of such institutions. We do not believe
that for the most part, such institutions have a heightened risk of
experiencing a triggering action or event. The financial stress on
institutions operating close to the margin of sustainability for the
reasons noted above is most likely to reflect in a lower composite
score than might otherwise be the case. Those institutions are
frequently able to operate as financially responsible institutions
under the zone alternative, and would not be subject to financial
protection disclosures.
Changes: None.
Warnings to Students--General
Comments: Some commenters contended that the proposed provisions
related to mandatory warnings to students are not consistent with the
provisions and purposes of the HEA. They noted that the HEA enumerates
an extensive list of information that institutions must ``produce . . .
and [make] readily available upon request'' to current and prospective
students (20 U.S.C. 1092(a)(1)), which includes, among other things,
graduation rates and crime statistics, but makes no
[[Page 76014]]
reference to any requirement to disclose information that bears on the
institution's financial viability or its need to provide financial
protection. See id. Sec. Sec. 1092(a)-(m). Moreover, the commenters
opined that the mandatory warning requirements run afoul of the First
Amendment, arguing that compelled speech, as included in the proposed
regulation's required warnings, is subject to strict scrutiny and
permissible only if ``reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception of consumers.'' R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA,
696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Discussion: Section 668.41(h)(3) and (i)(4) and (5) requires the
institution to provide what are described as ``warnings'' to students,
regarding the repayment rate of its alumni, through advertising and
promotional materials, and ``disclosures'' regarding the actions and
triggering events for any financial protection, identified pursuant to
consumer testing, directly to prospective and enrolled students. The
repayment rate provision requires the institution to state in its
disclosure that: ``A majority of recent student loan borrowers at this
school are not paying down their loans''--a statement that will rest
squarely on factual determinations of repayment patterns demonstrated
by a recent cohort of student borrowers from that institution, derived
from data validated through a challenge process in which the
institution may contest the accuracy of the data elements. The
statement does not, unlike the warning criticized in a prior court
ruling, state that the prospective student should expect difficulty in
repayment.\62\ It merely provides a factually accurate statement that
ascribes no adverse quality to the institution itself as the cause of
this pattern.\63\ The regulation does not compel the institution to
articulate a government position on the cause of that pattern, or to
engage in or disseminate as true what is ``uncertain, speculative
estimates.'' Association of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 199 (D.D.C. 2015), aff'd 640 Fed.Appx. 5
(D.C. Cir. 2016). Rather, the repayment rate provision simply requires
disclosure of a factual statement that the Department considers
valuable information to the consumer. The institution is free to
explain, if it wishes, why it believes that pattern exists, or why it
believes that the pattern does not indicate that it is unable to
deliver a quality education. The statement falls well within the
grounds upheld for other required disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ ``[A] student who enrolls or continues to enroll in the
program should expect to have difficulty repaying his or her student
loans.'' Debt Measure Rule, 76 Fed.Reg. at 34,432. . . . the court
doubts that the statement that every student in a program ``should
expect to have difficulty repaying his or her student loans'' is a
purely factual one. Association of Private Colleges and Universities
v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 155 (D.D.C. 2012).
\63\ Similarly, the statement simply describes whether borrowers
are paying ``down'' their loans, a readily understood term meaning
that the payments made are not reducing the loan amount--not whether
they are repaying under whichever repayment plan they chose, or are
in default.
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Furthermore, the form, place, and even the actual language of this
warning may change based on consumer testing or other factors to help
ensure that the warning is meaningful and helpful to students, and if
so, the Department will publish those matters in a notice in the
Federal Register. Sec. 668.41(h)(3). For the financial protection
disclosures, the Secretary will also conduct consumer testing to
determine precisely which actions and triggering events that require
financial protection would be most relevant and important for
prospective and enrolled students to know, and to determine the
appropriate language for a disclosure. Sec. 668.41(i).
We note first that the governmental interest in compelling speech
is not limited to ``preventing deception,'' as the commenter appears to
suggest.\64\ This follows from the nature of the test applied to First
Amendment challenges to compelled speech, as demonstrated in recent
litigation challenging disclosures mandated by the Department's GE
regulations. Because the required disclosures/warnings are commercial
speech, the government may require the commercial disclosure of `purely
factual and uncontroversial information' as long as there is a rational
justification for the means of disclosure and it is intended to prevent
consumer confusion.'' Ass'n of Private Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 155 (D.D.C. 2012). As that court noted in
upholding a requirement that an institution offering GE programs make
disclosures about its programs, costs, and student outcomes:
\64\ Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding country of origin labelling
requirements; overruling prior opinions of that court that limited
requirements to those aimed at preventing deception).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
. . . The Department has broad authority ``to make, promulgate,
issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing the manner
of operation of, and governing the applicable programs administered
by, the Department.'' 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3 (2006); see also id. Sec.
3474 (``The Secretary is authorized to prescribe such rules and
regulations as the Secretary determines necessary or appropriate to
administer and manage the functions of the Secretary or the
Department.''). The disclosures mandated here fall comfortably
within that regulatory power, and are therefore within the
Department's authority under the Higher Education Act.
Ass'n of Private Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 870 156.\65\
The regulations accord the institution a challenge process regarding
the calculation of the repayment rate itself, as well as an opportunity
for a hearing to consider challenges to a requirement to provide
financial protection. These procedures will produce a factual outcome;
the factual outcome--like the disclosures about costs, placements,
completion rate and repayment rate mandated in the GE regulations
already upheld--may themselves also be ``vanilla'' disclosures of
unpleasant, but factually accurate determinations. How alumni are
repaying their loans, and whether the school has experienced actions or
triggering events that pose financial risk to the government (and
students), are of direct interest to consumers. We believe
disclosures--and warnings--that convey determinations on those matters
fall well with the kind of disclosures the courts have upheld.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ In contrast, the court there doubted that the language of
the warning also required under those regulations (that every
student in a program ``should expect to have difficulty repaying his
or her student loans'') would have been ``purely factual and
uncontroversial information.'' Ass'n of Private Colleges &
Universities v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 155. When that regulation
was reissued and later challenged on First Amendment grounds, this
same court upheld the disclosures required in the new rule, and in
doing so contrasted the ``graphic, compelled speech'' challenged by
tobacco advertisers in R.J. Reynolds, on which the commenters relay,
with ``the vanilla, estimated-cost disclosures at issue'' in the
Department regulation. Id. Moreover, the court further noted that
even ``R.J. Reynolds acknowledged that the Zauderer standard applies
not just to purely factual and uncontroversial information, but also
to `accurate statement[s].' . . . The `total cost' estimates
contemplated here certainly meet that description.'' Ass'n of
Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d
176, 200 n.12 (D.D.C. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Ass'n of Private Sector
Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 640 F. App'x 5 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Proprietary Institution Loan Repayment Warning
General: Repayment Rate
Comments: A number of commenters supported requiring warnings for
prospective and enrolled students at proprietary institutions with poor
repayment rates. They argued that the warnings will provide useful
information for students as they make educational and borrowing
decisions. One group of commenters urged the Department to release all
loan repayment rates publicly, including for
[[Page 76015]]
institutions that are not required to deliver loan repayment warnings
under Sec. 668.41(h).
However, several commenters argued that, because repayment behavior
is not controllable by the institution, the repayment rate is not an
appropriate institutional performance measure. Another argued that loan
repayment rate reflects financial circumstances, but not educational
quality, so it is not appropriate to require institutions to issue
warnings based on their loan repayment rate.
Several commenters also raised concerns that Sec. 668.41(h) would
place an undue burden on institutions and duplicates other established
disclosure requirements. They contended that the requirement is
unnecessary, particularly because the proprietary institutions required
to comply with Sec. 668.41(h) are already subject to the GE reporting
and disclosure requirements, including a repayment rate disclosure if
specified by the Secretary; and because the Department already
publishes both cohort default rates and institutional repayment rates
on the College Scorecard. Other commenters suggested that the measure
would increase costs of higher education due to higher administrative
burden, and contended that the disclosures were not likely to make much
impact, given the large number of mandated disclosures already in
place.
Discussion: We appreciate the comments supporting the repayment
rate warning provision. We agree that this provision will provide
critical information for students that will help them to make well-
informed decisions about where to go to college and their financial aid
use. Repayment rates provide a key indicator of students' post-college
repayment outcomes, which are of vital interest to students considering
their families' personal financial circumstances, as well as to
taxpayers and policymakers. The Department has already worked to
promote greater access to such information through the GE regulations
and the College Scorecard; we believe that the repayment rate warning
requirement in these regulations will provide an important complement
to those other efforts.
We do not agree with the commenters who stated that repayment does
not constitute a measure of educational quality, or the commenter who
argued that repayment rate is a measure of students' financial
backgrounds and not academic quality. We believe that all students
deserve to have information about their prospective outcomes after
leaving the institution. Particularly for students who expect to borrow
Federal loans to attend college, it is critical to know whether other
students have been able to repay their debts incurred at the
institution.
However, while we believe that this information is very important
for prospective students to be aware of and to consider, we agree with
the concerns that creating a new rate could confuse the borrowers who
will also receive the GE program-level repayment rate disclosures using
a different calculation and different cohorts for measuring borrower
outcomes. While not decisive, we also recognize and understand the
comments from those who raised concerns that the requirement may be
overly burdensome because of the differences with the data used in the
GE calculation. Requiring a separate data corrections process for
proprietary institutions, which are already subject to reporting
requirements for repayment rate under GE for virtually all of their
borrowers, may be needlessly burdensome given the virtually complete
overlap in students covered.
To avoid any confusion resulting from a new repayment rate
calculation, as well as to limit burden on institutions, we are
revising the repayment rate provision. Under this revised provision,
the repayment rate data that proprietary institutions report at the
program level will be used to calculate a comparable repayment rate at
the institution level. Specifically, the Department will calculate, for
those borrowers who entered repayment during a particular two-year
cohort period, the repayment rate as follows: The number of borrowers
in GE programs who are paid in full or who are in active repayment
(defined as the number of borrowers who entered repayment and, during
the most recently completed award year, made loan payments sufficient
to reduce the outstanding balance of loans received for enrollment in
the program by at least one dollar), divided by the number of borrowers
reported in GE programs who entered repayment. Institutions with a
repayment rate showing that the median borrower has not either fully
repaid the borrower's loans by the end of the third year after entering
repayment, or reduced their outstanding balance by at least one dollar,
over the third year of repayment (which, under the calculation
methodology, is equivalent to a loan repayment rate of less than 0.5)
will be subject to a requirement that they include a warning, to be
prescribed in a later Federal Register notice by the Secretary, in
advertising and promotional materials. We are also removing the
proposed requirement for direct delivery of repayment rate warnings to
prospective and enrolled students, recognizing that the GE regulations
already require those proprietary institutions to deliver a program-
level disclosure template that includes repayment rate to those
students. We believe that these changes will reduce administrative
burden on institutions considerably, and help to ensure that increased
administrative burden is not passed on by institutions in greater costs
to students.
We disagree with the commenters who argued that the disclosures
would not make much impact. A large and growing body of research
suggests that in many cases, students and families react to information
about the costs and especially the value of higher education, including
by making different decisions.\66\ To maximize the potential for
effective warnings to students, the Department has revised the
regulatory language about the warnings that must be included in
advertising and promotional materials to maximize the likelihood that
such information will be well presented in a timely manner. We believe
that this information will build upon, and not conflict with, other
disclosures that institutions currently make. In particular, we believe
that the institutional warning requirement in advertising and
promotional materials will provide a valuable caution to students in
their early stages of considering which colleges to attend. We also
believe that the institutional warning requirement will act as a
complement to other disclosure requirements, including the disclosure
template required to be provided under the GE regulations and the
Department's own efforts to promote greater transparency and better-
informed decision-making through the College Scorecard and the
Financial Aid Shopping Sheet. The Department will also promote this
information through its own channels to reach students, including
through the College Scorecard or the FAFSA, after consideration of the
most effective and efficient ways to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Wiswall, M., and Zafar, B. (2015). How Do College Students
Respond to Public Information about Earnings? Journal of Human
Capital, 9(2), 117-169. DOI: 10.1086/681542. Retrieved from ;
Hastings, J., Neilson, C.A., and Zimmerman, S.D. (June 2015). The
Effects of Earnings Disclosure on College Enrollment Decisions.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working
Papers 21300. Retrieved from www.nber.org/papers/w21300; and Hoxby,
C. and Turner, S. (2015). What High-Achieving Low-Income Students
Know About College. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research. NBER Working Paper No. 20861. Retrieved from www.nber.org/papers/w20861.pdf.
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[[Page 76016]]
Changes: We have revised the loan repayment rate calculation in
Sec. 668.41(h), altered the loan repayment rate issuing process to
reflect that any corrections will occur under the GE regulations, and
provided that proprietary institutions with a sufficiently large number
of borrowers who are not covered under GE reporting may be exempt from
the warning requirement (as described in more detail later in this
section). We have made conforming changes to separate the loan
repayment warning delivery provisions, which require a warning to be
included in advertising and promotional materials but no individual
disclosure to students, from the delivery provisions for the financial
protection disclosure required under Sec. 668.41(i) of the final
regulations, which require delivery of the disclosure to prospective
and enrolled students.
Legal/Process Concerns
Comments: Noting that the proposed loan repayment warning was not
included in the Department's notice announcing its intent to establish
a negotiated rulemaking committee published in the Federal Register on
August 20, 2015 (80 FR 50588), one commenter contended that the
requirement falls outside the scope of the rulemaking process.
Discussion: The first session of negotiated rulemaking, held
January 12-14, 2016, included a discussion of the potential
consequences for ``conditions that may be detrimental to students,''
including the possibility of disclosure requirements and student
warnings. The Department proposed regulatory text concerning a
repayment rate warning at the second negotiated rulemaking session
(February 17-19, 2016), and the committee discussed the proposal during
the second and third sessions. Moreover, the negotiated rulemaking
process ensures that a broad range of interests and qualifications are
considered in the development of regulations. We believe that
sufficient notice was provided about the potential for inclusion of the
repayment rate warning, and that the negotiators involved in developing
these regulations were well-qualified to explore the option.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter argued that the loan repayment rate
provision does not constitute ``reasoned decision-making,'' because the
Department did not explain the evaluation of repayment on an
individualized basis; the use of a median, rather than an average,
borrower to determine the school's rate; the zero percent threshold;
the length of the measurement window; and the exemption of in-school
and military deferments only in the final year. Another commenter
asserted that the requirement is arbitrary and capricious because
several points in the preamble (such as the level of the calculation
and the data challenge process) were unclear.
Discussion: We disagree with the commenters who stated that the
repayment rate warning provision is arbitrary and capricious, and that
it does not constitute reasoned decision-making. The repayment rate
measure identified in the proposed regulations, while different from
other repayment rate measures the Department has used in other
contexts, was designed to measure repayment outcomes in greater detail
than existing measures do (for instance, by looking at the percentage
of the balance repaid rather than the share of borrowers who met a
binary threshold of paying down at least one dollar in principal).
However, as described earlier, the Department has revised the
repayment rate provision in the final regulations to mirror the
program-level rates used under the GE regulations. Those rates
calculate the share of borrowers who have made progress in repaying
their loans, and will rely exclusively on data reported already under
the GE regulations. We believe that these changes address the concerns
of the commenters.
Changes: We have revised the calculation of the loan repayment rate
in Sec. 668.41(h), as previously described.
Proprietary Sector Requirement
Comments: Several commenters wrote that limiting the repayment rate
provision to proprietary institutions is reasonable, given the
differences in structure between those institutions and other sectors
and the data that indicate poor repayment outcomes are widespread in
the for-profit sector.
However, many commenters disagreed with the Department's proposal
to limit the requirement to proprietary institutions. One commenter
questioned the validity of the Department's argument that limiting the
applicability of Sec. 668.41(h) to proprietary institutions reduces
the burden on institutions because only certain institutions benefit
from the reduced burden. Noting that there is no similar limitation
applicable to financial protection disclosures, one commenter suggested
that the Department's limitation of the repayment rate provision to
proprietary institutions was inconsistent. Some commenters argued that
the Department was ignoring the needs of students at the estimated 30
percent of public and private nonprofit institutions with similarly low
repayment rates that are not subject to the warning requirement,
particularly because a majority of Federal student loan borrowers
attend public institutions. Others stated that a repayment rate warning
requirement for public and private nonprofit institutions is necessary
to help students understand their choices and contextualize the
information available to them. Several of these commenters proposed
that public and private nonprofit institutions be required to disclose
that the Department had not calculated a loan repayment rate for the
institution and that it is therefore not possible to know whether the
institution's repayment rate is acceptable.
Some commenters contended that there is no rationale for limiting
the warning requirement to the proprietary sector. Other commenters
stated that the Department lacked sufficient research to support the
proposed regulations. Several commenters argued that the information
cited as justification for limiting the repayment rate warning
requirement to the proprietary sector was overstated or invalid. One
commenter suggested that the Department cited inaccurate data from the
College Scorecard. Several commenters noted that they could not
replicate their Scorecard repayment rates due to inconsistencies in the
National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) data underlying the measure.
Another commenter suggested that the cohort used to support the
analysis did not reflect typical cohorts, since those students entered
repayment during a recession. Several other commenters contended that
the decision to limit the warning requirement to proprietary
institutions violates GEPA and has no basis in the HEA.
A number of commenters suggested removing the loan repayment
warning provision entirely, while several proposed expanding its
application to all institutions with low repayment rates, regardless of
sector. Several commenters suggested limiting the repayment rate
warning requirement to institutions at which a majority of students are
enrolled in programs subject to the Department's GE regulations,
because, according to the commenters, students at career-oriented
institutions frequently have misconceptions about their likely
earnings. Alternatively, commenters suggested limiting the requirement
to schools with ``financially interested boards'' to include
proprietary
[[Page 76017]]
institutions that have converted to nonprofit status.
Discussion: We appreciate the comments supporting the limitation of
the repayment rate warning to proprietary institutions in light of the
concentration of poor repayment outcomes in the proprietary sector and
the risk of excessive and unnecessary burden to institutions with a far
lower likelihood of poor repayment rates. As discussed in both the NPRM
\67\ and in the Gainful Employment final regulations,\68\ a wide body
of evidence demonstrates that student debt and loan repayment outcomes
are worse for students in the proprietary sector than students in other
sectors.
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\67\ www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015-OPE-0103-0221.
\68\ www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2014-OPE-0039-2390.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most students in the proprietary sector borrow Federal loans, while
borrowing rates among public and private nonprofit institutions are far
lower; and debt levels are often higher. For instance, as also noted in
the final Gainful Employment regulations, in 2011-2012, 60 percent of
certificate students who were enrolled at for-profit two-year
institutions took out Federal student loans during that year, compared
with 10 percent at public two-year institutions. Of those who borrowed,
the median amount borrowed by students enrolled in certificate programs
at two-year for-profit institutions was $6,629, as opposed to $4,000 at
public two-year institutions. Additionally, in 2011-12, 66 percent of
associate degree students who were enrolled at for-profit institutions
took out student loans, while only 20 percent of associate degree
students who were enrolled at public two-year institutions did so. Of
those who borrowed in that year, for-profit two-year associate degree
enrollees had a median amount borrowed during that year of $7,583,
compared with $4,467 for students at public two-year institutions.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) 2012.
Unpublished analysis of restricted-use data using the NCES
PowerStats tool.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to higher rates of borrowing, students at proprietary
schools also default at higher rates than borrowers who attend schools
in other sectors. Proprietary institutions have higher three-year
cohort default rates than other sectors (15.0 percent, compared with
7.0 percent at private nonprofit institutions and 11.3 percent at
public institutions in fiscal year 2013), and enroll a disproportionate
share of students who default relative to all borrowers in the
repayment cohort.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ ``Comparison of FY 2013 Official National Cohort Default
Rates to Prior Two Official Cohort Default Rates.'' U.S. Department
of Education. Calculated August 6, 2016: https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/schooltyperates.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the final regulations, the Department seeks to reduce confusion
among students and families by using rates that parallel the Gainful
Employment program-level repayment rate, including using the same
cohorts of students as the GE rates do. As a result of these changes,
the repayment rate will be calculated using data that institutions
already report to the Department through the GE regulations, rather
than through a distinct data reporting and corrections process. This
eliminates many of the concerns raised by commenters and discussed in
the NPRM about the burden to institutions of complying with the
repayment rate calculation provision.
However, the Department believes that, because of the changes, it
would be inappropriate to apply an institutional warning to sectors
other than the proprietary sector, because public and private nonprofit
institutions are not typically comprised solely of GE programs and the
repayment rate warning may not be representative of all borrowers at
the school. Federal student loan borrowers also typically represent a
relatively small proportion of the student population in the public
sector, whereas borrowing rates are much higher, on average, at
proprietary institutions (for instance, among full-time undergraduates
enrolled in 2011-12, 19.7 percent borrowed Stafford loans at public
less-than-two-year institutions, compared with 82.9 percent at for-
profit less-than-two-year institutions and 83.3 percent at for-profit
two-year-and-above institutions).\71\ Moreover, the mix of programs at
public and private nonprofit institutions may shift from year to year,
changing the share of GE borrowers at the institution on an annual
basis; including such institutions in the repayment rate requirement
would require the Department to expend annual efforts to identify
schools that are comprised entirely of GE programs for a relatively
small number of schools. Therefore, this requirement is limited only to
proprietary institutions. We recognize that some proprietary
institutions may have Federal student loan borrowers in non-GE programs
under section 102(b)(1)(ii) of the HEA. Accordingly, the final
regulations specify that proprietary institutions with a failing
repayment rate may appeal to the Secretary for an exemption from the
warning requirement if they can demonstrate that including non-GE
borrowers in the rate would increase the rate to passing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics, 2007-08 and 2011-12 National Postsecondary Student Aid
Study (NPSAS:08 and NPSAS:12). (This table was prepared July 2014.)
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_331.90.asp?current=yes.
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With these changes, we believe that the Department's decision to
limit the repayment rate warning to proprietary institutions is well-
founded and does not raise concerns about excessive burden or
inaccurate representation of student outcomes, and we disagree with the
commenters who stated that the limitation to proprietary schools is not
appropriate.
In response to the commenter who asserted that requiring only
proprietary institutions to disclose repayment rates is inconsistent,
as noted earlier, we decided to limit the repayment rate warning
requirement to the sector of institutions where the frequency of poor
repayment outcomes is greatest. Also as described earlier, the
Department's analysis of data shows the financial risk to students to
be far more severe in the proprietary sector; and data suggest that an
institution-wide warning about borrower outcomes is more appropriate in
the proprietary sector, given higher rates of borrowing among students
(particularly in GE programs).
While we recognize some users' concerns with specific elements of
the data cited in the NPRM, we believe that the data corrections
process that will be established through the GE regulations will ensure
the accuracy of the information on which the warning in advertisements
and promotional materials is based. We recognize the concerns of the
commenter who stated that the data cited in the NPRM reflect a cohort
that entered repayment during the recession, but believe that this
regulation will appropriately capture the actual outcomes of students,
given that even students who enter repayment during a recession will be
required to repay their loans in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Federal student loan programs. The provision of GEPA
to which the commenter refers requires uniform application of
regulations throughout the United States. 20 U.S.C. 1232(a). The HEA
authorizes the Department to adopt disclosure regulations as does the
general authority of the Secretary in 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3 and 20 U.S.C.
3474. Assn. of Private Coll. and Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d at
156. We believe that our analysis of the outcomes provides a reasonable
basis on
[[Page 76018]]
which to focus this requirement on for-profit schools.
We disagree with the commenters who propose to remove the repayment
rate warning provision from the regulations. The Department believes
that this information is critical to ensure students and families have
the information they need to make well-informed decisions about where
to go to college. Given the concerns discussed earlier about the
inaccuracy of applying a warning to an entire institution based on data
that do not necessarily represent all borrowers at the school, and the
added burden both on public and private nonprofit institutions and on
the Department to identify the relatively few institutions that might
be accurately represented by such a rate, we believe it is appropriate
to maintain the repayment rate warning provision only for proprietary
schools. We appreciate the comments from those who suggested tying the
repayment rate warning requirement to those institutions with a
significant proportion of students in GE programs, and have adopted a
version of that requirement (i.e., the warning requirement applies only
to those institutions at which a majority of GE borrowers are not in
active repayment or repaid in full; and only at proprietary
institutions, where effectively all programs are subject to the GE
requirements). While we appreciate the comments from those who proposed
instead limiting the requirement to ``financially interested boards''
to prevent certain institutions from avoiding the requirements, we
believe that the requirements as stated in the final regulations will
cover the vast majority of students at institutions with such boards,
and that the added burden of identifying those institutions in another
way would not yield much additional coverage for the requirement.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.41(h) to provide that, if a
proprietary institution has a repayment rate that shows that the median
borrower has not either fully repaid, or made loan payments sufficient
to reduce by at least one dollar, the outstanding balance of the
borrower's loans, it may seek to demonstrate to the Secretary's
satisfaction that it has borrowers in non-GE programs who would
increase the school's repayment rate above the threshold for the
warning requirement if they were included in the calculation. If an
institution demonstrates this to the Secretary's satisfaction, it will
receive an exemption from the warning requirement.
Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) Enrollment
Comments: A number of commenters asserted that Sec. 668.41(h)
conflicts with the Administration's income-based repayment plan
enrollment campaigns. One commenter pointed to a Council of Economic
Advisers report that states that borrowers on IDR plans are from more
disadvantaged backgrounds than those on the standard repayment plans,
suggesting that borrowers' investments in higher education pay off over
time. That commenter contended that measuring borrowers' repayment
behavior in the first five years is not appropriate because of the
long-term payoff of postsecondary education. Other commenters argued
that institutions would be unfairly--and retroactively--penalized for
encouraging students to sign up for IDR plans.
Several commenters proposed to remove from the repayment rate
calculation any borrower making payments under any Federal repayment
plan, including IDR plans. Alternatively, one of the commenters
proposed that the Department should allow institutions to include in
the warning to students that the negative amortization of its borrowers
occurred because of federally authorized repayment plans where that is
the case.
Discussion: We disagree with the commenters' statements that
income-driven repayment plans conflict with the loan repayment warning
provision. The IDR plans that Congress and the Department provide to
borrowers were created to act as a safety net for struggling
borrowers--those whose debts are sufficiently high, or incomes are
sufficiently low, to make repaying them on the expected timeline
exceedingly difficult. However, a post-college safety net program for
borrowers does not eliminate the responsibility the institution has to
provide a high-quality education that ensures borrowers are able to, at
a minimum, afford to pay down their loans, even in the first years
after entering repayment. Moreover, the Department agrees with the
commenter who noted that many of the borrowers currently enrolled in
income-driven repayment (IDR) plans would otherwise be in distress on
their loans, and may thus be in negative amortization regardless of
whether they were on an IDR plan or may have defaulted. For instance, a
recent report from the Council of Economic Advisers found that over 40
percent of borrowers who entered repayment in fiscal year 2011 and
later enrolled in income-driven repayment had defaulted, had an
unemployment or economic hardship deferment, or had a single
forbearance of more than two months in length before entering their
first income-driven repayment plan.\72\ While the report shows that
measurements of short-term distress were mitigated for the borrowers
who enrolled in income-driven repayment plans, the Department believes
that the fact that such borrowers experienced types of financial
distress--whether failure to pay down the outstanding balance of the
loans or deferments, forbearances, and defaults that suggest acute
problems in repaying in the initial several years after leaving
school--constitute critical information that prospective students and
potential borrowers should be aware of prior to making enrollment or
financial aid decisions. To that point, we do not agree with the
commenters who stated that enrollment in IDR plans among students would
unfairly penalize institutions; on the contrary, borrowers who enroll
in IDR plans and still do not have sufficiently high incomes or low
debts to pay down the balance on their loans are experiencing precisely
the negative post-college outcomes about which students, taxpayers, and
the Department should have concerns. This argument is especially
relevant for institutions that are eligible for title IV, HEA aid on
the basis of providing educational programs that prepare students for
gainful employment in a recognized occupation. Students considering
such programs should be warned if the majority of borrowers do not have
sufficient income to pay down their Federal student debt, even if those
borrowers are protected from default by enrolling in IDR plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ ``Investing in Higher Education: Benefits, Challenges, and
the State of Student Debt.'' Council of Economic Advisers. July
2016: www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160718_cea_student_debt.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Inconsistency of Rates
Comments: Several commenters noted that the Department has
considered many variations of a repayment rate calculation in recent
years. They stated that none of these rates has been subject to peer-
review research and that the Department has not sufficiently supported
its proposal with research. Several commenters raised concerns that the
use of multiple repayment rates would lead to significant confusion.
These commenters urged the Department to use an existing definition of
repayment rate, or to remove the provision entirely.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenters' concerns that multiple
[[Page 76019]]
repayment rates, particularly where provided to the same students, may
lead to confusion. While we believe that this is important information
for students and families to consider while deciding where to apply and
enroll in college, we do not wish to create confusion for borrowers.
To that end, as described earlier, the Department has revised the
repayment rate provision in the final regulations to mirror the
program-level rates used under the GE regulations. Those rates
calculate the share of borrowers who have made progress in repaying
their loans; and will rely exclusively on data already reported under
the GE regulations. We believe that these changes address the
commenters' concerns. Moreover, the GE definition of ``repayment rate''
has been subjected to research, analysis, and consumer testing by the
field.
Changes: We have revised the calculation of the loan repayment rate
in Sec. 668.41(h), as described in more detail earlier in this
section.
Technical Comments About the Calculation
Comments: A number of commenters suggested specific changes to the
repayment rate. One commenter disagreed with the Department's proposed
use of a median repayment rate, rather than a mean. Several others
argued that an institutional median is not appropriate because post-
college repayment outcomes may vary significantly by program. One
commenter was confused as to whether the loan repayment rate would be
calculated on a per-borrower or a per-loan basis. Another commenter
proposed to separate out, and create distinct loan repayment rates and
warnings for graduate, undergraduate, and Parent PLUS Loan debts.
Several commenters stated that the treatment of consolidation loans was
unclear. One commenter suggested changing treatment of payments on
consolidation loans by attributing the same payments to loans at
multiple institutions, rather than attributing payments based on the
share of debt from each institution.
One commenter expressed confusion over the use of ``accrued
interest'' in the definition of ``original outstanding balance,'' and
the use of ``capitalized interest'' in the definition of current
outstanding balance for the repayment measure. Another commenter
proposed that, for graduate programs that prepare students for medical
residencies, the original outstanding balance should be defined as the
principal balance after the medical residency forbearance period.
Other commenters suggested minor changes to the proposed
calculation. One commenter argued that the Department proposed
inconsistent treatment of borrowers who default on their loans. This
commenter urged the Department to ensure that all defaulters appear as
a zero percent repayment rate, or that defaulters are given no distinct
treatment. Another commenter proposed that, under Sec.
668.41(h)(6)(i), there should be a minimum of 30 students in the
cohort, rather than 10, before requiring a loan repayment warning.
As noted earlier, several commenters argued that the zero percent
repayment rate threshold was not supported by any evidence or analysis,
and one contended that it is legally unsupportable.
Several commenters raised concerns about the five-year window for
measuring borrowers' repayment. Some argued that the five-year
measurement period is not predictable because of insufficient data.
Some commenters argued that a two- or three-year measurement period
would be better supported; or alternatively, proposed to use a 10-year
window. Another commenter stated that analysis of data from the College
Scorecard found that three- or seven-year repayment rates would be more
reliable. One commenter argued that the repayment rate window for
medical schools should be seven years, as in the Gainful Employment
regulations; while another commenter proposed that repayment rates for
graduate programs that prepare students for medical residencies should
be measured five years from the end of their medical residency
forbearance period.
Several commenters raised concerns about excluding from the
measurement only those students who are in certain deferments during
the measurement year. One commenter proposed to extend the measurement
window of borrowers who spend several years in in-school deferments,
while others proposed to exclude any borrower who entered an in-school
or military deferment at any point during the measurement period.
Several commenters argued that borrowers' backgrounds affect their
repayment rates; one commenter asserted that when borrowers'
backgrounds are taken into consideration, repayment rates of low-income
students and students enrolled at proprietary institutions are similar
to those of their higher-income peers. One commenter suggested that the
Department should revise the loan repayment rate methodology to exclude
all borrowers with an Expected Family Contribution of zero dollars in
any year of attendance. Another proposed to disclose the percentage of
Pell Grant recipients or adjust the threshold at institutions with a
high enrollment of Pell Grant recipients.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenters' concerns about the
specific calculation of the repayment rate. We have made changes to the
calculation of the repayment rate, as described earlier, that address
or eliminate many of the concerns raised, including clarifying that the
median rate over a mean is comparable to a proportion of borrowers; the
use of program-level data to calculate an institution-level rate,
ensuring that borrowers in GE programs receive warnings if either or
both rates raise cause for concern; and whether the rate would be
calculated on a per-borrower or per-loan basis (because the rate was
replaced by a proportion of borrowers who have not repaid at least one
dollar in outstanding balance). We disagree with the commenter who
suggested that creating distinct repayment rates and warning
requirements for particular programs is necessary, because such rates
will already be made available at the educational program level through
the GE regulations; this warning requirement is designed to complement
and supplement that rate with a broader measure of the entire
institution.
We believe that we have clarified the treatment of consolidation
loans, which will mirror the treatment of such loans in the GE
regulations. We also believe that additional clarification of the
definitions of ``accrued'' and ``capitalized'' interest, and one
commenter's proposed change to the definition for graduate programs
that prepare students for medical residencies, is not necessary because
the repayment rate will instead rely on data already reported under the
GE regulations. Similarly, the treatment of defaulted student loans
will mirror the GE data that are already reported to the Department. We
will continue to use a minimum cohort size of 10, rather than 30 as one
commenter proposed, because 10 is a sufficiently large size to meet
both minimum requirements and best practices for the protection of
student privacy; a minimum count of 10 borrowers is also the standard
already used in the GE regulations for repayment rate and other
metrics. With respect to concerns from several commenters about the use
of negative amortization as a threshold for requiring warnings, we
disagree that there is no support in research for doing so. Based on
internal analysis of data from the National Student Loan Data System
[[Page 76020]]
(NSLDS), the typical borrower in negative amortization--more than half
of those who have made no or negative repayment progress in the third
year after entering repayment--experienced long-term repayment hardship
such as default. Those borrowers are especially unlikely to satisfy
their loan debt in the long term.\73\ Additionally, several public
comments received and papers published during the negotiations for the
Department's GE regulations include reference to negative-amortization
thresholds for student loan repayment rates.\74\ Moreover, we believe
this will be an understandable measure to help inform consumer choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Analysis of NSLDS data was based on a statistical sample of
two cohorts of borrowers with FFEL Loans and Direct Loans entering
repayment in 1999 and 2004, respectively. The repayment statuses of
the loans were tracked at 10 and 15 years after entry into
repayment, depending on the age of the cohort.
\74\ For instance, ``TICAS Detailed Comments on Proposed Gainful
Employment Rule,'' The Institute for College Access and Success. May
27, 2014. https://ticas.org/content/pub/ticas-detailed-comments-proposed-gainful-employment-rule; and Miller, Ben. ``Improving
Gainful Employment: Suggestions for Better Accountability.'' New
America. www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-papers/improving-gainful-employment/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We agree with commenters who stated that a measurement three years
after entering repayment (e.g., examining borrowers' outcomes three
years after they enter repayment) is well supported. Given the other
changes to the repayment rate calculation made to mirror the GE
repayment rate metric, we will use this period, rather than the five-
year period included in the proposed regulations, to calculate the
institutions' rate. We believe that a 10-year window, as some
commenters proposed, would be too long to provide relevant and timely
data; such long-term outcomes would fail to incorporate improvement in
quality or other changes at the institution since those borrowers
entered repayment, and would likely fail to capture many of the signs
of short-term financial distress that some borrowers experience. We
agree with the commenter who stated that the repayment rate window
should be lengthened for medical schools; we are revising the provision
to provide that the same period will be used for this requirement as is
used in the GE regulations.
With respect to comments raised about students who use in-school or
military deferments, we will again mirror the provisions outlined in
the GE regulations. Because that calculation measures active repayment
during the most recently completed award year, we believe that we have
addressed concerns about borrowers who may have used deferments in the
interim. For the purposes of this calculation, the Department plans to
rely on the data reporting and data corrections under the GE
regulations for the purposes of calculating repayment rates.
We disagree with the commenters who stated that borrowers'
backgrounds drive their ability to repay, and that institutions should
therefore not be held accountable for their repayment rates. One of the
central missions of institutions of higher education is to ensure low-
income students receive an education that will help them to earn a
living and successfully repay their loans. At institutions where more
than half of borrowers do not successfully pay down the balance on
their loans, the Department believes that students have the right to
know--before they enroll or borrow financial aid--that the majority of
borrowers have not repaid even one dollar in outstanding balance three
years out of school.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.41(h) as described earlier in
this section.
Challenge Process
Comments: One commenter asked the Department to clarify whether
institutions will have an opportunity to challenge the Department's
student-level data. Another commenter recommended that the Department
use a 20.8 percent borrowing rate in place of the proposed two-step
borrowing rate calculation in order to simplify the calculation and
reduce the associated burden.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenter's concern for the accuracy
of the data. Given the changes to the rate described earlier, there
will be no additional data corrections process beyond the one already
provided for in the GE regulations. Institutions will already be
responsible for reporting accurate data under the GE regulations, and
for making any necessary corrections to the data. The Department will
use those already-corrected data to derive the institution-level
repayment rate. However, a proprietary institution at which the median
borrower has not repaid in full, or paid down the outstanding balance
of, the borrower's loans may receive an exemption from the warning
requirement if the institution demonstrates that not all of its
programs constitute GE programs and that if the borrowers in the non-GE
programs were included in the calculation of the loan repayment rate,
the loan repayment rate would be equal to or greater than 0.5, meaning
that the median borrower had paid down the outstanding balance of the
borrower's loans by at least one dollar.
Additionally, we do not believe the participation rate index (i.e.,
the index comparable to the 20.8 percent borrowing rate percentage)
appeal is still necessary under this revised version of the repayment
rate. The GE repayment rate calculation does not include such an
exception, and limiting the warning requirement only to proprietary
institutions means that the rates will cover all borrowers at the
institution, accurately representing the universe of students with
Federal loan debt. In the interest of ensuring consistency between the
GE repayment rates and this one, and of reducing burden on both
institutions and the Department, we have removed the participation rate
index appeal.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.41(h) to remove the data
corrections process and the participation rate index appeal. We have
also added Sec. 668.41(h)(4)(ii), which creates an exemption to the
warning requirement for institutions that demonstrate that they have
borrowers in non-GE programs and that, if those borrowers were included
in the loan repayment rate calculation, the loan repayment rate would
meet the threshold.
Warnings
Comments: Several commenters supported using a plain-language
warning that has been tested with consumers, and that is timely for
students. One commenter supported incorporating those warnings into
institutional promotional materials, and suggested expanding the
definition of ``promotional materials'' to include all materials and
services for which an institution has paid or contracted. Several
commenters requested that we further clarify how the warning must be
presented, so that it is not difficult for the public to see. Other
commenters expressed disappointment that the proposed regulations do
not require institutions to deliver repayment rate warnings to
prospective students at the first contact with those students, when the
information may be most valuable to students, and strongly supported
including such a requirement in the final regulations.
However, several commenters suggested that the loan repayment
warning raises First Amendment concerns. Some commenters believed that
the requirement would both target institutions at which borrowers are
appropriately using IDR plans and excuse private nonprofit and public
institutions with similarly poor loan repayment rates. One commenter
raised concerns that the specific language provided for illustrative
purposes in the
[[Page 76021]]
NPRM did not accurately describe the loan repayment rate.
One commenter believed that the warning would be most effective if
it were included within other loan and borrowing information, rather
than delivered separately along with other disclosures. The commenter
also stated that institutions should not be required to provide the
warning to students who do not intend to borrow Federal student loans.
Several commenters argued that requiring institutions to include
the entire content of the warning in advertising and promotional
materials would be cost-prohibitive. Instead, commenters proposed that
institutions provide a briefer statement, similar to the requirements
in the Gainful Employment regulations.
Discussion: We appreciate the support of commenters who stated that
they agreed with the Department's proposed use of a plain-language,
consumer-tested warning. We also agree with commenters who supported
incorporating warnings into a wider range of promotional materials, and
have strengthened the definitions for warnings and promotional
materials accordingly. We recognize and agree with the concerns of
commenters who suggested additional clarity around the presentation of
the warning to prevent obfuscation. To that end, we have clarified the
requirements for promotional materials to ensure the warning will be
prominent, clear, and conspicuous, including a variety of conditions
both for advertising and promotional materials. The Secretary may
require the institution to modify its materials if the Department
determines that the warning is not sufficiently prominent or
conspicuous. The Secretary may also issue guidance describing form,
place, and manner criteria that would make the warning sufficiently
prominent, clear, and conspicuous.
We also appreciate the perspective of commenters who supported
hand-delivered warnings at early stages in a student's college search.
However, we recognize that many of these goals will be accomplished
under the GE regulations, which require that program-level data be
provided on a GE disclosure template to students. To that end, we have
removed the requirement that an institution-level warning also be
provided directly to prospective and enrolled students, and instead
will require that the warnings be provided through advertising and
promotional materials. This also resolves the concerns of the commenter
who believed that the warning would be most effective if accompanied by
other loan and borrowing information; and the commenter who argued that
institutions should be required to provide the warning directly to only
those students who intend to borrow Federal student loans.
While we recognize that some institutions believe providing these
warnings in advertising and promotional materials would be cost-
prohibitive, we believe that this is important information to help
students themselves make critical cost-benefit analyses prior to
investing their time and money in an institution.
We address the First Amendment concerns above in the section
``Warnings'' and do not repeat them here. We also remind commenters
that the warning language included in the final regulations may be
subject to consumer testing and may change in accordance with the
results of that testing. The precise warning language, if revised, will
be published in the Federal Register by the Secretary.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 668.41(h) to remove the delivery of
a repayment rate warning to prospective and enrolled students. Instead,
we have strengthened the requirements under Sec. 668.41(h)(3) to
ensure the materials are appropriately provided in advertising and
promotional materials.
Agreements Between an Eligible School and the Secretary for
Participation in the Direct Loan Program (Section 685.300)
Legal Authority and Basis for Regulating Class Action Waivers and
Arbitration Agreements
Comments: Several commenters objected that the Department lacks the
legal authority to ban either mandatory predispute arbitration
agreements or class action waivers. These commenters strongly believed
that by this regulation, the Department would be inappropriately
interfering with institutional operations, violating established
Federal law, and interfering with parties' freedom to contract.
Commenters suggested that the Department has ignored clear messages
from both Congress and the Supreme Court indicating Federal policy
favoring arbitration.
Many commenters argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
precludes the Department from restricting the use of arbitration
agreements. Commenters noted that the FAA makes arbitration agreements
``valid, irrevocable, and enforceable as written,'' reflecting a
national preference for resolving disputes by arbitration. These
commenters believed that the proposed regulations run counter to public
policy and violate the FAA. According to commenters, the prohibition on
arbitration in the proposed regulations is precisely the type of agency
action that Congress sought to curtail with the FAA.
The commenters asserted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
demonstrated its support for the FAA and for arbitration as an
effective method of dispute resolution. Commenters cited cases in which
they view the Supreme Court as having struck down regulations and
statutes that are inconsistent with the pro-arbitration policy
established by the FAA, such as DirecTV v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463
(2015). Commenters further cited to a line of Supreme Court precedent
favoring arbitration, including Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), and Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). According to these commenters, the
Department's proposed regulations are contrary to well-established law.
Commenters contended that, under the FAA, the Department may not
issue the proposed regulations absent a clear congressional command,
which they argued the Department lacks. According to commenters, when
Federal law is silent as to whether Congress intended to override the
FAA for a claim, the FAA requires that an arbitration agreement be
enforced according to its terms. Here, in the absence of explicit
congressional command, commenters believed that the Department is not
authorized to restrict arbitration. To support this position,
commenters noted that Congress has granted the necessary authority to
other agencies in other circumstances. Commenters suggested that
because Congress has granted agencies this authority in the past, but
has not granted this authority to the Department, this silence means
that Congress did not intend for the Department to exercise such
authority.
Specifically, commenters stated that the HEA does not authorize the
Department to supersede the FAA. As a result, commenters contended that
the proposed ban on arbitration must yield to the FAA. Specifically,
commenters noted that sections 454(a)(6) and 455(h) of the HEA, which
the Department cites in the proposed regulations, provide no indication
that the Department is authorized to override the FAA. One commenter
contended that the Department has misinterpreted its statutory mandate
by relying on these provisions to justify the proposed arbitration ban.
Specifically, this
[[Page 76022]]
commenter asserted that, unlike other sections of the HEA, section
454(a)(6) does not contain a provision that expressly makes the FAA
inapplicable. According to the commenter, the Department should
interpret this distinction to mean that the Department may not
disregard the FAA in its actions pursuant to this provision.
Further, another commenter stated that section 454(a) of the HEA
does not relate to contracts between students and schools and that none
of the current regulatory requirements governing PPAs regulate
contracts between students and the institution. These commenters
objected that the Department is acting outside the scope of its
statutory authority by attempting to become involved in contractual
relationships between students and institutions.
Other commenters, in contrast, asserted that the Department has
authority to regulate the use of arbitration. One commenter stated that
the FAA does not limit the Department's ability to require schools to
remove forced arbitration clauses and class action waivers from
enrollment contracts. The commenter noted that the FAA legal analysis
is not triggered in the absence of an arbitration clause and that the
FAA does not preclude laws or regulations preventing parties from
placing arbitration provisions in their contracts. This commenter
asserted that the history of the FAA and judicial treatment of
arbitration provisions does not suggest an absolute right to impose an
arbitration agreement.
Another commenter strongly asserted that the Department may
condition Federal funding on a school's agreement not to use forced
arbitration clauses without violating the FAA. This commenter cited to
section 2 of the FAA, stating that agreements to arbitrate are ``valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable,'' except where grounds ``exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.'' This commenter
suggested that the proposed regulations would not interfere with
existing arbitration agreements and that students would still have the
ability to arbitrate if they chose to do so. One commenter noted that
the Department's authority to adopt stand-alone conditions on funding
as part of its PPAs is broad with respect to the Direct Loan Program,
and stated that barring predispute arbitration agreements is within the
scope of this authority. The commenter noted that including this
restriction in PPAs would force schools to internalize the cost of
their misconduct and minimize costs imposed on the public.
Another commenter cited the Spending Clause of the Constitution in
support of its position that the Department is authorized to impose
conditions of this nature on Federal funding recipients. The commenter
stated that the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutionality of
such conditional funding in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
In addition to citing this holding, the commenter noted that other
agencies, such as the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) place similar conditions on
recipients of their funding.
Discussion: Addressing the comment that the Department lacks legal
authority to ban either class action waivers or predispute arbitration
agreements regarding borrower-defense type claims, we repeat the
position and rationale for each as stated in the NPRM. As we stressed
there, the HEA gives the Department the authority to impose conditions
on schools that wish to participate in a Federal benefit program. In
this regulation, the Department is exercising its broad authority, as
provided under the HEA, to impose conditions on schools that wish to
participate in the Federal Direct Loan Program. Section 452(b) of the
HEA states, ``No institution of higher education shall have a right to
participate in the [Direct Loan] programs authorized under this part
[part D of title IV of the HEA].'' 20 U.S.C. 1087b(b). If a school
chooses to participate in the Direct Loan Program, it must enter into a
Direct Loan Program participation agreement (PPA). 20 U.S.C. 1087d.
Section 454(a)(6) of the HEA authorizes the Department to include in
that PPA ``provisions that the Secretary determines are necessary to
protect the interests of the United States and to promote the purposes
of'' the Direct Loan Program. 20 U.S.C. 1087d(a)(6); 81 FR 39385.
This regulation addresses class action waivers and predispute
arbitration agreements separately, because the proscriptions adopted
here are distinct and apply to each separately. As we explained in the
NPRM, recent experience with class action waivers demonstrates that
some institutions, notably Corinthian, aggressively used class action
waivers to thwart actions by students for the very same abusive conduct
that government agencies, including this Department, eventually
pursued. Corinthian used these waivers to avoid the publicity that
might have triggered more timely enforcement agency action, which came
too late for Corinthian to provide relief to affected students. 81 FR
39383.\75\ Corinthian's widespread use of these waivers and mandatory
arbitration agreements resulted in grievances against Corinthian being
asserted not against the now-defunct Corinthian, but as defenses to
repayment of taxpayer-financed Direct Loans, with no other party from
which the Federal government may recover any losses. As noted,
Corinthian was not alone in this practice. The absence of class action
risk coincided with the use of deceptive practices in the industry
during this same period, as recounted in the NPRM and in the earlier
NPRM for Program Integrity: Gainful Employment. 79 FR 16426 (March 24,
2014). We infer that from the continued misconduct and from the
extensive use of class action waivers that the waivers effectively
removed any deterrent effect that the risk of such lawsuits would have
provided. These claims, thus, ended up as defenses to repayment of
Direct Loans. This experience demonstrates that class action waivers
for these claims substantially harm the financial interest of the
United States and thwart achievement of the purpose of the Direct Loan
Program. Accordingly, section 454(a)(6) of the HEA authorizes the
Department to ban Direct Loan participant institutions from securing
class action waivers of borrower-defense type claims.
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\75\ As one commenter noted, during the period in question--2011
to 2015--very few Corinthian students pursued arbitration, according
to records maintained by the American Arbitration Association, and
even fewer received any award. www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015-OPE-0103-10723, citing Consumer Arbitration Statistics,
Provider Organization Report, available at www.adr.org. This data
supports our conclusion that widespread use of mandatory arbitration
agreements effectively masked serious misconduct later uncovered in
government enforcement actions, while providing minimal relief for
students.
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Separately, we considered the effect of predispute arbitration
agreements on the achievement of Direct Loan Program objectives and the
Federal interest, as evidenced during the same period. A major
objective of the program is protecting the taxpayer investment in
Direct Loans. That objective includes preventing the institutions
empowered to arrange Direct Loans for their students from insulating
themselves from direct and effective accountability for their
misconduct, from deterring publicity that would prompt government
oversight agencies to react, and from shifting the risk of loss for
that misconduct to the taxpayer. Predispute arbitration agreements,
like class action waivers, do each of these, and thus jeopardize the
taxpayer investment in Direct Loans. Aligned with these steps
[[Page 76023]]
to protect the taxpayer investment in Direct Loans, we note that these
regulations replace, for new loans, the State law cause of action
standard with a new Federal standard. Negotiators had objected to that
change, and we retained the State law option for those State law claims
reduced to judgment. Mandatory predispute arbitration agreements would
have made this standard a null option.
For all these reasons, as explained in the NPRM, we concluded that
agreements barring individual or joint actions by students frustrate
Federal interests and Direct Loan Program objectives for the same
reasons as did class action waivers. Therefore, we concluded that
section 454(a)(6) of the HEA authorizes the Department to regulate the
use of predispute arbitration agreements.
As explained in the NPRM, we acknowledge that the FAA assures that
agreements to arbitrate shall be valid, and may not be invalidated
``save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.'' 9 U.S.C. 2. Contrary to the commenters'
assertion, none of the case authority to which the commenters cite
addresses Federal regulations that may affect arbitration, and the
disputes addressed in that case authority appear to involve litigation
between private parties regarding rights arising under Federal, State,
or local law or contracts between those parties.
As we also stated in the NPRM, the Department does not have the
authority, and does not propose, to displace or diminish the effect of
the FAA. 81 FR 39385. These regulations do not invalidate any
arbitration agreement, whether already in existence or obtained in the
future. Moreover, the Department does not have the authority to
invalidate any arbitration agreement, did not propose to do, and does
not in this final rule attempt to do so.
However, as we explained in the NPRM, and repeat under ``Class
Action Waivers'' here, the Department considers the regulation of class
action waivers and predispute arbitration agreements to be justified
because they affect Direct Loan borrowing.\76\ The arguments that, by
these regulations, the Department attempts to override, displace, or
disregard the FAA mischaracterize the regulations. The regulations do
not control the conduct of purely private transactions between private
parties, transactions unrelated to the Direct Loan Program.\77\ Direct
Loans are not purely private transactions; but for the Direct Loan, the
student may very likely not have enrolled at all in a chosen school.
The terms of enrollment agreements between the institution and the
student loan recipient, and the school's performance with respect to
the education financed by that loan, directly affect the Direct Loan
program. These regulations impose a condition on the participation by a
school in this specific Federal program, a Federal program in which
Congress explicitly stated that ``no institution shall have a right to
participate . . .'' 20 U.S.C. 1087b(b). The final regulations do not
bar schools from using any kind of predispute arbitration agreements,
or class action waivers, so long as they pertain only to grievances
unrelated to the Direct Loan Program. The regulations merely require
that a school that participates in the Direct Loan program cannot enter
into a predispute arbitration agreement regarding borrower defense-type
claims with a student who benefits from aid under that program.
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\76\ 81 FR 39382-39383.
\77\ Purely private transactions are the kinds of relationships
that the CFPB may regulate under section 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 5518(b)
(authority to regulate the use of agreements between covered persons
and consumers).
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These requirements are well within the kind of regulation upheld by
courts that address the authority of the government to impose
conditions that limit the exercise of constitutional rights by
beneficiaries. That case law gives strong support for the position that
the Department has authority to impose limits of the kind adopted here
on the use of class action waivers and predispute arbitration
agreements. For example, the government may impose a restriction on the
exercise of a recipient's First Amendment rights so long as that
restriction does not extend beyond the recipient's participation in the
Federal program:
Our `unconstitutional conditions' cases involve situations in
which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the
subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus
effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.
Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2321, 2330-31 (2013), quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197
(1991).\78\ Here, the scope of the federally funded program--the Direct
Loan Program--extends far beyond the simple act of originating the loan
on behalf of the Department; the HEA itself regulates a broad range of
school actions as they relate to Direct Loan participation, from
advertising and recruiting practices that lead to enrollment to
refunding tuition payments after a student drops out. See, e.g., 20
U.S.C. 1094(a)(20) (incentive compensation); 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(22)
(refund requirements). Section 454 of the HEA provides that under the
Direct Loan program, the school acts as the Department's loan
originator, and accepts responsibility and financial liability for
failure to perform its functions pursuant to the Direct Loan PPA. 20
U.S.C. 1087d(a)(3). The HEA gives the Secretary the authority to modify
the terms of the PPA as needed to protect Federal interests and promote
the objectives of the program. 20 U.S.C. 1087d(a)(6). The Department
issues these regulations pursuant to that authority, to regulate
conduct well within the ``scope of the federally funded program'' at
issue here. As we explained in the NPRM and earlier in this discussion,
the restrictions involve terms, conditions, and practices that directly
and closely affect the objectives of the Federal Direct Loan
Program.\79\
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\78\ The Spending Clause of the Federal Constitution grants
Congress the power ``[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States.'' U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8,
cl. 1. The clause provides Congress broad discretion to tax and
spend for the ``general Welfare,'' including by funding particular
State or private programs or activities. That power includes the
authority to impose limits on the use of such funds to ensure they
are used in the manner Congress intends. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 195, n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) (``Congress'
power to allocate funds for public purposes includes an ancillary
power to ensure that those funds are properly applied to the
prescribed use.''). Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y
Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327-28, (2013).
\79\ See 81 FR 39383-84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For several reasons, the fact that Congress gave certain agencies
power to regulate arbitration, or outright banned mandatory
arbitration, supports no inference that Congress considered other
agencies, such as the Department, to lack the power to regulate.\80\
First, these enactments regulate purely private transactions between
private parties. As such, transactions in these contexts fall squarely
within the terms of the FAA, a Federal statute, and arbitration clauses
in these transactions would be deemed valid and enforceable if Congress
had not, by Federal legislation, barred or nullified their use, or
explicitly
[[Page 76024]]
authorized a Federal agency to do so by regulation. Federal legislation
was therefore essential to achieve the intended restriction of
arbitration in that context. None of the situations cited involve the
terms and conditions of participation in a Federal benefit program.\81\
Second, these latter enactments offer no legislative interpretation of
the 1993 amendment to the 1965 Higher Education Act, which enacted
section 454, because they deal with different subject matters. Thus,
courts interpret statutes with similar language, and which address the
same general subject matter, ``as if they were one law.'' See
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972). In such a
case, a ``later act can . . . be regarded as a legislative
interpretation of (an) earlier act . . .'' United States v. Stewart,
311 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1940) (construing two statutes that both address
the scope of the tax exemption afforded farm loan bonds).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 987(f)(4), (h) (authorizing the DoD to
regulate use of mandatory arbitration in extensions of credit to
servicemembers); 12 U.S.C. 5518 (authorizing the CFPB to regulate
use of arbitration in consumer financial services); 15 U.S.C. 78o
(authorizing the SEC to regulate use of mandatory arbitration in
certain investment relationships); 15 U.S.C. 1639c(e) (barring
mandatory arbitration in extensions of credit secured on the
principal dwelling of a consumer); and 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)
(prohibiting use of arbitration in regard to certain whistleblower
proceedings regarding securities).
\81\ Congress's power to regulate in these matters rests, thus,
on the Commerce Clause, not the Spending Clause.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here, newer enactments addressing arbitration provide no
``legislative interpretation'' of the HEA, because they share neither
language nor subject matter with the 1965 Higher Education Act in
general or the 1993 Direct Loan Program statute in particular. To the
contrary, Congress has generally rejected any inference that other
Federal law regulating consumer lending, most prominently, the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), operates on ``the same general subject matter'' as
Federal education loans financed under the HEA. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
1603(7) (exempting from TILA those loans made, insured, or guaranteed
pursuant to a program authorized by title IV of the Higher Education
Act of 1965). Section 454 itself--the statutory basis for adopting
``other provisions'' needed to protect Federal interests evidences this
distinction in subject matter by repeatedly referencing not other
Federal laws addressing consumer lending, but specific disclosure
requirements in the HEA itself, as well as provisions barring the
school from charging fees for arranging Direct Loans. 20 U.S.C.
1087d(a)(1)(E). This context compels the conclusion that the scope of
the power to regulate under section 454 was to be governed by reference
to the Federal objectives stated in this very statute, not by
inferences drawn from subsequent legislation addressing very different
objectives in transactions involving different--private--participants.
The objection that section 454(a)(6) of the HEA does not authorize the
Department to involve itself in the contractual relationships--or
impair its freedom to contract with others and exercise rights under
existing contracts--ignores a host of HEA provisions that regulate the
``contractual relationships'' between the school and other parties.
These provisions restrict, and in some instances ban, the exercise of
rights that the school may already have under existing contracts or
wish to include in future contracts. The HEA thus regulates contractual
relationships with students: The qualifications for enrollment of
students who may become borrowers, 20 U.S.C. 1091(a), (d); the manner
in which the school must determine whether the student borrower is
making academic progress while enrolled, 20 U.S.C. 1091(c); banning the
school from imposing penalties and late fees on students whose tuition
payments may be delayed for various reasons, 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(19); and
determining when that student has ceased enrollment and whether and how
much the school must refund to the student and the Department of
tuition payments the school has already received for that student, 20
U.S.C. 1091b. The HEA, moreover, imposes significant prohibitions that
ban the institution from the exercise of rights it may have under its
existing contracts with its employees and third parties, or may wish to
include in future contracts with those employees and with third
parties. Thus, an institution cannot compensate its employees on the
basis of success in securing enrollments (``incentive compensation'').
20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(20). More recently, section 487 of the HEA was
amended by Public Law 110-315, the Higher Education Opportunity Act of
2008, to impose significant new restrictions on the exercise by
institutions and affiliated entities of rights under existing contracts
with lenders that provided financing for their students. That act
mandated adoption and compliance by institutions with a code of conduct
governing their relationships with lenders that made both Federal loans
and private loans for their students, and banned numerous practices in
widespread use at the time under arrangements between the institution,
affiliated entities, its own employees and their family members, and
lenders. 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(25), (e). These amendments were effective on
the date of enactment. Public Law 110-3110-315, Sec. 3, August 14,
2008, 122 Stat 3078. Thus, the HEA itself repeatedly conditions
participation in title IV, HEA programs on an institution's refraining
from exercising rights the institution may already have under existing
contracts or may acquire under new contracts. These regulations
similarly operate within the very scope of the Federal program in which
these HEA provisions operate, to bar the institution from exercising
certain rights it may have already acquired or wished to acquire by
contract. In doing so, neither the HEA nor these regulations improperly
infringe on the institution's freedom of contract or freedom of
expression.
Changes: None.
Comments: A few commenters suggested that the proposed regulations
may violate the rights of institutions under the First Amendment, by
compelling speech, and under the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment by interfering with or depriving the institution of its
contractual rights in arbitration and class action waiver agreements.
Several commenters objected that by applying to existing contracts, the
regulations are impermissibly retroactive.
Discussion: The regulations effect neither a deprivation of a
property right of an institution in agreements it already has with
students, nor an impairment of those contracts. The regulation affects
the terms on which an institution may continue to participate in a
Federal program. The institution has no property right to continue to
participate on the terms under which the institution previously
participated. See Ass'n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 198. Rights acquired by the institution
under agreements already executed with students remain fully
enforceable on their own terms.
Like any new regulations, these regulations impose requirements on
the future conduct of institutions that intend to continue to
participate in the Direct Loan Program. Regulations commonly change the
future consequences of permissible acts that occurred prior to adoption
of the regulations, and such regulations are not retroactive, much less
impermissibly retroactive, if they affect only future conduct, and
impose no fine or other liability on a school for lawful conduct that
occurred prior to the adoption of the regulations. The regulations do
not make an institution prospectively ineligible because it has already
entered into contracts with arbitration provisions. The regulations
impose no fine or liability on a school that has already obtained such
agreements. The regulations address only future conduct by the
institution, and only as that conduct is related to the institution's
participation in the Federal Direct Loan Program. The institution is
not obligated
[[Page 76025]]
to continue to participate in the Direct Loan program. If it chooses to
continue to participate, it agrees to do so under rules such as these
that change--prospectively--the conduct in which it can engage. These
rules thereafter bar the institution that chooses to continue to
participate from exercising rights acquired by the institution under
agreements already executed with students. The regulations abrogate
none of those agreements; an institution that chooses not to continue
to participate is free to rely on those agreements.
In response to the assertion that requiring the institution to
include provisions in any arbitration agreement it has obtained or
obtains in the future violates the First Amendment, we note that the
regulations compel action, not merely speech. The requirements of Sec.
685.300(e)(1) and (2) and (f)(1) and (2) are different than the
warnings required under Sec. 668.41, and those warnings and
disclosures regarding gainful employment programs that were challenged
and upheld in Ass'n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v.
Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 182 (D.D.C. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Ass'n of
Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 640 Fed. Appx 5 (D.C.
Cir. 2016). Section 685.300(e) and (f) requires an institution that has
obtained a class action waiver or predispute arbitration agreement that
included borrower defense-type claims to, most importantly, take no
action to enforce that waiver or agreement and, secondly, to notify the
affected student that it does not intend to enforce the agreement. The
regulations further require the institution to avoid certain actions,
or to conduct those actions in a particular manner, which include
adding a clause to new agreements to advise the student of its
commitment. To the extent that the regulations compel speech, they
compel commercial speech, like other communications with students
required by Department regulations, and the content of the speech is
limited to stating that the institution agrees to comply with a
particular Federal regulation. The regulations do not require the
institution to express the viewpoint of any other party on the value of
arbitration, much less to disparage arbitration. Nor do they prevent
the institution from advocating in its communications with students its
opinion of the benefits of arbitration and the disadvantages of
litigation, or from encouraging students who have a grievance with the
institution from agreeing to arbitration. To the extent that the
regulations compel speech, therefore, they compel only factual, non-
controversial speech.
Changes: None.
Comments: Several commenters considered the Department's proposed
arbitration and class action waiver bans to be arbitrary and capricious
agency actions, adopted without proper, reasoned decision-making. Some
commenters contended that the Department did not gather sufficient
evidence to support its positions in the NPRM. Commenters also believed
that the Department relied too heavily on a CFPB study that they
believed was not relevant to the public student loan context at issue.
Additionally, commenters believed that the Department did not
sufficiently consider conflicting evidence, such as the benefits of
arbitration and the drawbacks of class actions. A commenter cited to
literature and academic studies that the commenter asserts demonstrate
the merits of arbitration.
Discussion: As discussed elsewhere, we do not deny the merits of
arbitration, and the regulations do not ban arbitration. The Department
gathered substantial evidence to support the position taken in the
regulations, as described in detail in the NPRM. That evidence showed
that the widespread and aggressive use of class action waivers and
predispute arbitration agreements coincided with widespread abuse by
schools over recent years, and effects of that abuse on the Direct Loan
Program. It is undisputable that the abuse occurred, that a great many
students were injured by the abuse, that the abusive parties
aggressively used waivers and arbitration agreements to thwart timely
efforts by students to obtain relief from the abuse, and that the
ability of the school to continue that abuse unhindered by lawsuits
from consumers has already cost the taxpayers many millions of dollars
in losses and can be expected to continue to do so.
Regarding the commenter that objected to our reliance on the CFPB
study because that study may not be relevant to the Federal student
loan market, the CFPB's study did analyze the prevalence of arbitration
agreements for private student loans as well as disputes concerning
those loans. Schools participating in the Direct Loan Program not
infrequently provide or arrange private student loans to their
students; these private loan borrowers may also have Direct Loans, and
in any case can be expected often to share characteristics with Direct
Loan borrowers.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated that the arbitration ban falls
outside the scope of topics the Department announced that it would be
addressing in development of these regulations and therefore the
Department is not authorized to address the issue.
Discussion: The proposal to include consideration of arbitration
agreements and class action waivers was presented in writing by at
least one negotiator during the negotiated rulemaking proceedings, and
was the subject of significant discussion during the final negotiated
rulemaking session. The issue was highly relevant to the consideration
of borrower defense claims, the core of the rulemaking exercise, and
was duly and properly considered.
Changes: None.
Class Action Waivers
Comments: Commenters offered opposing views on the treatment of
class action waivers under the regulations. Several commenters approved
of the Department's proposal to prohibit the use of class action
waivers, noting the government's obligation to protect taxpayers and
students from misuse of funds dispensed through the Direct Loan
Program. One commenter cited research from the CFPB showing that class
actions are more effective at securing relief for consumers than
individual arbitrations. This commenter suggested that arbitration
agreements prevented Corinthian students from receiving relief from the
institution, and that class actions are essential to safeguarding
taxpayer money. This commenter asserted that the provisions in the
proposed regulations addressing class action waivers are narrowly
tailored, consistent with precedent established in Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Another commenter suggested that class actions are beneficial to
students because they minimize resource obstacles often faced by
students. According to this commenter, class actions are powerful tools
that can rectify wrongs and create incentives for industries to change
behavior. Further, this commenter noted that class actions enable
students to band together to seek relief, rather than bringing such
grievances to the Department as defenses to repayment of taxpayer-
funded Direct Loans.
Other commenters disapproved of the Department's proposed ban on
class action waivers. These commenters contended that class actions
only benefit lawyers and are not helpful to students. A few commenters
noted that an individual participant in a class
[[Page 76026]]
action often receives only nominal returns for his or her claim, while
attorneys receive disproportionately large returns. One commenter
suggested that class actions cannot be effective because the needs and
particular circumstances of individuals within the class cannot be
properly considered, so students cannot receive the appropriate
tailored relief.
Another commenter criticized class actions as being incredibly time
consuming and yielding minimal public benefit. The commenter stated
that attorneys are less likely to represent students from small schools
in class actions because of the lower potential rewards, leaving
injured students at small schools without adequate recourse.
One commenter rejected the Department's position that class actions
are likely to have a deterrence effect, contending that plaintiffs'
lawyers often pursue frivolous claims for which institutions could not
anticipate liability and therefore could not effectively monitor their
own behavior.
One commenter stated that the ban on class action waivers would be
harmful to schools, particularly private institutions that lack the
legal protections afforded to public institutions. A commenter
contended that the rule would expose institutions to frivolous lawsuits
and thus would divert funds needed for educational expenses to pay the
costs of litigation.
Discussion: In the NPRM, we described in detail the actual effect
that class action waivers have had in the postsecondary education field
on students and Federal taxpayers. 81 FR 39382. Nothing in the comments
opposing the regulation demonstrates that these effects are exaggerated
or mischaracterized, that the substantial problems created by the use
of class action waivers can be reduced or eliminated by more modest
measures, that the disadvantages and burdens the regulation would place
on schools outweigh the costs and harm that use of class action waivers
has already caused, or that there is any reason to expect that this
pattern will change so that such waivers will not cause these same
problems in the future. It is possible that banning class action
waivers may increase legal expenses and could divert funds from
educational services, or lead to tuition increases.\82\ We expect that
the potential exposure to class actions will motivate institutions to
provide value and treat their student consumers fairly in order to
reduce the likelihood of suits in the first place.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ It is probable that institutions against whom arbitrations
have been filed are already incurring legal costs for arbitration.
The CFPB study found that on the average, over 90 percent of the
companies involved in the arbitrations it surveyed were represented
by counsel in those proceedings. CFPB, Arbitration Study, Sec.
5.5.3.
\83\ ``[C]lass actions increase negative publicity of for-
profits and draw attention to deceptive recruiting in a much more
public fashion than bilateral arbitration. '' Blake Shinoda,
Enabling Class Litigation As an Approach to Regulating for-Profit
Colleges, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1085 (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We expect that institutions, like other parties that provide
consumer services, already monitor, and will continue to monitor, court
rulings to guide these efforts. By strengthening the incentive for all
institutions to serve consumers fairly, and thereby reduce both
grievances by students and attendant scrutiny by the Department (and
other enforcement agencies), we expect that the limits we adopt here
will tend to reduce the likelihood that an institution that neglects
these efforts will enjoy a competitive advantage over those that engage
in these efforts. Although it is possible that frivolous lawsuits may
be brought, and that institutions will incur costs to defend such
suits, institutions already face that risk and expense. We do not
dismiss this risk, but we have no basis from which to speculate how
much this regulation might increase that risk and attendant expense. We
see that risk as outweighed by the benefits to students and the
taxpayer in allowing those students who wish to seek relief in court
the option to do so.
Commenters who oppose the regulations on the ground that class
actions benefit lawyers more than consumers, and may result in modest
returns for an individual member of the class, disregard the need for
this regulation in this field. Contrary to the assertion that class
actions provide only modest returns, we note that the CFPB found, in
its study, that the 419 consumer finance class actions during the five-
year period it studied produced some $2.2 billion in net cash or in
kind relief to consumers in those markets.\84\ Whether or not consumer
class actions have produced minimal or no actual benefit to the
consumers who comprise the class, there is little evidence that this
has happened in the postsecondary education industry.\85\ Rather,
precisely because of schools' widespread and aggressive use of class
action waivers, and even opposition to class arbitration, as described
in the NPRM, there appears to be no history of such minimal benefits in
this market.
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\84\ 81 FR 32858.
\85\ It appears that at least in the postsecondary education
market, the claim is unfounded; in one of the few class actions to
proceed to trial, a class of students obtained two million dollars
in relief from a for-profit school. Jamieson v. Vatterott
Educational Centers, Inc., 259 FRD. 520 (D. Kan. 2009); Nick
DeSantis, Missouri Court Upholds Ex-Student's Win in Suit Against
Vatterott College, Chronicle of Higher Education, The Ticker (Aug.
27, 2014), available at www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/mo-appeals-court-upholds-ex-students-win-in-suit-against-vatterott-college/84777.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We do not suggest that class actions are a panacea, and the
criticisms of class actions in other markets may also apply to class
actions in the postsecondary education market if such suits were
available. We stress that class actions have significant effects beyond
financial recovery for the particular class members, including
deterring misconduct by the institution, deterring misconduct by other
industry members, and publicizing claims of misconduct that law
enforcement authorities might otherwise have never been aware of, or
may have discovered only much later. The CFPB described these effects
in its proposed rule,\86\ and as we demonstrated in the NPRM, recent
history shows the significant consequences for students and taxpayers
in an industry that has effectively barred consumers from using the
class action tool. As to the comment that class actions would harm
private non-profit institutions, we note that these institutions are
already subject to that risk, and nevertheless, only a small percentage
of non-profit institutions currently use arbitration agreements with
their students.\87\ This suggests that institutions in this sector have
generally felt no need for such protection, and we see no reason to
expect that this regulation will change the exposure of non-profit
institutions to class actions or other suits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ See, e.g., 81 FR 32861-32865.
\87\ Tariq Habash and Robert Shireman, How College Enrollment
Contracts Limit Students' Rights, The Century Foundation, (April 28,
2016), available at https://tcf.org/content/report/how-college-enrollment-contracts-limit-students-rights/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter objected that the proposed regulations would
improperly restrict borrowers' choices regarding how they are
represented. This commenter expressed concern that borrowers from small
schools would be overlooked under the proposed regulations because they
would not be able to share the costs of litigation with a larger group.
Another commenter objected that the regulations would adversely affect
students who could not successfully pursue class actions because their
claims would not meet the commonality and predominance requirements for
class actions. This commenter asserted that alternative forms of
aggregate litigation other than class action suits are essential to
ensuring that students are able to obtain
[[Page 76027]]
judicial relief, and found the regulations insufficient to enable those
actions.
Discussion: The objective of Sec. 685.300(e) is to ensure that
those students who choose to pursue their claims against a voluntarily
participating school by a class action are not prevented from doing so
by agreements they are compelled to enter in order to enroll at the
school. The Department cannot change the rules and practical
consequences of class action litigation so that groups of students
would be spared the costs and risks incurred by class action litigants,
and did not intend to do so in these regulations. Similarly, the
Department has neither the mandate nor the authority to create
alternative forms of aggregate litigation in other forums, but the
regulations, by ensuring that individuals are free to retain the right
to sue for relief, necessarily enable those individuals to enjoy the
benefits of joinder under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 20 or comparable State
rules, as an alternative to class actions.
Changes: None.
Arbitration Agreements
Comments: Several commenters urged the Department to bar the use of
any predispute arbitration agreements by schools. Commenters asserted
that limiting the regulation to mandatory predispute agreements would
prove ineffective for several reasons: The agreement could be presented
to the student as part of a packet of enrollment materials, or included
as another term in a mandatory enrollment agreement with merely an
opportunity to agree or decline; the agreement could be required as a
condition of other benefits, even if not a condition of enrollment; or
the clause could be included, with an ``opt-out'' provision. The
commenters stressed that for a student to understand the significance
of the agreement, the school would have to explain its significance, a
duty that the proposed rule did not impose. The commenters further
contended that even if the student were to be aware of the clause, it
is reasonable to expect that the student would not understand the
significance of entering into such an agreement. A commenter stated
that numerous student consumers represented by the commenter had agreed
to arbitration, stating that they did so even, in some instances, where
the agreement was labeled voluntary, because they did not understand
the significance of the agreement itself or their ability to opt out,
or because they relied on misstatements by recruiters.\88\ Other
commenters stressed that the literature is replete with evidence that
consumers do not understand the terms of agreements governing the
consumer financial transactions in which they engage, making it
unlikely that the student would fully understand either the
significance of the agreement itself or a warning that the student need
not agree to arbitration in order to enrollment. A commenter provided
declarations and statements from students attesting to their lack of
understanding either that they had executed agreements to arbitrate, or
what arbitration meant, or both.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015-OPE-0103-10729.
\89\ www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015-OPE-0103-10723.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters also addressed the issue of ``opt-out'' clauses with
similar concerns. A comment signed by sixteen attorneys general urged
that the regulation ban the use of ``opt-out'' clauses, which they
viewed as unfair as mandatory arbitration clauses. They asserted that
predatory for-profit schools, in particular, have a history of using
arbitration clauses to violate the rights of their students, and that
in their experience, students often do not consider the consequences of
an arbitration agreement, or the value of opting out, until they have a
legitimate complaint against the school, at which point it is too late
to opt out of any arbitration agreement that may have appeared in the
student's enrollment agreement. Other commenters strongly believed that
arbitration agreements containing opt-out clauses should still be
considered mandatory, and should be prohibited under Sec. 685.300(f).
According to these commenters, opt-out provisions are highly
ineffective because students misunderstand the provisions or choose not
to accept them to avoid being disagreeable. Commenters also asserted
that recruiters at proprietary institutions are trained to manipulate
students and may be able to convince them to sign agreements even if
students are apprehensive about the meaning and consequences. Some
commenters noted that students are unable to make informed decisions
about whether to accept these optional agreements because students must
understand and exercise the option well before any disputes arise. One
commenter cited to a CFPB study that found that, even when consumers
are afforded the opportunity to opt-out of arbitration clauses, many
are either unaware of this option or do not exercise this right.
Another commenter cited to examples from court records indicating that
students who receive an opt-out provision rarely take advantage.
Based on these concerns, commenters recommended that the Department
prohibit schools from entering into any predispute arbitration
agreements, even those containing opt-out provisions. Commenters
cautioned that the Department's failure to explicitly prohibit these
agreements would create an exception that swallows the Department's
proposed rule on forced arbitration. Some commenters suggested that
failure to ban opt-out clauses would actually make students worse off
than if the agreements had no such option. According to these
commenters, students who unknowingly sign arbitration agreements
containing opt-out provisions may face greater hurdles in any efforts
to circumvent them by demonstrating their unconscionability, as is
generally required for challenges to arbitration agreements.
Additionally, commenters suggested that, as proposed, it would be more
difficult for the Department to take enforcement actions against
schools that take advantage of loopholes in the regulations.
Another commenter believed that allowing the enforcement of
arbitration agreements containing opt-out provisions would be highly
beneficial to both students and the Department. This commenter believed
that these provisions afford students a higher degree of choice and
control over their situations. Additionally, this commenter believed
that allowing such provisions would relieve the Department of a
potential influx of claims.
Discussion: The Department solicited comments on how the
regulations should treat agreements that would mandate arbitration of
borrower defense claims but that contain opt-out clauses. We have
considered the comments received, as well as the findings of the CFPB
cited by the commenter as relevant to this question. We have considered
as well the comments about students' lack of awareness either that they
were executing an agreement to arbitrate, or that doing so had
significant consequences that they did not understand, or both. The
same considerations that apply to opt-out clauses apply as well to our
proposal in the NPRM that would ban only mandatory predispute
arbitration.
Our proposal in the NPRM to bar only mandatory ``take it or leave
it'' predispute arbitration agreements rested on the expectation that a
student consumer could make an informed choice prior to a dispute to
agree to arbitrate such a dispute, and that this
[[Page 76028]]
objective could realistically be accomplished by having the agreement
presented to the student in a manner that would separate the agreement
from the bulk of enrollment material presented to the borrower on or at
the beginning of class, with a clearly-worded notice that the student
was free not to sign the agreement. These comments have persuaded us
that the steps we proposed in the NPRM would not produce an informed
decision, because even if the agreement were to be presented to
students in this manner, it is unrealistic to expect the students to
understand what arbitration is and thus what they would be
relinquishing by agreeing to arbitrate. The submissions from commenters
provide specific evidence of this lack of understanding in the
postsecondary education market among students enrolled in the very
sector of that market that far more commonly uses predispute
arbitration agreements.\90\ They are not alone. The literature
regarding use of arbitration agreements in consumer transactions
provides repeated anecdotal and empirical evidence that consumers
commonly lack understanding of the consequences of arbitration
agreements.\91\ In its survey of credit card users, the CFPB found
generally that ``consumers generally lack awareness regarding the
effects of arbitration agreements'' and specifically that
``[r]espondents were also generally unaware of any opt-out
opportunities afforded by their issuer.'' CFPB, Arbitration Agreements,
81 FR 32843 (May 24, 2016).\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Indeed, a commenter noted testimony in one case that the
school official shared her students' lack of understanding: None of
[the students] knew what arbitration was or asked any questions
about the arbitration provision. Ms. Dennison testified that,
although she interviews hundreds of applicants each year, she has
never been asked a question about the arbitration provision and she
has not mentioned it when meeting with prospective students. In
fact, Ms. Dennison testified that she did not understand the
arbitration provision herself.
Rude v. NUCO Edn. Corp., 2011 WL 6931516 Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30,
2011.
\91\ See: Jeff Sovern, et al., ``Whimsy Little Contracts'' with
Unexpected Consequences, 75 Md. L. Rev. 1, at 21 (2015): The degree
of literacy required to comprehend the average disclosure form and
key contract terms simply is not within reach of the majority of
American adults.'' Judge Posner has explained ``not all persons are
capable of being careful readers.'' Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben
S. Bernanke, whose agency was responsible for administering the
Truth in Lending disclosures, among others, has said that ``not even
the best disclosures are always adequate. . . . [S]ome aspects of
increasingly complex products simply cannot be adequately understood
or evaluated by most consumers, no matter how clear the
disclosure.'' And noted scholar and now-Senator Elizabeth Warren . .
. has been quoted as saying about a credit card contract: ``I teach
contract law at Harvard, and I can't understand half of what it
says.''
\92\ The CFPB stated that it focused on use of credit card
users, a subset of the financial products included in its Study,
because ``credit cards offer strong market penetration across the
nation.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We see no reason to expect that students who are now enrolled or
will enroll in the future will be different than those described or
included in the comments. We see no realistic way to improve this
awareness, and thus, we do not believe that the use of predispute
agreements to arbitrate will result in well-informed choices,
particularly by students in the sector of the market in which such
agreements are most commonly used. Based on the lack of understanding
of the consequences of these agreements evidenced in the CFPB survey of
credit card users, in the literature dealing with credit cards and
other financial products, and in the examples of individual
postsecondary students' lack of awareness, we consider predispute
arbitration agreements, whether voluntary or mandatory, and whether or
not they contain opt-out clauses, to frustrate achievement of the goal
of the regulation--to ensure that students who choose to enter into an
agreement to arbitrate their borrower defense type claims do so freely
and knowingly.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.300(f)(1) to delete the words
``will not compel a student''; we have revised Sec. 685.300(f)(1),
(2), and (3)(i) and (ii) to remove the word ``mandatory'' each time it
appears; we have revised Sec. 685.300(g)(1)(ii) to delete the word
``predispute''; and we have revised Sec. 685.300(i) to delete
paragraph (i)(4). We also have removed the definition of a ``voluntary
agreement'' from Sec. 685.300(f)(1)(ii) and revised the definition of
``predispute arbitration agreement'' in Sec. 685.300(i).
Comments: Several commenters believed that the proposed regulations
would unfairly deny students the opportunity to seek relief through
arbitration. Commenters suggested that if given the option, many
students would choose to seek relief through arbitration, rather than
litigation. Multiple commenters suggested that limiting the
availability of arbitration would be highly burdensome for students,
particularly those from low-income backgrounds who are less likely to
be able to afford attorneys and fees associated with litigation. These
commenters suggested that without arbitration, many low-income students
may be prevented from actively pursuing relief. These commenters
contended that arbitration is beneficial to students and should remain
available to those students who would like to pursue it as a means of
obtaining relief.
Some commenters lauded arbitration as fair and legally sound. One
commenter noted that under a particular arbitration agreement, students
received a fair and impartial hearing, comprehensive review of
evidence, and an impartial ruling by an independent arbitrator. This
commenter also noted that the arbitration agreement in question is
governed by State law, which the commenter believes provides sufficient
legal oversight.
Other commenters noted that arbitrators generally have more subject
area expertise than judges, which makes them more qualified to issue an
informed decision on a particular matter. One commenter suggested that
students benefit from widespread arbitration because administrators
learn to run more effective and service-oriented schools by
participating in arbitration proceedings. One commenter noted that the
benefits of arbitration are particularly profound in smaller
institutions with closer relationships between students and
administrators.
Further, commenters suggested that arbitration is more efficient
than litigation, and suggested that limiting the availability of
arbitration would unduly delay provision of relief to students. Some
commenters suggested that students benefit from the flexibility
afforded by arbitration agreements. According to a few commenters, the
flexibility available in arbitration proceedings allows participants to
schedule events around their availability. Additionally, commenters
believed that parties benefit from not being restricted by requirements
that they adhere to traditional rules of evidence or civil procedure.
One commenter asserted that arbitrators are generally very fair to
students. This commenter opined that the consumer arbitration rules are
particularly friendly to plaintiffs, particularly because of lower fees
associated with proceedings. Another commenter asserted that plaintiffs
prevail in arbitration proceedings at least as frequently as they do in
court. Some commenters believed that the arbitration process often
facilitates more positive outcomes because both students and
institutions participate fully in the process, and are more invested in
the outcomes.
Additionally, some commenters suggested that in the absence of
widespread arbitration, legal fees associated with litigation would
take money away from institutions that could be used towards resources
that
[[Page 76029]]
would improve educational outcomes for students. Several commenters
suggested that the arbitration ban may ultimately lead to tuition
increases as institutions are required to spend more money on
litigation. These commenters also noted that the arbitration ban will
be particularly harmful to smaller institutions that lack the resources
necessary to hire robust legal teams. One commenter believed that some
smaller institutions may be forced to close if responsible for funding
costly litigation. This commenter also worried about ``ambulance
chasing'' attorneys encouraging students to bring frivolous suits.
On the other hand, a number of commenters supported the proposed
ban on mandatory predispute arbitration agreements for various reasons.
Several commenters suggested that arbitration systems create structures
that the commenters view as inherently biased against students.
Commenters noted that arbitrators are often paid on a case-by-case or
hour-by-hour basis, which can create incentives for them to rule in
favor of institutions, which are more likely than individuals to be
able to produce repeat business for them. One commenter cited to
empirical evidence that the commenter viewed as supporting its position
that arbitration is harmful to consumers. Additionally, commenters
noted that because arbitrators are not bound by adhering to precedent,
their decisions are less predictable and reliable.
Further, commenters stated that arbitration can be extremely
costly. Commenters attributed the high costs of arbitration to the
private nature of the system, noting that individual parties are often
responsible for paying costs associated with arbitration, which may
include high fees that arbitrators may tack on to total costs without
sufficient notice. One commenter also cited the procedural limitations
of arbitration as another detriment. This commenter stated that
students may miss out on the opportunity for discovery in arbitration
because the discovery process is not formalized in the same manner as
civil lawsuits. According to the commenter, students are often denied
access to information that is essential to their claims. Additionally,
the commenter noted that there is a lack of oversight in arbitration
proceedings, which may result in a lack of accountability among
arbitrators for following by their own established procedures. This
commenter also believed that the appeal process under arbitration is
inadequate and that the narrow grounds and limited time frame for
appeals ultimately harms students. Several commenters also suggested
that the lack of transparency in the arbitration system works to the
detriment of students. These commenters believed that the public and
parties benefit from the transparency offered by civil litigation.
Unlike civil litigation, arbitration is generally not public,
transcripts are not provided to the public at large, and some
proceedings include gag clauses to maintain privacy.
One commenter believed that forced arbitration impedes the
Department's ability to effectively oversee Federal assistance programs
and ensure proper use of taxpayer dollars. This commenter also
suggested that forced arbitration is unfair to students and deprives
them of the opportunity to receive an education in a well-regulated
system. Several commenters lauded the Department for taking measures to
ensure that students who are wronged by unscrupulous schools receive
their day in court. These commenters were particularly concerned that
many students have been signing their rights away upon enrollment and
urged the Department to prevent the continuation of that practice.
Discussion: We appreciate the support for the proposed regulations
from many of the commenters. For those commenters that did not support
Sec. 685.300(f), many of their objections incorrectly suggested the
regulations pose an outright ban or effectively preclude any use of
arbitration. The regulations do not bar the use of arbitration and
therefore do not deny students the benefits that the commenters ascribe
to arbitration. Rather, consistent with the scope of our statutory
authority, the regulations ban predispute arbitration agreements for
borrower defense-type claims.
The regulations do not bar the school from seeking to persuade
students to agree to arbitrate, so long as the attempt is made after
the dispute arises. The regulations, moreover, extend only to
predispute agreements to arbitrate borrower defense-type grievances.
They do not prohibit a school from requiring the student, as a
condition of enrollment or continuing in a program, to agree to
arbitrate claims that are not borrower defense-related grievances.
Consistent with our statutory authority to regulate Direct Loan
participation terms, the regulations address only predispute
arbitration agreements for claims related to borrower defenses and not
for other claims.
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter suggested that the private nature of
arbitration affords a level of protection to parties. According to this
commenter, because arbitration proceedings are not public, parties need
not be concerned about private information being revealed during
proceedings.
Discussion: The regulations do not ban arbitration entirely, but
only arbitration achieved through predispute arbitration agreements for
borrower defense-type claims. Students and institutions are free under
this rule to agree to arbitration if privacy is an important
consideration to the student. We expect that a student who chooses to
litigate rather than pursue arbitration is already aware that generally
litigation is a public proceeding, or becomes aware of that fact very
quickly, and accepts that fact voluntarily. The regulations simply
assure that a student will have the option to choose that forum.
Changes: None.
Comments: A few commenters addressed the effect of delegation
clauses within arbitration agreements--provisions that assign, or
delegate, to the arbitrator, not a court, the power to decide whether a
particular claim or grievance falls within the agreement to arbitrate.
The commenters considered such delegation clauses problematic because
they allow arbitrators who, according to the commenters, may have
financial incentives that impact their neutrality, to make decisions
regarding whether a claim belongs in court or arbitration. The
commenters suggested that if the Department does not address delegation
provisions, the proposed regulations may not fulfill their intended
purpose. The commenters urged the Department to prohibit the use of
delegation clauses to ensure that any questions about the
enforceability or scope of predispute arbitration agreements are
resolved by a court rather than an arbitrator, so that schools cannot
force students into time-consuming arbitration proceedings to resolve
threshold questions about enforceability.
Discussion: The commenters identify an important issue, one made
particularly significant because Sec. 685.300(e) and (f) distinguish
between borrower defense-type claims or grievances, which the
regulations address, and other student claims, which it does not. The
commenters rightly argue that the objective of the regulation may be
frustrated if the school resists a suit by moving to compel arbitration
and the arbitrator, not the court, were to have authority under the
agreement to decide whether the claim is one that the student must
arbitrate. In the NPRM, we described the recent history of aggressive
actions to compel arbitration of student claims,
[[Page 76030]]
and consider it reasonable to expect that schools will continue to
oppose lawsuits by moving to compel arbitration, and would rely on
delegation clauses in arbitration agreements to support these efforts.
We did not explicitly address in the NPRM the use of delegation
clauses, but we proposed there to preclude attempts, where the student
had agreed to a class action waiver, to ``seek[ ] dismissal, deferral
or stay'' of ``any aspect of a class action,'' Sec. 685.300(e)(2)(i),
or, if the student had entered into a mandatory predispute arbitration
agreement, to ``seek[ ] dismissal, deferral or stay'' of ``any aspect
of a judicial action filed by the student.'' Sec.
685.300(f)(2)(i).\93\ These prohibited actions could rest on an express
delegation clause committing to the arbitrator the determination
whether the claim was a borrower-defense type claim. We did not intend
to allow that action, and in response to the commenters who stressed
the significance of this issue, we are adding language making it clear
that the court, not the arbitrator, is to decide the scope of any
arbitration agreement or class action waiver. Of course, if the student
has in fact agreed to arbitrate some or all claims in a post-dispute
agreement, then the school has every right, pursuant to these terms of
its Direct Loan agreement with the Department, to oppose litigation by
relying on that arbitration agreement. However, the regulation is
intended to protect the rights of students who agree, predispute, only
to arbitration of other kinds of claims, to have their borrower defense
claims heard by a court. To ensure that goal is achieved, we believe
that any arbitration agreement with a Direct Loan borrower should place
power to decide the scope of the agreement in the court, not the
arbitrator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Indeed, in at least two of the cases cited in the NPRM, an
essential element of the ruling turned on whether the student had
agreed to arbitration of issues about the arbitrability of the
claims at issue. Eakins v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. E058330,
2015 WL 758286 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2015); Kimble v. Rhodes
College, No. C-10-5786, 2011 WL 2175249 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: We have modified Sec. Sec. 685.300(e)(3) and
685.300(f)(3) to add to the required provisions and notices the
statement that ``we agree that only the court is to decide whether a
claim asserted in the lawsuit is a claim regarding the making of the
Direct Loan or the provision of educational services for which the loan
was obtained.''
Comments: A few commenters recommended alternatives to proposed
Sec. 685.300(f). One commenter recommended that the Department
eliminate its ban and instead provide suggested best practices to
facilitate dispute resolution. Another commenter recommended that the
Department develop rules to govern arbitration proceedings rather than
banning them entirely. Some rules proposed by the commenter included:
(1) A neutral arbitrator, (2) more than minimal discovery, (3) a
written arbitration award, (4) all forms of relief available in court
available in arbitration, and (5) prohibition on imposing unreasonable
costs in arbitration. Another commenter suggested that the Department
establish an annual threshold for the number of arbitration settlements
for all institutions. Under this proposal, institutions would only be
held accountable if their number of arbitration proceedings exceeded
this threshold.
Discussion: The regulations do not ban arbitration entirely, as
suggested by some of the commenters. Rather, the regulations ban
predispute arbitration agreements for borrower defense-type claims. We
discussed at some length in the last negotiated rulemaking session the
proposal to regulate the conduct of arbitration, rather than banning
compelled predispute arbitration agreements, but in issuing this final
rule, we conclude that limiting agreements to arbitrate borrower
defense claims to those entered into after a dispute has arisen will
achieve the goal of an informed decision by the borrower. Therefore, we
have no reason to set a limit on the number of such arbitrations a
school may conduct. The regulations do, however, require information
from the school about the substance and outcomes of arbitration.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested that eliminating mandatory
arbitration would be overly burdensome on our judicial system because
many claims that otherwise would have gone to arbitration will wind up
in court.
Discussion: The regulations allow students who agree to arbitration
to use that method, rather than pursuing relief through a lawsuit, and
we have no expertise or experience from which to estimate the effect of
the regulation on judicial filings.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter contended that the Department's position is
logically inconsistent, because the commenter viewed the Department as
simultaneously asserting that courts do not provide adequate relief for
students, while also asserting that access to the judicial system is
essential for students to obtain relief.
Discussion: We do not believe, and did not state, that the judicial
system provides inadequate relief for students; to the contrary, we
noted that recent history shows that access to the judicial system was
denied by widespread use of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements
and class action waivers. Far from implying that the judicial system
did not or could not provide relief, we included in the new borrower
defense Federal standard, for new loans, an alternative that rests
entirely on a court judgment on a borrower defense claim based on State
law.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter stated that permitting only post-dispute
arbitration agreements would be entirely ineffective and cautioned the
Department against allowing only post-dispute arbitration as an option
to students. Another commenter urged the Department to implement
additional safeguards to protect students under post-dispute
arbitration agreements. This commenter was concerned that schools could
potentially force students to sign post-dispute arbitration agreements
with prohibitions limiting their ability to seek relief and urged the
Department to take measures to prevent schools from engaging in this
activity.
Discussion: Section 685.300(f) does not limit the ability of the
school to enter into a post-dispute arbitration agreement, even one
that would include arbitration of a borrower defense-type claim. A
student with an actual claim has every reason to question the
consequences of agreeing to arbitrate the claim, as opposed to filing
suit, and at that point we expect such a decision to be an informed
choice by the student.
Changes: None.
Comments: A commenter noted that some students would have
difficulty joining in a class action for various reasons, and would
lack the resources to pursue an individual suit, but that recently
consumers have had success by participating in aggregate litigation.
The commenter feared that the NPRM by barring class action waivers
would not have barred the institution from attempting to force an
individual student to pursue litigation alone and not as part of a
combined suit.
Discussion: The regulation as proposed would bar an institution
from relying on a mandatory predispute arbitration agreement by
``dismissal, deferral, or stay of any aspect of a judicial action filed
by the student.'' Sec. 685.300(f)(2)(i). We consider that language to
include the action described by the commenter, such as actions to
challenge the student's joinder in a single suit under Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 20 or a similar rule by which individual litigants may
consolidate their actions.
[[Page 76031]]
We clarify that in this final regulation. An institution remains free
to seek relief on grounds other than that the individual is barred from
joinder in an action by reason of the terms of the arbitration
agreement.
Changes: Section 685.300(f)(2)(i) is revised to include opposing
joinder in a single action.
Internal Dispute Processes
Comments: One commenter expressed strong approval for Sec.
685.300(d), which would ban schools from requiring students to use the
school's internal complaint process before seeking remedies from
accrediting agencies or government agencies. However, a few commenters
strongly believed that students should exhaust internal grievance
procedures before seeking relief externally. These commenters noted
that internal grievance procedures offer students adequate
opportunities to seek relief. A few of these commenters touted the
transparency and collaboration between students and institutions that
results from engaging in these proceedings.
Discussion: The regulations do not discourage the use and promotion
of internal grievance procedures, and we encourage schools to adopt
those procedures in order to remedy grievances before they become
claims that lead to litigation or arbitration. The regulations also do
not bar the institution from addressing the grievance as fully as it
may wish immediately, whether or not the student chooses to raise the
complaint to authorities. The institution may succeed in resolving the
matter. However, if the student believes that the grievance is
significant enough to warrant the attention of law enforcement
officials or bodies empowered to evaluate academic matters, we believe
that the benefit of bringing that complaint to their attention
outweighs the benefits of attempting to compel the student to delay.
The regulations do not impose any duty on an authority or accreditor to
take any particular action, and they may choose to defer or delay
consideration of the complaint until completion of the institutional
process. However, the regulations would help those authorities better
monitor institutional performance by making timely notice of complaints
more likely.
Changes: None.
Comments: One commenter suggested that proposed Sec. 685.300(d)
conflicts with State law that requires that students exhaust internal
dispute resolution procedures prior to seeking other relief.
Discussion: State law may require a consumer to make a written
demand on a merchant before filing suit, and the regulations do not
supersede such a law. Some State laws or case law may also require a
student to exhaust a school's administrative appeal process before
filing suit on a grievance.\94\ Section 685.300(d) addresses not the
filing of a lawsuit, but rather a very different matter: Seeking
redress from the State agency with authority to address the complaint,
or the accreditor for the school. If those authorities decline to
intervene, the student is left in effect with the need to pursue any
internal grievance process. The regulations in no way require those
authorities to exercise their independent judgment. The regulations
simply bar the school from attempting to block the student from seeking
redress from those authorities. The regulations leave the school free
to respond to a student's lawsuit by contending that applicable law
precludes judicial review of the claim or requires the litigant to
first exhaust available internal procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ See, e.g., Susan M. v. New York Law Sch., 76 N.Y.2d 241,
556 NE.2d 1104 (1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: None.
Forbearance (Sections 685.205(b)(6) and 682.211)
Comments: Several commenters expressed support for the Department's
proposal to grant an administrative forbearance to a Direct Loan
borrower who applies for relief under the borrower defense provisions.
Commenters were also supportive of the proposal to grant FFEL borrowers
the same type of administrative forbearance that Direct Loan borrowers
would receive.
Multiple comments supported the Department's proposed use of
forbearance (along with information about how to decline forbearance
and providing information about income-driven repayment plans). One
commenter, however, recommended that the Department require borrowers
to request forbearance instead of expecting borrowers to decline
forbearance (opting-in rather than opting-out). Commenters also
expressed the view that forbearance should apply to all loan types.
Another commenter suggested that the use of administrative
forbearance or the suspension of collection activity would lead to
frivolous claims intended to delay repayment.
A group of commenters recommended that forbearance for a borrower
who files a borrower defense claim be granted in yearly increments, or
for some other explicit time frame designated by the Department, during
which the Department will make a determination of eligibility for a
borrower defense claim. These commenters noted that servicing systems
generally require periods of forbearance to have explicit begin and end
dates. The commenters believed that the proposed change would resolve
the servicing requirement and permit the Department to designate an
explicit time frame for servicers (such as one to three years) during
which the Department would make a determination of eligibility for
relief under a borrower defense claim.
Under the commenters' proposal, upon receiving the notification of
the Department's determination of eligibility for relief under borrower
defenses, FFEL Loan servicers would either end the forbearance and
resume servicing or maintain the forbearance until the borrower's loans
are consolidated into a Direct Consolidation loan. A group of
commenters recommended that, if the Department plans to begin the
process for prequalification or consolidation before the effective date
of the final regulations, the Department consider permitting early
implementation of the new mandatory administrative forbearance under
Sec. 682.211(i)(7). The commenters noted that without the new
authority to grant mandatory administrative forbearance, discretionary
forbearance can be used to suspend servicing and collection. However,
these commenters pointed out that discretionary forbearance requires a
borrower's request and agreement to the terms of the forbearance. A
discretionary forbearance may also be subject to a borrower's
cumulative maximum forbearance limit. If a borrower has reached his or
her maximum forbearance limit, the loan holder would have no other
remedy but to provide a borrower relief during the review period. The
commenters believed that early implementation of Sec. 682.211(i)(7)
would be more efficient and provide a necessary benefit for borrowers
that have reached their cumulative maximum forbearance limit while the
Department makes a discharge eligibility determination.
One commenter noted that, under the proposed regulation, a borrower
who files a defense to repayment claim will experience immediate relief
due to forbearance or suspension of collection. However, any interest
that is not paid during forbearance will be capitalized. This commenter
suggested that a borrower should not be discouraged from mounting a
defense to repayment that could involve extended
[[Page 76032]]
investigation by having accrued interest capitalized if the claim is
rejected. The commenter recommended that the Department set a limit on
the interest that can be capitalized or limit the length of time for
which accrued interest can be capitalized.
A group of commenters recommended a conforming change to Sec.
682.410(b) to address defaulted loans held by a guaranty agency. In
such cases, a guaranty agency is the holder of a loan for which the
Department is making a determination of eligibility, not a lender.
Under the conforming change, when the guarantor is the holder of a
loan, the Department will notify the guarantor to suspend collection
efforts, comparably to when a lender is notified by the Department
under Sec. 682.211(i)(7) of a borrower defense claim. Upon receiving
notification of the Department's determination, a guarantor would
either resume collection efforts or maintain the suspension until the
borrower's loans are consolidated into a Direct Consolidation loan.
Discussion: We appreciate the commenters' support for granting
forbearance and providing information about alternatives and believe it
will aid borrowers while the Department reviews their applications.
Forbearance is available to Direct Loan borrowers and administered by
the loan servicers.
The Department will allow lenders and loan holders to implement
Sec. 682.211(i)(7) early, so that they may grant the forbearance prior
to July 1, 2017. Lenders and loan holders will be required to grant
such forbearance as of July 1, 2017, the effective date of these
regulations.
We disagree that forbearance should be an opt-in process, as we
believe that the majority of borrowers will want to receive the
forbearance, making an opt-out process both more advantageous to
borrowers and more efficient.
We also disagree that providing forbearance and suspending
collection activities will lead to substantial numbers of frivolous
claims. Borrowers experiencing difficulty with their monthly loan
obligations may avail themselves of income-driven repayment plans, loan
deferment, and voluntary forbearance upon request. Additionally,
because applicants for forbearance are required to sign a certification
statement that the information contained on their application is true
and that false statements are subject to penalties of perjury, we do
not expect a sizeable increase in fraudulent claims.
We disagree with the recommendation that the Department set a limit
on the amount of accrued interest that may be capitalized, or the
length of time that interest may be allowed to accrue, during the
administrative forbearance. We have seen no evidence that
capitalization of interest that accrues during a forbearance period
while a discharge claim is being reviewed discourages borrowers from
applying for loan discharges. Even in situations when the suspension of
collection activity may be for an extended period of time--such as
during bankruptcy proceedings--interest that accrues during the
suspension of collection activity is capitalized. We see no
justification for limiting capitalization of interest during the period
in which a borrower defenses claim is being evaluated by the
Department.
We agree with the commenters that it is preferable to have a set
time period for mandatory forbearances granted during the period that
the Department is reviewing a borrower defense claim. In addition to
resolving the systems issues raised by the commenters, it would help
borrowers to have precise begin and end dates for the forbearance.
Granting these forbearances in yearly increments, with the option to
end the forbearance earlier if the borrower does not qualify, would be
consistent with most of the other mandatory forbearances in the FFEL
Program, which are granted in yearly increments, or a lesser period
equal to the actual period of time for which the borrower is eligible
for the forbearance. In most cases, we do not believe that the full
year for the forbearance will be required.
We also agree to make the conforming changes that would address
defaulted loans held by a guaranty agency.
Changes: We have modified Sec. 682.211(i)(7) to specify that the
administrative forbearance is granted in yearly increments, until the
loan is consolidated or the Department notifies the loan holder to
discontinue the forbearance.
We have added a new Sec. 682.410(b)(6)(viii), requiring a guaranty
agency to suspend collection activities on a FFEL Loan held by the
guaranty agency for borrowers seeking relief under Sec. 682.212(k)
upon notification by the Department.
Closed School Discharges (Sections 674.33, 682.402 and 685.214)
General
Comments: Several commenters supported the proposed closed school
discharge regulations. These commenters appreciated the Department's
proposal to provide more closed school discharge information to
borrowers and to increase access to closed school discharges. One
commenter strongly supported the proposed changes to the closed school
discharge regulations that would require greater outreach and provision
of information to students at schools that close, and would
automatically discharge the loans of students from closed schools who
do not re-enroll within three years. This commenter believed that too
many students at schools that close neither receive a closed school
discharge nor complete their program at another school.
A group of commenters also felt that too few eligible borrowers
apply for closed school discharges, primarily because these borrowers
are unaware of their eligibility. These commenters believed that
amending the regulations to provide additional closed school discharge
information to borrowers, to make relief automatic and mandatory for
borrowers who do not re-enroll within one year, and to provide for
review of guaranty agency denials, would ensure that eligible students
get relief.
One commenter supported strengthening regulations to hold
institutions accountable and protect student borrowers from fraudulent
and predatory conduct. This commenter applauded the Department's
efforts on behalf of Latino students who are overrepresented in
institutions that engage in this conduct, while suggesting that more
must be done to ensure the success of these students.
A group of commenters recommended that the Department broaden the
scope of the proposed regulation to apply to any planned school
closures, rather than only school closures for which schools submit
teach-out plans. These commenters noted that very few closing schools
arrange for teach-outs at other schools, and that many of the recent
school closures did not involve teach-outs. These commenters believed
that the proposed regulations would fail to ensure that students at
closing schools that do not submit teach-out plans receive accurate,
complete, and unbiased information about their rights prior to the
school closure.
One commenter recommended that the Department require institutions
to facilitate culturally responsive outreach and counseling to students
who opt-in to teach-out plans to ensure that they understand the
benefits and consequences of their decision.
Discussion: We thank the commenters for their support. We agree
that these are important provisions, and note that through our intended
early implementation of the automatic closed school discharge
provisions, students
[[Page 76033]]
affected by the recent closure of Corinthian will be able to benefit
from a more streamlined, automatic process for relief sooner. However,
we do not believe that it is necessary to broaden the scope of the
regulations to apply to ``any planned school closures'' because the
current regulations already cover all planned school closures. Current
34 CFR 668.14(a)(31) requires a school to submit a teach-out plan under
several conditions, including a school intending to close a location
that ``provides at least 100 percent of at least one program'' or if
the school ``otherwise intends to cease operations.'' 34 CFR
668.14(a)(31)(iv) and (v). Therefore, the provision of the teach-out
plan triggers the provision of the closed school disclosures and
application form.
Although we agree that schools should provide culturally responsive
outreach and counseling to students who opt-in to teach-out plans, we
believe that it would be difficult to establish standards for such
outreach and counseling or to define ``culturally responsive'' through
regulation. However, we expect institutions to be cognizant of the
needs of their student population, and to provide appropriate outreach
and counseling for their students. At a future date, the Department may
consider providing resources, guidance, or technical assistance to
institutions to facilitate a culturally responsive dissemination of
information.
Changes: None.
Availability of Disclosures
Comments: Many commenters supported the Department's proposed
regulations that increase disclosure requirements for schools that are
closing. These commenters shared the Department's concern that many
borrowers are unaware of their eligibility for a closed school
discharge because of insufficient outreach and information. These
commenters noted that, in some instances, closing schools inform
borrowers of the option to complete their program through a teach-out,
but either fail to advise them of the option for a closed school
discharge, or advise them of the option in a way that discourages them
from pursuing a discharge. According to these commenters, students
often receive a closed school loan discharge application from the
Department after deciding whether to enroll in teach-out programs. The
commenters believe that students must receive clear, accurate, and
complete information much earlier in the process when they are making
major decisions. The commenters speculated that students who have
enrolled in, but have not completed, a teach-out program may not
realize they are still eligible for a closed school discharge, and may
feel committed to pursuing the teach-out even though it is not in their
best interest to do so.
A group of commenters urged the Department to clarify that closed
school discharges may be available to eligible students who have re-
enrolled in another institution. These commenters argued that relief
should not be limited to students who do not re-enroll in a title IV-
eligible institution. Commenters stated that the HEA and current
regulations provide that a borrower is eligible for closed school
discharge if the borrower did not complete a program due to school
closure and did not subsequently complete the program through a teach-
out or credit transfer. Students who participate in a teach-out or who
transfer credits but do not complete their program remain eligible for
a closed school discharge, as do students who re-enroll in a different
institution but do not transfer credits or transfer some credits to an
entirely different program. According to these commenters, this
clarification is particularly important because students attending
closing institutions have reported frequent instances of having been
misled by closing institutions and recruiters from proprietary schools.
In these commenters' view, the low application rate for closed
school discharges is due to a lack of understandable and accessible
information about closed school discharges.
A group of commenters noted that in some cases it may be unclear
when loan discharge information should be provided because the 60-day
forbearance or suspension of collection activity period may expire
while the borrower is still within the six-month grace period before
collection begins. Therefore collection activities will not be resumed
by the guaranty agency or lender under Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(H), or
by the Department under Sec. 685.214(f)(4). These commenters urged the
Department to revise the regulations to clarify that the closed school
discharge information must be provided either when collection first
begins (when a borrower enters repayment after the grace period and
will be more inclined to exercise their discharge rights) or when
collection is resumed, whichever is applicable.
A group of commenters supported the Department's proposal to
require closing schools to provide discharge information to students.
When schools announce that they are closing, they currently have no
obligation to inform their students about their loan discharge rights
and options. According to these commenters, students feel compelled to
continue their educations in ways that may not be in their best
interests because they lack sufficient information. For example,
commenters contended that when a teach-out is offered, students often
believe they are obligated to participate, even though they have a
right to opt for a closed school discharge instead. Alternatively,
although instruction may be seriously deteriorating, students may feel
compelled to complete the program at the closing school, unaware that
they have a right to withdraw within 120 days of the closure and
receive a closed school discharge. These commenters also suggested that
students may feel compelled to accept another school's offer to accept
their credits, without understanding that by accepting the offer they
may become ineligible for a closed school discharge.
Because of the issues discussed above, these commenters supported
the Department's proposal to require schools to provide borrowers with
a notice about closed school discharge rights when they submit a teach-
out plan after the Department initiates an action to terminate title IV
eligibility or other specified events.
A group of commenters recommended that we revise the regulations to
require that whenever a school notifies the Department of its intent to
close, it must provide a written notice to students about the expected
date of closure and their closed school discharge rights, including
their right to a discharge if they withdraw within 120 days prior to
closure.
One commenter stated that the proposed regulations would require
the dissemination of a closed school discharge application to students
who are not and will not be eligible for discharge. The commenter
recommended that the Department revise proposed Sec. 668.14(b)(32) so
that an institution would not be required to disseminate a closed
school discharge application if the institution's teach-out plan
provides that the school or location will close only after all students
have graduated or withdrawn. According to this commenter, if a school
that plans to close remains open until all students have graduated or
withdrawn, few if any students would be eligible for a loan discharge.
The commenter believed that the proposed regulations create
incentives to withdraw that are contrary to public policy favoring
program completion. The commenter recommended that proposed Sec.
668.14(b)(32) be revised to
[[Page 76034]]
provide that when an institution arranges a teach-out opportunity that
would permit a student to complete his or her program, the institution
would only be required to provide the discharge application and
accompanying disclosure if the student declines the teach-out
opportunity. The commenter suggested that the Department require that
institutions inform students of their opportunity to discharge their
loans before the school closes and before the student makes any
decision as to whether to participate in the teach-out. The commenter
believed that it is unrealistic to assume that students will not take
advantage of the opportunity to discharge their loan debt, particularly
when students can simply enroll in another institution and complete
their program after receiving a discharge.
Another commenter disagreed with the inclusion of voluntary school
closures in Sec. 668.14(b)(31)(iv) where the institution intends to
close a location that provides 100 percent of at least one program. The
commenter stated that when a school decides that a particular location
is no longer desirable or viable, and makes plans to responsibly teach-
out the enrolled students itself, the school should not be treated like
a school which has lost State approval, accreditation, or Federal
eligibility. The commenter believed that the proposed regulation would
discourage schools from acting responsibly and undertaking the
considerable expense to voluntarily teach-out a location because after
receiving a discharge application, students would be more likely to
withdraw and seek a discharge rather than finishing their education.
This commenter recommended limiting the requirement that closing
schools provide a discharge application and a written disclosure to
situations described in Sec. 668.14(b)(31)(ii) and (iii), where there
is some likelihood that the school's behavior may have disadvantaged
students.
Some commenters urged the Department to locate the provision
requiring closing schools to provide a discharge application and
written disclosures in Sec. 668.26, rather than Sec. 668.14, the
section of the regulations pertaining to the PPA. These commenters
asserted that placing this provision in the PPA could lead to potential
False Claims Act liability centered around disputes of fact that cannot
be resolved absent undergoing discovery in a court proceeding.
According to these commenters, schools would face the risk of costly
litigation to address issues of fact regarding whether students
received proper notice, even where schools have documented the proper
provision of notice.
One commenter recommended a technical change for non-defaulted
loans, by moving the proposed requirement to provide a second
application from guarantor responsibilities in Sec.
682.402(d)(6)(ii)(J) to lender responsibilities in Sec.
682.402(d)(7)(ii).
Discussion: We appreciate the support of the commenters who agreed
with our proposed changes to the disclosure requirements. The
commenters are correct that a borrower may receive a closed school
discharge even if the borrower re-enrolls at another institution of
higher education. Under current Sec. 685.214(c)(1)(C), an otherwise
eligible borrower who re-enrolled at another institution may qualify
for a closed school discharge if the borrower did not complete the
program of study at another school, or by transferring credits earned
at the closed school at another school.
With regard to the recommendation that the Department revise the
regulations to specify that closed school discharge information be
provided either when collection first begins, or when collection
resumes, whichever is applicable, we do not believe that a lender in
the FFEL program would find the use of the term ``resume'' confusing.
We note that current regulations in Sec. 682.402(d)(7)(i) use the term
``resume.'' We are not aware of any cases in which a FFEL lender failed
to meet the requirements in the current regulations to ``resume''
collections activities because the lender had not yet begun collection
activities.
We disagree with the recommendation that a school that plans to
keep a closing location open until all of the students have either
graduated or withdrawn should be exempted from the requirement to
provide its students with the closed school disclosures or the
application. Because all students at such a school or location are
entitled to the option of a closed school discharge, we believe that
all such borrowers should receive this information, so that they have
full knowledge of their options. While many of the students at such a
school location may plan to take advantage of the teach-out, not all
necessarily will.
We disagree with the recommendation that the closed school
discharge form only be provided to borrowers who decline the teach-out.
As other commenters pointed out, students may accept a teach-out not
realizing that they have other options. The disclosure information and
the information on the discharge application form will apprise
borrowers of their options, and help the borrower to make an informed
decision based on full knowledge of the borrower's options.
We disagree with the comment suggesting that the proposed
regulations create an incentive to withdraw that is contrary to public
policy. Although public policy generally favors higher rates of program
completion, it is not always in the individual borrower's best interest
to continue a program through graduation. In a closed school situation,
the value of the degree the borrower obtains may be degraded, depending
on the reasons for the school closure. Borrowers at closing schools may
incur unmanageable amounts of debt in exchange for relatively low-value
degrees. We do not believe that it is good public policy to require
these borrowers to repay that debt if they cannot or choose not to
complete the program and are eligible for a closed school discharge.
Similarly, we disagree with the recommendation that voluntary
school closures be exempted from the requirements. As noted earlier,
the teach-out requirements in 34 CFR 668.14(a)(31) apply whether the
school is forced to close or voluntarily closes. We see no basis for
exempting schools that voluntarily close from the closed school
discharge requirements promulgated in these final regulations.
With regard to schools being discouraged from acting responsibly
and voluntarily providing teach-outs, as noted above, closing schools
are required to provide teach-outs. A school that declines to provide
teach-outs as a result of these final regulations would be in violation
of the requirements specified in the school's PPA.
We do not agree with the recommendation that a school be required
to provide disclosures whenever a school notifies the Department of its
intent to close. The regulations as proposed require a school to
provide disclosures as result of any of the events in section
668.14(b)(31)(ii)-(v), which includes ``an institution otherwise
intends to cease operations.'' We disagree with the recommendation that
the provision in Sec. 668.14 be moved to Sec. 668.26. We believe the
provision is more appropriately included in Sec. 668.14, which
enumerates the requirements of a school's PPA. We do not agree that
schools are at greater risk of costly litigation if the provision is
located in Sec. 668.14 than they would be if the provision were
located in Sec. 668.26. To the extent that a closed school would face
potential liability under the False
[[Page 76035]]
Claims Act for claims for Federal funds made after the school failed to
comply with this requirement, we see little difference in the risk
based on where the regulatory requirement is located in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
We agree with the recommended technical change that, for non-
defaulted FFEL Program loans, the regulations should include the
requirement to provide a borrower a second closed school application
under lender responsibilities in Sec. 682.402(d)(7).
Changes: We have revised Sec. 682.402(d)(7)(ii) to require a
lender to provide a borrower another closed school discharge
application upon resuming collection.
Content of Disclosures
Comments: Under the proposed regulations, institutions are
responsible for providing written disclosures to students to inform
them of the benefits and consequences of a closed school discharge. A
group of commenters made recommendations for the content of the written
materials that schools would be required to provide to students under
proposed Sec. 668.14(b)(32). Specifically, these commenters suggested
that the written disclosure describing the benefits and consequences of
a closed school discharge as an alternative to program completion
through a teach-out should encourage program completion, because
earning a degree can lead to employment. These commenters encouraged
the Department to work with the postsecondary education community to
draft discharge applications and disclosures that encourage program
completion.
This group of commenters also recommended modifications to the
closed school discharge regulations, to proscribe the content of the
disclosures. These commenters believed that if the Department provided
or approved the written disclosures, it would help ensure that
borrowers are able to make better-informed choices over how they
proceed with their higher education.
These commenters believed that the Department should not rely on
failing schools to ensure that students receive this information prior
to closure. According to these commenters, because these schools can be
liable for the closed school discharges, closing schools often provide
inaccurate closed school discharge information or provide information
in a format that students are unlikely to read or notice.
To prevent misleading disclosures, which would defeat the purpose
of the proposed regulation, these commenters recommend that the
Department amend proposed Sec. 668.14(b)(32) to require that the
written disclosure the school gives to its students be in a form
provided or approved by the Secretary.
This group of commenters recommended that the closed school
disclosures also include the expected closure date. These commenters
asserted that when schools announce that they are closing, but plan on
teaching out all the existing programs themselves, they currently have
no obligation to inform their students about the expected date of
closure. These commenters suggest that, as a result, students who
experience a deterioration in the level of instruction are hesitant to
withdraw and in many cases do not know they have the right to withdraw.
These commenters contend that even students who are aware of their
right to withdraw do not know when they can withdraw while remaining
eligible for a closed school discharge.
To provide borrowers with more choice over how they proceed with
their higher education, these commenters recommended that, upon
notifying the Department of its intent to close and teach-out all
existing students, the regulations require a school to provide a
written notice to students about the expected date of closure and their
right to a discharge if they withdraw within 120 days prior to closure.
One commenter contended that schools required to post letters of
credit before closing have a strong financial incentive to minimize the
number of students who choose to take a closed school discharge,
regardless of what is in each student's best interest. In addition,
this commenter suggested that unscrupulous schools often aggressively
recruit students from closed schools. This commenter recommended that,
to ensure students at closing schools receive clear, accurate, and
complete information about their options, the Department should require
schools to use standard language and/or a standard fact sheet approved
by the Department in their disclosures.
This group of commenters recommended that the disclosures clearly
explain the student's closed school discharge rights. The commenters
asserted that closing schools often obfuscate a borrower's discharge
rights and options. In the commenters' view, the Department's proposal
would only encourage continued obfuscation. Under the proposed
regulations, a school must provide a disclosure that describes the
benefits and consequences of a closed school discharge as an
alternative to a teach-out agreement. The commenters believe that a
school could comply with this proposed requirement by providing a long,
complicated disclosure about benefits and consequences, while burying a
borrower's right to obtain a closed school discharge instead of
participating in a teach-out. To prevent obfuscation and confusion the
commenters recommended that the Department revise proposed Sec.
668.14(b)(32) to require a clear and conspicuous written disclosure
informing students of their right to seek a closed school discharge as
an alternative to a teach-out.
Discussion: We do not have plans to develop written closed school
discharge disclosure materials for schools to use, although we may
develop such materials in the future if warranted. In addition, we may
provide technical assistance to schools required to develop school
discharge disclosure materials. We note that the Department already
provides information on closed school discharges on our studentaid.gov
Web site.
The current closed school discharge form provided to borrowers,
Loan Discharge Application: School Closure, is a Department form. The
Department has developed this form in consultation with the student
financial aid community. The form is due to expire on August 31, 2017.
In the coming months, we will revise the form to reflect the changes in
the closed school discharge regulations. The revised version of the
form will go through two public comment periods before it is
implemented.
We disagree with the recommendation that we require schools to
provide students with the expected date of a school closure. The
expected date of closure may not be the actual closure date, and the
school may actually close earlier or later than that date. Providing a
date that may or not be accurate could be confusing to borrowers. It
may also discourage borrowers from continuing in their education
programs when, in some cases, it may be beneficial for them to complete
their programs at that institution.
Changes: None.
Procedures for Providing Disclosures
Comments: A group of commenters expressed support for the
Department's closed school discharge proposal, but strongly recommended
several modifications to further the Department's goal of increasing
the numbers of eligible students who receive closed school discharges.
Under current Sec. 685.214(f)(2), after the Department confirms the
date of a school closure, the Department mails a closed school
discharge application to
[[Page 76036]]
borrowers affected by the closure. The Department suspends collection
efforts on applicable loans for 60 days. If the borrower does not
submit the closed school discharge application within that timeframe,
the Department resumes collection on the loan, and grants forbearance
for the 60-day period as provided for under Sec. 685.214(f)(4). These
commenters noted that, currently, after a school closes, the Department
or guaranty agency is required to provide discharge applications to
borrowers who appear to have been enrolled at the time of the school's
closure or to have withdrawn not more the 120 days prior to closure.
The Department or guaranty agency often sends this information one to
six months after the school has closed. Then, the Department or
guaranty agency must refrain from collecting on the loans obtained to
attend the closed school for 60 days. If the borrower does not apply
for a closed school discharge during that time, the Department or
guaranty agency is required to resume collection on their loans if the
loans are not still within the six-month grace period that begins when
a borrower ceases to be enrolled at an eligible school on at least a
half-time basis, as provided for under Sec. Sec. 685.207(b)(2)(i) and
685.207(c)(2)(i).
Some commenters believed that many borrowers do not respond to the
notice regarding closed school discharge because it is typically
provided within the six-month grace period. At that time the borrower
is focused on his or her school closure rather than debt burden. These
commenters contend that providing another closed school discharge
application when the loan is actually being collected, and the borrower
faces the burden of loan payments, is likely to increase the borrower
response rate.
Another group of commenters proposed that after one year, the
Department or guaranty agency should provide a closed school discharge
application and information to borrowers who have re-enrolled in a
title IV institution, noting that borrowers who have re-enrolled may
still qualify for a closed school discharge.
These commenters also recommended requiring that closed school
discharge information be provided with the borrower's monthly payment
statement upon beginning or resuming collection, or the appropriate
entity if the borrower is in default. These commenters contended that
many closed school borrowers receive fraudulent solicitations
containing inaccurate information. These commenters asserted that many
borrowers are confused about which notifications are legitimate and
which are not, and are most likely to trust and pay attention to the
monthly payment statement from their loan servicer.
This group of commenters recommended that the Department take
measures to ensure that disclosures are provided on a timely basis. In
the commenters' view, the Department's proposal does not address a
situation in which the school fails to provide the required
information. The commenters noted that most schools close due to
financial problems, and that by the time they submit teach-out plans
(if they do submit such plans), most schools have lost significant
personnel and their operations are in disarray. As a result, commenters
suggested that some schools are likely to fail to provide the required
notices. The commenters recommended that the Department clarify that,
if a school fails to provide the notice required under proposed Sec.
668.14(b)(32) within five days after submission of a teach-out plan,
the Secretary would be required to provide timely disclosures before
any student may take steps toward participation in a teach-out plan
that may impact his or her discharge eligibility.
Similarly to teach-outs, a group of commenters recommended that
whenever a school notifies the Department of its intent to close, the
Department provide a written notice to students about the expected date
of closure and their closed school discharge rights, including their
right to a discharge if they withdraw within 120 days prior to closure,
if the school fails to do so within five days of informing the
Department of closure.
Discussion: Although we agree that providing the disclosures with
the monthly payment statement would be an effective way of providing
the disclosures to students, there are a variety of methods in which a
loan holder can provide such disclosures to borrowers, and we do not
believe that the Department should specify which method to use through
regulation. However, nothing in the regulations prevents a loan holder
from providing the closed school discharge disclosures in this manner.
We have concerns with the recommendation that a second closed
school discharge application be provided to the borrower when payment
resumes, either after the six-month grace period has elapsed or after
the end of the 60-day forbearance period. We also have concerns about
the recommendation that a second closed school discharge application be
provided after one year if the borrower has re-enrolled. Borrowers are
often overwhelmed with information that is provided to them related to
their student loans, either by the Department or other sources.
Providing multiple copies of the discharge form to borrowers at
different points in time would likely add to the information overload
that student loan borrowers currently experience. We also point out
that the Department's current closed school discharge form is easily
available on the Department's studentaid.gov Web site.
We disagree with the recommendation that the Department provide the
required disclosures if the school does not provide them within five
days of submission of the teach-out plan. We do not believe that the
commenters' suggestion is feasible or practical. The Department expects
regulated parties to comply with regulatory requirements, and typically
reviews for such compliance in program reviews or audits. It would be
difficult for the Department to determine whether the school has
provided the disclosures within five days of submission of the teach-
out plan without such a review or audit.
Changes: None.
Discharge Without An Application
Comments: The Department proposed revisions to Sec. 674.33(g)(3),
Sec. 682.402(d)(8), and Sec. 685.214(c)(2) that would permit the
Department to discharge loans of borrowers who do not re-enroll in a
title IV-eligible institution within three years of their school's
closure. Several commenters supported the Department's proposal to
grant a closed school discharge without a borrower application, based
on information in its possession indicating that the borrower did not
subsequently re-enroll in any title IV-eligible institution within
three years after the date the school closed.
One commenter applauded this proposal, noting that 47 percent of
all Direct Loan borrowers at schools that closed from 2008-2011 did not
receive a closed school discharge or title IV, HEA aid to enroll
elsewhere in the three years following the school's closure. The
commenter asserted that students were left with debt but no degree,
putting them at great risk of default. The commenter asserted that
research has consistently shown that students who do not complete their
programs are among the most likely to default on their loans, leaving
them worse off than when they enrolled. The commenter recommended that
the final preamble clearly state that after three years, an eligible
borrower's loans shall be
[[Page 76037]]
discharged without an application and any amounts paid shall be
refunded. This commenter believed that the preamble to the NPRM
suggested discharge of loans without an application for students who
have not re-enrolled within three years is optional, not required.
One of the commenters supportive of the proposal noted that the
proposed regulations would not discharge the loans of students who
enroll in a teach-out program but do not complete it and are not still
enrolled within three years of a school's closure. The commenter noted
that these borrowers may be unaware of their eligibility for a closed
school discharge. The commenter recommended that the Department use
available data on program completion among students receiving title IV,
HEA aid to automatically discharge the loans of students who did not
complete and are not enrolled in a comparable program within three
years of their school closing.
A commenter recommended that the final regulation provide for
automatic discharges of the loans, to the extent that data are
available to identify them, for borrowers who:
Transfer credits from a closed school and enroll in, but
do not complete, a comparable program, and
Transfer credits to enroll in a completely different
program.
Several commenters did not support the automatic discharge
provision of the proposed rule. One group of commenters contended that
under the proposed regulations, the Department would discharge the loan
absent any evidence that the failure of the student to re-enroll in
another school was a result of the closed school or that the student
did not receive any value for the education received from the closed
school. This group of commenters believed the proposed rule would not
serve the public interest, as it would minimize borrowers' incentives
to continue educational pursuits. These commenters recommended that the
automatic discharge provision be deleted from the final rule. These
commenters further recommended that if the automatic discharge
provision is not removed, that schools should not be held liable for
loans that have been automatically discharged due to a student's
failure to re-enroll in another school.
Another commenter believed that it would not be appropriate for the
Department to grant a closed school discharge without a borrower
application. In this commenter's view, a loan servicer may easily
provide a borrower with the information necessary to apply for a closed
school discharge. This commenter noted that in many instances a student
may have completed his or her education under a teach-out agreement
without necessarily receiving any additional title IV, HEA aid, and
NSLDS may not indicate that the student enrolled in another
institution.
A group of commenters that supported the Department's proposal to
allow loan holders to grant closed school discharges without
applications to borrowers who do not re-enroll in a new institution
within three years of their schools' closures noted that, although the
disclosures discussed earlier in this section will increase the number
of closed school discharge applications submitted by eligible
borrowers, many borrowers will still not likely respond to the
disclosures. These commenters noted that borrowers in closed school
situations, even students who receive information about their rights
from State agencies and the Department, are often confused by
contradictory information from their schools, as well as aggressive
solicitations from other proprietary schools and fraudulent student
loan debt relief companies.
The commenters also urged the Department to make additional
revisions in the final regulations. They recommended that the
Department make automatic discharges mandatory for borrowers who have
not re-enrolled in a title IV-eligible institution within three years
of their schools' closures. These commenters believed that discharges
under the proposed rule would be entirely discretionary, noting that
under the proposed rule, loan holders ``may'' grant discharges in
certain circumstances. The commenters expressed concern that, given
that the Department and guaranty agencies have conflicting duties and
motivations to collect on loans, the discretionary language could make
this regulation meaningless. These commenters also noted that the
proposed regulations lack a mechanism for allowing an organization,
borrower, or attorney general to demand that the Department or guaranty
agency implement the automatic discharge provision. These commenters
recommended that the Department make automatic discharge mandatory,
noting that the Department proposed to make this provision mandatory
during the negotiated rulemaking sessions.
This group of commenters also recommended shortening the re-
enrollment period from three years to one year. These commenters stated
that the vast majority of closed school borrowers who are able to
transfer their credits do so within several weeks to several months
after a school closes. They noted that other schools often market their
programs to affected students immediately following a school closure.
They also claimed that that other schools, including community
colleges, often reach out to students within the first few weeks after
a school closure, and that students actively search for a new school to
accept their closed school credits.
Commenters contended that because very few students transfer their
closed school credits after one year, all closed school borrowers who
do not re-enroll in a title IV institution within one year should be
granted a closed school discharge without any application. These
commenters believed that it would be unfair to require these borrowers
to wait three years for a closed school discharge, during which time
they will make payments and may face burdensome involuntary debt
collection tactics if they default.
This group of commenters anticipated that the vast majority of
eligible borrowers would likely want a closed school discharge.
However, these commenters asserted that some borrowers may not want a
discharge. These commenters propose addressing this potential issue
through an opt-out procedure, in which students receive notice of the
consequences of the discharge and are afforded the opportunity to opt-
out of a discharge within 60 days of receiving the notice.
One commenter raised concerns that the proposal to discharge loans
without an application from a borrower would deny institutions due
process. This commenter proposed revising the regulations to clarify
whether there is a presumption that the borrower did not re-enroll
absent evidence to the contrary, or whether the Department must have in
its possession evidence that the borrower did not re-enroll in another
institution. The commenter also recommended that the regulation be
revised to afford the closed school with notice and the opportunity to
contest the student's eligibility for a loan discharge (e.g., whether
the borrower was enrolled within 120 days of the closure or whether the
borrower was enrolled at another institution or participated in a
teach-out).
In the commenter's view, the procedures the Department follows to
discharge a student loan and make a determination regarding amounts
owed by an institution constitute informal agency adjudication, and
even in the context of informal adjudication, an agency must provide
fundamental due
[[Page 76038]]
process. The commenter contended that due process requires that a
participant in an agency adjudication must receive adequate notice and
``the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.'' Though the Department has flexibility in the way it provides
such due process, the Department may not deny closed institutions the
opportunity to communicate with the Department prior to a discharge and
recovery action. The commenter also expressed the view that, as a
matter of public policy, it would benefit the Department to involve
closed schools before discharging any loans in order to ensure that
discharges are only granted to eligible borrowers.
Another group of commenters recommended eliminating the automatic
discharge provision. These commenters expressed concern with the
concept of an automatic closed school discharge, especially if the
Department intends to rely on the school's NSLDS enrollment reporting
process for information about student re-enrollment. In the school
enrollment reporting process for NSLDS, schools are only required to
include title IV recipients. Therefore, NSLDS may not identify students
who re-enrolled but did not receive title IV, HEA aid. As a result,
commenters suggested that borrowers who received credit from attending
the closed school for the same or similar program of study could be
improperly identified as eligible to receive a discharge.
Under proposed Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3), if the Department
determines that the borrower meets the requirements for a closed school
discharge, the guaranty agency, within 30 days of being informed that
the borrower qualifies, will take the actions described under Sec.
682.402(d)(6) and (7). Section 682.402(d)(6) and (7) specifies the
responsibilities of a guaranty agency. A group of commenters expressed
the view that the cross-reference to Sec. 682.402(d)(6) is too broad.
Theses commenters believed that Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(E) and Sec.
682.402(d)(6)(H)(1) more specifically describe the required action by
the guarantor and should replace Sec. 682.402(d)(6) in the cross-
reference. These commenters also stated that if the Department
determines that the borrower is eligible for a discharge, the guaranty
agency will pay the claim and the lender actions in Sec.
682.402(d)(7)(iv) do not change.
These commenters also recommended changes to the regulations to
provide that the guarantor pay the claim if the Department determines a
borrower is eligible for a discharge. This change would not impact
lender actions in Sec. 682.402(d)(7)(iv).
These commenters also recommended that, if the Department continues
using NSLDS and providing an automatic discharge after three years, the
Department should be responsible for monitoring identified borrowers
during this period, and notifying the applicable guarantor when a
closed school discharge must be processed.
Discussion: We agree with the commenters who recommended that the
Department clarify the final regulations to provide that closed school
discharges for Perkins, FFEL and Direct Loan borrowers who have not re-
enrolled in a title IV-eligible institution within three years of their
schools' closures are not discretionary. We have revised Sec. Sec.
674.33(g)(3), 682.402(d)(8), and 685.214(c)(2) to clearly delineate the
circumstances under which a closed school discharge is discretionary as
opposed to required.
We recognize that some borrowers will qualify for closed school
discharges, but will not receive an automatic closed school discharge
because they re-enrolled in a title IV school within the three-year
timeframe. If the borrower is not participating in a teach-out, or
transferring credits from the closed school to a comparable program at
the new school, the borrower would still be eligible for a closed
school discharge. We do not agree, however, that the Department should
automatically grant closed school discharges in these situations. A
borrower in this type of situation still has access to a closed school
discharge; however, the borrower must apply directly for the discharge.
The provisions for discharges without an application are intended to
provide closed school discharges to borrowers that the Department can
readily determine qualify for the discharge, based on information in
our possession. A borrower who re-enrolled within the three-year time
period may or may not qualify for a closed school discharge, depending
on whether the borrower transferred credits from the closed school to a
comparable program. A borrower who re-enrolled, but still qualifies for
a closed school discharge, would have to provide more detailed
information to the Department through the closed school application
process to allow for a determination of the borrower's eligibility for
a closed school discharge. However, the Department has continued to
increase and improve the quality of data reporting by institutions,
including beginning the collection of program-level data for borrowers
through recently implemented Gainful Employment regulations and through
recent Subsidized Stafford Loan reporting requirements. While current
data limitations make it challenging to definitively identify a
borrower who has enrolled in a comparable program or who has
successfully transferred credits, in future years, the Department may
be able to identify those eligible borrowers who did re-enroll, but not
in a comparable program. In that case, the Department may revisit its
ability to provide closed school discharges automatically to those
borrowers, using the discretion available to the Secretary and
mirroring the three-year provision set forth in these regulations. This
will help to ensure that as many eligible borrowers as possible receive
the discharges for which they qualify.
We disagree with the commenters who recommended eliminating
automatic closed school discharges from the final regulations. We note
that the current regulations already provide for a closed school
discharge without an application, and believe that this is an important
benefit to borrowers. We also believe that the final regulations
provide sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse, such as the three-year
period before an automatic closed school discharge is granted.
Therefore, we also decline to accept the recommendation that we reduce
the three-year time period to one year.
With regard to the three-year time period, we note that the
discharge of a loan is a significant benefit to a borrower, with
potentially significant fiscal impacts. Absent a closed school
discharge application from a borrower, we do not believe that a one-
year period of non-enrollment would be sufficient to discharge a
borrower's debt.
We see no basis for exempting schools from liability for closed
school discharges when the discharge is granted without an application.
We do not believe an opt-out notice for the automatic discharge
without an application is necessary. It is unlikely that a sufficient
number of borrowers will choose not to have their loans discharged to
justify the administrative burden involved in sending the borrower an
opt-out notice. We are also concerned that an opt-out notice could be
confusing, and result in ``false positives''--borrowers inadvertently
choosing to opt out of the discharge.
We acknowledge that the automatic discharge process could result in
discharges being granted to some borrowers who were able to complete
their programs but we believe this would be a negligible number of
borrowers. Even a borrower who does not receive title IV, HEA aid to
attend
[[Page 76039]]
another school, may still receive an in-school deferment. Both receipt
of additional title IV, HEA aid and receiving an in-school deferment
would be reported to NSLDS. Unless the borrower is attending in a less-
than-half-time status, the Department will be able to determine whether
a borrower has re-enrolled at another title IV eligible institution
during the three-year period. We believe that the likely minimal
potential cost of granting discharges to a very small number of
borrowers who do not qualify is counterbalanced by the benefit of
granting closed school discharges to large numbers of borrowers who
qualify for them, but do not receive them under our current procedures.
The comment regarding the Department monitoring borrowers during
the three-year period relates to operationalization of the final
regulations. The Department will develop procedures for determining
whether borrowers qualify for a closed school discharge without an
application, and the appropriate method of notifying guaranty agencies
if the Department makes such a determination. We note, however, that
the final regulations in Sec. 682.402(d)(8)(iii) give guaranty
agencies the authority to grant closed school discharges without an
application based on information in the guaranty agency's possession.
We disagree with commenters who stated that closed school discharge
procedures may deny schools of due process. The closed school discharge
procedures do not currently involve the school in the determination
process. The Department currently pursues recovery of the amounts lost
through closed school and other discharges under section 437(c) of the
HEA through the ordinary audit and program review process. Thus, in the
final audit determination or the final program review determination
issued upon closure of a school or one of its locations, the Department
asserts a claim for recovery of the amounts discharged. The school may
challenge that claim in an appeal under Subpart L of Part 668, as it
can with any other audit or program review liability.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ See, e.g., In the Matter of Coll. of Visual Arts,
Respondent, Docket No.: 15-05-SP, 2015 WL 6396241, at *1 (July 20,
2015); In the Matter of Pennsylvania Sch. of Bus., Respondent,
Docket No. 15-04-SA, 2015 WL 10459890, at *1 (Oct. 27, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes: We have revised Sec. Sec. 674.33(g)(3), 682.402(d)(8),
and 685.214(c)(2) to clearly delineate the circumstances under which a
closed school discharge is discretionary, as opposed to required.
Comments: None.
Discussion: Upon further review, the Department determined that the
proposed regulations related to automatic closed school discharges
needed to specify the period of time for which borrowers from closed
schools would be evaluated to determine whether they would qualify for
automatic discharges. The Department concluded that it would be
administratively feasible to conduct such an evaluation for borrowers
at schools that closed on or after November 1, 2013.
Changes: We have revised Sec. Sec. 674.33(g)(3)(ii),
682.402(d)(8)(ii), and 685.214(c)(2)(ii) to specify that they apply
with respect to schools that closed on or after November 1, 2013.
Review of Guaranty Agency Denials
Comments: Some commenters expressed strong support for the proposed
regulation that would allow borrowers the right to appeal to the
Department when guaranty agencies deny closed school discharges. One
commenter noted that the right to appeal is paramount to due process.
This commenter stated that the right to appeal provides qualified
borrowers with a safety net for obtaining debt relief and also provides
a framework for accountability in guaranty agency decisions.
These commenters noted that the guarantor in this case would need
to notify the lender to resubmit the closed school claim for
reimbursement.
A group of commenters recommended that the Department retain
current language requiring the guaranty agency to state the reasons for
its denial. The group of commenters supported the Department's proposal
to provide for the review of guaranty agency denials of closed school
discharge applications for FFEL Loans. These commenters averred that
FFEL borrowers, whose loans are held by guaranty agencies, should have
the same right to challenge an erroneous unpaid refund or closed school
discharge denial as Direct Loan and FFEL Loan borrowers whose loans are
held by the Department. The commenters noted that current FFEL Loan
regulations do not provide borrowers with any right to seek review of
guaranty agency denials of closed school discharges. The commenters
also noted that, even when FFEL borrowers are entitled to
administrative review, their right to seek further review in court is
not clear, unlike Direct Loan borrowers. Commenters noted that the APA
does not provide for judicial review of decisions by private, non-
governmental entities such as guaranty agencies, nor is there any
explicit right to judicial review of guaranty agency decisions in the
HEA.
As a result, commenters said that FFEL borrowers whose loans are
held by guaranty agencies have no clear way to challenge an erroneous
closed school discharge decision from a guaranty agency. Only Direct
Loan and FFEL Loan borrowers whose loans are held by the Department may
seek judicial review of administrative unpaid refund or closed school
discharge denials. These commenters believe that the Department's
proposed rule would address what the commenters consider an arbitrary
denial of borrower due process.
This group of commenters recommended one modification to the
proposed regulations. Under current Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F), if a
guaranty agency denies a closed school discharge application, it must
notify the borrower in writing of its determination and the reasons for
the determination. Under the proposed regulation, a guaranty agency
would still be required to notify the borrower of its determination,
but would not be required to notify the borrower of its reasons for the
determination. These commenters believed that removing this requirement
would frustrate the purpose of the review process and urged the
Department not to remove the notification requirement.
Multiple groups of commenters noted that the proposed regulations
do not provide a time frame during which a borrower can request an
appeal of a denied closed school discharge by the guarantor. These
commenters recommended a 30-day timeframe, which would align with the
timeframe allowed for an appeal of a false certification discharge
denial. These commenters also proposed language that would allow a
borrower to submit a request after the 30-day period.
One group of commenters proposed that the guarantor would still
submit the appeal to the Department; however, collection of the loan
would continue during the Department's review.
Another group of commenters also recommended additional language to
address situations in which a borrower submits a request after the 30-
day period. The commenters suggested that in this case, the guarantor
would still submit the appeal to the Secretary; however, unlike with a
timely request, collection of the loan (nondefaulted or defaulted)
would continue during the Secretary's review.
[[Page 76040]]
This group of commenters stated that the proposed regulations are
not clear on the availability of an appeal option for non-defaulted
borrowers. These commenters recommended adding language to clarify that
non-defaulted borrowers should be afforded the same opportunity to
appeal. Under the proposed regulations, a guarantor would be
responsible for notifying a defaulted borrower of the option for review
by the Secretary. For consistency, the commenters believed it would be
reasonable for the guarantor to utilize this same process for non-
defaulted borrowers.
These commenters also believed that it would be less confusing for
a borrower for the guarantor to retain the loan until 30 days after the
agency's notification to the borrower of the right to appeal.
Commenters proposed that if the borrower appeals within 30 days, the
loan should remain with the guarantor until the Secretary renders a
final determination on the borrower's appeal. These commenters
recommended that the guarantor should be responsible for notifying
defaulted and non-defaulted borrowers of the option for review by the
Secretary.
Under proposed Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3), if the Department
determines that the borrower meets the requirements for a closed school
discharge, the guaranty agency, within 30 days of being informed that
the borrower qualifies, will take the actions described under Sec.
682.402(d)(6) and Sec. 682.402(d)(7). Section 682.402(d)(6) specifies
the responsibilities of a guaranty agency and 682.402(d)(7) specifies
the responsibilities of a lender.
A group of commenters expressed the view that the cross-reference
to Sec. 682.402(d)(6) is too broad. These commenters believed that
Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(E) and 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(H)(1) more
specifically describe the required action by the guarantor and should
replace Sec. 682.402(d)(6) in the cross-reference. These commenters
also recommended that we clarify under Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3) if
the Department determines that the borrower is eligible for a
discharge, the guaranty agency will pay the claim and the lender will
be required to take the actions specified in Sec. 682.402(d)(7)(iv).
Discussion: We do not believe that a 30-day timeframe for appealing
a denial of a closed school discharge claim by a guaranty agency is
sufficient. We have retained the language in the NPRM, which did not
provide a timeframe for such an appeal.
We agree with the commenters who recommended that proposed Sec.
682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F) be revised to specify that, when a guaranty agency
notifies a borrower of the denial of a closed school discharge claim
and of the opportunity to appeal the denial to the Department, that the
notification from the guaranty agency should state the reasons for the
denial. Since the proposed revision to the regulation is intended to
provide borrowers an opportunity to appeal a negative decision, a
borrower should have the opportunity to address the issues that led to
the denial during the appeal process.
We agree with the commenters that the regulations should provide
for an appeal process for non-defaulted FFEL borrowers (whose loans are
held by lenders) as well as for defaulted FFEL borrowers (whose loans
are held by guaranty agencies). Although the NPRM only addressed an
appeal process for FFEL Program loans held by a guaranty agency, our
intent was to provide an appeal process for FFEL Program loans held by
either a lender or a guaranty agency.
We agree that the cross-references to Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3)
should be written more narrowly, and have made additional technical
corrections to the FFEL regulations, based on the recommendations
relating to the process for granting discharges in the FFEL Program.
These technical corrections are identified in the ``Changes'' section,
below.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F) to stipulate
that a guaranty agency that denies a borrower's closed school discharge
request must notify the borrower of the reasons for the denial.
We have revised the cross-references in Sec.
682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K)(3), to more specifically describe the guarantor's
action. We have also changed the cross-reference from (d)(7) to
(d)(7)(iv), clarifying that after the guaranty agency pays the claim
the lender actions in (d)(7)(iv) do not change.
We have made a technical correction to Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(H),
deleting the reference to a guaranty agency exercising a forbearance
during the suspension of collection activity.
We have revised Sec. 682.402(d)(7)(iii) to clarify that a borrower
whose FFEL Loan is held by a lender, has the same appeal rights as a
borrower whose loan is held by a guaranty agency if the guaranty agency
denies the closed school discharge request.
Miscellaneous Recommendations
Comments: One commenter supported the proposed changes to the
closed school discharge regulations, but believed that the proposal did
not go far enough to provide displaced students with comprehensive
assistance and an explanation of their right to debt relief. This
commenter urged the Department to ensure that a clearly identifiable,
knowledgeable, and accessible representative is made available on
campus immediately after announcement of an impending closure, to
provide in-person, meaningful assistance to displaced students.
In addition, this commenter recommended that the Department offer
ongoing assistance through the creation of a student loan discharge
hotline and/or on-line computer chat, and hyper-links on the
Department's Web site directing students to assistance in their local
communities. The commenter averred that assistance should be made
available in multiple formats (telephone, smartphone apps, mail, in
person, and on-line), as many students at closing or closed schools do
not own or have limited access to computers.
A group of commenters recommended that the discharge regulations
for Perkins and Direct Loans be amended to extend the 120-day look back
period by the number of days between the expected and actual date of
closure whenever the actual closure date is later than the expected and
disclosed closure date.
Another commenter recommended prohibiting the capitalization of
interest when the collections process has been suspended because a
student is filing for a closed school discharge.
A group of commenters recommended that the terminology throughout
Sec. 682.402(d) be updated for consistency with current Sec. 682.402
regulations for other discharges types. Specifically, commenters
suggested replacing references to written and sworn statements with
references to applications.
Discussion: We appreciate the recommendations for additional steps
the Department may take to assist borrowers in closed school
situations. Many of these recommendations relate to activities that are
not governed by regulations, or are out of the scope of this regulatory
action.
With regard to the comment recommending that we extend the look-
back period beyond 120 days if the expected closure date is different
than the actual closure date, we do not believe such a change is
necessary. Under current regulations in
[[Page 76041]]
Sec. 685.214(c)(1)(B), the Department has the authority to extend the
look-back period due to ``exceptional circumstances.'' We believe that
this provision provides appropriate flexibility to the Department in
cases where it may be necessary to extend the look-back period.
Under Sec. 682.202(b)(2)(ii) and (iii) a lender may capitalize
interest that accrues during a period of authorized deferment or
forbearance. We see no justification for exempting the 60-day
forbearance period from this practice.
We agree with the recommendation to update the terminology
throughout Sec. 682.402(d) for consistency with current Sec. 682.402
for other discharges types, and will make those changes in the final
regulations.
Changes: In Sec. Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(B)(1), (d)(6)(ii)(B)(2),
(d)(6)(ii)(F)(5), (d)(6)(ii)(G), and (d)(6)(ii)(H) of the FFEL closed
school discharge regulations, we have replaced the terms ``sworn
statement'' or ``written request'' with the term ``application'', to
conform the regulations with the current closed school discharge
application process.
Data Requests
Comments: A group of commenters recommended that the Department
disclose, at the school level, information about closed school
discharges, including information about the Department's outreach to
borrowers, the number of applicants, the number of applicants who
receive a discharge, the total amount discharged, and the amount
collected from schools to offset the discharged amounts. Similarly,
this group of commenters requested that the Department disclose, at the
school and discharge type level, information about false certification
discharges, including the number of applicants, the number of
applicants who receive a discharge, and total amount discharged and
related offsets. In addition, this group of commenters recommended that
the Department disclose the number of borrowers for whom a death
discharge has been requested, the number of borrowers for whom a death
discharge has been granted, and the total discharged amount.
Discussion: We thank the commenters for their thoughtful reporting
recommendations; however, we do not have plans to provide such
information at this time. We note that publication of data at this
level may require providing the school with the opportunity to review
and challenge or correct inaccurate information. However, the
Department may be able to publish more aggregated versions of these
data for public review at a later date. The Department is not prepared
to implement such processes at this time, but will consider releasing
these data moving forward.
Changes: None.
False Certification Discharges (Section 685.215)
High School Diploma
Comments: Commenters generally supported the proposed improvements
to the false certification process. Some commenters noted that
broadening the reasons that loans may be discharged due to false
certification may provide a simpler process for loan discharge than
borrower defense to repayment for many borrowers.
A group of commenters expressed support for the proposed regulatory
changes that would provide a false certification loan discharge to
borrowers whose schools have falsely reported that they earned a high
school diploma, including schools that have facilitated the borrower's
attainment of a fabricated high school diploma. The commenters noted
that that proposed Sec. 685.215(a)(1)(ii) would allow for discharge of
a borrower's loan if the school falsified the borrower's high school
graduation status; falsified the borrower's high school diploma; or
referred the borrower to a third party to obtain a falsified high
school diploma. The commenters viewed this proposed regulation as a
critical improvement over the current false certification regulations.
However, several commenters expressed concern that some otherwise
eligible borrowers may be denied discharges because their financial aid
applications, which were completed by the school, indicate that they
reported having earned a high school diploma.
A group of commenters recommended revisions to the final
regulations regarding what they referred to as ``unfair'' evidentiary
burdens. These commenters recommended that the Department clarify that
students whose schools falsely certified that they have high school
diplomas, including schools that do so by falsely certifying financial
aid applications, are eligible for false certification discharges.
One group of commenters recommended that the Department further
modify the regulatory language to clarify that borrowers who report to
their school that they earned a high school diploma are ineligible for
a false certification loan discharge, but that borrowers whose FAFSA
falsely indicates the borrower had earned a high school diploma may be
eligible for a false certification loan discharge.
Another group of commenters believed that the Department should
revise the proposed regulations to ensure that a borrower will qualify
for a false certification discharge only if the borrower can fulfill
the bases for discharge. These commenters recommended that the
Department revise proposed Sec. 685.215(c) to require borrowers to
demonstrate each element of the bases for discharge under proposed
Sec. 685.215(a)(l) in order to qualify for a discharge. The commenters
also recommended that the Department provide guidance regarding
acceptable online high schools.
These commenters observed that the Department's intent, as stated
in the preamble to the NPRM, is that borrowers who provide false
information to postsecondary schools regarding high school graduation
status will not obtain a false certification discharge. Proposed Sec.
685.215(a)(l) (``Basis for Discharge'') states that a false
certification discharge is available if a borrower reported to the
postsecondary school that the borrower did not have a high school
diploma. The commenters believed that the section of the proposed
regulation regarding borrower qualifications for discharge does not
reflect the Department's intent. Proposed Sec. 685.215(c) (``Borrower
qualification for discharge'') does not require a borrower to
demonstrate that the borrower presented accurate information regarding
the borrower's high school graduation status to the postsecondary
school.
These commenters believe that under the proposed regulations,
taxpayers may be forced to pay for false certification discharges for
borrowers who did not meet the test in proposed Sec. 685.215(a)(l) and
yet qualified under proposed Sec. 685.215(c)(1). The commenters noted
that the Department can seek recovery from institutions for certain
losses determined under proposed Sec. 685.2125(a)(l). However, if
borrowers are granted discharges under the weaker standard at proposed
Sec. 685.215(c)(1), then in many cases the Department will be unable
to collect from institutions under the stronger standard at proposed
Sec. 685.215(a)(l).
The commenters believed that schools should be able to rely on the
fact that a high school is accredited by a reputable accrediting
agency, absent a list of high schools that provide instruction to adult
students and that are acceptable to the Department. Another commenter
requested that the Department provide schools with a reliable source of
information regarding appropriately accredited high school
[[Page 76042]]
diploma programs available to adults, including those that are offered
online.
A group of commenters expressed concerns that the proposed false
certification and unauthorized payment discharge rule would penalize
institutions for the false certification of the student or the
independent actions of a third party.
In addition, these commenters recommended that, under the
evidentiary standards articulated in proposed Sec. 685.215(c)(1), a
borrower requesting a false certification loan discharge should be
required to certify that, at the time of enrollment, he or she did not
represent to the school, either orally or in writing, that he or she
had a high school diploma. The commenters believed that this
evidentiary requirement would help deter frivolous false certification
claims.
Some commenters observed that, pursuant to proposed Sec.
685.215(a)(l)(ii), a borrower would be eligible for a false
certification loan discharge if the school the borrower attended
certified the eligibility of a student who is not a high school
graduate based on ``[a] high school diploma falsified by the school or
a third party to which the school referred the borrower.'' The
commenters recommended that the regulation be revised to clarify that a
school is only penalized if it referred a student to a third party for
the purpose of having the third party falsify the high school diploma.
These commenters believed that it is not uncommon for a school to refer
a student to a third-party servicer to verify the diploma, particularly
in the case of students who graduated from foreign high schools. The
commenters believed that institutions should not be penalized if a
third-party verification entity falsified the legitimacy of the foreign
credential without the school's knowledge.
Discussion: We thank the commenters who are supportive of the
proposed revisions of the false certification of high school graduation
status regulatory provisions. However, we do not agree that the
regulations need further modification to address situations in which a
borrower who is not a high school graduate states on the FAFSA that the
borrower is a high school graduate. If a borrower falsely stated on the
FAFSA that they were a high school graduate, but also reported to the
school that they were not a high school graduate, and the school
certified the eligibility of the borrower based on the FAFSA, the
school would still have falsely certified the eligibility of the
borrower. In this situation, the borrower would qualify for a false
certification discharge--assuming the borrower did not meet the
alternative to high school graduation status in effect at the time--
regardless of the information on the student's FAFSA. The same would
hold true whether the FAFSA was actually completed by the borrower, or
completed by the school. We note that, while a school may assist a
student in completing a FAFSA, a school may never complete a FAFSA for
a student. Conversely, if a borrower falsified the FAFSA on their own
initiative, did not inform the school that they were not a high school
graduate, and the school did not receive any discrepant information
indicating that the borrower was not a high school graduate, the
borrower would not qualify for a false certification discharge.
Borrowers who deliberately provide misleading or false information in
order to obtain Federal student loans do not qualify for false
certification discharges based on the false or misleading information
that the borrower provided to the school.
We agree with the commenters who noted a discrepancy between the
language in proposed Sec. 685.215(a)(l) and proposed Sec.
685.215(c)(l). Section 685.215(a)(l) provides the basic eligibility
criteria for a false certification discharge based on false
certification of a borrower's high school graduation status. Section
685.215(c)(1) describes how a borrower qualifies for a discharge. The
two sections are intended to mirror each other, not to establish
slightly different standards for the discharge. If a borrower, in
applying for the discharge, is only required to state that the borrower
``did not have a valid high school diploma at the time the loan was
certified,'' the question of whether the borrower ``reported not having
a high school diploma or its equivalent'' would not be addressed.
We also agree that the standards under which the Department may
seek recovery for losses under Sec. 685.215(a)(1) should not be
different from the standards under which a borrower may receive a false
certification discharge under Sec. 685.215(c)(1).
The commenter who recommended that schools be able to rely on a
high school's accreditation status by a ``reputable accrediting
agency'' did not specify what criteria would be used to determine if an
agency accrediting a high school is reputable, and does not suggest a
process for making such determinations. Moreover, even if it were
feasible for the Department to provide a list of acceptable high
schools for title IV student financial assistance purposes or guidance
regarding acceptable schools, there is no guarantee that a diploma
purporting to come from such a school is legitimate.
We do not share the concern of commenters that the proposed
regulations may penalize a school for relying on the independent
actions of a third party. If a school is relying on a third party to
verify the high school graduation status of a borrower, it is incumbent
on the school to ensure that the third-party is providing legitimate
verifications. We note that high school graduation status, or its
approved equivalent, is a fundamental borrower eligibility criterion
for title IV federal student assistance. Any school that wishes to
participate in the title IV, HEA programs and outsources the
determination of high school graduation status to a third party without
ensuring that the third party is trustworthy, is acting irresponsibly.
We also note, in response to this comment, that the Department is
not proposing revisions to the regulations governing false
certification discharges due to unauthorized payment.
We also disagree with the comment recommending that a school should
only be penalized if it referred a student to a third-party ``for the
purpose of having the third party falsify the high-school diploma.''
This commenter raised this issue in particular with regard to students
who graduated from foreign high schools. The commenter stated that
schools often use third parties to verify the legitimacy of a foreign
credential. We do not believe that the Department must demonstrate
intent on the part of a school when assessing liabilities against a
school due to false certification of borrower eligibility. We do not
believe that a school that routinely certifies eligibility of borrowers
who graduated from foreign high schools can credibly claim to be
ignorant of the legitimacy of a third-party verification entity that
the school uses for verification purposes.
We agree with the comment that the false certification loan
discharge application should include a certification from the borrower
that the borrower did not report to the school that the borrower had a
high school diploma. The current form, Loan Discharge Application:
False Certification (Ability to Benefit), expires on August 31, 2017.
After these final regulations are published, we will revise the form to
make it consistent with these final regulations. The revised version of
the form will go through two public comment periods, with the intent of
being finalized by the time these regulations become effective on July
1, 2017.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.215(c)(1) to clarify that the
borrower must have reported to the
[[Page 76043]]
school that the borrower did not have a high school diploma or its
equivalent.
Disqualifying Condition
Comments: Current regulations under Sec. 685.215(a)(1)(iii)
provide for a discharge if a school certified the eligibility of a
borrower who would not meet requirements for employment in the
occupation for which the training program supported by the loan was
intended. The proposed regulations would modify this provision to
clarify that the relevant ``requirements for employment'' are ``State
requirements for employment'' in the student's State of residence at
the time the loan was originated.
A group of commenters sought confirmation that, while a borrower
may be eligible for a false certification discharge due to a condition
that disqualified them for employment in the field for which
postsecondary education was pursued, the postsecondary institution
would not be financially liable for the discharged loan. These
commenters believed that this is the Department's intent because the
remedial action provision at proposed Sec. 685.308 does not list the
disqualifying condition discharge provision at proposed Sec.
685.215(a)(l)(iv) as a basis for institutional liability. These
commenters observed that the current version of Sec. 685.308 states
the Department may seek recoupment if the loan certification resulted
in whole or in part from the school's violation of a Federal statute or
regulation or from the school's negligent or willful false
certification.
These commenters averred that anti-discrimination laws limit
schools' ability to deny admission to a prospective student, even when
the individual would be disqualified for employment in the career field
for which the program prepares students. The commenters recommended
that the Department state explicitly in the preamble to the final
regulations that disqualifying condition discharges will not result in
institutional liabilities.
Another commenter asserted that it would be administratively
burdensome for institutions to maintain the knowledge necessary to
determine what conditions would disqualify a prospective student for
employment in a specific field. This commenter suggested that this
would be particularly challenging for distance education programs that
serve students remotely, since these institutions would only be aware
of potentially disqualifying conditions that the student discloses.
A group of commenters echoed this concern, stating that it would be
administratively burdensome for distance education programs to comply
with proposed Sec. 685.215(c)(2). In these commenters' view, a
primarily distance education institution may not have occasion to
become aware of a student's disqualifying physical or mental condition
unless and until the student voluntarily discloses such information. In
addition, for institutions that operate in numerous States, the
commenters stated that it would be administratively burdensome and near
impossible for an institution to remain constantly vigilant about
potential changes to State statutes, State regulations, or other
limitations established by the States that may affect a student's
eligibility for employment.
Since institutions must comply with various anti-discrimination
laws when admitting students, several commenters argued that
institutions should not be held liable for discharges based on
disqualifying conditions unless it can be shown that the institution
engaged in substantial misrepresentation. Another commenter stated that
there are legitimate reasons why institutions--including, but not
limited to, distance education institutions--may not be aware of a
student's disqualifying physical or mental condition or criminal
record. The commenter claimed that, under applicable Department
regulations, an institution may not make a preadmission inquiry as to
whether an applicant has a disability. The commenter cited regulations
at 34 CFR 104.42(b)(2) limiting schools' ability to determine whether
applicants have a disability.
Another commenter referenced the Department's publication Beyond
the Box: Increasing Access to Higher Education for Justice-Involved
Individuals, which encourages alternatives to inquiring about criminal
histories during college admissions and provides recommendations to
support a holistic review of applicants.
A commenter asked why the regulation does not specify that the
institution knew about or could be expected to have known about the
disqualifying condition. The commenter questioned whether a student who
intentionally concealed a disqualifying condition should obtain a
discharge. The commenter also raised the issue of a borrower whose
disqualifying impairment occurs after the fact, but does not qualify
for a disability discharge. In such situations, the commenter
recommended that the Department clearly state that the school would not
be subject to any penalty under Sec. 685.308.
Another group of commenters recommended that the Department expand
the regulation pertaining to disqualifying conditions to include
certifications not provided by the State, such as those referenced in
the Gainful Employment regulations such as professional licensure and
certification requirements, including meeting the requirements to sit
for any required licensure or certification exam.
A group of commenters noted their opposition to the Department's
proposal which, in their view, narrows discharge eligibility for
students whose schools falsely certify that they meet the requirements
for employment in the occupations for which their programs are intended
to train. These commenters asserted that some schools frequently
recruit students they know will be barred from employment in their
field after program completion.
These commenters objected to the proposed regulatory language,
which addresses requirements imposed by the State, not by the
profession. To the extent that this discharge provision is intended to
provide relief to students whose schools recruit and enroll them
despite the fact that they cannot benefit from the program, the
commenters believed that the Department should not limit the scope of
this protection. The commenters observed that while most professional
licensing is found in State law and regulation, others--such as those
from trade-specific entities--are not. In the commenters' view, the
proposed change would unnecessarily restrict relief to students who are
unemployable because they are ineligible for certifications not
provided by a State.
The commenters also believed that this change would be inconsistent
with the Department's Gainful Employment regulations, which requires
schools to certify that each of their career education programs
``satisfies the applicable educational prerequisites for professional
licensure or certification requirements in that State so that the
student who completes the program and seeks employment in that State
qualifies to take any licensure or certification exam that is needed
for the student to practice or find employment in an occupation that
the program prepares students to enter.'' 34 CFR 668.414(d)(3). As the
Department noted in the preamble to the NPRM for the Gainful Employment
regulations, a student's enrollment in a program intended to prepare
them for a career for which they cannot be certified ``can have grave
consequences for students' ability to find jobs and repay their loans
after graduation.'' 79 FR 16478.
[[Page 76044]]
The commenters believed that the consequences are equally grave for
students who are unwittingly enrolled in programs that they personally
can never benefit from, though their classmates might. In the view of
these commenters, it is therefore unnecessary and unfair to narrow this
standard for relief.
Discussion: The proposed regulations were not intended to absolve
schools of financial liability in the case of false certification due
to a disqualifying condition. The commenters point to proposed Sec.
685.308, which inadvertently omitted a cross-reference to Sec.
685.215(a)(1)(iv) in identifying provisions under which the Secretary
``collects from the school the amount of the losses the Secretary
incurs and determines that the institution is liable to repay.'' We
note that the proposed regulations include cross-references to the
provisions covering false certification due to high school graduation
status and unauthorized signature. We believe that discharge due to
false certification of disqualifying status should be treated the same
as the other types of false certification discharges, as it is under
current regulations in Sec. 685.308(a)(2).
The commenter who suggested that it would be administratively
burdensome for schools to maintain the knowledge necessary to determine
what conditions would disqualify a prospective student from employment
in a specific field appears to be unaware of the current regulatory
requirements. Under current Sec. 685.215(a)(1)(iii), the Department
considers a school to have falsely certified a borrower's eligibility
for a title IV loan if the school ``certified the eligibility of a
student who, because of a physical or mental condition, age, criminal
record, or other reason accepted by the Secretary would not meet the
requirements for employment (in the student's State of residence when
loan was originated) in the occupation for which the training program
supported by the loan was intended.'' The final regulations revise this
provision to refer to ``State requirements,'' but make no additional
changes to this provision. The change is consistent with our
interpretation set forth in Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) GEN-95-42,
dated September 1995. In that DCL, we clarified that for a borrower to
qualify for a false certification discharge due to a disqualifying
condition, a borrower must provide evidence that the borrower had a
disqualifying condition at the time of enrollment and of ``a State
prohibition (in that student's State of residence) against employment''
in that occupation based on the borrower's status.
We note in response to the commenters who were concerned about the
administrative burden associated with compliance for distance education
programs that these schools have been subject to this regulatory
requirement for over 20 years. Neither the proposed regulations nor
these final regulations would change the basic requirements regarding
false certification due to a disqualifying condition.
The regulation at 34 CFR 104.42 refers to general postsecondary
education admission procedures, not eligibility for title IV student
financial assistance. While the requirements in Sec. 685.215 do not
apply to a school's evaluation of whether to admit a student to a
particular program, they do apply to its certification of that
student's eligibility for title IV student financial assistance for
that program. Therefore, we do not believe that the further limitation
suggested by the commenter is necessary.
The Department of Education Beyond The Box publication cited by
commenters specifically addresses career-training programs. Further,
the publication does not advise schools to ignore disqualifying
characteristics, but rather not to be overbroad in their preclusion of
otherwise eligible applicants:
Tailor questions about CJI [``Criminal Justice Information''] to
avoid unnecessarily precluding applicants from entering training
programs, and thus employment, for which they might be eligible. For
career-oriented training programs, institutions should limit CJI
inquiries to criminal convictions that pose barriers to
certification and licensing. For example, if a State teacher's board
will not grant a license to anyone with a felony conviction for
sexual assault or rape, the teaching program could specifically ask,
``Have you ever been convicted of felony sexual assault or rape?''
instead of broadly asking, ``Have you ever been convicted of a
crime?'' This specificity would enable the institution to adequately
assess whether a student could face occupational licensing and
credentialing barriers (Beyond the Box: Increasing Access to Higher
Education for Justice-Involved Individuals, p. 25).
As stated in the Beyond the Box publication, we expect schools to
be aware of disqualifying conditions for employment in the fields for
which the schools are providing training. Schools that offer career-
training programs need to be proactive in determining whether borrowers
who are training for fields that have such employment restrictions do
not have a disqualifying condition for that career.
In response to the comment regarding a student intentionally
misleading a school, if the school could demonstrate that a student
intentionally misled the school about a disqualifying condition, we
would take that into account in determining the amount that the school
is liable to repay under Sec. 685.308(a). However, in our view, it
seems unlikely that a borrower would knowingly go through the time,
effort, and expense of enrolling in an education program that trains
the borrower for an occupation for which the borrower is unemployable.
A far more common scenario is unscrupulous schools recruiting students
with disqualifying conditions who cannot possibly benefit from the
training programs that the school offers.
With regard to borrowers who do not have a disqualifying condition
at the time of enrollment, the regulations specify that a borrower
qualifies for the discharge only if the borrower had a disqualifying
condition that ``would have'' disqualified the borrower from employment
in the occupation, and that the borrower ``did not meet'' State
requirements for employment in the career. A condition that arose after
the borrower was no longer enrolled at the school would not qualify the
borrower for a false certification discharge due to a disqualifying
condition.
We addressed the question of expanding the scope of this provision
to include non-State requirements for employment in certain fields,
such as employment standards established by professional associations
during the negotiated rulemaking sessions and in the NPRM. As we noted
earlier, employment standards established by professional associations
could vary, and it would not be practical to require schools to
determine which professional association standards to use. The
reference to the Gainful Employment requirements is inapplicable here,
as the Gainful Employment requirements relate to the quality of a
school's program.
Changes: We have revised Sec. 685.308(a) to clarify that
Department assesses liabilities to schools for false certification due
to disqualifying condition or identity theft.
Satisfactory Academic Progress
Comments: A group of commenters supported the proposed regulation
that would provide automatic false certification loan discharges for
students whose satisfactory academic progress (SAP) was falsified by an
institution. While the regulation specifies that these loan discharges
are initiated by the Department, these commenters requested that
borrowers be permitted to submit an application for false certification
loan discharge due to the
[[Page 76045]]
falsification of satisfactory academic progress by an institution.
The commenters urged the Department to clarify that students may
also apply for a discharge on this basis, rather than wait for the
Department to grant discharges without applications. The commenters
observed that there are often False Claims Act and government cases
involving false certification of SAP, and that many students also know
when their academic progress was falsified by schools, but are not
covered by such cases.
The commenters suggested that information provided by students in
discharge applications would also allow the Department to identify bad-
acting schools and prevent abuse of title IV, HEA funding. These
commenters recommended that the Department revise the proposed rules to
provide a means for students to individually apply for discharge when
their SAP is falsely certified by their school.
Discussion: We continue to believe that allowing individual
borrowers to apply for false certification discharges due to
falsification of SAP is not practical. As we discussed in the NPRM,
schools have a great deal of flexibility both in determining and in
implementing SAP standards. There are a number of exceptions under
which a borrower who fails to meet SAP can continue to receive title IV
loans. Borrowers who are in danger of losing title IV eligibility due
to a failure to meet SAP standards often request reconsideration of the
SAP determination. Schools often work with borrowers in good faith
efforts to attempt to resolve the situation without cutting off the
borrower's access to title IV assistance.
We do not believe that a school should be penalized for legitimate
attempts to help a student who is not meeting SAP standards, nor do we
believe a student who has successfully appealed a SAP determination
should be able to use that initial SAP determination to obtain a false
certification discharge on his or her student loans. In addition, we
continue to believe that it would be very difficult for an individual
borrower to sufficiently demonstrate that a school violated its own SAP
procedures.
Given these considerations, the final regulations continue to limit
false certification discharges based on falsification of SAP to
discharges based on information in the Secretary's possession.
Changes: None.
Ability To Benefit
Comments: A group of commenters requested that the Department
reconsider the evidentiary standard for false certification of a
borrower's ability to benefit. In these commenters' view, the
requirement for additional corroborating evidence beyond the self-
certification of the borrower is unreasonable. The commenters suggested
that borrowers who are unable to obtain corroborating evidence should
be able to submit a sworn statement in support of their false
certification application.
These commenters referenced two DCLs the Department issued in
connection with false certification of ability to benefit: DCL GEN-95-
42 (dated September 1995) and DCL FP-07-09 (dated September 2009). The
commenters characterized the DCLs as establishing a presumption that
students who claim ability to benefit fraud are not telling the truth
unless they submit independent corroborating evidence to support their
discharge application. To support this claim, these commenters quoted
the statement in DCL GEN-95-42 that the absence of findings of improper
ability to benefit practices by authorities with oversight powers
``raises an inference that no improper practices were reported because
none were taking place.''
The commenters asserted that many borrowers cannot provide proof of
Federal or State investigations of particular schools because
enforcement has been lenient in this area. They asserted that, in 1992,
Congress provided for the false certification discharge and overhauled
the student loan system because oversight of schools was inadequate.
A group of commenters criticized the Department's current approach,
and noted that statements that a borrower makes on the current Loan
Discharge Application: False Certification (Ability to Benefit) are
made under penalty of perjury. According to commenters, if a borrower
is unable to provide investigative findings supporting the borrower's
claim, the Department or the guaranty agency will deny the discharge
unless the borrower submits additional corroborating evidence (such as
statements by school officials or statements made in other borrower
claims for discharge relief).
The commenters noted that DCL FP-07-09 discusses guaranty agencies'
consideration of ``the incidence of discharge applications filed
regarding that school by students who attended the school during the
same time frame as the applicant,'' and suggested that students have no
way of knowing whether a guaranty agency has done so in evaluating
their applications.
The commenters asserted that students do not have access to school
employee statements and do not know whether other borrowers have filed
similar claims for relief. When borrowers are able to find attorneys to
help them, attorneys are often unable to obtain the required evidence
through Freedom of Information Act requests. The commenters also
asserted that the Department does not have possession of all false
certification discharge applications and does not ensure that copies
are retained when guaranty agencies go out of business or retain all
potentially corroborating evidence. In addition, if the student has
carried the debt for years before learning of their right to a false
certification discharge, the school may have closed. At that point, key
documents and corroborating evidence may no longer be available.
The commenters recommended that the Department revise its proposed
regulations to specify that a student may establish a right to a false
certification discharge through a ``preponderance of the evidence,'' as
it has proposed for borrower defense claims. In addition, the
commenters recommended that borrowers be presumptively eligible for
discharge after application in the following circumstances:
The school's academic and financial aid files do not
include a copy of test answers and results showing that the borrower
obtained a passing score on an ability-to-benefit test approved by the
Secretary;
No testing agency has registered a passing score on an
ability-to-benefit test approved by the Secretary for the borrower; or
The school directed the borrower to take an online test to
obtain a high school degree, the borrower believed the test to be
legitimate, and the high school diploma is invalid.
Discussion: In the NPRM, we removed the references to ``ability to
benefit'' from the Direct Loan false certification regulatory language
and replaced it with a cross-reference to section 484(d) of the HEA,
and have retained that change in the final regulations. Section 484(d)
establishes the current borrower eligibility requirements for students
who are not high school graduates. The current alternative to
graduation from high school requirements are substantially different
from the earlier ability to benefit requirements. We have provided
guidance describing the current alternative to high school graduation
requirements in DCL GEN-16-09.
[[Page 76046]]
We disagree with the recommendation to revise the regulations
pertaining to the evidentiary standards for false certification of
ability to benefit. Any modifications to these regulations could only
be applied prospectively. Schools can be held liable for false
certification discharges, and we cannot impose retroactive requirements
on schools.
We also disagree with the commenters' characterization of the
guidance in DCL GEN-95-42 and DCL FP-07-09. DCL FP-07-09 does not
require a borrower to provide additional corroborating evidence if the
borrower is unable to do so. That DCL provides examples of ``credible
evidence'' that would provide a guaranty agency with ``an adequate
basis for granting a discharge application'' when there is no borrower-
specific evidence that the borrower qualifies for a discharge due to
false certification of ability to benefit.
We believe the two DCLs still provide an accurate description of
the legal requirements for false certification, so we do not have plans
to update them in the near future.
Changes: None.
Interest Capitalization (Sections 682.202(b)(1), 682.405, and
682.410(b)(4))
Comments: Several commenters supported the proposed changes in
Sec. Sec. 682.202(b)(1), 682.405, and 682.410(b)(4), providing that a
guaranty agency may not capitalize unpaid interest after a defaulted
FFEL Loan has been rehabilitated, and that a lender may not capitalize
unpaid interest when purchasing a rehabilitated FFEL Loan.
A group of commenters noted that in the preamble to the NPRM, the
Department characterized these changes as clarifications of existing
regulations. The commenters disagreed with this characterization,
stating that during the negotiated rulemaking sessions, negotiators
representing guaranty agencies, lenders, and servicers did not agree
that current regulations prohibit the capitalization of interest
following loan rehabilitation. The commenters further stated that the
negotiating committee agreed to add this issue to the negotiating
agenda after an agreement was reached with the Department that the
proposed changes represented a change in policy for prospective
implementation. The commenters added that when the Department was asked
by another member of the negotiating committee whether the proposed
changes would have any retroactive impact, the Department responded
that retroactive application was not the issue being negotiated. The
commenter requested that the Department clarify in the final
regulations that the changes to the FFEL Program regulations
prohibiting the capitalization of interest following loan
rehabilitation are amendments to the current rules, consistent with the
commenters' understanding of what was agreed to during the
negotiations. Based on that understanding, the commenters stated that
FFEL Program guarantors, lenders, and servicers are planning to
implement the changes for loans that go into default on or after the
effective date of the regulations and are subsequently rehabilitated.
Discussion: We thank the commenters for their support of the
changes to prohibit interest capitalization following loan
rehabilitation. In response to the group of commenters who requested
confirmation that the changes in Sec. Sec. 682.202(b)(1), 682.405, and
682.410(b)(4) represent amendments to the current regulations and are
to be applied only prospectively, we confirm that this is the intent.
Changes: None.
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
Regulatory Impact Analysis
Under Executive Order 12866, it must be determined whether this
regulatory action is ``significant'' and, therefore, subject to the
requirements of the Executive order and subject to review by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB). Section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866
defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as an action likely to
result in a rule that may--
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more,
or adversely affect a sector of the economy, productivity, competition,
jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or
tribal governments or communities in a material way (also referred to
as an ``economically significant'' rule);
(2) Create serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impacts of entitlement grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles stated in the
Executive order.
This final regulatory action will have an annual effect on the
economy of more than $100 million because regulations would have annual
federal budget impacts of approximately $1.9 billion in the low impact
scenario to $3.5 billion in the high impact scenario at 3 percent
discounting and $1.8 billion and $3.4 billion at 7 percent discounting,
additional transfers from affected institutions to student borrowers
via reimbursements to the Federal government, and annual quantified
costs of $9.8 million related to paperwork burden. Therefore, this
final action is ``economically significant'' and subject to review by
OMB under section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 12866. Notwithstanding
this determination, we have assessed the potential costs and benefits,
both quantitative and qualitative, of this final regulatory action and
have determined that the benefits justify the costs.
We have also reviewed these regulations under Executive Order
13563, which supplements and explicitly reaffirms the principles,
structures, and definitions governing regulatory review established in
Executive Order 12866. To the extent permitted by law, Executive Order
13563 requires that an agency--
(1) Propose or adopt regulations only on a reasoned determination
that their benefits justify their costs (recognizing that some benefits
and costs are difficult to quantify);
(2) Tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society,
consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives and taking into
account--among other things and to the extent practicable--the costs of
cumulative regulations;
(3) In choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, select
those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other
advantages; distributive impacts; and equity);
(4) To the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather
than the behavior or manner of compliance a regulated entity must
adopt; and
(5) Identify and assess available alternatives to direct
regulation, including economic incentives--such as user fees or
marketable permits--to encourage the desired behavior, or provide
information that enables the public to make choices.
Executive Order 13563 also requires an agency ``to use the best
available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future
benefits and costs as accurately as possible.'' The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB has emphasized that these
techniques may include ``identifying changing future compliance costs
that might result from technological innovation or anticipated
behavioral changes.''
We are issuing these final regulations only on a reasoned
determination that
[[Page 76047]]
their benefits justify their costs. In choosing among alternative
regulatory approaches, we selected those approaches that maximize net
benefits. Based on the analysis that follows, the Department believes
that these regulations are consistent with the principles in Executive
Order 13563.
We also have determined that this regulatory action does not unduly
interfere with State, local, or tribal governments in the exercise of
their governmental functions.
In accordance with both Executive Orders, the Department has
assessed the potential costs and benefits, both quantitative and
qualitative, of this regulatory action. The potential costs associated
with this regulatory action are those resulting from statutory
requirements and those we have determined as necessary for
administering the Department's programs and activities.
In this Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) we discuss the need for
regulatory action, the comments about the NPRM analysis and significant
changes from the NPRM, the potential costs and benefits, net budget
impacts, assumptions, limitations, and data sources, as well as
regulatory alternatives we considered. Although the majority of the
costs related to information collection are discussed within this RIA,
elsewhere in this notice under Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, we also
identify and further explain burdens specifically associated with
information collection requirements.
1. Need for Regulatory Action
These final regulations address several topics related to the
administration of title IV, HEA student aid programs and benefits and
options for borrowers.
As detailed in the NPRM, the Department last revised the borrower
defense regulations over two decades ago, and until recently, use of
borrower defense has been very limited. The lack of clarity in the
current regulations has led to much confusion among borrowers regarding
what protections and actions for recourse are available to them when
dealing with cases of wrongdoing by their institutions. The Department
received comments addressing this lack of clarity during the public
comment period.
The need for a clearer and more efficient process was also
highlighted when the collapse of Corinthian generated an unprecedented
level of borrower defense claims activity. As detailed extensively in
the NPRM, Corinthian, a publicly traded for-profit higher education
company that in 2014 enrolled over 70,000 students at more than 100
campuses nationwide, filed for bankruptcy in 2015 after being the
subject of multiple investigations and actions by Federal and State
governments. The Department committed itself to ensuring that students
harmed by Corinthian's misrepresentations receive the relief to which
they are entitled, and realized that the existing regulations made this
process burdensome, both for borrowers and for the Department. Under
the current process, the Department would be required to devote
significant resources to reviewing individual State laws to determine
which law to apply to each borrower's claim. The Department appointed a
Special Master in June of 2015 to create and oversee the process of
providing debt relief for these Corinthian students. As of October
2016, approximately 3,787 borrower defense discharges totaling $73.1
million had been completed and another 7,858 closed school discharges
totaling approximately $103.1 million have been processed. Moreover,
the Department has received thousands more claims--both from former
Corinthian students and from students at a number of other
institutions--that are pending a full review, and expects to receive
more as the Department continues to conduct outreach to potentially
affected students.
The Department remains committed to ensuring that borrowers with a
valid defense to repayment are able to benefit from this option.
Research has shown that large sums of student debt can reduce levels of
participation in the economy, especially if borrowers are unable to
obtain adequate income to repay their debts.\96\ If the borrower is
harmed such as by being provided with educational credentials worth
significantly less than an institution's misrepresentation has led him
or her to believe, the borrower may be entitled to some relief from the
loans associated with such education. The changes to the borrower
defense provisions in these final regulations will update the process
and standard for determining relief and allow the Department to
effectively address claims that arise in the modern postsecondary
educational system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ The Economics of Student Loan Borrowing and Repayment, Wen
Li, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, available at https://philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2013/q3/brq313_economics-of-student-loan-borrowing-and-repayment.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The landscape of higher education has changed significantly over
the past 20 years, including a substantial increase in the number of
students enrolled in distance education. Because distance education
allows students to enroll in courses and programs based in other States
and jurisdictions, it has created additional challenges as it relates
to the Department's current borrower defense regulations.
The current regulations require an analysis of State law to
determine the validity of a borrower defense claim. This approach
creates complexities in determining which State law applies and may
give rise to potential inequities, as students in one State may receive
different relief than students in another State, despite common
underlying facts and claims.
The expansion of distance education has also impacted the
Department's ability to apply its borrower defense regulations. The
current borrower defense regulations do not identify which State's law
is considered the ``applicable'' State law on which the borrower's
claim can be based.\97\ Generally, the regulation was assumed to refer
to the laws of the State in which the institution was located; we did
not have much occasion to address differences in protection for
borrowers in States that offer little protection from school misconduct
or borrowers who reside in one State but are enrolled via distance
education in a program based in another State. Some States have
extended their rules to protect these students, while others have not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ In the few instances prior to 2015 in which claims have
been recognized under current regulations, borrowers and the school
were typically located in the same State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final regulations give students access to consistent, clear,
fair, and transparent processes to seek debt relief. The new Federal
standard will allow a borrower to assert a borrower defense on the
basis of a substantial misrepresentation, a breach of contract, or a
favorable, nondefault contested judgment against the school for its act
or omission relating to the making of the borrower's Direct Loan or the
provision of educational services for which the loan was provided.
Additionally, the final regulations separately address predispute
arbitration clauses, another possible obstacle to borrowers pursuing a
borrower defense claim. These final regulations also prohibit a school
participating in the Direct Loan Program from obtaining, through the
use of contractual provisions or other agreements, a predispute
agreement for arbitration to resolve claims brought by a borrower
against the school that could also form the basis of a borrower defense
under the Department's
[[Page 76048]]
regulations. The final regulations also prohibit a school participating
in the Direct Loan Program from obtaining an agreement, either in an
arbitration agreement or in another form, that a borrower waive his or
her right to initiate or participate in a class action lawsuit
regarding such claims and from requiring students to engage in internal
dispute processes before contacting accrediting or government agencies
with authority over the school regarding such claims. In addition, the
final regulations establish the conditions or events upon which an
institution is or may be required to provide to the Department
financial protection, such as a letter of credit, to help protect
students, the Federal government, and taxpayers against potential
institutional liabilities.
Additionally, to enhance and clarify other existing protections for
students, these regulations update the basis for obtaining a false
certification discharge, clarify the processes for false certification
and closed school discharges, require institutions to provide
applications and explain the benefits and consequences of a closed
school discharge, and establish a process for a closed school discharge
without an application for students who do not re-enroll in a title IV-
participating institution within three years of an institution's
closure. These regulations also codify the Department's practice that a
discharge based on school closure, false certification, unpaid refund,
or defense to repayment will result in the elimination or recalculation
of the subsidized usage period associated with the loan discharged.
These regulations also amend the regulations governing the
consolidation of Nursing Student Loans and Nurse Faculty Loans so that
they align with the statutory requirements of section 428C(a)(4)(E) of
the HEA; clarify rules regulating the capitalization of interest on
defaulted FFEL Loans; require that proprietary schools at which the
median borrower has not repaid in full, or paid down the balance of,
the borrower's loans include a warning in advertising and promotional
materials about those repayment rate outcomes; require that a school
disclose on its Web site and to prospective and enrolled students about
events for which it is required to provide financial protection to the
Department; clarify the treatment of spousal income in the PAYE and
REPAYE plans; and make other changes that we do not expect to have a
significant economic impact.
2. Summary of Comments and Changes From the NPRM
A number of commenters expressed that the RIA in the NPRM was
inadequate and did not support proceeding with the regulations without
further study. Commenters noted that the accuracy of several of the
Department's past budget estimates had been questioned by Congressional
committees and other outside reviewers. Several commenters pointed out
that the wide range in the estimate, from $646 million up to $41.3
billion over the 2017 to 2026 loan cohorts, indicated that the
Department does not know the potential budget impact of the regulation.
Other commenters noted that if the impact is at the higher end of the
range, the analysis does not quantify benefits greater than the costs
to justify the decision to proceed with the regulations.
Another set of comments focused on the impact of the regulations on
higher education, the costs to institutions, and the potential for
institutional closures. A number of commenters expressed concern that
institutional closures related to the regulations, especially the
financial responsibility provisions, will reduce access to higher
education for low-income and minority students. Materials included with
the comments analyzed National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 2012
(NPSAS 2012) data to demonstrate that students at for-profit
institutions are, on average, more likely to be older, racial
minorities, veterans, part-time, financially independent, responsible
for dependents, and Pell Grant recipients. A number of commenters
suggested that the costs of providing financial protection would result
in increased costs for students and potentially limit access to higher
education. Other commenters were concerned with a lack of analysis
about the costs of the financial protection or the possibility that
schools would be unable to obtain a letter of credit and would lose
access to title IV, HEA funding and be forced to close. Several
commenters suggested that the regulations would open the floodgates to
frivolous claims that would overwhelm the Department and institutions,
exacerbating the harmful effects on higher education.
One commenter argued that the proposed regulations would result in
a large number of disappointed borrowers filing borrower defense claims
without merit. Several commenters were concerned that the projected net
budget impact referred to in the NPRM of as much as $42.698 billion
during the coming decade would undermine the integrity of the Direct
Loan Program and that neither American taxpayers, nor schools that have
successfully educated students, could cover these costs if thousands of
students or graduates start requesting discharges of their loans. The
commenters argued that the regulations lack any quality control measure
to ensure that the Department would not be hit with an influx of
fraudulent claims. They cited a recent lawsuit in which a former law
student unsuccessfully sued her law school for false advertising.
Finally, a number of commenters suggested the high cost estimate
was overstated because schools would change their practices and limit
behavior that would result in valid borrower defense claims. Another
commenter questioned the characterization of the net budget impact as a
cost based on the idea that the Department should not collect on loans
established fraudulently. Several commenters noted that the potential
fiscal impact should not factor into decisions about whether borrowers
are eligible for relief.
We appreciate the comments about the RIA in the NPRM. As discussed
in the NPRM, given the limited history of borrower defense claims and
the limitations of available data, there is uncertainty about the
potential impact of the regulations. Per OMB Circular A-4, in some
cases, uncertainty may be addressed by presenting discrete alternative
scenarios without addressing the likelihood of each scenario
quantitatively. The uncertainty about borrower defense was acknowledged
and reflected in the wide range of scenario estimates in the NPRM. The
Department presented the range of scenarios and discussion of sources
of uncertainty in the estimates in order to be transparent and
encourage comments that might aid the Department in refining the
estimates for the final regulations.
We do not agree that the analysis was inadequate to support
proceeding with the regulations. Under Executive Orders 12866 and
13563, the Department must adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that its benefits justify its cost. The Executive Orders
recognize that some benefits and costs are difficult to quantify, and
provide that costs and benefits include both quantifiable measures--to
the fullest extent that they can be usefully estimated--as well as
qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to
quantify but ``essential to consider.'' OMB Circular A-4 provides that
in cases where benefit and cost estimates are uncertain, benefit and
cost estimates that reflect the full
[[Page 76049]]
probability distribution of potential consequences should be reported.
Where possible, the analysis should present probability distributions
of benefits and costs and include the upper and lower bound estimates
as complements to central tendency and other estimates. If a lack of
knowledge prevents construction of a scientifically defensible
probability distribution, the Department should describe benefits or
costs under plausible scenarios and characterize the evidence and
assumptions underlying each alternative scenario. The Department took
this approach in the NPRM and presents the analysis with relevant
revisions for the final regulations.
OMB Circular A-4 suggests that in some instances when uncertainty
has significant effects on the final conclusion about net benefits, the
agency should consider additional research prior to rulemaking. For
example, when the uncertainty is due to a lack of data, the agency
might consider deferring rulemaking, pending further study to obtain
sufficient data. Delaying a decision will also have costs, as will
further efforts at data gathering and analysis. The Department has
weighed the benefits of delay against these costs in making the
decision to proceed with the regulation. With respect to borrower
defense, if the Department did not proceed with the final regulations,
the existing borrower defense provisions would remain in effect and
some of the costs associated with potential claims would be incurred
whether or not the final regulations go into effect. The final
regulations build in more clarity and add accountability and
transparency provisions that are designed to shift risk from the
taxpayers to institutions. Moreover, if the Department were to delay
implementation of the final regulations to obtain further information
about the scope of institutional behavior that could give rise to
claims, it is not clear when a significant amount of relevant data
would become available. Borrower responses in absence of the process
established in the final regulations do not necessarily reflect the
level of claims that will be processed under the final regulations.
Delaying the regulations would delay the improved clarity and
accountability from the regulations without developing additional data
within a definite timeframe, and we do not believe the benefits of such
a delay outweigh the costs. As with any regulation, additional data
that becomes available will be taken into account in the ongoing re-
estimates of the title IV, HEA aid programs.
We have considered the other comments received. Revisions to the
analysis in response to those comments and our internal review of the
analysis are incorporated into the Discussion of Costs, Benefits, and
Transfers and Net Budget Impacts sections of this RIA as applicable.
Table 1 summarizes significant changes made from the NPRM in response
to comments and the Department's ongoing development of the final
regulations.
Table 1--Summary of Key Changes in the Final Regulations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reg section Description of change
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial Responsibility Triggers:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 668.171(c)(1).............. As detailed in Table 2, eliminates
the $750,000 or 10 percent of
current assets materiality
threshold. Instead, losses from all
of the automatic triggers except 90/
10, cohort default rate (CDR), SEC
delisting, and SEC warning, are
used to recalculate the composite
score. If the recalculated score is
less than 1.0, the school is not
financially responsible and must
provide financial protection.
Removes Form 8-K trigger from
proposed Sec.
668.171(c)(10)(vii).
Eliminates discretionary trigger
based on bond or credit ratings
from proposed Sec.
668.171(c)(10)(iv).
Sec. 668.171(h)................. Reclassifies proposed automatic
triggers including those related to
accreditor probation and show-cause
actions, pending borrower defense
claims, and violations of loan
agreements as discretionary
triggers.
Specifies that in its notice
reporting a triggering event, an
institution may demonstrate
mitigating factors about the event,
including that the reported action
or event no longer exists or has
been resolved or the institution
has insurance that will cover part
or all of the debts and liabilities
that arise at any time from that
action or event.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial Protection Disclosures:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 668.41(i).................. Revised to clarify that the
Secretary will conduct consumer
testing prior to establishing the
actions and triggering events that
require financial disclosures.
Further clarifies the requirements
for testing with consumers before
publishing the content of the
disclosure, as well as the
disclosure delivery requirements to
prospective and enrolled students.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial Responsibility:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 668.175(f)(5).............. Clarifies how long an institution
must maintain the financial
protection associated with a
triggering event in Sec. 668.171.
Sec. 668.175(f)(2)(i)........... Provides that the Secretary may
identify other acceptable forms of
financial protection.
Sec. 668.175(h)................. Provides that the Secretary will
release any funds held under a set-
aside if the institution
subsequently provides cash, the
letter of credit, or other
financial protection required under
the zone or provisional
certification alternatives in Sec.
668.175(d) or (f).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repayment Rate:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 668.41(h)(3)............... Clarifies that the Secretary will
calculate a repayment rate based on
the proportion of students who have
repaid at least one dollar in
outstanding balance, measured in
the third year after entering
repayment, using data reported and
validated through the Gainful
Employment program-level repayment
rate calculation.
Removes the requirement that
repayment rate warnings be
delivered individually to all
prospective and enrolled students.
Enhances the requirement as to how
repayment rate warnings must be
presented in advertising and
promotional materials.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 76050]]
Closed School Discharge:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 682.402(d)(7)(ii).......... Requires a lender to provide a
borrower another closed school
discharge application upon resuming
collection.
Sec. Sec. 674.33(g)(3), Revised to clearly delineate the
682.402(d)(8), and 685.214(c)(2). circumstances under which a closed
school discharge is discretionary,
as opposed to required.
Sec. 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F)....... Revised to stipulate that a guaranty
agency that denies a borrower's
closed school discharge request
must notify the borrower of the
reasons for the denial.
Sec. 682.402(d)................. Updates wording in FFEL closed
school discharge regulations to
refer to application instead of
sworn statement or written request.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
False Certification Discharge:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 685.215(c)(1).............. Clarifies that a borrower must have
reported to the school that the
borrower did not have a high school
diploma or its equivalent.
Sec. 685.308(a)................. Clarifies that the Department
assesses liabilities to schools for
false certification due to
disqualifying condition or identity
theft.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Predispute Agreements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 685.300.................... Eliminates the use of predispute
arbitration agreements, whether or
not they are mandatory, to resolve
claims brought by a borrower
against the school that could also
form the basis of a borrower
defense or to prevent a student who
has obtained or benefited from a
Direct Loan from participating in a
class action suit related to
borrower defense claim.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Discussion of Costs, Benefits, and Transfers
In developing the final regulations, the Department made some
changes to address concerns expressed by commenters and to achieve the
objectives of the regulations while acknowledging the potential costs
of the provisions to institutions and taxpayers. As noted in the NPRM,
the primary potential benefits of these regulations are: (1) An updated
and clarified process and a Federal standard to improve the borrower
defense process and usage of the borrower defense process to increase
protections for students; (2) increased financial protections for
taxpayers and the Federal government; (3) additional information to
help students, prospective students, and their families make educated
decisions based on information about an institution's financial
soundness and its borrowers' loan repayment outcomes; (4) improved
conduct of schools by holding individual institutions accountable and
thereby deterring misconduct by other schools; (5) improved awareness
and usage, where appropriate, of closed school and false certification
discharges; and (6) technical changes to improve the administration of
the title IV, HEA programs. Costs associated with the regulations will
fall on a number of affected entities including institutions, guaranty
agencies, the Federal government, and taxpayers. These costs include
changes to business practices, review of marketing materials,
additional employee training, and unreimbursed claims covered by
taxpayers. The largest quantified impact of the regulations is the
transfer of funds from the Federal government to borrowers who succeed
in a borrower defense claim, a significant share of which will be
offset by the recovery of funds from institutions whose conduct gave
rise to the claims.
We have considered and determined the primary costs and benefits of
these regulations for the following groups or entities that we expect
to be impacted by the proposed regulations:
Students and borrowers
Institutions
Guaranty agencies and loan servicers
Federal, State, and local government
Borrower Defense, Closed School Discharges, and False Certification
Discharges
Students and Borrowers
The fundamental underlying right of borrowers to assert a defense
to repayment and obligation of institutions to reimburse the Federal
government for such claims that are valid exist under the current
borrower defense regulations. These final regulations aim to establish
processes that enable more borrowers to pursue valid claims and
increase their likelihood of discharging their loans as a result of
institutional actions generating such claims. As detailed in the NPRM,
borrowers will be the primary beneficiaries of these regulations as
greater awareness of borrower defense, a common Federal standard, and a
better defined process may encourage borrowers who may have been
unaware of the process, or intimidated by its complexity in the past,
to file claims.
Furthermore, these changes could reduce the number of borrowers who
are struggling to meet their student loan obligations. During the
public comment periods of the negotiated rulemaking sessions, many
public commenters who were borrowers mentioned that they felt that they
had been defrauded by their institutions of higher education and were
unable to pay their student loans, understand the borrower defense
process, or obtain debt relief for their FFEL Loans under the current
regulations. We received many comments on the NPRM echoing this
sentiment.
Through the financial responsibility provisions, these final
regulations introduce far stronger incentives for schools to avoid
committing acts or making omissions that could lead to a valid borrower
defense claim than currently exist. In addition, through clarification
of circumstances that could lead to a valid claim, institutions may
better avoid behavior that could result in a valid claim and future
borrowers may be less likely to face such behavior.
Providing an automatic forbearance with an option for the borrower
to decline the temporary relief and continue making payments will
reduce the potential burden on borrowers pursuing borrower defenses.
These borrowers will be able to focus on
[[Page 76051]]
supplying the information needed to process their borrower defense
claims without the pressure of continuing to make payments on loans for
which they are currently seeking relief. When claims are successful,
there will be a transfer between the Federal government and affected
student borrowers as balances are forgiven and some past payments are
returned. In the scenarios described in the Net Budget Impacts section
of this analysis, those transfers range from $1.7 billion for the
minimum budget estimate to $3.3 billion in the maximum impact estimate
annually, with the primary budget estimate at $2.5 billion annually.
Borrowers who ultimately have their loans discharged will be
relieved of debts they may not have been able to repay, and that debt
relief can ultimately allow them to become bigger participants in the
economy, possibly buying a home, saving for retirement, or paying for
other expenses. Recent literature related to student loans suggests
that high levels of student debt may decrease the long-term probability
of marriage,\98\ increase the probability of bankruptcy,\99\ reduce
home ownership rates,\100\ and increase credit constraints, especially
for students who drop out.\101\ Further, when borrowers default on
their loans, everyday activities like signing up for utilities,
obtaining insurance, or renting an apartment can become a
challenge.\102\ Borrowers who default might also be denied a job due to
poor credit, struggle to pay fees necessary to maintain professional
licenses, or be unable open a new checking account.\103\ While
difficult to quantify because of the multitude of different potential
borrowing profiles and nature of the claims of those who will seek
relief through borrower defense and the possibility of partial relief,
the discharge of loans for which borrowers have valid borrower defenses
could have significant positive consequences for affected borrowers and
associated spillover economic benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Gicheva, D. ``In Debt and Alone? Examining the Causal Link
between Student Loans and Marriage.'' Working Paper (2013).
\99\ Gicheva, D., and U. N. C. Greensboro. ``The Effects of
Student Loans on Long-Term Household Financial Stability.'' Working
Paper (2014).
\100\ Shand, J. M. (2007). ``The Impact of Early-Life Debt on
the Homeownership Rates of Young Households: An Empirical
Investigation.'' Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Center for
Financial Research.
\101\ Id.
\102\ https://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/default.
\103\ www.asa.org/in-default/consequences/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected borrowers also will be able to return into the higher
education marketplace and pursue credentials they need for career
advancement. To the extent borrowers have subsidized loans, the
elimination or recalculation of the borrowers' subsidized usage period
could relieve them of their responsibility for accrued interest and
make them eligible for additional subsidized loans, which could make
returning to higher education a more acceptable option.
These regulations will also give borrowers more information with
which they can make informed decisions about the institutions they
choose to attend. An institution will be required to provide a
disclosure for certain actions and triggering events, to be determined
through consumer testing, for which it was required to obtain a letter
of credit. Recent events involving closure of several large proprietary
institutions have shown the need for lawmakers, regulatory bodies,
State authorizers, taxpayers, and students to be more broadly aware of
circumstances that could affect the continued existence of an
institution. This disclosure, the content of which will be prescribed
by the Secretary in a notice published in the Federal Register, will
allow borrowers to receive early warning signs about an institution's
risk for students, and therefore borrowers may be able to select a
different college, or withdraw or transfer to an institution in better
standing in lieu of continuing to work towards earning credentials that
may have limited value.
Proprietary institutions will also be required to provide a warning
through advertising and promotional materials if their loan repayment
rate, based on the proportion of students who have repaid at least one
dollar in outstanding balance and measured in the third year after
entering repayment, using data reported and validated through the
Gainful Employment repayment rate calculation, shows that the median
borrower has not paid down his balance by at least one dollar. To
estimate the effect of the repayment rate warning on institutions, the
Department analyzed program-level repayment rate data prepared for the
Gainful Employment regulation \104\ and aggregated the proprietary
institutions data to the 6-digit OPEID level and found that 972 of
1,345 institutions in the 2012 Gainful Employment data had a repayment
rate that showed the median borrower had not paid down the balance of
the borrower's loans by at least one dollar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ A privacy-protected version of the data is available at
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/2013-repayment-rate-data.xls. The Department aggregated all program
numerators and denominators to each unique six-digit OPEID and
calculated how many institutions had aggregate rates under the
negative amortization threshold and at least 10 borrowers in the
denominator. Note that these data reflect students who entered
repayment in 2007 and 2008; analysis of later cohorts (those who
entered repayment in 2011 and 2012) published through the College
Scorecard, which calculate a similar repayment rate, showed 501
institutions with repayment rates below the negative amortization
threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of commenters pointed to the Department's failure to
quantify the benefits of the proposed regulations in the NPRM as an
indication that the analysis did not support the implementation of the
final regulations. As mentioned throughout the RIA, the extent of the
private and public benefit from the regulations is difficult to
quantify. We have limited experience with borrower defense claims to
draw upon in generating a profile of those likely to make successful
claims. There are different potential profiles of student loan
borrowers in terms of loan amounts, loan type composition, likelihood
of default, fields of employment, degree level, and other factors. We
do not have a basis in the data from existing claims to know how
borrower profiles and the distribution and nature of claims will
intersect. The economic and psychological benefits of debt relief may
vary for a graduate student with high income potential receiving
partial relief on a high level of debt and a student who dropped out of
a certificate program with a lower level of debt and lower earnings
potential from that program of education. While we do not quantify the
amount, we expect the benefits associated with the substantial
transfers to students from successful borrower defense claims will be
significant. Several commenters noted that students may face costs or
other negative impacts from these final regulations. In particular,
commenters expressed concern that the closure of institutions,
especially proprietary institutions that serve many low-income,
minority, first-generation, and non-traditional students, will hurt
access to higher education, especially for those groups. The Department
acknowledges that some institutions may close if their actions mean
that they are required to provide a substantial amount of financial
protection, or that a large number of successful claims are made
against them. However, as the regulation comes into effect and examples
of conduct that generates claims are better understood, we expect
institutions will limit such behavior and compete for students without
such conduct, and that closures will be reduced over time. The
Department also believes that institutions that do not face significant
claims will be able to provide opportunities for students in
[[Page 76052]]
the event of closures of other institutions that do.
Another possible impact on students mentioned by some commenters is
that the costs of financial protection or other compliance measures
will be passed on to students in tuition and fee increases. We believe
potential tuition increases will be constrained by loan limits and
other initiatives, such as the Department's Gainful Employment
regulations, where institutions would be negatively affected by such
increases.
Institutions
Institutions will bear many of this regulation's costs, which fall
into three categories: Paperwork costs associated with compliance with
the regulations; other compliance costs that may be incurred as
institutions adapt their business practices and training to ensure
compliance with the regulations; and costs associated with obtaining
letters of credit or suitable equivalents if required by the
institution's performance under a variety of triggers. Additionally,
there may be a potentially significant amount of funds transferred
between institutions and the Federal government as reimbursement for
successful claims. Some institutions may close some or all of their
programs if their activities generate large numbers of borrower defense
claims.
A key consideration in evaluating the effect on institutions is the
distribution of the impact. While all institutions participating in
title IV loan programs are subject to the possibility of borrower
defense, closed school, and false certification claims and the
reporting requirements in these final regulations, the Department
expects that fewer institutions will engage in conduct that generates
borrower defense claims. Over time, the Department expects the number
of schools that would face the most significant costs to come into
compliance, the amount of transfers to reimburse the government for
successful claims, costs to obtain required letters of credit, and
disclosure of borrower defense claims against the schools to be reduced
as some offenders are eliminated and other institutions adjust their
practices. In the primary budget scenario described in the Net Budget
Impacts section of this analysis, the annual transfers from
institutions to students, via the Federal government, as reimbursement
for successful claims are estimated at $994 million. On the other hand,
it is possible that high-quality, compliant institutions, especially in
the for-profit sector, will see benefits if the overall reputation of
the sector improves as a result of (1) more trust that enforcement
against bad actors will be effective, and (2) the removal of bad
schools from the higher education marketplace, freeing up market share
for the remaining schools.
The accountability framework in the regulations requiring
institutions to provide financial protection in response to various
triggers would generate costs for institutions. Some of the triggering
provisions would affect institutions differently depending upon their
type and control, as, for example, only publicly traded institutions
are subject to delisting or SEC suspension of trading, only proprietary
institutions are subject to the 90/10 rule, and public institutions are
not subject to the financial protection requirements. To the extent
data were available, we evaluated the financial protection triggers to
analyze the expected impact on institutions. Several of the triggers
are based on existing performance measures and are aimed at identifying
institutions that may face sanctions and experience difficulty meeting
their financial obligations. The triggers and, where available, data
about their potential impact are discussed in Table 2. The consequences
of an institution being found to be not financially responsible are set
out in Sec. 668.175 and include providing financial protection through
a letter of credit, a set-aside of title IV, HEA funds, or other forms
of financial protection specified by the Secretary in a notice
published in the Federal Register. Alternatively, an institution that
can prove it has insurance that covers the triggering risk is not
considered to be not financially responsible and does not need to
provide financial protection to the Department.
The Department will review the triggering events before determining
whether to require separate financial protection for a triggering event
that occurs with other triggering events. Another change from the NPRM
concerns those triggers that include a materiality threshold. Instead
of being evaluated separately, lawsuits, borrower protection repayments
to the Secretary, losses from gainful employment and campus closures,
withdrawal of owner's equity, and other triggers with a materiality
threshold will be evaluated by their effect on the institution's most
recent composite score, which will allow the cumulative effect of
violation of multiple triggers to be taken into account. If the
recalculated composite score is a failing score, institutions would be
required to provide financial protection. For the triggers evaluated
through the revised composite score approach, the required financial
protection is 10 percent or more, as determined by the Secretary, of
the total amount of title IV, HEA program received by the institution
during its most recently completed fiscal year. For the other triggers,
the amount of financial protection required remains 10 percent or more,
as determined by the Secretary, of the total amount of title IV, HEA
program received by the institution during its most recently completed
fiscal year, unless the Department determines that based on the facts
of that particular case, the potential losses are greater.
Table 2--Financial Responsibility Triggers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description Impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automatic Triggers Evaluated through Revised Composite Score Calculation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institution found to be not financially responsible under Sec. 668.171
and must qualify under an alternative standard if the addition of the
triggering liability to the institution's most recently calculated
composite score causes it to fail the composite score. Triggering
liabilities that occur during the period between the fiscal year for
which the Secretary last calculated the institution's composite score
under Sec. 668.172 and the next following fiscal year for which the
Secretary calculates a composite score are evaluated. Requires
financial protection of no less than 10 percent of prior year's title
IV, HEA aid and such additional amount as the Secretary demonstrates is
needed to protect from other losses that may arise within the next 18
months.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 76053]]
Lawsuits and Other Actions: Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(i) and (ii)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triggered if an institution is required Since 2010, at least 25
to pay any debt or incur any liability institutions have been
arising from a final judgment in a investigated or reached
judicial proceeding, or from an settlements with State AGs,
administrative proceeding or with some being involved in
determination, or from a settlement. actions by multiple States.
Triggered if the institution is being Federal agencies, including
sued in an action brought on or after the Department, DOJ, FTC,
July 1, 2017 by a Federal or State CFPB, and the SEC have been
authority for financial relief on involved in actions against at
claims related to the making of the least 20 institutions, with
Direct Loan for enrollment at the multiple actions against some
school or the provision of educational schools.
services and the suit has been pending
for 120 days..
Triggered if the institution is being
sued in a lawsuit other than by a
Federal or State authority related to
the making of a Direct Loan or
provision of educational services
which has survived a motion for
summary judgment or the time for such
motion has passed.
If claims do not state a dollar amount
and no amount has been set in a court
ruling: (1) For Federal and State
borrower defense-related action, the
Department will calculate loss by
considering claim to seek the amount
set by a court ruling, or if no ruling
has been issued, in a written demand
or settlement offer by the agency, or
the amount of all tuition and fees for
the period in the suit, for the
program or location described in the
allegations. Institution allowed to
show suit is limited to a smaller
portion of the school and that tuition
and fees for that portion should be
used; and (2) For all other suits the
potential loss (if none is stated in
the complaint or in a court ruling) is
the amount in a written demand pre-
suit, the amount offered by the
plaintiff to settle, or the amount
stated in discovery leading up to a
trial.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accreditor Actions: (Teach-Outs) Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iii)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triggered if institution required by
its accrediting agency to submit a
teach-out plan that covers the closing
of the institution or any of its
branches or additional locations.
The amount of title IV, HEA aid
allocated in the previous year to the
closed locations will be used to
recalculate the composite score.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gainful Employment: Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iv)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triggered if the potential loss from
the closure of programs that are one
year away from losing their
eligibility for title IV, HEA program
funds causes the recalculated
composite score to fall below 1.0.
The amount of title IV, HEA aid
allocated in the previous year to
programs that could lose eligibility
in the next year will be used to
recalculate the composite score.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Withdrawal of Owner's Equity: Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(v)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The amount of equity withdrawn will be
used to recalculate the composite
score. Applies only to proprietary
institutions and provides that funds
transferred between institutions in a
group that have a common composite
score are not considered withdrawals
of owner's equity.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automatic Triggers Not Evaluated through Revised Composite Score
Calculation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institution found to be not financially responsible under Sec. 668.171
and must qualify under an alternative standard if the triggering events
occur..
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Title IV Revenue: Sec. 668.171(d)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
If an institution fails the 90/10 In the most recent 90/10
revenue test in its most recently report, 14 institutions
completed fiscal year. Applies to received 90 percent or more of
proprietary institutions only. their revenues from title IV,
HEA funds. The total title IV,
HEA funding for those
institutions in award year
(AY) 2013-14 was $56.4
million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Publicly Traded Institutions--SEC or Exchange Actions: Sec. 668.171(e)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SEC warns the institution that it
may suspend trading on the
institution's stock.
The institution failed to file a
required annual or quarterly report
with the SEC within the time period
prescribed for that report or by any
extended due date under 17 CFR 240.12b-
25.
[[Page 76054]]
The exchange on which the institution's
stock is traded notifies the
institution that it is not in
compliance with exchange requirements,
or its stock is delisted.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cohort Default Rates: Sec. 668.171(f)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triggered if institution's two most From the most recently released
recent official cohort default rates official CDR rates, for FY2013
are 30 percent or above after any and FY2012, 20 of 3,058 non-
challenges or appeals. public institutions that had
CDR rates in both years were
over 30 percent in both years.
Title IV, HEA aid received by
these institutions in AY2015-
16 totaled $12.8 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discretionary Triggers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institution found to be not financially responsible under Sec. 668.171
and must qualify under an alternative standard if the Secretary
determines that there is an event or condition that is reasonably
likely to have a material adverse effect on the financial condition,
business, or results of operations of the institution..
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 668.171(g)(1): Significant The Department looked at
fluctuations in title IV, HEA program fluctuations in Direct Loan
funds. amounts and found that 1,113
of 3,534 non-public
institutions had an absolute
change in Direct Loan volume
of 25 percent or more between
the 2014-15 and 2015-16 award
years and 350 had a change of
50 percent or more.
Sec. 668.171(g)(2): Citation for
failing State licensing or authorizing
agency requirements.
Sec. 668.171(g)(3): Failing financial
stress test developed or adopted by
the Secretary.
Sec. 668.171(g)(4): High annual The Department analyzed College
dropout rates, as calculated by the Scorecard data to develop a
Secretary. withdrawal rate within six
years. Of 928 proprietary
institutions with data, 482
had rates from 0 to 20
percent, 415 from 20 to 40
percent, 30 from 40 to 60
percent, and 1 from 60 to 80
percent. Of 1,058 private not-
for-profit institutions with
data, 679 had rates from 0 to
20 percent, 328 from 20 to 40
percent, 51 from 40 to 60
percent, and none above 60
percent. Of 1,476 public
institutions with data, 857
had rates from 0 to 20
percent, 587 from 20 to 40
percent, 32 from 40 to 60
percent, and none above 60
percent.
Sec. 668.171(g)(5): The institution In the March 2015 accreditation
was placed on probation or issued a report available at https://
show-cause order or a status that ope.ed.gov/accreditation/
poses equivalent or greater risk to GetDownLoadFile.aspx, 278 of
accreditation. 33,956 programs were on
probation and 5 were in the
resigned under show cause
status. Of the 283 programs in
those statuses in the March
2015 accreditation report, 9
were closed by institutions or
had their accreditation
terminated and 147 remained in
the same status for at least 6
consecutive months.
Sec. 668.171(g)(6): Institution
violates a provision or requirement in
a loan agreement that enables a
creditor to require an increase in
collateral, a change in contractual
obligations, an increase in interest
rates or payments, or other sanctions,
penalties, or fees.
Sec. 668.171(g)(7): The institution
has pending claims borrower relief
discharge under Sec. 685.206 or Sec.
685.222.
Sec. 668.171(g)(8): The Secretary
expects to receive a significant
number of claims for borrower relief
discharge under Sec. 685.206 or Sec.
685.222 as a result of a lawsuit,
settlement, judgement, or finding from
a State or Federal administrative
proceeding.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to any resources institutions would devote to training
or changes in business practices to improve compliance with the final
regulations, institutions would incur costs associated with the
reporting and disclosure requirements of the final regulations. This
additional workload is discussed in more detail under Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995. In total, the final regulations are estimated to
increase burden on institutions participating in the title IV, HEA
programs by 251,049 hours. The monetized cost of this burden on
institutions, using wage data developed using BLS data available at
www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is $9,175,841. This cost was based
on an hourly rate of $36.55.
Guaranty Agencies and Loan Servicers
Several provisions may impose a cost on guaranty agencies or
lenders, particularly the limits on interest capitalization. Loan
servicers may have to update their process to accept electronic death
certificates, but increased use of electronic documents should be more
efficient over the long term. As indicated in the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 section of this preamble, the final regulations are
estimated to increase burden on guaranty agencies and loan servicers by
7,622 hours related to the mandatory forbearance for FFEL borrowers
considering consolidation for a borrower defense claim and reviews of
denied closed school claims. The monetized cost of this burden on
guaranty agencies and loan servicers, using wage data developed using
BLS data available at www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/
[[Page 76055]]
sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is $278,584. This cost was based on an hourly rate of
$36.55.
Federal, State, and Local Governments
In addition to the costs detailed in the Net Budget Impacts section
of this analysis, the final regulations will affect the Federal
government's administration of the title IV, HEA programs. The borrower
defense process in the final regulations will provide a framework for
handling claims in the event of significant institutional wrongdoing.
The Department may incur some administrative costs or shifting of
resources from other activities if the number of applications increases
significantly and a large number of claims require hearings.
Additionally, to the extent borrower defense claims are not reimbursed
by institutions, Federal government resources that could have been used
for other purposes will be transferred to affected borrowers. Taxpayers
will bear the burden of these unreimbursed claims. In the scenarios
presented in the Net Budget Impacts section of this analysis,
annualized unreimbursed claims range from $923 million to $2.1 billion.
The accountability framework and financial protection triggers will
provide some protection for taxpayers as well as potential direction
for the Department and other Federal and State investigatory agencies
to focus their enforcement efforts. The financial protection triggers
may potentially assist the Department as it seeks to identify, and take
action regarding, material actions and events that are likely to have
an adverse impact on the financial condition or operations of an
institution. In addition to the current process where, for the most
part, the Department determines annually whether an institution is
financially responsible based on its audited financial statements,
under these final regulations the Department may determine at the time
a material action or event occurs that the institution is not
financially responsible.
Other Provisions
The technical corrections and additional changes in the final
regulations will benefit student borrowers and the Federal government's
administration of the title IV, HEA programs. Updates to the acceptable
forms of certification for a death discharge will be more convenient
for borrowers' families or estates and the Department. The provision
for consolidation of Nurse Faculty Loans reflects current practice and
gives those borrowers a way to combine the servicing of all their
loans. Many of these technical corrections and changes involve
relationships between the student borrowers and the Federal government,
such as the clarification in the REPAYE treatment of spousal income and
debt, and they are not expected to significantly impact institutions.
4. Net Budget Impacts
The final regulations are estimated to have a net budget impact in
costs over the 2017-2026 loan cohorts of $16.6 billion in the primary
estimate scenario, including a $381 million modification to cohorts
2014-2016 for the 3-year automatic closed school discharge. A cohort
reflects all loans originated in a given fiscal year. Consistent with
the requirements of the Credit Reform Act of 1990, budget cost
estimates for the student loan programs reflect the estimated net
present value of all future non-administrative Federal costs associated
with a cohort of loans.
As noted by many commenters, in the NPRM we presented a number of
scenarios that generated a wide range of potential budget impacts from
$1.997 billion in the lowest impact scenario to $42.698 billion in the
highest impact scenario. As described in the NPRM, this range reflected
the uncertainty related to the borrower defense provisions in the
regulations and our intent to be transparent about the estimates to
generate discussion and information that could help to refine the
estimates. In response to comments and our own internal review, we have
made a number of revisions to the borrower defense budget impact
estimate that are described in the discussion of the impact of those
provisions.
The provisions with the greatest impact on the net budget impact of
the regulations are those related to the discharge of borrowers' loans,
especially the changes to borrower defense and closed school
discharges. As noted in the NPRM, borrowers may pursue closed school,
false certification, or borrower defense discharges depending on the
circumstances of the institution's conduct and the borrower's claim. If
the institution does not close, the borrower cannot or does not pursue
closed school or false certification discharges, or the Secretary
determines the borrower's claim is better suited to a borrower defense
group process, the borrower may pursue a borrower defense claim. The
precise split among the types of claims will depend on the borrower's
eligibility and ease of pursuing the different claims. While we
recognize that some claims may be fluid in classification between
borrower defense and the other discharges, in this analysis any
estimated effect from borrower defense related claims are described in
that estimate, and the net budget impact in the closed school estimate
focuses on the process changes and disclosures related to that
discharge.
Borrower Defense Discharges
As the Department will eventually have to incorporate the borrower
defense provisions of these final regulations into its ongoing budget
estimates, we have moved closer to that goal in refining the estimated
impact of the regulations to reflect a primary scenario. The
uncertainty inherent in the borrower defense estimate given the limited
history of borrower defense claims and other factors described in the
NPRM is reflected in the additional sensitivity runs that demonstrate
the effect of changes in the specific assumption being tested. Another
change from the NPRM is the specification of an estimated baseline
scenario for the impact of borrower defense claims if these final
regulations did not go into effect and borrowers had to pursue claims
under the existing borrower defense regulation. Similar to the NPRM,
the estimated net budget impact of $14.9 billion attributes all
borrower defense activity for the 2017 to 2026 cohorts to these final
regulations, but with the baseline scenario, we present an estimate of
the subset of those costs that could be incurred under the existing
borrower defense regulation.
These final regulations establish a Federal standard for borrower
defense claims related to loans first disbursed on or after July 1,
2017, as well as describe the process for the assertion and resolution
of all borrower defense claims--both those made for Direct Loans first
disbursed prior to July 1, 2017, and for those made under the
regulations after that date. As indicated in this preamble, while
regulations governing borrower defense claims have existed since 1995,
those regulations have rarely been used. Therefore, we have used the
limited data available on borrower defense claims, especially
information about the results of the collapse of Corinthian, projected
loan volumes, Departmental expertise, the discussions at negotiated
rulemaking, comments on the NPRM analysis, and information about past
investigations into the type of institutional acts or omissions that
would give rise to borrower defense claims to refine the primary
estimate and sensitivity scenarios that we believe will capture the
range of net budget impacts
[[Page 76056]]
associated with the borrower defense regulations.
While we have refined the assumptions used to estimate the impact
of the borrower defense provisions, the ultimate method of estimating
the impact remains entering a level of net borrower defense claims into
the student loan model (SLM) by risk group, loan type, and cohort. The
net present value of the reduced stream of cash flows compared to what
the Department would have expected from a particular cohort, risk
group, and loan type generates the expected cost of the regulations.
Similar to the NPRM, we applied an assumed level of school misconduct,
borrower claims success, and recoveries from institutions (respectively
labeled as Conduct Percent, Borrower Percent, and Recovery Percent in
Tables 3-A and 3-B) to the President's Budget 2017 (PB2017) loan volume
estimates to generate the estimated net borrower defense claims for
each cohort, loan type, and sector.
The limited history of borrower defense claims and other factors
that lead the Department to the range of scenarios described in the
NPRM are still in effect. These factors include the level of school
misconduct that could give rise to claims and institutions' reaction to
the regulation to cut back on such activities, borrowers' response to
the regulations including the consolidation of FFEL and Perkins
borrowers to access the Direct Loan borrower defense process, the level
of group versus individual claims, and the extent of full or partial
relief applied to claims. Additionally, other regulatory and
enforcement initiatives such as the Gainful Employment regulations,
creation of the Student Aid Enforcement Unit, and greater rigor in the
Department's review of accrediting agencies may have overlapping
effects and may affect loan volumes and potential exposure to borrower
defense claims at some institutions. To demonstrate the effect of the
uncertainty about these factors, we estimated several scenarios to test
the sensitivity of the various assumptions.
In refining our approach and estimating a primary scenario with
several sensitivity runs, we also changed the assumptions from the NPRM
in response to comments and our own review. The development of the
estimated baseline scenario described in Table 3-B is one of the
changes. Another major change is the incorporation of a deterrent
effect of the borrower defense provisions on institutional behavior. In
the NPRM, there was no change across cohorts in the level of school
misconduct giving rise to claims. Upon review, we believe it is more
likely that the borrower defense provision will have an impact like
that of other title IV policies such as the cohort default rate or 90/
10 in that institutions will make efforts to comply as the rule comes
into effect and the precedents for what constitutes behavior resulting
in successful claims are developed. In the past, when provisions
targeting specific institutional activities or performance have been
introduced, there has generally been a period of several years while
the worst performers are removed from the system and while other
institutions adapt to the new requirements and a lower steady state is
established. We expect a similar pattern to develop with respect to
borrower defense, as reflected in the Conduct Percent in Table 3-A.
Another change reflected by the Conduct Percent is an increase in
maximum level of claims from public and private non-profit institutions
to 3 percent. Many commenters expressed concern about the effect of the
regulations on these sectors or questions about the type of misconduct
leading to claims that exist in those sectors. A number of commenters
pointed to graduate programs, especially law programs, as a potential
source of claims. Graduate students took out approximately 36 percent
of all Direct Loans in 2015-16.\105\ Given the history of court
decisions related to law school debt, the presumed greater
sophistication of graduate borrowers, and the possibility of partial
relief due to the value of the education received, we still do not
expect many successful claims to come from these sectors but did
increase the level to account for the possibility. The other major
change is the introduction of a ramp-up in the Borrower Percent and the
Recovery Percent to reflect an increase in borrower awareness and the
effectiveness of the financial responsibility protections over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Federal Student Aid, Student Aid Data: Title IV Program
Volume by School, available at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/title-iv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are a number of other potential mitigating factors that we
did not explicitly adjust in our estimates in order to avoid
underestimating the potential cost of the borrower defense provisions.
Several commenters expressed concern about the effect of the
regulations on access to higher education, especially for low-income,
minority, or first-generation students. It is possible that the mix of
financial aid received by students could shift if they attend different
institutions than they would if the rule were not in place, but we
believe that students whose choice of schools may have been affected by
an institution's wrongdoing will find an alternative and receive
similar amounts of title IV, HEA aid. Some students who may not have
pursued higher education without the institution's act or omission may
not enter the system, reducing the amount of Pell Grants or loans taken
out, but we do not expect this to be a substantial portion of affected
student borrowers. In the case of Pell Grants in particular, we do not
want to estimate savings from potential reductions in aid related to
borrower defense until such an effect is demonstrated in relevant data.
Similarly, default discharges may decrease as borrowers seek discharge
under the borrower defense provisions of these final regulations. If
borrowers with valid borrower defense claims differ in their payment
profile from the overall portfolio, the effect on the level of
defaults, especially in some risk groups, could be substantial.
Table 3-A presents the assumptions for the primary budget estimate
with the budget estimate for each scenario presented in Table 4. As in
the NPRM, we also estimated the impact if the Department received no
recoveries from institutions, the results of which are discussed after
Table 4. As in the NPRM, we do not specify how many institutions are
represented in the estimate, as the scenario could represent a
substantial number of institutions engaging in acts giving rise to
borrower defense claims or could represent a small number of
institutions with significant loan volume subject to a large number of
claims. According to Federal Student Aid data center loan volume
reports, the five largest proprietary institutions in loan volume
received 26 percent of Direct Loans disbursed in the proprietary sector
in award year 2014-15 and the 50 largest represent 69 percent.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ Federal Student Aid, Student Aid Data: Title IV Program
Volume by School Direct Loan Program AY2015-16, Q4, available at
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/title-iv
accessed August 22, 2016. https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/title-iv accessed August 22, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As was done in the NPRM, the PB2017 loan volumes by sector were
multiplied by the Conduct Percent that represents the share of loan
volume estimated to be affected by institutional behavior that results
in a borrower defense claim and the Borrower Percent that captures the
percent of loan volume associated with potentially eligible borrowers
who successfully pursue a claim to generate gross claims. The
[[Page 76057]]
Recovery Percent was then applied to the gross claims to calculate the
net claims that were processed in the Student Loan Model as increased
discharges. The numbers in Tables 3-A and 3-B are the percentages
applied for the primary estimate and baseline scenarios for each
assumption.
Table 3-A--Assumptions for Primary Budget Estimate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cohort 2Yr pub 2Yr priv 2Yr prop 4Yr pub 4Yr priv 4Yr prop
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conduct Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017.................................................... 3.0 3.0 20 3.0 3.0 20
2018.................................................... 2.4 2.4 16 2.4 2.4 16
2019.................................................... 2.0 2.0 13.6 2.0 2.0 13.6
2020.................................................... 1.7 1.7 11.6 1.7 1.7 11.6
2021.................................................... 1.5 1.5 9.8 1.5 1.5 9.8
2022.................................................... 1.4 1.4 8.8 1.4 1.4 8.8
2023.................................................... 1.3 1.3 8.4 1.3 1.3 8.4
2024.................................................... 1.2 1.2 8 1.2 1.2 8
2025.................................................... 1.2 1.2 7.8 1.2 1.2 7.8
2026.................................................... 1.1 1.1 7.7 1.1 1.1 7.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Borrower Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017.................................................... 35 35 45 35 35 45
2018.................................................... 36.8 36.8 47.3 36.8 36.8 47.3
2019.................................................... 38.6 38.6 49.6 38.6 38.6 49.6
2020.................................................... 42.4 42.4 54.6 42.4 42.4 54.6
2021.................................................... 46.7 46.7 60 46.7 46.7 60
2022.................................................... 50 50 63 50 50 63
2023.................................................... 50 50 65 50 50 65
2024.................................................... 50 50 65 50 50 65
2025.................................................... 50 50 65 50 50 65
2026.................................................... 50 50 65 50 50 65
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recovery Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017.................................................... 75 23.8 23.8 75 23.8 23.8
2018.................................................... 75 23.8 23.8 75 23.8 23.8
2019.................................................... 75 26.18 26.18 75 26.18 26.18
2020.................................................... 75 28.80 28.80 75 28.80 28.80
2021.................................................... 75 31.68 31.68 75 31.68 31.68
2022.................................................... 75 33.26 33.26 75 33.26 33.26
2023.................................................... 75 34.93 34.93 75 34.93 34.93
2024.................................................... 75 36.67 36.67 75 36.67 36.67
2025.................................................... 75 37.4 37.4 75 37.4 37.4
2026.................................................... 75 37.4 37.4 75 37.4 37.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also estimated a baseline scenario for the potential impact of
borrower defense in recognition that many claims could be pursued under
the existing State standards. The publicity and increased awareness of
borrower defense could lead to increased activity under the existing
regulations. In addition to the Corinthian claims, as of October 2016,
the Department had received nearly 4,400 claims from borrowers of at
least 20 institutions. The Federal standard in the final regulations
will provide a unified standard across all States but is based on
elements of relevant consumer protection law from the various States.
We estimate that the final regulations could increase claims beyond
those that could be pursued without it by an average of approximately
10 percent for the FY2017 cohort. This is based on our initial review
of claims presented that does not reveal significant differences
between the State and Federal standards, limiting the expected increase
in claims from the adoption of the Federal standard. The baseline
school conduct percentage does improve over time, but at a slower rate
than occurs under the regulation. The borrower claim percentage for the
baseline is based on the history of limited claims, informational
sessions \107\ during which during which 5 to 10 percent was presented
as a reasonable rate when borrowers have to submit applications or
otherwise initiate the process, and the level of effort used by the
Department and advocates to get the Corinthian claims into the system.
The recovery percentage reflects the fact that public institutions are
not subject to the changes in the financial responsibility provisions
because of their presumed backing by their respective States.
Therefore, the baseline and primary recovery scenarios are the same for
public institutions and set at a high level to reflect the Department's
confidence in recovering the expected low level of claims against
public institutions. Table 3-B presents the assumptions used to
generate the share of the total net budget impact that we believe could
have occurred even in the absence of these final regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ Conference calls with the Department, non-Federal
negotiators, and Professor Adam Zimmerman were held on March 9, 2016
and March 10, 2016 from 12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.
[[Page 76058]]
Table 3-B--Assumptions for Estimated Baseline Scenario
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cohort All sectors 2Yr pub 2Yr priv 2Yr prop 4Yr pub 4Yr priv 4Yr prop
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conduct Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017.................................... .............. 2.7 2.7 18.0 2.7 2.7 18.0
2018.................................... .............. 2.6 2.6 17.1 2.6 2.6 17.1
2019.................................... .............. 2.4 2.4 16.2 2.4 2.4 16.2
2020.................................... .............. 2.3 2.3 15.4 2.3 2.3 15.4
2021.................................... .............. 2.2 2.2 14.7 2.2 2.2 14.7
2022.................................... .............. 2.1 2.1 13.9 2.1 2.1 13.9
2023.................................... .............. 2.0 2.0 13.2 2.0 2.0 13.2
2024.................................... .............. 1.9 1.9 12.6 1.9 1.9 12.6
2025.................................... .............. 1.8 1.8 11.9 1.8 1.8 11.9
2026.................................... .............. 1.7 1.7 11.3 1.7 1.7 11.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Borrower Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017.................................... 8
2018.................................... 8.4
2019.................................... 8.8
2020.................................... 9.3
2021.................................... 9.7
2022.................................... 10.2
2023.................................... 10.7
2024.................................... 11.3
2025.................................... 11.8
2026.................................... 12.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recovery Pct
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2018.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2019.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2020.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2021.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2022.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2023.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2024.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2025.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
2026.................................... .............. 75 5 5 75 5 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted in the NPRM, and throughout this RIA, the Department
recognizes the uncertainty associated with the factors contributing to
the primary budget assumptions presented in Table 3-A. The baseline
scenario defined by the assumptions in Table 3-B indicates the net
costs of claims the Department assumes could occur in absence of these
final regulations. The $4.9 billion estimated cost for the baseline
scenario is provided for illustrative purposes and, as discussed above,
is included in the $14.9 billion total estimated cost for the borrower
defense provisions. To demonstrate the effect of a change in any of the
assumptions, the Department designed the following scenarios to isolate
each assumption and adjust it by 15 percent in the direction that would
increase costs, increasing the Conduct or Borrower percentages and
decreasing recoveries. As the gross claims are generated by multiplying
the PB2017 estimated volumes by the Conduct Percent and the Borrower
Percent, the Con15 scenario demonstrates the effect of the change in
either assumption. The recovery percentage is applied to the gross
claims to generate the net claims, so the REC15 scenario reduces
recoveries by 15 percent to demonstrate the impact of that assumption.
The final two runs adjust all the assumptions simultaneously to present
a maximum and minimum expected budget impact. These sensitivity runs
are identified as Con15, Rec15, All15, and Min15 respectively. The
results of the various scenarios range from $14.9 billion to $21.2
billion and are presented in Table 4.
Table 4--Budget Estimates for Borrower Defense Sensitivity Runs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated costs for cohorts
Scenario 2017-2026 (Budget Authority Annualized cost to Federal Annualized cost to Federal
in $mns) Gov't (3% discounting) Gov't (7% discounting)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary Estimate.............................................. $14,867 $1,471 $1,452
Baseline Scenario Estimate.................................... 4,899 485 478
Con15......................................................... 16,770 1,659 1,638
Rec15......................................................... 16,092 1,592 1,571
All15......................................................... 21,246 2,102 2,075
Min15......................................................... 9,459 936 923
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 76059]]
The transfers among the Federal government and affected borrowers
and institutions associated with each scenario above are included in
Table 5, with the difference in amounts transferred to borrowers and
received from institutions generating the budget impact in Table 4. The
amounts in Table 4 assume the Federal Government will recover some
portion of claims from institutions. In the absence of any recovery
from institutions, taxpayers would bear the full cost of successful
claims from affected borrowers. At a 3 percent discount rate, the
annualized costs with no recovery are approximately $2.465 billion for
the primary budget estimate, $637 million for the baseline scenario,
$2.758 billion for the Con15 scenario, $3.279 billion for the All15
scenario, and $1.666 billion for the Min15 scenario. At a 7 percent
discount rate, the annualized costs with no recovery are approximately
$2.414 billion for the primary budget estimate, $628 million for the
baseline scenario, $2.699 billion for the Con15 scenario, $3.213
billion for the All15 scenario, and $1.627 billion for the Min15
scenario. This potential increase in costs demonstrates the significant
effect that recoveries from institutions have on the net budget impact
of the borrower defense provisions.
Closed School Discharge and False Certification Discharges
In addition to the provisions previously discussed, the final
regulations also would make changes to the closed school discharge
process, which are estimated to cost $1.732 billion, of which $381
million is a modification to cohorts 2014-2016 related to the extension
of the automatic 3-year discharge and $1.351 billion is for cohorts
2017-2026. The final regulations include requirements to inform
students of the consequences, benefits, requirements, and procedures of
the closed school discharge option, including providing students with
an application form, and establish a Secretary-led discharge process
for borrowers who qualify but do not apply and, according to the
Department's information, did not subsequently re-enroll in any title
IV-eligible institution within three years from the date the school
closed. The increased information about and automatic application of
the closed school discharge option and possible increase in school
closures related to the institutional accountability provisions in the
proposed regulations are likely to increase closed school claims. Chart
1 provides the history of closed schools, which totals 12,666 schools
or campus locations through September 2016.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR01NO16.000
In order to estimate the effect of the changes to the discharge
process that would grant relief without an application after a three-
year period, the Department looked at all Direct Loan borrowers at
schools that closed from 2008-2011 to see what percentage of them had
not received a closed school discharge and had no NSLDS record of
title-IV aided enrollment in the three years following their school's
closure. Of 2,287 borrowers in the file, 47 percent had no record of a
discharge or subsequent title IV, HEA aid. This does not necessarily
mean they did not re-enroll at a title IV institution, so this
assumption may overstate the potential effect of the three-year
discharge provision. The Department used this information and the high
end of closed school claims in recent years to estimate the effect of
the final regulations related to closed school discharges. The
resulting estimated cost to the Federal government of the closed school
provisions is $1.732 billion, of which $381 million is a modification
related to extending the 3-year automatic discharge to cohorts 2014
through 2016 and $1.351 billion relates to the 2017 to 2026 loan
cohorts.
The final regulations will also change the false certification
discharge process to include instances in which schools certified the
eligibility of a borrower who is not a high school graduate (and does
not meet applicable alternative to high school graduate requirements)
where the borrower would qualify for a false certification discharge if
the school falsified the borrower's high school graduation status;
falsified the borrower's high school diploma; or referred the borrower
to a third party to obtain a falsified high school diploma. Under
existing regulations, false certification discharges represent a very
low share of discharges granted to borrowers. The final regulations
will replace the explicit reference to ability to benefit requirements
in the false
[[Page 76060]]
certification discharge regulations with a more general reference to
requirements for admission without a high school diploma as applicable
when the individual was admitted, and specify how an institution's
certification of the eligibility of a borrower who is not a high school
graduate (and does not meet applicable alternative to high school
graduate requirements) could give rise to a false certification
discharge claim. However, we do not expect an increase in false
certification discharge claims to result in a significant budget impact
from this change. We believe that schools that comply with the current
ability to benefit assessment requirement and that honor the current
high school graduation requirements will continue to comply in the
manner they now do, and we have no basis to believe that changing the
terminology or adding false certification of SAP as an example of a
reason the Secretary may grant a false certification discharge without
an application will lead to an increase in claims that will result in a
significant net budget impact.
Other Provisions
As indicated in the NPRM, there are a number of additional
provisions in these final regulations that are not expected to have a
significant net budget impact. These provisions include a number of
technical changes related to the PAYE and REPAYE repayment plans and
the consolidation of Nurse Faculty Loans, updates to the regulations
describing the Department's authority to compromise debt, and updates
to the acceptable forms of verification of death for discharge of title
IV loans or TEACH Grant obligations. The technical changes to the
REPAYE and PAYE plans were already reflected in the Department's budget
estimates for those regulations, so no additional budget effects are
included here. Some borrowers may be eligible for additional subsidized
loans and no longer be responsible for accrued interest on their
subsidized loans as a result of their subsidized usage period being
eliminated or recalculated because of a closed school, false
certification, unpaid refund, or defense to repayment discharge.
However, we believe the institutions primarily affected by the 150
percent subsidized usage regulation are not those expected to generate
many of the applicable discharges, so this reflection of current
practice is not expected to have a significant budget impact. Allowing
death discharges based on death certificates submitted or verified
through additional means is convenient for borrowers, but is not
estimated to substantially change the amount of death discharges. These
updates to the debt compromise limits reflect statutory changes and the
Secretary's existing authority to compromise debt, so we do not
estimate a significant change in current practices. Revising the
regulations to expressly permit the consolidation of Nurse Faculty
Loans is not expected to have a significant budget impact, as this
technical change reflects current practices. According to Department of
Health and Human Services budget documents, approximately $26.5 million
\108\ in grants are available annually for schools to make Nurse
Faculty Loans, and borrowers would lose access to generous forgiveness
terms if they choose to consolidate those loans. Therefore, we would
expect the volume of consolidation to be very small, and do not
anticipate any significant budget impact from this provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Department of Health and Human Services, FY 2017 Health
Resources and Services Administration Justification of Estimates for
Appropriations Committees. Available at www.hrsa.gov/about/budget/budgetjustification2017.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assumptions, Limitations, and Data Sources
In developing these estimates, we used a wide range of data
sources, including data from the NSLDS; operational and financial data
from Department systems; and data from a range of surveys conducted by
the National Center for Education Statistics such as the 2012 National
Postsecondary Student Aid Survey. We also used data from other sources,
such as the U.S. Census Bureau.
5. Accounting Statement
As required by OMB Circular A-4 (available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf), in the
following table we have prepared an accounting statement showing the
classification of the expenditures associated with the provisions of
these final regulations. This table provides our best estimate of the
changes in annual monetized costs, benefits, and transfers as a result
of the final regulations based on the assumptions described in the Net
Budget Impacts and Paperwork Reduction Act sections of this preamble.
Table 5--Accounting Statement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Benefits
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated and clarified borrower defense process not quantified
and Federal standard to increase protection
for student borrowers and taxpayers.
Improved awareness and usage of closed school not quantified
and false certification discharges.
Improved consumer information about not quantified
institutions' performance and practices.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% 7%
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Costs of obtaining LOCs or equivalents........ not quantified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Costs of compliance with paperwork 9.87 9.84
requirements.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Transfers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% 7%
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Borrower Defense claims from the Federal Primary......................... 2,465 2,414
government to affected borrowers (partially
borne by affected institutions, via
reimbursements.
Baseline........................ 637 628
[[Page 76061]]
Con15........................... 2,758 2,699
REC15........................... 2484 2,434
ALL15........................... 3,279 3,213
MIN15........................... 1,666 1,627
Reimbursements of borrower defense claims from Primary.........................
affected institutions to affected student
borrowers, via the Federal government.
Baseline........................ 152 150
CON15........................... 1,099 1,061
REC15........................... 891 862
ALL15........................... 1,176 1,138
MIN15........................... 730 704
Closed school discharges from the Federal 178 185
government to affected students.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Regulatory Alternatives Considered
In response to comments received and the Department's further
internal consideration of these final regulations, the Department
reviewed and considered various changes to the proposed regulations
detailed in the NPRM. The changes made in response to comments are
described in the Analysis of Comments and Changes section of this
preamble. We summarize below the major proposals that we considered but
which we ultimately declined to implement in these regulations.
In particular, the Department extensively reviewed the financial
responsibility provisions and related disclosures, the repayment rate
warning, and the arbitration provisions of these final regulations. In
developing these final regulations, the Department considered the
budgetary impact, administrative burden, and effectiveness of the
options it considered.
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Description of the Reasons That Action by the Agency Is Being
Considered
The Secretary is amending the regulations governing the Direct Loan
Program to establish a new Federal standard, limitation periods, and a
process for determining whether a borrower has a borrower defense based
on an act or omission of a school. We are also amending the Student
Assistance General Provisions regulations to revise the financial
responsibility standards and add disclosure requirements for schools.
Finally, we are amending the discharge provisions in the Perkins Loan,
Direct Loan, FFEL Program, and TEACH Grant programs. These changes will
provide transparency, clarity, and ease of administration to current
and new regulations and protect students, the Federal government, and
taxpayers against potential school liabilities resulting from borrower
defenses.
The U.S. Small Business Administration Size Standards define ``for-
profit institutions'' as ``small businesses'' if they are independently
owned and operated and not dominant in their field of operation with
total annual revenue below $7,000,000. The standards define ``non-
profit institutions'' as ``small organizations'' if they are
independently owned and operated and not dominant in their field of
operation, or as ``small entities'' if they are institutions controlled
by governmental entities with populations below 50,000. Under these
definitions, an estimated 4,365 institutions of higher education
subject to the paperwork compliance provisions of the proposed
regulations are small entities. Accordingly, we have prepared this
final regulatory flexibility analysis to present an estimate of the
effect of these regulations on small entities.
Succinct Statement of the Objectives of, and Legal Basis for, the Final
Regulations
Section 455(h) of the HEA authorizes the Secretary to specify in
regulation which acts or omissions of an institution of higher
education a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment of a Direct
Loan. Current regulations in Sec. 685.206(c) governing defenses to
repayment have been in place since 1995, but have rarely been used.
Those regulations specify that a borrower may assert as a defense to
repayment any ``act or omission of the school attended by the student
that would give rise to a cause of action against the school under
applicable State law.'' In response to the collapse of Corinthian, the
Secretary announced in June of 2015 that the Department would develop
new regulations to clarify and streamline the borrower defense process,
in a manner that would protect borrowers and allow the Department to
hold schools accountable for actions that result in loan discharges.
Description of and, Where Feasible, an Estimate of the Number of Small
Entities To Which the Regulations Will Apply
These final regulations will affect institutions of higher
education that participate in the Federal Direct Loan Program and
borrowers. Approximately 60 percent of institutions of higher education
qualify as small entities, even though the range of revenues at the
non-profit institutions varies greatly. Using data from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System, the Department estimates that
approximately 4,365 institutions of higher education qualify as small
entities--1,891 are not-for-profit institutions, 2,196 are for-profit
institutions with programs of two years or less, and 278 are for-profit
institutions with four-year programs.
Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements of the Regulations, Including an Estimate of
the Classes of Small Entities That Will Be Subject to the Requirement
and the Type of Professional Skills Necessary for Preparation of the
Report or Record
Table 6 relates the estimated burden of each information collection
requirement to the hours and costs estimated in the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 section of the preamble. This additional workload is
discussed in more detail under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
section of the preamble. Additional workload is expected to result in
estimated costs associated with either the hiring of additional
employees or opportunity costs related to the reassignment of existing
staff from other activities. In total, these changes are estimated to
increase burden on small entities participating in the title IV, HEA
programs by 109,351 hours. The monetized cost of this additional burden
on institutions, using wage data developed using BLS data available at
www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is
[[Page 76062]]
$3,996,777. This cost was based on an hourly rate of $36.55.
Table 6--Paperwork Reduction Act for Small Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reg section OMB control No. Hours Cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Participation Agreement-- 668.14 OMB 1845-0022................. 985 $36,004
requires school to provide
enrolled students a closed
school discharge application
and written disclosure of the
benefits of consequences of the
discharge as an alternative to
completing their educational
program through a teach-out.
Advertising warning of repayment 668.41 OMB 1845-0004................. 2,138 78,159
rate outcomes; and disclosure
to prospective and enrolled
students of actions and
triggering events for financial
protection.
Financial Responsibility-- 668.171 OMB 1845-0022................. 1,617 59,094
reporting of certain actions or
triggering events in 668.171(c)-
(g) no later than the time
specified in 668.171(h).
Alternative Standards and 668.175 OMB 1845-0022................. 32,336 1,181,881
Requirements--requires an
institution to provide the
Secretary financial protection,
such as an irrevocable letter
of credit, upon the occurrence
of an action or triggering
event described in Sec.
668.171(c)-(g) if that event
warrants protection as
determined under Sec.
668.175(f)(4).
Borrower defense process-- 685.222 OMB 1845-0142................. 530 19,372
provides a framework for the
borrower defense process.
Institutions could engage in
fact-finding, provide evidence
related to claims and appeal
decisions.
Agreements between an eligible 685.300 OMB 1845-0143................. 71,745 2,622,268
school and the Secretary for
participation in the Direct
Loan Program--prohibits
predispute arbitration
agreements for borrower defense
claims, specifies required
agreement and notification
language, and requires schools
to provide copies of arbitral
and judicial filings to the
Secretary.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Identification, to the Extent Practicable, of All Relevant Federal
Regulations That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Regulations
The final regulations are unlikely to conflict with or duplicate
existing Federal regulations.
Alternatives Considered
As described above, the Department participated in negotiated
rulemaking and reviewed a large number of comments when developing the
regulations, and considered a number of options for some of the
provisions. We considered multiple issues, including the group
discharge process for borrower defense claims, the limitation periods,
the appropriate procedure for considering borrower defense claims
including the role of State AGs, the Department, borrowers, and
institutions, and the continued use of State standards for borrower
defense claims. While no alternatives were aimed specifically at small
entities, limiting repayment rate warnings to affected proprietary
institutions will reduce the burden on the private not-for-profit
institutions that are a significant portion of small entities that
would be affected by the final regulations. The additional options to
provide financial protection may also benefit small entities, even
though the changes were not specifically directed at them.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent
burden, the Department provides the general public and Federal agencies
with an opportunity to comment on proposed and continuing collections
of information in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)). This helps ensure that: The public
understands the Department's collection instructions, respondents can
provide the requested data in the desired format, reporting burden
(time and financial resources) is minimized, collection instruments are
clearly understood, and the Department can properly assess the impact
of collection requirements on respondents.
Sections 668.14, 668.41, 668.171, 668.175, 682.211, 682.402,
685.222, and 685.300 contain information collection requirements. Under
the PRA, the Department has submitted a copy of these sections and an
Information Collections Request to OMB for its review.
A Federal agency may not conduct or sponsor a collection of
information unless OMB approves the collection under the PRA and the
corresponding information collection instrument displays a currently
valid OMB control number. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
no person is required to comply with, or is subject to penalty for
failure to comply with, a collection of information if the collection
instrument does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
In these final regulations, we have displayed the control numbers
assigned by OMB to any information collection requirements in this NPRM
and adopted in the final regulations.
Discussion
Section 668.14--Program Participation Agreement
Requirements: Section 668.14(b)(32) of the final regulations will
require, as part of the program participation agreement, a school to
provide all enrolled students with a closed school discharge
application and a written disclosure, describing the benefits and the
consequences of a closed school discharge as an alternative to
completing their educational program through a teach-out plan after the
Department initiates any action to terminate the participation of the
school in any title IV, HEA program or after the occurrence of any of
the events specified in Sec. 668.14(b)(31) that would require the
institution to submit a teach-out plan.
Burden Calculation: From the Award Years 2011-12 to 2014-15 there
were 182 institutions that closed (30 private, 150 proprietary, and two
public). The number of students who were enrolled at the institutions
at the time of the closure was 43,299 (5,322 at the private
[[Page 76063]]
institutions, 37,959 at the proprietary institutions, and 18 at the
public institutions). With these figures as a base, we estimate that
there could be 46 schools closing in a given award year (182
institutions divided by 4 = 45.5) with an average 238 students per
institution (43,299 divided by 182 = 237.9).
We estimate that an institution will require two hours to prepare
the required written disclosure to be sent with a copy of the closed
school discharge application and the necessary mailing list for
currently enrolled students. We anticipate that most schools will
provide this information electronically to their students, thus
decreasing burden and cost.
On average, we estimate that it will take the estimated eight
private institutions 16 hours to prepare the written disclosure
information required (8 institutions x 2 hours).
On average, we estimate that it will take the estimated eight
private institutions that will close a total of 324 hours (1,904
students x .17 (10 minutes)) to process the required written disclosure
with a copy of the closed school discharge application based on the
mailing list for the estimated 1,904 enrolled students.
The burden for this process for private institutions is 340 hours.
On average, we estimate that it will take the estimated 38
proprietary institutions 76 hours to prepare the written disclosure
information required (38 institutions x 2 hours).
On average, we estimate that it will take the estimated 38
proprietary institutions that will close a total of 1,537 hours (9,044
students x .17 (10 minutes)) to process the required written disclosure
with a copy of the closed school discharge application based on the
mailing list for the estimated 9,044 enrolled students.
The burden for this process for proprietary institutions is 1,613
hours.
For Sec. 668.14, the total increase in burden is 1,953 hours under
OMB Control Number 1845-0022.
Section 668.41--Reporting and Disclosure of Information
Requirements: Section 668.41(h) of the final regulations Loan
repayment warning for proprietary institutions will expand the
disclosure requirements under Sec. 668.41 to provide that, for any
award year in which a proprietary institution's loan repayment rate as
reported to it by the Secretary shows that the median borrower has not
paid down the balance of the borrower's loans by at least $1, the
institution must provide a loan repayment warning in advertising and
promotional materials. An institution with fewer than 10 borrowers, or
that demonstrates to the Secretary's satisfaction that it has borrowers
in non-Gainful Employment programs who would increase the institution's
repayment rate to meet the negative amortization threshold if included
in the calculation, would not be required to provide the warning.
The process through which a proprietary institution will be
informed of its repayment rate, and provided the opportunity to appeal
that rate, is included in Sec. 668.41(h)(2) of the final regulations.
The Department notifies the institution of its repayment rate. Upon
receipt of the rate the institution has 15 days to submit an appeal
based on the two conditions in Sec. 668.41(h)(2)(ii) to the Secretary.
Additionally, Sec. 668.41(h)(3) of the final regulations
stipulates the treatment of required disclosures in advertising and
promotional materials. Under the provision, all advertising and
promotional materials made available by or on behalf of an institution
that identify the institution by name must include a warning about loan
repayment outcomes as prescribed by the Secretary. The Secretary may
conduct consumer testing to ensure meaningful and helpful language is
provided to the students. All promotional materials, including printed
materials, about an institution must be accurate and current at the
time they are published, approved by a State agency, or broadcast. The
warning must be prominent, clear and conspicuous, easily heard or read.
The Secretary may require modifications to such materials if the
warning does not meet the regulatory conditions.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on schools to review the
repayment rate identified in Sec. 668.41(h)(1) and to submit an appeal
to the accuracy of the information, as provided in Sec. 668.41(h)(2).
Additionally, there will be burden for those institutions that are
required to include the necessary loan repayment warning in their
promotional materials.
Based on an analysis of Departmental data, 972 of the 1,345
proprietary institutions with reported repayment rate data would not
meet the negative amortization threshold for the repayment rate
calculation.
We estimate that it will take the 972 institutions 30 minutes (.50
hours) or 486 hours to review the institutional repayment rate and
determine if it meets one of the conditions to submit an appeal to the
Secretary (972 institutions x .50 hours = 486 hours).
Of the 972 institutions that would not meet the negative
amortization loan repayment threshold, we anticipate that one percent
or 10 institutions could meet the appeal criteria identified in
668.41(h)(2)(ii)(A).
We estimate that it will take the 10 institutions another 2 hours
to produce the required evidence to submit with the appeal (10
institutions x 2 hours = 20 hours). We estimate it will take the
approximate 10 institutions an additional 30 minutes (.50 hours) to
submit the appeal to the Secretary (10 institutions x .50 hours = 5
hours) for a total of 25 hours.
We estimate that 5 institutions will be successful in their appeal,
leaving 967 institutions that are required to include the necessary
loan repayment warning in their promotional materials.
We estimate it will take each of the approximate 967 proprietary
institutions a total of 5 hours to update their promotional materials
(967 institutions x 5 hours = 4,835 hours).
For Sec. 668.41(h), the total increase in burden is 5,346 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845-0004.
Requirements: Revised Sec. 668.41(i) Financial protection
disclosures clarified the disclosure requirements regarding triggering
events to both enrolled and prospective students, as well as on the
institution's Web site. The Secretary will conduct consumer testing to
determine which actions and triggering events will require disclosures;
and will publish the prescribed content of the disclosures in a Federal
Register notice after conducting consumer testing to ensure that it is
meaningful and helpful to students. Institutions must provide the
required disclosures to enrolled and prospective students and post the
disclosure to their Web sites within 30 days of notifying the Secretary
of the relevant triggering event. Institutions may hand-deliver the
disclosure notification, or may send the disclosure notification to the
primary email address or other electronic communication method used by
the institution for communicating with the enrolled or prospective
student. In all cases, the institution must ensure that the disclosure
notification is the only substantial content in the message.
Prospective students must receive the disclosure before enrolling,
registering, or entering into a financial obligation with the
institution.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on schools to deliver the
disclosures required by the Secretary to enrolled and prospective
students and post it on the institution's Web site under this final
regulation. However, as Sec. 668.41(i) commits to consumer testing of
both the specific actions and events
[[Page 76064]]
that will require a disclosure, and of the required disclosure itself,
to be published by the Secretary in a Federal Register notice, burden
will not be included here. Instead, the consumer testing procedures
will follow information clearance review requirements. Prior to the
implementation of the regulatory requirements under Sec. 668.41(i)
there will be an information clearance review package submitted to
allow the public to comment.
The total increase in burden is 5,346 hours for OMB Control Number
1845-0004.
Section 668.171--Financial Responsibility--General
Requirements: We added a new paragraph 668.171(h) under which, in
accordance with procedures to be established by the Secretary, an
institution will notify the Secretary of any action or triggering event
described in Sec. 668.171(c) through (g) in the specified number of
days after that action or event occurs.
In that notice, the institution may show that certain actions or
events are not material or that those actions are resolved.
Specifically the institution may demonstrate that:
The amount claimed in a lawsuit by a State or Federal
authority for financial relief on a claim related to the making of a
Direct Loan for enrollment at the school or the provision of
educational services exceeds the potential recovery.
The withdrawal of owner's equity was used solely to meet
tax liabilities of the institution or its owners.
The creditor waived a violation of a loan agreement. If
the creditor imposes additional constraints or requirements as a
condition of waiving the violation and continuing with the loan, the
institution must identify and describe those constraints or
requirements but would be permitted to show why these actions would not
have an adverse financial impact on the institution.
The reportable action or event no longer exists, has been
resolved, or there is insurance to cover the liabilities that arise
from the action or event.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on schools to provide the
notice to the Secretary when one of the actions or triggering events
identified in Sec. 668.171(c)-(g) occurs. We estimate that an
institution will take two hours per action or triggering event to
prepare the appropriate notice and provide it to the Secretary. We
estimate that 169 private institutions may have two events annually to
report for a total burden of 676 hours (169 institutions x 2 events x 2
hours). We estimate that 392 proprietary institutions may have three
events annually to report for total burden of 2,352 hours (392
institutions x 3 events x 2 hours). For Sec. 668.171, the total
increase in burden is 3,028 hours under OMB Control Number 1845-0022.
Section 668.175--Alternative Standards and Requirements
Requirements: Under the provisional certification alternative in
Sec. 668.175(f), we added a new paragraph (f)(4) that requires an
institution to provide the Secretary financial protection, such as an
irrevocable letter of credit, upon the occurrence of an action or
triggering event described in Sec. 668.171(c)-(g) if that event
warrants protection as determined under Sec. 668.175(f)(4).
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on schools to provide the
required financial protection, such as a letter of credit, to the
Secretary to utilize the provisional certifications alternatives. We
estimate that an institution will take 40 hours per action or
triggering event to obtain the required financial protections and
provide it to the Secretary. We estimate that 169 private not-for-
profit institutions may have two events annually to report for a total
burden of 13,520 hours (169 institutions x 2 events x 40 hours). We
estimate that 392 proprietary institutions may have three events
annually to report for total burden of 47,040 hours (392 institutions x
3 events x 40 hours).
For Sec. 668.175, the total increase in burden is 60,560 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845-0022.
The combined total increase in burden for Sec. Sec. 668.14,
668.171, and 668.175 is 65,541 hours under OMB Control Number 1845-
0022.
Section 682.211--Mandatory Administrative Forbearance for FFEL Program
Borrowers
Requirements: The final regulations add a new paragraph Sec.
682.211(i)(7) that requires a lender to grant a mandatory
administrative forbearance to a borrower upon being notified by the
Secretary that the borrower has submitted an application for a borrower
defense discharge related to a FFEL Loan that the borrower intends to
pay off through a Direct Loan Program Consolidation Loan for the
purpose of obtaining relief under Sec. 685.212(k) of the final
regulations. The administrative forbearance will be granted in yearly
increments or for a period designated by the Secretary until the
Secretary notifies the lender that the loan has been consolidated or
that the forbearance should be discontinued. If the Secretary notifies
the borrower that the borrower will qualify for a borrower defense
discharge if the borrower were to consolidate, the borrower will then
be able to consolidate the loan(s) to which the defense applies and, if
the borrower were to do so, the Secretary will recognize the defense
and discharge that portion of the Consolidation Loan that paid off the
FFEL loan in question.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden for the current 1,446 FFEL
lenders to track the required mandatory administrative forbearance when
they are notified by the Secretary of the borrower's intention to enter
their FFEL loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan to obtain relief
under a borrower defenses claim. We estimate that it will take each
lender approximately four hours to develop and program the needed
tracking into their current systems. There will be an estimated burden
of 5,480 hours on the 1,370 for-profit lenders (1,370 x 4 = 5,480
hours). There will be an estimated burden of 304 hours on the 76 not-
for-profit lenders (76 x 4 = 304 hours).
For Sec. 682.211, the total increase in burden is 5,784 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845-0020.
Section 682.402--Closed School Discharges
Requirements: Section 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(F) of the final regulations
provides a second level of Departmental review for denied closed school
discharge claims in the FFEL program. The final regulations require a
guaranty agency that denies a closed school discharge request to inform
the borrower in writing of the reasons for the denial, the opportunity
for a review of the guaranty agency's decision by the Secretary, and
how the borrower may request such a review.
Section 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(I) of the final regulations requires the
lender or guaranty agency, upon resuming collection, to provide a FFEL
borrower with another closed school discharge application, and an
explanation of the requirements and procedures for obtaining the
discharge.
Section 682.402(d)(6)(ii)(K) of the final regulations describes the
responsibilities of the guaranty agency if the borrower requests such a
review.
Section 682.402(d)(8)(ii) of the final regulations authorizes the
Department, or a guaranty agency with the Department's permission, to
grant a closed school discharge to a FFEL borrower without a borrower
application based on information in the Department's or guaranty
agency's possession that the borrower did not subsequently re-enroll in
any title IV-
[[Page 76065]]
eligible institution within a period of three years after the school
closed.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on guaranty agencies to
provide information to borrowers denied closed school discharge
regarding the opportunity for further review of the discharge request
by the Secretary. We estimate that it will take the 27 guaranty
agencies 4 hours to update their notifications and establish a process
for forwarding any requests for escalated reviews to the Secretary.
There will be an estimated burden of 68 hours on the 17 public guaranty
agencies (17 x 4 hours = 68 hours). There will be an estimated burden
of 40 hours on the 10 not-for-profit guaranty agencies (10 x 4 hours =
40 hours).
There is an increase in burden of 108 hours under OMB Control
Number 1845-0020.
There will be burden on guaranty agencies, upon receipt of the
request for escalated review from the borrower, to forward to the
Secretary the discharge form and any relevant documents. For the period
between 2011 and 2015 there were 43,268 students attending closed
schools, of which 9,606 students received a closed school discharge. It
is estimated that 5 percent of the 43,268, or 2,163 closed school
applications were denied. We estimate that 10 percent or 216 of those
borrowers whose application was denied will request escalated review by
the Secretary. We estimate that the process to forward the discharge
request and any relevant documentation to the Secretary will take .5
hours (30 minutes) per request. There will be an estimated burden of 58
hours on the 17 public guaranty agencies based on an estimated 116
requests (116 x .5 hours = 58 hours). There will be an estimated burden
of 50 hours on the 10 not-for-profit guaranty agencies (100 x .5 hours
= 50 hours). There is an increase in burden of 108 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845-0020.
The guaranty agencies will have burden assessed based on these
final regulations to provide another discharge application to a
borrower upon resuming collection activities with explanation of
process and requirements for obtaining a discharge. We estimate that
for the 2,163 closed school applications that were denied, it will take
the guaranty agencies .5 hours (30 minutes) to provide the borrower
with another discharge application and instructions for filing the
application again. There will be an estimated burden of 582 hours on
the 17 public guaranty agencies based on an estimated 1,163 borrowers
(1,163 x .5 hours = 582 hours). There will be an estimated burden of
500 hours on the 10 not-for-profit guaranty agencies (1,000 x .5 hours
= 500 hours). There is an increase in burden of 1,082 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845-0020.
There will be burden on the guaranty agencies to determine the
eligibility of a borrower for a closed school discharge without the
borrower submitting such an application. This determination requires a
review of those borrowers who attended a closed school but did not
apply for a closed school discharge to determine if the borrower re-
enrolled in any other institution within three years of the school
closure. We estimate that 20 hours of programming will be necessary to
enable a guaranty agency to establish a process to review its records
for borrowers who attended a closed school and to determine if any of
those borrowers reenrolled in a title IV eligible institution within
three years. There will be an estimated burden of 340 hours on the 17
public guaranty agencies for this programming (17 x 20 hours = 340
hours). There will be an estimated burden of 200 hours on the not-for-
profit guaranty agencies for this programming (10 x 20 hours = 200
hours). There is an increase in burden of 540 hours under OMB Control
Number 1845-0020.
For Sec. 682.402, the total increase in burden is 1,838 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845-0020.
The combined total increase in burden for Sec. Sec. 682.211 and
682.402 is 7,622 hours under OMB Control Number 1845-0020.
Section 685.222(e)--Process for Individual Borrowers
Requirements: Section 685.222(e)(1) of the final regulations
describes the steps an individual borrower must take to initiate a
borrower defense claim. First, an individual borrower will submit an
application to the Secretary, on a form approved by the Secretary. In
the application, the borrower will certify that he or she received the
proceeds of a loan to attend a school; may provide evidence that
supports the borrower defense; and will indicate whether he or she has
made a claim with respect to the information underlying the borrower
defense with any third party, and, if so, the amount of any payment
received by the borrower or credited to the borrower's loan obligation.
The borrower will also be required to provide any other information or
supporting documentation reasonably requested by the Secretary.
While the decision of the Department official will be final as to
the merits of the claim and any relief that may be warranted on the
claim, if the borrower defense is denied in full or in part, the
borrower will be permitted to request that the Secretary reconsider the
borrower defense upon the identification of new evidence in support of
the borrower's claim. ``New evidence'' will be defined as relevant
evidence that the borrower did not previously provide and that was not
identified by the Department official as evidence that was relied upon
for the final decision.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden associated with the filing
of the Departmental form by the borrower asserting a borrower defense
claim. There is a separate information collection being processed to
put the final form through the information collection review process to
provide for public comment on the form as well as the estimated burden.
A separate information collection review package will be published in
the Federal Register and available through Regulations.gov for review
and comment.
Additionally there will be burden on any borrower whose borrower
defense claim is denied, if they elect to request reconsideration from
the Secretary based on new evidence in support of the borrower's claim.
We estimate that two percent of borrower defense claims received will
be denied and those borrowers will then request reconsideration by
presenting new evidence to support their claim. As of April 27, 2016,
18,688 borrower defense claims had been received. Of that number, we
estimate that 467 borrowers including those that opted out of a
successful Borrower Defense group relief would require .5 hours (30
minutes) to submit the request for reconsideration to the Secretary for
a total of 234 burden hours (467 x .5 hours) under OMB Control Number
1845-0142.
Section 685.222(f)--Group Process for Borrower Defenses--General
Requirements: Section 685.222(f) of the final regulations provides
a framework for the borrower defense group process, including
descriptions of the circumstances under which group borrower defense
claims could be considered, and the process the Department will follow
for borrower defenses for a group.
Once a group of borrowers with common facts and claims has been
identified, the Secretary will designate a Department official to
present the group's common borrower defense in the fact-finding
process, and will provide each identified member of the
[[Page 76066]]
group with notice that allows the borrower to opt out of the
proceeding.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on any borrower who elects
to opt out of the group process after the Secretary has identified them
as a member of a group for purposes of borrower defense. We estimate
that one percent of borrowers who are identified as part of a group
process for borrower defense claims would opt out of the group claim
process. As of April 27, 2016, 18,688 borrower defense claims had been
received. Of that number, we estimate that 187 borrowers would require
.08 hours (5 minutes) to submit the request to opt out of the group
process to the Secretary for a total of 15 burden hours (187 x .08
hours) under OMB Control Number 1845-0142.
Section 685.222(g)--Group Process for Borrower Defense--Closed School
Requirements: Section 685.222(g) of the final regulations
establishes a process for review and determination of a borrower
defense for groups identified by the Secretary for which the borrower
defense is made with respect to Direct Loans to attend a school that
has closed and has provided no financial protection currently available
to the Secretary from which to recover any losses based on borrower
defense claims, and for which there is no appropriate entity from which
the Secretary can otherwise practicably recover such losses.
Under Sec. 685.222(g)(1) of the final regulations, a hearing
official will review the Department official's basis for identifying
the group and resolve the claim through a fact-finding process. As part
of that process, the hearing official will consider any evidence and
argument presented by the Department official on behalf of the group
and on behalf of individual members of the group. The hearing official
will consider any additional information the Department official
considers necessary, including any Department records or response from
the school or a person affiliated with the school as described Sec.
668.174(b) as reported to the Department or as recorded in the
Department's records if practicable.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on any school that elects
to provide records or response to the hearing official's fact finding.
We anticipate that each group will represent a single institution. We
estimate that there will be four potential groups involving closed
schools. We estimate that the fact-finding process would require 50
hours from one private closed school or persons affiliated with that
closed school (1 private institution x 50 hours). We estimate that the
fact-finding process will require 150 hours from three proprietary
closed schools or persons affiliated with that closed school (3
proprietary institutions x 50 hours). We estimate the burden to be 200
hours (4 institutions x 50 hours) under OMB Control Number 1845-0142.
Section 685.222(h)--Group Borrower for Defense--Open School
Requirements: Section 685.222(h) of the final regulations
establishes the process for groups identified by the Secretary for
which the borrower defense is asserted with respect to Direct Loans to
attend an open school.
A hearing official will resolve the borrower defense and determine
any liability of the school through a fact-finding process. As part of
the process, the hearing official will consider any evidence and
argument presented by the school and the Department official on behalf
of the group and, as necessary, any evidence presented on behalf of
individual group members.
The hearing official will issue a written decision. If the hearing
official approves the borrower defense, that decision will describe the
basis for the determination, notify the members of the group of the
relief provided on the basis of the borrower defense, and notify the
school of any liability to the Secretary for the amounts discharged and
reimbursed.
If the hearing official denies the borrower defense in full or in
part, the written decision will state the reasons for the denial, the
evidence that was relied upon, the portion of the loans that are due
and payable to the Secretary, and whether reimbursement of amounts
previously collected is granted, and will inform the borrowers that
their loans will return to their statuses prior to the group borrower
defense process. It also will notify the school of any liability to the
Secretary for any amounts discharged. The Secretary will provide copies
of the written decision to the members of the group, the Department
official and the school.
The hearing official's decision will become final as to the merits
of the group borrower defense claim and any relief that may be granted
within 30 days after the decision is issued and received by the
Department official and the school unless, within that 30-day period,
the school or the Department official appeals the decision to the
Secretary. A decision of the hearing official will not take effect
pending the appeal. The Secretary will render a final decision
following consideration of any appeal.
After a final decision has been issued, if relief for the group has
been denied in full or in part, a borrower may file an individual claim
for relief for amounts not discharged in the group process. In
addition, the Secretary may reopen a borrower defense application at
any time to consider new evidence, as discussed above.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on any school which
provides evidence and responds to any argument made to the hearing
official's fact finding and if the school elects to appeal the final
decision of the hearing official regarding the group claim. We
anticipate that each group will represent claims from a single
institution. We estimate that there will be six potential groups
involving open schools. We estimate that the fact-finding process will
require 150 hours from the three open private institutions or persons
affiliated with that school (3 institutions x 50 hours). We estimate
that the fact-finding process will require 150 hours from the three
open proprietary institutions or persons affiliated with that school (3
institutions x 50 hours). We estimate the burden to be 300 hours (6
institutions x 50 hours).
We further estimate that the appeal process will require 150 hours
from the three open private institutions or persons affiliated with
that school (3 institutions x 50 hours). We estimate that the appeal
process will require 150 hours from the three open proprietary
institutions or persons affiliated with that school (3 institutions x
50 hours). We estimate the burden to be 300 hours (6 institutions x 50
hours). The total estimated burden for this section will be 600 hours
assessed under OMB Control Number 1845-0142.
Additionally, any borrower whose borrower defense claim is denied
under the group claim may request reconsideration based on new evidence
to support the individual claim. We believe that the estimate for the
total universe of denied claims in Sec. 685.222(e) includes these
borrowers.
The combined total increase in burden for Sec. 685.222 is 1,049
hours under OMB Control Number 1845-0142.
Section 685.300--Agreements Between an Eligible School and the
Secretary for Participation in the Direct Loan Program
Requirements: Section 685.300(e) of the final regulations requires
institutions who, after the effective date of the final regulations,
incorporate a predispute arbitration agreement or any other predispute
agreement addressing class actions in any agreements with Direct Loan
program borrowers to include specific language regarding a
[[Page 76067]]
borrower's right to file or be a member of a class action suit against
the institution when the class action concerns acts or omissions
surrounding the making of the Direct Loan or provision of educational
services purchased with the Direct Loan. Additionally, institutions
that incorporated a predispute arbitration agreement or any other
predispute agreement addressing class actions in any agreements with
Direct Loan program borrowers prior to the effective date of the final
regulations must provide borrowers with agreements or notices
containing specific language regarding their right to file or be a
member of a class action suit against the institution when the class
action concerns acts or omissions surrounding the making of the Direct
Loan or provision of educational services purchased with the Direct
Loan. Institutions must provide this notice to borrowers no later than
the date of the loan exit counseling for current students or the date
the school files an initial response to an arbitration demand or
complaint suit from a student who has not received such notice.
Section 685.300(f) of the final regulations requires institutions
who, after the effective date of the final regulations, incorporate
predispute arbitration agreements with Direct Loan program borrowers to
include specific language regarding a borrower's right to file a
lawsuit against the institution when it concerns acts or omissions
surrounding the making of the Direct Loan or provision of educational
services purchased with the Direct Loan. Additionally, institutions
that incorporated predispute arbitration agreements with Direct Loan
program borrowers prior to the effective date of the final regulations
must provide borrowers with agreements or notices containing specific
language regarding a borrower's right to file a lawsuit against the
institution when the class action concerns acts or omissions
surrounding the making of the Direct Loan or provision of educational
services purchased with the Direct. Institutions must provide this
notice to such borrowers no later than the date of the loan exit
counseling for current students or the date the school files an initial
response to an arbitration demand or complaint suit from a student who
hasn't received such notice.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on any school that meets
the conditions for supplying students with the changes to any
agreements. Based on the Academic Year 2014-2015 Direct Loan
information available, there were 1,528,714 Unsubsidized Direct Loan
recipients at proprietary institutions. Assuming 66 percent of these
students will continue to be enrolled at the time these regulations
become effective, 1,008,951 students will be required to receive the
agreements or notices required in Sec. 685.300(e) or (f). We
anticipate that it will take proprietary institutions .17 hours (10
minutes) per student to develop these agreements or notices, research
who is required to receive them, and forward the information
accordingly for an increase in burden of 171,522 hours (1,008,951
students x .17 hours) under OMB Control Number 1845-0143.
Requirements: Section 685.300(g) of the final regulations requires
institutions to provide to the Secretary, copies of specified records
connected to a claim filed in arbitration by or against the school
regarding a borrower defense claim. The school must submit any records
within 60 days of the filing by the school of such records to an
arbitrator or upon receipt by the school of such records that were
filed by someone other than the school, such as an arbitrator or
student regarding a claim.
Section 685.300(h) of the final regulations requires institutions
to provide to the Secretary, copies of specified records connected to a
claim filed in lawsuit by the school by a student or any party against
the school regarding a borrower defense claim. The school must submit
any records within 30 days of the filing or receipt of the complaint by
the school or upon receipt by the school of rulings on a dipositive
motion or final judgement.
Burden Calculation: There will be burden on any school that meets
the conditions for supplying students with the changes to any
agreements. We estimate that 5 percent of the 1,959 proprietary
schools, or 98 schools would be required to submit documentation to the
Secretary to comply with the final regulations. We anticipate that each
of the 98 schools will have an average of four filings there will be an
average of four submissions for each filing. Because these are copies
of documents required to be submitted to other parties we anticipate 5
burden hours to produce the copies and submit to the Secretary for an
increase in burden of 7,840 hours (98 institutions x 4 filings x 4
submissions/filing x 5 hours) under OMB Control Number 1845-0143.
The combined total increase in burden for Sec. 685.300 is 179,362
hours under OMB Control Number 1845-0143.
Consistent with the discussion above, the following chart describes
the sections of the final regulations involving information
collections, the information being collected, the collections that the
Department will submit to OMB for approval and public comment under the
PRA, and the estimated costs associated with the information
collections. The monetized net costs of the increased burden on
institutions, lenders, guaranty agencies, and borrowers, using wage
data developed using BLS data, available at www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is $9,458,484 as shown in the chart below. This cost was
based on an hourly rate of $36.55 for institutions, lenders, and
guaranty agencies and $16.30 for borrowers.
Collection of Information
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OMB Control No. and
Regulatory section Information collection estimated burden [change Estimated
in burden] costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 668.14--Program The final regulation requires, as 1845-0022--This would be $71,382
participation agreement. part of the program participation a revised collection.
agreement, a school to provide to We estimate burden
all enrolled students with a would increase by 1,953
closed school discharge hours.
application and a written
disclosure, describing the
benefits and the consequences of a
closed school discharge as an
alternative to completing their
educational program through a
teach-out plan after the
Department initiates any action to
terminate the participation of the
school in any title IV, HEA
program or after the occurrence of
any of the events specified in
Sec. 668.14(b)(31) that require
the institution to submit a teach-
out plan.
[[Page 76068]]
Sec. 668.41--Reporting and The final regulation clarifies in 1845-0004--This would be 195,396
disclosure of information. Sec. 668.41(h) reporting and a revised collection.
disclosure requirements to provide We estimate burden
that, for any fiscal year in which would increase by 5,346
the median borrower of a hours.
proprietary institution had not
paid down the balance of the
borrower's loans by at least one
dollar, the institution must
include a warning about that
institution's repayment outcomes
in advertising and promotional
materials.
Additionally, the final regulation
clarifies that certain actions and
triggering events for financial
protection may, under Sec.
668.41(i), require disclosure to
prospective and enrolled students.
Both the actions and triggering
events and the disclosure language
are subject to consumer testing.
Sec. 668.171--Financial The final regulations add a new 1845-0022--This is a 110,673
responsibility--General. paragraph 668.171(h) under which, revised collection. We
in accordance with procedures to estimate burden will
be established by the Secretary, increase by 3,028 hours.
an institution will notify the
Secretary of any action or
triggering event described in Sec.
668.171(c) through (g) in the
specified number of days after
that action or event occurs.
Sec. 668.175--Alternative The final regulations add a new 1845-0022--This is a 2,213,468
standards and requirements. paragraph (f)(4) that requires an revised collection. We
institution to provide the estimate burden would
Secretary financial protection, increase by 60,560
such as an irrevocable letter of hours.
credit, upon the occurrence of an
action or triggering event
described in Sec. 668.171(c)-(g)
if that event warrants protection
as determined under Sec.
668.175(f)(4).
Sec. 682.211--Forbearance...... The final regulations add a new 1845-0020--This is a 211,405
paragraph Sec. 682.211(i)(7) revised collection. We
that requires a lender to grant a estimate burden will
mandatory administrative increase by 5,784 hours.
forbearance to a borrower upon
being notified by the Secretary
that the borrower has submitted an
application for a borrower defense
discharge related to a FFEL Loan
that the borrower intends to pay
off through a Direct Loan Program
Consolidation Loan for the purpose
of obtaining relief under Sec.
685.212(k) of the final
regulations.
Sec. 682.402--Death, The final regulations provide a 1845-0020--This is a 67,179
disability, closed school, false second level of Departmental revised collection. We
certification, unpaid refunds, review for denied closed school estimate burden will
and bankruptcy payments. discharge claims in the FFEL increase by 1,838 hours.
program. The final language
requires a guaranty agency that
denies a closed school discharge
request to inform the borrower of
the opportunity for a review of
the guaranty agency's decision by
the Department, and an explanation
of how the borrower may request
such a review.
The final regulations require the
guaranty agency or the Department,
upon resuming collection, to
provide a FFEL borrower with
another closed school discharge
application, and an explanation of
the requirements and procedures
for obtaining the discharge.
The final regulations describe the
responsibilities of the guaranty
agency if the borrower requests
such a review.
The final regulations authorize the
Department, or a guaranty agency
with the Department's permission,
to grant a closed school discharge
to a FFEL borrower without a
borrower application based on
information in the Department's or
guaranty agency's possession that
the borrower did not subsequently
re-enroll in any title IV-eligible
institution within a period of
three years after the school
closed.
[[Page 76069]]
Sec. 685.222--Borrower Defenses The final regulation describes the 1845-0142--This is a new 33,299
steps an individual borrower must collection. We estimate
take to initiate a borrower burden will increase by
defense claim. The final 1,049 hours (249
regulations also provide a Individual hours 800
framework for the borrower defense Institutional hours).
group process, including
descriptions of the circumstances
under which group borrower defense
claims could be considered, and
the process the Department will
follow for borrower defenses for a
group. The final regulations
establish a process for review and
determination of a borrower
defense for groups identified by
the Secretary for which the
borrower defense is made with
respect to Direct Loans to attend
a school that has closed and has
provided no financial protection
currently available to the
Secretary from which to recover
any losses based on borrower
defense claims, and for which
there is no appropriate entity
from which the Secretary can
otherwise practicably recover such
losses. The final regulations
establish the process for groups
identified by the Secretary for
which the borrower defense is
asserted with respect to Direct
Loans to attend an open school.
Sec. 685.300 Agreements between The final regulations require 1845-0143--This is a new 6,555,681
an eligible school and the institutions, following the collection. We estimate
Secretary for participation in effective date of the regulations, burden will increase by
the Direct Loan Program. to incorporate language into 179,362 hours.
agreements allowing participation
by Direct Loan students in class
action lawsuits as well as
predispute arbitration agreements.
There is required agreement and
notification language to be
provided to affected students.
Additionally, the final
regulations require institutions
to submit to the Secretary copies
of arbitral records and judicial
records within specified
timeframes when the actions
concern a borrower defense claim.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The total burden hours and change in burden hours associated with
each OMB Control number affected by the final regulations follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final
Total final change in
Control No. burden burden
hours hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1845-0004..................................... 24,016 +5,346
1845-0020..................................... 8,249,520 +7,622
1845-0022..................................... 2,281,511 +65,541
1845-0142..................................... 1,049 +1,049
1845-0143..................................... 179,362 +179,362
-------------------------
Total....................................... 10,735,458 +258,920
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessment of Educational Impact
Under Sec. 668.171(h) of the final regulations, institutions are
required to report to the Department certain events or occurrences that
they may also be required to report to the SEC. Under SEC rules and
regulations, institutions are generally required to report information
that would be material to stockholders, including certain specified
information, whereas the Department has identified events and
occurrences unique to institutions of higher education that it believes
could threaten an institution's financial viability and for which it
requires specific and perhaps more timely reporting. We believe this
reporting is necessary to ensure that institutions provide financial
protection, for the benefit of students and taxpayers, against actions
or events that threaten an institution's ability to (1) meet its
current and future financial obligations, (2) continue as a going
concern or continue to participate in the title IV, HEA programs, and
(3) continue to deliver educational services.
Accessible Format: Individuals with disabilities can obtain this
document in an accessible format (e.g., braille, large print,
audiotape, or compact disc) on request to the person listed under FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
Electronic Access to This Document: The official version of this
document is the document published in the Federal Register. Free
Internet access to the official edition of the Federal Register and the
Code of Federal Regulations is available via the Federal Digital System
at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys. At this site you can view this document, as well
as all other documents of this Department published in the Federal
Register, in text or Portable Document Format (PDF). To use PDF you
must have Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is available free at the site.
You may also access documents of the Department published in the
Federal Register by using the article search feature at:
www.federalregister.gov. Specifically, through the advanced search
feature at this site, you can limit your search to documents published
by the Department.
List of Subjects
34 CFR Part 30
Claims, Income taxes.
34 CFR Part 668
Administrative practice and procedure, Colleges and universities,
Consumer protection, Grant programs--education, Loan programs--
education, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Selective Service
System, Student aid, Vocational education.
34 CFR Part 674
Loan programs--education, Reporting and recordkeeping, Student aid.
34 CFR Parts 682 and 685
Administrative practice and procedure, Colleges and universities,
Loan programs--education, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Student aid, Vocational education.
34 CFR Parts 686
Administrative practice and procedure, Colleges and universities,
Education, Elementary and Secondary education, Grant programs--
education,
[[Page 76070]]
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Student aid.
Dated: October 17, 2016.
John B. King, Jr.,
Secretary of Education.
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Secretary of
Education amends parts 30, 668, 674, 682, 685, and 686 of title 34 of
the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 30--DEBT COLLECTION
0
1. The authority citation for part 30 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3(a)(1), and 1226a-1, 31 U.S.C.
3711(e), 31 U.S.C. 3716(b) and 3720A, unless otherwise noted.
0
2. Section 30.70 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 30.70 How does the Secretary exercise discretion to compromise a
debt or to suspend or terminate collection of a debt?
(a)(1) The Secretary uses the standards in the FCCS, 31 CFR part
902, to determine whether compromise of a debt is appropriate if the
debt arises under a program administered by the Department, unless
compromise of the debt is subject to paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) If the amount of the debt is more than $100,000, or such higher
amount as the Department of Justice may prescribe, the Secretary refers
a proposed compromise of the debt to the Department of Justice for
approval, unless the compromise is subject to paragraph (b) of this
section or the debt is one described in paragraph (e) of this section.
(b) Under the provisions in 34 CFR 81.36, the Secretary may enter
into certain compromises of debts arising because a recipient of a
grant or cooperative agreement under an applicable Department program
has spent some of these funds in a manner that is not allowable. For
purposes of this section, neither a program authorized under the Higher
Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA), nor the Impact Aid Program is
an applicable Department program.
(c)(1) The Secretary uses the standards in the FCCS, 31 CFR part
903, to determine whether suspension or termination of collection
action on a debt is appropriate.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (e), the Secretary--
(i) Refers the debt to the Department of Justice to decide whether
to suspend or terminate collection action if the amount of the debt
outstanding at the time of the referral is more than $100,000 or such
higher amount as the Department of Justice may prescribe; or
(ii) May suspend or terminate collection action if the amount of
the debt outstanding at the time of the Secretary's determination that
suspension or termination is warranted is less than or equal to
$100,000 or such higher amount as the Department of Justice may
prescribe.
(d) In determining the amount of a debt under paragraph (a), (b),
or (c) of this section, the Secretary deducts any partial payments or
recoveries already received, and excludes interest, penalties, and
administrative costs.
(e)(1) Subject to paragraph (e)(2) of this section, under the
provisions of 31 CFR part 902 or 903, the Secretary may compromise a
debt in any amount, or suspend or terminate collection of a debt in any
amount, if the debt arises under the Federal Family Education Loan
Program authorized under title IV, part B, of the HEA, the William D.
Ford Federal Direct Loan Program authorized under title IV, part D of
the HEA, or the Perkins Loan Program authorized under title IV, part E,
of the HEA.
(2) The Secretary refers a proposed compromise, or suspension or
termination of collection, of a debt that exceeds $1,000,000 and that
arises under a loan program described in paragraph (e)(1) of this
section to the Department of Justice for review. The Secretary does not
compromise, or suspend or terminate collection of, a debt referred to
the Department of Justice for review until the Department of Justice
has provided a response to that request.
(f) The Secretary refers a proposed resolution of a debt to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) for review and approval before
referring the debt to the Department of Justice if--
(1) The debt arose from an audit exception taken by GAO to a
payment made by the Department; and
(2) The GAO has not granted an exception from the GAO referral
requirement.
(g) Nothing in this section precludes--
(1) A contracting officer from exercising his authority under
applicable statutes, regulations, or common law to settle disputed
claims relating to a contract; or
(2) The Secretary from redetermining a claim.
(h) Nothing in this section authorizes the Secretary to compromise,
or suspend or terminate collection of, a debt--
(1) Based in whole or in part on conduct in violation of the
antitrust laws; or
(2) Involving fraud, the presentation of a false claim, or
misrepresentation on the part of the debtor or any party having an
interest in the claim.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1082(a) (5) and (6), 1087a, 1087hh, 1221e-
3(a)(1), 1226a-1, and 1234a, 31 U.S.C. 3711)
PART 668--STUDENT ASSISTANCE GENERAL PROVISIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 668 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1001-1003, 1070g, 1085, 1088, 1091, 1092,
1094, 1099c, 1099c-1, 1221-3, and 1231a, unless otherwise noted.
0
4. Section 668.14 is amended:
0
A. In paragraph (b)(30)(ii)(C), by removing the word ``and''.
0
B. In paragraph (b)(31)(v), by removing the period and adding in its
place ``; and''.
0
C. By adding paragraph (b)(32).
The addition reads as follows:
Sec. 668.14 Program participation agreement.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(32) The institution will provide all enrolled students with a
closed school discharge application and a written disclosure,
describing the benefits and consequences of a closed school discharge
as an alternative to completing their educational program through a
teach-out agreement, as defined in 34 CFR 602.3, immediately upon
submitting a teach-out plan after the occurrence of any of the
following events:
(i) The initiation by the Secretary of an action under 34 CFR
600.41 or subpart G of this part or the initiation of an emergency
action under Sec. 668.83, to terminate the participation of an
institution in any title IV, HEA program.
(ii) The occurrence of any of the events in paragraph (b)(31)(ii)
through (v) of this section.
* * * * *
0
5. Section 668.41 is amended by adding paragraphs (h) and (i) and
revising the authority citation to read as follows:
Sec. 668.41 Reporting and disclosure of information.
* * * * *
(h) Loan repayment warning for proprietary institutions--(1)
Calculation of loan repayment rate. For each award year, the Secretary
calculates a proprietary institution's loan repayment rate, for the
cohort of borrowers who entered repayment on their FFEL or Direct Loans
at any time during the two-year cohort period, using the methodology in
Sec. 668.413(b)(3), provided that, for the purpose of this paragraph
(h)--
[[Page 76071]]
(i) The reference to ``program'' in Sec. 668.413(b)(3)(vi) is read
to refer to ``institution'';
(ii) ``Award year'' means the 12-month period that begins on July 1
of one year and ends on June 30 of the following year;
(iii) ``Borrower'' means a student who received a FFEL or Direct
Loan for enrolling in a gainful employment program at the institution;
and
(iv) ``Two-year cohort period'' is defined as set forth in Sec.
668.402.
(2) Issuing and appealing loan repayment rates. (i) For each award
year, the Secretary notifies an institution of its final loan repayment
rate.
(ii) If an institution's final loan repayment rate shows that the
median borrower has not either fully repaid all FFEL or Direct Loans
received for enrollment in the institution or made loan payments
sufficient to reduce by at least one dollar the outstanding balance of
each of the borrower's FFEL or Direct Loans received for enrollment in
the institution--
(A) Using the calculation described in paragraph (h)(4)(ii) of this
section, the institution may submit an appeal to the Secretary within
15 days of receiving notification of its final loan repayment rate; and
(B) The Secretary will notify the institution if the appeal is--
(1) Granted and the institution qualifies for an exemption from the
warning requirement under paragraph (h)(4) of this section; or
(2) Not granted, and the institution must comply with the warning
requirement under paragraph (h)(3) of this section.
(3) Loan repayment warning--(i) Promotional materials. (A) Except
as provided in paragraph (h)(4) of this section, for any award year in
which the institution's loan repayment rate shows that the median
borrower has not either fully repaid, or made loan payments sufficient
to reduce by at least one dollar the outstanding balance of, each of
the borrower's FFEL or Direct Loans received for enrollment in the
institution, the institution must, in all promotional materials that
are made available to prospective or enrolled students by or on behalf
of the institution, include a loan repayment warning in a form, place,
and manner prescribed by the Secretary in a notice published in the
Federal Register. The warning language must read: ``U.S. Department of
Education Warning: A majority of recent student loan borrowers at this
school are not paying down their loans,'' unless stated otherwise by
the Secretary in a notice published in the Federal Register. Before
publishing that notice, the Secretary may conduct consumer testing to
help ensure that the warning is meaningful and helpful to students.
(B) Promotional materials include, but are not limited to, an
institution's Web site, catalogs, invitations, flyers, billboards, and
advertising on or through radio, television, video, print media, social
media, or the Internet.
(C) The institution must ensure that all promotional materials,
including printed materials, about the institution are accurate and
current at the time they are published, approved by a State agency, or
broadcast.
(ii) Clarity of warning. The institution must ensure that the
warning is prominent, clear, and conspicuous. The warning is not
prominent, clear, and conspicuous if it is difficult to read or hear,
or placed where it can be easily overlooked. In written materials,
including email, Internet advertising and promotional materials, print
media, and other advertising or hard-copy promotional materials, the
warning must be included on the cover page or home page and any other
pages with information on a program of study and any pages with
information on costs and financial aid. For television and video
materials, the warning must be both spoken and written simultaneously.
The Secretary may require the institution to modify its promotional
materials, including its Web site, if the warning is not prominent,
clear, and conspicuous.
(4) Exemptions. An institution is not required to provide a warning
under paragraph (h)(3) of this section based on a final loan repayment
rate for that award year if--
(i) That rate is based on fewer than 10 borrowers in the cohort
described in paragraph (h)(1) of this section; or
(ii) The institution demonstrates to the Secretary's satisfaction
that not all of its programs constitute GE programs and that if the
borrowers in the non-GE programs were included in the calculation of
the loan repayment rate, the loan repayment rate would show that the
median borrower has made loan payments sufficient to reduce by at least
one dollar the outstanding balance of each of the borrower's FFEL or
Direct Loans received for enrollment in the institution.
(i) Financial protection disclosures--(1) General. An institution
must deliver a disclosure to enrolled and prospective students in the
form and manner described in paragraph (i)(3), (4), and (5) of this
section, and post that disclosure to its Web site as described in
paragraph (i)(6) of this section, within 30 days of notifying the
Secretary under Sec. 668.171(h) of the occurrence of a triggering
event or events identified pursuant to paragraph (i)(2) of this
section. The requirements in this paragraph (i) apply for the 12-month
period following the date the institution notifies the Secretary under
Sec. 668.171(h) of a triggering event or events identified under
paragraph (i)(2).
(2) Triggering events. The Secretary will conduct consumer testing
to inform the identification of events for which a disclosure is
required. The Secretary will consumer test each of the events
identified in Sec. 668.171(c) through (g), as well as other events
that result in an institution being required to provide financial
protection to the Department, to determine which of these events are
most meaningful to students in their educational decision-making. The
Secretary will identify the triggering events for which a disclosure is
required under paragraph (i)(1) in a document published in the Federal
Register.
(3) Form of disclosure. The Secretary will conduct consumer testing
to ensure the form of the disclosure is meaningful and helpful to
students. The Secretary will specify the form and placement of the
disclosure in a notice published in the Federal Register following the
consumer testing.
(4) Delivery to enrolled students. An institution must deliver the
disclosure required under this paragraph (i) to each enrolled student
in writing by--
(i) Hand-delivering the disclosure as a separate document to the
student individually or as part of a group presentation; or
(ii)(A) Sending the disclosure to the student's primary email
address or delivering the disclosure through the electronic method used
by the institution for communicating with the student about
institutional matters; and
(B) Ensuring that the disclosure is the only substantive content in
the message sent to the student under this paragraph unless the
Secretary specifies additional, contextual language to be included in
the message.
(5) Delivery to prospective students. An institution must deliver
the disclosure required under this paragraph (i) to a prospective
student before that student enrolls, registers, or enters into a
financial obligation with the institution by--
(i) Hand-delivering the disclosure as a separate document to the
student individually, or as part of a group presentation; or
(ii)(A) Sending the disclosure to the student's primary email
address or delivering the disclosure through the electronic method used
by the institution for communicating with
[[Page 76072]]
prospective students about institutional matters; and
(B) Ensuring that the disclosure is the only substantive content in
the message sent to the student under this paragraph unless the
Secretary specifies additional, contextual language to be included in
the message.
(6) Institutional Web site. An institution must prominently provide
the disclosure required under this paragraph (i) in a simple and
meaningful manner on the home page of the institution's Web site.
* * * * *
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1092, 1094, 1099c)
0
6. Section 668.71 is amended in paragraph (c), in the second sentence
of the definition of ``Misrepresentation'', by removing the word
``deceive'' and adding in its place the words ``mislead under the
circumstances'' and by adding a fourth sentence.
The addition reads as follows:
Sec. 668.71 Scope and special definitions.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
Misrepresentation: * * * Misrepresentation includes any statement
that omits information in such a way as to make the statement false,
erroneous, or misleading.
* * * * *
0
7. Section 668.90 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(3) to read as
follows:
Sec. 668.90 Initial and final decisions.
(a) * * *
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a)(2) of this
section--
(i) If, in a termination action against an institution, the hearing
official finds that the institution has violated the provisions of
Sec. 668.14(b)(18), the hearing official also finds that termination
of the institution's participation is warranted;
(ii) If, in a termination action against a third-party servicer,
the hearing official finds that the servicer has violated the
provisions of Sec. 668.82(d)(1), the hearing official also finds that
termination of the institution's participation or servicer's
eligibility, as applicable, is warranted;
(iii) In an action brought against an institution or third-party
servicer that involves its failure to provide a letter of credit or
other financial protection under Sec. 668.15 or Sec. 668.171(c)
through (g), the hearing official finds that the amount of the letter
of credit or other financial protection established by the Secretary
under Sec. 668.175(f)(4) is appropriate, unless the institution can
demonstrate that the amount was not warranted because--
(A) For financial protection demanded based on events or conditions
described in Sec. 668.171(c) through (f), the events or conditions no
longer exist or have been resolved or the institution demonstrates that
it has insurance that will cover the debts and liabilities that arise
from the triggering event or condition, or, for a condition or event
described in Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(iii) (teach out) or (iv) (gainful
employment eligibility loss), the amount of educationally related
expenses reasonably attributable to the programs or location is greater
than the amount calculated in accordance with Appendix C of subpart L
of this part. The institution can demonstrate that insurance covers
risk by presenting the Department with a statement from the insurer
that the institution is covered for the full or partial amount of the
liability in question;
(B) For financial protection demanded based on a suit described in
Sec. 668.171(c)(1)(i) that does not state a specific amount of relief
and on which the court has not ruled on the amount of relief, the
institution demonstrates that, accepting the facts alleged as true, and
assuming the claims asserted are fully successful, the action pertains
to a period, program, or location for which the maximum potential
relief is less than the amount claimed or the amount determined under
Sec. 668.171(c)(2)(ii);
(C) For financial protection demanded based on the ground
identified in Sec. 668.171(g), the factor or event does not and will
not have a material adverse effect on the financial condition,
business, or results of operations of the institution;
(D)(1) For financial protection demanded under Sec.
668.175(f)(4)(i), the institution does not participate and has not
participated for the prior fiscal year in a title IV, HEA loan program;
and
(2) For any financial protection demanded of an institution
described in paragraph (a)(3)(iii)(D)(1) of this section, and any
portion of financial protection demanded of any other institution
greater than 10 percent of the amount of title IV, HEA funds received
by the institution in its most recently completed fiscal year--
(i) The risk of loss to the Secretary on the grounds demonstrated
by the Secretary does not exist;
(ii) The loss as demonstrated by the Secretary is not reasonably
likely to arise within the next 18 months; or
(iii) The amount is unnecessary to protect, or contrary to, the
Federal interest;
(E) The institution has proffered alternative financial protection
that provides students and the Department adequate protection against
losses resulting from the risks identified by the Secretary. In the
Secretary's discretion, adequate protection may consist of one or more
of the following--
(1) An agreement with the Secretary that a portion of the funds due
to the institution under a reimbursement or heightened cash monitoring
funding arrangement will be temporarily withheld in such amounts as
will meet, no later than the end of a nine-month period, the amount of
the required financial protection demanded; or
(2) Other form of financial protection specified by the Secretary
in a notice published in the Federal Register.
(iv) In a termination action taken against an institution or third-
party servicer based on the grounds that the institution or servicer
failed to comply with the requirements of Sec. 668.23(c)(3), if the
hearing official finds that the institution or servicer failed to meet
those requirements, the hearing official finds that the termination is
warranted;
(v)(A) In a termination action against an institution based on the
grounds that the institution is not financially responsible under Sec.
668.15(c)(1), the hearing official finds that the termination is
warranted unless the institution demonstrates that all applicable
conditions described in Sec. 668.15(d)(4) have been met; and
(B) In a termination or limitation action against an institution
based on the grounds that the institution is not financially
responsible--
(1) Upon proof of the conditions in Sec. 668.174(a), the hearing
official finds that the limitation or termination is warranted unless
the institution demonstrates that all the conditions in Sec.
668.175(f) have been met; and
(2) Upon proof of the conditions in Sec. 668.174(b)(1), the
hearing official finds that the limitation or termination is warranted
unless the institution demonstrates that all applicable conditions
described in Sec. 668.174(b)(2) or Sec. 668.175(g) have been met.
* * * * *
0
8. Section 668.93 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (h) and (i) as
paragraphs (i) and (j), respectively, and adding a new paragraph (h) to
read as follows:
Sec. 668.93 Limitation.
* * * * *
(h) A change in the participation status of the institution from
fully certified to participate to provisionally certified to
participate under Sec. 668.13(c).
* * * * *
0
9. Section 668.171 is revised to read as follows:
[[Page 76073]]
Sec. 668.171 General.
(a) Purpose. To begin and to continue to participate in any title
IV, HEA program, an institution must demonstrate to the Secretary that
it is financially responsible under the standards established in this
subpart. As provided under section 498(c)(1) of the HEA, the Secretary
determines whether an institution is financially responsible based on
the institution's ability to--
(1) Provide the services described in its official publications and
statements;
(2) Meet all of its financial obligations; and
(3) Provide the administrative resources necessary to comply with
title IV, HEA program requirements.
(b) General standards of financial responsibility. Except as
provided under paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section, the Secretary
considers an institution to be financially responsible if the Secretary
determines that--
(1) The institution's Equity, Primary Reserve, and Net Income
ratios yield a composite score of at least 1.5, as provided under Sec.
668.172 and appendices A and B to this subpart;
(2) The institution has sufficient cash reserves to make required
returns of unearned title IV, HEA program funds, as provided under
Sec. 668.173;
(3) The institution is able to meet all of its financial
obligations and otherwise provide the administrative resources
necessary to comply with title IV, HEA program requirements. An
institution may not be able to meet its financial or administrative
obligations if it is subject to an action or event described in
paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g) of this section. The Secretary
considers those actions or events in determining whether the
institution is financially responsible only if they occur on or after
July 1, 2017; and
(4) The institution or persons affiliated with the institution are
not subject to a condition of past performance under Sec. 668.174(a)
or (b).
(c) Debts, liabilities, and losses. (1) Except as provided under
paragraph (h)(3) of this section, an institution is not able to meet
its financial or administrative obligations under paragraph (b)(3) of
this section if, after the end of the fiscal year for which the
Secretary has most recently calculated an institution's composite
score, the institution is subject to one or more of the following
actions or triggering events, and as a result of the actual or
potential debts, liabilities, or losses that have stemmed or may stem
from those actions or events, the institution's recalculated composite
score is less than 1.0, as determined by the Secretary under paragraph
(c)(2) of this section:
(i) Debts and borrower defense-related lawsuits. (A) The
institution is required to pay any debt or incur any liability arising
from a final judgment in a judicial proceeding or from an
administrative proceeding or determination, or from a settlement; or
(B) The institution is being sued in an action brought on or after
July 1, 2017 by a Federal or State authority for financial relief on
claims related to the making of the Direct Loan for enrollment at the
school or the provision of educational services and the suit has been
pending for 120 days.
(ii) Other litigation. The institution is being sued in an action
brought on or after July 1, 2017 that is not described in paragraph
(c)(1)(i)(B) of this section and--
(A) The institution has filed a motion for summary judgment or
summary disposition and that motion has been denied or the court has
issued an order reserving judgment on the motion;
(B) The institution has not filed a motion for summary judgment or
summary disposition by the deadline set for such motions by the court
or agreement of the parties; or
(C) If the court did not set a deadline for filing a motion for
summary judgment and the institution did not file such a motion, the
court has set a pretrial conference date or trial date and the case is
pending on the earlier of those two dates.
(iii) Accrediting agency actions. The institution was required by
its accrediting agency to submit a teach-out plan, for a reason
described in Sec. 602.24(c)(1), that covers the closing of the
institution or any of its branches or additional locations.
(iv) Gainful employment. As determined annually by the Secretary,
the institution has gainful employment programs that, under Sec.
668.403, could become ineligible based on their final D/E rates for the
next award year.
(v) Withdrawal of owner's equity. For a proprietary institution
whose composite score is less than 1.5, any withdrawal of owner's
equity from the institution by any means, including by declaring a
dividend, unless the transfer is to an entity included in the
affiliated entity group on whose basis the institution's composite
score was calculated.
(2) Recalculating the composite score--(i) General. Unless the
institution demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the
event or condition has had or will have no effect on the assets and
liabilities of the institution under paragraph (g)(3)(iv) of this
section, as specified in Appendix C of this subpart, the Secretary
recognizes and accounts for the actual or potential losses associated
with the actions or events under paragraph (c)(1) of this section and,
based on that accounting, recalculates the institution's most recent
composite score. The recalculation will occur regularly after
associated actions or events are reported to the Secretary. The
Secretary recalculates the composite score under this paragraph using
the financial statements on which the institution's composite score has
been calculated under Sec. 668.172.
(ii) Calculation of potential loss--debts and borrower defense-
related lawsuits. For a debt or a suit described in paragraph (c)(1)(i)
of this section, the amount of loss is--
(A) The amount of debt;
(B) For a suit, the amount set by a court ruling, or, in the
absence of a court ruling--
(1) The amount of relief claimed in the complaint;
(2) If the complaint demands no specific amount of relief, the
amount stated in any final written demand issued by the agency to the
institution prior to the suit or a lesser amount that the agency offers
to accept in settlement of any financial demand in the suit; or
(3) If the agency stated no specific demand in the complaint, in a
pre-filing demand, or in a written offer of settlement, the amount of
tuition and fees received by the institution during the period, and for
the program or location, described in the allegations in the complaint.
(iii) Calculation of potential loss--other litigation. For any suit
described in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section, the amount of loss
is the amount set by a court ruling, or, in the absence of a court
ruling--
(A) The amount of relief claimed in the complaint;
(B) If the complaint demands no specific amount of relief, the
amount stated in any final written demand by the claimant to the
institution prior to the suit or a lesser amount that the plaintiff
offers to accept in settlement of any financial demand in the suit; or
(C) If the complainant stated no specific demand in the complaint,
in a pre-filing demand, or in a written offer of settlement, the amount
of the claim as stated in a response to a discovery request, including
an expert witness report.
(iv) Calculation of potential loss--other events. (A) For a closed
location or institution, or the potential loss of eligibility for
gainful employment programs, as described in paragraph (c)(1)(iii) or
(iv), the amount of loss is the amount of title IV, HEA program
[[Page 76074]]
funds the institution received in its most recently completed fiscal
year for that location or institution, or for those GE programs.
(B) For the withdrawal of owner's equity, described in paragraph
(c)(1)(v) of this section, the amount of loss is the amount transferred
to any entity other than the institution.
(d) Non-title IV revenue. Except as provided under paragraph (h)(3)
of this section, a proprietary institution is not able to meet its
financial or administrative obligations under paragraph (b)(3) of this
section if, for its most recently completed fiscal year, the
institution did not derive at least 10 percent of its revenue from
sources other than title IV, HEA program funds, as provided under Sec.
668.28(c).
(e) Publicly traded institutions. Except as provided under
paragraph (h)(3) of this section, a publicly traded institution is not
able to meet its financial or administrative obligations under
paragraph (b)(3) of this section if the institution is currently
subject to one or more of the following actions or events:
(1) SEC actions. The SEC warns the institution that it may suspend
trading on the institution's stock.
(2) SEC reports. The institution failed to file a required annual
or quarterly report with the SEC within the time period prescribed for
that report or by any extended due date under 17 CFR 240.12b-25.
(3) Exchange actions. The exchange on which the institution's stock
is traded notifies the institution that it is not in compliance with
exchange requirements, or its stock is delisted.
(f) Cohort default rates. Except as provided under paragraph (h)(3)
of this section, an institution is not able to meet its financial or
administrative obligations under paragraph (b)(3) of this section if
the institution's two most recent official cohort default rates are 30
percent or greater, as determined under subpart N of this part,
unless--
(1) The institution files a challenge, request for adjustment, or
appeal under that subpart with respect to its rates for one or both of
those fiscal years; and
(2) That challenge, request, or appeal remains pending, results in
reducing below 30 percent the official cohort default rate for either
or both years, or precludes the rates from either or both years from
resulting in a loss of eligibility or provisional certification.
(g) Discretionary factors or events. Except as provided under
paragraph (h)(3) of this section, an institution is not able to meet
its financial or administrative obligations under paragraph (b)(3) of
this section if the Secretary demonstrates that there is an event or
condition that is reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect
on the financial condition, business, or results of operations of the
institution, including but not limited to whether--
(1) There is a significant fluctuation between consecutive award
years, or a period of award years, in the amount of Direct Loan or Pell
Grant funds, or a combination of those funds, received by the
institution that cannot be accounted for by changes in those programs;
(2) The institution is cited by a State licensing or authorizing
agency for failing State or agency requirements;
(3) The institution fails a financial stress test developed or
adopted by the Secretary to evaluate whether the institution has
sufficient capital to absorb losses that may be incurred as a result of
adverse conditions and continue to meet its financial obligations to
the Secretary and students;
(4) As calculated by the Secretary, the institution has high annual
dropout rates;
(5) The institution is or was placed on probation or issued a show-
cause order, or placed on an accreditation status that poses an
equivalent or greater risk to its accreditation, by its accrediting
agency for failing to meet one or more of the agency's standards;
(6)(i) The institution violated a provision or requirement in a
loan agreement; and
(ii) As provided under the terms of a security or loan agreement
between the institution and the creditor, a monetary or nonmonetary
default or delinquency event occurs, or other events occur, that
trigger, or enable the creditor to require or impose on the
institution, an increase in collateral, a change in contractual
obligations, an increase in interest rates or payments, or other
sanctions, penalties, or fees;
(7) The institution has pending claims for borrower relief
discharge under Sec. 685.206 or Sec. 685.222; or
(8) The Secretary expects to receive a significant number of claims
for borrower relief discharge under Sec. 685.206 or Sec. 685.222 as a
result of a lawsuit, settlement, judgement, or finding from a State or
Federal administrative proceeding.
(h) Reporting requirements. (1) In accordance with procedures
established by the Secretary, an institution must notify the Secretary
of any of the following actions or events identified in paragraphs (c)
through (g) of this section no later than--
(i) For lawsuits and for other actions or events described in
paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section--
(A) For lawsuits, 10 days after the institution is served with the
complaint and 10 days after the suit has been pending for 120 days; and
(B) For debts arising from lawsuits and for other actions or
events, 10 days after a payment was required or a liability was
incurred.
(ii) For lawsuits described in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this
section--
(A) Ten days after the institution is served with the complaint;
(B) Ten days after the court sets the dates for the earliest of the
events described in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section, provided
that, if the deadline is set by procedural rules, notice of the
applicable deadline must be included with notice of the service of the
complaint; and
(C) Ten days after the earliest of the applicable events occurs;
(iii) For an accrediting agency action described in paragraph
(c)(1)(iii) of this section, 10 days after the institution is notified
by its accrediting agency that it must submit a teach-out plan;
(iv) For a withdrawal of owner's equity described in paragraph
(c)(1)(v) of this section, 10 days after the withdrawal is made;
(v) For the non-title IV revenue provision in paragraph (d) of this
section, 45 days after the end of the institution's fiscal year, as
provided in Sec. 668.28(c)(3);
(vi) For the SEC and stock exchange provisions for publicly traded
institutions in paragraph (e), 10 days after the SEC or exchange warns,
notifies, or takes an action against the institution, or 10 days after
any extension granted by the SEC;
(vii) For State or agency actions in paragraph (g)(2) of this
section, 10 days after the institution is cited for violating a State
or agency requirement;
(viii) For probation or show cause actions under paragraph (g)(5)
of this section, 10 days after the institution's accrediting agency
places the institution on that status; or
(ix) For the loan agreement provisions in paragraph (g)(6) of this
section, 10 days after a loan violation occurs, the creditor waives the
violation, or the creditor imposes sanctions or penalties in exchange
or as a result of the waiver.
(2) The Secretary may take an administrative action under paragraph
(k) of this section against the institution if it fails to provide
timely notice under this paragraph (h).
(3) In its notice to the Secretary, the institution may demonstrate
that--
(i) For a suit by a Federal or State agency described in paragraph
(c)(1)(i)(B) of this section, the amount claimed in the complaint or
determined
[[Page 76075]]
under paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section exceeds the potential
recovery because the allegations in the complaint, if accepted as true,
and the claims asserted, if fully successful, cannot produce relief in
the amount claimed or, if no amount was claimed, the amount deemed
under paragraph (c)(2)(ii) because they pertain to a period, program,
or location for which the full recovery possible is a lesser amount;
(ii) The reported withdrawal of owner's equity under paragraph
(c)(1)(v) of this section was used exclusively to meet tax liabilities
of the institution or its owners for income derived from the
institution;
(iii) The reported violation of a provision or requirement in a
loan agreement under paragraph (g)(6) of this section was waived by the
creditor. However, if the creditor imposes additional constraints or
requirements as a condition of waiving the violation, or imposes
penalties or requirements under paragraph (g)(6)(ii) of this section,
the institution must identify and describe those penalties,
constraints, or requirements and may demonstrate that complying with
those actions will not adversely affect the institution's ability to
meet its current and future financial obligations; or
(iv) The action or event reported under this paragraph (h) no
longer exists or has been resolved or the institution has insurance
that will cover part or all of the debts and liabilities that arise at
any time from that action or event.
(i) Public institutions. (1) The Secretary considers a domestic
public institution to be financially responsible if the institution--
(i)(A) Notifies the Secretary that it is designated as a public
institution by the State, local, or municipal government entity, tribal
authority, or other government entity that has the legal authority to
make that designation; and
(B) Provides a letter from an official of that State or other
government entity confirming that the institution is a public
institution; and
(ii) Is not subject to a condition of past performance under Sec.
668.174.
(2) The Secretary considers a foreign public institution to be
financially responsible if the institution--
(i)(A) Notifies the Secretary that it is designated as a public
institution by the country or other government entity that has the
legal authority to make that designation; and
(B) Provides documentation from an official of that country or
other government entity confirming that the institution is a public
institution and is backed by the full faith and credit of the country
or other government entity; and
(ii) Is not subject to a condition of past performance under Sec.
668.174.
(j) Audit opinions. Even if an institution satisfies all of the
general standards of financial responsibility under paragraph (b) of
this section, the Secretary does not consider the institution to be
financially responsible if, in the institution's audited financial
statements, the opinion expressed by the auditor was an adverse,
qualified, or disclaimed opinion, or the auditor expressed doubt about
the continued existence of the institution as a going concern, unless
the Secretary determines that a qualified or disclaimed opinion does
not significantly bear on the institution's financial condition.
(k) Administrative actions. If the Secretary determines that an
institution is not financially responsible under the standards and
provisions of this section or under an alternative standard in Sec.
668.175, or the institution does not submit its financial and
compliance audits by the date and in the manner required under Sec.
668.23, the Secretary may--
(1) Initiate an action under subpart G of this part to fine the
institution, or limit, suspend, or terminate the institution's
participation in the title IV, HEA programs; or
(2) For an institution that is provisionally certified, take an
action against the institution under the procedures established in
Sec. 668.13(d).
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1094 and 1099c and section 4 of Pub. L. 95-
452, 92 Stat. 1101-1109)
0
10. Section 668.175 is amended by:
0
A. Revising paragraphs (c) and (d).
0
B. Removing and reserving paragraph (e).
0
C. Revising paragraph (f).
0
D. Adding paragraph (h).
0
E. Revising the authority citation.
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 668.175 Alternative standards and requirements.
* * * * *
(c) Letter of credit alternative for participating institutions. A
participating institution that is not financially responsible either
because it does not satisfy one or more of the standards of financial
responsibility under Sec. 668.171(b) through (g), or because of an
audit opinion described under Sec. 668.171(j), qualifies as a
financially responsible institution by submitting an irrevocable letter
of credit or other form of financial protection specified by the
Secretary in a notice published in the Federal Register, that is
acceptable and payable to the Secretary, for an amount determined by
the Secretary that is not less than one-half of the title IV, HEA
program funds received by the institution during its most recently
completed fiscal year.
(d) Zone alternative. (1) A participating institution that is not
financially responsible solely because the Secretary determines that
its composite score under Sec. 668.172 is less than 1.5 may
participate in the title IV, HEA programs as a financially responsible
institution for no more than three consecutive years, beginning with
the year in which the Secretary determines that the institution
qualifies under this alternative.
(i)(A) An institution qualifies initially under this alternative
if, based on the institution's audited financial statement for its most
recently completed fiscal year, the Secretary determines that its
composite score is in the range from 1.0 to 1.4; and
(B) An institution continues to qualify under this alternative if,
based on the institution's audited financial statement for each of its
subsequent two fiscal years, the Secretary determines that the
institution's composite score is in the range from 1.0 to 1.4.
(ii) An institution that qualified under this alternative for three
consecutive years, or for one of those years, may not seek to qualify
again under this alternative until the year after the institution
achieves a composite score of at least 1.5, as determined by the
Secretary.
(2) Under the zone alternative, the Secretary--
(i) Requires the institution to make disbursements to eligible
students and parents, and to otherwise comply with the provisions,
under either the heightened cash monitoring or reimbursement payment
method described in Sec. 668.162;
(ii) Requires the institution to provide timely information
regarding any of the following oversight and financial events--
(A) Any event that causes the institution, or related entity as
defined in Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 850, to realize any
liability that was noted as a contingent liability in the institution's
or related entity's most recent audited financial statement; or
(B) Any losses that are unusual in nature or infrequently occur, or
both, as defined in accordance with Accounting Standards Update (ASU)
No. 2015-01 and ASC 225;
(iii) May require the institution to submit its financial statement
and compliance audits earlier than the time specified under Sec.
668.23(a)(4); and
[[Page 76076]]
(iv) May require the institution to provide information about its
current operations and future plans.
(3) Under the zone alternative, the institution must--
(i) For any oversight or financial event described in paragraph
(d)(2)(ii) of this section for which the institution is required to
provide information, in accordance with procedures established by the
Secretary, notify the Secretary no later than 10 days after that event
occurs; and
(ii) As part of its compliance audit, require its auditor to
express an opinion on the institution's compliance with the
requirements under the zone alternative, including the institution's
administration of the payment method under which the institution
received and disbursed title IV, HEA program funds.
(4) If an institution fails to comply with the requirements under
paragraph (d)(2) or (3) of this section, the Secretary may determine
that the institution no longer qualifies under this alternative.
* * * * *
(f) Provisional certification alternative. (1) The Secretary may
permit an institution that is not financially responsible to
participate in the title IV, HEA programs under a provisional
certification for no more than three consecutive years if, as
determined annually by the Secretary--
(i) The institution is not financially responsible because it does
not satisfy the general standards under Sec. 668.171(b)(1) or (3), its
recalculated composite score under Sec. 668.171(c)(2) is less than
1.0, is subject to an action or event under Sec. 668.171(d), (e),
(f),or (g) or because of an audit opinion described in Sec.
668.171(i); or
(ii) The institution is not financially responsible because of a
condition of past performance, as provided under Sec. 668.174(a), and
the institution demonstrates to the Secretary that it has satisfied or
resolved that condition.
(2) Under this alternative, the institution must--
(i) Provide to the Secretary an irrevocable letter of credit that
is acceptable and payable to the Secretary, agree to a set-aside under
paragraph (h) of this section, or, at the Secretary's discretion,
provide another form of financial protection specified by the Secretary
in a notice published in the Federal Register, for an amount determined
by the Secretary under paragraph (f)(4) of this section, except that
this requirement does not apply to a public institution; and
(ii) Comply with the provisions under the zone alternative, as
provided under paragraph (d)(2) and (3).
(3) If at the end of the period for which the Secretary
provisionally certified the institution, the institution is still not
financially responsible, the Secretary--
(i) May permit the institution to participate under a provisional
certification, but--
(A) May require the institution, or one or more persons or entities
that exercise substantial control over the institution, as determined
under Sec. 668.174(b)(1) and (c), or both, to provide to the Secretary
financial protection for an amount determined by the Secretary under
paragraph (f)(4) of this section; and
(B) May require one or more of the persons or entities that
exercise substantial control over the institution, as determined under
Sec. 668.174(b)(1) and (c), to be jointly or severally liable for any
liabilities that may arise from the institution's participation in the
title IV, HEA programs; and
(ii) May permit the institution to continue to participate under a
provisional certification but requires the institution to provide, or
continue to provide, the financial protection resulting from an event
described in Sec. 668.171(c) through (g) until the institution meets
the requirements of paragraph (f)(5) of this section.
(4)(i) The institution must provide to the Secretary the financial
protection described under paragraph (f)(2)(i) in an amount that,
together with the amount of any financial protection that the
institution has already provided if that protection covers the period
described in paragraph (f)(5) of this section, equals, for a composite
score calculated under Sec. 668.172, a composite score recalculated
under Sec. 668.171(c)(2), or for any other reason that the institution
is not financially responsible--
(A) Ten percent of the total amount of title IV, HEA program funds
received by the institution during its most recently completed fiscal
year; and
(B) Any additional amount that the Secretary demonstrates is needed
under paragraph (f)(4)(ii) of this section.
(ii) The Secretary determines the amount specified in paragraph
(f)(4)(i)(B) of this section that must be provided by the institution
in addition to the amount specified in paragraph (f)(4)(i)(A) of this
section, and must ensure that the total amount of financial protection
provided under paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section is sufficient to
fully cover any estimated losses. The Secretary may reduce the amount
required under paragraph (f)(4)(i)(B) only if an institution
demonstrates that this amount is unnecessary to protect, or is contrary
to, the Federal interest.
(5) The Secretary maintains the full amount of the financial
protection provided by the institution under paragraph (f)(4) of this
section until the Secretary first determines that the institution has--
(i) A composite score of 1.0 or greater based on the review of the
audited financial statements for the fiscal year in which all losses
from any event described in Sec. 668.171(c), (d), (e), (f), or (g) on
which financial protection was required have been fully recognized; or
(ii) A recalculated composite score of 1.0 or greater, and any
event or condition described in Sec. 668.171(d), (e), (f), or (g) has
ceased to exist.
* * * * *
(h) Set-aside. If an institution does not provide a letter of
credit or financial protection acceptable to the Secretary for the
amount required under paragraph (d) or (f) of this section within 45
days of the Secretary's request, the Secretary offsets the amount of
title IV, HEA program funds that an institution is eligible to receive
in a manner that ensures that, no later than the end of a nine-month
period, the total amount offset equals the amount of financial
protection the institution would otherwise provide. The Secretary uses
the funds to satisfy the debt and liabilities owed to the Secretary
that are not otherwise paid directly by the institution, and provides
to the institution any funds not used for this purpose during the
period for which the financial protection was required, or provides the
institution any remaining funds if the institution subsequently submits
the financial protection originally required under paragraph (d) or (f)
of this section.
* * * * *
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1094 and 1099c)
0
11. Section 668.176 is added to subpart L to read as follows:
Sec. 668.176 Severability.
If any provision of this subpart or its application to any person,
act, or practice is held invalid, the remainder of the subpart or the
application of its provisions to any person, act, or practice will not
be affected thereby.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1094, 1099c)
0
12. Appendix C to subpart L of part 668 is added to read as follows:
[[Page 76077]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR01NO16.001
[[Page 76078]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR01NO16.002
PART 674--FEDERAL PERKINS LOAN PROGRAM
0
13. The authority citation for part 674 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1070g, 1087aa--1087hh, unless otherwise
noted.
0
14. Section 674.33 is amended by:
0
A. Revising paragraph (g)(3).
0
B. Redesignating paragraphs (g)(8)(vi) through (ix) as paragraphs
(g)(8)(vii) through (x), respectively.
0
C. Adding a new paragraph (g)(8)(vi).
The revision and addition read as follows:
Sec. 674.33 Repayment.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(3) Determination of borrower qualification for discharge by the
Secretary. (i) The Secretary may discharge the borrower's obligation to
repay an NDSL or Federal Perkins Loan without an application if the
Secretary determines that--
(A) The borrower qualified for and received a discharge on a loan
pursuant to 34 CFR 682.402(d) (Federal Family Education Loan Program)
or 34 CFR 685.214 (Federal Direct Loan Program), and was unable to
receive a discharge on an NDSL or Federal Perkins Loan because the
Secretary lacked the statutory authority to discharge the loan; or
(B) Based on information in the Secretary's possession, the
borrower qualifies for a discharge.
(ii) With respect to schools that closed on or after November 1,
2013, the Secretary will discharge the borrower's obligation to repay
an NDSL or Federal Perkins Loan without an application from the
borrower if the Secretary determines that the borrower did not
subsequently re-enroll in any title IV-eligible institution within a
period of three years from the date the school closed.
* * * * *
(8) * * *
(vi) Upon resuming collection on any affected loan, the Secretary
provides the borrower another discharge application and an explanation
of the requirements and procedures for obtaining a discharge.
* * * * *
0
15. Section 674.61 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:
Sec. 674.61 Discharge for death or disability.
(a) Death. (1) An institution must discharge the unpaid balance of
a borrower's Defense, NDSL, or Federal
[[Page 76079]]
Perkins loan, including interest, if the borrower dies. The institution
must discharge the loan on the basis of--
(i) An original or certified copy of the death certificate;
(ii) An accurate and complete photocopy of the original or
certified copy of the death certificate;
(iii) An accurate and complete original or certified copy of the
death certificate that is scanned and submitted electronically or sent
by facsimile transmission; or
(iv) Verification of the borrower's death through an authoritative
Federal or State electronic database approved for use by the Secretary.
(2) Under exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis,
the chief financial officer of the institution may approve a discharge
based upon other reliable documentation of the borrower's death.
* * * * *
PART 682--FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN (FFEL) PROGRAM
0
16. The authority citation for part 682 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1071-1087-4, unless otherwise noted.
Sec. 682.202 [Amended]
0
17. Section 682.202 is amended in paragraph (b)(1) by removing the
words ``A lender'' and adding in their place ``Except as provided in
Sec. 682.405(b)(4), a lender''.
0
18. Section 682.211 is amended by adding paragraph (i)(7) to read as
follows:
Sec. 682.211 Forbearance.
* * * * *
(i) * * *
(7) The lender must grant a mandatory administrative forbearance to
a borrower upon being notified by the Secretary that the borrower has
made a borrower defense claim related to a loan that the borrower
intends to consolidate into the Direct Loan Program for the purpose of
seeking relief in accordance with Sec. 685.212(k). The mandatory
administrative forbearance shall be granted in yearly increments or for
a period designated by the Secretary until the loan is consolidated or
until the lender is notified by the Secretary to discontinue the
forbearance.
* * * * *
0
19. Section 682.402 is amended:
0
A. By revising paragraphs (b)(2) and (d)(3).
0
B. In paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(B)(1) and (2), by removing the words ``sworn
statement (which may be combined)'' and adding in their place the word
``application''.
0
C. By revising paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(F) introductory text.
0
D. In paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(F)(5) removing the words ``and sworn
statement''.
0
E. In paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(G) introductory text, by removing the words
``request and supporting sworn statement'' and adding, in their place,
the words ``completed application''.
0
F. By revising paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(H).
0
G. By redesignating paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(I) as paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(J).
0
H. By adding new paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(I) and paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(K).
0
I. By revising paragraphs (d)(7)(ii) and (iii) and (d)(8).
0
J. In paragraph (e)(6)(iii), by removing the last sentence.
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 682.402 Death, disability, closed school, false certification,
unpaid refunds, and bankruptcy payments.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2)(i) A discharge of a loan based on the death of the borrower (or
student in the case of a PLUS loan) must be based on--
(A) An original or certified copy of the death certificate;
(B) An accurate and complete photocopy of the original or certified
copy of the death certificate;
(C) An accurate and complete original or certified copy of the
death certificate that is scanned and submitted electronically or sent
by facsimile transmission; or
(D) Verification of the borrower's or student's death through an
authoritative Federal or State electronic database approved for use by
the Secretary.
(ii) Under exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis,
the chief executive officer of the guaranty agency may approve a
discharge based upon other reliable documentation of the borrower's or
student's death.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(3) Borrower qualification for discharge. Except as provided in
paragraph (d)(8) of this section, in order to qualify for a discharge
of a loan under paragraph (d) of this section, a borrower must submit a
completed closed school discharge application on a form approved by the
Secretary. By signing the application, the borrower certifies--
* * * * *
(6) * * *
(ii) * * *
(F) If the guaranty agency determines that a borrower identified in
paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(C) or (D) of this section does not qualify for a
discharge, the agency shall notify the borrower in writing of that
determination and the reasons for it, the opportunity for review by the
Secretary, and how to request such a review within 30 days after the
date the agency--
* * * * *
(H) If a borrower described in paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(E) or (F) of
this section fails to submit the completed application within 60 days
of being notified of that option, the lender or guaranty agency shall
resume collection.
(I) Upon resuming collection on any affected loan, the lender or
guaranty agency provides the borrower another discharge application and
an explanation of the requirements and procedures for obtaining a
discharge.
* * * * *
(K)(1) Within 30 days after receiving the borrower's request for
review under paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(F) of this section, the agency shall
forward the borrower's discharge request and all relevant documentation
to the Secretary for review.
(2) The Secretary notifies the agency and the borrower of the
determination upon review. If the Secretary determines that the
borrower is not eligible for a discharge under paragraph (d) of this
section, within 30 days after being so informed, the agency shall take
the actions described in paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(H) or (I) of this
section, as applicable.
(3) If the Secretary determines that the borrower meets the
requirements for a discharge under paragraph (d) of this section, the
agency shall, within 30 days after being so informed, take actions
required under paragraphs (d)(6)(ii)(E) and (d)(6)(ii)(G)(1) of this
section, and the lender shall take the actions described in paragraph
(d)(7)(iv) of this section, as applicable.
* * * * *
(7) * * *
(i) * * *
(ii) If the borrower fails to submit a completed application
described in paragraph (d)(3) of this section within 60 days of being
notified of that option, the lender shall resume collection and shall
be deemed to have exercised forbearance of payment of principal and
interest from the date the lender suspended collection activity. The
lender may capitalize, in accordance with Sec. 682.202(b), any
interest accrued and not paid during that period. Upon resuming
collection, the lender provides the borrower with another discharge
application and an explanation of the
[[Page 76080]]
requirements and procedures for obtaining a discharge.
(iii) The lender shall file a closed school claim with the guaranty
agency in accordance with Sec. 682.402(g) no later than 60 days after
the lender receives a completed application described in paragraph
(d)(3) of this section from the borrower, or notification from the
agency that the Secretary approved the borrower's appeal in accordance
with paragraph (d)(6)(ii)(K)(3) of this section.
* * * * *
(8) Discharge without an application. (i) A borrower's obligation
to repay a FFEL Program loan may be discharged without an application
from the borrower if the--
(A) Borrower received a discharge on a loan pursuant to 34 CFR
674.33(g) under the Federal Perkins Loan Program, or 34 CFR 685.214
under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program; or
(B) Secretary or the guaranty agency, with the Secretary's
permission, determines that the borrower qualifies for a discharge
based on information in the Secretary or guaranty agency's possession.
(ii) With respect to schools that closed on or after November 1,
2013, a borrower's obligation to repay a FFEL Program loan will be
discharged without an application from the borrower if the Secretary or
guaranty agency determines that the borrower did not subsequently re-
enroll in any title IV-eligible institution within a period of three
years after the school closed.
* * * * *
0
20. Section 682.405 is amended by redesignating paragraph (b)(4) as
paragraph (b)(4)(i) and adding paragraph (b)(4)(ii).
The addition reads as follows:
Sec. 682.405 Loan rehabilitation agreement.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) The lender must not consider the purchase of a rehabilitated
loan as entry into repayment or resumption of repayment for the
purposes of interest capitalization under Sec. 682.202(b).
* * * * *
0
21. Section 682.410 is amended:
0
A. In paragraph (b)(4) by adding, after the words ``to the lender'',
the words and punctuation ``, but shall not capitalize any unpaid
interest thereafter''.
0
B. By adding paragraph (b)(6)(viii).
The addition reads as follows:
Sec. 682.410 Fiscal, administrative, and enforcement requirements.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(6) * * *
(viii) Upon notification by the Secretary that the borrower has
made a borrower defense claim related to a loan that the borrower
intends to consolidate into the Direct Loan Program for the purpose of
seeking relief in accordance with Sec. 685.212(k), the guaranty agency
must suspend all collection activities on the affected loan for the
period designated by the Secretary.
* * * * *
PART 685--WILLIAM D. FORD FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM
0
22. The authority citation for part 685 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1070g, 1087a, et seq., unless otherwise
noted.
0
23. Section 685.200 is amended by adding paragraphs (f)(3)(v) and
(f)(4)(iii) to read as follows:
Sec. 685.200 Borrower eligibility.
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(3) * * *
(v) A borrower who receives a closed school, false certification,
unpaid refund, or defense to repayment discharge that results in a
remaining eligibility period greater than zero is no longer responsible
for the interest that accrues on a Direct Subsidized Loan or on the
portion of a Direct Consolidation Loan that repaid a Direct Subsidized
Loan unless the borrower once again becomes responsible for the
interest that accrues on a previously received Direct Subsidized Loan
or on the portion of a Direct Consolidation Loan that repaid a Direct
Subsidized Loan, for the life of the loan, as described in paragraph
(f)(3)(i) of this section.
(4) * * *
(iii) For a first-time borrower who receives a closed school, false
certification, unpaid refund, or defense to repayment discharge on a
Direct Subsidized Loan or a portion of a Direct Consolidation Loan that
is attributable to a Direct Subsidized Loan, the Subsidized Usage
Period is reduced. If the Direct Subsidized Loan or a portion of a
Direct Consolidation Loan that is attributable to a Direct Subsidized
Loan is discharged in full, the Subsidized Usage Period of those loans
is zero years. If the Direct Subsidized Loan or a portion of a Direct
Consolidation Loan that is attributable to a Direct Subsidized Loan is
discharged in part, the Subsidized Usage Period may be reduced if the
discharge results in the inapplicability of paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this
section.
* * * * *
0
24. Section 685.205 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(6) to read as
follows:
Sec. 685.205 Forbearance.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(6) Periods necessary for the Secretary to determine the borrower's
eligibility for discharge--
(i) Under Sec. 685.206(c);
(ii) Under Sec. 685.214;
(iii) Under Sec. 685.215;
(iv) Under Sec. 685.216;
(v) Under Sec. 685.217;
(vi) Under Sec. 685.222; or
(vii) Due to the borrower's or endorser's (if applicable)
bankruptcy;
* * * * *
0
25. Section 685.206 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 685.206 Borrower responsibilities and defenses.
* * * * *
(c) Borrower defenses. (1) For loans first disbursed prior to July
1, 2017, the borrower may assert a borrower defense under this
paragraph. A ``borrower defense'' refers to any act or omission of the
school attended by the student that relates to the making of the loan
for enrollment at the school or the provision of educational services
for which the loan was provided that would give rise to a cause of
action against the school under applicable State law, and includes one
or both of the following:
(i) A defense to repayment of amounts owed to the Secretary on a
Direct Loan, in whole or in part.
(ii) A claim to recover amounts previously collected by the
Secretary on the Direct Loan, in whole or in part.
(2) The order of objections for defaulted Direct Loans are as
described in Sec. 685.222(a)(6). A borrower defense claim under this
section must be asserted, and will be resolved, under the procedures in
Sec. 685.222(e) to (k).
(3) For an approved borrower defense under this section, except as
provided in paragraph (c)(4) of this section, the Secretary may
initiate an appropriate proceeding to collect from the school whose act
or omission resulted in the borrower defense the amount of relief
arising from the borrower defense, within the later of--
(i) Three years from the end of the last award year in which the
student attended the institution; or
(ii) The limitation period that State law would apply to an action
by the borrower to recover on the cause of action on which the borrower
defense is based.
(4) The Secretary may initiate a proceeding to collect at any time
if the
[[Page 76081]]
institution received notice of the claim before the end of the later of
the periods described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section. For purposes
of this paragraph, notice includes receipt of--
(i) Actual notice from the borrower, from a representative of the
borrower, or from the Department;
(ii) A class action complaint asserting relief for a class that may
include the borrower; and
(iii) Written notice, including a civil investigative demand or
other written demand for information, from a Federal or State agency
that has power to initiate an investigation into conduct of the school
relating to specific programs, periods, or practices that may have
affected the borrower.
* * * * *
Sec. 685.209 [Amended]
0
26. Section 685.209 is amended:
0
A. In paragraph (a)(1)(ii), by adding ``, for purposes of determining
whether a borrower has a partial financial hardship in accordance with
paragraph (a)(1)(v) of this section or adjusting a borrower's monthly
payment amount in accordance with paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this
section,'' after the words ``Eligible loan''.
0
B. In paragraph (c)(1)(ii), by adding ``, for purposes of adjusting a
borrower's monthly payment amount in accordance with paragraph
(c)(2)(ii) of this section,'' after the words ``Eligible loan''.
0
C. In paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(B) introductory text, by removing the word
``Both'' and adding in its place the words ``Except in the case of a
married borrower filing separately whose spouse's income is excluded in
accordance with paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) or (B) of this section, both''.
0
D. In paragraph (c)(2)(v), by removing the words ``or the Secretary
determines the borrower does not have a partial financial hardship''.
0
E. In paragraph (c)(4)(iii)(B), by removing the citations ``(c)(2)(iv),
(c)(4)(v), and (c)(4)(vi)'' and adding, in their place, the citations
``(c)(2)(iv) and (c)(4)(v)''.
0
27. Section 685.212 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1) and (2)
and adding paragraph (k) to read as follows:
Sec. 685.212 Discharge of a loan obligation.
(a) Death. (1) If a borrower (or a student on whose behalf a parent
borrowed a Direct PLUS Loan) dies, the Secretary discharges the
obligation of the borrower and any endorser to make any further
payments on the loan based on--
(i) An original or certified copy of the death certificate;
(ii) An accurate and complete photocopy of the original or
certified copy of the death certificate;
(iii) An accurate and complete original or certified copy of the
death certificate that is scanned and submitted electronically or sent
by facsimile transmission; or
(iv) Verification of the borrower's or student's death through an
authoritative Federal or State electronic database approved for use by
the Secretary.
(2) Under exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis,
the Secretary discharges a loan based upon other reliable documentation
of the borrower's or student's death that is acceptable to the
Secretary.
* * * * *
(k) Borrower defenses. (1) If a borrower defense is approved under
Sec. 685.206(c) or Sec. 685.222--
(i) The Secretary discharges the obligation of the borrower in
whole or in part in accordance with the procedures in Sec. Sec.
685.206(c) and 685.222, respectively; and
(ii) The Secretary returns to the borrower payments made by the
borrower or otherwise recovered on the loan that exceed the amount owed
on that portion of the loan not discharged, if the borrower asserted
the claim not later than--
(A) For a claim subject to Sec. 685.206(c), the limitation period
under applicable law to the claim on which relief was granted; or
(B) For a claim subject to Sec. 685.222, the limitation period in
Sec. 685.222(b), (c), or (d), as applicable.
(2) In the case of a Direct Consolidation Loan, a borrower may
assert a borrower defense under Sec. 685.206(c) or Sec. 685.222 with
respect to a Direct Loan, FFEL Program Loan, Federal Perkins Loan,
Health Professions Student Loan, Loan for Disadvantaged Students under
subpart II of part A of title VII of the Public Health Service Act,
Health Education Assistance Loan, or Nursing Loan made under part E of
the Public Health Service Act that was repaid by the Direct
Consolidation Loan.
(i) The Secretary considers a borrower defense claim asserted on a
Direct Consolidation Loan by determining--
(A) Whether the act or omission of the school with regard to the
loan described in paragraph (k)(2) of this section, other than a Direct
Subsidized, Unsubsidized, or PLUS Loan, constitutes a borrower defense
under Sec. 685.206(c), for a Direct Consolidation Loan made before
July 1, 2017, or under Sec. 685.222, for a Direct Consolidation Loan
made on or after July 1, 2017; or
(B) Whether the act or omission of the school with regard to a
Direct Subsidized, Unsubsidized, or PLUS Loan made on after July 1,
2017 that was paid off by the Direct Consolidation Loan, constitutes a
borrower defense under Sec. 685.222.
(ii) If the borrower defense is approved, the Secretary discharges
the appropriate portion of the Direct Consolidation Loan.
(iii) The Secretary returns to the borrower payments made by the
borrower or otherwise recovered on the Direct Consolidation Loan that
exceed the amount owed on that portion of the Direct Consolidation Loan
not discharged, if the borrower asserted the claim not later than--
(A) For a claim asserted under Sec. 685.206(c), the limitation
period under the law applicable to the claim on which relief was
granted; or
(B) For a claim asserted under Sec. 685.222, the limitation period
in Sec. 685.222(b), (c), or (d), as applicable.
(iv) The Secretary returns to the borrower a payment made by the
borrower or otherwise recovered on the loan described in paragraph
(k)(2) of this section only if--
(A) The payment was made directly to the Secretary on the loan; and
(B) The borrower proves that the loan to which the payment was
credited was not legally enforceable under applicable law in the amount
for which that payment was applied.
* * * * *
0
28. Section 685.214 is amended by:
0
A. Revising paragraphs (c)(2) and (f)(4).
0
B. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(5) and (6) as paragraphs (f)(6) and
(7), respectively.
0
C. Adding a new paragraph (f)(5).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 685.214 Closed school discharge.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) If the Secretary determines, based on information in the
Secretary's possession, that the borrower qualifies for the discharge
of a loan under this section, the Secretary--
(i) May discharge the loan without an application from the
borrower; and
(ii) With respect to schools that closed on or after November 1,
2013, will discharge the loan without an application from the borrower
if the borrower did not subsequently re-enroll in any title IV-eligible
institution within a period of three years from the date the school
closed.
* * * * *
[[Page 76082]]
(f) * * *
(4) If a borrower fails to submit the application described in
paragraph (c) of this section within 60 days of the Secretary's
providing the discharge application, the Secretary resumes collection
and grants forbearance of principal and interest for the period in
which collection activity was suspended. The Secretary may capitalize
any interest accrued and not paid during that period.
(5) Upon resuming collection on any affected loan, the Secretary
provides the borrower another discharge application and an explanation
of the requirements and procedures for obtaining a discharge.
* * * * *
0
29. Section 685.215 is amended by:
0
A. Revising paragraph (a)(1).
0
B. Revising paragraph (c) introductory text.
0
C. Revising paragraph (c)(1).
0
D. Redesignating paragraphs (c)(2) through (7) as paragraphs (c)(3)
through (8), respectively.
0
E. Adding a new paragraph (c)(2).
0
F. Revising redesignated paragraph (c)(8).
0
G. Revising paragraph (d).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 685.215 Discharge for false certification of student eligibility
or unauthorized payment.
(a) Basis for discharge--(1) False certification. The Secretary
discharges a borrower's (and any endorser's) obligation to repay a
Direct Loan in accordance with the provisions of this section if a
school falsely certifies the eligibility of the borrower (or the
student on whose behalf a parent borrowed) to receive the proceeds of a
Direct Loan. The Secretary considers a student's eligibility to borrow
to have been falsely certified by the school if the school--
(i) Certified the eligibility of a student who--
(A) Reported not having a high school diploma or its equivalent;
and
(B) Did not satisfy the alternative to graduation from high school
requirements under section 484(d) of the Act that were in effect at the
time of certification;
(ii) Certified the eligibility of a student who is not a high
school graduate based on--
(A) A high school graduation status falsified by the school; or
(B) A high school diploma falsified by the school or a third party
to which the school referred the borrower;
(iii) Signed the borrower's name on the loan application or
promissory note without the borrower's authorization;
(iv) Certified the eligibility of the student who, because of a
physical or mental condition, age, criminal record, or other reason
accepted by the Secretary, would not meet State requirements for
employment (in the student's State of residence when the loan was
originated) in the occupation for which the training program supported
by the loan was intended; or
(v) Certified the eligibility of a student for a Direct Loan as a
result of the crime of identity theft committed against the individual,
as that crime is defined in paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section.
* * * * *
(c) Borrower qualification for discharge. To qualify for discharge
under this section, the borrower must submit to the Secretary an
application for discharge on a form approved by the Secretary. The
application need not be notarized but must be made by the borrower
under penalty of perjury; and in the application, the borrower's
responses must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary that
the requirements in paragraph (c)(1) through (7) of this section have
been met. If the Secretary determines the application does not meet the
requirements, the Secretary notifies the applicant and explains why the
application does not meet the requirements.
(1) High school diploma or equivalent. In the case of a borrower
requesting a discharge based on not having had a high school diploma
and not having met the alternative to graduation from high school
eligibility requirements under section 484(d) of the Act applicable at
the time the loan was originated, and the school or a third party to
which the school referred the borrower falsified the student's high
school diploma, the borrower must state in the application that the
borrower (or the student on whose behalf a parent received a PLUS
loan)--
(i) Reported not having a valid high school diploma or its
equivalent at the time the loan was certified; and
(ii) Did not satisfy the alternative to graduation from high school
statutory or regulatory eligibility requirements identified on the
application form and applicable at the time the institution certified
the loan.
(2) Disqualifying condition. In the case of a borrower requesting a
discharge based on a condition that would disqualify the borrower from
employment in the occupation that the training program for which the
borrower received the loan was intended, the borrower must state in the
application that the borrower (or student for whom a parent received a
PLUS loan)--
(i) Did not meet State requirements for employment (in the
student's State of residence) in the occupation that the training
program for which the borrower received the loan was intended because
of a physical or mental condition, age, criminal record, or other
reason accepted by the Secretary.
(ii) [Reserved]
* * * * *
(8) Discharge without an application. The Secretary discharges all
or part of a loan as appropriate under this section without an
application from the borrower if the Secretary determines, based on
information in the Secretary's possession, that the borrower qualifies
for a discharge. Such information includes, but is not limited to,
evidence that the school has falsified the Satisfactory Academic
Progress of its students, as described in Sec. 668.34.
(d) Discharge procedures. (1) If the Secretary determines that a
borrower's Direct Loan may be eligible for a discharge under this
section, the Secretary provides the borrower an application and an
explanation of the qualifications and procedures for obtaining a
discharge. The Secretary also promptly suspends any efforts to collect
from the borrower on any affected loan. The Secretary may continue to
receive borrower payments.
(2) If the borrower fails to submit the application described in
paragraph (c) of this section within 60 days of the Secretary's
providing the application, the Secretary resumes collection and grants
forbearance of principal and interest for the period in which
collection activity was suspended. The Secretary may capitalize any
interest accrued and not paid during that period.
(3) If the borrower submits the application described in paragraph
(c) of this section, the Secretary determines whether the available
evidence supports the claim for discharge. Available evidence includes
evidence provided by the borrower and any other relevant information
from the Secretary's records and gathered by the Secretary from other
sources, including guaranty agencies, other Federal agencies, State
authorities, test publishers, independent test administrators, school
records, and cognizant accrediting associations. The Secretary issues a
decision that explains the reasons for any adverse determination on the
application, describes the evidence on which the decision was made, and
provides the borrower, upon request, copies of the evidence. The
Secretary considers any response from the borrower and any additional
information from the borrower, and notifies the borrower whether the
determination is changed.
[[Page 76083]]
(4) If the Secretary determines that the borrower meets the
applicable requirements for a discharge under paragraph (c) of this
section, the Secretary notifies the borrower in writing of that
determination.
(5) If the Secretary determines that the borrower does not qualify
for a discharge, the Secretary notifies the borrower in writing of that
determination and the reasons for the determination.
* * * * *
Sec. 685.220 [Amended]
0
30. Section 685.220 is amended by:
0
A. Removing the words ``subpart II of part B'' from paragraph (b)(21)
and adding in their place the words ``part E''.
0
B. Removing paragraph (d)(1)(i).
0
C. Redesignating paragraph (d)(1)(ii) and (iii) as paragraphs (d)(1)(i)
and (ii).
0
31. Section 685.222 is added to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 685.222 Borrower defenses.
(a) General. (1) For loans first disbursed prior to July 1, 2017, a
borrower asserts and the Secretary considers a borrower defense in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 685.206(c), unless otherwise
noted in Sec. 685.206(c).
(2) For loans first disbursed on or after July 1, 2017, a borrower
asserts and the Secretary considers a borrower defense in accordance
with this section. To establish a borrower defense under this section,
a preponderance of the evidence must show that the borrower has a
borrower defense that meets the requirements of this section.
(3) A violation by the school of an eligibility or compliance
requirement in the Act or its implementing regulations is not a basis
for a borrower defense under either this section or Sec. 685.206(c)
unless the violation would otherwise constitute a basis for a borrower
defense under this section or Sec. 685.206(c), as applicable.
(4) For the purposes of this section and Sec. 685.206(c),
``borrower'' means--
(i) The borrower; and
(ii) In the case of a Direct PLUS Loan, any endorsers, and for a
Direct PLUS Loan made to a parent, the student on whose behalf the
parent borrowed.
(5) For the purposes of this section and Sec. 685.206(c), a
``borrower defense'' refers to an act or omission of the school
attended by the student that relates to the making of a Direct Loan for
enrollment at the school or the provision of educational services for
which the loan was provided, and includes one or both of the following:
(i) A defense to repayment of amounts owed to the Secretary on a
Direct Loan, in whole or in part; and
(ii) A right to recover amounts previously collected by the
Secretary on the Direct Loan, in whole or in part.
(6) If the borrower asserts both a borrower defense and any other
objection to an action of the Secretary with regard to that Direct
Loan, the order in which the Secretary will consider objections,
including a borrower defense, will be determined as appropriate under
the circumstances.
(b) Judgment against the school. The borrower has a borrower
defense if the borrower, whether as an individual or as a member of a
class, or a governmental agency, has obtained against the school a
nondefault, favorable contested judgment based on State or Federal law
in a court or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction. A
borrower may assert a borrower defense under this paragraph at any
time.
(c) Breach of contract by the school. The borrower has a borrower
defense if the school the borrower received the Direct Loan to attend
failed to perform its obligations under the terms of a contract with
the student. A borrower may assert a defense to repayment of amounts
owed to the Secretary under this paragraph at any time after the breach
by the school of its contract with the student. A borrower may assert a
right to recover amounts previously collected by the Secretary under
this paragraph not later than six years after the breach by the school
of its contract with the student.
(d) Substantial misrepresentation by the school. (1) A borrower has
a borrower defense if the school or any of its representatives, or any
institution, organization, or person with whom the school has an
agreement to provide educational programs, or to provide marketing,
advertising, recruiting, or admissions services, made a substantial
misrepresentation in accordance with 34 CFR part 668, subpart F, that
the borrower reasonably relied on to the borrower's detriment when the
borrower decided to attend, or to continue attending, the school or
decided to take out a Direct Loan. A borrower may assert, at any time,
a defense to repayment under this paragraph (d) of amounts owed to the
Secretary. A borrower may assert a claim under this paragraph (d) to
recover funds previously collected by the Secretary not later than six
years after the borrower discovers, or reasonably could have
discovered, the information constituting the substantial
misrepresentation.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a designated Department
official pursuant to paragraph (e) of this section or a hearing
official pursuant to paragraph (f), (g), or (h) of this section may
consider, as evidence supporting the reasonableness of a borrower's
reliance on a misrepresentation, whether the school or any of the other
parties described in paragraph (d)(1) engaged in conduct such as, but
not limited to:
(i) Demanding that the borrower make enrollment or loan-related
decisions immediately;
(ii) Placing an unreasonable emphasis on unfavorable consequences
of delay;
(iii) Discouraging the borrower from consulting an adviser, a
family member, or other resource;
(iv) Failing to respond to the borrower's requests for more
information including about the cost of the program and the nature of
any financial aid; or
(v) Otherwise unreasonably pressuring the borrower or taking
advantage of the borrower's distress or lack of knowledge or
sophistication.
(e) Procedure for an individual borrower. (1) To assert a borrower
defense under this section, an individual borrower must--
(i) Submit an application to the Secretary, on a form approved by
the Secretary--
(A) Certifying that the borrower received the proceeds of a loan,
in whole or in part, to attend the named school;
(B) Providing evidence that supports the borrower defense; and
(C) Indicating whether the borrower has made a claim with respect
to the information underlying the borrower defense with any third
party, such as the holder of a performance bond or a tuition recovery
program, and, if so, the amount of any payment received by the borrower
or credited to the borrower's loan obligation; and
(ii) Provide any other information or supporting documentation
reasonably requested by the Secretary.
(2) Upon receipt of a borrower's application, the Secretary--
(i) If the borrower is not in default on the loan for which a
borrower defense has been asserted, grants forbearance and--
(A) Notifies the borrower of the option to decline the forbearance
and to continue making payments on the loan; and
(B) Provides the borrower with information about the availability
of the income-contingent repayment plans under Sec. 685.209 and the
income-based repayment plan under Sec. 685.221; or
[[Page 76084]]
(ii) If the borrower is in default on the loan for which a borrower
defense has been asserted--
(A) Suspends collection activity on the loan until the Secretary
issues a decision on the borrower's claim;
(B) Notifies the borrower of the suspension of collection activity
and explains that collection activity will resume if the Secretary
determines that the borrower does not qualify for a full discharge; and
(C) Notifies the borrower of the option to continue making payments
under a rehabilitation agreement or other repayment agreement on the
defaulted loan.
(3) The Secretary designates a Department official to review the
borrower's application to determine whether the application states a
basis for a borrower defense, and resolves the claim through a fact-
finding process conducted by the Department official.
(i) As part of the fact-finding process, the Department official
notifies the school of the borrower defense application and considers
any evidence or argument presented by the borrower and also any
additional information, including--
(A) Department records;
(B) Any response or submissions from the school; and
(C) Any additional information or argument that may be obtained by
the Department official.
(ii) Upon the borrower's request, the Department official
identifies to the borrower the records the Department official
considers relevant to the borrower defense. The Secretary provides to
the borrower any of the identified records upon reasonable request of
the borrower.
(4) At the conclusion of the fact-finding process, the Department
official issues a written decision as follows:
(i) If the Department official approves the borrower defense in
full or in part, the Department official notifies the borrower in
writing of that determination and of the relief provided as described
in paragraph (i) of this section.
(ii) If the Department official denies the borrower defense in full
or in part, the Department official notifies the borrower of the
reasons for the denial, the evidence that was relied upon, any portion
of the loan that is due and payable to the Secretary, and whether the
Secretary will reimburse any amounts previously collected, and informs
the borrower that if any balance remains on the loan, the loan will
return to its status prior to the borrower's submission of the
application. The Department official also informs the borrower of the
opportunity to request reconsideration of the claim based on new
evidence pursuant to paragraph (e)(5)(i) of this section.
(5) The decision of the Department official is final as to the
merits of the claim and any relief that may be granted on the claim.
Notwithstanding the foregoing--
(i) If the borrower defense is denied in full or in part, the
borrower may request that the Secretary reconsider the borrower defense
upon the identification of new evidence in support of the borrower's
claim. ``New evidence'' is relevant evidence that the borrower did not
previously provide and that was not identified in the final decision as
evidence that was relied upon for the final decision. If accepted for
reconsideration by the Secretary, the Secretary follows the procedure
in paragraph (e)(2) of this section for granting forbearance and for
defaulted loans; and
(ii) The Secretary may reopen a borrower defense application at any
time to consider evidence that was not considered in making the
previous decision. If a borrower defense application is reopened by the
Secretary, the Secretary follows the procedure paragraph (e)(2) of this
section for granting forbearance and for defaulted loans.
(6) The Secretary may consolidate applications filed under this
paragraph (e) that have common facts and claims, and resolve the
borrowers' borrower defense claims as provided in paragraphs (f), (g),
and (h) of this section.
(7) The Secretary may initiate a proceeding to collect from the
school the amount of relief resulting from a borrower defense under
this section--
(i) Within the six-year period applicable to the borrower defense
under paragraph (c) or (d) of this section;
(ii) At any time, for a borrower defense under paragraph (b) of
this section; or
(iii) At any time if during the period described in paragraph
(e)(7)(i) of this section, the institution received notice of the
claim. For purposes of this paragraph, notice includes receipt of--
(A) Actual notice from the borrower, a representative of the
borrower, or the Department of a claim, including notice of an
application filed pursuant to this section or Sec. 685.206(c);
(B) A class action complaint asserting relief for a class that may
include the borrower for underlying facts that may form the basis of a
claim under this section or Sec. 685.206(c);
(C) Written notice, including a civil investigative demand or other
written demand for information, from a Federal or State agency that has
power to initiate an investigation into conduct of the school relating
to specific programs, periods, or practices that may have affected the
borrower, for underlying facts that may form the basis of a claim under
this section or Sec. 685.206(c).
(f) Group process for borrower defense, generally. (1) Upon
consideration of factors including, but not limited to, common facts
and claims, fiscal impact, and the promotion of compliance by the
school or other title IV, HEA program participant, the Secretary may
initiate a process to determine whether a group of borrowers,
identified by the Secretary, has a borrower defense.
(i) The members of the group may be identified by the Secretary
from individually filed applications pursuant to paragraph (e)(6) of
this section or from any other source.
(ii) If the Secretary determines that there are common facts and
claims that apply to borrowers who have not filed an application under
paragraph (e) of this section, the Secretary may identify such
borrowers as members of a group.
(2) Upon the identification of a group of borrowers under paragraph
(f)(1) of this section, the Secretary--
(i) Designates a Department official to present the group's claim
in the fact-finding process described in paragraph (g) or (h) of this
section, as applicable;
(ii) Provides each identified member of the group with notice that
allows the borrower to opt out of the proceeding;
(iii) If identified members of the group are borrowers who have not
filed an application under paragraph (f)(1)(ii) of this section,
follows the procedures in paragraph (e)(2) of this section for granting
forbearance and for defaulted loans for such identified members of the
group, unless an opt-out by such a member of the group is received; and
(iv) Notifies the school of the basis of the group's borrower
defense, the initiation of the fact-finding process described in
paragraph (g) or (h) of this section, and of any procedure by which the
school may request records and respond. No notice will be provided if
notice is impossible or irrelevant due to a school's closure.
(3) For a group of borrowers identified by the Secretary, for which
the Secretary determines that there may be a borrower defense under
paragraph (d) of this section based upon a substantial
misrepresentation that has been widely disseminated, there is a
rebuttable presumption that each member
[[Page 76085]]
reasonably relied on the misrepresentation.
(g) Procedures for group process for borrower defenses with respect
to loans made to attend a closed school. For groups identified by the
Secretary under paragraph (f) of this section, for which the borrower
defense is asserted with respect to a Direct Loan to attend a school
that has closed and has provided no financial protection currently
available to the Secretary from which to recover any losses arising
from borrower defenses, and for which there is no appropriate entity
from which the Secretary can otherwise practicably recover such
losses--
(1) A hearing official resolves the borrower defense through a
fact-finding process. As part of the fact-finding process, the hearing
official considers any evidence and argument presented by the
Department official on behalf of the group and, as necessary to
determine any claims at issue, on behalf of individual members of the
group. The hearing official also considers any additional information
the Department official considers necessary, including any Department
records or response from the school or a person affiliated with the
school as described in Sec. 668.174(b), if practicable. The hearing
official issues a written decision as follows:
(i) If the hearing official approves the borrower defense in full
or in part, the written decision states that determination and the
relief provided on the basis of that claim as determined under
paragraph (i) of this section.
(ii) If the hearing official denies the borrower defense in full or
in part, the written decision states the reasons for the denial, the
evidence that was relied upon, the portion of the loans that are due
and payable to the Secretary, and whether reimbursement of amounts
previously collected is granted, and informs the borrowers that if any
balance remains on the loan, the loan will return to its status prior
to the group claim process.
(iii) The Secretary provides copies of the written decision to the
members of the group and, as practicable, to the school.
(2) The decision of the hearing official is final as to the merits
of the group borrower defense and any relief that may be granted on the
group claim.
(3) After a final decision has been issued, if relief for the group
has been denied in full or in part pursuant to paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of
this section, an individual borrower may file a claim for relief
pursuant to paragraph (e)(5)(i) of this section.
(4) The Secretary may reopen a borrower defense application at any
time to consider evidence that was not considered in making the
previous decision. If a borrower defense application is reopened by the
Secretary, the Secretary follows the procedure in paragraph (e)(2) of
this section for granting forbearance and for defaulted loans.
(h) Procedures for group process for borrower defenses with respect
to loans made to attend an open school. For groups identified by the
Secretary under paragraph (f) of this section, for which the borrower
defense is asserted with respect to Direct Loans to attend a school
that is not covered by paragraph (g) of this section, the claim is
resolved in accordance with the procedures in this paragraph (h).
(1) A hearing official resolves the borrower defense and determines
any liability of the school through a fact-finding process. As part of
the fact-finding process, the hearing official considers any evidence
and argument presented by the school and the Department official on
behalf of the group and, as necessary to determine any claims at issue,
on behalf of individual members of the group. The hearing official
issues a written decision as follows:
(i) If the hearing official approves the borrower defense in full
or in part, the written decision establishes the basis for the
determination, notifies the members of the group of the relief as
described in paragraph (i) of this section, and notifies the school of
any liability to the Secretary for the amounts discharged and
reimbursed.
(ii) If the hearing official denies the borrower defense for the
group in full or in part, the written decision states the reasons for
the denial, the evidence that was relied upon, the portion of the loans
that are due and payable to the Secretary, and whether reimbursement of
amounts previously collected is granted, and informs the borrowers that
their loans will return to their statuses prior to the group borrower
defense process. The decision notifies the school of any liability to
the Secretary for any amounts discharged or reimbursed.
(iii) The Secretary provides copies of the written decision to the
members of the group, the Department official, and the school.
(2) The decision of the hearing official becomes final as to the
merits of the group borrower defense and any relief that may be granted
on the group borrower defense within 30 days after the decision is
issued and received by the Department official and the school unless,
within that 30-day period, the school or the Department official
appeals the decision to the Secretary. In the case of an appeal--
(i) The decision of the hearing official does not take effect
pending the appeal; and
(ii) The Secretary renders a final decision.
(3) After a final decision has been issued, if relief for the group
has been denied in full or in part pursuant to paragraph (h)(1)(ii) of
this section, an individual borrower may file a claim for relief
pursuant to paragraph (e)(5)(i) of this section.
(4) The Secretary may reopen a borrower defense application at any
time to consider evidence that was not considered in making the
previous decision. If a borrower defense application is reopened by the
Secretary, the Secretary follows the procedure in paragraph (e)(2) of
this section for granting forbearance and for defaulted loans.
(5)(i) The Secretary collects from the school any liability to the
Secretary for any amounts discharged or reimbursed to borrowers under
this paragraph (h).
(ii) For a borrower defense under paragraph (b) of this section,
the Secretary may initiate a proceeding to collect at any time.
(iii) For a borrower defense under paragraph (c) or (d) of this
section, the Secretary may initiate a proceeding to collect within the
limitation period that would apply to the borrower defense, provided
that the Secretary may bring an action to collect at any time if,
within the limitation period, the school received notice of the
borrower's borrower defense claim. For purposes of this paragraph, the
school receives notice of the borrower's claim by receipt of--
(A) Actual notice of the claim from the borrower, a representative
of the borrower, or the Department, including notice of an application
filed pursuant to this section or Sec. 685.206(c);
(B) A class action complaint asserting relief for a class that may
include the borrower for underlying facts that may form the basis of a
claim under this section or Sec. 685.206(c); or
(C) Written notice, including a civil investigative demand or other
written demand for information, from a Federal or State agency that has
power to initiate an investigation into conduct of the school relating
to specific programs, periods, or practices that may have affected the
borrower, of underlying facts that may form the basis of a claim under
this section or Sec. 685.206(c).
(i) Relief. If a borrower defense is approved under the procedures
in
[[Page 76086]]
paragraph (e), (g), or (h) of this section, the following procedures
apply:
(1) The Department official or the hearing official deciding the
claim determines the appropriate amount of relief to award the
borrower, which may be a discharge of all amounts owed to the Secretary
on the loan at issue and may include the recovery of amounts previously
collected by the Secretary on the loan, or some lesser amount.
(2) For a borrower defense brought on the basis of--
(i) A substantial misrepresentation, the Department official or the
hearing official will factor the borrower's cost of attendance to
attend the school, as well as the value of the education the borrower
received, the value of the education that a reasonable borrower in the
borrower's circumstances would have received, and/or the value of the
education the borrower should have expected given the information
provided by the institution, into the determination of appropriate
relief. A borrower may be granted full, partial, or no relief. Value
will be assessed in a manner that is reasonable and practicable. In
addition, the Department official or the hearing official deciding the
claim may consider any other relevant factors;
(ii) A judgment against the school--
(A) Where the judgment awards specific financial relief, relief
will be the amount of the judgment that remains unsatisfied, subject to
the limitation provided for in Sec. 685.222(i)(8) and any other
reasonable considerations; and
(B) Where the judgment does not award specific financial relief,
the Department will rely on the holding of the case and applicable law
to monetize the judgment; and
(iii) A breach of contract, relief will be determined according to
the common law of contracts, subject to the limitation provided for in
Sec. 685.222(i)(8) and any other reasonable considerations.
(3) In a fact-finding process brought against an open school under
paragraph (h) of this section on the basis of a substantial
misrepresentation, the school has the burden of proof as to any value
of the education.
(4) In determining the relief, the Department official or the
hearing official deciding the claim may consider--
(i) Information derived from a sample of borrowers from the group
when calculating relief for a group of borrowers; and
(ii) The examples in Appendix A to this subpart.
(5) In the written decision described in paragraphs (e), (g), and
(h) of this section, the designated Department official or hearing
official deciding the claim notifies the borrower of the relief
provided and--
(i) Specifies the relief determination;
(ii) Advises that there may be tax implications; and
(iii) Advises the borrower of the requirements to file a request
for reconsideration upon the identification of new evidence.
(6) Consistent with the determination of relief under paragraph
(i)(1) of this section, the Secretary discharges the borrower's
obligation to repay all or part of the loan and associated costs and
fees that the borrower would otherwise be obligated to pay and, if
applicable, reimburses the borrower for amounts paid toward the loan
voluntarily or through enforced collection.
(7) The Department official or the hearing official deciding the
case, or the Secretary as applicable, affords the borrower such further
relief as appropriate under the circumstances. Such further relief
includes, but is not limited to, one or both of the following:
(i) Determining that the borrower is not in default on the loan and
is eligible to receive assistance under title IV of the Act.
(ii) Updating reports to consumer reporting agencies to which the
Secretary previously made adverse credit reports with regard to the
borrower's Direct Loan.
(8) The total amount of relief granted with respect to a borrower
defense cannot exceed the amount of the loan and any associated costs
and fees and will be reduced by the amount of any refund,
reimbursement, indemnification, restitution, compensatory damages,
settlement, debt forgiveness, discharge, cancellation, compromise, or
any other financial benefit received by, or on behalf of, the borrower
that was related to the borrower defense. The relief to the borrower
may not include non-pecuniary damages such as inconvenience,
aggravation, emotional distress, or punitive damages.
(j) Cooperation by the borrower. To obtain relief under this
section, a borrower must reasonably cooperate with the Secretary in any
proceeding under paragraph (e), (g), or (h) of this section. The
Secretary may revoke any relief granted to a borrower who fails to
satisfy his or her obligations under this paragraph (j).
(k) Transfer to the Secretary of the borrower's right of recovery
against third parties. (1) Upon the granting of any relief under this
section, the borrower is deemed to have assigned to, and relinquished
in favor of, the Secretary any right to a loan refund (up to the amount
discharged) that the borrower may have by contract or applicable law
with respect to the loan or the contract for educational services for
which the loan was received, against the school, its principals, its
affiliates, and their successors, its sureties, and any private fund.
If the borrower asserts a claim to, and recovers from, a public fund,
the Secretary may reinstate the borrower's obligation to repay on the
loan an amount based on the amount recovered from the public fund, if
the Secretary determines that the borrower's recovery from the public
fund was based on the same borrower defense and for the same loan for
which the discharge was granted under this section.
(2) The provisions of this paragraph (k) apply notwithstanding any
provision of State law that would otherwise restrict transfer of those
rights by the borrower, limit or prevent a transferee from exercising
those rights, or establish procedures or a scheme of distribution that
would prejudice the Secretary's ability to recover on those rights.
(3) Nothing in this paragraph (k) limits or forecloses the
borrower's right to pursue legal and equitable relief against a party
described in this paragraph (k) for recovery of any portion of a claim
exceeding that assigned to the Secretary or any other claims arising
from matters unrelated to the claim on which the loan is discharged.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq.; 28 U.S.C. 2401; 31 U.S.C. 3702)
0
32. Section 685.223 is added to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 685.223 Severability.
If any provision of this subpart or its application to any person,
act, or practice is held invalid, the remainder of the subpart or the
application of its provisions to any person, act, or practice shall not
be affected thereby.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq.)
0
33. Appendix A to subpart B of part 685 is added to read as follows:
Appendix A to Subpart B of Part 685--Examples of Borrower Relief
The Department official or the hearing official deciding a
borrower defense claim determines the amount of relief to award the
borrower, which may be a discharge of all amounts owed to the
Secretary on the loan at issue and may include the recovery of
amounts previously collected by the Secretary on the loan, or some
lesser amount. The following are some conceptual examples
demonstrating relief. The actual relief awarded will be determined
by the Department official or the hearing official deciding the
claim, who shall not be bound by these examples.
[[Page 76087]]
1. A school represents to prospective students, in widely
disseminated materials, that its educational program will lead to
employment in an occupation that requires State licensure. The
program does not in fact meet minimum education requirements to
enable its graduates to sit for the exam necessary for them to
obtain licensure. The claims are adjudicated in a group process.
Appropriate relief: Borrowers who enrolled in this program
during the time that the misrepresentation was made should receive
full relief. As a result of the schools' misrepresentation, the
borrowers cannot work in the occupation in which they reasonably
expected to work when they enrolled. Accordingly, borrowers received
limited or no value from this educational program because they did
not receive the value that they reasonably expected.
2. A school states to a prospective student that its medical
assisting program has a faculty composed of skilled nurses and
physicians and offers internships at a local hospital. The borrower
enrolls in the school in reliance on that statement. In fact, none
of the teachers at the school other than the Director is a nurse or
physician. The school has no internship program. The teachers at the
school are not qualified to teach medical assisting and the student
is not qualified for medical assistant jobs based on the education
received at the school.
Appropriate relief: This borrower should receive full relief.
None of the teachers at the school are qualified to teach medical
assisting, and there was no internship. In contrast to reasonable
students' expectations, based on information provided by the school,
the typical borrower received no value from the program.
3. An individual interested in becoming a registered nurse meets
with a school's admissions counselor who explains that the school
does not have a nursing program but that completion of a medical
assisting program is a prerequisite for any nursing program. Based
on this information, the borrower enrolls in the school's medical
assisting program rather than searching for another nursing program,
believing that completing a medical assisting program is a necessary
step towards becoming a nurse. After one year in the program, the
borrower realizes that it is not necessary to become a medical
assistant before entering a nursing program. The borrower's credits
are not transferrable to a nursing program.
Appropriate relief: This borrower should receive full relief.
Because it is not necessary to become a medical assistant prior to
entering a nursing program, she has made no progress towards the
career she sought, and in fact has received an education that cannot
be used for its intended purpose.
4. A school tells a prospective student, who is actively seeking
an education, that the cost of the program will be $20,000. Relying
on that statement, the borrower enrolls. The student later learns
the cost for that year was $25,000. There is no evidence of any
other misrepresentations in the enrollment process or of any
deficiency in value in the school's education.
Appropriate relief: This borrower should receive partial relief
of $5,000. The borrower received precisely the value that she
expected. The school provides the education that the student was
seeking but misrepresented the price.
5. A school represents in its marketing materials that three of
its undergraduate faculty members in a particular program have
received the highest award in their field. A borrower choosing among
two comparable, selective programs enrolls in that program in
reliance on the representation about its faculty. However, although
the program otherwise remains the same, the school had failed to
update the marketing materials to reflect the fact that the award-
winning faculty had left the school.
Appropriate relief: Although the borrower reasonably relied on a
misrepresentation about the faculty in deciding to enroll at this
school, she still received the value that she expected. Therefore,
no relief is appropriate.
6. An individual wishes to enroll in a selective, regionally
accredited liberal arts school. The school gives inflated data to a
well-regarded school ranking organization regarding the median grade
point average of recent entrants and also includes that inflated
data in its own marketing materials. This inflated data raises the
place of the school in the organization's rankings in independent
publications. The individual enrolls in the school and graduates.
Soon after graduating, the individual learns from the news that the
school falsified admissions data. Notwithstanding this issue,
degrees from the school continue to serve as effective, well-
regarded liberal arts credentials.
The Department also determines that the school violated the
title IV requirement that it not make substantial misrepresentations
pursuant to 34 CFR 668.71, which constitutes an enforceable
violation separate and apart from any borrower defense relief.
Appropriate Relief: The borrower relied on the misrepresentation
about the admissions data to his detriment, because the
misrepresentation factored into the borrower's decision to choose
the school over others. However, the borrower received a selective
liberal arts education which represents the value that he could
reasonably expect, and gets no relief.
0
34. Section 685.300 is amended by:
0
A. Redesignating paragraph (b)(11) as paragraph (b)(12).
0
B. Adding a new paragraph (b)(11).
0
C. Adding paragraphs (d) through (i).
The additions read as follows:
Sec. 685.300 Agreements between an eligible school and the Secretary
for participation in the Direct Loan Program.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(11) Comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) through (i) of
this section regarding student claims and disputes.
* * * * *
(d) Borrower defense claims in an internal dispute process. The
school will not compel any student to pursue a complaint based on a
borrower defense claim through an internal dispute process before the
student presents the complaint to an accrediting agency or government
agency authorized to hear the complaint.
(e) Class action bans. (1) The school will not seek to rely in any
way on a predispute arbitration agreement or on any other predispute
agreement with a student who has obtained or benefited from a Direct
Loan, with respect to any aspect of a class action that is related to a
borrower defense claim, including to seek a stay or dismissal of
particular claims or the entire action, unless and until the presiding
court has ruled that the case may not proceed as a class action and, if
that ruling may be subject to appellate review on an interlocutory
basis, the time to seek such review has elapsed or the review has been
resolved.
(2) Reliance on a predispute arbitration agreement, or on any other
predispute agreement, with a student, with respect to any aspect of a
class action includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:
(i) Seeking dismissal, deferral, or stay of any aspect of a class
action.
(ii) Seeking to exclude a person or persons from a class in a class
action.
(iii) Objecting to or seeking a protective order intended to avoid
responding to discovery in a class action.
(iv) Filing a claim in arbitration against a student who has filed
a claim on the same issue in a class action.
(v) Filing a claim in arbitration against a student who has filed a
claim on the same issue in a class action after the trial court has
denied a motion to certify the class but before an appellate court has
ruled on an interlocutory appeal of that motion, if the time to seek
such an appeal has not elapsed or the appeal has not been resolved.
(vi) Filing a claim in arbitration against a student who has filed
a claim on the same issue in a class action after the trial court in
that class action has granted a motion to dismiss the claim and, in
doing so, the court noted that the consumer has leave to refile the
claim on a class basis, if the time to refile the claim has not
elapsed.
(3) Required provisions and notices. (i) The school must include
the following provision in any agreements with a student recipient of a
Direct Loan for attendance at the school, or, with respect to a Parent
PLUS Loan, a student for whom the PLUS loan was obtained, that include
any agreement regarding predispute arbitration or any other predispute
agreement addressing class actions and that are entered into after the
effective date of this regulation: ``We agree that neither we nor
anyone else will use this agreement to stop you from being part of a
class action lawsuit in
[[Page 76088]]
court. You may file a class action lawsuit in court or you may be a
member of a class action lawsuit even if you do not file it. This
provision applies only to class action claims concerning our acts or
omissions regarding the making of the Direct Loan or the provision by
us of educational services for which the Direct Loan was obtained. We
agree that only the court is to decide whether a claim asserted in the
lawsuit is a claim regarding the making of the Federal Direct Loan or
the provision of educational services for which the loan was
obtained.''
(ii) When a predispute arbitration agreement or any other
predispute agreement addressing class actions has been entered into
before the effective date of this regulation and does not contain a
provision described in paragraph (e)(3)(i) of this section, the school
must either ensure the agreement is amended to contain the provision
specified in paragraph (e)(3)(iii)(A) of this section or provide the
student to whom the agreement applies with the written notice specified
in paragraph (e)(3)(iii)(B) of this section.
(iii) The school must ensure the agreement described in paragraph
(e)(3)(ii) of this section is amended to contain the provision
specified in paragraph (e)(3)(iii)(A) or must provide the notice
specified in paragraph (e)(3)(iii)(B) to students no later than the
exit counseling required under Sec. 685.304(b), or the date on which
the school files its initial response to a demand for arbitration or
service of a complaint from a student who has not already been sent a
notice or amendment.
(A) Agreement provision. ``We agree that neither we nor anyone else
who later becomes a party to this agreement will use it to stop you
from being part of a class action lawsuit in court. You may file a
class action lawsuit in court or you may be a member of a class action
lawsuit in court even if you do not file it. This provision applies
only to class action claims concerning our acts or omissions regarding
the making of the Federal Direct Loan or the provision by us of
educational services for which the Federal Direct Loan was obtained. We
agree that only the court is to decide whether a claim asserted in the
lawsuit is a claim regarding the making of the Federal Direct Loan or
the provision of educational services for which the loan was
obtained.''
(B) Notice provision. ``We agree not to use any predispute
agreement to stop you from being part of a class action lawsuit in
court. You may file a class action lawsuit in court or you may be a
member of a class action lawsuit even if you do not file it. This
provision applies only to class action claims concerning our acts or
omissions regarding the making of the Federal Direct Loan or the
provision by us of educational services for which the Federal Direct
Loan was obtained. We agree that only the court is to decide whether a
claim asserted in the lawsuit is a claim regarding the making of the
Federal Direct Loan or the provision of educational services for which
the loan was obtained.''
(f) Predispute arbitration agreements. (1)(i) The school will not
enter into a predispute agreement to arbitrate a borrower defense
claim, or rely in any way on a predispute arbitration agreement with
respect to any aspect of a borrower defense claim.
(ii) A student may enter into a voluntary post-dispute arbitration
agreement with a school to arbitrate a borrower defense claim.
(2) Reliance on a predispute arbitration agreement with a student
with respect to any aspect of a borrower defense claim includes, but is
not limited to, any of the following:
(i) Seeking dismissal, deferral, or stay of any aspect of a
judicial action filed by the student, including joinder with others in
an action;
(ii) Objecting to or seeking a protective order intended to avoid
responding to discovery in a judicial action filed by the student; and
(iii) Filing a claim in arbitration against a student who has filed
a suit on the same claim.
(3) Required provisions and notices. (i) The school must include
the following provision in any predispute arbitration agreements with a
student recipient of a Direct Loan for attendance at the school, or,
with respect to a Parent PLUS Loan, a student for whom the PLUS loan
was obtained, that include any agreement regarding arbitration and that
are entered into after the effective date of this regulation: ``We
agree that neither we nor anyone else will use this agreement to stop
you from bringing a lawsuit concerning our acts or omissions regarding
the making of the Federal Direct Loan or the provision by us of
educational services for which the Federal Direct Loan was obtained.
You may file a lawsuit for such a claim or you may be a member of a
class action lawsuit for such a claim even if you do not file it. This
provision does not apply to lawsuits concerning other claims. We agree
that only the court is to decide whether a claim asserted in the
lawsuit is a claim regarding the making of the Federal Direct Loan or
the provision of educational services for which the loan was
obtained.''
(ii) When a predispute arbitration agreement has been entered into
before the effective date of this regulation that did not contain the
provision specified in paragraph (f)(3)(i) of this section, the school
must either ensure the agreement is amended to contain the provision
specified in paragraph (f)(3)(iii)(A) of this section or provide the
student to whom the agreement applies with the written notice specified
in paragraph (f)(3)(iii)(B) of this section.
(iii) The school must ensure the agreement described in paragraph
(f)(3)(ii) of this section is amended to contain the provision
specified in paragraph (f)(3)(iii)(A) of this section or must provide
the notice specified in paragraph (f)(3)(iii)(B) of this section to
students no later than the exit counseling required under Sec.
685.304(b), or the date on which the school files its initial response
to a demand for arbitration or service of a complaint from a student
who has not already been sent a notice or amendment.
(A) Agreement provision. ``We agree that neither we nor anyone else
who later becomes a party to this predispute arbitration agreement will
use it to stop you from bringing a lawsuit concerning our acts or
omissions regarding the making of the Federal Direct Loan or the
provision by us of educational services for which the Federal Direct
Loan was obtained. You may file a lawsuit for such a claim or you may
be a member of a class action lawsuit for such a claim even if you do
not file it. This provision does not apply to other claims. We agree
that only the court is to decide whether a claim asserted in the
lawsuit is a claim regarding the making of the Federal Direct Loan or
the provision of educational services for which the loan was
obtained.''
(B) Notice provision. ``We agree not to use any predispute
arbitration agreement to stop you from bringing a lawsuit concerning
our acts or omissions regarding the making of the Federal Direct Loan
or the provision by us of educational services for which the Federal
Direct Loan was obtained. You may file a lawsuit regarding such a claim
or you may be a member of a class action lawsuit regarding such a claim
even if you do not file it. This provision does not apply to any other
claims. We agree that only the court is to decide whether a claim
asserted in the lawsuit is a claim regarding the making of the Direct
Loan or the provision of educational services for which the loan was
obtained.''
(g) Submission of arbitral records. (1) A school must submit a copy
of the
[[Page 76089]]
following records to the Secretary, in the form and manner specified by
the Secretary, in connection with any claim filed in arbitration by or
against the school concerning a borrower defense claim:
(i) The initial claim and any counterclaim.
(ii) The arbitration agreement filed with the arbitrator or
arbitration administrator.
(iii) The judgment or award, if any, issued by the arbitrator or
arbitration administrator.
(iv) If an arbitrator or arbitration administrator refuses to
administer or dismisses a claim due to the school's failure to pay
required filing or administrative fees, any communication the school
receives from the arbitrator or arbitration administrator related to
such a refusal.
(v) Any communication the school receives from an arbitrator or an
arbitration administrator related to a determination that a predispute
arbitration agreement regarding educational services provided by the
school does not comply with the administrator's fairness principles,
rules, or similar requirements, if such a determination occurs.
(2) A school must submit any record required pursuant to paragraph
(g)(1) of this section within 60 days of filing by the school of any
such record with the arbitrator or arbitration administrator and within
60 days of receipt by the school of any such record filed or sent by
someone other than the school, such as the arbitrator, the arbitration
administrator, or the student.
(h) Submission of judicial records. (1) A school must submit a copy
of the following records to the Secretary, in the form and manner
specified by the Secretary, in connection with any claim concerning a
borrower defense claim filed in a lawsuit by the school against the
student or by any party, including a government agency, against the
school:
(i) The complaint and any counterclaim.
(ii) Any dispositive motion filed by a party to the suit; and
(iii) The ruling on any dispositive motion and the judgment issued
by the court.
(2) A school must submit any record required pursuant to paragraph
(h)(1) of this section within 30 days of filing or receipt, as
applicable, of the complaint, answer, or dispositive motion, and within
30 days of receipt of any ruling on a dispositive motion or a final
judgment.
(i) Definitions. For the purposes of paragraphs (d) through (h) of
this section, the term--
(1) ``Borrower defense claim'' means a claim that is or could be
asserted as a borrower defense as defined in Sec. 685.222(a)(5),
including a claim other than one based on Sec. 685.222(c) or (d) that
may be asserted under Sec. 685.222(b) if reduced to judgment;
(2) ``Class action'' means a lawsuit in which one or more parties
seek class treatment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or
any State process analogous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;
(3) ``Dispositive motion'' means a motion asking for a court order
that entirely disposes of one or more claims in favor of the party who
files the motion without need for further court proceedings;
(4) ``Predispute arbitration agreement'' means any agreement,
regardless of its form or structure, between a school or a party acting
on behalf of a school and a student providing for arbitration of any
future dispute between the parties.
* * * * *
0
35. Section 685.308 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:
Sec. 685.308 Remedial actions.
(a) The Secretary collects from the school the amount of the losses
the Secretary incurs and determines that the institution is liable to
repay under Sec. 685.206, Sec. 685.214, Sec. 685.215(a)(1)(i), (ii),
(iii), (iv) or (v), Sec. 685.216, or Sec. 685.222 or that were
disbursed--
(1) To an individual, because of an act or omission of the school,
in amounts that the individual was not eligible to receive; or
(2) Because of the school's violation of a Federal statute or
regulation.
* * * * *
0
36. Section 685.310 is added to subpart C to read as follows:
Sec. 685.310 Severability.
If any provision of this subpart or its application to any person,
act, or practice is held invalid, the remainder of the subpart or the
application of its provisions to any person, act, or practice shall not
be affected thereby.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq.)
PART 686--TEACHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE FOR COLLEGE AND HIGHER
EDUCATION (TEACH) GRANT PROGRAM
0
37. The authority citation for part 686 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1070g, et seq., unless otherwise noted.
0
38. Section 686.42 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:
Sec. 686.42 Discharge of an agreement to serve.
(a) Death. (1) If a grant recipient dies, the Secretary discharges
the obligation to complete the agreement to serve based on--
(i) An original or certified copy of the death certificate;
(ii) An accurate and complete photocopy of the original or
certified copy of the death certificate;
(iii) An accurate and complete original or certified copy of the
death certificate that is scanned and submitted electronically or sent
by facsimile transmission; or
(iv) Verification of the grant recipient's death through an
authoritative Federal or State electronic database approved for use by
the Secretary.
(2) Under exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis,
the Secretary discharges the obligation to complete the agreement to
serve based on other reliable documentation of the grant recipient's
death that is acceptable to the Secretary.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2016-25448 Filed 10-31-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4000-01-P