Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Describe the Blackout Period Exposure Charge That May Be Imposed on GCF Repo Participants, 71545-71548 [2016-24982]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 200 / Monday, October 17, 2016 / Notices
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Dated: October 12, 2016.
Denise L. McGovern,
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BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL
Senior Executive Service Performance
Board
Office of Special Counsel
Notice.
AGENCY:
The Office of Special Counsel
(OSC) publishes the names of the
persons selected to serve on its SES
Performance Review Board (PRB). This
notice supersedes all previous notices of
the PRB membership.
DATES: October 17, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kenneth Hendricks, Acting General
Counsel, U.S. Office of Special Counsel,
1730 M Street NW., Suite 218,
Washington, DC 20036, (202) 254–3600
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
4314(c) of Title 5, U.S.C. requires each
agency to establish, in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Office of
Personnel Management, one or more
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
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Dated: October 11, 2016
Bruce Gipe,
Chief Operating Officer.
[FR Doc. 2016–24976 Filed 10–14–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7405–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–79077; File No. SR–FICC–
2016–003)
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed
Income Clearing Corporation; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change To
Describe the Blackout Period
Exposure Charge That May Be
Imposed on GCF Repo Participants
October 11, 2016.
[FR Doc. 2016–25106 Filed 10–13–16; 11:15 am]
ACTION:
PRBs. The PRB shall review and
evaluate the initial appraisal of a senior
executive’s performance by the
supervisor, along with any response by
the senior executive, and make
recommendations to the final rating
authority relative to the performance of
the senior executive.
The following individuals have been
selected to serve on the OSC’s PRB:
Bruce Fong, Associate Special Counsel;
Bruce Gipe, Chief Operating Officer;
Louis Lopez, Associate Special Counsel;
Anne Wagner, Associate Special
Counsel.
On July 12, 2016, the Fixed Income
Clearing Corporation (‘‘FICC’’) filed
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘Commission’’) proposed
rule change SR–FICC–2016–003
pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder.2
The proposed rule change was
published for comment in the Federal
Register on July 21, 2016.3 The
Commission received no comments on
the proposed rule change. On August
30, 2016, the Commission designated a
longer period within which to approve
the proposed rule change, disapprove
the proposed rule change, or institute
proceedings to determine whether to
approve or disapprove the proposed
rule change.4 For the reasons discussed
below, the Commission is approving the
proposed rule change.
1 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
3 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34–78347
(July 15, 2016), 81 FR 47466 (July 21, 2016) (SR–
FICC–2016–003) (‘‘Notice’’).
4 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78720
(August 30, 2016), 81 FR 61271 (September 6,
2016).
2 17
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I. Description of the Proposed Rule
Change
FICC proposes to amend the
Government Securities Division
(‘‘GSD’’) Rulebook (the ‘‘GSD Rules’’) 5
to include a margin charge increase (the
‘‘Blackout Period Exposure Charge’’ as
further described below) that is imposed
on Netting Members that participate in
the GCF Repo® service (‘‘GCF Repo
Participants’’). Specifically, the
proposed rule change would amend
GSD Rule 1 (Definitions) to include
certain defined terms and would amend
Section 1b of GSD Rule 4 (Clearing
Fund and Loss Allocations) to include
the Blackout Period Exposure Charge
and the manner in which FICC
determines and imposes such charge, as
described in detail below.6
A. GCF Repo Service and the Required
Fund Deposit
FICC states that the GCF Repo service
enables GCF Repo Participants to trade
general collateral repurchase agreements
based on rate, term, and underlying
product throughout the day, without
requiring intraday, trade-for-trade
settlement on a delivery-versus-payment
basis. On each trading day, GCF Repo
Participants must cover their repurchase
obligations by allocating collateral to
FICC’s account at the GCF Repo
Participant’s GCF Clearing Agent Bank.7
FICC accepts mortgage-backed securities
(‘‘MBS’’) securities for such collateral
allocations.8 Additionally, FICC collects
Required Fund Deposits from all Netting
Members (including GCF Repo
Participants) to help protect FICC
against losses that could be realized in
the event of a Netting Member’s default.
The Required Fund Deposit serves as
each Netting Member’s margin. FICC
states that the objective of the Required
Fund Deposit is to mitigate potential
losses to FICC associated with
liquidation of the Netting Member’s
portfolio in the event that FICC ceases
to act for a Netting Member (hereinafter
referred to as a ‘‘default’’). FICC
determines Required Fund Deposit
amounts using a risk-based margin
methodology.
FICC determines the adequacy of each
Netting Member’s Required Fund
Deposit through daily backtesting. FICC
compares each Netting Member’s
5 Available at https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rulesand-procedures. Capitalized terms used herein and
not otherwise defined shall have the meaning
assigned to such terms in the GSD Rules.
6 The description of the proposed rule change
herein is based on the statements prepared by FICC
in the Notice. Notice, supra note 3, 81 FR 47466–
47469.
7 GSD Rule 20 Section 3.
8 Id.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 200 / Monday, October 17, 2016 / Notices
Required Fund Deposit to the simulated
liquidation gains and losses based on
the positions in the Netting Member’s
portfolio, including the allocated
collateral of GCF Repo Participants, and
the historical security returns. FICC
investigates the cause(s) of any
deficiencies. As a part of this process,
FICC pays particular attention to Netting
Members with backtesting deficiencies
that bring the results for that Netting
Member below a 99 percent confidence
level (i.e., greater than two deficiency
days in a rolling twelve-month period) 9
to determine if there is an identifiable
cause of repeat deficiencies. FICC also
evaluates whether multiple Netting
Members may experience deficiencies
for the same underlying reason.
B. MBS and the Blackout Period
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
FICC only accepts MBS that are
issued and guaranteed by U.S.
government-sponsored entities
(‘‘GSEs’’). Because MBS are composed
of pools of mortgages, whose principal
balances decrease over time because of
scheduled and unscheduled payments
by mortgagors, MBS notional values
decrease over time. Investors in MBS
issued by the GSEs are informed of the
amount of this reduction in value on a
monthly basis when the GSEs release
new ‘‘Pool Factors’’ for their MBS at the
beginning of every month.10 The period
between the last business day of the
prior month (‘‘Record Date’’) and the
date on which the GSE releases its new
Pool Factors (‘‘Factor Date’’) is known as
the ‘‘Blackout Period.’’ 11 FICC states
that during the Blackout Period, MBS
values may be overstated because they
do not capture reductions in the
principal balances of the MBS as
described above.
FICC states that GCF Repo
Participants may experience backtesting
deficiencies during the Blackout Period
if they allocate substantial amounts of
MBS collateral to cover their repurchase
obligations. Such deficiencies occur
because the value of MBS collateral
allocated to cover GCF Repo
Participants’ repurchase obligations may
be overstated on the collateral reports
9 FICC explains that each deficiency reduces
backtesting coverage by 0.4 percent (1 exception/
250 observation days). Accordingly, three
deficiencies in a 12-month period would decrease
backtesting coverage to 98.8 percent.
10 FICC explains that Pool Factors are stated as a
percentage amount of the initial aggregate face
value of the security that remains unpaid on the
underlying mortgage pool. For example, if the face
amount of a mortgage-backed security were
$100,000 and the stated pool factor were 0.4587, the
remaining principal balance in the security to be
paid to the investor would be $45,870.
11 The Factor Date is typically the fourth or fifth
business day of each calendar month.
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delivered to FICC by the GCF Clearing
Agent Banks, which rely on the prior
month’s Pool Factors to value MBS
collateral pledged by GCF Repo
Participants. FICC states that the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge is
designed to mitigate the risk posed to
FICC by such deficiencies by
temporarily increasing such GCF Repo
Participants’ Required Fund Deposits.
C. Calculation of the Blackout Period
Exposure Charge
FICC states that the objective of the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge is to
increase Required Fund Deposits by an
amount sufficient to maintain
backtesting coverage above the 99
percent confidence threshold for GCF
Repo Participants that are likely to
experience backtesting deficiencies on
the basis described above. Because the
size of the backtesting deficiencies
caused by this issue varies among
impacted GCF Repo Participants, FICC
must assess a Blackout Period Exposure
Charge that is specific to each impacted
GCF Repo Participant.
FICC examines each impacted GCF
Repo Participant’s historical backtesting
deficiencies to identify the two largest
deficiencies that occurred during a
rolling 12-month look-back period. FICC
then identifies an amount equal to the
midpoint between the two largest
historical deficiencies for such GCF
Repo Participant as the presumptive
Blackout Period Exposure Charge
amount, subject to adjustment as further
described below.12 FICC identified the
midpoint between the two largest
historical deficiencies as an amount that
is (i) particular to the GCF Repo
Participant and its use of MBS
collateral, and (ii) which FICC believes
provides a reasonable buffer above the
historically observed minimum increase
necessary to achieve 99 percent
coverage.
FICC states that the resulting Blackout
Period Exposure Charge is added to the
VaR Charge for such GCF Repo
Participant pursuant to FICC’s riskbased margining methodology, but that
the charge is only imposed during the
Blackout Period (i.e., until the GCF
Repo Participant’s GCF Clearing Agent
Bank updates the Pool Factors it uses to
12 FICC states that although an increase equal to
the third largest historical deficiency would suffice
to bring the GCF Repo Participant’s historicallyobserved backtesting coverage above the 99 percent
target if deficiencies due to Blackout Period
exposures were the only deficiencies experienced,
such an approach would fail to take into account
potential changes in such GCF Repo Participant’s
MBS collateral pledges or other factors that could
contribute to deficiencies during this period.
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value MBS collateral).13 FICC further
states that this charge is applicable only
to those GCF Repo Participants that
have two or more backtesting
deficiencies that occurred during the
Blackout Period and whose overall 12month trailing backtesting coverage falls
below the 99 percent coverage target.
Although FICC uses the midpoint
between the two largest historical
Blackout Period deficiencies for a GCF
Repo Participant as the Blackout Period
Exposure Charge in most cases, FICC
retains discretion to adjust the charge
based on other relevant circumstances,
such as material differences in the two
largest deficiencies, variability in a GCF
Repo Participant’s use of MBS for
collateral allocation, and variability in
the magnitude of Pool Factor changes
for certain categories of MBS. Based on
FICC’s assessment of the impact of these
circumstances on the likelihood of, and
estimated size of, future Blackout Period
deficiencies for a GCF Repo Participant,
FICC may, in its discretion, adjust the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge for
such Participant to an amount that FICC
determines to be more appropriate for
maintaining such GCF Repo
Participant’s backtesting results above
the 99 percent coverage threshold
(including a reasonable buffer).
D. Communication With GCF Repo
Participants and Imposition of the
Charge
If FICC determines that a Blackout
Period Exposure Charge should apply to
a GCF Repo Participant who was not
assessed a Blackout Period Exposure
Charge during the immediately
preceding month or that the Blackout
Period Exposure Charge applied to a
GCF Repo Participant during the
previous month should be increased,
FICC will notify the Participant on or
around the 25th calendar day of the
month. FICC states that the Participant
may avoid or decrease the charge by
notifying FICC in writing of its intent to
remove or reduce its use of MBS in
collateral allocations, followed by the
actual removal or reduction of MBS
collateral allocations, during the
Blackout Period. If such Participant
elects not to adjust its portfolio (or fails
to do so despite such notification to
FICC), then FICC will impose a Blackout
Period Exposure Charge as determined
above.
FICC imposes the Blackout Period
Exposure Charge as of the morning
Clearing Fund call on the Record Date
through and including the intraday
13 The GCF Clearing Agent Banks typically have
a one-day lag in updating their databases with the
most recent Pool Factor information.
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jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Clearing Fund call on the Factor Date,
or until the Pool Factors have been
updated to reflect the current month’s
Pool Factors in the GCF Clearing Agent
Bank’s collateral reports. Thereafter the
charge is removed because updated
MBS valuations are incorporated into
FICC’s risk-based margining
methodology for the remainder of the
month, alleviating the risk of potentially
uncovered credit exposures resulting
from overvalued MBS collateral during
Blackout Period. FICC repeats this
process monthly.
If changes in an impacted GCF Repo
Participant’s MBS collateral pledges
over time materially reduce the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge
calculated pursuant to the procedures
described above, FICC may, in its
discretion, reduce the Blackout Period
Exposure Charge and would so notify
the Participant. If an impacted GCF
Repo Participant’s trailing 12-month
backtesting coverage exceeds 99 percent
(without taking into account
historically-imposed Blackout Period
Exposure Charges), the Blackout Period
Exposure Charge would be removed.
II. Discussion and Commission
Findings
Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act 14
directs the Commission to approve a
proposed rule change of a selfregulatory organization if it finds that
such proposed rule change is consistent
with the requirements of the Act and the
rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to such organization. The
Commission finds that the proposed
rule change is consistent with Section
17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act 15 and Rules
17Ad–22(b)(1) and (2) thereunder, as
discussed below.16
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act
requires, in part, that the rules of a
clearing agency be designed to assure
the safeguarding of securities and funds
that are within the custody or control of
the clearing agency.17 As a central
counterparty (‘‘CCP’’), FICC is exposed
to losses that could arise out of the
default of one of its Netting Members,
such as a GCF Repo Participant. As
explained above, FICC attempts to cover
such potential losses through the
collection of daily Required Fund
Deposits (i.e., margin) from its Netting
Members, including GCF Repo
Participants. Consequently, failure to
accurately calculate Required Fund
Deposits could expose FICC to losses in
excess of the margin collected and, thus,
14 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
U.S.C. 78q–1(b)(3)(F).
16 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(b)(1)–(2).
17 15 U.S.C. 78q–1(b)(3)(F).
15 15
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jeopardize the securities and funds in
FICC’s custody or control.
As described above, FICC determined
that the Required Fund Deposits
collected from GCF Repo Participants
during monthly Blackout Periods may
not accurately reflect decreases in the
value of MBS underlying the GCF Repo
transactions and, therefore, the Required
Fund Deposits collected may be
inadequate to cover the losses that could
arise if a GCF Repo Participant
defaulted. The Blackout Period
Exposure Charge is specifically
designed to address that risk. The
charge is sized based on certain
backtesting deficiencies of GCF Repo
Participants. Where FICC identifies
deficiencies related to the use of MBS
underlying GCF Repo transactions, the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge may
be applied and, in turn, FICC would
collect more margin. Therefore, the
proposed rule change enhances the
safeguarding of securities and funds that
are in the custody or control of FICC,
consistent with Section 17(b)(3)(F) of
the Act.
Rule 17Ad–22(b)(1) requires a
clearing agency that performs CCP
services to establish, implement,
maintain and enforce written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to
measure its credit exposures to its
participants at least once a day and limit
its exposures to potential losses from
defaults by its participants under
normal market conditions, so that the
operations of the clearing agency would
not be disrupted and non-defaulting
participants would not be exposed to
losses that they cannot anticipate or
control.18 FICC’s Blackout Period
Exposure Charge is calculated and
imposed to cover potential credit
exposures to certain GCF Repo
Participants during monthly Blackout
Periods, under normal market
conditions.19 As described above, FICC
estimates the Blackout Period Exposure
Charge based on a GCF Repo
Participant’s backtesting results.
Specifically, FICC calculates the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge as the
midpoint between a GCF Participant’s
two largest deficiencies over the past
twelve months, which, as designed,
incorporates a buffer to help ensure that
FICC maintain margin coverage at or
CFR 240.17Ad–22(b)(1).
used in Rule 17Ad–22(b)(1), normal market
conditions are conditions in which the expected
movement of the price of cleared securities would
produce changes in a clearing agency’s exposures
to its participants that would be expected to breach
margin requirements or other risk control
mechanisms only one percent of the time (i.e., a 99
percent confidence threshold). 17 CFR 240.17Ad–
22(a)(4).
71547
above the 99 percent confidence
threshold during monthly Blackout
Periods. Therefore, because the
proposed rule change will help FICC
limit its potential losses from the default
of certain GCF Repo Participants during
monthly Blackout Periods, under
normal market conditions, the proposed
rule change is consistent with Rule
17Ad–22(b)(1).
Rule 17Ad–22(b)(2) requires a
clearing agency that performs CCP
services to maintain and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably
designed to use margin requirements to
limit its credit exposures to participants
under normal market conditions and
use risk-based models and parameters to
set margin requirements.20 As described
above, FICC limits its exposure to
Netting Members, including GCF
Participants, by collecting margin (i.e.,
Required Fund Deposit), which is sized
using a risk-based margin methodology.
The Blackout Period Exposure Charge is
a component of a GCF Repo
Participant’s daily Required Fund
Deposit and is sized based on the GCF
Repo Participant’s backtesting
deficiencies, as described above. The
charge is designed to address the
potential increased exposure that FICC
may face if the MBS collateral
underlying a GCF Repo Participant’s
transactions decreases during a monthly
Blackout Period, under normal market
conditions. Therefore, because the
proposed rule change will help FICC
limit its exposure to GCG Repo
Participants during monthly Blackout
Periods, under normal market
conditions, by collecting more margin,
as needed, the proposed rule change is
consistent with Rule 17Ad–22(b)(2)
under the Act.
III. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the
Commission finds that the proposed
rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Act, particularly
those set forth in Section 17A,21 and the
rules and regulations thereunder.
It is therefore ordered, pursuant to
Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,22 that the
proposed rule change (SR–FICC–2016–
003) be, and hereby is, APPROVED.23
18 17
19 As
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20 17
CFR 240.17Ad–22(b)(2).
U.S.C. 78q–1.
22 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
23 In approving the proposed rule change, the
Commission considered the proposal’s impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See
15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
21 15
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 200 / Monday, October 17, 2016 / Notices
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.24
Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016–24982 Filed 10–14–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
[Release No. 34–79081; File No. SR–
NASDAQ–2016–135]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The
Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change To
Amend the Continued Listing
Requirements for Exchange-Traded
Products
1. Purpose
October 11, 2016
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on
September 30, 2016, The Nasdaq Stock
Market LLC (‘‘Nasdaq’’ or ‘‘Exchange’’)
filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘SEC’’ or ‘‘Commission’’)
the proposed rule change as described
in Items I and II below, which Items
have been prepared by the Exchange.
The Commission is publishing this
notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested
persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
The Exchange proposes to amend the
continued listing requirements for
exchange-traded products (‘‘ETPs’’) in
the Nasdaq Rule 5700 Series, as well as
a related amendment to Nasdaq Rule
5810 (Notification of Deficiency by the
Listing Qualifications Department). The
Exchange is also making housekeeping
changes throughout the Nasdaq Rule
5700 Series and in Nasdaq Rule 5810 for
improved clarity.
The text of the proposed rule change
is available on the Exchange’s Web site
at https://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com, at
the principal office of the Exchange, and
at the Commission’s Public Reference
Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
24 17
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
2 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
The Exchange proposes to amend the
listing rules for ETPs in the Nasdaq Rule
5700 Series (Other Securities) to add
additional continued listing standards
as well as a related amendment to
Nasdaq Rule 5810 (Notification of
Deficiency by the Listing Qualifications
Department). The Exchange is also
making housekeeping changes
throughout the Nasdaq Rule 5700 Series
and in Nasdaq Rule 5810 (e.g.,
punctuation, formatting, capitalization
and renumbering) for improved clarity.
The proposed rule changes are being
made in concert with discussions with
the SEC. Citing their concern for
potential manipulation of ETPs, staff
(‘‘Staff’’) of the SEC’s Office of Trading
and Markets (‘‘T&M’’) requested that the
Exchange adopt certain additional
continued listing standards for ETPs.
As a result, the proposed amended
rules reflect the guidance provided by
T&M Staff to clarify that most initial
listing standards, as well as certain
representations included in Exchange
rule filings under SEC Rule 19b–4 3 to
list an ETP (‘‘Exchange Rule Filings’’),
are also considered continued listing
standards. The Exchange Rule Filing
representations that will also be
required to be maintained on a
continuous basis include: (a) The
description of the fund; (b) the fund’s
investment restrictions; and (c) the
applicability of Nasdaq rules and
surveillance procedures.
The proposed rule changes require
that ETPs listed by the Exchange
without an Exchange Rule Filing must
maintain the initial index or reference
asset criteria on a continued basis. For
example, in the case of a domestic
equity index, these criteria generally
include: (a) Stocks with 90% of the
weight of the index must have a
minimum market value of at least $75
million; (b) stocks with 70% of the
weight of the index must have a
minimum monthly trading volume of at
1 15
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14:22 Oct 14, 2016
3 17
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CFR 240.19b–4.
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least 250,000 shares; (c) the most
heavily weighted component cannot
exceed 30% of the weight of the index,
and the five most heavily weighted
stocks cannot exceed 65%; (d) there
must be at least 13 stocks in the index;
and (e) all securities in the index must
be listed in the U.S. There are similar
criteria for international indexes, fixedincome indexes and indexes with a
combination of components.
If an Exchange Rule Filing is made to
list a specific ETP, the proposed rule
change requires that the issuer of the
security comply on a continuing basis
with any statements or representations
contained in the applicable rule
proposal, including: (a) The description
of the portfolio; (b) limitations on
portfolio holdings or reference assets;
and (c) the applicability of Nasdaq rules
and surveillance procedures.
The Nasdaq listing rules will also be
modified to require that issuers of
securities listed under the Nasdaq Rule
5700 Series must notify the Exchange
regarding instances of non-compliance.
In addition, while listed ETPs are
currently subject to the delisting process
in the Rule 5800 Series, the rules will
be clarified to make this explicit.4 The
Rule 5800 Series will also be clarified to
make explicit that in cases where
Listing Qualifications staff has notified
an ETP that it is deficient under one or
more listing standards, the ETP may
submit a plan to regain compliance as
set forth under the Listing Rules. In this
regard, consistent with deficiencies
from most other rules that allow issuers
to submit a plan to regain compliance,5
Nasdaq proposes to allow issuers of
ETPs 45 calendar days to submit such
a plan. Nasdaq staff will review the plan
and may grant a limited period of time
for the ETP to regain compliance as
permitted under the Listing Rules. If
Nasdaq staff does not accept the plan,
Nasdaq staff would issue a Delisting
Determination, which the company
could appeal to a Hearings Panel
pursuant to Rule 5815.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that its
proposal is consistent with Section 6(b)
4 ETPs are also subject to Nasdaq Rule 4120,
which governs trading halts.
5 Pursuant to Rule 5810(c)(2)(A), a company is
provided 45 days to submit a plan to regain
compliance with Rules 5620(c) (Quorum), 5630
(Review of Related Party Transactions), 5635
(Shareholder Approval), 5250(c)(3) (Auditor
Registration), 5255(a) (Direct Registration Program),
5610 (Code of Conduct), 5615(a)(4)(E) (Quorum of
Limited Partnerships), 5615(a)(4)(G) (Related Party
Transactions of Limited Partnerships), and 5640
(Voting Rights). A company is generally provided
60 days to submit a plan to regain compliance with
the requirement to timely file periodic reports
contained in Rule 5250(c)(1).
E:\FR\FM\17OCN1.SGM
17OCN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 200 (Monday, October 17, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71545-71548]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-24982]
=======================================================================
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-79077; File No. SR-FICC-2016-003)
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Describe the Blackout Period
Exposure Charge That May Be Imposed on GCF Repo Participants
October 11, 2016.
On July 12, 2016, the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (``FICC'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'')
proposed rule change SR-FICC-2016-003 pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4
thereunder.\2\ The proposed rule change was published for comment in
the Federal Register on July 21, 2016.\3\ The Commission received no
comments on the proposed rule change. On August 30, 2016, the
Commission designated a longer period within which to approve the
proposed rule change, disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute
proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed
rule change.\4\ For the reasons discussed below, the Commission is
approving the proposed rule change.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\3\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-78347 (July 15,
2016), 81 FR 47466 (July 21, 2016) (SR-FICC-2016-003) (``Notice'').
\4\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78720 (August 30, 2016),
81 FR 61271 (September 6, 2016).
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I. Description of the Proposed Rule Change
FICC proposes to amend the Government Securities Division (``GSD'')
Rulebook (the ``GSD Rules'') \5\ to include a margin charge increase
(the ``Blackout Period Exposure Charge'' as further described below)
that is imposed on Netting Members that participate in the GCF
Repo[supreg] service (``GCF Repo Participants''). Specifically, the
proposed rule change would amend GSD Rule 1 (Definitions) to include
certain defined terms and would amend Section 1b of GSD Rule 4
(Clearing Fund and Loss Allocations) to include the Blackout Period
Exposure Charge and the manner in which FICC determines and imposes
such charge, as described in detail below.\6\
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\5\ Available at https://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures.
Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have
the meaning assigned to such terms in the GSD Rules.
\6\ The description of the proposed rule change herein is based
on the statements prepared by FICC in the Notice. Notice, supra note
3, 81 FR 47466-47469.
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A. GCF Repo Service and the Required Fund Deposit
FICC states that the GCF Repo service enables GCF Repo Participants
to trade general collateral repurchase agreements based on rate, term,
and underlying product throughout the day, without requiring intraday,
trade-for-trade settlement on a delivery-versus-payment basis. On each
trading day, GCF Repo Participants must cover their repurchase
obligations by allocating collateral to FICC's account at the GCF Repo
Participant's GCF Clearing Agent Bank.\7\ FICC accepts mortgage-backed
securities (``MBS'') securities for such collateral allocations.\8\
Additionally, FICC collects Required Fund Deposits from all Netting
Members (including GCF Repo Participants) to help protect FICC against
losses that could be realized in the event of a Netting Member's
default.
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\7\ GSD Rule 20 Section 3.
\8\ Id.
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The Required Fund Deposit serves as each Netting Member's margin.
FICC states that the objective of the Required Fund Deposit is to
mitigate potential losses to FICC associated with liquidation of the
Netting Member's portfolio in the event that FICC ceases to act for a
Netting Member (hereinafter referred to as a ``default''). FICC
determines Required Fund Deposit amounts using a risk-based margin
methodology.
FICC determines the adequacy of each Netting Member's Required Fund
Deposit through daily backtesting. FICC compares each Netting Member's
[[Page 71546]]
Required Fund Deposit to the simulated liquidation gains and losses
based on the positions in the Netting Member's portfolio, including the
allocated collateral of GCF Repo Participants, and the historical
security returns. FICC investigates the cause(s) of any deficiencies.
As a part of this process, FICC pays particular attention to Netting
Members with backtesting deficiencies that bring the results for that
Netting Member below a 99 percent confidence level (i.e., greater than
two deficiency days in a rolling twelve-month period) \9\ to determine
if there is an identifiable cause of repeat deficiencies. FICC also
evaluates whether multiple Netting Members may experience deficiencies
for the same underlying reason.
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\9\ FICC explains that each deficiency reduces backtesting
coverage by 0.4 percent (1 exception/250 observation days).
Accordingly, three deficiencies in a 12-month period would decrease
backtesting coverage to 98.8 percent.
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B. MBS and the Blackout Period
FICC only accepts MBS that are issued and guaranteed by U.S.
government-sponsored entities (``GSEs''). Because MBS are composed of
pools of mortgages, whose principal balances decrease over time because
of scheduled and unscheduled payments by mortgagors, MBS notional
values decrease over time. Investors in MBS issued by the GSEs are
informed of the amount of this reduction in value on a monthly basis
when the GSEs release new ``Pool Factors'' for their MBS at the
beginning of every month.\10\ The period between the last business day
of the prior month (``Record Date'') and the date on which the GSE
releases its new Pool Factors (``Factor Date'') is known as the
``Blackout Period.'' \11\ FICC states that during the Blackout Period,
MBS values may be overstated because they do not capture reductions in
the principal balances of the MBS as described above.
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\10\ FICC explains that Pool Factors are stated as a percentage
amount of the initial aggregate face value of the security that
remains unpaid on the underlying mortgage pool. For example, if the
face amount of a mortgage-backed security were $100,000 and the
stated pool factor were 0.4587, the remaining principal balance in
the security to be paid to the investor would be $45,870.
\11\ The Factor Date is typically the fourth or fifth business
day of each calendar month.
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FICC states that GCF Repo Participants may experience backtesting
deficiencies during the Blackout Period if they allocate substantial
amounts of MBS collateral to cover their repurchase obligations. Such
deficiencies occur because the value of MBS collateral allocated to
cover GCF Repo Participants' repurchase obligations may be overstated
on the collateral reports delivered to FICC by the GCF Clearing Agent
Banks, which rely on the prior month's Pool Factors to value MBS
collateral pledged by GCF Repo Participants. FICC states that the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge is designed to mitigate the risk posed
to FICC by such deficiencies by temporarily increasing such GCF Repo
Participants' Required Fund Deposits.
C. Calculation of the Blackout Period Exposure Charge
FICC states that the objective of the Blackout Period Exposure
Charge is to increase Required Fund Deposits by an amount sufficient to
maintain backtesting coverage above the 99 percent confidence threshold
for GCF Repo Participants that are likely to experience backtesting
deficiencies on the basis described above. Because the size of the
backtesting deficiencies caused by this issue varies among impacted GCF
Repo Participants, FICC must assess a Blackout Period Exposure Charge
that is specific to each impacted GCF Repo Participant.
FICC examines each impacted GCF Repo Participant's historical
backtesting deficiencies to identify the two largest deficiencies that
occurred during a rolling 12-month look-back period. FICC then
identifies an amount equal to the midpoint between the two largest
historical deficiencies for such GCF Repo Participant as the
presumptive Blackout Period Exposure Charge amount, subject to
adjustment as further described below.\12\ FICC identified the midpoint
between the two largest historical deficiencies as an amount that is
(i) particular to the GCF Repo Participant and its use of MBS
collateral, and (ii) which FICC believes provides a reasonable buffer
above the historically observed minimum increase necessary to achieve
99 percent coverage.
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\12\ FICC states that although an increase equal to the third
largest historical deficiency would suffice to bring the GCF Repo
Participant's historically-observed backtesting coverage above the
99 percent target if deficiencies due to Blackout Period exposures
were the only deficiencies experienced, such an approach would fail
to take into account potential changes in such GCF Repo
Participant's MBS collateral pledges or other factors that could
contribute to deficiencies during this period.
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FICC states that the resulting Blackout Period Exposure Charge is
added to the VaR Charge for such GCF Repo Participant pursuant to
FICC's risk-based margining methodology, but that the charge is only
imposed during the Blackout Period (i.e., until the GCF Repo
Participant's GCF Clearing Agent Bank updates the Pool Factors it uses
to value MBS collateral).\13\ FICC further states that this charge is
applicable only to those GCF Repo Participants that have two or more
backtesting deficiencies that occurred during the Blackout Period and
whose overall 12-month trailing backtesting coverage falls below the 99
percent coverage target.
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\13\ The GCF Clearing Agent Banks typically have a one-day lag
in updating their databases with the most recent Pool Factor
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although FICC uses the midpoint between the two largest historical
Blackout Period deficiencies for a GCF Repo Participant as the Blackout
Period Exposure Charge in most cases, FICC retains discretion to adjust
the charge based on other relevant circumstances, such as material
differences in the two largest deficiencies, variability in a GCF Repo
Participant's use of MBS for collateral allocation, and variability in
the magnitude of Pool Factor changes for certain categories of MBS.
Based on FICC's assessment of the impact of these circumstances on the
likelihood of, and estimated size of, future Blackout Period
deficiencies for a GCF Repo Participant, FICC may, in its discretion,
adjust the Blackout Period Exposure Charge for such Participant to an
amount that FICC determines to be more appropriate for maintaining such
GCF Repo Participant's backtesting results above the 99 percent
coverage threshold (including a reasonable buffer).
D. Communication With GCF Repo Participants and Imposition of the
Charge
If FICC determines that a Blackout Period Exposure Charge should
apply to a GCF Repo Participant who was not assessed a Blackout Period
Exposure Charge during the immediately preceding month or that the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge applied to a GCF Repo Participant
during the previous month should be increased, FICC will notify the
Participant on or around the 25th calendar day of the month. FICC
states that the Participant may avoid or decrease the charge by
notifying FICC in writing of its intent to remove or reduce its use of
MBS in collateral allocations, followed by the actual removal or
reduction of MBS collateral allocations, during the Blackout Period. If
such Participant elects not to adjust its portfolio (or fails to do so
despite such notification to FICC), then FICC will impose a Blackout
Period Exposure Charge as determined above.
FICC imposes the Blackout Period Exposure Charge as of the morning
Clearing Fund call on the Record Date through and including the
intraday
[[Page 71547]]
Clearing Fund call on the Factor Date, or until the Pool Factors have
been updated to reflect the current month's Pool Factors in the GCF
Clearing Agent Bank's collateral reports. Thereafter the charge is
removed because updated MBS valuations are incorporated into FICC's
risk-based margining methodology for the remainder of the month,
alleviating the risk of potentially uncovered credit exposures
resulting from overvalued MBS collateral during Blackout Period. FICC
repeats this process monthly.
If changes in an impacted GCF Repo Participant's MBS collateral
pledges over time materially reduce the Blackout Period Exposure Charge
calculated pursuant to the procedures described above, FICC may, in its
discretion, reduce the Blackout Period Exposure Charge and would so
notify the Participant. If an impacted GCF Repo Participant's trailing
12-month backtesting coverage exceeds 99 percent (without taking into
account historically-imposed Blackout Period Exposure Charges), the
Blackout Period Exposure Charge would be removed.
II. Discussion and Commission Findings
Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act \14\ directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to such organization. The Commission finds that the proposed
rule change is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \15\ and
Rules 17Ad-22(b)(1) and (2) thereunder, as discussed below.\16\
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\14\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
\15\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\16\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(b)(1)-(2).
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Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act requires, in part, that the rules
of a clearing agency be designed to assure the safeguarding of
securities and funds that are within the custody or control of the
clearing agency.\17\ As a central counterparty (``CCP''), FICC is
exposed to losses that could arise out of the default of one of its
Netting Members, such as a GCF Repo Participant. As explained above,
FICC attempts to cover such potential losses through the collection of
daily Required Fund Deposits (i.e., margin) from its Netting Members,
including GCF Repo Participants. Consequently, failure to accurately
calculate Required Fund Deposits could expose FICC to losses in excess
of the margin collected and, thus, jeopardize the securities and funds
in FICC's custody or control.
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\17\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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As described above, FICC determined that the Required Fund Deposits
collected from GCF Repo Participants during monthly Blackout Periods
may not accurately reflect decreases in the value of MBS underlying the
GCF Repo transactions and, therefore, the Required Fund Deposits
collected may be inadequate to cover the losses that could arise if a
GCF Repo Participant defaulted. The Blackout Period Exposure Charge is
specifically designed to address that risk. The charge is sized based
on certain backtesting deficiencies of GCF Repo Participants. Where
FICC identifies deficiencies related to the use of MBS underlying GCF
Repo transactions, the Blackout Period Exposure Charge may be applied
and, in turn, FICC would collect more margin. Therefore, the proposed
rule change enhances the safeguarding of securities and funds that are
in the custody or control of FICC, consistent with Section 17(b)(3)(F)
of the Act.
Rule 17Ad-22(b)(1) requires a clearing agency that performs CCP
services to establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to measure its credit exposures to
its participants at least once a day and limit its exposures to
potential losses from defaults by its participants under normal market
conditions, so that the operations of the clearing agency would not be
disrupted and non-defaulting participants would not be exposed to
losses that they cannot anticipate or control.\18\ FICC's Blackout
Period Exposure Charge is calculated and imposed to cover potential
credit exposures to certain GCF Repo Participants during monthly
Blackout Periods, under normal market conditions.\19\ As described
above, FICC estimates the Blackout Period Exposure Charge based on a
GCF Repo Participant's backtesting results. Specifically, FICC
calculates the Blackout Period Exposure Charge as the midpoint between
a GCF Participant's two largest deficiencies over the past twelve
months, which, as designed, incorporates a buffer to help ensure that
FICC maintain margin coverage at or above the 99 percent confidence
threshold during monthly Blackout Periods. Therefore, because the
proposed rule change will help FICC limit its potential losses from the
default of certain GCF Repo Participants during monthly Blackout
Periods, under normal market conditions, the proposed rule change is
consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(b)(1).
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\18\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(b)(1).
\19\ As used in Rule 17Ad-22(b)(1), normal market conditions are
conditions in which the expected movement of the price of cleared
securities would produce changes in a clearing agency's exposures to
its participants that would be expected to breach margin
requirements or other risk control mechanisms only one percent of
the time (i.e., a 99 percent confidence threshold). 17 CFR 240.17Ad-
22(a)(4).
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Rule 17Ad-22(b)(2) requires a clearing agency that performs CCP
services to maintain and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to use margin requirements to limit its credit
exposures to participants under normal market conditions and use risk-
based models and parameters to set margin requirements.\20\ As
described above, FICC limits its exposure to Netting Members, including
GCF Participants, by collecting margin (i.e., Required Fund Deposit),
which is sized using a risk-based margin methodology. The Blackout
Period Exposure Charge is a component of a GCF Repo Participant's daily
Required Fund Deposit and is sized based on the GCF Repo Participant's
backtesting deficiencies, as described above. The charge is designed to
address the potential increased exposure that FICC may face if the MBS
collateral underlying a GCF Repo Participant's transactions decreases
during a monthly Blackout Period, under normal market conditions.
Therefore, because the proposed rule change will help FICC limit its
exposure to GCG Repo Participants during monthly Blackout Periods,
under normal market conditions, by collecting more margin, as needed,
the proposed rule change is consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(b)(2) under
the Act.
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\20\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(b)(2).
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III. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Act,
particularly those set forth in Section 17A,\21\ and the rules and
regulations thereunder.
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\21\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
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It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Act,\22\ that the proposed rule change (SR-FICC-2016-003) be, and
hereby is, APPROVED.\23\
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\22\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
\23\ In approving the proposed rule change, the Commission
considered the proposal's impact on efficiency, competition, and
capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
[[Page 71548]]
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For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\24\
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\24\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016-24982 Filed 10-14-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P