Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers Sanction for Breaches of Administrative Protective Order, 60021-60022 [2016-20869]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 169 / Wednesday, August 31, 2016 / Notices
Authority: 43 CFR 1784.4–1
Sally R. Butts,
Acting Deputy State Director, Lands and
Resources.
[FR Doc. 2016–20942 Filed 8–30–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310–FB–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement
[S1D1S SS08011000 SX066A0067F
167S180110; S2D2D SS08011000 SX066A00
33F 16XS501520]
Notice of Proposed Information
Collection; Request for Comments for
1029–0113
Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement.
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:
In compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement (OSMRE) is
announcing its intention to request
approval for the collection of
information for General Reclamation
Requirements.
DATES: Comments on the proposed
information collection must be received
by October 31, 2016, to be assured of
consideration.
ADDRESSES: Mail comments to John
Trelease, Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement, 1951
Constitution Ave. NW., Room 203—SIB,
Washington, DC 20240. Comments may
also be submitted electronically to
jtrelease@osmre.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: To
receive a copy of the information
collection request contact John Trelease
at (202) 208–2783, or via email at
jtrelease@osmre.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)
regulations at 5 CFR 1320, which
implement provisions of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13),
require that interested members of the
public and affected agencies have an
opportunity to comment on information
collection and recordkeeping activities
[see 5 CFR 1320.8 (d)]. This notice
identifies the information collection that
OSMRE will be submitting to OMB for
extension. This collection is contained
in 30 CFR part 874.
OSM has revised burden estimates,
where appropriate, to reflect current
reporting levels or adjustments based on
reestimates of burden or number of
respondents. OSMRE will request a
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SUMMARY:
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3-year term of approval for this
information collection activity.
Comments are invited on: (1) the need
for the collection of information for the
performance of the functions of the
agency; (2) the accuracy of the agency’s
burden estimates; (3) ways to enhance
the quality, utility and clarity of the
information collections; and (4) ways to
minimize the information collection
burden on respondents, such as use of
automated means of collection of the
information. A summary of the public
comments will accompany OSMRE’s
submission of the information collection
request to OMB.
Before including your address, phone
number, email address, or other
personal identifying information in your
comment, you should be aware that
your entire comment–including your
personal identifying information–may
be made publicly available at any time.
While you can ask us in your comment
to withhold your personal identifying
information from public review, we
cannot guarantee that we will be able to
do so.
This notice provides the public with
60 days in which to comment on the
following information collection
activity:
Title: 30 CFR part 874—General
Reclamation Requirements.
OMB Control Number: 1029–0113.
Summary: Part 874 establishes land
and water eligibility requirements,
reclamation objectives and priorities
and reclamation contractor
responsibility. 30 CFR 874.17 requires
consultation between the AML agency
and the appropriate Title V regulatory
authority on the likelihood of removing
the coal under a Title V permit and
concurrences between the AML agency
and the appropriate Title V regulatory
authority on the AML project boundary
and the amount of coal that would be
extracted under the AML reclamation
project.
Bureau Form Number: None.
Frequency of Collection: Once.
Description of Respondents: 17 State
regulatory authorities and Indian tribes.
Total Annual Responses: 17.
Total Annual Burden Hours: 1,411.
Dated: August 25, 2016.
John A. Trelease,
Acting Chief, Division of Regulatory Support.
[FR Doc. 2016–20937 Filed 8–30–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310–05–P
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60021
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
[Investigation No. 337–TA–794]
Certain Electronic Devices, Including
Wireless Communication Devices,
Portable Music and Data Processing
Devices, and Tablet Computers
Sanction for Breaches of
Administrative Protective Order
U.S. International Trade
Commission.
ACTION: Sanction for breaches of
Commission administrative protective
order.
AGENCY:
Notice is hereby given that
the U.S. International Trade
Commission has imposed a sanction for
the breach of the administrative
protective order (‘‘APO’’) issued in this
investigation. The Commission
determined that the law firm of Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP
(‘‘Quinn Emanuel’’) breached the APO
by failing to adequately control access to
confidential business information
(‘‘CBI’’) in the investigation and
litigation in the U.S. District for the
Northern District of California. As a
result, Quinn Emanuel attorneys and
employees of complainants Samsung
Telecommunications America LLC and
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
(collectively, ‘‘Samsung’’) improperly
disclosed CBI to more than 140
unauthorized persons over a fourteenmonth period. Quinn Emanuel is being
publicly reprimanded for pervasive
problems at the firm in safeguarding
CBI.
SUMMARY:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Carol McCue Verratti, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, U.S. International
Trade Commission, 500 E Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20436, telephone (202)
205–3088. Hearing impaired individuals
are advised that information on this
matter can be obtained by contacting the
Commission’s TDD terminal at (202)
205–1810. General information
concerning the Commission can also be
obtained by accessing its Internet server
(https://www.usitc.gov).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Several
Quinn Emanuel attorneys inadvertently
disclosed CBI designated by respondent
Apple Inc. as CBI in the investigation
and for cross-use in litigation in the U.S.
District for the Northern District of
California to persons who were not
authorized to access CBI under the APO.
A junior associate at Quinn Emanuel
failed to fully redact CBI from an expert
report prepared for the district court
action, and a partner at Quinn Emanuel
failed to supervise the junior associate.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 169 / Wednesday, August 31, 2016 / Notices
Quinn Emanuel attorneys subsequently
sent the incompletely redacted expert
report to unauthorized persons at
Samsung and other law and consulting
firms on several occasions. Some of the
non-signatory recipients further
disseminated the CBI to other nonsignatories, including an Italian court.
One of the incidents involved a partner
at Quinn Emanuel emailing more than
90 Samsung employees with
instructions on how to access the
incompletely redacted expert report on
an FTP site. Another incident involved
a second associate who failed to
safeguard CBI by improperly confirming
the redactions. In another incident, the
same junior associate who made the
original redactions discovered that an
incompletely redacted report had been
inadvertently disclosed to a Samsung
employee and alerted the second
associate and a supervising partner.
Although the Samsung employee
deleted the report without viewing the
CBI, the second associate later sent a
revised version that still contained CBI.
No one at Quinn Emanuel notified
Apple or the Commission of the
disclosure at the time. No other efforts
were made to investigate whether other
disclosures had been made so as to
prevent further disclosures. As a result,
the unauthorized disclosures continued.
In connection with the investigation
before the Commission, a mid-level
associate at Quinn Emanuel failed to
redact the same CBI from an outline for
a brief on remedy and the public
interest. Quinn Emanuel attorneys
subsequently sent versions of the
outline and the public interest brief
containing CBI to unauthorized persons
at Samsung and other law firms on
several occasions. A partner at Quinn
Emanuel discovered one such
disclosure, but did not notify Apple or
the Commission at the time because he
had acted promptly after the discovery
to prevent unauthorized persons from
viewing CBI.
A third party filed a motion for a
protective order in the district court
action, alleging that Samsung had
obtained CBI. Quinn Emanuel notified
the Commission of certain of the
disclosures a month later, and two
weeks after it had notified the third
party of the same disclosures.
The Commission considered several
aggravating factors, including the
viewing of CBI by unauthorized
persons; the discovery of the breaches
by a third party; Quinn Emanuel’s
failure and delay in reporting to the
Commission the disclosures when they
were discovered; the lengthy period of
time in which CBI was unprotected;
multiple breaches by Quinn Emanuel
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attorneys in the same investigation; and
multiple breaches by Quinn Emanuel
attorneys in a two-year period. The
Commission also considered several
mitigating factors, including the
inadvertent nature of the breaches;
Quinn Emanuel’s recent
implementation of a firm-wide policy to
help prevent unauthorized disclosures;
Quinn Emanuel’s prompt and strenuous
efforts to investigate, cure, and prevent
further breaches; and the fact that a
federal district court has already
sanctioned the disclosures and conduct
underlying the breaches relating to the
expert report.
Although Quinn Emanuel had
procedures to prevent unauthorized
disclosures, the firm did not ensure that
attorneys complied with those
procedures and made unilateral
decisions regarding the APO’s scope
and requirements. The large number
and the vast extent of the unauthorized
disclosures show that the failure to
safeguard CBI was a pervasive problem
at Quinn Emanuel.
The authority for the Commission’s
determination is contained in section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended (19 U.S.C. 1337), and in Part
210 of the Commission’s Rules of
Practice and Procedure (19 CFR part
210).
By order of the Commission.
Issued: August 25, 2016.
Lisa R. Barton,
Secretary to the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2016–20869 Filed 8–30–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives
[Docket No. ATF 2015R–15]
Electronic Collection and Transfer of
Import Information: Cessation of PGA
Message Set Pilot Program
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, Department of
Justice.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
announces cessation of the pilot
program that tested the transfer of data
between the Participating Government
Agency (PGA) Message Set in the
Automated Commercial Environment
(ACE) and ATF’s Web-based data
analytics system. ACE is the Web-based
portal for the collection and use of
international trade data maintained by
SUMMARY:
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U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP). The PGA Message Set is the data
related to merchandise regulated by an
agency, such as ATF, that CBP will
receive electronically from importers for
its use as well as for the PGA’s use. The
data enables ATF to determine the
actual items imported. Although this
notice announces the cessation of the
pilot program, the mandatory filing date
for filing entries in ACE has yet to be
determined.
This notice is effective on
August 31, 2016.
DATES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
William E. Majors, Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Imports Branch, Firearms
and Explosives Services Division,
Enforcement Programs and Services;
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives; U.S. Department of
Justice; 244 Needy Road, Martinsburg,
WV 25401; telephone (304) 616–4589,
fax: (304) 616–4551, or email:
William.Majors@atf.gov.
ATF
participated in a voluntary CBP pilot
program of the International Trade Data
System (ITDS) involving the use of the
PGA Message Set in ACE. See 80 FR
45548 (July 30, 2015). The pilot allowed
importers to submit required data to
CBP through ACE for the purposes of
obtaining CBP release and receipt. CBP
validated that information
electronically, and electronically
transmitted entry and release
information to ATF for purposes of
satisfying certification requirements.
The pilot program confirmed the
efficiency and effectiveness of digitizing
traditional, manual paperwork. While
the pilot has been suspended, the
mandatory filing date for filing entries
in ACE has yet to be determined.
Importers should be aware that no
changes have been made to the
requirement that importers submit their
copy of the Form 6A (with Sections I
and III completed) to ATF within 15
days of release from CBP custody.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Thomas E. Brandon,
ATF Deputy Director.
[FR Doc. 2016–20939 Filed 8–30–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–FY–P
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[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 169 (Wednesday, August 31, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60021-60022]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-20869]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
[Investigation No. 337-TA-794]
Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication
Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet
Computers Sanction for Breaches of Administrative Protective Order
AGENCY: U.S. International Trade Commission.
ACTION: Sanction for breaches of Commission administrative protective
order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the U.S. International Trade
Commission has imposed a sanction for the breach of the administrative
protective order (``APO'') issued in this investigation. The Commission
determined that the law firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP
(``Quinn Emanuel'') breached the APO by failing to adequately control
access to confidential business information (``CBI'') in the
investigation and litigation in the U.S. District for the Northern
District of California. As a result, Quinn Emanuel attorneys and
employees of complainants Samsung Telecommunications America LLC and
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (collectively, ``Samsung'') improperly
disclosed CBI to more than 140 unauthorized persons over a fourteen-
month period. Quinn Emanuel is being publicly reprimanded for pervasive
problems at the firm in safeguarding CBI.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carol McCue Verratti, Esq., Office of
the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission, 500 E Street
SW., Washington, DC 20436, telephone (202) 205-3088. Hearing impaired
individuals are advised that information on this matter can be obtained
by contacting the Commission's TDD terminal at (202) 205-1810. General
information concerning the Commission can also be obtained by accessing
its Internet server (https://www.usitc.gov).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Several Quinn Emanuel attorneys
inadvertently disclosed CBI designated by respondent Apple Inc. as CBI
in the investigation and for cross-use in litigation in the U.S.
District for the Northern District of California to persons who were
not authorized to access CBI under the APO.
A junior associate at Quinn Emanuel failed to fully redact CBI from
an expert report prepared for the district court action, and a partner
at Quinn Emanuel failed to supervise the junior associate.
[[Page 60022]]
Quinn Emanuel attorneys subsequently sent the incompletely redacted
expert report to unauthorized persons at Samsung and other law and
consulting firms on several occasions. Some of the non-signatory
recipients further disseminated the CBI to other non-signatories,
including an Italian court. One of the incidents involved a partner at
Quinn Emanuel emailing more than 90 Samsung employees with instructions
on how to access the incompletely redacted expert report on an FTP
site. Another incident involved a second associate who failed to
safeguard CBI by improperly confirming the redactions. In another
incident, the same junior associate who made the original redactions
discovered that an incompletely redacted report had been inadvertently
disclosed to a Samsung employee and alerted the second associate and a
supervising partner. Although the Samsung employee deleted the report
without viewing the CBI, the second associate later sent a revised
version that still contained CBI. No one at Quinn Emanuel notified
Apple or the Commission of the disclosure at the time. No other efforts
were made to investigate whether other disclosures had been made so as
to prevent further disclosures. As a result, the unauthorized
disclosures continued.
In connection with the investigation before the Commission, a mid-
level associate at Quinn Emanuel failed to redact the same CBI from an
outline for a brief on remedy and the public interest. Quinn Emanuel
attorneys subsequently sent versions of the outline and the public
interest brief containing CBI to unauthorized persons at Samsung and
other law firms on several occasions. A partner at Quinn Emanuel
discovered one such disclosure, but did not notify Apple or the
Commission at the time because he had acted promptly after the
discovery to prevent unauthorized persons from viewing CBI.
A third party filed a motion for a protective order in the district
court action, alleging that Samsung had obtained CBI. Quinn Emanuel
notified the Commission of certain of the disclosures a month later,
and two weeks after it had notified the third party of the same
disclosures.
The Commission considered several aggravating factors, including
the viewing of CBI by unauthorized persons; the discovery of the
breaches by a third party; Quinn Emanuel's failure and delay in
reporting to the Commission the disclosures when they were discovered;
the lengthy period of time in which CBI was unprotected; multiple
breaches by Quinn Emanuel attorneys in the same investigation; and
multiple breaches by Quinn Emanuel attorneys in a two-year period. The
Commission also considered several mitigating factors, including the
inadvertent nature of the breaches; Quinn Emanuel's recent
implementation of a firm-wide policy to help prevent unauthorized
disclosures; Quinn Emanuel's prompt and strenuous efforts to
investigate, cure, and prevent further breaches; and the fact that a
federal district court has already sanctioned the disclosures and
conduct underlying the breaches relating to the expert report.
Although Quinn Emanuel had procedures to prevent unauthorized
disclosures, the firm did not ensure that attorneys complied with those
procedures and made unilateral decisions regarding the APO's scope and
requirements. The large number and the vast extent of the unauthorized
disclosures show that the failure to safeguard CBI was a pervasive
problem at Quinn Emanuel.
The authority for the Commission's determination is contained in
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1337), and
in Part 210 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 CFR
part 210).
By order of the Commission.
Issued: August 25, 2016.
Lisa R. Barton,
Secretary to the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2016-20869 Filed 8-30-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
