Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Maximum and Minimum Compensation Rates, 58878-58890 [2016-20467]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 166 / Friday, August 26, 2016 / Proposed Rules
The Commission believes that providing
the public additional time to consider
thoroughly the matters addressed by the
release and to submit comprehensive
responses to the release would benefit
the Commission in its consideration of
final rules. Therefore, the Commission
is extending the comment period for
Release Nos. 33–10098 and 34–78086,
‘‘Modernization of Property Disclosures
for Mining Registrants,’’ until
September 26, 2016.
By the Commission.
Dated: August 23, 2016.
Brent J. Fields,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016–20548 Filed 8–25–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs
20 CFR Part 702
RIN 1240–AA06
Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act: Maximum and
Minimum Compensation Rates
Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, Labor.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking;
request for comments.
AGENCY:
The Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs is proposing
rules to implement the Longshore and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act’s
maximum and minimum compensation
provisions. Some of these provisions,
which cap the amounts of compensation
and death benefits payable to entitled
claimants and provide a floor below
which compensation may not fall, have
become the topic of litigation. The
proposed rules would clarify how the
Department interprets and applies these
provisions. In addition, the proposed
rules would implement the Act’s annual
compensation-adjustment mechanism
for permanent total disability
compensation and death benefits.
DATES: The Department invites written
comments on the proposed regulations
from interested parties. Written
comments must be received by October
25, 2016.
ADDRESSES: You may submit written
comments, identified by RIN number
1240–AA06, by any of the following
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SUMMARY:
2016); and letter from Jeffrey Klenda, Chair of UrEnergy Inc. (August 19, 2016). Comments are
available on the Commission’s Web site at: https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-16/s71016.htm.
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methods. To facilitate the receipt and
processing of comment letters, OWCP
encourages interested parties to submit
their comments electronically.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions on the Web site for
submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 693–1380 (this is not a
toll-free number). Only comments of ten
or fewer pages (including a Fax cover
sheet and attachments, if any) will be
accepted by Fax.
• Regular Mail or Hand Delivery/
Courier: Submit comments on paper to
the Division of Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S.
Department of Labor, Room C–4319, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington,
DC 20210. The Department’s receipt of
U.S. mail may be significantly delayed
due to security procedures. You must
take this into consideration when
preparing to meet the deadline for
submitting comments.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the agency name and the
Regulatory Information Number (RIN)
for this rulemaking. All comments
received will be posted without change
to https://www.regulations.gov, including
any personal information provided.
Docket: To read background
documents or comments received, go to
https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Antonio Rios, Director, Division of
Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, U.S.
Department of Labor, Room C–4319, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington,
DC 20210. Telephone: (202)–693–0038
(this is not a toll-free number). TTY/
TDD callers may dial toll free 1–877–
889–5627 for further information.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background of This Rulemaking
The Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901–50
(LHWCA or Act), establishes a federal
workers’ compensation system for an
employee’s disability or death arising in
the course of covered maritime
employment. 33 U.S.C. 903(a), 908, 909.
This proposed rule would implement
the Act’s provisions on maximum and
minimum amounts of compensation
payable.
A. The Act’s Compensation Scheme
Disability, which the Act defines as
‘‘incapacity because of injury to earn the
wages which the employee was
receiving at the time of injury,’’ 33
U.S.C. 902(10), ‘‘is in essence an
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economic, not a medical concept.’’
Metro. Stevedores v. Rambo, 515 U.S.
291, 297 (1995). From its inception in
1927, the Act has provided that ‘‘the
average weekly wage of the injured
employee at the time of the injury’’ must
be used as the basis for computing his
or her compensation rate. 33 U.S.C. 910.
Thus, ‘‘[a]n employee’s compensation
depends on the severity of his disability
and his preinjury pay.’’ Roberts v. SeaLand Services, Inc., 566 U.S. ll, 132
S.Ct. 1350, 1354 (2012).
Several statutory sections have an
impact on determining the amount of
compensation payable. Section 10,
‘‘Determination of Pay,’’ 33 U.S.C. 910,
is the starting point in the statutory
scheme. It sets out rules for calculating
the employee’s average weekly wage
(AWW) as of the time of the employee’s
disabling injury. This AWW serves as
the basis for all future benefit
calculations for that worker throughout
the life of his or her claim.
The second step is to determine what
percentage of the employee’s AWW a
claimant will receive in compensation.
This is determined under section 8,
‘‘Compensation for Disability,’’ and
section 9, ‘‘Compensation for Death,’’ 33
U.S.C. 908, 909. Compensation payable
for disability varies based on the nature
and extent of an employee’s disability.
Section 8 establishes four basic
categories of disability: Permanent total,
temporary total, permanent partial, and
temporary partial. 33 U.S.C. 908(a)–(c),
(e). In general, an injury is ‘‘total’’ if the
worker is unable to work after the injury
and ‘‘partial’’ if the worker is able to
work at a diminished wage. A disability
is ‘‘temporary’’ if the employee’s
medical condition is improving and
becomes ‘‘permanent’’ when he or she
reaches maximum medical
improvement. See 33 U.S.C. 908(a)–(c),
(e); see also Potomac Elec. Power Co. v.
Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268 (1980).
And section 9 provides compensation
payable to the employees’ eligible
survivors for injuries causing death. 30
U.S.C. 909.
For all disability categories, the Act
uses a ‘‘two-thirds’’ rule to compute
compensation. Totally disabled
employees—those who are unable to
return to their original employment or
earn wages in suitable alternative
employment—receive two-thirds the
AWW they were earning at the time of
injury. 33 U.S.C. 908(a)–(b). Partially
disabled employees—those who
experience the loss or loss-of-use of
body parts specified in the statute—are
entitled to two-thirds of their date-ofinjury AWW for a specified number of
weeks. 33 U.S.C. 908(c)(1)–(19). Other
partially disabled employees—those
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who are able to work after their injuries
at a diminished wage—receive twothirds of the difference between their
pre-disability AWW and their residual
earning capacity (i.e., the post-injury
wages they earn or could earn through
suitable alternative employment). See
33 U.S.C. 908(c)(21), (e). Finally, the
compensation rate for survivors of an
employee who suffers a work-related
death is usually based on the deceased
employee’s AWW at the time of death,
and, with certain exceptions, can be as
high as two-thirds of that wage. 33
U.S.C. 909(b).
The third step is to apply the statute’s
compensation-limiting rules. Despite
the general two-thirds rule, section 6,
‘‘Compensation,’’ 33 U.S.C. 906, both
caps the compensation amounts that can
be received (a ‘‘maximum’’) and
provides a floor below which
compensation may not fall (a
‘‘minimum’’). These limits are applied
after calculating two-thirds of the
worker’s date-of-injury AWW. The Act
sets the maximum for all disability
compensation categories at 200 percent
of the ‘‘applicable national average
weekly wage.’’ 33 U.S.C. 906(b)(1). Total
compensation for death—the amount
payable to all survivors in the
aggregate—is also limited to that 200percent figure, or to the deceased
employee’s AWW, whichever is less. 33
U.S.C. 909(e)(1); Donovan v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 31
BRBS 2 (1997). The Act sets the
minimum for total disability
compensation at the lower of: (1) 50
percent of the applicable national
average weekly wage; or (2) the
employee’s actual AWW. 33 U.S.C.
906(b)(2). The Act does not provide
minimums for the remaining
compensation categories.
The Secretary of Labor determines the
national average weekly wage before
October 1 of each year, and it applies for
a fiscal year (FY), from October 1 until
the next September 30. 33 U.S.C.
906(b)(3). A given fiscal year’s national
average weekly wage, and the resulting
maximum and minimum rates, apply to
‘‘employees or survivors currently
receiving compensation for permanent
total disability or death during such
[fiscal year], as well as those newly
awarded compensation during such
[fiscal year].’’ 33 U.S.C. 906(c)
(emphasis added). Under the ‘‘currently
receiving’’ clause, the maximum rate for
claimants receiving benefits for
permanent total disability or death is
‘‘adjusted each fiscal year—and
typically increases, in step with the
usual inflation-driven rise in the
national average weekly wage.’’ Roberts,
132 S.Ct. at 1354 n.2. In fact, because
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the national average weekly wage has
risen every year since Congress added
this self-adjustment feature to section 6
in 1972, each year’s maximum rate has
risen as well. Thus, applying a later
fiscal year’s maximum generally results
in a higher compensation rate.
Finally, in addition to section 6’s
provisions allowing adjustments to the
maximum compensation rate, section
10(f) provides another mechanism for
adjusting compensation amounts over
time. ‘‘[B]enefits payable for permanent
total disability or death’’ are increased
at the beginning of each fiscal year
(October 1) by the same percentage as
any increase in the national average
weekly wage (as calculated under
section 6), but no more than 5 percent.
33 U.S.C. 910(f). The primary difference
between the two adjustment provisions
is that section 10(f) applies to all
claimants receiving compensation for
permanent total disability or death,
while section 6(c) assists only those
affected by the maximum rate. Through
these provisions, compensation payable
to a claimant each year increases by the
same amount as wage-growth generally,
ensuring that the value of the workers’
compensation is not eroded over time.
In recent litigation, disputes have
arisen over which fiscal year’s
maximum rate or rates apply to a given
claimant, specifically: (1) In what fiscal
year is a claimant ‘‘newly awarded
compensation’’; and (2) in what fiscal
year is a claimant ‘‘currently receiving
compensation for permanent total
disability or death.’’ On the first
question, the dispute is whether a
claimant is ‘‘newly awarded
compensation’’ when he or she first
becomes disabled—and therefore
entitled to compensation—or when an
administrative law judge issues a
compensation order. On the second
question, the dispute is whether a
claimant is ‘‘currently receiving
compensation for permanent total
disability’’ when he or she first becomes
permanently totally disabled or when he
or she actually receives compensation
for permanent total disability.
The Supreme Court resolved the first
of these questions in its Roberts
decision. But the second issue has not
been addressed by all circuits around
the country, and thus remains subject to
litigation. The proposed rules would
codify the Supreme Court’s decision,
resolve the second issue in a manner
consistent with the courts that have
addressed it, implement other aspects of
the Act’s maximum and minimum
compensation provisions, and address
the related section 10(f) annual
adjustment provision.
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B. Section 6(c)’s ‘‘Newly Awarded
Compensation During Such Period’’
Clause
The Supreme Court construed this
part of section 6(c) in Roberts and held
‘‘that an employee is ‘newly awarded
compensation’ when he first becomes
disabled and thereby becomes
statutorily entitled to benefits, no matter
whether, or when, a compensation order
issues on his behalf.’’ 132 S.Ct. at 1363.
Mr. Roberts was injured and became
disabled in FY 2002. An administrative
law judge (ALJ) order awarding
compensation, however, was not issued
until FY 2007. While Mr. Roberts’
employer initially made some
compensation payments, it stopped in
May 2005 and did not resume payments
until after the ALJ’s FY 2007 order. The
ALJ found that Mr. Roberts’ disability
was: Temporary total from March 11,
2002, to July 11, 2005; permanent total
from July 12, 2005, to October 9, 2005;
and permanent partial beginning on
October 10, 2005. Roberts v. Director,
Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs, 625 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir.
2010). Because the employer had ceased
paying compensation in May 2005,
before Mr. Roberts’ period of permanent
total disability, it did not pay him for
that disability until after the ALJ’s order
in FY 2007.
The ALJ found that Mr. Roberts’
compensation rate for total disability—
two-thirds of his AWW—was $1,902.05,
and that his compensation rate for
permanent partial disability—two-thirds
of the difference between his average
weekly and his residual wage-earning
capacity—was $1,422.05. He found,
however, that Mr. Roberts was subject,
for all periods of disability, to the
maximum rate of $966.08 in effect
during FY 2002, because that was when
he first became disabled, and was thus
‘‘newly awarded compensation.’’ Id. at
1206. On Mr. Roberts’ motion for
reconsideration, the ALJ determined
that he had applied the wrong
maximum rate for the period from
October 1, 2005, through October 9,
2005. The ALJ found that Mr. Roberts
was entitled to the FY 2006 maximum
rate of $1,703.64 per week for that
period because he was ‘‘currently
receiving compensation for permanent
total disability’’ during that time. Id.
The Benefits Review Board, relying on
its earlier decision in Reposky v. Int’l
Transp. Services, 40 BRBS 65, 74–76
(2006) (holding that a claimant is newly
awarded compensation ‘‘when benefits
commence, generally at the time of
injury’’), affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
The Ninth Circuit followed suit. In
affirming the ALJ’s decision, it held that
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an injured employee is ‘‘newly
awarded’’ compensation when he or she
first becomes entitled to compensation
rather than when a formal compensation
order is issued. Roberts, 625 F.3d at
1208. Although Mr. Roberts argued that
‘‘awarded’’ could mean only ‘‘assigned
by formal order in the course of
adjudication,’’ and that ‘‘newly
awarded’’ must therefore mean newly
issued a compensation order, id. at
1206, the court rejected that argument.
It reasoned that the LHWCA sometimes
uses ‘‘awarded’’ to mean ‘‘entitled to.’’
It found that use applied to section 6,
and held that a claimant is ‘‘newly
awarded’’ compensation when he first
becomes entitled to compensation,
which is when he first becomes
disabled.
The Supreme Court agreed with the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section
6(c)’s ‘‘newly awarded compensation’’
clause. The Court acknowledged that
Mr. Roberts’ contrary view was
‘‘appealing’’ because ‘‘[i]n ordinary
usage, ‘award’ most often means ‘give by
judicial decree’ or ‘assign after careful
judgment.’ ’’ Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1356
(quoting Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 152 (2002)). It
recognized, however, that ‘‘award’’ can
also mean ‘‘grant’’ or ‘‘confer or bestow
upon.’’ Thus, deciding that ‘‘the text of
§ 906(c), in isolation, is
indeterminate[,]’’ the Court considered
its function in the context of the statute
as a whole. Id. at 1357. The Court
concluded that in the Act’s
‘‘comprehensive, reticulated regime for
worker benefits—in which § 906 plays a
pivotal role—‘awarded compensation’ is
much more sensibly interpreted to mean
‘statutorily entitled to compensation
because of disability,’ ’’ id. at 1357, than
‘‘awarded compensation in a formal
order.’’ Id. at 1356.
The Court gave several reasons for its
holding. First, the Court recognized that
construing ‘‘newly awarded
compensation’’ to mean a formal
compensation order would be
‘‘incompatible with the Act’s design.’’
Id. at 1357. The Court reasoned that this
construction of the clause would be
impossible to apply in the many cases
where benefits are paid voluntarily and
a formal compensation order is never
issued. Noting that the three provisions
of section 6 that relate to the maximum
compensation rate ‘‘work together to cap
disability benefits,’’ and that section
6(b)(1)’s cap on benefits ‘‘applies
globally, to all disability claims,’’ the
Court concluded that section 6(c)’s
‘‘newly awarded’’ clause must also
apply globally. Id. at 1358.
Second, the Court examined the Act’s
administrative structure, which requires
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employers to pay compensation within
14 days after the employer knows of the
worker’s injury (see 30 U.S.C. 914(b)). It
determined that using the national
average weekly wage at the time of
disability to determine the applicable
maximum ‘‘coheres’’ with that structure.
Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1358. The Court
recognized that the employer, as well as
OWCP, must be able to calculate the
amount of compensation due at the time
of payment, a calculation that
necessarily includes consideration of
any applicable cap. Because an
employer is ‘‘powerless to predict’’
future events related to the
compensation claim or what a later
national average weekly wage will be,
the court reasoned that ‘‘[i]t is difficult
to see how an employer can apply or
certify a national average weekly wage
other than the one in effect at the time
an employee becomes disabled.’’
Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1358–59.
Reading section 6(c) in the context of
the Act’s comprehensive scheme, the
Court further explained that ‘‘applying
the national average weekly wage for the
fiscal year in which an employee
becomes disabled advances the
LHWCA’s purpose to compensate
disability,’’ which focuses on wages at
the time of the injury as the basis to
compute compensation. Id. at 1359
(citing 33 U.S.C. 902(10)). It is thus
‘‘logical to apply the national average
weekly wage for the same point in
time.’’ Id.
Moreover, the Court found that
applying the date-of-disability
maximum rate as suggested by the
Director and Employer ‘‘avoids
disparate treatment of similarly situated
employees . . . who earn the same
salary and suffer the same injury on the
same day.’’ Id. at 1359. By contrast, Mr.
Roberts’ approach could subject such
employees to different rates based solely
on the ‘‘happenstance of their obtaining
orders in different fiscal years.’’ Id.
Third, the Court believed its approach
‘‘discourages gamesmanship in the
claims process.’’ Id. at 1360. Using the
date a compensation order issues would
encourage claimants to delay the
adjudication process or initiate
additional administrative proceedings
seeking to take advantage of a later
year’s national average weekly wage. At
the same time, an employer who
promptly pays compensation at the
correct rate would be subject to an
increased cap retroactively for those
payments based on a later compensation
order. The Court refused to ‘‘reward’’
claimants with these ‘‘windfalls’’ while
‘‘punishing’’ employers who have met
their statutory obligations. Id.
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C. Section 6(c)’s ‘‘Currently Receiving
Compensation for Permanent Total
Disability or Death Benefits During Such
Period’’ Clause
While the Supreme Court’s Roberts
decision settled the interpretation of the
‘‘newly awarded’’ clause, the Court
declined to consider section 6(c)’s
‘‘currently receiving’’ clause, leaving the
phrase’s correct interpretation open to
further litigation. The Ninth Circuit
Roberts court had interpreted the
‘‘currently receiving’’ clause
consistently with the ‘‘newly awarded’’
clause, noting that ‘‘[u]nder both
clauses, the inquiry into the applicable
maximum rate focuses on an employee’s
entitlement to compensation.’’ Roberts,
625 F.3d at 1208. It held that ‘‘the
‘currently receiving’ clause of section
6(c) unambiguously refers to the period
during which an employee was entitled
to receive compensation for permanent
total disability, regardless of whether
his employer actually paid it.’’ Id. at
1209. Consequently, the court
determined that Mr. Roberts was
‘‘currently receiving compensation for
permanent total disability’’ as of July 12,
2005, and thus entitled to the FY 2005
maximum rate from that date through
September 30, 2005 (the end of FY
2005), and to the FY 2006 rate from
October 1, 2005, through October 9,
2005. Beginning October 10, 2005—
when Mr. Roberts regained an earning
capacity, making his disability
permanent partial—the court concluded
he was once again subject to the FY
2002 maximum rate. Id. at 1206, 1209.
Although the Eleventh Circuit
initially disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit’s construction of the ‘‘currently
receiving’’ clause, Boroski v. DynCorp
Int’l, 662 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2011),
that court reversed its position after the
Supreme Court decided Roberts. Boroski
v. DynCorp Int’l, 700 F.3d 446 (11th Cir.
2012) on remand from 132 S.Ct. 2430
(2012). Mr. Boroski was first disabled by
his work-related injury in April 2002.
His employer, DynCorp International,
timely contested his compensation
claim and thus did not voluntarily pay
him compensation. An ALJ entered an
order in FY 2008 awarding him
permanent total disability compensation
from 2002 and continuing. DynCorp
based its subsequent payments on the
maximum compensation rate applicable
for FY 2002, and adjusted the amount
upward each year, beginning on October
1, 2002, as required by section 10(f). Mr.
Boroski objected, arguing that he was
not ‘‘currently receiving compensation
for permanent total disability’’ until FY
2008, when the employer actually began
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paying him, and was thus entitled to the
FY 2008 maximum rate from the outset.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Mr.
Boroski’s argument and held that
‘‘ ‘currently receiving compensation’ in
§ 906(c) means ‘currently entitled to
compensation.’ ’’ Boroski, 700 F.3d at
451. The court agreed with the Director
that for each year after 2002 during
which Mr. Boroski was entitled to
compensation for permanent total
disability, he was ‘‘currently receiving
compensation for permanent total
disability,’’ and thus subject to the new
fiscal year’s maximum rate, regardless of
when the compensation was actually
paid.
Taking its analytical lead from the
Supreme Court in Roberts, the Boroski
court considered the ‘‘currently
receiving’’ clause’s role in the context of
the entire statute. The court noted that
using the maximum for the year in
which compensation was actually paid
(2008) rather than for the first year Mr.
Boroski was disabled (2002) would lead
to ‘‘two different and irreconcilable
weekly benefit payment amounts’’
under the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the ‘‘newly awarded’’
clause, which also applied to his
compensation calculation. Id. at 451.
The Director’s contrary interpretation
instead harmonized the two clauses of
section 6(c).
The court also found the Director’s
position more consistent with section
10(f)’s annual adjustment mechanism.
The court reasoned that the Director’s
interpretation of the ‘‘currently
receiving’’ clause operates similarly,
‘‘gradually increasing benefits to
maintain the value of an injured
employee’s wages, determined ‘at the
time of the injury.’ ’’ Id. at 452. Mr.
Boroski’s interpretation—under which
‘‘employers who first pay benefits to an
injured employee in a year other than
the year of the injury would pay all past
due payments based on the national
average weekly wage for the year in
which the first payment is made . . .
effectively giv[ing] the injured employee
a raise to the later year’s national
average weekly wage, and would make
that raise retroactive to the date of his
disability’’—would be ‘‘incongruous’’
with section 10(f). Id. at 452. The court
also rejected Mr. Boroski’s assertion that
Congress intended his interpretation to
encourage prompt payment of benefits.
The court noted that claimants are
entitled to interest on late payments of
compensation, and found that interest
both adequately compensates claimants
for the delayed receipt of benefits and
discourages employers from refusing to
promptly pay legitimate claims.
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Finally, the court determined that the
Director’s interpretation avoided
disparate treatment of similarly situated
claimants. ‘‘Under the Director’s
interpretation, Boroski receives the
same benefits as a similarly situated
employee who was first injured and
who first received payment in 2002,
and, additionally, Boroski receives
interest on all late payments, to
compensate him for the delay.’’ Id. at
453. By contrast, under Mr. Boroski’s
interpretation—in which Mr. Boroski
‘‘would receive, in addition to interest,
higher benefits for the same period of
disability than claimants who timely
receive their benefits’’—the same
hypothetical employee ‘‘would receive
approximately $30,000 less than
Boroski.’’ Id.
For all of these reasons, the Eleventh
Circuit held, as had the Ninth Circuit in
Roberts, that an employee is ‘‘currently
receiving compensation for permanent
total disability’’ when he is entitled to
such compensation, not when he is
actually paid that compensation. To
date, the remaining circuits have not
weighed in on this issue.
The Benefits Review Board
subsequently reached the same
conclusion as the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits. Lake v. L–3 Communications,
47 BRBS 45 (2013). In Lake, the Board
held that a claimant is ‘‘currently
receiving compensation’’ under section
6(c) ‘‘during a period in which he is
entitled to receive such compensation,
regardless of whether his employer
actually pays it.’’ Id. at 48. The Board
also held that when a claimant’s
temporary total disability changes to
permanent total disability during a
fiscal year, the maximum rate in effect
during that year applies immediately.
Id. at 48. In reaching this conclusion,
the Board overruled this portion of its
earlier contrary decision in Reposky, 40
BRBS at 65. The Board thus held that
the FY 2009 maximum rate applied as
of December 10, 2008, the date that Mr.
Lake’s entitlement to permanent total
disability benefits commenced, until the
next October 1, when the new fiscal
year’s maximum rate applied.
The Board also addressed a related
question on the interplay between
sections 6 and 10(f) in Lake. The
employer argued that Mr. Lake, who
first reached permanent total disability
status in FY 2009, was not entitled to
the FY 2009 maximum rate. Instead, the
employer contended that he was limited
to a section 10(f) increase on the FY
2006 maximum rate that he had been
receiving since his injury, followed by
a section 10(f) adjustment each
subsequent October 1. The Board
rejected this argument. Citing its earlier
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contrary holding in Marko v. Morris
Boney Co., 23 BRBS 353 (1990), the
Board reiterated its conclusion that, ‘‘in
a permanent total disability case in
which two-thirds of the claimant’s
actual [AWW] exceeds the Section
6(b)(3) statutory maximum rate, he is
entitled to the benefit of the new
maximum rate each fiscal year . . .
until such time as two-thirds of his
actual average weekly wage falls below
200 percent of the applicable [national
average weekly wage], and then annual
adjustments under Section 10(f) apply.’’
Lake, 47 BRBS at 50. The Board found
its holding compelled by the plain
language of section 6(c) and supported
by the Ninth Circuit’s Roberts decision.
II. Summary of the Proposed Rule
A. General Information
As discussed in the Section-bySection Explanation below, this
proposed rule implements the Act’s
provisions governing the maximum and
minimum amount of disability
compensation and death benefits
payable. The proposed regulations do
not govern general compensation
calculations (referred to in the rules as
the ‘‘calculated compensation rate’’),
and the fact that compensation payable
is subject to these maximum and
minimum rates does not mean that
claimants are necessarily entitled to
them. Rather, the proposed regulations
simply provide that disability
compensation and death benefits can go
no higher than the applicable maximum
rate or lower than the applicable
minimum rate.
The proposed rule includes two
subparts. Subpart G describes the
annual adjustment to compensation and
death benefits provided under section
10(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 910(f). While
section 10(f) allows for an annual
adjustment to all payments of
compensation for permanent total
disability or death benefits, including
those cases where neither the maximum
nor the minimum rates are implicated,
the Department has included section
10(f) in this rulemaking because its
application can be closely tied with the
maximum compensation or death
benefits payable in certain cases. These
interrelationships are detailed in the
Section-by-Section Explanation below.
Subpart H includes proposed
regulations implementing the Act’s
maximum and minimum provisions.
The Department has organized these
sections first to cover general topics,
then by whether the rules govern
maximum or minimum compensation
payable, and finally by categories of
compensation payable (i.e., temporary
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total or partial, permanent total or
partial, and death benefits).
B. Section-by-Section Explanation
This discussion contains an
explanation of each proposed rule.
Many of the rules include examples that
use the Department’s yearly calculation
of the applicable national average
weekly wage, the maximum and
minimum weekly compensation rates,
and percentage adjustments available
under section 10(f), 33 U.S.C. 910(f).
This information is routinely available
NAWW 1
Period
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
(FY
16)
15)
14)
13)
12)
11)
10)
09)
08)
07)
06)
05)
04)
03)
02)
01)
00)
10/01/2015–09/30/2016
10/01/2014–09/30/2015
10/01/2013–09/30/2014
10/01/2012–09/30/2013
10/01/2011–09/30/2012
10/01/2010–09/30/2011
10/01/2009–09/30/2010
10/01/2008–09/30/2009
10/01/2007–09/30/2008
10/01/2006–09/30/2007
10/01/2005–09/30/2006
10/01/2004–09/30/2005
10/01/2003–09/30/2004
10/01/2002–09/30/2003
10/01/2001–09/30/2002
10/01/2000–09/30/2001
10/01/1999–09/30/2000
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
......................................................................
Some examples also include
compensation calculations. When
compensation is based on 66 and 2⁄3
percent of the injured employee’s
average weekly wage (e.g.,
compensation for permanent total
disability), the formula for calculating
this percentage is expressed as: Average
weekly wage amount × 2 ÷ 3.
mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with PROPOSALS
Subpart G—Section 10(f) Adjustments
20 CFR 702.701 What is an annual
section 10(f) adjustment and how is it
calculated?
Section 10(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
910(f), provides for an annual upward
percentage adjustment of permanent
total disability compensation rates and
death benefits so that the value of the
compensation received does not erode
over time. Proposed § 702.701 sets out
the basic rules for section 10(f)
adjustments.
Proposed paragraphs (a) and (b)
describe the section 10(f) adjustment
and how the fiscal year percentage is
determined. Consistent with the statute,
paragraph (a) states that section 10(f)
adjustments apply each fiscal year to
permanent total disability compensation
and death benefits, and that those
adjustments may only increase amounts
1 For purposes of this chart, ‘‘NAWW’’ means the
applicable national average weekly earnings of
production or nonsupervisory workers on private
nonagricultural payrolls during the first three
quarters of the preceding fiscal year as determined
by the Department.
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$703.00
688.51
673.34
662.59
647.60
628.42
612.33
600.31
580.18
557.22
536.82
523.58
515.39
498.27
483.04
466.91
450.64
payable. 33 U.S.C. 910(f) (‘‘benefits
payable for permanent total disability or
death . . . shall be increased’’); 33
U.S.C. 910(g) (‘‘in no event shall
compensation for death benefits be
reduced’’). Paragraph (b) describes how
the Department calculates the annual
section 10(f) adjustment, a method
dictated by section 10(f) itself. In any
given fiscal year, the 10(f) adjustment is
the percentage increase in the
applicable national average weekly
wage over the prior fiscal year’s
applicable national average or five
percent, whichever is lower. See 33
U.S.C. 910(f)(1), (2).
Proposed paragraphs (c) through (e)
set out how the fiscal year percentage is
applied in individual cases. Paragraph
(c) specifies that section 10(f)
adjustments are applied each October 1
to the prior year’s compensation or
death benefits payable to the claimant.
By using the statutory term ‘‘payable,’’
the Department intends the percentage
increase to apply to the compensation
and death benefits due during the prior
year, even if not actually paid.
Paragraph (d) implements the statutory
requirements that calculations resulting
from section 10(f) adjustments are
rounded to the nearest dollar and that
no adjustment is made if the amount is
less than one dollar. See 33 U.S.C.
910(g). And paragraph (e) provides that
section 10(f) adjustments may not
increase compensation or death benefits
beyond the maximum rate for any fiscal
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on OWCP’s Web site. See https://
www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/ (last visited
Aug. 1, 2016). For the reader’s
convenience, these amounts for FY 2000
to FY 2016 are provided in the
following chart.
Maximum
weekly
rate
(200% of
NAWW)
Minimum
weekly
rate
(50% of
NAWW)
$1,406.00
1,377.02
1,346.68
1,325.18
1,295.20
1,256.84
1,224.66
1,200.62
1,160.36
1114.44
1073.64
1,047.16
1,030.78
996.54
966.08
933.82
901.28
$351.50
344.26
336.67
331.30
323.80
314.21
306.17
300.16
290.09
278.61
268.41
261.79
257.70
249.14
241.52
233.46
225.32
Section 10(f)
percent
increase (%)
2.10
2.25
1.62
2.31
3.05
2.63
2.00
3.47
4.12
3.80
2.53
1.59
3.44
3.15
3.45
3.61
3.39
year. This limitation is consistent with
LHWCA section 6(b)(1)’s command that
compensation payments, whether for
disability or death, must not exceed the
applicable fiscal year’s maximum rate.
Finally, proposed paragraph (f) states
that the adjustments do not apply to
compensation for temporary or partial
disability, including temporary total
disability, temporary partial disability,
and permanent partial disability. The
paragraph reflects the limitation set
forth in paragraph (a) and is added for
clarity.
Subpart H—Maximum and Minimum
Compensation Rates
General
20 CFR 702.801
This Subpart
Scope and Intent of
Proposed § 702.801 describes the
statutory provisions this subpart is
intended to implement. Paragraph (a)
generally lists the statutory provisions
that affect the maximum and minimum
compensation and death benefits
payable to entitled individuals. Section
6(b) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 906(b),
sets the maximum compensation rate for
death or disability compensation at 200
percent of the applicable national
average weekly wage, and the minimum
compensation rate for total disability at
the lower of the employee’s average
weekly wage or 50 percent of the
applicable national average weekly
wage. Section 6(b) also provides that the
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Secretary of Labor determines the
applicable national average weekly
wage for each one-year period from
October 1 to September 30. Section 6(c),
33 U.S.C. 906(c), provides that the
Secretary’s determination of the
national average weekly wage for each
one-year period ‘‘shall apply to
employees or survivors currently
receiving compensation for permanent
total disability or death benefits during
such period, as well as those newly
awarded compensation during such
period.’’ Section 9(e), 33 U.S.C. 909(e),
includes provisions that affect the
minimum death benefits payable to a
deceased employee’s survivors.
Because the interpretation of section
6(c) is important to determining how the
maximum and minimum provisions
apply and has been the subject of
litigation, proposed paragraph (b) more
specifically addresses section 6(c)’s
‘‘newly awarded compensation’’ and
‘‘currently receiving compensation’’
phrases. Paragraph (b)(1) adopts the
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Roberts
that a claimant, regardless of the nature
or extent of disability, is ‘‘newly
awarded compensation’’ when he or she
first becomes disabled and entitled to
compensation. See supra Section I. B.
Claimants are initially subject to the
maximum and minimum rates derived
from the national average weekly wage
in effect during the fiscal year his or her
disability begins. Paragraph (b)(2)
applies the Supreme Court’s Roberts
analysis to death benefits by providing
that a deceased employee’s survivor is
‘‘newly awarded compensation’’ on the
day of the employee’s death, the first
time a survivor may be entitled to death
benefits. See discussion infra at
proposed § 702.807. And paragraph
(b)(3) provides that a claimant is
‘‘currently receiving compensation’’
during the period for which the
compensation is payable, regardless of
when it is actually paid. This
construction is consistent with the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’
interpretations. See supra Section I. C.
While these phrases are not used in the
remainder of the proposed subpart, the
concepts set forth in paragraph (b)
underlie the rules.
20 CFR 702.802 Applicability of This
Subpart
Proposed § 702.802(a) lists several
circumstances in which this subpart’s
rules do not apply, including: Approved
settlements made under section 8(i) of
the Act, 33 U.S.C. 908(i); payments for
an employee’s compensable death made
to the Special Fund when the employee
has no eligible survivors, 33 U.S.C.
944(c)(1); payments for medical
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17:00 Aug 25, 2016
Jkt 238001
expenses, 33 U.S.C. 907; and any other
compensation calculated and paid in a
lump sum, such as the two years of
death benefits payable to an employee’s
eligible surviving spouse who remarries,
33 U.S.C. 909(b), or when compensation
payments are commuted, 33 U.S.C.
909(g). In all of these circumstances, the
maximum and minimum weekly rates
do not apply either because the
compensation due is not based on a
weekly rate (e.g., medical expenses) or
it is not necessarily paid on a weekly
basis (e.g., settlements, commutations).
Although not subject to the rules in this
subpart, the maximum and minimum
compensation rates will nevertheless be
relevant in some of these circumstances.
For example, the Department would
consider such compensation rates in
calculating a commuted award or death
benefits payable when a survivor
remarries. Similarly, the Department
anticipates that private parties will
consider the maximum and minimum
compensation rates in settlement
negotiations, and the Department will
consider them in deciding whether to
approve settlements.
Proposed § 702.802(b) provides that
the rules governing minimum
compensation and death benefits
payable do not apply to claims arising
under the Defense Base Act (DBA), 42
U.S.C. 1651 et seq. The DBA specifically
precludes application of the LHWCA’s
minimum compensation provisions:
‘‘The minimum limit on weekly
compensation for disability, established
by section 6(b), and the minimum limit
on the average weekly wages on which
death benefits are to be computed,
established by section 9(e) of the
[Longshore] Act, shall not apply in
computing compensation and death
benefits under [the DBA].’’ 42 U.S.C.
1652(a). The Secretary’s regulations
implementing the DBA also reflect this
limitation. See 20 CFR 704.103. The
limitation in proposed § 702.802(b)
comports with these authorities.
20 CFR 702.803 Definitions
This section defines certain terms
used in this subpart; these definitions
do not apply outside of this subpart.
Proposed paragraph (a) defines a
claimant’s ‘‘calculated compensation
rate’’ as the weekly compensation or
death benefits payable prior to any
consideration of the maximum or
minimum rates, or a section 10(f)
adjustment. As discussed above (see
supra Section I. A.), this figure is a
specified percentage of the employee’s
average weekly wage at the time of the
injury or death. But there are
exceptions. For example, in certain
claims, the calculated compensation
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58883
rate is based on the national average
weekly wage rather than on the
employee’s actual earnings. 33 U.S.C.
909(e), 910(d)(2)(B).
Proposed paragraph (b) defines the
phrase ‘‘date of disability’’ as the date
an employee first becomes economically
impaired—or, in other words, unable to
earn the same wages—as a result of a
covered injury. The phrase incorporates
the statutory definition of ‘‘disability,’’
see 33 U.S.C. 902(10), and is based on
the Supreme Court’s decision in
Roberts, which held that the maximum
compensation rate applicable on the day
the employee became ‘‘entitled to
compensation because of disability’’
controlled. Roberts, 132 S.Ct. at 1357.
The phrase is used in this subpart to
delineate when certain minimum or
maximum compensation rates apply.
The proposed rule, however, excepts
from the general ‘‘date of disability’’
definition three situations that demand
special treatment. Paragraph (b)(2)(i)
provides that for scheduled permanent
partial disabilities under 33 U.S.C.
908(c)(1)–(20) that are not preceded by
another category of disability (i.e.,
permanent total, temporary total, or
temporary partial), the date of disability
is when the employee first becomes
permanently impaired by the injury to
the scheduled member. This exception
is necessary because an employee may
suffer a scheduled injury without any
loss in wage-earning capacity, which is
the touchstone for the general ‘‘date of
disability’’ definition. Paragraph
(b)(2)(ii) establishes a separate date of
disability for occupational diseases
because the disease may manifest after
voluntary retirement, when the
employee does not experience a loss of
wage-earning capacity. Paragraph
(b)(2)(iii) provides that for very shortterm disabilities lasting no more than 14
days, the date of disability is 4 days
after the injury affected the employee’s
wage earning capacity. For such a shortterm disability, section 6(a) of the Act
provides that no compensation is
payable for the first 3 days of disability.
33 U.S.C. 906(a). Thus, using the fourth
day as the ‘‘date of disability’’ for
determining the maximum and
minimum compensation payable
reflects the date on which the employee
is actually entitled to compensation.
The remaining definitions explain
how basic terms are used in the
proposed rule. Paragraph (c) defines the
dates of a standard fiscal year.
Paragraphs (d) and (e) define
‘‘maximum rate’’ and ‘‘minimum rate’’
as the weekly compensation rates the
Department calculates for each fiscal
year. And paragraph (f) defines a
‘‘section 10(f) adjustment’’ as the annual
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compensation increase some claimants
receive under LHWCA section 10(f), 33
U.S.C. 910(f). See proposed § 702.701.
20 CFR 702.804 What are the weekly
maximum and minimum rates for each
fiscal year and how are they calculated?
Proposed § 702.804 explains how the
Department calculates basic weekly
maximum and minimum rates for each
fiscal year. Paragraph (a) notes that
these weekly compensation rates are
one factor considered when calculating
compensation and death benefits
payable. Paragraphs (b) and (c) set forth
the calculation formulas for weekly
maximum and minimum rates. Both are
based on the national average weekly
wage, which the Act defines as the
‘‘national average weekly earnings of
production or nonsupervisory workers
on private nonagricultural payrolls.’’ 33
U.S.C. 902(19). These statistics are
compiled on an ongoing basis by the
Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Before each new fiscal year, the
Department calculates the average
earnings of these employees for the
period October 1 through June 30 (i.e.,
the first three quarters) of the current
fiscal year. 33 U.S.C. 906(b)(3). The Act
pegs the maximum weekly rate at 200
percent of this number and the
minimum at 50 percent. 33 U.S.C.
906(b)(1), (2). For example, the national
average weekly earnings of production
or nonsupervisory workers on private,
nonagricultural payrolls for the period
from October 1, 2013, to June 30, 2014
(i.e., the first three quarters of FY 2014),
were $688.51. As a result, the
Department determined that the
maximum compensation rate for FY
2015 was $1,377.02 ($688.51 × 2) and
the minimum compensation rate was
$344.26 ($688.51 × 2).
Maximum Rates
mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with PROPOSALS
20 CFR 702.805 What weekly
maximum rates apply to compensation
for permanent partial disability,
temporary total disability, and
temporary partial disability?
Proposed § 702.805 provides that the
maximum rate in effect for the fiscal
year on the employee’s date of disability
applies to all compensation payable for
temporary partial disability, temporary
total disability, or permanent partial
disability, including compensation
payable in subsequent fiscal years. This
rule effectuates the Supreme Court’s
construction of the ‘‘newly awarded
compensation’’ clause by applying the
maximum rate for the fiscal year the
employee’s disability begins. For these
types of compensation, the date-ofdisability fiscal year’s maximum rate
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applies to all compensation payments—
including compensation payable for
subsequent fiscal years—because
section 6(c)’s ‘‘currently receiving
compensation’’ clause does not apply.
33 U.S.C. 906(c) (maximum rate
determinations ‘‘with respect to a period
shall apply to employees or survivors
currently receiving compensation for
permanent total disability or death
benefits during such period[.]’’).
The first example at paragraph (b)(1)
sets out a common scenario involving
an injured employee who is temporarily
totally disabled for a period prior to
being permanently partially disabled.
Although his compensation periods
span more than one fiscal year, the
maximum rate that applies remains the
rate in effect on his date of disability.
See proposed § 702.803(b)(1). The
second example at paragraph (b)(2) is
slightly more complicated. The
employee incurs two separate periods of
temporary total disability from the same
injury; each period begins in a different
fiscal year. Under section 6(c), the
maximum rate applicable at the
beginning of the first disability period
applies to all payments for temporary
total disability, including those in the
second period. The third example at
paragraph (b)(3) addresses an
occupational disease discovered postretirement. Occupational diseases
occurring after an employee has
voluntarily retired are considered
permanent partial disabilities. 20 CFR
702.601(b). Thus, compensation payable
in this instance is subject to the
maximum rate in effect on the date of
disability—when the employee becomes
aware of the relationship between
employment, the disease and any
disability. See proposed
§ 702.803(b)(2)(ii).
20 CFR 702.806 What weekly
maximum rates apply to compensation
for permanent total disability?
Proposed § 702.806 implements both
the ‘‘newly awarded’’ and ‘‘currently
receiving’’ compensation clauses for
permanent total disability compensation
as they pertain to the maximum
compensation payable. Paragraph (a)
provides that the maximum rate for the
fiscal year during which the employee
first becomes permanently and totally
disabled applies to all compensation
payable during that fiscal year.
Paragraph (b) then provides that all
periods of permanent total disability in
subsequent fiscal years arising from the
same injury are subject to the maximum
rates for those subsequent fiscal years
because the employee is then ‘‘currently
receiving compensation.’’
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Proposed paragraph (c) addresses how
the 10(f) adjustment applies in a ‘‘crossover’’ year. A cross-over year is one in
which the claimant’s compensation was
paid at the maximum rate in the current
fiscal year, but the claimant’s calculated
compensation rate does not exceed the
maximum rate set for the next fiscal
year. In those circumstances, the rule
requires that the claimant’s
compensation for the next fiscal year be
increased by the amount of the 10(f)
adjustment up to the maximum for that
fiscal year.
The examples in proposed paragraph
(d) apply these principles. Paragraph
(d)(1) presents the relatively
straightforward situation of an employee
who is permanently totally disabled
from the time of injury. He is ‘‘newly
awarded’’ compensation in the fiscal
year he became disabled and his
compensation is subject to that fiscal
year’s maximum rate. In subsequent
years, he is ‘‘currently receiving’’
compensation and his compensation is
subject to the maximum rate for each
subsequent fiscal year. Paragraph (d)(2)
adds an additional wrinkle to the first
example. Here, the employee suffers a
period of temporary total disability that
spans more than one fiscal year before
he becomes permanently totally
disabled. The maximum that applies to
the entire temporary total disability
compensation period is the fiscal year
rate in effect on the date of disability (in
the example, FY 2000), which is when
the employee is ‘‘newly awarded’’
compensation. See proposed
§ 702.805(a). When the employee
becomes permanently totally disabled
two years later, however, he is
‘‘currently receiving’’ permanent total
disability compensation and the
maximum rate in effect at that time (in
the example, FY 2002) applies.
Compensation for permanent total
disability in succeeding years is subject
to those subsequent fiscal years’
maximum rates because he continues to
be ‘‘currently receiving’’ compensation.
Finally, proposed paragraph (d)(3)
demonstrates how the rule operates in a
‘‘cross-over’’ year. In the example,
employee C’s calculated compensation
rate exceeds the annual fiscal year
maximum rate each year from when he
was first permanently totally disabled in
FY 2009 through FY 2012. In FY 2013,
however, the employee’s calculated
compensation rate falls below the
maximum rate and remains below that
rate even after the addition of a section
10(f) adjustment. Thus, for FY 2013,
employee C’s compensation is not
limited by the maximum rate.
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20 CFR 702.807 What weekly
maximum rates apply to death benefits?
Determining the maximum rates for
death benefits in any particular case can
be straightforward or involve several
statutory provisions. The proposed rule
integrates these provisions to provide a
comprehensive approach to the issue.
LHWCA section 6(b)(1) applies the
‘‘applicable’’ maximum rate to all
compensation for disability or death.
For death benefits purposes, proposed
§ 702.807(a) defines the ‘‘applicable’’
rate as the fiscal-year rate in effect when
the employee died. By using the
employee’s date of death, the rule
applies the ‘‘newly awarded’’ clause in
the same manner as the Supreme Court
applied it to disability claims in
Roberts: A survivor’s right to benefits
first arises at the time of death. See
generally Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v.
Director, OWCP, 519 U.S. 248, 257–58
(1997) (survivors seeking death benefits
cannot satisfy prerequisites prior to
employee’s death); Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Marshall, 634 F.2d 843, 846 (5th
Cir. 1981) (section 9 ‘‘cause of action for
death benefits certainly does not arise
until [employee’s] death’’).
Proposed § 702.807(b) sets out the
general rules for determining the deathbenefits cap in the year the employee
died. These limits are compelled by
LHWCA section 6(b)(1) along with the
provisions of section 9(e), 33 U.S.C.
909(e). Section 9(e) provides an
alternative method for computing death
benefits for survivors of lower-wage
employees to boost the benefit amount.
If the deceased employee’s actual
average weekly wage was lower than the
national average weekly wage, death
benefits are calculated as a percentage of
the national average weekly wage
instead of a percentage of the actual
wage. This results in a higher calculated
compensation rate than if the
calculation were based on the
employee’s actual wage. Survivors are
entitled to benefits at the higher
calculated rate except when that rate
exceeds the employee’s full actual
weekly wage. In that event, section
9(e)(1) sets an initial cap by providing
that total weekly death benefits ‘‘shall
not exceed the lesser of the average
weekly wages of the deceased’’ (or the
section 6(b)(1) maximum rate). 33 U.S.C.
909(e)(1). Thus, in no event may weekly
death benefits payable in the year of the
employee’s death exceed the employee’s
actual average weekly wages. Proposed
paragraph (b) implements these
provisions by limiting ‘‘aggregate’’
weekly death benefits—meaning the
death benefits payable to all survivors
combined—to the lower of the
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maximum rate applicable for the fiscal
year in which the employee died or the
employee’s actual average weekly
wages.
Proposed paragraph (c) sets out rules
governing payments for subsequent
fiscal years. Consistent with the
‘‘currently receiving’’ clause, paragraph
(c)(1) provides that each subsequent
fiscal year’s maximum rate applies to
aggregate death benefits. Paragraph
(c)(2) provides an exception to the
section 9(e)(1) feature limiting death
benefits to no more than the employee’s
actual average weekly wages. If death
benefits were paid at the employee’s full
average weekly wage in the year of
death, paragraph (c)(2) provides that
death benefits payable may be adjusted
upward under section 10(f). See
Donovan, 31 BRBS 2 (holding that
section 9(e)(1) does not bar application
of 10(f) adjustments even if adjusted
death benefits amount exceeds deceased
employee’s actual average weekly
wage).
Finally, proposed paragraph (d)
addresses LHWCA section 9(e)’s specific
limit on death benefits payable when
death results from an occupational
disease that manifested after the
employee retired voluntarily (i.e., he or
she did not retire because of disability).
In those circumstances, LHWCA section
9(e)(2) provides that ‘‘total weekly
benefits shall not exceed one fiftysecond part of the employee’s average
annual earnings during the 52-week
period preceding retirement.’’ 33 U.S.C.
909(e)(2). Proposed paragraph (d)(1)
implements this provision, as well as
the general section 6(b) maximum cap,
by providing that aggregate death
benefits paid during the year of the
employee’s death must not exceed the
lower of that fiscal year’s maximum rate
or one-fifty-second part of the
employee’s average annual earnings
during the 52-weeks preceding
retirement. Proposed paragraph (d)(2)(i)
provides that each subsequent fiscal
year’s maximum rate applies to
aggregate death benefits because death
benefits are subject to the ‘‘currently
receiving’’ clause. If death benefits in
the year of death were paid at one-fiftysecond part of the employee’s average
annual earnings, proposed paragraph
(d)(2)(ii) provides that the death benefits
payable may be adjusted upward under
section 10(f).
The example at proposed paragraph
(e)(1) illustrates that the maximum rate
applicable at the time of the employee’s
death applies to death benefits, even
when the employee’s injury occurred in
an earlier fiscal year. Employee A’s
injury occurred in FY 2013 but he did
not die as a result of the injury until FY
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2014. His survivor’s death benefits for
the remainder of the year in which he
died are subject to the FY 2014
maximum rate, with subsequent death
benefits subject to each subsequent
fiscal year’s rate.
Paragraph (e)(2)’s example
demonstrates how the death-benefitscalculation method for survivors of lowwage earners interfaces with the cap
placed on those benefits in some
circumstances. In the example,
employee B’s weekly earnings fell below
the national average during the year of
her death. Thus, her survivor’s death
benefits are computed using the higher
national average weekly wage. 33 U.S.C.
909(e); see proposed § 702.811(a).
Because that calculated compensation
rate of $331.30 exceeds the employee’s
actual average weekly wage of $300.00,
death benefits are capped at the
employee’s actual wages, except for
section 10(f) adjustments in subsequent
fiscal years.
Paragraph (e)(3) sets out an example
involving an occupational disease
discovered more than one year postretirement that leads to death. Employee
C’s compensation during his lifetime is
calculated based on the FY 2002
national average weekly wage because
his disease manifested then and he had
voluntarily retired more than one year
earlier. Based on the date of employee
C’s death, his survivors’ death benefits
are calculated based on the national
average weekly wage for FY 2015. 33
U.S.C. 910(d)(2)(B); 20 CFR 702.604(b).
This calculation yields a weekly figure
greater than 1/52 part of the employee’s
last year of earnings. Thus, the total
death benefits payable are capped at 1/
52 part of the employee’s actual
earnings, except for section 10(f)
adjustments in subsequent fiscal years.
Minimum Rates
20 CFR 702.808 What weekly
minimum rates apply to compensation
for partial disability?
The LHWCA places no minimum
compensation requirements on
payments for temporary partial
disability or permanent partial
disability. Accordingly, proposed
§ 702.808 simply states that there is no
minimum rate for these types of
compensation.
20 CFR 702.809 What weekly
minimum rates apply to compensation
for temporary total disability?
Proposed § 702.809 provides that the
minimum rate in effect for the fiscal
year on the employee’s date of disability
applies to all compensation payable for
temporary total disability, including
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compensation payable in subsequent
fiscal years. LHWCA section 6(b)(2)
generally provides that compensation
for total disability cannot fall below 50
percent of the ‘‘applicable’’ national
average weekly wage unless the
employee’s actual average weekly wages
are less than that amount. In that event,
the employee receives his or her average
weekly wages as compensation. This
rule effectuates the Supreme Court’s
construction of the ‘‘newly awarded
compensation’’ clause by applying the
minimum rate for the fiscal year the
employee’s disability begins. See
generally Montoya v. Navy Exchange
Service Command, 49 BRBS 51 (2015)
(applying Roberts, employee entitled to
minimum rate in effect on date of
disability onset). The date-of-disability
fiscal year’s minimum rate applies to all
temporary total disability compensation
payments—including compensation
payable for subsequent fiscal years—
because section 6(c)’s ‘‘currently
receiving’’ clause does not apply to
compensation for temporary disabilities.
See 33 U.S.C. 906(c) (national average
weekly wage determinations ‘‘with
respect to a period shall apply to
employees or survivors currently
receiving compensation for permanent
total disability or death benefits during
such period’’). Thus, the applicable
minimum remains the one in effect on
the date of disability.
Proposed paragraph (b)’s example
demonstrates how the minimum rate
provision works when the employee’s
calculated compensation rate falls
below it. In the example, employee A’s
calculated compensation rate for FY
2014 (the year of his injury) is $333.34
per week. That number falls below the
FY 2014 minimum rate of $336.67.
Thus, employee A’s compensation is
raised to the minimum rate. Although
his temporary total disability continues
into FY 2015, his rate remains tied to
the FY 2014 minimum because neither
section 6(c)’s ‘‘currently receiving’’
clause nor section 10(f)’s adjustments
apply to compensation for temporary
disabilities. See 33 U.S.C. 906(c), 910(f).
20 CFR 702.810 What weekly
minimum rates apply to compensation
for permanent total disability?
Proposed § 702.810(a) provides that
the lower of the minimum rate in effect
on the date of disability or the
employee’s actual average weekly wage
on that date sets the floor below which
compensation may not fall. This rule
implements LHWCA section 6(b)(2)’s
direction that compensation for total
disability be no less than 50 percent of
the ‘‘applicable’’ national average
weekly wage unless the employee’s
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actual average weekly wages are less
than that amount. In that event, the
employee receives his or her average
weekly wages as compensation. By
using the date of disability to describe
the applicable fiscal year’s minimum
rate, paragraph (a) also implements
section 6(c)’s ‘‘newly awarded’’ clause.
Proposed paragraph (b) describes how
the minimum applies in subsequent
fiscal years. It sets the minimum
compensation level at the lower of the
minimum rate for each subsequent fiscal
year or the employee’s actual average
weekly wages on the date of disability.
By applying subsequent fiscal years’
minimum rates, the regulation
implements section 6(c)’s ‘‘currently
receiving’’ clause.
Proposed paragraph (c)’s example
shows how this regulation applies when
a low-wage earner suffers a permanent
total disability. Because his calculated
compensation rate for the fiscal year in
which he first became disabled (in the
example, FY 2003) was below the
applicable fiscal year minimum rate,
and his actual weekly wages were above
the fiscal year minimum, he is
compensated at the minimum rate. But
in subsequent fiscal years, when the
minimum rises above the employee’s
actual average weekly wages at the time
of disability, he receives his actual
wages in compensation, subject in
following years to section 10(f)
adjustments.
20 CFR 702.811 What weekly
minimum rates apply to death benefits?
Rather than applying weekly
minimum rates like those used for
temporary total or permanent total
disability compensation—specified
amounts below which compensation
may not fall—section 9(e) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. 909(e), uses a different
mechanism to ensure a minimum
compensation level for an employee’s
survivors. Section 9(e) does this by
using the national average weekly wage
calculated by the Department under
section 6(b) as a proxy to compute death
benefits when the deceased employee’s
actual weekly wage falls below the
national average. See 33 U.S.C. 902(19)
(defining national average weekly wage
for LHWCA purposes). Using the
national average weekly wage ensures
that death benefits will be paid at a
minimal level. Proposed paragraph (a)
sets out this procedure by providing that
the average weekly wage used to
compute death benefits is the greater of
the employee’s actual wages or the
national average. The regulation also
provides that the applicable national
average weekly wage is the one in effect
when the employee died, which is when
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a survivor’s right to benefits first arises.
See generally Ingalls Shipbuilding, 519
U.S. at 257–58 (survivors seeking death
benefits cannot satisfy prerequisites
prior to employee’s death); Travelers
Insurance, 634 F.2d at 846 (section 9
‘‘cause of action for death benefits
certainly does not arise until
[employee’s] death’’). Paragraph (b) adds
that the weekly minimum rate, as that
phrase is used in this subpart, does not
apply to death benefits.
III. Statutory Authority
Section 39(a) of the LHWCA, 33
U.S.C. 939(a), authorizes the Secretary
of Labor to prescribe rules and
regulations necessary for the
administration of the Act.
IV. Information Collection
Requirements (Subject to the
Paperwork Reduction Act) Imposed
Under the Proposed Rule
This rulemaking would impose no
new collections of information.
V. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
(Regulatory Planning and Review)
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
direct agencies to assess all costs and
benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, if regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and
equity). Executive Order 13563
emphasizes the importance of
quantifying both costs and benefits,
reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and
promoting flexibility. The Department
has considered this proposed rule with
these principles in mind and has
concluded that the regulated
community will benefit from this
regulation.
This proposed rule will benefit the
parties by providing them with greater
guidance on applying the Act’s
maximum and minimum compensation
provisions and section 10(f) adjustments
in determining the amount of disability
compensation or death benefits payable.
By clarifying how these provisions
apply, the rule will also promote
consistency so that similarly situated
claimants receive similar compensation
or death benefits. In addition, the rule
will benefit the regulated community by
forestalling further litigation over the
‘‘currently receiving’’ clause, which
neither the Supreme Court nor several
circuit courts have yet construed.
Indeed, the absence of regulations
implementing these statutory provisions
led to much of the litigation described
above. See supra Sections I. B. and C.
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The Department also sees no
countervailing burden—economic or
otherwise—other than those imposed by
the statute itself that would counsel
against promulgating this rule.
Finally, because this is not a
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ within
the meaning of Executive Order 12866,
the Office of Management and Budget
has not reviewed it prior to publication.
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VI. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531 et
seq.) directs agencies to assess the
effects of Federal regulatory actions on
State, local, and tribal governments, and
the private sector, ‘‘other than to the
extent that such regulations incorporate
requirements specifically set forth in
law.’’ For purposes of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, this rule does not
include any Federal mandate that may
result in increased expenditures by
State, local, and tribal governments, or
increased expenditures by the private
sector of more than $100,000,000.
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act and
Executive Order 13272 (Proper
Consideration of Small Entities in
Agency Rulemaking)
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980, as amended (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.),
requires an agency to prepare a
regulatory flexibility analysis when it
proposes regulations that will have ‘‘a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities’’ or
to certify that the proposed regulations
will have no such impact, and to make
the analysis or certification available for
public comment.
The Department has determined that
a regulatory flexibility analysis under
the RFA is not required for this
rulemaking. While many longshore
employers are small entities within the
meaning of the RFA, see generally 77 FR
19471–72 (March 30, 2012), this rule, if
adopted in final, will not have a
significant economic impact on them.
The proposed rules reflect current
payment practices and thus impose no
new costs on employers or their
insurance carriers. As explained above,
the proposed rules mainly codify case
law interpreting how the Act’s
maximum and minimum provisions
work; the rules are based primarily on
the Supreme Court’s controlling
decision in Roberts, the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits’ decisions in Roberts
and Boroski, and the Benefits Review
Board’s decisions in Reposky and Lake.
With one small exception, these
decisions comport with the Director’s
longstanding interpretation and
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application of the maximum and
minimum compensation provisions.
That exception involved cases in which
the employee’s disability was initially
something less than permanent total—
temporary total, permanent partial, or
temporary partial—and in a later fiscal
year became permanently totally
disabling. Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Roberts, the Department
took the view that the employee would
have remained at the maximum rate in
effect on the date of disability until the
next October 1. On that October 1, his
compensation rate would be determined
by applying section 10(f) to increase his
maximum rate by the same percentage
as the increase to the national average
weekly wage. But the Ninth Circuit held
that the employee need not wait until
the next October 1 and is instead
immediately subject to the maximum
rate in effect on the day he or she
becomes permanently totally disabled
under section 6(c)’s ‘‘currently
receiving’’ clause. Roberts, 625 F.3d at
1208–09. The Department has been
following the Ninth Circuit’s
construction of the statute since 2012,
and the regulations reflect this
construction as well.
Based on these facts, the Department
certifies that this rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Thus, a regulatory flexibility analysis is
not required. The Department invites
comments from members of the public
who believe the regulations will have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small longshore
employers or insurers. The Department
has provided the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration with a copy of this
certification. See 5 U.S.C. 605.
XIII. Executive Order 13132
(Federalism)
The Department has reviewed this
proposed rule in accordance with
Executive Order 13132 regarding
federalism, and has determined that it
does not have ‘‘federalism
implications.’’ The proposed rule will
not ‘‘have substantial direct effects on
the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government,’’ if promulgated as
a final rule.
IX. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
This proposed rule meets the
applicable standards in sections 3(a)
and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988,
Civil Justice Reform, to minimize
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58887
litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and
reduce burden.
List of Subjects in 20 CFR Part 702
Administrative practice and
procedure, Claims, Longshore and
harbor workers, Maximum
compensation rates, Minimum
compensation rates, Workers’
compensation.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Department of Labor
proposes to amend 20 CFR part 702 as
follows:
PART 702—ADMINISTRATION AND
PROCEDURE
1. The authority citation for part 702
is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, and 8171 et seq.;
33 U.S.C. 901 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1651 et seq.;
43 U.S.C. 1333; Reorganization Plan No. 6 of
1950, 15 FR 3174, 64 Stat. 1263; Secretary’s
Order 10–2009, 74 FR 58834.
2. In part 702, add subparts G and H
as follows:
■
Subpart G—Section 10(f) Adjustments
Sec.
702.701 What is an annual section 10(f)
adjustment and how is it calculated?
Subpart H—Maximum and Minimum
Compensation Rates
General
Sec.
702.801 Scope and intent of this subpart.
702.802 Applicability of this subpart.
702.803 Definitions.
702.804 What are the weekly maximum and
minimum rates for each fiscal year and
how are they calculated?
Maximum Rates
Sec.
702.805 What weekly maximum rates apply
to compensation for permanent partial
disability, temporary total disability, and
temporary partial disability?
702.806 What weekly maximum rates apply
to compensation for permanent total
disability?
702.807 What weekly maximum rates apply
to death benefits?
Minimum Rates
Sec.
702.808 What weekly minimum rates apply
to compensation for partial disability?
702.809 What weekly minimum rates apply
to compensation for temporary total
disability?
702.810 What weekly minimum rates apply
to compensation for permanent total
disability?
702.811 What weekly minimum rates apply
to death benefits?
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Subpart G—Section 10(f) Adjustments
§ 702.701 What is an annual section 10(f)
adjustment and how is it calculated?
(a) Claimants receiving compensation
for permanent total disability or death
benefits are entitled to section 10(f)
adjustments each fiscal year. A section
10(f) adjustment cannot decrease the
compensation or death benefits payable
to any claimant.
(b) The section 10(f) adjustment for a
given fiscal year is the lower of:
(1) The percentage by which the new
fiscal year’s national average weekly
wage exceeds the prior fiscal year’s
national average weekly wage as
determined by the Department (see
§ 702.804(b)); or
(2) 5 percent.
(c) Section 10(f) percentage increases
are applied each October 1 to the
amount of compensation or death
benefits payable in the prior fiscal year.
(d) In applying section 10(f)
adjustments—
(1) Calculations are rounded to the
nearest dollar; and
(2) No adjustment is made if the
calculated amount is less than one
dollar.
(e) A section 10(f) adjustment must
not increase a claimant’s weekly
compensation or death benefits beyond
the applicable fiscal year’s maximum
rate.
(f) Section 10(f) adjustments do not
apply to compensation for temporary or
partial disability.
Subpart H—Maximum and Minimum
Compensation Rates
General
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§ 702.801
Scope and intent of this subpart.
(a) This subpart implements the Act’s
provisions that affect the maximum and
minimum rates of compensation and
death benefits payable to employees and
survivors. These statutory provisions
include sections 6(b) and (c), and 9(e).
33 U.S.C. 906(b), (c); 909(e). It is
intended that these statutory provisions
be construed as provided in this
subpart.
(b) These regulations implement
section 6(c), 33 U.S.C. 906(c), based on
the following concepts:
(1) An employee is ‘‘newly awarded
compensation’’ when he or she first
becomes disabled due to an injury;
(2) A survivor is ‘‘newly awarded
compensation’’ on the date the
employee died; and
(3) An employee or survivor is
‘‘currently receiving compensation’’
when compensation for permanent total
disability or death benefits is payable,
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regardless of when payment is actually
made.
§ 702.802
Applicability of this subpart.
(a) This subpart applies to all
compensation and death benefits paid
under the Act with the following
exceptions:
(1) Amounts payable under an
approved settlement (see 33 U.S.C.
908(i));
(2) Amounts paid for an employee’s
death to the Special Fund (see 33 U.S.C.
944(c)(1));
(3) Any payments for medical
expenses (see 33 U.S.C. 907); and
(4) Any other lump sum payment of
compensation or death benefits,
including aggregate death benefits paid
when a survivor remarries (see 33 U.S.C.
909(b)) or aggregate compensation paid
under a commutation (see 33 U.S.C.
909(g)).
(b) The rules in this subpart governing
minimum disability compensation and
death benefits do not apply to claims
arising under the Defense Base Act, 42
U.S.C. 1651 (see 42 U.S.C. 1652(a); 20
CFR 704.103).
§ 702.803
Definitions.
The following definitions apply to
this subpart:
(a) Calculated compensation rate
means the amount of weekly
compensation for total disability or
death that a claimant would be entitled
to if there were no maximum rates,
minimum rates, or section 10(f)
adjustments.
(b) Date of disability
(1) Except as provided in paragraph
(b)(2), the date of disability is the date
on which the employee first became
incapable, because of an injury, of
earning the same wages the employee
was receiving at the time of the injury.
(2) Exceptions:
(i) For scheduled permanent partial
disability benefits under 33 U.S.C.
908(c)(1)–(20) that are not preceded by
a permanent total, temporary total, or
temporary partial disability resulting
from the same injury, the date of
disability is the date on which the
employee first becomes permanently
impaired by the injury to the scheduled
member.
(ii) For an occupational disease that
does not immediately result in
disability, the date of disability is the
date on which the employee becomes
aware, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence or by reason of medical advice
should have been aware, of the
relationship between his or her
employment, the disease, and the
disability.
(iii) For any disability lasting 14 or
fewer days, the date of disability is 4
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days after the date on which the
employee first became incapable,
because of an injury, of earning the
same wages the employee was receiving
at the time of the injury.
(c) Fiscal year or FY means the period
from October 1 of a calendar year until
September 30 of the following calendar
year.
(d) Maximum rate means the
maximum weekly compensation rate
calculated by the Department for a given
fiscal year as described in § 702.804(b).
(e) Minimum rate means the
minimum weekly compensation rate
calculated by the Department for a given
fiscal year as described in § 702.804(c).
(f) Section 10(f) adjustment means the
annual increase that certain claimants
receiving compensation for permanent
total disability or death are entitled to
each fiscal year under 33 U.S.C. 910(f)
and as calculated by the Department as
described in § 702.701(b).
§ 702.804 What are the weekly maximum
and minimum rates for each fiscal year and
how are they calculated?
(a) For each fiscal year, the
Department must determine a weekly
maximum and minimum compensation
rate. These amounts are called the
maximum and minimum rates in this
subchapter. In combination with other
factors, these rates are used to determine
compensation payments under the Act.
(b) The maximum compensation rate
in effect for a given fiscal year is 200%
of the national average weekly earnings
of production or nonsupervisory
workers on private, nonagricultural
payrolls, as calculated by the
Department, for the first three quarters
of the preceding fiscal year.
(c) The minimum compensation rate
in effect for a given fiscal year is 50%
of the national average weekly earnings
of production or nonsupervisory
workers on private, nonagricultural
payrolls, as calculated by the
Department, for the first three quarters
of the preceding fiscal year.
Maximum Rates
§ 702.805 What weekly maximum rates
apply to compensation for permanent
partial disability, temporary total disability,
and temporary partial disability?
(a) The maximum rate in effect on the
date of disability applies to all
compensation payable for permanent
partial disability, temporary partial
disability, and temporary total
disability.
(b) Examples:
(1) Employee A suffers a covered
workplace injury on April 1, 2000, is
temporarily totally disabled from that
day through June 4, 2002, and is
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thereafter permanently partially
disabled. All compensation payable for
A’s disability is subject to the FY 2000
maximum rate.
(2) Employee B suffers a covered
workplace injury on August 25, 2010,
and is temporarily totally disabled until
September 25, 2010, when he returns to
work. On January 3, 2011, he again
becomes temporarily totally disabled
from the same injury. He ceases work
and is unable to return until November
22, 2012. All compensation payable for
B’s disability is subject to the FY 2010
maximum rate.
(3) Employee C retires on May 6,
2011. She discovers on November 10,
2012, that she has a compensable
occupational disease. All compensation
payable for C’s occupational disease is
subject to the FY 2013 maximum rate.
See § 702.601(b) (occupational diseases
discovered post-retirement are
compensated as permanent partial
disabilities).
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§ 702.806 What weekly maximum rates
apply to compensation for permanent total
disability?
(a) The maximum rate in effect on the
date that the employee became totally
and permanently disabled applies to all
compensation payable for permanent
total disability during that fiscal year.
(b) For all periods the employee is
permanently and totally disabled in
subsequent fiscal years, the weekly
compensation payable is subject to each
subsequent year’s maximum rate.
(c) If a claimant is receiving
compensation for permanent total
disability at the maximum rate for the
current fiscal year, but the next fiscal
year’s maximum rate will be higher than
the claimant’s calculated compensation
rate, the claimant’s compensation for
the next fiscal year will increase by the
amount of the 10(f) adjustment, subject
to the maximum rate for the next fiscal
year.
(d) Examples:
(1) Employee A suffers a covered
workplace injury on April 1, 2000, and
is permanently and totally disabled
from that date forward. A’s
compensation for the period from April
1, 2000, until September 30, 2000, is
subject to the FY 2000 maximum rate.
Beginning October 1, 2000, A’s
compensation for FY 2001 is subject to
the FY 2001 maximum rate,
compensation for FY 2002 is subject to
the FY 2002 maximum rate, etc.
(2) Employee B suffers a covered
workplace injury on April 1, 2000, is
temporarily totally disabled from that
day through June 3, 2002, and is
thereafter permanently totally disabled.
B’s compensation for the period from
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April 1, 2000, through June 3, 2002, is
subject to the FY 2000 maximum rate
(see § 702.805(a)). B’s compensation for
the period from June 4, 2002, through
September 30, 2002, is subject to the FY
2002 maximum rate. Beginning October
1, 2002, B’s compensation for FY 2003
is subject to the FY 2003 maximum rate,
compensation for FY 2004 is subject to
the FY 2004 maximum rate, etc.
(3) Employee C suffers a covered
workplace injury in FY 2009 and is
permanently totally disabled from that
day forward. He was earning $1,950.00
a week when he was injured, making his
calculated compensation rate $1,300.00
($1,950.00 × 2 ÷ 3). His calculated
compensation rate exceeds the
maximum rate from FY 2009–2012;
thus, his compensation is limited to
each year’s maximum rate. In FY 2013,
C’s calculated compensation rate of
$1,300.00 is, for the first time, less than
the FY 2013 maximum rate of $1,325.18.
Applying the FY 2013 2.31% section
10(f) adjustment to C’s FY 2012
compensation rate of $1,295.20 results
in a compensation rate of $1,325.00
($1,295.20 × .0231 = $29.92 (rounded to
the nearest cent); $1,295.20 + $29.92 =
$1,325.12, rounded to the nearest
dollar). This amount falls just below the
FY 2013 maximum rate of $1,325.18.
Thus, C’s benefit rate for FY 2013 is
$1,325.00, and is not limited by the
maximum rate.
§ 702.807 What weekly maximum rates
apply to death benefits?
(a) The maximum rate in effect on the
date that the employee died applies to
all death benefits payable during that
fiscal year.
(b) Aggregate weekly death benefits
paid to all eligible survivors during the
fiscal year in which the employee died
must not exceed the lower of—
(1) The maximum rate for that fiscal
year; or
(2) The employee’s average weekly
wages.
(c) For subsequent fiscal years—
(1) Aggregate weekly death benefits
paid during each subsequent fiscal year
are subject to each subsequent year’s
maximum rate.
(2) If death benefits were paid in the
first year at the employee’s full average
weekly wage under paragraph (b)(2), the
aggregate weekly death benefits paid for
each subsequent year may not exceed
the current benefit rate plus the
subsequent year’s section 10(f)
adjustment (see § 702.701).
(d) Post-retirement occupational
diseases. Notwithstanding paragraphs
(a)–(c), if an employee’s death results
from an occupational disease where the
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
58889
date of disability occurred after the
employee voluntarily retired—
(1) Aggregate weekly death benefits
paid to all eligible survivors during the
fiscal year in which the employee died
must not exceed the lower of:
(i) The maximum rate for that fiscal
year; or
(ii) One fifty-second part of the
employee’s average annual earnings
during the 52-week period preceding
retirement.
(2) For subsequent fiscal years—
(i) Aggregate weekly death benefits
paid during each subsequent fiscal year
are subject to each subsequent year’s
maximum rate.
(ii) If death benefits were paid in the
first year at 1/52 part of the employee’s
average annual earnings prior to
retirement under paragraph (d)(1)(ii),
the aggregate weekly death benefits paid
for each subsequent year may not
exceed the current benefit rate plus the
subsequent year’s section 10(f)
adjustment (see § 702.701).
(e) Examples:
(1) Employee A suffers a covered
workplace injury on May 1, 2013, and
is permanently and totally disabled
from that date until August 1, 2014,
when he dies due to the injury. He has
one eligible survivor and his average
weekly wage at the time of injury was
$3,000.00. The calculated compensation
rate for A’s survivor is $1,500.00 (i.e.,
50% of A’s average weekly wage). A’s
weekly survivor’s benefits for the period
from August 2, 2014, to September 30,
2014, are limited to the FY 2014
maximum rate of $1,346.68. Beginning
October 1, 2014, A’s survivor’s benefits
for FY 2015 are subject to the FY 2015
maximum rate, benefits for FY 2016 are
subject to the FY 2016 maximum rate,
etc.
(2) Employee B suffers a covered
workplace injury and dies on December
1, 2012. She has one eligible survivor
and her average weekly wage was
$300.00. Because B’s average weekly
wage of $300.00 falls below the FY 2013
national average weekly wage of
$662.59, death benefits are calculated at
50% of that national average wage (see
33 U.S.C. 909(e)). This yields a
calculated compensation rate of
$331.30. But because this rate exceeds
B’s actual average weekly wages, weekly
death benefits payable during FY 2013
are limited to $300.00. In FY 2014, B’s
survivor is entitled to a 1.62% section
10(f) adjustment, resulting in weekly
death benefits of $305.00 ($300.00 ×
.0162 = $4.86; $300.00 + $4.86 =
$304.86, rounded to the nearest dollar).
B’s survivor would continue to receive
section 10(f) adjustments in subsequent
fiscal years.
E:\FR\FM\26AUP1.SGM
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58890
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 166 / Friday, August 26, 2016 / Proposed Rules
(3) Employee C retired on February 1,
1998. During his last year of
employment, he earned $23,000. He
discovers on April 15, 2002, that he has
a compensable occupational disease
resulting in a 50% permanent
impairment. See § 702.601(b). Because
he retired more than one year before this
date, his payrate for calculating
compensation is the FY 2002 national
average weekly wage, or $483.04. See
§ 702.603(b). He is entitled to weekly
compensation of $161.01 ($483.04 × 2 ÷
3 × 50%). C dies from the disease on
June 1, 2015, leaving two survivors. The
payrate for calculating death benefits is
the FY 2015 national average weekly
wage, or $688.51. See § 702.604(b). The
survivors’ aggregate calculated
compensation rate is $459.01 ($688.51 ×
2 ÷ 3). But because compensation
cannot exceed 1/52 part of C’s last year
of earnings, aggregate weekly death
benefits payable for FY 2015 are limited
to $442.31 ($23,000 ÷ 52). For FY 2016,
C’s survivors are entitled to a 2.10%
section 10(f) adjustment resulting in
weekly death benefits of $452.00
($442.31 × 021 = $9.29 (rounded to the
nearest cent); $442.31 + $9.29 =
$451.60, rounded to the nearest dollar).
C’s survivors would continue to receive
section 10(f) adjustments in subsequent
fiscal years.
Minimum Rates
§ 702.808 What weekly minimum rates
apply to compensation for partial disability?
There is no minimum rate for
compensation paid for partial disability,
whether temporary or permanent.
mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with PROPOSALS
§ 702.809 What weekly minimum rates
apply to compensation for temporary total
disability?
(a) The minimum compensation
payable for temporary total disability is
the lower of:
(1) The minimum rate in effect on the
date of disability, or
(2) The employee’s average weekly
wage on the date of disability.
(b) Example: Employee A suffers a
covered workplace injury on May 6,
2014. He is temporarily totally disabled
until November 6, 2015, when he
returns to work. His average weekly
wages at the time of disability were
$500.00. Because his calculated
compensation rate (i.e., 66 and 2⁄3% of
$500.00, or $333.34) is lower than the
$336.67 FY 2014 minimum rate, A’s
compensation is raised to $336.67 for
the entire period of his disability.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:00 Aug 25, 2016
Jkt 238001
§ 702.810 What weekly minimum rates
apply to compensation for permanent total
disability?
(a) The weekly minimum
compensation payable for the fiscal year
in which the employee became
permanently and totally disabled is the
lower of:
(1) The minimum rate in effect on the
date of disability, or
(2) The employee’s average weekly
wage on the date of disability.
(b) For all periods the employee is
permanently and totally disabled in
subsequent fiscal years, the weekly
minimum compensation payable is the
lower of:
(1) Each subsequent fiscal year’s
minimum rate, or
(2) The employee’s average weekly
wage on the date of disability.
(c) Example: Employee A suffers a
covered workplace injury on April 1,
2003, and is permanently totally
disabled from that day forward. He was
earning $250.00 a week when he was
injured. His calculated compensation
rate is $166.67 ($250 × 2 ÷ 3). The FY
2003 minimum rate is $249.14. Because
A’s calculated compensation rate is
below the FY 2003 minimum rate, and
his actual weekly wage is above that
rate, he is entitled to compensation at
the minimum rate of $249.14 from April
1, 2003, to September 30, 2003. The FY
2004 minimum rate is $257.70. Because
A’s actual weekly wages on the date of
disability are lower than the FY 2004
minimum rate, A’s minimum weekly
compensation rate for FY 2004 is
$250.00. His weekly compensation rate
for FY 2004, however, is higher because
of a section 10(f) adjustment. For FY
2004, A’s compensation rate is
increased by a 3.44% section 10(f)
adjustment, raising his compensation
level to $258.00 ($249.14 × .0344 =
$8.57; $249.14 + $8.57 = $257.71,
rounded to the nearest dollar).
§ 702.811 What weekly minimum rates
apply to death benefits?
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Indian Gaming Commission
25 CFR Part 515
RIN 3141–AA65
Privacy Act Procedures
National Indian Gaming
Commission, Department of the Interior.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
The purpose of this document
is to propose amendments to the
procedures followed by the National
Indian Gaming Commission
(Commission) when processing a
request under the Privacy Act of 1974.
The proposed amendments make the
following changes to the current
regulations. These changes will serve to
update certain Commission information,
streamline how the Commission
processes its Privacy Act requests, and
aligns those processes with its
procedures for processing Freedom of
Information Act requests.
DATES: Written comments on this
proposed rule must be received on or
before October 11, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to
Attn: National Indian Gaming
Commission, FOIA/PA Officer, C/O
Department of the Interior, 1849 C Street
NW., Mail Stop #1621, Washington, DC
20240 or faxed to (202) 632–7066 (this
is not a toll free number). Comments
may be inspected between 9:00 a.m. and
noon and between 2:00 p.m. and 5:00
p.m., Monday through Friday, at 90 K
Street NE., Washington, DC 20002.
Comments may also be submitted
electronically at www.regulations.gov or
emailed to pacomments@nigc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Andrew Mendoza at (202) 632–7003 or
by fax (202) 632–7066 (these numbers
are not toll free).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Comments Invited
(a) The average weekly wage used to
compute death benefits is the greater
of—
(1) The deceased employee’s average
weekly wages; or
(2) The national average weekly wage
in effect at the time of the employee’s
death.
(b) The weekly minimum rate does
not apply to death benefits.
Interested parties are invited to
participate in this proposed rulemaking
by submitting such written data, views,
or arguments as they may desire.
Comments that provide the factual basis
supporting the views and suggestions
presented are particularly helpful in
developing reasoned regulatory
decisions on the proposal.
Leonard J. Howie III,
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA), enacted on October 17, 1988,
established the National Indian Gaming
Commission. Congress enacted the
Privacy Act in 1974 (Pub. L. 93–579, 5
[FR Doc. 2016–20467 Filed 8–25–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–CR–P
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Fmt 4702
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II. Background
E:\FR\FM\26AUP1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 166 (Friday, August 26, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 58878-58890]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-20467]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
20 CFR Part 702
RIN 1240-AA06
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Maximum and
Minimum Compensation Rates
AGENCY: Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Labor.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs is proposing
rules to implement the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act's
maximum and minimum compensation provisions. Some of these provisions,
which cap the amounts of compensation and death benefits payable to
entitled claimants and provide a floor below which compensation may not
fall, have become the topic of litigation. The proposed rules would
clarify how the Department interprets and applies these provisions. In
addition, the proposed rules would implement the Act's annual
compensation-adjustment mechanism for permanent total disability
compensation and death benefits.
DATES: The Department invites written comments on the proposed
regulations from interested parties. Written comments must be received
by October 25, 2016.
ADDRESSES: You may submit written comments, identified by RIN number
1240-AA06, by any of the following methods. To facilitate the receipt
and processing of comment letters, OWCP encourages interested parties
to submit their comments electronically.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions on the Web site for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 693-1380 (this is not a toll-free number). Only
comments of ten or fewer pages (including a Fax cover sheet and
attachments, if any) will be accepted by Fax.
Regular Mail or Hand Delivery/Courier: Submit comments on
paper to the Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor,
Room C-4319, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210. The
Department's receipt of U.S. mail may be significantly delayed due to
security procedures. You must take this into consideration when
preparing to meet the deadline for submitting comments.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name
and the Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. All
comments received will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided.
Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to
https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Antonio Rios, Director, Division of
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, Room C-4319, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210. Telephone: (202)-693-
0038 (this is not a toll-free number). TTY/TDD callers may dial toll
free 1-877-889-5627 for further information.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background of This Rulemaking
The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-
50 (LHWCA or Act), establishes a federal workers' compensation system
for an employee's disability or death arising in the course of covered
maritime employment. 33 U.S.C. 903(a), 908, 909. This proposed rule
would implement the Act's provisions on maximum and minimum amounts of
compensation payable.
A. The Act's Compensation Scheme
Disability, which the Act defines as ``incapacity because of injury
to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of
injury,'' 33 U.S.C. 902(10), ``is in essence an economic, not a medical
concept.'' Metro. Stevedores v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 297 (1995). From
its inception in 1927, the Act has provided that ``the average weekly
wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury'' must be used
as the basis for computing his or her compensation rate. 33 U.S.C. 910.
Thus, ``[a]n employee's compensation depends on the severity of his
disability and his preinjury pay.'' Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc.,
566 U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1350, 1354 (2012).
Several statutory sections have an impact on determining the amount
of compensation payable. Section 10, ``Determination of Pay,'' 33
U.S.C. 910, is the starting point in the statutory scheme. It sets out
rules for calculating the employee's average weekly wage (AWW) as of
the time of the employee's disabling injury. This AWW serves as the
basis for all future benefit calculations for that worker throughout
the life of his or her claim.
The second step is to determine what percentage of the employee's
AWW a claimant will receive in compensation. This is determined under
section 8, ``Compensation for Disability,'' and section 9,
``Compensation for Death,'' 33 U.S.C. 908, 909. Compensation payable
for disability varies based on the nature and extent of an employee's
disability. Section 8 establishes four basic categories of disability:
Permanent total, temporary total, permanent partial, and temporary
partial. 33 U.S.C. 908(a)-(c), (e). In general, an injury is ``total''
if the worker is unable to work after the injury and ``partial'' if the
worker is able to work at a diminished wage. A disability is
``temporary'' if the employee's medical condition is improving and
becomes ``permanent'' when he or she reaches maximum medical
improvement. See 33 U.S.C. 908(a)-(c), (e); see also Potomac Elec.
Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268 (1980). And section 9
provides compensation payable to the employees' eligible survivors for
injuries causing death. 30 U.S.C. 909.
For all disability categories, the Act uses a ``two-thirds'' rule
to compute compensation. Totally disabled employees--those who are
unable to return to their original employment or earn wages in suitable
alternative employment--receive two-thirds the AWW they were earning at
the time of injury. 33 U.S.C. 908(a)-(b). Partially disabled
employees--those who experience the loss or loss-of-use of body parts
specified in the statute--are entitled to two-thirds of their date-of-
injury AWW for a specified number of weeks. 33 U.S.C. 908(c)(1)-(19).
Other partially disabled employees--those
[[Page 58879]]
who are able to work after their injuries at a diminished wage--receive
two-thirds of the difference between their pre-disability AWW and their
residual earning capacity (i.e., the post-injury wages they earn or
could earn through suitable alternative employment). See 33 U.S.C.
908(c)(21), (e). Finally, the compensation rate for survivors of an
employee who suffers a work-related death is usually based on the
deceased employee's AWW at the time of death, and, with certain
exceptions, can be as high as two-thirds of that wage. 33 U.S.C.
909(b).
The third step is to apply the statute's compensation-limiting
rules. Despite the general two-thirds rule, section 6,
``Compensation,'' 33 U.S.C. 906, both caps the compensation amounts
that can be received (a ``maximum'') and provides a floor below which
compensation may not fall (a ``minimum''). These limits are applied
after calculating two-thirds of the worker's date-of-injury AWW. The
Act sets the maximum for all disability compensation categories at 200
percent of the ``applicable national average weekly wage.'' 33 U.S.C.
906(b)(1). Total compensation for death--the amount payable to all
survivors in the aggregate--is also limited to that 200-percent figure,
or to the deceased employee's AWW, whichever is less. 33 U.S.C.
909(e)(1); Donovan v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 31 BRBS
2 (1997). The Act sets the minimum for total disability compensation at
the lower of: (1) 50 percent of the applicable national average weekly
wage; or (2) the employee's actual AWW. 33 U.S.C. 906(b)(2). The Act
does not provide minimums for the remaining compensation categories.
The Secretary of Labor determines the national average weekly wage
before October 1 of each year, and it applies for a fiscal year (FY),
from October 1 until the next September 30. 33 U.S.C. 906(b)(3). A
given fiscal year's national average weekly wage, and the resulting
maximum and minimum rates, apply to ``employees or survivors currently
receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death during
such [fiscal year], as well as those newly awarded compensation during
such [fiscal year].'' 33 U.S.C. 906(c) (emphasis added). Under the
``currently receiving'' clause, the maximum rate for claimants
receiving benefits for permanent total disability or death is
``adjusted each fiscal year--and typically increases, in step with the
usual inflation-driven rise in the national average weekly wage.''
Roberts, 132 S.Ct. at 1354 n.2. In fact, because the national average
weekly wage has risen every year since Congress added this self-
adjustment feature to section 6 in 1972, each year's maximum rate has
risen as well. Thus, applying a later fiscal year's maximum generally
results in a higher compensation rate.
Finally, in addition to section 6's provisions allowing adjustments
to the maximum compensation rate, section 10(f) provides another
mechanism for adjusting compensation amounts over time. ``[B]enefits
payable for permanent total disability or death'' are increased at the
beginning of each fiscal year (October 1) by the same percentage as any
increase in the national average weekly wage (as calculated under
section 6), but no more than 5 percent. 33 U.S.C. 910(f). The primary
difference between the two adjustment provisions is that section 10(f)
applies to all claimants receiving compensation for permanent total
disability or death, while section 6(c) assists only those affected by
the maximum rate. Through these provisions, compensation payable to a
claimant each year increases by the same amount as wage-growth
generally, ensuring that the value of the workers' compensation is not
eroded over time.
In recent litigation, disputes have arisen over which fiscal year's
maximum rate or rates apply to a given claimant, specifically: (1) In
what fiscal year is a claimant ``newly awarded compensation''; and (2)
in what fiscal year is a claimant ``currently receiving compensation
for permanent total disability or death.'' On the first question, the
dispute is whether a claimant is ``newly awarded compensation'' when he
or she first becomes disabled--and therefore entitled to compensation--
or when an administrative law judge issues a compensation order. On the
second question, the dispute is whether a claimant is ``currently
receiving compensation for permanent total disability'' when he or she
first becomes permanently totally disabled or when he or she actually
receives compensation for permanent total disability.
The Supreme Court resolved the first of these questions in its
Roberts decision. But the second issue has not been addressed by all
circuits around the country, and thus remains subject to litigation.
The proposed rules would codify the Supreme Court's decision, resolve
the second issue in a manner consistent with the courts that have
addressed it, implement other aspects of the Act's maximum and minimum
compensation provisions, and address the related section 10(f) annual
adjustment provision.
B. Section 6(c)'s ``Newly Awarded Compensation During Such Period''
Clause
The Supreme Court construed this part of section 6(c) in Roberts
and held ``that an employee is `newly awarded compensation' when he
first becomes disabled and thereby becomes statutorily entitled to
benefits, no matter whether, or when, a compensation order issues on
his behalf.'' 132 S.Ct. at 1363. Mr. Roberts was injured and became
disabled in FY 2002. An administrative law judge (ALJ) order awarding
compensation, however, was not issued until FY 2007. While Mr. Roberts'
employer initially made some compensation payments, it stopped in May
2005 and did not resume payments until after the ALJ's FY 2007 order.
The ALJ found that Mr. Roberts' disability was: Temporary total from
March 11, 2002, to July 11, 2005; permanent total from July 12, 2005,
to October 9, 2005; and permanent partial beginning on October 10,
2005. Roberts v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
625 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). Because the employer had ceased
paying compensation in May 2005, before Mr. Roberts' period of
permanent total disability, it did not pay him for that disability
until after the ALJ's order in FY 2007.
The ALJ found that Mr. Roberts' compensation rate for total
disability--two-thirds of his AWW--was $1,902.05, and that his
compensation rate for permanent partial disability--two-thirds of the
difference between his average weekly and his residual wage-earning
capacity--was $1,422.05. He found, however, that Mr. Roberts was
subject, for all periods of disability, to the maximum rate of $966.08
in effect during FY 2002, because that was when he first became
disabled, and was thus ``newly awarded compensation.'' Id. at 1206. On
Mr. Roberts' motion for reconsideration, the ALJ determined that he had
applied the wrong maximum rate for the period from October 1, 2005,
through October 9, 2005. The ALJ found that Mr. Roberts was entitled to
the FY 2006 maximum rate of $1,703.64 per week for that period because
he was ``currently receiving compensation for permanent total
disability'' during that time. Id.
The Benefits Review Board, relying on its earlier decision in
Reposky v. Int'l Transp. Services, 40 BRBS 65, 74-76 (2006) (holding
that a claimant is newly awarded compensation ``when benefits commence,
generally at the time of injury''), affirmed the ALJ's decision. The
Ninth Circuit followed suit. In affirming the ALJ's decision, it held
that
[[Page 58880]]
an injured employee is ``newly awarded'' compensation when he or she
first becomes entitled to compensation rather than when a formal
compensation order is issued. Roberts, 625 F.3d at 1208. Although Mr.
Roberts argued that ``awarded'' could mean only ``assigned by formal
order in the course of adjudication,'' and that ``newly awarded'' must
therefore mean newly issued a compensation order, id. at 1206, the
court rejected that argument. It reasoned that the LHWCA sometimes uses
``awarded'' to mean ``entitled to.'' It found that use applied to
section 6, and held that a claimant is ``newly awarded'' compensation
when he first becomes entitled to compensation, which is when he first
becomes disabled.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
section 6(c)'s ``newly awarded compensation'' clause. The Court
acknowledged that Mr. Roberts' contrary view was ``appealing'' because
``[i]n ordinary usage, `award' most often means `give by judicial
decree' or `assign after careful judgment.' '' Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at
1356 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 152 (2002)).
It recognized, however, that ``award'' can also mean ``grant'' or
``confer or bestow upon.'' Thus, deciding that ``the text of Sec.
906(c), in isolation, is indeterminate[,]'' the Court considered its
function in the context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 1357. The
Court concluded that in the Act's ``comprehensive, reticulated regime
for worker benefits--in which Sec. 906 plays a pivotal role--`awarded
compensation' is much more sensibly interpreted to mean `statutorily
entitled to compensation because of disability,' '' id. at 1357, than
``awarded compensation in a formal order.'' Id. at 1356.
The Court gave several reasons for its holding. First, the Court
recognized that construing ``newly awarded compensation'' to mean a
formal compensation order would be ``incompatible with the Act's
design.'' Id. at 1357. The Court reasoned that this construction of the
clause would be impossible to apply in the many cases where benefits
are paid voluntarily and a formal compensation order is never issued.
Noting that the three provisions of section 6 that relate to the
maximum compensation rate ``work together to cap disability benefits,''
and that section 6(b)(1)'s cap on benefits ``applies globally, to all
disability claims,'' the Court concluded that section 6(c)'s ``newly
awarded'' clause must also apply globally. Id. at 1358.
Second, the Court examined the Act's administrative structure,
which requires employers to pay compensation within 14 days after the
employer knows of the worker's injury (see 30 U.S.C. 914(b)). It
determined that using the national average weekly wage at the time of
disability to determine the applicable maximum ``coheres'' with that
structure. Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1358. The Court recognized that the
employer, as well as OWCP, must be able to calculate the amount of
compensation due at the time of payment, a calculation that necessarily
includes consideration of any applicable cap. Because an employer is
``powerless to predict'' future events related to the compensation
claim or what a later national average weekly wage will be, the court
reasoned that ``[i]t is difficult to see how an employer can apply or
certify a national average weekly wage other than the one in effect at
the time an employee becomes disabled.'' Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1358-
59.
Reading section 6(c) in the context of the Act's comprehensive
scheme, the Court further explained that ``applying the national
average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which an employee becomes
disabled advances the LHWCA's purpose to compensate disability,'' which
focuses on wages at the time of the injury as the basis to compute
compensation. Id. at 1359 (citing 33 U.S.C. 902(10)). It is thus
``logical to apply the national average weekly wage for the same point
in time.'' Id.
Moreover, the Court found that applying the date-of-disability
maximum rate as suggested by the Director and Employer ``avoids
disparate treatment of similarly situated employees . . . who earn the
same salary and suffer the same injury on the same day.'' Id. at 1359.
By contrast, Mr. Roberts' approach could subject such employees to
different rates based solely on the ``happenstance of their obtaining
orders in different fiscal years.'' Id.
Third, the Court believed its approach ``discourages gamesmanship
in the claims process.'' Id. at 1360. Using the date a compensation
order issues would encourage claimants to delay the adjudication
process or initiate additional administrative proceedings seeking to
take advantage of a later year's national average weekly wage. At the
same time, an employer who promptly pays compensation at the correct
rate would be subject to an increased cap retroactively for those
payments based on a later compensation order. The Court refused to
``reward'' claimants with these ``windfalls'' while ``punishing''
employers who have met their statutory obligations. Id.
C. Section 6(c)'s ``Currently Receiving Compensation for Permanent
Total Disability or Death Benefits During Such Period'' Clause
While the Supreme Court's Roberts decision settled the
interpretation of the ``newly awarded'' clause, the Court declined to
consider section 6(c)'s ``currently receiving'' clause, leaving the
phrase's correct interpretation open to further litigation. The Ninth
Circuit Roberts court had interpreted the ``currently receiving''
clause consistently with the ``newly awarded'' clause, noting that
``[u]nder both clauses, the inquiry into the applicable maximum rate
focuses on an employee's entitlement to compensation.'' Roberts, 625
F.3d at 1208. It held that ``the `currently receiving' clause of
section 6(c) unambiguously refers to the period during which an
employee was entitled to receive compensation for permanent total
disability, regardless of whether his employer actually paid it.'' Id.
at 1209. Consequently, the court determined that Mr. Roberts was
``currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability'' as
of July 12, 2005, and thus entitled to the FY 2005 maximum rate from
that date through September 30, 2005 (the end of FY 2005), and to the
FY 2006 rate from October 1, 2005, through October 9, 2005. Beginning
October 10, 2005--when Mr. Roberts regained an earning capacity, making
his disability permanent partial--the court concluded he was once again
subject to the FY 2002 maximum rate. Id. at 1206, 1209.
Although the Eleventh Circuit initially disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit's construction of the ``currently receiving'' clause, Boroski
v. DynCorp Int'l, 662 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2011), that court reversed
its position after the Supreme Court decided Roberts. Boroski v.
DynCorp Int'l, 700 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 2012) on remand from 132 S.Ct.
2430 (2012). Mr. Boroski was first disabled by his work-related injury
in April 2002. His employer, DynCorp International, timely contested
his compensation claim and thus did not voluntarily pay him
compensation. An ALJ entered an order in FY 2008 awarding him permanent
total disability compensation from 2002 and continuing. DynCorp based
its subsequent payments on the maximum compensation rate applicable for
FY 2002, and adjusted the amount upward each year, beginning on October
1, 2002, as required by section 10(f). Mr. Boroski objected, arguing
that he was not ``currently receiving compensation for permanent total
disability'' until FY 2008, when the employer actually began
[[Page 58881]]
paying him, and was thus entitled to the FY 2008 maximum rate from the
outset.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Mr. Boroski's argument and held that
`` `currently receiving compensation' in Sec. 906(c) means `currently
entitled to compensation.' '' Boroski, 700 F.3d at 451. The court
agreed with the Director that for each year after 2002 during which Mr.
Boroski was entitled to compensation for permanent total disability, he
was ``currently receiving compensation for permanent total
disability,'' and thus subject to the new fiscal year's maximum rate,
regardless of when the compensation was actually paid.
Taking its analytical lead from the Supreme Court in Roberts, the
Boroski court considered the ``currently receiving'' clause's role in
the context of the entire statute. The court noted that using the
maximum for the year in which compensation was actually paid (2008)
rather than for the first year Mr. Boroski was disabled (2002) would
lead to ``two different and irreconcilable weekly benefit payment
amounts'' under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ``newly
awarded'' clause, which also applied to his compensation calculation.
Id. at 451. The Director's contrary interpretation instead harmonized
the two clauses of section 6(c).
The court also found the Director's position more consistent with
section 10(f)'s annual adjustment mechanism. The court reasoned that
the Director's interpretation of the ``currently receiving'' clause
operates similarly, ``gradually increasing benefits to maintain the
value of an injured employee's wages, determined `at the time of the
injury.' '' Id. at 452. Mr. Boroski's interpretation--under which
``employers who first pay benefits to an injured employee in a year
other than the year of the injury would pay all past due payments based
on the national average weekly wage for the year in which the first
payment is made . . . effectively giv[ing] the injured employee a raise
to the later year's national average weekly wage, and would make that
raise retroactive to the date of his disability''--would be
``incongruous'' with section 10(f). Id. at 452. The court also rejected
Mr. Boroski's assertion that Congress intended his interpretation to
encourage prompt payment of benefits. The court noted that claimants
are entitled to interest on late payments of compensation, and found
that interest both adequately compensates claimants for the delayed
receipt of benefits and discourages employers from refusing to promptly
pay legitimate claims.
Finally, the court determined that the Director's interpretation
avoided disparate treatment of similarly situated claimants. ``Under
the Director's interpretation, Boroski receives the same benefits as a
similarly situated employee who was first injured and who first
received payment in 2002, and, additionally, Boroski receives interest
on all late payments, to compensate him for the delay.'' Id. at 453. By
contrast, under Mr. Boroski's interpretation--in which Mr. Boroski
``would receive, in addition to interest, higher benefits for the same
period of disability than claimants who timely receive their
benefits''--the same hypothetical employee ``would receive
approximately $30,000 less than Boroski.'' Id.
For all of these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit held, as had the
Ninth Circuit in Roberts, that an employee is ``currently receiving
compensation for permanent total disability'' when he is entitled to
such compensation, not when he is actually paid that compensation. To
date, the remaining circuits have not weighed in on this issue.
The Benefits Review Board subsequently reached the same conclusion
as the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Lake v. L-3 Communications, 47 BRBS
45 (2013). In Lake, the Board held that a claimant is ``currently
receiving compensation'' under section 6(c) ``during a period in which
he is entitled to receive such compensation, regardless of whether his
employer actually pays it.'' Id. at 48. The Board also held that when a
claimant's temporary total disability changes to permanent total
disability during a fiscal year, the maximum rate in effect during that
year applies immediately. Id. at 48. In reaching this conclusion, the
Board overruled this portion of its earlier contrary decision in
Reposky, 40 BRBS at 65. The Board thus held that the FY 2009 maximum
rate applied as of December 10, 2008, the date that Mr. Lake's
entitlement to permanent total disability benefits commenced, until the
next October 1, when the new fiscal year's maximum rate applied.
The Board also addressed a related question on the interplay
between sections 6 and 10(f) in Lake. The employer argued that Mr.
Lake, who first reached permanent total disability status in FY 2009,
was not entitled to the FY 2009 maximum rate. Instead, the employer
contended that he was limited to a section 10(f) increase on the FY
2006 maximum rate that he had been receiving since his injury, followed
by a section 10(f) adjustment each subsequent October 1. The Board
rejected this argument. Citing its earlier contrary holding in Marko v.
Morris Boney Co., 23 BRBS 353 (1990), the Board reiterated its
conclusion that, ``in a permanent total disability case in which two-
thirds of the claimant's actual [AWW] exceeds the Section 6(b)(3)
statutory maximum rate, he is entitled to the benefit of the new
maximum rate each fiscal year . . . until such time as two-thirds of
his actual average weekly wage falls below 200 percent of the
applicable [national average weekly wage], and then annual adjustments
under Section 10(f) apply.'' Lake, 47 BRBS at 50. The Board found its
holding compelled by the plain language of section 6(c) and supported
by the Ninth Circuit's Roberts decision.
II. Summary of the Proposed Rule
A. General Information
As discussed in the Section-by-Section Explanation below, this
proposed rule implements the Act's provisions governing the maximum and
minimum amount of disability compensation and death benefits payable.
The proposed regulations do not govern general compensation
calculations (referred to in the rules as the ``calculated compensation
rate''), and the fact that compensation payable is subject to these
maximum and minimum rates does not mean that claimants are necessarily
entitled to them. Rather, the proposed regulations simply provide that
disability compensation and death benefits can go no higher than the
applicable maximum rate or lower than the applicable minimum rate.
The proposed rule includes two subparts. Subpart G describes the
annual adjustment to compensation and death benefits provided under
section 10(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 910(f). While section 10(f) allows
for an annual adjustment to all payments of compensation for permanent
total disability or death benefits, including those cases where neither
the maximum nor the minimum rates are implicated, the Department has
included section 10(f) in this rulemaking because its application can
be closely tied with the maximum compensation or death benefits payable
in certain cases. These interrelationships are detailed in the Section-
by-Section Explanation below.
Subpart H includes proposed regulations implementing the Act's
maximum and minimum provisions. The Department has organized these
sections first to cover general topics, then by whether the rules
govern maximum or minimum compensation payable, and finally by
categories of compensation payable (i.e., temporary
[[Page 58882]]
total or partial, permanent total or partial, and death benefits).
B. Section-by-Section Explanation
This discussion contains an explanation of each proposed rule. Many
of the rules include examples that use the Department's yearly
calculation of the applicable national average weekly wage, the maximum
and minimum weekly compensation rates, and percentage adjustments
available under section 10(f), 33 U.S.C. 910(f). This information is
routinely available on OWCP's Web site. See https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). For the reader's convenience, these
amounts for FY 2000 to FY 2016 are provided in the following chart.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum weekly Minimum weekly Section 10(f)
Period NAWW \1\ rate (200% of rate (50% of percent
NAWW) NAWW) increase (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(FY 16) 10/01/2015-09/30/2016................... $703.00 $1,406.00 $351.50 2.10
(FY 15) 10/01/2014-09/30/2015................... 688.51 1,377.02 344.26 2.25
(FY 14) 10/01/2013-09/30/2014................... 673.34 1,346.68 336.67 1.62
(FY 13) 10/01/2012-09/30/2013................... 662.59 1,325.18 331.30 2.31
(FY 12) 10/01/2011-09/30/2012................... 647.60 1,295.20 323.80 3.05
(FY 11) 10/01/2010-09/30/2011................... 628.42 1,256.84 314.21 2.63
(FY 10) 10/01/2009-09/30/2010................... 612.33 1,224.66 306.17 2.00
(FY 09) 10/01/2008-09/30/2009................... 600.31 1,200.62 300.16 3.47
(FY 08) 10/01/2007-09/30/2008................... 580.18 1,160.36 290.09 4.12
(FY 07) 10/01/2006-09/30/2007................... 557.22 1114.44 278.61 3.80
(FY 06) 10/01/2005-09/30/2006................... 536.82 1073.64 268.41 2.53
(FY 05) 10/01/2004-09/30/2005................... 523.58 1,047.16 261.79 1.59
(FY 04) 10/01/2003-09/30/2004................... 515.39 1,030.78 257.70 3.44
(FY 03) 10/01/2002-09/30/2003................... 498.27 996.54 249.14 3.15
(FY 02) 10/01/2001-09/30/2002................... 483.04 966.08 241.52 3.45
(FY 01) 10/01/2000-09/30/2001................... 466.91 933.82 233.46 3.61
(FY 00) 10/01/1999-09/30/2000................... 450.64 901.28 225.32 3.39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some examples also include compensation calculations. When
compensation is based on 66 and \2/3\ percent of the injured employee's
average weekly wage (e.g., compensation for permanent total
disability), the formula for calculating this percentage is expressed
as: Average weekly wage amount x 2 / 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For purposes of this chart, ``NAWW'' means the applicable
national average weekly earnings of production or nonsupervisory
workers on private nonagricultural payrolls during the first three
quarters of the preceding fiscal year as determined by the
Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subpart G--Section 10(f) Adjustments
20 CFR 702.701 What is an annual section 10(f) adjustment and how is it
calculated?
Section 10(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 910(f), provides for an annual
upward percentage adjustment of permanent total disability compensation
rates and death benefits so that the value of the compensation received
does not erode over time. Proposed Sec. 702.701 sets out the basic
rules for section 10(f) adjustments.
Proposed paragraphs (a) and (b) describe the section 10(f)
adjustment and how the fiscal year percentage is determined. Consistent
with the statute, paragraph (a) states that section 10(f) adjustments
apply each fiscal year to permanent total disability compensation and
death benefits, and that those adjustments may only increase amounts
payable. 33 U.S.C. 910(f) (``benefits payable for permanent total
disability or death . . . shall be increased''); 33 U.S.C. 910(g) (``in
no event shall compensation for death benefits be reduced''). Paragraph
(b) describes how the Department calculates the annual section 10(f)
adjustment, a method dictated by section 10(f) itself. In any given
fiscal year, the 10(f) adjustment is the percentage increase in the
applicable national average weekly wage over the prior fiscal year's
applicable national average or five percent, whichever is lower. See 33
U.S.C. 910(f)(1), (2).
Proposed paragraphs (c) through (e) set out how the fiscal year
percentage is applied in individual cases. Paragraph (c) specifies that
section 10(f) adjustments are applied each October 1 to the prior
year's compensation or death benefits payable to the claimant. By using
the statutory term ``payable,'' the Department intends the percentage
increase to apply to the compensation and death benefits due during the
prior year, even if not actually paid. Paragraph (d) implements the
statutory requirements that calculations resulting from section 10(f)
adjustments are rounded to the nearest dollar and that no adjustment is
made if the amount is less than one dollar. See 33 U.S.C. 910(g). And
paragraph (e) provides that section 10(f) adjustments may not increase
compensation or death benefits beyond the maximum rate for any fiscal
year. This limitation is consistent with LHWCA section 6(b)(1)'s
command that compensation payments, whether for disability or death,
must not exceed the applicable fiscal year's maximum rate.
Finally, proposed paragraph (f) states that the adjustments do not
apply to compensation for temporary or partial disability, including
temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, and permanent
partial disability. The paragraph reflects the limitation set forth in
paragraph (a) and is added for clarity.
Subpart H--Maximum and Minimum Compensation Rates
General
20 CFR 702.801 Scope and Intent of This Subpart
Proposed Sec. 702.801 describes the statutory provisions this
subpart is intended to implement. Paragraph (a) generally lists the
statutory provisions that affect the maximum and minimum compensation
and death benefits payable to entitled individuals. Section 6(b) of the
LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 906(b), sets the maximum compensation rate for death
or disability compensation at 200 percent of the applicable national
average weekly wage, and the minimum compensation rate for total
disability at the lower of the employee's average weekly wage or 50
percent of the applicable national average weekly wage. Section 6(b)
also provides that the
[[Page 58883]]
Secretary of Labor determines the applicable national average weekly
wage for each one-year period from October 1 to September 30. Section
6(c), 33 U.S.C. 906(c), provides that the Secretary's determination of
the national average weekly wage for each one-year period ``shall apply
to employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for
permanent total disability or death benefits during such period, as
well as those newly awarded compensation during such period.'' Section
9(e), 33 U.S.C. 909(e), includes provisions that affect the minimum
death benefits payable to a deceased employee's survivors.
Because the interpretation of section 6(c) is important to
determining how the maximum and minimum provisions apply and has been
the subject of litigation, proposed paragraph (b) more specifically
addresses section 6(c)'s ``newly awarded compensation'' and ``currently
receiving compensation'' phrases. Paragraph (b)(1) adopts the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Roberts that a claimant, regardless of the nature
or extent of disability, is ``newly awarded compensation'' when he or
she first becomes disabled and entitled to compensation. See supra
Section I. B. Claimants are initially subject to the maximum and
minimum rates derived from the national average weekly wage in effect
during the fiscal year his or her disability begins. Paragraph (b)(2)
applies the Supreme Court's Roberts analysis to death benefits by
providing that a deceased employee's survivor is ``newly awarded
compensation'' on the day of the employee's death, the first time a
survivor may be entitled to death benefits. See discussion infra at
proposed Sec. 702.807. And paragraph (b)(3) provides that a claimant
is ``currently receiving compensation'' during the period for which the
compensation is payable, regardless of when it is actually paid. This
construction is consistent with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits'
interpretations. See supra Section I. C. While these phrases are not
used in the remainder of the proposed subpart, the concepts set forth
in paragraph (b) underlie the rules.
20 CFR 702.802 Applicability of This Subpart
Proposed Sec. 702.802(a) lists several circumstances in which this
subpart's rules do not apply, including: Approved settlements made
under section 8(i) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 908(i); payments for an
employee's compensable death made to the Special Fund when the employee
has no eligible survivors, 33 U.S.C. 944(c)(1); payments for medical
expenses, 33 U.S.C. 907; and any other compensation calculated and paid
in a lump sum, such as the two years of death benefits payable to an
employee's eligible surviving spouse who remarries, 33 U.S.C. 909(b),
or when compensation payments are commuted, 33 U.S.C. 909(g). In all of
these circumstances, the maximum and minimum weekly rates do not apply
either because the compensation due is not based on a weekly rate
(e.g., medical expenses) or it is not necessarily paid on a weekly
basis (e.g., settlements, commutations). Although not subject to the
rules in this subpart, the maximum and minimum compensation rates will
nevertheless be relevant in some of these circumstances. For example,
the Department would consider such compensation rates in calculating a
commuted award or death benefits payable when a survivor remarries.
Similarly, the Department anticipates that private parties will
consider the maximum and minimum compensation rates in settlement
negotiations, and the Department will consider them in deciding whether
to approve settlements.
Proposed Sec. 702.802(b) provides that the rules governing minimum
compensation and death benefits payable do not apply to claims arising
under the Defense Base Act (DBA), 42 U.S.C. 1651 et seq. The DBA
specifically precludes application of the LHWCA's minimum compensation
provisions: ``The minimum limit on weekly compensation for disability,
established by section 6(b), and the minimum limit on the average
weekly wages on which death benefits are to be computed, established by
section 9(e) of the [Longshore] Act, shall not apply in computing
compensation and death benefits under [the DBA].'' 42 U.S.C. 1652(a).
The Secretary's regulations implementing the DBA also reflect this
limitation. See 20 CFR 704.103. The limitation in proposed Sec.
702.802(b) comports with these authorities.
20 CFR 702.803 Definitions
This section defines certain terms used in this subpart; these
definitions do not apply outside of this subpart. Proposed paragraph
(a) defines a claimant's ``calculated compensation rate'' as the weekly
compensation or death benefits payable prior to any consideration of
the maximum or minimum rates, or a section 10(f) adjustment. As
discussed above (see supra Section I. A.), this figure is a specified
percentage of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the
injury or death. But there are exceptions. For example, in certain
claims, the calculated compensation rate is based on the national
average weekly wage rather than on the employee's actual earnings. 33
U.S.C. 909(e), 910(d)(2)(B).
Proposed paragraph (b) defines the phrase ``date of disability'' as
the date an employee first becomes economically impaired--or, in other
words, unable to earn the same wages--as a result of a covered injury.
The phrase incorporates the statutory definition of ``disability,'' see
33 U.S.C. 902(10), and is based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Roberts, which held that the maximum compensation rate applicable on
the day the employee became ``entitled to compensation because of
disability'' controlled. Roberts, 132 S.Ct. at 1357. The phrase is used
in this subpart to delineate when certain minimum or maximum
compensation rates apply.
The proposed rule, however, excepts from the general ``date of
disability'' definition three situations that demand special treatment.
Paragraph (b)(2)(i) provides that for scheduled permanent partial
disabilities under 33 U.S.C. 908(c)(1)-(20) that are not preceded by
another category of disability (i.e., permanent total, temporary total,
or temporary partial), the date of disability is when the employee
first becomes permanently impaired by the injury to the scheduled
member. This exception is necessary because an employee may suffer a
scheduled injury without any loss in wage-earning capacity, which is
the touchstone for the general ``date of disability'' definition.
Paragraph (b)(2)(ii) establishes a separate date of disability for
occupational diseases because the disease may manifest after voluntary
retirement, when the employee does not experience a loss of wage-
earning capacity. Paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides that for very short-
term disabilities lasting no more than 14 days, the date of disability
is 4 days after the injury affected the employee's wage earning
capacity. For such a short-term disability, section 6(a) of the Act
provides that no compensation is payable for the first 3 days of
disability. 33 U.S.C. 906(a). Thus, using the fourth day as the ``date
of disability'' for determining the maximum and minimum compensation
payable reflects the date on which the employee is actually entitled to
compensation.
The remaining definitions explain how basic terms are used in the
proposed rule. Paragraph (c) defines the dates of a standard fiscal
year. Paragraphs (d) and (e) define ``maximum rate'' and ``minimum
rate'' as the weekly compensation rates the Department calculates for
each fiscal year. And paragraph (f) defines a ``section 10(f)
adjustment'' as the annual
[[Page 58884]]
compensation increase some claimants receive under LHWCA section 10(f),
33 U.S.C. 910(f). See proposed Sec. 702.701.
20 CFR 702.804 What are the weekly maximum and minimum rates for each
fiscal year and how are they calculated?
Proposed Sec. 702.804 explains how the Department calculates basic
weekly maximum and minimum rates for each fiscal year. Paragraph (a)
notes that these weekly compensation rates are one factor considered
when calculating compensation and death benefits payable. Paragraphs
(b) and (c) set forth the calculation formulas for weekly maximum and
minimum rates. Both are based on the national average weekly wage,
which the Act defines as the ``national average weekly earnings of
production or nonsupervisory workers on private nonagricultural
payrolls.'' 33 U.S.C. 902(19). These statistics are compiled on an
ongoing basis by the Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics. Before
each new fiscal year, the Department calculates the average earnings of
these employees for the period October 1 through June 30 (i.e., the
first three quarters) of the current fiscal year. 33 U.S.C. 906(b)(3).
The Act pegs the maximum weekly rate at 200 percent of this number and
the minimum at 50 percent. 33 U.S.C. 906(b)(1), (2). For example, the
national average weekly earnings of production or nonsupervisory
workers on private, nonagricultural payrolls for the period from
October 1, 2013, to June 30, 2014 (i.e., the first three quarters of FY
2014), were $688.51. As a result, the Department determined that the
maximum compensation rate for FY 2015 was $1,377.02 ($688.51 x 2) and
the minimum compensation rate was $344.26 ($688.51 x 2).
Maximum Rates
20 CFR 702.805 What weekly maximum rates apply to compensation for
permanent partial disability, temporary total disability, and temporary
partial disability?
Proposed Sec. 702.805 provides that the maximum rate in effect for
the fiscal year on the employee's date of disability applies to all
compensation payable for temporary partial disability, temporary total
disability, or permanent partial disability, including compensation
payable in subsequent fiscal years. This rule effectuates the Supreme
Court's construction of the ``newly awarded compensation'' clause by
applying the maximum rate for the fiscal year the employee's disability
begins. For these types of compensation, the date-of-disability fiscal
year's maximum rate applies to all compensation payments--including
compensation payable for subsequent fiscal years--because section
6(c)'s ``currently receiving compensation'' clause does not apply. 33
U.S.C. 906(c) (maximum rate determinations ``with respect to a period
shall apply to employees or survivors currently receiving compensation
for permanent total disability or death benefits during such
period[.]'').
The first example at paragraph (b)(1) sets out a common scenario
involving an injured employee who is temporarily totally disabled for a
period prior to being permanently partially disabled. Although his
compensation periods span more than one fiscal year, the maximum rate
that applies remains the rate in effect on his date of disability. See
proposed Sec. 702.803(b)(1). The second example at paragraph (b)(2) is
slightly more complicated. The employee incurs two separate periods of
temporary total disability from the same injury; each period begins in
a different fiscal year. Under section 6(c), the maximum rate
applicable at the beginning of the first disability period applies to
all payments for temporary total disability, including those in the
second period. The third example at paragraph (b)(3) addresses an
occupational disease discovered post-retirement. Occupational diseases
occurring after an employee has voluntarily retired are considered
permanent partial disabilities. 20 CFR 702.601(b). Thus, compensation
payable in this instance is subject to the maximum rate in effect on
the date of disability--when the employee becomes aware of the
relationship between employment, the disease and any disability. See
proposed Sec. 702.803(b)(2)(ii).
20 CFR 702.806 What weekly maximum rates apply to compensation for
permanent total disability?
Proposed Sec. 702.806 implements both the ``newly awarded'' and
``currently receiving'' compensation clauses for permanent total
disability compensation as they pertain to the maximum compensation
payable. Paragraph (a) provides that the maximum rate for the fiscal
year during which the employee first becomes permanently and totally
disabled applies to all compensation payable during that fiscal year.
Paragraph (b) then provides that all periods of permanent total
disability in subsequent fiscal years arising from the same injury are
subject to the maximum rates for those subsequent fiscal years because
the employee is then ``currently receiving compensation.''
Proposed paragraph (c) addresses how the 10(f) adjustment applies
in a ``cross-over'' year. A cross-over year is one in which the
claimant's compensation was paid at the maximum rate in the current
fiscal year, but the claimant's calculated compensation rate does not
exceed the maximum rate set for the next fiscal year. In those
circumstances, the rule requires that the claimant's compensation for
the next fiscal year be increased by the amount of the 10(f) adjustment
up to the maximum for that fiscal year.
The examples in proposed paragraph (d) apply these principles.
Paragraph (d)(1) presents the relatively straightforward situation of
an employee who is permanently totally disabled from the time of
injury. He is ``newly awarded'' compensation in the fiscal year he
became disabled and his compensation is subject to that fiscal year's
maximum rate. In subsequent years, he is ``currently receiving''
compensation and his compensation is subject to the maximum rate for
each subsequent fiscal year. Paragraph (d)(2) adds an additional
wrinkle to the first example. Here, the employee suffers a period of
temporary total disability that spans more than one fiscal year before
he becomes permanently totally disabled. The maximum that applies to
the entire temporary total disability compensation period is the fiscal
year rate in effect on the date of disability (in the example, FY
2000), which is when the employee is ``newly awarded'' compensation.
See proposed Sec. 702.805(a). When the employee becomes permanently
totally disabled two years later, however, he is ``currently
receiving'' permanent total disability compensation and the maximum
rate in effect at that time (in the example, FY 2002) applies.
Compensation for permanent total disability in succeeding years is
subject to those subsequent fiscal years' maximum rates because he
continues to be ``currently receiving'' compensation.
Finally, proposed paragraph (d)(3) demonstrates how the rule
operates in a ``cross-over'' year. In the example, employee C's
calculated compensation rate exceeds the annual fiscal year maximum
rate each year from when he was first permanently totally disabled in
FY 2009 through FY 2012. In FY 2013, however, the employee's calculated
compensation rate falls below the maximum rate and remains below that
rate even after the addition of a section 10(f) adjustment. Thus, for
FY 2013, employee C's compensation is not limited by the maximum rate.
[[Page 58885]]
20 CFR 702.807 What weekly maximum rates apply to death benefits?
Determining the maximum rates for death benefits in any particular
case can be straightforward or involve several statutory provisions.
The proposed rule integrates these provisions to provide a
comprehensive approach to the issue.
LHWCA section 6(b)(1) applies the ``applicable'' maximum rate to
all compensation for disability or death. For death benefits purposes,
proposed Sec. 702.807(a) defines the ``applicable'' rate as the
fiscal-year rate in effect when the employee died. By using the
employee's date of death, the rule applies the ``newly awarded'' clause
in the same manner as the Supreme Court applied it to disability claims
in Roberts: A survivor's right to benefits first arises at the time of
death. See generally Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 519
U.S. 248, 257-58 (1997) (survivors seeking death benefits cannot
satisfy prerequisites prior to employee's death); Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Marshall, 634 F.2d 843, 846 (5th Cir. 1981) (section 9 ``cause
of action for death benefits certainly does not arise until
[employee's] death'').
Proposed Sec. 702.807(b) sets out the general rules for
determining the death-benefits cap in the year the employee died. These
limits are compelled by LHWCA section 6(b)(1) along with the provisions
of section 9(e), 33 U.S.C. 909(e). Section 9(e) provides an alternative
method for computing death benefits for survivors of lower-wage
employees to boost the benefit amount. If the deceased employee's
actual average weekly wage was lower than the national average weekly
wage, death benefits are calculated as a percentage of the national
average weekly wage instead of a percentage of the actual wage. This
results in a higher calculated compensation rate than if the
calculation were based on the employee's actual wage. Survivors are
entitled to benefits at the higher calculated rate except when that
rate exceeds the employee's full actual weekly wage. In that event,
section 9(e)(1) sets an initial cap by providing that total weekly
death benefits ``shall not exceed the lesser of the average weekly
wages of the deceased'' (or the section 6(b)(1) maximum rate). 33
U.S.C. 909(e)(1). Thus, in no event may weekly death benefits payable
in the year of the employee's death exceed the employee's actual
average weekly wages. Proposed paragraph (b) implements these
provisions by limiting ``aggregate'' weekly death benefits--meaning the
death benefits payable to all survivors combined--to the lower of the
maximum rate applicable for the fiscal year in which the employee died
or the employee's actual average weekly wages.
Proposed paragraph (c) sets out rules governing payments for
subsequent fiscal years. Consistent with the ``currently receiving''
clause, paragraph (c)(1) provides that each subsequent fiscal year's
maximum rate applies to aggregate death benefits. Paragraph (c)(2)
provides an exception to the section 9(e)(1) feature limiting death
benefits to no more than the employee's actual average weekly wages. If
death benefits were paid at the employee's full average weekly wage in
the year of death, paragraph (c)(2) provides that death benefits
payable may be adjusted upward under section 10(f). See Donovan, 31
BRBS 2 (holding that section 9(e)(1) does not bar application of 10(f)
adjustments even if adjusted death benefits amount exceeds deceased
employee's actual average weekly wage).
Finally, proposed paragraph (d) addresses LHWCA section 9(e)'s
specific limit on death benefits payable when death results from an
occupational disease that manifested after the employee retired
voluntarily (i.e., he or she did not retire because of disability). In
those circumstances, LHWCA section 9(e)(2) provides that ``total weekly
benefits shall not exceed one fifty-second part of the employee's
average annual earnings during the 52-week period preceding
retirement.'' 33 U.S.C. 909(e)(2). Proposed paragraph (d)(1) implements
this provision, as well as the general section 6(b) maximum cap, by
providing that aggregate death benefits paid during the year of the
employee's death must not exceed the lower of that fiscal year's
maximum rate or one-fifty-second part of the employee's average annual
earnings during the 52-weeks preceding retirement. Proposed paragraph
(d)(2)(i) provides that each subsequent fiscal year's maximum rate
applies to aggregate death benefits because death benefits are subject
to the ``currently receiving'' clause. If death benefits in the year of
death were paid at one-fifty-second part of the employee's average
annual earnings, proposed paragraph (d)(2)(ii) provides that the death
benefits payable may be adjusted upward under section 10(f).
The example at proposed paragraph (e)(1) illustrates that the
maximum rate applicable at the time of the employee's death applies to
death benefits, even when the employee's injury occurred in an earlier
fiscal year. Employee A's injury occurred in FY 2013 but he did not die
as a result of the injury until FY 2014. His survivor's death benefits
for the remainder of the year in which he died are subject to the FY
2014 maximum rate, with subsequent death benefits subject to each
subsequent fiscal year's rate.
Paragraph (e)(2)'s example demonstrates how the death-benefits-
calculation method for survivors of low-wage earners interfaces with
the cap placed on those benefits in some circumstances. In the example,
employee B's weekly earnings fell below the national average during the
year of her death. Thus, her survivor's death benefits are computed
using the higher national average weekly wage. 33 U.S.C. 909(e); see
proposed Sec. 702.811(a). Because that calculated compensation rate of
$331.30 exceeds the employee's actual average weekly wage of $300.00,
death benefits are capped at the employee's actual wages, except for
section 10(f) adjustments in subsequent fiscal years.
Paragraph (e)(3) sets out an example involving an occupational
disease discovered more than one year post-retirement that leads to
death. Employee C's compensation during his lifetime is calculated
based on the FY 2002 national average weekly wage because his disease
manifested then and he had voluntarily retired more than one year
earlier. Based on the date of employee C's death, his survivors' death
benefits are calculated based on the national average weekly wage for
FY 2015. 33 U.S.C. 910(d)(2)(B); 20 CFR 702.604(b). This calculation
yields a weekly figure greater than 1/52 part of the employee's last
year of earnings. Thus, the total death benefits payable are capped at
1/52 part of the employee's actual earnings, except for section 10(f)
adjustments in subsequent fiscal years.
Minimum Rates
20 CFR 702.808 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for
partial disability?
The LHWCA places no minimum compensation requirements on payments
for temporary partial disability or permanent partial disability.
Accordingly, proposed Sec. 702.808 simply states that there is no
minimum rate for these types of compensation.
20 CFR 702.809 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for
temporary total disability?
Proposed Sec. 702.809 provides that the minimum rate in effect for
the fiscal year on the employee's date of disability applies to all
compensation payable for temporary total disability, including
[[Page 58886]]
compensation payable in subsequent fiscal years. LHWCA section 6(b)(2)
generally provides that compensation for total disability cannot fall
below 50 percent of the ``applicable'' national average weekly wage
unless the employee's actual average weekly wages are less than that
amount. In that event, the employee receives his or her average weekly
wages as compensation. This rule effectuates the Supreme Court's
construction of the ``newly awarded compensation'' clause by applying
the minimum rate for the fiscal year the employee's disability begins.
See generally Montoya v. Navy Exchange Service Command, 49 BRBS 51
(2015) (applying Roberts, employee entitled to minimum rate in effect
on date of disability onset). The date-of-disability fiscal year's
minimum rate applies to all temporary total disability compensation
payments--including compensation payable for subsequent fiscal years--
because section 6(c)'s ``currently receiving'' clause does not apply to
compensation for temporary disabilities. See 33 U.S.C. 906(c) (national
average weekly wage determinations ``with respect to a period shall
apply to employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for
permanent total disability or death benefits during such period'').
Thus, the applicable minimum remains the one in effect on the date of
disability.
Proposed paragraph (b)'s example demonstrates how the minimum rate
provision works when the employee's calculated compensation rate falls
below it. In the example, employee A's calculated compensation rate for
FY 2014 (the year of his injury) is $333.34 per week. That number falls
below the FY 2014 minimum rate of $336.67. Thus, employee A's
compensation is raised to the minimum rate. Although his temporary
total disability continues into FY 2015, his rate remains tied to the
FY 2014 minimum because neither section 6(c)'s ``currently receiving''
clause nor section 10(f)'s adjustments apply to compensation for
temporary disabilities. See 33 U.S.C. 906(c), 910(f).
20 CFR 702.810 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for
permanent total disability?
Proposed Sec. 702.810(a) provides that the lower of the minimum
rate in effect on the date of disability or the employee's actual
average weekly wage on that date sets the floor below which
compensation may not fall. This rule implements LHWCA section 6(b)(2)'s
direction that compensation for total disability be no less than 50
percent of the ``applicable'' national average weekly wage unless the
employee's actual average weekly wages are less than that amount. In
that event, the employee receives his or her average weekly wages as
compensation. By using the date of disability to describe the
applicable fiscal year's minimum rate, paragraph (a) also implements
section 6(c)'s ``newly awarded'' clause.
Proposed paragraph (b) describes how the minimum applies in
subsequent fiscal years. It sets the minimum compensation level at the
lower of the minimum rate for each subsequent fiscal year or the
employee's actual average weekly wages on the date of disability. By
applying subsequent fiscal years' minimum rates, the regulation
implements section 6(c)'s ``currently receiving'' clause.
Proposed paragraph (c)'s example shows how this regulation applies
when a low-wage earner suffers a permanent total disability. Because
his calculated compensation rate for the fiscal year in which he first
became disabled (in the example, FY 2003) was below the applicable
fiscal year minimum rate, and his actual weekly wages were above the
fiscal year minimum, he is compensated at the minimum rate. But in
subsequent fiscal years, when the minimum rises above the employee's
actual average weekly wages at the time of disability, he receives his
actual wages in compensation, subject in following years to section
10(f) adjustments.
20 CFR 702.811 What weekly minimum rates apply to death benefits?
Rather than applying weekly minimum rates like those used for
temporary total or permanent total disability compensation--specified
amounts below which compensation may not fall--section 9(e) of the Act,
33 U.S.C. 909(e), uses a different mechanism to ensure a minimum
compensation level for an employee's survivors. Section 9(e) does this
by using the national average weekly wage calculated by the Department
under section 6(b) as a proxy to compute death benefits when the
deceased employee's actual weekly wage falls below the national
average. See 33 U.S.C. 902(19) (defining national average weekly wage
for LHWCA purposes). Using the national average weekly wage ensures
that death benefits will be paid at a minimal level. Proposed paragraph
(a) sets out this procedure by providing that the average weekly wage
used to compute death benefits is the greater of the employee's actual
wages or the national average. The regulation also provides that the
applicable national average weekly wage is the one in effect when the
employee died, which is when a survivor's right to benefits first
arises. See generally Ingalls Shipbuilding, 519 U.S. at 257-58
(survivors seeking death benefits cannot satisfy prerequisites prior to
employee's death); Travelers Insurance, 634 F.2d at 846 (section 9
``cause of action for death benefits certainly does not arise until
[employee's] death''). Paragraph (b) adds that the weekly minimum rate,
as that phrase is used in this subpart, does not apply to death
benefits.
III. Statutory Authority
Section 39(a) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 939(a), authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to prescribe rules and regulations necessary for the
administration of the Act.
IV. Information Collection Requirements (Subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act) Imposed Under the Proposed Rule
This rulemaking would impose no new collections of information.
V. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 (Regulatory Planning and Review)
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public
health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive
Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and
benefits, reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and promoting flexibility.
The Department has considered this proposed rule with these principles
in mind and has concluded that the regulated community will benefit
from this regulation.
This proposed rule will benefit the parties by providing them with
greater guidance on applying the Act's maximum and minimum compensation
provisions and section 10(f) adjustments in determining the amount of
disability compensation or death benefits payable. By clarifying how
these provisions apply, the rule will also promote consistency so that
similarly situated claimants receive similar compensation or death
benefits. In addition, the rule will benefit the regulated community by
forestalling further litigation over the ``currently receiving''
clause, which neither the Supreme Court nor several circuit courts have
yet construed. Indeed, the absence of regulations implementing these
statutory provisions led to much of the litigation described above. See
supra Sections I. B. and C.
[[Page 58887]]
The Department also sees no countervailing burden--economic or
otherwise--other than those imposed by the statute itself that would
counsel against promulgating this rule.
Finally, because this is not a ``significant regulatory action''
within the meaning of Executive Order 12866, the Office of Management
and Budget has not reviewed it prior to publication.
VI. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531
et seq.) directs agencies to assess the effects of Federal regulatory
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private
sector, ``other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate
requirements specifically set forth in law.'' For purposes of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, this rule does not include any Federal
mandate that may result in increased expenditures by State, local, and
tribal governments, or increased expenditures by the private sector of
more than $100,000,000.
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272 (Proper
Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking)
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.), requires an agency to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis
when it proposes regulations that will have ``a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities'' or to certify that
the proposed regulations will have no such impact, and to make the
analysis or certification available for public comment.
The Department has determined that a regulatory flexibility
analysis under the RFA is not required for this rulemaking. While many
longshore employers are small entities within the meaning of the RFA,
see generally 77 FR 19471-72 (March 30, 2012), this rule, if adopted in
final, will not have a significant economic impact on them. The
proposed rules reflect current payment practices and thus impose no new
costs on employers or their insurance carriers. As explained above, the
proposed rules mainly codify case law interpreting how the Act's
maximum and minimum provisions work; the rules are based primarily on
the Supreme Court's controlling decision in Roberts, the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits' decisions in Roberts and Boroski, and the Benefits
Review Board's decisions in Reposky and Lake.
With one small exception, these decisions comport with the
Director's longstanding interpretation and application of the maximum
and minimum compensation provisions. That exception involved cases in
which the employee's disability was initially something less than
permanent total--temporary total, permanent partial, or temporary
partial--and in a later fiscal year became permanently totally
disabling. Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roberts, the
Department took the view that the employee would have remained at the
maximum rate in effect on the date of disability until the next October
1. On that October 1, his compensation rate would be determined by
applying section 10(f) to increase his maximum rate by the same
percentage as the increase to the national average weekly wage. But the
Ninth Circuit held that the employee need not wait until the next
October 1 and is instead immediately subject to the maximum rate in
effect on the day he or she becomes permanently totally disabled under
section 6(c)'s ``currently receiving'' clause. Roberts, 625 F.3d at
1208-09. The Department has been following the Ninth Circuit's
construction of the statute since 2012, and the regulations reflect
this construction as well.
Based on these facts, the Department certifies that this rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Thus, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. The
Department invites comments from members of the public who believe the
regulations will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small longshore employers or insurers. The Department has
provided the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration with a copy of this certification. See 5 U.S.C. 605.
XIII. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
The Department has reviewed this proposed rule in accordance with
Executive Order 13132 regarding federalism, and has determined that it
does not have ``federalism implications.'' The proposed rule will not
``have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government,''
if promulgated as a final rule.
IX. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
This proposed rule meets the applicable standards in sections 3(a)
and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize
litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.
List of Subjects in 20 CFR Part 702
Administrative practice and procedure, Claims, Longshore and harbor
workers, Maximum compensation rates, Minimum compensation rates,
Workers' compensation.
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Department of Labor
proposes to amend 20 CFR part 702 as follows:
PART 702--ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE
0
1. The authority citation for part 702 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, and 8171 et seq.; 33 U.S.C. 901 et
seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1651 et seq.; 43 U.S.C. 1333; Reorganization Plan
No. 6 of 1950, 15 FR 3174, 64 Stat. 1263; Secretary's Order 10-2009,
74 FR 58834.
0
2. In part 702, add subparts G and H as follows:
Subpart G--Section 10(f) Adjustments
Sec.
702.701 What is an annual section 10(f) adjustment and how is it
calculated?
Subpart H--Maximum and Minimum Compensation Rates
General
Sec.
702.801 Scope and intent of this subpart.
702.802 Applicability of this subpart.
702.803 Definitions.
702.804 What are the weekly maximum and minimum rates for each
fiscal year and how are they calculated?
Maximum Rates
Sec.
702.805 What weekly maximum rates apply to compensation for
permanent partial disability, temporary total disability, and
temporary partial disability?
702.806 What weekly maximum rates apply to compensation for
permanent total disability?
702.807 What weekly maximum rates apply to death benefits?
Minimum Rates
Sec.
702.808 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for partial
disability?
702.809 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for
temporary total disability?
702.810 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for
permanent total disability?
702.811 What weekly minimum rates apply to death benefits?
[[Page 58888]]
Subpart G--Section 10(f) Adjustments
Sec. 702.701 What is an annual section 10(f) adjustment and how is it
calculated?
(a) Claimants receiving compensation for permanent total disability
or death benefits are entitled to section 10(f) adjustments each fiscal
year. A section 10(f) adjustment cannot decrease the compensation or
death benefits payable to any claimant.
(b) The section 10(f) adjustment for a given fiscal year is the
lower of:
(1) The percentage by which the new fiscal year's national average
weekly wage exceeds the prior fiscal year's national average weekly
wage as determined by the Department (see Sec. 702.804(b)); or
(2) 5 percent.
(c) Section 10(f) percentage increases are applied each October 1
to the amount of compensation or death benefits payable in the prior
fiscal year.
(d) In applying section 10(f) adjustments--
(1) Calculations are rounded to the nearest dollar; and
(2) No adjustment is made if the calculated amount is less than one
dollar.
(e) A section 10(f) adjustment must not increase a claimant's
weekly compensation or death benefits beyond the applicable fiscal
year's maximum rate.
(f) Section 10(f) adjustments do not apply to compensation for
temporary or partial disability.
Subpart H--Maximum and Minimum Compensation Rates
General
Sec. 702.801 Scope and intent of this subpart.
(a) This subpart implements the Act's provisions that affect the
maximum and minimum rates of compensation and death benefits payable to
employees and survivors. These statutory provisions include sections
6(b) and (c), and 9(e). 33 U.S.C. 906(b), (c); 909(e). It is intended
that these statutory provisions be construed as provided in this
subpart.
(b) These regulations implement section 6(c), 33 U.S.C. 906(c),
based on the following concepts:
(1) An employee is ``newly awarded compensation'' when he or she
first becomes disabled due to an injury;
(2) A survivor is ``newly awarded compensation'' on the date the
employee died; and
(3) An employee or survivor is ``currently receiving compensation''
when compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits is
payable, regardless of when payment is actually made.
Sec. 702.802 Applicability of this subpart.
(a) This subpart applies to all compensation and death benefits
paid under the Act with the following exceptions:
(1) Amounts payable under an approved settlement (see 33 U.S.C.
908(i));
(2) Amounts paid for an employee's death to the Special Fund (see
33 U.S.C. 944(c)(1));
(3) Any payments for medical expenses (see 33 U.S.C. 907); and
(4) Any other lump sum payment of compensation or death benefits,
including aggregate death benefits paid when a survivor remarries (see
33 U.S.C. 909(b)) or aggregate compensation paid under a commutation
(see 33 U.S.C. 909(g)).
(b) The rules in this subpart governing minimum disability
compensation and death benefits do not apply to claims arising under
the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651 (see 42 U.S.C. 1652(a); 20 CFR
704.103).
Sec. 702.803 Definitions.
The following definitions apply to this subpart:
(a) Calculated compensation rate means the amount of weekly
compensation for total disability or death that a claimant would be
entitled to if there were no maximum rates, minimum rates, or section
10(f) adjustments.
(b) Date of disability
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), the date of disability
is the date on which the employee first became incapable, because of an
injury, of earning the same wages the employee was receiving at the
time of the injury.
(2) Exceptions:
(i) For scheduled permanent partial disability benefits under 33
U.S.C. 908(c)(1)-(20) that are not preceded by a permanent total,
temporary total, or temporary partial disability resulting from the
same injury, the date of disability is the date on which the employee
first becomes permanently impaired by the injury to the scheduled
member.
(ii) For an occupational disease that does not immediately result
in disability, the date of disability is the date on which the employee
becomes aware, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence or by reason
of medical advice should have been aware, of the relationship between
his or her employment, the disease, and the disability.
(iii) For any disability lasting 14 or fewer days, the date of
disability is 4 days after the date on which the employee first became
incapable, because of an injury, of earning the same wages the employee
was receiving at the time of the injury.
(c) Fiscal year or FY means the period from October 1 of a calendar
year until September 30 of the following calendar year.
(d) Maximum rate means the maximum weekly compensation rate
calculated by the Department for a given fiscal year as described in
Sec. 702.804(b).
(e) Minimum rate means the minimum weekly compensation rate
calculated by the Department for a given fiscal year as described in
Sec. 702.804(c).
(f) Section 10(f) adjustment means the annual increase that certain
claimants receiving compensation for permanent total disability or
death are entitled to each fiscal year under 33 U.S.C. 910(f) and as
calculated by the Department as described in Sec. 702.701(b).
Sec. 702.804 What are the weekly maximum and minimum rates for each
fiscal year and how are they calculated?
(a) For each fiscal year, the Department must determine a weekly
maximum and minimum compensation rate. These amounts are called the
maximum and minimum rates in this subchapter. In combination with other
factors, these rates are used to determine compensation payments under
the Act.
(b) The maximum compensation rate in effect for a given fiscal year
is 200% of the national average weekly earnings of production or
nonsupervisory workers on private, nonagricultural payrolls, as
calculated by the Department, for the first three quarters of the
preceding fiscal year.
(c) The minimum compensation rate in effect for a given fiscal year
is 50% of the national average weekly earnings of production or
nonsupervisory workers on private, nonagricultural payrolls, as
calculated by the Department, for the first three quarters of the
preceding fiscal year.
Maximum Rates
Sec. 702.805 What weekly maximum rates apply to compensation for
permanent partial disability, temporary total disability, and temporary
partial disability?
(a) The maximum rate in effect on the date of disability applies to
all compensation payable for permanent partial disability, temporary
partial disability, and temporary total disability.
(b) Examples:
(1) Employee A suffers a covered workplace injury on April 1, 2000,
is temporarily totally disabled from that day through June 4, 2002, and
is
[[Page 58889]]
thereafter permanently partially disabled. All compensation payable for
A's disability is subject to the FY 2000 maximum rate.
(2) Employee B suffers a covered workplace injury on August 25,
2010, and is temporarily totally disabled until September 25, 2010,
when he returns to work. On January 3, 2011, he again becomes
temporarily totally disabled from the same injury. He ceases work and
is unable to return until November 22, 2012. All compensation payable
for B's disability is subject to the FY 2010 maximum rate.
(3) Employee C retires on May 6, 2011. She discovers on November
10, 2012, that she has a compensable occupational disease. All
compensation payable for C's occupational disease is subject to the FY
2013 maximum rate. See Sec. 702.601(b) (occupational diseases
discovered post-retirement are compensated as permanent partial
disabilities).
Sec. 702.806 What weekly maximum rates apply to compensation for
permanent total disability?
(a) The maximum rate in effect on the date that the employee became
totally and permanently disabled applies to all compensation payable
for permanent total disability during that fiscal year.
(b) For all periods the employee is permanently and totally
disabled in subsequent fiscal years, the weekly compensation payable is
subject to each subsequent year's maximum rate.
(c) If a claimant is receiving compensation for permanent total
disability at the maximum rate for the current fiscal year, but the
next fiscal year's maximum rate will be higher than the claimant's
calculated compensation rate, the claimant's compensation for the next
fiscal year will increase by the amount of the 10(f) adjustment,
subject to the maximum rate for the next fiscal year.
(d) Examples:
(1) Employee A suffers a covered workplace injury on April 1, 2000,
and is permanently and totally disabled from that date forward. A's
compensation for the period from April 1, 2000, until September 30,
2000, is subject to the FY 2000 maximum rate. Beginning October 1,
2000, A's compensation for FY 2001 is subject to the FY 2001 maximum
rate, compensation for FY 2002 is subject to the FY 2002 maximum rate,
etc.
(2) Employee B suffers a covered workplace injury on April 1, 2000,
is temporarily totally disabled from that day through June 3, 2002, and
is thereafter permanently totally disabled. B's compensation for the
period from April 1, 2000, through June 3, 2002, is subject to the FY
2000 maximum rate (see Sec. 702.805(a)). B's compensation for the
period from June 4, 2002, through September 30, 2002, is subject to the
FY 2002 maximum rate. Beginning October 1, 2002, B's compensation for
FY 2003 is subject to the FY 2003 maximum rate, compensation for FY
2004 is subject to the FY 2004 maximum rate, etc.
(3) Employee C suffers a covered workplace injury in FY 2009 and is
permanently totally disabled from that day forward. He was earning
$1,950.00 a week when he was injured, making his calculated
compensation rate $1,300.00 ($1,950.00 x 2 / 3). His calculated
compensation rate exceeds the maximum rate from FY 2009-2012; thus, his
compensation is limited to each year's maximum rate. In FY 2013, C's
calculated compensation rate of $1,300.00 is, for the first time, less
than the FY 2013 maximum rate of $1,325.18. Applying the FY 2013 2.31%
section 10(f) adjustment to C's FY 2012 compensation rate of $1,295.20
results in a compensation rate of $1,325.00 ($1,295.20 x .0231 = $29.92
(rounded to the nearest cent); $1,295.20 + $29.92 = $1,325.12, rounded
to the nearest dollar). This amount falls just below the FY 2013
maximum rate of $1,325.18. Thus, C's benefit rate for FY 2013 is
$1,325.00, and is not limited by the maximum rate.
Sec. 702.807 What weekly maximum rates apply to death benefits?
(a) The maximum rate in effect on the date that the employee died
applies to all death benefits payable during that fiscal year.
(b) Aggregate weekly death benefits paid to all eligible survivors
during the fiscal year in which the employee died must not exceed the
lower of--
(1) The maximum rate for that fiscal year; or
(2) The employee's average weekly wages.
(c) For subsequent fiscal years--
(1) Aggregate weekly death benefits paid during each subsequent
fiscal year are subject to each subsequent year's maximum rate.
(2) If death benefits were paid in the first year at the employee's
full average weekly wage under paragraph (b)(2), the aggregate weekly
death benefits paid for each subsequent year may not exceed the current
benefit rate plus the subsequent year's section 10(f) adjustment (see
Sec. 702.701).
(d) Post-retirement occupational diseases. Notwithstanding
paragraphs (a)-(c), if an employee's death results from an occupational
disease where the date of disability occurred after the employee
voluntarily retired--
(1) Aggregate weekly death benefits paid to all eligible survivors
during the fiscal year in which the employee died must not exceed the
lower of:
(i) The maximum rate for that fiscal year; or
(ii) One fifty-second part of the employee's average annual
earnings during the 52-week period preceding retirement.
(2) For subsequent fiscal years--
(i) Aggregate weekly death benefits paid during each subsequent
fiscal year are subject to each subsequent year's maximum rate.
(ii) If death benefits were paid in the first year at 1/52 part of
the employee's average annual earnings prior to retirement under
paragraph (d)(1)(ii), the aggregate weekly death benefits paid for each
subsequent year may not exceed the current benefit rate plus the
subsequent year's section 10(f) adjustment (see Sec. 702.701).
(e) Examples:
(1) Employee A suffers a covered workplace injury on May 1, 2013,
and is permanently and totally disabled from that date until August 1,
2014, when he dies due to the injury. He has one eligible survivor and
his average weekly wage at the time of injury was $3,000.00. The
calculated compensation rate for A's survivor is $1,500.00 (i.e., 50%
of A's average weekly wage). A's weekly survivor's benefits for the
period from August 2, 2014, to September 30, 2014, are limited to the
FY 2014 maximum rate of $1,346.68. Beginning October 1, 2014, A's
survivor's benefits for FY 2015 are subject to the FY 2015 maximum
rate, benefits for FY 2016 are subject to the FY 2016 maximum rate,
etc.
(2) Employee B suffers a covered workplace injury and dies on
December 1, 2012. She has one eligible survivor and her average weekly
wage was $300.00. Because B's average weekly wage of $300.00 falls
below the FY 2013 national average weekly wage of $662.59, death
benefits are calculated at 50% of that national average wage (see 33
U.S.C. 909(e)). This yields a calculated compensation rate of $331.30.
But because this rate exceeds B's actual average weekly wages, weekly
death benefits payable during FY 2013 are limited to $300.00. In FY
2014, B's survivor is entitled to a 1.62% section 10(f) adjustment,
resulting in weekly death benefits of $305.00 ($300.00 x .0162 = $4.86;
$300.00 + $4.86 = $304.86, rounded to the nearest dollar). B's survivor
would continue to receive section 10(f) adjustments in subsequent
fiscal years.
[[Page 58890]]
(3) Employee C retired on February 1, 1998. During his last year of
employment, he earned $23,000. He discovers on April 15, 2002, that he
has a compensable occupational disease resulting in a 50% permanent
impairment. See Sec. 702.601(b). Because he retired more than one year
before this date, his payrate for calculating compensation is the FY
2002 national average weekly wage, or $483.04. See Sec. 702.603(b). He
is entitled to weekly compensation of $161.01 ($483.04 x 2 / 3 x 50%).
C dies from the disease on June 1, 2015, leaving two survivors. The
payrate for calculating death benefits is the FY 2015 national average
weekly wage, or $688.51. See Sec. 702.604(b). The survivors' aggregate
calculated compensation rate is $459.01 ($688.51 x 2 / 3). But because
compensation cannot exceed 1/52 part of C's last year of earnings,
aggregate weekly death benefits payable for FY 2015 are limited to
$442.31 ($23,000 / 52). For FY 2016, C's survivors are entitled to a
2.10% section 10(f) adjustment resulting in weekly death benefits of
$452.00 ($442.31 x 021 = $9.29 (rounded to the nearest cent); $442.31 +
$9.29 = $451.60, rounded to the nearest dollar). C's survivors would
continue to receive section 10(f) adjustments in subsequent fiscal
years.
Minimum Rates
Sec. 702.808 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for
partial disability?
There is no minimum rate for compensation paid for partial
disability, whether temporary or permanent.
Sec. 702.809 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for
temporary total disability?
(a) The minimum compensation payable for temporary total disability
is the lower of:
(1) The minimum rate in effect on the date of disability, or
(2) The employee's average weekly wage on the date of disability.
(b) Example: Employee A suffers a covered workplace injury on May
6, 2014. He is temporarily totally disabled until November 6, 2015,
when he returns to work. His average weekly wages at the time of
disability were $500.00. Because his calculated compensation rate
(i.e., 66 and \2/3\% of $500.00, or $333.34) is lower than the $336.67
FY 2014 minimum rate, A's compensation is raised to $336.67 for the
entire period of his disability.
Sec. 702.810 What weekly minimum rates apply to compensation for
permanent total disability?
(a) The weekly minimum compensation payable for the fiscal year in
which the employee became permanently and totally disabled is the lower
of:
(1) The minimum rate in effect on the date of disability, or
(2) The employee's average weekly wage on the date of disability.
(b) For all periods the employee is permanently and totally
disabled in subsequent fiscal years, the weekly minimum compensation
payable is the lower of:
(1) Each subsequent fiscal year's minimum rate, or
(2) The employee's average weekly wage on the date of disability.
(c) Example: Employee A suffers a covered workplace injury on April
1, 2003, and is permanently totally disabled from that day forward. He
was earning $250.00 a week when he was injured. His calculated
compensation rate is $166.67 ($250 x 2 / 3). The FY 2003 minimum rate
is $249.14. Because A's calculated compensation rate is below the FY
2003 minimum rate, and his actual weekly wage is above that rate, he is
entitled to compensation at the minimum rate of $249.14 from April 1,
2003, to September 30, 2003. The FY 2004 minimum rate is $257.70.
Because A's actual weekly wages on the date of disability are lower
than the FY 2004 minimum rate, A's minimum weekly compensation rate for
FY 2004 is $250.00. His weekly compensation rate for FY 2004, however,
is higher because of a section 10(f) adjustment. For FY 2004, A's
compensation rate is increased by a 3.44% section 10(f) adjustment,
raising his compensation level to $258.00 ($249.14 x .0344 = $8.57;
$249.14 + $8.57 = $257.71, rounded to the nearest dollar).
Sec. 702.811 What weekly minimum rates apply to death benefits?
(a) The average weekly wage used to compute death benefits is the
greater of--
(1) The deceased employee's average weekly wages; or
(2) The national average weekly wage in effect at the time of the
employee's death.
(b) The weekly minimum rate does not apply to death benefits.
Leonard J. Howie III,
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.
[FR Doc. 2016-20467 Filed 8-25-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-CR-P