Nucor Steel Connecticut Incorporated; Grant of a Permanent Variance, 20680-20688 [2016-08004]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 68 (Friday, April 8, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20680-20688]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-08004]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2014-0022]


Nucor Steel Connecticut Incorporated; Grant of a Permanent 
Variance

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to Nucor 
Steel Connecticut Incorporated from the provisions of OSHA standards 
that regulate the control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout).

DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice, becomes 
effective on April 8, 2016 and shall remain in effect until it is 
modified or revoked.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is 
available from the following sources:
    Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office 
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue 
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999; 
email: meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
    General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson, 
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, 
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 
Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; phone: 
(202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Copies of this Federal Register notice.
    Electronic copies of this Federal Register notice are available at 
https://www.regulations.gov. This Federal Register notice, as well as 
news releases and other relevant information, also are available at 
OSHA's Web page at https://www.osha.gov.

I. Notice of Application

    On September 22, 2014, Nucor Steel Connecticut Incorporated 
(hereafter, ``NSCI'' or ``the applicant'') 35 Toelles Road, 
Wallingford, CT 06492, submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (``OSH Act''; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 
1905.11 (``Variances and other relief under section 6(d)'') an 
application for a permanent variance from several provisions of the 
OSHA standard that regulates the control of hazardous energy 
(``lockout/tagout'' or ``LOTO''), as well as a request for an interim 
order pending OSHA's decision on the application for variance (Ex. 
OSHA-2014-0022-0003) at its Wallingford, CT facility. Specifically, 
NSCI was seeking a variance from the provisions of the standard that 
require: (1) Lockout or tagout devices be affixed to each energy 
isolating device by authorized employees (29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i)); 
and (2) lockout devices, where used, be affixed in a manner that holds 
the energy isolating devices in a ``safe'' or ``off'' position (29 CFR 
1910.147(d)(4)(ii)). Also, NSCI requested an interim order pending 
OSHA's decision on the application for variance.
    According to its application, NSCI manufactures steel wire rod and 
coiled rebar from billets of steel by using rolling and forming 
processes. Further, NSCI's description of its operation indicated that 
the hot steel billets are shaped and formed into steel wire rod and 
coiled rebar by running them through a series of rolls. The rolls shape 
and form the steel as it moves from one stand to the next. Each roll 
has several passes (or grooves), only one of which is used at a time. 
The pass is designed to shape the bar to a certain size as it goes 
through the mill by compressing, squeezing, and stretching the bar. 
Rolls are designed with passes to bring a bar down through roughing, 
intermediate and finish mills to a finished size.
    As with any shaping tool, the passes wear during use and from time 
to time need to be changed. As the pass wears, the shape of the bar and 
the appearance of the bar are affected. When new rolls are brought into 
production, every pass is prepared with a spray that provides friction 
which allows the rolls to bite the bar between the rolls. Once rolls 
are in operation, roll grinding is regularly required, because during 
the operation of the mill stands water is used to cool the rolls to 
prevent fracturing and damage to the rolls. The water protects the pass 
while in use, but it also creates rust in the other passes. The rust 
can affect the final quality of the bar being processed, so steps are 
taken to remove the rust prior to restarting the operations. Rust is 
removed from the passes using a common 4-inch hand grinder. Since 
January 2012, the rolls have been ground with the rolls stopped and 
locked out.
    NSCI asserted that grinding the rolls requires access to the Motor 
Control Room (MCR), in order to operate the energy isolation 
disconnects for the roll mills. Employees who perform the particular 
task of grinding the passes are exposed to potentially serious arc 
flash hazards if they accessed the MCR in order to perform energy 
isolation functions. To control exposure to the arc flash hazards, NSCI 
instituted safe work rules that: (1) Designate the MCR as a restricted 
entry work area; (2) restrict MCR access to qualified electricians 
only; and (3) prohibit employees who perform pass grinding from 
entering the MCR because they are not qualified electrical employees 
trained in recognition and mitigation of electrical hazards. Further, 
NSCI asserted that as a consequence of following these safe work rules 
the employees performing pass grinding cannot lockout the energy 
isolation disconnects located in the MCR or personally verify that a 
lockout has been performed.
    OSHA initiated a technical review of NSCI's variance application 
and developed a set of follow-up questions regarding the assertions of 
equivalent worker protection included in the application. On November 
26, 2014, OSHA sent NSCI a letter containing a set of follow-up 
questions (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0006). On December 19, 2014, NSCI 
provided its responses to the follow-up questions (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-
0007). Based on these responses to the follow-up questions and the 
alternate safety measures proposed in NSCI's application, on May 22, 
2015, the Agency sent NSCI a letter (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0009) 
describing its findings on the technical merits of the application. 
OSHA's letter also included a set of proposed conditions for the grant 
of an interim order and permanent variance and a request for NSCI's 
comments on these proposed conditions. On July 10, 2015, NSCI provided 
its response (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0010) indicating acceptance of the 
proposed conditions and including a few recommended changes. OSHA 
carefully reviewed NSCI's recommended changes and incorporated the 
majority of the changes into the conditions of the variance.
    Following this review, OSHA determined that the applicant proposed 
an alternative that provides a workplace as safe and healthful as that 
provided by the standard. On December 2, 2015, OSHA published a 
preliminary Federal Register announcing NSCI's application for a 
permanent variance and interim

[[Page 20681]]

order, grant of an interim order, and request for comments (80 FR 
75472).
    The comment period closed on January 4, 2016, and OSHA received one 
comment (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0012) from the Association for Packaging 
and Processing Technologies in support of granting NSCI the variance.

II. The Variance Application

A. Background

    NSCI's variance application and the responses to OSHA's follow-up 
questions included the following: Detailed descriptions of the 
manufacturing process; the equipment used; the proposed alternative to 
lockout/tagout (LOTO) devices and procedures implemented during 
servicing and maintenance of specific equipment (e.g., grinding of roll 
mill passes located in the roll mill stands); and technical evidence 
supporting NSCI's assertions of equivalency of worker protection.
    According to the information included in its application, 
performing lockout on the roll mill stands requires access to the MCR, 
an area restricted to qualified electricians. Because NSCI employees 
who perform the particular task of grinding the passes are not 
qualified electrical employees trained in recognition and mitigation of 
electrical hazards, they may not access the MCR. Therefore, they cannot 
use the EID in that location to isolate the hazardous electrical energy 
or personally verify that energy isolation has been achieved if the EID 
is operated by a qualified employee.
    To address these issues, NSCI developed an alternative method of 
preventing the unexpected startup or energization of the roll mill 
passes located in the roll mill stands. NSCI proposes to use a 
comprehensive engineered system and appropriate administrative 
procedures to meet the energy isolation requirements. The engineered 
system uses a ``trapped key'' concept and monitored safety-rated power 
relays in combination with administrative procedures. The trapped key 
system is designed to: Replace a locked out energy isolating device; 
and function similarly (to a lockout device), in that only the employee 
in possession of the key can restart the machine undergoing 
maintenance. The single key is controlled through administrative group 
lockout procedures that NSCI believes match the requirements of 29 CFR 
1910.147.
    Further, NSCI asserted that its proposed trapped key energy control 
system has been evaluated \1\ for three scenarios that could result in 
unexpected energization of the rolls including: (1) Intentional de-
energization; (2) intentional re-energization; and (3) potential 
faults. The system prevents unexpected startup or energization in all 
three scenarios.
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    \1\ NSCI provided documentation that TUV Rheinland, an 
independent third-party testing laboratory reviewed and certified 
that the trapped key interlock system is a suitable component for 
use in safety category 2, 3, and 4 safety systems as specified in 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) machinery standards. Further, 
NSCI asserted that several independent experts (including Dr. James 
Barrett, Mr. Ed Grund, Mr. Bruce Main, and Mr. Alan Metelsky) 
skilled in the evaluation of electrical circuitry, guarding, and the 
control of hazardous energy evaluated the circuitry of the trapped 
key system and found that it was appropriately designed and 
installed for this application.
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    The applicant contended that the alternative safety measures 
included in its application provide its workers with a place of 
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain 
under the existing provisions of OSHA's control of hazardous energy 
(lockout/tagout) standard. The applicant certified that it provided 
employee representatives with a copy of the variance application. The 
applicant also certified that it notified its workers of the variance 
application by posting, at prominent locations where it normally posts 
workplace notices, a summary of the application and information 
specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the application. In 
addition, the applicant informed its workers of their rights to 
petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and 
Health for a hearing on the variance application.

B. Variance From Paragraph (d)(4)(i) and (d)(4)(ii) of 29 CFR 1910.147

    As an alternative means of compliance to the requirements of 
1910.147(d)(4(i) and (ii), NSCI proposed to use a comprehensive 
engineered system and appropriate administrative procedures to meet 
these requirements. The engineered system uses a ``trapped key'' 
concept and monitored safety-rated power relays in combination with 
administrative procedures. The trapped key system is designed to: 
Replace a locked out energy isolating device; and function similarly 
(to a lockout device), in that only the employee in possession of the 
key can restart the machine undergoing maintenance. The single key is 
controlled through administrative group lockout procedures identical to 
those required by 29 CFR 1910.147. Although the trapped key prevents 
normal intended startup of the equipment being serviced, it is not 
being used on an EID, as required by OSHA's standards. To meet this 
requirement, NSCI proposed to use a monitored safety-relay system that 
uses approved components, redundant systems, and control-reliable 
circuitry. Use of the trapped key system in combination with detailed 
administrative energy control policies and procedures, as well as 
providing effective training allows NSCI's authorized and affected 
employees to complete the required grinding of its stationary rolls in 
a manner that provides equivalency in energy isolation to compliance 
with the applicable provisions of the LOTO standard. The trapped key 
system is based on use of an Allen Bradley GuardMaster safety-rated 
relay, which is specifically designed for safety applications. However, 
the use of the Allen Bradley GuardMaster safety-rated relay does not 
meet the LOTO standard's definition of EID because this relay is a form 
of control circuitry.
    The applicant maintains that use of the trapped key system provides 
equivalent safety with what can be achieved by strict compliance with 
the 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) requirements. According to NSCI's 
variance application, equivalent safety is achieved by prohibiting roll 
movement during de-energization while grinding is being performed, as 
well as prohibiting mistaken intentional re-energization and re-
energization due to fault conditions, without exposing employees to 
hazards within the MCR. To protect against system faults causing re-
energization, the trapped key system meets the requirements for control 
reliability as stated in ANSI B11.19 (2010) Performance of 
Safeguarding, in that no single fault results in the loss of the safety 
function. In addition, the system includes system fault monitoring, 
tamper resistance, and exclusive employee control over lockout devices.
    Further, the applicant asserted that the trapped key system uses 
well tried components, which is a key factor in the reliability of a 
control system. The system is based on an Allen Bradley GuardMaster 
safety-rated relay which is specifically designed for safety 
applications. The trapped key is a specially manufactured unique key 
that is only available from the manufacturer at a significant cost, and 
cannot be otherwise duplicated.

C. Technical Review

    OSHA conducted a review of NSCI's application and the supporting 
technical documentation. After completing the review of the application

[[Page 20682]]

and supporting documentation, OSHA concluded that NSCI:
    1. Modified the electrical controls at the pulpit (central control 
station located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll mill stands), to 
prevent employee exposure to hazards associated with movement of the 
roll mill while performing the task of grinding roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands;
    2. Installed a trapped key control system and implemented 
administrative energy control procedures that prevent employee exposure 
to hazards associated with energy while grinding on the roll mill 
passes;
    3. Utilizing qualified engineering safety experts, performed a job 
hazard analysis for roll grinding associated tasks, conducted and 
documented an electrical isolation analysis, system and functional 
safety reviews, and control reliability analysis to verify that the use 
of the trapped key system and administrative energy control procedures 
prevent the movement of roll mill passes; prevent mistaken or 
intentional re-energization; and maintain immobility in the event of 
fault conditions;
    4. Developed a two-tiered system of securing the trapped key as 
follows:
    a. Stopping the operation and energization of the roll mill passes 
by removing the trapped key from the system, and securing the key 
within a lock box inside the pulpit area (central control station 
located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll mill stands); and
    b. Locking the key to the lock box in the pulpit area inside a 
secondary group lock box installed on the roll mill floor, with each 
employee performing roll mill grinding applying their personal lock to 
the lock box;
    5. Developed detailed administrative energy control procedures for 
use of the trapped key system;
    6. Implemented detailed administrative energy control procedures 
designed to ensure that each authorized employee applies a personal 
lock to the secondary group lock box;
    7. Procured and provided appropriate equipment and supplies;
    8. Made the administrative energy control policies and procedures 
available in English and Spanish;
    9. Trained authorized and affected employees on the application of 
the trapped key system and associated administrative energy control 
policies and procedures;
    10. Ensured that grinding on the passes is conducted only while 
using the administrative energy control procedures based on the trapped 
key system;
    11. Installed guarding on the entry/infeed and exit/outfeed sides 
of each roll mill stand to prevent employees from standing between 
turning mills and being exposed to the crushing hazards of in-running 
nip points;
    12. Developed additional administrative controls and procedures to 
minimize the potential for authorized and affected employees to enter 
between the mill stands when harm could occur; and
    13. Designated and posted the areas as ``No Entry'' unless the 
procedures (1-12 above) are followed.

III. Description of the Conditions Specified for the Permanent Variance

    As previously indicated in this notice, OSHA conducted a review of 
NSCI's application and the supporting technical documentation. After 
completing the review of the application and supporting documentation, 
OSHA determined that NSCI developed, and proposed to implement, 
effective alternative means of protection that protect its employees as 
effectively as paragraphs 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of OSHA's LOTO 
standard during the servicing and maintenance task of grinding roll 
mill passes located in the roll mill stands. Therefore, on December 2, 
2015, OSHA published a preliminary Federal Register announcing NSCI's 
application for a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an 
interim order, and request for comments (80 FR 75472). The comment 
period closed on January 4, 2016, and OSHA received one comment (Ex. 
OSHA-2014-0022-0012) from the Association for Packaging and Processing 
Technologies in support of granting NSCI the variance.
    During the period starting with the December 2, 2015, publication 
of the preliminary Federal Register notice announcing grant of the 
interim order (80 FR 75472), until the Agency modifies or revokes the 
interim order or makes a decision on its application for a permanent 
variance, the applicant was required to comply fully with the 
conditions of the interim order as an alternative to complying with the 
requirements of 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and 1910.147(d)(4)(ii). With 
the publication of this notice, OSHA is revoking the interim order 
granted to the employer on December 2, 2015 (80 FR 75472).
    This section describes the conditions that comprise the alternative 
means of compliance with 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (d)(4)(ii). Also, 
these conditions provide additional detail regarding the conditions 
that form the basis of the permanent variance OSHA is granting to NSCI.

Condition A: Scope

    The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage of the 
conditions of the permanent variance to the work situations specified 
under this condition. Clearly defining the scope of the permanent 
variance provides NSCI, NSCI's employees, other stakeholders, the 
public, and OSHA with necessary information regarding the work 
situations in which the permanent variance applies and does not apply. 
For example, condition A limits coverage of the permanent variance only 
to the task of grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill 
stands. The condition clarifies that no other maintenance work, 
including electrical maintenance, can be performed on the roll mill 
passes, the roll mill motors, other residual or stored energy sources, 
or electric circuits connected to the trapped key system or roll mill 
stands using the trapped key system to control hazardous energy.
    According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer or class or group of 
employers \2\ may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace 
or workplaces. If granted, the variance applies only to the specific 
employer(s) that submitted the application. In this instance, the 
permanent variance applies to NSCI at its Wallingford, CT plant only. 
As a result, it is important to understand that permanent variance does 
not apply to any other employers or NSCI plant locations.
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    \2\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade 
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided 
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application 
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
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Condition B: Definitions

    Condition B defines a series of terms, mostly technical terms, used 
in the permanent variance to standardize and clarify their meaning. 
Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and its 
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the permanent 
variance.

Condition C: Safety and Health Practices

    Condition C requires the applicant to: (1) Modify certain controls 
at the pulpit by installing and operating a trapped key system designed 
to replace an energy isolating device; (2) develop and implement 
certain trapped key system-related alternate energy control policies 
and procedures; and (3) develop and implement a series of trapped key

[[Page 20683]]

system-related hazard prevention and control requirements and methods 
designed to ensure the continued effective functioning of the alternate 
energy control equipment, policies, and procedures. Examples of such 
hazard control measures include, but are not limited to: (1) Conducting 
grinding on the passes only after using the steps required to properly 
de-energize the system; (2) under the direction of a qualified 
person,\3\ ensuring that the trapped key system is installed, 
inspected, serviced, maintained, used, and when appropriate modified in 
accordance with good engineering practices, and/or in strict accordance 
with the manufacturers' specifications and instructions, where 
available; and (3) no other maintenance can be performed on the roll 
mill stands while grinding is taking place.
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    \3\ See footnote 9.
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Condition D: Steps Required To De-Energize the System

    Condition D requires the applicant to develop and implement a 
detailed procedure for de-energizing the roll mill passes located in 
the roll mill stands in order to perform the grinding task. The 
procedure for de-energizing the roll mill passes includes a series of 
steps to ensure that all authorized and effected employees are notified 
that: The roll mill passes are effectively de-energized; the task of 
grinding the roll mill passes is ready to begin; and no other servicing 
or maintenance is to be performed on the roll mill stands while 
grinding is taking place.

Condition E: Steps Required To Start Motion Intentionally

    Condition E requires the applicant to develop and implement a 
detailed procedure for re-energizing and intentionally starting motion 
in the roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands in order to 
resume normal operations at the conclusion of the grinding task. The 
procedure for re-energizing the roll mill passes includes a series of 
steps to ensure that all authorized and effected employees are notified 
that the task of grinding the roll mill passes is complete and that the 
roll mill passes are ready for use.

Condition F: Training and Methods of Operation

    Condition F requires the applicant to develop and implement an 
effective hazardous energy control qualification and training program 
for authorized employees involved in using the trapped key system while 
grinding roll mill passes. The condition specifies the factors that an 
employee must know following completion of the training program. 
Elements to be included in the training program encompass, among 
others: The program to be presented in language that the employees can 
understand; the instruction be reviewed periodically to accommodate 
changes in the energy control program; the contents and conditions 
included in the variance; the preparation of a job hazard analysis 
(JHA) describing the application of the trapped key system, the 
identification of associated hazards and safe use of the associated 
energy control procedures; and instruction regarding the safe use of 
the associated energy control procedures. Additionally, condition F 
also requires the applicant to train each affected employee in the 
purpose and use of the alternative energy control procedures using the 
trapped key system.

Condition G: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    Condition G requires the applicant to develop, implement and 
operate an effective program for completing inspections, tests, program 
evaluations, and accident prevention measures for the use of the 
trapped key system and safe application of the hazardous energy control 
procedures in the roll mill stands and associated work areas. This 
condition serves to ensure the safe operation and physical integrity of 
the equipment and work area. Use of the trapped key system while 
conducting roll mill grinding operations enhances worker safety by 
reducing the risk of unexpected energization of the equipment.
    This condition also requires the applicant to document tests, 
inspections, corrective actions and repairs involving the use of the 
trapped key system, and maintain these documents. Further, this 
requirement provides the applicant with information needed to schedule 
tests and inspections to ensure the continued safe operation of the 
equipment and systems, and to determine that the actions taken to 
correct defects are appropriate.

Condition H: Recordkeeping

    Condition H requires the applicant to maintain records of specific 
factors associated with use of the trapped key system implemented to 
prevent the unexpected energization of the equipment while grinding 
roll mill passes. The information gathered and recorded under this 
provision, in concert with the information provided under condition I 
(Notifications, for using the OSHA 301 Incident Report form to 
investigate and record energy isolation failure-related injuries as 
defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), enables the 
applicant and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent 
variance in preventing recordable injuries.\4\
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    \4\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); recordkeeping 
forms and instructions (https://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf); and Updates to OSHA's 
Recordkeeping Rule (https://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/).
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Condition I: Notifications

    Condition I requires the applicant, within specified periods to: 
(1) Notify OSHA (i.e., Office of Technical Programs and Coordination 
Activities (OTPCA), and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office) of any 
recordable injuries, illnesses, fatalities, work-related in-patient 
hospitalizations, amputations and all losses of an eye (as defined by 
29 CFR 1904.4, and 1904.7 through 1904.12) that occur as a result of 
complying with the alternative energy control conditions of the 
variance (e.g., as a result of performing roll mill pass grinding 
operations) within 8 hours of the incident (or becoming aware of the 
incident); (2) provide OSHA (i.e., OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area 
Office) with a copy of the preliminary incident investigation report 
(using OSHA 301 form) within 24 hours of the incident (or becoming 
aware of the incident); (3) provide OSHA (i.e., OTPCA and the 
Bridgeport, CT, Area Office) with a copy of the full incident 
investigation within 7 calendar days of the incident (or becoming aware 
of the incident); (4) include on the 301 form information on the energy 
isolation procedures and conditions associated with the recordable 
injury or illness, the root-cause determination, and preventive and 
corrective actions identified and implemented; (5) provide its 
certification that it informed affected workers of the incident and the 
results of the incident investigation; (6) notify OTPCA and the 
Bridgeport, CT, Area Office within 15 working days should the applicant 
need to revise its energy isolation procedures to accommodate changes 
in the application of its trapped key system that affect its ability to 
comply with the conditions of the permanent variance; and (7) provide 
OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office, by January 31st at the 
beginning of each calendar year, with a report covering the year just 
ended, evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate energy isolation 
program.

[[Page 20684]]

    This condition for completing and submitting the variance 
conditions-related (recordable) preliminary incident investigation 
report (OSHA 301 form) is more restrictive than the current 
recordkeeping requirement of completing the OSHA 301 form within 7 
calendar days of the incident (1904.29(b)(3)). Submittal of the 
preliminary incident investigation report is to be followed by 
submittal of the full incident investigation report within 7 calendar 
days. This modified and more stringent incident investigation and 
reporting requirement is restricted to variance conditions-related 
(recordable) incidents only. Providing this notification is essential 
because time is a critical element in OSHA's ability to determine the 
continued effectiveness of the variance conditions in preventing 
recordable incidents as well as the employer's identification of 
appropriate hazard control measures and implementation of corrective 
and preventive actions. Further, these notification requirements enable 
the applicant, its employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness 
of the permanent variance in providing the requisite level of safety to 
the employer's workers and, based on this determination, whether to 
revise or revoke the conditions of the permanent variance. Timely 
notification permits OSHA to take whatever action is necessary and 
appropriate to prevent further variance conditions-related recordable 
injuries and illnesses. Providing notification to employees informs 
them of the precautions taken by the employer to prevent similar 
incidents in the future. Additionally, these notification requirements 
allow OSHA to: Communicate effectively, expedite administration, and 
enforce the conditions of the permanent variance.
    Additionally, this condition requires the applicant to notify OSHA 
if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its main 
office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent variance 
to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies that OSHA 
must approve the transfer of the permanent variance to a successor 
company. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate effectively with 
the applicant regarding the status of the permanent variance, and 
expedite the Agency's administration and enforcement. Stipulating that 
an applicant is required to have OSHA's approval to transfer a variance 
to a successor company provides assurance that the successor company 
has knowledge of, and will comply with, the conditions specified by the 
permanent variance. Also, seeking OSHA's approval to transfer a 
variance to a successor company serves to further ensure the safety of 
workers involved in performing the operations covered by the variance.

IV. Decision

    As described earlier in this notice, after reviewing the proposed 
alternatives OSHA determined that NSCI developed, and proposed to 
implement, effective alternative means of protection that protect its 
employees as effectively as paragraphs 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of 
OSHA's LOTO standard during the servicing and maintenance task of 
grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands. Further, 
under section 6(d) of the Occupational safety and Health Act of 1970 
(29 U.S.C. 655(d)), and based on the record discussed above, the Agency 
finds that when the employer complies with the conditions of the 
variance, the working conditions of the employers' workers are at least 
as safe and healthful as if the employers complied with the working 
conditions specified by paragraph 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of OSHA's 
LOTO standard. Therefore, under the terms of this variance NSCI must: 
(1) Comply with the conditions listed below under section V of this 
notice (``Order'') for the period between the date of this notice and 
until the Agency modifies or revokes this final order in accordance 
with 29 CFR 1905.13; (2) comply fully with all other applicable 
provisions of 29 CFR part 1910; and (3) provide a copy of this Federal 
Register notice to all employees affected by the conditions using the 
same means it used to inform these employees of its application for a 
permanent variance.

V. Order

    As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the 
interim order granted to the employer on December 2, 2015 (80 FR 
75472).
    OSHA issues this final order authorizing Nucor Steel Connecticut 
Incorporated (``NSCI'' or ``the applicant'') to comply with the 
following conditions instead of complying with the requirements of 
paragraphs 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of OSHA's LOTO standard 
during the servicing and maintenance task of grinding roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands. This final order applies to all NSCI 
employees located at the 35 Toelles Road, Wallingford, CT 06492 
establishment during the servicing and maintenance task of grinding 
roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands. These conditions are: 
\5\
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    \5\ See footnote 2.
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A. Scope

    1. This permanent variance applies only to the task of grinding 
roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands of NSCI's Wallingford, 
CT establishment. This work is to be performed by authorized employees 
under alternative energy control procedures using a trapped key system 
and lock boxes.
    2. No other maintenance work, including electrical maintenance 
(such as troubleshooting or maintenance covered under 29 CFR 1910.333), 
may be performed on the roll mill passes, the roll mill motors, or 
electric circuits connected to the trapped key system or roll mill 
stands using the trapped key system to control hazardous energy.
    3. If any other maintenance or servicing work is performed, even if 
that work is performed at the same time as grinding roll mill passes, 
all of the maintenance work at that time must be performed under full 
lockout as required by 29 CFR 1910.147.
    4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 
1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii), NSCI must comply fully with all other 
applicable provisions of 29 CFR 1910.147 during servicing and 
maintenance of roll mills during the task of grinding roll mill passes.
    5. The interim order granted to the employer on December 2, 2015 
(80 FR 75472) is hereby revoked.

B. Definitions

    The following definitions apply to this permanent variance:
    1. Affected employee--an employee whose job requires him/her to 
work in an area in which grinding of roll mill passes located in the 
roll mill stands is being performed.
    2. Authorized employee--an employee who uses the trapped key system 
in order to perform grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll 
mill stands. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when 
that employee's duties include performing grinding of roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands covered under this section.
    3. Competent person--an employee who is capable of identifying 
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings associated with 
grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands or working 
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, 
and who has

[[Page 20685]]

authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them.\6\
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    \6\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
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    4. Equipment lock box--a part of the trapped key system consisting 
of any group lock box designated for and mounted on or near equipment 
used for securing the equipment lock box key by use of a personal 
lockout device.
    5. Equipment lock box lock and key--a part of the trapped key 
system consisting of a uniquely identified equipment specific lock 
(red) and key used to secure the pulpit designated lock box containing 
and securing the trapped key.
    6. Group lock box--a purchased lock box labeled as ``TRAPPED KEY 
SYSTEM'' that is used to enable more than one lock to be applied to the 
box. There are two types of lock boxes used in association with the 
trapped key system (see definitions for pulpit designated lock box and 
secondary group lock box).
    7. Job Hazard Analysis/Job Safety Analysis--an evaluation of tasks 
or operations to identify potential hazards and to determine the 
necessary controls.
    8. Personal lock and key--a durable, standardized substantial and 
uniquely identified device (a lock) that is maintained and controlled 
by a single authorized employee whose name is attached to the device. 
The key is unique to this device and is equally maintained and 
controlled by the authorized employee \7\ whose name is attached to the 
device. The personal lock and key is used to secure the equipment lock 
box key in the secondary group lock box.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ See 29 CFR part 1910 [Docket No. S-012A], RIN 1218-AA53. 
Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), regarding 
``one person, one lock, one key.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. Pulpit designated lock box--a group lock box mounted inside the 
pulpit designated for use with the ``TRAPPED KEY SYSTEM'' and including 
the: (a) Trapped key; (b) equipment lock box lock and key; and (c) 
pulpit operator personal lock and key placed on the pulpit designated 
lock box to secure the trapped key.
    10. Pulpit operator--an authorized employee who: (a) Is designated 
to work on a roll mill crew; (b) is authorized to use the trapped key 
system during the grinding of roll mill passes; and (c) is trained to 
operate the pulpit panel. The pulpit panel has the ability to control 
the following equipment systems: Reheat furnace, discharge roll line, 
turntable, roll mill stands A & B; roll mill stands 1-15; water system; 
finishing mill; laying head; and stelmore conveyor.
    11. Pulpit operator trapped key system personal lock and key--a 
part of the trapped key system consisting of a uniquely identified lock 
(green) and key used by the pulpit operator to secure the pulpit 
designated lock box containing and securing the trapped key.
    12. Qualified person--an employee who, by possession of a 
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by 
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully 
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the 
subject matter, the work, or the project.\8\
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    \8\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    13. Roll mill operator and/or lead--an authorized employee who is 
designated and trained to operate specific and multiple equipment 
systems or perform a specific job task that is part of the rolling 
process, including application of the trapped key system for the 
grinding of roll mill passes.
    14. Secondary group lock box--a group lock box located on the mill 
floor just below the pulpit where authorized employees apply personal 
locks and follow trapped key system alternative energy isolation 
procedures to secure the equipment lock box key.
    15. Safety-rated relay--a device specifically designed for safety 
applications that meets the requirements for control reliability as 
stated in ANSI B11.19 (2010) Performance of Safeguarding. The term 
``control reliable'' means that no single fault results in the loss of 
the safety function. In addition, the relay must include monitoring and 
tamper resistance.
    16. Team member--an employee who is trained and authorized to use 
the trapped key system in order to perform grinding of roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands.
    17. Trapped key--a specially manufactured unique key only available 
from its manufacturer that is inserted into the trapped key system's 
rotary switch. The rotary switch trapped key is mechanically attached 
by a chain to the pulpit designated lock box.
    18. Trapped key system--the alternative method of preventing the 
unexpected startup or energization during grinding of roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands. NSCI presented the trapped key system 
to OSHA in its variance application of September 22, 2014, as 
supplemented by its responses to OSHA's questions during the Agency's 
application review. The system is based on an Allen Bradley GuardMaster 
safety-rated relay which is specifically designed for safety 
applications and use of a trapped key that is a specially manufactured 
unique key only available from its manufacturer, and the administrative 
controls described in this variance.

C. Safety and Health Practices

    1. NSCI shall modify the electrical controls at the pulpit (central 
control station located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll mill 
stands), to prevent employee exposure to hazards associated with 
movement of the roll mill during the task of grinding roll mill passes;
    2. NSCI shall install a trapped key system;
    3. NSCI shall install a pulpit designated lock box for the trapped 
key in the pulpit area;
    4. NSCI shall install a secondary group lock box in the roll mills 
floor area for securing the pulpit designated lock box key;
    5. NSCI shall develop administrative energy control procedures for 
use of the trapped key system as described below;
    6. NSCI shall implement detailed energy control procedures designed 
to ensure that each authorized employee applies a personal lock to the 
secondary group lock box, and has the ability to personally verify de-
energization of the system, as described below;
    7. NSCI shall make the energy control policies and procedures 
available to authorized and affected employees in English and Spanish;
    8. NSCI shall ensure that grinding on the passes is conducted only 
while using the administrative energy control procedures based on the 
trapped key system, or using full lockout procedures that comply with 
29 CFR 1910.147 when the roll stands must be de-energized so that other 
maintenance operations can be performed simultaneously with roll 
grinding;
    9. NSCI shall install guarding on the entry/infeed and exit/outfeed 
sides of each roll mill stand to prevent employees from standing 
between turning mills and being exposed to the crushing hazards of in-
running nip points;
    10. NSCI shall develop additional administrative controls and 
procedures to minimize the potential for authorized and affected 
employees to enter between the mill stands when harm could occur; and
    11. NSCI shall designate and post the areas as ``No Entry'' unless 
the procedures (1-10) are followed.
    12. NSCI shall ensure that the trapped key system and its 
components are properly installed, inspected, maintained, and used so 
that it works as designed. NSCI shall strictly follow, where 
applicable, manufacturers'

[[Page 20686]]

recommendations for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and use 
of the system and its components.
    13. NSCI shall ensure that the trapped key system is only altered 
or modified for uses specified and approved by a qualified person by 
following good engineering practices. Where available, such alterations 
and modifications shall strictly follow the manufacturers' 
specifications, instructions, and written authorization. No changes or 
modifications may be made to the trapped key system or its components 
that diminish the protection provided to affected employees.
    14. NSCI shall ensure that alteration or modification of the 
trapped key system is fully justified and documented when the 
manufacturers' specifications, instructions, and written authorization 
are lacking.
    15. NCSI shall implement a procedure to ensure that no other 
maintenance will be performed on the roll mill stands while grinding is 
taking place, unless full lockout is used for all maintenance tasks 
being performed at that time.

D. Steps Required To De-Energize the System

    NSCI shall develop and implement a detailed procedure for de-
energizing the roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands in 
order to perform the grinding task. The procedure for de-energizing the 
roll mill passes shall include the following steps:
    1. The authorized employee de-energizing the roll mill passes shall 
notify all affected employees that the equipment will be shut down and 
locked out to perform grinding of the passes;
    2. The pulpit operator shall turn off the control leveler on the 
control panel;
    3. The pulpit operator shall activate the E-stop;
    4. The pulpit operator verifies that the red ``system functional'' 
indicator is illuminated, then turns the trapped lockout key 90[ordm] 
to OFF position, and removes the trapped key from the panel. The 
operator verifies that the green ``safe to work indicator'' 
illuminates, and that the red ``system functional'' indicator goes out;
    5. The pulpit operator:
    a. Places the trapped key in the pulpit designated lock box and 
applies his or her personal lock to the pulpit designated lock box; and
    b. Applies the equipment lock box lock designated for this energy 
control procedure;
    6. The pulpit operator hands the equipment lock box lock key to the 
roll mill operator and/or lead;
    7. The roll mill operator and/or lead takes the equipment lock box 
lock key to the secondary group lock box;
    8. The roll mill operator and/or lead places the equipment lock box 
lock key in the secondary group lock box and attaches his or her 
personal lock;
    9. Authorized employees (team members) place their personal locks 
on the secondary group lock box;
    10. The roll mill operator and/or lead verifies that the equipment 
is de-energized and locked out by trying to operate the equipment 
(using the start button);
    11. The roll mill operator and/or lead ensures that there are no 
additional sources of energy that could lead to the unexpected 
energization of the roll mill passes;
    12. Authorized employees who placed their personal trapped key 
system locks on the secondary group lockout box shall also confirm that 
the equipment is fully de-energized;
    13. Authorized employees who placed their personal locks on the 
secondary group lock box shall maintain their personal key in their 
possession while performing grinding of the roll mill passes; and
    14. Authorized employees shall perform the task of grinding the 
passes only while these procedures are used.

E. Steps Required To Start Motion Intentionally

    NSCI shall develop and implement a detailed procedure for re-
energizing and intentionally starting motion in the roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands in order to resume normal operations at 
the conclusion of the grinding task. The procedure for re-energizing 
the roll mill passes shall include the following steps:
    1. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall check the equipment and 
the immediate area around the equipment to ensure that necessary items 
have been removed and that the equipment components are operationally 
intact;
    2. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall check the work area to 
ensure that all affected employees have been safely positioned or 
removed from the area;
    3. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall check that all controls 
are in the neutral or off position;
    4. Authorized employees shall remove their personal trapped key 
system locks from the secondary group lock box;
    5. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall remove the equipment 
lock box lock key from the secondary group lock box and take it to the 
pulpit;
    6. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall hand the equipment lock 
box lock key to the pulpit operator;
    7. The pulpit operator shall verify that all personnel are clear of 
the equipment before starting to re-energize the roll mill passes;
    8. The pulpit operator shall remove his or her trapped key system 
personal lock from the pulpit designated lock box;
    9. Using the equipment lock box lock key, the pulpit operator shall 
remove the equipment lock box lock;
    10. The pulpit operator shall remove the trapped key from the 
pulpit designated lock box and shall insert the key into the rotary 
switch and turn it 90[deg] to the ON position;
    11. The pulpit operator shall press the reset button to re-energize 
the roll mill passes;
    12. The pulpit operator shall confirm that the green light clears 
and the red light activates indicating that the system is powered and 
that the trapped key system no longer prevents roll mill motion; and
    13. The pulpit operator shall notify affected employees that the 
task of grinding the roll mill passes is complete and that the roll 
mill passes are ready for use.

F. Training and Methods of Operation

    NSCI shall develop and implement a detailed worker qualifications 
and training program. NSCI must:
    1. Develop an energy control training program and train each 
authorized employee, pulpit operator, roll mill designated person, and 
their supervisors on the trapped key system, and the procedures each 
must perform under it. The training program shall be provided in a 
language that the employees can understand;
    2. Develop a training program and train each affected employee in 
the purpose and use of the alternative energy control procedures using 
the trapped key system before commencing operations under this 
variance, and document this instruction. The training program shall be 
provided in a language that the employees can understand;
    3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (1) of this 
condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making changes, in 
accordance with condition I-5, to the use of the trapped key system 
that affect its component configuration or operation and associated 
energy control procedures);
    4. Ensure that each authorized and affected employee, designated 
pulpit operator, roll mill designated person, and each of their 
supervisors have effective and documented training in the contents and 
conditions covered by this proposed variance;

[[Page 20687]]

    5. Ensure that only trained and authorized employees, designated 
pulpit operators, and roll mill designated persons, perform energy 
control procedures for the task of grinding roll mill passes;
    6. Prepare a JHA for the safe application of energy control 
procedures; and
    7. Review periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making 
changes, in accordance with conditions C-13 and I-5, to the component 
configuration or operation of the trapped key system and energy control 
procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes located in the 
roll mill stands), the contents of the JHA with affected personnel.

G. Inspections, Tests and Incident Prevention

    NSCI shall develop and implement a detailed program for completing 
inspections, tests, program evaluations and incident prevention. NSCI 
must:
    1. Initiate and maintain a program of frequent and regular 
inspections of the trapped key system and associated work areas by:
    a. Ensuring that a competent person (authorized employee) conducts 
daily visual checks and quarterly inspections and functionality tests 
of the trapped key system components and configuration or operation and 
energy control procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands to ensure that the procedure and the 
conditions of this variance are being followed;
    b. Ensuring that a competent person conducts weekly inspections of 
the work areas associated with the grinding of roll mill passes located 
in the roll mill stands; and
    c. Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person 
in conducting the weekly inspections of the work areas associated with 
the grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands and 
the quarterly inspections and functionality tests of the trapped key 
system components and configuration or operation and energy control 
procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes.
    2. Remove the equipment from service if the competent person 
determines that the equipment constitutes a safety hazard. NSCI must 
not return the equipment to service until the hazardous condition is 
corrected and the correction has been approved by a qualified person.
    3. All maintenance, servicing, and installation of replacement 
parts must be performed in strict accordance with good engineering 
practices. Where available, the maintenance, servicing and installation 
of replacement parts must strictly follow the manufacturers' 
specifications, instructions, and limitations.

H. Recordkeeping

    1. NSCI must maintain a record of any recordable injury, illness, 
in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye or fatality 
(using the OSHA 301 Incident Report form to investigate and record 
energy control-related recordable injuries as defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 
1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12 \9\), resulting from the task of 
grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands by completing 
the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work-Related 
Injuries and Illnesses.
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    \9\ See footnote 5.
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    2. NSCI must maintain records of all tests and inspections of the 
component configuration or operation, and energy control procedures, as 
well as associated hazardous condition corrective actions and repairs.

I. Notifications

    To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein, 
NSCI shall:
    1. Notify the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office of any 
recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, 
amputations, loss of an eye or fatality (by submitting the completed 
OSHA 301 Incident Report form) resulting from implementing the 
alternative energy control procedures of the proposed variance 
conditions while completing the task of grinding roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands. The notification must be made within 8 
hours of the incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable 
injury, illness, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an 
eye, or fatality.
    2. Submit a copy of the preliminary incident investigation (OSHA 
form 301) to the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office within 24 
hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming aware of a recordable 
case and submit a copy of the full incident investigation within 7 
calendar days of the incident or 7 calendar days after becoming aware 
of the case. In addition to the information required by the OSHA form 
301, the incident-investigation report must include a root-cause 
determination, and the preventive and corrective actions identified and 
implemented.
    3. Provide certification within 15 working days of the incident 
that NSCI informed affected workers of the incident and the results of 
the incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and 
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
    4. Notify the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office in writing 
and 15 working days prior to any proposed change in the energy control 
operations (including changes addressed by condition C-13) that affects 
NSCI's ability to comply with the conditions specified herein.
    5. Obtain OSHA's approval prior to implementing the proposed change 
in the energy control operations that affects NSCI's ability to comply 
with the conditions specified herein.
    6. Provide a written evaluation report, by January 31st at the 
beginning of each calendar year, with a report covering the year just 
ended, to the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office summarizing the 
quarterly inspections and functionality tests of the trapped key system 
components and configuration or operation and energy control procedures 
that affect the grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill 
stands, to ensure that the energy control procedure and the conditions 
of this variance are being followed.

    Note: The evaluation report is to contain summaries of: (1) The 
number of variance-related incidents (as recorded on OSHA 301 
forms); and (2) root causes of any incidents, and preventive and 
corrective actions identified and implemented.

    7. Inform the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office as soon as 
possible after it has knowledge that it will:
    a. Cease to do business;
    b. change the location and address of the main office for managing 
the
    alternative energy control procedures specified herein; or
    c. transfer the operations specified herein to a successor company.
    8. Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the 
same means required to inform them of its application for a variance.
    9. Request approval from OSHA for the transfer of the permanent 
variance to a successor company.

Authority and Signature

    David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice. 
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to Section 29 
U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912, 
Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.


[[Page 20688]]


    Signed at Washington, DC, on March 4, 2016.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2016-08004 Filed 4-7-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4510-26-P