Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 75-1, Part V, Exemptions From Prohibitions Respecting Certain Classes of Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Certain Broker-Dealers, Reporting Dealers and Banks, 21139-21147 [2016-07927]

Agencies

• Employee Benefits Security Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 68 (Friday, April 8, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 21139-21147]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07927]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employee Benefits Security Administration

29 CFR Part 2550

 [Application Number D-11687]
ZRIN 1210-ZA25


Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 75-1, Part V, 
Exemptions From Prohibitions Respecting Certain Classes of Transactions 
Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Certain Broker-Dealers, Reporting 
Dealers and Banks

AGENCY: Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), U.S. 
Department of Labor.

ACTION: Adoption of amendment to PTE 75-1, Part V.

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SUMMARY: This document contains an amendment to PTE 75-1, Part V, a 
class exemption from certain prohibited transactions provisions of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the 
Internal Revenue Code (the Code). The provisions at issue generally 
prohibit fiduciaries of employee benefit plans and individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs), from lending money or otherwise extending 
credit to the plans and IRAs and receiving compensation in return. PTE 
75-1, Part V, permits the extension of credit to a plan or IRA by a 
broker-dealer in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; 
however, it originally did not permit the receipt of compensation for 
an extension of credit by broker-dealers that are fiduciaries with 
respect to the assets involved in the transaction. This amendment 
permits investment advice fiduciaries to receive compensation when they 
extend credit to plans and IRAs to avoid a failed securities 
transaction. The amendment affects participants and beneficiaries of 
plans, IRA owners, and fiduciaries with respect to such plans and IRAs.

DATES: Issuance date: This amendment is issued June 7, 2016.
    Applicability date: This amendment is applicable to transactions 
occurring on or after April 10, 2017. See Applicability Date, below, 
for further information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Wilker, Office of Exemption 
Determinations, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. 
Department of Labor, (202) 693-8824 (this is not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Department is amending PTE 75-1, Part V 
on its own motion, pursuant to ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 
4975(c)(2), and in accordance with the procedures set forth in 29 CFR 
part 2570, subpart B (76 FR 66637 (October 27, 2011)).

Executive Summary

Purpose of Regulatory Action

    The Department grants this amendment to PTE 75-1, Part V, in 
connection with its publication today, elsewhere in this issue of the 
Federal Register, of a final regulation defining who is a ``fiduciary'' 
of an employee benefit plan under ERISA as a result of giving 
investment advice to a plan or its participants or beneficiaries 
(Regulation). The Regulation also applies to the definition of a 
``fiduciary'' of a plan (including an IRA) under the

[[Page 21140]]

Code. The Regulation amends a prior regulation specifying when a person 
is a ``fiduciary'' under ERISA and the Code by reason of the provision 
of investment advice for a fee or other compensation regarding assets 
of a plan or IRA. The Regulation amends a prior regulation, dating to 
1975, specifying when a person is a ``fiduciary'' under ERISA and the 
Code by reason of the provision of investment advice for a fee or other 
compensation regarding assets of a plan or IRA. The Regulation takes 
into account the advent of 401(k) plans and IRAs, the dramatic increase 
in rollovers, and other developments that have transformed the 
retirement plan landscape and the associated investment market over the 
four decades since the existing regulation was issued. In light of the 
extensive changes in retirement investment practices and relationships, 
the Regulation updates existing rules to distinguish more appropriately 
between the sorts of advice relationships that should be treated as 
fiduciary in nature and those that should not.
    This amendment to PTE 75-1, Part V, allows broker-dealers that are 
investment advice fiduciaries to receive compensation when they extend 
credit to plans and IRAs to avoid failed securities transactions 
entered into by the plan or IRA. In the absence of an exemption, these 
transactions would be prohibited under ERISA and the Code. In this 
regard, ERISA and the Code generally prohibit fiduciaries from lending 
money or otherwise extending credit to plans and IRAs, and from 
receiving compensation in return.
    ERISA section 408(a) specifically authorizes the Secretary of Labor 
to grant and amend administrative exemptions from ERISA's prohibited 
transaction provisions.\1\ Regulations at 29 CFR 2570.30 to 2570.52 
describe the procedures for applying for an administrative exemption. 
In granting this amended exemption, the Department has determined that 
the exemption is administratively feasible, in the interests of plans 
and their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective 
of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of plans and IRA 
owners.
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    \1\ Code section 4975(c)(2) authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury to grant exemptions from the parallel prohibited 
transaction provisions of the Code. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 
1978 (5 U.S.C. app. at 214 (2000)) (``Reorganization Plan'') 
generally transferred the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to grant administrative exemptions under Code section 4975 to the 
Secretary of Labor. To rationalize the administration and 
interpretation of dual provisions under ERISA and the Code, the 
Reorganization Plan divided the interpretive and rulemaking 
authority for these provisions between the Secretaries of Labor and 
of the Treasury, so that, in general, the agency with responsibility 
for a given provision of Title I of ERISA would also have 
responsibility for the corresponding provision in the Code. Among 
the sections transferred to the Department were the prohibited 
transaction provisions and the definition of a fiduciary in both 
Title I of ERISA and in the Code. ERISA's prohibited transaction 
rules, 29 U.S.C. 1106-1108, apply to ERISA-covered plans, and the 
Code's corresponding prohibited transaction rules, 26 U.S.C. 
4975(c), apply both to ERISA-covered pension plans that are tax-
qualified pension plans, as well as other tax-advantaged 
arrangements, such as IRAs, that are not subject to the fiduciary 
responsibility and prohibited transaction rules in ERISA. 
Specifically, section 102(a) of the Reorganization Plan provides the 
Department of Labor with ``all authority'' for ``regulations, 
rulings, opinions, and exemptions under section 4975 [of the Code]'' 
subject to certain exceptions not relevant here. Reorganization Plan 
section 102. In President Carter's message to Congress regarding the 
Reorganization Plan, he made explicitly clear that as a result of 
the plan, ``Labor will have statutory authority for fiduciary 
obligations. . . . Labor will be responsible for overseeing 
fiduciary conduct under these provisions.'' Reorganization Plan, 
Message of the President. This amended exemption provides relief 
from the indicated prohibited transaction provisions of both ERISA 
and the Code.
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Summary of the Major Provisions

    The amendment to PTE 75-1, Part V, allows investment advice 
fiduciaries that are broker-dealers to receive compensation when they 
lend money or otherwise extend credit to plans or IRAs to avoid the 
failure of a purchase or sale of a security. The exemption contains 
conditions that the broker-dealer lending money or otherwise extending 
credit must satisfy in order to take advantage of the exemption. In 
particular, the potential failure of the securities transaction may not 
be caused by the fiduciary or an affiliate, and the terms of the 
extension of credit must be at least as favorable to the plan or IRA as 
terms the plan or IRA could obtain in an arm's length transaction with 
an unrelated party. Certain advance written disclosures must be made to 
the plan or IRA, in particular, with respect to the rate of interest or 
other fees charged for the loan or other extension of credit.

Executive Order 12866 and 13563 Statement

    Under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, the Department must 
determine whether a regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore 
subject to the requirements of the Executive Order and subject to 
review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Executive Orders 
12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess all costs and benefits of 
available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to 
select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including 
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety effects, 
distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the 
importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, 
of harmonizing and streamlining rules, and of promoting flexibility. It 
also requires federal agencies to develop a plan under which the 
agencies will periodically review their existing significant 
regulations to make the agencies' regulatory programs more effective or 
less burdensome in achieving their regulatory objectives.
    Under Executive Order 12866, ``significant'' regulatory actions are 
subject to the requirements of the Executive Order and review by the 
OMB. Section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, defines a ``significant 
regulatory action'' as an action that is likely to result in a rule (1) 
having an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more, or 
adversely and materially affecting a sector of the economy, 
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or 
safety, or State, local or tribal governments or communities (also 
referred to as ``economically significant'' regulatory actions); (2) 
creating serious inconsistency or otherwise interfering with an action 
taken or planned by another agency; (3) materially altering the 
budgetary impacts of entitlement grants, user fees, or loan programs or 
the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) raising novel 
legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's 
priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive Order. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Executive Order, OMB has determined that 
this action is ``significant'' within the meaning of Section 3(f)(4) of 
the Executive Order. Accordingly, the Department has undertaken an 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the proposal, and OMB has 
reviewed this regulatory action. The Department's complete Regulatory 
Impact Analysis is available at www.dol.gov/ebsa.

Regulation Defining a Fiduciary

    As explained more fully in the preamble to the Regulation, ERISA is 
a comprehensive statute designed to protect the interests of plan 
participants and beneficiaries, the integrity of employee benefit 
plans, and the security of retirement, health, and other critical 
benefits. The broad public interest in ERISA-covered plans is reflected 
in its imposition of fiduciary responsibilities on parties engaging in 
important plan activities, as well as in the tax-favored status of plan 
assets and investments. One of the chief ways in which ERISA protects 
employee benefit plans is by

[[Page 21141]]

requiring that plan fiduciaries comply with fundamental obligations 
rooted in the law of trusts. In particular, plan fiduciaries must 
manage plan assets prudently and with undivided loyalty to the plans 
and their participants and beneficiaries.\2\ In addition, they must 
refrain from engaging in ``prohibited transactions,'' which ERISA does 
not permit because of the dangers posed by the fiduciaries' conflicts 
of interest with respect to the transactions.\3\ When fiduciaries 
violate ERISA's fiduciary duties or the prohibited transaction rules, 
they may be held personally liable for the breach.\4\ In addition, 
violations of the prohibited transaction rules are subject to excise 
taxes under the Code.
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    \2\ ERISA section 404(a).
    \3\ ERISA section 406. ERISA also prohibits certain transactions 
between a plan and a ``party in interest.''
    \4\ ERISA section 409; see also ERISA section 405.
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    The Code also has rules regarding fiduciary conduct with respect to 
tax-favored accounts that are not generally covered by ERISA, such as 
IRAs. In particular, fiduciaries of these arrangements, including IRAs, 
are subject to the prohibited transaction rules and, when they violate 
the rules, to the imposition of an excise tax enforced by the Internal 
Revenue Service. Unlike participants in plans covered by Title I of 
ERISA, IRA owners do not have a statutory right to bring suit against 
fiduciaries for violations of the prohibited transaction rules.
    Under this statutory framework, the determination of who is a 
``fiduciary'' is of central importance. Many of ERISA's and the Code's 
protections, duties, and liabilities hinge on fiduciary status. In 
relevant part, ERISA section 3(21)(A) and Code section 4975(e)(3) 
provide that a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan or IRA to 
the extent he or she (i) exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control with respect to management of such plan or IRA, 
or exercises any authority or control with respect to management or 
disposition of its assets; (ii) renders investment advice for a fee or 
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or 
other property of such plan or IRA, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so; or, (iii) has any discretionary authority or 
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan or IRA.
    The statutory definition deliberately casts a wide net in assigning 
fiduciary responsibility with respect to plan and IRA assets. Thus, 
``any authority or control'' over plan or IRA assets is sufficient to 
confer fiduciary status, and any persons who render ``investment advice 
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect'' are fiduciaries, 
regardless of whether they have direct control over the plan's or IRA's 
assets and regardless of their status as an investment adviser or 
broker under the federal securities laws. The statutory definition and 
associated responsibilities were enacted to ensure that plans, plan 
participants, and IRA owners can depend on persons who provide 
investment advice for a fee to provide recommendations that are 
untainted by conflicts of interest. In the absence of fiduciary status, 
the providers of investment advice are neither subject to ERISA's 
fundamental fiduciary standards, nor accountable under ERISA or the 
Code for imprudent, disloyal, or biased advice.
    In 1975, the Department issued a regulation, at 29 CFR 2510.3-
21(c)(1975), defining the circumstances under which a person is treated 
as providing ``investment advice'' to an employee benefit plan within 
the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) (the ``1975 regulation'').\5\ 
The 1975 regulation narrowed the scope of the statutory definition of 
fiduciary investment advice by creating a five-part test for fiduciary 
advice. Under the 1975 regulation, for advice to constitute 
``investment advice,'' an adviser must (1) render advice as to the 
value of securities or other property, or make recommendations as to 
the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities or 
other property (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual 
agreement, arrangement or understanding, with the plan or a plan 
fiduciary that (4) the advice will serve as a primary basis for 
investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that (5) the 
advice will be individualized based on the particular needs of the 
plan. The 1975 regulation provided that an adviser is a fiduciary with 
respect to any particular instance of advice only if he or she meets 
each and every element of the five-part test with respect to the 
particular advice recipient or plan at issue.
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    \5\ The Department of Treasury issued a virtually identical 
regulation, at 26 CFR 54.4975-9(c), which interprets Code section 
4975(e)(3).
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    The market for retirement advice has changed dramatically since the 
Department first promulgated the 1975 regulation. Individuals, rather 
than large employers and professional money managers, have become 
increasingly responsible for managing retirement assets as IRAs and 
participant-directed plans, such as 401(k) plans, have supplanted 
defined benefit pensions. At the same time, the variety and complexity 
of financial products have increased, widening the information gap 
between advisers and their clients. Plan fiduciaries, plan participants 
and IRA investors must often rely on experts for advice, but are unable 
to assess the quality of the expert's advice or effectively guard 
against the adviser's conflicts of interest. This challenge is 
especially true of retail investors with smaller account balances who 
typically do not have financial expertise, and can ill-afford lower 
returns to their retirement savings caused by conflicts. The IRA 
accounts of these investors often account for all or the lion's share 
of their assets and can represent all of savings earned for a lifetime 
of work. Losses and reduced returns can be devastating to the investors 
who depend upon such savings for support in their old age. As baby 
boomers retire, they are increasingly moving money from ERISA-covered 
plans, where their employer has both the incentive and the fiduciary 
duty to facilitate sound investment choices, to IRAs where both good 
and bad investment choices are myriad and advice that is conflicted is 
commonplace. These rollovers are expected to approach $2.4 trillion 
cumulatively from 2016 through 2020.\6\ These trends were not apparent 
when the Department promulgated the 1975 regulation. At that time, 
401(k) plans did not yet exist and IRAs had only just been authorized.
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    \6\ Cerulli Associates, ``Retirement Markets 2015.''
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    As the marketplace for financial services has developed in the 
years since 1975, the five-part test has now come to undermine, rather 
than promote, the statutes' text and purposes. The narrowness of the 
1975 regulation has allowed advisers, brokers, consultants and 
valuation firms to play a central role in shaping plan and IRA 
investments, without ensuring the accountability that Congress intended 
for persons having such influence and responsibility. Even when plan 
sponsors, participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners clearly relied on 
paid advisers for impartial guidance, the 1975 regulation has allowed 
many advisers to avoid fiduciary status and disregard basic fiduciary 
obligations of care and prohibitions on disloyal and conflicted 
transactions. As a consequence, these advisers have been able to steer 
customers to investments based on their own self-interest (e.g., 
products that generate higher fees for the adviser even if there are 
identical lower-fee products available), give imprudent advice, and 
engage in transactions that would otherwise be prohibited by ERISA and 
the Code

[[Page 21142]]

without fear of accountability under either ERISA or the Code.
    In the Department's amendments to the 1975 regulation defining 
fiduciary advice within the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and 
Code section 4975(e)(3)(B), (the ``Regulation'') which are also 
published in this issue of the Federal Register, the Department is 
replacing the existing regulation with one that more appropriately 
distinguishes between the sorts of advice relationships that should be 
treated as fiduciary in nature and those that should not, in light of 
the legal framework and financial marketplace in which IRAs and plans 
currently operate.\7\ The Regulation describes the types of advice that 
constitute ``investment advice'' with respect to plan or IRA assets for 
purposes of the definition of a fiduciary at ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) 
and Code section 4975(e)(3)(B). The Regulation covers ERISA-covered 
plans, IRAs, and other plans not covered by Title I, such as Keogh 
plans, and health savings accounts described in section 223(d) of the 
Code.
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    \7\ The Department initially proposed an amendment to its 
regulation defining a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA section 
3(21)(A)(ii) and Code section 4975(e)(3)(B) on October 22, 2010, at 
75 FR 65263. It subsequently announced its intention to withdraw the 
proposal and propose a new rule, consistent with the President's 
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, in order to give the public a full 
opportunity to evaluate and comment on the new proposal and updated 
economic analysis. The first proposed amendment to the rule was 
withdrawn on April 20, 2015, see 80 FR 21927.
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    As amended, the Regulation provides that a person renders 
investment advice with respect to assets of a plan or IRA if, among 
other things, the person provides, directly to a plan, a plan 
fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, IRA or IRA owner, the 
following types of advice, for a fee or other compensation, whether 
direct or indirect:
    (i) A recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring, holding, 
disposing of, or exchanging, securities or other investment property, 
or a recommendation as to how securities or other investment property 
should be invested after the securities or other investment property 
are rolled over, transferred or distributed from the plan or IRA; and
    (ii) A recommendation as to the management of securities or other 
investment property, including, among other things, recommendations on 
investment policies or strategies, portfolio composition, selection of 
other persons to provide investment advice or investment management 
services, types of investment account arrangements (brokerage versus 
advisory), or recommendations with respect to rollovers, transfers or 
distributions from a plan or IRA, including whether, in what amount, in 
what form, and to what destination such a rollover, transfer or 
distribution should be made.
    In addition, in order to be treated as a fiduciary, such person, 
either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any 
affiliate), must: represent or acknowledge that it is acting as a 
fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA or the Code with respect to the 
advice described; represent or acknowledge that it is acting as a 
fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA or the Code; render the advice 
pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, arrangement or understanding 
that the advice is based on the particular investment needs of the 
advice recipient; or direct the advice to a specific advice recipient 
or recipients regarding the advisability of a particular investment or 
management decision with respect to securities or other investment 
property of the plan or IRA.
    The Regulation also provides that as a threshold matter in order to 
be fiduciary advice, the communication must be a ``recommendation'' as 
defined therein. The Regulation, as a matter of clarification, provides 
that a variety of other communications do not constitute 
``recommendations,'' including non-fiduciary investment education; 
general communications; and specified communications by platform 
providers. These communications which do not rise to the level of 
``recommendations'' under the Regulation are discussed more fully in 
the preamble to the final Regulation.
    The Regulation also specifies certain circumstances where the 
Department has determined that a person will not be treated as an 
investment advice fiduciary even though the person's activities 
technically may satisfy the definition of investment advice. For 
example, the Regulation contains a provision excluding recommendations 
to independent fiduciaries with financial expertise that are acting on 
behalf of plans or IRAs in arm's length transactions, if certain 
conditions are met. The independent fiduciary must be a bank, insurance 
carrier qualified to do business in more than one state, investment 
adviser registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or by a 
state, broker-dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Exchange Act), or any other independent fiduciary that holds, or 
has under management or control, assets of at least $50 million, and: 
(1) The person making the recommendation must know or reasonably 
believe that the independent fiduciary of the plan or IRA is capable of 
evaluating investment risks independently, both in general and with 
regard to particular transactions and investment strategies (the person 
may rely on written representations from the plan or independent 
fiduciary to satisfy this condition); (2) the person must fairly inform 
the independent fiduciary that the person is not undertaking to provide 
impartial investment advice, or to give advice in a fiduciary capacity, 
in connection with the transaction and must fairly inform the 
independent fiduciary of the existence and nature of the person's 
financial interests in the transaction; (3) the person must know or 
reasonably believe that the independent fiduciary of the plan or IRA is 
a fiduciary under ERISA or the Code, or both, with respect to the 
transaction and is responsible for exercising independent judgment in 
evaluating the transaction (the person may rely on written 
representations from the plan or independent fiduciary to satisfy this 
condition); and (4) the person cannot receive a fee or other 
compensation directly from the plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant 
or beneficiary, IRA, or IRA owner for the provision of investment 
advice (as opposed to other services) in connection with the 
transaction.
    Similarly, the Regulation provides that the provision of any advice 
to an employee benefit plan (as described in ERISA section 3(3)) by a 
person who is a swap dealer, security-based swap dealer, major swap 
participant, major security-based swap participant, or a swap clearing 
firm in connection with a swap or security-based swap, as defined in 
section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a) and section 3(a) 
of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)) is not investment advice if 
certain conditions are met. Finally, the Regulation describes certain 
communications by employees of a plan sponsor, plan, or plan fiduciary 
that would not cause the employee to be an investment advice fiduciary 
if certain conditions are met.

Prohibited Transactions

    The Department anticipates that the Regulation will cover many 
investment professionals who did not previously consider themselves to 
be fiduciaries under ERISA or the Code. Under the Regulation, these 
entities will be subject to the prohibited transaction restrictions in 
ERISA and the Code that apply specifically to fiduciaries. The lending 
of money or other extension of credit between a fiduciary and a plan or 
IRA, and the plan's or IRA's payment of

[[Page 21143]]

compensation to the fiduciary in return may be prohibited by ERISA 
section 406(a)(1)(B) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(B) and (D). Further, 
ERISA section 406(b)(1) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(E) prohibit a 
fiduciary from dealing with the income or assets of a plan or IRA in 
his own interest or his own account. ERISA section 406(b)(2), which 
does not apply to IRAs, provides that a fiduciary shall not ``in his 
individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction involving 
the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests 
are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its 
participants or beneficiaries.'' ERISA section 406(b)(3) and Code 
section 4975(c)(1)(F) prohibit a fiduciary from receiving any 
consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with 
the plan or IRA in connection with a transaction involving assets of 
the plan or IRA.
    Parallel regulations issued by the Departments of Labor and the 
Treasury explain that these provisions impose on fiduciaries of plans 
and IRAs a duty not to act on conflicts of interest that may affect the 
fiduciary's best judgment on behalf of the plan or IRA.\8\ The 
prohibitions extend to a fiduciary causing a plan or IRA to pay an 
additional fee to such fiduciary, or to a person in which such 
fiduciary has an interest that may affect the exercise of the 
fiduciary's best judgment as a fiduciary. Likewise, a fiduciary is 
prohibited from receiving compensation from third parties in connection 
with a transaction involving the plan or IRA, or from causing a person 
in which the fiduciary has an interest which may affect its best 
judgment as a fiduciary to receive such compensation.\9\
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    \8\ Subsequent to the issuance of these regulations, 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. (2010), divided 
rulemaking and interpretive authority between the Secretaries of 
Labor and the Treasury. The Secretary of Labor was given 
interpretive and rulemaking authority regarding the definition of 
fiduciary under both Title I of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. 
Id. section 102(a) (``all authority of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to issue [regulations, rulings opinions, and exemptions under 
section 4975 of the Code] is hereby transferred to the Secretary of 
Labor'').
    \9\ 29 CFR 2550.408b-2(e); 26 CFR 54.4975-6(a)(5).
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    As relevant to this notice, the Department understands that broker-
dealers can be required, as part of their relationships with clearing 
houses, to complete securities transactions entered into by the broker-
dealer's customers, even if a particular customer does not perform on 
its obligations. If a broker-dealer is required to advance funds to 
settle a trade entered into by a plan or IRA, or purchase a security 
for delivery on behalf of a plan or IRA, the result can potentially be 
viewed as a loan of money or other extension of credit to the plan or 
IRA. Further, in the event a broker-dealer steps into a plan's or IRA's 
shoes in any particular transaction, it may charge interest or other 
fees to the plan or IRA. These transactions potentially violate ERISA 
section 406(a)(1)(B) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(B) and (D).

Prohibited Transaction Exemptions

    As reflected in the prohibited transaction provisions, ERISA and 
the Code strongly disfavor conflicts of interest. In appropriate cases, 
however, the statutes provide exemptions from the broad prohibitions on 
conflicts of interest. For example, ERISA section 408(b)(14) and Code 
section 4975(d)(17) specifically exempt transactions involving the 
provision of fiduciary investment advice to a participant or 
beneficiary of an individual account plan or IRA owner, including 
extensions of short term credit for settlements of securities trades, 
if the advice, resulting transaction, and the adviser's fees meet 
stringent conditions carefully designed to guard against conflicts of 
interest.
    In addition, the Secretary of Labor has discretionary authority to 
grant administrative exemptions under ERISA and the Code on an 
individual or class basis, but only if the Secretary first finds that 
the exemptions are (1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests 
of plans and their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and 
(3) protective of the rights of the participants and beneficiaries of 
such plans and IRA owners. Accordingly, fiduciary advisers may always 
give advice without need of an exemption if they avoid the sorts of 
conflicts of interest that result in prohibited transactions. However, 
when they choose to give advice in which they have a conflict of 
interest, they must rely upon an exemption.
    Pursuant to its exemption authority, the Department has previously 
granted several conditional administrative class exemptions that are 
available to fiduciary advisers in defined circumstances. The 
Department has, for example, permitted investment advice fiduciaries to 
receive compensation from a plan (i.e., a commission) for executing or 
effecting securities transactions as agent for the plan.\10\ Elsewhere 
in this issue of the Federal Register, a new ``Best Interest Contract 
Exemption'' is granted for the receipt of compensation by fiduciaries 
that provide investment advice to IRAs, plan participants and 
beneficiaries, and certain plan fiduciaries. Receipt by fiduciaries of 
compensation that varies, or compensation from third parties, as a 
result of advice to plans, would otherwise violate ERISA section 406(b) 
and Code section 4975(c). As part of the Department's regulation 
defining a fiduciary under ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii), the Department 
is conditioning these existing and newly-granted exemptions on the 
fiduciary's commitment to adhere to certain impartial professional 
conduct standards; in particular, when providing investment advice that 
results in varying or third-party compensation, investment advice 
fiduciaries will be required to act in the best interest of the plans 
and IRAs they are advising.
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    \10\ See PTE 86-128, Exemption for Securities Transactions 
Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers, 51 FR 41686 
(November 18, 1986), as amended, 67 FR 64137 (October 17, 2002), as 
further amended elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register.
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    The class exemptions described above do not provide relief for any 
extensions of credit that may be related to a plan's or IRA's 
investment transactions. PTE 75-1, Part V,\11\ permits such an 
extension of credit to a plan or IRA by a broker-dealer in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities. Specifically, the Department 
has acknowledged that the exemption is available for extensions of 
credit for: The settlement of securities transactions; short sales of 
securities; the writing of option contracts on securities, and 
purchasing of securities on margin.\12\
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    \11\ 40 FR 50845 (October 31, 1975), as amended, 71 FR 5883 
(February 3, 2006).
    \12\ See Preamble to PTE 75-1, Part V, 40 FR 50845 (Oct. 31, 
1975); ERISA Advisory Opinion 86-12A (March 19, 1986).
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    Relief under PTE 75-1, Part V, was historically limited in that the 
broker-dealer extending credit was not permitted to have or exercise 
any discretionary authority or control (except as a directed trustee) 
with respect to the investment of the plan or IRA assets involved in 
the transaction, nor render investment advice within the meaning of 29 
CFR 2510.3-21(c) with respect to those plan assets, unless no interest 
or other consideration was received by the broker-dealer or any 
affiliate of the broker-dealer in connection with the extension of 
credit. Therefore, broker-dealers that are considered fiduciaries under 
the amended regulation would not be able to receive compensation for 
extending credit under PTE 75-1, Part V, as it existed prior to this 
amendment.
    As part of its development of the Regulation, the Department 
considered public input indicating the need for

[[Page 21144]]

additional prohibited transaction exemptions for investment advice 
fiduciaries. The Department was informed that relief was needed for 
broker-dealers to extend credit to plans and IRAs to avoid failed 
securities transactions, and to receive compensation in return. In the 
Department's view, the extension of credit to avoid a failed securities 
transaction currently falls within the contours of the existing relief 
provided by PTE 75-1, Part V, for extensions of credit ``[i]n 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.'' Accordingly, 
broker-dealers that are not fiduciaries, e.g., those who execute 
transactions but do not provide advice, were permitted receive 
compensation for extending credit to avoid a failed securities 
transaction under the exemption as originally granted. The Department 
proposed this amendment to extend such relief to investment advice 
fiduciaries.
    This amended exemption follows a lengthy public notice and comment 
process, which gave interested persons an extensive opportunity to 
comment on the proposed Regulation and exemption proposals. The 
proposals initially provided for 75-day comment periods, ending on July 
6, 2015 but the Department extended the comment periods to July 21, 
2015. The Department then held four days of public hearings on the new 
regulatory package, including the proposed exemptions, in Washington, 
DC from August 10 to 13, 2015, at which over 75 speakers testified. The 
transcript of the hearing was made available on September 8, 2015, and 
the Department provided additional opportunity for interested persons 
to comment on the proposals or hearing transcript until September 24, 
2015. A total of over 3000 comment letters were received on the new 
proposals. There were also over 300,000 submissions made as part of 30 
separate petitions submitted on the proposal. These comments and 
petitions came from consumer groups, plan sponsors, financial services 
companies, academics, elected government officials, trade and industry 
associations, and others, both in support and in opposition to the 
rule.\13\ The Department has reviewed all comments, and after careful 
consideration of the comments, has decided to grant the amendment to 
PTE 75-1, Part V, as described herein. For the sake of convenience, the 
entire text of PTE 75-1, Part V, as amended, has been reprinted at the 
end of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ As used throughout this preamble, the term ``comment'' 
refers to information provided through these various sources, 
including written comments, petitions, and witnesses at the public 
hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion of the Final Amendment

I. Scope of Section (c)

    As amended, PTE 75-1, Part V, Section (c) provides that a fiduciary 
within the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) or Code section 
4975(e)(3)(B) may receive reasonable compensation for extending credit 
to a plan or IRA to avoid a failed purchase or sale of securities 
involving the plan or IRA. One commenter requested that Section (c) be 
broadened to cover all transactions that are covered by other sections 
of PTE 75-1, Part V, including short sales, options trading and margin 
transactions, but did not suggest any additional protective conditions. 
The commenter stated that extension of credit relief is critical to 
such transactions.
    The Department declined to accept this request. As noted above, 
this amendment was intended to be a narrow expansion of the existing 
exemption to permit investment advice fiduciaries to receive 
compensation for extending credit to avoid a failed securities 
transaction. As a condition of the exemption, the proposal stated that 
the potential failure of the transaction could not be the result of the 
action or inaction by the fiduciary or an affiliate. The proposal 
further stated that, due to that limitation, the Department considered 
it unnecessary to condition the amended exemption on the protective 
impartial conduct standards that were proposed to apply to the other 
new and amended exemptions applicable to investment advice fiduciaries 
acting in conflicted transactions.
    Extensions of credit entered into in connection with short sales, 
options trading and margin transactions expose retirement investors to 
the potential of losses that exceed their account value. Expanding the 
scope of the exemption to permit investment advice fiduciaries to 
provide advice on these transactions and earn compensation from the 
extension of credit would not be protective under the conditions of the 
amended exemption.
    In the Department's view, this relief is not critical to all short 
sales, options and margin transactions. For example, the Department 
understands that some options transactions can occur in a cash account 
that does not involve an extension of credit. In addition, self-
directed investors can still engage in the full extent of transactions 
that were permitted prior to the Applicability Date of the Regulation, 
and broker-dealers that are not fiduciaries will still be able to rely 
on the exemption to receive compensation. Finally, investors can 
receive unconflicted advice from an adviser regarding margin 
transactions entered into with an unaffiliated broker-dealer.

II. Conditions of Relief

    In conjunction with the expanded relief in the amended exemption, 
Section (c) includes several conditions. First, the potential failure 
of the purchase or sale of the securities may not be caused by the 
broker-dealer or any affiliate. The Department changed the phrasing of 
this requirement in response to a comment, which said that the proposed 
phrasing--requiring that the potential failure could not be ``the 
result of action or inaction by such fiduciary or affiliate''--was too 
vague, possibly overbroad, and would require a fact-intensive inquiry 
for every failure of the purchase or sale of securities, leading to a 
chaotic aftermath of each failed transaction and increasing cost to the 
investor.
    According to the commenter, broker-dealers regularly ``work out'' 
issues relating to settlement failures and have policies and procedures 
to allocate costs, including not charging clients when it is the 
broker-dealer's fault. Thus, the commenter suggested that the language 
be revised to state that the failure ``was not caused'' by the 
fiduciary or an affiliate.
    The Department accepted this comment. This condition was intended 
to ensure that broker-dealers will not profit from charging interest on 
settlement failures for which they are responsible. The Department has 
determined that the suggested change in phrasing is sufficiently 
protective of the plans and IRAs that may be paying interest.
    Additionally, under the final amendment, the terms of the extension 
of credit must be at least as favorable to the plan or IRA as the terms 
available in an arm's length transaction between unaffiliated parties. 
The Department did not receive comments on this point and did not make 
any changes to the proposed requirement.
    Finally, the plan or IRA must receive written disclosure of certain 
terms prior to the extension of credit. This disclosure does not need 
to be made on a transaction by transaction basis, and can be part of an 
account opening agreement or a master agreement. The disclosure must 
include the rate of interest or other fees that will be charged on such 
extension of credit, and the method of determining the balance upon 
which interest will be charged.

[[Page 21145]]

The plan or IRA must additionally be provided with prior written 
disclosure of any changes to these terms.
    The required disclosures are intended to be consistent with the 
requirements of Securities and Exchange Act Rule 10b-16,\14\ which 
governs broker-dealers' disclosure of credit terms in margin 
transactions. The Department understands that it is the practice of 
many broker-dealers to provide such disclosures to all customers, 
regardless of whether the customer is presently opening a margin 
account. To the extent such disclosure is provided, the disclosure 
terms of the exemption is satisfied. The Department received a comment 
that this is an appropriate disclosure standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ 17 CFR 240.10b-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Definitions and Recordkeeping

    Consistent with other class exemptions published elsewhere in this 
edition of the Federal Register, the amendment defines the term ``IRA'' 
as any account or annuity described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) 
through (F), including, for example, an individual retirement account 
described in section 408(a) of the Code and a health savings account 
described in section 223(d) of the Code.\15\ The amendment also revises 
the recordkeeping provisions of PTE 75-1, Part V, to require the 
broker-dealer engaging in the covered transaction, as opposed to the 
plan or IRA, to maintain the records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ The Department has previously determined, after consulting 
with the Internal Revenue Service, that plans described in 
4975(e)(1) of the Code are included within the scope of relief 
provided by PTE 75-1 because it was issued jointly by the Department 
and the Service. See PTE 2002-13, 67 FR 9483 (March 1, 2002) 
(preamble discussion). For simplicity and consistency with the other 
new exemptions and amendments to other existing exemptions published 
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register, the Department has 
adopted this specific definition of IRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments received specific to some of the other 
exemptions adopted or amended elsewhere in this edition of the Federal 
Register, the Department has modified the recordkeeping provision to 
clarify which parties may view the records that are maintained by the 
broker-dealer. As revised, the exemption requires the records be 
``reasonably'' available, rather than ``unconditionally available,'' 
and does not authorize plan fiduciaries, participants, beneficiaries, 
contributing employers, employee organizations with members covered by 
the plan, and IRA owners to examine records regarding a transaction 
involving another investor. In addition, broker-dealers are not 
required to disclose privileged trade secrets or privileged commercial 
or financial information to any of the parties other than the 
Department. The Department has made these changes to PTE 75-1, Part V 
for consistency with the other exemptions adopted or amended today.

IV. No Relief From ERISA Section 406(a)(1)(C) or Code Section 
4975(c)(1)(C) for the Provision of Services

    The amended exemption does not provide relief from a transaction 
prohibited by ERISA section 406(a)(1)(C), or from the taxes imposed by 
Code section 4975(a) and (b) by reason of Code section 4975(c)(1)(C), 
regarding the furnishing of goods, services or facilities between a 
plan and a party in interest or between an IRA and a disqualified 
person. The provision of investment advice to a plan or IRA is a 
service to the plan or IRA and compliance with this exemption will not 
relieve an investment advice fiduciary of the need to comply with ERISA 
section 408(b)(2), Code section 4975(d)(2), and applicable regulations 
thereunder. The disclosure standards under 408(b)(2) were recently 
finalized, and the Department took care to tailor those disclosure 
conditions for the plan marketplace. The Department believes that 
uniform standards are desirable and will promote broad compliance in 
this respect.

Applicability Date

    The Regulation will become effective June 7, 2016 and this amended 
exemption is issued on that same date. The Regulation is effective at 
the earliest possible effective date under the Congressional Review 
Act. For the exemption, the issuance date serves as the date on which 
the amended exemption is intended to take effect for purposes of the 
Congressional Review Act. This date was selected in order to provide 
certainty to plans, plan fiduciaries, plan participants and 
beneficiaries, IRAs, and IRA owners that the new protections afforded 
by the Regulation are officially part of the law and regulations 
governing their investment advice providers, and to inform financial 
services providers and other affected service providers that the rule 
and amended exemption are final and not subject to further amendment or 
modification without additional public notice and comment. The 
Department expects that this effective date will remove uncertainty as 
an obstacle to regulated firms allocating capital and other resources 
toward transition and longer term compliance adjustments to systems and 
business practices.
    The Department has also determined that, in light of the importance 
of the Regulation's consumer protections and the significance of the 
continuing monetary harm to retirement investors without the rule's 
changes, an Applicability Date of April 10, 2017 is appropriate for 
plans and their affected financial services and other service providers 
to adjust to the basic change from non-fiduciary to fiduciary status. 
This amendment has the same Applicability Date; parties may rely on the 
amended exemption as of the Applicability Date.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    In accordance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)), the Amendment to Prohibited 
Transaction Exemption (PTE) 75-1, Part V, Exemptions From Prohibitions 
Respecting Certain Classes of Transactions Involving Employee Benefit 
Plans and Certain Broker-Dealers, Reporting Dealers and Banks published 
as part of the Department's proposal to amend its 1975 rule that 
defines when a person who provides investment advice to an employee 
benefit plan or IRA becomes a fiduciary, solicited comments on the 
information collections included therein. The Department also submitted 
an information collection request (ICR) to OMB in accordance with 44 
U.S.C. 3507(d), contemporaneously with the publication of the proposed 
regulation, for OMB's review. The Department received two comments from 
one commenter that specifically addressed the paperwork burden analysis 
of the information collections. Additionally many comments were 
submitted, described elsewhere in the preamble to the accompanying 
final rule, which contained information relevant to the costs and 
administrative burdens attendant to the proposals. The Department took 
into account such public comments in connection with making changes to 
the prohibited transaction exemption, analyzing the economic impact of 
the proposals, and developing the revised paperwork burden analysis 
summarized below.
    In connection with publication of this final amendment to 
Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 75-1, Part V, Exemptions From 
Prohibitions Respecting Certain Classes of Transactions Involving 
Employee Benefit Plans and Certain Broker-Dealers, Reporting Dealers 
and Banks, the Department submitted an ICR to OMB for its request of a 
revision to OMB Control Number 1210-0059. The

[[Page 21146]]

Department will notify the public when OMB approves the revised ICR.
    A copy of the ICR may be obtained by contacting the PRA addressee 
shown below or at https://www.RegInfo.gov. PRA ADDRESSEE: G. Christopher 
Cosby, Office of Policy and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Employee Benefits Security Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Room N-5718, Washington, DC 20210. Telephone: (202) 693-8410; Fax: 
(202) 219-4745. These are not toll-free numbers.
    As discussed in detail below, Section (c)(3) of the amendment 
requires that prior to the extension of credit, the plan must receive 
from the fiduciary written disclosure of (i) the rate of interest (or 
other fees) that will apply and (ii) the method of determining the 
balance upon which interest will be charged in the event that the 
fiduciary extends credit to avoid a failed purchase or sale of 
securities, as well as, prior written disclosure of any changes to 
these terms. Section (d) requires broker-dealers engaging in the 
transactions to maintain records demonstrating compliance with the 
conditions of the PTE. These requirements are information collection 
requests (ICRs) subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act.
    The Department believes that this disclosure requirement is 
consistent with the disclosure requirement mandated by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 17 CFR 240.10b-16(1) for margin 
transactions. Although the SEC does not mandate any recordkeeping 
requirement, the Department believes that it would be a usual and 
customary business practice for financial institutions to maintain any 
records necessary to prove that required disclosures had been 
distributed in compliance with the SEC's rule. Therefore, the 
Department concludes that these ICRs impose no additional burden on 
respondents.

General Information

    The attention of interested persons is directed to the following:
    (1) The fact that a transaction is the subject of an exemption 
under ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2) does not relieve 
a fiduciary or other party in interest or disqualified person with 
respect to a plan from certain other provisions of ERISA and the Code, 
including any prohibited transaction provisions to which the exemption 
does not apply and the general fiduciary responsibility provisions of 
ERISA section 404 which require, among other things, that a fiduciary 
discharge his or her duties respecting the plan solely in the interests 
of the plan's participants and beneficiaries and in a prudent fashion 
in accordance with ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B);
    (2) The Department finds that the class exemption as amended is 
administratively feasible, in the interests of the plan and of its 
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective of the 
rights of the plan's participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners;
    (3) The class exemption is applicable to a particular transaction 
only if the transaction satisfies the conditions specified in the class 
exemption; and
    (4) This amended class exemption is supplemental to, and not in 
derogation of, any other provisions of ERISA and the Code, including 
statutory or administrative exemptions and transitional rules. 
Furthermore, the fact that a transaction is subject to an 
administrative or statutory exemption is not dispositive of whether the 
transaction is in fact a prohibited transaction.

Exemption

    The restrictions of section 406 of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (the Act) and the taxes imposed by section 4975(a) 
and (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the Code), by reason of 
section 4975(c)(1) of the Code, shall not apply to any extension of 
credit to an employee benefit plan or an individual retirement account 
(IRA) by a party in interest or a disqualified person with respect to 
the plan or IRA, provided that the following conditions are met:
    (a) The party in interest or disqualified person:
    (1) Is a broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934; and
    (2) Does not have or exercise any discretionary authority or 
control (except as a directed trustee) with respect to the investment 
of the plan or IRA assets involved in the transaction, nor does it 
render investment advice (within the meaning of 29 CFR 2510.3-21) with 
respect to those assets, unless no interest or other consideration is 
received by the party in interest or disqualified person or any 
affiliate thereof in connection with such extension of credit.
    (b) Such extension of credit:
    (1) Is in connection with the purchase or sale of securities;
    (2) Is lawful under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and any 
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder; and
    (3) Is not a prohibited transaction within the meaning of section 
503(b) of the Code.
    (c) Notwithstanding section (a)(2), a fiduciary under section 
3(21)(A)(ii) of the Act or Code section 4975(e)(3)(B) may receive 
reasonable compensation for extending credit to a plan or IRA to avoid 
a failed purchase or sale of securities involving the plan or IRA if:
    (1) The potential failure of the purchase or sale of the securities 
is not caused by such fiduciary or an affiliate;
    (2) The terms of the extension of credit are at least as favorable 
to the plan or IRA as the terms available in an arm's length 
transaction between unaffiliated parties;
    (3) Prior to the extension of credit, the plan or IRA receives 
written disclosure of (i) the rate of interest (or other fees) that 
will apply and (ii) the method of determining the balance upon which 
interest will be charged, in the event that the fiduciary extends 
credit to avoid a failed purchase or sale of securities, as well as 
prior written disclosure of any changes to these terms. This Section 
(c)(3) will be considered satisfied if the plan or IRA receives the 
disclosure described in the Securities and Exchange Act Rule 10b-16; 
\16\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 17 CFR 240.10b-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (d) The broker-dealer engaging in the covered transaction maintains 
or causes to be maintained for a period of six years from the date of 
such transaction in a manner that is reasonably accessible for 
examination, such records as are necessary to enable the persons 
described in paragraph (e) of this exemption to determine whether the 
conditions of this exemption have been met with respect to a 
transaction, except that:
    (1) No party other than the broker-dealer engaging in the covered 
transaction shall be subject to the civil penalty which may be assessed 
under section 502(i) of the Act, or to the taxes imposed by section 
4975(a) and (b) of the Code, if such records are not maintained, or are 
not available for examination as required by paragraph (e) below; and
    (2) A prohibited transaction will not be deemed to have occurred 
if, due to circumstances beyond the control of the broker-dealer, such 
records are lost or destroyed prior to the end of such six-year period.
    (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this exemption, 
and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in subsections (a)(2) and 
(b) of section 504 of the Act, the records referred to in paragraph (d) 
are

[[Page 21147]]

reasonably available at their customary location for examination during 
normal business hours by:
    (A) An authorized employee or representative of the Department of 
Labor or the Internal Revenue Service,
    (B) Any fiduciary of a plan that engaged in a transaction pursuant 
to this exemption, or any authorized employee or representative of such 
fiduciary;
    (C) Any contributing employer and any employee organization whose 
members are covered by a plan described in paragraph (e)(1)(B), or any 
authorized employee or representative of these entities; or
    (D) Any participant or beneficiary of a plan described in paragraph 
(e)(1)(B), IRA owner or the authorized representative of such 
participant, beneficiary or owner.
    (2) None of the persons described in paragraph (e)(1)(B)-(D) of 
this exemption are authorized to examine records regarding a 
recommended transaction involving another investor, or privileged trade 
secrets or privileged commercial or financial information, of the 
broker-dealer engaging in the covered transaction, or information 
identifying other individuals.
    (3) Should the broker-dealer engaging in the covered transaction 
refuse to disclose information on the basis that the information is 
exempt from disclosure, the broker-dealer must, by the close of the 
thirtieth (30th) day following the request, provide a written notice 
advising the requestor of the reasons for the refusal and that the 
Department may request such information.
    (4) Failure to maintain the required records necessary to determine 
whether the conditions of this exemption have been met will result in 
the loss of the exemption only for the transaction or transactions for 
which records are missing or have not been maintained. It does not 
affect the relief for other transactions.
    For purposes of this exemption, the terms ``party in interest,'' 
``disqualified person'' and ``fiduciary'' shall include such party in 
interest, disqualified person, or fiduciary, and any affiliates 
thereof, and the term ``affiliate'' shall be defined in the same manner 
as that term is defined in 29 CFR 2510.3-21 and 26 CFR 54.4975-9. Also 
for the purposes of this exemption, the term ``IRA'' means any account 
or annuity described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), 
including, for example, an individual retirement account described in 
section 408(a) of the Code and a health savings account described in 
section 223(d) of the Code.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 1st day of April, 2016.
Phyllis C. Borzi,
Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 
Department of Labor.
[FR Doc. 2016-07927 Filed 4-6-16; 11:15 am]
 BILLING CODE 4510-29-P