Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 45578-45585 [2015-18672]
Download as PDF
<![CDATA[
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
45578
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
review and comment. The ICR describes
the nature of the information collections
and their expected burden. The Federal
Register Notice with a 60-day comment
period was published on January 2,
2015 [80 FR 99].
DATES: Comments must be submitted on
or before August 31, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, within 30
days, to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, 725 17th
Street NW., Washington, DC 20503,
Attention NHTSA Desk Officer.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: KilJae Hong, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., W52–232, NPO–520,
Washington, DC 20590. Ms. Hong’s
telephone number is (202) 493–0524
and email address is kil-jae.hong@
dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In
compliance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, NHTSA
conducted a qualitative phase of
Consumer Research which included
Focus Groups. Based upon the
qualitative phase research results,
NHTSA developed the communications
materials its Fuel Economy Consumer
Education Program. This notice
announces that the ICR for a
quantitative study of the
communications materials, abstracted
below, has been forwarded to OMB
requesting review and comment. The
ICR describes the nature of the
information collection and its expected
burden. This is a request for new
collection.
Title: 49 CFR 575—Consumer
Information Regulations (sections 103
and 105) Quantitative Research.
OMB Number: Not Assigned.
Type of Request: New collection.
Abstract: The Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA),
enacted in December 2007, included a
requirement that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
develop a consumer information and
education campaign to improve
consumer understanding of automobile
performance with regard to fuel
economy, Greenhouse Gases (GHG)
emissions and other pollutant
emissions; of automobile use of
alternative fuels; and of thermal
management technologies used on
automobiles to save fuel. A critical step
in developing the consumer information
program was to conduct proper market
research to understand consumers’
knowledge surrounding these issues,
evaluate potential consumer-facing
messages in terms of clarity and
understand the communications
channels in which these messages
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:54 Jul 29, 2015
Jkt 235001
should be present. The research allowed
NHTSA to refine messaging to enhance
comprehension and usefulness and help
guide the development of an effective
communications plan. The consumer
market research informed NHTSA that
digital assets would be the best format
and distribution through web and
mobile channels would be the best
media. The assets being tested during
this quantitative study are a result from
the qualitative focus groups, and
include an animated infographic, video,
and fact sheets.
Affected Public: Passenger vehicle
consumers.
Estimated Total Annual Burden:
666.67 hours.
Number of Respondents: 2,000.
The estimated annual burden hour for
the online survey is 666.67 hours. Based
on the Bureau of Labor and Statistics’
median hourly wage (all occupations) in
the May 2013 National Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates,
NHTSA estimates that it would cost an
average of $16.87 per hour if all
respondents were interviewed on the
job. Therefore, the agency estimates that
the cost associated with the burden
hours is $11,247 ($16.87 per hour x
666.67 interviewing hours).
Comments are invited on: Whether
the proposed collection of information
is necessary for the proper performance
of the functions of the Department,
including whether the information will
have practical utility; the accuracy of
the Departments estimate of the burden
of the proposed information collection;
ways to enhance the quality, utility and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and ways to minimize the
burden of the collection of information
on respondents, including the use of
automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.
Comment to OMB is most effective if
OMB receives it within 30 days of
publication.
Colleen Coggins,
Acting Senior Associate Administrator, Policy
and Operations.
[FR Doc. 2015–18648 Filed 7–29–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect
investigation.
AGENCY:
PO 00000
Frm 00078
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
This notice sets forth the
reasons for the denial of a petition,
DP14–004, submitted by the Center for
Auto Safety (the petitioner) to the
Administrator of NHTSA by a letter
dated August 21, 2014, under 49 CFR
part 552. The petition requests the
agency to initiate a safety defect
investigation into alleged failures of
Totally Integrated Power Modules
(TIPMs) installed in sport utility
vehicles, trucks, and vans built by
Chrysler FCA (Chrysler) beginning in
the 2007 model year. The petitioner
alleges that TIPM defects may result in
the following safety defect conditions:
Engine stall, airbag non-deployment,
failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in
unintended acceleration, and fire.
After conducting a technical review
of: (1) Consumer complaints and other
material submitted by the petitioner; (2)
information provided by Chrysler in
response to information requests
regarding TIPM design, TIPM
implementation and the complaints
submitted by the petitioner; and (3)
Chrysler safety recalls 14V–530 and
15V–115 addressing a fuel pump relay
defect condition that may result in
engine stall while driving in certain
vehicles equipped with TIPM body
control modules; and the likelihood that
additional investigations would result
in a finding that a defect related to
motor vehicle safety exists, NHTSA has
concluded that further investigation of
the issues raised by the petition is not
warranted. The agency, accordingly, has
denied the petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Kareem Habib, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation,
NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–
366–8703. Email Kareem.Habib@
dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Introduction
Interested persons may petition
NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine
whether a motor vehicle or item of
replacement equipment does not
comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a
defect that relates to motor vehicle
safety. 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a
properly filed petition, the agency
conducts a technical review of the
petition, material submitted with the
petition, and any additional
information. § 552.6. After considering
the technical review and taking into
account appropriate factors, which may
include, among others, allocation of
agency resources, agency priorities, and
E:\FR\FM\30JYN1.SGM
30JYN1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
the likelihood of success in litigation
that might arise from a determination of
a noncompliance or a defect related to
motor vehicle safety, the agency will
grant or deny the petition. § 552.8.
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
II. Defect Petition Background
Information
By a letter dated August 21, 2014, the
Center for Auto Safety (CAS) submitted
a petition to NHTSA under 49 U.S.C.
30162 requesting ‘‘a safety defect
investigation into failures associated
with the Totally Integrated Power
Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler
SUV’s, trucks, and vans beginning in the
2007 model year.’’ On August 27, 2014,
CAS sent NHTSA a supplemental letter
identifying 24 fatal crashes from
Chrysler Early Warning Reporting
(EWR) submissions that CAS alleged
may be related to TIPM failures
(Supplement I). On September 8, 2014,
CAS sent another supplemental letter to
NHTSA with 35 additional complaints
allegedly related to TIPM failures
(Supplement II). On September 25,
2014, NHTSA’s Office of Defects
Investigation (ODI) opened DP14–004 to
evaluate the petition for a grant or deny
decision. In a September 29, 2014 letter
to CAS, ODI acknowledged receipt of
the petition and requested additional
information from CAS in support of its
allegations that TIPM malfunctions may
result in airbag non-deployment or
unintended acceleration caused by the
fuel pump failing to shutoff. After
opening DP14–004, ODI received four
additional CAS complaint supplements
on September 30, 2014 (Supplement III),
November 13, 2014 (Supplement IV),
January 14, 2015 (Supplement V), and
April 1, 2015 (Supplement VI).
The CAS petition provided the
following broad allegation of defect
conditions in TIPM modules:
Chrysler TIPM failures result in a variety
of safety-related issues in multiple vehicle
components, many of which have the
potential for destructive results. Not only do
Chrysler’s faulty TIPMs result in vehicle
stalling, they have also been implicated in
airbag non-deployment, random horn,
headlight, taillight, door lock, instrument
panel and windshield wiper activity, power
windows going up and down on their own,
failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in
unintended acceleration, and fires. In the
interim, these owners remain at the mercy of
a defect which many have likened to the
vehicle being possessed and uncontrollable.
A look at consumer complaints filed with
CAS suggests a better name for the TIPM—
Totally Inept Power Module.
Additionally, CAS referenced a recent
filing of a class action lawsuit in the
United States District Court, Central
District of California, Velasco et al vs.
Chrysler LLC, Case No. CV13–08080–
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:54 Jul 29, 2015
Jkt 235001
DDP–VBKx affecting fifteen different
Chrysler models and cited recalls 07V–
291 and 13V–282. According to CAS,
‘‘neither of these recalls was sufficient
to address the TIPM problem
throughout Chrysler’s fleet, instead
focusing on a highly limited set of
vehicles and circumstances. Given the
number and range of complaints related
to Chrysler TIPMs, it is time for NHTSA
to formally investigate TIPM failures
across the board in 2007 and later
models’’.
III. Summary of the Petition
The petitioner requests that NHTSA
formally investigate TIPM failures
across the board in 2007 and later
models and cites the following
allegations:
1. Vehicle Stall
CAS stated in the defect petition letter
and complaint Supplements III and IV
that:
TIPM failure contributes to a range of
problems in vehicle electric components, the
safety issue which continues to present itself
in complaints is stalling, often in traffic
where the dangers are obvious. The most
often cited TIPM failure is a loss of vehicle
power that can create a dangerous stall
condition at any speed. Additionally, a
survey of complaints related to Chrysler
TIPMs suggests that a stall/no-start condition
is most reported outcome of TIPM failure,
leaving drivers without power in traffic and
stranded for unknown periods of time before
the vehicle regains the capacity to be started.
2. Airbag Non-Deployment
According to CAS defect petition
letter and complaint Supplement IV,
‘‘Not only do Chrysler’s faulty TIPMs
result in vehicle stalling, they have also
been implicated in airbag nondeployment. As NHTSA knows from the
GM ignition switch mass defect, it is
virtually impossible to be sure that an
airbag will deploy until there is a crash.
Complaints directly citing airbag system
warnings can be found in the
complaints received by CAS’’.
3. Unintended Acceleration
CAS uses the term ‘‘unintended
acceleration’’ in complaint letter
Supplement IV dated November 13,
2014, ‘‘to indicate reports where the
vehicle continued to move or accelerate
when the operator did not want this to
happen. TIPM issues related to
acceleration appear to arise from lack of
fuel pump shut-off as well as problems
with gear shift, throttle, and cruise
control. Consumer problems related to
acceleration, gear and/or throttle
control may be found in CAS
complaints.’’
PO 00000
Frm 00079
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
45579
4. Fire and Other Symptoms
According to CAS defect petition
letter and complaint Supplement IV,
‘‘Chrysler’s faulty TIPMs have also been
implicated in fires. Additionally, there
are numerous complaints alleging
bizarre and unexplained headlight and
taillight failure, windshield wiper
activity, instrument panel failure, and
door lock problems.’’
5. EWR Fatalities
CAS included as Attachment A to
Supplement I what it believes to be
EWR information for all fatal crashes
involving TIPM failure. CAS claims that
‘‘[s]ince the TIPM functions as the
central gateway for all vehicle
electronics, there are multiple EWR
component codes that could point to the
defect. There are 24 such crashes
involving 28 deaths that the agency
must consider in reviewing our petition,
at least twelve of which have been the
subject of DI requests. There are also a
large number of injury crashes reported
to EWR that involve these components.’’
6. Class Action Lawsuit
The petition references a class action
lawsuit as evidence of the breadth and
scope of ‘‘the actual TIPM problem.’’ 1
The class action cited by the petition
was originally filed on November 1,
2013. The plaintiffs in the original
complaint, which were not limited to
TIPM equipped vehicles, included 2 MY
2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners, a
MY 2011 Dodge Grand Caravan owner
and a MY 2008 Chrysler 300 owner.2
The lawsuit provided the following
description of the alleged defect and
affected vehicles:
Plaintiffs and the Class members they
propose to represent purchased or leased
2008 model year Chrysler 300 and 2011–2012
model year Jeep Grand Cherokees, Dodge
Durangos, and Dodge Grand Caravans
equipped with defective Totally Integrated
Power Modules, also known as TIPMs. The
TIPM controls and distributes power to all of
the electrical functions of the vehicle,
including the vehicle safety and ignition
systems. Vehicles equipped with defective
TIPMs progress through a succession of
symptoms that begin with an inability to
reliably start the vehicle and lead to, among
other things, the vehicle not starting, the fuel
pump not turning off and the engine stalling
while driving.
A second amended complaint for the
class action was filed on May 5, 2014,
1 The petition references Velasco et al vs Chrysler
LLC, Case No. 13-cv-08080–DDP–VBK, in the
United States District Court for the Central District
of California as ‘‘incorporated herein by reference,
covering fifteen different Chrysler models over a
number of model years.’’
2 The MY 2008 Chrysler 300 is not equipped with
a TIPM body control module.
E:\FR\FM\30JYN1.SGM
30JYN1
45580
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
listing seven plaintiffs and redefining
the scope of vehicles as all Chrysler
vehicles equipped with TIPM–7
modules. The plaintiffs in the amended
complaint consist of 6 MY 2011 Jeep
Grand Cherokee owners and 1 MY 2011
Dodge Durango owner. The plaintiffs all
alleged experiencing ‘‘no-start’’
concerns, with one also alleging a fuel
pump run-on condition and another
reporting a single incident of engine
stall while driving. The amended
complaint continued to focus on
problems with starting, engine stall
while driving and fuel pumps that do
not turn off, while adding ‘‘headlights
and taillights shutting off’’ and ‘‘random
and uncontrollable activity of the horn,
windshield wipers, and alarm system’’
to the claimed TIPM deficiencies. The
class action does not include airbag
non-deployment, unintended
acceleration or fire among the alleged
consequences of the claimed TIPM
defect.
7. Petition Issues
ODI identified several issues with the
scope and supporting evidence for
defect allegations in the petition
submitted by CAS. The petition was
unnecessarily broad in scope and
included several alleged defects that
had no factual basis. After failing to
identify any clear basis for several of the
petition allegations, ODI included a
request for supporting information for
claims regarding airbag non-deployment
and unintended acceleration in its
September 29, 2014 petition
acknowledgement letter. The CAS
response, provided in a November 13,
2014 letter, did not provide any
technical basis for claims of airbag nondeployment and appeared to equate any
illumination of the airbag warning lamp
with TIPM failure, even when the
complaint clearly cited other causes for
the airbag system fault (e.g, ‘‘faulty
wiring in passenger front seat causing
airbag failure warning to illuminate’’ 3
and ‘‘open circuit in drivers [sic] seat
airbag’’ 4). Several other complaints
cited by CAS do not allege any airbag
failures but, in apparent reference to
CAS petition claims, state that TIPM
failure ‘‘can cause the airbags to not
deploy.’’
With regard to the basis for its claims
that TIPM failures can result in
unintended acceleration, CAS repeated
its allegation that such failures are
associated with fuel pump shut-off
failures,5 even while acknowledging
3 Identified
by CAS as complaint number 62.
by CAS as complaint number 146.
5 The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that,
‘‘TIPM issues related to acceleration appear to arise
4 Identified
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:54 Jul 29, 2015
Jkt 235001
that none of the reports that it provided
actually involved instances where fuel
pumps failing to shut off resulted in
unintended acceleration.6 ODI notes
that claims that unintended acceleration
is caused by, or related to, a ‘‘lack of
fuel pump shut-off’’ are not supported
by any known incidents. Moreover, any
allegation that a running fuel pump can,
absent extremely idiosyncratic failures
of many other systems, cause a vehicle
to accelerate on its own demonstrates a
fundamental misunderstanding of basic
automotive engineering.
IV. ODI Analysis
A. Scope Analysis
The CAS petition requests
investigation of alleged failures of TIPM
modules in Chrysler light vehicles, with
no reference to the automotive industry
body control technology
implementations or architecture
functionality distinctions: ‘‘The CAS
hereby petitions the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
to initiate a safety defect investigation
into failures associated with the Totally
Integrated Power Module (TIPM)
installed in Chrysler SUV’s, trucks, and
vans beginning in the 2007 model year’’.
Interpreted broadly, the CAS petition
potentially affects approximately 10
million 7 vehicles equipped with TIPM–
6 or TIPM–7 modules. The petition
scope does not appear to recognize the
functional distinctions between TIPM–6
and TIPM–7. The petition also does not
distinguish between the significant
electronics technology differences
between the relay based TIPM–7 and an
all solid-state Field Effect Transistors
(FET) TIPM–6.
TIPM–7 vehicle function outputs
(such as fuel pump control, wiper/
washer control. . .etc.) are a mix of
electro-mechanical relays and solid state
FET devices equipped with digital
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
communication ports while TIPM–6
vehicle function outputs are strictly
solid state SPI-based FET devices with
no electro-mechanical relays. Relays are
electro-mechanical devices with specific
inherent break down mechanisms
including, but not limited to, the
degradation of the mechanically
from lack of fuel pump shut-off as well as problems
with gear shift, throttle, and cruise control.’’
6 The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that,
‘‘There are quite a few consumer complaints in both
CAS and NHTSA databases citing lack of fuel pump
shutoff that result in stalling and/or nonstart
condition but do not produce uncontrolled
acceleration.’’ This statement, which also misstates
the effects of fuel pump shutoff failure,
acknowledges the absence of any related complaints
of unintended acceleration.
7 Chrysler SUV’s, trucks, and vans equipped with
TIMP–7 and TIPM–6 beginning MY 2007.
PO 00000
Frm 00080
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
coupled moving contact spring arm and
contact resistance; 8 both are design
elements that do not exist in silicon
only devices associated with TIPM–6.
Similarly, TIPM–7 implementations
include a fuse for overcurrent protection
while the TIPM–6 system design uses an
integrated silicon overcurrent protection
feature specific to solid state devices.
ODI is interpreting the petition as a
request for investigation of only vehicles
equipped with the TIPM–7 (subject
vehicles) for the following reasons: (1)
The petition refers to TIPM installed in
Chrysler vehicles ‘‘beginning in the
2007 model year’’ and TIPM–7 was
introduced in the 2007 model year; (2)
the affected models listed in the petition
and in the class action lawsuit
referenced by the petition are all TIPM–
7 vehicles; 9 (3) approximately 93
percent 10 of the complaints submitted
by CAS involve vehicles equipped with
TIPM–7; (4) only 3 percent of CAS
complaints are related to vehicles
equipped with TIPM–6 and ODI’s
review of these complaints did not
identify any safety defect trends; 11 and
(5) the significant technical differences
between the TIPM–6 and TIPM–7
modules as described above.
The TIPM–7 population includes
approximately 4.7 million Chrysler
sport utility vehicles, trucks, and vans
across 11 vehicle platforms beginning in
model year 2007 (Table 1). ODI
conducted a detailed review of
complaint narratives submitted by CAS
and consumers including careful
analysis of vehicle repair histories,
warranty claims obtained from the
manufacturer and any available
Customer Assistance Inquiry reports
(CAIR). In total, there were 296
complaints submitted by the petitioner
in the original petition and five
supplements, including 271 complaints
related to the subject vehicles equipped
with TIPM–7. ODI’s complaint analysis
focused on vehicles equipped with
TIPM–7.
8 Fuel pump relays were tested in simulated
vehicle environments incorporating variable factors
such as relay type; relay manufacture, simulated
fuel pump current and inductance levels of
representative TIPM–7 vehicles.
9 The CAS petition references a recent filing of a
class action lawsuit in US District Court, Velasco
et al. vs. Chrysler LLC affecting fifteen different
Chrysler models in which CAS cited the same
fifteen vehicle models in the defect petition dated
August 21, 2014. The Court order referenced by
CAS specifically cited TIPM–7 in Case No. CV 13–
08080 DDP, Dkt. No. 42, ‘‘Plaintiffs allege that the
TIPM with which the Class Vehicles are equipped,
referred to as TIPM 7.’’
10 Percentage based on CAS complaints through
Supplement V.
11 The remaining CAS complaints are associated
with vehicles equipped with Front Control Module
and Body Control Modules.
E:\FR\FM\30JYN1.SGM
30JYN1
45581
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
TABLE 1—TIPM–7 POPULATION
Models (platforms)
Model years
Population
Chrysler Town and Country/Dodge Grand Caravan (RT) .......................................................................................
Jeep Wrangler (JK) ..................................................................................................................................................
Ram 1500/2500/3500/4500and5500 (DS/DJ/DD/DP) .............................................................................................
Jeep Grand Cherokee/Dodge Durango (WK/WD) ..................................................................................................
Jeep Liberty (KK) .....................................................................................................................................................
Dodge Nitro (KA) .....................................................................................................................................................
Dodge Journey (JC) ................................................................................................................................................
2008–14
2007–14
2009–12
2011–13
2008–12
2007–11
2009–10
1,632,250
962,098
929,036
526,939
331,717
198,581
156,537
Total TIPM–7 ....................................................................................................................................................
2007–14
4,737,158
B. TIPM Function
TIPM–7 is a controller area network
(CAN) based body controller integrated
with an electrical power distribution
center; and is designed to support
centralized and distributed vehicle
control functions. The TIPM–7 electrical
architecture features three levels of
functional interactions with other
vehicle systems: (1) Power only
interaction- circuits that only pass
through the integrated fuse box (e.g.
occupant restraint controller); (2) power
and data transfer interaction for circuits
that pass through the power distribution
center with no TIPM control function
(e.g. powertrain controller and
transmission controller); and (3) power
and control interaction for circuits that
pass through the power distribution
center and are directly controlled by the
TIPM. The latter include power and
control logic for exterior lighting,
windshield wiper/washer, door lock,
and horn. A distinguishing feature of
the TIPM–7 from other Chrysler body
controllers is the integration of the fuel
pump relay.
C. Fuel Pump Relay Defect
In a September 3, 2014 letter to
NHTSA, Chrysler submitted a Defect
Information Report (DIR) identifying a
defect in the fuel pump relay (FPR)
within the TIPM–7 which can result in
a no start or stall condition in
approximately 188,723 model year (MY)
2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee (WK) and
Dodge Durango (WD) vehicles
manufactured from January 5, 2010
through July 20, 2011 (14V–530). In a
February 24, 2015 letter, Chrysler
submitted a second DIR expanding the
scope of the FPR defect condition to
include an additional 338,216 MY 2012
through 2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee
vehicles manufactured from September
17, 2010 through August 19, 2013 and
MY 2012 through 2013 Dodge Durango
vehicles manufactured from January 18,
2011 through August 19, 2013 (15V–
115). Chrysler identified the root cause
as deformation of the relay contact
spring due to the heat caused by contact
power, ambient temperature around the
fuel pump relay, and battery voltage.
These factors, present in combination
and in high amounts, led to premature
fuel pump relay failures, which usually
resulted in a no-start concern. When the
fuel pump relay fails while driving, the
fuel pump will cease to function and the
engine will shut off or ‘‘stall.’’ In the
case of a stall, the vehicle maintains
power and functionality for certain
features, such as hazard indicators, seat
belt pre-tensioners and airbags.
Chrysler’s recall remedy involved
installing a new, more robust fuel pump
relay, external to the TIPM.
Detailed analysis of relay material
composition, lab reports and fuel pump
system design reviews performed by
Chrysler and Continental that ODI
reviewed in examining the petition
identified the root cause of the
premature relay failure to be contact
erosion and the deformation of the
contact spring due to under-hood
temperatures around the fuel pump
relay, current draws, and fuel pump
inductance levels specific to Delphi fuel
pumps installed on MY 2011–2013 Jeep
Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango
vehicles. Vehicle fuel pump system
measurements indicated that WK/WD
vehicles have the highest current draw
and inductance while RT minivans have
the lowest current draw coupled with
lower fuel pump inductance. Relay
durability test data provided by Chrysler
indicated that other TIPM–7 vehicle
platform relays substantially outlasted
relays tested in a simulated WK/WD
environment. NHTSA believes that
because the current draw is lower for
other vehicles equipped with the TIPM–
7 than for the WK/WD vehicles, the risk
of fuel pump relay deformation for these
other vehicles is lower than for the WK/
WD vehicles.
On October 20, 2014, ODI sent an
Information Request (IR) letter to
Chrysler requesting production,
complaint, and warranty claim data
related to the complaints provided by
CAS and ODI complaints involving stall
while driving allegations potentially
related to TIPM faults. The IR letter also
requested information related to the fuel
pump relay root cause analysis and
technical data regarding TIPM design
and construction. Analysis of the field
data submitted indicated that the WK/
WD vehicles exhibited significantly
higher complaint rates related to FPR
failures than other subject vehicles
(Table 2). The data show that the
primary failure mode of the fuel pump
relay is a no-start condition, with nostarts and starts followed immediately
by stall accounting for approximately
68% of the complaints for both the
recalled WK/WD vehicles and the nonrecalled subject vehicles.
TABLE 2—FUEL PUMP RELAY COMPLAINT ANALYSIS, BY TOTAL FAILURE RATE 12
[All rates are in complaints per 100,000 vehicles]
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
TIPM–7 vehicles
Fuel pump relay failure mode
Stall while driving
Fuel pump relay recalls
Platforms
No.
Recalled ................................
Non-recalled .........................
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:54 Jul 29, 2015
WK/WD .........
JC ..................
Jkt 235001
PO 00000
Rate
37
2
Frm 00081
Start with
immediate stall
No.
7.0
1.3
Fmt 4703
Rate
4
0
Sfmt 4703
0.8
0.0
No-start
No.
82
3
Pump run-on
Rate
No.
15.6
1.9
E:\FR\FM\30JYN1.SGM
30JYN1
Rate
3
0
0.6
0.0
Total
No.
126
5
Rate
23.9
3.2
45582
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
TABLE 2—FUEL PUMP RELAY COMPLAINT ANALYSIS, BY TOTAL FAILURE RATE 12—Continued
[All rates are in complaints per 100,000 vehicles]
TIPM–7 vehicles
Fuel pump relay failure mode
Stall while driving
Fuel pump relay recalls
Platforms
No.
Start with
immediate stall
Rate
No.
Rate
No-start
No.
Pump run-on
Rate
No.
Total
Rate
No.
Rate
KA .................
RT .................
JK ..................
Ram ...............
KK .................
Total .......
Grand Total TIPM–7 ......
1
1
1
0
0
5
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2
4
3
0
0
12
1.0
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.3
0
1
0
0
0
1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3
7
4
0
0
19
1.5
0.4
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.5
.......................
42
0.9
5
0.1
94
2.0
4
0.1
145
3.1
ODI’s analysis of all confirmed FPR
failures identified a total of 145
complaints, including 42 resulting in at
least one incident of stall while driving.
The recalled WK/WD vehicles, which
comprise only 11 percent of the subject
vehicle population, account for 126 of
the total FPR related complaints (87
percent) and 37 of those involving stall
while driving (88 percent). This analysis
combined with overall warranty claim
data analysis and vehicle test data
related to FPR root cause analysis
indicate that, based on currently
available information, the scope of
recalls 14V–530 and 15V–115
adequately address the FPR defect
condition.
D. Other Stall While Driving Defects
In addition to the analysis of
complaints related to confirmed FPR
failures to assess the scope of Chrysler
recalls 14V–530 and 15V–115, ODI also
examined all stall while driving
complaints allegedly related to TIPM
failures in the subject vehicles to assess
whether any other engine stall related
defect conditions may exist in the
subject vehicles that are not already
addressed by a safety recall. ODI’s
analysis did not identify any specific
TIPM faults resulting in incidents of
stall while driving that are not already
addressed by safety recalls 13 and
analysis of complaints did not identify
any additional defect trends associated
with potentially TIPM-related stall
while driving that warrant additional
investigation.
ODI’s analysis identified a total of 131
complaints alleging TIPM related stall
while driving incidents. Fifty-five (55)
of the complaints were found to be
unrelated to TIPM failures, including 10
associated with a defect condition
addressed by alternator replacement
recall 14V–634.14 A total of 76
complaints were identified that were
either confirmed to be related to a TIPM
fault condition (49) or where either the
FPR or other, unspecified, TIPM fault
condition may have been the cause
(27).15 Table 3 shows the failure rates
for potentially TIPM related stall while
driving incidents for the recalled WK/
WD vehicles and for each of the nonrecalled platforms. These data do not
indicate a stall while driving defect
trend outside of the recall population.
TABLE 3—STALL WHILE DRIVING ANALYSIS, ALL CAUSES 17
TIPM–7 vehicles
Not related to TIPM
Alternator
recall
14V–634
Other nonTIPM 16
Potentially TIPM related
Fuel pump
relay
Total rate
(C/100k)
Platforms
Recalled ...........................
Non-recalled ....................
WK/WD ......
KA ..............
JC ...............
RT ..............
Ram ............
JK ...............
KK ..............
Total ....
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
5
1
9
5
6
2
28
27
5
1
9
5
6
2
28
40
1
2
4
1
1
0
9
14
3
1
6
2
1
0
13
54
4
3
10
3
2
0
22
10.2
2.0
1.9
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.0
0.5
....................
10
45
55
49
27
76
1.6
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Grand Total TIPM–7
12 Complaint data in Table 2 is limited to CAS
complaints and ODI VOQ’s potentially related to
stall while driving that were identified prior to
ODI’s information request letter to Chrysler for
DP14–004.
13 In addition to FPR recalls 14V–530 and 15V–
115, Chrysler previously initiated recall 07V–291 to
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:54 Jul 29, 2015
Jkt 235001
Total
Possible
TIPM
Fuel pump relay recalls
address a defect condition in approximately 81,000
MY 2007 JK and KA vehicles associated with the
PCM momentarily shutting the engine down due to
a prolonged (75ms) TIPM microprocessor reset
triggered by a vehicle-wide CAN bus error event.
14 For recall 14V–634, vehicles equipped with the
3.6L engine and 160 Amp Alternator may
PO 00000
Frm 00082
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Total
experience a rapid alternator failure having limited
or no detection, which can result in vehicle
shutdown/shut off and/or fire.
15 Unknown/possible TIPM’s include several for
which the condition could not be duplicated by the
servicing dealer.
E:\FR\FM\30JYN1.SGM
30JYN1
45583
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
vehicles. The recalled MY 2011 WK/WD
vehicles account for 25 percent of
production, 88 percent of confirmed
FPR stall while driving incidents and 81
percent of all potentially TIPM related
stall while driving incidents in MY 2011
subject vehicles.
MY 2011 vehicles recalled under 14V–
530, which account for 98 (78%) of the
total WK/WD FPR complaints shown in
Table 2 and 48 (89%) of the potentially
TIPM related WK/WD stall complaints
shown in Table 3. Table 4 shows
complaint data related to FPR failures
resulting in stall while driving for the
subject vehicles for just MY 2011
vehicles and other TIPM–7 platforms
differ significantly when age and
exposure are considered. The subject
vehicles range from less than 1 year to
up to 9 years of service exposure, while
the recalled WK/WD vehicles range in
age from 2 to 5 years of service. Most
of the WK/WD complaints involved the
TABLE 4—STALL WHILE DRIVING ANALYSIS, POTENTIALLY TIPM RELATED, MY 2011 ONLY
MY 2011 TIPM–7 vehicles
Potentially TIPM related
Verified TIPM
(FPR)
Possible TIPM
188,723
0
35,609
137,740
103,881
242,676
56,939
36
0
0
4
0
1
0
12
0
0
4
0
2
0
48
0
0
8
0
3
0
25.4
0.0
0.0
5.8
0.0
1.2
0.0
..............................
576,845
5
6
11
1.9
..............................
765,568
41
18
59
7.7
Platforms
Recalled .............................................
Non-recalled .......................................
WK/WD ................
JC ........................
KA ........................
RT ........................
JK ........................
Ram .....................
KK ........................
Total ............................................
Grand Total MY 2011 .................
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Fuel pump relay recalls
Population
Total rate
(C/100k)
Total
E. Airbag Non-Deployment
The CAS petition alleges that TIPM
failures are responsible for airbag nondeployments. ODI examined this
contention and finds it has no merit.
First, ODI’s analysis of the airbag system
architecture in the subject vehicles
indicates that airbag control is
performed by the Occupant Restraint
Control (ORC) module in the Chrysler
vehicles and the TIPM–7 functions only
to provide power to the ORC and does
not contain any logic for airbag
deployment control or crash event
discrimination. Second, the TIPM
supplies power to the ORC through two
independent fused power feeds
providing an extra level of redundancy
and safety to the airbag system in the
subject vehicles.18 Third, ODI did not
identify any mechanisms for TIPM
failure or power disruptions in a crash
event. Fourth, any interruption in power
resulting from such a failure would not
interfere with the ORC deployment
decision or prevent it from operating on
reserve power.19 Lastly, the complaint
data offered by the petitioner, analysis
of ODI complaint data, and analysis of
EWR death and injury claims cited by
the petitioner that were related to airbag
deployment also failed to support a
finding that TIPM failures have caused
any incidents of airbag non-deployment
(see Section F. EWR Fatalities). ODI’s
review of CAS and ODI complaints
related to airbags and TIPM did not
identify any incidents where a TIPM
failure was followed by a crash event or
any non-deployment incidents in which
the airbags would have been expected to
deploy or were associated with evidence
of TIPM malfunction.
The Run-Start and Run-Only relays
are integral to the TIPM and provide
power to multiple circuits including the
ORC. The Run-Start relay is powered
during engine crank and both the RunStart and Run-Only relays are powered
when the ignition is in RUN mode.
Examination of the airbag system
architecture for the subject vehicles
shows that power flows in the Run-Only
and Run-Start condition through the
TIPM–7 to the ORC through two
independent and redundant fused
power feeds. The ORC dual feed safety
strategy is designed so that each power
feed alone is capable of providing the
necessary power to deploy all required
restraints. According to Chrysler’s IR
response, the loss of power from one
ORC power feed will result in an Airbag
Warning Lamp (ABWL), but will not
affect deployment capability. The ORC
is still able to evaluate sensor inputs,
determine if a deployment is required,
and deploy airbags as needed. In the
event of a loss of a single power feed,
whether the IGN_RS or the IGN_RO
feed, the ORC will set a specific fault
code and turn on the ABWL.
If for any reason the ORC loses both
power feeds while the vehicle remains
powered, the instrument cluster will set
a fault and activate the ABWL. None of
the CAS or ODI complaints reviewed by
ODI contained evidence that either a
single or dual power loss to the ORC
occurred. Simultaneous power loss on
both ORC feeds could result from a
complete TIPM failure. However, in the
event of a complete TIPM failure, the
vehicle will lose power to multiple
other systems with instrument cluster
lights indicating faults in systems
powered through the TIPM. None of the
repair history records provided by
Chrysler included any evidence of faults
indicating a loss of power to the ORC or
other vehicle systems resulting from a
failure of the power feed from the TIPM.
Complaints reporting active ABWL were
either related to internal ORC
malfunctions or other SRS
(Supplemental Restraint System)
component failures such as seat harness
or clock spring shorting conditions.
The petitioner identified complaints
citing airbag system warnings as
evidence of TIPM failures resulting in
possible airbag non-deployments. These
16 Faults reported in repair histories included
WIN control module faults, PCM faults, engine
misfire and other engine compartment components
and harness issues.
17 Table 3 includes all CAS (through Supplement
VI) and ODI complaints related to allegations of
SWD.
18 The use of independent power feeds is a level
of functional safety that makes the power delivery
for the ORC module in the subject vehicles fairly
robust in comparison to the airbag ECU’s in many
peer designs reviewed by ODI.
19 There is a minimum of 150ms of back-up
power internal to the ORC that is available as
reserve power in the event of power interruption
during a crash event.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:54 Jul 29, 2015
Jkt 235001
PO 00000
Frm 00083
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
E:\FR\FM\30JYN1.SGM
30JYN1
45584
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
complaints, once analyzed, were found
to be either related to specific airbag
system component malfunctions (such
as seat harness, clock spring failures
. . . etc.), or occurred in vehicles
subject to previous TIPM–7 recalls, ORC
recalls (13V–282),20 or inadvertent
ignition key (WIN/FOBIK) displacement
recalls (11V–139 and 14V–373). None of
the incidents reported by the petitioner,
ODI complaints or EWR claims cited by
the petitioner can be traced to a TIPM
fault that resulted in a loss of power to
the ORC.
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
F. Unintended Acceleration
ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that
TIPM failures have resulted in incidents
of unintended acceleration, either based
on a technical review of the vehicle
powertrain control function area or
analysis of complaints. The Powertrain
Control Module (PCM) performs all
engine and transmission management
control functions in the Chrysler
vehicles and the TIPM functions only to
provide power to the PCM and does not
contain any torque management control
logic. ODI reviewed each complaint
submitted by CAS and consumers and
did not identify any evidence of TIPM,
or any other vehicle component, failures
resulting in unintended acceleration.
The petitioner’s allegations of UA
resulting from the fuel pump failing to
shut-off after ‘‘key-off’’ vehicle
shutdown are premised on an incorrect
belief that continued fuel pump
operation and presence of fuel line
pressure would somehow translate into
un-commanded acceleration. The fuel
pump only makes fuel available to the
engine; actual use of that fuel is
controlled by the PCM through the fuel
injectors, not the pump. Moreover, once
fuel is fed to the engine cylinders by the
fuel injectors, it must have both a
stoichiometric air mass from the throttle
and be ignited by a spark, which are
also controlled by the PCM. When the
ignition has been turned ‘‘Off’’, power is
removed from the PCM, the electronic
throttle is disabled and the ignition
system no longer provides a spark. If a
TIPM failure resulted in the fuel pump
continuing to run after the key is turned
off, the most likely harmful result would
be a dead battery.
Analyses of the UA incidents alleged
to have occurred by the petitioner do
not support a finding of any TIPM
failure or any other vehicle malfunction.
For example, CAS cited an incident
involving a MY 2013 Dodge Challenger.
20 For recall 13V–282, Occupant Restraint Control
(ORC) module resistor may fail from electrical
overstress (EOS), resulting in airbag light and loss
of head restraint function.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:54 Jul 29, 2015
Jkt 235001
According to CAS Supplement IV, ‘‘You
will find attached to this letter an
accident report from a May 2014 crash
involving unintended acceleration in
Vancouver, WA. The vehicle involved, a
2013 Dodge Challenger, is not a model
included in the CAS petition, but does
contain a TIPM that is the alleged
source of the acceleration event’’. The
referenced attachment provided a 42page police report and photographs.
According to the police report, the
Challenger passed directly in front of a
patrol car within approximately 20–30
feet. The report specifically indicates
that the operator’s head position
appeared to be downward with chin
resting against the chest. The crash
occurred when the operator did not
make any attempts to slow or steer the
vehicle to negotiate a roundabout. The
PAR report made no reference to
unintended acceleration or any attempts
by the driver to slow down the vehicle
or avoid property damage. Finally, ODI
notes that the 2013 Challenger is not
equipped with a TIPM.
G. Fire and Other Symptoms
ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that
TIPM failures have resulted in vehicle
fires or any other failure modes
representing potential safety hazards.
Vehicle inspection reports of the alleged
fires in the petition letter and
supplemental submissions lack any
evidence of a safety related defect or a
trend of such defects in the subject
vehicles. Allegations reporting fire or
smoke are either related to external
aftermarket vehicle body builder upfitter integration 21 or thermal damage in
the alternator diode with no damage
beyond the alternator assembly, recall
14V–634.
Additionally, ODI carefully analyzed
the petitioner data related to headlight
and taillight failure, windshield wiper
activity, instrument panel failure, and
door lock problems. Vehicle functions
related to TIPM–7 EX–2 relays typically
fail in an active state 22 with no loss of
system functionality. ODI’s analysis of
complaints provided by CAS and
received by the agency did not identify
any patterns or trends related to loss of
headlights or taillights while driving or
to driver distraction from unexpected
activation of windshield wipers/
washers, horn or car alarm while
21 Inspection and assessment confirmed that the
cause of this incident was improper installation of
aftermarket equipment. There are two aftermarket
wire bundles extending from the B+ cable, which
are secured using a non OEM aftermarket nut. There
was significant aftermarket wiring throughout the
vehicle that was not installed, or connected in
accordance with the Chrysler provided Ram Body
Builders Guide.
22 Active state typically involves a powered relay.
PO 00000
Frm 00084
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
driving due to TIPM malfunction.23 No
safety related defect or a trend of such
defects in the subject vehicles is
observed.
H. EWR Fatalities
ODI’s analysis of 24 EWR death
claims identified by CAS in Supplement
I as potentially related to TIPM
failures,24 did not identify any evidence
that TIPM faults caused or contributed
to any of the incidents. None of the
reports cited by the petitioner alleged
loss of control or airbag non-deployment
due to loss of power from the TIPM
module. The petitioner posits that there
was a loss of power to the ORC and
other vehicle systems in the referenced
crash and non-deployment events that
led to the death and injury.
Sixteen (16) of the reports cited by
CAS are related to TIPM–7 equipped
vehicles and included 6 death and
injury incidents in which a frontal
airbag, side airbag, or pre-tensioner
successfully deployed, demonstrating
the integrity of power delivery from the
TIPM was not compromised before or
during the collision event. Of the
remaining reports, two reports did not
involve any claims relating to loss of
control or airbag non-deployment, or
any other vehicle defect.25 The
remaining claims were related to an
unpowered rollaway due to documented
incorrect gear selection, an alleged
sudden acceleration with no evidence of
any throttle control or brake system
faults, a brake failure claim, 3 airbag
non-deployments with crash dynamics
that did not warrant deployment, and 2
non-deployment where the nondeployment may have involved
inadvertent ignition key (WIN/FOBIK)
displacement.26
V. Conclusion
ODI’s analysis of the CAS allegations
of TIPM defects resulting in stall while
driving, airbag non-deployment,
unintended acceleration, fire and other
faults identified a single defect
condition related to 1 of over 60
different circuits in the TIPM assembly.
The most common effect of this defect
23 Repair records indicated malfunctions outside
of TIPM, e.g. wiper stalk.
24 According to CAS Supplement I: ‘‘Since the
TIPM functions as the central gateway for all
vehicle electronics, there are multiple EWR
component codes that could point to the defect.
These codes include airbags, electrical system,
engine and engine cooling, exterior lighting, fire
related, powertrain, service brake, speed control,
and unknown’’.
25 The ‘‘claims’’ were simply requests for
assistance with downloading EDR data for the crash
event.
26 Both vehicles were 2008 Chrysler Town and
Country minivans that were in the scope of WIN/
FOB recall 14V–373.
E:\FR\FM\30JYN1.SGM
30JYN1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
condition, related to the fuel pump
relay, was a no-start concern, but it
could also result in stall while driving.
This fuel pump relay defect was limited
to approximately 11 percent of the 4.7
million subject vehicles equipped with
TIPM–7 and has been addressed by
safety recalls 14V–530 and 15V–115. No
valid evidence was presented in support
of claims related to airbag nondeployment, unintended acceleration or
fire resulting from TIPM faults and these
claims were found to be wholly without
merit based on review of the field data
and design of the relevant systems and
components.
Except insofar as the petitioner’s
contentions relate to the defect
condition addressed by the Chrysler
recalls, the factual bases of the
petitioner’s contentions that any further
investigation is necessary are
unsupported. In our view, additional
investigation is unlikely to result in a
finding that a defect related to motor
vehicle safety exists or a NHTSA order
for the notification and remedy of a
safety-related defect as alleged by the
petitioner at the conclusion of the
requested investigation. Therefore, the
petition is denied. This action does not
constitute a finding by NHTSA that a
safety-related defect does not exist. The
agency will take further action if
warranted by future circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations
of authority at CFR 1.95.
Frank S. Borris II,
Acting Associate Administrator for
Enforcement, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2015–18672 Filed 7–29–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
[U.S. DOT Docket Number NHTSA–2015–
0071]
Reports, Forms, and Recordkeeping
Requirements
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Request for public comment on
proposed collection of information.
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
AGENCY:
Before a Federal agency can
collect certain information from the
public, it must receive approval from
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Under procedures established
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, before seeking OMB approval,
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:54 Jul 29, 2015
Jkt 235001
Federal agencies must solicit public
comment on proposed collections of
information, including extensions and
reinstatement of previously approved
collections.
This document describes one
collection of information for which
NHTSA intends to seek OMB approval.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before September 28, 2015.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
[identified by DOT Docket No. NHTSA–
2015–0071] by any of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for submitting
comments.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility:
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
Washington, DC 20590–0001.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., between
9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Telephone: 1–800–647–5527.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the agency name and docket
number for this proposed collection of
information. Note that all comments
received will be posted without change
to https://www.regulations.gov, including
any personal information provided.
Please see the Privacy Act heading
below.
Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search
the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477–78) or you may visit https://
DocketInfo.dot.gov.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to https://
www.regulations.gov. or the street
address listed above. Follow the online
instructions for accessing the dockets.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Complete copies of each request for
collection of information may be
obtained at no charge from Timothy M.
Pickrell, NHTSA,1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., W55–320, NVS–421,
Washington, DC 20590. Mr. Pickrell’s
telephone number is (202) 366–2903.
Please identify the relevant collection of
information by referring to its OMB
Control Number.
PO 00000
Frm 00085
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
45585
Under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
before an agency submits a proposed
collection of information to OMB for
approval, it must first publish a
document in the Federal Register
providing a 60-day comment period and
otherwise consult with members of the
public and affected agencies concerning
each proposed collection of information.
The OMB has promulgated regulations
describing what must be included in
such a document. Under OMB’s
regulation (at 5 CFR 1320.8(d), an
agency must ask for public comment on
the following:
(i) Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(ii) the accuracy of the agency’s
estimate of the burden of the proposed
collection of information, including the
validity of the methodology and
assumptions used;
(iii) how to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected;
(iv) how to minimize the burden of
the collection of information on those
who are to respond, including the use
of appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology, e.g. permitting
electronic submission of responses.
In compliance with these
requirements, NHTSA asks for public
comments on the following proposed
collections of information:
Title: The National Survey on the Use
of Booster Seats.
OMB Control Number: 2127–0644.
Affected Public: Motorists in
passenger vehicles at gas stations, fast
food restaurants, and other types of sites
frequented by children during the time
in which the survey is conducted.
Form Number: NHTSA Form 1010.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Abstract
The National Survey of the Use of
Booster Seats is being conducted to
respond to the Section 14(i) of the
Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation
(TREAD) Act of 2000. The act directs
the Department of Transportation to
reduce the deaths and injuries among
children in the 4 to 8 year old age group
that are caused by failure to use a
booster seat by 25%. Conducting the
National Survey of the Use of Booster
Seats provides the Department with
invaluable information on who is and is
not using booster seats, helping the
Department better direct its outreach
programs to ensure that children are
E:\FR\FM\30JYN1.SGM
30JYN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 146 (Thursday, July 30, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45578-45585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-18672]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a
petition, DP14-004, submitted by the Center for Auto Safety (the
petitioner) to the Administrator of NHTSA by a letter dated August 21,
2014, under 49 CFR part 552. The petition requests the agency to
initiate a safety defect investigation into alleged failures of Totally
Integrated Power Modules (TIPMs) installed in sport utility vehicles,
trucks, and vans built by Chrysler FCA (Chrysler) beginning in the 2007
model year. The petitioner alleges that TIPM defects may result in the
following safety defect conditions: Engine stall, airbag non-
deployment, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in unintended
acceleration, and fire.
After conducting a technical review of: (1) Consumer complaints and
other material submitted by the petitioner; (2) information provided by
Chrysler in response to information requests regarding TIPM design,
TIPM implementation and the complaints submitted by the petitioner; and
(3) Chrysler safety recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115 addressing a fuel pump
relay defect condition that may result in engine stall while driving in
certain vehicles equipped with TIPM body control modules; and the
likelihood that additional investigations would result in a finding
that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists, NHTSA has
concluded that further investigation of the issues raised by the
petition is not warranted. The agency, accordingly, has denied the
petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Kareem Habib, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-8703. Email
Kareem.Habib@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item
of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety. 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a properly filed
petition, the agency conducts a technical review of the petition,
material submitted with the petition, and any additional information.
Sec. 552.6. After considering the technical review and taking into
account appropriate factors, which may include, among others,
allocation of agency resources, agency priorities, and
[[Page 45579]]
the likelihood of success in litigation that might arise from a
determination of a noncompliance or a defect related to motor vehicle
safety, the agency will grant or deny the petition. Sec. 552.8.
II. Defect Petition Background Information
By a letter dated August 21, 2014, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS)
submitted a petition to NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. 30162 requesting ``a
safety defect investigation into failures associated with the Totally
Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and
vans beginning in the 2007 model year.'' On August 27, 2014, CAS sent
NHTSA a supplemental letter identifying 24 fatal crashes from Chrysler
Early Warning Reporting (EWR) submissions that CAS alleged may be
related to TIPM failures (Supplement I). On September 8, 2014, CAS sent
another supplemental letter to NHTSA with 35 additional complaints
allegedly related to TIPM failures (Supplement II). On September 25,
2014, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP14-004 to
evaluate the petition for a grant or deny decision. In a September 29,
2014 letter to CAS, ODI acknowledged receipt of the petition and
requested additional information from CAS in support of its allegations
that TIPM malfunctions may result in airbag non-deployment or
unintended acceleration caused by the fuel pump failing to shutoff.
After opening DP14-004, ODI received four additional CAS complaint
supplements on September 30, 2014 (Supplement III), November 13, 2014
(Supplement IV), January 14, 2015 (Supplement V), and April 1, 2015
(Supplement VI).
The CAS petition provided the following broad allegation of defect
conditions in TIPM modules:
Chrysler TIPM failures result in a variety of safety-related
issues in multiple vehicle components, many of which have the
potential for destructive results. Not only do Chrysler's faulty
TIPMs result in vehicle stalling, they have also been implicated in
airbag non-deployment, random horn, headlight, taillight, door lock,
instrument panel and windshield wiper activity, power windows going
up and down on their own, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in
unintended acceleration, and fires. In the interim, these owners
remain at the mercy of a defect which many have likened to the
vehicle being possessed and uncontrollable. A look at consumer
complaints filed with CAS suggests a better name for the TIPM--
Totally Inept Power Module.
Additionally, CAS referenced a recent filing of a class action
lawsuit in the United States District Court, Central District of
California, Velasco et al vs. Chrysler LLC, Case No. CV13-08080-DDP-
VBKx affecting fifteen different Chrysler models and cited recalls 07V-
291 and 13V-282. According to CAS, ``neither of these recalls was
sufficient to address the TIPM problem throughout Chrysler's fleet,
instead focusing on a highly limited set of vehicles and circumstances.
Given the number and range of complaints related to Chrysler TIPMs, it
is time for NHTSA to formally investigate TIPM failures across the
board in 2007 and later models''.
III. Summary of the Petition
The petitioner requests that NHTSA formally investigate TIPM
failures across the board in 2007 and later models and cites the
following allegations:
1. Vehicle Stall
CAS stated in the defect petition letter and complaint Supplements
III and IV that:
TIPM failure contributes to a range of problems in vehicle
electric components, the safety issue which continues to present
itself in complaints is stalling, often in traffic where the dangers
are obvious. The most often cited TIPM failure is a loss of vehicle
power that can create a dangerous stall condition at any speed.
Additionally, a survey of complaints related to Chrysler TIPMs
suggests that a stall/no-start condition is most reported outcome of
TIPM failure, leaving drivers without power in traffic and stranded
for unknown periods of time before the vehicle regains the capacity
to be started.
2. Airbag Non-Deployment
According to CAS defect petition letter and complaint Supplement
IV, ``Not only do Chrysler's faulty TIPMs result in vehicle stalling,
they have also been implicated in airbag non-deployment. As NHTSA knows
from the GM ignition switch mass defect, it is virtually impossible to
be sure that an airbag will deploy until there is a crash. Complaints
directly citing airbag system warnings can be found in the complaints
received by CAS''.
3. Unintended Acceleration
CAS uses the term ``unintended acceleration'' in complaint letter
Supplement IV dated November 13, 2014, ``to indicate reports where the
vehicle continued to move or accelerate when the operator did not want
this to happen. TIPM issues related to acceleration appear to arise
from lack of fuel pump shut-off as well as problems with gear shift,
throttle, and cruise control. Consumer problems related to
acceleration, gear and/or throttle control may be found in CAS
complaints.''
4. Fire and Other Symptoms
According to CAS defect petition letter and complaint Supplement
IV, ``Chrysler's faulty TIPMs have also been implicated in fires.
Additionally, there are numerous complaints alleging bizarre and
unexplained headlight and taillight failure, windshield wiper activity,
instrument panel failure, and door lock problems.''
5. EWR Fatalities
CAS included as Attachment A to Supplement I what it believes to be
EWR information for all fatal crashes involving TIPM failure. CAS
claims that ``[s]ince the TIPM functions as the central gateway for all
vehicle electronics, there are multiple EWR component codes that could
point to the defect. There are 24 such crashes involving 28 deaths that
the agency must consider in reviewing our petition, at least twelve of
which have been the subject of DI requests. There are also a large
number of injury crashes reported to EWR that involve these
components.''
6. Class Action Lawsuit
The petition references a class action lawsuit as evidence of the
breadth and scope of ``the actual TIPM problem.'' \1\ The class action
cited by the petition was originally filed on November 1, 2013. The
plaintiffs in the original complaint, which were not limited to TIPM
equipped vehicles, included 2 MY 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners, a MY
2011 Dodge Grand Caravan owner and a MY 2008 Chrysler 300 owner.\2\ The
lawsuit provided the following description of the alleged defect and
affected vehicles:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The petition references Velasco et al vs Chrysler LLC, Case
No. 13-cv-08080-DDP-VBK, in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California as ``incorporated herein by
reference, covering fifteen different Chrysler models over a number
of model years.''
\2\ The MY 2008 Chrysler 300 is not equipped with a TIPM body
control module.
Plaintiffs and the Class members they propose to represent
purchased or leased 2008 model year Chrysler 300 and 2011-2012 model
year Jeep Grand Cherokees, Dodge Durangos, and Dodge Grand Caravans
equipped with defective Totally Integrated Power Modules, also known
as TIPMs. The TIPM controls and distributes power to all of the
electrical functions of the vehicle, including the vehicle safety
and ignition systems. Vehicles equipped with defective TIPMs
progress through a succession of symptoms that begin with an
inability to reliably start the vehicle and lead to, among other
things, the vehicle not starting, the fuel pump not turning off and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the engine stalling while driving.
A second amended complaint for the class action was filed on May 5,
2014,
[[Page 45580]]
listing seven plaintiffs and redefining the scope of vehicles as all
Chrysler vehicles equipped with TIPM-7 modules. The plaintiffs in the
amended complaint consist of 6 MY 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners and 1
MY 2011 Dodge Durango owner. The plaintiffs all alleged experiencing
``no-start'' concerns, with one also alleging a fuel pump run-on
condition and another reporting a single incident of engine stall while
driving. The amended complaint continued to focus on problems with
starting, engine stall while driving and fuel pumps that do not turn
off, while adding ``headlights and taillights shutting off'' and
``random and uncontrollable activity of the horn, windshield wipers,
and alarm system'' to the claimed TIPM deficiencies. The class action
does not include airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or fire
among the alleged consequences of the claimed TIPM defect.
7. Petition Issues
ODI identified several issues with the scope and supporting
evidence for defect allegations in the petition submitted by CAS. The
petition was unnecessarily broad in scope and included several alleged
defects that had no factual basis. After failing to identify any clear
basis for several of the petition allegations, ODI included a request
for supporting information for claims regarding airbag non-deployment
and unintended acceleration in its September 29, 2014 petition
acknowledgement letter. The CAS response, provided in a November 13,
2014 letter, did not provide any technical basis for claims of airbag
non-deployment and appeared to equate any illumination of the airbag
warning lamp with TIPM failure, even when the complaint clearly cited
other causes for the airbag system fault (e.g, ``faulty wiring in
passenger front seat causing airbag failure warning to illuminate'' \3\
and ``open circuit in drivers [sic] seat airbag'' \4\). Several other
complaints cited by CAS do not allege any airbag failures but, in
apparent reference to CAS petition claims, state that TIPM failure
``can cause the airbags to not deploy.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Identified by CAS as complaint number 62.
\4\ Identified by CAS as complaint number 146.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to the basis for its claims that TIPM failures can
result in unintended acceleration, CAS repeated its allegation that
such failures are associated with fuel pump shut-off failures,\5\ even
while acknowledging that none of the reports that it provided actually
involved instances where fuel pumps failing to shut off resulted in
unintended acceleration.\6\ ODI notes that claims that unintended
acceleration is caused by, or related to, a ``lack of fuel pump shut-
off'' are not supported by any known incidents. Moreover, any
allegation that a running fuel pump can, absent extremely idiosyncratic
failures of many other systems, cause a vehicle to accelerate on its
own demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of basic automotive
engineering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, ``TIPM issues
related to acceleration appear to arise from lack of fuel pump shut-
off as well as problems with gear shift, throttle, and cruise
control.''
\6\ The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, ``There are
quite a few consumer complaints in both CAS and NHTSA databases
citing lack of fuel pump shutoff that result in stalling and/or
nonstart condition but do not produce uncontrolled acceleration.''
This statement, which also misstates the effects of fuel pump
shutoff failure, acknowledges the absence of any related complaints
of unintended acceleration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. ODI Analysis
A. Scope Analysis
The CAS petition requests investigation of alleged failures of TIPM
modules in Chrysler light vehicles, with no reference to the automotive
industry body control technology implementations or architecture
functionality distinctions: ``The CAS hereby petitions the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to initiate a safety
defect investigation into failures associated with the Totally
Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and
vans beginning in the 2007 model year''. Interpreted broadly, the CAS
petition potentially affects approximately 10 million \7\ vehicles
equipped with TIPM-6 or TIPM-7 modules. The petition scope does not
appear to recognize the functional distinctions between TIPM-6 and
TIPM-7. The petition also does not distinguish between the significant
electronics technology differences between the relay based TIPM-7 and
an all solid-state Field Effect Transistors (FET) TIPM-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and vans equipped with TIMP-7 and
TIPM-6 beginning MY 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIPM-7 vehicle function outputs (such as fuel pump control, wiper/
washer control. . .etc.) are a mix of electro-mechanical relays and
solid state FET devices equipped with digital Serial Peripheral
Interface (SPI) communication ports while TIPM-6 vehicle function
outputs are strictly solid state SPI-based FET devices with no electro-
mechanical relays. Relays are electro-mechanical devices with specific
inherent break down mechanisms including, but not limited to, the
degradation of the mechanically coupled moving contact spring arm and
contact resistance; \8\ both are design elements that do not exist in
silicon only devices associated with TIPM-6. Similarly, TIPM-7
implementations include a fuse for overcurrent protection while the
TIPM-6 system design uses an integrated silicon overcurrent protection
feature specific to solid state devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Fuel pump relays were tested in simulated vehicle
environments incorporating variable factors such as relay type;
relay manufacture, simulated fuel pump current and inductance levels
of representative TIPM-7 vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI is interpreting the petition as a request for investigation of
only vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7 (subject vehicles) for the
following reasons: (1) The petition refers to TIPM installed in
Chrysler vehicles ``beginning in the 2007 model year'' and TIPM-7 was
introduced in the 2007 model year; (2) the affected models listed in
the petition and in the class action lawsuit referenced by the petition
are all TIPM-7 vehicles; \9\ (3) approximately 93 percent \10\ of the
complaints submitted by CAS involve vehicles equipped with TIPM-7; (4)
only 3 percent of CAS complaints are related to vehicles equipped with
TIPM-6 and ODI's review of these complaints did not identify any safety
defect trends; \11\ and (5) the significant technical differences
between the TIPM-6 and TIPM-7 modules as described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The CAS petition references a recent filing of a class
action lawsuit in US District Court, Velasco et al. vs. Chrysler LLC
affecting fifteen different Chrysler models in which CAS cited the
same fifteen vehicle models in the defect petition dated August 21,
2014. The Court order referenced by CAS specifically cited TIPM-7 in
Case No. CV 13-08080 DDP, Dkt. No. 42, ``Plaintiffs allege that the
TIPM with which the Class Vehicles are equipped, referred to as TIPM
7.''
\10\ Percentage based on CAS complaints through Supplement V.
\11\ The remaining CAS complaints are associated with vehicles
equipped with Front Control Module and Body Control Modules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The TIPM-7 population includes approximately 4.7 million Chrysler
sport utility vehicles, trucks, and vans across 11 vehicle platforms
beginning in model year 2007 (Table 1). ODI conducted a detailed review
of complaint narratives submitted by CAS and consumers including
careful analysis of vehicle repair histories, warranty claims obtained
from the manufacturer and any available Customer Assistance Inquiry
reports (CAIR). In total, there were 296 complaints submitted by the
petitioner in the original petition and five supplements, including 271
complaints related to the subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7. ODI's
complaint analysis focused on vehicles equipped with TIPM-7.
[[Page 45581]]
Table 1--TIPM-7 Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Models (platforms) Model years Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chrysler Town and Country/Dodge Grand 2008-14 1,632,250
Caravan (RT)...........................
Jeep Wrangler (JK)...................... 2007-14 962,098
Ram 1500/2500/3500/4500and5500 (DS/DJ/DD/ 2009-12 929,036
DP)....................................
Jeep Grand Cherokee/Dodge Durango (WK/ 2011-13 526,939
WD)....................................
Jeep Liberty (KK)....................... 2008-12 331,717
Dodge Nitro (KA)........................ 2007-11 198,581
Dodge Journey (JC)...................... 2009-10 156,537
-------------------------------
Total TIPM-7........................ 2007-14 4,737,158
------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. TIPM Function
TIPM-7 is a controller area network (CAN) based body controller
integrated with an electrical power distribution center; and is
designed to support centralized and distributed vehicle control
functions. The TIPM-7 electrical architecture features three levels of
functional interactions with other vehicle systems: (1) Power only
interaction- circuits that only pass through the integrated fuse box
(e.g. occupant restraint controller); (2) power and data transfer
interaction for circuits that pass through the power distribution
center with no TIPM control function (e.g. powertrain controller and
transmission controller); and (3) power and control interaction for
circuits that pass through the power distribution center and are
directly controlled by the TIPM. The latter include power and control
logic for exterior lighting, windshield wiper/washer, door lock, and
horn. A distinguishing feature of the TIPM-7 from other Chrysler body
controllers is the integration of the fuel pump relay.
C. Fuel Pump Relay Defect
In a September 3, 2014 letter to NHTSA, Chrysler submitted a Defect
Information Report (DIR) identifying a defect in the fuel pump relay
(FPR) within the TIPM-7 which can result in a no start or stall
condition in approximately 188,723 model year (MY) 2011 Jeep Grand
Cherokee (WK) and Dodge Durango (WD) vehicles manufactured from January
5, 2010 through July 20, 2011 (14V-530). In a February 24, 2015 letter,
Chrysler submitted a second DIR expanding the scope of the FPR defect
condition to include an additional 338,216 MY 2012 through 2013 Jeep
Grand Cherokee vehicles manufactured from September 17, 2010 through
August 19, 2013 and MY 2012 through 2013 Dodge Durango vehicles
manufactured from January 18, 2011 through August 19, 2013 (15V-115).
Chrysler identified the root cause as deformation of the relay contact
spring due to the heat caused by contact power, ambient temperature
around the fuel pump relay, and battery voltage. These factors, present
in combination and in high amounts, led to premature fuel pump relay
failures, which usually resulted in a no-start concern. When the fuel
pump relay fails while driving, the fuel pump will cease to function
and the engine will shut off or ``stall.'' In the case of a stall, the
vehicle maintains power and functionality for certain features, such as
hazard indicators, seat belt pre-tensioners and airbags. Chrysler's
recall remedy involved installing a new, more robust fuel pump relay,
external to the TIPM.
Detailed analysis of relay material composition, lab reports and
fuel pump system design reviews performed by Chrysler and Continental
that ODI reviewed in examining the petition identified the root cause
of the premature relay failure to be contact erosion and the
deformation of the contact spring due to under-hood temperatures around
the fuel pump relay, current draws, and fuel pump inductance levels
specific to Delphi fuel pumps installed on MY 2011-2013 Jeep Grand
Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles. Vehicle fuel pump system
measurements indicated that WK/WD vehicles have the highest current
draw and inductance while RT minivans have the lowest current draw
coupled with lower fuel pump inductance. Relay durability test data
provided by Chrysler indicated that other TIPM-7 vehicle platform
relays substantially outlasted relays tested in a simulated WK/WD
environment. NHTSA believes that because the current draw is lower for
other vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7 than for the WK/WD vehicles,
the risk of fuel pump relay deformation for these other vehicles is
lower than for the WK/WD vehicles.
On October 20, 2014, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to
Chrysler requesting production, complaint, and warranty claim data
related to the complaints provided by CAS and ODI complaints involving
stall while driving allegations potentially related to TIPM faults. The
IR letter also requested information related to the fuel pump relay
root cause analysis and technical data regarding TIPM design and
construction. Analysis of the field data submitted indicated that the
WK/WD vehicles exhibited significantly higher complaint rates related
to FPR failures than other subject vehicles (Table 2). The data show
that the primary failure mode of the fuel pump relay is a no-start
condition, with no-starts and starts followed immediately by stall
accounting for approximately 68% of the complaints for both the
recalled WK/WD vehicles and the non-recalled subject vehicles.
Table 2--Fuel Pump Relay Complaint Analysis, by Total Failure Rate \12\
[All rates are in complaints per 100,000 vehicles]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIPM-7 vehicles Fuel pump relay failure mode
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stall while Start with No-start Pump run-on Total
driving immediate stall -----------------------------------------------------
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms ------------------------------------
No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recalled............................. WK/WD.................. 37 7.0 4 0.8 82 15.6 3 0.6 126 23.9
Non-recalled......................... JC..................... 2 1.3 0 0.0 3 1.9 0 0.0 5 3.2
[[Page 45582]]
KA..................... 1 0.5 0 0.0 2 1.0 0 0.0 3 1.5
RT..................... 1 0.1 1 0.1 4 0.2 1 0.1 7 0.4
JK..................... 1 0.1 0 0.0 3 0.3 0 0.0 4 0.4
Ram.................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
KK..................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total............... 5 0.1 1 0.0 12 0.3 1 0.0 19 0.5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total TIPM-7............... ....................... 42 0.9 5 0.1 94 2.0 4 0.1 145 3.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI's analysis of all confirmed FPR failures identified a total of
145 complaints, including 42 resulting in at least one incident of
stall while driving. The recalled WK/WD vehicles, which comprise only
11 percent of the subject vehicle population, account for 126 of the
total FPR related complaints (87 percent) and 37 of those involving
stall while driving (88 percent). This analysis combined with overall
warranty claim data analysis and vehicle test data related to FPR root
cause analysis indicate that, based on currently available information,
the scope of recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115 adequately address the FPR
defect condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Complaint data in Table 2 is limited to CAS complaints and
ODI VOQ's potentially related to stall while driving that were
identified prior to ODI's information request letter to Chrysler for
DP14-004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Other Stall While Driving Defects
In addition to the analysis of complaints related to confirmed FPR
failures to assess the scope of Chrysler recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115,
ODI also examined all stall while driving complaints allegedly related
to TIPM failures in the subject vehicles to assess whether any other
engine stall related defect conditions may exist in the subject
vehicles that are not already addressed by a safety recall. ODI's
analysis did not identify any specific TIPM faults resulting in
incidents of stall while driving that are not already addressed by
safety recalls \13\ and analysis of complaints did not identify any
additional defect trends associated with potentially TIPM-related stall
while driving that warrant additional investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ In addition to FPR recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115, Chrysler
previously initiated recall 07V-291 to address a defect condition in
approximately 81,000 MY 2007 JK and KA vehicles associated with the
PCM momentarily shutting the engine down due to a prolonged (75ms)
TIPM microprocessor reset triggered by a vehicle-wide CAN bus error
event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI's analysis identified a total of 131 complaints alleging TIPM
related stall while driving incidents. Fifty-five (55) of the
complaints were found to be unrelated to TIPM failures, including 10
associated with a defect condition addressed by alternator replacement
recall 14V-634.\14\ A total of 76 complaints were identified that were
either confirmed to be related to a TIPM fault condition (49) or where
either the FPR or other, unspecified, TIPM fault condition may have
been the cause (27).\15\ Table 3 shows the failure rates for
potentially TIPM related stall while driving incidents for the recalled
WK/WD vehicles and for each of the non-recalled platforms. These data
do not indicate a stall while driving defect trend outside of the
recall population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ For recall 14V-634, vehicles equipped with the 3.6L engine
and 160 Amp Alternator may experience a rapid alternator failure
having limited or no detection, which can result in vehicle
shutdown/shut off and/or fire.
\15\ Unknown/possible TIPM's include several for which the
condition could not be duplicated by the servicing dealer.
Table 3--Stall While Driving Analysis, All Causes \17\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIPM-7 vehicles Not related to TIPM Potentially TIPM related
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternator
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms recall 14V- Other non- Total Fuel pump Possible Total Total rate
634 TIPM \16\ relay TIPM (C/100k)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recalled............................ WK/WD.................. 10 17 27 40 14 54 10.2
Non-recalled........................ KA..................... 0 5 5 1 3 4 2.0
JC..................... 0 1 1 2 1 3 1.9
RT..................... 0 9 9 4 6 10 0.6
Ram.................... 0 5 5 1 2 3 0.3
JK..................... 0 6 6 1 1 2 0.2
KK..................... 0 2 2 0 0 0 0.0
Total............... 0 28 28 9 13 22 0.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total TIPM-7.............. ....................... 10 45 55 49 27 76 1.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 45583]]
Additionally, the recalled WK/WD vehicles and other TIPM-7
platforms differ significantly when age and exposure are considered.
The subject vehicles range from less than 1 year to up to 9 years of
service exposure, while the recalled WK/WD vehicles range in age from 2
to 5 years of service. Most of the WK/WD complaints involved the MY
2011 vehicles recalled under 14V-530, which account for 98 (78%) of the
total WK/WD FPR complaints shown in Table 2 and 48 (89%) of the
potentially TIPM related WK/WD stall complaints shown in Table 3. Table
4 shows complaint data related to FPR failures resulting in stall while
driving for the subject vehicles for just MY 2011 vehicles. The
recalled MY 2011 WK/WD vehicles account for 25 percent of production,
88 percent of confirmed FPR stall while driving incidents and 81
percent of all potentially TIPM related stall while driving incidents
in MY 2011 subject vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Faults reported in repair histories included WIN control
module faults, PCM faults, engine misfire and other engine
compartment components and harness issues.
\17\ Table 3 includes all CAS (through Supplement VI) and ODI
complaints related to allegations of SWD.
Table 4--Stall While Driving Analysis, Potentially TIPM Related, MY 2011 Only
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY 2011 TIPM-7 vehicles Potentially TIPM related
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Verified TIPM Total rate (C/
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms Population (FPR) Possible TIPM Total 100k)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recalled.................................. WK/WD....................... 188,723 36 12 48 25.4
Non-recalled.............................. JC.......................... 0 0 0 0 0.0
KA.......................... 35,609 0 0 0 0.0
RT.......................... 137,740 4 4 8 5.8
JK.......................... 103,881 0 0 0 0.0
Ram......................... 242,676 1 2 3 1.2
KK.......................... 56,939 0 0 0 0.0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................. ............................ 576,845 5 6 11 1.9
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total MY 2011................... ............................ 765,568 41 18 59 7.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Airbag Non-Deployment
The CAS petition alleges that TIPM failures are responsible for
airbag non-deployments. ODI examined this contention and finds it has
no merit. First, ODI's analysis of the airbag system architecture in
the subject vehicles indicates that airbag control is performed by the
Occupant Restraint Control (ORC) module in the Chrysler vehicles and
the TIPM-7 functions only to provide power to the ORC and does not
contain any logic for airbag deployment control or crash event
discrimination. Second, the TIPM supplies power to the ORC through two
independent fused power feeds providing an extra level of redundancy
and safety to the airbag system in the subject vehicles.\18\ Third, ODI
did not identify any mechanisms for TIPM failure or power disruptions
in a crash event. Fourth, any interruption in power resulting from such
a failure would not interfere with the ORC deployment decision or
prevent it from operating on reserve power.\19\ Lastly, the complaint
data offered by the petitioner, analysis of ODI complaint data, and
analysis of EWR death and injury claims cited by the petitioner that
were related to airbag deployment also failed to support a finding that
TIPM failures have caused any incidents of airbag non-deployment (see
Section F. EWR Fatalities). ODI's review of CAS and ODI complaints
related to airbags and TIPM did not identify any incidents where a TIPM
failure was followed by a crash event or any non-deployment incidents
in which the airbags would have been expected to deploy or were
associated with evidence of TIPM malfunction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The use of independent power feeds is a level of functional
safety that makes the power delivery for the ORC module in the
subject vehicles fairly robust in comparison to the airbag ECU's in
many peer designs reviewed by ODI.
\19\ There is a minimum of 150ms of back-up power internal to
the ORC that is available as reserve power in the event of power
interruption during a crash event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Run-Start and Run-Only relays are integral to the TIPM and
provide power to multiple circuits including the ORC. The Run-Start
relay is powered during engine crank and both the Run-Start and Run-
Only relays are powered when the ignition is in RUN mode. Examination
of the airbag system architecture for the subject vehicles shows that
power flows in the Run-Only and Run-Start condition through the TIPM-7
to the ORC through two independent and redundant fused power feeds. The
ORC dual feed safety strategy is designed so that each power feed alone
is capable of providing the necessary power to deploy all required
restraints. According to Chrysler's IR response, the loss of power from
one ORC power feed will result in an Airbag Warning Lamp (ABWL), but
will not affect deployment capability. The ORC is still able to
evaluate sensor inputs, determine if a deployment is required, and
deploy airbags as needed. In the event of a loss of a single power
feed, whether the IGN_RS or the IGN_RO feed, the ORC will set a
specific fault code and turn on the ABWL.
If for any reason the ORC loses both power feeds while the vehicle
remains powered, the instrument cluster will set a fault and activate
the ABWL. None of the CAS or ODI complaints reviewed by ODI contained
evidence that either a single or dual power loss to the ORC occurred.
Simultaneous power loss on both ORC feeds could result from a complete
TIPM failure. However, in the event of a complete TIPM failure, the
vehicle will lose power to multiple other systems with instrument
cluster lights indicating faults in systems powered through the TIPM.
None of the repair history records provided by Chrysler included any
evidence of faults indicating a loss of power to the ORC or other
vehicle systems resulting from a failure of the power feed from the
TIPM. Complaints reporting active ABWL were either related to internal
ORC malfunctions or other SRS (Supplemental Restraint System) component
failures such as seat harness or clock spring shorting conditions.
The petitioner identified complaints citing airbag system warnings
as evidence of TIPM failures resulting in possible airbag non-
deployments. These
[[Page 45584]]
complaints, once analyzed, were found to be either related to specific
airbag system component malfunctions (such as seat harness, clock
spring failures . . . etc.), or occurred in vehicles subject to
previous TIPM-7 recalls, ORC recalls (13V-282),\20\ or inadvertent
ignition key (WIN/FOBIK) displacement recalls (11V-139 and 14V-373).
None of the incidents reported by the petitioner, ODI complaints or EWR
claims cited by the petitioner can be traced to a TIPM fault that
resulted in a loss of power to the ORC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ For recall 13V-282, Occupant Restraint Control (ORC) module
resistor may fail from electrical overstress (EOS), resulting in
airbag light and loss of head restraint function.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Unintended Acceleration
ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that TIPM failures have resulted
in incidents of unintended acceleration, either based on a technical
review of the vehicle powertrain control function area or analysis of
complaints. The Powertrain Control Module (PCM) performs all engine and
transmission management control functions in the Chrysler vehicles and
the TIPM functions only to provide power to the PCM and does not
contain any torque management control logic. ODI reviewed each
complaint submitted by CAS and consumers and did not identify any
evidence of TIPM, or any other vehicle component, failures resulting in
unintended acceleration.
The petitioner's allegations of UA resulting from the fuel pump
failing to shut-off after ``key-off'' vehicle shutdown are premised on
an incorrect belief that continued fuel pump operation and presence of
fuel line pressure would somehow translate into un-commanded
acceleration. The fuel pump only makes fuel available to the engine;
actual use of that fuel is controlled by the PCM through the fuel
injectors, not the pump. Moreover, once fuel is fed to the engine
cylinders by the fuel injectors, it must have both a stoichiometric air
mass from the throttle and be ignited by a spark, which are also
controlled by the PCM. When the ignition has been turned ``Off'', power
is removed from the PCM, the electronic throttle is disabled and the
ignition system no longer provides a spark. If a TIPM failure resulted
in the fuel pump continuing to run after the key is turned off, the
most likely harmful result would be a dead battery.
Analyses of the UA incidents alleged to have occurred by the
petitioner do not support a finding of any TIPM failure or any other
vehicle malfunction. For example, CAS cited an incident involving a MY
2013 Dodge Challenger. According to CAS Supplement IV, ``You will find
attached to this letter an accident report from a May 2014 crash
involving unintended acceleration in Vancouver, WA. The vehicle
involved, a 2013 Dodge Challenger, is not a model included in the CAS
petition, but does contain a TIPM that is the alleged source of the
acceleration event''. The referenced attachment provided a 42-page
police report and photographs. According to the police report, the
Challenger passed directly in front of a patrol car within
approximately 20-30 feet. The report specifically indicates that the
operator's head position appeared to be downward with chin resting
against the chest. The crash occurred when the operator did not make
any attempts to slow or steer the vehicle to negotiate a roundabout.
The PAR report made no reference to unintended acceleration or any
attempts by the driver to slow down the vehicle or avoid property
damage. Finally, ODI notes that the 2013 Challenger is not equipped
with a TIPM.
G. Fire and Other Symptoms
ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that TIPM failures have resulted
in vehicle fires or any other failure modes representing potential
safety hazards. Vehicle inspection reports of the alleged fires in the
petition letter and supplemental submissions lack any evidence of a
safety related defect or a trend of such defects in the subject
vehicles. Allegations reporting fire or smoke are either related to
external aftermarket vehicle body builder up-fitter integration \21\ or
thermal damage in the alternator diode with no damage beyond the
alternator assembly, recall 14V-634.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Inspection and assessment confirmed that the cause of this
incident was improper installation of aftermarket equipment. There
are two aftermarket wire bundles extending from the B+ cable, which
are secured using a non OEM aftermarket nut. There was significant
aftermarket wiring throughout the vehicle that was not installed, or
connected in accordance with the Chrysler provided Ram Body Builders
Guide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, ODI carefully analyzed the petitioner data related to
headlight and taillight failure, windshield wiper activity, instrument
panel failure, and door lock problems. Vehicle functions related to
TIPM-7 EX-2 relays typically fail in an active state \22\ with no loss
of system functionality. ODI's analysis of complaints provided by CAS
and received by the agency did not identify any patterns or trends
related to loss of headlights or taillights while driving or to driver
distraction from unexpected activation of windshield wipers/washers,
horn or car alarm while driving due to TIPM malfunction.\23\ No safety
related defect or a trend of such defects in the subject vehicles is
observed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Active state typically involves a powered relay.
\23\ Repair records indicated malfunctions outside of TIPM, e.g.
wiper stalk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. EWR Fatalities
ODI's analysis of 24 EWR death claims identified by CAS in
Supplement I as potentially related to TIPM failures,\24\ did not
identify any evidence that TIPM faults caused or contributed to any of
the incidents. None of the reports cited by the petitioner alleged loss
of control or airbag non-deployment due to loss of power from the TIPM
module. The petitioner posits that there was a loss of power to the ORC
and other vehicle systems in the referenced crash and non-deployment
events that led to the death and injury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ According to CAS Supplement I: ``Since the TIPM functions
as the central gateway for all vehicle electronics, there are
multiple EWR component codes that could point to the defect. These
codes include airbags, electrical system, engine and engine cooling,
exterior lighting, fire related, powertrain, service brake, speed
control, and unknown''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sixteen (16) of the reports cited by CAS are related to TIPM-7
equipped vehicles and included 6 death and injury incidents in which a
frontal airbag, side airbag, or pre-tensioner successfully deployed,
demonstrating the integrity of power delivery from the TIPM was not
compromised before or during the collision event. Of the remaining
reports, two reports did not involve any claims relating to loss of
control or airbag non-deployment, or any other vehicle defect.\25\ The
remaining claims were related to an unpowered rollaway due to
documented incorrect gear selection, an alleged sudden acceleration
with no evidence of any throttle control or brake system faults, a
brake failure claim, 3 airbag non-deployments with crash dynamics that
did not warrant deployment, and 2 non-deployment where the non-
deployment may have involved inadvertent ignition key (WIN/FOBIK)
displacement.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The ``claims'' were simply requests for assistance with
downloading EDR data for the crash event.
\26\ Both vehicles were 2008 Chrysler Town and Country minivans
that were in the scope of WIN/FOB recall 14V-373.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Conclusion
ODI's analysis of the CAS allegations of TIPM defects resulting in
stall while driving, airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration,
fire and other faults identified a single defect condition related to 1
of over 60 different circuits in the TIPM assembly. The most common
effect of this defect
[[Page 45585]]
condition, related to the fuel pump relay, was a no-start concern, but
it could also result in stall while driving. This fuel pump relay
defect was limited to approximately 11 percent of the 4.7 million
subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7 and has been addressed by safety
recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115. No valid evidence was presented in support
of claims related to airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or
fire resulting from TIPM faults and these claims were found to be
wholly without merit based on review of the field data and design of
the relevant systems and components.
Except insofar as the petitioner's contentions relate to the defect
condition addressed by the Chrysler recalls, the factual bases of the
petitioner's contentions that any further investigation is necessary
are unsupported. In our view, additional investigation is unlikely to
result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety
exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-
related defect as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the
requested investigation. Therefore, the petition is denied. This action
does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect
does not exist. The agency will take further action if warranted by
future circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at CFR
1.95.
Frank S. Borris II,
Acting Associate Administrator for Enforcement, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2015-18672 Filed 7-29-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
