Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 27835-27844 [2015-11632]
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 93 / Thursday, May 14, 2015 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect
investigation.
AGENCY:
This notice sets forth the
reasons for denying a petition (DP14–
003) submitted to NHTSA 49 U.S.C.
30162, 49 CFR part 552, requesting that
the agency open ‘‘an investigation into
low-speed surging in the 2006–2010
Toyota Corolla [vehicles] with ETCS-i,
in which the brakes fail to stop the
vehicle in time to prevent a crash.’’
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Stephen McHenry, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation,
NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–
366–4883. Email stephen.mchenry@
dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
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1.0 Introduction
Interested persons may petition
NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine
whether a motor vehicle or item of
replacement equipment does not
comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a
defect that relates to motor vehicle
safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR
552.1. Upon receipt of a properly filed
petition the agency conducts a technical
review of the petition, material
submitted with the petition, and any
additional information. 49 U.S.C.
30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. After
considering the technical review and
taking into account appropriate factors,
which may include, among others,
allocation of agency resources, agency
priorities, and the likelihood of success
in litigation that might arise from a
determination of a noncompliance or a
defect related to motor vehicle safety,
the agency will grant or deny the
petition. 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR
552.8.
2.0 Petition Background Information
In a letter dated September 11, 2014,
Mr. Robert Ruginis requested that
NHTSA open ‘‘an investigation into
low-speed surging in the 2006–2010
Toyota Corolla [vehicles] with ETCS-i,
in which the brakes fail to stop the
vehicle in time to prevent a crash.’’ Mr.
Ruginis based his request upon multiple
low-speed ‘‘surge events’’ allegedly
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experienced by his wife in their model
year (MY) 2010 Toyota Corolla, the
latest of which resulting in a crash into
a parked vehicle on June 8, 2014. Mr.
Ruginis makes the following claims in
support of his petition: (1) The Event
Data Recorder (EDR) readout of his
wife’s crash supports her account of
vehicle acceleration after she applied
the brake; (2) NHTSA has never
investigated surges in low-speed crashes
in Toyota vehicles; (3) a software expert
has identified vulnerabilities in Toyota’s
ETCS-i source code; (4) there are other
similar incidents of ‘‘surge at low speed
or no speed’’ in Toyota Corolla vehicles
in NHTSA’s consumer complaint
database; and (5) surges in low-speed
parking scenarios are a safety problem.
NHTSA has reviewed the material
cited by the petitioner. The results of
this review and our analysis of the
petition’s merits are set forth in the
DP14–003 Petition Analysis Report,
published in its entirety as an appendix
to this notice.
For the reasons presented in the
petition analysis report after a thorough
assessment of the potential risks to
safety, it is unlikely that an order
concerning the notification and remedy
of a safety-related defect would be
issued as a result of granting Mr.
Ruginis’s petition. After full
consideration of the potential for
finding a safety related defect in the
vehicle and in view of the need to
allocate and prioritize NHTSA’s limited
resources to best accomplish the
agency’s mission, the petition is
respectfully denied.
Appendix—Petition Analysis—DP14–
003
1.0
Introduction
On September 12, 2014, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) received a September 11,
2014, letter from Mr. Robert Ruginis
petitioning the agency ‘‘for an
investigation into low-speed surging in
the 2006–2010 Toyota Corolla [vehicles]
with ETCS-i, in which the brakes fail to
stop the vehicle in time to prevent a
crash.’’ The letter provides the following
basis for the request:
This request is based on first-hand
experience in which multiple low-speed
surge events that occurred while driving our
2010 Corolla. The latest incident resulted in
a crash on June 8, 2014. In addition to the
evidence from our crash incident, we are
providing evidence that many other Corolla
owners are experiencing similarly unsafe
scenarios that are leading to crashes.
The petition letter provides
information regarding the June 8, 2014,
crash incident, including the
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petitioner’s interpretation of pre-crash
data downloaded from the vehicle Event
Data Recorder (EDR) by Toyota field
inspectors:
The EDR investigation report clearly
showed that at the moment the airbag
module made the decision whether to deploy
(about the time of impact), the voltage to the
accelerator pedal was .78 (at idle), the brake
was engaged, yet both the speed of the
vehicle and engine RPM’s had doubled in
less than 2 seconds.
Mr. Ruginis provided copies of the
police report for the accident, the EDR
report, and a list of ODI complaints
(VOQs) that he considered similar to his
wife’s experience in the crash and in
prior driving experience. He provided
the following five reasons supporting an
ODI investigation of the alleged defect
in the MY 2006 through 2010 Toyota
Corolla vehicles:
1. The EDR results suggest that unsafe
and unexpected surges can occur even
when the driver’s action is to apply the
brake;
2. NHTSA has never investigated
surges in low-speed crashes in Toyotas;
3. The observations of software expert
Michael Barr suggest that Toyota’s
electronic architecture has many
vulnerabilities;
4. Unintended surges in low-speed
parking scenarios are common; and
5. Surges in low-speed parking
scenarios are a safety problem.
In evaluating the petitioner’s
allegations and preparing a response,
ODI:
• Reviewed the petition request and
submitted appendices, interviewed the
petitioner and his wife—who was the
primary driver and who was driving
when the crash occurred.
• Provided the 163 VOQs submitted
by the petitioner to Toyota, formally
requested Toyota to provide full
warranty claim histories for throttle and
braking systems on the subject vehicles,
as well as copies of all reports made to
Toyota by the complainants or by
dealership or Toyota technical
personnel related to the complaints,
field inspection data, and all related
EDR download data obtained by Toyota
collected from vehicles identified in
incidents reported in the subject vehicle
VOQs.
• Requested technical and
engineering information from Toyota
related to the alleged defect as
submitted by the petitioner.
• Analyzed the information provided
by Toyota in response to our specific
requests for information.
• Reviewed previous analysis and
investigative work into unintended
acceleration done by NHTSA, the
National Aeronautics and Space
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Administration, and the National
Academy of Sciences as well as papers
from the Society of Automotive
Engineers related to EDR download data
interpretation and limitations.
• Interviewed complainants who had
submitted the 163 VOQs noted by the
petitioner. Gathered, when possible, law
enforcement crash reports, insurance
reports, repair facility invoices,
photographs of crash sites, security
camera surveillance video, and any
other relevant information related to the
reported incidents.
• Acquired the petitioner’s vehicle
and transported it to the Vehicle
Research Test Center (VRTC) in East
Liberty, Ohio, for evaluation.
2.0
Background
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2.1 Definitions
The term ‘‘unintended acceleration’’
(UA) is often used to generally describe
any unintended speed increase in a
motor vehicle. This is an extremely
broad definition that includes some
aspects of normal vehicle performance
(e.g., idle speed control and
transmission control), as well as many
forms of abnormal performance of those
systems that represent little to no
hazards to highway safety (i.e., issues
generally described as ‘‘driveability’’
issues).1 Within the universe of
unintended acceleration issues that do
involve potentially serious safety
hazards, ‘‘sudden acceleration’’ (SA)
incidents are the most common and are
defined as allegations of ‘‘unintended,
unexpected, high-power acceleration
from a stationary position or a very low
initial speed accompanied by an
apparent loss of braking effectiveness.’’ 2
This definition was developed in the
1980’s, when ODI first began
investigating the subject in a large crosssection of passenger car makes and
models sold in the U.S., including Audi
5000 sedans.
The foregoing definition purposefully
excludes ‘‘stuck throttle’’ type incident
symptoms, which involve failure of the
throttle to return to idle when the
1 ODI’s analysis of warranty data for MY 2002–
2010 Toyota Camry vehicles submitted by Toyota
as part of RQ10–003, determined that
approximately 80 percent of the claims were related
to engine or transmission recalibrations to address
a number of vehicle driveability concerns (e.g.,
improving shift feel) as described in a series of
technical service bulletins, each related to separate
conditions and vehicle subpopulations. Claim rates
were negligible (less than 0.03%) in vehicles with
no such TSB’s (e.g., MY 2002–2006 Camry L4 with
2AZ–FE engines).
2 The definition has been broadened in recent
years to include incidents occurring in certain onroad driving maneuvers that require braking, such
as approaching controlled intersections or highway
exit ramps, but the majority of incidents continue
to be reported in low-speed parking maneuvers.
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accelerator pedal is released by the
driver. Stuck throttle defects generally
follow patterns including relatively high
initiation speeds, large accelerator pedal
applications and other driving
conditions specific to each defect
condition. For example, floor mat
entrapments tend to occur after the
driver has intentionally pressed the
accelerator pedal to the floor to pass
vehicles on the highway, merge with
highway traffic or accelerate up hills.
Unintended accelerations resulting from
pedal entrapment involve maximum
engine power and often include
degraded brake effectiveness if the
driver pumps out the reserve vacuum in
the brake booster, resulting in loss of
power assist to the brakes. If the driver
is unable to bring the vehicle to a
complete stop within the first couple of
miles, the brakes will continue to lose
effectiveness due to brake fade or heat
degradation of the friction materials.
2.2 Sudden Acceleration Background
ODI’s first investigation of sudden
acceleration, EA78–110, opened almost
40 years ago, covered approximately 60
million MY 1973 through 1986 General
Motors passenger cars. That
investigation established that sustained,
unintended, ‘‘high-power acceleration’’
could only be caused by failure
mechanisms that produced large throttle
openings. This finding reduced the
potential failure modes to defects
affecting throttle linkages and cruise
control components. Ninety percent of
the accident vehicles in EA78–110 were
not equipped with cruise control, thus
eliminating the only potential electronic
mechanism capable of opening the
throttle in that investigation.3 The
investigation was closed in 1986 after
eight years of testing and studies,
concluding that:
Inadvertent and unknowing driver
application of the accelerator pedal when the
driver intended to apply the brake [‘‘pedal
misapplication’’] appears to be the cause of
many of the reported sudden acceleration
related accidents, even though many of the
drivers continue to believe that they had been
pushing on the brake pedal.4
In October 1987, a little over a year
after EA78–110 was closed; NHTSA’s
Administrator ordered an independent
review of SA (the ‘‘Study’’). While the
phenomena affected all automatic
transmission-equipped cars sold in the
U.S., some had notably higher
occurrence rates, raising questions about
vehicle design factors that may be
3 Reinhart, W. 1996. Engineering Analysis Closing
Report, EA78–110. Washington, DC: NHTSA, (11).
4 Reinhart, W. 1996. Engineering Analysis Closing
Report, EA78–110. Washington, DC: NHTSA, (18).
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contributing to the problem. The Study
re-examined potential causes of SA, as
well as design factors that may
contribute to higher rates of pedal
misapplication. The results of the Study
were released in March 1989, in a report
titled ‘‘An Examination of Sudden
Acceleration.’’ 5 With respect to the
cause of SA incidents, the Study
concluded that, absent evidence of a
throttle, cruise control or brake
malfunction, ‘‘the inescapable
conclusion is that these definitely
involve the driver inadvertently
pressing the accelerator instead of, or in
addition to, the brake pedal.’’
Because the majority of incidents
were associated with accelerations that
began after the vehicle was started and
shifted from Park to Drive or Reverse
gear, the most effective countermeasure
for pedal error related SA incidents was
the incorporation of brake-shift
interlocks to prevent shifting from Park
when the brake pedal is not depressed.
Shift interlocks were voluntarily
implemented by most manufacturers in
the late-1980’s and early-1990’s and
early studies showed reductions in the
number of SA complaints during this
time period, with the trend driven by
the drop in events occurring
immediately after shift from Park.6
Brake shift interlocks have no effect on
mitigating pedal errors later in the drive
cycle (e.g., parking).
2.3 Toyota Investigations and NHTSA/
NASA Study
From 2003 through 2009, ODI
examined unintended acceleration
issues in Toyota vehicles equipped with
ETCS-i in 3 defect investigations and 5
defect petition evaluations. These
activities prompted 4 safety recalls
addressing floor mat entrapment, a
‘‘sticky pedal’’ condition, and an
accelerator pedal interference condition.
Publicity surrounding a fatal crash in
August 2009, that was determined to
have been caused by floor mat
entrapment, the ensuing floor mat recall
by Toyota and the ‘‘sticky pedal’’ recall
led to intense media coverage of Toyota
unintended acceleration issues and
possible electronic defects.
Much of the interest focused on lowspeed SA incidents in Toyotas not
included in the floor mat recalls or in
recalled vehicles that had clearly not
5 Pollard, J., and E.D. Sussman. 1989. An
Examination of Sudden Acceleration. Report DOT–
HS–807–367. Transportation Systems Center, U.S.
Department of Transportation.
6 Reinhart, W. 1994. The Effect of
Countermeasures to Reduce the Incidence of
Unintended Acceleration Accidents. Paper 94 S5 O
07. Proc., 14th International Technical Conference
on Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Washington, DC,
Vol. 1, (821–845).
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3.1
Petitioner’s Vehicle
3.1.1 Petitioner’s Accident
The petition was prompted by a
collision with a parked vehicle during
an attempted curbside parking
maneuver in a residential neighborhood
on June 8, 2014. In the police report, the
driver states that she stopped at an
intersection with the intention of
turning right and parking along the curb
behind a parked vehicle.
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Figure 1. Pre-Crash Data for Petitioner’s
Accident (Image From Bosch CDR
Report)
During a subsequent vehicle
inspection on June 24, 2014, Toyota
downloaded data from the vehicle EDR
(Figure 1).
3.1.2 EDR Data Analysis
Although the EDR data shown in
Figure 1 appears to show that engine
speed doubled on or about the same
time that the brake switch shows brake
pedal application, examination of this
data as well as the ways in which the
EDR collects, transmits and records it,
does not support the petitioner’s
conclusion that the vehicle accelerated
when the brake was applied.
Interpretation of EDR pre-crash data
should be done within the context of the
7 NRC. 2011. TRB Special Report 308: The Safety
Challenge and Promise of Automotive Electronics:
Insights from Unintended Acceleration.
Washington, DC: National Academies Press, (164).
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2.4 National Research Council Special
Report 308
In 2012, the National Academy of
Sciences released a report that included
a review of NHTSA’s defects
investigations of low-speed surging in
Toyota vehicles and the results of the
joint study with NASA. The report,
titled ‘‘The Safety Promise and
Challenge of Automotive Electronics,
Insights from Unintended
Acceleration,’’ concluded that NHTSA’s
decision to close its investigations of
Toyota’s ETC were justified based on
the initial investigations, complaint
analyses, field investigations using EDR
data and NASA’s examination of the
incident reconstruction, including a
detailed statement from the driver, and
must take into account the limitations of
the system as documented on the Bosch
Crash Data Retrieval (CDR) report. The
limitations include the resolution of
each data element, the asynchronous
refresh rates of the data elements, and
the rate at which the EDR samples and
records the data. Toyota provided the
following EDR design information for
the 2010 Corolla in response to a formal
request by ODI:
The Vehicle Speed is based on the front
wheel speed sensors and recorded in 2 kph
increments and nominally updated every 500
ms. The Brake Switch, based on the stop
lamp switch status, is either ON or OFF, and
is updated instantly. The service brake pedal
must be depressed minimally for the stop
lamp to activate. The accelerator pedal
position is recorded in 0.039 volt increments,
and the value is nominally updated every
524 ms. This measurement is taken directly
at the operator’s accelerator pedal. The
Engine RPM is measured in 400 RPM
increments and is nominally updated every
524 ms.8
ODI interviewed the driver to obtain
her description of the incident. She
indicated that her normal braking style
when parking is to apply light, gradual
pressure to the brake pedal, rather than
a sudden, hard stop. She indicated that
8 As indicated in the Bosch CDR report, the
Vehicle Speed and Engine RPM values are both
rounded down in the given increments.
9 Airbag deployment software is triggered within
1ms of the airbag module sensing a longitudinal
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Toyota ETC. With regard to allegations
of low-speed surging with ineffective
brakes, the report stated:
Reports of braking ineffectiveness in
controlling a vehicle experiencing the onset
of unintended acceleration from a stopped
position or when moving slowly require an
explanation for the ineffectiveness, such as
physical evidence of damage to the brake
system. Under these circumstances,
investigating for phenomena other than
pedal misapplication absent an explanation
for the ineffectiveness of the brakes, which
are independent of the throttle control system
and are designed to dominate engine torque,
is not likely to be useful.7
3.0
Petition Analysis
as she applied the brakes during the
incident, the car responded by
accelerating. She stated that it did not
slow down, and it continued to increase
in speed until it hit the back of the
parked vehicle. The petitioner provided
a similar description in a call to
Toyota’s customer relations department
three days after the incident, alleging
simultaneous failures of both the
engine/accelerator and brakes that
resulted in full throttle acceleration into
a parked vehicle.
The EDR data for the petitioner’s
incident shows no recorded service
brake application until the airbag
module trigger point (t = 0s).9 This
indicates that the brake switch was ON
immediately after impact, but does not
indicate the degree or duration of brake
application. The fact that the EDR
showed a nominal 3.8 mph increase in
vehicle speed in the last 1.8 seconds of
recording, and subsequent vehicle
testing found the brakes to be fully
functional, indicates that no meaningful
braking occurred prior to impact. Based
on the vehicle speeds recorded just
prior to impact (t = ¥0.8 s), the Corolla
was less than a car length from the
parked vehicle and traveling 7 to 9 feet
per second with no indication of service
brake application. Based on the vehicle
deceleration of about 2 g’s (‘‘algorithm enable’’).
The time interval between impact and airbag
algorithm enable is very short, with the precise time
depending upon specific crash dynamics.
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experienced either mat entrapment or
‘‘sticking accelerator pedals.’’ NHTSA
responded by conducting an in-depth
examination of Toyota’s electronic
throttle control systems in partnership
with NASA’s Engineering and Safety
Center. NHTSA and NASA released
reports detailing the results of this study
in early 2011, concluding that incidents
alleging low-speed surges during brake
application were most likely related to
driver pedal misapplication and were
not associated with an electronic or
software defect in Toyota’s ETCS-i
system.
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speed and the driver’s stated braking
habits, initiation of braking would be
expected when the vehicle is about a
full car length or more from the
intended stopping point. Based upon all
of these factors, ODI does not believe
that the brake switch data recorded by
the EDR is consistent with the
petitioner’s statement that the vehicle
accelerated with the brake applied and
vehicle testing demonstrated that
acceleration would not occur if the
brake pedal had been applied with any
meaningful force.
In addition, although the EDR does
not show any increase in accelerator
pedal voltage in the final 2.8 seconds
prior to impact, this does not mean that
the accelerator pedal was not depressed
during that time period. According to
Toyota, ‘‘The increase in the vehicle
speed and engine speed prior to impact
is consistent with an accelerator pedal
being depressed between the recorded
data points but not recorded by the
EDR.’’ VRTC testing confirmed that a
short and rapid application of the
accelerator could: (1) Fail to be recorded
by the EDR based on the asynchronous
update rates of the CAN bus signals and
the relatively slow sampling rate used
by the EDR; and (2) produce the engine
and vehicle speed changes recorded by
the EDR at t = 0.0 s.
3.1.3 VRTC Vehicle Evaluation/
Testing
Following detailed instructions
provided by the petitioner regarding the
conditions of the surging during the
parking maneuvers, VRTC performed
over 2,000 miles of test driving while
evaluating the petitioner’s accident and
the vehicle itself. The testing did not
produce any unusual performance of the
throttle or transmission systems. In
addition, testing of the incident vehicle
brake system found that it functioned
normally and could hold the vehicle
stationary with the engine at 2,000 RPM
with less than 15 lb of pedal pressure
applied to the brakes. The brakes could
also hold the vehicle stationary at full
throttle with less than 20 lb of force
applied to the brake pedal. Testing also
showed the vehicle’s brakes could bring
it to a full stop in less than three feet
at the speeds provided in the
petitioner’s account of the crash.
The petitioner also alleged that
uncommanded, short-duration throttle
surges occurred in the Corolla during
certain decelerations from highway
speed. VRTC also conducted testing to
try to reproduce this phenomenon but
did not observe any unusual
performance or symptoms associated
with harsh downshifting or changes in
torque converter clutch status. Drivers
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that use light braking during coasting
decelerations are likely to be more
sensitive to certain transmission shift
transients that are triggered by brake
application (e.g., torque converter unlock), that may not be noticed by drivers
who use more brake pedal force.
However, such transients have very
brief durations, involve minor changes
in vehicle deceleration and are normal
operating characteristics of automatic
transmission vehicles that do not
represent an unreasonable risk to motor
vehicle safety. Furthermore, ODI does
not consider the coast down condition
reported by the petitioner to be related
to the surging alleged in the accident,
which did not involve transmission
shifting.
not applying it until the last second or
so).’’ 11
A review of the NHTSA and NASA
reports from the Toyota ETCS-i study
show that the petitioner’s incident and
the other similar incidents presented by
the petitioner fall within the scope of
the prior work, which concluded that
allegations of sudden acceleration from
a stop or low-speed with ineffective
brakes are most likely caused by pedal
error by the driver and not indicative of
a vehicle-based defect (unless potential
faults are identified in pedal design or
in shift-interlock safeguards—for
incidents occurring after a shift from
Park).
Both [NHTSA and NASA] also noted that
the vast majority of complaints involved
incidents that originated when the vehicle
was stationary or at very low speeds and
contained allegations of very wide throttle
openings, often with allegations that brakes
were not effective. NHTSA’s analysis
indicated that these types of complaints
generally do not appear to involve vehiclebased causes and that, where the complaint
included allegations that the brakes were not
effective or that the incident began with a
brake application, the most likely cause of
the acceleration was actually pedal
misapplication (i.e., the driver’s unintended
application of the accelerator rather than, or
in addition to, the brake.)
The results of NHTSA’s field inspections of
vehicles involved in alleged UA incidents
during 2010 supported this analysis. Those
vehicle inspections, which included objective
evidence from event data recorders,
indicated that drivers were applying the
accelerator and not applying the brake (or
3.3 Software Theories
The petition states that ‘‘the
observations of software expert Michael
Barr suggest that Toyota’s electronic
architecture has many vulnerabilities’’
and concludes that these observations
suggest that ‘‘floor mats and sticky
accelerator pedals are not the only
causes of unintended low-speed surges
in Toyota vehicles.’’
Before responding to the petitioner’s
statement regarding recent software
theories, ODI first notes that floor mats
and sticky pedals have never been
considered likely ‘‘causes of unintended
low-speed surges in Toyota vehicles.’’
Incidents of pedal entrapment by
improper or out-of-position floor mats
are a severe form of a stuck throttle
condition, as they occur after the pedal
has intentionally been fully depressed
to wide-open throttle (WOT) by the
driver, generally during attempted
passing maneuvers, accelerations on
highway entrance ramps to merge with
highway traffic or attempts to maintain
speed or accelerate up hills. When the
driver releases pressure from the
accelerator, the pedal remains stuck at
WOT resulting in an incident of highspeed unintended acceleration.
The ‘‘sticky pedal’’ condition was
associated with excessive friction in the
accelerator pedal assembly which could
develop after the vehicle had been
parked overnight in certain
environmental conditions (e.g., high
relative humidity and cool ambient
temperature). A pedal with excessive
friction may be slow to return to idle
when released by the driver and, in
some cases, may stick after being held
at a constant position for an extended
period of time. This would typically
occur during steady-state highway
driving (i.e., pedal held at constant
position for some period of time)
10 DP03–003, DP04–003, PE04–021, DP05–002,
DP06–003 and DP08–001 all included examination
of alleged vehicle accelerations from low-speeds.
11 NHTSA. 2011. Technical Assessment of Toyota
Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) Systems. (viii).
https://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/DOT-16-11.
3.2 NHTSA Investigations of LowSpeed Surges
The petitioner claims that NHTSA has
never investigated low-speed surges in
Toyota vehicles. This is incorrect.
NHTSA has investigated complaints
alleging low-speed surges in Toyota
vehicles equipped with ETCS-i for over
10 years, starting with a defect petition
(DP03–003) in 2003. Altogether, ODI
completed 5 defect petition evaluations
and 1 investigation (PE04–021) related
to allegations of low-speed surging in
Toyota vehicles equipped with ETCS-i
prior to the joint study of the issue
initiated by NHTSA and NASA in
2010.10
Low-speed surges were the primary
focus of the study by NHTSA and NASA
in 2010. As clearly stated in the
Executive Summary of NHTSA’s
February 2011 report from this study:
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following a morning cold-start and the
pedal could ordinarily be returned to
idle simply by tapping the accelerator
pedal to free the sticking condition.
Although ODI is not aware of any
crashes or injuries resulting from
sticking pedals, the condition has been
mistaken for evidence of electronic UA
in at least one instance.12
With regard to Mr. Barr, ODI is aware
that he and other consultants have
raised certain software design and
electrical architecture issues in the
course of civil litigation regarding
Toyota ETCS-i vehicles. The petition
does not cite, and ODI is unaware of,
any instance where Barr or any other
consultant postulating that the ETCS-i
software is defective has reproduced
unintended acceleration in a Toyota
ETCS-i vehicle under real-world driving
conditions.
The petitioner submitted a
presentation prepared by Barr regarding
his analysis of the software in a 2005
Toyota Camry and cites several opinions
contained in that document, but does
not identify any specific condition or
theory that could result in SA in the
subject vehicles.13 The Barr
presentation summarizes his review of
Toyota’s ETCS-i source code and a case
review of a defect theory he developed
as part of a lawsuit relating to a fatal
accident in a 2005 Toyota Camry with
a 4-cylinder engine. Barr’s defect theory
involved the suspension of a specific
operating system task that performs
multiple throttle control and failsafe
functions in the Toyota ETCS-i source
code (Task X death). Task X death
would result in the throttle remaining
stuck at the last computed throttle
command, but would be terminated by
any transition in brake switch status.14
We note that the Corolla vehicles that
are the subject of this petition are
equipped with engine control modules
(ECM’s) supplied by Delphi, while
Barr’s task death theory applies to
Toyota Camry vehicles equipped with
Denso modules. The Delphi modules
contain different source code with
different task and stack monitoring
functionality than the Denso modules
and, hence, do not contain substantially
similar software. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that the theories
and mechanisms advanced by Mr. Barr
in regard to the software employed in
the Denso throttle controls are
inapplicable to the petitioner’s vehicle.
Nonetheless, since the low-speed
surge incidents that are the subject of
the petition are similar to the SA crash
incidents reported in other Toyota
vehicles, regardless of throttle control
technology or ECM supplier, ODI offers
the following assessment of the Barr
task death theory submitted by the
petitioner:
• No specific defect identified—Barr
identifies a number of issues with
Toyota’s ETCS-i software and electrical
architecture, including several potential
failure mechanisms that he speculates
could result in task death.15 However, as
stated in his ‘‘Case Specific Opinions’’
slide [54], he ‘‘cannot identify with
100% certainty the specific software
defects’’ responsible for the UA
incident. ODI sees no factual basis for
assigning any level of probability to his
theories.
27839
• Not reproduced—Barr does not
identify any specific software states or
vehicle operating conditions necessary
for any of the failure mechanisms to
occur and has not reproduced a task
death or any other software failure
resulting in SA in real world driving
conditions.16
• Untestable—Rather than identifying
the specific conditions necessary for
theoretical software failures to occur,
Barr and other proponents of the theory
have suggested that such failures cannot
be reproduced because ‘‘the test space is
effectively infinite’’ resulting in ‘‘too
many possible tests.’’ 17 This precludes
any scientific evaluation of the validity
of such theories.18
• Fault injection did not produce
SA—When Task X deaths were
reproduced by fault injection, they did
not result in sudden increases in throttle
opening or any loss of brake
effectiveness. Incidents that begin when
the brake is not applied result in loss of
power to the throttle when the brake is
applied and incidents that begin with
the brake already applied would,
necessarily, involve low severity
because the engine would be frozen at
idle.19 Table 1 describes throttle and
brake responses for each of the initial
condition pedal state scenarios
associated with Task X death. The risk
of uncontrolled acceleration, crash or
injury would be low and complaints
associated with such incidents would be
more likely to cite loss of power or
stalling than uncontrolled engine
power.
TABLE 1—TASK X DEATH SCENARIOS
Initial conditions
Throttle and brake symptoms
Foot on the accelerator pedal ..................................................................
Foot on the brake pedal ...........................................................................
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Foot on neither pedal ...............................................................................
12 Testing conducted by Toyota and observed by
NHTSA engineers reproduced the sticking pedal
condition in the pedal assembly removed from a
MY 2007 Toyota Avalon involved in an incident in
January 2010 that was reported by some as evidence
of electronic UA (VOQ 10300210).
13 For example, the petitioner cited Barr’s
opinions that ‘‘Toyota’s ETCS source code is of
unreasonable quality’’ and ‘‘Toyota’s source code is
defective and contains bugs, including bugs that
can cause unintended acceleration.’’
14 Any transition in brake switch status would
result in a discrepancy between brake status
recognized by the Main CPU, which would be
frozen by the task death, and the Sub-CPU which
would continue to receive actual brake status
voltage from the stop lamp switch (‘‘brake echo
check’’). This would trigger failsafe operation with
throttle opening limited to less than 10 degrees and
set a fault code.
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•
•
•
•
•
Throttle stuck at last computed throttle command.
Brake application cuts power to the throttle.
Throttle is initially stuck at idle.
Normal braking (brake release cuts power to the throttle).
Throttle is initially stuck at idle.
15 For example, Barr speculated that memory
corruptions resulting from stack overflow or
unidentified software bugs could result in task
death and other negative effects.
16 Barr’s only testing of Task X death involved a
fault injection method, performed with Toyota’s
assistance, to artificially induce task deaths to study
system and failsafe performance. There is no
evidence of any scenario in which the ‘‘brake echo
check’’ failed to cut power to the throttle after brake
switch transition during this testing.
17 In ODI’s investigations of defects involving
embedded control system faults, either VRTC, the
manufacturer, or the supplier have been able to: (1)
Identify the specific operating conditions necessary
to produce the fault through field data analysis,
system review and testing; and (2) reproduce the
conditions to duplicate the faults in vehicle testing.
PO 00000
Frm 00212
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
18 Theories of electromagnetic interference (EMI)
effects on ETC or cruise control systems as causes
of SA incidents have included similar claims
regarding testability. No EMI theories have ever
been duplicated in a vehicle and no specific source
or path for the interference has been identified.
19 With regard to the potential for more severe
failure modes associated with Task X death, Barr
further speculates that one memory corruption
event ‘‘can cause task death and open [the] throttle’’
and that the brake echo check may not always cut
power to the throttle. He states that ‘‘memory
corruptions are like ricocheting bullets’’ that may
result in more severe effects. However, these
theories have never been demonstrated in any
testing nor were they observed during fault
injection tests conducted to observe system
performance with artificially induced task death.
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 93 / Thursday, May 14, 2015 / Notices
TABLE 1—TASK X DEATH SCENARIOS—Continued
Initial conditions
Throttle and brake symptoms
• Brake application cuts power to the throttle.
• No evidence in field data—The
fault injection testing did not reproduce
an SA, but it did demonstrate that
failures related to Task X death would
result in a very specific set of symptoms
that can be used to identify potentially
relevant incidents in field data, such as:
(1) Allegations of unresponsive
accelerator pedals that do not increase
or decrease engine power when the
driver presses or releases the pedal; (2)
allegations of vehicles suddenly losing
power when the brake is applied; and
(3) fault codes associated with ‘‘brake
echo check’’ failsafe operation. ODI’s
analyses of complaints and warranty
data have not revealed any sign of these
symptoms in any Toyota ETCS-i
vehicles.
• Not consistent with reported SA—
Incidents of sudden acceleration also
involve very specific symptom patterns,
including: (1) Primarily occurring in
low-speed driving maneuvers in parking
lots and driveways, as well as other
driving maneuvers associated with
required brake application (see Table 3);
(2) reports of sudden increases in engine
power allegedly initiated by application
of the brake; and (3) the allegations of
brake ineffectiveness in the same
complaints. None of the software task
death theories postulated by Barr fit or
otherwise explain these patterns. The
same patterns and vehicle dynamics are
evident in the large volume of crashes
in which pedal misapplication has been
identified as the undisputed cause (see
section 3.5, Low-speed surge hazards).
ODI has observed these patterns in SA
complaints in investigations and
research covering nearly 40 years and
involving vehicles with all forms of
throttle control, both mechanical and
electronic.
• Brake effectiveness—None of the
electronic theories reviewed by ODI
explain how pressing on the ‘‘brake’’
would result in a sudden increase in
engine power as alleged in SA
complaints, nor do they explain why the
brakes would suddenly lose
effectiveness at the same time as the
engine power surge.20
• Different software—As noted above,
the Corolla vehicles at issue in this
petition are equipped with ECM’s
supplied by Delphi, while Barr’s task
death theory applies to certain Toyota
Camry vehicles equipped with Denso
modules. The Delphi modules contain
different system monitoring
functionality than the Denso modules
and, hence, do not contain substantially
similar software.
• Pedal error not excluded—As Barr
indicated in a slide titled ‘‘Other Similar
Incident Criteria [55],’’ evidence
contradicting correct use of pedals is
one factor that would exclude his
theories from consideration. As outlined
in Section 3.4 of this report, Other
Similar Incidents, the available EDR
data for the subject vehicles does
provide evidence contradicting the
correct use of pedals.
3.4
Other Similar Incidents
The petitioner states: ‘‘I reviewed the
complaints made to NHTSA by owners
of 2006–2010 Toyota Corollas [and]
found 163 reports in which the driver
experienced a surge at low speed or no
speed; 99 drivers mentioned that the
brakes were already depressed when the
surge occurred or the surge occurred
when the brakes were depressed; 83
incidents resulted in crashes.’’ ODI
provided copies of the 163 VOQs noted
by the petitioner to Toyota and
requested complaint, warranty,
inspection and EDR information about
each vehicle (‘‘subject vehicles’’).
Using information supplied by
Toyota, the VOQ text, and any
supporting or additional information
(e.g., law enforcement crash reports,
repair orders from dealers or
independent repair facilities,
photographs, interviews with
complainants and/or complainants’
families,21 witness statements, letters to
elected representatives, letters to
NHTSA, etc.) ODI analyzed the
petitioner’s incident and the 163 VOQs
reporting similar incidents as alleged by
the petitioner. Six of the VOQs are
duplicate submissions, resulting in a
total of 158 unique vehicles. ODI’s
analysis of these complaints is
summarized in Table 2, which groups
the complaints in three major
categories.22 The categories are based on
ODI’s analysis of all available
information and not solely on the initial
VOQ complaint text.
TABLE 2—ODI ANALYSIS OF PETITIONER SELECTED VOQ’S
Number of
VOQs
Category
Description of category
A ................
There is an alleged increase in engine power in which the brakes are allegedly unable to control: Incidents are caused by pedal misapplication or by a
late braking effort of the driver.
Dual pedal application: The driver inadvertently applied both the brake and the
accelerator simultaneously during the event.
Incidents that do not fit the alleged defect of ‘‘engine surge in which the
brakes fail to stop the vehicle in time to prevent a crash.’’.
B ................
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
C ................
Supported by
EDR pre-crash
data
Number of
crashes
105
93
17
28
2
0
25
10
0
Category A: Category A complaints
are those alleging simultaneous failures
of the vehicle’s braking ability and a
sudden increase in engine power that
the driver did not request by pressing on
the accelerator pedal, with no evidence
20 Pressing the brake pedal with a nominal force
of 40 lbs or less would produce sufficient braking
torque to overcome full/maximum drivetrain torque
in all vehicles that have been evaluated by ODI to
date.
21 Three complainants were now deceased and in
some cases the complainant was not the driver at
the time of the incident.
22 An itemization of VOQ number by Category is
provided in the closing resume for this
investigation, which can be obtained at
www.safercar.gov.
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 93 / Thursday, May 14, 2015 / Notices
unintended acceleration: ‘‘investigating
for phenomena other than pedal
misapplication absent an explanation
for the ineffectiveness of the brakes,
which are independent of the throttle
control system and are designed to
dominate engine torque, is not likely to
be useful. [164]’’
As further confirmation of this
assessment, some of the VOQs
submitted by the petitioner had precrash EDR data available that show
of brake system malfunction observed in
post-incident inspections/testing. These
complaints fit the definition of ‘‘sudden
acceleration’’ incident allegations as
described in the background section of
this report and fall within the scope of
the petitioner’s allegations. As
discussed in previously in this report,
these incidents fit the profile of pedal
misapplications. Again quoting from the
from the 2012 TRB report reviewing
ODI’s processes for investigating
brake status, accelerator pedal voltage,
engine speed and vehicle speed in the
5 seconds prior to the time of the
collision trigger (if it was on a model
year 2009 or later Corolla). This
information, together with other
relevant facts (e.g., law enforcement
reports, accident reconstruction, witness
interviews), can be compared to the
driver’s statement regarding the use of
foot controls and their alleged
effectiveness prior to the collision.
TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS WITH PRE-CRASH EDR DATA
Case No.
Incident
date
VOQ No.
ODI brake
category
A—misapply
B—late apply
C—no apply
T¥5 speed
(mph)
1 ......................
10534094
Sep-11 ...
45
B
2 ......................
3 ......................
10334936
10363685
May-10 ...
Oct-10 ....
31
31
A
C
4 ......................
5 ......................
10523677
10352668
May-13 ...
Mar-09 ...
20
11
A
A
6 ......................
10479582
Oct-12 ....
10
A
7 ......................
10369494
Nov-10 ...
8
A/B
8 ......................
9 ......................
10344874
10363886
Jul-10 .....
Sep-10 ...
6
6
A
A/B
10 ....................
10520195
Jun-13 ....
6
A/B
11 ....................
10551478
Oct-13 ....
5
A
12 ....................
10597296
May-14 ...
4
A
13 * ..................
10637908
Jun-14 ....
4
A/B
14 ....................
10507434
Apr-13 ....
2
A
15 ....................
10552563
Oct-13 ....
1
A
16 ....................
10578871
Apr-14 ....
1
A
17 ....................
10447756
Jan-12 ....
0
A
Summary of driver allegation
Driving at night in rain, released accelerator, departed road,
crashed into tree.
Approaching stop sign, applied brake, accelerated into fence.
Approaching stop sign, applied brake, accelerated into utility
pole.
Approaching intersection, applied brake, accelerated into tree.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into parked
vehicle.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into building.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into concrete post.
Entering driveway, applied brake, accelerated into iron fence.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into building.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated over two
curbs.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into dumpster.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into parked
vehicle.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into parked
vehicle.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into building.
Entering parking space, applied brake, accelerated into parked
vehicle.
Backing from parking space, lightly pressed accelerator, accelerated into vehicle.
Exiting parking space, applied brake, accelerated into brick
wall.
* petition incident.
TABLE 4—SUMMARY OF BRAKE AND ACCELERATOR PEDAL USE IN INCIDENTS WITH PRE-CRASH EDR DATA.23
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Case No.
2 ..................
6 ..................
4 ..................
16 ................
14 ................
8 ..................
12 ................
15 ................
10 ................
11 ................
5 ..................
17 ................
7 ..................
1 ..................
9 ..................
13 * ..............
VerDate Sep<11>2014
T¥5
speed
(mph)
31
10
20
1
2
6
4
1
6
5
11
0
8
45
6
4
Brake switch status by EDR time interval
¥5
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
.........
.........
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19:07 May 13, 2015
¥4
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Jkt 235001
¥3
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
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Off
.........
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.........
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.........
.........
.........
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PO 00000
¥2
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
.........
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Frm 00214
Accelerator pedal apply status by EDR time interval
¥1
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
Off
On
Off
Off
.........
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Fmt 4703
0
Off
Off
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On
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On
On
On
On
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¥5
¥4
¥3
¥2
¥1
High ......
Low .......
Low .......
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Low .......
Off .........
Low .......
Off .........
Med .......
Low .......
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Off .........
High ......
High ......
Off .........
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Low .......
Off .........
Low .......
Off .........
Med .......
Low .......
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Off .........
High ......
High ......
Low .......
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Off .........
Med .......
Low .......
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Low .......
High ......
High ......
High ......
Med .......
Low .......
Off .........
Low .......
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Med .......
Low .......
Low .......
Low .......
Off .........
Off .........
High ......
High ......
High ......
High ......
High ......
High ......
High ......
Low .......
High ......
Off .........
Med .......
Low .......
Med .......
Off .........
Low .......
Off .........
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High
High
High
High
High
High
Off
High
Off
High
Med
Med
Off
Off
Off
Off
27842
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TABLE 4—SUMMARY OF BRAKE AND ACCELERATOR PEDAL USE IN INCIDENTS WITH PRE-CRASH EDR DATA.23—
Continued
Case No.
T¥5
speed
(mph)
3 ..................
31
Brake switch status by EDR time interval
Accelerator pedal apply status by EDR time interval
¥5
¥4
¥3
¥2
¥1
0
¥5
¥4
¥3
¥2
¥1
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
Off .........
0
Off
* petition incident.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Summaries of the 17 crash incidents
in which pre-crash EDR was available
are provided in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3
provides a summary of the speeds the
vehicles were traveling approximately 5
seconds prior to the collision events,
ODI’s assessment of the causes, and the
incident driver’s allegation of the
sequence of events leading to the
collision. Thirteen (13) of the incidents
involved vehicles travelling at lowspeeds in parking lot maneuvers,
including 11 that occurred while
parking the vehicle. Fifteen (15) of the
incidents alleged that the acceleration
began after the brake was applied.24
These data are consistent with EDR data
collected during the prior Toyota study
in 2010, which included 39 incidents
assessed as pedal misapplications due
to no brake application or late braking,
including 29 that initiated in parking
lots or at low speeds.
ODI’s assessments were based on the
EDR download data and all available
supporting information, as to the cause
of the unintended acceleration event,
i.e., a pedal misapplication, a braking
that occurred too late to in the event to
effectively stop the vehicle in time
(driver error), a combination of both,
and in one case no application of
accelerator or brake. Table 4 provides
the EDR download information for brake
and accelerator pedal information for
the individual incidents. Twelve
incidents showed no evidence of
braking during the crash event, 4 do not
show braking until the airbag trigger
point, t = 0, and the final incident
involved late transition from accelerator
to brake for a vehicle travelling over 40
mph (Case #1).
These incidents are a representative
sampling of the incidents alleging lowspeed surging with ineffective brakes
and demonstrate that driver statements
regarding pedal use in such incidents
are not reliable. It should be emphasized
that in order for these 105 VOQs to be
23 EDR reports with accelerator pedal data shown
as voltage readings from 0.78 to 3.70V were
converted as follows: Off = 0.78V; Low = 0.79 to
1.75V; Medium = 1.76 to 2.72V; and High = 2.73V
and above.
24 See supplemental report in the public file for
this investigation (www.safercar.gov) for a
discussion of some of the EDR downloads and
associated VOQs, Supplemental Report, DP14–003,
EDR Examples.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:59 May 13, 2015
Jkt 235001
included in this category there must
have been an alleged concurrent failure
or weakness of the throttle and braking
systems. No mechanism has been
identified that could cause a sudden
failure of both systems. No evidence of
throttle or brake system faults were
found in post-incident inspections of
these vehicles and there is no indication
of faults in those systems in the
available service histories before and
after the events. Based on this analysis,
ODI does not believe there is evidence
of a vehicle based defect in this category
of complaints.
Category B: Category B complaints are
incidents involving allegations of engine
racing or surging during brake
application. These incidents do not
allege brake ineffectiveness and are
therefore not within the scope of the
petitioner’s alleged defect. The common
explanation for complaints alleging
engine racing or surging during brake
application is that the driver is
inadvertently applying both the brake
and accelerator pedals when intending
to only apply the brake. This is
particularly evident in complaints that
indicate that engine races faster when
the brake is pressed harder.25
Several drivers recognized that
inadvertently stepping on both pedals
was the cause of the engine surging they
reported, either in the initial complaint
or in subsequent interviews with ODI.
For example, in a follow-up interview
one owner (VOQ 10363529) noted that
after a few incidents, ‘‘I realized in that
case that my foot was on both the brake
and the accelerator. This may have been
carelessness on my part. However, it
being a compact car, the brake is very
close to the accelerator. Perhaps closer
that the other cars that I drive or have
driven. No one else in our family has
reported unintended acceleration with
this car.’’
A variation of dual application that
increases the potential severity of such
incidents involves unsecured floor mats
that slide forward into a position where
they can impede brake application. ODI
identified two crashes involving drivers
who had floor mats that had moved
25 These complaints further demonstrate the
effectiveness of the brakes in overcoming engine
power.
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
forward over the accelerator pedal and
under the brake pedal such that when
the brake pedal was applied the force
was transferred through the floor mat to
the accelerator pedal (in one case it was
an aftermarket floor mat plus a
bathroom rug).
Category C: Category C complaints are
incidents that do not fit the alleged
defect of ‘‘engine surge in which the
brakes fail to stop the vehicle in time to
prevent a crash.’’ Examples are
instances of high idle at initial startup,
transmission shift flares or delays in
coast down idle. Two of the crashes in
this category were due to vehicles being
struck by following traffic which then
propelled the vehicles forward
uncontrollably. Four of the crashes were
due to a lack of brake effectiveness, such
as a soft brake pedal, without any
corresponding engine surge, three of the
crashes were due to the driver applying
the accelerator pedal too aggressively
without any brake application, and one
crash was due to a medical condition
experienced by the driver.
3.5 Low-Speed Surge Hazards
ODI agrees that uncontrolled vehicle
accelerations in parking lot
environments represent a clear safety
hazard to surrounding traffic,
pedestrians and even building
occupants, as vehicles often accelerate
inside of businesses with facing parking
spaces where they have caused serious
and sometimes fatal injuries. However,
investigations have shown that these
incidents are not isolated to any
particular makes or models of vehicles
and rarely have any vehicle based
defects been identified in the throttle or
brake systems in post-incident
inspections.
As background, to put ODI complaints
of low-speed surging during brake
application in context, separate research
conducted for NHTSA by the Highway
Safety Research Center to examine the
prevalence of crashes caused by pedal
application errors found that they occur
more frequently than is generally known
and exhibit many of the same
characteristics as the SA complaints
received by ODI, although in much
greater numbers. The study included a
review of North Carolina state crash
database records, which identified 2,411
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27843
incidents per year in those driving
environments nationwide.27
In addition, the Storefront Safety
Council, an independent private
organization focused on safety hazards
associated with vehicle into building
crashes, estimates that over 20,000 such
crashes occur annually in the U.S. (60
per day), resulting in over 4,000 injuries
and as many as 500 deaths.28 The
Storefront Safety Council identifies
pedal error as the number one cause of
these crashes at 35 percent (other causes
include other types of operator error,
such as confusing Drive and Reverse,
impaired driving, medical conditions
and deliberate building intrusions).
These data indicate that pedal error
crashes are much more common than
previously known, even well after the
implementation of brake shift
interlocks. The patterns associated with
these incidents are similar to complaints
to ODI and manufacturers alleging SA
incidents when analyzed by: (1)
Location; (2) vehicle dynamics; (3)
driver demographics; and (4) vehicle
design. Both occur predominantly in
parking lots and driveways; both
involve sudden increases in engine
power, unchecked by braking, and
coinciding with intended application of
the brake; both disproportionately
involve younger and older drivers; and
both have occurred in vehicles with all
forms of throttle and cruise control
systems. As previously noted, the
incidents were initially observed by ODI
in vehicles with purely mechanical
throttle control and no cruise control in
the earliest years of NHTSA’s safety
defect enforcement program (EA78–
010).
Complaints to ODI alleging SA related
crashes are far less common. In the same
period from 2004 through 2008 that the
pedal error study identified over 2,400
pedal error related crashes in North
Carolina police reports, ODI received
less than 40 complaints alleging SA
crashes in North Carolina in all light
vehicles—or less than 2 percent of the
number of crash incidents identified in
the pedal error study. However,
publicity can significantly increase ODI
complaint volumes, as is evident for
Toyota Corolla vehicles equipped with
ETCS-i, which saw a 7,900% increase in
speed control complaints alleging
crashes and a 12,800% increase in total
speed control complaints from the first
quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of
2010, after news media coverage of
Toyota’s pedal entrapment and sticky
pedal recalls (Figure 2). Each of these
factors, as well as the incident
characteristics used for identifying
complaints likely to be related to a
common cause (see Section 2.1,
Definitions), must be considered before
conducting any analysis of, or drawing
any conclusions regarding, SA rates or
trends based strictly upon ODI
complaint data.
These data support the petitioner’s
claim that uncontrolled vehicle
accelerations in parking environments
are a public safety issue but are not
evidence of a motor vehicle defect and,
therefore, do not support the opening of
a defect investigation.
26 Lococo, K., Staplin, L., Martell, C., and Sifrit,
K. 2012. Pedal Application Errors. Report DOT–HS–
811–597. TransAnalytics, LLC and Highway Safety
Research Center, U.S. Department of
Transportation. www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/
811597.pdf.
27 NHTSA. 2012. Pedal Error Crashes. Report
DOT–HS–811–605. Traffic Tech. U.S. Department
of Transportation. (1). www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/
traffic_tech/811605.pdf.
28 Storefront Safety Council—working to end
vehicle into building crashes. https://
www.storefrontsafety.org/.
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4.0 Conclusion
In our view, a defects investigation is
unlikely to result in a finding that a
defect related to motor vehicle safety
E:\FR\FM\14MYN1.SGM
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tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
self-reported pedal misapplication
crashes between 2004 and 2008, an
average of approximately 480 per year.26
Projected nationally, the North
Carolina data predict over 16,000 pedal
error crashes per year, or about 44
incidents per day. These pedal error
crash counts are likely conservative,
since they are limited to self-reported
incidents that were documented in law
enforcement accident reports. The total
number of pedal error incidents,
including those in which the driver is
not aware of the error (such as the
petitioner’s incident) are unknown and
the there is no systematic process or
database in the United States for
tracking such events. An April 2012
summary of the study notes that 57
percent of pedal error crashes identified
in the study occurred in parking lots or
driveways, which projects to over 9,000
27844
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 93 / Thursday, May 14, 2015 / Notices
exists or a NHTSA order for the
notification and remedy of a safetyrelated defect as alleged by the
petitioner at the conclusion of the
requested investigation. Therefore,
given a thorough analysis of the
potential for finding a safety related
defect in the vehicle and in view of the
need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA’s
limited resources to best accomplish the
agency’s safety mission and mitigate
risk, the petition is respectfully denied.
This action does not constitute a finding
by NHTSA that a safety-related defect
does not exist. The agency will take
further action if warranted by future
circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations
of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Frank S. Borris, II,
Acting Associate Administrator for
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2015–11632 Filed 5–13–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2012–0082 (Notice No.
15–13)]
Hazardous Materials: Information
Collection Activities
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Department of Transportation
(DOT).
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
PHMSA invites comments on its
intention to revise an information
collection under Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Control Number
2137–0628, ‘‘Flammable Hazardous
Materials by Rail Transportation’’. This
reporting requirement would require
tank car owners to report their progress
in the retrofitting of tank cars to the
Department of Transportation (DOT).
DATES: Interested persons are invited to
submit comments on or before July 13,
2015.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
identified by the docket number
(PHMSA–2012–0082) by any of the
following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for submitting
comments.
• Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:59 May 13, 2015
Jkt 235001
• Mail: Docket Operations, U.S.
Department of Transportation, West
Building, Ground Floor, Room W12–
140, Routing Symbol M–30, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
20590.
• Hand Delivery: To Docket
Operations, Room W12–140 on the
ground floor of the West Building, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the agency name and docket
number for this notice. Internet users
may access comments received by DOT
at: https://www.regulations.gov. Please
note that comments received will be
posted without change to: https://
www.regulations.gov including any
personal information provided.
Privacy Act: In accordance with 5
U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments
from the public. DOT posts these
comments, without edit, including any
personal information the commenter
provides, to www.regulations.gov, as
described in the system of records
notice (DOT/ALL–14 FDMS), which can
be reviewed at www.dot.gov/privacy.
Requests for a copy of an information
collection should be directed to Steven
Andrews or T. Glenn Foster, Standards
and Rulemaking Division (PHH–12),
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., East Building, 2nd Floor,
Washington, DC 20590–0001,
Telephone (202) 366–8553.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Steven Andrews or T. Glenn Foster,
Standards and Rulemaking Division
(PHH–12), Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., East Building,
2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590–0001,
Telephone (202) 366–8553.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal
Regulations requires PHMSA to provide
interested members of the public and
affected agencies an opportunity to
comment on information collection and
recordkeeping requests. This notice
identifies an information collection
request that PHMSA will be submitting
to OMB for revision. This information
collection request is contained in 49
CFR part 174 of the Hazardous Materials
Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171–
180). PHMSA has revised the burden
estimate, where appropriate, to reflect
current reporting levels or adjustments
based on changes described in this
notice. The following information is
provided for the information collection:
(1) Title of the information collection,
PO 00000
Frm 00217
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
including former title if a change is
being made; (2) OMB control number;
(3) summary of the information
collection activity; (4) description of
affected public; (5) estimate of total
annual reporting and recordkeeping
burden; and (6) frequency of collection.
PHMSA will request a three-year term of
approval for the information collection
activity and, when approved by OMB,
publish a notice of the approval in the
Federal Register.
PHMSA requests comments on the
following information collection:
Title: Flammable Hazardous Materials
by Rail Transportation.
OMB Control Number: 2137–0628.
Summary: This information collection
pertains to requirements for the creation
of a sampling and testing program for
mined gas or liquid and rail routing for
High Hazard Flammable Trains
(HHFTs),a routing requirements for rail
operators, and the reporting of incidents
that may occur from HFFTs.
In the final rule entitled ‘‘Enhanced
Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable
Trains’’ PHMSA and FRA adopted a
risk-based timeline for the retrofit of
existing tank cars to meet an enhanced
CPC–1232 standard when used as part
of an HHFT. The retrofit timeline
focuses on two risk factors, the packing
group and differing types of DOT–111
and CPC–1232 tank cars. The timeline
provides an accelerated risk reduction
that more appropriately addresses the
overall risk. The timeline is provided in
the §§ 173.241, 173.242, and 173.243
tables of the final rulemaking (80 FR
26643) and includes a January 1, 2017
deadline for of non-jacketed DOT–111
tank cars in PG I service in an HHFT.
Not adhering to the January 1, 2017
deadline would trigger a reporting
requirement.
This reporting requirement would
require owners of non-jacketed DOT–
111 tank cars in Packing Group I service
in an HHFT to report to DOT the
following information regarding the
retrofitting progress:
• The total number of tank cars
retrofitted to meet the DOT–117R
specification;
• The total number of tank cars built
or retrofitted to meet the DOT–117P
specification;
• The total number of DOT–111 tank
cars (including those built to CPC–1232
industry standard) that have not been
modified;
a An HHFT means a single train transporting 20
or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable
liquid in a continuous block or a single train
carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3
flammable liquid throughout the train consist.
E:\FR\FM\14MYN1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 93 (Thursday, May 14, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27835-27844]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-11632]
[[Page 27835]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for denying a petition
(DP14-003) submitted to NHTSA 49 U.S.C. 30162, 49 CFR part 552,
requesting that the agency open ``an investigation into low-speed
surging in the 2006-2010 Toyota Corolla [vehicles] with ETCS-i, in
which the brakes fail to stop the vehicle in time to prevent a crash.''
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stephen McHenry, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-4883. Email
stephen.mchenry@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1.0 Introduction
Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item
of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a
properly filed petition the agency conducts a technical review of the
petition, material submitted with the petition, and any additional
information. 49 U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. After considering the
technical review and taking into account appropriate factors, which may
include, among others, allocation of agency resources, agency
priorities, and the likelihood of success in litigation that might
arise from a determination of a noncompliance or a defect related to
motor vehicle safety, the agency will grant or deny the petition. 49
U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR 552.8.
2.0 Petition Background Information
In a letter dated September 11, 2014, Mr. Robert Ruginis requested
that NHTSA open ``an investigation into low-speed surging in the 2006-
2010 Toyota Corolla [vehicles] with ETCS-i, in which the brakes fail to
stop the vehicle in time to prevent a crash.'' Mr. Ruginis based his
request upon multiple low-speed ``surge events'' allegedly experienced
by his wife in their model year (MY) 2010 Toyota Corolla, the latest of
which resulting in a crash into a parked vehicle on June 8, 2014. Mr.
Ruginis makes the following claims in support of his petition: (1) The
Event Data Recorder (EDR) readout of his wife's crash supports her
account of vehicle acceleration after she applied the brake; (2) NHTSA
has never investigated surges in low-speed crashes in Toyota vehicles;
(3) a software expert has identified vulnerabilities in Toyota's ETCS-i
source code; (4) there are other similar incidents of ``surge at low
speed or no speed'' in Toyota Corolla vehicles in NHTSA's consumer
complaint database; and (5) surges in low-speed parking scenarios are a
safety problem.
NHTSA has reviewed the material cited by the petitioner. The
results of this review and our analysis of the petition's merits are
set forth in the DP14-003 Petition Analysis Report, published in its
entirety as an appendix to this notice.
For the reasons presented in the petition analysis report after a
thorough assessment of the potential risks to safety, it is unlikely
that an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-
related defect would be issued as a result of granting Mr. Ruginis's
petition. After full consideration of the potential for finding a
safety related defect in the vehicle and in view of the need to
allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish
the agency's mission, the petition is respectfully denied.
Appendix--Petition Analysis--DP14-003
1.0 Introduction
On September 12, 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) received a September 11, 2014, letter from Mr.
Robert Ruginis petitioning the agency ``for an investigation into low-
speed surging in the 2006-2010 Toyota Corolla [vehicles] with ETCS-i,
in which the brakes fail to stop the vehicle in time to prevent a
crash.'' The letter provides the following basis for the request:
This request is based on first-hand experience in which multiple
low-speed surge events that occurred while driving our 2010 Corolla.
The latest incident resulted in a crash on June 8, 2014. In addition
to the evidence from our crash incident, we are providing evidence
that many other Corolla owners are experiencing similarly unsafe
scenarios that are leading to crashes.
The petition letter provides information regarding the June 8,
2014, crash incident, including the petitioner's interpretation of pre-
crash data downloaded from the vehicle Event Data Recorder (EDR) by
Toyota field inspectors:
The EDR investigation report clearly showed that at the moment
the airbag module made the decision whether to deploy (about the
time of impact), the voltage to the accelerator pedal was .78 (at
idle), the brake was engaged, yet both the speed of the vehicle and
engine RPM's had doubled in less than 2 seconds.
Mr. Ruginis provided copies of the police report for the accident,
the EDR report, and a list of ODI complaints (VOQs) that he considered
similar to his wife's experience in the crash and in prior driving
experience. He provided the following five reasons supporting an ODI
investigation of the alleged defect in the MY 2006 through 2010 Toyota
Corolla vehicles:
1. The EDR results suggest that unsafe and unexpected surges can
occur even when the driver's action is to apply the brake;
2. NHTSA has never investigated surges in low-speed crashes in
Toyotas;
3. The observations of software expert Michael Barr suggest that
Toyota's electronic architecture has many vulnerabilities;
4. Unintended surges in low-speed parking scenarios are common; and
5. Surges in low-speed parking scenarios are a safety problem.
In evaluating the petitioner's allegations and preparing a
response, ODI:
Reviewed the petition request and submitted appendices,
interviewed the petitioner and his wife--who was the primary driver and
who was driving when the crash occurred.
Provided the 163 VOQs submitted by the petitioner to
Toyota, formally requested Toyota to provide full warranty claim
histories for throttle and braking systems on the subject vehicles, as
well as copies of all reports made to Toyota by the complainants or by
dealership or Toyota technical personnel related to the complaints,
field inspection data, and all related EDR download data obtained by
Toyota collected from vehicles identified in incidents reported in the
subject vehicle VOQs.
Requested technical and engineering information from
Toyota related to the alleged defect as submitted by the petitioner.
Analyzed the information provided by Toyota in response to
our specific requests for information.
Reviewed previous analysis and investigative work into
unintended acceleration done by NHTSA, the National Aeronautics and
Space
[[Page 27836]]
Administration, and the National Academy of Sciences as well as papers
from the Society of Automotive Engineers related to EDR download data
interpretation and limitations.
Interviewed complainants who had submitted the 163 VOQs
noted by the petitioner. Gathered, when possible, law enforcement crash
reports, insurance reports, repair facility invoices, photographs of
crash sites, security camera surveillance video, and any other relevant
information related to the reported incidents.
Acquired the petitioner's vehicle and transported it to
the Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) in East Liberty, Ohio, for
evaluation.
2.0 Background
2.1 Definitions
The term ``unintended acceleration'' (UA) is often used to
generally describe any unintended speed increase in a motor vehicle.
This is an extremely broad definition that includes some aspects of
normal vehicle performance (e.g., idle speed control and transmission
control), as well as many forms of abnormal performance of those
systems that represent little to no hazards to highway safety (i.e.,
issues generally described as ``driveability'' issues).\1\ Within the
universe of unintended acceleration issues that do involve potentially
serious safety hazards, ``sudden acceleration'' (SA) incidents are the
most common and are defined as allegations of ``unintended, unexpected,
high-power acceleration from a stationary position or a very low
initial speed accompanied by an apparent loss of braking
effectiveness.'' \2\ This definition was developed in the 1980's, when
ODI first began investigating the subject in a large cross-section of
passenger car makes and models sold in the U.S., including Audi 5000
sedans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ODI's analysis of warranty data for MY 2002-2010 Toyota
Camry vehicles submitted by Toyota as part of RQ10-003, determined
that approximately 80 percent of the claims were related to engine
or transmission recalibrations to address a number of vehicle
driveability concerns (e.g., improving shift feel) as described in a
series of technical service bulletins, each related to separate
conditions and vehicle subpopulations. Claim rates were negligible
(less than 0.03%) in vehicles with no such TSB's (e.g., MY 2002-2006
Camry L4 with 2AZ-FE engines).
\2\ The definition has been broadened in recent years to include
incidents occurring in certain on-road driving maneuvers that
require braking, such as approaching controlled intersections or
highway exit ramps, but the majority of incidents continue to be
reported in low-speed parking maneuvers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The foregoing definition purposefully excludes ``stuck throttle''
type incident symptoms, which involve failure of the throttle to return
to idle when the accelerator pedal is released by the driver. Stuck
throttle defects generally follow patterns including relatively high
initiation speeds, large accelerator pedal applications and other
driving conditions specific to each defect condition. For example,
floor mat entrapments tend to occur after the driver has intentionally
pressed the accelerator pedal to the floor to pass vehicles on the
highway, merge with highway traffic or accelerate up hills. Unintended
accelerations resulting from pedal entrapment involve maximum engine
power and often include degraded brake effectiveness if the driver
pumps out the reserve vacuum in the brake booster, resulting in loss of
power assist to the brakes. If the driver is unable to bring the
vehicle to a complete stop within the first couple of miles, the brakes
will continue to lose effectiveness due to brake fade or heat
degradation of the friction materials.
2.2 Sudden Acceleration Background
ODI's first investigation of sudden acceleration, EA78-110, opened
almost 40 years ago, covered approximately 60 million MY 1973 through
1986 General Motors passenger cars. That investigation established that
sustained, unintended, ``high-power acceleration'' could only be caused
by failure mechanisms that produced large throttle openings. This
finding reduced the potential failure modes to defects affecting
throttle linkages and cruise control components. Ninety percent of the
accident vehicles in EA78-110 were not equipped with cruise control,
thus eliminating the only potential electronic mechanism capable of
opening the throttle in that investigation.\3\ The investigation was
closed in 1986 after eight years of testing and studies, concluding
that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Reinhart, W. 1996. Engineering Analysis Closing Report,
EA78-110. Washington, DC: NHTSA, (11).
Inadvertent and unknowing driver application of the accelerator
pedal when the driver intended to apply the brake [``pedal
misapplication''] appears to be the cause of many of the reported
sudden acceleration related accidents, even though many of the
drivers continue to believe that they had been pushing on the brake
pedal.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Reinhart, W. 1996. Engineering Analysis Closing Report,
EA78-110. Washington, DC: NHTSA, (18).
In October 1987, a little over a year after EA78-110 was closed;
NHTSA's Administrator ordered an independent review of SA (the
``Study''). While the phenomena affected all automatic transmission-
equipped cars sold in the U.S., some had notably higher occurrence
rates, raising questions about vehicle design factors that may be
contributing to the problem. The Study re-examined potential causes of
SA, as well as design factors that may contribute to higher rates of
pedal misapplication. The results of the Study were released in March
1989, in a report titled ``An Examination of Sudden Acceleration.'' \5\
With respect to the cause of SA incidents, the Study concluded that,
absent evidence of a throttle, cruise control or brake malfunction,
``the inescapable conclusion is that these definitely involve the
driver inadvertently pressing the accelerator instead of, or in
addition to, the brake pedal.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Pollard, J., and E.D. Sussman. 1989. An Examination of
Sudden Acceleration. Report DOT-HS-807-367. Transportation Systems
Center, U.S. Department of Transportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the majority of incidents were associated with
accelerations that began after the vehicle was started and shifted from
Park to Drive or Reverse gear, the most effective countermeasure for
pedal error related SA incidents was the incorporation of brake-shift
interlocks to prevent shifting from Park when the brake pedal is not
depressed. Shift interlocks were voluntarily implemented by most
manufacturers in the late-1980's and early-1990's and early studies
showed reductions in the number of SA complaints during this time
period, with the trend driven by the drop in events occurring
immediately after shift from Park.\6\ Brake shift interlocks have no
effect on mitigating pedal errors later in the drive cycle (e.g.,
parking).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Reinhart, W. 1994. The Effect of Countermeasures to Reduce
the Incidence of Unintended Acceleration Accidents. Paper 94 S5 O
07. Proc., 14th International Technical Conference on Enhanced
Safety of Vehicles, Washington, DC, Vol. 1, (821-845).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.3 Toyota Investigations and NHTSA/NASA Study
From 2003 through 2009, ODI examined unintended acceleration issues
in Toyota vehicles equipped with ETCS-i in 3 defect investigations and
5 defect petition evaluations. These activities prompted 4 safety
recalls addressing floor mat entrapment, a ``sticky pedal'' condition,
and an accelerator pedal interference condition. Publicity surrounding
a fatal crash in August 2009, that was determined to have been caused
by floor mat entrapment, the ensuing floor mat recall by Toyota and the
``sticky pedal'' recall led to intense media coverage of Toyota
unintended acceleration issues and possible electronic defects.
Much of the interest focused on low-speed SA incidents in Toyotas
not included in the floor mat recalls or in recalled vehicles that had
clearly not
[[Page 27837]]
experienced either mat entrapment or ``sticking accelerator pedals.''
NHTSA responded by conducting an in-depth examination of Toyota's
electronic throttle control systems in partnership with NASA's
Engineering and Safety Center. NHTSA and NASA released reports
detailing the results of this study in early 2011, concluding that
incidents alleging low-speed surges during brake application were most
likely related to driver pedal misapplication and were not associated
with an electronic or software defect in Toyota's ETCS-i system.
2.4 National Research Council Special Report 308
In 2012, the National Academy of Sciences released a report that
included a review of NHTSA's defects investigations of low-speed
surging in Toyota vehicles and the results of the joint study with
NASA. The report, titled ``The Safety Promise and Challenge of
Automotive Electronics, Insights from Unintended Acceleration,''
concluded that NHTSA's decision to close its investigations of Toyota's
ETC were justified based on the initial investigations, complaint
analyses, field investigations using EDR data and NASA's examination of
the Toyota ETC. With regard to allegations of low-speed surging with
ineffective brakes, the report stated:
Reports of braking ineffectiveness in controlling a vehicle
experiencing the onset of unintended acceleration from a stopped
position or when moving slowly require an explanation for the
ineffectiveness, such as physical evidence of damage to the brake
system. Under these circumstances, investigating for phenomena other
than pedal misapplication absent an explanation for the
ineffectiveness of the brakes, which are independent of the throttle
control system and are designed to dominate engine torque, is not
likely to be useful.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ NRC. 2011. TRB Special Report 308: The Safety Challenge and
Promise of Automotive Electronics: Insights from Unintended
Acceleration. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, (164).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.0 Petition Analysis
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN14MY15.008
3.1 Petitioner's Vehicle
3.1.1 Petitioner's Accident
The petition was prompted by a collision with a parked vehicle
during an attempted curbside parking maneuver in a residential
neighborhood on June 8, 2014. In the police report, the driver states
that she stopped at an intersection with the intention of turning right
and parking along the curb behind a parked vehicle.
Figure 1. Pre-Crash Data for Petitioner's Accident (Image From Bosch
CDR Report)
During a subsequent vehicle inspection on June 24, 2014, Toyota
downloaded data from the vehicle EDR (Figure 1).
3.1.2 EDR Data Analysis
Although the EDR data shown in Figure 1 appears to show that engine
speed doubled on or about the same time that the brake switch shows
brake pedal application, examination of this data as well as the ways
in which the EDR collects, transmits and records it, does not support
the petitioner's conclusion that the vehicle accelerated when the brake
was applied. Interpretation of EDR pre-crash data should be done within
the context of the incident reconstruction, including a detailed
statement from the driver, and must take into account the limitations
of the system as documented on the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval (CDR)
report. The limitations include the resolution of each data element,
the asynchronous refresh rates of the data elements, and the rate at
which the EDR samples and records the data. Toyota provided the
following EDR design information for the 2010 Corolla in response to a
formal request by ODI:
The Vehicle Speed is based on the front wheel speed sensors and
recorded in 2 kph increments and nominally updated every 500 ms. The
Brake Switch, based on the stop lamp switch status, is either ON or
OFF, and is updated instantly. The service brake pedal must be
depressed minimally for the stop lamp to activate. The accelerator
pedal position is recorded in 0.039 volt increments, and the value
is nominally updated every 524 ms. This measurement is taken
directly at the operator's accelerator pedal. The Engine RPM is
measured in 400 RPM increments and is nominally updated every 524
ms.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ As indicated in the Bosch CDR report, the Vehicle Speed and
Engine RPM values are both rounded down in the given increments.
ODI interviewed the driver to obtain her description of the
incident. She indicated that her normal braking style when parking is
to apply light, gradual pressure to the brake pedal, rather than a
sudden, hard stop. She indicated that as she applied the brakes during
the incident, the car responded by accelerating. She stated that it did
not slow down, and it continued to increase in speed until it hit the
back of the parked vehicle. The petitioner provided a similar
description in a call to Toyota's customer relations department three
days after the incident, alleging simultaneous failures of both the
engine/accelerator and brakes that resulted in full throttle
acceleration into a parked vehicle.
The EDR data for the petitioner's incident shows no recorded
service brake application until the airbag module trigger point (t =
0s).\9\ This indicates that the brake switch was ON immediately after
impact, but does not indicate the degree or duration of brake
application. The fact that the EDR showed a nominal 3.8 mph increase in
vehicle speed in the last 1.8 seconds of recording, and subsequent
vehicle testing found the brakes to be fully functional, indicates that
no meaningful braking occurred prior to impact. Based on the vehicle
speeds recorded just prior to impact (t = -0.8 s), the Corolla was less
than a car length from the parked vehicle and traveling 7 to 9 feet per
second with no indication of service brake application. Based on the
vehicle
[[Page 27838]]
speed and the driver's stated braking habits, initiation of braking
would be expected when the vehicle is about a full car length or more
from the intended stopping point. Based upon all of these factors, ODI
does not believe that the brake switch data recorded by the EDR is
consistent with the petitioner's statement that the vehicle accelerated
with the brake applied and vehicle testing demonstrated that
acceleration would not occur if the brake pedal had been applied with
any meaningful force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Airbag deployment software is triggered within 1ms of the
airbag module sensing a longitudinal deceleration of about 2 g's
(``algorithm enable''). The time interval between impact and airbag
algorithm enable is very short, with the precise time depending upon
specific crash dynamics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, although the EDR does not show any increase in
accelerator pedal voltage in the final 2.8 seconds prior to impact,
this does not mean that the accelerator pedal was not depressed during
that time period. According to Toyota, ``The increase in the vehicle
speed and engine speed prior to impact is consistent with an
accelerator pedal being depressed between the recorded data points but
not recorded by the EDR.'' VRTC testing confirmed that a short and
rapid application of the accelerator could: (1) Fail to be recorded by
the EDR based on the asynchronous update rates of the CAN bus signals
and the relatively slow sampling rate used by the EDR; and (2) produce
the engine and vehicle speed changes recorded by the EDR at t = 0.0 s.
3.1.3 VRTC Vehicle Evaluation/Testing
Following detailed instructions provided by the petitioner
regarding the conditions of the surging during the parking maneuvers,
VRTC performed over 2,000 miles of test driving while evaluating the
petitioner's accident and the vehicle itself. The testing did not
produce any unusual performance of the throttle or transmission
systems. In addition, testing of the incident vehicle brake system
found that it functioned normally and could hold the vehicle stationary
with the engine at 2,000 RPM with less than 15 lb of pedal pressure
applied to the brakes. The brakes could also hold the vehicle
stationary at full throttle with less than 20 lb of force applied to
the brake pedal. Testing also showed the vehicle's brakes could bring
it to a full stop in less than three feet at the speeds provided in the
petitioner's account of the crash.
The petitioner also alleged that uncommanded, short-duration
throttle surges occurred in the Corolla during certain decelerations
from highway speed. VRTC also conducted testing to try to reproduce
this phenomenon but did not observe any unusual performance or symptoms
associated with harsh downshifting or changes in torque converter
clutch status. Drivers that use light braking during coasting
decelerations are likely to be more sensitive to certain transmission
shift transients that are triggered by brake application (e.g., torque
converter un-lock), that may not be noticed by drivers who use more
brake pedal force. However, such transients have very brief durations,
involve minor changes in vehicle deceleration and are normal operating
characteristics of automatic transmission vehicles that do not
represent an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. Furthermore,
ODI does not consider the coast down condition reported by the
petitioner to be related to the surging alleged in the accident, which
did not involve transmission shifting.
3.2 NHTSA Investigations of Low-Speed Surges
The petitioner claims that NHTSA has never investigated low-speed
surges in Toyota vehicles. This is incorrect. NHTSA has investigated
complaints alleging low-speed surges in Toyota vehicles equipped with
ETCS-i for over 10 years, starting with a defect petition (DP03-003) in
2003. Altogether, ODI completed 5 defect petition evaluations and 1
investigation (PE04-021) related to allegations of low-speed surging in
Toyota vehicles equipped with ETCS-i prior to the joint study of the
issue initiated by NHTSA and NASA in 2010.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ DP03-003, DP04-003, PE04-021, DP05-002, DP06-003 and DP08-
001 all included examination of alleged vehicle accelerations from
low-speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low-speed surges were the primary focus of the study by NHTSA and
NASA in 2010. As clearly stated in the Executive Summary of NHTSA's
February 2011 report from this study:
Both [NHTSA and NASA] also noted that the vast majority of
complaints involved incidents that originated when the vehicle was
stationary or at very low speeds and contained allegations of very
wide throttle openings, often with allegations that brakes were not
effective. NHTSA's analysis indicated that these types of complaints
generally do not appear to involve vehicle-based causes and that,
where the complaint included allegations that the brakes were not
effective or that the incident began with a brake application, the
most likely cause of the acceleration was actually pedal
misapplication (i.e., the driver's unintended application of the
accelerator rather than, or in addition to, the brake.)
The results of NHTSA's field inspections of vehicles involved in
alleged UA incidents during 2010 supported this analysis. Those
vehicle inspections, which included objective evidence from event
data recorders, indicated that drivers were applying the accelerator
and not applying the brake (or not applying it until the last second
or so).'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ NHTSA. 2011. Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic
Throttle Control (ETC) Systems. (viii). https://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/DOT-16-11.
A review of the NHTSA and NASA reports from the Toyota ETCS-i study
show that the petitioner's incident and the other similar incidents
presented by the petitioner fall within the scope of the prior work,
which concluded that allegations of sudden acceleration from a stop or
low-speed with ineffective brakes are most likely caused by pedal error
by the driver and not indicative of a vehicle-based defect (unless
potential faults are identified in pedal design or in shift-interlock
safeguards--for incidents occurring after a shift from Park).
3.3 Software Theories
The petition states that ``the observations of software expert
Michael Barr suggest that Toyota's electronic architecture has many
vulnerabilities'' and concludes that these observations suggest that
``floor mats and sticky accelerator pedals are not the only causes of
unintended low-speed surges in Toyota vehicles.''
Before responding to the petitioner's statement regarding recent
software theories, ODI first notes that floor mats and sticky pedals
have never been considered likely ``causes of unintended low-speed
surges in Toyota vehicles.'' Incidents of pedal entrapment by improper
or out-of-position floor mats are a severe form of a stuck throttle
condition, as they occur after the pedal has intentionally been fully
depressed to wide-open throttle (WOT) by the driver, generally during
attempted passing maneuvers, accelerations on highway entrance ramps to
merge with highway traffic or attempts to maintain speed or accelerate
up hills. When the driver releases pressure from the accelerator, the
pedal remains stuck at WOT resulting in an incident of high-speed
unintended acceleration.
The ``sticky pedal'' condition was associated with excessive
friction in the accelerator pedal assembly which could develop after
the vehicle had been parked overnight in certain environmental
conditions (e.g., high relative humidity and cool ambient temperature).
A pedal with excessive friction may be slow to return to idle when
released by the driver and, in some cases, may stick after being held
at a constant position for an extended period of time. This would
typically occur during steady-state highway driving (i.e., pedal held
at constant position for some period of time)
[[Page 27839]]
following a morning cold-start and the pedal could ordinarily be
returned to idle simply by tapping the accelerator pedal to free the
sticking condition. Although ODI is not aware of any crashes or
injuries resulting from sticking pedals, the condition has been
mistaken for evidence of electronic UA in at least one instance.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Testing conducted by Toyota and observed by NHTSA engineers
reproduced the sticking pedal condition in the pedal assembly
removed from a MY 2007 Toyota Avalon involved in an incident in
January 2010 that was reported by some as evidence of electronic UA
(VOQ 10300210).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to Mr. Barr, ODI is aware that he and other consultants
have raised certain software design and electrical architecture issues
in the course of civil litigation regarding Toyota ETCS-i vehicles. The
petition does not cite, and ODI is unaware of, any instance where Barr
or any other consultant postulating that the ETCS-i software is
defective has reproduced unintended acceleration in a Toyota ETCS-i
vehicle under real-world driving conditions.
The petitioner submitted a presentation prepared by Barr regarding
his analysis of the software in a 2005 Toyota Camry and cites several
opinions contained in that document, but does not identify any specific
condition or theory that could result in SA in the subject
vehicles.\13\ The Barr presentation summarizes his review of Toyota's
ETCS-i source code and a case review of a defect theory he developed as
part of a lawsuit relating to a fatal accident in a 2005 Toyota Camry
with a 4-cylinder engine. Barr's defect theory involved the suspension
of a specific operating system task that performs multiple throttle
control and failsafe functions in the Toyota ETCS-i source code (Task X
death). Task X death would result in the throttle remaining stuck at
the last computed throttle command, but would be terminated by any
transition in brake switch status.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ For example, the petitioner cited Barr's opinions that
``Toyota's ETCS source code is of unreasonable quality'' and
``Toyota's source code is defective and contains bugs, including
bugs that can cause unintended acceleration.''
\14\ Any transition in brake switch status would result in a
discrepancy between brake status recognized by the Main CPU, which
would be frozen by the task death, and the Sub-CPU which would
continue to receive actual brake status voltage from the stop lamp
switch (``brake echo check''). This would trigger failsafe operation
with throttle opening limited to less than 10 degrees and set a
fault code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We note that the Corolla vehicles that are the subject of this
petition are equipped with engine control modules (ECM's) supplied by
Delphi, while Barr's task death theory applies to Toyota Camry vehicles
equipped with Denso modules. The Delphi modules contain different
source code with different task and stack monitoring functionality than
the Denso modules and, hence, do not contain substantially similar
software. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the theories and
mechanisms advanced by Mr. Barr in regard to the software employed in
the Denso throttle controls are inapplicable to the petitioner's
vehicle.
Nonetheless, since the low-speed surge incidents that are the
subject of the petition are similar to the SA crash incidents reported
in other Toyota vehicles, regardless of throttle control technology or
ECM supplier, ODI offers the following assessment of the Barr task
death theory submitted by the petitioner:
No specific defect identified--Barr identifies a number of
issues with Toyota's ETCS-i software and electrical architecture,
including several potential failure mechanisms that he speculates could
result in task death.\15\ However, as stated in his ``Case Specific
Opinions'' slide [54], he ``cannot identify with 100% certainty the
specific software defects'' responsible for the UA incident. ODI sees
no factual basis for assigning any level of probability to his
theories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ For example, Barr speculated that memory corruptions
resulting from stack overflow or unidentified software bugs could
result in task death and other negative effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not reproduced--Barr does not identify any specific
software states or vehicle operating conditions necessary for any of
the failure mechanisms to occur and has not reproduced a task death or
any other software failure resulting in SA in real world driving
conditions.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Barr's only testing of Task X death involved a fault
injection method, performed with Toyota's assistance, to
artificially induce task deaths to study system and failsafe
performance. There is no evidence of any scenario in which the
``brake echo check'' failed to cut power to the throttle after brake
switch transition during this testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Untestable--Rather than identifying the specific
conditions necessary for theoretical software failures to occur, Barr
and other proponents of the theory have suggested that such failures
cannot be reproduced because ``the test space is effectively infinite''
resulting in ``too many possible tests.'' \17\ This precludes any
scientific evaluation of the validity of such theories.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ In ODI's investigations of defects involving embedded
control system faults, either VRTC, the manufacturer, or the
supplier have been able to: (1) Identify the specific operating
conditions necessary to produce the fault through field data
analysis, system review and testing; and (2) reproduce the
conditions to duplicate the faults in vehicle testing.
\18\ Theories of electromagnetic interference (EMI) effects on
ETC or cruise control systems as causes of SA incidents have
included similar claims regarding testability. No EMI theories have
ever been duplicated in a vehicle and no specific source or path for
the interference has been identified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fault injection did not produce SA--When Task X deaths
were reproduced by fault injection, they did not result in sudden
increases in throttle opening or any loss of brake effectiveness.
Incidents that begin when the brake is not applied result in loss of
power to the throttle when the brake is applied and incidents that
begin with the brake already applied would, necessarily, involve low
severity because the engine would be frozen at idle.\19\ Table 1
describes throttle and brake responses for each of the initial
condition pedal state scenarios associated with Task X death. The risk
of uncontrolled acceleration, crash or injury would be low and
complaints associated with such incidents would be more likely to cite
loss of power or stalling than uncontrolled engine power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ With regard to the potential for more severe failure modes
associated with Task X death, Barr further speculates that one
memory corruption event ``can cause task death and open [the]
throttle'' and that the brake echo check may not always cut power to
the throttle. He states that ``memory corruptions are like
ricocheting bullets'' that may result in more severe effects.
However, these theories have never been demonstrated in any testing
nor were they observed during fault injection tests conducted to
observe system performance with artificially induced task death.
Table 1--Task X Death Scenarios
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial conditions Throttle and brake symptoms
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foot on the accelerator pedal.......... Throttle stuck at last
computed throttle command.
Brake application cuts
power to the throttle.
Foot on the brake pedal................ Throttle is initially
stuck at idle.
Normal braking (brake
release cuts power to the
throttle).
Foot on neither pedal.................. Throttle is initially
stuck at idle.
[[Page 27840]]
Brake application cuts
power to the throttle.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No evidence in field data--The fault injection testing did
not reproduce an SA, but it did demonstrate that failures related to
Task X death would result in a very specific set of symptoms that can
be used to identify potentially relevant incidents in field data, such
as: (1) Allegations of unresponsive accelerator pedals that do not
increase or decrease engine power when the driver presses or releases
the pedal; (2) allegations of vehicles suddenly losing power when the
brake is applied; and (3) fault codes associated with ``brake echo
check'' failsafe operation. ODI's analyses of complaints and warranty
data have not revealed any sign of these symptoms in any Toyota ETCS-i
vehicles.
Not consistent with reported SA--Incidents of sudden
acceleration also involve very specific symptom patterns, including:
(1) Primarily occurring in low-speed driving maneuvers in parking lots
and driveways, as well as other driving maneuvers associated with
required brake application (see Table 3); (2) reports of sudden
increases in engine power allegedly initiated by application of the
brake; and (3) the allegations of brake ineffectiveness in the same
complaints. None of the software task death theories postulated by Barr
fit or otherwise explain these patterns. The same patterns and vehicle
dynamics are evident in the large volume of crashes in which pedal
misapplication has been identified as the undisputed cause (see section
3.5, Low-speed surge hazards). ODI has observed these patterns in SA
complaints in investigations and research covering nearly 40 years and
involving vehicles with all forms of throttle control, both mechanical
and electronic.
Brake effectiveness--None of the electronic theories
reviewed by ODI explain how pressing on the ``brake'' would result in a
sudden increase in engine power as alleged in SA complaints, nor do
they explain why the brakes would suddenly lose effectiveness at the
same time as the engine power surge.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Pressing the brake pedal with a nominal force of 40 lbs or
less would produce sufficient braking torque to overcome full/
maximum drivetrain torque in all vehicles that have been evaluated
by ODI to date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Different software--As noted above, the Corolla vehicles
at issue in this petition are equipped with ECM's supplied by Delphi,
while Barr's task death theory applies to certain Toyota Camry vehicles
equipped with Denso modules. The Delphi modules contain different
system monitoring functionality than the Denso modules and, hence, do
not contain substantially similar software.
Pedal error not excluded--As Barr indicated in a slide
titled ``Other Similar Incident Criteria [55],'' evidence contradicting
correct use of pedals is one factor that would exclude his theories
from consideration. As outlined in Section 3.4 of this report, Other
Similar Incidents, the available EDR data for the subject vehicles does
provide evidence contradicting the correct use of pedals.
3.4 Other Similar Incidents
The petitioner states: ``I reviewed the complaints made to NHTSA by
owners of 2006-2010 Toyota Corollas [and] found 163 reports in which
the driver experienced a surge at low speed or no speed; 99 drivers
mentioned that the brakes were already depressed when the surge
occurred or the surge occurred when the brakes were depressed; 83
incidents resulted in crashes.'' ODI provided copies of the 163 VOQs
noted by the petitioner to Toyota and requested complaint, warranty,
inspection and EDR information about each vehicle (``subject
vehicles'').
Using information supplied by Toyota, the VOQ text, and any
supporting or additional information (e.g., law enforcement crash
reports, repair orders from dealers or independent repair facilities,
photographs, interviews with complainants and/or complainants'
families,\21\ witness statements, letters to elected representatives,
letters to NHTSA, etc.) ODI analyzed the petitioner's incident and the
163 VOQs reporting similar incidents as alleged by the petitioner. Six
of the VOQs are duplicate submissions, resulting in a total of 158
unique vehicles. ODI's analysis of these complaints is summarized in
Table 2, which groups the complaints in three major categories.\22\ The
categories are based on ODI's analysis of all available information and
not solely on the initial VOQ complaint text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Three complainants were now deceased and in some cases the
complainant was not the driver at the time of the incident.
\22\ An itemization of VOQ number by Category is provided in the
closing resume for this investigation, which can be obtained at
www.safercar.gov.
Table 2--ODI Analysis of Petitioner Selected VOQ's
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supported by
Category Description of category Number of VOQs Number of EDR pre-crash
crashes data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.................................. There is an alleged 105 93 17
increase in engine power
in which the brakes are
allegedly unable to
control: Incidents are
caused by pedal
misapplication or by a
late braking effort of the
driver.
B.................................. Dual pedal application: The 28 2 0
driver inadvertently
applied both the brake and
the accelerator
simultaneously during the
event.
C.................................. Incidents that do not fit 25 10 0
the alleged defect of
``engine surge in which
the brakes fail to stop
the vehicle in time to
prevent a crash.''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category A: Category A complaints are those alleging simultaneous
failures of the vehicle's braking ability and a sudden increase in
engine power that the driver did not request by pressing on the
accelerator pedal, with no evidence
[[Page 27841]]
of brake system malfunction observed in post-incident inspections/
testing. These complaints fit the definition of ``sudden acceleration''
incident allegations as described in the background section of this
report and fall within the scope of the petitioner's allegations. As
discussed in previously in this report, these incidents fit the profile
of pedal misapplications. Again quoting from the from the 2012 TRB
report reviewing ODI's processes for investigating unintended
acceleration: ``investigating for phenomena other than pedal
misapplication absent an explanation for the ineffectiveness of the
brakes, which are independent of the throttle control system and are
designed to dominate engine torque, is not likely to be useful. [164]''
As further confirmation of this assessment, some of the VOQs
submitted by the petitioner had pre-crash EDR data available that show
brake status, accelerator pedal voltage, engine speed and vehicle speed
in the 5 seconds prior to the time of the collision trigger (if it was
on a model year 2009 or later Corolla). This information, together with
other relevant facts (e.g., law enforcement reports, accident
reconstruction, witness interviews), can be compared to the driver's
statement regarding the use of foot controls and their alleged
effectiveness prior to the collision.
Table 3--Summary of Incidents with Pre-Crash EDR Data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI brake
category A--
Case No. VOQ No. Incident T-5 speed misapply B-- Summary of driver
date (mph) late apply C-- allegation
no apply
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........................... 10534094 Sep-11...... 45 B Driving at night in
rain, released
accelerator,
departed road,
crashed into tree.
2........................... 10334936 May-10...... 31 A Approaching stop
sign, applied
brake, accelerated
into fence.
3........................... 10363685 Oct-10...... 31 C Approaching stop
sign, applied
brake, accelerated
into utility pole.
4........................... 10523677 May-13...... 20 A Approaching
intersection,
applied brake,
accelerated into
tree.
5........................... 10352668 Mar-09...... 11 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into parked
vehicle.
6........................... 10479582 Oct-12...... 10 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into building.
7........................... 10369494 Nov-10...... 8 A/B Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into concrete post.
8........................... 10344874 Jul-10...... 6 A Entering driveway,
applied brake,
accelerated into
iron fence.
9........................... 10363886 Sep-10...... 6 A/B Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into building.
10.......................... 10520195 Jun-13...... 6 A/B Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
over two curbs.
11.......................... 10551478 Oct-13...... 5 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into dumpster.
12.......................... 10597296 May-14...... 4 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into parked
vehicle.
13 *........................ 10637908 Jun-14...... 4 A/B Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into parked
vehicle.
14.......................... 10507434 Apr-13...... 2 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into building.
15.......................... 10552563 Oct-13...... 1 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into parked
vehicle.
16.......................... 10578871 Apr-14...... 1 A Backing from parking
space, lightly
pressed
accelerator,
accelerated into
vehicle.
17.......................... 10447756 Jan-12...... 0 A Exiting parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into brick wall.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* petition incident.
Table 4--Summary of Brake and Accelerator Pedal Use in Incidents With Pre-Crash EDR Data.23
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T-5 Brake switch status by EDR time interval Accelerator pedal apply status by EDR time interval
Case No. speed ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(mph) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.............................. 31 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. High............. High............. High............. High............. High............. High
6.............................. 10 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. High............. High............. High............. High............. High
4.............................. 20 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Off.............. Low.............. High............. High............. High
16............................. 1 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Med.............. High............. High
14............................. 2 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. High............. High
8.............................. 6 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. High............. High
12............................. 4 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. High............. Off
15............................. 1 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. High
10............................. 6 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. On............... Low.............. Low.............. Off.............. Low.............. High............. Off
11............................. 5 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. High
5.............................. 11 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Med.............. Med.............. Med.............. Med.............. Med.............. Med
17............................. 0 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Med
7.............................. 8 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. On............... Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Med.............. Off
1.............................. 45 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... On............... On............... Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Off.............. Off
9.............................. 6 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. On............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Off
13 *........................... 4 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. On............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off
[[Page 27842]]
3.............................. 31 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* petition incident.
Summaries of the 17 crash incidents in which pre-crash EDR was
available are provided in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 provides a summary of
the speeds the vehicles were traveling approximately 5 seconds prior to
the collision events, ODI's assessment of the causes, and the incident
driver's allegation of the sequence of events leading to the collision.
Thirteen (13) of the incidents involved vehicles travelling at low-
speeds in parking lot maneuvers, including 11 that occurred while
parking the vehicle. Fifteen (15) of the incidents alleged that the
acceleration began after the brake was applied.\24\ These data are
consistent with EDR data collected during the prior Toyota study in
2010, which included 39 incidents assessed as pedal misapplications due
to no brake application or late braking, including 29 that initiated in
parking lots or at low speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ EDR reports with accelerator pedal data shown as voltage
readings from 0.78 to 3.70V were converted as follows: Off = 0.78V;
Low = 0.79 to 1.75V; Medium = 1.76 to 2.72V; and High = 2.73V and
above.
\24\ See supplemental report in the public file for this
investigation (www.safercar.gov) for a discussion of some of the EDR
downloads and associated VOQs, Supplemental Report, DP14-003, EDR
Examples.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI's assessments were based on the EDR download data and all
available supporting information, as to the cause of the unintended
acceleration event, i.e., a pedal misapplication, a braking that
occurred too late to in the event to effectively stop the vehicle in
time (driver error), a combination of both, and in one case no
application of accelerator or brake. Table 4 provides the EDR download
information for brake and accelerator pedal information for the
individual incidents. Twelve incidents showed no evidence of braking
during the crash event, 4 do not show braking until the airbag trigger
point, t = 0, and the final incident involved late transition from
accelerator to brake for a vehicle travelling over 40 mph (Case #1).
These incidents are a representative sampling of the incidents
alleging low-speed surging with ineffective brakes and demonstrate that
driver statements regarding pedal use in such incidents are not
reliable. It should be emphasized that in order for these 105 VOQs to
be included in this category there must have been an alleged concurrent
failure or weakness of the throttle and braking systems. No mechanism
has been identified that could cause a sudden failure of both systems.
No evidence of throttle or brake system faults were found in post-
incident inspections of these vehicles and there is no indication of
faults in those systems in the available service histories before and
after the events. Based on this analysis, ODI does not believe there is
evidence of a vehicle based defect in this category of complaints.
Category B: Category B complaints are incidents involving
allegations of engine racing or surging during brake application. These
incidents do not allege brake ineffectiveness and are therefore not
within the scope of the petitioner's alleged defect. The common
explanation for complaints alleging engine racing or surging during
brake application is that the driver is inadvertently applying both the
brake and accelerator pedals when intending to only apply the brake.
This is particularly evident in complaints that indicate that engine
races faster when the brake is pressed harder.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ These complaints further demonstrate the effectiveness of
the brakes in overcoming engine power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several drivers recognized that inadvertently stepping on both
pedals was the cause of the engine surging they reported, either in the
initial complaint or in subsequent interviews with ODI. For example, in
a follow-up interview one owner (VOQ 10363529) noted that after a few
incidents, ``I realized in that case that my foot was on both the brake
and the accelerator. This may have been carelessness on my part.
However, it being a compact car, the brake is very close to the
accelerator. Perhaps closer that the other cars that I drive or have
driven. No one else in our family has reported unintended acceleration
with this car.''
A variation of dual application that increases the potential
severity of such incidents involves unsecured floor mats that slide
forward into a position where they can impede brake application. ODI
identified two crashes involving drivers who had floor mats that had
moved forward over the accelerator pedal and under the brake pedal such
that when the brake pedal was applied the force was transferred through
the floor mat to the accelerator pedal (in one case it was an
aftermarket floor mat plus a bathroom rug).
Category C: Category C complaints are incidents that do not fit the
alleged defect of ``engine surge in which the brakes fail to stop the
vehicle in time to prevent a crash.'' Examples are instances of high
idle at initial startup, transmission shift flares or delays in coast
down idle. Two of the crashes in this category were due to vehicles
being struck by following traffic which then propelled the vehicles
forward uncontrollably. Four of the crashes were due to a lack of brake
effectiveness, such as a soft brake pedal, without any corresponding
engine surge, three of the crashes were due to the driver applying the
accelerator pedal too aggressively without any brake application, and
one crash was due to a medical condition experienced by the driver.
3.5 Low-Speed Surge Hazards
ODI agrees that uncontrolled vehicle accelerations in parking lot
environments represent a clear safety hazard to surrounding traffic,
pedestrians and even building occupants, as vehicles often accelerate
inside of businesses with facing parking spaces where they have caused
serious and sometimes fatal injuries. However, investigations have
shown that these incidents are not isolated to any particular makes or
models of vehicles and rarely have any vehicle based defects been
identified in the throttle or brake systems in post-incident
inspections.
As background, to put ODI complaints of low-speed surging during
brake application in context, separate research conducted for NHTSA by
the Highway Safety Research Center to examine the prevalence of crashes
caused by pedal application errors found that they occur more
frequently than is generally known and exhibit many of the same
characteristics as the SA complaints received by ODI, although in much
greater numbers. The study included a review of North Carolina state
crash database records, which identified 2,411
[[Page 27843]]
self-reported pedal misapplication crashes between 2004 and 2008, an
average of approximately 480 per year.\26\
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\26\ Lococo, K., Staplin, L., Martell, C., and Sifrit, K. 2012.
Pedal Application Errors. Report DOT-HS-811-597. TransAnalytics, LLC
and Highway Safety Research Center, U.S. Department of
Transportation. www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/811597.pdf.
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Projected nationally, the North Carolina data predict over 16,000
pedal error crashes per year, or about 44 incidents per day. These
pedal error crash counts are likely conservative, since they are
limited to self-reported incidents that were documented in law
enforcement accident reports. The total number of pedal error
incidents, including those in which the driver is not aware of the
error (such as the petitioner's incident) are unknown and the there is
no systematic process or database in the United States for tracking
such events. An April 2012 summary of the study notes that 57 percent
of pedal error crashes identified in the study occurred in parking lots
or driveways, which projects to over 9,000 incidents per year in those
driving environments nationwide.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ NHTSA. 2012. Pedal Error Crashes. Report DOT-HS-811-605.
Traffic Tech. U.S. Department of Transportation. (1). www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/traffic_tech/811605.pdf.
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In addition, the Storefront Safety Council, an independent private
organization focused on safety hazards associated with vehicle into
building crashes, estimates that over 20,000 such crashes occur
annually in the U.S. (60 per day), resulting in over 4,000 injuries and
as many as 500 deaths.\28\ The Storefront Safety Council identifies
pedal error as the number one cause of these crashes at 35 percent
(other causes include other types of operator error, such as confusing
Drive and Reverse, impaired driving, medical conditions and deliberate
building intrusions).
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\28\ Storefront Safety Council--working to end vehicle into
building crashes. https://www.storefrontsafety.org/.
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These data indicate that pedal error crashes are much more common
than previously known, even well after the implementation of brake
shift interlocks. The patterns associated with these incidents are
similar to complaints to ODI and manufacturers alleging SA incidents
when analyzed by: (1) Location; (2) vehicle dynamics; (3) driver
demographics; and (4) vehicle design. Both occur predominantly in
parking lots and driveways; both involve sudden increases in engine
power, unchecked by braking, and coinciding with intended application
of the brake; both disproportionately involve younger and older
drivers; and both have occurred in vehicles with all forms of throttle
and cruise control systems. As previously noted, the incidents were
initially observed by ODI in vehicles with purely mechanical throttle
control and no cruise control in the earliest years of NHTSA's safety
defect enforcement program (EA78-010).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN14MY15.009
Complaints to ODI alleging SA related crashes are far less common.
In the same period from 2004 through 2008 that the pedal error study
identified over 2,400 pedal error related crashes in North Carolina
police reports, ODI received less than 40 complaints alleging SA
crashes in North Carolina in all light vehicles--or less than 2 percent
of the number of crash incidents identified in the pedal error study.
However, publicity can significantly increase ODI complaint volumes, as
is evident for Toyota Corolla vehicles equipped with ETCS-i, which saw
a 7,900% increase in speed control complaints alleging crashes and a
12,800% increase in total speed control complaints from the first
quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2010, after news media coverage
of Toyota's pedal entrapment and sticky pedal recalls (Figure 2). Each
of these factors, as well as the incident characteristics used for
identifying complaints likely to be related to a common cause (see
Section 2.1, Definitions), must be considered before conducting any
analysis of, or drawing any conclusions regarding, SA rates or trends
based strictly upon ODI complaint data.
These data support the petitioner's claim that uncontrolled vehicle
accelerations in parking environments are a public safety issue but are
not evidence of a motor vehicle defect and, therefore, do not support
the opening of a defect investigation.
4.0 Conclusion
In our view, a defects investigation is unlikely to result in a
finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety
[[Page 27844]]
exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-
related defect as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the
requested investigation. Therefore, given a thorough analysis of the
potential for finding a safety related defect in the vehicle and in
view of the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources
to best accomplish the agency's safety mission and mitigate risk, the
petition is respectfully denied. This action does not constitute a
finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The
agency will take further action if warranted by future circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at 49
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Frank S. Borris, II,
Acting Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2015-11632 Filed 5-13-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
