Scope of the Copyright Royalty Judges' Continuing Jurisdiction, 25333-25335 [2015-10305]
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25333
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 85 / Monday, May 4, 2015 / Notices
TABLE E—U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, WORKFORCE INFORMATION
GRANTS TO STATES, PY 2015 VS PY 2014 ALLOTMENTS—Continued
State
PY 2014
Utah .........................................................................................
Vermont ...................................................................................
Virginia .....................................................................................
Washington ..............................................................................
West Virginia ............................................................................
Wisconsin .................................................................................
Wyoming ..................................................................................
State Total ........................................................................
Guam .......................................................................................
Virgin Islands ...........................................................................
Outlying Areas Total .........................................................
Portia Wu,
Assistant Secretary for Employment and
Training.
[FR Doc. 2015–10328 Filed 5–1–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2015–02]
Scope of the Copyright Royalty
Judges’ Continuing Jurisdiction
U.S. Copyright Office, Library
of Congress.
ACTION: Final order.
AGENCY:
The Copyright Royalty Judges
(‘‘CRJs’’), acting pursuant to statute,
referred novel material questions of
substantive law to the Register of
Copyrights for resolution. Those
questions concerned the scope of the
CRJs’ authority, under the statutory
grant of continuing jurisdiction over
ratemaking determinations, to issue a
clarifying interpretation of regulations
adopted pursuant to such a
determination. The Register resolved
those questions in a written decision
that was transmitted to the CRJs. That
decision is reproduced below.
DATES: Effective Date: April 8, 2015.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Stephen Ruwe, Assistant General
Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office, P.O. Box
70400, Washington, DC 20024.
Telephone: (202) 707–8350.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Copyright Royalty Judges are tasked
with determining and adjusting terms
and rates of royalty payments of
statutory licenses under the Copyright
Act. See 17 U.S.C. 801. If, in the course
of proceedings before the CRJs, novel
material questions of substantive law
concerning the interpretation of
provisions of title 17 arise, the CRJs are
required by statute to refer those
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SUMMARY:
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PY 2015
413,138
287,830
759,585
668,760
342,636
618,083
282,229
31,823,200
93,090
83,710
176,800
420,602
287,500
765,965
666,958
341,935
619,893
282,549
31,823,200
93,090
83,710
176,800
questions to the Register of Copyrights
for resolution. 17 U.S.C. 802(f)(1)(B).
On March 9, 2015, the CRJs, acting
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 802(f)(1)(B),
referred novel material questions of
substantive law to the Register,
concerning the CRJs’ authority to issue
a clarifying interpretation of regulations
adopted in a prior ratesetting
determination. On April 8, 2015, the
Register resolved those questions in a
Memorandum Opinion that she
transmitted to the CRJs. To provide the
public with notice of the decision
rendered by the Register, the
Memorandum Opinion is reproduced in
its entirety below.
Dated: April 28, 2015.
Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights and Director of the
U.S. Copyright Office.
Before the U.S. Copyright Office Library
of Congress Washington, DC 20559
In the Matter of Determination of
Rates and Terms for Preexisting
Subscription Services and Satellite
Digital Audio Radio Services
Docket No. 2006–1 CRB DSTRA (SDARS
I)
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON A
NOVEL QUESTION OF LAW
In relation to the above-captioned
proceeding before the Copyright Royalty
Judges (‘‘CRJs’’ or ‘‘Judges’’), questions
have arisen about the proper
interpretation of 17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4),
which provides the CRJs with
‘‘continuing jurisdiction’’ in certain
circumstances to amend a written
determination after it has issued. The
CRJs determined that these were novel
material questions of substantive law
and, as required by section 802(f)(1)(B),
referred them to the Register of
Copyrights for resolution. The Register
hereby resolves those referred questions.
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I. Procedural Background
On January 24, 2008, the CRJs
published final royalty rates and terms
under the section 112(e) and 114
statutory licenses for the period 2007
through 2012 for preexisting satellite
digital audio radio services (‘‘SDARS
I’’). 73 FR 4080 (Jan. 24, 2008).1 In that
proceeding, the CRJs set a royalty rate as
a percentage of the ‘‘Gross Revenues’’ of
the satellite services. 73 FR at 4084. The
definition of ‘‘Gross Revenues’’ adopted
by the CRJs excluded several categories
of revenues received by satellite
services, such as revenues from
channels and programming that are
‘‘exempt from any license requirement
or [are] separately licensed,’’ and
revenues attributable to channels and
programming that are ‘‘offered for a
separate charge’’ and ‘‘use only
incidental performances of sound
recordings.’’ 73 FR at 4102; 37 CFR
382.11 (2008) (paragraph (3)(vi)(B) & (D)
of Gross Revenues definition).
On April 17, 2013, the CRJs adjusted
the royalty rates and terms for satellite
radio for the period 2013 through 2017
(‘‘SDARS II’’). 78 FR 23054 (Apr. 17,
2013) as modified, 78 FR 31842 (May,
28, 2013). In the course of that
proceeding, SoundExchange criticized
the manner in which Sirius XM had
been excluding revenues in reliance on
the SDARS I regulations, including its
practice of excluding revenues
attributable to sound recordings made
before February 15, 1972, which are
generally not subject to federal
copyright protection, and thus do not
fall within the section 112(e) and 114
1 The CRJs’ determination in SDARS I was
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. The court affirmed the
determination in all but one respect, remanding to
the CRJs the single matter of specifying a royalty for
the use of the section 112 statutory license.
SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Congress, 571
F.3d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2009). That last issue was
resolved by the CRJs in further proceedings. 75 FR
5513 (Feb. 3, 2010).
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25334
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 85 / Monday, May 4, 2015 / Notices
statutory licenses.2 78 FR at 23071. In
SDARS II, the CRJs maintained the
exclusions from gross revenues it had
adopted in SDARS I, but added a new
provision specifically addressing the
proper treatment of pre-1972 sound
recordings. 78 FR at 23079–81.
After the CRJs’ determination in
SDARS II, SoundExchange brought suit
against Sirius XM on August 25, 2013 in
the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, alleging that for the time
period covered by SDARS I (2007
through 2012), Sirius XM had
underpaid royalties by improperly
excluding certain revenues from its
gross revenue calculations, including
revenues attributable to pre-1972 sound
recordings. SoundExchange, Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,—F. Supp. 3d —,
2014 WL 4219591, *3-*5 (D.D.C. Aug.
26, 2014).
Rather than seeking to have the
district court to resolve the dispute
itself, Sirius XM asked the court to refer
the issues to the CRJs under the
administrative law doctrine of ‘‘primary
jurisdiction’’ because they ‘‘involve
interpreting and applying the [CRJs’]
regulations on gross revenues.’’ Id. at *3.
As explained by the DC Circuit, under
that doctrine, when a court is
‘‘adjudicating a claim [that] would
‘require[] the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of
an administrative body,’’’ the court can
‘‘suspend the judicial process ‘pending
referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.’’’
United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.,
686 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R.
Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956)).
SoundExchange disagreed that the
doctrine applied, responding that the
relevant regulatory definitions were
unambiguous, and that the district court
should therefore decide the case.
SoundExchange, 2014 WL 4219591 at
*4.
The district court agreed with Sirius
XM, concluding that ‘‘the gross revenue
exclusions are ambiguous and do not,
on their face, make clear whether Sirius
XM’s approaches were permissible
under the regulations,’’ and that referral
to the CRJs under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine was therefore
appropriate. Id. In response to
SoundExchange’s related concern that
the CRJs lacked authority to resolve the
issues, the district court pointed to 17
U.S.C. 803(c)(4). Id. at *5. Section
803(c)(4) provides as follows:
2 See generally U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright
and the Music Marketplace 53–54 (Feb. 2014).
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Continuing jurisdiction.— The Copyright
Royalty Judges may issue an amendment to
a written determination to correct any
technical or clerical errors in the
determination or to modify the terms, but not
the rates, of royalty payments in response to
unforeseen circumstances that would
frustrate the proper implementation of such
determination. Such amendment shall be set
forth in a written addendum to the
determination that shall be distributed to the
participants of the proceeding and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4). The district court
concluded that ‘‘[n]either party is asking
for a change to rates; only a clarification
of the terms,’’ and that such a
clarification ‘‘is within the [CRJs’]
continuing jurisdiction.’’
SoundExchange, 2014 WL 4219591 at
*5. Accordingly, the court stayed its
proceedings pending a decision by the
CRJs clarifying the meaning of the
regulations defining Gross Revenues.
On November 24, 2014,
SoundExchange petitioned the CRJs to
clarify the definition of Gross Revenues
adopted in SDARS I. On December 9,
2014, the CRJs reopened the SDARS I
proceedings, observing that
SoundExchange’s petition raised a
threshold jurisdictional question that
potentially constituted a novel material
question of substantive law that, by
statute, must be referred to the Register.
In the order reopening proceedings, the
CRJs asked the parties to file briefs
addressing the CRJs’ authority to issue
a clarifying interpretation of its
regulations. Sirius XM took the position
that the Copyright Act or, in the
alternative, the Administrative
Procedure Act (‘‘APA’’), gave the CRJs
such authority. SoundExchange
disagreed, arguing that no statute gave
the CRJs authority to clarify the
regulations, and that the case should
therefore be returned to the district
court for resolution.
After considering the parties’
responses, on March 9, 2015, the CRJs,
acting pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 802(f)(1)(B),
referred the following novel material
questions of substantive law to the
Register, enclosing the briefs the parties
had filed:
(1) Do the Judges have jurisdiction
under title 17, or authority otherwise, to
interpret the regulations adopted in the
captioned proceeding?
(2) If the Judges have authority to
interpret regulations adopted in the
course of a rate determination
proceeding, is that authority timelimited?
(3) Would the answer regarding the
Judges’ jurisdiction or authority be
different if the terms at issue regulated
a current, as opposed to a lapsed, rate
period?
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II. Summary of Parties’ Arguments
The parties’ dispute is focused on
around the first referred question. The
Register understands this question to
ask, in essence, whether the CRJs have
the power to issue a clarifying
interpretation of their regulations.
SoundExchange asserts that the
provision cited by the district court, 17
U.S.C. 803(c)(4), does not give the CRJs
authority to clarify the regulations at
issue here. First, SoundExchange argues
that resolution of legal ambiguity cannot
properly be characterized as a correction
of a ‘‘technical or clerical’’ error.
Second, SoundExchange urges that the
separate authority in section 803(c)(4) to
‘‘modify the terms, but not the rates, of
royalty payments in response to
unforeseen circumstances that would
frustrate the proper implementation of
such determination’’ does not apply to
this case. In particular, it argues that any
modification of the definition of ‘‘Gross
Revenues’’ would affect the rates of
royalty payments, not the terms under
which those payments are made, and
that the definition of ‘‘Gross Revenues’’
is accordingly not a ‘‘term.’’ In addition,
SoundExchange asserts that Sirius XM’s
decision to exclude certain revenues
from its gross revenue calculation was
not an ‘‘unforeseen circumstance[ ]’’
that would ‘‘frustrate the proper
implementation of [the] determination.’’
Sirius XM, in contrast, asserts that
section 803(c)(4) empowers the CRJs to
interpret the SDARS I regulations, and
amend them to prevent an interpretation
that is at odds with copyright law or the
intent of its earlier determination.
According to Sirius XM, such an
amendment can either be considered a
‘‘technical amendment’’ that prevents a
mistaken interpretation of their
determination, or a ‘‘modification’’ of
the terms of the royalty payment in
response to unforeseen circumstances.
In response to SoundExchange’s point
that a modification of the Gross
Revenues definition would constitute an
impermissible change in rates, Sirius
XM urges that ‘‘rates’’ refers only to the
percentage-of-revenue rate in the CRJs’
determination, and ‘‘terms’’ refers
broadly to ‘‘other aspects of the
determination required to implement
the rates.’’
In the alternative, Sirius XM argues
that if section 803(c)(4) did not give the
CRJs sufficient authority to clarify the
meaning of the regulations, the APA
independently authorizes the CRJs to do
so. Sirius XM notes that section
803(a)(1) instructs the CRJs to act in
accordance with the APA, and that the
APA includes a provision authorizing
agencies to ‘‘issue a declaratory order to
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 85 / Monday, May 4, 2015 / Notices
terminate a controversy or remove
uncertainty’’ as part of formal
adjudications. 5 U.S.C. 554(e).
SoundExchange disputes that
contention on the ground that, within
the meaning of the APA, the CRJs
engage in rulemakings, not
adjudications, and therefore 5 U.S.C.
554(e) does not apply.
With respect to the remaining two
questions, the parties agree that if the
CRJs have authority to interpret
regulations adopted in the course of a
rate determination proceeding, that
authority would not be time limited. In
addition, they agree that the CRJs’
continuing jurisdiction does not depend
on whether a rate period is current or
lapsed.
III. Register’s Determination
Having considered the relevant
statutory language and the input from
the parties, the Register determines that
the CRJs have jurisdiction under section
803(c)(4) of Title 17 to clarify the
meaning of the regulations adopted in
SDARS I. The Register also determines
that this authority is not time-limited,
and that the CRJs’ authority is the same
whether the regulations at issue apply to
a current or lapsed rate period.
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A. The CRJs’ Continuing Jurisdiction
Encompasses the Authority to Issue
Clarifying Amendments to Written
Determinations.
As noted above, under section
803(c)(4), the CRJs ‘‘may issue an
amendment to a written determination
to correct any technical or clerical errors
in the determination or to modify the
terms, but not the rates, of royalty
payments in response to unforeseen
circumstances that would frustrate the
proper implementation of such
determination.’’ 17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4). As
an initial matter, the Register accepts
the district court’s conclusion that the
meaning of the relevant regulatory
provisions, and the application of those
provisions to the particular fact pattern
presented here, is uncertain. See
SoundExchange, 2014 WL 4219591, at
*4 (‘‘[T]he gross revenue exclusions are
ambiguous and do not, on their face,
make clear whether Sirius XM’s
approaches were permissible under the
regulations.’’).
The Register concludes that the CRJs’
power to ‘‘correct any technical . . .
errors’’ in determinations encompasses
the power to resolve ambiguity in the
meaning of regulations adopted
pursuant to those determinations.3 Such
3 As explained above, Sirius XM argues that the
CRJs’ power to ‘‘modify the terms, but not the rates,
of royalty payments in response to unforeseen
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a correction is ‘‘technical’’ in the sense
that it merely clarifies existing
regulations to ensure they are applied in
the manner intended by the CRJs. As the
district court appreciated, the CRJs are
in the best position to provide this type
of interpretive guidance, given their
familiarity with the extensive record on
which the regulations are based and
their general ‘‘technical and policy
expertise.’’ SoundExchange, 2014 WL
4219591 at *4. This approach is also
consistent with general principles of
administrative law, under which courts
regularly defer to agencies’ reasonable
interpretations of ambiguous
regulations. See Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997). Section 803(c)(4)
provides the administrative mechanism
by which the CRJs can issue such
interpretations.
This understanding of section
803(c)(4) also comports with the
Register’s prior reading of that
provision. Specifically, the Register has
construed section 803(c)(4) as providing
the CRJs the authority to amend their
regulations to conform with the
Register’s interpretation of the
Copyright Act. In 2009, after the CRJs
issued a determination setting the rates
and terms of royalty payments for
making and distribution of
phonorecords of musical works under
17 U.S.C. 115, the Register exercised her
statutory authority to correct certain
legal errors in that determination. 74 FR
4537 (Jan. 6, 2009). In particular, the
Register concluded that a number of
regulatory terms that the CRJs had
adopted were inconsistent with the
Copyright Act, including certain terms
related to digital phonorecord deliveries
and the retroactivity of promotional
royalty rates. See 73 FR at 4541–42.
Although the Register lacked the
authority actually to amend the
regulations adopted by the CRJs, she
concluded that the CRJs could ‘‘codify
the corrections identified and made
herein by the Register’’ by exercising
their authority under section 803(c)(4).
Id. at 4543. The CRJs subsequently
relied on that authority to amend the
regulations and excise the erroneous
circumstances that would frustrate the proper
implementation of such determination’’ provides an
alternate source of authority to clarify the SDARS
I regulations. 17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4). SoundExchange
contends, however, that the definition of ‘‘Gross
Revenues’’ is not a ‘‘term.’’ For its part, the district
court concluded that the definition was a term.
SoundExchange, 2014 WL 4219591 at *5 (‘‘Neither
party is asking for a change to rates; only a
clarification of terms.’’). The Register need not
resolve this issue, because the CRJs’ separate power
to ‘‘correct any technical . . . errors’’ provides a
sufficient basis for the CRJs to act in this case. For
the same reason, the Register need not address
whether the APA separately authorizes the CRJs to
clarify the SDARS I regulations.
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
25335
regulatory provisions. 74 FR 6832, 6833
(Feb. 11, 2009). The CRJs explained that
doing so would ‘‘clarify potential
confusion facing users of the license at
issue’’ and ‘‘promote an efficient
administration of the applicable
license.’’ Id. These same rationales
apply with equal force here.
B. The CRJs’ Continuing Jurisdiction Is
Not Subject to Time Limits, and Extends
to Both Current and Lapsed Rate
Periods.
The Register agrees with the parties
that the CRJs’ continuing jurisdiction
authority is not subject to a time limit.
Nothing in the text of section 803(c)(4)
indicates a time limit. And, no other
provision in Title 17 would otherwise
impose a time limit on the CRJs’
exercise of that authority. Furthermore,
the scope of the CRJs’ continuing
jurisdiction authority is the same
whether the terms at issue concern a
current or lapsed rate period. Nothing in
the text of section 803(c)(4), or any other
provision in Title 17, differentiates
between current and lapsed rate periods
for purposes of the CRJs’ exercise of
continuing jurisdiction.
April 8, 2015
Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights and Director of the
United States Copyright Office
[FR Doc. 2015–10305 Filed 5–1–15; 8:45 am]
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STATUS: Public and Closed.
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Thursday, April 30, 2015
8:55 a.m.
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[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 85 (Monday, May 4, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25333-25335]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-10305]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2015-02]
Scope of the Copyright Royalty Judges' Continuing Jurisdiction
AGENCY: U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress.
ACTION: Final order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Copyright Royalty Judges (``CRJs''), acting pursuant to
statute, referred novel material questions of substantive law to the
Register of Copyrights for resolution. Those questions concerned the
scope of the CRJs' authority, under the statutory grant of continuing
jurisdiction over ratemaking determinations, to issue a clarifying
interpretation of regulations adopted pursuant to such a determination.
The Register resolved those questions in a written decision that was
transmitted to the CRJs. That decision is reproduced below.
DATES: Effective Date: April 8, 2015.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen Ruwe, Assistant General
Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office, P.O. Box 70400, Washington, DC 20024.
Telephone: (202) 707-8350.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Copyright Royalty Judges are tasked with
determining and adjusting terms and rates of royalty payments of
statutory licenses under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. 801. If, in
the course of proceedings before the CRJs, novel material questions of
substantive law concerning the interpretation of provisions of title 17
arise, the CRJs are required by statute to refer those questions to the
Register of Copyrights for resolution. 17 U.S.C. 802(f)(1)(B).
On March 9, 2015, the CRJs, acting pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
802(f)(1)(B), referred novel material questions of substantive law to
the Register, concerning the CRJs' authority to issue a clarifying
interpretation of regulations adopted in a prior ratesetting
determination. On April 8, 2015, the Register resolved those questions
in a Memorandum Opinion that she transmitted to the CRJs. To provide
the public with notice of the decision rendered by the Register, the
Memorandum Opinion is reproduced in its entirety below.
Dated: April 28, 2015.
Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office.
Before the U.S. Copyright Office Library of Congress Washington, DC
20559
In the Matter of Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting
Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services
Docket No. 2006-1 CRB DSTRA (SDARS I)
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON A NOVEL QUESTION OF LAW
In relation to the above-captioned proceeding before the Copyright
Royalty Judges (``CRJs'' or ``Judges''), questions have arisen about
the proper interpretation of 17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4), which provides the
CRJs with ``continuing jurisdiction'' in certain circumstances to amend
a written determination after it has issued. The CRJs determined that
these were novel material questions of substantive law and, as required
by section 802(f)(1)(B), referred them to the Register of Copyrights
for resolution. The Register hereby resolves those referred questions.
I. Procedural Background
On January 24, 2008, the CRJs published final royalty rates and
terms under the section 112(e) and 114 statutory licenses for the
period 2007 through 2012 for preexisting satellite digital audio radio
services (``SDARS I''). 73 FR 4080 (Jan. 24, 2008).\1\ In that
proceeding, the CRJs set a royalty rate as a percentage of the ``Gross
Revenues'' of the satellite services. 73 FR at 4084. The definition of
``Gross Revenues'' adopted by the CRJs excluded several categories of
revenues received by satellite services, such as revenues from channels
and programming that are ``exempt from any license requirement or [are]
separately licensed,'' and revenues attributable to channels and
programming that are ``offered for a separate charge'' and ``use only
incidental performances of sound recordings.'' 73 FR at 4102; 37 CFR
382.11 (2008) (paragraph (3)(vi)(B) & (D) of Gross Revenues
definition).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The CRJs' determination in SDARS I was appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court
affirmed the determination in all but one respect, remanding to the
CRJs the single matter of specifying a royalty for the use of the
section 112 statutory license. SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of
Congress, 571 F.3d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2009). That last issue was
resolved by the CRJs in further proceedings. 75 FR 5513 (Feb. 3,
2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 17, 2013, the CRJs adjusted the royalty rates and terms
for satellite radio for the period 2013 through 2017 (``SDARS II''). 78
FR 23054 (Apr. 17, 2013) as modified, 78 FR 31842 (May, 28, 2013). In
the course of that proceeding, SoundExchange criticized the manner in
which Sirius XM had been excluding revenues in reliance on the SDARS I
regulations, including its practice of excluding revenues attributable
to sound recordings made before February 15, 1972, which are generally
not subject to federal copyright protection, and thus do not fall
within the section 112(e) and 114
[[Page 25334]]
statutory licenses.\2\ 78 FR at 23071. In SDARS II, the CRJs maintained
the exclusions from gross revenues it had adopted in SDARS I, but added
a new provision specifically addressing the proper treatment of pre-
1972 sound recordings. 78 FR at 23079-81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See generally U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music
Marketplace 53-54 (Feb. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the CRJs' determination in SDARS II, SoundExchange brought
suit against Sirius XM on August 25, 2013 in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, alleging that for the time period covered
by SDARS I (2007 through 2012), Sirius XM had underpaid royalties by
improperly excluding certain revenues from its gross revenue
calculations, including revenues attributable to pre-1972 sound
recordings. SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,--F. Supp. 3d
--, 2014 WL 4219591, *3-*5 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2014).
Rather than seeking to have the district court to resolve the
dispute itself, Sirius XM asked the court to refer the issues to the
CRJs under the administrative law doctrine of ``primary jurisdiction''
because they ``involve interpreting and applying the [CRJs']
regulations on gross revenues.'' Id. at *3. As explained by the DC
Circuit, under that doctrine, when a court is ``adjudicating a claim
[that] would `require[] the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body,''' the court can ``suspend the judicial process
`pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view.''' United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 832, 837
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S.
59, 64 (1956)). SoundExchange disagreed that the doctrine applied,
responding that the relevant regulatory definitions were unambiguous,
and that the district court should therefore decide the case.
SoundExchange, 2014 WL 4219591 at *4.
The district court agreed with Sirius XM, concluding that ``the
gross revenue exclusions are ambiguous and do not, on their face, make
clear whether Sirius XM's approaches were permissible under the
regulations,'' and that referral to the CRJs under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine was therefore appropriate. Id. In response to
SoundExchange's related concern that the CRJs lacked authority to
resolve the issues, the district court pointed to 17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4).
Id. at *5. Section 803(c)(4) provides as follows:
Continuing jurisdiction.-- The Copyright Royalty Judges may
issue an amendment to a written determination to correct any
technical or clerical errors in the determination or to modify the
terms, but not the rates, of royalty payments in response to
unforeseen circumstances that would frustrate the proper
implementation of such determination. Such amendment shall be set
forth in a written addendum to the determination that shall be
distributed to the participants of the proceeding and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4). The district court concluded that ``[n]either
party is asking for a change to rates; only a clarification of the
terms,'' and that such a clarification ``is within the [CRJs']
continuing jurisdiction.'' SoundExchange, 2014 WL 4219591 at *5.
Accordingly, the court stayed its proceedings pending a decision by the
CRJs clarifying the meaning of the regulations defining Gross Revenues.
On November 24, 2014, SoundExchange petitioned the CRJs to clarify
the definition of Gross Revenues adopted in SDARS I. On December 9,
2014, the CRJs reopened the SDARS I proceedings, observing that
SoundExchange's petition raised a threshold jurisdictional question
that potentially constituted a novel material question of substantive
law that, by statute, must be referred to the Register. In the order
reopening proceedings, the CRJs asked the parties to file briefs
addressing the CRJs' authority to issue a clarifying interpretation of
its regulations. Sirius XM took the position that the Copyright Act or,
in the alternative, the Administrative Procedure Act (``APA''), gave
the CRJs such authority. SoundExchange disagreed, arguing that no
statute gave the CRJs authority to clarify the regulations, and that
the case should therefore be returned to the district court for
resolution.
After considering the parties' responses, on March 9, 2015, the
CRJs, acting pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 802(f)(1)(B), referred the following
novel material questions of substantive law to the Register, enclosing
the briefs the parties had filed:
(1) Do the Judges have jurisdiction under title 17, or authority
otherwise, to interpret the regulations adopted in the captioned
proceeding?
(2) If the Judges have authority to interpret regulations adopted
in the course of a rate determination proceeding, is that authority
time-limited?
(3) Would the answer regarding the Judges' jurisdiction or
authority be different if the terms at issue regulated a current, as
opposed to a lapsed, rate period?
II. Summary of Parties' Arguments
The parties' dispute is focused on around the first referred
question. The Register understands this question to ask, in essence,
whether the CRJs have the power to issue a clarifying interpretation of
their regulations.
SoundExchange asserts that the provision cited by the district
court, 17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4), does not give the CRJs authority to clarify
the regulations at issue here. First, SoundExchange argues that
resolution of legal ambiguity cannot properly be characterized as a
correction of a ``technical or clerical'' error. Second, SoundExchange
urges that the separate authority in section 803(c)(4) to ``modify the
terms, but not the rates, of royalty payments in response to unforeseen
circumstances that would frustrate the proper implementation of such
determination'' does not apply to this case. In particular, it argues
that any modification of the definition of ``Gross Revenues'' would
affect the rates of royalty payments, not the terms under which those
payments are made, and that the definition of ``Gross Revenues'' is
accordingly not a ``term.'' In addition, SoundExchange asserts that
Sirius XM's decision to exclude certain revenues from its gross revenue
calculation was not an ``unforeseen circumstance[ ]'' that would
``frustrate the proper implementation of [the] determination.''
Sirius XM, in contrast, asserts that section 803(c)(4) empowers the
CRJs to interpret the SDARS I regulations, and amend them to prevent an
interpretation that is at odds with copyright law or the intent of its
earlier determination. According to Sirius XM, such an amendment can
either be considered a ``technical amendment'' that prevents a mistaken
interpretation of their determination, or a ``modification'' of the
terms of the royalty payment in response to unforeseen circumstances.
In response to SoundExchange's point that a modification of the Gross
Revenues definition would constitute an impermissible change in rates,
Sirius XM urges that ``rates'' refers only to the percentage-of-revenue
rate in the CRJs' determination, and ``terms'' refers broadly to
``other aspects of the determination required to implement the rates.''
In the alternative, Sirius XM argues that if section 803(c)(4) did
not give the CRJs sufficient authority to clarify the meaning of the
regulations, the APA independently authorizes the CRJs to do so. Sirius
XM notes that section 803(a)(1) instructs the CRJs to act in accordance
with the APA, and that the APA includes a provision authorizing
agencies to ``issue a declaratory order to
[[Page 25335]]
terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty'' as part of formal
adjudications. 5 U.S.C. 554(e). SoundExchange disputes that contention
on the ground that, within the meaning of the APA, the CRJs engage in
rulemakings, not adjudications, and therefore 5 U.S.C. 554(e) does not
apply.
With respect to the remaining two questions, the parties agree that
if the CRJs have authority to interpret regulations adopted in the
course of a rate determination proceeding, that authority would not be
time limited. In addition, they agree that the CRJs' continuing
jurisdiction does not depend on whether a rate period is current or
lapsed.
III. Register's Determination
Having considered the relevant statutory language and the input
from the parties, the Register determines that the CRJs have
jurisdiction under section 803(c)(4) of Title 17 to clarify the meaning
of the regulations adopted in SDARS I. The Register also determines
that this authority is not time-limited, and that the CRJs' authority
is the same whether the regulations at issue apply to a current or
lapsed rate period.
A. The CRJs' Continuing Jurisdiction Encompasses the Authority to Issue
Clarifying Amendments to Written Determinations.
As noted above, under section 803(c)(4), the CRJs ``may issue an
amendment to a written determination to correct any technical or
clerical errors in the determination or to modify the terms, but not
the rates, of royalty payments in response to unforeseen circumstances
that would frustrate the proper implementation of such determination.''
17 U.S.C. 803(c)(4). As an initial matter, the Register accepts the
district court's conclusion that the meaning of the relevant regulatory
provisions, and the application of those provisions to the particular
fact pattern presented here, is uncertain. See SoundExchange, 2014 WL
4219591, at *4 (``[T]he gross revenue exclusions are ambiguous and do
not, on their face, make clear whether Sirius XM's approaches were
permissible under the regulations.'').
The Register concludes that the CRJs' power to ``correct any
technical . . . errors'' in determinations encompasses the power to
resolve ambiguity in the meaning of regulations adopted pursuant to
those determinations.\3\ Such a correction is ``technical'' in the
sense that it merely clarifies existing regulations to ensure they are
applied in the manner intended by the CRJs. As the district court
appreciated, the CRJs are in the best position to provide this type of
interpretive guidance, given their familiarity with the extensive
record on which the regulations are based and their general ``technical
and policy expertise.'' SoundExchange, 2014 WL 4219591 at *4. This
approach is also consistent with general principles of administrative
law, under which courts regularly defer to agencies' reasonable
interpretations of ambiguous regulations. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461 (1997). Section 803(c)(4) provides the administrative
mechanism by which the CRJs can issue such interpretations.
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\3\ As explained above, Sirius XM argues that the CRJs' power to
``modify the terms, but not the rates, of royalty payments in
response to unforeseen circumstances that would frustrate the proper
implementation of such determination'' provides an alternate source
of authority to clarify the SDARS I regulations. 17 U.S.C.
803(c)(4). SoundExchange contends, however, that the definition of
``Gross Revenues'' is not a ``term.'' For its part, the district
court concluded that the definition was a term. SoundExchange, 2014
WL 4219591 at *5 (``Neither party is asking for a change to rates;
only a clarification of terms.''). The Register need not resolve
this issue, because the CRJs' separate power to ``correct any
technical . . . errors'' provides a sufficient basis for the CRJs to
act in this case. For the same reason, the Register need not address
whether the APA separately authorizes the CRJs to clarify the SDARS
I regulations.
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This understanding of section 803(c)(4) also comports with the
Register's prior reading of that provision. Specifically, the Register
has construed section 803(c)(4) as providing the CRJs the authority to
amend their regulations to conform with the Register's interpretation
of the Copyright Act. In 2009, after the CRJs issued a determination
setting the rates and terms of royalty payments for making and
distribution of phonorecords of musical works under 17 U.S.C. 115, the
Register exercised her statutory authority to correct certain legal
errors in that determination. 74 FR 4537 (Jan. 6, 2009). In particular,
the Register concluded that a number of regulatory terms that the CRJs
had adopted were inconsistent with the Copyright Act, including certain
terms related to digital phonorecord deliveries and the retroactivity
of promotional royalty rates. See 73 FR at 4541-42. Although the
Register lacked the authority actually to amend the regulations adopted
by the CRJs, she concluded that the CRJs could ``codify the corrections
identified and made herein by the Register'' by exercising their
authority under section 803(c)(4). Id. at 4543. The CRJs subsequently
relied on that authority to amend the regulations and excise the
erroneous regulatory provisions. 74 FR 6832, 6833 (Feb. 11, 2009). The
CRJs explained that doing so would ``clarify potential confusion facing
users of the license at issue'' and ``promote an efficient
administration of the applicable license.'' Id. These same rationales
apply with equal force here.
B. The CRJs' Continuing Jurisdiction Is Not Subject to Time Limits, and
Extends to Both Current and Lapsed Rate Periods.
The Register agrees with the parties that the CRJs' continuing
jurisdiction authority is not subject to a time limit. Nothing in the
text of section 803(c)(4) indicates a time limit. And, no other
provision in Title 17 would otherwise impose a time limit on the CRJs'
exercise of that authority. Furthermore, the scope of the CRJs'
continuing jurisdiction authority is the same whether the terms at
issue concern a current or lapsed rate period. Nothing in the text of
section 803(c)(4), or any other provision in Title 17, differentiates
between current and lapsed rate periods for purposes of the CRJs'
exercise of continuing jurisdiction.
April 8, 2015
Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights and Director of the United States Copyright
Office
[FR Doc. 2015-10305 Filed 5-1-15; 8:45 am]
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