Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture: Grant of a Permanent Variance, 16440-16449 [2015-06975]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 59 (Friday, March 27, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16440-16449]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-06975]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2012-0035]


Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture: Grant of a Permanent 
Variance

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to Traylor/
Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture from the provisions of OSHA standards 
that regulate work in compressed air environments at 29 CFR 1926.803.

DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice becomes 
effective on March 27, 2015 and shall remain in effect until January 
31, 2016.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is 
available from the following sources:
    Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office 
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue 
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999; 
email: Meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
    General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson, 
Acting Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination 
Activities, Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of 
Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; 
phone: (202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    Copies of this Federal Register notice. Electronic copies of this 
Federal Register notice are available at https://www.regulations.gov. 
This Federal Register notice, as well as news releases and other 
relevant information, also are available at OSHA's Web page at https://www.osha.gov.

I. Notice of Application

    On April 26, 2012, Traylor Bros., Inc., 835 N. Congress Ave., 
Evansville, IN 47715, and Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture, Blue 
Plains Tunnel, 5000 Overlook Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20032, 
submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 (``OSH Act''; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances 
and other relief under section 6(d)'') an application for a permanent 
variance from several provisions of the OSHA standard that regulates 
work in compressed air at 29 CFR 1926.803. OSHA is addressing this 
request as two separate applications: (1) Traylor Bros., Inc. 
(``Traylor'') request for a permanent variance for future tunneling 
projects; and (2) Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture, Blue Plains 
Tunnel (``Traylor JV'' or ``the applicant''). This notice only 
addresses the Traylor JV application for an interim order and permanent 
variance for the Blue Plains Tunnel project.\1\ This notice does not 
address the Traylor application for a permanent variance for future 
projects. That request will be addressed separately.
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    \1\ See Section III discussion of condition A Scope.
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    Traylor JV also requested an interim order pending OSHA's decision 
on the application for a variance (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0008). 
Specifically, this notice addresses the application submitted by 
Traylor JV for the Blue Plains Tunnel project in which the applicant 
seeks a permanent variance and interim order from the provisions of the 
standard that: (1) Prohibit compressed-air worker exposure to pressures 
exceeding 50 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.) except in an emergency (29 
CFR 1926.803(e)(5)); \2\ (2) require the use of the decompression 
values specified in decompression tables in Appendix A of the 
compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and 
(3) require the use of automated operational controls and a special 
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), 
respectively).
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    \2\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express 
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge 
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g. 
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i. 
value specified by Sec.  1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent 
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
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    The applicant is a contractor that works on complex tunnel projects 
using recently developed equipment and procedures for soft-ground 
tunneling. The applicant's workers engage in the construction of 
tunnels using advanced shielded mechanical excavation

[[Page 16441]]

techniques in conjunction with an earth pressure balanced tunnel boring 
machine (EPBTBM).
    According to its application, Traylor is currently the managing 
partner of Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture (``Traylor JV''), the 
general contractor for the DC Water and Sewer Authority's project to 
construct the Blue Plains Tunnel. Traylor JV asserts that generally, it 
bores tunnels (i.e., Blue Plains Tunnel) below the water table through 
soft soils consisting of clay, silt, and sand. Traylor JV employs 
specially trained personnel for the construction of the tunnel, and 
states that this construction will use shielded mechanical-excavation 
techniques. Traylor JV asserts that its workers perform hyperbaric 
interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the excavation 
chamber of the EPBTBM; these interventions consist of conducting 
inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-head structure and 
cutting tools of the EPBTBM.
    Traylor JV asserts that innovations in tunnel excavation, 
specifically with EPBTBMs, have, in most cases, eliminated the need to 
pressurize the entire tunnel. This technology negates the requirement 
that all members of a tunnel-excavation crew work in compressed air 
while excavating the tunnel. These advances in technology modified 
substantially the methods used by the construction industry to excavate 
subaqueous tunnels compared to the caisson work regulated by the 
current OSHA compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR 
1926.803. Such advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the 
total duration of exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel 
construction.
    Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction 
with precast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs provide 
methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized 
tunnel face through various geologies, and isolate that pressure to the 
forward section (the working chamber) of the EPBTBM. Interventions in 
the working chamber (the pressurized portion of the EPBTBM) take place 
only after halting tunnel excavation and preparing the machine and crew 
for an intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the 
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber. 
Maintenance conducted in the working chamber includes changing 
replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars, and, in rare cases, 
repairing structural damage to the cutter head.
    In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, Traylor JV 
asserts that innovations in hyperbaric medicine and technology improve 
the safety of decompression from hyperbaric exposures. According to 
Traylor JV, the use of decompression protocols incorporating oxygen is 
at least as effective for tunnel workers as compliance with the 
decompression tables specified by the existing OSHA standard (29 CFR 
part 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). These 
hyperbaric exposures are possible due to advances in technology, a 
better understanding of hyperbaric medicine, and the development of a 
project-specific Hyperbaric Operations Manual (HOM) that requires 
specialized medical support and hyperbaric supervision to provide 
assistance to a team of specially trained man-lock attendants and 
hyperbaric or compressed-air workers.
    OSHA initiated a technical review of the Traylor JV's variance 
application and developed a set of follow-up questions that it sent to 
Traylor JV on September 17, 2012 (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0003). On October 
26, 2012, Traylor JV submitted its response and a request for an 
interim order for the Blue Plains Tunnel Project (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-
0008). In its response to OSHA's follow-up questions, Traylor JV 
indicated that the maximum pressure to which it is likely to expose 
workers during interventions for the Blue Plains Tunnel project is 52 
p.s.i.g. and does not involve the use of trimix breathing gas (composed 
of a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen, and helium in varying concentrations 
used for breathing by compressed air workers for compression and 
decompression when working at pressures exceeding 73 p.s.i.g.). 
Therefore, to work effectively on this project, Traylor JV must perform 
hyperbaric interventions in compressed air at pressures higher than the 
maximum pressure specified by the existing OSHA standard, 29 CFR 
1926.803(e)(5), which states: ``No employee shall be subjected to 
pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. except in emergency'' (see footnote 2).
    OSHA considered Traylor JV's application for a permanent variance 
and interim order for the Blue Plains Tunnel project. OSHA determined 
that Traylor JV proposed an alternative that will provide a workplace 
as safe and healthful as that provided by the standard. On July 11, 
2013, OSHA granted Traylor JV a project-specific interim order for the 
completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0011) in order 
to permit the applicant to begin work while OSHA continued to consider 
its application for a permanent variance. Further, on December 11, 
2014, OSHA published a Federal Register notice announcing Traylor JV's 
application for a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an 
interim order, and request for comments (79 FR 73631) for the Blue 
Plains Tunnel project.

II. The Variance Application

A. Background

    As indicated earlier in this notice, Traylor JV asserts that the 
advances in tunnel excavation technology described in Section I of this 
notice modified significantly the equipment and methods used by 
contractors to construct subaqueous tunnels, thereby making several 
provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR 
1926.803 inappropriate for this type of work. These advances reduce 
both the number of workers exposed, and the total duration of exposure, 
to the hyperbaric conditions associated with tunnel construction.
    Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction 
with pre-cast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs 
provide methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a 
stabilized tunnel face, through various geologies, while isolating that 
pressure to the forward section (working or excavation chamber) of the 
EPBTBM.
    Interventions involving the working chamber (the pressurized 
chamber at the head of the EPBTBM) take place only after the applicant 
halts tunnel excavation and prepares the machine and crew for an 
intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the 
mechanical-excavation components located in the forward portion of the 
working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the forward portion of the 
working chamber includes changing replaceable cutting tools, disposable 
wear bars, and, in rare cases, repairs to the cutter head due to 
structural damage.
    In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research 
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for 
construction in 1971, resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In 
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression 
protocols incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer 
for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA standard (29 
CFR part 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). According 
to the applicant, contractors routinely and safely expose employees 
performing

[[Page 16442]]

interventions in the working chamber of EPBTBMs to hyperbaric pressures 
up to 75 p.s.i.g., which is 50% higher than maximum pressure specified 
by the existing OSHA standard (see 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)).
    The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures 
included in its application provide its workers with a place of 
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain 
under the existing provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for 
construction. The applicant certifies that it provided employee 
representatives of affected workers with a copy of the variance 
application.\3\ The applicant also certifies that it notified its 
workers of the variance application by posting, at prominent locations 
where it normally posts workplace notices, a summary of the application 
and information specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the 
application. In addition, the applicant informed its workers and their 
representatives of their rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance 
application.
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    \3\ See the definition of ``Affected employee or worker'' in 
section VI. D.
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B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of 
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (See Footnote 1)

    The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions 
at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the 
EPBTBM; this pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i.g. 
specified for nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The 
EPBTBM has twin man locks, with each man lock having two compartments. 
This configuration allows workers to access the man locks for 
compression and decompression, and medical personnel to access the man 
locks if required in an emergency.
    EPBTBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and 
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use 
of propel cylinders, a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads 
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that 
moves excavated material from the working chamber. As noted earlier, 
the forward-most portion of the EPBTBM is the working chamber, and this 
chamber is the only pressurized segment of the EPBTBM. Within the 
shield, the working chamber consists of two sections: The staging 
chamber and the forward working chamber. The staging chamber is the 
section of the working chamber between the man-lock door and the entry 
door to the forward working chamber. The forward working chamber is 
immediately behind the cutter head and tunnel face.
    The applicant will pressurize the working chamber to the level 
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging 
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure) to a maximum 
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant 
asserts that most of the hyperbaric interventions will be around 14.7 
p.s.i.g. However, the applicant maintains that they may have to perform 
interventions at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
    During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one 
of the twin man locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the 
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a 
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working 
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber 
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression 
times are greater than work times), the twin man locks allow for crew 
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or 
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working 
crew always has an unoccupied man lock at its disposal.
    The applicant developed a project-specific HOM for the Blue Plains 
Tunnel (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0007) that describes in detail the 
hyperbaric procedures and required medical examinations used during the 
tunnel-construction project. The HOM discusses standard operating 
procedures and emergency and contingency procedures. The procedures 
include using experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who 
have the training and experience necessary to recognize and treat 
decompression illnesses and injuries. The attendants are under the 
direct supervision of the hyperbaric supervisor and attending 
physician. In addition, procedures include medical screening and review 
of prospective compressed-air workers (CAWs). The purpose of this 
screening procedure is to vet prospective CAWs with medical conditions 
(e.g., deep vein thrombosis, poor vascular circulation, and muscle 
cramping) that could be aggravated by sitting in a cramped space (e.g., 
a man lock) for extended periods or by exposure to elevated pressures 
and compressed gas mixtures. A transportable recompression chamber 
(shuttle) is available to extract workers from the hyperbaric working 
chamber for emergency evacuation and medical treatment; the shuttle 
attaches to the topside medical lock, which is a large recompression 
chamber. The applicant believes that the procedures included in the HOM 
provide safe work conditions when interventions are necessary, 
including interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.

C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To 
Use OSHA Decompression Tables

    OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires 
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A 
of 29 CFR part 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an 
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to 
use newer decompression schedules that supplement breathing air used 
during decompression with pure oxygen. The applicant asserts that these 
decompression protocols are safer for tunnel workers than the 
decompression protocols specified in Appendix A of 29 CFR part 1926, 
subpart S.
    Accordingly, the applicant proposes to use the 1992 French 
Decompression Tables to decompress CAWs after they exit the hyperbaric 
conditions in the working chamber. Depending on the maximum working 
pressure and exposure times, the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
provide for air decompression with or without oxygen. Traylor JV 
asserts that oxygen decompression has many benefits, including (1) 
keeping the partial pressure of nitrogen in the lungs as low as 
possible; (2) keeping external pressure as low as possible to reduce 
the formation of bubbles in the blood; (3) removing nitrogen from the 
lungs and arterial blood and increasing the rate of elimination of 
nitrogen; (4) improving the quality of breathing during decompression 
stops so that workers are less tired and to prevent bone necrosis; (5) 
reducing decompression time by about 33 percent as compared to air 
decompression; and (6) reducing inflammation. As described in Section V 
of this notice, OSHA's review of the use of oxygen in several major 
tunneling projects completed in the past indicates that it contributed 
significantly to the reduction of decompression illness (DCI) and other 
associated adverse effects observed and reported among CAWs.
    In addition, the HOM requires a physician certified in hyperbaric 
medicine to manage the medical condition of CAWs during hyperbaric 
exposures and decompression. A trained and experienced man-lock 
attendant also will be present during

[[Page 16443]]

hyperbaric exposures and decompression. This man-lock attendant will 
operate the hyperbaric system to ensure compliance with the specified 
decompression table. A hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), 
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety, directly 
oversees all hyperbaric interventions, and ensures that staff follow 
the procedures delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.
    The applicant asserts that at higher hyperbaric pressures, 
decompression times exceed 75 minutes. The HOM establishes protocols 
and procedures that provide the basis for alternate means of protection 
for CAWs under these conditions. Accordingly, based on these protocols 
and procedures, the applicant requests to use the 1992 French 
Decompression Tables for hyperbaric interventions up to 52 p.s.i.g. for 
completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel project. The applicant is 
committed to follow the decompression procedures described in the Blue 
Plains Tunnel project-specific HOM during these interventions.

D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, 
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression

    According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric 
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's 
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions, 
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the 
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure 
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen 
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the 
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure 
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles 
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly 
referred to as ``the bends.'' This description of the etiology of DCI 
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue 
(see footnote 13 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on DCI).
    The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the 
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged 
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into 
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in 
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the 
OSHA decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the 
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes 
9 through 14 in this notice for references to these studies).\4\ In 
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression is at least 
as effective as an automatic controller in regulating the decompression 
process because:
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    \4\ In the study cited in footnote 11, starting at page 338, Dr. 
Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically regulated 
continuous decompression in the Washington State safety standards 
for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its decompression 
tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the union, and 
against the advice of the expert who calculated the decompression 
table and recommended using staged decompression. Dr. Kindwall then 
states, ``Continuous decompression is inefficient and wasteful. For 
example, if the last stage from 4 psig . . . to the surface took 1 
h, at least half the time is spent at pressures less than 2 psig . . 
., which provides less and less meaningful bubble suppression . . 
.'' In addition, the report referenced in footnote 5 under the 
section titled, ``Background on the Need for Interim Decompression 
Tables'' addresses the continuous-decompression protocol in the OSHA 
compressed-air standard for construction, noting that ``[a]side from 
the tables for saturation diving to deep depths, no other widely 
used or officially approved diving decompression tables use straight 
line, continuous decompressions at varying rates. Stage 
decompression is usually the rule, since it is simpler to control.''
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    1. A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and 
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly 
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock 
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of 
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression 
tables, including stops; and
    2. The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged 
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control 
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results 
in lower occurrences of DCI.
    Accordingly, the applicant is applying for a permanent variance 
from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires 
automatic controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the 
applicant is committed to conduct the staged decompression according to 
the 1992 French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the 
trained man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric 
supervisor.

E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement 
of Special Decompression Chamber

    The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires 
employers to use a special decompression chamber when total 
decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR 
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Another provision of OSHA's compressed-air 
standard calls for locating the special decompression chamber adjacent 
to the man lock on the atmospheric pressure side of the tunnel bulkhead 
(see 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(2)(vii)). However, since only the working 
chamber of the EPBTBM is under pressure, and only a few workers out of 
the entire crew are exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks 
(which, as noted earlier, connect directly to the working chamber) are 
of sufficient size to accommodate the exposed workers. In addition, 
available space in the EPBTBM does not allow for an additional special 
decompression lock. Again, the applicant uses the man locks, each of 
which adequately accommodates a three-member crew, for this purpose 
when decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds 
75 minutes, crews can open the door connecting the two compartments in 
each man lock during decompression stops or exit the man lock and move 
into the staging chamber where additional space is available. This 
alternative enables CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent 
neuromuscular problems during decompression.

F. Previous Tunnel Construction Variance

    OSHA notes that on May 23, 2014, it granted a sub-aqueous tunnel 
construction permanent variance to Tully/OHL USA Joint Venture (79 FR 
29809) from the same provisions of the standard that regulates work in 
compressed air (at 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and 
(g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the present application. 
Generally, the alternate conditions in this notice are based on and 
very similar to the alternate conditions of the previous permanent 
variance.

G. Multi-State Variance

    As stated earlier in this notice, Traylor JV applied for an interim 
order for its Blue Plains Tunnel project only. On July 11, 2013, OSHA 
granted an interim order to cover only the Blue Plains Tunnel project, 
which is located entirely in the District of Columbia and thus under 
Federal OSHA's exclusive jurisdiction. Further, on December 11, 2014, 
OSHA published a Federal Register notice announcing Traylor JV's 
application for a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an 
interim order, and request for comments (79 FR 73631).

[[Page 16444]]

    Additionally, twenty-seven state safety and health plans have been 
approved by OSHA under section 18 of the (OSH) Act.\5\ As part of the 
permanent variance process, the Directorate of Cooperative and State 
Programs will notify the State Plans of Traylor JV's variance 
application and grant of the Blue Plains permanent variance. In 
considering Traylor JV's application for a permanent variance and 
interim order, OSHA noted that four states have previously granted sub-
aqueous tunnel construction variances and imposed different or 
additional requirements and conditions (California, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington). California also promulgated a new standard \6\ for similar 
sub-aqueous tunnel construction work.
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    \5\ Five State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
York, and the Virgin Islands) limit their occupational safety and 
health authority to state and local employers only. State Plans that 
exercise their occupational safety and health authority over both 
public- and private-sector employers are: Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wyoming.
    \6\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7, 
Group 26, Article 154, available at https://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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III. Description of the Conditions Specified for the Permanent Variance

    This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29 
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides 
additional detail regarding the conditions that form the basis of 
Traylor JV's permanent variance.

Condition A: Scope

    The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the work 
situations specified under this condition. Clearly defining the scope 
of the permanent variance provides Traylor JV, Traylor JV's employees, 
other stakeholders, the public, and OSHA with necessary information 
regarding the work situations in which the permanent variance applies.
    According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer or class or group of 
employers \7\ may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace 
or workplaces. If granted, the variance applies to the specific 
employer(s) that submitted the application. In this instance, the 
permanent variance applies to the applicant, Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee 
Joint Venture at the Blue Plains Tunnel project and does not apply to 
any other employers.
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    \7\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade 
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided 
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application 
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
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Condition B: Application

    This condition specifies the circumstances under which the 
permanent variance is in effect, notably only for hyperbaric work 
performed during interventions. The condition places clear limits on 
the circumstances under which the applicant can expose its employees to 
hyperbaric pressure.

Condition C: List of Abbreviations

    Condition C defines a number of abbreviations used in the permanent 
variance. OSHA believes that defining these abbreviations serves to 
clarify and standardize their usage, thereby enhancing the applicant's 
and its employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the 
permanent variance.

Condition D: Definitions

    The condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical terms, 
used in the permanent variance to standardize and clarify their 
meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and its 
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the permanent 
variance.

Condition E: Safety and Health Practices

    This condition requires the applicant to develop and submit to OSHA 
an HOM specific to the Blue Plains project at least six months before 
using the EPBTBM for tunneling operations. Additionally, the condition 
includes a series of related hazard prevention and control requirements 
and methods (e.g., decompression tables, job hazard analyses (JHA), 
operations and inspections checklists, incident investigation, 
recording and notification to OSHA of recordable hyperbaric injuries 
and illnesses, etc.) designed to ensure the continued effective 
functioning of the hyperbaric equipment and operating system.
    Review of the HOM enables OSHA to: (1) Determine that the safety 
and health instructions and measures it specifies are appropriate and 
do adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs; and (2) 
request the applicant to revise or modify the HOM if it finds that the 
hyperbaric safety and health procedures are not suitable for the 
specific project and do not adequately protect the safety and health of 
the CAWs. Once approved, the project-specific HOM becomes part of the 
variance, thus enabling OSHA to enforce its safety and health 
procedures and measures.\8\
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    \8\ Grant of the July 11, 2013, project-specific interim order 
constituted OSHA's approval of Traylor JV's Blue Plains Tunnel 
project-specific HOM.
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Condition F: Communication

    Condition F requires the applicant to develop and implement an 
effective system of information sharing and communication. Effective 
information sharing and communication ensures that affected workers 
receive updated information regarding any safety-related hazards and 
incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start of each 
shift. The condition also requires the applicant to ensure that 
reliable means of emergency communications are available and maintained 
for affected workers and support personnel during hyperbaric 
operations. Availability of such reliable means of communications 
enables affected workers and support personnel to respond quickly and 
effectively to hazardous conditions or emergencies that may develop 
during EPBTBM operations.

Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training

    This condition requires the applicant to develop and implement an 
effective qualification and training program for affected workers. The 
condition specifies the factors that an affected worker must know to 
perform safely during hyperbaric operations, including how to enter, 
work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions under both normal and 
emergency conditions. Having well-trained and qualified workers 
performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that they recognize, 
and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and health hazards. 
These qualification and training requirements enable affected workers 
to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the discomfort and 
physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby preventing worker 
injury, illness, and fatalities.
    Paragraph (2)(e) of this condition also requires the applicant to 
provide affected workers with information they can use to contact the 
appropriate healthcare professionals if they believe they are 
developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement provides 
for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health effects 
resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the potential 
severity of these effects.

[[Page 16445]]

Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    Condition H requires the applicant to develop, implement, and 
operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of the EPBTBM's 
hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated work areas. 
This condition helps to ensure the safe operation and physical 
integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct 
hyperbaric operations. The condition also enhances worker safety by 
reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
    Paragraph (3) of this condition requires the applicant to document 
tests, inspections, corrective actions, and repairs involving the 
EPBTBM, and maintain these documents at the job site for the duration 
of the job. This requirement provides the applicant with information 
needed to schedule tests and inspections to ensure the continued safe 
operation of the equipment and systems, and to determine that the 
actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric equipment and systems 
were appropriate, prior to returning them to service.

Condition I: Compression and Decompression

    This condition requires the applicant to consult with its 
designated medical advisor regarding special compression or 
decompression procedures appropriate for any un-acclimated CAW. This 
provision ensures that the applicant consults with the medical advisor, 
and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation, development, and 
implementation of compression or decompression protocols appropriate 
for any CAW requiring acclimation to the hyperbaric conditions 
encountered during EPBTBM operations. Accordingly, CAWs requiring 
acclimation have an opportunity to acclimate prior to exposure to these 
hyperbaric conditions. OSHA believes this condition will prevent or 
reduce adverse reactions among CAWs to the effects of compression or 
decompression associated with the intervention work they perform in the 
EPBTBM.

Condition J: Recordkeeping

    Condition J requires the applicant to maintain records of specific 
factors associated with each hyperbaric intervention. The information 
gathered and recorded under this provision, in concert with the 
information provided under condition K (using the OSHA 301 Incident 
Report form to investigate and record hyperbaric recordable injuries as 
defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), enables the 
applicant and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent 
variance in preventing DCI and other hyperbaric-related effects.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); recordkeeping 
forms and instructions (https://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf); OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook 
(https://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/); and updates 
to OSHA's recordkeeping rule and Web page ((79 FR 56130); https://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Condition K: Notifications

    Under this condition, the applicant is required, within specified 
periods to: (1) Notify OSHA of any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-
patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or fatalities 
that occur as a result of hyperbaric exposures during EPBTBM 
operations; (2) provide OSHA with a copy of the incident investigation 
report (using OSHA 301 form) of these events; (3) include on the 301 
form information on the hyperbaric conditions associated with the 
recordable injury or illness, the root-cause determination, and 
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented; (4) 
provide its certification that it informed affected workers of the 
incident and the results of the incident investigation; (5) notify the 
Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and 
the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office within 15 working days should 
the applicant need to revise its HOM to accommodate changes in its 
compressed-air operations that affect its ability to comply with the 
conditions of the permanent variance; and (6) provide OTPCA and the 
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office, at the end of the project, with a 
report evaluating the effectiveness of the decompression tables.
    These notification requirements enable the applicant, its 
employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent 
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's 
workers and, based on this determination, whether to revise or revoke 
the conditions of the permanent variance. Timely notification permits 
OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and appropriate to 
prevent further injuries and illnesses. Providing notification to 
employees informs them of the precautions taken by the applicant to 
prevent similar incidents in the future.
    This condition also requires the applicant to notify OSHA if it 
ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its main 
office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent variance 
to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies that OSHA 
must approve the transfer of the permanent variance to a successor 
company. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate effectively with 
the applicant regarding the status of the permanent variance, and 
expedite the Agency's administration and enforcement of the permanent 
variance. Stipulating that an applicant must have OSHA's approval to 
transfer a variance to a successor company provides assurance that the 
successor company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the 
conditions specified by the permanent variance, thereby ensuring the 
safety of workers involved in performing the operations covered by the 
permanent variance.

IV. Comments on the Proposed Variance Application

    OSHA received no comments on the proposed variance, including no 
comments from State Plans.

V. Decision

    After reviewing Traylor JV's proposed variance as described above, 
and having received no comment, OSHA determines that:
    A. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, effective 
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under 
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The alternative measures 
include use of engineering and administrative controls of the hazards 
associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions exceeding 
50 p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous tunnel 
using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in conjunction 
with an EPBTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the EPBTBM's 
pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel excavation and 
prepares the machine and crew to conduct the interventions. 
Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair of the 
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
    B. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric 
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical 
examinations for the Blue Plains Tunneling project's CAWs. The 
applicant compiled these standard operating procedures into a project-
specific HOM (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0007). The HOM discusses the

[[Page 16446]]

procedures and personnel qualifications for performing work safely 
during the compression and decompression phases of interventions. The 
HOM also specifies the decompression tables the applicant proposes to 
use. Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times 
during the interventions, the tables provide for decompression using 
air, pure oxygen, or a combination of air and oxygen. The decompression 
tables also include delays or stops for various time intervals at 
different pressure levels during the transition to atmospheric pressure 
(i.e., staged decompression). In all cases, a physician certified in 
hyperbaric medicine will manage the medical condition of CAWs during 
decompression. In addition, a trained and experienced man-lock 
attendant, experienced in recognizing decompression sickness or 
illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of key importance, a 
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric 
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise all 
hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures 
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
    C. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, a training 
program to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with 
conducting hyperbaric operations.
    D. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective 
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously 
decrease pressure to achieve decompression in accordance with the 
tables specified by the standard. The alternative includes using the 
1992 French Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to 
achieve lower occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent 
attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit 
procedures, and providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor and 
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all 
hyperbaric operations.
    E. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective 
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by 
the standard. EPBTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be 
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBTBM (i.e., the 
working chamber) at elevated pressure during interventions. The 
applicant limits interventions conducted in the working chamber to 
performing required inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting 
tools on the face of the EPBTBM. The EPBTBM's man lock and working 
chamber provide sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to 
stand up and move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up 
to 360 minutes. Therefore, OSHA preliminarily determined that the 
EPBTBM's man lock and working chamber function as effectively as the 
special decompression chamber required by the standard.
    OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding 
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method 
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) Traylor JV proposed 
provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the 
standard. Based on this review, OSHA determined that tunneling 
operations performed with these tables \10\ resulted in a lower 
occurrence of DCI than the decompression tables specified by the 
standard.11 12 13
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    \10\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974 
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression 
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A 
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear) 
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and 
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times 
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
    \11\ Kindwall, EP (1997). Compressed air tunneling and caisson 
work decompression procedures: Development, problems, and solutions. 
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article 
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19 
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence 
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA 
standard.
    \12\ Sealey, JL (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric 
environment: Medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations. 
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article 
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures 
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence 
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington 
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to 
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51 
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g., 
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
    \13\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled ``Criteria for Interim 
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers''; this report 
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries 
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on 
NIOSH's Web site: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The review conducted by OSHA found several research studies 
supporting the determination that the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
resulted in a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified 
by the standard. For example, H. L. Anderson studied the occurrence of 
DCI at maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43 
p.s.i.g. during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-
1996); \14\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to 
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson 
observed 6 DCI cases out of 7,220 decompression events, and reported 
that switching to the 1992 French Decompression tables reduced the DCI 
incidence to 0.08%. The DCI incidence in the study by H. L. Andersen is 
substantially less than the DCI incidence reported for the 
decompression tables specified in Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in 
which the DCI incidence reported for the 1992 French Decompression 
Tables were higher than the DCI incidence reported for the OSHA 
decompression tables.\15\ Therefore, OSHA concludes that use of the 
1992 French Decompression Tables protects workers at least as 
effectively as the OSHA decompression tables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during 
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and 
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
    \15\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F 
(September 1996). Compressed air work--French Tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical 
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp. 
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State 
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon and Washington) 
\16\ or promulgated a new standard (California) \17\ for hyperbaric 
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work, 
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application, 
OSHA is granting the permanent variance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ These state variances are available in the docket: Exs. 
OSHA-2012-0035-0006 (Nevada), OSHA-2012-0035-0005 (Oregon), and 
OSHA-2012-0035-0004 (Washington).
    \17\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7, 
Group 26, Article 154, available at https://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (29 U.S.C. 655), the Agency finds that when the employer complies 
with the conditions of the following order, the working conditions of 
the employer's workers are at least as safe and healthful as if the 
employer complied with the working conditions specified by paragraphs 
(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803. 
Therefore, Traylor JV will: (1) Comply with the conditions listed in 
section VI of this notice for the period between the grant of the 
interim order and completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel project, but no 
later than January 31, 2016; (2) comply fully with

[[Page 16447]]

all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (3) provide a 
copy of this Federal Register notice to all employees affected by the 
conditions, including the affected employees of other employers, using 
the same means it used to inform these employees of its application for 
a permanent variance. Additionally, this final order will remain in 
effect until OSHA modifies or revokes it in accordance with 29 CFR 
1905.13.

VI. Order

    As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the 
interim order granted to the employer on July 11, 2013, and affirmed on 
December 11, 2014 (79 FR 73631). OSHA issues this final order 
authorizing Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture (``Traylor JV'') to 
comply with following conditions instead of complying with the 
requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), 
and (g)(1)(xvii). This final order applies to all employees of Traylor 
JV exposed to hyperbaric conditions at the Blue Plains Tunnel project. 
These conditions are:

A. Scope

    The permanent variance applies only to work:
    1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of the Blue Plains 
Tunnel project, a tunnel constructed using advanced shielded 
mechanical-excavation techniques and involving operation of an EPBTBM;
    2. Performed under compressed-air and hyperbaric conditions up to 
52 p.s.i.g;
    3. In the EPBTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and 
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress 
employees entering and exiting the working chamber;
    4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), 
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), Traylor JV must comply fully 
with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and
    5. This order remains in effect until one of the following 
conditions occurs: (1) Completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel project, 
but no later than January 31, 2016; or (2) OSHA modifies or revokes 
this final order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.

B. Application

    The permanent variance applies only when Traylor JV stops the 
tunnel-boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs 
either enter the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e., 
inspect, maintain, or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or 
exit the working chamber after performing interventions.

C. List of Abbreviations

    Abbreviations used throughout this permanent variance include the 
following:

1. CAW--Compressed-air worker
2. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
3. DCI--Decompression Illness
4. EPBTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine
5. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
6. JHA--Job hazard analysis
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities

D. Definitions

    The following definitions apply to this permanent variance. These 
definitions supplement the definitions in Traylor JV's project-specific 
HOM.
    1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is 
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of 
his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has the 
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.)
    2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea-level, 
generally 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
    3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained 
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment 
while breathing air at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
    4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying 
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working 
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, 
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to 
eliminate them.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Decompression illness (also called decompression sickness or the 
bends)--an illness caused by gas bubbles appearing in body compartments 
due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of symptoms of 
decompression illness include (but are not limited to): Joint pain 
(also known as the ``bends'' for agonizing pain or the ``niggles'' for 
slight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed dysbaric 
osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes a 
pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as 
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction); 
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial 
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See Appendix 10 of ``A Guide to the Work in Compressed Air 
Regulations 1996,'' published by the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf.

    Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention but 
not considered symptoms of DCI can include: Barotrauma (direct 
damage to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses 
and lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in 
consciousness that may occur in hyperbaric environments and is 
caused by the anesthetic effect of certain gases at high pressure); 
and oxygen toxicity (a central nervous system condition resulting 
from the harmful effects of breathing molecular oxygen 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(O2) at elevated partial pressures).

    6. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine--the machinery 
used to excavate the tunnel.
    7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that 
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable 
atmosphere.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
    9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of 
stopping the EPBTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric 
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting, 
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutter head structure.
    10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific 
health and safety plan developed and implemented by Traylor JV for 
working in compressed air during the Blue Plains' tunnel project.
    11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to 
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
    12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used 
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either 
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
    13. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as 
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
    14. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of 
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
    15. p.s.i.a.--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute 
pressure, is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At 
sea-level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding 
14.7 to a pressure

[[Page 16448]]

expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the absolute pressure, 
expressed as p.s.i.a.
    16. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of 
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure 
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, atmospheric pressure is 
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in 
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
    17. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a 
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by 
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully 
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the 
subject matter, the work, or the project.\21\
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    \21\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    18. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBTBM in which CAWs 
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.

E. Safety and Health Practices

    1. Traylor JV must develop and implement an HOM specific to the 
Blue Plains project, and submit the HOM to OSHA at least six months 
before using the EPBTBM. Traylor JV must receive a written 
acknowledgement from OSHA regarding the acceptability of the HOM.\22\ 
The HOM shall provide the governing safety and health requirements 
regarding hyperbaric exposures during the tunnel-construction project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See footnote 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Traylor JV must implement the safety and health instructions 
included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the EPBTBM, and 
the safety and health instructions provided by the manufacturer for the 
operation of decompression equipment.
    3. Traylor JV must use air as the only breathing gas in the working 
chamber.
    4. Traylor JV must use the 1992 French Decompression Tables for 
air, air-oxygen, and oxygen decompression specified in the HOM, 
specifically the extracted portions of the 1992 French Decompression 
tables titled ``French Regulation Air Standard Tables.''
    5. Traylor JV must equip man-locks used by its employees with an 
oxygen-delivery system as specified by the HOM. Traylor JV must not 
store oxygen or other compressed gases used in conjunction with 
hyperbaric work in the tunnel.
    6. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions must use 
flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
    7. In hyperbaric work areas, Traylor JV must maintain an adequate 
fire-suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
    8. Traylor JV must develop and implement one or more JHAs for work 
in the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically and as necessary 
(e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that affects its 
operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected employees. The JHAs 
must include all the job functions that the risk assessment \23\ 
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for 
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. Traylor JV must develop a set of checklists to guide compressed-
air work and ensure that employees follow the procedures required by 
this permanent variance (including all procedures required by the HOM, 
which this variance incorporates by reference). The checklists must 
include all steps and equipment functions that the risk assessment 
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness during compressed-
air work.
    10. Traylor JV must ensure that the safety and health provisions of 
the HOM adequately protect the workers of all contractors and 
subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for 
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program 
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Communication

    1. Prior to beginning a shift, Traylor JV must implement a system 
that informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any hazardous 
occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety, including 
hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth or rock 
slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
    2. Traylor JV must provide a power-assisted means of communication 
among affected workers and support personnel in hyperbaric conditions 
where unassisted voice communication is inadequate.
    (a) Traylor JV must use an independent power supply for powered 
communication systems, and these systems must operate such that use or 
disruption of any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the 
operation of the system from any other location.
    (b) Traylor JV must test communication systems at the start of each 
shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.

G. Worker Qualifications and Training

    Traylor JV must:
    1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on 
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency 
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this 
training.
    2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric 
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure 
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The 
instruction must include topics such as:
    (a) The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
    (b) Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
    (c) Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and 
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric 
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen 
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity).
    (d) How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression; 
and
    (e) Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate 
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may 
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure.
    3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (2) of this 
condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making changes to 
its hyperbaric operations).
    4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers make this 
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's 
national office and OSHA's Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office before 
the training takes place.

H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    1. Traylor JV must initiate and maintain a program of frequent and 
regular inspections of the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support 
systems (such as temperature control, illumination, ventilation, and 
fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and hyperbaric work 
areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
    (a) Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person 
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work 
areas; and
    (b) Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks 
and weekly inspections of the EPBTBM.
    2. If the competent person determines that the equipment 
constitutes a safety hazard, Traylor JV must remove the

[[Page 16449]]

equipment from service until it corrects the hazardous condition and 
has the correction approved by a qualified person.
    3. Traylor JV must maintain records of all tests and inspections of 
the EPBTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and repairs, at 
the job site for the duration of the job.

I. Compression and Decompression

    Traylor JV must consult with its attending physician concerning the 
need for special compression or decompression exposures appropriate for 
CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.

J. Recordkeeping

    Traylor JV must maintain a record of any recordable injury, 
illness, or fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and 
Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses), resulting from exposure 
of an employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA 301 
Incident Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and 
Illnesses.

    Note:  Examples of important information to include on the OSHA 
301 Incident Report form (along with the corresponding question on 
the form) are: The task performed (Question (Q) 14); an estimate of 
the CAW's workload (Q 14); the composition of the gas mixture (e.g., 
air or oxygen (Q 14)); the maximum working pressure (Q 14); 
temperature in the work and decompression environments (Q 14); 
unusual occurrences, if any, during the task or decompression (Q 
14); time of symptom onset (Q 15); duration between decompression 
and onset of symptoms (Q 15); type and duration of symptoms (Q 16); 
a medical summary of the illness or injury (Q 16); duration of the 
hyperbaric intervention (Q 17); possible contributing factors (Q 
17); the number of prior interventions completed by the injured or 
ill CAW (Q 17); the number of prior interventions completed by the 
injured or ill CAW at this working pressure (Q 17); contact 
information for the treating healthcare provider (Q 17); and date 
and time of last hyperbaric exposure for this CAW.

    In addition to completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and 
OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses, Traylor JV must 
maintain records of:
    1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent 
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing), 
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
    2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric 
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
    3. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric 
work time at each pressure.
    4. The results of the post-intervention physical assessment of each 
CAW for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma, 
nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated 
with work in compressed air for each hyperbaric intervention.

K. Notifications

    1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein, 
Traylor JV must:
    (a) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office of 
any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, 
amputations, loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed 
OSHA 301 Incident Report form \25\) resulting from exposure of an 
employee to hyperbaric conditions including those that do not require 
recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity, 
barotrauma), but still meet the recordable injury or illness criteria 
of 29 CFR part 1904. The notification must be made within 8 hours of 
the incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable injury, 
illness, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or 
fatality, and submit a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA form 
301) within 24 hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming aware 
of a recordable case. In addition to the information required by the 
OSHA form 301, the incident-investigation report must include a root-
cause determination, and the preventive and corrective actions 
identified and implemented.
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    \25\ See footnote 9.
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    (b) Provide certification within 15 working days of the incident 
that Traylor JV informed affected workers of the incident and the 
results of the incident investigation (including the root-cause 
determination and preventive and corrective actions identified and 
implemented).
    (c) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office 
within 15 working days and in writing, of any change in the compressed-
air operations that affects Traylor JV's ability to comply with the 
conditions specified herein.
    (d) Upon completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel project, evaluate the 
effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the project, 
and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA and the 
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office.

    Note:  The evaluation report must contain summaries of: (1) The 
number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric 
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented 
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the 
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the 
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or 
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded 
on OSHA 301 and 300 forms, and relevant medical diagnoses and 
treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root causes of any 
hyperbaric incidents, and preventive and corrective actions 
identified and implemented.

    (e) To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified 
herein, inform the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office as 
soon as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
    (i) Cease to do business;
    (ii) Change the location and address of the main office for 
managing the tunneling operations specified herein; or
    (iii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor 
company.
    (f) Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the 
same means required to inform them of its application for a variance.
    2. OSHA must approve the transfer of the permanent variance to a 
successor company.

Authority and Signature

    David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice. 
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to Section 
29 U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 
3912, Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.

David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2015-06975 Filed 3-26-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4510-26-P