Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC; Order Instituting Proceedings To Determine Whether To Approve or Disapprove a Proposed Rule Change To Adopt New Exchange Rule 1081, Solicitation Mechanism, To Introduce a New Electronic Solicitation Mechanism, 5865-5875 [2015-02017]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change is consistent with the Act
and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to the Exchange
and, in particular, the requirements of
Section 6(b) of the Act.18 Specifically,
the Exchange believes the proposed rule
change is consistent with Section 6(b)(4)
of the Act,19 which requires that
Exchange rules provide for the equitable
allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and
other charges among its Trading Permit
Holders and other persons using its
facilities. The Exchange believes the
Rebate is reasonable because it will
allow COPS users who purchase four
valuations that make up a box spread to
only be ultimately charged for one of
those valuations (thereby saving three
valuations’ worth of fees).
The Exchange believes the Rebate is
equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because it will apply to
all COPS users who purchase four
valuations that make up a box spread.
While receiving end-of-day valuations
via COPS is extremely different than,
and not really comparable to, trading on
CBOE, it should be noted that the
components of a box spread trade,
reversals and conversions, are also
subject to rebates.20 From a practical
standpoint for the users, the purpose of
COPS is to get end-of-day valuations.
COPS users want to know the inputs
into an option’s price. There are five
major inputs into an option’s price: (1)
Underlying price, (2) time to expiration,
(3) strike price, (4) implied volatility,
and (5) interest rates. The proposed
Rebate simply allows the Exchange to
provide COPS users with a cost effective
method to extract implied interest rates.
While the Exchange cannot conceive of
any purpose for COPS users to request
pricing on a box spread (other than
those described herein), the Rebate will
be available to all COPS users.
burden on intermarket competition that
is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act
because the Rebate only applies to
CBOE COPS users, and does not affect
pricing or fees on other exchanges. To
the extent the Rebate makes CBOE a
more attractive marketplace for market
participants on other exchanges, such
market participants may become CBOE
market participants (and COPS users).
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
CBOE does not believe that the
proposed rule change will impose any
burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act. CBOE does
not believe that the proposed rule
change will impose any burden on
intramarket competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act because the
Rebate will be available to all COPS
users. CBOE does not believe that the
proposed rule change will impose any
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s Internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
CBOE–2015–007 on the subject line.
U.S.C. 78f(b).
U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
20 See CBOE Fees Schedule, Footnote 13.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange neither solicited nor
received comments on the proposed
rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)
of the Act 21 and paragraph (f) of Rule
19b–4 22 thereunder. At any time within
60 days of the filing of the proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend such rule change if
it appears to the Commission that such
action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, for the protection of
investors, or otherwise in furtherance of
the purposes of the Act. If the
Commission takes such action, the
Commission will institute proceedings
to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be approved or
disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street
NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CBOE–2015–007. This file
number should be included on the
18 15
19 15
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
21 15
22 17
PO 00000
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
CFR 240.19b–4(f).
Frm 00138
Fmt 4703
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all
subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed
rule change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549 on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change;
the Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from
submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make
available publicly.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CBOE–2015–007 and
should be submitted on or before
February 24, 2015.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.23
Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015–02012 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–74167; File No. SR–Phlx–
2014–66]
Self-Regulatory Organizations;
NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC; Order
Instituting Proceedings To Determine
Whether To Approve or Disapprove a
Proposed Rule Change To Adopt New
Exchange Rule 1081, Solicitation
Mechanism, To Introduce a New
Electronic Solicitation Mechanism
January 28, 2015.
I. Introduction
On October 14, 2014, NASDAQ OMX
PHLX LLC (‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘Phlx’’) filed
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘Commission’’), pursuant
23 17
Sfmt 4703
5865
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
03FEN1
5866
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule
19b–4 thereunder,2 a proposed rule
change to adopt new Exchange Rule
1081, Solicitation Mechanism, to
introduce a new electronic solicitation
mechanism pursuant to which a
member can electronically submit all-ornone orders of 500 contracts or more (or,
in the case of mini options, 5000
contracts or more) that the member
represents as agent against contra orders
that the member solicited. The proposed
rule change was published for comment
in the Federal Register on October 31,
2014.3 On December 8, 2014, the
Commission extended the time period
in which to either approve the proposed
rule change, disapprove the proposed
rule change, or institute proceedings to
determine whether to approve or
disapprove the proposed rule change to
January 29, 2015.4 The Commission has
received no comment letters on the
proposal. This order institutes
proceedings under Section 19(b)(2)(B) of
the Act 5 to determine whether to
approve or disapprove the proposed
rule change.
II. Description of the Proposal
The Exchange proposes to adopt new
Rule 1081, Solicitation Mechanism, to
introduce a new electronic solicitation
mechanism pursuant to which a
member can electronically submit all-ornone orders of 500 contracts or more (or,
in the case of mini options, 5000
contracts or more) that the member
represents as agent against contra orders
that the member solicited. Currently,
under Phlx Rule 1080(c)(ii)(C)(2), Order
Entry Firms 6 must expose orders they
represent as agent for at least one
second before such orders may be
automatically executed, in whole or in
part, against orders solicited from
members and non-member brokerdealers to transact with such orders.7
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
1 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
2 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
3 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73441
(October 27, 2014), 79 FR 64862 (‘‘Notice’’).
4 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73791
(December 8, 2014), 79 FR 73924 (December 12,
2014).
5 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
6 Rule 1080(c)(ii)(A)(1) defines ‘‘Order Entry
Firm’’ as a member organization of the Exchange
that is able to route orders to AUTOM. (AUTOM is
the Exchange’s electronic quoting and trading
system, which has been denoted in Exchange rules
as XL II, XL and AUTOM.)
7 Section (c), Solicited Orders, of Rule 1064,
Crossing, Facilitation and Solicited Orders, governs
execution of solicited orders by open outcry, on the
Exchange trading floor, and is unaffected by
proposed Rule 1081. The Exchange states that many
aspects of the functionality of the proposed
solicitation mechanism are similar to those
provided for in Rule 1080(n), PIXL, and certain of
the proposed rules track the existing PIXL rules.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
The proposed rule change would
provide an alternative method, enabling
a member to electronically execute
orders it represents on behalf of a public
customer, broker-dealer, or any other
entity (an ‘‘Agency Order’’) 8 against
solicited limit orders of a public
customer, broker-dealer, or any other
entity (a ‘‘Solicited Order’’) through a
solicitation mechanism designed for this
purpose.9
The new mechanism is a process by
which a member (the ‘‘Initiating
Member’’) can electronically submit allor-none orders 10 of 500 contracts or
more (or, in the case of mini options,11
5000 contracts or more) that it
represents as agent against contra orders
that it has solicited, and initiate an
auction (the ‘‘Solicitation Auction’’).12
As noted below, at the end of the
Solicitation Auction, allocation would
occur with all contracts of the Agency
Order trading at an improved price
against non-solicited contra-side interest
or at the stop price, defined below,
against the Solicited Order. The
solicitation mechanism would
accommodate both simple orders and
Complex Orders.13 Prior to the first time
8 Rule 1080(b)(i)(A) provides in part that ‘‘[f]or
purposes of Exchange options trading, an agency
order is any order entered on behalf of a public
customer, and does not include any order entered
for the account of a broker-dealer, or any account
in which a broker-dealer or an associated person of
a broker-dealer has any direct or indirect interest.’’
According to the Exchange, that provision did not
contemplate, and is not applicable to, the
capitalized and defined term ‘‘Agency Order’’ as
used in proposed Rule 1081.
9 The Exchange states that participants must
ensure that their records adequately demonstrate
the solicitation of an order that is entered into the
mechanism for execution. against an Agency Order
as a Solicited Order prior to entry of such order into
this mechanism.
10 Rule 1066(c)(4) defines an ‘‘all-or-none’’ order
as a market or limit order which is to be executed
in its entirety or not at all.
11 A given Solicitation Auction may be for options
contracts exclusively or for mini options contracts
exclusively, but cannot be used for a combination
of both options contracts and mini options contracts
together.
12 The Exchange noted that similar electronic
functionality is offered today by other option
exchanges. See Chicago Board Options Exchange
(‘‘CBOE’’) Rule 6.74B, Solicitation Auction
Mechanism (the ‘‘CBOE Mechanism’’), and
International Securities Exchange (‘‘ISE’’) Rule
716(e), Solicited Order Mechanism (the ‘‘ISE
Mechanism’’).
13 A Complex Order is any order involving the
simultaneous purchase and/or sale of two or more
different options series in the same underlying
security, priced at a net debit or credit based on the
relative prices of the individual components, for the
same account, for the purpose of executing a
particular investment strategy. A Complex Order
may also be a stock-option order, which is an order
to buy or sell a stated number of units of an
underlying stock or exchange-traded fund (‘‘ETF’’)
coupled with the purchase or sale of options
contract(s). Complex Orders on Phlx are discussed
in Commentary .08 to Rule 1080.
PO 00000
Frm 00139
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
a member enters an Agency Order into
the solicitation mechanism on behalf of
a customer, the member would be
required to deliver to the customer a
written notification informing the
customer that its Agency Orders may be
executed using the Phlx’s solicitation
mechanism. Such written notification
would be required to disclose the terms
and conditions contained in proposed
Rule 1081 and to be in a form approved
by the Exchange.14
Solicitation Auction Eligibility
Requirements
All options traded on the Exchange,
including mini options, would be
eligible for the Solicitation Auction.
Proposed Rule 1081(i) describes the
circumstances under which an Initiating
Member may initiate a Solicitation
Auction.
Proposed Rule 1081(i)(A) provides
that the Agency Order and the Solicited
Order must each be limit orders for at
least 500 contracts (or, in the case of
mini options, at least 5000 contracts)
and must be designated as all-or-none.
The orders must match in size, and their
limit prices must match or cross in
price.15 If the orders cross in price, the
price at which the Agency Order and
the Solicited Order may be considered
for submission pursuant to proposed
Rules 1081(i)(B) and (C) shall be the
limit price of the Solicited Order.16 The
orders may not be stop or stop limit
orders, must be marked with a time in
force of day, good till cancelled or
immediate or cancel, and would not be
routed regardless of routing strategy
indicated on the order.17
Pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(i)(B),
the Initiating Member must stop the
entire Agency Order at a price (the ‘‘stop
price’’) that is equal to or better than the
National Best Bid/Offer (‘‘NBBO’’) on
both sides of the market, provided that
14 See proposed Rule 1081(i)(H). The rule would
require delivery of this disclosure only prior to the
first submission of an Agency Order on behalf of a
customer rather than prior to the submission of
each and every Agency Order on behalf of such
customer.
15 In the case of Complex Orders, the underlying
components of both Complex Orders must also
match. Additionally, all the option legs of each
Complex Order must consist entirely of options or
entirely of mini options.
16 For example, assume an Agency Order to buy
1000 contracts for $2.00 and a Solicited Order to
sell 1000 contracts at $1.90 are entered into the
solicitation mechanism. Since the limits of these
orders cross in price, the Agency Order and
Solicited Order are considered to be submitted into
the mechanism with a stop price equal to the
Solicited Order price of $1.90.
17 Whether an order is marked with a time in
force of day as opposed to, for example, good till
cancelled or immediate or cancel is irrelevant to the
manner in which they would be treated once they
are entered into the solicitation mechanism.
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
such price must be at least $0.01 better
than any public customer noncontingent limit order on the Phlx order
book and must be equal to the Agency
Order’s limit price or provide the
Agency Order with a better price than
its limit price. Stop prices may be
submitted in $0.01 increments,
regardless of the applicable Minimum
Price Variation (the ‘‘MPV’’). Contingent
orders 18 (including all-or-none, stop or
stop-limit orders) on the book would not
be considered when checking the
acceptability of the stop price.
Contingent orders are not represented as
part of the Exchange Best Bid/Offer
since they may only be executed if
specific conditions are met. Given that
these orders are not represented as part
of the Exchange Best Bid/Offer, they are
not included in the NBBO and thus are
not considered when checking the
acceptability of the stop price.19
Orders that are submitted but that do
not comply with the eligibility
requirements set forth in proposed Rule
1081(i)(A) through (C) would be rejected
upon receipt and ineligible to initiate a
Solicitation Auction.20 In addition,
Agency Orders submitted at or before
the opening of trading are not eligible to
initiate a Solicitation Auction and
would be rejected.21 Orders submitted
during a specified period of time, as
determined by the Exchange and
communicated to Exchange membership
on the Exchange’s Web site, prior to the
end of the trading session in the affected
series 22 (including, in the case of
18 A contingent order is a limit or market order
to buy or sell that is contingent upon a condition
being satisfied. PIXL also does not consider
contingent orders on the book when checking the
acceptability of the stop price.
19 Proposed Rule 1081(i)(B) does not apply if the
Agency Order is a Complex Order (a ‘‘Complex
Agency Order’’). Rather, proposed Rule 1081(i)(C)
applies to Complex Agency Orders and requires
them to be of a conforming ratio, as defined in
Commentary.08(a)(ix) to Rule 1080. A Complex
Agency Order which is not of a conforming ratio
would be rejected. Proposed Rule 1081(i)(C)
requires all component option legs of the order to
be for at least 500 contracts (or, in the case of mini
options, at least 5000 contracts). It also provides
that the Initiating Member must stop the entire
Complex Agency Order at a price that is better by
at least $0.01 than the best net price (debit or credit)
(i) available on the Complex Order book regardless
of the Complex Order book size; and (ii) achievable
from the best Phlx bids and offers for the individual
options (an ‘‘improved net price’’) regardless of
size, provided in either case that such price is equal
to or better than the Complex Agency Order’s limit
price. Stop prices for Complex Agency Orders may
be submitted in $0.01 increments, regardless of
MPV, and contingent orders on the book would not
be considered when checking the acceptability of
the stop price. See proposed Rule 1081(i)(C).
20 See proposed Rule 1081(i)(D).
21 See proposed Rule 1081(i)(E).
22 The term ‘‘series’’ of options means all option
contracts of the same class having the same
expiration date and exercise price. A ‘‘class’’ of
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
Complex Orders, in any series which is
a component of the Complex Order) are
not eligible to initiate a Solicitation
Auction and would be rejected.23
Agency Orders which are not Complex
Orders received while another
electronic auction (including any
Solicitation Auction, PIXL auction, or
any other kind of auction) involving the
same option series is in progress would
not be eligible to initiate a Solicitation
Auction and would be rejected.24
Similarly, a Complex Agency Order
received while another auction in the
same Complex Order strategy is in
progress is not eligible to initiate a
Solicitation Auction and would be
rejected.25
Finally a solicited order for the
account of any Exchange specialist,
streaming quote trader (‘‘SQT’’), remote
streaming quote trader (‘‘RSQT’’) or
non-streaming registered options trader
(‘‘ROT’’) assigned in the affected series
may not be a Solicited Order.26
options means all option contracts of the same
‘‘type’’ of option covering the same underlying
stock. A ‘‘type’’ of option means the classification
of an option contract as a put or a call. See Rule
1000, Applicability, Definitions and References.
23 See proposed Rule 1081(i)(F).
24 A similar restriction applies with respect to
PIXL auctions. See PIXL Rule 1080(n)(ii) which
provides that ‘‘[o]nly one Auction may be
conducted at a time in any given series or strategy.’’
25 However, a simple Agency Order in one series
that is submitted while an electronic auction is
already in process with respect to a Complex
Agency Order that includes the same series would
not be rejected. Instead, a Solicitation Auction
would be initiated for that incoming Agency Order
offering each unique strategy or individual series
the same opportunity to initiate an auction. This
behavior is consistent with the handling of
overlapping PIXL and Complex PIXL auctions. See
PIXL Rule 1080(n)(ii). Complex Orders submitted
during normal trading hours in a strategy which has
not yet opened under Commentary .08 of Rule 1080
would cause the strategy to immediately open and
a Solicitation Auction may be initiated. See
proposed Rule 1081(i)(E). In addition, neither a
Solicitation Auction for a simple Agency Order or
Complex Agency Order may be initiated prior to the
regular opening of all individual components of the
Solicited simple or Complex Agency Order.
26 See proposed Rule 1081(i)(G). An SQT is an
Exchange Registered Options Trader (‘‘ROT’’) who
has received permission from the Exchange to
generate and submit option quotations
electronically through AUTOM in eligible options
to which such SQT is assigned. An SQT may only
submit such quotations while such SQT is
physically present on the floor of the Exchange. See
Rule 1014(b)(ii)(A). A RSQT is defined in Rule
1014(b)(ii)(B) as an ROT that is a member affiliated
with a Remote Streaming Quote Trader
Organization (‘‘RSQTO’’) with no physical trading
floor presence who has received permission from
the Exchange to generate and submit option
quotations electronically in options to which such
RSQT has been assigned. A qualified RSQT may
function as a Remote Specialist upon Exchange
approval. An RSQT may only submit such
quotations electronically from off the floor of the
Exchange. An RSQT may not submit option
quotations in eligible options to which such RSQT
is assigned to the extent that the RSQT is also
approved as a Remote Specialist in the same
PO 00000
Frm 00140
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
5867
Consistent with the explanation the
Exchange made in its filing proposing
PIXL, the Exchange believes that in
order to maintain fair and orderly
markets, a market maker assigned in an
option should not be solicited for
participation in a Solicitation Auction
by an Initiating Member. The Exchange
believes that market makers interested
in participating in transactions on the
Exchange should do so by way of his/
her quotations, and should respond to
Solicitation Auction notifications rather
than create them by having an Initiating
Member submitting Solicited Orders on
the market maker’s behalf.
Solicitation Auction Process
Pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(ii)(A)(1), to begin the process the
Initiating Member must mark the
Agency Order and the Solicited Order
for Solicitation Auction processing, and
specify the stop price at which it seeks
to cross the Agency Order with the
Solicited Order. Once the Initiating
Member has submitted an Agency Order
and Solicited Order for processing
pursuant to this subparagraph, such
Agency Order and Solicited Order may
not be modified or cancelled.27
Crossing Two Public Customer Orders
Without a Solicitation Auction
As noted above, the proposed rule
change would enable a member to
electronically execute an Agency Order,
which is an order it represents on behalf
of a public customer, broker-dealer, or
any other entity, against a Solicited
Order, which is a solicited limit order
of a public customer, broker-dealer, or
any other entity through the solicitation
mechanism.
However, pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(v), if a member enters an Agency
Order for the account of a public
customer paired with a Solicited Order
for the account of public customer and
if the paired orders adhere to the
eligibility requirements of proposed
Rule 1081(i), such paired orders would
options. An RSQT may only trade in a market
making capacity in classes of options in which he
is assigned or approved as a Remote Specialist. An
RSQTO is a member organization in good standing
that satisfies the SQTO readiness requirements in
Rule 507(a).
27 For clarity, Rule 1080(ii)(A)(l) does not apply
to Complex Agency Orders. Rather, in a parallel
provision, proposed Rule 1081(ii)(A)(2) provides
that to initiate a Solicitation Auction in the case of
a Complex Agency Order and Complex Solicited
Order (a ‘‘Complex Solicitation Auction’’), the
Initiating Member must mark the orders for
Solicitation Auction processing, and specify the
price (‘‘stop price’’) at which it seeks to cross the
Complex Agency Order with the Complex Solicited
Order. Once the Initiating Member has submitted
the orders for processing pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(ii)(A)(1)–(2), they may not be modified or
cancelled.
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
5868
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
be automatically executed without a
Solicitation Auction.28 The execution
price for such paired public customer
orders (except if they are Complex
Orders) must be expressed in the
minimum quoting increment applicable
to the affected series.29 Such an
execution may not trade through the
NBBO or at the same price as any
resting public customer order. If all-ornone orders are on the order book in the
affected series, the public customer-topublic customer order may not be
executed at a price at which the all-ornone order would be eligible to trade
based on its limit price and size.30
In the case of a Complex Order, a
public customer-to-public customer
cross may only occur at a price which
improves the calculated Phlx Best Bid/
Offer or ‘‘cPBBO’’ and improves upon
the net limit price of any Complex
Orders (excluding all-or-none) on the
Complex Order book in the same
strategy.31 If all-or-none Complex
Orders 32 are on the Complex Order
28 The eligibility requirements require the orders
to each be limit orders for at least 500 contracts (or,
in the case of mini options, at least 5000 contracts)
and be designated as all-or-none. The orders must
match in size, and the limit prices must match or
cross in price. The orders may not be stop or stop
limit orders, must be marked with a time in force
of day, good till cancelled or immediate or cancel.
In the case of Complex Orders, the orders must be
of a conforming ratio, and all component option
legs of the order must be for at least 500 contracts
(or, in the case of mini options, at least 5000
contracts). See proposed Rule 1081(i). The
Exchange also accommodates the crossing of two
public customer orders in PIXL. See Rule 1080(n).
29 The execution price for a Complex Order may
be in $.01 increments.
30 All-or-none orders can only be submitted for
non-broker-dealer customers. As stated above, allor-none orders are not considered when checking
the acceptability of the stop price of an Agency
Order.
31 The term ‘‘cPBBO’’ means the best net debit or
credit price for a Complex Order Strategy based on
the PBBO for the individual options components of
such Complex Order Strategy, and, where the
underlying security is a component of the Complex
Order, the National Best Bid and/or Offer for the
underlying security. See Rule 1080.08(a)(iv).
32 The Exchange’s trading system is capable of
accepting all-or-none Complex Orders which are
not, however, affirmatively permitted to be
submitted under Exchange rules. Rule 1080.08
(b)(v) provides in part that ‘‘Complex Orders may
be submitted as: All-or-none orders—to be executed
in its entirety or not at all.’’ See Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 72351 (June 9, 2014), 79 FR 33977
(June 13, 2014) (SR–Phlx–2014–39). Nevertheless,
all-or-none Complex Orders may not be submitted
at this time. The Exchange anticipates that it will
file a proposed rule change to provide for the
handling and execution of all-or-none Complex
Orders and thereafter permit the trading system to
accept them. The instant proposed rule change
describes how the solicitation mechanism would
deal with all-or-none Complex Orders once they are
permitted under Exchange rules. Complex Agency
Orders and Complex Solicited Orders provided for
herein are not Complex Orders that would require
filing of a proposed rule change in order to be
submitted into the system. Complex Agency Orders
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
book in the same strategy, the public
customer-to-public customer Complex
Order may not be executed at a price at
which the all-or-none Complex Order
would be eligible to trade based on its
limit price and size.
The Exchange believes that permitting
such executions would benefit public
customers on both sides of the crossing
transaction by providing speedy and
efficient executions to public customer
orders in this circumstance while
maintaining the priority of public
customer interest on the book. The
proposed handling of a public customer
Agency Order paired with a public
customer Solicited Order is similar to
the handling of a public customer PIXL
Order paired with a public customer
Initiating Order which is submitted into
the PIXL mechanism.33
Solicitation Auction Notification
Pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(ii)(A)(3), when the Exchange
receives an order for Solicitation
Auction processing, a Request for
Response with the option details
(meaning, the security, strike price, and
expiration date), size and stop price, but
not the side 34 of the Agency Order and
the Solicitation Auction start time is
then sent over the PHLX Orders data
feed 35 and Specialized Quote Feed
(‘‘SQF’’).36 The Exchange believes that
providing option details, size, and stop
price is sufficient information for
participants to determine whether to
submit responses to the Solicitation
Auction.37
and Complex Solicited Orders, while all-or-none in
character, are unique to the solicitation mechanism
and are explicitly provided for herein.
33 See Rule 1080(n)(vi).
34 The Exchange states that, by omitting the side
in the Request for Response, the system avoids
disclosure of potentially material information that
could move the market in the event the Agency
Order does not trade at the conclusion of the
Solicitation Auction. Market participants may enter
Responses on both sides of the market.
35 The PHLX Orders data feed is designed to
provide the real-time status of simple and Complex
Orders on the Phlx order book directly to
subscribers. This includes new orders and changes
to orders resting on the Phlx book for all Phlx listed
options. PHLX Orders also includes opening
imbalance information, PIXL information and
Complex Order Live Auction (‘‘COLA’’) data.
36 SQF is an interface that allows specialists and
market makers to connect and send quotes into Phlx
XL and assists them in responding to auctions and
providing liquidity to the market.
37 CBOE Rule 6.74B(b)(1)(B) suggests that Agency
Orders submitted to CBOE’s Solicitation Auction
Mechanism include the proposed price at which an
Agency Order is to be crossed with a solicited
order, as well as the size of the order. According
to Phlx, the rule does not specify that the side is
to be indicated on the order. See also C2 Rule
6.52(b)(1)(B), which is similar.
PO 00000
Frm 00141
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Solicitation Auction
The Solicitation Auction process is
described in proposed Rules
1081(ii)(A)(4)–(10). Following the
issuance of the Request for Response,
the Solicitation Auction would last for
a period of 500 milliseconds 38 unless it
is concluded as the result of any of the
circumstances described below.39
Any person or entity may submit
Responses to the Request for Response,
provided such Response is properly
marked specifying the price, size and
side of the market at which it would be
willing to participate in the execution of
the Agency Order. The Exchange
believes that permitting any person or
entity to submit Responses to the
Request for Response should attract
Responses from all sources, maximizing
the potential for liquidity in the
Solicitation Auction and thus affording
the Agency Order the best opportunity
for price improvement. Responses
would not be visible to Solicitation
Auction participants, and would not be
disseminated to the Options Price
Reporting Authority (‘‘OPRA’’). A
Response may be for any size up to the
size of the Agency Order.40 The
minimum price increment for
Responses would be $0.01. A Response
must be equal to or better than the
NBBO on both sides of the market at the
time of receipt of the Response. A
Response with a price that is outside the
NBBO at the time of receipt would be
rejected.41 Multiple Responses from the
38 In April/May 2014, to determine whether the
proposed Solicitation Auction timer would provide
sufficient time to respond to a Request for
Response, the Exchange polled all Phlx market
makers, 20 of which responded. Of those that
responded to the survey, 15 are currently
responding to auctions on Phlx or intend to do so.
100% of those respondents indicated that their firm
could respond to auctions with a duration of at least
50 milliseconds. Thus, the Exchange believes that
the proposed Solicitation Auction duration of 500
milliseconds would provide a meaningful
opportunity for participants on Phlx to respond to
a Solicitation Auction, whether initiated by an
Agency Order or a Complex Agency Order, while
at the same time facilitating the prompt execution
of orders. The Exchange notes that both ISE and
Miami International Securities Exchange LLC
(‘‘MIAX’’) rules provide for a 500 millisecond
response time. See ISE Rule 716, Supplementary
Material .04 and MIAX Rule 515A(b)(2)(i)(C).
39 Rule 1080(c)(ii)(C)(2), which states that Order
Entry Firms must expose orders they represent as
agent for at least one second before such orders may
be automatically executed against solicited orders,
is being amended to clarify that it does not apply
to proposed Rule 1081, Solicitation Mechanism. See
also proposed Rule 1081(ii)(A)(4).
40 Responses may not be submitted with an allor-none contingency. (Note, however, that all-ornone orders entered and present in the system at
the end of the Solicitation Auction would be
considered for execution, as discussed below.)
41 Similarly, in the case of Complex Order
Responses, the Response must be equal to or better
than the cPBBO on both sides, as defined in
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
same member may be submitted at
different prices on either or both sides
of the market during the Solicitation
Auction. Responses may be modified or
cancelled during the Solicitation
Auction. The acceptance and handling
of Responses to a Solicitation Auction is
the same as the acceptance and
handling of Responses today for a PIXL
Auction.42
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Conclusion of the Solicitation Auction
Proposed Rules 1081(ii)(B)(1)–(4)
describe a number of circumstances that
would cause the Solicitation Auction to
conclude. Generally, it would conclude
at the end of the Solicitation Auction
period, except that it may conclude
earlier: (i) any time the Phlx Best Bid/
Offer (‘‘PBBO’’) on the same side of the
market as the Agency Order crosses the
stop price (since further price
improvement would be unlikely and
any Responses offering improvement
would be likely to be cancelled),43 or (ii)
any time there is a trading halt on the
Exchange in the affected series (or, in
the case of a Complex Solicitation
Auction, any time there is a trading halt
on the Exchange in any component of a
Complex Agency Order).44
Pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(C),
if the Solicitation Auction concludes
before the expiration of the Solicitation
Auction period as the result of the
PBBO, cPBBO or Complex Order book
(excluding all-or-none Complex Orders)
crossing the stop price as described in
proposed Rules 1081(ii)(B)(2) and
1081(ii)(B)(3), the entire Agency Order
would be executed using the allocation
algorithm set forth in proposed Rule
1081(ii)(E). The algorithm is described
below under the heading ‘‘Order
Allocation’’.
Also pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(ii)(C), if the Solicitation Auction
concludes before the expiration of the
Commentary .08(a)(iv) of Rule 1080 at the time of
receipt of the Complex Order Response but need
not improve upon the limit of orders on the
CBOOK. A Complex Order Response submitted
with a price that is outside the cPBBO at the time
of receipt would be rejected. See proposed Rule
1081(ii)(A)(9).
42 See Rule 1080(n).
43 In the case of a Complex Solicitation Auction,
it would end any time the cPBBO or the Complex
Order book, excluding all-or-none Complex Orders,
on the same side of the market as the Complex
Agency Order, crosses the stop price. See proposed
Rule 1081(ii)(B)(3).
44 Trading on the Exchange in any option contract
is halted whenever trading in the underlying
security has been paused or halted by the primary
listing market. See Rule 1047(e). See also Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 62269 (June 10, 2010), 75
FR 34491 (June 17, 2010) (SR-Phlx-2010–82). Any
executions that occur during any latency between
the pause or halt in the underlying security and the
processing of the halt on the Exchange are nullified
pursuant to Rule 1092(c)(iv)(B).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
Solicitation Auction period as the result
of a trading halt, the entire Agency
Order or Complex Agency Order would
be executed solely against the Solicited
Order or Complex Solicited Order at the
stop price and any unexecuted
Responses would be cancelled.45
Responses and other interest present in
the system would not be considered for
trading against the Agency Order in the
case of a trading halt. The Exchange
believes that this is appropriate since
the participants representing tradable
interest in the Solicitation Auction have
not ‘stopped’ the Agency Order in its
entirety and would have no means after
the auction executions occur to offset
the trading risk they would incur
because the market is halted if they
were permitted to execute against the
Agency Order in this instance. However,
the Solicited Order ‘stopped’ the
Agency Order when the order was
submitted into the Solicitation Auction
and would therefore execute against the
Agency Order if the Solicitation Auction
concludes before the expiration of the
Solicitation Auction period as the result
of a trading halt.
Furthermore, when Agency and
Solicited Orders are submitted into the
Solicitation Auction, the stop price
must be equal to or improve the NBBO
and be at least $0.01 better than any
public customer non-contingent limit
orders on the Phlx order book. The
Exchange believes that public customer
interest submitted to Phlx after
submission of the Agency and Solicited
Orders but prior to the trading halt
should not prevent the Agency Order
from being executed at the stop price
since such public customer interest was
not present at the time the Agency
Order was ‘stopped’ by the Solicited
Order.
Entry of an unrelated market or
marketable limit order on the opposite
side of the market from the Agency
Order received during the Solicitation
Auction would not cause the
Solicitation Auction to end early.
Rather, the unrelated order would
execute against interest outside the
Solicitation Auction (if marketable
against the PBBO) or would post to the
book and then route if eligible for
routing (in the case of an order
marketable against the NBBO but not
against the PBBO), pursuant to proposed
Rule 1081(ii)(D). If contracts remain
from such unrelated order at the time
the Solicitation Auction ends, the total
45 The Exchange’s PIXL auction features similar
functionality. Pursuant to Rule 1080(n)(ii)(C), in the
case of a trading halt on the Exchange in the
affected series, a PIXL Order will be executed solely
against the Initiating Order at the stop price and any
unexecuted PAN responses will be cancelled.
PO 00000
Frm 00142
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
5869
unexecuted volume of such unrelated
interest would be considered for
participation in the order allocation
process, regardless of the number of
contracts in relation to the Solicitation
Auction size, described in proposed
Rule 1081(ii)(E).46 The handling of
unrelated opposite side interest which
is received during the Solicitation
Auction is the same as the handling of
unrelated opposite side interest which
is received during a PIXL Auction.47
Participants submitting such unrelated
interest may not be aware that an
auction is in progress and should
therefore be able to access firm quotes
that comprise the NBBO without delay.
Considering such unrelated interest
which remains unexecuted upon receipt
for participation in the order allocation
process described in proposed Rule
1081(ii)(E) would increase the number
of contracts against which an Agency
Order could be executed, and should
therefore create more opportunities for
the Agency Order to be executed at
better prices.
Order Allocation
The allocation of orders executed
upon the conclusion of a Solicitation
Auction would depend upon whether
the Solicitation Auction has yielded
sufficient improving interest to improve
the price of the entire Agency Order. As
noted above, all contracts of the Agency
Order would trade at an improved price
against non-solicited contra-side interest
or, in the event of insufficient
improving interest to improve the price
of the entire Agency Order, at the stop
price against the Solicited Order.
Consideration of All-or-None Interest.
All-or-none interest of a size which
could potentially be executed consistent
with its all-or-none contingency is
considered when determining whether
there is sufficient size to execute
Agency Orders which are not Complex
Agency Orders at price(s) better than the
stop price. However, pursuant to
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(5), when
46 Similarly, pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(ii)(D), in the case of a Complex Solicitation
Auction, an unrelated market or marketable limit
Complex Order on the opposite side of the market
from the Complex Agency Order as well as orders
for the individual components of the unrelated
Complex Order received during the Complex
Solicitation Auction would not cause the Complex
Solicitation Auction to end early and would
execute against interest outside of the Complex
Solicitation Auction. If contracts remain from such
unrelated Complex Order at the time the Complex
Solicitation Auction ends, the total unexecuted
volume of such unrelated interest would be
considered for participation in the order allocation
process, regardless of the number of contracts in
relation to the Complex Solicitation Auction size,
described in proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E).
47 See Rule 1080(n)(ii)(D).
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
5870
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
determining if there is sufficient size to
execute Complex Agency Orders at a
price(s) better than the stop price, no
all-or-none interest of any size would be
considered. If there is sufficient size to
execute the entire Complex Agency
Order at a price(s) better than the stop
price irrespective of any all-or-none
interest that may be present, then all-ornone interest would be considered for
trade and executed if possible. This
difference in behavior is due to a system
limitation relating to all-or-none
Complex Orders.48 The Exchange
believes this behavior is not impactful
since all-or-none Complex Orders are
rare 49 and if sufficient size exists to
execute the entire Complex Agency
Order at an improved price, the all-ornone Complex Order would be
considered for trade and executed if
possible.
In all Solicitation Auctions, all-ornone interest would be executed
pursuant to normal priority rules,
except that it would not be executed if
the all-or-none contingency cannot be
satisfied. If an execution which can
adhere to the all-or-none contingency is
not possible, such all-or-none interest
would be ignored and would remain on
the order book or be cancelled if such
interest is an immediate or cancel order.
For example, assume an Agency
Order to buy 1000 contracts stopped by
a Solicited Order at $2.00 is entered
when the PBBO is $1.90–$2.10. Assume
that during the Solicitation Auction,
Responses are received to sell 700
contracts at $1.97 and sell 150 contracts
at $1.99. In addition, assume an order to
sell 300 contracts at $1.98 with an allor-none contingency is received. At the
end of the Solicitation Auction, the
system would consider the all-or-none
order when determining if there is
sufficient size to execute the Agency
Order at a price(s) better than the stop
price since the all-or-none contingency
can be satisfied by an execution. In this
example, at the end of the Solicitation
Auction, the Agency Order would
execute against improving interest with
700 contracts executing at $1.97 and 300
contracts (representing the all-or-none
order) executing at $1.98. Consider a
similar scenario whereby the Responses
received were to sell 700 contracts at
$1.97 and sell 300 contracts at $1.99 and
48 All-or-none simple orders reside with simple
orders on the book. By contrast, all-or-none
Complex Orders reside in a separate book, in a
different part of the trading system. Thus
aggregation of all-or-none Complex Orders with
other Complex Orders is a more difficult process
than aggregation of all-or-none simple orders with
other simple orders.
49 The Exchange reviewed six months of data
which showed that all-or-none Complex Orders
represented only 0.12% of all Complex Orders.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
an all-or-none order to sell 500 contracts
at $1.98 was received. In this scenario,
the system would not consider the allor-none order when determining if there
is sufficient size to execute the Agency
Order at a price(s) better than the stop
price since the all-or-or none
contingency cannot be satisfied by an
execution. However, excluding the allor-none order, the Agency Order can
still be satisfied at a price(s) better than
the stop price. In this scenario, at the
end of the Solicitation Auction, the
Agency Order would execute against
improving interest with 700 contracts
executing at $1.97 and 300 contracts
executing at $1.99. The 500 contract allor-none order does not execute because
the all-or-none contingency cannot be
satisfied.
Similarly, assume a Complex Agency
Order to buy 1000 contracts stopped by
a Complex Solicited Order at $2.00 is
entered when the cPBBO is $1.90–$2.10.
Assume that during the Solicitation
Auction a Response is received to sell
900 contracts at $1.98 and an all-ornone Complex Order is received to sell
150 contracts at $1.99. At the end of the
Solicitation Auction involving a
Complex Order, the system does not
consider all-or-none interest in
determining whether it can execute the
Complex Agency Order at a better price
than the stop price. In this case,
excluding the all-or-none Complex
Order, only 900 contracts are available
to sell at a better price than the stop
price. Therefore, the Complex Agency
Order would trade against the Solicited
Order at the $2.00 stop price. The allor-none contracts would not be
included because although more than
1000 contracts are offered at a better
price than the $2.00 stop price, the
system cannot both trade best prices
first and adhere to the contingency of
the all-or-none order while ensuring
that the Agency Order trades 1000
contracts. If, however, the example is
changed and Responses are received to
sell 900 contracts at $1.98 and sell 100
contracts at $1.99 and an order to sell
100 contracts at $1.98 all-or-none is
received, at the end of the Solicitation
Auction involving this Complex Order,
there is enough interest which is not allor-none to satisfy the Complex Agency
Order at a better price than the $2.00
stop price. Therefore, the Agency Order
would be executed against the 900 lot at
$1.98 and the remaining 100 contracts
executed against the all-or-none
Complex Order at $1.98.
Solicitation Auction with Sufficient
Improving Interest. Pursuant to the
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(1) algorithm,
if there is sufficient size (considering all
resting orders, quotes and Responses) to
PO 00000
Frm 00143
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
execute the entire Agency Order at a
price or prices better than the stop price,
the Agency Order would be executed
against such better priced interest with
public customers having priority at each
price level. After public customer
interest at a particular price level has
been satisfied, including all-or-none
orders with a size which can be
satisfied, remaining contracts would be
allocated among all Exchange quotes,
orders and Responses in accordance
with Rules 1014(g)(vii)(B)(1)(b) and (d),
and the Solicited Order would be
cancelled.50
Example of Solicitation Auction with
Sufficient Improving Interest. To
illustrate a case where a Solicitation
Auction yields enough improving
interest to better the stop price and the
application of the proposed Rule
1081(ii)(E)(1) algorithm, assume the
NBBO is $0.95–$1.03, and a buy side
Agency Order for 1000 contracts is
50 Similarly, pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(ii)(E)(3), in the case of a Complex Solicitation
Auction, if there is sufficient size (considering
resting Complex Orders and Responses) to execute
the entire Complex Agency Order at a price(s) better
than the stop price, the Complex Agency Order
would be executed against better priced Complex
Orders, Responses, as well as quotes and orders
which comprise the cPBBO at the end of the
Complex Solicitation Auction. (The cPBBO is not
considered in determining whether there is
sufficient improving size because the market and/
or size of the individual components can change
between the calculation of sufficient size and the
actual execution.) Such interest would be allocated
at a given price in the following order: (i) to public
customer Complex Orders and Responses in time
priority; (ii) to SQT, RSQT, and non-SQT ROT
Complex Orders and Responses on a size pro-rata
basis; (iii) to non-market maker off-floor brokerdealer Complex Orders and Responses on a size
pro-rata basis, and (iv) to quotes and orders which
comprise the cPBBO at the end of the Complex
Solicitation Auction with public customer interest
being satisfied first in time priority, then to SQT,
RSQT, and non-SQT ROT interest satisfied on a size
pro-rata basis, and lastly to non-market maker offfloor broker-dealers on a size pro-rata basis. This
allocation methodology is consistent with the
allocation methodology utilized for a Complex
Order executed in PIXL. In addition, providing
public customer’s with priority over SQT, RSQT,
and non-SQT ROTs, who in turn have priority over
non-market maker off-floor broker-dealers is the
same priority scheme used for regular orders. See
Rule 1014(g).
When determining if there is sufficient size to
execute the entire Complex Agency Order at a
price(s) better than the stop price, if the short sale
price test in Rule 201 of Regulation SHO is triggered
for a covered security, Complex Orders and
Responses which are marked ‘‘short’’ will not be
considered because of the possibility that a short
sale price restriction may apply during the interval
between assessing for adequate size and the
execution of the Complex Agency Order. However,
if there is sufficient size to execute the entire
Complex Agency Order at a price(s) better than the
stop price irrespective of any covered securities for
which the price test is triggered that may be
present, then all Complex Orders and Responses
which are marked ‘‘short’’ will be considered for
allocation in accordance with proposed Rule
1081(ii)(J)(3).
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
submitted with a contra-side Solicited
Order to stop the Agency Order at $1.00.
During the Solicitation Auction, assume
a market maker (‘‘MM1’’) Response is
submitted to sell 800 contracts at $0.97,
a broker-dealer Response is submitted to
sell 100 contracts at $0.99, and a public
customer sends in an order, outside of
the Solicitation Auction, to sell 100
contracts at $0.99. Upon receipt of the
public customer order, the NBBO
changes to $0.95–$0.99. In addition,
assume two market makers send in
quotes of $0.95–$0.99 during the
Solicitation Auction. Market Maker 2
(‘‘MM2’’) quotes $0.95–$0.99 with 100
contracts and Market Maker 3 (‘‘MM3’’)
quotes $0.95–$0.99 with 50 contracts.
At the end of the Solicitation Auction,
since there is enough interest to execute
the entire Agency Order at a price(s)
better than the stop price, the Agency
Order would be executed against the
better priced interest as follows:
— the Agency Order trades 800
contracts at $0.97 against MM1
Response;
— the Agency Order trades 100
contracts at $0.99 against public
customer;
— the Agency Order trades 67
contracts at $0.99 against MM2 quote
(pro-rata allocation); and
— the Agency Order trades 33
contracts at $0.99 against MM3 quote
(pro-rata allocation).
The broker-dealer does not trade any
contracts since broker-dealer orders
execute only after all public customer
and market maker interest is satisfied.
The unexecuted Solicited Order and
broker-dealer Response are cancelled
back to the sending participants.51
51 To illustrate a Complex Solicitation Auction
with enough improving interest and the operation
of proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(3), assume that a
Complex Order to buy one of option A and sell one
of option B, 1000 times, with a cPBBO of $0.40 bid,
$0.70 offer, is submitted with a stop price of $0.65.
Assume that during the Solicitation Auction, the
following Responses and order interest are received:
a market maker (‘‘MM1’’) responds to sell the
strategy 100 times at a price of $0.55; MM1
responds to sell the strategy 100 times at a price of
$0.60; a broker-dealer responds to sell the strategy
400 times at a price of $0.60; a public customer
Complex Order to sell the strategy 300 times at a
price of $0.60; and another market maker (‘‘MM2’’)
responds to sell the strategy 200 times at $0.60.
After all these Responses and orders are received,
option A of the simple market moves causing the
cPBBO to become offered 200 times at $0.60.
Option A is quoted in the simple market as $1.00–
$1.10 and Option B is quoted in the simple market
as $0.50–$0.60. At the end of the Solicitation
Auction, the Complex Agency Order would be
executed as follows: the Complex Agency Order
trades 100 contracts at $0.55 against MM1; the
Complex Agency Order trades 300 contracts at
$0.60 against public customer; the Complex Agency
Order trades 100 contracts at $0.60 against MM1;
the Complex Agency Order trades 200 contracts at
$0.60 against MM2; the Complex Agency Order
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
Solicitation Auction with Insufficient
Improving Interest. Pursuant to
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(2), if there is
not sufficient size (considering all
resting orders, quotes and Responses) to
execute the entire Agency Order at a
price(s) better than the stop price, the
Agency Order would be executed
against the Solicited Order at the stop
price provided such price is better than
the limit of any public customer order
(excluding all-or-none) on the limit
order book, on either the same side as
or the opposite side of the Agency
Order, and equal to or better than the
contra-side PBBO.52 Otherwise, both the
Agency Order and Solicited Order
would be cancelled without a trade
occurring. This proposed behavior
ensures non-contingent public customer
orders on the limit order book maintain
priority. While the Exchange recognizes
that at least one other solicitation
mechanism offered by another exchange
considers public customer orders on the
limit order book at the stop price when
determining if there is sufficient
improving interest to satisfy the Agency
Order, the proposed solicitation
mechanism offered on Phlx would not
consider such interest.53 The Exchange
believes that requiring the stop price to
be at least $0.01 better than any public
customer interest on the limit order
book ensures public customer priority of
existing interest and in turn provides
the Solicited Order participant certainty
that if an execution occurs at the stop
price, such execution would represent
trades 300 contracts at $0.60 against the brokerdealer; and the Solicited Order and the residual
unexecuted contracts of the broker-dealer Response
are cancelled.
52 Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(2) does not apply to
Complex Solicitation Auctions. Rather, a parallel
provision, proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(4), provides
that in a Complex Solicitation Auction, if there is
not sufficient size (considering resting Complex
Orders and Responses) to execute the entire
Complex Agency Order at a price(s) better than the
stop price, the Complex Agency Order would be
executed against the Solicited Order at the stop
price, provided such stop price is better than the
limit of any public customer Complex Order
(excluding all-or-none) on the Complex Order book,
better than the cPBBO when a public customer
order (excluding all-or-none) is resting on the book
in any component of the Complex Agency Order,
and equal to or better than the cPBBO on the
opposite side of the Complex Agency Order. This
proposed behavior ensures non-contingent public
customers on the limit order book maintain priority.
Otherwise, both the Complex Agency Order and the
Solicited Order would be cancelled with no trade
occurring.
53 See ISE Rule 716(e)(2)(i) which provides in part
that in the case of insufficient improving interest
‘‘[i]f there are Priority Customer Orders on the
Exchange on the opposite side of the Agency Order
at the proposed execution price and there is
sufficient size to execute the entire size of the
Agency Order, the Agency Order will be executed
against the bid or offer, and the solicited order will
be cancelled.’’
PO 00000
Frm 00144
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
5871
the Solicited Order and not interest
which arrived after the Solicited Order
participant stopped the Agency Order
for its entire size.
Example of Solicitation Auction with
Insufficient Improving Interest. To
illustrate a case where the Solicitation
Auction has not yielded sufficient
interest to improve the price for the
entire Agency Order, assume the NBBO
is $0.97–$1.03, and a buy side Agency
Order for 1000 contracts is submitted
with a contra-side Solicited Order to
stop the Agency Order at $1.00. During
the Solicitation Auction, assume a
Response is submitted to sell 100
contracts at $0.97 and another to sell
100 contracts at $0.99. At the end of the
Solicitation Auction period, since there
is not enough interest to execute the
entire Agency Order at a price(s) better
than the stop price, the Agency Order
would be executed at $1.00 against the
Solicited Order. The unexecuted
Responses are then cancelled back to
the sending participant.54
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(6) provides
that a single quote, order or Response
shall not be allocated a number of
contracts that is greater than its size.
Finally, proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(7)
provides that a Complex Agency Order
consisting of a stock/ETF component
would not execute against interest
comprising the cPBBO at the end of the
Complex Solicitation Auction.55
Legging of a stock/ETF component
would introduce the risk of a participant
not receiving an execution on all
components of the Complex Order and
is therefore not considered as a means
54 To illustrate a Complex Solicitation Auction
that yields insufficient improving interest and the
operation of proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(4), assume a
Complex Order to buy one of option A and sell one
of option B, 1000 times, with a cPBBO of $0.40 bid,
$0.70 offer, is submitted with a stop price of $0.65.
Assume that during the Complex Solicitation
Auction, the following Responses and order interest
are received: a market maker (‘‘MM1’’) responds to
sell the strategy 100 times at a price of $0.55; MM1
responds to sell the strategy 100 times at a price of
$0.60; a broker-dealer responds to sell the strategy
300 times at a price of $0.60; and another market
maker (‘‘MM2’’) responds to sell the strategy 200
times at $0.60.
At the end of the Complex Solicitation Auction,
since there is not sufficient size to execute the
entire Complex Agency Order at a price(s) better
than the stop price, the Complex Agency Order
executes at the stop price of $0.65 against the
Solicited Order. All unexecuted Responses are
cancelled back to the sending participants.
55 This provision parallels PIXL Rule
1080(n)(ii)(E)(2)(g) and is being proposed for the
same reasons explained in the Complex PIXL
Filing. This limitation is also consistent with the
handling of Complex Orders that include a stock/
ETF component and are entered into the Phlx XL
system. Commentary .08(a)(i) to Rule 1080 states,
for example, that stock-option orders can only be
executed against other stock-option orders and
cannot be executed by the System against orders for
the individual components.
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
5872
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
of executing a Complex Order which
includes a stock/ETF component. The
Exchange believes that introducing the
risk of inability to fully execute a
complex strategy is counterproductive
to, and inconsistent with, the effort to
allow Complex Orders in the
solicitation mechanism.
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Miscellaneous Provisions
Proposed Rules 1081(ii)(F) through (I)
address the handling of the Agency
Order and other orders, quotes and
Responses when certain conditions are
present. Pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(ii)(F), if the market moves
following the receipt of a Response,
such that there are Responses that cross
the then-existing NBBO (provided such
NBBO is not crossed) at the time of the
conclusion of the Solicitation Auction,
such Responses would be executed, if
possible, at their limit price(s).56 Since
Responses may be cancelled at any time
prior to the conclusion of the
Solicitation Auction, the Exchange
believes that this behavior is, at best,
highly unlikely as participants would
cancel Responses when better priced
interest that they could trade against is
present in the marketplace. This
behavior is consistent with the current
handling of PAN Responses in a PIXL
Auction.
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(G) provides
that if the Solicitation Auction price
when trading against non-solicited
interest (except if it is a Complex
Solicitation Auction) would be the same
as or cross the limit of an order
(excluding an all-or-none order) on the
limit order book on the same side of the
market as the Agency Order, the Agency
Order may only be executed at a price
that is at least $0.01 better than the
resting order’s limit price provided such
execution price improves the stop price.
If such execution price would not
improve the stop price, the Agency
Order would be executed at a price
which is $0.01 better for the Agency
Order than the stop price provided the
price does not equal or cross a public
customer order and is equal to or
improves upon the PBBO on the
opposite side of the Agency Order.57 If
56 Similarly, in the case of a Complex Solicitation
Auction, if there are Responses that cross the thenexisting cPBBO at the time of conclusion of the
Complex Solicitation Auction, such Responses
would be executed, if possible, at their limit prices.
This provision parallels PIXL Rule 1080(n)(ii)(F).
57 See also PIXL Rule 1080(n)(ii)(H). Proposed
Rule 1081(ii)(G) does not apply to Complex
Solicitation Auctions. Rather, a parallel provision,
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(H), provides that if the
Complex Solicitation Auction price when trading
against non-solicited interest would be the same as
or cross the limit of that of a Complex Order
(excluding all-or-none) on the Complex Order Book
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
such price is not possible, the Agency
Order and Solicited Order would be
cancelled with no trade occurring. For
example, assume the NBBO is $1.03–
$1.10 when an order is submitted into
the Solicitation Auction, that the
Agency Order is buying and that the
order is stopped at $1.05. The $1.03 bid
is an order on Phlx. During the
Solicitation Auction a Response arrives
to sell at $1.03. At the end of the
Solicitation Auction, if the Response to
sell at $1.03 can fully satisfy the Agency
Order, the auction price would be $1.03
but, since that price is the same as the
price of a resting order on the book, the
Agency Order would trade against the
Response at $1.04 (an improvement of
$0.01 over the resting order’s limit). By
contrast, assume a case where the NBBO
is $1.03–$1.10 and where during the
Auction an unrelated non-customer
order to pay $1.04 is received. This
order rests on the book and the NBBO
becomes $1.04–$1.10. Assume the same
stop price of $1.05 for an Agency Order
to buy, and the receipt of a Response to
sell at $1.04 which can fully satisfy the
Agency order. At the end of the
Solicitation Auction, the auction price
would be $1.04 which equals the resting
order on the book. In this case, if the
trade were executed with $0.01
improvement over the resting order
limit (that is, if the trade were executed
at $1.05) the execution would be at the
stop price. The system would not
consider the origin of the resting order
but ensures the priority of such order,
regardless of origin by requiring that any
execution occur at a price which
improves upon the limit of a resting
order by at least $0.01. In addition, the
system only would permit the Solicited
Order and no other interest to trade
against the Agency Order at the stop
price since the Solicited Order stopped
the entire size Agency Order at a price
which was required upon receipt to be
equal to or improve the NBBO and to be
at least $0.01 improvement over any
public customer orders resting on the
on the same side of the market as the Complex
Agency Order, the Complex Agency Order may only
be executed at a price that improves the resting
order’s limit price by at least $0.01, provided such
execution price improves the stop price. If such
execution price would be equal to or would not
improve the stop price, the Agency Order would be
executed $0.01 better than the stop price provided
the price does not equal or cross a non-all-or-none
public customer Complex Order or a non-all-ornone public customer order present in the cPBBO
on the same side as the Complex Agency Order in
a component of the Complex Order Strategy and is
equal to or better than the cPBBO on the opposite
side of the Complex Agency Order. If such price is
not possible, the Agency Order and Solicited Order
would be cancelled with no trade occurring. This
functionality is consistent with that of Complex
PIXL auctions.
PO 00000
Frm 00145
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Phlx limit order book, thereby
establishing priority at the stop price.
Therefore, the execution price in this
case ($1.04) would be $0.01 better than
the stop price. This system logic ensures
that the Agency Order receives a better
priced execution than the stop price
when trading against interest other than
the Solicited Order.
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(I) provides
that any unexecuted Responses or
Solicited Orders would be cancelled at
the end of the Solicitation Auction. This
behavior is consistent with the handling
of unexecuted PAN Responses and
Initiating Orders in PIXL.58 Both
Responses and Solicited Orders are
specifically entered into the Solicitation
Auction to trade against the Agency
Order. The Exchange believes that
cancelling the unexecuted portion of
Responses and Solicited Orders is
consistent with the expected behavior of
such interest by the submitting
participants.
Complex Agency Orders With Stock/
ETF Components
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J) deals with
Complex Agency Orders with stock or
ETF components and generally tracks
Rule 1080(n)(ii)(J) applicable to PIXL.
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J)(1) states that
member organizations may only submit
Complex Agency Orders, Complex
Solicited Orders, Complex Orders and/
or Responses with a stock/ETF
component if such orders/Responses
comply with the Qualified Contingent
Trade Exemption from Rule 611(a) of
Regulation NMS pursuant to the Act.
Member organizations submitting such
orders with a stock/ETF component
represent that such orders comply with
the Qualified Contingent Trade
Exemption. Members of FINRA or the
NASDAQ Stock Market (‘‘NASDAQ’’)
are required to have a Uniform Service
Bureau/Executing Broker Agreement
(‘‘AGU’’) with Nasdaq Execution
Services LLC (‘‘NES’’) in order to trade
orders containing a stock/ETF
component; firms that are not members
of FINRA or NASDAQ are required to
have a Qualified Special Representative
(‘‘QSR’’) arrangement with NES in order
to trade orders containing a stock/ETF
component.
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J)(2) provides
that where one component of a Complex
Agency Order, Complex Solicited Order,
Complex Order or Response is the
underlying security, the Exchange shall
electronically communicate the
underlying security component of the
Complex Agency Order (together with
the Complex Solicited Order or
58 See
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
Rule 1080(n)(ii)(I).
03FEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
Response, as applicable) to NES, its
designated broker-dealer, for immediate
execution.
Such execution and reporting would
occur otherwise than on the Exchange
and would be handled by NES pursuant
to applicable rules regarding equity
trading.
Finally, proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J)(3)
states that when the short sale price test
in Rule 201 of Regulation SHO 59 is
triggered for a covered security, NES
would not execute a short sale order in
the underlying covered security
component of a Complex Agency Order,
Complex Solicited Order, Complex
Order or Response if the price is equal
to or below the current national best
bid.60 However, NES would execute a
short sale order in the underlying
covered security component of a
Complex Agency Order, Complex
Solicited Order, Complex Order or
Response if such order is marked ‘‘short
exempt,’’ regardless of whether it is at
a price that is equal to or below the
current national best bid.61 If NES could
not execute the underlying covered
security component of a Complex
Agency Order, Complex Solicited Order,
Complex Order or Response in
accordance with Rule 201 of Regulation
SHO, the Exchange would cancel back
the Complex Agency Order, Complex
Solicited Order, Complex Order or
Response to the entering member
organization. For purposes of this
paragraph, the term ‘‘covered security’’
has the same meaning as in Rule
201(a)(1) of Regulation SHO.62
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Regulatory Issues
The proposed rule change contains
two paragraphs describing prohibited
practices when participants use the
solicitation mechanism. These new
59 17 CFR 242.201. See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 61595 (February 26, 2010), 75 FR 11232
(March 10, 2010). See also Division of Trading and
Markets: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions
Concerning Rule 201 of Regulation SHO, January
20, 2011 (‘‘SHO FAQs’’) at www.sec.gov/divisions/
marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm.
60 The term ‘‘national best bid’’ is defined in SEC
Rule 201(a)(4). 17 CFR 242.201(a)(4).
61 The Exchange notes that a broker or dealer may
mark a sell order ‘‘short exempt’’ only if the
provisions of SEC Rule 201(c) or (d) are met. 17 CFR
242.200(g)(2). Since NES and the Exchange do not
display the stock or ETF portion of a Complex
Order, however, a broker-dealer should not mark
the short sale order ‘‘short exempt’’ under Rule
201(c). See SHO FAQs Question and Answer Nos.
4.2, 5.4, and 5.5. See also Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 63967 (February 25, 2011), 76 FR 12206
(March 4, 2011) (SR-Phlx-2011–27) (discussing,
among other things, Complex Orders marked ‘‘short
exempt’’) and the Complex PIXL Filing. The system
would handle short sales of the orders and
Responses described herein the same way it
handles the short sales discussed in the Complex
PIXL Filing.
62 17 CFR 242.201(a)(4).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
provisions track similar provisions in
the PIXL rule.63
Proposed Rule 1081(iii) states that the
Solicitation Auction may be used only
where there is a genuine intention to
execute a bona fide transaction. It would
be considered a violation of proposed
Rule 1081 and would be deemed
conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade and a
violation of Rule 707 if an Initiating
Member submits an Agency Order
(thereby initiating a Solicitation
Auction) and also submits its own
Response in the same Solicitation
Auction. The purpose of this provision
is to prevent Solicited Members from
submitting an inaccurate or misleading
stop price or trying to improve their
allocation entitlement by participating
with multiple expressions of interest.
Proposed Rule 1081(iv) states that a
pattern or practice of submitting
unrelated orders or quotes that cross the
stop price causing a Solicitation
Auction to conclude before the end of
the Solicitation Auction period would
be deemed conduct inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade
and a violation of Rule 707.
Definition of Professional in Rule
1000(b)(14)
In addition to proposing Rule 1081,
the Exchange also proposes an
amendment to Rule 1000(b)(14). In
2010, the Exchange amended its priority
rules to give certain non-broker-dealer
orders the same priority as broker-dealer
orders. In so doing, the Exchange
adopted a new defined term, the
‘‘professional,’’ for certain persons or
entities.64 Rule 1000(b)(14) defines
professional as a person or entity that (i)
is not a broker or dealer in securities,
and (ii) places more than 390 orders in
listed options per day on average during
a calendar month for its own beneficial
account(s). A professional account is
treated in the same manner as an offfloor broker-dealer for purposes of Phlx
Rule 1014(g), to which the trade
allocation algorithm described in
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(1) refers.
However, Rule 1000(b)(14) also
currently states that all-or-none
professional orders would be treated
like customer orders. The Exchange
proposes to amend Rule 1000(b)(14) by
(i) specifying that orders submitted
pursuant to Rule 1081 for the accounts
of professionals would be treated in the
same manner as off-floor broker-dealer
orders for purposes of Rule 1014(g), and
63 See
Rules 1080(n)(iii) and (iv).
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61802
(March 30, 2010), 75 FR 17193 (April 5, 2010)
(approving SR–Phlx–2010–05).
64 See
PO 00000
Frm 00146
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
5873
(ii) adding proposed Rule 1081 to the
list of rules for the purpose of which a
professional would be treated in the
same manner as an off-floor brokerdealer. The effect of these changes to
Rule 1014 is that professionals would
not receive the same priority afforded to
public customers in a Solicitation
Auction under proposed Rule 1081, and
instead would be treated as brokerdealers in this regard.
III. Proceedings to Determine Whether
to Approve or Disapprove SR–Phlx–
2014–66 and Grounds for Disapproval
Under Consideration
The Commission is instituting
proceedings pursuant to Section
19(b)(2)(B) of the Act 65 to determine
whether the proposed rule change
should be approved or disapproved.66
Institution of such proceedings is
appropriate at this time in view of the
legal and policy issues that are raised by
the proposal and are discussed below.
Institution of proceedings does not
indicate that the Commission has
reached any conclusions with respect to
any of the issues involved. Rather, as
described in greater detail below, the
Commission seeks and encourages
interested persons to comment on the
proposal and inform the Commission’s
analysis whether to approve or
disapprove the proposed rule change.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the
Act, the Commission is providing notice
of the grounds for disapproval under
consideration. The Commission is
instituting proceedings to allow for
additional analysis of, and input from,
commenters with regard to the proposed
rule change’s consistency with Section
6 of the Act, and in particular Sections
6(b)(5).67 Section 6(b)(5) requires that
the rules of an exchange be designed,
among other things, to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to remove
impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market
and a national market system and, in
general, to protect investors and the
public interest; and are not designed to
65 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
19(b)(2)(B) of the Act provides that
proceedings to determine whether to disapprove a
proposed rule change must be concluded within
180 days of the date of publication of notice of the
filing of the proposed rule change. The time for
conclusion of the proceedings may be extended for
up to an additional 60 days if the Commission finds
good cause for such extension and publishes its
reasons for so finding or if the self-regulatory
organization consents to the extension.
67 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
66 Section
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
5874
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.68
IV. Procedure: Request for Written
Comments
The Commission requests that
interested persons provide written
submissions of their views, data and
arguments with respect to the concerns
identified above, as well as any others
they may have with the proposal. In
particular, the Commission invites the
written views of interested persons
concerning whether the proposed rule
change is inconsistent with Section 6 or
any other provision, of the Act, or the
rules and regulations thereunder.
Although there do not appear to be any
issues relevant to approval or
disapproval that would be facilitated by
an oral presentation of views, data, and
arguments, the Commission will
consider, pursuant to Rule 19b-4, any
request for an opportunity to make an
oral presentation.69
In addition to any other facets of the
proposal on which persons may seek to
comment, the Commission is soliciting
the views of interested persons
regarding provisions of the proposed
rule change concerning the handling of
all-or-none orders. The Commission
notes that, in the case of a Solicitation
Auction for simple orders, all interest
on the opposite side of the Agency
Order would be considered in
determining whether the price has been
improved for the full size of the Agency
Order.70 However, in the case of a
Complex Order auction, all-or-none
interest would not be considered.71 As
discussed above, the Exchange explains
that this difference is due to a system
limitation relating to all-or-none
Complex Orders: ‘‘All-or-none simple
orders reside with simple orders on the
book. By contrast, all-or-none Complex
Orders reside in a separate book, in a
different part of the trading system.
Thus aggregation of all-or-none
Complex Orders with other Complex
Orders in order to determine the
presence of sufficient improving interest
is a more difficult process than
aggregation of all-or-none simple orders
with other simple orders.’’
68 15
U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
19(b)(2) of the Act, as amended by the
Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94–29
(June 4, 1975), grants the Commission flexibility to
determine what type of proceeding—either oral or
notice and opportunity for written comments—is
appropriate for consideration of a particular
proposal by a self-regulatory organization. See
Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No.
75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975).
70 See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(1).
71 See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(5).
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
69 Section
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
The Commission notes the impact
that the proposed difference in
treatment of all-or-none Complex Orders
would have. For example, if a proposed
cross was submitted to the Solicitation
Auction for 1000 contracts at a certain
price, and during the auction period an
all-or-none order for the full 1000
contracts was received by the Exchange
in its Complex Order book at a superior
price, the Agency Order nonetheless
would be awarded to the solicited party
at the stop price. As discussed above,
Phlx argues that not counting all-ornone interest in the case of all-or-none
Complex Orders would not be
impactful, maintaining that all-or-none
Complex Orders are rare.72
The Commission seeks comment on
this feature of the Solicitation
Mechanism. The Commission notes that
a critical factor in its consideration of
prior solicited order mechanism
proposals has been whether the Agency
Order was adequately exposed to all
potential price improvement before the
Solicited Order may trade against it at
the proposed cross price.
In addition, the Commission seeks
comment on the proposal’s
consideration of all-or-none orders that
are resting on the book at the stop price
at the conclusion of the auction (in both
simple and Complex Order
solicitations). The proposed rules
provide, generally, that if, upon the
conclusion of an auction, a public
customer order is resting on the book
opposite the Agency Order at the
Solicited Order’s stop price, both the
Solicited Order and the Agency Order
are canceled. However, if the public
customer order was an all-or-none
order, the proposal provides that the
execution of the Solicited Order against
the Agency Order can take place.73 The
Commission understands this result to
apply even if the size of the all-or-none
public customer order was such that it
otherwise would be eligible to trade
against the Agency Order. The
Commission seeks commenters’ views
on this feature of the Solicitation
Mechanism.74
The Commission further requests
commenters’ views on Phlx’s proposed
cancellation of the Agency Order (along
72 The Exchange states that it reviewed six
months of data which showed that all-or-none
Complex Orders represented only 0.12% of all
Complex Orders. See supra note 49. The Exchange
also notes that the proposed rule provides that, if
sufficient size exists to execute the entire Complex
Agency Order at an improved price, an all-or-none
Complex Order would be considered for trade and
executed if possible.
73 See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(2).
74 See also supra, text accompanying footnote 30,
regarding deference to all-or-none orders in the
context of crossing two public customer orders.
PO 00000
Frm 00147
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
with the Solicited Order) in certain
cases where non-solicited interest is
present that could fill the Agency Order.
The Commission notes, for example,
one result of proposed Rule 1081(ii)(G),
which concerns a situation (in the case
of simple orders) where the nonsolicited interest has improved the price
to a price that is the same as, or would
cross, the limit of an order on the limit
order book on the same side of the
market as the Agency Order. The
Commission understands the proposed
rule as providing that the Agency Order
would be permitted to be executed only
at a price that is at least $0.01 better
(i.e., toward the opposite side) than the
resting order’s limit price. However, if
that price, as adjusted by $.01, would be
equal to (i.e., would not improve) the
stop price, the non-solicited interest
would not be permitted to execute
against the Agency Order at that price.
In such case, as the Commission
understands the proposal, the price
would be adjusted back to $.01 better
(for the Agency Order) than the stop
price, but only if the resting limit order
on the Agency Order side is not a public
customer order. Otherwise, the Agency
Order and Solicited Order would be
cancelled with no trade occurring.
With respect to this cancellation
scenario, as discussed above, Phlx
explains that ‘‘the system only would
permit the Solicited Order and no other
interest to trade against the Agency
Order at the stop price since the
Solicited Order stopped the entire size
Agency Order at a price which was
required upon receipt to be equal to or
improve the NBBO and to be at least
$0.01 improvement over any public
customer orders resting on the Phlx
limit order book, thereby establishing
priority at the stop price.’’ The
Commission seeks comment on this
rationale and its result.
Another example concerns a case
where, at the conclusion of the auction
period, a public customer order is
resting on the book on the opposite side
of the Agency Order at the stop price.
As noted by the Exchange, its proposed
rule and another exchange’s solicited
order mechanism rule 75 prohibit the
execution of the Solicited Order in such
a case. However, the proposed Phlx rule
differs from the other exchange’s rule in
a case where, in addition to the public
customer order at the stop price, there
is price-improving interest of a size that
is of insufficient size to fill the entire
Agency Order on its own, but, when
aggregated with the size of the public
customer order, could fill the Agency
75 See ISE Rule 716(e), Solicited Order
Mechanism.
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
Order. On the other exchange, while the
Solicited Order is cancelled, the public
customer order at the stop price and the
improving interest trade against the
Agency Order. Under the Phlx’s
proposal, the Agency Order and
Solicited Order are cancelled.
The Exchange explains that its system
‘‘only permits the Solicited Order and
no other interest to trade against the
Agency Order at the stop price, thus
ensuring that the Agency Order receives
a better priced execution than the stop
price when trading against interest other
than the Solicited Order.’’ The
Commission notes that, when there is a
public customer order on the book at the
stop price, the Solicited Order would
not be permitted to trade in any case,
because a public customer on the book
cannot be bypassed by another order.
The Commission seeks comment on the
aspect of the Exchange’s proposal that
would cancel the Agency Order and the
Solicited Order in a case where there is
public customer interest at the stop
price, and together with any improving
interest, the Agency Order otherwise
could be satisfied.
The Commission further seeks
commenters’ views regarding the
proposal’s provisions regarding
participation and priority in the
allocation of the Agency Order, with
respect to the Solicited Order and with
respect to Responses, quotes and orders.
For example, under the proposal, one
of the scenarios in which a Solicitation
Auction would conclude early is if there
is a trading halt on the Exchange in the
option series that is the subject of the
auction.76 In such case, the Exchange’s
proposal provides that the entire
Agency Order would be executed solely
against the Solicited Order at the stop
price, and any unexecuted Responses
would be cancelled.77 The Commission
notes that there can be instances in
which an unrelated order on the side
opposite the Agency Order has arrived
on the Exchange and is resting on the
book at a price that is superior to the
stop price (from the point of view of the
Agency Order) when the trading halt
occurs. By crossing the Agency Order
against the Solicited Order at the stop
price in this situation, the Exchange
would be executing a trade at a price
that is inferior to a price on the
Exchange’s book. As noted above, the
Exchange believes that public customer
interest submitted to Phlx after
76 See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(B)(4). The
described scenario applies in a simple Solicitation
Auction. In a Complex Solicitation Auction, the
auction would end early any time there is a trading
halt on the Exchange in any component of the
Complex Agency Order. Id.
77 See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(C).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
submission of the Agency and Solicited
Orders but prior to the trading halt
should not prevent the Agency Order
from being executed at the stop price
since such public customer interest was
not present at the time the Agency
Order was ‘stopped’ by the Solicited
Order.78 The Commission solicits
comment on this functionality and the
Exchange’s rationale.
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views and
arguments regarding whether the
proposed rule change should be
approved or disapproved by [insert date
21 days from publication in the Federal
Register]. Any person who wishes to file
a rebuttal to any other person’s
submission must file that rebuttal by
[insert date 35 days from publication in
the Federal Register].
Comments may be submitted by any
of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s Internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
Phlx–2014–66 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street
NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–Phlx–2014–66. This file
number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
78 In explaining generally why Responses and
other interest present in the system would not be
considered for trading against the Agency Order in
the case of a trading halt—which, the Commission
notes, would apply even when the aggregate of such
Responses and other interest was sufficient to fill
the entire Agency Order at an improved price—the
Exchange stated that ‘‘this is appropriate since the
participants representing tradable interest in the
Solicitation Auction have not ‘stopped’ the Agency
Order in its entirety and would have no means after
the auction executions occur to offset the trading
risk they would incur because the market is halted
if they were permitted to trade against the Agency
Order in this instance.’’
PO 00000
Frm 00148
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
5875
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change;
the Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from
submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make
publicly available. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR–Phlx–
2014–66 and should be submitted on or
before February 24, 2015. If comments
are received, any rebuttal comments
should be submitted by March 10, 2015.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.79
Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015–02017 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Reporting and Recordkeeping
Requirements Under OMB Review
Small Business Administration.
30-Day notice.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Small Business
Administration (SBA) is publishing this
notice to comply with requirements of
the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) (44
U.S.C. Chapter 35), which requires
agencies to submit proposed reporting
and recordkeeping requirements to
OMB for review and approval, and to
publish a notice in the Federal Register
notifying the public that the agency has
made such a submission. This notice
also allows an additional 30 days for
public comments.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
March 5, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to
the information collection by name and/
or OMB Control Number and should be
sent to: Agency Clearance Officer, Curtis
Rich, Small Business Administration,
409 3rd Street SW., 5th Floor,
Washington, DC 20416; and SBA Desk
Officer, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, New
Executive Office Building, Washington,
DC 20503.
SUMMARY:
79 17
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
CFR 200.30–3(a)(57).
03FEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 22 (Tuesday, February 3, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 5865-5875]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-02017]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-74167; File No. SR-Phlx-2014-66]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC; Order
Instituting Proceedings To Determine Whether To Approve or Disapprove a
Proposed Rule Change To Adopt New Exchange Rule 1081, Solicitation
Mechanism, To Introduce a New Electronic Solicitation Mechanism
January 28, 2015.
I. Introduction
On October 14, 2014, NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC (``Exchange'' or ``Phlx'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission''),
pursuant
[[Page 5866]]
to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'')
\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a proposed rule change to adopt new
Exchange Rule 1081, Solicitation Mechanism, to introduce a new
electronic solicitation mechanism pursuant to which a member can
electronically submit all-or-none orders of 500 contracts or more (or,
in the case of mini options, 5000 contracts or more) that the member
represents as agent against contra orders that the member solicited.
The proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal
Register on October 31, 2014.\3\ On December 8, 2014, the Commission
extended the time period in which to either approve the proposed rule
change, disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute proceedings
to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed rule change
to January 29, 2015.\4\ The Commission has received no comment letters
on the proposal. This order institutes proceedings under Section
19(b)(2)(B) of the Act \5\ to determine whether to approve or
disapprove the proposed rule change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73441 (October 27,
2014), 79 FR 64862 (``Notice'').
\4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73791 (December 8,
2014), 79 FR 73924 (December 12, 2014).
\5\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Description of the Proposal
The Exchange proposes to adopt new Rule 1081, Solicitation
Mechanism, to introduce a new electronic solicitation mechanism
pursuant to which a member can electronically submit all-or-none orders
of 500 contracts or more (or, in the case of mini options, 5000
contracts or more) that the member represents as agent against contra
orders that the member solicited. Currently, under Phlx Rule
1080(c)(ii)(C)(2), Order Entry Firms \6\ must expose orders they
represent as agent for at least one second before such orders may be
automatically executed, in whole or in part, against orders solicited
from members and non-member broker-dealers to transact with such
orders.\7\ The proposed rule change would provide an alternative
method, enabling a member to electronically execute orders it
represents on behalf of a public customer, broker-dealer, or any other
entity (an ``Agency Order'') \8\ against solicited limit orders of a
public customer, broker-dealer, or any other entity (a ``Solicited
Order'') through a solicitation mechanism designed for this purpose.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Rule 1080(c)(ii)(A)(1) defines ``Order Entry Firm'' as a
member organization of the Exchange that is able to route orders to
AUTOM. (AUTOM is the Exchange's electronic quoting and trading
system, which has been denoted in Exchange rules as XL II, XL and
AUTOM.)
\7\ Section (c), Solicited Orders, of Rule 1064, Crossing,
Facilitation and Solicited Orders, governs execution of solicited
orders by open outcry, on the Exchange trading floor, and is
unaffected by proposed Rule 1081. The Exchange states that many
aspects of the functionality of the proposed solicitation mechanism
are similar to those provided for in Rule 1080(n), PIXL, and certain
of the proposed rules track the existing PIXL rules.
\8\ Rule 1080(b)(i)(A) provides in part that ``[f]or purposes of
Exchange options trading, an agency order is any order entered on
behalf of a public customer, and does not include any order entered
for the account of a broker-dealer, or any account in which a
broker-dealer or an associated person of a broker-dealer has any
direct or indirect interest.'' According to the Exchange, that
provision did not contemplate, and is not applicable to, the
capitalized and defined term ``Agency Order'' as used in proposed
Rule 1081.
\9\ The Exchange states that participants must ensure that their
records adequately demonstrate the solicitation of an order that is
entered into the mechanism for execution. against an Agency Order as
a Solicited Order prior to entry of such order into this mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The new mechanism is a process by which a member (the ``Initiating
Member'') can electronically submit all-or-none orders \10\ of 500
contracts or more (or, in the case of mini options,\11\ 5000 contracts
or more) that it represents as agent against contra orders that it has
solicited, and initiate an auction (the ``Solicitation Auction'').\12\
As noted below, at the end of the Solicitation Auction, allocation
would occur with all contracts of the Agency Order trading at an
improved price against non-solicited contra-side interest or at the
stop price, defined below, against the Solicited Order. The
solicitation mechanism would accommodate both simple orders and Complex
Orders.\13\ Prior to the first time a member enters an Agency Order
into the solicitation mechanism on behalf of a customer, the member
would be required to deliver to the customer a written notification
informing the customer that its Agency Orders may be executed using the
Phlx's solicitation mechanism. Such written notification would be
required to disclose the terms and conditions contained in proposed
Rule 1081 and to be in a form approved by the Exchange.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Rule 1066(c)(4) defines an ``all-or-none'' order as a
market or limit order which is to be executed in its entirety or not
at all.
\11\ A given Solicitation Auction may be for options contracts
exclusively or for mini options contracts exclusively, but cannot be
used for a combination of both options contracts and mini options
contracts together.
\12\ The Exchange noted that similar electronic functionality is
offered today by other option exchanges. See Chicago Board Options
Exchange (``CBOE'') Rule 6.74B, Solicitation Auction Mechanism (the
``CBOE Mechanism''), and International Securities Exchange (``ISE'')
Rule 716(e), Solicited Order Mechanism (the ``ISE Mechanism'').
\13\ A Complex Order is any order involving the simultaneous
purchase and/or sale of two or more different options series in the
same underlying security, priced at a net debit or credit based on
the relative prices of the individual components, for the same
account, for the purpose of executing a particular investment
strategy. A Complex Order may also be a stock-option order, which is
an order to buy or sell a stated number of units of an underlying
stock or exchange-traded fund (``ETF'') coupled with the purchase or
sale of options contract(s). Complex Orders on Phlx are discussed in
Commentary .08 to Rule 1080.
\14\ See proposed Rule 1081(i)(H). The rule would require
delivery of this disclosure only prior to the first submission of an
Agency Order on behalf of a customer rather than prior to the
submission of each and every Agency Order on behalf of such
customer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solicitation Auction Eligibility Requirements
All options traded on the Exchange, including mini options, would
be eligible for the Solicitation Auction. Proposed Rule 1081(i)
describes the circumstances under which an Initiating Member may
initiate a Solicitation Auction.
Proposed Rule 1081(i)(A) provides that the Agency Order and the
Solicited Order must each be limit orders for at least 500 contracts
(or, in the case of mini options, at least 5000 contracts) and must be
designated as all-or-none. The orders must match in size, and their
limit prices must match or cross in price.\15\ If the orders cross in
price, the price at which the Agency Order and the Solicited Order may
be considered for submission pursuant to proposed Rules 1081(i)(B) and
(C) shall be the limit price of the Solicited Order.\16\ The orders may
not be stop or stop limit orders, must be marked with a time in force
of day, good till cancelled or immediate or cancel, and would not be
routed regardless of routing strategy indicated on the order.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ In the case of Complex Orders, the underlying components of
both Complex Orders must also match. Additionally, all the option
legs of each Complex Order must consist entirely of options or
entirely of mini options.
\16\ For example, assume an Agency Order to buy 1000 contracts
for $2.00 and a Solicited Order to sell 1000 contracts at $1.90 are
entered into the solicitation mechanism. Since the limits of these
orders cross in price, the Agency Order and Solicited Order are
considered to be submitted into the mechanism with a stop price
equal to the Solicited Order price of $1.90.
\17\ Whether an order is marked with a time in force of day as
opposed to, for example, good till cancelled or immediate or cancel
is irrelevant to the manner in which they would be treated once they
are entered into the solicitation mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(i)(B), the Initiating Member must
stop the entire Agency Order at a price (the ``stop price'') that is
equal to or better than the National Best Bid/Offer (``NBBO'') on both
sides of the market, provided that
[[Page 5867]]
such price must be at least $0.01 better than any public customer non-
contingent limit order on the Phlx order book and must be equal to the
Agency Order's limit price or provide the Agency Order with a better
price than its limit price. Stop prices may be submitted in $0.01
increments, regardless of the applicable Minimum Price Variation (the
``MPV''). Contingent orders \18\ (including all-or-none, stop or stop-
limit orders) on the book would not be considered when checking the
acceptability of the stop price. Contingent orders are not represented
as part of the Exchange Best Bid/Offer since they may only be executed
if specific conditions are met. Given that these orders are not
represented as part of the Exchange Best Bid/Offer, they are not
included in the NBBO and thus are not considered when checking the
acceptability of the stop price.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ A contingent order is a limit or market order to buy or
sell that is contingent upon a condition being satisfied. PIXL also
does not consider contingent orders on the book when checking the
acceptability of the stop price.
\19\ Proposed Rule 1081(i)(B) does not apply if the Agency Order
is a Complex Order (a ``Complex Agency Order''). Rather, proposed
Rule 1081(i)(C) applies to Complex Agency Orders and requires them
to be of a conforming ratio, as defined in Commentary.08(a)(ix) to
Rule 1080. A Complex Agency Order which is not of a conforming ratio
would be rejected. Proposed Rule 1081(i)(C) requires all component
option legs of the order to be for at least 500 contracts (or, in
the case of mini options, at least 5000 contracts). It also provides
that the Initiating Member must stop the entire Complex Agency Order
at a price that is better by at least $0.01 than the best net price
(debit or credit) (i) available on the Complex Order book regardless
of the Complex Order book size; and (ii) achievable from the best
Phlx bids and offers for the individual options (an ``improved net
price'') regardless of size, provided in either case that such price
is equal to or better than the Complex Agency Order's limit price.
Stop prices for Complex Agency Orders may be submitted in $0.01
increments, regardless of MPV, and contingent orders on the book
would not be considered when checking the acceptability of the stop
price. See proposed Rule 1081(i)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orders that are submitted but that do not comply with the
eligibility requirements set forth in proposed Rule 1081(i)(A) through
(C) would be rejected upon receipt and ineligible to initiate a
Solicitation Auction.\20\ In addition, Agency Orders submitted at or
before the opening of trading are not eligible to initiate a
Solicitation Auction and would be rejected.\21\ Orders submitted during
a specified period of time, as determined by the Exchange and
communicated to Exchange membership on the Exchange's Web site, prior
to the end of the trading session in the affected series \22\
(including, in the case of Complex Orders, in any series which is a
component of the Complex Order) are not eligible to initiate a
Solicitation Auction and would be rejected.\23\ Agency Orders which are
not Complex Orders received while another electronic auction (including
any Solicitation Auction, PIXL auction, or any other kind of auction)
involving the same option series is in progress would not be eligible
to initiate a Solicitation Auction and would be rejected.\24\
Similarly, a Complex Agency Order received while another auction in the
same Complex Order strategy is in progress is not eligible to initiate
a Solicitation Auction and would be rejected.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See proposed Rule 1081(i)(D).
\21\ See proposed Rule 1081(i)(E).
\22\ The term ``series'' of options means all option contracts
of the same class having the same expiration date and exercise
price. A ``class'' of options means all option contracts of the same
``type'' of option covering the same underlying stock. A ``type'' of
option means the classification of an option contract as a put or a
call. See Rule 1000, Applicability, Definitions and References.
\23\ See proposed Rule 1081(i)(F).
\24\ A similar restriction applies with respect to PIXL
auctions. See PIXL Rule 1080(n)(ii) which provides that ``[o]nly one
Auction may be conducted at a time in any given series or
strategy.''
\25\ However, a simple Agency Order in one series that is
submitted while an electronic auction is already in process with
respect to a Complex Agency Order that includes the same series
would not be rejected. Instead, a Solicitation Auction would be
initiated for that incoming Agency Order offering each unique
strategy or individual series the same opportunity to initiate an
auction. This behavior is consistent with the handling of
overlapping PIXL and Complex PIXL auctions. See PIXL Rule
1080(n)(ii). Complex Orders submitted during normal trading hours in
a strategy which has not yet opened under Commentary .08 of Rule
1080 would cause the strategy to immediately open and a Solicitation
Auction may be initiated. See proposed Rule 1081(i)(E). In addition,
neither a Solicitation Auction for a simple Agency Order or Complex
Agency Order may be initiated prior to the regular opening of all
individual components of the Solicited simple or Complex Agency
Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally a solicited order for the account of any Exchange
specialist, streaming quote trader (``SQT''), remote streaming quote
trader (``RSQT'') or non-streaming registered options trader (``ROT'')
assigned in the affected series may not be a Solicited Order.\26\
Consistent with the explanation the Exchange made in its filing
proposing PIXL, the Exchange believes that in order to maintain fair
and orderly markets, a market maker assigned in an option should not be
solicited for participation in a Solicitation Auction by an Initiating
Member. The Exchange believes that market makers interested in
participating in transactions on the Exchange should do so by way of
his/her quotations, and should respond to Solicitation Auction
notifications rather than create them by having an Initiating Member
submitting Solicited Orders on the market maker's behalf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See proposed Rule 1081(i)(G). An SQT is an Exchange
Registered Options Trader (``ROT'') who has received permission from
the Exchange to generate and submit option quotations electronically
through AUTOM in eligible options to which such SQT is assigned. An
SQT may only submit such quotations while such SQT is physically
present on the floor of the Exchange. See Rule 1014(b)(ii)(A). A
RSQT is defined in Rule 1014(b)(ii)(B) as an ROT that is a member
affiliated with a Remote Streaming Quote Trader Organization
(``RSQTO'') with no physical trading floor presence who has received
permission from the Exchange to generate and submit option
quotations electronically in options to which such RSQT has been
assigned. A qualified RSQT may function as a Remote Specialist upon
Exchange approval. An RSQT may only submit such quotations
electronically from off the floor of the Exchange. An RSQT may not
submit option quotations in eligible options to which such RSQT is
assigned to the extent that the RSQT is also approved as a Remote
Specialist in the same options. An RSQT may only trade in a market
making capacity in classes of options in which he is assigned or
approved as a Remote Specialist. An RSQTO is a member organization
in good standing that satisfies the SQTO readiness requirements in
Rule 507(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solicitation Auction Process
Pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(A)(1), to begin the process the
Initiating Member must mark the Agency Order and the Solicited Order
for Solicitation Auction processing, and specify the stop price at
which it seeks to cross the Agency Order with the Solicited Order. Once
the Initiating Member has submitted an Agency Order and Solicited Order
for processing pursuant to this subparagraph, such Agency Order and
Solicited Order may not be modified or cancelled.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ For clarity, Rule 1080(ii)(A)(l) does not apply to Complex
Agency Orders. Rather, in a parallel provision, proposed Rule
1081(ii)(A)(2) provides that to initiate a Solicitation Auction in
the case of a Complex Agency Order and Complex Solicited Order (a
``Complex Solicitation Auction''), the Initiating Member must mark
the orders for Solicitation Auction processing, and specify the
price (``stop price'') at which it seeks to cross the Complex Agency
Order with the Complex Solicited Order. Once the Initiating Member
has submitted the orders for processing pursuant to proposed Rule
1081(ii)(A)(1)-(2), they may not be modified or cancelled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crossing Two Public Customer Orders Without a Solicitation Auction
As noted above, the proposed rule change would enable a member to
electronically execute an Agency Order, which is an order it represents
on behalf of a public customer, broker-dealer, or any other entity,
against a Solicited Order, which is a solicited limit order of a public
customer, broker-dealer, or any other entity through the solicitation
mechanism.
However, pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(v), if a member enters an
Agency Order for the account of a public customer paired with a
Solicited Order for the account of public customer and if the paired
orders adhere to the eligibility requirements of proposed Rule 1081(i),
such paired orders would
[[Page 5868]]
be automatically executed without a Solicitation Auction.\28\ The
execution price for such paired public customer orders (except if they
are Complex Orders) must be expressed in the minimum quoting increment
applicable to the affected series.\29\ Such an execution may not trade
through the NBBO or at the same price as any resting public customer
order. If all-or-none orders are on the order book in the affected
series, the public customer-to-public customer order may not be
executed at a price at which the all-or-none order would be eligible to
trade based on its limit price and size.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ The eligibility requirements require the orders to each be
limit orders for at least 500 contracts (or, in the case of mini
options, at least 5000 contracts) and be designated as all-or-none.
The orders must match in size, and the limit prices must match or
cross in price. The orders may not be stop or stop limit orders,
must be marked with a time in force of day, good till cancelled or
immediate or cancel. In the case of Complex Orders, the orders must
be of a conforming ratio, and all component option legs of the order
must be for at least 500 contracts (or, in the case of mini options,
at least 5000 contracts). See proposed Rule 1081(i). The Exchange
also accommodates the crossing of two public customer orders in
PIXL. See Rule 1080(n).
\29\ The execution price for a Complex Order may be in $.01
increments.
\30\ All-or-none orders can only be submitted for non-broker-
dealer customers. As stated above, all-or-none orders are not
considered when checking the acceptability of the stop price of an
Agency Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case of a Complex Order, a public customer-to-public
customer cross may only occur at a price which improves the calculated
Phlx Best Bid/Offer or ``cPBBO'' and improves upon the net limit price
of any Complex Orders (excluding all-or-none) on the Complex Order book
in the same strategy.\31\ If all-or-none Complex Orders \32\ are on the
Complex Order book in the same strategy, the public customer-to-public
customer Complex Order may not be executed at a price at which the all-
or-none Complex Order would be eligible to trade based on its limit
price and size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ The term ``cPBBO'' means the best net debit or credit price
for a Complex Order Strategy based on the PBBO for the individual
options components of such Complex Order Strategy, and, where the
underlying security is a component of the Complex Order, the
National Best Bid and/or Offer for the underlying security. See Rule
1080.08(a)(iv).
\32\ The Exchange's trading system is capable of accepting all-
or-none Complex Orders which are not, however, affirmatively
permitted to be submitted under Exchange rules. Rule 1080.08 (b)(v)
provides in part that ``Complex Orders may be submitted as: All-or-
none orders--to be executed in its entirety or not at all.'' See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 72351 (June 9, 2014), 79 FR
33977 (June 13, 2014) (SR-Phlx-2014-39). Nevertheless, all-or-none
Complex Orders may not be submitted at this time. The Exchange
anticipates that it will file a proposed rule change to provide for
the handling and execution of all-or-none Complex Orders and
thereafter permit the trading system to accept them. The instant
proposed rule change describes how the solicitation mechanism would
deal with all-or-none Complex Orders once they are permitted under
Exchange rules. Complex Agency Orders and Complex Solicited Orders
provided for herein are not Complex Orders that would require filing
of a proposed rule change in order to be submitted into the system.
Complex Agency Orders and Complex Solicited Orders, while all-or-
none in character, are unique to the solicitation mechanism and are
explicitly provided for herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes that permitting such executions would benefit
public customers on both sides of the crossing transaction by providing
speedy and efficient executions to public customer orders in this
circumstance while maintaining the priority of public customer interest
on the book. The proposed handling of a public customer Agency Order
paired with a public customer Solicited Order is similar to the
handling of a public customer PIXL Order paired with a public customer
Initiating Order which is submitted into the PIXL mechanism.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See Rule 1080(n)(vi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solicitation Auction Notification
Pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(A)(3), when the Exchange
receives an order for Solicitation Auction processing, a Request for
Response with the option details (meaning, the security, strike price,
and expiration date), size and stop price, but not the side \34\ of the
Agency Order and the Solicitation Auction start time is then sent over
the PHLX Orders data feed \35\ and Specialized Quote Feed
(``SQF'').\36\ The Exchange believes that providing option details,
size, and stop price is sufficient information for participants to
determine whether to submit responses to the Solicitation Auction.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ The Exchange states that, by omitting the side in the
Request for Response, the system avoids disclosure of potentially
material information that could move the market in the event the
Agency Order does not trade at the conclusion of the Solicitation
Auction. Market participants may enter Responses on both sides of
the market.
\35\ The PHLX Orders data feed is designed to provide the real-
time status of simple and Complex Orders on the Phlx order book
directly to subscribers. This includes new orders and changes to
orders resting on the Phlx book for all Phlx listed options. PHLX
Orders also includes opening imbalance information, PIXL information
and Complex Order Live Auction (``COLA'') data.
\36\ SQF is an interface that allows specialists and market
makers to connect and send quotes into Phlx XL and assists them in
responding to auctions and providing liquidity to the market.
\37\ CBOE Rule 6.74B(b)(1)(B) suggests that Agency Orders
submitted to CBOE's Solicitation Auction Mechanism include the
proposed price at which an Agency Order is to be crossed with a
solicited order, as well as the size of the order. According to
Phlx, the rule does not specify that the side is to be indicated on
the order. See also C2 Rule 6.52(b)(1)(B), which is similar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solicitation Auction
The Solicitation Auction process is described in proposed Rules
1081(ii)(A)(4)-(10). Following the issuance of the Request for
Response, the Solicitation Auction would last for a period of 500
milliseconds \38\ unless it is concluded as the result of any of the
circumstances described below.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ In April/May 2014, to determine whether the proposed
Solicitation Auction timer would provide sufficient time to respond
to a Request for Response, the Exchange polled all Phlx market
makers, 20 of which responded. Of those that responded to the
survey, 15 are currently responding to auctions on Phlx or intend to
do so. 100% of those respondents indicated that their firm could
respond to auctions with a duration of at least 50 milliseconds.
Thus, the Exchange believes that the proposed Solicitation Auction
duration of 500 milliseconds would provide a meaningful opportunity
for participants on Phlx to respond to a Solicitation Auction,
whether initiated by an Agency Order or a Complex Agency Order,
while at the same time facilitating the prompt execution of orders.
The Exchange notes that both ISE and Miami International Securities
Exchange LLC (``MIAX'') rules provide for a 500 millisecond response
time. See ISE Rule 716, Supplementary Material .04 and MIAX Rule
515A(b)(2)(i)(C).
\39\ Rule 1080(c)(ii)(C)(2), which states that Order Entry Firms
must expose orders they represent as agent for at least one second
before such orders may be automatically executed against solicited
orders, is being amended to clarify that it does not apply to
proposed Rule 1081, Solicitation Mechanism. See also proposed Rule
1081(ii)(A)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any person or entity may submit Responses to the Request for
Response, provided such Response is properly marked specifying the
price, size and side of the market at which it would be willing to
participate in the execution of the Agency Order. The Exchange believes
that permitting any person or entity to submit Responses to the Request
for Response should attract Responses from all sources, maximizing the
potential for liquidity in the Solicitation Auction and thus affording
the Agency Order the best opportunity for price improvement. Responses
would not be visible to Solicitation Auction participants, and would
not be disseminated to the Options Price Reporting Authority
(``OPRA''). A Response may be for any size up to the size of the Agency
Order.\40\ The minimum price increment for Responses would be $0.01. A
Response must be equal to or better than the NBBO on both sides of the
market at the time of receipt of the Response. A Response with a price
that is outside the NBBO at the time of receipt would be rejected.\41\
Multiple Responses from the
[[Page 5869]]
same member may be submitted at different prices on either or both
sides of the market during the Solicitation Auction. Responses may be
modified or cancelled during the Solicitation Auction. The acceptance
and handling of Responses to a Solicitation Auction is the same as the
acceptance and handling of Responses today for a PIXL Auction.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Responses may not be submitted with an all-or-none
contingency. (Note, however, that all-or-none orders entered and
present in the system at the end of the Solicitation Auction would
be considered for execution, as discussed below.)
\41\ Similarly, in the case of Complex Order Responses, the
Response must be equal to or better than the cPBBO on both sides, as
defined in Commentary .08(a)(iv) of Rule 1080 at the time of receipt
of the Complex Order Response but need not improve upon the limit of
orders on the CBOOK. A Complex Order Response submitted with a price
that is outside the cPBBO at the time of receipt would be rejected.
See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(A)(9).
\42\ See Rule 1080(n).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion of the Solicitation Auction
Proposed Rules 1081(ii)(B)(1)-(4) describe a number of
circumstances that would cause the Solicitation Auction to conclude.
Generally, it would conclude at the end of the Solicitation Auction
period, except that it may conclude earlier: (i) any time the Phlx Best
Bid/Offer (``PBBO'') on the same side of the market as the Agency Order
crosses the stop price (since further price improvement would be
unlikely and any Responses offering improvement would be likely to be
cancelled),\43\ or (ii) any time there is a trading halt on the
Exchange in the affected series (or, in the case of a Complex
Solicitation Auction, any time there is a trading halt on the Exchange
in any component of a Complex Agency Order).\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ In the case of a Complex Solicitation Auction, it would end
any time the cPBBO or the Complex Order book, excluding all-or-none
Complex Orders, on the same side of the market as the Complex Agency
Order, crosses the stop price. See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(B)(3).
\44\ Trading on the Exchange in any option contract is halted
whenever trading in the underlying security has been paused or
halted by the primary listing market. See Rule 1047(e). See also
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62269 (June 10, 2010), 75 FR
34491 (June 17, 2010) (SR-Phlx-2010-82). Any executions that occur
during any latency between the pause or halt in the underlying
security and the processing of the halt on the Exchange are
nullified pursuant to Rule 1092(c)(iv)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(C), if the Solicitation Auction
concludes before the expiration of the Solicitation Auction period as
the result of the PBBO, cPBBO or Complex Order book (excluding all-or-
none Complex Orders) crossing the stop price as described in proposed
Rules 1081(ii)(B)(2) and 1081(ii)(B)(3), the entire Agency Order would
be executed using the allocation algorithm set forth in proposed Rule
1081(ii)(E). The algorithm is described below under the heading ``Order
Allocation''.
Also pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(C), if the Solicitation
Auction concludes before the expiration of the Solicitation Auction
period as the result of a trading halt, the entire Agency Order or
Complex Agency Order would be executed solely against the Solicited
Order or Complex Solicited Order at the stop price and any unexecuted
Responses would be cancelled.\45\ Responses and other interest present
in the system would not be considered for trading against the Agency
Order in the case of a trading halt. The Exchange believes that this is
appropriate since the participants representing tradable interest in
the Solicitation Auction have not `stopped' the Agency Order in its
entirety and would have no means after the auction executions occur to
offset the trading risk they would incur because the market is halted
if they were permitted to execute against the Agency Order in this
instance. However, the Solicited Order `stopped' the Agency Order when
the order was submitted into the Solicitation Auction and would
therefore execute against the Agency Order if the Solicitation Auction
concludes before the expiration of the Solicitation Auction period as
the result of a trading halt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ The Exchange's PIXL auction features similar functionality.
Pursuant to Rule 1080(n)(ii)(C), in the case of a trading halt on
the Exchange in the affected series, a PIXL Order will be executed
solely against the Initiating Order at the stop price and any
unexecuted PAN responses will be cancelled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, when Agency and Solicited Orders are submitted into
the Solicitation Auction, the stop price must be equal to or improve
the NBBO and be at least $0.01 better than any public customer non-
contingent limit orders on the Phlx order book. The Exchange believes
that public customer interest submitted to Phlx after submission of the
Agency and Solicited Orders but prior to the trading halt should not
prevent the Agency Order from being executed at the stop price since
such public customer interest was not present at the time the Agency
Order was `stopped' by the Solicited Order.
Entry of an unrelated market or marketable limit order on the
opposite side of the market from the Agency Order received during the
Solicitation Auction would not cause the Solicitation Auction to end
early. Rather, the unrelated order would execute against interest
outside the Solicitation Auction (if marketable against the PBBO) or
would post to the book and then route if eligible for routing (in the
case of an order marketable against the NBBO but not against the PBBO),
pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(D). If contracts remain from such
unrelated order at the time the Solicitation Auction ends, the total
unexecuted volume of such unrelated interest would be considered for
participation in the order allocation process, regardless of the number
of contracts in relation to the Solicitation Auction size, described in
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E).\46\ The handling of unrelated opposite side
interest which is received during the Solicitation Auction is the same
as the handling of unrelated opposite side interest which is received
during a PIXL Auction.\47\ Participants submitting such unrelated
interest may not be aware that an auction is in progress and should
therefore be able to access firm quotes that comprise the NBBO without
delay. Considering such unrelated interest which remains unexecuted
upon receipt for participation in the order allocation process
described in proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E) would increase the number of
contracts against which an Agency Order could be executed, and should
therefore create more opportunities for the Agency Order to be executed
at better prices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Similarly, pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(D), in the
case of a Complex Solicitation Auction, an unrelated market or
marketable limit Complex Order on the opposite side of the market
from the Complex Agency Order as well as orders for the individual
components of the unrelated Complex Order received during the
Complex Solicitation Auction would not cause the Complex
Solicitation Auction to end early and would execute against interest
outside of the Complex Solicitation Auction. If contracts remain
from such unrelated Complex Order at the time the Complex
Solicitation Auction ends, the total unexecuted volume of such
unrelated interest would be considered for participation in the
order allocation process, regardless of the number of contracts in
relation to the Complex Solicitation Auction size, described in
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E).
\47\ See Rule 1080(n)(ii)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Order Allocation
The allocation of orders executed upon the conclusion of a
Solicitation Auction would depend upon whether the Solicitation Auction
has yielded sufficient improving interest to improve the price of the
entire Agency Order. As noted above, all contracts of the Agency Order
would trade at an improved price against non-solicited contra-side
interest or, in the event of insufficient improving interest to improve
the price of the entire Agency Order, at the stop price against the
Solicited Order.
Consideration of All-or-None Interest. All-or-none interest of a
size which could potentially be executed consistent with its all-or-
none contingency is considered when determining whether there is
sufficient size to execute Agency Orders which are not Complex Agency
Orders at price(s) better than the stop price. However, pursuant to
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(5), when
[[Page 5870]]
determining if there is sufficient size to execute Complex Agency
Orders at a price(s) better than the stop price, no all-or-none
interest of any size would be considered. If there is sufficient size
to execute the entire Complex Agency Order at a price(s) better than
the stop price irrespective of any all-or-none interest that may be
present, then all-or-none interest would be considered for trade and
executed if possible. This difference in behavior is due to a system
limitation relating to all-or-none Complex Orders.\48\ The Exchange
believes this behavior is not impactful since all-or-none Complex
Orders are rare \49\ and if sufficient size exists to execute the
entire Complex Agency Order at an improved price, the all-or-none
Complex Order would be considered for trade and executed if possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ All-or-none simple orders reside with simple orders on the
book. By contrast, all-or-none Complex Orders reside in a separate
book, in a different part of the trading system. Thus aggregation of
all-or-none Complex Orders with other Complex Orders is a more
difficult process than aggregation of all-or-none simple orders with
other simple orders.
\49\ The Exchange reviewed six months of data which showed that
all-or-none Complex Orders represented only 0.12% of all Complex
Orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In all Solicitation Auctions, all-or-none interest would be
executed pursuant to normal priority rules, except that it would not be
executed if the all-or-none contingency cannot be satisfied. If an
execution which can adhere to the all-or-none contingency is not
possible, such all-or-none interest would be ignored and would remain
on the order book or be cancelled if such interest is an immediate or
cancel order.
For example, assume an Agency Order to buy 1000 contracts stopped
by a Solicited Order at $2.00 is entered when the PBBO is $1.90-$2.10.
Assume that during the Solicitation Auction, Responses are received to
sell 700 contracts at $1.97 and sell 150 contracts at $1.99. In
addition, assume an order to sell 300 contracts at $1.98 with an all-
or-none contingency is received. At the end of the Solicitation
Auction, the system would consider the all-or-none order when
determining if there is sufficient size to execute the Agency Order at
a price(s) better than the stop price since the all-or-none contingency
can be satisfied by an execution. In this example, at the end of the
Solicitation Auction, the Agency Order would execute against improving
interest with 700 contracts executing at $1.97 and 300 contracts
(representing the all-or-none order) executing at $1.98. Consider a
similar scenario whereby the Responses received were to sell 700
contracts at $1.97 and sell 300 contracts at $1.99 and an all-or-none
order to sell 500 contracts at $1.98 was received. In this scenario,
the system would not consider the all-or-none order when determining if
there is sufficient size to execute the Agency Order at a price(s)
better than the stop price since the all-or-or none contingency cannot
be satisfied by an execution. However, excluding the all-or-none order,
the Agency Order can still be satisfied at a price(s) better than the
stop price. In this scenario, at the end of the Solicitation Auction,
the Agency Order would execute against improving interest with 700
contracts executing at $1.97 and 300 contracts executing at $1.99. The
500 contract all-or-none order does not execute because the all-or-none
contingency cannot be satisfied.
Similarly, assume a Complex Agency Order to buy 1000 contracts
stopped by a Complex Solicited Order at $2.00 is entered when the cPBBO
is $1.90-$2.10. Assume that during the Solicitation Auction a Response
is received to sell 900 contracts at $1.98 and an all-or-none Complex
Order is received to sell 150 contracts at $1.99. At the end of the
Solicitation Auction involving a Complex Order, the system does not
consider all-or-none interest in determining whether it can execute the
Complex Agency Order at a better price than the stop price. In this
case, excluding the all-or-none Complex Order, only 900 contracts are
available to sell at a better price than the stop price. Therefore, the
Complex Agency Order would trade against the Solicited Order at the
$2.00 stop price. The all-or-none contracts would not be included
because although more than 1000 contracts are offered at a better price
than the $2.00 stop price, the system cannot both trade best prices
first and adhere to the contingency of the all-or-none order while
ensuring that the Agency Order trades 1000 contracts. If, however, the
example is changed and Responses are received to sell 900 contracts at
$1.98 and sell 100 contracts at $1.99 and an order to sell 100
contracts at $1.98 all-or-none is received, at the end of the
Solicitation Auction involving this Complex Order, there is enough
interest which is not all-or-none to satisfy the Complex Agency Order
at a better price than the $2.00 stop price. Therefore, the Agency
Order would be executed against the 900 lot at $1.98 and the remaining
100 contracts executed against the all-or-none Complex Order at $1.98.
Solicitation Auction with Sufficient Improving Interest. Pursuant
to the proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(1) algorithm, if there is sufficient
size (considering all resting orders, quotes and Responses) to execute
the entire Agency Order at a price or prices better than the stop
price, the Agency Order would be executed against such better priced
interest with public customers having priority at each price level.
After public customer interest at a particular price level has been
satisfied, including all-or-none orders with a size which can be
satisfied, remaining contracts would be allocated among all Exchange
quotes, orders and Responses in accordance with Rules
1014(g)(vii)(B)(1)(b) and (d), and the Solicited Order would be
cancelled.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Similarly, pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(3), in the
case of a Complex Solicitation Auction, if there is sufficient size
(considering resting Complex Orders and Responses) to execute the
entire Complex Agency Order at a price(s) better than the stop
price, the Complex Agency Order would be executed against better
priced Complex Orders, Responses, as well as quotes and orders which
comprise the cPBBO at the end of the Complex Solicitation Auction.
(The cPBBO is not considered in determining whether there is
sufficient improving size because the market and/or size of the
individual components can change between the calculation of
sufficient size and the actual execution.) Such interest would be
allocated at a given price in the following order: (i) to public
customer Complex Orders and Responses in time priority; (ii) to SQT,
RSQT, and non-SQT ROT Complex Orders and Responses on a size pro-
rata basis; (iii) to non-market maker off-floor broker-dealer
Complex Orders and Responses on a size pro-rata basis, and (iv) to
quotes and orders which comprise the cPBBO at the end of the Complex
Solicitation Auction with public customer interest being satisfied
first in time priority, then to SQT, RSQT, and non-SQT ROT interest
satisfied on a size pro-rata basis, and lastly to non-market maker
off-floor broker-dealers on a size pro-rata basis. This allocation
methodology is consistent with the allocation methodology utilized
for a Complex Order executed in PIXL. In addition, providing public
customer's with priority over SQT, RSQT, and non-SQT ROTs, who in
turn have priority over non-market maker off-floor broker-dealers is
the same priority scheme used for regular orders. See Rule 1014(g).
When determining if there is sufficient size to execute the
entire Complex Agency Order at a price(s) better than the stop
price, if the short sale price test in Rule 201 of Regulation SHO is
triggered for a covered security, Complex Orders and Responses which
are marked ``short'' will not be considered because of the
possibility that a short sale price restriction may apply during the
interval between assessing for adequate size and the execution of
the Complex Agency Order. However, if there is sufficient size to
execute the entire Complex Agency Order at a price(s) better than
the stop price irrespective of any covered securities for which the
price test is triggered that may be present, then all Complex Orders
and Responses which are marked ``short'' will be considered for
allocation in accordance with proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example of Solicitation Auction with Sufficient Improving Interest.
To illustrate a case where a Solicitation Auction yields enough
improving interest to better the stop price and the application of the
proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(1) algorithm, assume the NBBO is $0.95-$1.03,
and a buy side Agency Order for 1000 contracts is
[[Page 5871]]
submitted with a contra-side Solicited Order to stop the Agency Order
at $1.00. During the Solicitation Auction, assume a market maker
(``MM1'') Response is submitted to sell 800 contracts at $0.97, a
broker-dealer Response is submitted to sell 100 contracts at $0.99, and
a public customer sends in an order, outside of the Solicitation
Auction, to sell 100 contracts at $0.99. Upon receipt of the public
customer order, the NBBO changes to $0.95-$0.99. In addition, assume
two market makers send in quotes of $0.95-$0.99 during the Solicitation
Auction. Market Maker 2 (``MM2'') quotes $0.95-$0.99 with 100 contracts
and Market Maker 3 (``MM3'') quotes $0.95-$0.99 with 50 contracts. At
the end of the Solicitation Auction, since there is enough interest to
execute the entire Agency Order at a price(s) better than the stop
price, the Agency Order would be executed against the better priced
interest as follows:
-- the Agency Order trades 800 contracts at $0.97 against MM1
Response;
-- the Agency Order trades 100 contracts at $0.99 against public
customer;
-- the Agency Order trades 67 contracts at $0.99 against MM2 quote
(pro-rata allocation); and
-- the Agency Order trades 33 contracts at $0.99 against MM3 quote
(pro-rata allocation).
The broker-dealer does not trade any contracts since broker-dealer
orders execute only after all public customer and market maker interest
is satisfied. The unexecuted Solicited Order and broker-dealer Response
are cancelled back to the sending participants.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ To illustrate a Complex Solicitation Auction with enough
improving interest and the operation of proposed Rule
1081(ii)(E)(3), assume that a Complex Order to buy one of option A
and sell one of option B, 1000 times, with a cPBBO of $0.40 bid,
$0.70 offer, is submitted with a stop price of $0.65. Assume that
during the Solicitation Auction, the following Responses and order
interest are received: a market maker (``MM1'') responds to sell the
strategy 100 times at a price of $0.55; MM1 responds to sell the
strategy 100 times at a price of $0.60; a broker-dealer responds to
sell the strategy 400 times at a price of $0.60; a public customer
Complex Order to sell the strategy 300 times at a price of $0.60;
and another market maker (``MM2'') responds to sell the strategy 200
times at $0.60.
After all these Responses and orders are received, option A of
the simple market moves causing the cPBBO to become offered 200
times at $0.60. Option A is quoted in the simple market as $1.00-
$1.10 and Option B is quoted in the simple market as $0.50-$0.60. At
the end of the Solicitation Auction, the Complex Agency Order would
be executed as follows: the Complex Agency Order trades 100
contracts at $0.55 against MM1; the Complex Agency Order trades 300
contracts at $0.60 against public customer; the Complex Agency Order
trades 100 contracts at $0.60 against MM1; the Complex Agency Order
trades 200 contracts at $0.60 against MM2; the Complex Agency Order
trades 300 contracts at $0.60 against the broker-dealer; and the
Solicited Order and the residual unexecuted contracts of the broker-
dealer Response are cancelled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solicitation Auction with Insufficient Improving Interest. Pursuant
to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(2), if there is not sufficient size
(considering all resting orders, quotes and Responses) to execute the
entire Agency Order at a price(s) better than the stop price, the
Agency Order would be executed against the Solicited Order at the stop
price provided such price is better than the limit of any public
customer order (excluding all-or-none) on the limit order book, on
either the same side as or the opposite side of the Agency Order, and
equal to or better than the contra-side PBBO.\52\ Otherwise, both the
Agency Order and Solicited Order would be cancelled without a trade
occurring. This proposed behavior ensures non-contingent public
customer orders on the limit order book maintain priority. While the
Exchange recognizes that at least one other solicitation mechanism
offered by another exchange considers public customer orders on the
limit order book at the stop price when determining if there is
sufficient improving interest to satisfy the Agency Order, the proposed
solicitation mechanism offered on Phlx would not consider such
interest.\53\ The Exchange believes that requiring the stop price to be
at least $0.01 better than any public customer interest on the limit
order book ensures public customer priority of existing interest and in
turn provides the Solicited Order participant certainty that if an
execution occurs at the stop price, such execution would represent the
Solicited Order and not interest which arrived after the Solicited
Order participant stopped the Agency Order for its entire size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(2) does not apply to Complex
Solicitation Auctions. Rather, a parallel provision, proposed Rule
1081(ii)(E)(4), provides that in a Complex Solicitation Auction, if
there is not sufficient size (considering resting Complex Orders and
Responses) to execute the entire Complex Agency Order at a price(s)
better than the stop price, the Complex Agency Order would be
executed against the Solicited Order at the stop price, provided
such stop price is better than the limit of any public customer
Complex Order (excluding all-or-none) on the Complex Order book,
better than the cPBBO when a public customer order (excluding all-
or-none) is resting on the book in any component of the Complex
Agency Order, and equal to or better than the cPBBO on the opposite
side of the Complex Agency Order. This proposed behavior ensures
non-contingent public customers on the limit order book maintain
priority. Otherwise, both the Complex Agency Order and the Solicited
Order would be cancelled with no trade occurring.
\53\ See ISE Rule 716(e)(2)(i) which provides in part that in
the case of insufficient improving interest ``[i]f there are
Priority Customer Orders on the Exchange on the opposite side of the
Agency Order at the proposed execution price and there is sufficient
size to execute the entire size of the Agency Order, the Agency
Order will be executed against the bid or offer, and the solicited
order will be cancelled.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example of Solicitation Auction with Insufficient Improving
Interest. To illustrate a case where the Solicitation Auction has not
yielded sufficient interest to improve the price for the entire Agency
Order, assume the NBBO is $0.97-$1.03, and a buy side Agency Order for
1000 contracts is submitted with a contra-side Solicited Order to stop
the Agency Order at $1.00. During the Solicitation Auction, assume a
Response is submitted to sell 100 contracts at $0.97 and another to
sell 100 contracts at $0.99. At the end of the Solicitation Auction
period, since there is not enough interest to execute the entire Agency
Order at a price(s) better than the stop price, the Agency Order would
be executed at $1.00 against the Solicited Order. The unexecuted
Responses are then cancelled back to the sending participant.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ To illustrate a Complex Solicitation Auction that yields
insufficient improving interest and the operation of proposed Rule
1081(ii)(E)(4), assume a Complex Order to buy one of option A and
sell one of option B, 1000 times, with a cPBBO of $0.40 bid, $0.70
offer, is submitted with a stop price of $0.65. Assume that during
the Complex Solicitation Auction, the following Responses and order
interest are received: a market maker (``MM1'') responds to sell the
strategy 100 times at a price of $0.55; MM1 responds to sell the
strategy 100 times at a price of $0.60; a broker-dealer responds to
sell the strategy 300 times at a price of $0.60; and another market
maker (``MM2'') responds to sell the strategy 200 times at $0.60.
At the end of the Complex Solicitation Auction, since there is
not sufficient size to execute the entire Complex Agency Order at a
price(s) better than the stop price, the Complex Agency Order
executes at the stop price of $0.65 against the Solicited Order. All
unexecuted Responses are cancelled back to the sending participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(6) provides that a single quote, order or
Response shall not be allocated a number of contracts that is greater
than its size.
Finally, proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(7) provides that a Complex
Agency Order consisting of a stock/ETF component would not execute
against interest comprising the cPBBO at the end of the Complex
Solicitation Auction.\55\ Legging of a stock/ETF component would
introduce the risk of a participant not receiving an execution on all
components of the Complex Order and is therefore not considered as a
means
[[Page 5872]]
of executing a Complex Order which includes a stock/ETF component. The
Exchange believes that introducing the risk of inability to fully
execute a complex strategy is counterproductive to, and inconsistent
with, the effort to allow Complex Orders in the solicitation mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ This provision parallels PIXL Rule 1080(n)(ii)(E)(2)(g) and
is being proposed for the same reasons explained in the Complex PIXL
Filing. This limitation is also consistent with the handling of
Complex Orders that include a stock/ETF component and are entered
into the Phlx XL system. Commentary .08(a)(i) to Rule 1080 states,
for example, that stock-option orders can only be executed against
other stock-option orders and cannot be executed by the System
against orders for the individual components.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miscellaneous Provisions
Proposed Rules 1081(ii)(F) through (I) address the handling of the
Agency Order and other orders, quotes and Responses when certain
conditions are present. Pursuant to proposed Rule 1081(ii)(F), if the
market moves following the receipt of a Response, such that there are
Responses that cross the then-existing NBBO (provided such NBBO is not
crossed) at the time of the conclusion of the Solicitation Auction,
such Responses would be executed, if possible, at their limit
price(s).\56\ Since Responses may be cancelled at any time prior to the
conclusion of the Solicitation Auction, the Exchange believes that this
behavior is, at best, highly unlikely as participants would cancel
Responses when better priced interest that they could trade against is
present in the marketplace. This behavior is consistent with the
current handling of PAN Responses in a PIXL Auction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Similarly, in the case of a Complex Solicitation Auction,
if there are Responses that cross the then-existing cPBBO at the
time of conclusion of the Complex Solicitation Auction, such
Responses would be executed, if possible, at their limit prices.
This provision parallels PIXL Rule 1080(n)(ii)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(G) provides that if the Solicitation Auction
price when trading against non-solicited interest (except if it is a
Complex Solicitation Auction) would be the same as or cross the limit
of an order (excluding an all-or-none order) on the limit order book on
the same side of the market as the Agency Order, the Agency Order may
only be executed at a price that is at least $0.01 better than the
resting order's limit price provided such execution price improves the
stop price. If such execution price would not improve the stop price,
the Agency Order would be executed at a price which is $0.01 better for
the Agency Order than the stop price provided the price does not equal
or cross a public customer order and is equal to or improves upon the
PBBO on the opposite side of the Agency Order.\57\ If such price is not
possible, the Agency Order and Solicited Order would be cancelled with
no trade occurring. For example, assume the NBBO is $1.03-$1.10 when an
order is submitted into the Solicitation Auction, that the Agency Order
is buying and that the order is stopped at $1.05. The $1.03 bid is an
order on Phlx. During the Solicitation Auction a Response arrives to
sell at $1.03. At the end of the Solicitation Auction, if the Response
to sell at $1.03 can fully satisfy the Agency Order, the auction price
would be $1.03 but, since that price is the same as the price of a
resting order on the book, the Agency Order would trade against the
Response at $1.04 (an improvement of $0.01 over the resting order's
limit). By contrast, assume a case where the NBBO is $1.03-$1.10 and
where during the Auction an unrelated non-customer order to pay $1.04
is received. This order rests on the book and the NBBO becomes $1.04-
$1.10. Assume the same stop price of $1.05 for an Agency Order to buy,
and the receipt of a Response to sell at $1.04 which can fully satisfy
the Agency order. At the end of the Solicitation Auction, the auction
price would be $1.04 which equals the resting order on the book. In
this case, if the trade were executed with $0.01 improvement over the
resting order limit (that is, if the trade were executed at $1.05) the
execution would be at the stop price. The system would not consider the
origin of the resting order but ensures the priority of such order,
regardless of origin by requiring that any execution occur at a price
which improves upon the limit of a resting order by at least $0.01. In
addition, the system only would permit the Solicited Order and no other
interest to trade against the Agency Order at the stop price since the
Solicited Order stopped the entire size Agency Order at a price which
was required upon receipt to be equal to or improve the NBBO and to be
at least $0.01 improvement over any public customer orders resting on
the Phlx limit order book, thereby establishing priority at the stop
price. Therefore, the execution price in this case ($1.04) would be
$0.01 better than the stop price. This system logic ensures that the
Agency Order receives a better priced execution than the stop price
when trading against interest other than the Solicited Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ See also PIXL Rule 1080(n)(ii)(H). Proposed Rule
1081(ii)(G) does not apply to Complex Solicitation Auctions. Rather,
a parallel provision, proposed Rule 1081(ii)(H), provides that if
the Complex Solicitation Auction price when trading against non-
solicited interest would be the same as or cross the limit of that
of a Complex Order (excluding all-or-none) on the Complex Order Book
on the same side of the market as the Complex Agency Order, the
Complex Agency Order may only be executed at a price that improves
the resting order's limit price by at least $0.01, provided such
execution price improves the stop price. If such execution price
would be equal to or would not improve the stop price, the Agency
Order would be executed $0.01 better than the stop price provided
the price does not equal or cross a non-all-or-none public customer
Complex Order or a non-all-or-none public customer order present in
the cPBBO on the same side as the Complex Agency Order in a
component of the Complex Order Strategy and is equal to or better
than the cPBBO on the opposite side of the Complex Agency Order. If
such price is not possible, the Agency Order and Solicited Order
would be cancelled with no trade occurring. This functionality is
consistent with that of Complex PIXL auctions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(I) provides that any unexecuted Responses or
Solicited Orders would be cancelled at the end of the Solicitation
Auction. This behavior is consistent with the handling of unexecuted
PAN Responses and Initiating Orders in PIXL.\58\ Both Responses and
Solicited Orders are specifically entered into the Solicitation Auction
to trade against the Agency Order. The Exchange believes that
cancelling the unexecuted portion of Responses and Solicited Orders is
consistent with the expected behavior of such interest by the
submitting participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ See Rule 1080(n)(ii)(I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Complex Agency Orders With Stock/ETF Components
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J) deals with Complex Agency Orders with
stock or ETF components and generally tracks Rule 1080(n)(ii)(J)
applicable to PIXL. Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J)(1) states that member
organizations may only submit Complex Agency Orders, Complex Solicited
Orders, Complex Orders and/or Responses with a stock/ETF component if
such orders/Responses comply with the Qualified Contingent Trade
Exemption from Rule 611(a) of Regulation NMS pursuant to the Act.
Member organizations submitting such orders with a stock/ETF component
represent that such orders comply with the Qualified Contingent Trade
Exemption. Members of FINRA or the NASDAQ Stock Market (``NASDAQ'') are
required to have a Uniform Service Bureau/Executing Broker Agreement
(``AGU'') with Nasdaq Execution Services LLC (``NES'') in order to
trade orders containing a stock/ETF component; firms that are not
members of FINRA or NASDAQ are required to have a Qualified Special
Representative (``QSR'') arrangement with NES in order to trade orders
containing a stock/ETF component.
Proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J)(2) provides that where one component of a
Complex Agency Order, Complex Solicited Order, Complex Order or
Response is the underlying security, the Exchange shall electronically
communicate the underlying security component of the Complex Agency
Order (together with the Complex Solicited Order or
[[Page 5873]]
Response, as applicable) to NES, its designated broker-dealer, for
immediate execution.
Such execution and reporting would occur otherwise than on the
Exchange and would be handled by NES pursuant to applicable rules
regarding equity trading.
Finally, proposed Rule 1081(ii)(J)(3) states that when the short
sale price test in Rule 201 of Regulation SHO \59\ is triggered for a
covered security, NES would not execute a short sale order in the
underlying covered security component of a Complex Agency Order,
Complex Solicited Order, Complex Order or Response if the price is
equal to or below the current national best bid.\60\ However, NES would
execute a short sale order in the underlying covered security component
of a Complex Agency Order, Complex Solicited Order, Complex Order or
Response if such order is marked ``short exempt,'' regardless of
whether it is at a price that is equal to or below the current national
best bid.\61\ If NES could not execute the underlying covered security
component of a Complex Agency Order, Complex Solicited Order, Complex
Order or Response in accordance with Rule 201 of Regulation SHO, the
Exchange would cancel back the Complex Agency Order, Complex Solicited
Order, Complex Order or Response to the entering member organization.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``covered security'' has the
same meaning as in Rule 201(a)(1) of Regulation SHO.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ 17 CFR 242.201. See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
61595 (February 26, 2010), 75 FR 11232 (March 10, 2010). See also
Division of Trading and Markets: Responses to Frequently Asked
Questions Concerning Rule 201 of Regulation SHO, January 20, 2011
(``SHO FAQs'') at www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm.
\60\ The term ``national best bid'' is defined in SEC Rule
201(a)(4). 17 CFR 242.201(a)(4).
\61\ The Exchange notes that a broker or dealer may mark a sell
order ``short exempt'' only if the provisions of SEC Rule 201(c) or
(d) are met. 17 CFR 242.200(g)(2). Since NES and the Exchange do not
display the stock or ETF portion of a Complex Order, however, a
broker-dealer should not mark the short sale order ``short exempt''
under Rule 201(c). See SHO FAQs Question and Answer Nos. 4.2, 5.4,
and 5.5. See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63967
(February 25, 2011), 76 FR 12206 (March 4, 2011) (SR-Phlx-2011-27)
(discussing, among other things, Complex Orders marked ``short
exempt'') and the Complex PIXL Filing. The system would handle short
sales of the orders and Responses described herein the same way it
handles the short sales discussed in the Complex PIXL Filing.
\62\ 17 CFR 242.201(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory Issues
The proposed rule change contains two paragraphs describing
prohibited practices when participants use the solicitation mechanism.
These new provisions track similar provisions in the PIXL rule.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ See Rules 1080(n)(iii) and (iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Rule 1081(iii) states that the Solicitation Auction may be
used only where there is a genuine intention to execute a bona fide
transaction. It would be considered a violation of proposed Rule 1081
and would be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade and a violation of Rule 707 if an Initiating Member
submits an Agency Order (thereby initiating a Solicitation Auction) and
also submits its own Response in the same Solicitation Auction. The
purpose of this provision is to prevent Solicited Members from
submitting an inaccurate or misleading stop price or trying to improve
their allocation entitlement by participating with multiple expressions
of interest.
Proposed Rule 1081(iv) states that a pattern or practice of
submitting unrelated orders or quotes that cross the stop price causing
a Solicitation Auction to conclude before the end of the Solicitation
Auction period would be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade and a violation of Rule 707.
Definition of Professional in Rule 1000(b)(14)
In addition to proposing Rule 1081, the Exchange also proposes an
amendment to Rule 1000(b)(14). In 2010, the Exchange amended its
priority rules to give certain non-broker-dealer orders the same
priority as broker-dealer orders. In so doing, the Exchange adopted a
new defined term, the ``professional,'' for certain persons or
entities.\64\ Rule 1000(b)(14) defines professional as a person or
entity that (i) is not a broker or dealer in securities, and (ii)
places more than 390 orders in listed options per day on average during
a calendar month for its own beneficial account(s). A professional
account is treated in the same manner as an off-floor broker-dealer for
purposes of Phlx Rule 1014(g), to which the trade allocation algorithm
described in proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(1) refers. However, Rule
1000(b)(14) also currently states that all-or-none professional orders
would be treated like customer orders. The Exchange proposes to amend
Rule 1000(b)(14) by (i) specifying that orders submitted pursuant to
Rule 1081 for the accounts of professionals would be treated in the
same manner as off-floor broker-dealer orders for purposes of Rule
1014(g), and (ii) adding proposed Rule 1081 to the list of rules for
the purpose of which a professional would be treated in the same manner
as an off-floor broker-dealer. The effect of these changes to Rule 1014
is that professionals would not receive the same priority afforded to
public customers in a Solicitation Auction under proposed Rule 1081,
and instead would be treated as broker-dealers in this regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61802 (March 30,
2010), 75 FR 17193 (April 5, 2010) (approving SR-Phlx-2010-05).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Proceedings to Determine Whether to Approve or Disapprove SR-Phlx-
2014-66 and Grounds for Disapproval Under Consideration
The Commission is instituting proceedings pursuant to Section
19(b)(2)(B) of the Act \65\ to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be approved or disapproved.\66\ Institution of such
proceedings is appropriate at this time in view of the legal and policy
issues that are raised by the proposal and are discussed below.
Institution of proceedings does not indicate that the Commission has
reached any conclusions with respect to any of the issues involved.
Rather, as described in greater detail below, the Commission seeks and
encourages interested persons to comment on the proposal and inform the
Commission's analysis whether to approve or disapprove the proposed
rule change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
\66\ Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the Act provides that proceedings to
determine whether to disapprove a proposed rule change must be
concluded within 180 days of the date of publication of notice of
the filing of the proposed rule change. The time for conclusion of
the proceedings may be extended for up to an additional 60 days if
the Commission finds good cause for such extension and publishes its
reasons for so finding or if the self-regulatory organization
consents to the extension.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the Act, the Commission is
providing notice of the grounds for disapproval under consideration.
The Commission is instituting proceedings to allow for additional
analysis of, and input from, commenters with regard to the proposed
rule change's consistency with Section 6 of the Act, and in particular
Sections 6(b)(5).\67\ Section 6(b)(5) requires that the rules of an
exchange be designed, among other things, to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism
of a free and open market and a national market system and, in general,
to protect investors and the public interest; and are not designed to
[[Page 5874]]
permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or
dealers.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
\68\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Procedure: Request for Written Comments
The Commission requests that interested persons provide written
submissions of their views, data and arguments with respect to the
concerns identified above, as well as any others they may have with the
proposal. In particular, the Commission invites the written views of
interested persons concerning whether the proposed rule change is
inconsistent with Section 6 or any other provision, of the Act, or the
rules and regulations thereunder. Although there do not appear to be
any issues relevant to approval or disapproval that would be
facilitated by an oral presentation of views, data, and arguments, the
Commission will consider, pursuant to Rule 19b-4, any request for an
opportunity to make an oral presentation.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Section 19(b)(2) of the Act, as amended by the Securities
Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29 (June 4, 1975), grants the
Commission flexibility to determine what type of proceeding--either
oral or notice and opportunity for written comments--is appropriate
for consideration of a particular proposal by a self-regulatory
organization. See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 30 (1975).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to any other facets of the proposal on which persons
may seek to comment, the Commission is soliciting the views of
interested persons regarding provisions of the proposed rule change
concerning the handling of all-or-none orders. The Commission notes
that, in the case of a Solicitation Auction for simple orders, all
interest on the opposite side of the Agency Order would be considered
in determining whether the price has been improved for the full size of
the Agency Order.\70\ However, in the case of a Complex Order auction,
all-or-none interest would not be considered.\71\ As discussed above,
the Exchange explains that this difference is due to a system
limitation relating to all-or-none Complex Orders: ``All-or-none simple
orders reside with simple orders on the book. By contrast, all-or-none
Complex Orders reside in a separate book, in a different part of the
trading system. Thus aggregation of all-or-none Complex Orders with
other Complex Orders in order to determine the presence of sufficient
improving interest is a more difficult process than aggregation of all-
or-none simple orders with other simple orders.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(1).
\71\ See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes the impact that the proposed difference in
treatment of all-or-none Complex Orders would have. For example, if a
proposed cross was submitted to the Solicitation Auction for 1000
contracts at a certain price, and during the auction period an all-or-
none order for the full 1000 contracts was received by the Exchange in
its Complex Order book at a superior price, the Agency Order
nonetheless would be awarded to the solicited party at the stop price.
As discussed above, Phlx argues that not counting all-or-none interest
in the case of all-or-none Complex Orders would not be impactful,
maintaining that all-or-none Complex Orders are rare.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ The Exchange states that it reviewed six months of data
which showed that all-or-none Complex Orders represented only 0.12%
of all Complex Orders. See supra note 49. The Exchange also notes
that the proposed rule provides that, if sufficient size exists to
execute the entire Complex Agency Order at an improved price, an
all-or-none Complex Order would be considered for trade and executed
if possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission seeks comment on this feature of the Solicitation
Mechanism. The Commission notes that a critical factor in its
consideration of prior solicited order mechanism proposals has been
whether the Agency Order was adequately exposed to all potential price
improvement before the Solicited Order may trade against it at the
proposed cross price.
In addition, the Commission seeks comment on the proposal's
consideration of all-or-none orders that are resting on the book at the
stop price at the conclusion of the auction (in both simple and Complex
Order solicitations). The proposed rules provide, generally, that if,
upon the conclusion of an auction, a public customer order is resting
on the book opposite the Agency Order at the Solicited Order's stop
price, both the Solicited Order and the Agency Order are canceled.
However, if the public customer order was an all-or-none order, the
proposal provides that the execution of the Solicited Order against the
Agency Order can take place.\73\ The Commission understands this result
to apply even if the size of the all-or-none public customer order was
such that it otherwise would be eligible to trade against the Agency
Order. The Commission seeks commenters' views on this feature of the
Solicitation Mechanism.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(E)(2).
\74\ See also supra, text accompanying footnote 30, regarding
deference to all-or-none orders in the context of crossing two
public customer orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission further requests commenters' views on Phlx's
proposed cancellation of the Agency Order (along with the Solicited
Order) in certain cases where non-solicited interest is present that
could fill the Agency Order. The Commission notes, for example, one
result of proposed Rule 1081(ii)(G), which concerns a situation (in the
case of simple orders) where the non-solicited interest has improved
the price to a price that is the same as, or would cross, the limit of
an order on the limit order book on the same side of the market as the
Agency Order. The Commission understands the proposed rule as providing
that the Agency Order would be permitted to be executed only at a price
that is at least $0.01 better (i.e., toward the opposite side) than the
resting order's limit price. However, if that price, as adjusted by
$.01, would be equal to (i.e., would not improve) the stop price, the
non-solicited interest would not be permitted to execute against the
Agency Order at that price. In such case, as the Commission understands
the proposal, the price would be adjusted back to $.01 better (for the
Agency Order) than the stop price, but only if the resting limit order
on the Agency Order side is not a public customer order. Otherwise, the
Agency Order and Solicited Order would be cancelled with no trade
occurring.
With respect to this cancellation scenario, as discussed above,
Phlx explains that ``the system only would permit the Solicited Order
and no other interest to trade against the Agency Order at the stop
price since the Solicited Order stopped the entire size Agency Order at
a price which was required upon receipt to be equal to or improve the
NBBO and to be at least $0.01 improvement over any public customer
orders resting on the Phlx limit order book, thereby establishing
priority at the stop price.'' The Commission seeks comment on this
rationale and its result.
Another example concerns a case where, at the conclusion of the
auction period, a public customer order is resting on the book on the
opposite side of the Agency Order at the stop price. As noted by the
Exchange, its proposed rule and another exchange's solicited order
mechanism rule \75\ prohibit the execution of the Solicited Order in
such a case. However, the proposed Phlx rule differs from the other
exchange's rule in a case where, in addition to the public customer
order at the stop price, there is price-improving interest of a size
that is of insufficient size to fill the entire Agency Order on its
own, but, when aggregated with the size of the public customer order,
could fill the Agency
[[Page 5875]]
Order. On the other exchange, while the Solicited Order is cancelled,
the public customer order at the stop price and the improving interest
trade against the Agency Order. Under the Phlx's proposal, the Agency
Order and Solicited Order are cancelled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ See ISE Rule 716(e), Solicited Order Mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange explains that its system ``only permits the Solicited
Order and no other interest to trade against the Agency Order at the
stop price, thus ensuring that the Agency Order receives a better
priced execution than the stop price when trading against interest
other than the Solicited Order.'' The Commission notes that, when there
is a public customer order on the book at the stop price, the Solicited
Order would not be permitted to trade in any case, because a public
customer on the book cannot be bypassed by another order. The
Commission seeks comment on the aspect of the Exchange's proposal that
would cancel the Agency Order and the Solicited Order in a case where
there is public customer interest at the stop price, and together with
any improving interest, the Agency Order otherwise could be satisfied.
The Commission further seeks commenters' views regarding the
proposal's provisions regarding participation and priority in the
allocation of the Agency Order, with respect to the Solicited Order and
with respect to Responses, quotes and orders.
For example, under the proposal, one of the scenarios in which a
Solicitation Auction would conclude early is if there is a trading halt
on the Exchange in the option series that is the subject of the
auction.\76\ In such case, the Exchange's proposal provides that the
entire Agency Order would be executed solely against the Solicited
Order at the stop price, and any unexecuted Responses would be
cancelled.\77\ The Commission notes that there can be instances in
which an unrelated order on the side opposite the Agency Order has
arrived on the Exchange and is resting on the book at a price that is
superior to the stop price (from the point of view of the Agency Order)
when the trading halt occurs. By crossing the Agency Order against the
Solicited Order at the stop price in this situation, the Exchange would
be executing a trade at a price that is inferior to a price on the
Exchange's book. As noted above, the Exchange believes that public
customer interest submitted to Phlx after submission of the Agency and
Solicited Orders but prior to the trading halt should not prevent the
Agency Order from being executed at the stop price since such public
customer interest was not present at the time the Agency Order was
`stopped' by the Solicited Order.\78\ The Commission solicits comment
on this functionality and the Exchange's rationale.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(B)(4). The described scenario
applies in a simple Solicitation Auction. In a Complex Solicitation
Auction, the auction would end early any time there is a trading
halt on the Exchange in any component of the Complex Agency Order.
Id.
\77\ See proposed Rule 1081(ii)(C).
\78\ In explaining generally why Responses and other interest
present in the system would not be considered for trading against
the Agency Order in the case of a trading halt--which, the
Commission notes, would apply even when the aggregate of such
Responses and other interest was sufficient to fill the entire
Agency Order at an improved price--the Exchange stated that ``this
is appropriate since the participants representing tradable interest
in the Solicitation Auction have not `stopped' the Agency Order in
its entirety and would have no means after the auction executions
occur to offset the trading risk they would incur because the market
is halted if they were permitted to trade against the Agency Order
in this instance.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments regarding whether the proposed rule change should be approved
or disapproved by [insert date 21 days from publication in the Federal
Register]. Any person who wishes to file a rebuttal to any other
person's submission must file that rebuttal by [insert date 35 days
from publication in the Federal Register].
Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include
File Number SR-Phlx-2014-66 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Brent J. Fields,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-Phlx-2014-66. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make publicly available. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-Phlx-2014-66 and should be
submitted on or before February 24, 2015. If comments are received, any
rebuttal comments should be submitted by March 10, 2015.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(57).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-02017 Filed 2-2-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P