Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Modify an Optional Subscriber Fee and Tiered Distribution Fee for “Enhanced” Data Displays (the “Enhanced Display Solution Fee”), 74784-74790 [2014-29362]
Download as PDF
<![CDATA[
74784
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 241 / Tuesday, December 16, 2014 / Notices
to 90 days as the Commission may
designate if it finds such longer period
to be appropriate and publishes its
reasons for so finding, or as to which the
self-regulatory organization consents,
the Commission shall either approve the
proposed rule change, disapprove the
proposed rule change, or institute
proceedings to determine whether the
proposed rule change should be
disapproved. The 45th day after
publication of the notice for this
proposed rule change is December 22,
2014. The Commission is extending this
45-day time period.
The Commission finds it appropriate
to designate a longer period within
which to take action on the proposed
rule change so that it has sufficient time
to consider this proposed rule change.
Accordingly, the Commission, pursuant
to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,6
designates February 5, 2015, as the date
by which the Commission shall either
approve or disapprove, or institute
proceedings to determine whether to
disapprove, the proposed rule change
(File No. SR–NYSEArca–2014–107)
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.7
Kevin M. O’Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014–29365 Filed 12–15–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–73807; File No. SR–
NASDAQ–2014–117]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The
NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of
Proposed Rule Change To Modify an
Optional Subscriber Fee and Tiered
Distribution Fee for ‘‘Enhanced’’ Data
Displays (the ‘‘Enhanced Display
Solution Fee’’)
December 10, 2014.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on November
25, 2014, The NASDAQ Stock Market
LLC (‘‘NASDAQ’’ or the ‘‘Exchange’’)
filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘Commission’’) the
proposed rule change as described in
Items I and II below, which Items have
been prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to modify an
optional Subscriber fee and tiered
Distribution fee for ‘‘Enhanced’’ data
displays (the ‘‘Enhanced Display
Solution Fee’’).
The text of the proposed rule change
is below; proposed new language is
italicized; proposed deletions are in
brackets.
*
*
*
*
*
7026. Distribution Models
(a) Display Solutions
(1) Enhanced Display[s] Solution
(‘‘EDS’’) (optional delivery method)
(A) The charges to be paid by
Distributors for offering EDS
S[s]ubscribers of NASDAQ Depth [data]
Information [controlled display
products along] with access to an API or
similar solution shall be:
Number of downstream EDS subscribers
Monthly Enhanced Display Solution Fee per Distributor for the right to offer an [display products
containing] API or similar solution*.
[1–299 users = $2,000/month.
300–399 users = $3,000/month].
1–399 [400–499] users = $4,000/month.
[500–599 users = $5,000/month.
600–699 users = $6,000/month.
700–799 users = $7,000/month.
800–899 users = $8,000/month.
900–999 users = $9,000/month].
400–999 users = $7,500/month.
1,000 users or more = $15[0],000/month.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
* [Customers] Distributors that are subscribing to certain enterprise depth capped fees as described in NASDAQ Rule 7023(a)(1)(c) are exempt
from this fee.
(B) The monthly fee per Professional
[or Non-Professional] EDS S[s]ubscriber
for utilizing NASDAQ Level 2, NASDAQ
TotalView or NASDAQ OpenView data
on a [controlled display] product with
access to an API or similar solution
[through that display] is $74 per month
for TotalView and Level 2 and $6 per
month for OpenView. [the applicable
NASDAQ TotalView or NASDAQ
OpenView rates.]
The monthly fee per Non-Professional
EDS Subscriber for utilizing NASDAQ
Level 2, NASDAQ TotalView or
NASDAQ OpenView data on a product
with access to an API or similar solution
is the applicable NASDAQ Level 2,
6 Id.
7 17
NASDAQ TotalView or NASDAQ
OpenView rates.
[The monthly fee per Professional or
Non-Professional subscriber for utilizing
the Level 2 data for NASDAQ-listed
securities on a controlled display
product with access to an API or similar
solution through that display is the
applicable NASDAQ TotalView rates.]
[The monthly fee per Professional or
Non-Professional subscriber for utilizing
NASDAQ Level 2 data for NYSE, AMEX
or regional listed securities on a
controlled display product with access
to an API or similar solution through
that display is the applicable NASDAQ
OpenView rates.]
1 15
CFR 200.30–3(a)(31).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:38 Dec 15, 2014
2 17
Jkt 235001
PO 00000
(C) EDS Enterprise License: EDS
Distributors may elect to purchase an
Enterprise License for $30,000 per
month. Such Enterprise License shall
entitle the EDS Distributor to distribute
to an unlimited number of Professional
EDS Subscribers for a monthly fee of
$70 for TotalView and/or Level 2 and $6
for OpenView, notwithstanding the fees
set forth in subsection (B) above.
(2) The term ‘‘[n]Non-[p]Professional’’
shall have the same meaning as set forth
in NASDAQ Rule 7011(b).
(3) The term ‘‘Distributor’’ shall have
the same meaning as set forth in
NASDAQ Rule 7019(c).
(b)–(c) No change.
*
*
*
*
*
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
Frm 00103
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
E:\FR\FM\16DEN1.SGM
16DEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 241 / Tuesday, December 16, 2014 / Notices
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of, and basis for,
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant parts of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
1. Purpose
NASDAQ is proposing to amend
NASDAQ Rule 7026 (Distribution
Models) to modify the optional
Enhanced Display Solution (‘‘EDS’’) Fee
governing the distribution of NASDAQ
TotalView, NASDAQ OpenView and
NASDAQ Level 2 Information
(collectively, ‘‘NASDAQ Depth
Information’’). The modified optional
EDS Fee will offer increased flexibility
and simplified market data
administration for members and to
Distributors with external subscribers
that use the NASDAQ Depth
Information internally.
Existing EDS Fee. Currently, the
optional EDS Fee provides a pricing
option for Distributors who provide a
‘‘controlled device’’ product 3 along
with an Application Programming
Interface (‘‘API’’) or similar solution to
Subscribers. Non-display use is not
permitted under the Enhanced Display
Solution fee structure. To ensure proper
application of the EDS Fee, NASDAQ
requires Distributors to monitor for any
non-display or excessive use suggesting
that the EDS Subscriber is not in
3 The term ‘‘controlled device’’ is defined as
follows in Rule 7023(a)(6): A Controlled Device is
any device that a Distributor of NASDAQ Depth-ofBook data permits to: (1) Access the Depth-of-Book
information or (2) communicate with the
Distributor so as to cause the Distributor to access
the Depth-of-Book data. Where a Controlled Device
is part of an electronic network between computers
used for investment, trading or order routing
activities, the Distributor must demonstrate that the
particular Controlled Device should not have to pay
for an entitlement. For example, in some Display
systems the Distributor gives the Subscribers the
choice to view the data or not; a Subscriber that
chooses not to view it would not be charged.
Similarly, in a Non-Display system, users of
Controlled Devices may have a choice of basic or
advanced computerized trading or order routing
services, where only the advanced version uses the
information. Customers of the basic service would
not be charged.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:38 Dec 15, 2014
Jkt 235001
compliance. The Distributor is liable for
any unauthorized use by the EDS
Subscribers under the EDS Fee. The
optional fee is available only to
NASDAQ members and external
Distributors offering NASDAQ Depth
Information and who apply and are
approved for an Enhanced Display
Solution.
The EDS option also has
administrative requirements for data
usage. As administered today, the
Distributor must agree to reformat,
redisplay and/or alter the NASDAQ
Depth Information prior to
retransmission, but not to affect the
integrity of the NASDAQ Depth
Information and not to render it
inaccurate, unfair, uninformative,
fictitious, misleading or discriminatory.
An Enhanced Display Solution is any
controlled display product containing
NASDAQ Depth Information where the
Distributor controls a display of
NASDAQ Depth Information, but also
allows the EDS Subscriber to access an
API or similar solution from that display
product. The EDS Subscriber may use
the NASDAQ Depth Information for the
EDS Subscriber’s own purposes and
may not redistribute the information
outside of their organization. The EDS
Subscriber may not redistribute the data
internally to other users in the same
organization.
Proposed Modification. The new
Enhanced Display Solution will offer
even greater flexibility. Where
previously, EDS required the Distributor
to both ‘‘control’’ the display and the
entitlement to the display, effective
January 1, 2015, Distributors will have
the option to disseminate NASDAQ
Depth Information to EDS Subscribers
without the requirement of controlling
the display. This does not replace the
existing EDS program, but rather
provides additional flexibility by
offering two options under the EDS
program. In response to industry
demand and ongoing changes in the
technical distribution of market data,
NASDAQ will now permit Distributors
to offer APIs that power third party
software display applications where the
Distributor controls the entitlement but
not the display of data. Previously,
downstream firms receiving this type of
NASDAQ Depth Information would
have been classified as a data feed
recipient and pay a much higher
internal distributor fee. These
downstream data feed recipients are
now able to reduce their cost and the
cost to the industry by paying a modest
fee increase for each EDS Subscriber,
while also removing reporting and
administration requirements by
allowing the Distributor to manage this
PO 00000
Frm 00104
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
74785
on behalf of the EDS Subscriber firm.
The EDS program will continue to cover
the same NASDAQ Depth Information,
namely NASDAQ TotalView, NASDAQ
OpenView, and NASDAQ Level 2.
The EDS Subscriber, or end user, to
an Enhanced Display Solution may use
the NASDAQ Depth Information for its
own purposes but may not redistribute
the NASDAQ Depth Information outside
of their organization or even internally
to other subscribers in the same
organization. Any EDS Subscriber
distributing the NASDAQ Depth
Information further downstream from
NASDAQ—such as posting the
NASDAQ Depth Information on a
shared drive or delivering the NASDAQ
Depth Information into another
system—would forfeit eligibility for the
EDS Fee.4 Additionally, EDS
Distributors must offer an integrated
data solution with secured data
transmissions, a robust entitlement
system and monitor EDS Subscribers for
any non-display or excessive usage to
ensure compliance. EDS Distributors
must also offer NASDAQ Depth
Information in Distributor’s own
messaging formats (rather than its raw
NASDAQ message formats) by
reformatting, redisplaying and/or
altering the NASDAQ Depth
Information prior to retransmission, but
not to affect the integrity of the
NASDAQ Depth Information and not to
render it inaccurate, unfair,
uninformative, fictitious, misleading or
discriminatory.
Non-display use is not included or
permitted under the EDS Fee. While
Distributors are not required to
technically control against non-display
usage (due to the difficulty of achieving
such control), the Distributor is required
to restrict non-display usage
contractually by including such
restrictions in any agreements with
recipients of the Information. The nondisplay definition in the policy
document is not changing. Today, data
use that powers the display is allowed.
For example, if an application is
updating a portfolio and exposes such
information on the display, this use is
included under EDS. Also, calculating
VWAPs or other derived information for
use on the display/device is permitted
under EDS. Examples of prohibited nondisplay use include but are not limited
to, auto-quoting, algorithmic trading,
and risk management, even if that
information is used to power the
display.
4 Such use would be considered a Retransmission and would be governed by NASDAQ
Rule 7019 governing market data distribution.
E:\FR\FM\16DEN1.SGM
16DEN1
74786
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 241 / Tuesday, December 16, 2014 / Notices
Finally, Distributors offering an
Enhanced Display Solution have several
administrative requirements. They must
report the number of EDS Subscribers
under new report titles and separately
from controlled non-EDS products.
Distributors must include EDS
Subscribers under new products codes
in the Detailed Usage Reporting.
Distributors also assume the liability for
any unauthorized use of NASDAQ
Depth Information by EDS Subscribers.
While there are more administrative
requirements for this program for the
Distributor, the industry administration
burden is lessened, as downstream data
feed recipient firms no longer need to go
through the process of having data feeds
approved or tracking and reporting
usage.
Effective January 1, 2015, NASDAQ
will offer new pricing for the optional
EDS program. If the Distributor offers
multiple Enhanced Display Solutions, it
would only be fee liable for one EDS
Distribution fee. The simplified fees to
be paid by Distributors offering EDS are
as follows:
New fee for number of downstream
subscribers
Old fee for number of downstream subscribers
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
1–299 Subscribers = $2,000/month ..................................................................................................
300–399 Subscribers = $3,000/month.
400–499 Subscribers = $4,000/month ..............................................................................................
500–599 Subscribers = $5,000/month.
600–699 Subscribers = $6,000/month.
700–799 Subscribers = $7,000/month.
800–899 Subscribers = $8,000/month.
900–999 Subscribers = $9,000/month.
1,000 or more Subscribers = $10,000/month ...................................................................................
With one exception, distributors
opting for an Enhanced Display
Solution are, in addition, liable for the
applicable Professional or NonProfessional Subscriber fees for the
underlying NASDAQ Depth Information
products. Distributors opting for an
Enhanced Display Solution that
provides access to NASDAQ TotalView,
NASDAQ Level 2 or OpenView will be
charged a monthly fee of $74 per
Professional EDS Subscriber of
TotalView or Level 2 and $6 per
Professional EDS Subscriber of
OpenView. The fees otherwise
applicable to such Subscribers would be
$70 and $6 for TotalView and
OpenView.5
NASDAQ is also creating a new
Enterprise License option for EDS
Distributors. Specifically, as set forth in
new Rule 7026(a)(1)(C), an EDS
Distributor may elect to purchase an
Enterprise License for $30,000 per
month. This Enterprise Licensee will
permit the EDS Distributor to distribute
to an unlimited number of Professional
EDS Subscribers for $70 per month each
for TotalView and Level 2 and $6 per
month each for OpenView. The EDS
Enterprise License does not modify the
fees assessed for distribution to NonProfessional Subscribers. Distributors
that subscribe to existing NASDAQ
enterprise licenses set forth in Rule
7023(c)(1–3) are not impacted by the
new EDS Enterprise License and they
remain exempt from the EDS Distributor
fee as they are today.
5 Effective January 1, 2015, the fees for non-EDS
Level 2 subscribers will be increasing from $45 to
$50 per month. See SR–NASDAQ–2014–111, filed
November 17, 2014.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:38 Dec 15, 2014
Jkt 235001
This new pricing and administrative
option respond to industry demand, as
well as to changes in the technology to
distribute market data. By providing this
new fee option, Distributors will have
more administrative flexibility in their
receipt and distribution of NASDAQ
Depth Information.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed
rule change is consistent with the
provisions of Section 6 of the Act,6 in
general, and with Section 6(b)(4) of the
Act,7 in particular, in that it provides an
equitable allocation of reasonable fees
among users and recipients of NASDAQ
Depth Information.
NASDAQ believes that this proposal
represents an equitable allocation of
reasonable dues and fees, consistent
with the requirements of the Act. The
EDS Fee, which has been available as an
option for two years, has reduced costs
for Distributors and Subscriber firms
that voluntarily opt for this service. The
fee is tiered by number of subscribers,
which has been found to be consistent
with the Act in multiple contexts due to
the economic efficiencies attributable to
providing the same data elements to an
increasing population of subscribers.
NASDAQ’s proposal to reduce the
number of price tiers is also consistent
with the Act in that it merely simplifies
the existing tiers and only modestly
adjusts the fees—some higher, some
lower—of Distributors that opt for the
program and that fall within the old and
new tiers.
NASDAQ’s proposal to increase by $4
the monthly fee for EDS Subscribers
6 15
7 15
PO 00000
U.S.C. 78f.
U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
Frm 00105
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
1–399 Subscribers= $4,000/month.
400–999 Subscribers = $7,500/month.
1,000 or more Subscribers = $15,000/month.
with access to NASDAQ TotalView and
Level 2 is also consistent with the Act
in that it reflects an equitable allocation
of reasonable fees. The Commission has
long recognized the equitable nature of
assessing different fees for Professional
and Non-Professional users of the same
data. NASDAQ also believes it is
equitable to assess a higher fee per EDS
Professional TotalView Subscriber than
to an ordinary Professional TotalView
Subscriber due to the enhanced
flexibility and lower overall costs that
the EDS program offers Distributors, as
well as to the voluntary nature of the
EDS program itself.
Finally, NASDAQ believes that the
new EDS Enterprise License is fair and
equitable and not unreasonably
discriminatory. Enterprise Licenses
have long been accepted as an
economically efficient form of volume
discount for the heaviest users of market
data (see Rule 7023 enterprise licenses).
NASDAQ notes that the EDS Enterprise
License Fee—and the entire EDS
program—is entirely optional in that
NASDAQ is not required to offer it and
Distributors are not required to pay it.
Accordingly, Distributors and users can
discontinue use at any time and for any
reason, including due to an assessment
of the reasonableness of fees charged.
NASDAQ continues to create new
pricing policies aimed at increasing
transparency in the market and believes
this is another step in that direction.
In adopting Regulation NMS, the
Commission granted self-regulatory
organizations and broker-dealers
increased authority and flexibility to
offer new and unique market data to the
public. It was believed that this
authority would expand the amount of
E:\FR\FM\16DEN1.SGM
16DEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 241 / Tuesday, December 16, 2014 / Notices
data available to consumers, and also
spur innovation and competition for the
provision of market data.
The Commission concluded that
Regulation NMS—by deregulating the
market in proprietary data—would itself
further the Act’s goals of facilitating
efficiency and competition:
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
[E]fficiency is promoted when brokerdealers who do not need the data beyond the
prices, sizes, market center identifications of
the NBBO and consolidated last sale
information are not required to receive (and
pay for) such data. The Commission also
believes that efficiency is promoted when
broker-dealers may choose to receive (and
pay for) additional market data based on their
own internal analysis of the need for such
data.8
By removing ‘‘unnecessary regulatory
restrictions’’ on the ability of exchanges
to sell their own data, Regulation NMS
advanced the goals of the Act and the
principles reflected in its legislative
history. If the free market should
determine whether proprietary data is
sold to broker-dealers at all, it follows
that the price at which such data is sold
should be set by the market as well.
On July 21, 2010, President Barack
Obama signed into law H.R. 4173, the
Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(‘‘Dodd-Frank Act’’), which amended
Section 19 of the Act. Among other
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank
Act amended paragraph (A) of Section
19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the
phrase ‘‘on any person, whether or not
the person is a member of the selfregulatory organization’’ after ‘‘due, fee
or other charge imposed by the selfregulatory organization.’’ As a result, all
SRO rule proposals establishing or
changing dues, fees, or other charges are
immediately effective upon filing
regardless of whether such dues, fees, or
other charges are imposed on members
of the SRO, non-members, or both.
Section 916 further amended paragraph
(C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Exchange
Act to read, in pertinent part, ‘‘At any
time within the 60-day period beginning
on the date of filing of such a proposed
rule change in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section
19(b)], the Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend the change in the
rules of the self-regulatory organization
made thereby, if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of this title. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall
8 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808
(June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:38 Dec 15, 2014
Jkt 235001
institute proceedings under paragraph
(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine
whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.’’
NASDAQ believes that these
amendments to Section 19 of the Act
reflect Congress’s intent to allow the
Commission to rely upon the forces of
competition to ensure that fees for
market data are reasonable and
equitably allocated. Although Section
19(b) had formerly authorized
immediate effectiveness for a ‘‘due, fee
or other charge imposed by the selfregulatory organization,’’ the
Commission adopted a policy and
subsequently a rule stipulating that fees
for data and other products available to
persons that are not members of the selfregulatory organization must be
approved by the Commission after first
being published for comment. At the
time, the Commission supported the
adoption of the policy and the rule by
pointing out that unlike members,
whose representation in self-regulatory
organization governance was mandated
by the Act, non-members should be
given the opportunity to comment on
fees before being required to pay them,
and that the Commission should
specifically approve all such fees.
NASDAQ believes that the amendment
to Section 19 reflects Congress’s
conclusion that the evolution of selfregulatory organization governance and
competitive market structure have
rendered the Commission’s prior policy
on non-member fees obsolete.
Specifically, many exchanges have
evolved from member-owned not-forprofit corporations into for-profit
investor-owned corporations (or
subsidiaries of investor-owned
corporations). Accordingly, exchanges
no longer have narrow incentives to
manage their affairs for the exclusive
benefit of their members, but rather
have incentives to maximize the appeal
of their products to all customers,
whether members or non-members, so
as to broaden distribution and grow
revenues. Moreover, we believe that the
change also reflects an endorsement of
the Commission’s determinations that
reliance on competitive markets is an
appropriate means to ensure equitable
and reasonable prices. Simply put, the
change reflects a presumption that all
fee changes should be permitted to take
effect immediately, since the level of all
fees are constrained by competitive
forces.
The recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v.
SEC, No. 09–1042 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
although reviewing a Commission
decision made prior to the effective date
PO 00000
Frm 00106
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
74787
of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the
Commission’s reliance upon
competitive markets to set reasonable
and equitably allocated fees for market
data. ‘‘In fact, the legislative history
indicates that the Congress intended
that the market system ‘evolve through
the interplay of competitive forces as
unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed’ and that the SEC wield its
regulatory power ‘in those situations
where competition may not be
sufficient,’ such as in the creation of a
‘consolidated transactional reporting
system.’ NetCoaltion, at 15 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 94–229, at 92 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321,
323). The court’s conclusions about
Congressional intent are therefore
reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments, which create a
presumption that exchange fees,
including market data fees, may take
effect immediately, without prior
Commission approval, and that the
Commission should take action to
suspend a fee change and institute a
proceeding to determine whether the fee
change should be approved or
disapproved only where the
Commission has concerns that the
change may not be consistent with the
Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
NASDAQ does not believe that the
proposed rule change will result in any
burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act, as amended.
Notwithstanding its determination that
the Commission may rely upon
competition to establish fair and
equitably allocated fees for market data,
the NetCoaltion court found that the
Commission had not, in that case,
compiled a record that adequately
supported its conclusion that the market
for the data at issue in the case was
competitive. For the reasons discussed
above, NASDAQ believes that the DoddFrank Act amendments to Section 19
materially alter the scope of the
Commission’s review of future market
data filings, by creating a presumption
that all fees may take effect
immediately, without prior analysis by
the Commission of the competitive
environment. Even in the absence of
this important statutory change,
however, NASDAQ believes that a
record may readily be established to
demonstrate the competitive nature of
the market in question.
There is intense competition between
trading platforms that provide
transaction execution and routing
services and proprietary data products.
E:\FR\FM\16DEN1.SGM
16DEN1
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
74788
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 241 / Tuesday, December 16, 2014 / Notices
Transaction execution and proprietary
data products are complementary in that
market data is both an input and a
byproduct of the execution service. In
fact, market data and trade execution are
a paradigmatic example of joint
products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post
an order will depend on the attributes
of the platform where the order can be
posted, including the execution fees,
data quality and price and distribution
of its data products. Without the
prospect of a taking order seeing and
reacting to a posted order on a particular
platform, the posting of the order would
accomplish little. Without trade
executions, exchange data products
cannot exist. Data products are valuable
to many end users only insofar as they
provide information that end users
expect will assist them or their
customers in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data
include not only the costs of the data
distribution infrastructure, but also the
costs of designing, maintaining, and
operating the exchange’s transaction
execution platform and the cost of
regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor
confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the
revenues it receives from both products
and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover,
an exchange’s customers view the costs
of transaction executions and of data as
a unified cost of doing business with the
exchange. A broker-dealer will direct
orders to a particular exchange only if
the expected revenues from executing
trades on the exchange exceed net
transaction execution costs and the cost
of data that the broker-dealer chooses to
buy to support its trading decisions (or
those of its customers). The choice of
data products is, in turn, a product of
the value of the products in making
profitable trading decisions. If the cost
of the product exceeds its expected
value, the broker-dealer will choose not
to buy it. Moreover, as a broker-dealer
chooses to direct fewer orders to a
particular exchange, the value of the
product to that broker-dealer decreases,
for two reasons. First, the product will
contain less information, because
executions of the broker-dealer’s orders
will not be reflected in it. Second, and
perhaps more important, the product
will be less valuable to that brokerdealer because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it
is directing its orders. Data from the
competing venue to which the brokerdealer is directing orders will become
correspondingly more valuable.
Thus, a super-competitive increase in
the fees charged for either transactions
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:38 Dec 15, 2014
Jkt 235001
or data has the potential to impair
revenues from both products. ‘‘No one
disputes that competition for order flow
is ‘fierce’.’’ NetCoalition at 24. However,
the existence of fierce competition for
order flow implies a high degree of price
sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers
with order flow, since they may readily
reduce costs by directing orders toward
the lowest-cost trading venues. A
broker-dealer that shifted its order flow
from one platform to another in
response to order execution price
differentials would both reduce the
value of that platform’s market data and
reduce its own need to consume data
from the disfavored platform. Similarly,
if a platform increases its market data
fees, the change will affect the overall
cost of doing business with the
platform, and affected broker-dealers
will assess whether they can lower their
trading costs by directing orders
elsewhere and thereby lessening the
need for the more expensive data.
Analyzing the cost of market data
distribution in isolation from the cost of
all of the inputs supporting the creation
of market data will inevitably
underestimate the cost of the data. Thus,
because it is impossible to create data
without a fast, technologically robust,
and well-regulated execution system,
system costs and regulatory costs affect
the price of market data. It would be
equally misleading, however, to
attribute all of the exchange’s costs to
the market data portion of an exchange’s
joint product. Rather, all of the
exchange’s costs are incurred for the
unified purposes of attracting order
flow, executing and/or routing orders,
and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an
exchange earns reflects the revenues it
receives from the joint products and the
total costs of the joint products.
Competition among trading platforms
can be expected to constrain the
aggregate return each platform earns
from the sale of its joint products, but
different platforms may choose from a
range of possible, and equally
reasonable, pricing strategies as the
means of recovering total costs. For
example, some platform may choose to
pay rebates to attract orders, charge
relatively low prices for market
information (or provide information free
of charge) and charge relatively high
prices for accessing posted liquidity.
Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates)
to attract orders, setting relatively high
prices for market information, and
setting relatively low prices for
accessing posted liquidity. In this
environment, there is no economic basis
for regulating maximum prices for one
PO 00000
Frm 00107
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
of the joint products in an industry in
which suppliers face competitive
constraints with regard to the joint
offering. This would be akin to strictly
regulating the price that an automobile
manufacturer can charge for car sound
systems despite the existence of a highly
competitive market for cars and the
availability of after-market alternatives
to the manufacturer-supplied system.
The market for market data products
is competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce
competition for the inputs necessary to
the creation of proprietary data and
strict pricing discipline for the
proprietary products themselves.
Numerous exchanges compete with
each other for listings, trades, and
market data itself, providing virtually
limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs
who wish to produce and distribute
their own market data. This proprietary
data is produced by each individual
exchange, as well as other entities, in a
vigorously competitive market.
Broker-dealers currently have
numerous alternative venues for their
order flow, including ten self-regulatory
organization (‘‘SRO’’) markets, as well
as internalizing broker-dealers (‘‘BDs’’)
and various forms of alternative trading
systems (‘‘ATSs’’), including dark pools
and electronic communication networks
(‘‘ECNs’’). Each SRO market competes to
produce transaction reports via trade
executions, and two FINRA-regulated
Trade Reporting Facilities (‘‘TRFs’’)
compete to attract internalized
transaction reports. Competitive markets
for order flow, executions, and
transaction reports provide pricing
discipline for the inputs of proprietary
data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs,
and ATSs that currently produce
proprietary data or are currently capable
of producing it provides further pricing
discipline for proprietary data products.
Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is
currently permitted to produce
proprietary data products, and many
currently do or have announced plans to
do so, including NASDAQ, NYSE,
NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any
other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs or BDs
to produce joint proprietary data
products. Additionally, order routers
and market data vendors can facilitate
single or multiple broker-dealers’
production of proprietary data products.
The potential sources of proprietary
products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from
ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-pass
SROs is significant in two respects.
First, non-SROs can compete directly
with SROs for the production and sale
E:\FR\FM\16DEN1.SGM
16DEN1
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 241 / Tuesday, December 16, 2014 / Notices
of proprietary data products, as BATS
and Arca did before registering as
exchanges by publishing proprietary
book data on the Internet. Second,
because a single order or transaction
report can appear in an SRO proprietary
product, a non-SRO proprietary
product, or both, the data available in
proprietary products is exponentially
greater than the actual number of orders
and transaction reports that exist in the
marketplace.
Market data vendors provide another
form of price discipline for proprietary
data products because they control the
primary means of access to end users.
Vendors impose price restraints based
upon their business models. For
example, vendors such as Bloomberg
and Thomson Reuters that assess a
surcharge on data they sell may refuse
to offer proprietary products that end
users will not purchase in sufficient
numbers. Internet portals, such as
Google, impose a discipline by
providing only data that will enable
them to attract ‘‘eyeballs’’ that
contribute to their advertising revenue.
Retail broker-dealers, such as Schwab
and Fidelity, offer their customers
proprietary data only if it promotes
trading and generates sufficient
commission revenue. Although the
business models may differ, these
vendors’ pricing discipline is the same:
they can simply refuse to purchase any
proprietary data product that fails to
provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and
other producers of proprietary data
products must understand and respond
to these varying business models and
pricing disciplines in order to market
proprietary data products successfully.
In addition to the competition and
price discipline described above, the
market for proprietary data products is
also highly contestable because market
entry is rapid, inexpensive, and
profitable. The history of electronic
trading is replete with examples of
entrants that swiftly grew into some of
the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers:
Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN,
BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other
ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated
market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the
market for proprietary data, has
increased the contestability of that
market. While broker-dealers have
previously published their proprietary
data individually, Regulation NMS
encourages market data vendors and
broker-dealers to produce proprietary
products cooperatively in a manner
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:38 Dec 15, 2014
Jkt 235001
never before possible. Multiple market
data vendors already have the capability
to aggregate data and disseminate it on
a profitable scale, including Bloomberg,
and Thomson Reuters.
The court in NetCoalition concluded
that the Commission had failed to
demonstrate that the market for market
data was competitive based on the
reasoning of the Commission’s
NetCoalition order because, in the
court’s view, the Commission had not
adequately demonstrated that the depthof-book data at issue in the case is used
to attract order flow. NASDAQ believes,
however, that evidence not before the
court clearly demonstrates that
availability of data attracts order flow.
For example, as of July 2010, 92 of the
top 100 broker-dealers by shares
executed on NASDAQ consumed Level
2/NQDS and 80 of the top 100 brokerdealers consumed TotalView. During
that month, the Level 2/NQDS-users
were responsible for 94.44% of the
orders entered into NASDAQ and
TotalView users were responsible for
92.98%.
Competition among platforms has
driven NASDAQ continually to improve
its platform data offerings and to cater
to customers’ data needs. For example,
NASDAQ has developed and
maintained multiple delivery
mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and
compression) that enable customers to
receive data in the form and manner
they prefer and at the lowest cost to
them. NASDAQ offers front end
applications such as its ‘‘Bookviewer’’
to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ
has created new products like
TotalView Aggregate to complement
TotalView ITCH and Level 2/NQDS,
because offering data in multiple
formatting allows NASDAQ to better fit
customer needs. NASDAQ offers data
via multiple extranet providers, thereby
helping to reduce network and total cost
for its data products. NASDAQ has
developed an online administrative
system to provide customers
transparency into their data feed
requests and streamline data usage
reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded
its Enterprise License options that
reduce the administrative burden and
costs to firms that purchase market data.
Despite these enhancements and a
dramatic increase in message traffic,
NASDAQ’s fees for market data have
remained flat. In fact, as a percent of
total customer costs, NASDAQ data fees
have fallen relative to other data usage
costs—including bandwidth,
programming, and infrastructure—that
have risen. The same holds true for
execution services; despite numerous
enhancements to NASDAQ’s trading
PO 00000
Frm 00108
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
74789
platform, absolute and relative trading
costs have declined. Platform
competition has intensified as new
entrants have emerged, constraining
prices for both executions and for data.
The vigor of competition for depth
information is significant and the
Exchange believes that this proposal
clearly evidences such competition.
NASDAQ is offering a new pricing
model in order to keep pace with
changes in the industry and evolving
customer needs. It is entirely optional
and is geared towards attracting new
customers, as well as retaining existing
customers.
The Exchange has witnessed
competitors creating new products and
innovative pricing in this space over the
course of the past year. NASDAQ
continues to see firms challenge its
pricing on the basis of the Exchange’s
explicit fees being higher than the zeropriced fees from other competitors such
as BATS. In all cases, firms make
decisions on how much and what types
of data to consume on the basis of the
total cost of interacting with NASDAQ
or other exchanges. Of course, the
explicit data fees are but one factor in
a total platform analysis. Some
competitors have lower transactions fees
and higher data fees, and others are vice
versa. The market for this depth
information is highly competitive and
continually evolves as products develop
and change.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants or Others
No written comments were either
solicited or received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act 9 and paragraph
(f)(2) of Rule 19b–4 thereunder.10 At any
time within 60 days of the filing of the
proposed rule change, the Commission
summarily may temporarily suspend
such rule change if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
9 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
CFR 240.19b–4(f)(2).
10 17
E:\FR\FM\16DEN1.SGM
16DEN1
74790
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 241 / Tuesday, December 16, 2014 / Notices
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s Internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
NASDAQ–2014–117 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NASDAQ–2014–117. This
file number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of NASDAQ. All comments
received will be posted without change;
the Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from
submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make
available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR–
NASDAQ–2014–117 and should be
submitted on or before January 6, 2015.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.11
Kevin M. O’Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014–29362 Filed 12–15–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
11 17
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:38 Dec 15, 2014
Jkt 235001
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–73805; File No. SR–FICC–
2014–11]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed
Income Clearing Corporation; Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change To
Amend the Government Securities
Division Rulebook and the Mortgage
Backed Securities Clearing Rules In
Order To Move the Time of Novation
With Respect to Certain Trades,
Include Rules To Reflect Existing
Processes, and Clarify Certain Rules
To Reflect Current Practices
December 10, 2014.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4,2 notice is
hereby given that on December 2, 2014,
Fixed Income Clearing Corporation
(‘‘FICC’’) filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’)
the proposed rule change as described
in Items I, II, and III below, which Items
have been prepared by FICC. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
I. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the
Terms of Substance of the Proposed
Rule Change
FICC is proposing to (1) move the
time of novation for netting eligible
transactions submitted to the
Government Securities Division
(‘‘GSD’’) in accordance with the GSD
Rulebook (‘‘GSD Rules’’) and for SBODestined Trades 3 submitted to the
Mortgage-Backed Securities Division
(‘‘MBSD’’) in accordance with the
MBSD Clearing Rules (‘‘MBSD Rules’’)
in order to provide members with
additional legal certainty that FICC will
be the legal counterparty with respect to
their guaranteed trades for purposes of
regulatory capital requirements, (2)
include rules to reflect existing
processes, and (3) clarify certain rules to
reflect current practices.
II. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the
Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the
Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission,
FICC included statements concerning
1 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
3 The MBSD Rules define a ‘‘SBO-Destined
Trade’’ as a to-be-announced (‘‘TBA’’) transaction in
the clearing system intended for TBA Netting in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules. MBSD
Rule 1, Definitions. In a TBA transaction, members
agree on a sale price, quantity, and the
characteristics of the securities being sold, but they
do not specify which particular securities will be
delivered on the settlement date.
2 17
PO 00000
Frm 00109
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
the purpose of and basis for the
proposed rule change and discussed any
comments it received on the proposed
rule change. The text of these statements
may be examined at the places specified
in Item IV below. FICC has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B
and C below, of the most significant
aspects of such statements.
A. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the
Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the
Proposed Rule Change.
1. Purpose
FICC is proposing to move the time of
novation applicable to certain
transactions submitted to the GSD and
MBSD to earlier in the clearing process
in order to provide members with
additional legal certainty that FICC will
be their legal counterparty with respect
to their guaranteed trades for purposes
of members’ regulatory capital
requirements.
Currently, GSD and MBSD guarantee
the settlement of a trade upon
comparison, which generally occurs
when FICC issues initial ‘‘output’’ to
GSD netting members or MBSD clearing
members, as applicable, indicating that
their trades have compared,4 provided
that the trade meets the requirements of
the GSD Rules or the MBSD Rules, as
applicable.5 This means that FICC is
responsible for settling the guaranteed
trades, even if one of the members who
submitted the trade becomes insolvent.
Novation, which refers to the
termination of delivery, receive and
related payment obligations between the
original parties to the contract and the
replacement of such obligations with
identical obligations between each party
and FICC, currently does not occur until
later in the clearing and settlement
process than comparison. In GSD,
novation currently occurs when
subsequent ‘‘netting output’’ is issued to
netting members (usually the day before
settlement); in MBSD, novation
currently occurs when subsequent ‘‘pool
netting output’’ is issued to clearing
members (usually the day before
settlement).
Because there is a legal distinction
between the concept of ‘‘guarantee’’ and
‘‘novation’’, and this legal distinction
may have a bearing on how members
calculate their capital requirement, FICC
proposes to move the time of novation
(i.e. the point that FICC becomes the
legal counterparty) so that it occurs at
the time of the trade guarantee.
4 In the case of GSD locked-in trades, comparison
occurs upon receipt of the trade data submitted to
FICC from the locked-in trade source. GSD Rule 6C.
5 See GSD Rule 11B and MBSD Rule 5.
E:\FR\FM\16DEN1.SGM
16DEN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 241 (Tuesday, December 16, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 74784-74790]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-29362]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-73807; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2014-117]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To
Modify an Optional Subscriber Fee and Tiered Distribution Fee for
``Enhanced'' Data Displays (the ``Enhanced Display Solution Fee'')
December 10, 2014.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that on November 25, 2014, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'' or
the ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I and
II below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to modify an optional Subscriber fee and
tiered Distribution fee for ``Enhanced'' data displays (the ``Enhanced
Display Solution Fee'').
The text of the proposed rule change is below; proposed new
language is italicized; proposed deletions are in brackets.
* * * * *
7026. Distribution Models
(a) Display Solutions
(1) Enhanced Display[s] Solution (``EDS'') (optional delivery
method)
(A) The charges to be paid by Distributors for offering EDS
S[s]ubscribers of NASDAQ Depth [data] Information [controlled display
products along] with access to an API or similar solution shall be:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of downstream EDS subscribers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly Enhanced Display Solution Fee per [1-299 users = $2,000/month.
Distributor for the right to offer an 300-399 users = $3,000/month].
[display products containing] API or 1-399 [400-499] users = $4,000/month.
similar solution*. [500-599 users = $5,000/month.
600-699 users = $6,000/month.
700-799 users = $7,000/month.
800-899 users = $8,000/month.
900-999 users = $9,000/month].
400-999 users = $7,500/month.
1,000 users or more = $15[0],000/month.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* [Customers] Distributors that are subscribing to certain enterprise depth capped fees as described in NASDAQ
Rule 7023(a)(1)(c) are exempt from this fee.
(B) The monthly fee per Professional [or Non-Professional] EDS
S[s]ubscriber for utilizing NASDAQ Level 2, NASDAQ TotalView or NASDAQ
OpenView data on a [controlled display] product with access to an API
or similar solution [through that display] is $74 per month for
TotalView and Level 2 and $6 per month for OpenView. [the applicable
NASDAQ TotalView or NASDAQ OpenView rates.]
The monthly fee per Non-Professional EDS Subscriber for utilizing
NASDAQ Level 2, NASDAQ TotalView or NASDAQ OpenView data on a product
with access to an API or similar solution is the applicable NASDAQ
Level 2, NASDAQ TotalView or NASDAQ OpenView rates.
[The monthly fee per Professional or Non-Professional subscriber
for utilizing the Level 2 data for NASDAQ-listed securities on a
controlled display product with access to an API or similar solution
through that display is the applicable NASDAQ TotalView rates.]
[The monthly fee per Professional or Non-Professional subscriber
for utilizing NASDAQ Level 2 data for NYSE, AMEX or regional listed
securities on a controlled display product with access to an API or
similar solution through that display is the applicable NASDAQ OpenView
rates.]
(C) EDS Enterprise License: EDS Distributors may elect to purchase
an Enterprise License for $30,000 per month. Such Enterprise License
shall entitle the EDS Distributor to distribute to an unlimited number
of Professional EDS Subscribers for a monthly fee of $70 for TotalView
and/or Level 2 and $6 for OpenView, notwithstanding the fees set forth
in subsection (B) above.
(2) The term ``[n]Non-[p]Professional'' shall have the same meaning
as set forth in NASDAQ Rule 7011(b).
(3) The term ``Distributor'' shall have the same meaning as set
forth in NASDAQ Rule 7019(c).
(b)-(c) No change.
* * * * *
[[Page 74785]]
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of those statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant parts of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
NASDAQ is proposing to amend NASDAQ Rule 7026 (Distribution Models)
to modify the optional Enhanced Display Solution (``EDS'') Fee
governing the distribution of NASDAQ TotalView, NASDAQ OpenView and
NASDAQ Level 2 Information (collectively, ``NASDAQ Depth
Information''). The modified optional EDS Fee will offer increased
flexibility and simplified market data administration for members and
to Distributors with external subscribers that use the NASDAQ Depth
Information internally.
Existing EDS Fee. Currently, the optional EDS Fee provides a
pricing option for Distributors who provide a ``controlled device''
product \3\ along with an Application Programming Interface (``API'')
or similar solution to Subscribers. Non-display use is not permitted
under the Enhanced Display Solution fee structure. To ensure proper
application of the EDS Fee, NASDAQ requires Distributors to monitor for
any non-display or excessive use suggesting that the EDS Subscriber is
not in compliance. The Distributor is liable for any unauthorized use
by the EDS Subscribers under the EDS Fee. The optional fee is available
only to NASDAQ members and external Distributors offering NASDAQ Depth
Information and who apply and are approved for an Enhanced Display
Solution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The term ``controlled device'' is defined as follows in Rule
7023(a)(6): A Controlled Device is any device that a Distributor of
NASDAQ Depth-of-Book data permits to: (1) Access the Depth-of-Book
information or (2) communicate with the Distributor so as to cause
the Distributor to access the Depth-of-Book data. Where a Controlled
Device is part of an electronic network between computers used for
investment, trading or order routing activities, the Distributor
must demonstrate that the particular Controlled Device should not
have to pay for an entitlement. For example, in some Display systems
the Distributor gives the Subscribers the choice to view the data or
not; a Subscriber that chooses not to view it would not be charged.
Similarly, in a Non-Display system, users of Controlled Devices may
have a choice of basic or advanced computerized trading or order
routing services, where only the advanced version uses the
information. Customers of the basic service would not be charged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EDS option also has administrative requirements for data usage.
As administered today, the Distributor must agree to reformat,
redisplay and/or alter the NASDAQ Depth Information prior to
retransmission, but not to affect the integrity of the NASDAQ Depth
Information and not to render it inaccurate, unfair, uninformative,
fictitious, misleading or discriminatory. An Enhanced Display Solution
is any controlled display product containing NASDAQ Depth Information
where the Distributor controls a display of NASDAQ Depth Information,
but also allows the EDS Subscriber to access an API or similar solution
from that display product. The EDS Subscriber may use the NASDAQ Depth
Information for the EDS Subscriber's own purposes and may not
redistribute the information outside of their organization. The EDS
Subscriber may not redistribute the data internally to other users in
the same organization.
Proposed Modification. The new Enhanced Display Solution will offer
even greater flexibility. Where previously, EDS required the
Distributor to both ``control'' the display and the entitlement to the
display, effective January 1, 2015, Distributors will have the option
to disseminate NASDAQ Depth Information to EDS Subscribers without the
requirement of controlling the display. This does not replace the
existing EDS program, but rather provides additional flexibility by
offering two options under the EDS program. In response to industry
demand and ongoing changes in the technical distribution of market
data, NASDAQ will now permit Distributors to offer APIs that power
third party software display applications where the Distributor
controls the entitlement but not the display of data. Previously,
downstream firms receiving this type of NASDAQ Depth Information would
have been classified as a data feed recipient and pay a much higher
internal distributor fee. These downstream data feed recipients are now
able to reduce their cost and the cost to the industry by paying a
modest fee increase for each EDS Subscriber, while also removing
reporting and administration requirements by allowing the Distributor
to manage this on behalf of the EDS Subscriber firm. The EDS program
will continue to cover the same NASDAQ Depth Information, namely NASDAQ
TotalView, NASDAQ OpenView, and NASDAQ Level 2.
The EDS Subscriber, or end user, to an Enhanced Display Solution
may use the NASDAQ Depth Information for its own purposes but may not
redistribute the NASDAQ Depth Information outside of their organization
or even internally to other subscribers in the same organization. Any
EDS Subscriber distributing the NASDAQ Depth Information further
downstream from NASDAQ--such as posting the NASDAQ Depth Information on
a shared drive or delivering the NASDAQ Depth Information into another
system--would forfeit eligibility for the EDS Fee.\4\ Additionally, EDS
Distributors must offer an integrated data solution with secured data
transmissions, a robust entitlement system and monitor EDS Subscribers
for any non-display or excessive usage to ensure compliance. EDS
Distributors must also offer NASDAQ Depth Information in Distributor's
own messaging formats (rather than its raw NASDAQ message formats) by
reformatting, redisplaying and/or altering the NASDAQ Depth Information
prior to retransmission, but not to affect the integrity of the NASDAQ
Depth Information and not to render it inaccurate, unfair,
uninformative, fictitious, misleading or discriminatory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Such use would be considered a Re-transmission and would be
governed by NASDAQ Rule 7019 governing market data distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-display use is not included or permitted under the EDS Fee.
While Distributors are not required to technically control against non-
display usage (due to the difficulty of achieving such control), the
Distributor is required to restrict non-display usage contractually by
including such restrictions in any agreements with recipients of the
Information. The non-display definition in the policy document is not
changing. Today, data use that powers the display is allowed. For
example, if an application is updating a portfolio and exposes such
information on the display, this use is included under EDS. Also,
calculating VWAPs or other derived information for use on the display/
device is permitted under EDS. Examples of prohibited non-display use
include but are not limited to, auto-quoting, algorithmic trading, and
risk management, even if that information is used to power the display.
[[Page 74786]]
Finally, Distributors offering an Enhanced Display Solution have
several administrative requirements. They must report the number of EDS
Subscribers under new report titles and separately from controlled non-
EDS products. Distributors must include EDS Subscribers under new
products codes in the Detailed Usage Reporting. Distributors also
assume the liability for any unauthorized use of NASDAQ Depth
Information by EDS Subscribers. While there are more administrative
requirements for this program for the Distributor, the industry
administration burden is lessened, as downstream data feed recipient
firms no longer need to go through the process of having data feeds
approved or tracking and reporting usage.
Effective January 1, 2015, NASDAQ will offer new pricing for the
optional EDS program. If the Distributor offers multiple Enhanced
Display Solutions, it would only be fee liable for one EDS Distribution
fee. The simplified fees to be paid by Distributors offering EDS are as
follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Old fee for number of downstream
subscribers New fee for number of downstream subscribers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-299 Subscribers = $2,000/month.......... 1-399 Subscribers= $4,000/month.
300-399 Subscribers = $3,000/month........
400-499 Subscribers = $4,000/month........ 400-999 Subscribers = $7,500/month.
500-599 Subscribers = $5,000/month........
600-699 Subscribers = $6,000/month........
700-799 Subscribers = $7,000/month........
800-899 Subscribers = $8,000/month........
900-999 Subscribers = $9,000/month........
1,000 or more Subscribers = $10,000/month. 1,000 or more Subscribers = $15,000/month.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
With one exception, distributors opting for an Enhanced Display
Solution are, in addition, liable for the applicable Professional or
Non-Professional Subscriber fees for the underlying NASDAQ Depth
Information products. Distributors opting for an Enhanced Display
Solution that provides access to NASDAQ TotalView, NASDAQ Level 2 or
OpenView will be charged a monthly fee of $74 per Professional EDS
Subscriber of TotalView or Level 2 and $6 per Professional EDS
Subscriber of OpenView. The fees otherwise applicable to such
Subscribers would be $70 and $6 for TotalView and OpenView.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Effective January 1, 2015, the fees for non-EDS Level 2
subscribers will be increasing from $45 to $50 per month. See SR-
NASDAQ-2014-111, filed November 17, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASDAQ is also creating a new Enterprise License option for EDS
Distributors. Specifically, as set forth in new Rule 7026(a)(1)(C), an
EDS Distributor may elect to purchase an Enterprise License for $30,000
per month. This Enterprise Licensee will permit the EDS Distributor to
distribute to an unlimited number of Professional EDS Subscribers for
$70 per month each for TotalView and Level 2 and $6 per month each for
OpenView. The EDS Enterprise License does not modify the fees assessed
for distribution to Non-Professional Subscribers. Distributors that
subscribe to existing NASDAQ enterprise licenses set forth in Rule
7023(c)(1-3) are not impacted by the new EDS Enterprise License and
they remain exempt from the EDS Distributor fee as they are today.
This new pricing and administrative option respond to industry
demand, as well as to changes in the technology to distribute market
data. By providing this new fee option, Distributors will have more
administrative flexibility in their receipt and distribution of NASDAQ
Depth Information.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\6\ in general, and with Section
6(b)(4) of the Act,\7\ in particular, in that it provides an equitable
allocation of reasonable fees among users and recipients of NASDAQ
Depth Information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\7\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASDAQ believes that this proposal represents an equitable
allocation of reasonable dues and fees, consistent with the
requirements of the Act. The EDS Fee, which has been available as an
option for two years, has reduced costs for Distributors and Subscriber
firms that voluntarily opt for this service. The fee is tiered by
number of subscribers, which has been found to be consistent with the
Act in multiple contexts due to the economic efficiencies attributable
to providing the same data elements to an increasing population of
subscribers. NASDAQ's proposal to reduce the number of price tiers is
also consistent with the Act in that it merely simplifies the existing
tiers and only modestly adjusts the fees--some higher, some lower--of
Distributors that opt for the program and that fall within the old and
new tiers.
NASDAQ's proposal to increase by $4 the monthly fee for EDS
Subscribers with access to NASDAQ TotalView and Level 2 is also
consistent with the Act in that it reflects an equitable allocation of
reasonable fees. The Commission has long recognized the equitable
nature of assessing different fees for Professional and Non-
Professional users of the same data. NASDAQ also believes it is
equitable to assess a higher fee per EDS Professional TotalView
Subscriber than to an ordinary Professional TotalView Subscriber due to
the enhanced flexibility and lower overall costs that the EDS program
offers Distributors, as well as to the voluntary nature of the EDS
program itself.
Finally, NASDAQ believes that the new EDS Enterprise License is
fair and equitable and not unreasonably discriminatory. Enterprise
Licenses have long been accepted as an economically efficient form of
volume discount for the heaviest users of market data (see Rule 7023
enterprise licenses). NASDAQ notes that the EDS Enterprise License
Fee--and the entire EDS program--is entirely optional in that NASDAQ is
not required to offer it and Distributors are not required to pay it.
Accordingly, Distributors and users can discontinue use at any time and
for any reason, including due to an assessment of the reasonableness of
fees charged. NASDAQ continues to create new pricing policies aimed at
increasing transparency in the market and believes this is another step
in that direction.
In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-regulatory
organizations and broker-dealers increased authority and flexibility to
offer new and unique market data to the public. It was believed that
this authority would expand the amount of
[[Page 74787]]
data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition
for the provision of market data.
The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of
facilitating efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal
analysis of the need for such data.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70
FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability of
exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of
the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the
free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to
broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is
sold should be set by the market as well.
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law H.R. 4173,
the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of
Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person,
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all SRO rule proposals
establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately
effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other
charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both.
Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the
Exchange Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any time within the 60-
day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule
change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section
19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in
the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes
such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph
(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should
be approved or disapproved.''
NASDAQ believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act
reflect Congress's intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the
forces of competition to ensure that fees for market data are
reasonable and equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly
authorized immediate effectiveness for a ``due, fee or other charge
imposed by the self-regulatory organization,'' the Commission adopted a
policy and subsequently a rule stipulating that fees for data and other
products available to persons that are not members of the self-
regulatory organization must be approved by the Commission after first
being published for comment. At the time, the Commission supported the
adoption of the policy and the rule by pointing out that unlike
members, whose representation in self-regulatory organization
governance was mandated by the Act, non-members should be given the
opportunity to comment on fees before being required to pay them, and
that the Commission should specifically approve all such fees. NASDAQ
believes that the amendment to Section 19 reflects Congress's
conclusion that the evolution of self-regulatory organization
governance and competitive market structure have rendered the
Commission's prior policy on non-member fees obsolete. Specifically,
many exchanges have evolved from member-owned not-for-profit
corporations into for-profit investor-owned corporations (or
subsidiaries of investor-owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no
longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive
benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the
appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or non-
members, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover, we
believe that the change also reflects an endorsement of the
Commission's determinations that reliance on competitive markets is an
appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply
put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be
permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are
constrained by competitive forces.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v. SEC, No. 09-1042 (D.C.
Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the
effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's reliance
upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees
for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history indicates that the
Congress intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay
of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.'
NetCoaltion, at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court's conclusions about
Congressional intent are therefore reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments, which create a presumption that exchange fees, including
market data fees, may take effect immediately, without prior Commission
approval, and that the Commission should take action to suspend a fee
change and institute a proceeding to determine whether the fee change
should be approved or disapproved only where the Commission has
concerns that the change may not be consistent with the Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the
NetCoaltion court found that the Commission had not, in that case,
compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the
market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. For the
reasons discussed above, NASDAQ believes that the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments to Section 19 materially alter the scope of the Commission's
review of future market data filings, by creating a presumption that
all fees may take effect immediately, without prior analysis by the
Commission of the competitive environment. Even in the absence of this
important statutory change, however, NASDAQ believes that a record may
readily be established to demonstrate the competitive nature of the
market in question.
There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data
products.
[[Page 74788]]
Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary
in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution
service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic
example of joint products with joint costs. The decision whether and on
which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the
platform where the order can be posted, including the execution fees,
data quality and price and distribution of its data products. Without
the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to a posted order on
a particular platform, the posting of the order would accomplish
little. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist.
Data products are valuable to many end users only insofar as they
provide information that end users expect will assist them or their
customers in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it.
Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer
decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders
will become correspondingly more valuable.
Thus, a super-competitive increase in the fees charged for either
transactions or data has the potential to impair revenues from both
products. ``No one disputes that competition for order flow is
`fierce'.'' NetCoalition at 24. However, the existence of fierce
competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity
on the part of broker-dealers with order flow, since they may readily
reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues.
A broker-dealer that shifted its order flow from one platform to
another in response to order execution price differentials would both
reduce the value of that platform's market data and reduce its own need
to consume data from the disfavored platform. Similarly, if a platform
increases its market data fees, the change will affect the overall cost
of doing business with the platform, and affected broker-dealers will
assess whether they can lower their trading costs by directing orders
elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the more expensive data.
Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading,
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the
joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible,
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering
total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints
with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly
regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car
sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for
cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the
manufacturer-supplied system.
The market for market data products is competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself,
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in
a vigorously competitive market.
Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their
order flow, including ten self-regulatory organization (``SRO'')
markets, as well as internalizing broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various
forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools
and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two
FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to
attract internalized transaction reports. Competitive markets for order
flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline
for the inputs of proprietary data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so,
including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete
directly with SROs for the production and sale
[[Page 74789]]
of proprietary data products, as BATS and Arca did before registering
as exchanges by publishing proprietary book data on the Internet.
Second, because a single order or transaction report can appear in an
SRO proprietary product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the
data available in proprietary products is exponentially greater than
the actual number of orders and transaction reports that exist in the
marketplace.
Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of
access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their
business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Thomson
Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer
proprietary products that end users will not purchase in sufficient
numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a discipline by
providing only data that will enable them to attract ``eyeballs'' that
contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as
Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it
promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although
the business models may differ, these vendors' pricing discipline is
the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data
product that fails to provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and other
producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to
these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to
market proprietary data products successfully.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data,
has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers
have previously published their proprietary data individually,
Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to
produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before
possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to
aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including
Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters.
The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed
to demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on
the reasoning of the Commission's NetCoalition order because, in the
court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the
depth-of-book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow.
NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly
demonstrates that availability of data attracts order flow. For
example, as of July 2010, 92 of the top 100 broker-dealers by shares
executed on NASDAQ consumed Level 2/NQDS and 80 of the top 100 broker-
dealers consumed TotalView. During that month, the Level 2/NQDS-users
were responsible for 94.44% of the orders entered into NASDAQ and
TotalView users were responsible for 92.98%.
Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data
needs. For example, NASDAQ has developed and maintained multiple
delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable
customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the
lowest cost to them. NASDAQ offers front end applications such as its
``Bookviewer'' to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ has created new
products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and
Level 2/NQDS, because offering data in multiple formatting allows
NASDAQ to better fit customer needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple
extranet providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost
for its data products. NASDAQ has developed an online administrative
system to provide customers transparency into their data feed requests
and streamline data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded its
Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and
costs to firms that purchase market data.
Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message
traffic, NASDAQ's fees for market data have remained flat. In fact, as
a percent of total customer costs, NASDAQ data fees have fallen
relative to other data usage costs--including bandwidth, programming,
and infrastructure--that have risen. The same holds true for execution
services; despite numerous enhancements to NASDAQ's trading platform,
absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition
has intensified as new entrants have emerged, constraining prices for
both executions and for data.
The vigor of competition for depth information is significant and
the Exchange believes that this proposal clearly evidences such
competition. NASDAQ is offering a new pricing model in order to keep
pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs. It is
entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new customers, as
well as retaining existing customers.
The Exchange has witnessed competitors creating new products and
innovative pricing in this space over the course of the past year.
NASDAQ continues to see firms challenge its pricing on the basis of the
Exchange's explicit fees being higher than the zero-priced fees from
other competitors such as BATS. In all cases, firms make decisions on
how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total
cost of interacting with NASDAQ or other exchanges. Of course, the
explicit data fees are but one factor in a total platform analysis.
Some competitors have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and
others are vice versa. The market for this depth information is highly
competitive and continually evolves as products develop and change.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants or Others
No written comments were either solicited or received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act \9\ and paragraph (f)(2) of Rule 19b-4
thereunder.\10\ At any time within 60 days of the filing of the
proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend
such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of
investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
\10\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
[[Page 74790]]
including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2014-117 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2014-117. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of NASDAQ. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2014-117 and should
be submitted on or before January 6, 2015.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-29362 Filed 12-15-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
