Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To Adopt FINRA Rule 2242 (Debt Research Analysts and Debt Research Reports), 69905-69929 [2014-27701]

Agencies

• SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 226 (Monday, November 24, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69905-69929]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27701]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-73623; File No. SR-FINRA-2014-048]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To Adopt 
FINRA Rule 2242 (Debt Research Analysts and Debt Research Reports)

November 18, 2014.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that 
on November 14, 2014, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. 
(``FINRA'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC'' 
or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, 
II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by FINRA. The 
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the 
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    FINRA is proposing to adopt new FINRA Rule 2242 (Debt Research 
Analysts and Debt Research Reports) to address conflicts of interest 
relating to the publication and distribution of debt research reports.
    The text of the proposed rule change is available on FINRA's Web 
site at https://www.finra.org, at the principal office of FINRA and at 
the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, FINRA included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. FINRA has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, 
B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
Background
    The proposed rule change would adopt FINRA Rule 2242 to address 
conflicts of interest relating to the publication and distribution of 
debt research reports. Proposed FINRA Rule 2242 would adopt a tiered 
approach that, in general, would provide retail debt research 
recipients with extensive protections similar to those provided to 
recipients of equity research under current and proposed FINRA rules, 
with modifications to reflect differences in the trading of debt 
securities.\3\
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    \3\ The proposed rule change reflects proposed amendments to 
FINRA's equity research rules set forth in a companion filing to the 
proposed rule change (the ``equity research filing''). See Exchange 
Act Rel. No. 34-[] (Nov. 17, 2014) (SR-FINRA-2014-047).
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    Currently, FINRA's research rules, NASD Rule 2711 (Research 
Analysts and Research Reports) and Incorporated NYSE Rule 472 
(Communications with the Public) (the ``equity research rules''), set 
forth requirements to foster objectivity and transparency in equity 
research and provide investors with more reliable and useful 
information to make investment decisions. The equity research rules 
apply only to research reports that include analysis of an ``equity 
security,'' as that term is defined under the Exchange Act,\4\ subject 
to certain exceptions.\5\ The equity research rules were intended to 
restore public confidence in the objectivity of research and the 
veracity of research analysts, who are expected to function as unbiased 
intermediaries between issuers and the investors who buy and sell those 
issuers' securities.\6\ The integrity of research had eroded due to the 
pervasive influences of investment banking and other conflicts during 
the market boom of the late 1990s.
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    \4\ See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(11).
    \5\ In contrast to FINRA's current research rules, SEC 
Regulation Analyst Certification (``Regulation AC''), the SEC's 
primary vehicle to foster objective and transparent research, 
applies to both debt and equity research. See 17 CFR 242.500 et seq.
    \6\ NASD Rule 1050 (Registration of Research Analysts) and 
Incorporated NYSE Rule 344 (Research Analysts and Supervisory 
Analysts) require any person associated with a member and who 
functions as a research analyst to be registered as such and pass 
the Series 86 and 87 exams, unless an exemption applies. FINRA is 
considering whether debt research analysts also should be subject to 
the same or a similar qualification requirement.
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    In general, the equity research rules require disclosure of 
conflicts of interest

[[Page 69906]]

in research reports and public appearances by research analysts. The 
equity research rules further prohibit conflicted conduct--investment 
banking personnel involvement in the content of research reports and 
determination of analyst compensation, for example--where the conflicts 
are too pronounced to be cured by disclosure. Several requirements in 
the equity research rules implement provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (``Sarbanes-Oxley''), which mandates separation between 
research and investment banking, proscribes conduct that could 
compromise a research analyst's objectivity and requires specific 
disclosures in research reports and public appearances.\7\ The 
Sarbanes-Oxley research provisions do not apply to debt research.
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    \7\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-6.
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    In December 2005, in response to a Commission Order, FINRA and NYSE 
Regulation, Inc. (``NYSE'') submitted to the Commission a joint report 
on the operation and effectiveness of the research analyst conflict of 
interest rules (the ``Joint Report'').\8\ Among other things, the Joint 
Report analyzed the impact of the equity research rules based on 
academic studies, media reports and commentary. The Joint Report 
concluded that the equity research rules have been effective in helping 
to restore integrity to research by minimizing the influence of 
investment banking and promoting transparency of other potential 
conflicts of interest. Evidence from academic studies, among other 
sources, further suggested that investors are benefiting from more 
balanced and accurate research to aid their investment decisions. A 
January 2012 GAO report on securities research (``GAO Report'') also 
concluded that empirical studies suggest the rules have resulted in 
increased equity analyst independence and weakened the influence of 
conflicts of interest on analyst recommendations.\9\
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    \8\ Joint Report by NASD and the NYSE on the Operation and 
Effectiveness of the Research Analyst Conflict of Interest Rules 
(December 2005), available at https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@issues/@rar/documents/industry/p015803.pdf.
    \9\ United States Government Accountability Office, Securities 
Research, Additional Actions Could Improve Regulatory Oversight of 
Analyst Conflicts of Interest, January 2012.
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    The Joint Report also recommended changes to the equity research 
rules to strike a better balance between ensuring objective and 
reliable research on the one hand, and permitting the flow of 
information to investors and minimizing costs and burdens to members on 
the other.\10\ The proposed rule change is informed by FINRA's 
experience with and the effectiveness of the equity research rules and 
incorporates many of the findings and recommendations from the Joint 
Report.
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    \10\ The basis for the recommended changes to the equity 
research rules is described in more detail in the equity research 
filing. See supra note 3.
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    A number of events and circumstances contributed to FINRA's 
determination that a dedicated debt research rule is needed to further 
investor protection. In 2004, the Bond Market Association (``BMA'') 
published its Guiding Principles to Promote the Integrity of Fixed 
Income Research (``Guiding Principles''),\11\ a set of voluntary 
guidelines intended to foster management and transparency of conflicts 
of interest with respect to debt research. The Guiding Principles 
acknowledge that potential conflicts of interest could arise in the 
preparation of debt research, and many of the principles to maintain 
integrity of debt research hew closely to the equity research rule 
requirements. The Guiding Principles also reflect what the BMA asserted 
are several significant differences in the role and impact of research 
on the equity and fixed income markets, as well as differences in 
research regarding individual fixed-income asset classes. For example, 
the BMA contended that the prices of debt securities were less 
sensitive to the views of research analysts and that the major rating 
agencies provided a reliable source of independent information for the 
debt markets. It also asserted that most debt research was provided to 
sophisticated market participants for which it serves as one of many 
sources of information to consider when making an investment decision.
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    \11\ In 2005, the BMA merged with the Securities Industry 
Association (``SIA'') to form the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (``SIFMA'').
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    The Joint Report discussed the need for rules to govern debt 
research distribution. NASD and NYSE indicated that they would examine 
the extent to which firms voluntarily adopted the Guiding Principles 
and would consider further rulemaking after assessing the effectiveness 
of voluntary compliance. The Joint Report noted that the anti-fraud 
statutes and existing NASD and NYSE broad ethical rules could reach 
instances of misconduct involving debt research. NASD and NYSE 
subsequently surveyed a selection of firms' debt research supervisory 
systems and found many instances where firms failed to adhere to the 
Guiding Principles. More significantly, NASD and NYSE found cases where 
firms lacked any policies and procedures to manage debt research 
conflicts to ensure compliance with applicable ethical and anti-fraud 
rules. Those findings were published in Notice to Members 06-36,\12\ 
where FINRA expressly noted that it would continue to consider more 
definitive rulemaking that might differ from or expand on the Guiding 
Principles.\13\
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    \12\ Notice to Members 06-36 (July 2006).
    \13\ As noted in the 2005 report, FINRA believes that the anti-
fraud statutes, as well as existing FINRA rules, such as the 
requirement in FINRA Rule 2010 (Standards of Commercial Honor and 
Principles of Trade) that members, in the conduct of their business, 
``observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade,'' can reach any egregious conduct involving 
fixed-income research.
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    Following publication of its findings in 2006, FINRA continued to 
examine whether firms had implemented and enforced supervisory policies 
and procedures to promote the integrity of debt research and address 
attendant conflicts of interest. As noted in the GAO Report, between 
2005 and 2010, FINRA conducted 55 such examinations and found 
deficiencies involving inadequate supervisory procedures to manage debt 
research conflicts or failure to disclose such conflicts in 11 (20%) 
examinations. The GAO Report stated that most market participants and 
observers that the GAO interviewed ``acknowledged that additional 
rulemaking is needed to protect investors, particularly retail 
investors.'' The GAO Report concluded that ``until FINRA adopts a 
fixed-income research rule, investors continue to face a potential 
risk.''
    Following the consolidation of NASD and the member regulatory 
functions of NYSE Regulation, Inc. into FINRA, and as part of the 
process to develop the consolidated FINRA rulebook,\14\ FINRA conducted 
a comprehensive review of all of its research rules and considered the 
appropriateness of adopting a dedicated rule to address potential 
conflicts of interest in the publication and distribution of debt 
research reports. In addition to its examination findings, and later, 
the conclusions of the GAO Report, several other factors also weighed 
in FINRA's decision to propose dedicated debt research conflict of 
interest rules. Misconduct in the sale of auction rate securities 
(i.e., debt

[[Page 69907]]

traders pressured research analysts to help prop up the market with 
optimistic research) demonstrates that potential conflicts of interest 
in the publication and distribution of debt research can exist just as 
they do for equity research.\15\ Also, the reliability of credit agency 
ratings was called into question during the financial crisis that began 
in 2008. Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank legislation in response to that 
crisis has resulted in rules by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (``CFTC'') to govern conflicts of interest regarding non-
security-based swaps and commodities research, and the SEC has proposed 
rules that would require security-based swap dealers and major 
security-based swap participants to adopt written policies and 
procedures to address conflicts related to security-based swaps and 
research. Based on the foregoing considerations, and consistent with 
the regulatory trend to require mitigation and transparency of 
conflicts related to all types of investment research, FINRA believes 
it necessary and appropriate to provide better protections to 
recipients of debt research, particularly less sophisticated investors. 
FINRA's belief is buttressed by observations of retail investment in 
debt securities. For example, FINRA TRACE data shows that from 2007 
through 2013, retail-sized transactions (defined to mean trades with a 
face value of less than $100,000) in corporate bonds increased 
approximately 97 percent to about 16,000 daily trades.
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    \14\ The current FINRA rulebook includes, in addition to FINRA 
Rules, (1) NASD Rules and (2) rules incorporated from NYSE 
(``Incorporated NYSE Rules'') (together, the NASD Rules and 
Incorporated NYSE Rules are referred to as the ``Transitional 
Rulebook''). While the NASD Rules generally apply to all FINRA 
members, the Incorporated NYSE Rules apply only to those members of 
FINRA that are also members of the NYSE (``Dual Members''). For more 
information about the rulebook consolidation process, see 
Information Notice, March 12, 2008 (Rulebook Consolidation Process).
    \15\ See e.g., SEC Finalizes ARS Settlements With Bank of 
America, RBC and Deutsch Bank, Litigation Release No. 21066, 2009 
SEC LEXIS 1799 (June 3, 2009); SEC Finalizes ARS Settlement With 
Wachovia, Litigation Release No. 20885, 2009 SEC LEXIS 282 (February 
5, 2009); SEC Finalizes Settlements With Citigroup and UBS, 
Litigation Release No. 20824, 2008 WL 5189517 (December 11, 2008).
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    In developing the proposed rule change, FINRA recognized that the 
debt markets operate differently from the equity markets in some 
respects. Several of the differences were noted by the BMA in the 
release accompanying the Guiding Principles. For example, the debt 
markets feature a number of different asset classes (e.g., corporate, 
high yield, mortgage backed and asset-backed) with unique 
characteristics. Within each class, there are typically many issues 
with similar terms, creating a fungibility of securities that doesn't 
exist to the same extent in the equity markets. As the BMA noted, these 
securities are often priced in relation to benchmark securities or 
interest rate measures, and their prices tend to depend more on 
interest rate movements and other macroeconomic factors than issuer 
fundamentals, although an issuer's ability to service its debt remains 
an important factor. As a result of these dynamics, it is less likely 
that a debt research report will influence the price of a subject 
company's debt securities than an equity report will impact the price 
of that company's equity securities. Also, while retail and 
institutional market participants invest in both equity and debt 
securities, relative to the equity markets, the debt markets are 
dominated by institutional market participants.
    The nature of the debt markets has resulted in several different 
types of debt research. There is debt research that focuses on the 
creditworthiness of an issuer or its individual debt securities. Debt 
research reports on individual debt securities may look at the relative 
value of those securities compared to similar securities of other 
issuers. Some debt research compares debt asset classes or issues 
within those asset classes. And in light of the importance of interest 
rates on the price of debt securities, much of the research related to 
debt analyzes macroeconomic factors, monetary policy and economic 
events without reference to particular assets classes or securities. 
While much of this research is prepared by a dedicated research 
department, FINRA also understands that trading desks generate market 
color, analysis and trading ideas, sometimes known as ``trader 
commentary,'' geared towards institutional customers. FINRA understands 
from those participants that they value timely information from the 
trading desk and incorporate that information into their own analysis 
when making an investment decision about debt securities. As discussed 
in more detail below, the tiered structure of the proposed rule change 
and the definition of ``debt research report'' are intended to 
recognize these different forms of debt research and to accommodate the 
needs of the institutional market participants.
    In a concept proposal published in Regulatory Notice 11-11,\16\ 
FINRA first sought to gather additional information on differences 
between debt and equity research and the most appropriate rules to 
protect recipients of debt research. FINRA subsequently published two 
rule proposals in Regulatory Notice 12-09 and Regulatory Notice 12-42, 
each refining the previous proposal in response to comments.
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    \16\ See Regulatory Notice 11-11 (March 2011), available at 
https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p123296.pdf.
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    The proposed rule change reflects feedback from those proposals and 
extensive discussions with industry participants. This proposal is 
narrowly tailored to achieve the regulatory objective to foster 
objectivity and transparency in debt research, particularly for retail 
investors, and to provide more reliable and useful information for 
investors to make investment decisions.
    The proposed rule change adopts a substantial portion of the equity 
research rules and their basic framework for debt research distributed 
to retail investors. The equity research rules have proven to be 
effective in mitigating conflicts of interest in the publication and 
distribution of equity research.\17\ Notwithstanding the differences in 
the operation of the equity and debt markets noted above, FINRA 
believes that many of the conflicts of interest in the publication and 
distribution of equity research are also present in debt research. 
Therefore, FINRA believes it reasonable generally to apply the same 
standards to address these conflicts for recipients of debt research 
reports. Moreover, FINRA believes that both investors and firms' 
compliance systems would benefit from consistency between those rules.
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    \17\ See supra notes 8 and 9.
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    As noted above, the proposed rule change adopts a tiered approach 
that, in general, would provide retail debt research recipients with 
extensive protections similar to those provided to recipients of equity 
research under current and proposed FINRA rules, with modifications to 
reflect the different nature and trading of debt securities. Proposed 
FINRA Rule 2242 would differ from FINRA's current equity research rules 
in three key respects.\18\ First, the proposed rule change would 
delineate the prohibited and permissible communications between debt 
research analysts and principal trading and sales and trading 
personnel. These restrictions take into account the need to ration a 
debt research analyst's resources among the multitude of debt 
securities, the limitations on price discovery in the debt markets, and 
the need for trading personnel to perform credit risk analyses with 
respect to

[[Page 69908]]

current and prospective inventory. Second, the proposed rule change 
would exempt debt research provided solely to institutional investors 
from many of the structural protections and prescriptive disclosure 
requirements that apply to research reports distributed to retail 
investors. FINRA believes that this tiered approach is appropriate as 
it recognizes the needs of institutional market participants who rely 
on timely market color, trading strategies and other communications 
from the trading desk. Third, in addition to the exemption for limited 
investment banking activity found in the current and proposed equity 
research rules, the proposed rule change has a similar additional 
exemption for limited principal trading activity. The proposed rule 
change, in general, would exempt members that engage in limited 
investment banking activity or those with limited principal trading 
activity and revenues generated from debt trading from the review, 
supervision, budget, and compensation provisions in the proposed rule 
related to investment banking activity or principal trading activity, 
respectively.
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    \18\ FINRA notes that the proposed rule change differs from the 
current equity rules in some other respects, including not 
incorporating the quiet periods and restrictions on pre-IPO share 
ownership. FINRA believes that the different nature and trading of 
debt securities, as discussed in detail above, does not necessitate 
the restrictions in the context of debt research. We further note 
that the quiet periods in the equity rules are mandated by Sarbanes-
Oxley and that FINRA has proposed to reduce or eliminate those quiet 
periods, consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley, in the proposed equity 
rules.
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    Like the equity research rules, the proposed rule change is 
intended to foster objectivity and transparency in debt research and to 
provide investors with more reliable and useful information to make 
investment decisions. The proposed rule change is set forth in detail 
below.
Proposed FINRA Rule 2242
Definitions
    The proposed rule change would adopt defined terms for purposes of 
proposed FINRA Rule 2242.\19\ Most of the defined terms closely follow 
the defined terms for equity research in NASD Rule 2711, as amended by 
the equity research filing, with minor changes to reflect their 
application to debt research. The proposed definitions are set forth 
below.\20\
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    \19\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a) for all of the proposed 
defined terms.
    \20\ The proposed rule change also adopts defined terms to 
implement the tiered structure of proposed FINRA Rule 2242, 
including the terms ``qualified institutional buyer'' or ``QIB,'' 
which is part of the description of an institutional investor for 
purposes of the Rule, and ``retail investor.'' A detailed discussion 
of these definitions and the tiered structure of the proposed rule 
is available at pages 89 through 95.
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    Under the proposed rule change, the term ``debt research analyst'' 
would mean an associated person who is primarily responsible for, and 
any associated person who reports directly or indirectly to a debt 
research analyst in connection with, the preparation of the substance 
of a debt research report, whether or not any such person has the job 
title of ``research analyst.'' \21\ The term ``debt research analyst 
account'' would mean any account in which a debt research analyst or 
member of the debt research analyst's household has a financial 
interest, or over which such analyst has discretion or control; 
provided, however, it would not include an investment company 
registered under the Investment Company Act over which the debt 
research analyst or a member of the debt research analyst's household 
has discretion or control, provided that the debt research analyst or 
member of a debt research analyst's household has no financial interest 
in such investment company, other than a performance or management fee. 
The term also would not include a ``blind trust'' account that is 
controlled by a person other than the debt research analyst or member 
of the debt research analyst's household where neither the debt 
research analyst nor a member of the debt research analyst's household 
knows of the account's investments or investment transactions.\22\
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    \21\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(1).
    \22\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(2). The exclusion for a 
registered investment company over which a research analyst has 
discretion or control in the proposed definition mirrors proposed 
changes to the definition of ``research analyst account'' in the 
equity research rules.
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    The proposed rule change would define the term ``debt research 
report'' as any written (including electronic) communication that 
includes an analysis of a debt security or an issuer of a debt security 
and that provides information reasonably sufficient upon which to base 
an investment decision, excluding communications that solely constitute 
an equity research report as defined in proposed Rule 2241(a)(11).\23\ 
The proposed definition and exceptions noted below would generally 
align with the definition of ``research report'' in NASD Rule 2711, 
while incorporating aspects of the Regulation AC definition of 
``research report.'' \24\
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    \23\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(3). The proposed rule 
change does not incorporate a proposed exclusion from the equity 
research rule's definition of ``research report'' of communications 
concerning open-end registered investment companies that are not 
listed or traded on an exchange (``mutual funds'') because it is not 
necessary since mutual fund securities are equity securities under 
Section 3(a)(11) of the Exchange Act and therefore would not be 
captured by the proposed definition of ``debt research report'' in 
the proposed rule change.
    \24\ In aligning the proposed definition with the Regulation AC 
definition of research report, the proposed definition differs in 
minor respects from the definition of ``research report'' in NASD 
Rule 2711. For example, the proposed definition of ``debt research 
report'' would apply to a communication that includes an analysis of 
a debt security or an issuer of a debt security, while the 
definition of ``research report'' in NASD Rule 2711 applies to an 
analysis of equity securities of individual companies or industries.
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    Communications that constitute statutory prospectuses that are 
filed as part of the registration statement would not be included in 
the definition of a debt research report. In general, the term debt 
research report also would not include communications that are limited 
to the following, if they do not include an analysis of, or recommend 
or rate, individual debt securities or issuers:
     Discussions of broad-based indices;
     commentaries on economic, political or market conditions;
     commentaries on or analyses of particular types of debt 
securities or characteristics of debt securities;
     technical analyses concerning the demand and supply for a 
sector, index or industry based on trading volume and price;
     recommendations regarding increasing or decreasing 
holdings in particular industries or sectors or types of debt 
securities; or
     notices of ratings or price target changes, provided that 
the member simultaneously directs the readers of the notice to the most 
recent debt research report on the subject company that includes all 
current applicable disclosures required by the rule and that such debt 
research report does not contain materially misleading disclosure, 
including disclosures that are outdated or no longer applicable.
    The term debt research report also, in general, would not include 
the following communications, even if they include an analysis of an 
individual debt security or issuer and information reasonably 
sufficient upon which to base an investment decision:
     Statistical summaries of multiple companies' financial 
data, including listings of current ratings that do not include an 
analysis of individual companies' data;
     an analysis prepared for a specific person or a limited 
group of fewer than 15 persons;
     periodic reports or other communications prepared for 
investment company shareholders or discretionary investment account 
clients that discuss individual debt securities in the context of a 
fund's or account's past performance or the basis for previously made 
discretionary investment decisions; or
     internal communications that are not given to current or 
prospective customers.
    The proposed rule change would define the term ``debt security'' as 
any

[[Page 69909]]

``security'' as defined in Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, except 
for any ``equity security'' as defined in Section 3(a)(11) of the 
Exchange Act, any ``municipal security'' as defined in Section 3(a)(29) 
of the Exchange Act, any ``security-based swap'' as defined in Section 
3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act, and any ``U.S. Treasury Security'' as 
defined in paragraph (p) of FINRA Rule 6710.\25\ The proposed 
definition excludes municipal securities, in part because of FINRA's 
jurisdictional limitations with respect to such securities. The 
proposed definition excludes security-based swaps given the nascent and 
evolving nature of security-based swap regulation.\26\ However, FINRA 
intends to monitor regulatory developments with respect to security-
based swaps and may determine to later include such securities in the 
definition of debt security.
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    \25\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(4).
    \26\ The Commission's rulemaking in the area of security-based 
swaps, pursuant to Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (the ``Dodd-Frank Act''), is ongoing. In 
June 2011, the Commission proposed rules addressing policies and 
procedures with respect to research and analysis for security-based 
swaps as part of its proposal governing business conduct standards 
for security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap 
participants. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64766 (June 
29, 2011), 76 FR 42396 (July 18, 2011) (Business Conduct Standards 
for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap 
Participants). In June 2012, the Commission staff sought comment on 
a statement of general policy for the sequencing of compliance dates 
for rules applicable to security-based swaps. See Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 67177 (June 11, 2012), 77 FR 35625 (June 
14, 2012) (Statement of General Policy on the Sequencing of the 
Compliance Dates for Final Rules Applicable to Security-Based Swaps 
Adopted Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). In May 
2013, the Commission re-opened comment on the statement of general 
policy and on the outstanding rulemaking releases. The comment 
period was reopened until July 22, 2013. See Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 69491 (May 1, 2013), 78 FR 30800 (May 23, 2013) 
(Reopening of Comment Periods for Certain Proposed Rulemaking 
Releases and Policy Statements Applicable to Security-Based Swaps).
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    The proposed rule change would define the term ``debt trader'' as a 
person, with respect to transactions in debt securities, who is engaged 
in proprietary trading or the execution of transactions on an agency 
basis.\27\
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    \27\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(5).
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    The proposed rule change would provide that the term ``independent 
third-party debt research report'' means a third-party debt research 
report, in respect of which the person producing the report: (1) Has no 
affiliation or business or contractual relationship with the 
distributing member or that member's affiliates that is reasonably 
likely to inform the content of its research reports; and (2) makes 
content determinations without any input from the distributing member 
or that member's affiliates.\28\
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    \28\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(6).
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    The proposed rule change would define the term ``investment banking 
department'' as any department or division, whether or not identified 
as such, that performs any investment banking service on behalf of a 
member.\29\ The term ``investment banking services'' would include, 
without limitation, acting as an underwriter, participating in a 
selling group in an offering for the issuer or otherwise acting in 
furtherance of a public offering of the issuer; acting as a financial 
adviser in a merger or acquisition; providing venture capital or equity 
lines of credit or serving as placement agent for the issuer or 
otherwise acting in furtherance of a private offering of the 
issuer.\30\
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    \29\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(8).
    \30\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(9). The current definition 
in NASD Rule 2711 includes, without limitation, many common types of 
investment banking services. The proposed rule change and the equity 
research filing propose to add the language ``or otherwise acting in 
furtherance of'' either a public or private offering to further 
emphasize that the term ``investment banking services'' is meant to 
be construed broadly.
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    The proposed rule change would define the term ``member of a debt 
research analyst's household'' as any individual whose principal 
residence is the same as the debt research analyst's principal 
residence.\31\ This term would not include an unrelated person who 
shares the same residence as a debt research analyst, provided that the 
debt research analyst and unrelated person are financially independent 
of one another.
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    \31\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(10).
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    The proposed rule change would define ``public appearance'' as any 
participation in a conference call, seminar, forum (including an 
interactive electronic forum) or other public speaking activity before 
15 or more persons or before one or more representatives of the media, 
a radio, television or print media interview, or the writing of a print 
media article, in which a debt research analyst makes a recommendation 
or offers an opinion concerning a debt security or an issuer of a debt 
security.\32\ This term shall not include a password protected webcast, 
conference call or similar event with 15 or more existing customers, 
provided that all of the event participants previously received the 
most current debt research report or other documentation that contains 
the required applicable disclosures, and that the debt research analyst 
appearing at the event corrects and updates during the event any 
disclosures in the debt research report that are inaccurate, misleading 
or no longer applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rule change the term ``qualified institutional 
buyer'' has the same meaning as under Rule 144A of the Securities 
Act.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change would define ``research department'' as 
any department or division, whether or not identified as such, that is 
principally responsible for preparing the substance of a debt research 
report on behalf of a member.\34\ The proposed rule change would define 
the term ``subject company'' as the company whose debt securities are 
the subject of a debt research report or a public appearance.\35\ 
Finally, the proposed rule change would define the term ``third-party 
debt research report'' as a debt research report that is produced by a 
person or entity other than the member.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(14).
    \35\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(15).
    \36\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Identifying and Managing Conflicts of Interest
    Similar to the proposed equity research rules, the proposed rule 
change contains an overarching provision that would require members to 
establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to identify and effectively manage conflicts of 
interest related to the preparation, content and distribution of debt 
research reports, public appearances by debt research analysts, and the 
interaction between debt research analysts and persons outside of the 
research department, including investment banking, sales and trading 
and principal trading personnel, subject companies and customers.\37\ 
The proposed rule change then sets forth minimum requirements for those 
written policies and procedures. These provisions set out the 
fundamental obligation for a member to establish and maintain a system 
to identify and mitigate conflicts to foster integrity and fairness in 
its debt research products and services. The provisions are also 
intended to require firms to be more proactive in identifying and 
managing conflicts as new research products, affiliations and 
distribution methods emerge. This approach allows for some flexibility 
to manage identified conflicts, with some specified prohibitions and 
restrictions where

[[Page 69910]]

disclosure does not adequately mitigate them. Most of the minimum 
requirements have been experience tested and found effective in the 
equity research rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, the proposed rule change adopts, with slight 
modifications, the structural safeguards that the Joint Report found 
effective to promote analyst independence and objective research in the 
equity research rules, but in the form of mandated policies and 
procedures with some baseline proscriptions.\38\ FINRA believes this 
approach will impose less cost than a pure prescriptive approach by 
requiring members to adopt a compliance system that aligns with their 
particular structure, business model and philosophy. FINRA notes that 
the approach is consistent with FINRA's general supervision rule, which 
similarly provides firms flexibility to establish and maintain 
supervisory programs best suited to their business models, reasonably 
designed to achieve compliance with applicable federal securities law 
and regulations and FINRA rules.\39\ The proposed rule change 
introduces a distinction between sales and trading personnel--
institutional sales representatives and sales traders--and persons 
engaged in principal trading activities, where the conflicts addressed 
by the proposal are of most concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Among the structural safeguards, FINRA believes separation 
between investment banking and debt research, and between sales and 
trading and principal trading and debt research, is of particular 
importance. As such, while the proposed rule change does not mandate 
physical separation between the debt research department and the 
investment banking, sales and trading and principal trading 
departments (or other person who might seek to influence research 
analysts), FINRA would expect such physical separation except in 
extraordinary circumstances where the costs are unreasonable due to 
a firm's size and resource limitations. In those instances, a firm 
must implement written policies and procedures, including 
information barriers, to effectively achieve and monitor separation 
between debt research and investment banking, sales and trading and 
principal trading personnel.
    \39\ See NASD Rule 3010, recently adopted with changes as a 
consolidated FINRA rule by Securities Exchange Act Release No. 71179 
(December 23, 2013), 78 FR 79542 (December 30, 2013) (Order 
Approving File No. SR-FINRA-2013-025). The consolidated rule becomes 
effective December 1, 2014. FINRA notes that the policies and 
procedures approach is consistent with the effective practices 
highlighted by FINRA in its Report on Conflicts of Interest, among 
them that firms should implement a robust conflicts management 
framework that includes structures, processes and policies to 
identify and manage conflicts of interest. See Report on Conflicts 
of Interest, FINRA (October 2013) at 5, available at https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p359971.pdf. The proposed changes also help to harmonize 
with approaches in international jurisdictions, such as the rules of 
the Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom. See COBS 
12.2.5 R, The Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, available at 
https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/COBS/12/2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, members must implement written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to promote objective and reliable debt 
research that reflects the truly held opinions of debt research 
analysts and to prevent the use of debt research reports or debt 
research analysts to manipulate or condition the market or favor the 
interests of the firm or current or prospective customers or class of 
customers.\40\ Such policies and procedures must, at a minimum, address 
the following.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Prepublication Review
    The required policies and procedures must, at a minimum, be 
reasonably designed to prohibit prepublication review, clearance or 
approval of debt research by persons involved in investment banking, 
sales and trading or principal trading, and either restrict or prohibit 
such review, clearance and approval by other non-research personnel 
other than legal and compliance.\41\ The policies and procedures also 
must prohibit prepublication review of a debt research report by a 
subject company, other than for verification of facts.\42\ Similar 
provisions in the equity rules have proven effective to ensure 
independence of the research department, and FINRA believes that the 
objectivity of debt research could be compromised to the extent 
conflicted persons, e.g., those involved in investment banking and 
trading activities, have an opportunity to review and comment on the 
content of a debt research report. The proposed rule change would allow 
limited review by the subject company because it is sometimes in a 
unique position to verify facts; otherwise, FINRA believes research 
analysts should confirm that purported facts are based on other 
reliable information. The proposed rule change allows sections of a 
draft debt research report to be provided to non-investment banking 
personnel, non-principal trading personnel, non-sales and trading 
personnel or to the subject company for factual review, so long as: (a) 
The sections of the draft debt research report submitted do not contain 
the research summary, recommendation or rating; (b) a complete draft of 
the debt research report is provided to legal or compliance personnel 
before sections of the report are submitted to non-investment banking 
personnel, non-principal trading personnel, non-sales and trading 
personnel or the subject company; and (c) if, after submitting sections 
of the draft debt research report to non-investment banking personnel, 
non-principal trading personnel, non-sales and trading personnel or the 
subject company, the research department intends to change the proposed 
rating or recommendation, it must first provide written justification 
to, and receive written authorization from, legal or compliance 
personnel for the change. The member must retain copies of any draft 
and the final version of such debt research report for three years 
after publication.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(A) and (B). Thus, a firm 
must specify in its policies and procedures the circumstances, if 
any, where prepublication review would be permitted as necessary and 
appropriate pursuant to proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(B); for 
example, where non-research personnel are best situated to verify 
select facts or where administrative personnel review for 
formatting. FINRA notes that members still would be subject to the 
overarching requirement to have policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to effectively manage conflicts of interest between 
research analysts and those outside of the research department. See 
also proposed FINRA Rule 2242.05 (Submission of Sections of a Draft 
Research Report for Factual Review).
    \42\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(N).
    \43\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.05 (Submission of Sections of 
a Draft Research Report for Factual Review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Coverage Decisions
    With respect to coverage decisions, a member's written policies and 
procedures must restrict or limit input by investment banking, sales 
and trading and principal trading personnel to ensure that research 
management independently makes all final decisions regarding the 
research coverage plan.\44\ However, as discussed below, the provision 
does not preclude personnel from these or any other department from 
conveying customer interests and coverage needs, so long as final 
decisions regarding the coverage plan are made by research management. 
FINRA believes this provision strikes an appropriate balance by 
allowing input of customer interests in determining the allocation of 
limited research resources to a wide range of debt securities, while 
preserving the final decisions for research management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Solicitation and Marketing of Investment Banking Transactions
    A member's written policies and procedures also must, at a minimum, 
restrict or limit activities by debt research analysts that can 
reasonably be expected to compromise their objectivity.\45\ This 
includes prohibiting participation in pitches and other solicitations 
of investment banking

[[Page 69911]]

services transactions and road shows and other marketing on behalf of 
issuers related to such transactions. The proposed rule change adopts 
Supplementary Material that incorporates an existing FINRA 
interpretation for the equity research rules that prohibits in pitch 
materials any information about a member's debt research capacity in a 
manner that suggests, directly or indirectly, that the member might 
provide favorable debt research coverage.\46\ By way of example, the 
Supplementary Material explains that FINRA would consider the 
publication in a pitch book or related materials of an analyst's 
industry ranking to imply the potential outcome of future research 
because of the manner in which such rankings are compiled. The 
Supplementary Material further notes that a member would be permitted 
to include in the pitch materials the fact of coverage and the name of 
the debt research analyst, since that information alone does not imply 
favorable coverage. FINRA notes that, consistent with existing guidance 
on the equity research rules, debt research analysts may listen to or 
view a live webcast of a transaction-related road show or other widely 
attended presentation by investment banking to investors or the sales 
force from a remote location, or another room if they are in the same 
location.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(L).
    \46\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.01 (Efforts to Solicit 
Investment Banking Business).
    \47\ See NASD Notice to Members 07-04 (January 2007) and NYSE 
Information Memo 07-11 (January 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change also would prohibit investment banking 
personnel from directing debt research analysts to engage in sales or 
marketing efforts related to an investment banking services transaction 
or any communication with a current or prospective customer about an 
investment banking services transaction.\48\ In addition, the proposed 
rule change adopts Supplementary Material to provide that, consistent 
with this requirement, no debt research analyst may engage in any 
communication with a current or prospective customer in the presence of 
investment banking department personnel or company management about an 
investment banking services transaction.\49\ FINRA believes that the 
presence of investment bankers or issuer management could compromise a 
debt research analyst's candor when talking to a current or prospective 
customer about a deal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(M).
    \49\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.02(a) (Restrictions on 
Communications with Customers and Internal Personnel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA believes that the role of any research analyst, debt or 
equity, is to provide unbiased analysis of issuers and their securities 
for the benefit of investors, not to help win business for their firms 
or market transactions on behalf of issuers. FINRA believes the 
prohibitions in these provisions, which have been a cornerstone of the 
equity research rules, are equally important to mitigate significant 
conflicts between investment banking and debt research analysts.
Supervision
    A member's written policies and procedures must limit the 
supervision of debt research analysts to persons not engaged in 
investment banking, sales and trading or principal trading 
activities.\50\ In addition, they further must establish information 
barriers or other institutional safeguards to ensure that debt research 
analysts are insulated from the review, pressure or oversight by 
persons engaged in investment banking services, principal trading or 
sales and trading activities or others who might be biased in their 
judgment or supervision.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(D). The provision is 
substantively the same as current NASD Rule 2711(b)(1), a core 
structural separation requirement in the equity research rules that 
FINRA believes is essential to safeguarding analyst objectivity.
    \51\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(H).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirement for information barriers or other institutional 
safeguards to insulate research analysts from pressure is taken from 
Sarbanes-Oxley, which applies only to research reports on equity 
securities. FINRA believes this provision has equal application to debt 
research reports and that firms must not allow supervision or influence 
by anyone in the firm outside of the research department whose 
interests may be at odds with producing objective research. FINRA 
believes that independence for debt research analysts requires 
effective separation from those whose economic interests may be in 
conflict with the content of debt research. The proposed rule change 
furthers that separation by prohibiting oversight of debt research 
analysts by those involved in investment banking or trading activities.
Budget and Compensation
    A member's written policies and procedures also must limit the 
determination of a firm's debt research department budget to senior 
management, excluding senior management engaged in investment banking 
or principal trading activities, and without regard to specific 
revenues or results derived from investment banking.\52\ However, the 
proposed rule change would expressly permit all persons to provide 
input to senior management regarding the demand for and quality of debt 
research, including product trends and customer interests. It further 
would allow consideration by senior management of a firm's overall 
revenues and results in determining the debt research budget and 
allocation of expenses. FINRA believes the budget provisions strike a 
reasonable balance by prohibiting final budget determinations by those 
persons most conflicted, but allowing input from all persons and 
consideration of revenues other than investment banking to best 
allocate scarce budget resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(E).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to compensation determinations, a member's written 
policies and procedures must prohibit compensation based on specific 
investment banking services or trading transactions or contributions to 
a firm's investment banking or principal trading activities and 
prohibit investment banking and principal trading personnel from input 
into the compensation of debt research analysts.\53\ Further, the 
firm's written policies and procedures must require that the 
compensation of a debt research analyst who is primarily responsible 
for the substance of a research report be reviewed and approved at 
least annually by a committee that reports to a member's board of 
directors or, if the member has no board of directors, a senior 
executive officer of the member.\54\ This committee may not have 
representation from investment banking personnel or persons engaged in 
principal trading activities and must consider the following factors 
when reviewing a debt research analyst's compensation, if applicable: 
The debt research analyst's individual performance, including the 
analyst's productivity and the quality of the debt research analyst's 
research; and the overall ratings received from customers and peers 
(independent of the member's investment banking department and persons 
engaged in principal trading activities) and other independent ratings 
services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(D) and (F).
    \54\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(G).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Neither investment banking personnel nor persons engaged in 
principal trading activities may give input with respect to the 
compensation determination for debt research analysts. However, sales 
and trading personnel may give input to

[[Page 69912]]

debt research management as part of the evaluation process in order to 
convey customer feedback, provided that final compensation 
determinations are made by research management, subject to review and 
approval by the compensation committee.\55\ The committee, which may 
not have representation from investment banking or persons engaged in 
principal trading activities, must document the basis for each debt 
research analyst's compensation, including any input from sales and 
trading personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(D) and (G).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The compensation provisions are similar to those that have proven 
effective in the equity research rules. However, the separation extends 
to not only investment banking, but also those engaged in principal 
trading activities, because such persons have the most pronounced 
conflict with respect to debt research. FINRA believes that the 
compensation determination is a key source of influence on the content 
of debt research reports and therefore it is important to require both 
separation from those who might influence research analysts and 
consideration of the quality of the research produced in making that 
determination.
Personal Trading Restrictions
    Under the proposed rule change, a member's written policies and 
procedures must restrict or limit trading by a ``debt research analyst 
account'' in securities, derivatives and funds whose performance is 
materially dependent upon the performance of securities covered by the 
debt research analyst.\56\ The procedures must ensure that those 
accounts, supervisors of debt research analysts and associated persons 
with the ability to influence the content of debt research reports do 
not benefit in their trading from knowledge of the content or timing of 
debt research reports before the intended recipients of such research 
have had a reasonable opportunity to act on the information in the 
report.\57\ Furthermore, the procedures must generally prohibit a debt 
research analyst account from purchasing or selling any security or any 
option or derivative of such security in a manner inconsistent with the 
debt research analyst's most recently published recommendation, except 
that they may define circumstances of financial hardship (e.g., 
unanticipated significant change in the personal financial 
circumstances of the beneficial owner of the research analyst account) 
in which the firm will permit trading contrary to that recommendation. 
In determining whether a particular trade is contrary to an existing 
recommendation, firms may take into account the context of a given 
trade, including the extent of coverage of the subject security. While 
the proposed rule change does not include a recordkeeping requirement, 
FINRA expects members to evidence compliance with their policies and 
procedures and retain any related documentation in accordance with 
FINRA Rule 4511.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(J).
    \57\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.07 (Ability to Influence the 
Content of a Research Report) would provide that for the purposes of 
the rule, an associated person with the ability to influence the 
content of a debt research report is an associated person who, in 
the ordinary course of that person's duties, has the authority to 
review the debt research report and change that debt research report 
prior to publication or distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change includes Supplementary Material .10, which 
provides that FINRA would not consider a research analyst account to 
have traded in a manner inconsistent with a research analyst's 
recommendation where a member has instituted a policy that prohibits 
any research analyst from holding securities, or options on or 
derivatives of such securities, of the companies in the research 
analyst's coverage universe, provided that the member establishes a 
reasonable plan to liquidate such holdings consistent with the 
principles in paragraph (b)(2)(J)(i) and such plan is approved by the 
member's legal or compliance department.\58\ This provision is intended 
to provide a mechanism by which a firm's analysts can divest their 
holdings to comply with a more restrictive personal trading policy 
without violating the trading against recommendation provision in 
circumstances where an analyst has, for example, a ``buy'' rating on a 
subject company or debt security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA believes these provisions will protect investors by 
prohibiting research analysts and those with an ability to influence 
the content of research reports, such as supervisors, from trading 
ahead of their customers based on knowledge that may move the market 
once made public. FINRA further believes the provisions, in general, 
will promote objective research by requiring consistency between 
personal trading by research analysts and recommendations to customers.
Retaliation and Promises of Favorable Research
    A member's written policies and procedures must prohibit direct or 
indirect retaliation or threat of retaliation against debt research 
analysts by any employee of the firm for publishing research or making 
a public appearance that may adversely affect the member's current or 
prospective business interests.\59\ FINRA believes it is essential to a 
research analyst's independence and objectivity that no person employed 
by the member that is in a position to retaliate or threaten to 
retaliate should be permitted to do so based on the content of a 
research report or public appearance. The policies and procedures also 
must prohibit explicit or implicit promises of favorable debt research, 
specific research content or a specific rating or recommendation as 
inducement for the receipt of business or compensation.\60\ This 
provision is also key to preserving the integrity of debt research and 
the independence of debt research analysts, who otherwise may feel 
pressure to tailor the content of debt research to the business 
interests of the firm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(I). This provision is 
not intended to limit a member's authority to discipline or 
terminate a debt research analyst, in accordance with the member's 
written policies and procedures, for any cause other than writing an 
adverse, negative, or otherwise unfavorable research report or for 
making similar comments during a public appearance.
    \60\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(K).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Joint Due Diligence With Investment Banking Personnel
    The proposed rule change establishes a proscription with respect to 
joint due diligence activities--i.e., due diligence by the debt 
research analyst in the presence of investment banking department 
personnel--during a specified time period. Specifically, the proposed 
rule change states that FINRA interprets the overarching principle 
requiring members to, among other things, establish, maintain and 
enforce written policies and procedures that address the interaction 
between debt research analysts, banking and subject companies,\61\ to 
prohibit the performance of joint due diligence prior to the selection 
of underwriters for the investment banking services transaction.\62\ 
FINRA understands that in some instances, due diligence activities take 
place even before an issuer has awarded the mandate to manage or co-
manage an offering. There is heightened risk in those circumstances 
that investment bankers may pressure analysts to produce favorable 
research that may bolster the firm's bid to become an underwriter for 
the offering. Once the mandate has been awarded, FINRA believes joint 
due diligence may take place in accordance

[[Page 69913]]

with appropriate written policies and procedures to guard against 
interactions to further the interests of the investment banking 
department. At that time, FINRA believes that the efficiencies of joint 
due diligence outweigh the risk of pressure on debt research analysts 
by investment banking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(1)(C).
    \62\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.09 (Joint Due Diligence).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Communications Between Debt Research Analysts and Trading Personnel
    The proposed rule change delineates the prohibited and permissible 
interactions between debt research analysts and sales and trading and 
principal trading personnel. The proposed rule change would require 
members to establish, maintain and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to prohibit sales and trading and 
principal trading personnel from attempting to influence a debt 
research analyst's opinions or views for the purpose of benefiting the 
trading position of the firm, a customer or a class of customers.\63\ 
It would further prohibit debt research analysts from identifying or 
recommending specific potential trading transactions to sales and 
trading or principal trading personnel that are inconsistent with such 
debt research analyst's currently published debt research reports or 
from disclosing the timing of, or material investment conclusions in, a 
pending debt research report.\64\ The communications prohibited under 
the proposed rule change are intended to prevent undue influence on 
debt research analysts to generate or conform research to a firm's 
proprietary trading interests or those of particular customers. FINRA 
believes that these prohibitions are necessary to mitigate a 
significant conflict between firms and their customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(a)(1) (Information Barriers 
between Research Analysts and Trading Desk Personnel).
    \64\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(a)(2) (Information Barriers 
between Research Analysts and Trading Desk Personnel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, FINRA understands that certain communications between debt 
research analysts and trading desk personnel are essential to the 
discharge of their functions, e.g., debt research analysts need to 
obtain from trading personnel information relevant to a valuation 
analysis and trading personnel need to obtain from debt research 
analysts information regarding the creditworthiness of an issuer. These 
departments also must communicate regarding coverage decisions, given 
the large number of debt instruments.
    Therefore, the proposed rule change would permit sales and trading 
and principal trading personnel to communicate customers' interests to 
a debt research analyst, so long as the debt research analyst does not 
respond by publishing debt research for the purpose of benefiting the 
trading position of the firm, a customer or a class of customers.\65\ 
In addition, debt research analysts may provide customized analysis, 
recommendations or trade ideas to sales and trading and principal 
trading personnel and customers, provided that any such communications 
are not inconsistent with the analyst's currently published or pending 
debt research, and that any subsequently published debt research is not 
for the purpose of benefiting the trading position of the firm, a 
customer or a class of customers.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(b)(1) (Information Barriers 
between Research Analysts and Trading Desk Personnel).
    \66\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(b)(2) (Information Barriers 
between Research Analysts and Trading Desk Personnel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change also would permit sales and trading and 
principal trading personnel to seek the views of debt research analysts 
regarding the creditworthiness of the issuer of a debt security and 
other information regarding an issuer of a debt security that is 
reasonably related to the price or performance of the debt security, so 
long as, with respect to any covered issuer, such information is 
consistent with the debt research analyst's published debt research 
report and consistent in nature with the types of communications that a 
debt research analyst might have with customers. In determining what is 
consistent with the debt research analyst's published debt research, a 
member may consider the context, including that the investment 
objectives or time horizons being discussed differ from those 
underlying the debt research analyst's published views.\67\ Finally, 
debt research analysts may seek information from sales and trading and 
principal trading personnel regarding a particular debt instrument, 
current prices, spreads, liquidity and similar market information 
relevant to the debt research analyst's valuation of a particular debt 
security.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(b)(3) (Information Barriers 
between Research Analysts and Trading Desk Personnel).
    \68\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(b)(4) (Information Barriers 
between Research Analysts and Trading Desk Personnel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change clarifies that communications between debt 
research analysts and sales and trading or principal trading personnel 
that are not related to sales and trading, principal trading or debt 
research activities may take place without restriction, unless 
otherwise prohibited.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(c) (Information Barriers 
between Research Analysts and Trading Desk Personnel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Restrictions on Communications With Customers and Internal Sales 
Personnel
    The proposed rule change would apply standards to communications 
with customers and internal sales personnel. Any written or oral 
communication by a debt research analyst with a current or prospective 
customer or internal personnel related to an investment banking 
services transaction must be fair, balanced and not misleading, taking 
into consideration the overall context in which the communication is 
made.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.02(b) (Restrictions on 
Communications with Customers and Internal Personnel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the prohibition on investment banking department 
personnel directly or indirectly directing a debt research analyst to 
engage in sales or marketing efforts related to an investment banking 
services transaction or directing a debt research analyst to engage in 
any communication with a current or prospective customer about an 
investment banking services transaction, no debt research analyst may 
engage in any communication with a current or prospective customer in 
the presence of investment banking department personnel or company 
management about an investment banking services transaction. These 
provisions are intended to allow debt research analysts to educate 
investors and internal sales personnel about an investment banking 
transaction in fair and balanced manner, in a setting that promotes 
candor by the debt research analyst.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.02(a) (Restrictions on 
Communications with Customers and Internal Personnel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Content and Disclosure in Debt Research Reports
    The proposed rule change would, in general, adopt the disclosures 
in the equity research rule for debt research, with modifications to 
reflect the different characteristics of the debt market. As discussed 
above, the equity research rules are designed to provide investors with 
useful information on which to base their investment decisions. FINRA 
believes retail debt investors would benefit from similar disclosures 
applied to debt research reports. In addition, FINRA understands from 
industry participants that members have systems in place to track the 
disclosures required under the equity

[[Page 69914]]

research rules that can be leveraged to meet the debt research 
disclosure requirements in the proposed rule change.
    The proposed rule change would require members to establish, 
maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to ensure that purported facts in their debt research reports 
are based on reliable information.\72\ FINRA has included this 
provision because it believes members should have policies and 
procedures to foster verification of facts and trustworthy research on 
which investors may rely. In addition, the policies and procedures must 
be reasonably designed to ensure that any recommendation or rating has 
a reasonable basis and is accompanied by a clear explanation of any 
valuation method used and a fair presentation of the risks that may 
impede achievement of the recommendation or rating.\73\ While there is 
no obligation to employ a rating system under the proposed rule, 
members that choose to employ a rating system must clearly define in 
each debt research report the meaning of each rating in the system, 
including the time horizon and any benchmarks on which a rating is 
based. In addition, the definition of each rating must be consistent 
with its plain meaning.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(1)(A).
    \73\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(1)(B).
    \74\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the equity rules, irrespective of the rating system 
a member employs, a member must disclose, in each debt research report 
that includes a rating, the percentage of all debt securities rated by 
the member to which the member would assign a ``buy,'' ``hold'' or 
``sell'' rating.\75\ In addition, a member must disclose in each debt 
research report the percentage of subject companies within each of the 
``buy,'' ``hold'' and ``sell'' categories for which the member has 
provided investment banking services within the previous 12 months.\76\ 
All such information must be current as of the end of the most recent 
calendar quarter or the second most recent calendar quarter if the 
publication date of the debt research report is less than 15 calendar 
days after the most recent calendar quarter.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(2)(A).
    \76\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(2)(B).
    \77\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(2)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If a debt research report contains a rating for a subject company's 
debt security and the member has assigned a rating to such debt 
security for at least one year, the debt research report must show each 
date on which a member has assigned a rating to the debt security and 
the rating assigned on such date. This information would be required 
for the period that the member has assigned any rating to the debt 
security or for a three-year period, whichever is shorter.\78\ Unlike 
the equity research rules, the proposed rule change does not require 
those ratings to be plotted on a price chart because of limits on price 
transparency, including daily closing price information, with respect 
to many debt securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change would require \79\ a member to disclose in 
any debt research report at the time of publication or distribution of 
the report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     If the debt research analyst or a member of the debt 
research analyst's household has a financial interest in the debt or 
equity securities of the subject company (including, without 
limitation, any option, right, warrant, future, long or short 
position), and the nature of such interest;
     if the debt research analyst has received compensation 
based upon (among other factors) the member's investment banking, sales 
and trading or principal trading revenues;
     if the member or any of its affiliates: Managed or co-
managed a public offering of securities for the subject company in the 
past 12 months; received compensation for investment banking services 
from the subject company in the past 12 months; or expects to receive 
or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from 
the subject company in the next three months;
     if, as of the end of the month immediately preceding the 
date of publication or distribution of a debt research report (or the 
end of the second most recent month if the publication date is less 
than 30 calendar days after the end of the most recent month), the 
member or its affiliates have received from the subject company any 
compensation for products or services other than investment banking 
services in the previous 12 months; \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ See also discussion of proposed FINRA Rule 2242.04 
(Disclosure of Compensation Received by Affiliates) below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     if the subject company is, or over the 12-month period 
preceding the date of publication or distribution of the debt research 
report has been, a client of the member, and if so, the types of 
services provided to the issuer. Such services, if applicable, shall be 
identified as either investment banking services, non-investment 
banking securities-related services or non-securities services;
     if the member trades or may trade as principal in the debt 
securities (or in related derivatives) that are the subject of the debt 
research report; \81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ This provision is analogous to the equity research rule 
requirement to disclose market making activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     if the debt research analyst received any compensation 
from the subject company in the previous 12 months; and
     any other material conflict of interest of the debt 
research analyst or member that the debt research analyst or an 
associated person of the member with the ability to influence the 
content of a debt research report knows or has reason to know at the 
time of the publication or distribution of a debt research report.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ For example, FINRA would consider it to be a material 
conflict of interest if the debt research analyst or a member of the 
debt research analyst's household serves as an officer, director or 
advisory board member of the subject company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change would incorporate a proposed amendment to 
the corresponding provision in the equity research rules that expands 
the existing ``catch all'' disclosure to require disclosure of material 
conflicts known not only by the research analyst, but also by any 
``associated person of the member with the ability to influence the 
content of a research report.'' In so doing, the proposed rule change 
would capture material conflicts of interest that, for example, only a 
supervisor or the head of research may be aware of. The ``reason to 
know'' standard would not impose a duty of inquiry on the debt research 
analyst or others who can influence the content of a debt research 
report. Rather, it would cover disclosure of those conflicts that 
should reasonably be discovered by those persons in the ordinary course 
of discharging their functions.
    The proposed equity research rules include an additional disclosure 
if the member or its affiliates maintain a significant financial 
interest in the debt or equity of the subject company, including, at a 
minimum, if the member or its affiliates beneficially own 1% or more of 
any class of common equity securities of the subject company. FINRA did 
not include this provision in the proposed debt research rule because, 
unlike equity holdings, firms do not typically have systems to track 
ownership of debt securities. Moreover, the number and complexity of 
bonds, together with the fact that a firm may be both long and short 
different bonds of the same issuer, make it difficult to have real-time 
disclosure of a firm's credit exposure. Therefore, the proposed rule 
change only requires disclosure of firm

[[Page 69915]]

ownership of debt securities in research reports or a public appearance 
to the extent those holdings constitute a material conflict of 
interest.\83\ While the ownership of the equity securities of the 
subject company of a debt research report can constitute a conflict of 
interest for the member that publishes or distributes the research 
report, FINRA does not believe the conflict requires routine 
disclosure, even above some threshold of ownership. This is because the 
impact of a debt research report on the market for an equity security 
is more attenuated than that of an equity research report. In those 
circumstances where the impact is heightened--e.g., a debt research 
report asserting that a subject company may not be able to meet its 
debt service--disclosure could be captured by the material conflict of 
interest provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See proposed FINRA Rules 2242(c)(4)(H) and (d)(1)(E).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change adopts from the equity research rules the 
general exception for disclosure that would reveal material non-public 
information regarding specific potential future investment banking 
transactions of the subject company.\84\ Similar to the equity research 
rules, the proposed rule change would require that disclosures be 
presented on the front page of debt research reports or the front page 
must refer to the page on which the disclosures are found. Electronic 
debt research reports, however, may provide a hyperlink directly to the 
required disclosures. All disclosures and references to disclosures 
required by the proposed rule must be clear, comprehensive and 
prominent.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(5).
    \85\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Like the equity research rule, the proposed rule change would 
permit a member that distributes a debt research report covering six or 
more companies (compendium report) to direct the reader in a clear 
manner to the applicable disclosures. Electronic compendium reports 
must include a hyperlink to the required disclosures. Paper-based 
compendium reports must provide either a toll-free number or a postal 
address to request the required disclosures and also may include a web 
address of the member where the disclosures can be found.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(c)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Disclosure of Compensation Received by Affiliates
    The proposed rule change would provide that a member may satisfy 
the disclosure requirement with respect to receipt of non-investment 
banking services compensation by an affiliate by implementing written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the debt 
research analyst and associated persons of the member with the ability 
to influence the content of debt research reports from directly or 
indirectly receiving information from the affiliate as to whether the 
affiliate received such compensation.\87\ In addition, a member may 
satisfy the disclosure requirement with respect to the receipt of 
investment banking compensation from a foreign sovereign by a non-U.S. 
affiliate of the member by implementing written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to prevent the debt research analyst and associated 
persons of the member with the ability to influence the content of debt 
research reports from directly or indirectly receiving information from 
the non-U.S. affiliate as to whether such non-U.S. affiliate received 
or expects to receive such compensation from the foreign sovereign. 
However, a member must disclose receipt of compensation by its 
affiliates from the subject company (including any foreign sovereign) 
in the past 12 months when the debt research analyst or an associated 
person with the ability to influence the content of a debt research 
report has actual knowledge that an affiliate received such 
compensation during that time period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.04 (Disclosure of Compensation 
Received by Affiliates).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Disclosure in Public Appearances
    The proposed rule change closely parallels the equity research 
rules with respect to disclosure in public appearances. Under the 
proposed rule, a debt research analyst must disclose in public 
appearances: \88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     If the debt research analyst or a member of the debt 
research analyst's household has a financial interest in the debt or 
equity securities of the subject company (including, without 
limitation, whether it consists of any option, right, warrant, future, 
long or short position), and the nature of such interest;
     if, to the extent the debt research analyst knows or has 
reason to know, the member or any affiliate received any compensation 
from the subject company in the previous 12 months;
     if the debt research analyst received any compensation 
from the subject company in the previous 12 months;
     if, to the extent the debt research analyst knows or has 
reason to know, the subject company currently is, or during the 12-
month period preceding the date of publication or distribution of the 
debt research report, was, a client of the member. In such cases, the 
debt research analyst also must disclose the types of services provided 
to the subject company, if known by the debt research analyst; or
     any other material conflict of interest of the debt 
research analyst or member that the debt research analyst knows or has 
reason to know at the time of the public appearance.
    However, a member or debt research analyst will not be required to 
make any such disclosure to the extent it would reveal material non-
public information regarding specific potential future investment 
banking transactions of the subject company.\89\ Unlike in debt 
research reports, the ``catch all'' disclosure requirement in public 
appearances applies only to a conflict of interest of the debt research 
analyst or member that the analyst knows or has reason to know at the 
time of the public appearance and does not extend to conflicts that an 
associated person with the ability to influence the content of a 
research report or public appearance knows or has reason to know. FINRA 
understands that supervisors typically do not have the opportunity to 
review and insist on changes to public appearances, many of which are 
extemporaneous in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change would require members to maintain records 
of public appearances by debt research analysts sufficient to 
demonstrate compliance by those debt research analysts with the 
applicable disclosure requirements for public appearances. Such records 
must be maintained for at least three years from the date of the public 
appearance.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Disclosure Required by Other Provisions
    With respect to both research reports and public appearances, the 
proposed rule change would require that, in addition to the disclosures 
required under the proposed rule, members and debt research analysts 
must comply with all applicable disclosure provisions of FINRA Rule 
2210 (Communications with the Public) and the federal securities 
laws.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Distribution of Member Research Reports
    The proposed rule change, like the proposed amendments to the 
equity research rules, codifies an existing interpretation of FINRA 
Rule 2010 (Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of Trade) and 
provides

[[Page 69916]]

additional guidance regarding selective--or tiered--dissemination of a 
firm's debt research reports. The proposed rule change requires firms 
to establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that a debt research report is not 
distributed selectively to internal trading personnel or a particular 
customer or class of customers in advance of other customers that the 
member has previously determined are entitled to receive the debt 
research report.\92\ The proposed rule change includes further guidance 
to explain that firms may provide different debt research products and 
services to different classes of customers, provided the products are 
not differentiated based on the timing of receipt of potentially market 
moving information and the firm discloses its research dissemination 
practices to all customers that receive a research product.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(f).
    \93\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.06 (Distribution of Member 
Research Products).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A member, for example, may offer one debt research product for 
those with a long-term investment horizon (``investor research'') and a 
different debt research product for those customers with a short-term 
investment horizon (``trading research''). These products may lead to 
different recommendations or ratings, provided that each is consistent 
with the meaning of the member's ratings system for each respective 
product. However, a member may not differentiate a debt research 
product based on the timing of receipt of a recommendation, rating or 
other potentially market moving information, nor may a member label a 
debt research product with substantially the same content as a 
different debt research product as a means to allow certain customers 
to trade in advance of other customers.
    In addition, a member that provides different debt research 
products and services for certain customers must inform its other 
customers that its alternative debt research products and services may 
reach different conclusions or recommendations that could impact the 
price of the debt security.\94\ Thus, for example, a member that offers 
trading research must inform its investment research customers that its 
trading research product may contain different recommendations or 
ratings that could result in short-term price movements contrary to the 
recommendation in its investment research. FINRA understands, however, 
that customers may actually receive at different times research reports 
originally made available at the same time because of the mode of 
delivery elected by the customer eligible to receive such research 
services (e.g., in paper form versus electronic). However, members may 
not design or implement a distribution system intended to give a timing 
advantage to some customers over others. FINRA will read with interest 
comments as to whether a member should be required to disclose to its 
other customers when an alternative research product or service does, 
in fact, contain a recommendation contrary to the research product or 
service that those customers receive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.06 (Distribution of Member 
Research Products). A member that distributes both institutional and 
retail debt research would be required to inform its retail 
customers of the existence of the institutional debt research 
product and, if applicable, that the product may contain different 
recommendations or ratings than its retail debt research product. 
This disclosure need not be in each retail debt research report; 
rather, a member may establish policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to inform retail investors of the existence and nature of 
the institutional debt research product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Distribution of Third-Party Debt Research Reports
    FINRA believes that the supervisory review and disclosure 
obligations applicable to the distribution of third-party equity 
research should similarly apply to third-party retail debt research. 
Moreover, the proposed rule change would incorporate the current 
standards for third-party equity research, including the distinction 
between independent and non-independent third-party research with 
respect to the review and disclosure requirements. In addition, the 
proposed rule change adopts an expanded requirement in the proposed 
equity research rules that requires members to disclose any other 
material conflict of interest that can reasonably be expected to have 
influenced the member's choice of a third-party research provider or 
the subject company of a third-party research report. FINRA believes 
that it is important that readers be made aware of any conflicts of 
interest present that may have influenced either the selection or 
content of third-party research disseminated to investors.
    The proposed rule change would prohibit a member from distributing 
third-party debt research if it knows or has reason to know that such 
research is not objective or reliable.\95\ FINRA believes that, where a 
member is distributing or ``pushing-out'' third-party debt research, 
the member must have written policies and procedures to vet the quality 
of the research producers. A member would satisfy the standard based on 
its actual knowledge and reasonable diligence; however, there would be 
no duty of inquiry to definitively establish that the third-party 
research is, in fact, objective and reliable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(g)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposed rule change would require a member to 
establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that any third-party debt research report 
it distributes contains no untrue statement of material fact and is 
otherwise not false or misleading.\96\ For the purpose of this 
requirement, a member's obligation to review a third-party debt 
research report extends to any untrue statement of material fact or any 
false or misleading information that should be known from reading the 
debt research report or is known based on information otherwise 
possessed by the member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(g)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change would require that a member accompany any 
third-party debt research report it distributes with, or provide a web 
address that directs a recipient to, disclosure of any material 
conflict of interest that can reasonably be expected to have influenced 
the choice of a third-party debt research report provider or the 
subject company of a third-party debt research report, including, at a 
minimum:
     If the member or any of its affiliates managed or co-
managed a public offering of securities for the subject company in the 
past 12 months; received compensation for investment banking services 
from the subject company in the past 12 months; or expects to receive 
or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from 
the subject company in the next three months;
     if the member trades or may trade as principal in the debt 
securities (or in related derivatives) that are the subject of the debt 
research report; and
     any other material conflict of interest of the debt 
research analyst or member that the debt research analyst or an 
associated person of the member with the ability to influence the 
content of a debt research report knows or has reason to know at the 
time of the publication or distribution of a debt research report.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(g)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change would not require members to review a 
third-party debt research report prior to distribution if such debt 
research report is an independent third-party debt research

[[Page 69917]]

report.\98\ For the purposes of the disclosure requirements for third-
party research reports, a member shall not be considered to have 
distributed a third-party debt research report where the research is an 
independent third-party debt research report and made available by a 
member upon request, through a member-maintained Web site, or to a 
customer in connection with a solicited order in which the registered 
representative has informed the customer, during the solicitation, of 
the availability of independent debt research on the solicited debt 
security and the customer requests such independent debt research.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(g)(4).
    \99\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(g)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would require that members ensure that third-
party debt research reports are clearly labeled as such and that there 
is no confusion on the part of the recipient as to the person or entity 
that prepared the debt research reports.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(g)(6). This requirement 
codifies guidance in Notice to Members 04-18 (March 2004) related to 
equity research reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Obligations of Persons Associated With a Member
    The proposed rule change clarifies the obligations of each 
associated person under those provisions of the proposed rule that 
require a member to restrict or prohibit certain conduct by 
establishing, maintaining and enforcing particular policies and 
procedures. Specifically, the proposed rule change provides that, 
consistent with FINRA Rule 0140, persons associated with a member must 
comply with such member's written policies and procedures as 
established pursuant to the proposed rule. Failure of an associated 
person to comply with such policies and procedures shall constitute a 
violation of the proposed rule.\101\ In addition, consistent with Rule 
0140, the proposed rule states in Supplementary Material .08 that it 
shall be a rule violation for an associated person to engage in the 
restricted or prohibited conduct to be addressed through the 
establishment, maintenance and enforcement of written policies and 
procedures required by provisions of FINRA Rule 2242, including 
applicable Supplementary Material, that embed in the policies and 
procedures specific obligations on individuals. This Supplementary 
Material reflects FINRA's position that associated persons can be held 
liable for engaging in conduct that is proscribed by the member under 
FINRA rules. FINRA is clarifying this point in the Supplementary 
Material because the proposed rule change would adopt a policies and 
procedures approach to restricted and prohibited conduct with respect 
to research in place of specific proscriptions in the current equity 
research rules. Thus, for example, where the proposed rule requires a 
member to establish policies and procedures to prohibit debt research 
analyst participation in road shows, associated persons also are 
directly prohibited from engaging in such conduct, even where a member 
has failed to establish policies and procedures. FINRA believes that it 
is incumbent upon each associated person to familiarize themselves with 
the regulatory requirements applicable to his or her business and 
should not be able to avoid responsibility where minimum standards of 
conduct have been established for members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.08 (Obligations of Persons 
Associated with a Member).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Exemption for Members With Limited Investment Banking Activity
    Similar to the equity research rules, the proposed rule change 
exempts from certain provisions regarding supervision and compensation 
of debt research analysts those members that over the previous three 
years, on average per year, have participated in 10 or fewer investment 
banking services transactions as manager or co-manager and generated $5 
million or less in gross investment banking revenues from those 
transactions.\102\ Specifically, members that meet those thresholds 
would be exempt from the requirement to establish, maintain and enforce 
policies and procedures that: Prohibit prepublication review of debt 
research reports by investment banking personnel or other persons not 
directly responsible for the preparation, content or distribution of 
debt research reports (but not principal trading or sales and trading 
personnel, unless the member also qualifies for the limited principal 
trading activity exemption); restrict or limit investment banking 
personnel from input into coverage decisions; limit supervision of debt 
research analysts to persons not engaged in investment banking; limit 
determination of the research department budget to senior management, 
excluding senior management engaged in investment banking activities; 
require that compensation of a debt research analyst be approved by a 
compensation committee that may not have representation from investment 
banking personnel; and establish information barriers to insulate debt 
research analysts from the review or oversight by persons engaged in 
investment banking services or other persons who might be biased in 
their judgment or supervision.\103\ However, the proposed rule would 
require that members with limited investment banking activity establish 
information barriers or other institutional safeguards to ensure debt 
research analysts are insulated from pressure by persons engaged in 
investment banking services activities or other persons, including 
persons engaged in principal trading or principal sales and trading 
activities, who might be biased in their judgment or supervision.\104\ 
FINRA believes that even where research analysts need not be 
structurally separated from investment banking or other non-research 
personnel, they should not be subject to pressures that could 
compromise their independence and objectivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(h).
    \103\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B), 
(b)(2)(C) (with respect to investment banking), (b)(2)(D)(i), 
(b)(2)(E) (with respect to investment banking), (b)(2)(G) and 
(b)(2)(H)(i) and (iii).
    \104\ For the purposes of proposed FINRA Rule 2242(h), the term 
``investment banking services transactions'' includes the 
underwriting of both corporate debt and equity securities but not 
municipal securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While small investment banks may need those who supervise debt 
research analysts under such circumstances also to be involved in the 
determination of those analysts' compensation, the proposal still 
prohibits these firms from compensating a debt research analyst based 
upon specific investment banking services transactions or contributions 
to a member's investment banking services activities. Members that 
qualify for this exemption must maintain records sufficient to 
establish eligibility for the exemption and also maintain for at least 
three years any communication that, but for this exemption, would be 
subject to all of the requirements of proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b).
    FINRA has found the thresholds in the current equity rule to be 
reasonable and appropriate: They reduce the challenges and costs of 
compliance for select provisions for those firms whose limited 
investment banking business significantly reduces the magnitude of 
conflicts that could impact investors. In addition, in the context of 
the equity rules, FINRA analyzed data to see if changing the magnitude 
of either or both thresholds--the number of transactions managed or co-
managed or the amount of gross revenues generated from those 
transactions--yielded a more appropriate universe of exempted firms. 
FINRA reviewed and analyzed deal data

[[Page 69918]]

for calendar years 2009 through 2011. FINRA reviewed firms that either 
managed or co-managed deals and earned underwriting revenues from those 
transactions during the review period. The analysis found that 155 of 
317 such firms--or 49%--would have been eligible for the exemption. The 
data further suggested that incremental upward adjustments to the 
exemption thresholds would not result in a significant number of 
additional firms eligible for the exemption. For example, increasing 
both of the thresholds by 33% (to 40 transactions managed or co-managed 
and $20 million in gross revenues over a three-year period) would 
result in 18 additional exempted firms. As such, FINRA believes the 
current exemption produces a reasonable and appropriate universe of 
exempted firms. Since the exemption in the equity research rules 
relates to the same investment banking conflicts that debt research 
analysts face, FINRA believes the exemption, with its current 
thresholds, is equally reasonable and appropriate for the debt research 
rules.
Exemption for Limited Principal Trading Activity
    FINRA believes it appropriate to provide an exemption from some 
provisions of the proposed rule that require separation of debt 
research from sales and trading and principal trading for firms whose 
limited principal trading operations results in an appreciably 
increased burden of compliance relative to the expected investor 
protection benefits. In general, FINRA believes that firms with modest 
potential principal trading profits pose lower risk of having sales and 
trading or principal trading personnel pressure debt analysts, provided 
other safeguards remain in place. The proposed rule change therefore 
includes an exemption from certain provisions regarding supervision and 
compensation of debt research analysts for members that engage in 
limited principal trading activity where: (1) In absolute value on an 
annual basis, the member's trading gains or losses on principal trades 
in debt securities are $15 million or less over the previous three 
years, on average per year; and (2) the member employs fewer than 10 
debt traders; provided, however, such members must establish 
information barriers or other institutional safeguards to ensure debt 
research analysts are insulated from pressure by persons engaged in 
principal trading or sales and trading activities or other persons who 
might be biased in their judgment or supervision.\105\ Specifically, 
members that meet those thresholds would be exempt from the requirement 
to establish, maintain and enforce policies and procedures that: 
Prohibit prepublication review of debt research reports by principal 
trading or sales and trading personnel or other persons not directly 
responsible for the preparation, content or distribution of debt 
research reports (but not investment banking personnel, unless the firm 
also qualifies for the limited investment banking activity exemption); 
restrict or limit principal trading or sales and trading personnel from 
input into coverage decisions; limit supervision of debt research 
analysts to persons not engaged in sales and trading or principal 
trading activities, including input into the compensation of debt 
research analysts; limit determination of the research department 
budget to senior management, excluding senior management engaged in 
principal trading activities; require that compensation of a debt 
research analyst be approved by a compensation committee that may not 
have representation from principal trading personnel; and establish 
information barriers to insulate debt research analysts from the review 
or oversight by persons engaged in principal trading or sales and 
trading activities or other persons who might be biased in their 
judgment or supervision.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(i).
    \106\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), 
(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(C) (with respect to sales and trading and 
principal trading), (b)(2)(D)(ii) and (iii), (b)(2)(E) (with respect 
to principal trading), (b)(2)(G) and (b)(2)(H)(ii) and (iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with the limited investment banking activity exemption, members 
still would be required to establish information barriers or other 
institutional safeguards to ensure debt research analysts are insulated 
from pressure by persons engaged in principal trading or sales and 
trading activities or other persons who might be biased in their 
judgment or supervision. Members that qualify for this exemption must 
maintain records sufficient to establish eligibility for the exemption 
and also maintain for at least three years any communication that, but 
for this exemption, would be subject to all of the requirements of 
proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b).
    In crafting the exemption, FINRA sought a rational principal debt 
trading revenue threshold for small firms where the conflicts addressed 
by the proposal might be minimized. FINRA further considered the 
ability of firms with limited personnel to comply with the provisions 
that require effective separation of principal debt trading and debt 
research activities. To those ends, FINRA reviewed and analyzed 
available TRACE and FOCUS data, particularly with respect to small 
firms (150 or fewer registered representatives). FINRA supplemented its 
analysis with survey results from 72 geographically diverse small firms 
that engage in principal debt trading in varying magnitudes. The survey 
sought more specific information on the nature of the firms' debt 
trading--the breakdown between trading in corporate versus municipal 
securities (which are excepted from the proposal) and the amount of 
``riskless principal'' trading--as well as the number of debt traders, 
whether any of those traders write research or market commentary, and 
the prospective ability of firms to comply with the proposal's 
structural separation requirements.
    Based on the data, FINRA analyzed the range of principal debt 
revenues generated by small firms and determined that $15 million would 
be a reasonable threshold for the exemption. However, because the 
revenue figure represents a net gain or loss (in absolute terms) from 
principal debt trading activity, the potential exists that a firm with 
substantial trading operations could have an anomalous year that yields 
net revenues under the threshold. Therefore, FINRA added as a backstop 
the second criterion of having fewer than 10 debt traders, to ensure 
the exemption applies only to firms with modest debt trading activity. 
Furthermore, based on the assessment, FINRA believes firms with 10 or 
more debt traders are more capable of dedicating a debt trader to 
writing research. FINRA notes that only eight of the 72 responding 
survey firms indicated that they have debt traders that write either 
research or market commentary--which is excepted from the definition of 
``debt research report'' under the proposal--on debt securities. FINRA 
intends to monitor the research produced by firms that avail themselves 
of the exemption to assess whether the thresholds to qualify for the 
exemption are appropriate or should be modified.
Exemption for Debt Research Reports Provided to Institutional Investors
    FINRA understands that, unlike in the equity market, institutional 
investors trading in debt securities tend to interact with broker-
dealers in a manner more closely resembling that of a counterparty than 
a customer. FINRA further understands that these institutional 
investors value the timely flow of analysis and trade ideas related to 
debt securities, are aware of the types of potential conflicts that may 
exist

[[Page 69919]]

between a member's recommendations and trading interests, and are 
capable of exercising independent judgment in evaluating such 
recommendations (and selectively incorporate research as a data point 
in their own analytics) and reaching pricing decisions. Moreover, some 
well-regarded debt research is produced by analysts that are part of 
the trading desk. The separation required by the Rule would preclude 
this source of information. Given the debt market and the needs of its 
participants, the proposed rule change would exempt debt research 
distributed solely to eligible institutional investors (``institutional 
debt research'') from most of the provisions regarding supervision, 
coverage determinations, budget and compensation determinations and all 
of the disclosure requirements applicable to debt research reports 
distributed to retail investors (``retail debt research'').\107\ Under 
the proposed rule change, the term ``retail investor'' means any person 
other than an institutional investor.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(j)(1).
    \108\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA believes that institutional investors should opt in to 
receive institutional debt research and should be able to choose to 
receive only debt research that is subject to the full protections of 
the rule. The proposed rule distinguishes between larger and smaller 
institutions in the manner in which their opt-in decision is obtained. 
The larger may receive institutional debt research based on negative 
consent, while the smaller must affirmatively consent in writing to 
receive that research.
    Specifically, the proposed rule would allow firms to distribute 
institutional debt research by negative consent to a person who meets 
the definition of a QIB \109\ and where, pursuant to FINRA Rule 
2111(b): (1) The member or associated person has a reasonable basis to 
believe that the QIB is capable of evaluating investment risks 
independently, both in general and with regard to particular 
transactions and investment strategies involving a debt security or 
debt securities; and (2) the QIB has affirmatively indicated that it is 
exercising independent judgment in evaluating the member's 
recommendations pursuant to FINRA Rule 2111 and such affirmation is 
broad enough to encompass transactions in debt securities. The proposed 
rule change would require written disclosure to the QIB that the member 
may provide debt research reports that are intended for institutional 
investors and are not subject to all of the independence and disclosure 
standards applicable to debt research reports prepared for retail 
investors. If the QIB does not contact the member and request to 
receive only retail debt research reports, the member may reasonably 
conclude that the QIB has consented to receiving institutional debt 
research reports.\110\ FINRA interprets this standard to allow an order 
placer, e.g., a registered investment adviser, for a QIB that satisfies 
the FINRA Rule 2111 institutional suitability requirements with respect 
to debt transactions to agree to receive institutional debt research on 
behalf of the QIB by negative consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(a)(12) under which a QIB has 
the same meaning as under Rule 144A of the Securities Act.
    \110\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(j)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Institutional accounts that meet the definition of FINRA Rule 
4512(c) but do not satisfy the higher tier requirements described above 
may still affirmatively elect in writing to receive institutional debt 
research. Specifically, a person that meets the definition of 
``institutional account'' in FINRA Rule 4512(c) may receive 
institutional debt research provided that such person, prior to receipt 
of a debt research report, has affirmatively notified the member in 
writing that it wishes to receive institutional debt research and 
forego treatment as a retail investor for the purposes of the proposed 
rule. Retail investors may not choose to receive institutional debt 
research.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(j)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To avoid a disruption in the receipt of institutional debt 
research, the proposed rule change would allow firms to send 
institutional debt research to any FINRA Rule 4512(c) account, except a 
natural person, without affirmative or negative consent for a period of 
up to one year after SEC approval while they obtain the necessary 
consents. Natural persons that qualify as an institutional account 
under FINRA Rule 4512(c) must provide affirmative consent to receive 
institutional debt research during this transition period and 
thereafter.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.11 (Distribution of 
Institutional Debt Research During Transition Period).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed exemption relieves members that distribute 
institutional debt research to institutional investors from the 
requirements to have written policies and procedures for this research 
with respect to: (1) Restricting or prohibiting prepublication review 
of institutional debt research by principal trading and sales and 
trading personnel or others outside the research department, other than 
investment banking personnel; (2) input by investment banking, 
principal trading and sales and trading into coverage decisions; (3) 
limiting supervision of debt research analysts to persons not engaged 
in investment banking, principal trading or sales and trading 
activities; (4) limiting determination of the debt research 
department's budget to senior management not engaged in investment 
banking or principal trading activities and without regard to specific 
revenues derived from investment banking; (5) determination of debt 
research analyst compensation; (6) restricting or limiting debt 
research analyst account trading; and (7) information barriers to 
ensure debt research analysts are insulated from review or oversight by 
investment banking, sales and trading or principal trading personnel, 
among others (but members still must have written policies and 
procedures to guard again those persons pressuring analysts). The 
exemption further would apply to all disclosure requirements, including 
content and disclosure requirements for third-party research.
    Notwithstanding the proposed exemption, some provisions of the 
proposed rule still would apply to institutional debt research, 
including the prohibition on prepublication review of debt research 
reports by investment banking personnel and the restrictions on such 
review by subject companies. While prepublication review by principal 
trading and sales and trading personnel would not be prohibited 
pursuant to the exemption, other provisions of the rule continue to 
require management of those conflicts, including the requirement to 
impose information barriers to insulate debt research analysts from 
pressure by those persons. Furthermore, the requirements in 
Supplementary Material .05 related to submission of sections of a draft 
debt research report for factual review would apply to any permitted 
prepublication review by persons not directly responsible for the 
preparation, content or distribution of debt research reports. In 
addition, members must prohibit debt research analysts from 
participating in the solicitation of investment banking services 
transactions, road shows and other marketing on behalf of issuers and 
further prohibit investment banking personnel from directly or 
indirectly directing a debt research analyst to engage in sales and 
marketing efforts related to an investment banking deal or to 
communicate with a current or prospective customer with respect to such 
transactions. The provisions regarding retaliation against debt

[[Page 69920]]

research analysts and promises of favorable debt research also still 
apply with respect to research distributed to eligible institutional 
investors.\113\ FINRA believes that, notwithstanding the sophistication 
of its recipients, minimum objectivity standards should apply to 
institutional debt research and members should not be encouraged to use 
debt research analysts for the purpose of soliciting and marketing 
investment banking transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(j)(2). A member must 
establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to identify and effectively manage conflicts of 
interest described in paragraphs (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(H) (with 
respect to pressuring), (b)(2)(I), (b)(2)(K), (b)(2)(L), (b)(2)(M), 
(b)(2)(N) and Supplementary Material .02(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the proposed rule change does not require institutional debt 
research to carry the specific disclosures applicable to retail debt 
research, it does require that such research carry general disclosures 
prominently on the first page warning that: (1) The report is intended 
only for institutional investors and does not carry all of the 
independence and disclosure standards of retail debt research reports; 
(2) if applicable, that the views in the report may differ from the 
views offered in retail debt research reports; and (3) if applicable, 
that the report may not be independent of the firm's proprietary 
interests and that the firm trades the securities covered in the report 
for its own account and on a discretionary basis on behalf of certain 
customers, and such trading interests may be contrary to the 
recommendation in the report.\114\ Thus, the second and third 
disclosures described above would be required only if the member 
produces both retail and institutional debt research reports that 
sometimes differ in their views or if the member maintains a 
proprietary trading desk or trades on a discretionary basis on behalf 
of some customers and those interests sometimes are contrary to 
recommendations in institutional debt research reports. Although FINRA 
typically favors specific disclosure e.g., that a view or 
recommendation does, in fact, differ or is contrary to the member's 
trading interests--FINRA believes that the cost to track and identify a 
specific conflict with respect to institutional debt research reports 
exceeds the value that specific disclosure would provide to 
sophisticated institutional investors, particularly since those 
investors value timely analysis and trade ideas that could be 
diminished due to the burdens associated with a specific disclosure 
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(j)(3). With respect to the 
disclosure requirement, if applicable, that the views in the 
institutional debt research report may differ from views in retail 
debt research, FINRA notes institutional debt research is not 
subject to Supplementary Material .06, which otherwise requires a 
member to inform its customers of the existence of a different 
research product offered to other customers that may reach different 
conclusions or recommendations that could impact the price of the 
debt security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA believes that this approach will maintain the flow of 
institutional debt research to most institutional investors and allow 
firms to leverage existing compliance efforts, while ensuring that 
those investors who receive institutional debt research through 
negative consent have a high level of experience in evaluating 
transactions involving debt securities, and that certain protections 
remain in place to manage potential conflicts of interest. In addition, 
FINRA believes that this approach appropriately acknowledges the arm's-
length nature of transactions between trading desk personnel and 
institutional buyers. Finally, FINRA notes that no institutional 
investor will be exposed to this less-protected institutional research 
without either negative or affirmative consent, as applicable.
    The proposed rule change would require members to establish, 
maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to ensure that institutional debt research is made available 
only to eligible institutional investors.\115\ A member may not rely on 
the proposed exemption with respect to a debt research report that the 
member has reason to believe will be redistributed to a retail 
investor. The proposed rule change also states that the proposed 
exemption does not relieve a member of its obligations to comply with 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and FINRA 
rules.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(j)(4).
    \116\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(j)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

General Exemptive Authority
    The proposed rule change would provide FINRA, pursuant to the FINRA 
Rule 9600 Series, with authority to conditionally or unconditionally 
grant, in exceptional and unusual circumstances, an exemption from any 
requirement of the proposed rule for good cause shown, after taking 
into account all relevant factors and provided that such exemption is 
consistent with the purposes of the rule, the protection of investors, 
and the public interest.\117\ Given the scope of the rule's subject 
matter and the diversity of firm sizes, structures and research 
business and distribution models, FINRA believes it would be useful and 
appropriate to have the ability to provide relief from a particular 
provision of the proposed rules under specific factual circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(k).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA will announce the effective date of the proposed rule change 
in a Regulatory Notice to be published no later than 60 days following 
Commission approval. The effective date will be no later than 180 days 
following publication of the Regulatory Notice announcing Commission 
approval.
2. Statutory Basis
    FINRA believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the 
provisions of Section 15A(b)(6) of the Act,\118\ which requires, among 
other things, that FINRA rules must be designed to prevent fraudulent 
and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade, and, in general, to protect investors and the 
public interest. FINRA believes that the proposed rule change would 
promote increased quality, objectivity and transparency of debt 
research distributed to investors by requiring firms to identify and 
mitigate conflicts in the preparation and distribution of such 
research. FINRA further believes the rule will provide investors with 
more reliable information on which to base investment decisions in debt 
securities, while maintaining timely flow of information important to 
institutional market participants and providing those institutional 
investors with appropriate safeguards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    FINRA does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in 
any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The proposed rule change 
largely adopts provisions that have proven effective to promote 
objective and reliable research in the equity research space, as 
detailed through academic studies and other observations in the Joint 
Report and the GAO Report.\119\ The GAO report, for example, concluded 
that empirical studies suggest the rules have resulted in increased 
analyst independence and weakened the influence of conflicts of 
interest on analyst recommendations.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ See Joint Report, supra note 8 at 12-23.
    \120\ See GAO Report, supra note 9 at 11-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change would adopt a policies and procedures 
approach that allows members to implement a compliance system that

[[Page 69921]]

aligns with their particular structure and business models, without 
diminishing investor protection. FINRA believes that this proposed 
approach imposes less cost on members without reducing investor 
protections than does a purely prescriptive approach or ``one size fits 
all'' approach with respect to compliance. In addition, the proposed 
rule adopts a substantial portion of the equity research rules. FINRA 
believes that many of the same conflicts of interest are present in the 
publication and distribution of equity and debt research and that 
consistency among the debt and equity research rules will further 
minimize the burdens to members to comply with the proposed rule 
change.
    As set forth in Item II.C., FINRA elicited comment on proposed debt 
research rules in two separate Regulatory Notices. In each instance, 
FINRA carefully considered the commenters' concerns and amended the 
proposal to address issues with respect to costs and burdens raised by 
commenters. Even before the two proposals, FINRA issued a concept 
proposal in Regulatory Notice 11-11 to gather information and identify 
provisions of the equity research rules that would not be efficient or 
effective in a debt research proposal. For example, the concept 
proposal included a parallel provision to the equity rules that would 
have required a firm to promptly notify its customers if it intends to 
terminate coverage in a debt security and include with the notice a 
final research report. If it were impracticable to provide such final 
report, the concept proposal would have required a firm to disclose to 
customers its reason for terminating coverage. FINRA recognized that 
firms may have an extensive coverage universe of debt securities that 
may only be the subject of episodic research coverage. As such, FINRA 
determined that the termination of coverage provision in the debt 
context would be overly burdensome to firms relative to its investor 
protection value and therefore eliminated the provision from this 
revised proposal.
    In addition, and as detailed below in Item II.C., FINRA considered 
numerous iterations of an institutional exemption for debt research. 
Several commenters raised issues regarding an earlier provision that 
would have required affirmative consent for all institutional 
investors. In response to comments that the proposal was overly 
burdensome and may exclude a significant number of institutional 
investors from receiving the debt research that they receive today, 
FINRA is now proposing a higher tier of institutional investors that 
may receive institutional debt research based on negative consent. As 
set forth in Regulatory Notice 12-42, FINRA also made several other 
changes and clarifications in response to comments, including to the 
definition of ``debt research report,'' the standard for disclosure of 
conflicts and the permissible interactions between debt research 
analysts and sales and trading personnel.
    FINRA also considered an alternative suggested by commenters to 
exempt all trader commentary from the protections of the proposed rule. 
FINRA did not adopt this alternative because it would create an avenue 
through which firms could funnel debt research to retail investors 
without objectivity and reliability safeguards or disclosure of 
conflicts. FINRA reviewed examples of trader commentary and believes 
that many of those communications either do not meet the definition of 
a research report or are subject to exceptions from that definition. 
For those that are debt research reports, FINRA believes retail 
recipients should be entitled to the same protections, irrespective of 
the author or department of origin. FINRA further understands that most 
trader commentary is intended for sophisticated institutional 
investors, and to the extent a firm limits distribution to eligible 
institutional investors, most of the provisions of the proposed rule 
change would not apply. Therefore, FINRA believes its institutional 
exemption approach strikes the appropriate balance between protecting 
retail investors and maintaining timely information flow to more 
sophisticated investors.
    FINRA also sought comment and engaged in data analysis, as 
described in Item II.A.1., to fashion exemptions for firms with limited 
investment banking activity and limited principal trading activity. In 
combination with the institutional investor exemption, FINRA believes 
the proposed rule change is narrowly tailored to achieve its regulatory 
objectives.
    Finally, FINRA notes that it solicited comment in Regulatory Notice 
12-42 on the economic impact of the proposed rule change, including 
quantified costs and the anticipated effects on competition, but 
received little or no feedback.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    Earlier iterations of the proposed rule change were published for 
comment in Regulatory Notice 12-09 (``Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal) 
and Regulatory Notice 12-42 (''Regulatory Notice 12-42 Proposal'') 
(together, the ``Notice Proposals''). Copies of the Regulatory Notices 
are attached as Exhibit 2a. A list of the commenters and copies of the 
comment letters received in response to the Notice Proposals are 
attached as Exhibits 2b and 2c, respectively.
    The Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal sought comment on a proposed 
rule to govern the preparation and distribution of debt research 
pursuant to a tiered approach based on whether debt research is 
distributed to retail or institutional investors. Under the proposal, 
debt research distributed to retail investors would carry most of the 
same protections provided to recipients of equity research, while 
institutional investors could affirmatively opt in to a framework that 
would exempt such research from many of those provisions. FINRA 
received seven comments in response to the proposal.\121\ Commenters 
suggested significant changes to the proposal, most notably with 
respect to the definitions of ``debt security'' and ``debt research 
report,'' the opt-in requirement for institutional investors, and the 
restrictions on input into debt research budget and compensation 
determinations by those involved in principal trading activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ See Letter from Joseph R.V. Romano, President, Romano 
Brothers & Co., to Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA, 
dated March 31, 2012 (``Romano''); letter from Ryan K. Bakhtiari, 
President, Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association, to Marcia 
E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA, dated April 2, 2012 
(``PIABA''); letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Director, 
General Counsel and Secretary, Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association, to Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, 
FINRA, dated April 2, 2012 (``SIFMA''); letter from Michael 
Nicholas, CEO, Bond Dealers of America, to Marcia E. Asquith, 
Corporate Secretary, FINRA, dated April 2, 2012 (``BDA''); letter 
from Lee A. Pickard and William D. Edick, Pickard and Djinis LLP, to 
Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA, dated April 2, 2012 
(``ASIR''); letter from Chris Charles, President, Wulff, Hansen & 
Co., to Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA, dated April 
5, 2012 (``Wulff''); and letter from Amy Natterson Kroll, Bingham 
McCutchen LLP, to Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA, 
dated April 10, 2012 (``Morgan Stanley'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA addressed several of the commenters' concerns in the 
Regulatory Notice 12-42 Proposal, which included, among other things, 
amended exemptions for research distributed to certain institutional 
investors and for firms with limited principal debt trading activity. 
The amended exemption for institutional investors added a higher tier 
of institutional investor that could receive institutional debt 
research by negative consent. FINRA received five comment letters on

[[Page 69922]]

the proposal.\122\ The comments focused on two primary issues: The 
higher tier definition of institutional investor and the restrictions 
on input by principal trading personnel into research budget and 
evaluation and compensation determinations. Despite specific requests 
in the Regulatory Notice, FINRA received little or no comment on the 
economic impact of the proposal or any particular provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ See Letter from Kurt N. Schacht, Managing Director, and 
Linda L. Rittenhouse, Director, CFA Institute, to Marcia E. Asquith, 
Corporate Secretary, FINRA, dated December 7, 2012 (``CFA''); letter 
from Michael Nicholas, CEO, Bond Dealers of America, to Marcia E. 
Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA, dated December 20, 2012 
(``BDA''); letter from Lee A. Pickard and William D. Edick, Pickard 
and Djinis LLP, to Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA, 
dated December 20, 2012 (``ASIR''); letter from Roberts J. Stracks, 
Counsel, BMO Capital Markets GKST Inc., to Marcia E. Asquith, 
Corporate Secretary, FINRA, dated December 20, 2012 (``BMO''); and 
letter from Kevin A. Zambrowicz, Managing Director, Associate 
General Counsel, Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association, to Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA, dated 
January 4, 2013 (``SIFMA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A summary of the comments received on the Notice Proposals and 
FINRA's responses are set forth below.
Definitions
    The Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal defined ``debt security'' to 
mean any ``security'' as defined in Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange 
Act, except for any ``equity security,'' ``municipal security'' or 
``security-based swap'' as defined in Section 3(a) of the Exchange Act, 
or any U.S. Treasury Security as defined in FINRA Rule 6710(p). SIFMA 
and BDA urged FINRA to expand the exceptions to the definition to 
include U.S. agency securities and investment grade foreign government 
securities. BDA again urged FINRA to exclude U.S. agency securities in 
response to the Regulatory Notice 12-42 Proposal. SIFMA further asked 
FINRA to clarify that ``derivatives,'' as defined in the CFTC conflict 
rules are excluded from the definition of ``debt security'' because 
they are subject to a separate federal regulatory regime. PIABA, on the 
other hand, thought FINRA should include municipal securities and 
security-based swaps within the definition.
    FINRA did not believe it was appropriate to expand the exceptions 
to the definition of ``debt security'' to include agency securities or 
foreign sovereign debt securities and did not propose these changes to 
the definition. FINRA has not provided these exclusions in the proposed 
rule change for a variety of reasons. First, commenters did not provide 
a rationale to exclude other non-equity securities. Second, treasury 
securities are excluded because FINRA is reticent to interfere with the 
markets involving direct obligations of the United States. In contrast, 
FINRA already has reporting schemes around agency securities and does 
not think it appropriate to carve out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
securities, for example. Municipal securities were excluded from the 
proposal in part due to FINRA's jurisdictional limitations with respect 
to those securities, so suggestions to exclude other securities as 
analogous to municipals are misplaced.
    FINRA believes an exclusion for foreign sovereign debt of other G-
20 countries is too broad, as the conflicts the rules address are 
similarly present with respect to research on such securities, and 
therefore retail investors would benefit from the proposal's 
protections. Alternatively, commenters asked for greater flexibility 
with respect to disclosure of compensation on foreign sovereign issues, 
in large part due to tracking difficulties given the many and diverse 
relationships that firms' affiliates have with governments. In 
response, FINRA amended the proposal to permit firms, in lieu of 
disclosing investment banking compensation received by a non-U.S. 
affiliate from foreign sovereigns, to instead implement information 
barriers between that affiliate and the debt research department to 
prevent direct or indirect receipt of such information.\123\ However, 
the proposed rule change would still require disclosure if the debt 
research analyst has actual knowledge of receipt of investment banking 
compensation by the non-U.S. affiliate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242. 04 (Disclosure of 
Compensation Received by Affiliates).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As stated in Item II.A. above, the proposed rule excludes security-
based swaps from the definition of debt security given the nascent and 
evolving nature of security-based swaps regulation. FINRA intends to 
monitor regulatory developments with respect to security-based swaps 
and may determine to later include such securities in the definition of 
debt security.
    The Regulatory Notice 12-09 proposal defined ``debt research 
report'' as any written (including electronic) communication that 
includes an analysis of debt securities and that provides information 
sufficient upon which to base an investment decision. The term excluded 
the same communications excepted from the definition of ``research 
report'' in NASD Rule 2711. Morgan Stanley and SIFMA suggested that the 
definition should be amended to conform to the definition of ``research 
report'' in Regulation AC, which defines ``research report'' as a 
``written communication . . . that includes an analysis of a security 
or issuer . . . .'' They further suggested that FINRA should include an 
exception from the definition of ``research report'' similar to 
interpretive guidance found in the Commission's adopting release about 
the general characteristics of that term as it is used in Regulation AC 
for ``reports commenting on or analyzing particular types of debt 
securities or characteristics of debt securities'' that do not include 
an analysis of, or recommend or rate individual securities or 
companies. In response to comments to both of the Notice Proposals, 
FINRA agreed that the definition of ``debt research report'' should be 
consistent with the definition in Regulation AC and therefore amended 
the proposal to achieve that regulatory harmony, including the 
exception for reports on classes of debt securities. This amendment is 
reflected in the proposed rule change.
    In response to a suggestion by BDA to the Regulatory Notice 12-09 
Proposal, FINRA included the exceptions to the definition of ``debt 
research report'' in the rule text rather than by reference to the 
exceptions in NASD Rule 2711. BDA, BMO, Morgan Stanley, SIFMA, and 
Wulff, in response to one or both of the Notice Proposals, suggested 
that FINRA should exclude from the definition desk communications, 
including trader commentary, if such communications are sent only to 
institutional investors. Among other arguments, these commenters 
asserted that trader commentary is common in the debt markets, that 
institutions don't rely on it as the sole basis for their investment 
decisions and that inclusion of trader commentary within the definition 
of ``debt research report'' is unduly burdensome and costly and could 
reduce available market information to investors without ``commensurate 
policy returns.'' BDA asserted that the proposal would categorically 
eliminate an entire segment of analysis for retail investors without 
providing evidence that it is a harmful or abusive practice. In 
response to Regulatory Notice 12-42, BDA also stated that the 
definition should exclude offering documents for unregistered 
transactions and securities and any document prepared by or at the 
request of the issuer or obligor of a security.
    FINRA continues to believe it imprudent to create a broad exception 
from the definition of ``debt research report'' based on the author or

[[Page 69923]]

department of origin. As explained in Regulatory Notice 12-09, such an 
approach creates a potential loophole through which biased and non-
transparent research could be disseminated to investors, including 
retail investors. FINRA notes that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act declined to 
adopt such an approach in the equity context. Furthermore, Regulation 
AC has no such exception, so the regulatory consistency that commenters 
seek would be undermined. If, as commenters maintain, trader commentary 
is mostly provided only to institutions, then the institutional 
research exemption could exclude these communications from most of the 
provisions of the rule that otherwise apply to retail debt research for 
institutions that opt in. While FINRA understands that institutions may 
be more attuned to conflicts, FINRA believes it appropriate that even 
institutional debt research should retain certain minimum standards of 
independence and transparency, including restrictions on prepublication 
review by investment banking and the issuer, prohibitions on promises 
of favorable research as an inducement for receipt of business or 
compensation and general disclosure alerting recipients of the lesser 
standards and potential conflicts of interest attendant to the research 
report.
    FINRA declined BDA's suggestion to exclude from the definition of 
``debt research report'' offering documents for unregistered 
transactions or any document prepared by or at the request of the 
issuer or obligor of a security. BDA offered no rationale for the 
exclusions, which would be inconsistent with Regulation AC. Moreover, 
FINRA believes an exception for any document requested by an issuer 
would seriously undermine the regulatory purpose of the proposed rule 
change because it would allow a broker-dealer to distribute to retail 
investors a communication that contains all of the elements of a debt 
research report but none of the protections where the issuer, a 
conflicted party, requested it be created.
Prepublication Review
    The proposed rule change maintains provisions in the Notice 
Proposals that would prohibit prepublication review, clearance or 
approval of debt research reports by investment banking, principal 
trading and sales and trading personnel. In response to the Regulatory 
Notice 12-09 Proposal, SIFMA contended that the rule should permit 
investment banking and sales and trading to review debt research 
reports prior to publication for factual accuracy, subject to 
appropriate supervision. As an example, SIFMA cited research on new 
complex structured products, suggesting analysts need to verify with 
investment banking or sales and trading that the basic facts about the 
products are correct and to corroborate the accuracy of the analyst's 
statements regarding trading activity, prevailing market prices or 
yields. SIFMA also pointed out that current NASD Rule 2711 permits such 
factual review of research reports by investment banking and other non-
research personnel.
    First, FINRA notes that it has proposed to eliminate any 
prepublication review by investment banking or other persons not 
directly responsible for the preparation, content and distribution of 
equity research reports, other than legal and compliance personnel. 
FINRA believes that review of facts in a report by investment banking 
and other non-research personnel is unnecessary in light of the 
numerous other sources available to verify factual information, 
including the subject company. FINRA notes that such review may invite 
pressure on a research analyst that could be difficult to monitor. 
FINRA further notes that such factual review is not permitted under the 
terms of the Global Settlement \124\ and that FINRA staff has seen no 
evidence that the factual accuracy of research produced by Global 
Settlement firms has suffered. Second, with respect to debt research, 
the proposal delineates certain permissible communications between debt 
research analysts and sales and trading and principal trading personnel 
necessary for each to effectively discharge their responsibilities and 
facilitate debt market trading. Among the allowable communications, a 
debt research analyst may seek information from sales and trading and 
principal trading personnel regarding a ``particular bond instrument, 
current prices, spreads, liquidity and similar market information 
relevant to the debt research analyst's valuation of a particular 
security.'' In light of these permissible communications, and the other 
reasons stated above, FINRA sees no compelling reason why a debt 
research analyst needs further factual review from sales and trading or 
principal trading personnel by sharing portions of a draft research 
report. FINRA believes that any incremental improvement in accuracy by 
permitting factual review by investment banking, principal trading or 
sales and trading personnel is outweighed by the increased risk of 
pressure on a research analyst and the prospect that the perceived 
objectivity of the research may be undermined. Therefore, the proposed 
rule change does not incorporate the commenter's suggestion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See Letter from James A. Brigagliano, Assistant Director, 
SEC Division of Trading and Markets, to Dana G. Fleischman, Clearly, 
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, dated Nov. 2, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Research Department Budget
    The Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal limited determination of the 
research department budget to senior management, other than persons 
engaged in investment banking or principal trading activities, and 
without regard to specific revenues or results derived from those 
activities. However, the proposal noted that revenues and results of 
the firm as a whole may be considered in determining the debt research 
department budget and allocation of research department expenses. 
Moreover, the proposal permitted all persons within the firm to provide 
senior management input regarding the demand for and quality of debt 
research, including product trends and customer interests.
    In response to that proposal, SIFMA commented that senior 
management should be permitted to consider principal trading and other 
business revenues in making budget decisions, else senior management 
cannot accurately marry research funding to customer needs. SIFMA 
further contended that the proposal's other provisions adequately 
safeguard against inappropriate pressures by investment banking and 
principal trading with respect to debt research budget determinations. 
The Regulatory Notice 12-42 Proposal maintained these restrictions on 
debt research budget input, and in response, SIFMA again asserted that 
the provision denies research management the ability to assess the 
value of the permissible input by comparing it to the revenues 
generated from principal trading activities, thereby resulting in a 
misallocation of resources. SIFMA contended that the allocation of the 
research department's resources to a particular asset class ``will be 
and should be influenced by the size and profitability of the 
respective market.''
    FINRA appreciates the desire of firms to allocate research costs 
based on the revenues to which the research department contributes, but 
also sees a countervailing investor protection interest in firms 
managing conflicts between their revenue-producing operations and 
research. FINRA believes that the size and allocation of the research 
budget should be insulated from pressure by those business

[[Page 69924]]

segments. In the case of investment banking, FINRA believes the 
conflict is too pronounced to allow any consideration of investment 
banking revenues in determining the research department budget. 
However, given the vast array of debt securities and classes, FINRA 
believes it appropriate to allow some consideration of revenue streams 
in allocating research budget resources. Therefore, the proposed rule 
change would permit consideration of those revenues, provided that: (1) 
Senior management, other than persons engaged in principal trading or 
investment banking activities, makes the final research department 
budget determination; \125\ and (2) the member establishes information 
barriers or other institutional safeguards to ensure that debt research 
analysts are insulated from the review, pressure or oversight by 
persons engaged in principal trading activities, among others.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(E).
    \126\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(H).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Debt Research Analyst Evaluation and Compensation
    With respect to evaluation and compensation of debt research 
analysts, the proposed rule change maintains a provision in the Notice 
Proposals that would allow sales and trading personnel, but not persons 
engaged in principal trading activities, to provide input to research 
management into the evaluation of a debt research analyst, so long as 
research management makes final determinations on compensation, subject 
to review by the compensation committee.
    In response to the Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal, SIFMA argued 
that the proposal was too strict in prohibiting the input of principal 
trading personnel and contributions to principal trading activities in 
determining debt research analyst compensation. SIFMA asserted that as 
long as final compensation decisions rest with research management and 
the compensation committee, FINRA should allow input from principal 
trading personnel because those individuals regularly interface with 
customers and therefore are a necessary resource for customer feedback 
on the quality and productivity of debt research analysts. SIFMA also 
noted that the provision would preclude input from persons who wear 
multiple hats and engage in both sales and principal trading 
activities. Finally, SIFMA contended that compensation prohibitions 
fail to acknowledge the important role that debt research analysts play 
in assisting market making and customer facilitation desks.
    In response to Regulatory Notice 12-42, SIFMA reiterated that the 
provision will deprive research management of important client feedback 
to evaluate debt research analysts' performance because principal 
traders are the primary conduit for such information. According to 
SIFMA, there are limited means to obtain direct customer feedback on 
the quality of research, and reliance on the sales force to provide 
customer feedback is inadequate because debt traders can have as much 
or more interaction with clients. In addition, SIFMA noted that the 
CFTC business conduct rules permit employees of the business trading 
unit or clearing unit of a swap dealer or major swap participant to 
communicate customer feedback, ratings and other indicators of research 
analyst performance to research department management.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ The CFTC rules apply to research on derivatives, which is 
predominantly an institutional business. As noted below, the 
proposed rule change exempts from the compensation prohibitions 
institutional debt research. By comparison, SIFMA asked to allow 
principal traders to relay customer feedback in connection with 
retail debt research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While FINRA recognizes that there is some value in input from those 
engaged in principal trading activities, FINRA believes such input is 
outweighed by conflicts that could provide incentive for principal 
trading personnel to reward or punish a debt research analyst with 
selected feedback based on whether his or her research or trading ideas 
benefitted the firm's trading activities. Conversely, debt research 
analysts may feel compelled to produce research and trade ideas to 
benefit firm or particular customer positions if their compensation is 
tied to contributions to principal trading activities. Moreover, FINRA 
believes, in part based on discussions with research management 
personnel, that input from sales and trading personnel provides an 
effective proxy for customer feedback, to the extent such feedback 
cannot be obtained directly from customers. Furthermore, FINRA believes 
that research management should be in a position to assess the quality 
of the research it oversees. Finally, to the extent firms qualify for 
the limited principal trading exemption in the proposed rule change, 
dual-hatted persons engaged in both research and principal trading 
activities would be able to provide feedback to research department 
management.
    Given the importance of principal trading operations to the 
revenues of many firms, FINRA believes there is increased risk that 
principal traders could improperly pressure or influence debt research 
if they have input into analyst compensation or can solicit, relay or 
characterize customer feedback on retail debt research. FINRA believes 
this risk, which if manifested could directly impact retail investors, 
outweighs the benefit of an additional data point for research 
management to evaluate the quality of research produced by analysts 
they oversee.
    BDA stated that FINRA should amend the proposal to clarify that 
debt research analyst compensation may be based on the revenues and 
results of the firm as a whole. FINRA agrees that a member may consider 
the overall success of the firm when determining a debt analyst's 
compensation, provided the member complies with the compensation review 
and approval requirements. FINRA notes that the proposed rule change 
specifies that the revenues and results of the firm as a whole may be 
considered in determining the research department budget, including 
expenses. Since debt analyst compensation is a research department 
expense, FINRA does not believe it necessary to further amend the 
compensation provisions.
Prohibitions on Interactions With Investment Banking Personnel
    The proposed rule change would require members to have written 
policies and procedures to prohibit participation in pitches and other 
solicitations of investment banking services transactions and 
participation in road shows and other marketing on behalf of an issuer 
related to investment banking services transactions.
    The Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal had a similar provision, but 
did not limit the marketing prohibition to investment banking services 
transactions. SIFMA asked whether the proposed requirement with respect 
to road shows was intended to operate identically with NASD Rule 2711. 
SIFMA also asked FINRA to clarify that, consistent with NASD Rule 2711, 
the prohibition on road shows is only intended to cover road shows and 
other marketing related to an investment banking transaction and not 
non-deal road shows. FINRA is primarily concerned with marketing by 
research analysts in connection with an investment banking services 
transaction, and therefore FINRA has added that limitation to the 
provision in proposed rule change. FINRA notes, however, that the 
overarching requirement to have written policies and procedures to 
manage conflicts related to the interaction between debt research 
analysts and, among others, subject companies would apply to other

[[Page 69925]]

marketing activity on behalf of an issuer. FINRA does not believe that 
merely facilitating a meeting between issuer management and investors, 
absent other facts, would constitute marketing on behalf of the issuer.
    In response to the Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal, SIFMA 
contended that the prohibition on joint due diligence conducted with 
the subject company in the presence of investment banking personnel was 
overly restrictive. FINRA has clarified in the proposed rule change 
that the prohibition on joint due diligence applies only during the 
period prior to the selection by the issuer of the underwriters for the 
investment banking services transaction.\128\ In response to the 
Regulatory Notice 12-42 Proposal, SIFMA commented that debt research 
analysts should be able to passively attend road show presentations 
because, unlike equity analysts that frequently have access to issuer 
management, the road show is often the only opportunity for a debt 
research analyst to view an issuer's management presentation and 
evaluate the credibility of management's business plan and outlook. 
SIFMA contended that it is impractical for issuers to meet separately 
with debt research analysts and challenging for analysts to call in and 
listen to an issuer presentation. SIFMA also noted that the concern is 
more pronounced in certain sectors of the debt markets, such as high-
yield and emerging markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.09 (Joint Due Diligence).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA does not believe that the prohibition with respect to road 
show participation should differ between the debt and equity research 
rules, since the conflicts are the same. FINRA believes the ability to 
listen remotely to a road show presentation provides debt research 
analysts a reasonable means to hear the issuer management's story, 
while not appearing to be part of the deal team to prospective 
customers attending the presentation in person. Therefore, FINRA did 
not amend this provision of the proposal.
Prohibitions on Interactions with Sales and Trading
    The proposed rule change maintains a provision in the Notice 
Proposals that would require members to have written policies and 
procedures to prohibit certain interactions between debt research and 
sales and trading and principal trading personnel. The proposed rule 
change also delineates prohibited and permissible communications 
between those persons. In response to the Regulatory Notice 12-09 
Proposal, SIFMA asked FINRA to clarify that the prohibition on 
attempting to influence analysts for the purpose of benefiting the 
firm, a customer or class of customers would not capture ordinary-
course communications and is meant to prohibit non-research direction 
over the decision to publish a report and non-research direction over 
the views and opinions expressed in debt reports. The proposed rule 
provides that communications between debt research analysts and trading 
desk personnel that are not related to sales and trading, principal 
trading or debt research activities may take place without restriction, 
unless otherwise prohibited.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SIFMA also recommended that FINRA include in the proposed rule text 
the language provided in Regulatory Notice 12-09 that, in assessing 
whether a debt research analyst's permissible communications are 
``inconsistent'' with the analyst's published research, firms may 
consider the context, including that the investment objectives or time 
horizons being discussed differ from those underlying the analyst's 
published views. FINRA incorporated the suggested language into 
proposed FINRA Rule 2242.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See proposed FINRA Rule 2242.03(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ASIR noted that the Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal goes beyond 
NASD Rule 2711 by restricting not only communications between analysts 
and investment banking, but also between debt research analysts and 
sales and trading personnel. ASIR asserted that the debt research 
proposal should only restrict communications between research and 
investment banking personnel, so as to harmonize with the equity rules.
    The proposed rule change specifically addresses communications 
between debt research and sales and trading and principal trading 
personnel because the interests of the trading department create a 
particularly pronounced conflict with respect to debt research. This is 
because, under current market conditions, principal trading is far more 
prevalent in the debt markets than in the equity markets. However, 
FINRA continues to monitor the relationship between equity research and 
sales and trading and principal trading personnel to assess whether 
similar specific restrictions should be applied in the equity research 
context. FINRA notes that the current and proposed equity research 
rules do require firms to manage conflicts between equity research and 
other non-research personnel, including those engaged in sales and 
trading and principal trading activities.
Conflicts Disclosure
    With respect to the Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal, SIFMA and BDA 
found overly broad the provision that requires disclosure of ``all 
conflicts that reasonably could be expected to influence the 
objectivity of the research report and that are known or should have 
been known by the member or debt research analyst on the date of 
publication or distribution of the report.'' SIFMA contended that the 
language would require firms to identify ``all possible conflicts 
(material or immaterial)'' and encouraged FINRA to either specify the 
conflicts it intends to capture or rely on the standard in NASD Rule 
2711 requiring disclosure of ``actual, material'' conflicts. SIMFA 
further questioned whether conflicts could ever be expected to 
influence the objectivity of research reports and suggested that 
existing FINRA research rules and Regulation AC assume the contrary.
    In response to SIFMA's doubt that conflicts could ever be expected 
to influence the objectivity of research reports, FINRA notes that its 
research rules are premised on the belief that conflicts can be 
disinfected--and possibly discouraged--by disclosure and will give 
investors the material information needed to assess the objectivity of 
a research report. In addition, the rules prohibit certain conduct 
where the conflicts are too pronounced to be cured by disclosure. Yet 
the rules do not--and cannot--identify every such conflict. Thus, at a 
minimum, FINRA's proposal would require firms to identify and disclose 
them.
    In general, FINRA believes that an immaterial conflict could not 
reasonably be expected to influence the objectivity of a research 
report, and therefore a materiality standard is essentially congruent 
with the proposed standard. FINRA agrees that the ``catch-all'' 
disclosure provision captures such material conflicts that the research 
analyst and persons with the ability to influence the content of a 
research report know or have reason to know. Therefore, FINRA has 
amended the proposal to delete as superfluous the overarching 
obligation to disclose ``all conflicts that reasonably could be 
expected to influence the objectivity of the research report and that 
are known or should have been known by the member or research analyst 
on the date of publication or distribution of the report.''

[[Page 69926]]

    SIFMA also contended that the requirement in proposed FINRA Rule 
2242(c)(5) to disclose information on the date of publication or 
distribution is broader than current NASD Rule 2711, which only applies 
at the time of publication, and problematic logistically because the 
broader standard is not reflective of the conflicts that apply at the 
time the debt research analyst writes the research report. In addition, 
SIFMA argues that it is unclear how members could control and prevent 
the distribution of reports that have already been published in order 
to determine if additional disclosures are required. FINRA notes that 
the term ``distribution'' is drawn from the provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Law that apply to equity research reports and is intended to 
capture research that may only be distributed electronically as opposed 
to published in hard copy. FINRA has included the same ``publication or 
distribution'' language in the proposed changes to the equity research 
rules. However, FINRA interprets this language to require the 
disclosures to be current only as of the date of first publication or 
distribution, provided that the research report is prominently dated, 
and the disclosures are not known to be misleading.
    The proposed rule text in the Regulatory Notice 12-09 Proposal 
required firms to ensure any recommendation or rating has a reasonable 
basis in fact and is accompanied by a clear explanation of the 
valuation method utilized and a fair presentation of the risks that may 
impede achievement of the recommendation or rating. SIFMA requested 
clarification that the requirement with respect to valuation method 
should apply only if the analyst used a ``formal'' valuation method. 
FINRA is not clear what constitutes a ``formal'' valuation method, but 
made a clarification in the proposed rule change to provide that any 
recommendation or rating must be accompanied by a clear explanation of 
``any'' (as opposed to ``the'') valuation method used.
    SIFMA also sought several other clarifications on the proposal. 
First, it asked FINRA to clarify that the requirement to include in 
research reports that contain a rating a distribution of ``all 
securities rated by the member to which the member would assign a 
`buy,' `hold,' or `sell' rating'' is limited to debt securities. FINRA 
agrees that the proposed provision is limited to debt securities and 
has changed the text accordingly. Second, SIFMA sought flexibility to 
make a good faith determination as to which securities constitute a 
debt security that must be accompanied by a ``ratings table,'' given 
that bonds of the same issuer may have different ratings. FINRA agrees 
that any ratings table should reflect ratings of distinct securities 
rather than issuers. Finally, SIFMA requested guidance to distinguish 
between a ``recommendation'' and a ``rating'' for the purposes of 
disclosure under the revised proposal. In particular, SIFMA suggested 
that a recommendation of a relative value or paired trade idea should 
constitute a recommendation but not a rating. While any determination 
will be fact specific, FINRA believes in general that a recommendation 
is a suggestion to make a particular investment while a rating is a 
label or conclusion attached to a research report.
    SIFMA asked that FINRA allow firms to modify the required ``health 
warning'' disclosure for institutional debt research to refer to ``this 
document'' rather than ``this research report'' when the material is 
not prepared by research department personnel. While FINRA would permit 
firms to use the word ``document'' rather than ``research report,'' 
such labeling must be used consistently and would have no bearing on 
whether the communication constitutes a ``research report'' for 
purposes of the proposed rule.
Third-Party Research Reports
    With respect to distribution of third-party debt research reports, 
SIMFA objected to requirements in the Notice Proposals that do not 
currently apply to equity research under NASD Rule 2711. In particular, 
SIFMA cited the requirement to establish, maintain and enforce written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that any third-
party debt research report it distributes is ``reliable and 
objective.'' SIFMA stated that it is unclear what FINRA means by 
``objective.'' With respect to the requirement to disclose ``any 
material conflict of interest that can reasonably expected to have 
influenced the choice of a third-party debt research provider or the 
subject company of a third-party debt research report,'' SIFMA stated 
that it is ``not clear what types of conflicts this provision is 
intended to capture.''
    FINRA notes that its equity research proposal contains identical 
requirements with respect to the selection and distribution of third-
party research. FINRA believes it reasonable to require firms to 
conduct upfront due diligence on the quality of its third-party 
research providers, particularly given the lesser review obligations 
imposed prior to distribution. FINRA notes that Global Settlement firms 
had to have such procedures to select their independent research 
providers,\131\ and FINRA does not believe it unreasonable to have some 
type of screening procedures to ensure, for example that the third-
party provider is not being paid by the issuer or that the research has 
some kind of track record or good reputation. In fact, in a 2006 
comment letter, SIFMA stated that firms should ``demand high 
standards'' from providers of third-party research.\132\ FINRA further 
believes it appropriate for firms to disclose to investors any 
relationship, e.g., an affiliate relationship, or other circumstances 
that rise to a material conflict of interest that could reasonably be 
seen as having influenced the choice of third-party research provider. 
FINRA believes this disclosure is consistent with the requirement to 
disclosure material conflicts of interest with respect to a firm's own 
research, and therefore will similarly promote objectivity and 
transparency of information provided to investors that may influence 
their investment decisions. FINRA notes that a firm may avoid the 
requirement to review third-party research for false or misleading 
statements if it chooses to distribute only independent third-party 
research.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ See Letter from James A. Brigagliano, Assistant Director, 
SEC Division of Trading and Markets, to Dana G. Fleischman, Clearly, 
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, dated Nov. 2, 2004.
    \132\ See Letter from Michael D. Udoff, SIFMA, to Nancy M. 
Morris, Secretary, SEC, dated Nov. 14, 2006.
    \133\ See proposed FINRA Rules 2242(g)(2) and (g)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the Notice Proposals, ASIR commented that the 
proposal could be read to impose obligations on members who make 
available third-party research pursuant to Section 28(e) of the 
Exchange Act to have procedures to ensure that such research is 
reliable and objective and labeled in a certain manner. FINRA is not 
proposing to make any changes based on this comment. However, research 
made available pursuant to Section 28(e) is not ``distributed'' and 
therefore the proposed requirements would not apply.
Institutional Investor Definition
    The Regulatory Notice 12-09 proposal would have exempted from many 
of the rule's provisions debt research reports disseminated only to 
``institutional investors,'' provided that those institutional 
investors had, prior to receipt of a debt research report, 
affirmatively notified the member in writing that they wished to forego 
treatment as a retail investor for the

[[Page 69927]]

purposes of the rule. ASIR, BDA and SIFMA found this provision 
unnecessarily burdensome and difficult to implement and track. The 
commenters noted that they already expend resources to document similar 
consents under FINRA's suitability rule and that the nature of research 
distribution makes it more challenging than the suitability rule to 
track and process all eligible institutional investors that have 
consented to receive institutional debt research. Commenters instead 
advocated an approach whereby persons or entities that otherwise meet 
the definition of ``institutional investor''--as defined in FINRA Rule 
4512(c)--are presumed to have consented to the institutional debt 
research regime unless they affirmatively choose to receive the 
protections afforded recipients of retail debt research. Among other 
things, these commenters asserted that this alternative approach would 
be less costly and burdensome to administer and that the remaining 
protections afforded institutional debt research under the proposal, 
together with the content standards applicable to institutional 
communications pursuant to FINRA's Communications with the Public 
rules,\134\ provide less sophisticated institutional investors adequate 
protections should they not to choose be treated as retail investors 
for the purposes of debt research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ At the time of the comment letters, those content 
standards were found in NASD IM-2110-1. Since that time, the 
Commission has approved a consolidated FINRA communications with the 
public rule, and those standards are now found in FINRA Rule 
2210(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering these comments and discussing the issue further 
with industry members, FINRA proposed a revised institutional investor 
exemption in the Regulatory Notice 12-42 Proposal. Under the revised 
proposal, institutional investors that meet the definition of QIB and 
satisfy the FINRA Rule 2111 institutional suitability standards with 
respect to debt trading and strategies would be eligible to receive 
institutional debt research by way of negative consent. Other 
institutional investors that meet the definition in FINRA Rule 4512(c) 
but do not satisfy the higher tier requirements could still 
affirmatively elect in writing to receive institutional debt research. 
The revised proposal asked whether alternative standards for the higher 
tier would be more appropriate, including one that combines the FINRA 
Rule 4512(c) definition and the institutional suitability requirements.
    CFA Institute supported the revised higher tier of QIB plus 
suitability standard in Regulatory Notice 12-42. SIFMA, BDA and BMO 
opposed it. BDA asserted that all QIBs should be able to receive 
research on debt securities without consent since they are in the 
business of investing and that an institutional suitability standard 
should be imposed to determine whether other institutional accounts may 
receive institutional debt research. BMO expressed concern that the 
proposal to require affirmative consent is cumbersome and burdensome 
and would deprive some smaller and mid-size institutional investors of 
research they receive today, in part because experience has shown that 
some institutional clients cannot or will not provide the affirmation 
required in FINRA Rule 2111.
    SIFMA contended that the proposal had both practical and logical 
flaws. SIFMA maintained that the QIB component would introduce a 
problematic new standard that would require complex and costly systems 
to track QIB certifications and link them to FINRA Rule 2111 
certifications and research distribution lists. SIFMA stated that one 
firm estimated a cost of $5 million to develop such a system. SIFMA 
further noted that suitability certifications are tracked at the order 
placer level, whereas QIBs are tracked for particular transactions. 
SIFMA also asserted that the proposal would lead to anomalous results, 
such as the circumstance where a dual registered investment adviser has 
multiple institutional accounts, only some of which have QIB 
certificates. SIFMA asked how the registered investment adviser could 
meet its duty to all of its clients but only utilize the institutional 
debt research for the QIBs. SIFMA further questioned the logic of a 
proposal that would allow institutional investors to transact in 
restricted securities but not receive research on those securities 
without taking additional steps.
    SIFMA offered two alternatives for the higher tier: (1) Non-natural 
persons that satisfy institutional suitability requirements with 
respect to debt trading and strategies; or (2) certain order placing 
institutions: QIBs; registered broker-dealers, banks, savings and 
loans, insurance companies, registered investment companies; registered 
investment advisers; institutions with $50-$100 million in assets and 
represented by an independent investment adviser; and universities, 
regulatory and government entities that use research for academic 
purposes.
    FINRA does not believe that retail investors or less sophisticated 
institutional investors should be required to take any additional steps 
to receive the full protections of the proposed rule. FINRA believes 
that some QIBs may lack expertise and experience in debt market 
analysis and trading, including some employee benefit plans, trust 
funds with participants of employee benefit plans and charitable 
organizations. For the same reasons, FINRA believes SIFMA's first 
alternative is too broad in that it would require less sophisticated 
institutional customers to affirmatively opt-in to the full protections 
of the rule. Therefore, the proposed rule change would adopt a standard 
under which firms may use negative consent only for the higher standard 
QIBs that also satisfy the institutional suitability requirements under 
FINRA Rule 2111 with respect to debt transactions, and affirmative 
consent from any institutional account as defined in FINRA Rule 
4512(c). To avoid a disruption in the receipt of institutional debt 
research, the proposed rule change would allow firms to send 
institutional debt research to any FINRA Rule 4512(c) account, except a 
natural person, without affirmative or negative consent for a period of 
up to one year after SEC approval while they obtain the necessary 
consents. Natural persons that qualify as an institutional account 
under Rule 4512(c) must provide affirmative consent to receive 
institutional debt research during this transition period and 
thereafter.
    FINRA believes that the proposed institutional investor definition 
strikes an appropriate balance between protecting less sophisticated 
institutional investors and maintaining the flow of research--and 
minimizing the burdens and costs of distributing debt research--to 
knowledgeable institutional investors. The exemption provides 
additional protections beyond the FINRA Rule 4512(c) standard for firms 
to receive institutional debt research by negative consent by ensuring 
that those institutions satisfy the higher QIB standard and are both 
capable of evaluating investment risks with respect to debt trading and 
strategies and have affirmatively indicated that they are exercising 
independent judgment in evaluating recommendations for such 
transactions. FINRA believes an affirmative consent requirement is 
appropriate for FINRA Rule 4512(c) accounts, which are more likely to 
include investors lacking experience in debt market analysis and 
trading. To the extent a FINRA Rule 4512(c) institutional investor 
values institutional debt research, FINRA

[[Page 69928]]

believes the proposed rule change imposes a one-time small burden on 
such investors to provide written consent. Some firms indicated to 
FINRA that the consent could be obtained at the time of other required 
written authorizations. FINRA believes the one-year grace period will 
ease the transition to the new rules without disrupting the current 
flow of debt research to institutional clients.
    As to SIFMA's second alternative above, FINRA believes it would 
only exacerbate SIFMA's stated concerns about introducing a new 
standard, as the suggested standard has no precedent and is even more 
complex and presumably difficult to track than the QIB plus suitability 
standard FINRA proposes to adopt to receive institutional debt research 
by negative consent.
    SIFMA also commented that even if FINRA adopted its preferred 
institutional suitability standard for the higher tier, many firms may 
not avail themselves of the exemption because of cost, logistics and 
obligations to provide their research to retail customers. Thus, SIFMA 
asked to narrow the scope of restricted persons by adopting the 
following definition of ``principal trading'' to mean:

    Engaging in proprietary trading activities for the trading book 
of a member but does not include transactions undertaken as part of 
underwriting related, market making related, or hedging activities, 
or otherwise on behalf of clients.

    FINRA declined to adopt the suggested definition. FINRA believes 
the definition is overly broad and ambiguous and could encourage 
traders to pressure debt research analysts to support firm inventory 
positions. For example, the proposed definition would seem to permit 
traders of auction rate securities to participate in the determination 
of compensation for debt research analysts, thereby sanctioning the 
type of concerning conduct that served as a catalyst for rulemaking in 
this area. For the same reason, FINRA declines a request by BMO for 
FINRA to clarify that persons who position debt inventory to sell on a 
principal basis to customers but not for a firm's proprietary trading 
account would not be deemed to be engaged in principal trading 
activities.
    SIFMA indicated to FINRA in discussions subsequent to their comment 
letter that firms with large institutional client bases were divided on 
whether the QIB-based negative consent standard or the FINRA Rule 
4512(c) affirmative consent standard would be preferable from a cost 
efficiency perspective. The proposed rule change provides both options, 
which FINRA believes will help reduce the costs to satisfy the 
exemption requirements. The proposed rule change further reduces the 
costs of compliance by interpreting the QIB-based alternative to 
capture both QIBs and any order placer (e.g. registered investment 
adviser) that has at least one QIB sub-account. FINRA believes this 
interpretation addresses SIFMA's concern that suitability 
certifications are tracked at the order placer level, while QIBs are 
tracked for particular transactions, as well as concerns as to how the 
requirement would apply to a registered investment adviser with both 
QIB and non-QIB accounts. FINRA understands that the single $5 million 
estimate referenced by SIFMA in its letter was based in large part on 
the cost of developing a system that could directly link institutional 
suitability certifications to QIB sub-accounts and that the 
interpretation would appreciably reduce the burden.
Limited Investment Banking or Principal Trading Activities Exemptions
    The proposed rule change includes an exemption for firms with 
limited investment banking activity, which is defined as managing or 
co-managing 10 or fewer investment banking services transactions on 
average per year over the previous three years and generating $5 
million or less in gross investment banking revenues from those 
transactions. The proposed rule change also includes an exemption for 
firms that engage in limited principal trading activity where, in 
absolute value on an annual basis, the member's trading gains or losses 
on principal trades in debt securities are $15 million or less over the 
previous three years, on average per year, and the member employs fewer 
than 10 debt traders.
    In response to Regulatory Notice 12-42, CFA opposed both the 
proposed exemption for firms with limited investment banking and the 
proposed exemption for firms with limited principal debt trading 
activities because they would allow influences that could compromise 
the independence and accuracy of debt research distributed to retail 
investors. FINRA did not propose any changes based on CFA's comments. 
With respect to the limited investment banking exemption, FINRA notes 
that this provision parallels an exemption in the equity research rules 
and FINRA has not found any evidence of abuse by firms subject to the 
exemption. With respect to the exemption for limited principal trading 
activity, FINRA notes that it would be limited to those firms whose 
limited trading activity makes the conflicts less pronounced and where 
it would be a significant marginal cost to add a trader dedicated to 
producing research.
    In response to Regulatory Notice 12-09, Wulff and Romano expressed 
concerns regarding the exemption for firms that engage in limited 
investment banking activity, arguing that it did not go far enough to 
curtail the burden of the proposed rule on small firms, many of which 
have associated persons that engage in both producing debt research and 
principal trading activities, and that the thresholds were not 
appropriate for a proposal regarding debt research conflicts of 
interest. FINRA subsequently amended the proposal to add a more 
targeted exemption for firms with limited principal trading activity. 
The exemption, discussed in detail in Item II.A.1., addresses the 
concerns of small firms with dual-hatted persons by exempting those 
firms that engage in modest principal trading activity from the 
restrictions on supervision and compensation determination of debt 
research analysts by those engaged in sales and trading and principal 
trading activities. As noted above, FINRA determined the thresholds for 
the exemption based on data analysis and a survey of firms that engage 
in principal trading activity.
    In addition, FINRA maintained the exemption for firms with limited 
investment banking activity, exempting eligible firms from similar 
supervision and compensation determination restrictions with respect to 
investment banking personnel. FINRA also engaged in data analysis, 
discussed in Item II.A.1., to confirm the appropriateness of the 
proposed thresholds for that exemption.
Effective Date
    In response to both Regulatory Notices, SIFMA requested that FINRA 
establish an effective date that will provide adequate time for 
implementation of the proposed rule change, e.g., 12 to 18 months after 
SEC approval. FINRA notes that it will provide sufficient time for 
implementation taking into account any required systems changes.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period (i) as the Commission may 
designate up to 90 days of such date if it finds such longer period to 
be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or

[[Page 69929]]

(ii) as to which the self-regulatory organization consents, the 
Commission will:
    (A) By order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-FINRA-2014-048 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Brent J Fields, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-FINRA-2014-048. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 
a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for 
inspection and copying at the principal office of FINRA. All comments 
received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit 
personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit 
only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-FINRA-2014-048 and should be 
submitted on or before December 15, 2014.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\135\
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    \135\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-27701 Filed 11-21-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P